UNPACKING THE CONCEPT OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY: DO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ELDERS, HEADMEN, CHIEFS AND KINGS MATTER IN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT?

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Introduction

Over the past three-quarters of a century, the field of political anthropology has evolved a more or less commonly agreed-upon typology of leadership and authority, which differentiates between various styles of leadership and relates these to four basic types of social and economic formations and to different magnitudes of social groupings within societies. The typology also distinguishes between what are generally understood to be significantly different types of authority. In this article I refer to this as the "consensus typology" of political authority, a summary of which is presented below.

This essay seeks to bring this typology together with the vision of the TAARN project – which I take to be the refutation of the conventional wisdom that traditional forms of leadership and authority are inimical to the social development of traditional societies – and the documentation and theorization of the contrary proposition, namely that traditional authorities can be efficient and effective mechanisms to foster social and economic development, if the nature of their roles is clearly understood and their authority is effectively matched to the task of development.

Specifically, this inquiry asks whether *all* traditional authorities, irrespective of differences in style of leadership or the nature of their authority, are equally likely to be effective in fostering humane and sustainable development, or whether certain types of tradi-

tional authorities, by the very nature of the type of authority on which their leadership is based, are predisposed to be conducive to social development, while others are not. In this, I should be clear: it is not the idiosyncratic leadership styles and attitudes of particular *individuals* that I am concerned with. My concern is rather with the manner in which traditional leaders are articulated to various types of traditional publics, and with the nature of the authority that flows from this nexus.

The anthropological typology of traditional authority: Preliminary remarks

In order to be able to discuss a broad range of types of traditional authority I make use of a typology that is widely, though by no means universally, established in the field of political anthropology. I refer to this as the "consensus typology." I do not use this typology because I believe it is a definitive classification of traditional authority; I use it simply because it has the virtue of being widely known and agreed upon, and it does a tolerably good, though by no means perfect, job of covering the field. My concern in this paper is not typology, but rather the relationship between variant forms of authority to social change, and it is convenient to refer to an existing typology to make my points. One of the unheralded functions of introductory anthropology textbooks is that they help us understand and gauge the consensus views of a discipline that is extremely broad in its scope and whose central tenets and methods remain in dispute. Comparing a half dozen or so of these textbooks, one can begin to gain a sense of what the commonly shared knowledge and emphases of the field are, simply by noting what things are found in a majority of or all textbooks. For example, few textbooks do not mention, at least in passing, the Kula Ring of the Massim peoples and the potlatch of the Northwest Coast Indi-

ans, the so-called leopard skin chief of the Nuer, the age-grading system of the Maasai, the song-duels of the Inuit, or the dreamtime concepts of the Australian Aborigines.

In the treatment of polities, political anthropology has devoted considerable attention to the study of stateless societies, incipient states, and traditional states, and the authors of most introductory textbooks appear to feel that a grasp of the principal differences in political organization remains essential knowledge for beginning students. The model most commonly used is based on the works of Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service and classifies the polities themselves (bands, tribes, chiefdoms, incipient states, and states), the system of authority and the nature of leadership as being embedded in the nature of the polity itself. The classification emerged out of the authors' work on the evolution of social forms, and orders the various polities both in terms of the sequence in which they appeared in human history (both in general and in the case of particular historical provinces), and in terms of increasing scale (although in introductory textbooks it tends more often to be used as a taxonomic device for classifying polities, with its specifically evolutionary implications played down). The typology also bears the perceptible imprint of the work of Max Weber, particularly in the way in which the development and specialization of an administrative staff is a key factor in distinguishing between certain types of polities.

An attractive aspect of the typology from a pedagogical point of view is that the classification of political types meshes with a parallel typology of economies, likewise derived from the work of Sahlins and Service, which has usually been covered earlier in the course. The political classification thus harks back to, and expands upon, the economic

typology, thus allowing the reader to build his or her conceptions of political order around what he or she has already learned.

The typology

The following table represents my synthesis (informed by Lewellyn 1992) of the common elements of the consensus typology, as it appears, with minor variants, in three recent editions of prominent and standard introductory textbooks to anthropology (Ember and Ember 1993; Kottak 1994; and Peoples and Bailey 1994). The typology is intended to cover most political formations in human history up to the rise of the nation state, and thus covers a vast range of scale, from minuscule band societies, in which even the largest autonomous political units are smaller than a few dozen souls, through tribal societies and chiefdoms to the states and empires of antiquity, with populations that had to be counted in the millions.

TYPOLOGY OF TRADITIONAL POLITICAL AUTHORITY		
Society	**Leadership**	**Political Roles**
1. Band polities consist of a number of families living together and cooperating in economic activities throughout the year. Associated with foraging or hunting societies with low population densities, high seasonal mobility, and no means of storing surplus resources. *Subtypes:* simple and composite bands, the latter being named aggregations of bands.	Decisions are reached through consensus. Leadership is informal, with older male members of the family serving as leaders. In composite bands, there may be "big men," who exercise influence over elders in a number of bands. Political relations between bands mainly a matter of alliances based on intermarriage, as simple bands tend to be exogamous.	Elders, headmen, and influential individuals who speak on behalf of bands; leaders who emerge situationally in the context of various activities to coordinate those activities.
2. **Tribes** possess formally organized kinship groupings (lineages, clans) and/or non-kinship institutions (age sets, voluntary societies) that unite the scattered residential communities into larger structures, and are, in comparison to band societies, considerably more cohesive and able to deal with external threats in a more organized fashion. Associated with horticultural and some agricultural economies and pastoral economies with relatively little economic differentiation in production. *Sub-types:* segmentary lineage organizations, age-set organizations, associational tribes.	Descent groups and/or non-kin groupings may have leaders who coordinate group activities to some extent or who represent the group externally, sometimes on governing bodies such as councils, but with limited coercive powers. Leadership positions may be more or less hereditary.	Headmen of named social units, elders organized either loosely or in councils; in some cases, "big men" wielding regional personal influence.
3. Chiefdoms are autonomous multicommunity political units that have a centralized political systems focused on the office of a chief, whose persona may be more or less sacralized. The only administrative staff under the direct control of the chief are close relatives. Associated with agrarian societies in which there is at least some degree of differentiation in productive specialization between communities. All chiefdoms presuppose some degree of status differentiation of members, typically of the sort known as "ranking." *Subtypes:* Chiefdoms may be either simple or complex (i.e., in which a paramount chief conquers and administers a number of formerly autonomous chiefdoms, which are administered more or less indirectly through their indigenous leaders).	Chiefs redistribute surplus resources – they collect these resources in the form of tribute and redirect them to various eusocial ends, for example, coming to the aid of units that have suffered unexpected reverses, or organizing feasts and activities that promote identity-building, solidarity, and images of success and power.	Chiefs and their close relatives. Subject units may be administered by headmen drawn from the membership of the unit.
4. States are autonomous multicommunity polities, centralized under the rule of a sovereign, and distinguished from chiefdoms by both size and scale (they are larger and more complex) and by the presence of a permanent bureaucracy, consisting of professional officers not related by kinship to the ruler, and who administer various branches of government (revenue, army, diplomatic functions, etc.). States are always predicated upon, and in turn foster, social class differences among the citizenry. State societies are associated with more or less intensive agriculture, although there may also be sectors of pastoral, horticultural, or even hunting production as well.	Fully developed states show a marked division between ruled and the ruled. There are nesting spheres of legitimate authority, ranging from the absolute authority of the sovereign down though layers of delegated authority within an administrative hierarchy.	Sovereigns (kings, potentates, emperors), plus their appointees within the bureaucracy. Headmen, chiefs, or elders of regional units may have their authority validated by the ruler.

Like any typology, this one marks out a series of ideal types, or points on a continuum, with the understanding that particular real-world cases may fall in between the designated types (Vincent 1990, 325-29). For example, there are numerous ethnographic and historical instances of societies that are intermediate between "tribal" and "chiefly" organization as well as cases intermediate between "tribal" and "state" organization.

Not only is it possible for real-world cases to fall in between the categories, but they may also be situated in more than one category. A common instance of this would be the phenomenon of political encapsulation, in which, for example, a tribal polity is conquered by an expansive state. In return for an annual presentation of tribute to the conquering ruler, its populace continues to be governed by its traditional leaders and thus is insulated by its leaders from direct experience of the encapsulating state. This is an instance of what, in colonial contexts, is called indirect rule, in which traditional authorities function somewhat like interpreters between the structures and idiom of the colonial system and those of the traditional polity.

The opposite ends of the scale

Taking this typology as a fair representation of the range of traditional authority, let us now begin the task of unpacking traditional authority. It is best to begin at the extremes and ask the question: is there enough in common between the authority of a band headman among the !Kung San and the Mugabe of Banyankole (for example) to make it worthwhile bracketing them together under a single term? There is no doubt they both exemplify something we could call leadership, and they both incarnate something we

could call authority, but it appears on first glance that the nature of the leadership and authority in question are very different.

Of the !Kung band headman, Lorna Marshall (1955, 267-68) says, "!Kung society accords to the headman the authority to coordinate the movements of his own people in relation to their consumption of resources, and his chief duty is to plan when and where the band will move. […] It is not a headman's duty, as headman, to instigate or organize hunting parties, trading trips, the making of artifacts, or gift giving, nor does he make marriage arrangements. Individuals instigate their own activities. A headman is not in any formalized way a judge of his people, nor must he punish a wrongdoer. He may have great influence, if he is an effective leader, but wrongdoing is judged and controlled by public opinion, usually expressed in talk."

Even this account may make the headman's authority seem more formal than it is. In another work Marshall (1976) stresses the manner in which decisions about band movements are the subject of lengthy campfire discussions in the evenings. Men of hunting age pool all the bits of information they possess and rehearse the consequences of heading out in this direction or that. The band headman does not so much determine the direction and timing of movement as he articulates the consensus that emerges out of days of discussion. The consensus is merely a consensus until he pronounces it verbally at the end of a discussion, at which point it becomes policy.

And so it is in most band societies, with the exception of those, such as the Northwest Coast societies of British Columbia and Alaska and perhaps various Australian Aboriginal societies, in which ecological conditions allowed the development of semi-sedentism for much of the year, and in which the accumulation of stored forms of wealth were pos-

sible. The authority of leaders in band societies is, generally speaking, an expression of the popular will – the very consensus of the group made tangible. Part of the reason for this is the factor of scale: only in the context of face-to-face relations among persons who have interacted together for years can there be the sort of trust that band headmanship is predicated upon. As well, particularly effective checks exist on the possible abuse of authority in mobile band societies: in such economies human labour power is the most valuable asset, and headmen who abuse their authority risk the defection of band members who can take their hunting skills and negotiate membership in other bands if they are dissatisfied with their headman's leadership. It is almost certainly the case that the headmen of mobile hunting bands can claim to be more closely in tune with the sentiments and thoughts of their publics than any other sort of political leader in human history. But this very high degree of trust comes at the cost of their ability to control or coerce their people in any but the most fleeting of circumstances.

It is quite a different matter with chiefs and rulers of states, whose authority is backed up by real force. I say this, mindful of the fact that the power and absolutism of certain traditional rulers has sometimes in the past been exaggerated out of a variety of motives. Sometimes the authority of traditional rulers, like the Kabaka of Buganda or Shaka Zulu, has been greatly overestimated (Beattie 1967, 355-374) out of racialist and ideological/orientalist motives that justified colonialism. And perhaps it has been occasionally overestimated by observers who are simply too literal and take indigenous representations at face value, failing to appreciate the symbolic, ritual, and dramaturgical aspects that are interwoven in all human politics. Thanks to Geertz (1980), we can now appreciate that *all* states (and, I would suggest, a great many chiefdoms as well) are in some

sense "theatre states," and all of them stage public self-representations that over-communicate the elements of power, control, and order in the system. Of course, the purpose of ritual representations is to portray an idealization of reality, and it would by the same token be an analytical blunder to mistake the symbol for the thing. We are very beholden to writers like John Beattie (1967), Lloyd Fallers (1967, 1974), Jacques Maquet (1961), and Hilda Kuper (1961), who have helped us to appreciate the numerous ways in which apparent despotisms are softened by whole hosts of subtle checks on the abuse of power, and checks-and-balances embedded in the structure of traditional political institutions.

But the fact remains that there is a vast gulf between the leadership of (say) the Mugabe of Banyankole and a !Kung band headman. Or for that matter between a Bedouin tribal *shaikh* and a rabbit boss among the Shoshone (Oberg 1940, 121-164; Marshall 1955; Cole 1985; Steward 1938). This is in part because their relationships are mediated by property rights and relations of production. Unlike the footloose hunter, the cultivator and the animal husbandman are not quite so free to pick up stakes and move at will. Their access to land and pasture typically comes as part of their political relationship to their chief, and this property relationship is the basis of the chief's power. The threat of being expelled is ultimately not a life-threatening proposition to a hunter, but it is much more so to a cultivator. And, I would add, it becomes more threatening in proportion to either agricultural or pastoral intensification, as that variable is understood by anthropologists. The classic "big man" systems of Highland New Guinea are found in areas of shifting cultivation and semipermanent settlement, meaning that the cultivator's freedom of movement is not entirely determined by the leader's control over land. This mobility can

be exploited by the citizen, who can to a certain extent play one big man off against another, in a system in which the political fortunes of politicians are notoriously prone to flux. But not so the cultivator of precolonial Buganda or the herdsman of precolonial Banyankole. For them, insubordination could easily result in loss of economic rights (among a whole host of punishments).

To be sure, the classic hierarchical and pyramidal chiefly and state systems allow for some degree of countervailing power to be in play between ruler and ruled, particularly at the lower levels of the system. Overly exploitative or corrupt lesser chiefs or village administrators might be reported to the central court, thus leading to their removal and replacement. Besides being an undoubtedly risky business, this is a solution that, paradoxically, does not change the structure but, on the contrary, reinforces it. The paramount chief and the king are happy enough to sack the occasional staffer, not only because they are jealous of their tributary rights (but that, too), but because, in the Weberian sense, doing this from time to time counters the centrifugal forces that are present in all complex administrative structures. Executing a corrupt or disloyal official every now and then is a good lesson for other officials, and it binds the ruler closer to his subjects.

How leaders and followers think

This brings us to what I would argue is the crucial analytical difference brought out by this rather crude comparison between band headmen and kings. Recall that the salient aspect of the leadership of the band headman is the fact that he and his fellow band members think alike – they conceptualize their situation in very similar terms, having to do with band movements and natural resources. Because he *thinks like them* (or in terms

very close to theirs) and he listens very well (his main job prerequisite), he can "lead" them by articulating in an authoritative fashion the main tendencies of their thoughts. The Mugabe or Kabaka, by contrast, *do not* "think like" their people. Their people think in practical ways about immediate situations in which their own personal and kin group interests are at stake. The Kabaka and his staff, by contrast, spend their time thinking at a very different level – that of the inclusive system. Whereas the thinking of their subjects follows along the lines of their segmental interests, the king and his staff have to take into account their subjects' competing interests. They need somehow to balance these divergent interests in such a way that all the subjects are at least partially satisfied, and the competition between interests does not get out of hand and vitiate the common interests of all (Oberg 1940; Mair 1938; Fallers 1967).

I suggest that this basic difference between the thinking of the two types of leaders, seen most clearly at the two extremes of the anthropological typology of traditional authority, band headmen and kings, can be seen in gradually diminishing form throughout the whole typology as one moves from states to bands. For example, tribal councils are by definition forums in which participants (family heads, lineage elders, village representatives) represent their followers' interests to the council, but in which they must eventually be willing to compromise those interests if wider public goals are to be achieved. In the Turnerian account of the Ndembu village headman (a kind of big man common throughout Central Africa), the headman works hard to attract strangers to come and live in his village, constituted in the first instance by a few kinfolk he has managed to persuade to come and make a clearing with him. His success as a leader consists in large measure in playing off the interests of the already-there against those he is seeking to at-

tract (Turner 1957, 16). To attract new villagers to come and make his village prosperous, he must make promises of land and help with clearing land, building huts, and getting started. The help in question consists largely in the labour of those-already-there, who end up working hard for their headman, though they benefited from such help when they were newcomers. Does the newcomer see behind the sweet deal he is being offered the outlines of obligations to come behind the sweet deal he is being offered? Of course, if the corvées become too onerous, villagers can refuse their labour or, perhaps more realistically, go slow about their tasks. But – as the big man/head man will argue – it's all about economies of scale: bigger villages are better to live in (up to a point), since there is a bigger labour force to draw upon, and so it is in a way in a villager's best interest to help recruit more able-bodied members.

In these two instances from the middle of the typology's range, what we see are not leaders and members thinking alike or thinking differently, but rather we see people (leaders and members) moving back and forth between the micro (the interests of segmental groups) and the macro (the interests of wider polities). In the tribal council, the discussion lays bare both the segmental oppositions and the common interests; closed away from the eyes of their sets of followers, the representatives can work out their compromises in the most face-saving fashion possible. The situation of the Ndembu village headman is quite different in its structure from the tribal council situation, but we can see similar elements of the back-and-forth thinking process, the village headman physically going back and forth between different constituencies (established villagers and new recruits) to work out a *modus vivendi* that encompasses the interests of all.

Both of these are *different in kind* from either the leadership of the band headman, whose interests, as we have seen, are convergent with those of his fellow band members, or the leadership of a paramount chief or king, who is usually both the representative of the interests and the personification of the wider polity. The band headman may well be the man with the broadest vision of band relationships and interconnections, but in this he is hardly different from other band members, some of whom (in cases, such as the !Kung San, where band headmanship is at least in part hereditary) may in fact be older and more experienced than him.

Leadership and authority and risk and innovation

What are the implications of this for social and economic development? How do leaders lead their people to change their thinking and behaviour in socially progressive and beneficial ways? What role does authority play in this process? And what can we say about the various styles of leadership and types of authority that appear in the consensus typology of traditional polities used by anthropologists?

Empirically, anthropologists have long established that leadership in social and economic development comes sometimes from traditional authorities (e.g., Firth 1956; Belshaw 1964), and sometimes from ordinary members of the society – such individuals are usually dubbed exemplars, entrepreneurs, or innovators (e.g., Mead 1956; Barth 1965) – who set out on innovative courses of action of their own, with no authority whatsoever other than the force of their example, but whose successful example often leads others to imitate them.

Social change induced by force of example can be contrasted with change induced by force of authority. Force of example tends to be risky for the individual entrepreneur but, as a type, has the advantage of allowing a variety of entrepreneurs to innovate, and allowing the people the luxury of selecting only the successful innovations to adopt into their social and cultural repertoire. The man who planted a new kind of bean and thrived while everyone else went hungry will be remembered, whereas the man who planted a new kind of bean and as a consequence had to beg food from those who stuck to the tried-and-true beans will be soon enough forgotten. In other words, force of example allows for a considerable amount of what would in science be called "experimentation" at low cost to the society (though sometimes at a high cost for the entrepreneurially minded members of society).

The force of authority, on the other hand, comes with a different distribution of risks and advantages. As a force, it is obviously stronger and more coordinated. A chief can tell you ("you" being an ordinary member of society) where you may graze your camels or where you will grow your beans, and, possibly, even what kind of beans you will grow. The probability that you will comply consists in your acceptance of the proposition that he is acting in terms of knowledge accessible to him but not necessarily to you (so succinctly summed up in the *locus classicus* of traditional authority, namely elderhood, in which the elders, themselves on the threshold of becoming ancestors, are vouchsafed the role of being the mouthpieces of the *real* authorities, the ancestors).

The force of example works through the cumulation of individual instances of behavioural change, until some point when the new behaviour becomes the statistically dominant form. By contrast, the force of authority can produce very rapid behavioural change,

if the leader invests his authority in promoting that change (e.g., planting a new kind of crop). But the risk involved here is not simply to the reputation of a single individual if the innovation does not work well – the risk is to the polity itself, if the authority of its leaders is undermined. Traditional authorities thus tend to be more conservative in their risk-taking than ordinary members of their societies.

Languages of the past and of the future

The inherently conservative bias of traditional authority derives in part from the inherent association between risk and innovation. When a traditional authority pushes his authority beyond its normal limits (e.g., to endorse a particular plan of development), the risk is not simply a risk to the individual, but a risk to the very belief system in which the authority is grounded. To be sure, a polity's relationship with a traditional authority (headman, chief, or king) does not normally hang on a single event in their relationship (unless it be a disastrous battle lost or a great collective loss of honour), but rather on a generalized sense that the leader is – or is not – managing things tolerably well. Where that is the case, the authority is legitimate. There are always grumbles and doubts in accepting the coercion of authority, but the fact that in most polities this happens routinely and repeatedly is the essence of the Weberian notion of legitimacy.

However, another root of the conservative bias of traditional authority is its defining characteristic, which is its fundamental temporal orientation to the past. We call a system of authority traditional because (in the analysis of Weber, Malinowski, and Bloch) the distinctive mode of iteration within it relates the present and the future to the past. Things are "right" when they are in conformity with patterns and arrangements that have been

laid down in the past – by the ancestors, by custom, by the culture heroes, or by the creator gods. Although this might almost seem to preclude all change and innovation, in practice it does not. In practice, innovations are very much possible, but they need to be presented as being conceptually in accord with the past, with tradition, or with sacred writ. Thus, for example, the appearance of white Europeans in various regions of the world where their existence was novel (e.g., Australia and New Guinea) was almost always followed by their being rapidly assimilated to the category of some sort of creature or being that was already a part of the mythological corpus of the people (Tonkinson 1978, 148). In a past-oriented *Weltanschaaung*, the novel can be re-mapped as the old, just as (to cite a phrase from our own cultural setting) old wine can be sold in new bottles.

Conclusion

For the purposes of the TAARN project, is all traditional authority enough alike that it can be treated as a unitary phenomenon, or is it incumbent on those discoursing upon the subject to observe the finer distinctions that we see adumbrated in the anthropological typology? The answer is that there are, indeed, senses in which we can legitimately use the concept of traditional authority as a global phenomenon in broad contradistinction to rational-legal authority. Such a usage would be in large-scale world-historical comparisons or comparisons of broad types of systems. Here, following Weber, the common element is the mode of legitimization of authority by reference to the past, in contrast to those political cultures in which the dominant mode of legitimization is by reasoned argument and utilitarian measures such as "the greatest good for the greatest number," and

in which the fact that some proposed course of action or social arrangement is unprecedented is no argument against it.

Even at this level of discourse, there can be no question of pure types. Those régimes we tend to describe as systems of traditional authority regularly innovate and change – they just need to couch their innovation within a framework of tradition. Likewise, those political orders we normally dub systems of rational-legal authority have strong counterweights to innovation and change. The English common-law system is shared by a group of the most innovative and transforming societies of the past three or four centuries, and yet, in its emphasis on precedent, it admits a significant source of tradition into its legal reasoning.

But the problem with the concept of traditional authority is that it is too easy to glide from the issue of the *mode of legitimization of authority* to the *structure of authority*, and hence to conflate a variety of distinct political roles into a single one. The styles of discourse whereby a band headman and a paramount chief of a traditional state polity might seek to present their ideas to their publics might be similar in that they are both oriented to the past and represent courses of action not as the whims of particular individuals but as following logically from custom, tradition, or patterns set down by the founding heroes or gods. But the actual spheres of authority and scope of action of the two roles are vastly different, and it would be misleading to confuse them.

As a purely practical matter, however, it is unlikely that development projects are frequently going to take band polities as their object – they might address band *peoples* (e.g., gathered together in resettlement camps), but foraging bands, as such, have such inherently small constituencies and are so widely scattered that it hardly seems cost-

effective to proceed in this way. The majority of development projects address themselves to rather more complex political entities of the sort designated by the typology as tribes, chiefdoms, or states, *or* to those artificially created political jurisdictions (e.g., units designated as tribes by colonial governments) of sufficient historical depth that they perforce have developed their own political traditions within the context of the wider governmental orders in which they are encapsulated.

The important thing is to ask the question: what it is that one might reasonably expect a traditional authority to actually do in fostering social development that a regular member of the society (e.g., an exemplar or an entrepreneur) or a skilled community worker or activist could nor accomplish? Is it the power of coercion of the traditional leader that is desirable to control – his (or her) power to command labour (e.g., to muster out villagers to plant trees or to work on roads)? Or is it his mystical powers (e.g., his power to taboo and, thus, to prevent his people from hunting local populations of endangered species to extinction)? Or is it his (or her) illocutionary powers – the ability to orate and speak to his people in ways that resonate with them (Bloch 1974, 67), and thus to motivate them, not in this case by threats or by orders they are obliged to obey, but by imbuing them with the desire to embrace the project wholeheartedly, of their own volition? Or is it, in fact, his example, particularly in the case of those cultures in which the traditional ruler has the prerogative of *initium* in various domains of social life, such as first fruits, first plowing, first milking? In such cases, the leader's example is not merely exemplary in the ordinary way, but in a potent ritual way, in which the leader's gesture presages the action of all the people.

As these questions show, there is no single paradigm for traditional chiefs and head-men, or elders and monarchs, to play a role in social development. Their potential roles are numerous, but each case needs to be analyzed in its own right.

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