



THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONE PROJECT

Incentives, Opportunities, and Unintended Consequences: An Economic Perspective on the African Charter and Canada's Foreign Policy Objectives

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(Please provide a short paragraph, including acknowledgment of assistance from supervisor, external advisor and others, as appropriate)

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Capstone Executive Summary

There is a major link between underdevelopment and the risk of conflict. Canada's largest and most immediate security threats comes from organizations in fragile regions. These regions suffer from weak governments, dismal economies, and violent conflict.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, weak governments, underdevelopment, and conflict seem to go hand-in-hand. As such, this region has a long history of instability and violent conflict, and has become a breeding ground for radical terrorist organizations. Global Affairs currently has "ten countries of focus" in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is working towards promoting economic and human development, promoting peace and security, and promoting democracy, governance, human rights and the rule of law.

There are two main issues that this capstone looks to address. First, this capstone examines the effectiveness of four policies – aid, trade, military intervention, and the promotion of democratic regime change – used by Canada and the international community in fragile regions. While examining the democracy-economic development-conflict nexus, this capstone also analyzes whether Canada's efforts to spread democratic institutions and encourage democratic regime change have helped accomplish policy objectives. Along with contributing to the debate on the effectiveness of certain policies, this capstone contributes insight on whether democracy is a cause of progress or arises as a consequence of progress.

There are four main policy implications addressed in this capstone. First, there is little evidence to suggest that democracy causes economic growth and reduces the likelihood of conflict in fragile states. In fact, there is substantial evidence to suggest the contrary. Second, there is evidence suggesting that economic growth and prosperity improves democratic institutions and reduces the likelihood of conflict. It appears that democracy does not initiate growth but emerges from economic growth. As democracies mature, the institutions then foster further prosperity. Third, if Canada wishes to use democratic institutions as a policy tool, efforts should be focused on the least well off countries. Democratic regime change, however, does not appear to be an effective policy tool in low-income countries. Economic growth must be emphasized before democratic regime change is emphasized. Finally, when constructing foreign policies, policymakers must account for the various incentives and opportunities faced by numerous actors, and consider the likelihood that unintended consequences may emerge from intervention.

Chapter 1: Introduction

There is a major link between underdeveloped societies and the risk of conflict. According to UNICEF, of the 150-plus conflicts fought since the end of the Second World War, 130 of them have been fought in the developing world.¹ According to economist Paul Collier, 73 percent of people within the “bottom billion”² have recently been through a civil war or are still experiencing one.³ Additionally, a country in the bottom billion has a one in six chance of falling into a civil war in any five-year period, with nearly half of all civil wars being a post-conflict relapse.⁴ One of the largest challenges for countries dealing with extreme poverty and poor economies is dealing with constant conflict. As Collier describes, not only is conflict and underdevelopment closely related, but their forces tend to interact with each other driving societies further into conflict and poverty. According to Collier, low-income and conflict produce a vicious cycle for these societies. That is, as countries’ economies fail to grow, they become more likely to enter conflict. As conflict breaks out, national economies tend to dive into further decline. This in turn increases the probability for continued violence; hence, the societies have entered a “conflict trap” inhibiting the likelihood of growth.⁵

The international community has long focused their development goals and resources on conflict and poverty stricken countries. In addition to the moral imperative,

¹ “Patterns in Conflict: Civilians are now the Target,” UNICEF, The United Nations, accessed June 15, 2016, <http://www.unicef.org/graca/patterns.htm>.

² “Bottom billion” is a term coined by Collier to describe the people living in countries within the most extreme poverty. He does specifically name the countries he considers to be in the bottom but acknowledges 58 countries that he includes within the “bottom billion.”

³ Paul Collier, *Bottom Billion: Why the poorest Countries are Failing and What We Can Do About It*, (New York, Oxford University Press USA, 2007), ProQuest ebrary edition, 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 31-34.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 19, 20.

scholars have argued the case for intervention in places of extreme poverty because of the negative externality arising from these areas. That is, it is in the best interest of the developed world to increase the standard of living in regions defined by poverty. If the international community does not intervene, these states will fail, laws will break down, immigration crises will occur, and these areas will become breeding grounds for criminal and terrorist networks. As explained by former United States Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa, William G. Thom, “lawlessness in Africa constitutes a threat to the United States [and the rest of the developed world] in terms of terrorist breeding grounds, organized crime, drug trafficking, small arms proliferation, severe political instability, and global health issues.”⁶

If left ignored, these societies will eventually impose large costs on the developed world. Collier calculates the cost of a failing state over its entire history to be at least \$100 billion. However, he claims that this is a conservative estimate, arguing that the cost of a failing Iraq in 2003 was at least \$100 billion to the United States alone. His claim is based on the fact that prior to the Iraq counterinsurgency in 2003, the cost of the war reaching at least \$100 billion was easily predicted by U.S. policymakers. Therefore, the expected benefit of intervening was at least \$100 billion. Collier is not claiming that all failing states cost the developed world \$100 billion, he merely uses the Iraq example to illustrate that the cost of a failing state to the international community is quite large and is definitely greater than zero.⁷ Collier’s Iraq example clearly has faults, as the U.S. government may have had other motivations other than just stabilizing the country, which likely increased

⁶ William G. Thom, *African Wars: A Defense Intelligence Perspective*, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2010), 33.

⁷ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 74, 75.

the expected benefit of intervention. Regardless, the international community tends to estimate large costs associated with failing states. Canada also associates large costs to areas affected by poverty and conflict. According to Global Affairs Canada, conflict affected areas cost the international community up to \$237 billion per year, which aligns with Collier's conservative estimate.⁸

Of the forty-eight countries listed as Least Developed Countries by the United Nations, thirty-four are located within the African continent.⁹ Global Affairs Canada currently has twenty-five "countries of focus," and of the twenty-five, ten countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰ In Sub-Saharan Africa, conflict and underdevelopment seem to go hand-in-hand. According to Global Conflict Tracker, there are currently seven conflicts occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa. All but the conflict in Nigeria are taking place in Least Developed Countries (LDCs).¹¹ Although Nigeria is not a LDC, its conflict is having major implication on its neighboring countries' economic potential. Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad are all LDCs and are all being affected by the civil war occurring on their borders.

Global Affairs Canada currently has three objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa,¹² supporting development and promoting economic activity, promoting peace and security,

⁸ "Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force," Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified November 5, 2015, <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

⁹ "About LDCs," UN Office of the High Representative For the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States," The United Nations, accessed on February 28, 2016, <http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/>.

¹⁰ "Where We Work in International Development," Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified March 22, 2016, <http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/countries-pays/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

¹¹ "Global Conflict Tracker," Council on Foreign Relations, last updated July 1, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/>.

¹² Global Affairs Canada lists four priorities. However, I have chosen to combine "supporting international development initiatives that focus on improving the future of children and youth, increasing food security, and enhancing sustainable economic growth" with "engaging in commercial activities arising from Africa's economic growth and policy reforms." I have combined these priorities into a broader priority of "supporting international development initiatives and economic activities," in order to remove any redundancies.

and promoting democracy, governance, human rights and the rule of law.¹³ There are two main policy issues that this capstone examines. The first issue that is addressed is whether four policy tools used by Canada and the international community – aid, trade, military intervention and the promotion of democratic regime change – have been effective in achieving development goals in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This capstone also addresses the notion – conveyed by many politicians and the international community – that the emergence of democratic regimes in fragile states will improve national economies and reduce security threats. While examining the relationship between democracy, economic development and conflict, this capstone examines whether Canada’s efforts to spread democratic institutions and encourage democratic regime change in Sub-Saharan Africa have resulted in greater political freedoms, economic progress, and less conflict.

The capstone is broken down into the following chapters. Chapter 2 includes a summary of the methodology used during my research. As is further discussed, the analysis of this capstone is broken into two parts. The first part is a critical examination of the academic debate on the merits of policies used by Canada and the international community to promote economic development, security, and democratic institutions. The second part is a quantitative analysis on the impact of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance on the political and economic development, and security in Africa. This part of the analysis looks to determine if those that have ratified the Charter have realized greater improvements than those that have not ratified the Charter since its adoption in 2007.

¹³ “Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa,” Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified March 9, 2016, <http://www.international.gc.ca/ss-africa-afrique-ss/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of Canada's policy objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa and reviews the current literature regarding the democracy-economic development-conflict nexus. This includes an in-depth analysis of the academic debate on the effectiveness of different development policies, the political-economic motivations behind civil wars, the role of natural resources in conflict, how militias fund their war efforts, the damage conflict imposes on a civilian population, and whether promoting democracy in fragile states has been effective in promoting economic growth and reducing conflict. Chapter 3 analyzes the first issue dealt with in this Capstone. That is, have the policy tools used by Canada and the international community been successful in promoting economic development, peace and security, and democracy?

Chapter 4 contains the bulk of the analysis regarding the effectiveness of Canada's efforts to promote democracy and electoral reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis will begin by comparing the progress made by Canada's countries of focus, with the progress made by all African Union states over the past twenty-five years. The second part of the analysis will determine whether the countries that have ratified the Charter have been made substantially better off than the countries that have not ratified the Charter. The third part of the analysis compares the most successful African Union states – in terms of 2015 per capita GDP – with the least successful countries.

Chapter 5 reviews the findings and offers four policy implications for Global Affairs Canada to consider when constructing future policies in Sub-Saharan Africa and other fragile regions. First, there is little evidence to suggest that democracy causes economic growth and reduces the likelihood of conflict in fragile states. In fact, there is substantial to

suggest that newly formed democracies – especially those formed in low-income countries – tend to be the most violent political regime. Second, although there is little evidence to support the notion that democracy will promote peace and prosperity in fragile states, there is evidence to suggest that economic growth tends to reduce the likelihood of conflict, while increasing political freedoms. Third, if Canada wishes to implement democratic institutions – like the African Charter – efforts should be focused on the least well off countries. Democratic regime change, however, does not appear to be an effective policy tool in low-income countries. Finally, as illustrated throughout the entire capstone, policymakers must account for the various incentives and opportunities faced by numerous actors, and consider the likelihood that unintended consequences may emerge from intervention.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Global Affairs Canada currently has three objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa: supporting development and promoting economic activity, promoting peace and security, and promoting democracy, governance, human rights and the rule of law.¹⁴ Global Affairs Canada currently has ten “countries of focus,”¹⁵ and “is working with African countries and international organizations, such as the African Union, to strengthen democratic institutions and actors, reduce corruption and promote transparency and accountability.”¹⁶ Canada has worked to strengthen democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa through assisting in establishing the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, which was adopted in 2007. Nearly a decade after its creation, twenty-three states have signed and ratified the Charter, twenty-three states have signed but not ratified the Charter, while seven African Union members have not signed or ratified the Charter.¹⁷ Although there are fifty four member states in the African Union my analysis will not include the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, as it is not fully recognized by the international community as an official state and there was insufficient data. The objectives of this capstone are twofold. First, this capstone examines the effectiveness of policies such as aid, trade, military intervention and the promotion of democracy in achieving Canada’s three development objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, this capstone examines whether the implementation of the African Charter has been successful in spreading democracy and

¹⁴ “Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa,” Global Affairs Canada.

¹⁵ “Where we Work in International Development,” Global Affairs Canada.

¹⁶ “Promoting Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and the Rule of Law,” Global Affairs Canada.

¹⁷ “List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,” African Union, last modified April 1, 2016, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-sl-african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance.pdf.

improving political freedoms, promoting economic growth and human development, and promoting peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The capstone has been broken into two different types of analysis. The first half of the analysis uses an analytic narrative to critically examine the relationship between democracy, economic progress, and conflict. The analytic narrative is broken into four sections. The first section outlines the evolution of Canada's engagement in fragile states since the end of the Second World War. This section highlights the different motivations that guide Canadian policymakers in determining where to focus development efforts. Additionally, this section describes how Canada's policymakers have been greatly influenced by our Western allies and the Canadian public.

The second section examines the effectiveness of aid and trade policies in promoting economic development in fragile countries. In this section I graph the relationship between aid, trade, and economic growth among African Union members. To determine whether there is an empirical relationship between aid and economic growth, I graph the average annual Official Development Assistant received with the average annual per capita GDP growth for African Union members between 1991 and 2015 (twenty-five years). I also graph countries' share of exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP – a measure of trade openness – with average annual per capita GDP growth rates between 1991 and 2015. Furthermore, I determine whether countries who have the greatest per capita GDP – a measure of standard of living as defined in Appendix I – had greater export to GDP ratios between 1991 and 2014. I use 2014 per capita GDP, as 2015 data for a few countries were unavailable.

The third section outlines the underlying motivations of conflict, and the incentives faced by different actors that are engaged in violent conflict. As the major focus of the capstone is to examine the democracy-economic development-conflict nexus within Sub-Saharan Africa, and electoral conflicts tend to be internal by nature, the majority of the analysis examines civil wars. This section also provides an overview of the debate regarding the use of military intervention to promote peace and security in fragile regions. In order for policymakers to implement successful policies to reduce conflict and security threats in fragile states, they must understand the competing motivations of the actors involved.

The final section analyzes whether foreign intervention to promote democratic institutions and regime change produces desirable outcomes, and whether successful state reconstruction is feasible. Each section is concluded with policy recommendations based on the extensive examination of published evidence. Although the main focus of this project is to examine development issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, the information and analysis within this capstone can be applied to a wide range of development and conflict issues in fragile regions.

The second half of the analysis is based on data collected to determine the effectiveness of the African Charter – a democratic institution promoted by Canada and the international community – in promoting political freedom, economic development, and security in Africa. That is, I am analyzing the hypothesis of whether promoting democratic institutions and regime change positively effects political freedoms and economic prosperity, while reducing the level of conflict. Throughout my analysis I use ten different progress indicators – three measures of political institutions, three measures of economic

progress, two measures of human development, and two measures of combat deaths – to determine whether the Charter has been successful in achieving Canada’s policy objectives.¹⁸

The first part of the analysis will use the above indicators to determine whether Canada’s countries of focus have made progress in the past twenty-five years. As the objective of this project is to determine whether the African Charter has aided Canada in achieving the policy objectives, the indicators will compare the progress made prior to the adoption of the Charter, with the progress made from 2008 to present. The countries of focus will be compared with the fifty-three African Union countries to determine whether progress made in the countries of focus can be attributed to efforts made by Global Affairs Canada, or whether the progress can be better explained by regional trends.

The second part of the analysis looks to determine whether countries that have ratified the Charter have made substantial progress over and above the progress made by countries that have not ratified the Charter. The fifty-three countries are broken up into three groups: the twenty-three countries that have ratified, the twenty-three countries that have signed but have not ratified the Charter, and the remaining seven countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter. As the aim is to determine whether the Charter has benefited the African region, the ten progress indicators will be used to determine whether progress has been made since 2007. Although relative improvements are one of the main determinants of whether the Charter has been successful, the analysis will also need to consider which group of countries is better off in absolute terms.

¹⁸ Refer to Appendix I for details on the ten progress indicators.

The third part of the analysis will compare the ten countries with the highest per capita GDP in 2015 – a measure of standard of living in a country – with the ten countries with the lowest per capita GDP in 2015. The objective of this section of the analysis is to determine whether the Charter was one of the factors leading to the success of the top ten countries. Once again the ten progress indicators will be used to determine which countries have made relative improvements, and which countries are better off in absolute terms. For each indicator I compare the progress made by the top countries with the progress of the bottom countries. I then split up the top countries into the three groups – ratified, signed, and neither – to determine whether there is a positive relationship between ratifying the Charter and progress. I do the same for the bottom ten countries to determine whether ratifying the Charter has improved their situation since 2007, or whether their lack of progress can be attributed to not ratifying the Charter.

There are a few limitations with my analysis. The first limitation is a result from the nature of the indicators and countries used in the analysis. As many of the countries have weak states, there is not always complete and reliable data. For example, some countries – such as Somalia and South Sudan – consistently lacked complete data. The indicators used also contributed to the limitations of the analysis. As discussed in Chapter 3, whenever using conflict-related measures, data is often incomplete and the validity may be debatable. In order to increase the robustness of my analysis, I used two different data sources – the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project – to determine conflict trends. Although both data sources gave different magnitudes, the trends were very similar. Another critique of my analysis may stem from the fact that I am using an institution that includes all African Union members to analyze

the effectiveness of Canada's policies on Sub-Saharan countries. Although different sources consider Sub-Saharan Africa to be made up of different countries, Sub-Saharan countries tend to make up the vast majority of AU members, regardless of the source. According to the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, forty-nine of the fifty-three AU states¹⁹ are Sub-Saharan countries.²⁰ Another limitation arises due to the time frame and time inconsistencies evident in the analysis. As the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance was created less than a decade ago there may not have been enough time elapsed to fully determine its impact on African Union members. Furthermore, not all countries that have ratified or signed the Charter did so at the same time. My analysis of the Charter's impact compares countries prior to 2007 with their current level of development, without taking account for the fact that countries ratified and signed the Charter at different times. I do not believe that this reduces the significance of my analysis as even the countries that ratified late, were influenced by its creation in 2007 and likely worked towards necessary reforms prior to official ratification. The final limitation of my analysis stems from causality – or lack thereof. I cannot conclude that any specific policy, or absence of policy, causes an improvement or deterioration of a given situation. However, I am able to make policy recommendations based on extensive data analysis and examination of the published research.

I have assumed that democracy is not the objective, improving the standard of living in Sub-Saharan Africa is the objective. That is, democracy is a policy tool used by Canada

¹⁹ As discussed above, although there are fifty-four African Union members, not all countries recognize the legitimacy of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

²⁰ "List of eligible Countries in sub-Saharan Africa," The Royal Society – DFID Africa Capacity Building Initiative, United Kingdom Department of International Development, accessed August 31, 2016, https://royalsociety.org/~media/Royal_Society_Content/grants/schemes/Royal_Society-DFID_Africa_Capacity_Building_Initiative/2012-07-25-Eligible-countries.pdf.

and the international community in order to increase the standard of living in the developing world. Given this assumption, and Global Affairs Canada's emphasis on promoting democracy and electoral reforms, I am attempting to analyze the effectiveness of this policy tool in achieving an improved standard of living in Sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, I hope to contribute insight on whether democracy is a cause of growth or whether democracy is a consequence of growth.

Chapter 3: Background

Canada's policy objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa are threefold: supporting development and promoting economic activity, promoting peace and security, and promoting democracy, governance, human rights and the rule of law.²¹ The following chapter outlines Canada's current policies, along with the academic debate regarding the effectiveness of the policy tools used by the Canadian government to promote their objectives. Section one is a brief outline of the history of Canada's engagement in fragile states. This section describes the strategic intent behind the allocation of development resources since the end of the Second World War, and how Canada's allies and different public opinions have influenced foreign policy decisions.

Section two describes the measures currently employed by Global Affairs Canada to promote development and economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to determine the effectiveness of aid and trade policies – two policies often used by Canada and the international community to promote development – the academic debate regarding their effectiveness is examined. This section is concluded with recommendations on how Canada can better encourage economic growth and human development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Section three provides an overview of Canada's efforts to promote peace and security in Africa. This section also describes the academic literature regarding the political economy of civil wars, describing the benefactors of civil wars, the underlying motivations, how factions fund their war efforts, and the role that natural resources play in fueling competition among elites. As the major focus of the capstone is to examine the democracy-economic development-conflict nexus within Sub-Saharan Africa, and electoral conflicts

²¹ "Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa," Global Affairs Canada.

tend to be internal by nature, the majority of the analysis examines civil wars. It is evident that policymakers must clearly understand the underlying motivations and profitable opportunities of modern conflicts in order to implement successful policies to encourage the cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, this section describes the academic debate regarding the effectiveness of military interventions and offers recommendations on how Canada can reduce security threats in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Finally, section four describes Canada's efforts to promote democratic institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa along with the debate regarding the interrelationship between democracy, economic growth and peace. This section is concluded with the policy ramifications of promoting democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

3.1: Evolution of Canada's Engagement in Fragile States

In the post-Second World War era, the idea of sovereignty as a right of the governing body to rule has shifted to the idea of sovereignty as the obligation to protect and provide civilians with policies that promote their well-being. Canada's policy towards fragile states has evolved with the changing notion regarding the obligation of the developed world in creating stability in fragile countries. According to Tom Keating (2016), there are four distinct phases of Canada's policy towards failing and fragile states.²²

Keating's first phase of Canadian policy begins immediately after the end of the Second World War. Canada's foreign policy was developed out of the concern that newly decolonized states would form an alliance with the Soviet Union. To combat the spread of communism, Canada, along with her democratic allies, dumped vast sums of aid into the

²² Tom Keating, "Responding to Failed and Fragile States: The Evolution of Canadian Policy," in *From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2016), 13.

developing world along with war-torn Europe. As Keating explains, Canada's international development policy was effectively an "extension of national security policy."²³

The late 1950s and early 1960s marked the second phase of Canadian involvement in fragile states. Canada responded to the armed conflicts and development challenges in Cyprus, the Congo, Vietnam, and in Nigeria. Canada's contribution was conducted through, and heavily influenced by, the United Nations and the Commonwealth. This era also marked the beginning of the media's influence on Canadians' perception of international relations, resulting in massive support for decolonization. By the early 1960s, Canada's foreign policy was defined by recognition of newly formed states and their right to sovereignty within their borders. In sharp contrast to the current state of Canada's foreign policy, during this second phase, the Western world strongly supported the notion of state sovereignty and non-intervention.²⁴

The third phase of Canadian involvement in fragile states began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the newfound independence of former satellite states. The addition of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in 1982 to the *Canadian Constitution*, and the global human rights movement led to the public push for international intervention. Public acceptance for military intervention and the violation of state sovereignty both emerged during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This marked the first time since post-World War II that Canadian foreign policy was not entirely focused on strategic interests. According to the 1994 White Paper on Defense: "Even where Canada's interests are not directly engaged, the values of Canadian society leads Canadians to expect their government to respond

²³ Ibid., 13-15.

²⁴ Ibid., 15-17.

when modern communication technologies make us real-time witnesses to violence, suffering and even genocide in many parts of the world.”²⁵ Keating explains that Canadian policy makers were global leaders in creating the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, a precursor to Responsibility to Protect, mapping out the international community’s obligation to intervene in failing states.²⁶

The fourth phase of Canada’s engagement in fragile states began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As with all other phases, Canada’s foreign policy was largely influenced by the objectives and views of the leaders of the United States and other Western allies. As the United States began to view fragile states as the largest threat to national security, Canada’s main security focus also shifted to the “war on terror.” This focus is reflected in Paul Martin’s statement, “Failed and failing states dot the international landscape, creating despair and regional instability and providing a haven for those who would attack us directly.”²⁷ The emphasis on the promotion of human rights, and strong political, economic, and judicial institutions in the developing world that dominated Canada’s foreign policy discussion in the 1990s quickly returned back to the emphasis being placed on national security.²⁸

Canadian aid to fragile states as a percentage of total aid has also increased significantly in the post 9/11 era. Canadian aid increased from 18.2 percent of total aid in 2001 to 38.4 percent of total aid in 2011, with Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Haiti as the

²⁵ National Defense, *1994 White Paper on Defense*, (Ottawa: Minister of National Defense, 1994), 12, 13.

²⁶ Keating, “Responding to Failed and Fragile States: The Evolution of Canadian Policy,” in *From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective*, 17-20.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

largest recipients.²⁹ Carment and Samy (2014) note two major problems with Canadian aid flows to these fragile states. First, in states such as Afghanistan where there is minimal accountability among the public servants, aid is typically wasted on inefficient project or payments to bribe local elites or for personal use. The second problem is that most donor activity is focusing on humanitarian assistance instead of long-term projects aimed at increasing economic growth and reducing future reliance on aid.³⁰ Carment and Samy argue that moving forward, the international community needs to identify and focus on the structural drivers of instability and conflict that has stunted progress in fragile states.³¹

Since the end of the Second World War, there has been two constant themes in Canada's foreign policy regarding fragile states. First, Canada's foreign policy has been largely shaped by the objectives of our allies, especially the United States, and international organizations such as the Commonwealth, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As Tom Keating explains, "Canadian policy in response to failed states has generally been articulated and around these institutional and alliance commitments."³² Another prevailing theme is the use of development assistance and intervention as a means of promoting national security. From preventing the rise of communism to the hunting of terrorist organizations, the primary focus of the Canada's foreign policy has been to ensure national security.

Since the end of the Second World War, the largest shift in the foreign policy debate has revolved around state sovereignty. In the early years of Canadian engagement in fragile

²⁹ David Carment and Yiagadeesen Samy, "Canada, Fragile States and the New Deal: Looking Beyond 2015," Canadian Global Affairs Institute, August 2014, http://www.cgai.ca/canada_fragile_states_and_the_newdeal.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Keating, "Responding to Failed and Fragile States: The Evolution of Canadian Policy," in *From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective*, 23.

states, there was massive support for respecting other nations' sovereignty. However, the idea of the "right" of state sovereignty has shifted to the "obligation" of the state to act in the best interest of its citizens. The current debate tends to favour the obligation of the international community to intervene when the sovereign state fails to meet its obligations to its citizens.³³

3.2: Promoting Development and Economic Growth

One of Canada's objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa is the promotion of economic and human development. As such, this section describes Canada's current development initiatives, along with the academic debate regarding the effectiveness of aid and trade in raising the standard of living in fragile and underdeveloped regions. Based on extensive examination of the published evidence, I conclude with recommendations for implementing effective development policies.

3.2.1: Canada's Role in Supporting International Development Initiatives and Economic Activity

As outlined in the mandate letter to Ms. Bibeau, the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie, reducing poverty and inequality between countries is an ambition of the Government of Canada. Within the mandate letter, it is stated that department priority should be placed on reducing global poverty and inequality, providing humanitarian assistance, and working to implement the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.³⁴ The mandate letter is referring specifically to the first goal of

³³ Ibid., 10-29.

³⁴ Justin Trudeau, "Minister of International Development and La Francophonie Mandate Letter," Office of the Prime Minister, Government of Canada, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-international-development-and-la-francophonie-mandate-letter>.

the 2030 Agenda, to “eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day.”³⁵ According to Global Affairs Canada, approximately 414 million people living in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2010 were living on less than \$1.25, more people than ever before.³⁶ Along with working towards the alleviation of extreme poverty, Global Affairs Canada consistently refers to “improving the future of children and youth in the region” and implementing “maternal, newborn, and child health” programs.³⁷

Canada’s efforts to promote economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa are channeled through the Pan-Africa Regional Program, and the Extractives Cooperation for Enhanced Economic Development (EXCEED) program. The Pan-Africa Regional Program “works to strengthen an environment that supports regional integration as well as coordinate the mechanisms needed to achieve these goals.”³⁸ Within this program, Canada is focusing on improving infrastructure services, fostering trade through regional integration, strengthening the governance of the extractive sector, and improving food security and agricultural capacity. Through EXCEED, which looks to enhance the private extractive sector, and the Pan-Africa Regional Program, Canada’s policy direction is to help create an environment that will allow the nations’ private sector to initiate economic growth.³⁹ Global Affairs Canada is also looking to improve agricultural production –

³⁵ “Goal 1: End Poverty in All its Forms Everywhere,” Sustainable Development Goals: 17 Goals to Transform Our World, The United Nations, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/>.

³⁶ “Supporting Development,” Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified October 28, 2014, http://www.international.gc.ca/ss-africa-afrique-ss/support_dev.aspx?lang=eng.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ “Pan African Regional Program,” Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified December 8, 2014, <http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/countries-pays/panafrica-panafricain.aspx?lang=eng>.

³⁹ “Supporting Development,” Global Affairs Canada.

through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme – by 6 percent per year in each country.⁴⁰

Canada has also entered into Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (FIPAs) with nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, in order to promote Canadian private investment in the region.⁴¹ According to Global Affairs Canada, Canada has chosen to focus its effort promoting trade and investment in Africa’s extractive and energy sector, “To highlight Canadian expertise... [and share] knowledge and expertise with developing countries.”⁴² The FIPAs have been created to reduce the risk of investing in Africa, in order to increase the flows of foreign investment into the region.

In order to promote economic progress, Global Affairs Canada has focused on improving infrastructure, increasing agricultural productivity, improving regional trade networks, and reducing the risk of foreign investment into Sub-Saharan Africa. Along with these measures, trillions of dollars have flown into the region in order to alleviate human suffering and develop national economies. The following section will outline the effectiveness of aid as a development tool.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ “Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa,” Global Affairs Canada.


⁴² “Promoting Economic and Commercial Engagement,” Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified October 28, 2014, <http://www.international.gc.ca/ss-africa-afrique-ss/ece-eec.aspx?lang=eng>.

3.2.2: Aid, Conflict, and Development

The merits of development aid have long been debated in academia. From scholars declaring the benefits of aid, to others arguing that aid may not fully solve the problems but is a part of the solution, to others completely denouncing the benefits of aid, there appears to be a myriad of contradicting views on the impact of development assistance. The following section outlines the academic debate regarding the advantages and disadvantages of using aid as a development tool.

As the academic debate regarding the effectiveness of aid is often conflicting, graphing the relationship between aid and economic growth will help determine whether an empirical relationship exists between aid and economic growth. Figure 1 graphs the relationship between Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by African Union members and their per capita GDP growth rates between 1991 and 2015. I have graphed the two variables in order to determine whether economic growth can be explained by the level development assistance that a country receives.

Figure 1: Aid and Annual Growth Rates Between 1991 and 2015



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2015*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files & Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016), accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

According to Figure 1, there seems to be a weakly negative relationship between levels of ODA and economic growth. On average, as ODA increases there is a slight decrease in average annual growth rates. However, I cannot conclude that increasing the level of ODA reduces economic growth, because countries who receive greater ODA are more likely to have struggling economies. The most interesting result from the data is that there is a significant amount of struggling countries that receive relatively small amounts of aid. After comparing average annual growth rates with average levels of ODA received by African countries, it is unclear what – if any – impact aid has on economic growth. This unclear relationship between aid and economic development is reflected in the academic debate.

Many scholars have argued that aid can be used as an effective development tool. Although humanitarian assistance has been used by warring parties to fuel their efforts, aid is very important in reducing the cost of violence imposed on civilians. Aid money may actually reduce the need for civilians to turn to rebel groups by supplementing incomes, and reducing the need to turn to violent groups for financial assistance. Keen (2000) acknowledges both the positive and negative impacts of aid in war-torn countries and concludes that “aid explicitly conditioned on human rights observance,” can create a disincentive for militias to target civilians while reducing the burden of conflict.⁴³ Menkhaus and Prendergast (1995) have also observed the benefits of aid conditioned on human rights observance. They refer to Somali elites maintaining peace for period of times in order to receive international aid.⁴⁴ Other academics such as Shearer (2000), argue that relief aid has had little impact on the nature of civil wars. Shearer argues that aid revenue is relatively insignificant when compared with the revenues derived from primary commodities, drugs, and the sale of arms.⁴⁵ Although Shearer claims that aid is probably not incentivizing or prolonging conflict, he stresses that aid can only address the symptoms of the problem in the developing world, but cannot fix the underlying issues.⁴⁶

Aid has been linked to improving the overall condition of failing economies. By increasing economic growth, aid can also lower the likelihood of conflict. According to Collier (2007), over the past three decades aid has improved economic growth rates in the

⁴³ David Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” in *Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 37, 38.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁴⁵ David Shearer, “Aiding or Abetting? Humanitarian Aid and its Economic Role in Civil War,” in *Greed and Grievances*, 189, 190.

⁴⁶ Shearer, “Aiding or Abetting?,” in *Greed and Grievances*, 199.

poorest countries by approximately 1 percentage point.⁴⁷ Collier argues that aid can be an effective policy tool by preventing situations from completely deteriorating. Collier describes aid as a policy adhesive, keeping failing states from completely falling apart.⁴⁸ Although Collier argues that aid has the potential to improve situations in low-income countries, there are two major limitations of aid. The first is that aid tends to have diminishing returns. Collier refers to a study done by the Center for Global Development, which found that when the amount of aid received reaches 16 percent of a country's GDP it no longer generates economic growth.⁴⁹ According to Collier, aid is also ineffective in situations of poor governance with lacking checks and balances. In fact, Collier claims that aid in the least well off countries is ineffective. Aid is especially ineffective in situations immediately following civil wars because of the lack of institutions that restrict what governments can spend the aid money on. Collier recommends that technical assistance may be more effective than aid money when institutions are inadequate. The international community should use technical assistance until political and judicial institutions are stable,⁵⁰ then aid money can be spent effectively.⁵¹ Aid money can help spur economic development and reduce the likelihood of conflict. However, aid does experience diminishing returns and is ineffective in failing states defined by poor governance. Aid can be part of an effective development strategy, but must be used in combination with other policies. Collier concludes, "Alone it [aid] will not be sufficient to turn the societies of the

⁴⁷ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 100.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Technical assistance is the supply of skilled workers paid for by donor countries.

⁵¹ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 106-116.

bottom billion around. But it is part of the solution rather than part of the problem. The challenge is to complement it with other activities.”⁵²

International aid and intervention policies have suffered heavy criticisms for exacerbating the problems faced by fragile and underdeveloped states. Aid programs have been held responsible for financing rebel groups, prolonging wars, increasing the likelihood of genocide, and creating third-world dependency on foreign handouts. External sources have played a large role in funding, directly and indirectly, warring parties. According to Kaldor (2001), external funding typically comes in the form of direct funding from outside governments, remittances from individuals living abroad, and “taxation” on humanitarian and development aid.⁵³ The taxation of foreign aid has become so widespread that typical institutions consider 5 percent of total donations being stolen as “acceptable.”⁵⁴ Berdal and Malone (2000) have also asserted that humanitarian assistance is essentially “taxed” by warring parties and used to fund their war efforts.⁵⁵

The merits of aid and its impact on development are a widely contested issue. Many scholars have argued that although the objective behind delivering aid – improving living standards in poor countries – is desirable, aid tends to produce unintended consequences and can even worsen the situation. Scholars have applied Noble Laureate James Buchanan’s coined term “Samaritan’s dilemma” of the welfare transfer system to the distribution of aid. Extending the Samaritan dilemma to aid, Coyne (2008) explains that the distribution of aid changes the incentives faced by the recipient by providing a disincentive to save, invest,

⁵² Ibid., 123.

⁵³ Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 49, 50.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 103.

⁵⁵ Mats R. Berdal and David Malone, “Economic Agendas in Civil Wars,” in *Greed and Grievances*, 5,6

and be productive. Coyne argues that aid has effectively altered the incentives, encouraging recipients to stay dependent on aid transfers. Coyne asserts that, unfortunately, aid has created dependency and prevents the indigenous development of strong political, economic, and judicial institutions.⁵⁶

In *Dead Aid*, Moyo (2009) builds upon the idea of the Samaritan dilemma of aid. Moyo points out that aid is simply not working, claiming that over the past three decades the most aid dependent countries have experienced negative growth. She adds that while aid to Africa was at its peak, between 1970 and 1998, the continent's poverty rate increased from 11 percent to 66 percent.⁵⁷ Moyo's central argument is that even with the trillions of dollars in aid money that has flown into Africa, extreme poverty, corruption, and conflict have not disappeared.

Moyo frequently refers to what she defines as the "vicious cycle of aid," which resembles the "poverty trap," a popular term used in welfare economics.⁵⁸ This vicious cycle refers to the process of foreign aid flowing to countries that are the least developed and most conflict prone. However, instead of fixing the numerous issues in these failing states, aid exacerbates the problems and the recipient states fall into further poverty and conflict. To deal with falling standards of living, the international community proceeds to send more aid, and the cycle continues. As Moyo explains, "the cycle chokes off investment, instills a culture of dependency, and facilitates rampant and systematic corruption, all with deleterious consequences for growth."⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Christopher J Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 144.

⁵⁷ Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010), X.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

The failings of aid arise due to the perverse incentives that large and long-term flows create. First, as Kaldor, Berdal and Malone have agreed with, aid is very easy for militias to steal. Not only is aid easy to steal but it also tends to make up a large portion of national income, at its peak, accounting for 15 percent of Africa's GDP.⁶⁰ As aid typically flows to governments, becoming the government in power is extremely profitable, providing the incentive for elites to attempt to overthrow the current regime.⁶¹ Aid also provides disincentives for good governance. As aid flows have been a long-term phenomenon, governments have increased their dependence on aid as a source of income and reduced their efforts to stimulate a flourishing economy.⁶² As governments' ratio of aid to public revenues increase, their dependence on citizens for revenue necessarily decreases. As Moyo argues, the reduction in a government's dependence on its citizens for revenue leads to a reduction in government accountability. As accountability decreases corruption tends to increase. Moyo contends, "The cornerstone of development is an economically responsible and accountable government."⁶³ However, evidence suggests that aid reduces accountability, while failing to address corruption and violence within the society. Instead of long term flows of aid, she argues that a development strategy should be focused on market policies such as trade and foreign direct investment, and the "weaning off" of aid.⁶⁴

When creating an international development strategy, policymakers need to take into consideration that their intervention may indeed result in unintended consequences.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 38.

⁶¹ Ibid., X.

⁶² Ibid., 36.

⁶³ Ibid., 57.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 75.

Coyne (2013) explains that state-led humanitarian intervention is unable to cure the large issue at hand, and has usually exacerbated the problem. In *Doing Bad by Doing Good*, Coyne begins his analysis of state-led humanitarian intervention by recalling the effects of foreign aid flows to the Helmand Province of Afghanistan. Evidence suggests that instead of promoting security and economic stability through aid, foreign assistance benefited wealthy elites, strengthened existing criminal networks, flooded farmlands, and led to population movements resulting in community tensions. Ultimately, intervention resulted in unintended consequences and failed to improve the well-being of the poorest civilians.⁶⁵

Coyne sees the over-emphasis on the normative – what ought to be done – as one of the major downfalls of current development thinking. Coyne explains that, “In focusing on the normative aspects of the issue – what governments ought to do – the positive aspects – what can be done – of state-led humanitarian action are often neglected.”⁶⁶ That is, there is a gap between what policymakers are trying to achieve, and what policymakers can actually achieve.

Coyne’s central argument is that, although policymakers continue to claim the ability to provide society-wide economic development, this policy is doomed to fail. According to Coyne, humanitarian aid cannot promote sustained economic development for two reasons. First, is what he refers to as the “planner’s problem.” This problem, which is built upon Nobel Laureate F.A. Hayek’s work, is that nonmarket actors do not have the relevant knowledge to allocate resources to maximize a society’s welfare. Coyne argues

⁶⁵ Christopher J. Coyne, *Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Assistance Fails*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2013), 5, 6.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, XIV.

that economic progress and sustained development can only take place through markets.⁶⁷ Regardless of what policymakers portray, there is indeed no known formula to solve extreme poverty and promote economic development. Coyne illustrates that many empirical studies have been conducted to determine the causes of economic growth and development. Coyne points out that over 145 different variables have been identified as statistically significant factors that may contribute to growth and development.⁶⁸ The issue is extremely complex, and the solution is not as simple as “more aid.” The second problem of humanitarian intervention is that it creates perverse incentives. According to Coyne, “In many cases, efforts to foster development result in a reinforcement of the very conditions that are responsible for continued underdevelopment.”⁶⁹ Aid tends to benefit the wealthy elites while providing the disincentive to reform the current system. The following best summarizes Coyne’s arguments:

Even the most well-intentioned proponents of humanitarian action are obfuscating the problems at the heart of the situation, which are twofold: (1) those carrying out humanitarian actions often lack the relevant knowledge to accomplish the desired goals, and (2) humanitarian action is often not compatible with the incentives of those in political power, both those in power in the nation or in a coalition of nations carrying out the action and those in power in the country where action is taking place. The interaction of these two factors implies that, no matter what level of resources or [political] will is invested or expended, there are clear limits to what state-led humanitarian action can accomplish in practice.⁷⁰

Another downfall of aid is the aid industry itself. As Collier suggests, the aid industry tends to focus their efforts in the developing countries that are already developing at

⁶⁷ Ibid., 23.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 15.

incredible rates, while neglecting the countries that are in the most need of attention.⁷¹ The neglect of the most in need does not arise from ignorance but is due to the mere fact that staffs do not want to work in those harsh working environments. As Collier describes, “Every development agency has difficulty getting its staff to serve in Chad and Laos; the glamour postings are for countries such as Brazil and China...The World Bank has large offices in every major middle-income country but not a single person resident in the Central African Republic.”⁷²

Moyo argues that the downfalls of flooding African countries with aid are well-known, yet Western governments continue the status quo because of the large number of jobs within Western aid agencies and the lobbying pressures they apply. She explains,

“Western donors have an aid industry to feed, farmers to placate (vulnerable when trade barriers are removed), liberal constituencies with ‘altruistic’ intentions to alley, and, facing their own economic challenges, [have] very little time to worry about Africa’s demise. For the Western politician maintaining the status quo of aid, it is much easier to just sign the check.”⁷³

The incentive structure within the aid industry is also a problem that needs to be addressed. Moyo explains that within most developmental organizations, success is not measured by how much of the aid is actually used for its intended purpose, but on how much aid was allocated to certain countries.⁷⁴ By placing the emphasis on the amount of aid donated rather than on the effectiveness of aid donations, the recipient governments are not held accountable to the donor institutions. What occurs is a situation where billions of donor money is not spent on its intended use. Estimates suggest that between US \$200

⁷¹ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷³ Moyo, *Dead Aid*, 148.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

billion and US \$525 billion of funds that the World Bank has allocated to developing countries since 1996 has been “misused,” with close to US\$ 10 billion of Africa’s foreign aid receipts leaving the continent every year.⁷⁵ In order for recipient governments to be held accountable to its civilians, they must first be held accountable to the donating agencies. Agencies that neglect measures of aid effectiveness will only incentivize corruption within recipient governments.

Coyne employs a public choice analysis to explain the perverse incentives motivating humanitarian actors, resulting in an ineffective aid industry. Coyne builds off work done by William Niskanen to argue that the primary objective of bureaucrats within aid agencies is to maximize their welfare by increasing the size of their agency’s budget. According to Coyne this will result in the ineffectiveness of the aid industry for three reasons. First, resources will be invested to create demand for their humanitarian goods and services. Instead of using all of the allocated resources to improve the well-being of people in the developing world, some resources will be diverted to increase awareness of foreign issues within the bureaucracy’s home country. In order to receive more funding from politicians, bureaucracies will need to raise the public’s interest on certain humanitarian issues. This may result in an exaggeration of certain situations and the inevitable diversion of funds in order to raise public awareness.⁷⁶ According to Foley (2008), “Press offices and lobbyists are employed to highlight particular crises and make the public aware of them. Their job is to stir people’s consciences and to ‘do something to help.’”⁷⁷ The second bureaucratic inefficiency is the tendency for “mission creep,” which

⁷⁵ Ibid., 52-57.

⁷⁶ Coyne, *Doing Bad by Doing Good*, 111, 112.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 112.

occurs when bureaucracies expand beyond their original mandate in order to increase their resources. Coyne explains that this phenomenon is what leads to agencies attempting to tackle issues that are unsolvable. According to Coyne, “As bureaus fail to meet these challenges, they repeatedly request more and more funding to attempt to solve an ultimately unsolvable problem.”⁷⁸ The third force affecting aid effectiveness is the incentive to engage in spending activities while neglecting cost-saving activities.⁷⁹ As Coyne illustrates, unlike private firms, bureaucracies do not bear the cost of inefficient production personally. In fact, the budgetary process encourages over spending. This is because bureaucracies are actually “punished,” through a smaller future budget, if they fail to spend all of their resources. If the agency implores cost-saving activities and has left over resources, the politicians will be inclined to view the bureaucracy as not requiring that level of spending and will reduce the size of their budget in the following period. As Coyne explains, “In the context of humanitarian action, this implies that bureaus will have an incentive to spend their entire budgets, even if funds are wasted or could have a greater return if saved and spent later.”⁸⁰

Coyne also uses public choice theory to explain how incentives drive NGOs to use aid resources inefficiently. Coyne illustrates the activity – that Alexander Cooley and James Ron coined as “NGO scramble” – in which NGOs increase the amount of resources they spend on rent seeking activities to secure government contracts. As in the case of bureaucracies, NGOs also divert resources away from international development efforts, in

⁷⁸ Ibid., 112, 113.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 113

⁸⁰ Ibid., 113.

order to win development funding.⁸¹ As Coyne explains, “From an economists standpoint, the problem with rent seeking is that these lobbying expenditures are wasted resources in that they do not create anything new, but rather are spent to influence a favorable – from the point of the lobbyist – allocation of already existing resources.”⁸²

Diverting development funds away from development projects is not the only similarity between NGOs and bureaucracies. NGOs also engage in, what David Rieff refers to as, “disaster hype.” NGOs working in international development are ultimately competing for scarce government resources that could be spent on other activities. Thus, they have the incentive to exaggerate certain conditions in order to raise public awareness and ultimately receive more government funding. Coyne points out that because government resources are scarce, over exaggeration of one situation may result in the overfunding of a project in one area at the expense of others who are also in need of those funds.⁸³

The competition for scarce government resources between different interests, departments, and agencies is a large reason behind the ineffectiveness of the aid industry. Coyne points to the policy of “tied aid” to demonstrate the effects that competing interest groups within the donor country have on aid effectiveness. “Tied aid” refers to donor money that must be spent on production that occurs within the donor country. The example of food aid best depicts how protectionist policies in the donor country can often create inefficiencies paid for by the donor’s taxpayers and by the low-income individuals who are in need. According to Jacques Diouf, former United Nations director of the Food

⁸¹ Ibid., 97

⁸² Ibid., 94.

⁸³ Ibid., 98.

and Agriculture Organization, “Most food aid is donated on condition that it be purchased and processed in, and shipped from, donor countries, even when adequate supplies are available in the region where it is needed.”⁸⁴ According to a 2005 study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), food-aid tying results in one-third of the funding being captured by the donor country’s firms.⁸⁵ Public choice theory is a good tool to explain the incentive structures within the aid system that results in the ineffective use of funding.


3.2.3: Trade, Globalization, and Economic Growth

Like aid, Canada and the international community have used trade policies in order to spur economic growth. Another similarity with aid is that policies used to encourage greater trade are often debated among academics. I have graphed the relationship between trade and economic growth in order to determine an empirical relationship. Figure 2 graphs the relationship between trade openness – determined by the share of exports to GDP – and economic growth among African Union member between 1991 and 2015. In order to determine whether trade openness may have resulted in a greater standard of living – measured by per capita GDP – in figure 3 I graph the relationship between the share of exports to GDP with per capita GDP in 2014. The objective of both figures is to determine whether trade liberalization is likely to promote economic well-being.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 99.


⁸⁵ Ibid., 99, 100.

Figure 2: Trade Openness and Annual Growth Rates Between 1991 and 2015



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2015*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

Figure 3: Trade Openness and Standards of Living in 2014



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2014*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

According to both figures, there appears to be a positive relationship between economic progress and a country's share of exports to GDP. Referring to Figure 2, there appears to be a weakly positive relationship between a country's exports as a percentage of GDP and its annual per capita GDP growth rates. That is, as a country exports more of the goods they produce, they are likely to realize growth in per capita GDP. Figure 3 illustrates a strong positive relationship between a country's level of per capita GDP in 2014 and their annual average level of trade openness. The African countries with the greatest standard of living in 2014, annually exported the most – as a percentage of GDP – between 1991 and 2014. From the above data there appears to be a positive relationship between trade openness and economic well-being. However, the impact of trade and development in fragile and underdeveloped countries has long been debated.

The impact of trade policies on developing countries are often contested among academics. Panagariya (2009) sought to measure the effects of liberalizing trade policies on economic growth in developing countries. His study shows that, empirically, reducing barriers to trade tends to be a significant factor behind sustained growth achieved by developing countries.⁸⁶ His study demonstrates that stagnating economies and declining incomes are almost never associated with opening up to trade. In fact, low or declining trade barriers is almost always followed by rapid and sustained economic growth.⁸⁷ His findings suggest that “miracle” countries – those that experienced 3 percent or more per capita income growth during his fifteen year observation periods – consistently demonstrate high rates of growth in imports and exports. While the “debacle” countries –

⁸⁶ Arvind Panagariya, “Miracles and Debacles Revisited,” *Journal of Policy Modelling* 31, no. 4, (2009):557, doi: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2009.05.012.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 558, 559.

those that experienced declines in per capita incomes – rarely experienced import surges. Thus, his findings suggest that there is a positive and significant relationship between expanding imports and exports and growth of incomes. However, the critique that import surges lead to declining incomes does not find support from his empirical findings.⁸⁸ Frankel and Romer (1999) have reached similar conclusion about the positive impacts of trade on incomes. Their findings suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the trade to GDP ratio increases per capita incomes by 2 percent on average.⁸⁹ Panagariya concludes that, “From a policy perspective, these conclusions establish a strong presumption in favor of liberal over protectionist policies...and as growth accelerates, opening the economy further will help expand trade faster.”⁹⁰

Panagariya’s empirical study has two important implications for policymakers interested in promoting sustained economic growth in developing countries. The first implication is that trade liberalization policies tend to contribute to positive economic growth, while an increase in a country’s imports do not usually result in declining incomes. The second implication from his study is extremely relevant to the African context. His findings suggest that trade liberalization alone will not guarantee sustained economic growth. The positive effects of trade liberalization tend to be offset by situations of lacking government credibility and stability, product and labour market rigidities, and conflict.⁹¹ This finding has very important implications regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, where countries are often lacking institutions ensuring government credibility, and are teeming

⁸⁸ Ibid., 562- 570.

⁸⁹ Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer, “Does Trade Cause Growth,” *The American Economic Review* 89, no. 3 (1999): 387, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/docview/1474235835?pq-origsite=summon>.

⁹⁰ Panagariya, “Miracles and Debacles Revisited,” 571

⁹¹ Ibid., 557- 559.

with conflict. Although trade policies may help encourage sustained growth when certain institutions are in place, trade liberalization may only have marginal impacts in African societies brimming with corruption and conflict. As Collier (2007) suggest, in conflict and immediate post conflict situations “we can more or less forget about trade.”⁹²

There are many challenges to stimulating growth in the most underdeveloped countries. Collier (2011) argues that a primary focus of the development community should be encouraging the growth of manufacturing industries in the most underdeveloped countries. He argues that underdeveloped countries tend to rely on primary commodity exports, keeping these societies susceptible to commodity price volatility, and increases their likelihood of conflict, which significantly reduces the economic potential of an economy.⁹³ Collier asserts that preferential trade agreements can be used to aid these infant-manufacturing industries to break into the global markets. Collier lists three advantages that trade preferences offer countries that have failed to develop. First, corrupt governments are unable to reap all of the benefits from preferential trade agreements. As Collier puts it, trade preferences are “immune from recipient country’s political economy problem.”⁹⁴ Second, trade preferences offer performance-based incentives, incentivizing productivity gains and benefiting only those who chose to export. Third, Collier argues that trade preferences are costless to recipient countries and virtually costless to the governments that implement the preferential trade program.⁹⁵ However, as Collier argues, in order for preferential trade programs to be successful they must have relaxed rules of

⁹² Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 177.

⁹³ Paul Collier, *Catching Up: What LDCs Can Do, and How Others Can Help*, (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2011), viii.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 27, 28.

origin and must exclude all established producers.⁹⁶ Collier claims that the success of the African Growth and Opportunities Act in expanding African apparel exports was a result of its relaxed rules of origins.⁹⁷ Collier, much like other supporters of trade-led growth, argue that policies geared at breaking into global markets should be a focus for underdeveloped countries looking to experience sustained economic growth.

The economic benefits from reducing trade barriers have long been advocated for by economists. Although Coyne (2008), agrees that free trade benefits national economies, he also asserts that free trade may be the best policy to promote the development of liberal democratic institutions while reducing the likelihood of conflict in fragile states.⁹⁸ Along the same lines as Collier, Coyne argues that, although trade agreements would be preferable, developed countries should first unilaterally remove trade barriers for producers in developing countries. According to Coyne, unilaterally removing trade barriers would promote democratic institutions in fragile states in two ways. First, free trade will result in economic progress. According to Cline (2004), trade liberalization would greatly benefit underdeveloped economies. According to his estimates, world-wide free trade would contribute to lifting 500 million people out of poverty within fifteen years, while contributing approximately \$200 billion annually into the developing world.⁹⁹ As economies grow and standards of living increase, citizens are more likely to demand more political rights and civil liberties, and democratic institutions will emerge.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Ibid., 31, 32.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 29, 30.

⁹⁸ Coyne, *After War*, 181-194.

⁹⁹ William R. Cline, *Trade Policy and Global Poverty* (Washington: Center for Global Development and Institute for Internal Economics, 2004), XIV.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 182.

Second, Coyne argues that trade liberalization increases the transfer of cultural ideas. Instead of imposing democratic institutions on foreign countries, trade allows for the transfer of culture and ideas. One of the cultural transfers that will likely occur in the developing world is the benefits of democratic institutions.¹⁰¹ Coyne argues that free trade has been more successful in promoting democratic values than intervention and state building efforts. As Coyne illustrates, “Many of the autocracies with which the United States has engaged in large-scale trade with (Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan) have moved toward liberal democracy, relative to their starting point, as a result of a larger trade-produced commercial middle class and its demands for political participation.”¹⁰²

Coyne argues that unilaterally removing trade barriers for producers in developing countries, will also benefit the developed countries who are removing the barriers. Although economist have long argued for the benefits of trade liberalization, removing trade barriers is not always embraced by politicians. Domestic industries tend to lobby politicians to impose these trade restriction in order to reduce foreign competition. As politicians’ primary objective is to get elected, they are more than willing to accept contributions from interest groups, while promoting the idea that trade restrictions are necessary to protect local industries. This message has largely distorted citizens’ views on trade liberalization. Instead of demanding for trade liberalization, citizens have largely welcomed the idea of domestic protection from low-wage competitors. However, Coyne argues that trading with low-wage countries will in fact benefit high-wage consumers and producers. According to Coyne,

¹⁰¹ Coyne, *After War*, 183, 184.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 185.

If the United States [and other high-income countries like Canada] unilaterally reduced its trade barriers, it would reduce the cost of foreign goods entering the country. This in turn would reduce the costs for U.S. producers that use foreign goods as inputs in their final products, as well as the cost for final foreign goods sold directly to U.S. consumers. A subsidiary effect of lowering the cost of foreign-produced goods is that this would tend to increase the incomes of foreign producers as U.S. consumers purchased their goods, which would not only contribute to economic development abroad but also provide these foreign producers with additional means to purchase U.S. goods and services. In short, even if the United States' trading partners maintained barriers to their markets, unilateral reductions in U.S. trade barriers would be beneficial to many individuals in the United States and abroad.¹⁰³

Along with the institutional and economic benefits of trade liberalization, there are also security benefits from unilaterally removing trade barriers. According to Coyne, the more that the citizens' in fragile states' income depends on trade with Western countries, the greater the likelihood that these citizens will view the Western world positively. Although terrorist organizations are likely to always exist, it may be more difficult for terrorist organizations to find recruits, as individuals – whose incomes rely on the Western world – are less willing to attack Western countries.¹⁰⁴ As income from trade increases, the cost of committing terrorist acts on the West also increases.

Coyne's arguments for unilaterally removing trade barriers to fragile countries is quite convincing. Coyne argues that removing trade barriers will greatly benefit both developing and developed countries. Trade liberalization will spur economic growth in fragile states by increasing income, while simultaneously reducing conflict by increasing the cost to engage in conflict. Increased income and reduced conflict is likely to help spur liberal democratic institutions by growing a middle class, reducing the relative power of wealthy elites.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Ibid., 182, 183.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 187.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 181-194.

Like Panagariya Collier, and Coyne, Moyo (2009) also claims that trade can act as an engine for growth in African societies. However, unlike Collier, Moyo advocates for trade in agricultural products. Moyo proceeds to argue – consistent with Coyne’s argument – that removing agricultural subsidies would greatly enhance African producers’ ability to break into global markets.¹⁰⁶ Estimates suggest that close to US\$ 500 billion is not recognized by African exporters because of trade restrictions and barriers enacted by Western governments to protect their agricultural industries.¹⁰⁷ Moyo argues for the focus of trade policy, at least in the short run, towards agricultural products instead of manufacturing. Because of Africa’s current state of eroding infrastructure, manufacturing costs are too high and African producers will not be able to compete in global markets. Agriculture, which is less reliant on capital and networks of infrastructure, may be an easier growth source for current Africans. However, as described above, the greatest hurdle for African farmers are not domestic barriers, but international restrictions on agricultural imports. Moyo concludes, “If the West wants to be moralistic about Africa’s lack of development, trade is the issue it ought to address, not aid.”¹⁰⁸

Whether increasing trade in natural resources will improve current situations in Africa is greatly contested. Collier, although advocating for trade policies to spur growth, warns that trade policies should not be geared towards expanding trade in natural resources. Collier argues that increasing primary commodity exports is only likely to increase income inequality in the poorest nations because the rents are received mainly by the elite landowners, and not by the majority – low income workers. Collier claims that

¹⁰⁶ Moyo, *Dead Aid*, XI.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 119.

primary commodity exports benefits flow to a few local elites while failing to benefit the vast majority of the poor.¹⁰⁹

Although altruistic motivations typically dominate the public discourse on international development, Moyo argues that international actors looking to spur development in Africa should follow China's example. China's business-like strategy focuses on trade, agricultural cooperation, debt relief, improved cultural ties, health care, education and vocation training, with only a small amount allocated to aid.¹¹⁰ Moyo argues that self-interest from donor states and the development of poorer nations should not be seen as mutually exclusive goals. Although China's activity in Africa has been based on objectives to improve their own national wealth, their large investments in African business activities have had large trickle down effects increasing employment rates and improving infrastructure and standards of living on the African continent. According to Moyo, "No one can deny that China is at least in Africa for the oil, the gold, the copper and whatever else lies in the ground. But to say that the average African is not benefitting at all is a falsehood, and critics know it."¹¹¹ According to the 2007 Pew report, "Global Unease with Major World Powers," among Africans, China is considered to be "having a more beneficial impact on African countries than does the United States."¹¹² Moyo's conclusion is that the altruistic policy of aid to the poorest countries is not working. Instead, the international community should follow the Chinese example; a business-like development strategy in Africa can benefit all parties involved.

¹⁰⁹ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 81.

¹¹⁰ Moyo, *Dead Aid*, 104.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 109.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 109, 110.

Neoliberal policies have received much praise in helping certain countries develop and join the global economy. However, there are academics that argue that neoliberalism and globalization have benefited the developed world while imposing large costs on the least developed. Kaldor (2001) argues that the West's neoliberal policies are in fact increasing unemployment, income inequalities, resource depletion, and corruption, which in turn are providing the breeding grounds for criminal networks.¹¹³ Berdal and Malone (2000) agree with Kaldor's argument that globalizing policies are creating environments that stunt growth in nations that are the least developed and conflict prone. However, their argument is based primarily on the fact that Western policies create rent seeking opportunities for opposing groups of elites often resulting in prolonged violence due to competition for resource wealth.¹¹⁴ Duffield (2000) claims that the ease with which goods are traded across borders creates the dominance of criminal networks in fragile states.¹¹⁵ Duffield points out that developed governments have not done a good job in limiting trade with warring factions. In the 1990s, Charles Taylor the former Liberian president, who has been convicted of war crimes, was able to fuel his war efforts by supplying one third of France's tropical hardwood. International treaties have also been quite unsuccessful in limiting warlords' abilities to fund their efforts through resources. Even with the United Nations sanctions imposed in 1993, UNITA, the Angolan rebel group, raised US\$ 4 billion through the illegal sale of diamonds. Additionally, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 was violated by European and Asian companies.¹¹⁶ Duffield optimistically concludes that

¹¹³ Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 8.

¹¹⁴ Berdal and Malone, "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars," in *Greed and Grievances*, 3.

¹¹⁵ Mark Duffield, "Globalization, Transborder Trade and War Economies," in *Greed and Grievances*, 74.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 84, 85.

because the groups that engage in civil conflict are highly dependent on income from foreign sources, the international community can severely limit their scope with adherence to sanctions and regulatory measures.¹¹⁷

Although Collier argues that the expansion of trade has the potential to spur development, he concludes that with the current state in Africa, trade is unlikely to spur sustained economic growth and improve standards of living on the continent. According to Collier, “The growth of global trade has been wonderful for Asia. But don’t count on trade to help the bottom billion. Based on present trends, it seems more likely to lock yet more of the bottom billion countries into the natural resource trap than to save them through export diversification.”¹¹⁸

The merits of aid and trade policies have been largely debated in academia. Although there seems to be a myriad of conflicting ideas regarding these policies there are a few general take-a-ways from the literature. There are many downsides with relying on aid as a development tool. However, although aid has been shown to exacerbate the situation in low-income countries, it would be unwise for the international community to completely shut off the flow of aid to those who are most in need. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that aid conditioned on human rights observance may increase the cost of conflict to elites, which may reduce the level of violence, benefiting the majority of citizens.

Although aid may be somewhat useful as a humanitarian tool – helping to alleviate human suffering in the direst situations – there seems to be substantial evidence to suggest

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 85.

¹¹⁸ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 87.

that aid is an ineffective tool for development. The main downfall of aid as a development tool is the perverse incentives that it creates. As discussed above, large flows of aid results in a “Samaritan’s dilemma,” where recipients become dependent on aid. As aid flows increase, governments become less dependent on a well-function economy for revenue. In turn, governments are less likely to implement sound economic policies, and are more likely to engage in corrupt activities. Furthermore, aid flows increase the benefit of obtaining political power. This has resulted in warring elites using violent conflict in attempts to overthrow the current government. Aid does not appear to be an effective policy tool for development. Unfortunately, aid creates the unintended consequences of dependency, government corruption and increased violence.

Although there is no consensus on whether trade has improved situations in the most underdeveloped countries, there seems to be substantial evidence supporting the benefits of trade liberalization. From the data presented in Figure 1, there does not appear to be a positive relationship between ODA received by a country and economic growth. However, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate a positive relationship between a country’s openness to trade and their economic well-being. As discussed above, trade liberalization helps spur economic growth, reduce conflict, and promote democratic institutions. Coyne argues that the key to successful development efforts is altering the incentives and opportunities faced by citizens in developing countries.¹¹⁹ Unlike aid, trade liberalization positively alters the incentives and opportunities faced by those in the developing world. Whereas aid provides a disincentive to increase productivity and incentivizes conflict, trade liberalization incentivizes productive activity – trade only benefits productive members of society –

¹¹⁹ Coyne, *After War*, 27.

while providing a disincentive to engage in conflict. It appears that trade liberalization provides desirable incentives while increasing the opportunities available to those living in underdeveloped countries. Upon extensive review of the academic debate on development policies, I recommend that the Government of Canada and the international community should put greater emphasis on trade liberalization – rather than aid – as a development tool.

3.3: Promoting Peace and Security

Many of the poorest countries in world have also experienced very costly civil conflicts. Civil wars tends to have negative effects on the domestic economies making it all the more difficult to promote sustainable growth within these countries. According to Collier (2007) civil wars tend to reduce economic growth by approximately 2.3 percent per year. As Collier points out, a seven year war would leave a country 15 percent poorer than it would have been had the conflict not occurred.¹²⁰ The Democratic Republic of Congo, a country that has experienced years of conflict, will need close to fifty years of sustained peace in order to reach its 1960 level of income.¹²¹ However, as Collier explains, with its low-income, slow economic growth, and dependency on natural resource exports, the Democratic Republic of Congo has a low chance of sustaining fifty years of continuous peace. The Democratic Republic of Congo, according to Collier, is stuck in the “conflict trap”; conflict resulting in reduced incomes and a declining economy, further increases the likelihood of further conflict.¹²² Addressing the conflict trap is crucial for promoting economic development in many of the least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

¹²⁰ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 27.

¹²¹ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 34.

¹²² Ibid.

Canada is currently attempting to promote peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa. As such, this section will include a brief overview of Canada's policies to combat conflict and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa. This section also examines the academic debate explaining the root causes of civil conflict, its impact on civilian life and the effectiveness of international law and military intervention in promoting peace and security. This section is concluded with recommendations regarding Canada's current efforts to promote peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa.

3.3.1: Promoting Peace and Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

Instead of direct military intervention, Canada's ambition in Sub-Saharan Africa is to provide assistance in training members of the military and police forces, while providing technical assistance and funds to build training centres.¹²³ In addition to aiding in training programs, Canada has also been concerned with terrorism spawning from this region. According to Global Affairs Canada, instead of directly hunting and combating terrorist networks, Canada has been training African militaries to combat regional terrorism. Canada has also provided equipment, funds, and technical assistance to improve the region's ability to guard against security threats.¹²⁴

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) leads Canada's efforts in designing policies to deal with security and stability issues in fragile states. According to Global Affairs Canada, START's policy focus deals with: protecting and promoting the rights of women and girls in conflict situations, limiting the financing of conflict through illegal channels, reforming countries' security and defense systems, atrocity prevention, working

¹²³ "Promoting Peace and Security," Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified October 28, 2014, http://www.international.gc.ca/ss-africa-afrique-ss/peace_security-paix_securite.aspx?lang=eng.

¹²⁴ "Promoting Peace and Security," Global Affairs Canada.

with the UN Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, and working towards fulfilling the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.¹²⁵

In order to promote peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa, Canada is working closely with several UN agencies including the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Department of Peacebuilding Operations. The Canadian Armed Forces also work closely with the United Nations to promote security in Sub-Saharan Africa. Canada's military forces are currently deployed in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in UN operations' SOPRANO and CROCODILE.¹²⁶ Both operations include only a limited number of Canadian personnel. Operation SOPRANO in South Sudan includes only twelve Canadian Armed Forces personnel who work as staff and military liaison officers assisting with technical and operational planning. Operation SOPRANO's mandate is fourfold: protect civilians, investigate human rights violations, protect the shipment of humanitarian goods and services, and support a "cessation of hostilities agreement."¹²⁷

Similar to the UN-led operation in South Sudan, Operation CROCODILE in the DRC only has limited Canadian personnel contribution. Of the 19,292 total UN military personnel, only seven are from the Canadian Armed Forces with expertise in training, operation strategies, and liaison. The most recent revision to the Operation's mandate emphasises the protection of civilians as the main priority. The mandate states that it is the

¹²⁵ "Building Peace and Security in Fragile States," Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified June 6, 2016, http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/peace_fragile_states-paix_etats_fragiles.aspx?lang=eng/

¹²⁶ "Current Operations List," National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada, last modified July 12, 2016, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations/current-list.page#details-panel-1424977816603-4>.

¹²⁷ "Operation SOPRANO," National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada, last modified May 18, 2016, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-soprano.page>.

Government of the DRC's main responsibility to promote security and development, although UN personnel will contribute to peacebuilding operations and help prevent the relapse into conflict.¹²⁸

There are a few important take-a-ways from Canada's involvement in both UN-led operations. The first is that Canada is only contributing limited military personnel to each operation. The second is that of the limited personnel Canada contributes, the personnel tend to be more "sophisticated" in the sense that they are liaison, operations and training officers instead of combat soldiers. This leads to the third policy "take-a-way"; Canada has firmly recognized that it is the recipient government's responsibility to establish and maintain security. Canada's policies are focused on protecting civilians and humanitarian services while helping the host governments to maintain peace.

3.3.2: Incentives Fueling Conflict and Instability

In order to successfully promote peace and combat security threats, policymakers must recognize the incentives and motivations of violent factions prior to implementing specific policies. There is vast literature acknowledging the role that economic incentives play in fueling and prolonging civil conflict.

It appears that the previous objective of war - defeating the enemy and conquering territory - has been replaced. In the modern era, conflict in many low-income countries has become part of a larger business model used by elites to control valuable commodities, tax the movement of people and goods, and break down the government monopoly on violence and protection. Keen (2000) argues that groups use violence and civil conflict for two

¹²⁸ "Operation CROCODILE," National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada, last modified July 10, 2015, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-crocodile.page>.

reasons. The first is to change domestic laws and legislative processes, manipulating the long-term distribution of resources; attaining state power allows groups to determine where the country's resources will be allocated. The second use of violence is to create a situation in which law enforcement is eroded. Using violence not to change the law but to easily avoid the law, allows groups to create criminal monopolies controlling trade routes, exploit labour, and extort property.¹²⁹ Keen lists seven short term but highly profitable benefits of prolonged violence including: increased ability to pillage and loot, securing protection money from those spared from violence, control of trade, the exploitation of labour, acquiring land and valuable resources, aid extraction, and an increased need for military services.¹³⁰ Using conflict to erode the legitimate law enforcement greatly reduces the cost of legal activity. As Collier (2007) asserts, countries in civil wars have a "comparative advantage" in international crime and terrorism.¹³¹ Berdal and Malone (2000) build on Keen's argument, recognizing that similar to the medieval period, conflict is once again a vast "private and profit making enterprise." They argue that understanding economic motivations is "central to understanding why civil wars get going."¹³²

It is crucial to understand that it is not only rebel groups that benefit from conflict. In many instances, the ruling power not only benefits from conflict, but also instigates violence. Reno (2000) explains that in most developed countries the legitimate government provides national security as a public good and attempts to foster economic independence for its citizens. However, in fragile nations it is the government that creates instability and

¹²⁹ David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," in *Greed and Grievances*, 23-30.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 29-31.

¹³¹ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 31.

¹³² Berdal and Malone, "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars," in *Greed and Grievances*, 1-4.

reduces the ability of citizens to be economically independent. Violence is used as a means to create a demand for security, which the government then sells as a private good.

Economic instability also increases the government's power over its subjects, by creating the need for "individuals to seek the rulers' personal favor."¹³³ Keen argues that because it is in both the government's and rebel group's self-interest to continue violence, civil wars tend to be reoccurring and last for an extensive amount of time.¹³⁴ Civil wars are not a zero sum game, where only the winning party benefits, there are numerous examples of opposing groups benefiting from cooperation at the expense of the civilian population.

There are many examples of governments and rebel groups using conflict as a means to increase profit. Charles Taylor, a former Liberian president, was reported to have earned close to US\$ 400 million from his war efforts between 1992 and 1996. Berdal and Malone have noted many examples of opposing parties using the conflict situations to foster a profitable business partnership. According to Stephen Ellis (1999), during the Liberian civil war, "As far as possible, factions avoided fighting other armed groups... [They] simulated attacks, designed solely to facilitate looting."¹³⁵ In Sierra Leone, government forces were caught selling arms and ammunition to the rebel fighters,¹³⁶ a situation that also occurred in Angola between the government MPLA forces and the UNITA rebel group. Collusion also occurred during the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Croat forces willingly supplied the Bosnian Serb army with large amounts of fuel.¹³⁷

¹³³ William Reno, "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars," in *Greed and Grievances*, 46-50.

¹³⁴ Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," in *Greed and Grievances*, 24.

¹³⁵ Berdal and Malone, "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars," in *Greed and Grievances*, 6.

¹³⁶ Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 106.

¹³⁷ Berdal and Malone, "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars," in *Greed and Grievances*, 5, 6.

The research supports the notion that civil wars tend to benefit the elites and government groups engaged in the fighting. The idea that civil wars tend to be started from the ground-up is not supported in the literature. Revolutionaries looking to overthrow a repressive government typically do not initiate civil wars. As Collier explains, the most marginalized members of a society do not initiate civil wars in hopes of creating a more just and equitable nation. Instead, civil wars tend to be fought between elites looking to attain more power and resources.¹³⁸ According to Collier, “All too often the really disadvantages are in no position to rebel; they just suffer quietly.”¹³⁹ The notion that civil wars are disastrous for all parties involved is also flawed. Civil wars tend to be fought because they provide large financial benefits for certain elites within the society. As outlined above, internal conflict provides situations in which control over resources and government power is shifted between groups within the society. All too often competing groups use conflict and the breakdown of the legal system to cooperate and increase their revenue streams. Conflict provides enormous financial benefits to the fighting elites, often at the expense of the poorest civilians.

It is widely acknowledged in academic circles that economic incentives motivate actors engaged in internal conflicts. However, there is much debate regarding how important economic motivations are. The debate typically revolves around whether conflicts are more likely to be a result of “grievances” (i.e., intergroup tensions, ethnic divisions etc.) or “greed” (economic benefits from conflict). In “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” economist Paul Collier (1999) attempted to answer this question

¹³⁸ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 24.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

using empirical analysis. Collier asserts that the “results overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic agendas as opposed to grievances.”¹⁴⁰ Collier finds that his three “greed” indicators - share of primary commodity exports to GDP, the proportion of young males in a society, and the average level of education of a population - all have a statistically significant influence on the likelihood of conflict. Collier finds that, other things being equal, a country heavily dependent on primary commodity exports, with a quarter of its national income derived from this revenue is four times more likely to experience conflict than a country without a reliance on primary commodity exports. Collier also finds that increasing the proportion of males in a society increases the risk of conflict, while increasing the average education level in a society reduces the risk of conflict. The proportion of young males and average education levels in a society represent the cost of attracting recruits to join the rebellion. The greater the proportion of young males, (“increased rebellion labour availability”) the lower the cost of the additional recruit, increasing the likelihood of rebellion. The lower the education level of the society, the lower the opportunity for other employment, resulting in low cost recruits and an increased likelihood of conflict. Collier found that education has a greater impact on the likelihood of conflict than the proportion of young males in a society. His findings suggest that even if the proportion of young males in a society is doubled, increasing the average education level by two months can offset these effects.¹⁴¹

Collier also tested four proxies for grievances – extent to which societies are fragmented, economic inequality, lack of political rights, and government economic

¹⁴⁰ Paul Collier, “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, (Switzerland, University for Peace, 2011,) 70.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 69, 70.

incompetence measured by the rate of growth of per capita income in the previous five years – and measured their effect on the probability of conflict. However, the findings suggest that only a declining economy (“government economic incompetence”) increased the likelihood of conflict. His findings suggest that income inequality has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of conflict. His findings on political repression were inconclusive, suggesting that fully democratic nations are least prone to conflict, but autocratic governments were less likely to experience conflict than newly formed democracies. Collier’s “most surprising” finding was that nations that were fragmented along ethnic or religious lines were significantly less at risk of conflict than nations that were more homogeneous. According to Collier, “a highly fractionalized society like Uganda would be about 40 percent safer than a homogenous society, controlling for other characteristics.”¹⁴² Although there is not much statistical evidence supporting the popular notion that highly fractionalized societies tend to experience more conflict, Collier does acknowledge that societies with two major ethnic groups may be more inclined to experience conflict. Societies composed of a majority group with a smaller but still significant secondary group are indeed more likely to experience violence than a homogenous society. Examples of these societies include Rwanda, Burundi, and Iraq, all of which have experienced bloody civil wars.¹⁴³

Collier also addresses the fact that rebel groups tend to declare their cause rooted in some fundamental grievance (e.g., political repression). Collier argues that the root cause of the movement is economic; grievances alone are not enough to cause the rebellion.

¹⁴² Ibid., 71.

¹⁴³ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 25.

However, as the rebel group becomes larger, there are fewer material benefits that the organization can offer their recruits. Therefore, they must play up their sense of grievances to recruit more personnel at a lower cost. Collier notes that all rebel groups will play up their grievances in order to gain both domestic and international support.¹⁴⁴ Collier's empirical study concludes that, "the grievance theory of conflict thus finds surprisingly little empirical evidence...the true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed."¹⁴⁵

Aderoju Oyefusi's work on Nigerian rebellions, supports Collier's conclusions that greed-based motivations are the primary forces behind civil wars. According to Oyefusi, people with a sense of grievance were no more likely to take part in the conflict than those without. People who were most likely to take part in the rebellion were the young and uneducated members of society who had no children.¹⁴⁶ With little employment opportunities for this demographic, joining a rebellion may be the best prospect to earn a living.

Kaldor would not argue the notion that economic incentives motivate warring parties during civil wars. In fact, Kaldor (2001) argues that in the Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war, the motivation of paramilitary groups were "largely economic."¹⁴⁷ Kaldor acknowledges that the militias were involved in black market activities, and even traded with "enemy" groups when there were opportunities to earn a profit.¹⁴⁸ However, Kaldor would argue against the notion that national identities and grievances do not influence the

¹⁴⁴ Collier, "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective," in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 68.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 71-73.

¹⁴⁶ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 30.

¹⁴⁷ Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 53.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

likelihood of civil wars. Kaldor concludes that identity politics has been the basis for “tribal conflict in Africa, religious conflict in the Middle East or South Asia, or nationalist conflict in Europe.”¹⁴⁹ Kaldor is essentially claiming that groups attempt to capture state power as a means of advancing national identities.¹⁵⁰ However, Collier would claim that that rebel groups use national grievances as a means of capturing state power.

Academics such as Homer-Dixon (1999), have argued that inequality within a population does increase the likelihood of civil conflict. He claims that, “A severe imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power... is a key factor in virtually every case of scarcity contributing to conflict.”¹⁵¹ Similar to Kaldor, Homer-Dixon acknowledges the role of economic incentives in fueling civil wars, but argues that identity politics and group tensions are significant factors that increase the likelihood of insurgency and internal conflicts.¹⁵²

3.3.3: Natural Resources and Funding War Efforts

With the breakdown of state functions such as law enforcement and the protection of property, rent seeking opportunities arise where extractive industries are present. As natural resources become open to predation, competition among elites often spurs violence. A cycle of conflict emerges out of the competition for natural resources. Mwanasali (2000) explains that civil conflict defined by predation and rent seeking reduces productivity and drives society towards subsistence living.¹⁵³ As the economy, people’s standard of living, employment and education opportunities continue to decline the

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 76,77

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 37-76.

¹⁵¹ Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 15.

¹⁵² Ibid., 147.

¹⁵³ Musifiky Mwansali, “The View From Below,” in *Greed and Grievances*, 141.

likelihood of war continues to increase. Collier (2007) refers to this phenomenon as the “conflict trap.” Rent seeking and competition among elites for control of resources push a society into civil war. As war continues the economy and standards of living tend to decrease. Wars keep these low-income countries dependent on natural resource exports and economic growth low, resulting in prolonged and reoccurring conflicts.¹⁵⁴ Homer-Dixon (1999) also alludes to the fact that once conflict has broken out, it becomes very hard to reverse the effects of conflict and remove these countries from the conflict trap.¹⁵⁵

According to Berdal and Malone (2000), “an abundance of mineral wealth is positively and significantly related to armed conflict.”¹⁵⁶ As mentioned earlier, Collier (1999) argues that increasing a nation’s primary commodity export to GDP increases the likelihood of conflict.¹⁵⁷ Indra de Soysa (2000) builds on this argument by stressing that the incidence of war does not depend on the total availability of resources that a nation has. Rather, the likelihood of war can be determined by the economy’s dependence on resource wealth. A country that has an abundance of natural resources is no more likely to go to war than a country lacking natural resources. However, a country that is extremely dependent on its natural resources for income is more likely to experience conflict.¹⁵⁸

Although there is vast literature citing the positive relationship between an abundance of natural resources and the likelihood of civil conflict, there are also academics, which argue that environmental scarcity can increase the likelihood of conflict. Homer -

¹⁵⁴ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 37.

¹⁵⁵ Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, 10, 11.

¹⁵⁶ Berdal and Malone, “Economic Agendas in Civil Wars,” in *Greed and Grievances*, 6.

¹⁵⁷ Collier, “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 70.

¹⁵⁸ Indra de Soysa, “The Resource Curse? Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?” in *Greed and Grievances*, 123, 124.

Dixon claims that scarcity of non-renewable resources can fuel conflict by eroding the state and increasing competition between elites. Homer-Dixon explains that as resources become in short supply they become extremely valuable, incentivizing the manipulation of laws governing the distribution of resources. As the non-renewable resources become scarcer, and more profitable, the likelihood that elites will attempt to overthrow government to alter the distribution of resources increases.¹⁵⁹ Homer-Dixon concludes that, in already weak states, the eroding capacity of the state provides the opportunity and incentive for elites to manipulate the distribution of resources.¹⁶⁰

Homer-Dixon points to the policies used by the Israeli government that limited the Palestinians use of water as a case in which competition over scarce resources contributed to the breakout of violent conflict.¹⁶¹ Ismail Serageldin, former vice president of the World Bank for Environmentally Stable Development, warns that environmental scarcity will become a route cause of conflict stating, “Wars of the next century will be over water, not oil.”¹⁶² It is important to note that Homer-Dixon does not claim that environmental scarcity on its own is the cause of civil conflict. He argues that scarcity can generate severe social stresses such as unemployment, extreme poverty, and ethnic tensions. These social stresses may evolve into civil conflict.¹⁶³

Fighting factions are able to generate a numerous amount of revenue, especially when they control the country’s natural resources. Gamba and Cornwell (2000) explain that the Angolan government could have at least partially addressed the needs of its

¹⁵⁹ Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, 73-75.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 103

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 75, 76.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 139.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 12.

citizens through its oil, diamonds, gold, and export revenues. However, revenues were instead used to increase personal wealth of a few elites, and to fuel the war effort.¹⁶⁴

Along with extractable commodities, conflicting parties have a variety of funding opportunities. Kaldor explains that with the erosion of state function, the cost of criminal activities is severely reduced as enforcement of the law becomes non-existent. Drug trafficking, robbery, and taking hostages for rewards are commonplace in fragile situations. Additionally, militias are able to exert pressures on markets. Through the threat of violence, groups can force civilians to sell their assets far below the market price. Another large source of funding comes from external parties, either from supporting nations, remittances or from foreign aid.¹⁶⁵

3.3.4: Damage to Civilian Life

Violations of human rights within the context of armed conflicts are not a new phenomenon. However, the increased frequency of internal armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War has created a surge in violations of human rights. As Kaldor (2001) explains, conflicts that have characterized the modern era are much different than the wars waged by the major powers prior to collapse of the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁶ Instead of mobilizing national support against a common international enemy, the “new” internal conflicts are a means of controlling populations through forced exile, mass murder, torture, and humiliating and degrading practices.¹⁶⁷ Kaldor explains that the damage done to civilian populations is no longer a byproduct of conflict, but rather it is the objective of war.¹⁶⁸ In the decade

¹⁶⁴ Virginia Gamba and Richard Cornwell, “Arms, Elites and Resources in the Angolan Civil War,” in *Greed and Grievances*, 165.

¹⁶⁵ Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 101.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-165.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 7, 8.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 60-64.

following the fragmentation of the former Soviet Union, eighty percent of all war casualties were civilian.¹⁶⁹ However, damage to civilians runs deeper than just combat deaths. Massive human rights violations during internal conflicts also include forced detention, torture, mass rape, and forced migration.¹⁷⁰ In fact, more civilians are killed from disease than combat-related deaths during civil wars. As Collier (2007) points out, migration caused by civil wars greatly increases the spread of disease among the civilian population. As people are forced to leave their homes, refugees are susceptible to diseases in which there are inadequate medical supplies to treat the illnesses. The dense population, inadequate medical supplies, and poor living conditions make refugee camps the perfect place for the spread of deadly diseases.¹⁷¹

Although there is no doubt that internal armed conflicts cause massive amounts of damage to civilians, there are debates as to how devastating conflict is on civilian life. Many well established experts such as Ahlström, Christer and Kjell-Åke Nordquist (1991), Sivard (1991), Kaldor (1997, 2001), Smith (1997), the *Human Development Report 1998*, Collier (2003), and Martin (2003), have all estimated that civilian casualties account for 75-90 percent of the overall casualties of war since the beginning of the cold war era.¹⁷² However, Roberts (2010) urges researchers and policymakers to be cautious when using combat data, arguing that there are many problems associated with these types of estimates. The first problem is that it is often difficult to determine who exactly is a civilian. In today's context, often insurgents and guerilla fighters may appear to be civilians, but are indeed

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 100.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 31

¹⁷¹ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 28.

¹⁷² Adam Roberts, "Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians?" *Survival* 52, no.3, (2010): 118-122, doi: 10.1080/00396338.2010.494880.

militants. The second problem is that civilian casualties occur from both direct and indirect causes of conflict. In order to better understand the nature of the conflict, it is important that researchers are very clear about the causes of death. The third problem Roberts details is that it is very hard to find reliable statistics; often governments distort and withhold information.¹⁷³ Although there has been substantial support for the 75-90 percent statistic, institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Health Organisation, along with the *Human Security Report 2005* have all questioned its validity.¹⁷⁴ Roberts acknowledges that some conflict situations have extremely high civilian casualties, but concludes, "It is clearly not possible to claim that all contemporary conflicts have anything close to the 9:1 ratio of civilian to military deaths."¹⁷⁵

3.3.5: The Use of International Law to Restrain Combatants

Canada has long supported international treaties and conventions to help promote peace, and security and reduce civilian casualties in fragile regions. The following section provides a brief overview of the international community's efforts to use international law as a tool to reduce the impact of civil conflict.

The codification of international laws regarding armed conflicts was first developed in the nineteenth century.¹⁷⁶ However, the concept of unilateral aggression as being unlawful was not codified until the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy in 1928. The General Treaty, later reinforced by the United Nations Charter, the International Military Tribunal, and the Universal Declaration of

¹⁷³ Ibid., 116- 118.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 122-123.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 126.

¹⁷⁶ The Declaration of Paris Respecting Maritime Law of 16 April 1856 was the first multilateral codification of rules regarding rules that would be following in times of peace as well as in times of war.

Human Rights, established the foundation of international law that serves to protect civilians from state aggression.¹⁷⁷ The International Military Tribunal not only created a criteria defining what offenses constitute as a breach of international law, but also placed the burden of responsibility on the individual. As a result of Article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, no longer was a defendant able to escape responsibility for their actions because they were following orders, or acting in the interest of the state.¹⁷⁸ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), although not considered to be legally binding, was an early and paramount resolution in which representatives of states would look to when forming future binding treaties.¹⁷⁹

The Fourth Geneva Convention and the Second Additional Protocol further progressed the fields of international humanitarian and human rights law. They laid down the rights of civilians, the responsibility of governments, and the acts that are prohibited during internal armed conflicts. Article 3 of the Convention constitutes the basis for the protection of civilians during times of internal conflicts and specifically establishes the definition of individuals that are granted protection.¹⁸⁰ Article 13 requires that all individuals regardless of race, nationality, religion, or political opinion are protected from crimes of war.¹⁸¹ Article 146 legally binds all High Contracting Parties to protect all civilians from the “grave breaches” of human rights defined in Article 147.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁷ Kaldor *New & Old Wars*, 5.

¹⁷⁸ “Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1 Charter of the International Military Tribunal,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diploma, Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library, Accessed November 16, 2015, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp>.

¹⁷⁹ Future binding laws would adopt principles such as equal protection of the law without discrimination (Articles 2 and 7 in the UDHR), and the protections of inalienable rights for all peoples (Articles 2 through 29 of the UDHR).

¹⁸⁰ “Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection Civilian Persons in Times of War. Geneva 12 August 1949,” Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, International Committee of the Red Cross, Accessed November 16, 2015, <https://www.icrc.org/ihl/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5>.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

As defined in Article 1, the Second Additional Protocol was composed to develop and supplement the Geneva Conventions in protecting the victims of non-international conflicts.¹⁸³ Paragraph 2 of Article 13 protects civilians from being objects of attack and prohibits threats for the purpose of spreading terror. Paragraph 3 stipulates that all civilians are guaranteed protection under the Second Protocol until “they take direct part in hostilities.”¹⁸⁴ The Geneva Conventions and the Second Additional Protocol are the main bodies of international law that specifically protect civilians in cases of internal armed conflicts. As mass atrocities continued to occur, new bodies of applicable law were created in order to protect civilians and punish those who have committed violations of international law.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda codified laws to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities. They require the Contracting Parties to undertake all necessary steps to prevent and punish violations in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.¹⁸⁵ Article 2 of the Genocide Convention defines which acts constitute genocide, and Article 4 requires that any individual who commits an act of genocide, regardless of public status, is violating international law and shall be punished.¹⁸⁶ The Rwanda Tribunal

¹⁸³ “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977,” Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, International Committee of the Red Cross, Accessed November 16, 2015, <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/d67c3971bcff1c10c125641e0052b545>.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ “Chapter VII: Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” Charter of the United Nations, United Nations, Accessed November 16 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>.

¹⁸⁶ “Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948,” Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, International Committee of the Red Cross, Accessed November 16, 2015, <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=1507EE9200C58C5EC12563F6005FB3E5&action=openDocument>.

builds upon the Genocide Convention by further increasing the sphere of acts considered to be genocide in paragraph 2 of Article 2. The Tribunal created a new classification of offense titled, “crimes against humanity,” which was defined in Article 3. Articles 2, 3, and 4 gave the Tribunal the power to prosecute persons who violated, or ordered others to commit violations of the Rwanda Statute, Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, and the Second Additional Protocol.¹⁸⁷

In response to the continuation of human rights violations, the international community agreed on the “Responsibility to Protect” principle published in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.¹⁸⁸ The Responsibility to Protect has three fundamental pillars: the state has the obligation to protect its civilians from violations of human rights, the international community has the responsibility to assist the state in fulfilling its obligation, and if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligations, the international community is required to intervene.¹⁸⁹ The Responsibility to Protect agreement represents a paradigm shift in traditional international thinking. As Francis, Popovski, and Sampford (2012) explain, sovereignty no longer prevents a state from being accountable for its actions.¹⁹⁰

There is an extensive legal framework surrounding international humanitarian and human rights law. Yet, Hafner-Brown and Tsutsui (2007) indicate that the empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that international law does not affect the behavior of

¹⁸⁷ “Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994,” Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, International Committee for the Red Cross, Accessed November 16, 2015, <https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/565?OpenDocument>.

¹⁸⁸ “The Responsibility to Protect,” Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, United Nations, Accessed November 16, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml>.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Angus Francis, Vesselin Popovski, and Charles Sampford, *Norms of Protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction*, (Tokyo: UPUN Japan, 2012), ProQuest ebrary, 12.

states that are most likely to commit human rights violations.¹⁹¹ The problem is not that there is a lack of existing law, but that the enforcement of international laws is severely lacking.

International military intervention is legal under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter when “measures provided for in Article 41 [intervention without the use of armed forces] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate.”¹⁹² However, because of the long time horizon required to mobilize forces, intervention has been relatively ineffective. In “Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect,” Kuperman (2009), explains that international intervention typically does not protect civilian populations from mass atrocities because of the long time it takes military forces to operationalize. In Bosnia the majority of ethnic cleansing occurred in 1992, in Kosovo nearly half of ethnic Albanians were forced to leave in the first two weeks, and in Rwanda approximately 250,000 Tutsi victims were killed before peacekeeping forces were available.¹⁹³ Kuperman explains that even if there were adequate political will to intervene in Rwanda, by the time military forces were capable of intervening, the majority of targeted civilians would have already been dead. The inevitable problem is that violence can be carried out much quicker than military intervention.¹⁹⁴

International Law is formed in response to atrocities, but has not done a good job in preventing atrocities. The International Military Tribunal, the International Bill of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, and the Fourth Geneva Convention were all established in response to the crimes committed in the Second World War. Yet these implementations

¹⁹¹ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Justice Lost! The Future of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 4 (2007): 408.

¹⁹² “Chapter VII,” Charter of the United Nations.

¹⁹³ Kuperman, “Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect,” 21.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

along with the development of other applicable laws were unable to prevent the mass atrocities that occurred in the 1980's and 1990's and that continue today.¹⁹⁵ It appears that the current application of international law breeds a continuous cycle of atrocity followed by legislation followed by more atrocity. International law has been treating the symptom, mass violence, rather than the disease – poor standards of living in the developing world.

International law appears to be fundamentally unable to prevent atrocities for two main reasons. The first, is that without a military force willing and able to punish actors who commit war crimes, the laws in effect do not change the incentives or opportunities faced by actors involved in the civil conflict. The objective of international law is to reduce conflict by increasing the cost to engage in violent activities. That is, the law was implemented to provide a disincentive to engage in conflict. However, with lacking international commitment to enforce the laws or intervene, the cost to warring factions is not significantly increased.

The second fundamental issue, is that even if there was an international force willing and able to punish those who commit war crimes, there is substantial evidence in the literature to suggest that intervention may actually make the situation worse. The unintended consequence of military intervention is usually an increase in terrorist activities, crimes against humanity, and civilian casualties.

¹⁹⁵ Other applicable treaties formed to protect human rights include but are not limited to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

3.3.6: Military Intervention

Often the international community is called on to protect civilians during situations of internal conflict. The effectiveness of military intervention, like other policies that help alleviate suffering in the developing world, is often debated. As Collier (2007) explains, in the poorest and war torn countries the domestic military is often a source of the problem, and therefore is not a substitute for international forces.¹⁹⁶ Collier argues that there are three reasons for the international community to provide military assistance in civil conflict situations. The first is the restoration of order in a collapsed state. Collier's first argument for military intervention is based on the fact that state stability in the developing world produces a positive externality. According to Collier, Western armies are needed to "supply the global public good of peace in territories that otherwise have the potential for nightmare."¹⁹⁷ Collier claims that it is in the interest of the developed world to provide stability in conflict situations. Failing to provide stability will inevitably impose large costs on the developed world through the development of terrorist and criminal networks, and refugee crises. The failure to promote security in the developing world will lead to situations where "some citizens of the rich world are going to die as a result of chaos in the bottom billion."¹⁹⁸

Collier's second reason for international intervention is to maintain peace in post conflict situations. As previously mentioned, close to 50 percent of all civil wars are relapses.¹⁹⁹ Thus, international military intervention may be most needed to prevent the

¹⁹⁶ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 124.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

society from collapsing back into conflict. Collier describes British intervention in Sierra Leone through Operation Palliser as the “model for military intervention in the bottom billion.” Although military intervention may be very costly, Collier argues that the benefit of a well-developed intervention strategy greatly outweighs the costs. According to Collier, the benefits of Operation Palliser were approximately 30 times its costs.²⁰⁰

Collier’s third reason for military intervention is protection against coups. In order to reduce the occurrence of coups and rebellions the international community needs to increase the cost to those considering to overthrow the government. Collier argues that all that is needed by the international community is to create the illusion that there is ample amount of force in favour of the domestic government. Credible support for the current regime, and willingness by the international community to intervene would prevent coups in the developing world.²⁰¹

Like Collier, Coyne (2013) also makes the case that military intervention may result in a positive outcome, but only in certain situations. Coyne argues that military intervention is only a successful policy tool once a ceasefire is in place.²⁰² According to Fortna and Howard (2008), “[t]he finding that peacekeeping makes civil wars much less likely to resume once a ceasefire is in place has emerged as a strongly robust result in the quantitative literature.”²⁰³

Although Coyne acknowledges that military intervention can bring positive results when implemented after a ceasefire; he argues that it may produce negative results when

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 128.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 130.

²⁰² Coyne, *Doing Bad by Doing Good*, 55.

²⁰³ Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” *The Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1, (2008): 289, doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022.

used in almost all other circumstances. Coyne argues that the use of military intervention prior to a ceasefire tends to have no effect in encouraging peace and can even reduce the likelihood of a peace settlement occurring.²⁰⁴ Coyne specifically argues that the use of military intervention to force regime change tends to result in poor outcomes such as the renewal of civil conflict because of the fragility of the new regime, local resentments, and the view that the new regime is a puppet being controlled by a foreign government.²⁰⁵ According to Coyne, “a number of studies indicate that attempts by foreign military interveners (U.S.-led and UN-led) to establish consolidated democratic institutions where they do not exist beforehand are likely to have no effect, or even negative effect.”²⁰⁶

Collier’s first argument in favor of military intervention is based on national security interests. According to Collier’s argument – which is supported by other academics and security experts – military intervention is required to prevent future terrorist and security threats. However, Coyne (2008) has argued the exact opposite, arguing that Western intervention has not prevented terrorism, but has created terrorist attacks that are in retaliation to the initial intervention. In fact, military intervention tends to result in a cycle that continually produces more terrorism. Intervention results in terrorist retaliation, which results in greater military intervention and more terrorist retaliation.²⁰⁷ Political scientists John and Karl Mueller (1999), have argued that increased terrorism has also occurred due to U.S. imposed trade sections that resulted in hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths.²⁰⁸ Osama bin Laden has claimed that retaliation against U.S. sanctions was a

²⁰⁴ Coyne, *Doing Bad by Doing Good*, 56.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ Coyne, *After War*, 105.

²⁰⁸ John Mueller and Karl Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 1999, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/1999-05-01/sanctions-mass-destruction>.

motivating factor behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks.²⁰⁹ Although sanctions are much different than military intervention, this example is a useful illustration of Western intervention resulting in the unintended consequence of increased security threats.

Often military intervention is advocated in order to reduce civilian casualties. However, Kuperman (2009) argues that international intervention may also increase the likelihood of mass civilian casualties. Kuperman explains that genocide often takes the form of state retaliation against a minority rebellion group. The possibility of international intervention reduces the expected cost to the minority rebellion group and increases the likelihood of its success. Intervention results in a quasi-Peltzman effect, by reducing the expected cost of rebellion, more rebellions occur, resulting in an increased backlash from the state and greater damage inflicted on the ethnic group supporting the rebellion. Kuperman argues that during the Bosnian war, the ethnic Bosnian-Muslim population would have recognized that any attempt at secession would be equivalent to suicide, as they were vastly out powered by the ethnic Serbs and Croats. However, support from the international community lowered the expected cost of seceding. The Muslim efforts were met by extreme violence resulting in thousands of military and civilian casualties. Kuperman concludes that without international support, the Bosnian-Muslims would have realized the full cost of seceding, and many casualties may have been avoided.²¹⁰

It is important to understand that conflict in fragile states are rarely initiated by poor civilians who are motivated by years of political oppression. Rather, conflict usually

²⁰⁹ Jason Brennan, *Libertarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 34.

²¹⁰ Alan J. Kuperman, "Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect," *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 10, no. 1, (2009): 22, 23, <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/Kuperman%20-%20Rethinking%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect.pdf>.

occurs between the ruling elite who desire a redistribution of resources. Understanding that civil wars are usually motivated by economic motives rather than “grievances,” is extremely important in order to determine a policy that alters incentives. As previously mentioned, the key to effectively initiating development is to alter the incentives and opportunities faced by the population. In terms of peace and security, aid does not seem to be the proper policy tool. Once again, aid may incentivize conflict by increasing the benefit of attaining government power. Although trade liberalization may not have a positive effect on a country currently engaged in civil conflict, trade policies may be appropriate in order to prevent future conflict. For example, trade increases the opportunities of civilians in fragile states. By increasing the amount of employment opportunities, recruits become more costly to a rebellion. Furthermore, as civilians’ income becomes more dependent on trade with Western countries, they are less likely to join a terrorist network that is based on “anti-West” principles. It seems that while development aid may actually produce more conflict, greater trade opportunities seem to greatly increase the cost of rebellion and terrorist attacks against Western nations.

Canada’s current strategy to promote peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa seems appropriate. Canada has currently taken more of an advisory role, providing limited but sophisticated personnel to provide operations and training assistance, and to ensure the cessation of hostilities. At the time of writing, the Government of Canada has just announced that it will be increasing its security presence in Sub-Saharan Africa through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP).²¹¹ The reasoning behind increasing

²¹¹ “Canada to Support Peace Operations,” Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, August 26, 2016, <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiqués/2016/08/26a.aspx?lang=eng>.

security operations is based on the global public good argument posed by Collier. That is, it is in Canada's best interest to provide security in fragile regions in order to prevent future national security threats. This may be a justifiable reason to provide security abroad.

However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that military intervention may actually increase security threats, as terrorists groups initiate harsh retaliatory attacks in response to foreign intervention. It is unclear whether Canada's plan to increase its military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa will improve the situation or result in unintended consequences that just exacerbate the current problems. In order to provide humanitarian assistance, uphold ceasefire agreements, and maintain security during transitions to electoral democracies, short term military assistance may be necessary. However, upon analysis of the literature, it appears that the best policy option to prevent future conflict – conflict prevention is an objective of the PSOP – would be to work towards removing domestic trade barriers. As increased trade helps spur economic growth, providing greater opportunities for civilians, and provides a disincentive to engage in violent conflict.

3.4: Promoting Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Canada has emphasized that the promotion of electoral democracy and democratic values is a prime objective in Sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, this section outlines the role that elections and liberal democratic institutions play in promoting economic growth and reducing the incidence for conflict. The first section outlines Canada's role in spreading democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The second section introduces the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.²¹² The final section outlines the academic debate on the impact of democracy and liberal institutions on political freedoms, economic

²¹² Further analysis on the impact of the Charter on African Union members takes place in Chapter 4.

development and conflict. This sections is concluded with policy implications regarding the promotion of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

3.4.1: Canada's Role in Spreading Democracy

Although scholars such as Moyo have questioned the necessity of democracy in the developing world, good governance, human rights and the rule of law are necessary for a well-functioning private sector. With regards to institution building in Sub-Saharan Africa, Canada has focused on the promotion of democracy, electoral reforms, and strong public institutions. This comes as no surprise given that Canada is a Western-democratic nation whose foreign policy has often been based on the promotion of democracy in the developing world to safeguard against competing ideologies. Canada has worked hard to promote democracy through aiding in the creation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and providing technical assistance for elections observers and public institution educators, and supporting electoral commissions.²¹³

3.4.2: The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

Global Affairs Canada has stated that democracy, effective institutions, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights are necessary requirements for economic growth and stability. In order to meet these requirements, Canada has attempted to promote democracy and political freedom through the creation and implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.²¹⁴ According to Global Affairs Canada, the Charter, “commits member states to establish independent electoral bodies, codes of

²¹³ “Promoting Democracy, Governance, Human Rights, and Rule of Law,” Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified October 28, 2014, <http://www.international.gc.ca/ss-africa-afrique-ss/pdghrrl-pdgdhpd.aspx?lang=eng>.

²¹⁴ “Promoting Democracy, Governance, Human Rights, and Rule of Law,” Global Affairs Canada.

conduct and standards as well as creating an obligation to respond to unconstitutional actions within member states.”²¹⁵ The following section briefly outlines the Charter’s principles.

According to Article 2, the Charter has thirteen primary objectives:

1. Promote the principles of democracy and the universal human rights;
2. Increase adherence to the rule of law, and promote the supremacy of the national constitutions;
3. Promote democratic change of government through fair and free elections;
4. Prohibit unconstitutional change of government;
5. Promote judicial independence;
6. Promote democratic culture and practice;
7. Promote regional and African integrations;
8. Promote sustainable development and human security;
9. Reduce government corruption;
10. Promote political participation, transparency and accountability, access to information, and freedom of the press;
11. Promote gender equality;
12. Promote greater integration between the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, and the international community;

²¹⁵ Ibid.

13. Promote best practices in the management of elections in order to increase political stability and good governance.²¹⁶

The Charter emphasises the importance of good governance, civil participation, and the adherence to the rule of law.²¹⁷ Along with the Articles, the Charter also abides by the objectives and principles within the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Along with the Constitutive Act, the Charter attempts to advance six core issues. The first is the spread of fair and free democratic elections. According to Article 17, all ratifying countries agree to regularly hold “transparent, free and fair elections.”²¹⁸ Among the countries that have either signed or ratified the Charter, there are now fewer countries considered to be electoral democracies than in 2007, when the Charter was officially adopted. In contrast, among the countries that have not ratified or signed the Charter, there were more electoral democracies in 2015 than in 2007.

The second core issue that is addressed in the Charter deals with the unconstitutional change of governments. The Charter prohibits the use of force to overthrow current governments. In an attempt to reduce the forceful removal of governments, member Parties have agreed to cede military and security control to civilians. The Charter also describes the process that should be taken to deal with those that have attempted to take control of government through the use of force.²¹⁹ Although the Charter prohibits the use of force to overthrow a government, in West Africa, ten out of

²¹⁶ “African Charter on Democracy, elections and Governance,” Article 2, African Union, adopted June 30, 2007, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-file-african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance.pdf.

²¹⁷ “African Charter on Democracy, elections and Governance,” Inspiration, African Union.

²¹⁸ Ibid., Article 17.

²¹⁹ Ibid., Article 14, 25.

fourteen attempts to disrupt the democratically elected government have occurred in countries that are Parties to the Charter.²²⁰

The third core issue dealt within the Charter is sustaining economic growth. Article 33 of the Charter establishes a guideline for national governments to follow in order to promote economic development. The guidelines deal with transparency and reducing corruption, reducing public debt, and establishing legislative and regulatory frameworks that encourage the private sector and foreign investment.²²¹

The fourth issue dealt with is equality in terms of economic wealth and social cohesion. Article 33 also deals economic equality by stating that each Party should “promote the equitable allocation of the nation’s wealth and natural resources.”²²² Articles 8 and 10 deal with the removal of any barriers that discriminate against certain groups on the basis of political opinion, gender, ethnicity, and religious beliefs.²²³ There is substantial literature on the instability of new democracies, and the violence that stems from ethnic tensions and inequality. It is apparent that the framers of the Charter implemented these Articles with hopes of reducing the likelihood of violence in states transitioning into democracy.

The fifth core issue deals with reducing the control that political parties have over certain institutions. The Charter places specific emphasis on the need for judicial independence and professional militaries that are not under the control of a certain political party.²²⁴

²²⁰ “Promoting the AU Charter on Democracy,” Elections and Governance in West Africa,” What We Do, National Democratic Institute, last modified June 28, 2013, <https://www.ndi.org/WAEON-symposium>.

²²¹ “African Charter,” Article 33, African Union.

²²² Ibid., Article 33.

²²³ Ibid., Article 8, 10.

²²⁴ Ibid., Article 14, 15.

The final core issue dealt with under the Charter relates to peace, security and the adherence to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Article 38 states that, “Parties shall promote peace, security, and stability in their respective countries, regions and in the continent by following participatory political system.”²²⁵ The Constitutive Act also attempts to provide measures to reduce conflict in Africa. Article 4 attempts to establish a common defense policy for all of Africa. The Act also asserts that all African countries have the obligation to respect fundamental human rights. And in the case of a grave breach of these rights, the African community has the responsibility to intervene on the behalf of the suffering civilians. Although Article 4 recognizes each members’ sovereignty, the Article gives the right to the African Union Assembly to authorize intervention “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.”²²⁶ The Article also recognizes the need for member states to be able to request intervention from the African Union in order to restore peace and stability.²²⁷

The objectives within the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance align well with Canada’s development objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa. Both are concerned with promoting economic growth and development, peace and security, and democracy, effective institutions, and the rule of law.

3.4.3: Spreading Democracy

Canada has focused on promoting democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although politicians and the international community have advocated for the benefits of this

²²⁵ Ibid., Article 38.

²²⁶ “Constitutive Act of the African Union,” Article 4, African Union, adopted July 11, 2000, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf.

²²⁷ “Constitutive Act of the African Union,” Article 4.

approach, there is an on-going debate within the academic community on the merits of promoting democracy as a development tool.

There has been successful cases of the Western world reconstructing failed states through the implementation of liberal democratic institutions. The aftermath of World War II saw two collapsed totalitarian regimes – Germany and Japan – successfully transition into electoral democracies that now have relatively strong economies and peaceful societies. The international community has spent vast human and financial resources to recreate the success of the reconstruction efforts of Germany and Japan. As Coyne (2008) illustrates, “The successful cases of Japan and West Germany have lasting importance...these cases laid the groundwork for the perception that the United States [and the rest of the developed world] had the ability to successfully export liberal democracy.”²²⁸ Developed nations have long recognized that the greatest threat to national security comes from criminal and terrorist networks in poor and undemocratic states. The answer has been to attempt to promote democracy and liberal institutions in these fragile states. However, many academics have debated whether promoting democracy is a good strategy to lift failing states out of poverty and instability.

The argument for establishing liberal democracies in fragile areas typically stems from the democratic peace theory, which argues that democracies tend to be more peaceful and do not go to war with each other. As the greatest threat to Western democracies now comes from fragile areas where democracy is either not present or very weak, politicians largely advocate the spread of democracy as means to improve national security. In 1994, President Bill Clinton argued that, “the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a

²²⁸ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War*, 5.

durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy."²²⁹ Along those same lines, in 2004 President George W. Bush stated, "the reason why I'm so strong on democracy is that democracies don't go to war with each other...That's why I'm such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy."²³⁰ According to these presidents, if the West can successfully promote democracy in fragile states, these states will become more peaceful and better members of the international community.

The benefits of good governance and democratic institutions have long been advocated for by the United Nations (UN). According to Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, "good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty,"²³¹ Although the UN has been a strong advocator for democracy, it was made very clear in their 2002 Development Programme that the presence of elections is not a sufficient condition for democracy.²³² According to the Development Programme there are six institutions that must be in place in order for a society to have a well-functioning democracy:

1. A legislature that embodies the will of the people. The legislature cannot be controlled by the military or any leader;
2. An independent judiciary;

²²⁹ "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," The American Presidency project, accessed August 20, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

²³⁰ "President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East," The White House, Federal Government of the United States of American, accessed August 20, 2016, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041112-5.html>.

²³¹ "Democratic Governance for Human development," UN Development Programme 2002, in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 306.

²³² *Ibid.*, 307.

3. A well-functioning electoral system with multiple political parties;
4. A professional military that is not attached to a political party;
5. An accessible, impediment-free, and unbiased media;
6. A vibrant civil society.²³³

Academics have argued that building stable democratic institutions are crucial in promoting development in fragile regions. According to Paris and Sisk (2007), building effective government institutions “is a crucial element in any larger effort to create conditions for a durable peace and human development.”²³⁴ They argue that in post-conflict situations, without functioning government institutions, violence and poverty will remain the norm.²³⁵ Although they acknowledge the significant challenges involved in intervention and statebuilding, Paris and Sisk conclude, “In the most extreme case, a rejection of statebuilding could effectively abandon tens of millions of people to lawlessness, predation, disease and fear.”²³⁶

Since the end of the Second World War many scholars have questioned both the feasibility of promoting democratic institutions in fragile states, along with whether democracy is necessary for growth and peace. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) urge policy makers to rethink the democratic peace theory that was first constructed by Kant and Paine in the 18th century. Although they acknowledge that stable and mature democracies are the least likely regime to experience violent conflict, their findings for countries transitioning to democracy do not support the theory. In fact, their statistical findings

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, “Postwar Statebuilding,” in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 306.

²³⁵ Ibid., 295

²³⁶ Ibid., 304.

suggest that countries beginning to transition to democracy, “promote the outbreak of war when a state’s institutions are weak.”²³⁷ These findings support Collier’s (1999) data indicating that countries transitioning into democracies are the most likely to experience violent conflict. Collier also finds that newly formed democracies are more at risk of conflict than oppressive totalitarian regimes, findings that are also supported by Mansfield and Snyder.²³⁸ These findings have major implications for Canada’s policy to promote democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. As success would necessarily imply the formation of newly formed democratic states, the outbreak of civil war becomes more likely. Unfortunately, the unintended consequence may be an increased level of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Attempting to establish liberal democratic institutions in fragile regions tend to increase conflict. In many developing countries, citizens view electoral democracies as zero-sum institutions. Rather than benefiting society at large, they only benefit those in power. Coyne (2008) claims that in Somalia, “the central government was seen as a tool to be used by a few to expropriate from the many.” Clans easily identify the vast benefits associated with attaining political power and are willing to incur the cost of violence for the potential of a leading political position within their society.²³⁹ The large political competition among factions may be best summarized by Claude Ake, a renowned Nigerian political scientist, when he stated: “We [Nigerians] are intoxicated with politics; the

²³⁷ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 101.

²³⁸ Collier, “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 71.

²³⁹ Coyne, *After War*, 107

premium on political power is so high that we are prone to take the most extreme measures to win and to maintain power...Politics [is] warfare, a matter of life and death.”²⁴⁰

Coyne explains that there is a wide range of competition involved with democratic institutions. The reasons conflict in developed democracies do not become violent is because of the matured checks and balances. However, in countries transitioning to democracy, the necessary checks and balances have not been established, resulting in leaders attempting to get elected on the basis of ethnic support. Ethnic tensions tend to be played up and the likelihood for violence between groups increases.²⁴¹

Mansfield and Snyder (2009) build on Coyne’s argument that ethnic nationalism, which is amplified through the electoral process, is the main driver behind conflict in newly formed democracies. According to Mansfield and Snyder, democratization and the electoral process incentivizes political elites and ethnic minorities to gain support through ethnic divisions and nationalist sentiments.²⁴² According to Mansfield and Snyder, countries with weak institutions that transition to democracy incur greater political divide, incentivize elites to use nationalist propaganda to gain support, increase competition between nationalist elites, and creates the incentive for ethnic groups to become allies with foreign radicals of the same ethnicity. The end result is that transitioning democracies face a greater likelihood for ethnic violence, genocide, and civil and international war.²⁴³ Based on their work of causal process tracing in numerous case studies, Mansfield and Snyder conclude that, “from a policy standpoint, none of the causal pathways reassure us that

²⁴⁰ Richard Joseph, “Growth, Security, and Democracy in Africa,” *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 4, (2015): 72, <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/article/556411>.

²⁴¹ Coyne, *After War*, 109.

²⁴² Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Pathways to War in Democratic Transitions,” *International Organization* 63, no 2, (2009): 386, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40345939>.

²⁴³ Mansfield and Snyder, “War in Democratic Transitions,” 388.

holding elections in countries with weak political institutions is likely to provide a shortcut to political stability and peace.”²⁴⁴

Whether or not democracies increase the likelihood of violence may not depend solely on how “mature” the democratic state is, and may depend more on the level of per capita income within the state. Collier and Rohner (2008), argue that democracy as a contributing factor to conflict depends on the level of income within the democracy. They argue that without accounting for income, the effects of democracy on conflict are ambiguous. On one hand, democracy may reduce the likelihood of conflict. As governments become more accountable to their citizens, the citizens have less reason to initiate a violent attack against the government. This “accountability effect,” reduces the likelihood of violence.²⁴⁵ However, democracy reduces a government’s technical ability to repress its citizens. This “technical regression in repression” reduces a government’s ability to stop a rebellion and, therefore, increases the likelihood of violence.²⁴⁶ According to Collier and Rohner, the level of income determines whether a democracy is more prone to violence. They found that in rich countries, democracies reduce the likelihood of violence, but in poor countries democracies increase the likelihood of violence.²⁴⁷ Collier and Rohner offer a few explanations for this phenomenon. At high levels of income, additional income becomes worth less, whereas political freedom becomes worth more.²⁴⁸ They argue that this is one of the reasons that at higher incomes, people are more prone to care about political voice. Whereas, in poor countries this is not a large concern. Interestingly, Collier

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 389.

²⁴⁵ Paul Collier and Dominic Rohner, “Democracy, Development and Conflict,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6, no. 2-3 (2008): 2, doi:10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.531.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 1.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 2.

and Rohner, find that unlike democracy, income has the complete opposite effect on the likelihood of violence in autocracies. They find that in autocracies, the likelihood of violence increases as income levels increase.²⁴⁹ This is likely due to the fact that as income increases government accountability and political voice becomes more important.

The second explanation they offer to explain the relationship between income, conflict and democracy is that as income increases, the incentive for political violence decreases.²⁵⁰ At low levels of income the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion is very low, especially in societies where employment opportunities remain scarce. However, as income levels increase the marginal cost associated with joining a rebellion increases – the best alternative use of time increases – and the marginal benefit of joining a rebellion is likely to decrease.

The finding that low-income democracies are more prone to violence has major policy implications for the international community. According to Collier and Rohner, the threshold level of income tends to be around \$2750 per person. That is, at income levels below \$2750 per person, democracy increases the likelihood of violence. While at income levels above \$2750, democracy greatly reduces the likelihood of conflict.²⁵¹ This finding is quite problematic, as the average per capita GDP among African Union members in 2015 was approximately \$2500. This may suggest that promoting democracy in Africa may actually increase the likelihood of conflict on the continent.

Although these findings suggest that promoting democracy in low-income countries may not appear to be a beneficial policy, the authors have a more optimistic

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 5.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 3.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 4.

recommendation. Collier and Rohner conclude, “While these results are troubling, they do not necessarily call into question the promotion of democracy. Rather, they might imply that in low-income countries international promotion of democracy needs to be complemented by international strengthening of security.”²⁵² Although Collier and Rohner recommend that the international community continue to encourage low-income countries to transition towards democracies, they advise interveners to increase their military and security efforts in order to combat the increased risk of conflict. In *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*, Coyne thoroughly illustrates why this may not be such a great idea.

Coyne points to past failures since the 1960s as an indication that “exporting” liberal democratic institutions into the developing world is no easy task, and may be out of the realm of possibility.²⁵³ Coyne looks at twenty-five different American-led reconstruction efforts since the late 1800s. In the situations in which twenty years had passed, only 39 percent of countries had greater political freedoms than prior to the intervention.²⁵⁴ The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance has also produced dismal results. Since the adoption of the Charter in 2007, the countries that have ratified, on average, have not experienced an improvement in the number of electoral democracies, or in their degree of political rights and civil liberties. In fact, the only group to have made political improvements were the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter.

Coyne’s conclusion is that forcing democracy on a nation is unlikely to have the expected positive results. While drawing on past examples in Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and

²⁵² Ibid., 6.

²⁵³ Coyne, *After War*, 6

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 16, 17.

Afghanistan, Coyne argues that intervention efforts to construct a liberal democracy are likely to produce worse outcomes. According to Coyne, “while an effective and strong liberal government might be preferable to the current situation in such countries, often such an outcome is not a realistic option.”²⁵⁵

Coyne offers three main reasons why forcing liberal democratic institutions on a nation is not likely to succeed. The first reason he offers is that “everyone acts purposefully.”²⁵⁶ That is, everyone attempts to make their life better given the constraints they face. The greatest obstacle to resolve conflict and develop democracy – as described earlier – is that many members within fragile societies are benefiting from conflict. Although society as a whole may benefit from the cooperation around democratic institutions, the powerful within these societies benefit from conflict. Wealthy elites have the incentive to defect from democracy and engage in violence. As Coyne explains, it is difficult to get a country to cooperate around liberal democratic institutions when defection is the societal norm. The reason being, there is no incentive to abide by liberal institutions, when everyone else is defecting.²⁵⁷ To illustrate the underlying issue, in a corrupt election, it doesn’t make sense to abide by the electoral rules and remain peaceful. If the current government in power will alter the results in order to remain in power, cooperating with the established rules will only result in defeat. In order to remove the current government from power, the only realistic option is to do so through force. Many fragile states have entered a prisoner’s dilemma where the rational person chooses to defect rather than cooperate with democratic institutions and practices.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 26.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 32.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 37.

However, Coyne argues that it may be possible to move a society from a game of prisoner's dilemma where there is no incentive to cooperate, to a game of coordination where cooperation is the norm. In order to do so, the international community must find a way to change the society's incentives and opportunities. As Coyne points out, "sustainable social change requires either a shift in preferences or a shift in the opportunities facing members of society."²⁵⁸ Although Coyne acknowledges that social change is possible, his conclusions are more sobering: "in reality, only rarely will games of conflict turn into games of pure coordination."²⁵⁹

The second limiting factor of intervention efforts to promote democracy is the history of the country. The different indigenous political systems that have developed, perceptions of Western interests, and centuries of intertribal conflict all reduce the likelihood that democratic institutions will be lasting. Unlike Collier who has asserted that ethnic diversity does not raise the likelihood of conflict, Coyne would argue that in poor societies where conflict is more likely, groups are likely cooperate around ethnic lines. Although ethnic diversity in and of itself may not increase the likelihood of conflict, once conflict does occur, societies are likely to unite along ethnic lines. Over centuries, these tensions between different ethnic groups greatly increase the "transaction costs" involved in cooperation.²⁶⁰ Coyne uses the history of Iraq to explain why cooperation between the Sunnis, Shi'a, and Kurds is very difficult. The long history of conflict between the three groups resulted in distrust that any agreement formed would actually be enforced.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 27.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 39.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 49.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 68.

Although ethnic diversity may not inherently increase the likelihood of conflict, it does reduce the likelihood for cooperation in conflict torn societies.

Coyne argues that the Western ideal of liberal democracy may never work in certain fragile nations because of the indigenous systems and beliefs that have already developed. The norms, beliefs, and enforcement systems all constrain what political institutions are sustainable within a society. If the idea, norms and beliefs that have developed naturally differ from those in the West, it is not realistic to assume that Western ideals will be readily accepted.²⁶² As Coyne explains, in Somalia, citizens identify with their clans and their subgroups within clans, but do not associate themselves with a national identity. He argues that this is the main reason behind the failure of liberal democracies in Somalia, and other countries in Africa.²⁶³

The third reason that outside intervention is likely to fail in building liberal democratic institutions is the knowledge problem.²⁶⁴ The knowledge problem stems from the fact that the international community lacks perfect information on conflict situations, and how to promote economic growth and stability in these situations. The intervener lacks knowledge on two important aspects. The first is on how to resolve the overall situation; there is no consensus on how to implement long lasting liberal institutions in societies where they have never existed. The second gap in knowledge stems from the inability to recognize all of the possible actors and all of their possible motivations and incentives. In any reconstruction effort there are many competing factions, many competing agencies within a donor country, and many competing interest within the

²⁶² Ibid., 55-58.

²⁶³ Ibid., 143.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 24.

international community. Furthermore, once intervention occurs and the formation of an electoral democracy becomes a real possibility, the motivations and incentives of actors change.²⁶⁵ The complexity of the situations should call into question the ability of an outside intervener to successfully foster cooperation.

Another problem associated with incomplete knowledge is the inability to foresee unintended consequences. Often, when interveners attempt to establish liberal democracies the situation becomes worse than before the intervention. Academics and intelligence professionals have long argued that America's attempt to build liberal democracies have increased the amount of terrorist attacks on the Western world. According to Michael Scheur, former head of the CIA's Bin Laden Unit, al Qaeda and other terrorist attacks were not initiated because of an inherent hatred towards the West. Instead, they were a retaliation against Western intervention and their Middle East policies. Scheur claims that intervention has bred a cycle of increased terrorism. Intervention results in increased terrorism, which results in more intervention, and the cycle continues. Scheur concludes that the unintended consequence of American intervention has been attacks like 9/11.²⁶⁶ Along the same lines, Jason Brennan, Professor of Ethics, Economics, and Public Policy at Georgetown University, argues that, "they [Islamic extremist] do not fly airplanes into our buildings because of our freedom. They fly airplanes into buildings because we drop bombs on theirs."²⁶⁷ The U.S. led efforts to produce democratic regime change Iraq have also resulted in unintended consequences. The current situation in Iraq may be worse than the situation in 2003. Coyne argues that

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 58, 59.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 105

²⁶⁷ Brennan, *Libertarianism*, 156.

the Iraq war – beginning in 2003 – provided a training ground for today’s military factions. The failures of the counterinsurgency have also made it easier for terrorist groups to acquire new recruits by allowing terrorist to play up their grievances on how the West’s true role in the Middle East is occupation rather than liberation.²⁶⁸ State building efforts have resulted in similar results in Africa. Coyne claims that the unintended consequence of attempting to build a liberal democracy in Somalia has been an increase in conflict.²⁶⁹

Arising from the knowledge problem stems what Coyne refers to as the “nirvana fallacy.” Although policymakers lack complete or even adequate knowledge on how to bring peace, prosperity, and democratic institutions in fragile regions, they still believe that outside intervention may produce a better outcome than what would arise without intervention.²⁷⁰ Coyne argues that policymakers tend to ignore the possibility of government failure; even with a “perfect” policy plan, the implementation may be wasteful and poorly executed. Coyne concludes that:

*The central implication of the nirvana fallacy is that it is not always preferable for foreign governments to intervene in weak and failed states...Given the potential for negative unintended consequences, as well as the real possibility that such interventions can cause more harm than good, refraining from interventions aimed at establishing liberal democratic institutions seems to be the default strategy that should be followed.*²⁷¹

Paris and Sisk define statebuilding as the development of “legitimate and effective government institutions.”²⁷² Although they believe that an effective state is necessary for post conflict countries to escape instability and poverty, they conclude that international

²⁶⁸ Coyne, *After War*, 109.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 111.

²⁷² Paris and Sisk, “Postwar Statebuilding,” in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 295.

statebuilding efforts have been largely unsuccessful. They illustrate that even in “successful” cases where statebuilding has resulted in electoral democracy, they tend to be “superficial” democracies. They point to examples such as Cambodia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Liberia as illustrations in where “successful” statebuilding operations did not result in sustainable or effective institutions. Rwanda and Liberia even saw a return to violence and authoritarian rule after the establishment of an electoral democracy.²⁷³

Paris and Sisk note that during reconstruction and statebuilding efforts, often interveners need to make short-term agreements that often hinder their long-term objectives. They explain that in order to maintain ceasefires, or other agreements, interveners often need to give in to the demands of certain factions.²⁷⁴ Although this may be necessary at the time, other factions are likely to feel betrayed and view the interveners as biased in favour of the other group. Inevitably, interveners will have to cooperate with the leaders of former factions. However, this may be more difficult than it may first seem. If interveners allow a certain faction to become too involved in the political process, the new institutions may be viewed by the public as illegitimate, corrupt, and even criminal, which could result in violent uprisings. However, if factions feel neglected from the political process they will have the incentive to violently take control of the political system.²⁷⁵

Due to the association of violence with newly formed democracies, some have argued that elections should not take place until economic growth has occurred and stability has been achieved. Scholars such as Robert Rothberg, recommend that interveners

²⁷³ Ibid..

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 299.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 300.

should make sure that the region is secured and factions are demobilized, economic growth has been achieved, and legal norms have been established and followed before elections have occurred. Scholars who take this stance do not believe that an electoral democracy is needed to initiate security, economic growth, or societal well-being. In fact, they argue that in post conflict situations, certain institutions must already be in place before elections will have positive impacts.²⁷⁶

There does not seem to be any conclusive evidence to suggest that democracy reduces conflict, promote economic growth, or improves human development. As noted above, well-established democracies tend to be the most peaceful political regime. However, newly established democracies are the most prone to conflict, even more so than countries under total authoritarian rule. There also does not appear to be any link between democracy and economic growth. Most of today's most successful economies are democracies. However, substantial economic growth has occurred in Asian countries under authoritarian regimes. According to the 2002 UN Development Programme, "the literature finds no causal relationship between democracy and economic performance, in either direction."²⁷⁷ In fact, there is no significant relationship between democracies and improvements in human development indicators. According to the Development Programme, "Mali has progressed further than Togo in stabilizing its democratic structures but has done no better in spreading primary schooling, raising literacy or reducing infant mortality."²⁷⁸ Narayan, Narayan, and Smyth's (2011) empirical study on the relationship

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 301

²⁷⁷ "Democratic Governance for Human development," UN Development Programme 2002, in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 308.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 310.

between democracy and economic growth seems to concur with the UN Development Programme's assertion that the causal relationship between democracy and growth has not been fully proven. Their findings suggest support for the "skeptical view" of the democracy-growth nexus. That is, there is no systematic relationship between democracy and economic growth; the effectiveness of the policies that are implemented matters more than the type of political regime.²⁷⁹

It appears that Prezeworski and Limongi's statement in 1993, may still be the best way to sum up the academic literature on the democracy-development-conflict nexus. They concluded: "we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders growth."²⁸⁰ From the above debate, I think this statement can easily apply to conflicts as well. Although academics and many politicians have argued that democracy will reduce conflict, there is substantial evidence to suggest otherwise. Most academics and policymakers would agree that democratic institutions that resemble those in the West – rule of law, property rights, and an independent judiciary – are necessary for improving the standard of living in fragile regions. However, there is still great debate on whether Western intervention can effectively implement these institutions. After examining the published evidence, it is difficult to recommend that Global Affairs Canada should continue its efforts to promote the spread of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. As most countries in the region have low-incomes and weak political institutions, it is likely that democratic regime change may

²⁷⁹ Paresh Kumar Narayan, Seema Narayan and Russell Smyth, "Does Democracy Facilitate Economic Growth or Does Economic Growth Facilitate Democracy? An Empirical Study of Sub-Saharan Africa," *Economic Modeling* 28, no. 3, (2011): 901-910, http://ac.els-cdn.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/S0264999310002269/1-s2.0-S0264999310002269-main.pdf?_tid=e11f0b64-6b2d-11e6-8af1-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1472175727_f53c91a3753a5f3c45b464b08ffab250.

²⁸⁰ Adam Prezeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7, no. 3, (1993): 64, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/docview/1300246612?pq-origsite=summon>.

actually increase the level of conflict in the region. Instead, the Government of Canada should focus on policies that create economic growth. Although there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the implementation of a democracy improves economic conditions and reduces the level of conflict, there is evidence in the literature to suggest that economic growth increases the demand for democratic institutions, while increasing the cost of conflict. Instead of creating democratic institutions to promote economic prosperity and security, economic prosperity appears to result in political participation, democratic institutions, and increased security.

Chapter 4: The African Charter and Canada's Foreign Policy Objectives

Global Affairs Canada has three broad development goals in Sub-Saharan Africa. They are to increase economic growth and development, promote peace and security, and promote electoral democracies and democratic institutions. One of the policies that Global Affairs Canada has used to attempt to achieve these goals is the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Through the use of ten progress indicators – three measures of democratic institutions and political freedoms, three measures of economic well-being, two measure of human development, and two measures of conflict – I will examine the impact of the African Charter on fifty-three African Union members since its adoption in 2007. The three political indicators measure the number of electoral democracies, the political rights and civil liberties in each country. In terms of political rights and civil liberties, the lower the score, the greater the political freedoms, with 1 being the greatest degree of freedom and 7 being the lowest degree of freedom. The economic indicators look to determine the per capita GDP, per capita GDP growth rates, and the degree of income equality in each country. I use the Gini index to measure the level of income equality in each country. A reduction in the Gini index represents an improvement in terms of equality. A score of 0 represent perfect income equality, whereas a score of 100 represent perfect income inequality. The development indicators measure the annual life expectancy at birth and the number of under five-year old deaths per year in each country. I also use data from two sources to track the number of annual battle deaths in each country. For further discussion on the indicators and the quantitative results refer to Appendix I-IV. As the tables in the following three sections were constructed from data retrieved from many different sources, they are cited in Appendix I.

The analysis on the African Charter is broken into three sections. The first section uses the above indicators to determine whether Canada's countries of focus have made progress in the past twenty-five years. The countries of focus are then compared to the average of the fifty-three African Union members. The second section looks to determine whether countries that have ratified the Charter have made greater progress since 2007 than the countries that have not ratified the Charter. The final section compares the ten countries with the highest per capita GDP in 2015 with the ten countries with the lowest per capita GDP. The objective of the final section is to determine whether ratifying the Charter has contributed to the success of the well-off countries, or whether the failure to ratify the Charter contributed to the poor results among the least well-off countries.

4.1: Countries of Focus in Sub-Saharan Africa

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is currently undergoing development efforts in ten countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁸¹ This section analyzes the progress made by Canada's "countries of focus,"²⁸² by comparing these countries with the average of the fifty-three states in the African Union. In addition, this section determines whether the countries of focus were more likely to implement the Charter, and whether or not the countries of focus that have ratified the Charter have progressed since its adoption in 2007. I have collected data for all ten progress indicators over the past twenty-five years. The results are summarized in Table 1. As an objective is to determine whether the Charter may have contributed to the progress made by all African countries, I compare the progress made

²⁸¹ "Where we Work In International Development," Global Affairs Canada.

²⁸² Refer to Appendix V for data on Canada's ten countries of focus.

prior to 2007, to the progress made by each country in the post 2007 period. For convenience, I have highlighted improvements made since 2007 in **green**, and have highlighted regressions in **orange**. For further clarification of the progress indicators refer to Appendix I. For a more in-depth quantitative analysis of the results refer to Appendix II.

Table 1: The Countries of Focus and the African Charter


Indicators	Average of GAC Countries of Focus	Average of African Union Members
Ratified	6	23
Signed	3	23
Haven't Signed or Ratified	1	7
Electoral Democracies in 2007	5	24
Electoral Democracies in 2015	4	23
Political Rights in 2007	3.22	4.44
Political Rights in 2015	4.10	4.51
Civil Liberties in 2007	3.33	4.15
Civil Liberties in 2015	3.90	4.42
GDP/Capita in 2007 (Current USD)	2,758.19	2,226.89
GDP/Capita in 2015 (Current USD)	3,158.02	2,503.57
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 1991-2007 (%)	1.53	1.79
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 2008-2015 (%)	2.53	1.65
Difference in Growth (%)	1	-0.14
Gini Index 1991-2007	40.69	43.62
Gini Index 2008-2015	39.64	43.31
Average Annual Life Expectancy 1991-2007 (Years)	52.24	54.35
Average Annual Life Expectancy 2008-2015 (Years)	58.78	59.46
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	143,115.86	77,326.24
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	105,243.22	61,876.18
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	1,201.68	1,034.20
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	348.40	484.05

ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1997-2007 (Number)	560.91	620.20
ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	389.65	243.95

According to Table 1, countries where Canada is engaged follow similar trends as other African Union (AU) members regarding their decision to ratify the Charter. However, Canada’s “countries of focus” were slightly more likely to ratify the Charter than the AU average. As illustrated in Table 1, 60 percent of the countries of focus have ratified the Charter, whereas less than 45 percent of all AU countries have decided to ratify.

Given the greater percentage of countries of focus that have ratified the Charter, it would seem logical to assume that the countries of focus have made greater institutional improvements since 2007. However, the data illustrates that the countries of focus have not made any improvements in the chosen indicators since the creation of the Charter. Contrary to the objectives of the Charter and Canada’s objectives, Table 1 illustrates that citizens living in the countries of focus have actually seen a reduction in their political rights and civil liberties since 2007. This trend is similar for all countries in the AU. On average, African citizens have less political rights and civil liberties since the Charter was created in 2007. It appears that the Charter has failed to improve the political institutions in Africa. Although both groups of countries have regressed in terms of political freedoms, it appears that they are making improvements in terms of economic well-being. Figure 4 illustrates improvements in the standard of living – measured by per capita GDP – realized by the African Union since 1991.

Figure 4: Standard of Living Improvements in Africa



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2015*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

Figure 4 corresponds with the results in Table 1, illustrating that on average, African Union members have experienced improvements in their standard of living. However, since 2007, the countries of focus have made greater improvements than the AU average. This is illustrated in Figure 4 by the greater slope of the GAC curve after the year 2007. Referring to Table 1, it is clear that the GAC countries realized greater growth improvements since the adoption of the Charter. During 2008-2015 the annual average growth rate increased by 1 percent for the countries of focus relative to the pre-Charter period. In contrast, on average, all AU members experienced higher growth rates prior to the adoption of the Charter in 2007. In terms of income equality, it appears that all AU countries have made improvements. However, Table 1 illustrates that the countries of focus have made greater improvements since 2007 than the AU average. The post-Charter period saw a 2.57 percent reduction in the Gini index (greater income equality) for the countries of focus. This same

period saw a reduction in income inequality, on average, by 0.14 percent for all AU members. It appears that all African Union members have made economic progress since the adoption of the African Charter in 2007, with countries of focus being better off in terms of per capita GDP, annual growth rates, and income equality. However, I cannot contribute this economic success to the Charter, as economic progress began prior to its creation. As illustrated in Figure 4, economic growth began to accelerate in 1999 – several years prior to the introduction of the Charter.

As illustrated in Table 1, substantial progress has been made in terms of development indicators since the creation of the African Charter nearly a decade ago. Since 2007, there has been a major improvement in the average life expectancy, and the early childhood mortality rate. According to the data presented Table 1 and Appendix II, the post-Charter period saw the average life expectancy increase by 6.54 and 5.11 years for the countries of focus and the AU average respectively. Since the adoption of the Charter, the number of average annual early childhood deaths have decreased by 26.46 and 19.98 percent for the countries of focus and the AU average respectively.²⁸³ Although it appears that the countries of focus are making greater improvements than the AU average, they still experience greater childhood deaths and a lower life expectancy than the AU average. Although I cannot conclude that Canada's engagement or the creation of the Charter has caused these improvements, it appears that all AU members are experiencing human development progress.

²⁸³ The data for all percentage changes are illustrated in Appendix II.

Since 2007, the average number of battle related deaths has been falling for countries within the African Union. From the data presented in Table 1, it is difficult to determine whether the countries where Canada is engaged have experienced a greater reduction in battle deaths. Although both sets of data illustrate a similar trend, the data from the World Bank suggests that the countries of focus have experienced a greater percentage reduction in battle deaths than the AU average. However, the data retrieved from the ACLED suggests the exact opposite. Regardless, it is apparent that since the creation of the Charter, average annual battle related deaths have decreased.

From the data in Table 1, it appears that Canada's countries of focus have made improvements greater than the average AU country. However, these improvements are not likely best explained by the implementation of the Charter or Canada's presence. As demonstrated in Figure 4, economic growth occurred prior to the creation of the Charter. Additionally, although the countries of focus have experienced greater improvements, it appears that they are following the trend of all AU members. That is, all AU members seem to be making progress in terms of economic well-being, human development, and conflict management. Furthermore, as discussed in section 3 (4.3) and the final chapter, the greater progress made by Canada's countries of focus is likely due to the fact that Canada is typically not working in the least well-off countries. In terms of 2015 per capita GDP, only two out of the ten "bottom" countries – the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique – are GAC countries of focus. This coincides with Collier's argument that one of the downfalls of the development industry is that the international community is not

focusing its resources on the countries that are the most in need.²⁸⁴ Interestingly, since the creation of the Charter, on average, all AU members have experienced a decline in terms of their political freedoms.

From the data presented in Table 1 and the above discussion, the impact of the Charter remains unclear. The following sections will look to address this uncertainty by comparing the progress made by the countries that have ratified the Charter with the progress made by countries that have not ratified the Charter.

4.2: Are Countries That Have Ratified the Charter Better Off?

The following section looks to determine whether countries that have ratified the Charter have made greater progress than those that have not ratified the Charter. The countries will be organized into three groups: those that have ratified, those that have signed but not ratified, and those that have neither signed nor ratified the Charter. Each group is then compared based on the institutional, economic, development, and conflict indicators. For further explanation on the progress indicators refer to Appendix I. The summary of the quantitative analysis is presented in Table 2. In order to determine the effectiveness of the Charter, Table 2 illustrates whether each group has made improvements or has regressed since 2007. For convenience, I have highlighted improvements made since 2007 in **green**, and have highlighted regressions in **orange**. For further quantitative analysis on the impact of the Charter among the three groups refer to Appendix III.

²⁸⁴ Collier, *Bottom Billion*, 3.

Figure 2: The Impact of the Charter on African Union Members


Indicators	Ratified	Signed	Haven't Signed or Ratified
Number of Countries	23	23	7
Electoral Democracies in 2007	11	11	2
Electoral Democracies in 2015	10	10	3
Political Rights in 2007	4.23	4.43	5.14
Political Rights in 2015	4.48	4.48	4.71
Civil Liberties in 2007	4.14	4.04	4.57
Civil Liberties in 2015	4.35	4.43	4.57
GDP/Capita in 2007 (Current USD)	960.11	2,749.83	4,564.64
GDP/Capita in 2015 (Current USD)	1,190.27	2,975.46	5,308.33
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 1991-2007 (%)	1.18	2.40	1.80
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 2008-2015 (%)	2.28	1.06	1.41
Difference in Growth (%)	1.10	-1.34	-0.39
Gini Index 1991-2007	42.82	43.57	49.26
Gini Index 2008-2015	43.17	43.61	43.00
Average Annual Life Expectancy 1991-2007 (Years)	50.95	56.15	59.61
Average Annual Life Expectancy 2008-2015 (Years)	56.52	60.73	64.97
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	111,225.27	52,943.46	46,058.59
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	87,882.69	44,925.53	32,121.20
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	663.98	752.73	5,781.20
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	540.24	362.22	667.00
ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1997-2007 (Number)	355.33	764.58	1,090.05

ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	302.83	191.05	185.73
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According to the data presented in Table 2, it appears that ratifying or signing the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance has not improved the number of electoral democracies or the quality of democratic institutions among participating countries. In fact, the only group of countries that have experienced a greater degree of political freedoms since the creation of the Charter were the countries that did not sign or ratify the Charter. Furthermore, the only group of countries that saw an increase in the amount of electoral democracies since 2007 were the countries that did not sign or ratify the Charter. Countries that signed or ratified the Charter actually saw a reduction in the number of electoral democracies since the creation of the Charter. With regards to civilian's political rights, again, only countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter saw an improvement in political rights, while civilians living in either countries that have signed or ratified saw reductions in their political rights. As illustrated in Table 2, no group of countries have made any improvements in their civil liberties. However, only the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter did not become worse off. Since 2007, countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have made the greatest improvements in political institutions. However, in absolute terms, civilians living in countries that have either signed or ratified the Charter live with greater political rights and civil liberties. This cannot be attributed to the implementation of the Charter, as these countries had greater political rights and civil liberties prior to its creation in 2007. After examining the data presented in Table 2, I cannot conclude that signing or ratifying the Charter has resulted in greater improvements in the degree of democratic institutions and political freedoms.

Although the only group to make improvements in terms of the political indicators were the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter, it appears that all countries have made improvements in their standard of living – as measured by per capita GDP – since the creation of the Charter in 2007. Figure 5 graphs the three groups of countries' average annual per capita GDP since 1991. According to Figure 5, it is apparent that the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have the greatest standard of living among all African Union members.

Figure 5: The Impact of the Charter on Standards of Living in Africa



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2015*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

The economic indicators illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 5 suggest that signing or ratifying the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance did not result in significant improvements to the countries' economic well-being. In fact, the countries that have had the most economic success are countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter. According to Table 2, the average per capita GDP in 2015 of the countries that

neither signed nor ratified the Charter was close to 4.5 times greater than those that have ratified the Charter. Countries that have signed but not ratified also saw significant improvements in their standard of living. Since 1991, these countries have experienced the greatest amount of growth in per capita GDP. In 2015 their average per capita GDP was close to 2.5 times greater than countries that have ratified the Charter. Although the countries that ratified, on average, have the lowest per capita GDP, they have experienced the greatest per capita GDP growth rates between 2008 and 2015. However, the relatively large growth rates do not represent significant economic progress, rather the high growth rates are best explained by the low starting per capita GDP.

Although the countries that have ratified the Charter have agreed to implement policies that encourage economic equality,²⁸⁵ Table 2 illustrates that the only countries to reduce income inequality since 2007 are those that have not signed or ratified the Charter. According to the data illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 5, countries that have not ratified the Charter appear to be enjoying the greatest economic success, while countries that have ratified continue to have struggling economies. The economic indicators suggest that ratifying the Charter has not resulted in major improvements in economic well-being.

All countries have experienced major development improvements since the creation of the African Charter in 2007. As illustrated in Table 2, countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have the longest life expectancy, and the fewest number of early childhood deaths. However, the greatest improvements, in terms of life expectancy, have

²⁸⁵ Refer to Chapter 3 (3.4.2) for a further discussion on the principles included in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

been made in countries that have ratified. Although countries that have ratified have experienced the greatest improvements, they are still the worse off. The average life expectancy for people in countries that have ratified was 8.45 years less than those living in countries that have neither signed nor ratified between 2008 and 2015. Similar to life expectancy, Table 2 illustrates that all groups of countries have seen improvements in early childhood deaths. However, countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have made the greatest improvements since 2007. Between 2008 and 2015, ratified countries have experienced an average of 42,957 more early childhood deaths per year than countries that have only signed, and 55,761 more deaths than countries that have not signed or ratified. Although countries that have ratified the Charter have made development improvements, the improvements made by those that have not ratified the Charter have been more impressive.

The limitations of conflict data are well known. As explained in Chapter 3 (3.3.4), there are numerous reasons why conflict data may be misleading. For these reasons I decided to acquire data from two well-respected sources in order to increase confidence surrounding the findings. Although both sources offer different numbers for annual average battle related deaths, the trends are very similar. All groups of countries have experienced reductions in average annual battle related deaths since the creation of the Charter in 2007. According to both sets of data presented in Table 2, countries that have ratified the Charter have experienced only small reductions in battle related deaths since 2007, while the other groups of countries have experienced significantly greater reductions. According to the data collected from the World Bank, the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter experienced an 88.5 percent reduction in annual average

battle-related deaths since the adoption of the Charter. Whereas those that have ratified have experienced only an 18.6 percent reduction in annual battle-related deaths since 2007. The greater improvement made by countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter should not be attributed to their large initial amount of deaths, but should be attributed to their large annual reductions following 2007. For example, according to the World Bank the post-Charter number of deaths decreased, on average, by 5,114 per year within countries that neither signed nor ratified. Whereas, those that ratified experienced, on average, 124 less annual deaths since the creation of the Charter.²⁸⁶ Although I cannot make the claim that not ratifying the Charter has resulted in major reductions in combat related deaths, it is clear that, on average, ratifying the Charter has not resulted in major reductions in conflict.

According to the data presented in Table 2, it appears that the countries that have ratified the Charter have not made significant improvements relative to the countries that have only signed or to the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter. Although ratified countries have experienced greater growth in average annual per capita GDP and annual life expectancy, it should not be concluded that the ratification of the Charter led to substantial improvements. The relatively large increase in annual growth rates is better explained by the low starting per capita GDP rather than any substantial improvement in economic potential. Due to the low initial per capita GDP any small improvement will be magnified through greater growth rates. Although countries that ratified experienced greater improvements in life expectancy, their average annual life expectancy still remains

²⁸⁶ The ACLED data are extremely similar to the World Bank data, Refer to Appendix III for the analysis including the data acquired from ACLED.

nearly 8.5 years lower than in countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter. Countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have experienced greater improvements in the number of countries with electoral democracies, political rights, income equality, reductions in early childhood deaths, and combat related deaths. Furthermore, these countries have much longer average life expectancies and their per capita GDP is approximately 4.5 times greater than countries that have ratified the Charter. Since 2007, it cannot be concluded that the countries that have ratified the Charter have experienced greater institutional, economic, developmental, or conflict-related improvements than the countries that have not.

The African Charter alone has not generated great improvements among African Union members. These results are consistent with the evidence in the published literature reviewed in Chapter 3 (3.4.3). The fundamental failure of the Charter is that it does not have the ability to alter the incentives and opportunities available in these countries. The result has been no substantial social change. The lack of enforcement partly explains why the Charter has failed to bring substantial gains to the Parties that have ratified the agreement. There remains a clear time-consistency problem, where leaders of the country can agree to abide by the liberal democratic institutions in place, and then defect on the ir promise whenever it is in their short-term interest to do so. Other actors within these countries – leaders of other factions, potential investors, and civilians – understand that the lack of enforcement allows leaders to defect from their agreement to uphold the Charter. The other actors then realize it is in their best interest to also defect from the agreement. For example, instead of respecting the outcomes of an election, rival factions will predict that the current leader does not have the incentive to abide by electoral rules. It will then

be in their best interest to use force to gain state power, rather than peacefully accept the electoral results and begin campaigning for the next election. As previously noted, ten military coups in Western Africa have taken place in countries that have ratified the Charter.²⁸⁷ Once defection from the principles of the Charter becomes profitable and inevitably occurs, cooperating with the Charter is not a best response. That is, once defection occurs, cooperating is not in anyone's best interest. Without an enforcement mechanism to make the agreement credible, the Charter is not likely to significantly improve the standard of living in Sub-Saharan Africa.

4.3: The Charter and the Gap

It appears that there has been a clear divergence between the “top” countries in the African Union who have the greatest per capita GDP, and the countries at the “bottom” that have been unable to experience any significant economic progress. This section outlines the differences between those at the “top” and those stuck at the “bottom.” As the main focus is to determine how the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance may have affected political institutions, economic growth and development, and peace and security the analysis will compare trends before and after the creation of the Charter. This section ultimately determines whether the Charter has encouraged growth in the top countries, and whether the failure to ratify the Charter is a reason behind the poor economic performance in the bottom countries.

²⁸⁷ “Promoting the AU Charter on Democracy,” Elections and Governance in West Africa,” What We Do, National Democratic Institute, last modified June 28, 2013, <https://www.ndi.org/WAEON-symposium>.

The countries with the highest standard of living in 2015 – measured by per capita GDP – are illustrated in Table 3. Likewise, the countries with the lowest standard of living are included in Table 4. Canada’s countries of focus in Sub-Saharan Africa are indicated in red. As mentioned in the methodology, South Sudan – a Canadian country of focus – lacked data regarding their standard of living in 2015. It is possible that South Sudan could be included within the bottom countries. However, because of the lack of data I have left South Sudan out of the analysis. Refer to Appendix I for full definitions and citations of indicators used within the section.

Table 3: Countries with the Highest Standard of Living in Africa


Country	2015 GDP/Capita (Current USD)	1991-2015 Average Growth rate (%)	Charter Status	Electoral Democracy in 2015?	Life Expectancy in 2014 (Years)	1991-2015 Average Annual Battle Deaths
Seychelles	\$15,476.02	2.52	Neither	Yes	73.2	..
Equatorial Guinea	\$11,120.86	17.13	Signed	No	57.6	..
Mauritius	\$9,116.83	3.61	Signed	Yes	74.2	..
Gabon	\$8,311.48	-0.06	Signed	No	64.4	..
Botswana	\$6,360.64	2.53	Neither	Yes	64.4	..
South Africa	\$5,691.69	0.74	Ratified	Yes	57.2	1,292.4
Namibia	\$4,695.77	2.22	Signed	Yes	64.7	21.0
Libya	\$4,643.31	1.65	Neither	No	71.7	1,126.0
Algeria	\$4,206.03	1.23	Signed	No	74.8	771.9
Angola	\$4,102.12	1.90	Signed	No	52.3	1,678.0
Average	\$7,372.48	3.35	Ratified=1 Signed=6 Neither=3	Yes=5 No=5	65.5	977.9

Table 4: Countries with the Lowest Standard of Living in Africa

Country	2015 GDP/Capita (Current USD)	1991-2015 Average Growth rate (%)	Charter Status	Electoral Democracy in 2015?	Life Expectancy in 2014 (Years)	1991-2015 Average Annual Battle Deaths
Burundi	\$275.98	-1.58	Signed	No	56.7	540.3
Central African Republic	\$306.78	-1.61	Signed	No	50.7	112.2
Niger	\$358.96	0.03	Ratified	Yes	61.5	35.6
Malawi	\$381.37	1.75	Ratified	Yes	62.7	..
Madagascar	\$411.82	-0.66	Signed	Yes	65.1	..
Liberia	\$455.87	1.86	Signed	Yes	60.8	536.4
Democratic Republic of Congo	\$456.05	-1.94	Signed	No	58.7	1,313.5
Mozambique	\$525.01	4.58	Signed	No	55.0	554.0
Guinea	\$531.32	0.05	Ratified	No	58.7	323.5
Togo	\$547.97	0.23	Ratified	No	59.7	..
Average	\$425.11	0.27	Ratified=4 Signed=6 Neither=0	Yes=7 No=3	59.0	487.9


There is a clear distinction between the best-off countries and the worse-off countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Along with Tables 3 and 4, Figure 6A clearly demonstrates the difference in economic well-being among both groups of countries. According to the above tables, the 2015 average per capita GDP of the top countries was \$6,947.37 greater than in the bottom countries. This difference is clearly illustrated in Figure 6A. Because of the large difference in per capita GDP I have re-created Figure 6A to include an additional vertical axis in order to better represent the trend in growth of per capita GDP among the bottom countries, which is graphed in Figure 6B.

Figure 6A: Standard of Living Between Top and Bottom Countries



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2015*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

Figure 6B: Standard of Living Between Top and Bottom Countries



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2015*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

As illustrated in Figure 6A there is a large difference between the top and bottom countries in terms of per capita GDP. However, Figure 6B demonstrates that since the adoption of the African Charter in 2007, on average the bottom countries have experienced growth in per capita GDP, while on average the top countries have experienced a reduction in per capita GDP.

The rest of this section will employ the ten progress indicators to further analyze the impact of the Charter on the top and bottom countries. Table 5 compares the progress made in terms of political and democratic freedoms, economic growth, human development and conflict reduction between both groups of countries since the adoption of the Charter. In order to determine whether the success of the top countries can be attributed to the Charter, Table 6 compares the progress made by countries that have ratified, signed, or have done neither since 2007. In order to determine whether the failure to ratify the Charter has contributed to the dismal performance of the bottom countries, Table 7 compares the progress made those that have ratified with those that have only signed the Charter. For convenience, I have highlighted improvements made since 2007 in **green**, and have highlighted regressions in **orange**. For further quantitative analysis on the impact of the on the top and bottom countries refer to Appendix IV.

Table 5: The Impact of the Charter on the Top and Bottom Countries

Indicators	Top Countries	Bottom Countries
Ratified	1	4
Signed	6	6
Haven't Signed or Ratified	3	0
Electoral Democracies in 2007	5	7
Electoral Democracies in 2015	5	7
Political Rights in 2007	4.2	4.2
Political Rights in 2015	4.2	4.4
Civil Liberties in 2007	3.8	4.4
Civil Liberties in 2015	4	4.7
GDP/Capita in 2007 (Current USD)	7,759.34	330.41
GDP/Capita in 2015 (Current USD)	7,372.47	425.11
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 1991-2007 (%)	4.51	-0.06
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 2008-2015 (%)	1.09	0.97
Difference in Growth (%)	-3.42	1.03
Gini Index 1991-2007	49.82	40.23
Gini Index 2008-2015	52.67	42.98
Average Annual Life Expectancy 1991-2007 (Years)	60.91	50.56
Average Annual Life Expectancy 2008-2015 (Years)	64.39	57.23
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	27,439.79	91,199.71
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	27,296.31	73,029.38
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	1,085.95	571.6
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	586.5	529.26
ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1997-2007 (Number)	1,336.58	298.86
ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	132.45	140.72

Table 6: The Charter and the Top Countries

Indicators	Ratified	Signed	Haven't Signed or Ratified
Number of Countries	1	6	3
Political Rights in 2007	2.00	4.67	4.00
Political Rights in 2015	2.00	4.67	4.00
Civil Liberties in 2007	2.00	4.00	4.00
Civil Liberties in 2015	2.00	4.50	3.67
GDP/Capita in 2007 (Current USD)	6,161.22	7,065.21	9,680.30
GDP/Capita in 2015 (Current USD)	5,691.69	6,925.51	8,826.66
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 1991-2007 (%)	0.93	5.88	2.99
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 2008-2015 (%)	0.34	1.08	1.37
Difference in Growth (%)	-0.59	-4.8	-1.62
Gini Index 1991-2007	64.79	44.12	53.75
Gini Index 2008-2015	63.38	46.51	..
Average Annual Life Expectancy 1991-2007 (Years)	57.00	59.22	65.60
Average Annual Life Expectancy 2008-2015 (Years)	55.10	63.42	69.43
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	76,010.00	31,922.52	2,284.27
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	59,040.40	34,835.30	1,636.97
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	1,546.20	932.53	..
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	929.70	145.15	1,126.00
ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1997-2007 (Number)	5.60	2,137.24	0.40
ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	5.00	52.60	395.80

Table 7: The Charter and the Bottom Countries

Indicators	Ratified	Signed
Number of Countries	4	6
Political Rights in 2007	4.50	4.00
Political Rights in 2015	3.75	4.83
Civil Liberties in 2007	4.50	4.33
Civil Liberties in 2015	4.00	5.17
GDP/Capita in 2007 (Current USD)	364.85	307.44
GDP/Capita in 2015 (Current USD)	454.91	405.25
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 1991-2007 (%)	0.16	-0.20
Annual GDP/Capita Growth 2008-2015 (%)	1.28	0.76
Difference in Growth (%)	1.12	0.96
Gini Index 1991-2007	36.69	40.60
Gini Index 2008-2015	39.33	46.64
Average Annual Life Expectancy 1991-2007 (Years)	50.33	50.72
Average Annual Life Expectancy 2008-2015 (Years)	58.05	56.37
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	71,811.78	104,125.00
Average Annual Early Childhood Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	51,440.83	87,421.75
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1991-2007 (Number)	200.75	719.94
World Bank Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	1,392.60	313.43
ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 1997-2007 (Number)	32.98	476.12
ACLED Average Annual Battle-Related Deaths 2008-2015 (Number)	11.83	226.65

The main objective of this section is to determine whether the most successful countries have benefited from ratifying the Charter, or whether the least successful countries have been made worse off by not ratifying the Charter. There is no evidence to suggest that ratifying the Charter is a contributing factor to the success of those countries at the top. In fact, the vast majority of the countries at the top have not ratified the Charter. As illustrated in Table 6, only one of the top countries – South Africa – has ratified the Charter, while six have only signed and three countries have not signed or ratified the Charter. Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that not ratifying the Charter is a contributing factor to the failures of the countries at the bottom. Interestingly, Table 7 demonstrates that among the countries at the bottom, it appears that ratifying the Charter may have been beneficial.

Table 5 demonstrates that all countries that were considered electoral democracies in 2007 remained electoral democracies in 2015. Since the adoption of the Charter the number of democracies among the top and bottom countries remains unchanged. Interestingly, there are seven electoral democracies within the bottom group of countries, while only five of the top countries are considered electoral democracies.

On average, countries with the higher per capita GDP also had greater political rights. As illustrated in Table 5, in 2015 the top countries achieved a political rights and civil liberties score of 4.2 and 4 respectively. Whereas the bottom countries had a political rights and civil liberties score of 4.4 and 4.7 respectively.²⁸⁸ Although, the top countries were less likely to ratify the Charter or to be considered an electoral democracy, their


²⁸⁸ Recall that a lower score corresponds to greater political freedoms.

citizens enjoyed greater political freedoms. This finding is consistent with the published evidence that higher income tends to result in an increased likelihood of greater political freedoms. Although the top countries had greater political freedoms than the bottom countries, neither group made any improvement since the creation of the Charter. As illustrated in Tables 6 and 7, within both groups, the countries that ratified the Charter, on average, have greater political rights and civil liberties. Among the top countries, those that had the greatest political freedoms in 2015 also had the greatest political freedoms prior to the creation of the Charter.

The Charter may have been beneficial for the least-well off countries. Among the bottom countries illustrated in Table 7, the countries that have ratified the Charter made significant improvements since 2007 in terms of political rights and civil liberties, while those that have only signed the Charter have become worse off. However, it is difficult to attribute this success to the Charter, as political improvements began prior to 2007.


Among the top countries, those that did not sign or ratify the Charter seem to be the best-off. However, among the bottom countries, it appears that ratifying the Charter may have improved economic performance. Figures 7 and 8 provide an illustration of the patterns of growth among the top and bottom countries respectively.

Figure 7: Per Capita GDP Among the Top Countries



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2015*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

Figure 8: Per Capita GDP Among the Bottom Countries



Source: *World Development Indicators 1991-2015*, World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

As illustrated in Table 6 and Figure 7, the top countries in all three groups – those that have ratified, those that have signed, and those that have not signed or ratified – have lower per capita GDP in 2015 than they did in 2007. This is likely explained by the global financial crisis that occurred in 2007 through 2009. However, those that have not signed or ratified have much greater per capita GDP than those that have either ratified or signed the Charter. In contrast, the results in Table 7 and Figure 8 illustrate that within the bottom countries, all groups made improvements since 2007, with those that have ratified being better off than those that have only signed the Charter.

Table 6 demonstrates that in terms of per capita GDP growth rates, since 2007 all groups within the top countries have failed to make improvements. This again, is likely due to the global financial crisis. It is likely that the top countries were affected more by the financial crisis as their economies are more integrated into the global economy. As demonstrated in Chapter 2 (Figure 3), the countries with the highest per capita GDP tend to generate a greater percentage of their GDP from exports, and thus are more affected by a global economic downturn. The group of countries that have not ratified or signed the Charter have the highest rate of growth since its creation. In terms of income equality, only South Africa – the only top country to ratify the Charter – has made improvements. However, their distribution of income is less equal than those that have not ratified the Charter.

Table 7 illustrates that among the bottom countries, those that have ratified the Charter have experienced the greatest growth rates. In terms of income inequality, only the bottom countries that have ratified the Charter have experienced improvements.

Within the top countries, those that have not signed or ratified the Charter have the longest life expectancy, while South African – the only country to ratify – experienced the lowest annual life expectancy between 2008 and 2015. Similar to annual life expectancy, among the top countries, those that have not signed or ratified the Charter are doing the best in terms of fewest childhood deaths. According to Table 6, those that have not ratified or signed the Charter on average had an annual life expectancy, between 2008 and 2015, that was 14.3 years greater than South Africa. Likewise, the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter experienced 57,403.4 less annual childhood deaths than South Africa in the post-Charter period. In terms of development indicators, the top countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter are better off.

Among the bottom countries, those that have ratified the Charter made the greatest improvements in terms of the development indicators since 2007. As illustrated in table 7, since 2007 those that ratified the Charter, on average, have an annual life expectancy 1.7 years longer while experiencing 35,980.9 less early childhood deaths than those that have not ratified the Charter.

As illustrated in Table 5, both the top and bottom countries have similar levels of average annual battle related deaths between 2008 and 2015. However, the top ten countries have made greater improvements since 2007. According to both sets of conflict data presented in Table 6, those that have signed or ratified the Charter have experienced greater reductions in battle related deaths than those that have not ratified or signed the Charter.

The two data sets in Table 7 offer different results when comparing the countries with the lowest per capita GDP. According to the World Bank, those that have only signed the Charter have experienced a significant reduction in average annual battle deaths, while those that have ratified the Charter have experienced an increase in their annual battle related deaths since 2007. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, both groups have experienced reductions in battle related deaths since 2007, but the ratified countries have experienced significantly less deaths.

According to Table 5, which compares the top and bottom countries, the top countries continuously outperform the bottom countries regardless if they have ratified the Charter or not. The analysis conducted within this chapter does not support the hypothesis that those that ratified the Charter would enjoy greater progress than those that have not since 2007. Throughout the analysis, the group of countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter, on average, have higher per capita GDP, greater income equality, longer life expectancies, fewer early childhood deaths, and have experienced greater improvements in political freedoms and reductions in battle-related deaths than the countries that have ratified the Charter.

However, among the least well off members of the African Union, it appears that those that have ratified the Charter out performed those that have not. Among the bottom countries, those that ratified the Charter, on average, have greater political freedoms, have higher per capita GDP, higher per capita GDP growth rates, greater income equality, longer life expectancy, and fewer early childhood deaths. As demonstrated in Table 7, not only were the bottom countries that ratified the Charter better off in 2015, they also made the

greatest improvements since the adoption of the Charter. It appears that the ratification of the Charter has been beneficial for the least well-off members of the African Union.

Chapter 5: Policy Implications

Canada's current development policies in Sub-Saharan Africa are threefold: supporting development and promoting economic activity, promoting peace and security, and promoting democracy, governance, human rights and the rule of law.²⁸⁹ As such, this capstone has illustrated and critically examined the merits of different development policies, the incentives and underlying motivations of conflict, and the relationship between democracy, economic growth, and conflict in fragile states. Several policy implications can be drawn from my analysis of the published evidence and the impact of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

1. There is little evidence to suggest that democracy causes economic growth and reduces the likelihood of conflict in fragile states.

Political leaders have suggested that promoting democracy in fragile regions is desirable, as democracies tend to be peaceful and prosperous. Although many of the wealthiest and most peaceful nations – such as Canada – are liberal democracies, there is little evidence to suggest that promoting democracy in fragile regions will improve their economic well-being or reduce their level of conflict. In fact, there is substantial evidence to suggest that unstable and low-income countries that transition to democracy are more likely to engage in internal and international wars.

According to the 2002 United Nations development Programme, “the literature finds no causal relationship between democracy and economic performance, in either

²⁸⁹ “Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa,” Global Affairs Canada.

direction.”²⁹⁰ The analysis on the African Charter seems to support the literature. I cannot conclude that the countries that have ratified the Charter have experienced greater economic or security improvements than the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter. In fact, out of the ten countries in the African Union with the highest per capita GDP, only one country has ratified the Charter. The group of countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter, on average, have higher per capita GDP, greater income equality, longer life expectancies, fewer early childhood deaths, and have experienced greater improvements in political freedoms and reductions in battle-related deaths than the countries that have ratified the Charter. The ratification of the Charter on Democracy, Elections and governance has not led to substantial progress in countries. In almost all indicators, it appears that the countries that have not ratified the African Charter are better off.

The democratic peace theory, which argues that democracies tend to have more peaceful foreign policies, may correctly explain mature and high income countries. However, the theory fails to correctly explain the behaviour of newly formed and low-income democracies. Unlike mature democracies, there is substantial evidence demonstrating that newly formed and low-income democracies are the most violent political regime. Newly formed democracies are even more likely to engage in violent conflict than authoritarian regimes. These findings have major implications for Canada’s policy to promote democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even if the international community was successful in creating additional democracies in the region, the results will likely be

²⁹⁰ “Democratic Governance for Human development,” UN Development Programme 2002, in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 308.

undesirable. Because the region is made up of low-income states with weak institutional checks and balances, the emergence of peaceful and commercial oriented democracies is unlikely. The likely result is political competition based on ethnic nationalism, which are democracies by name only. Most academics and policy makers would agree that democratic institutions such as the rule of law, enforceable property rights, and an independent judiciary are necessary to improve standards of living. However, instead of focusing resources on implementing democratic institutions and encouraging democratic regime change in fragile regions, the international community should allocate their resources on promoting economic development.

2. There is evidence to suggest that economic growth and prosperity improves democratic institutions and reduces the likelihood of conflict.

There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that, in fragile states, democracy causes economic growth and reduces the likelihood of conflict. However, there is evidence to suggest that economic growth increases the degree of democratic freedoms, while reducing the likelihood of conflict.

It appears that in order to sustain a democratic regime, there needs to be a certain level of economic development. As a certain economic threshold is met, the likelihood that the democracy survives and matures is very likely. As a mature and stable democracy develops – at a relatively high level of income for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa – the institutional checks and balances then have a positive effect on economic growth. As Heo and Hahm explain, the effects of democracy on economic development depend on the maturity of the democratic regime. However, economic development increases the

likelihood that democracies will emerge, survive and mature.²⁹¹ Their study provides “empirical evidence that as the level of economic prosperity improves, a transition to democracy is likely to occur and democracy is likely to survive and mature. In other words, good economic performance is important for democratic institutions to survive and mature.”²⁹² This capstone and many academics studying development in fragile regions often refer to less than desirable cycles, such as the conflict trap, the natural resource trap, the poverty trap, and the relationship between intervention and increased security threats. However, economic growth resulting in democratic maturity appears to be a positive cycle. As an economy grows, the likelihood that a democracy will emerge, survive and mature increases. And as democratic institutions mature, the economy is more likely to continue to develop. It appears that some initial level of economic development is required to allow democratic institutions to emerge, and as these institutions become more developed, they are likely to allow for further economic prosperity.

One of the reasons that economic growth increases the likelihood that a democracy will mature is that economic growth reduces the likelihood of conflict in democratic regimes. According to Collier and Rohner, “empirically, we find that whereas in rich countries democracy makes countries safer, below an income threshold, democracy increases proneness to political violence.”²⁹³ Their empirical findings suggest that below an income of \$2750 per capita, transitioning to a democracy increases the likelihood of conflict. When per capita income increases above \$2750, transitioning to a democracy

²⁹¹ Uk Heo and Sung Deuk Hahm, “Democracy, Institutional Maturity, and Economic Development,” *Social Science Quarterly* 96, no. 4, (2015): 1043-1045, doi: 10.1111/ssqu.12185.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 1050, 1051.

²⁹³ Collier and Rohner, “Democracy, Development, and Conflict,” 1.

reduces the likelihood of conflict.²⁹⁴ Collier has also found evidence to suggest that a declining economy – defined as a country that has experienced a declining growth rate in per capita income over the past five years – increases the likelihood of conflict.²⁹⁵

There are a few explanations as to why increasing the per capita level of income may reduce the level of violence in a democratic society. First, as income increases, the incentive for political violence decreases. This is because the opportunity cost – forgone activity such as employment – of violence increases as income increases. As standards of living increase, the marginal benefit of conflict is also likely to decrease. This argument may be quite intuitive, and is supported when considering democracies. However, this argument is not supported when considering autocratic regimes. In fact, as income increases, autocracies are more likely to experience violent conflict.²⁹⁶ A better argument to explain the relationship between income and the likelihood of conflict in political regimes is that as income increases, individuals' preferences change. At extremely low levels of income, individuals are primarily concerned about the consumption of necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, and medical services. However, as income increases, individuals become less concerned with their ability to consume the necessities and become more concerned with freedoms. As Collier and Rohner explain, "a lack of democracy will be more provoking at higher levels of income."²⁹⁷ The change in preferences as income changes explains why individuals with higher incomes are more

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 4.

²⁹⁵ Collier, "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective," in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 71.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 3-5.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 2.

likely to become violent in autocracies – where individual freedoms are low – and less likely to become violent in democracies, where individual freedoms are greater.

From my analysis on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it appears that even though high-income countries may not be more likely to be electoral democracies, they do tend to have greater political freedoms than low-income countries. Of the ten high-income African Union members, only five countries were considered to be electoral democracies. Among the ten low-income members, seven countries were considered to be electoral democracies in 2015. However, high-income countries offered their citizens greater political rights and civil liberties. Although fewer high-income countries had ratified the Charter and were less likely to be electoral democracies, they still had greater political freedoms.

From my analysis, it appears that democracy is not an initiator of growth, but stems from economic well-being. As nations become more prosperous, democracy is more likely to emerge and strengthen. After a level of maturity, democracy then contributes to economic growth.

3. If Canada wishes to use democratic institutions as a policy tool, efforts should be focused on the least well off countries. Democratic regime change, however, does not appear to be an effective policy tool in low-income countries. Emphasis must be placed on economic growth before democratic regime change.

Those that have not signed or ratified the African Charter consistently outperform the countries that have ratified the Charter. The group of countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter, on average, have higher per capita GDP, greater income equality,

longer life expectancies, fewer early childhood deaths, and have experienced greater improvements in political freedoms and reductions in battle-related deaths than the countries that have ratified the Charter.

However, among the least well off members of the African Union, it appears that those that ratified the Charter out performed those that did not. Among the bottom countries, those that ratified the Charter, on average, have greater political freedoms, have higher per capita GDP, higher per capita GDP growth rates, greater income equality, longer life expectancy, and fewer early childhood deaths. Not only were the bottom countries that ratified the Charter better off in 2015, they also made the greatest improvements since the adoption of the Charter. Although the countries that have ratified the Charter had worse political rights and civil liberties prior to the creation of the Charter, on average, their citizens now enjoy greater political freedoms than those living in countries that have not ratified the Charter. The ratified countries have also experienced greater improvements in annual per capita GDP growth rates, income equality, and have experienced greater percentage changes in terms of life expectancy and child mortality improvements.

It appears that among the countries with the lowest standard of living, the ratification of the Charter was beneficial. The analysis within this capstone regarding the use of democratic institutions as a development tool leads to a very important policy implication for Global Affairs Canada. For the reasons mentioned above, it may be unwise for the international community to attempt to construct democratic regimes in fragile states. However, there is some evidence to suggest that implementing liberal democratic institutions such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance may be beneficial for the most impoverished countries. Although electoral democratic regimes may

be unsustainable in these “bottom” countries, it appears that democratic institutions may actually benefit the least well of economies. Perhaps increasing their level of income to a point where a democratic regime may become sustainable. Although the Charter benefited the least well-off countries – with little evidence to suggest that it benefited higher income countries – only two out of the ten bottom countries (Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo) are countries of focus for Global Affairs Canada. To maximize the potential benefit of institutions like the Charter, Canada should focus its efforts more on the most struggling countries.

As Canada continues to promote democracy and economic growth in fragile regions, it would be wise to refrain from promoting electoral competition. Instead, Canada’s main focus should be the promotion of economic growth. As economic growth increases, the likelihood that a country will transition into a peaceful and sustainable democracy also increases. Before emphasis is placed on elections, emphasis must be placed on economic prosperity. Without the initial emphasis being placed on economic prosperity, elections are likely to result in violent competition based on ethnic tensions.

4. Policymakers must account for incentives, opportunities, and the likelihood of unintended consequences.

A major challenge with forming a successful foreign policy with respect to fragile states is interpreting all of the contradicting arguments made by experts in the field. For all of the policy options available to policy makers – aid, trade, military intervention, building democratic regimes – there appears to be ample evidence supporting both the merits and demerits of each policy. For every expert that has proclaimed the benefits of military

intervention there seems to be another expert who has argued against the use of military force. The lack of consensus in fields relating to the study of fragile states adds to the pressures of policymakers who are trying to produce a coherent and well thought out policy.

After critically examining the published evidence and conducting my own quantitative analysis, I believe there are two main “policy take-a-ways.” The first take-away is that in order to be successful in creating social change, policy makers must use policies that positively change the incentives and opportunities faced by all actors. Without changing the incentives or opportunities, security and development efforts will fail to change the status quo. The second take-a-way is that foreign intervention often results in unintended consequences.

The first policy take-a-way relates to Coyne’s statement that, “sustainable social change requires either a shift in preferences or a shift in the opportunities facing members of a society.”²⁹⁸ As clearly outlined throughout my entire analysis, all actors have their own motivations, which are constrained by the opportunities they currently face, their past history, and their expected potential opportunities.

Another challenge with implementing a successful foreign policy is that there are many different actors. Therefore, many different motivations must be considered. Policy makers must account for the motivations of the impoverished civilians, the land owning elites, the current unstable government leaders and their technical officials, the interest groups, bureaucracies and political leaders in donor countries, and the motivations of other affected members of the international community.

²⁹⁸ Coyne, *After War*, 27.

When developed governments attempt to promote peace and security in conflict-torn situations, the policy makers must first understand the motivations behind those waging the war. As the evidence suggest, most conflicts in fragile states are being waged because they benefit the parties who are waging the war. Collier has demonstrated, through empirical analysis, that civil wars are usually initiated due to economic motivations rather than grievances.²⁹⁹ Keen also makes the claim that groups use conflict in order to reap highly profitable benefits. According to Keen, groups use conflict to: increase their ability to pillage and loot, acquire security money from those spared from violence, control trade routes, exploit labour, acquire valuable land and resources, extract aid money, and increase the demand for their military services.³⁰⁰ Prior to engaging in operations to restore peace and security, policy makers must consider all of the motivations of all of the actors in the conflict situation.

The different motivations and incentives also explain the challenges of implementing successful development programs. For example, development aid increases the benefit of attaining political power, incentivizing factions to use any means possible – including violence – to obtain power. Furthermore, as humanitarian assistance is often targeted towards civilians in conflict situations, aid may actually incentivize warring factions to prolong the violence in order to receive this additional funding. As Berdal and Malone have asserted, warring parties essentially tax humanitarian assistance in order to fund their operations.³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ Collier, “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 69-71.

³⁰⁰ Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” in *Greed and Grievances*, 29-31.

³⁰¹ Berdal and Malone, “Economic Agendas in Civil Wars,” in *Greed and Grievances*, 5,6.

In order to implement successful development programs, policy makers must also consider all of the different motivations and incentives of those not only in the recipient country, but also in their own country. Development programs often fail, not only because of the motivations in the recipient country, but also because of the motivations of actors in the donor country. Motivations of politicians, interest groups, bureaucracies, and the media all result in less than optimal policies being implemented. Consider the motivations of bureaucracies and the perverse incentives they face. The structure of the bureaucratic process incentivizes the wasteful use of resources. As Coyne explains, bureaucracies that fail to spend their full budget are “punished” by receiving a smaller budget in the following year. Politicians realize that the bureaucracy that does not spend its entire budget, does not need the same level of funding to complete its task. As bureaucracies attempt to maximize the size of their budget, bureaucracies have the incentive to spend their entire budget, even if that means funds are wasted.³⁰²

Along with understanding the various incentives and opportunities that motivate actors in development situations, policy makers must also recognize that intervention often exacerbates the problems that it was designed to solve. In fact, it appears that almost every policy analyzed in this capstone has resulted in some kind of negative unintended consequence. For example, when considering the effects of aid in fragile states, it appears that often, aid exacerbated the current problems. As previously mentioned, aid may unintentionally prolong the length of violence. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the “Samaritan’s dilemma” of aid. As Moyo explains, instead of improving the overall

³⁰² Coyne, *Doing Bad by Doing Good*, 111- 113.

situation, aid tends to “choke off investment, instills a culture of dependency, and facilitates rampant and systematic corruption, all with deleterious consequences for growth.”³⁰³

Military intervention also appears to create negative unintended consequences. In fact, there is substantial evidence to suggest that foreign military intervention prior to a ceasefire being in place can reduce the likelihood of a peace settlement occurring.³⁰⁴

Although Western leaders have argued for the use of military intervention to reduce security threats in fragile states, the unintended consequence of these interventions have often been an increase in terrorist attacks. According to Michael Scheur, former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, al Qaeda and other terrorist networks are not motivated by an inherent hatred towards Western ideals. Rather, terrorist attacks have been initiated as retaliation against previous Western intervention. Scheur describes how intervention can actually breed a cycle of increased terrorism. According to Scheur, military intervention results in retaliatory terrorist attacks, which results in more intervention and more retaliatory attacks. The attacks on 9/11 were the unintended consequence of past military interventions.³⁰⁵

Many military operations are initiated in order to reduce the level of human suffering. However, Kuperman suggests that international military intervention may actually increase the amount of civilian casualties. As Kuperman suggests, international intervention tends to reduce the cost of rebellion. As a result more rebellions occur. In an effort to provide a disincentive for joining a rebellion, the current government in power increases the amount of damage inflicted on the rebel supporters, resulting in a greater

³⁰³ Moyo, *Dead Aid*, 49.

³⁰⁴ Coyne, *Doing Bad by Doing Good*, 56.

³⁰⁵ Coyne, *After War*, 105

number of casualties. The evidence suggests that long-term military intervention tends to exacerbate the current conflict situation.³⁰⁶

Canada's current security contribution in Sub-Saharan Africa – prior to further details on Canada's new Peace and Stabilization Operations Program – seems appropriate. The Government of Canada has acknowledged that it is the domestic government's responsibility to establish and maintain security. However, Canada has provided limited but sophisticated operations and training support, in order to provide humanitarian support and uphold ceasefire agreements.³⁰⁷ According to Fortna and Howard, "[t]he finding that peacekeeping makes civil wars much less likely to resume once a ceasefire is in place has emerged as a strongly robust result in the quantitative literature."³⁰⁸ The literature supports Canada's current policy to provide limited and short term assistance. However, the literature does not support large scale and long term military operations, as these operations often result in negative unintended consequences that make the situation worse.

Efforts to force regime change in fragile states have also resulted in negative unintended consequences. The result is often a renewal of internal conflict, and the view that the new regime is a local puppet of the interveners.³⁰⁹ Although Western leaders advocate the spread of democracy because democracies tend to be the most peaceful regime, there is substantial evidence supporting the claim that newly formed democracies in fragile states are extremely unstable and are prone to conflict. Collier's empirical

³⁰⁶ Kuperman, "Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect," 22, 23.

³⁰⁷ "Promoting Peace and Security," Global Affairs Canada.

³⁰⁸ Fortna and Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects," 289.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

findings suggest that newly formed democracies are the most likely political regime to engage in conflict.³¹⁰ According to Collier and Rohner, below an income per capita of \$2750, the transition to democracy actually increases the likelihood of violent conflict.³¹¹ The unintended consequence of democratic regime change in fragile and low-income states may actually be an increase in violent conflict.

It appears that many forms of foreign policy intervention fail to change the incentive and opportunities and tend to produce unintended consequences. Of the four broad development tools analyzed in this Capstone – aid, trade, military intervention, and the promotion of democracy – it appears the removal of domestic barriers to trade may be the most successful policy at positively altering incentives and opportunities, while mitigating the degree of negative unintended consequences.

Canada's current development objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa are threefold: promote economic growth and development, peace and security, and the spread of democracy and democratic institutions. Based on the evidence, removing barriers to trade seems to be the most effective policy in achieving all three objectives. There is substantial evidence to suggest that trade liberalization promotes economic development. According to Panagariya, liberalizing trade policies tend to contribute to positive economic growth, while an increase in a country's imports does not usually result in declining incomes.³¹² Trade liberalization may even reduce the level of future conflict experienced in a society in two ways. First, as standards of living improve, countries become less likely to engage in

³¹⁰ Collier, "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective," in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, 71.

³¹¹ Collier and Rohner, "Democracy, development and Conflict," 4.

³¹² Panagariya, "Miracles and Debacles Revisited," 562- 570.

conflict, as the cost of conflict increases as employment opportunities increase. Second, the more that citizens' in fragile states trade with Western countries, the less likely they are to join a rebellion or engage in terrorist activities. As incomes rise, individuals are less likely to join a rebellion as the opportunity cost of rebelling increases. Furthermore, as citizens' incomes are more closely related to trade with the West, they will become less likely to engage in terrorist activities against their Western trade partners.³¹³

Trade liberalization may even increase the emergence of democracies in fragile areas. As Coyne argues, trade liberalization tends to increase the transfer of ideas. Instead of imposing democratic regime change, trade tends to illustrate the positive benefits of democratic institutions and freedoms. Coyne argues that the transfer of cultural ideas through trade liberalization has been more successful at promoting democratic ideals in fragile states than intervention and state building operations.³¹⁴ As trade is likely to improve the economic situation in fragile states, citizens are more likely to demand greater political freedoms, and democratic regimes are likely to emerge.

Out of the policies examined throughout this capstone, trade liberalization appears to be the policy that will most likely encourage economic growth and development, promote peace and security, and promote the emergence and maturity of democratic regimes.

³¹³ Coyne, *After War*, 187.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 182 -185.

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Appendix I: Progress Indicators

Institutional Indicators

Indicator	Definition	Source
Electoral Democracy	<p>Freedom House determines whether countries are “electoral democracies” depending on whether or not they have met the certain Political Rights requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Is the government elected through fair and free elections?• Are the legislative representatives elected through fair and free elections?• Are the electoral laws and framework fair?	<p><i>Electoral Democracies: Freedom in the World 1989-90 to 2016.</i> Freedom House 2016, accessed August 1, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.</p>
Political Rights	<p>The Political Rights indicator gives a score based on the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Degree of fairness and freedom of a countries electoral process;• Whether or not citizens have the right to organize freely in different political parties or other groups;• Whether or not there are significant opposition parties;• How accountable the elected	<p><i>Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Individual Country Ratings and Status, FIW 1973-2016,</i> Freedom House 2016, accessed August 1, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.</p>

	<p>government is to the electorate;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether or not the government is free from pervasive corruption. <p>Freedom House gives each country a score from 1 to 7. 1 represents the greatest degree of freedom, 7 represents the smallest degree of freedom.</p>	
<p>Civil Liberties</p>	<p>The Civil Liberties indicators give a score based on the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Freedom of expression and belief for the media, religious and academic institutions, and for all individuals; • Whether or not there is freedom of assembly and demonstration; • The degree of judicial independence; • The prevalence of the rule of law; • Whether or not there is equal treatment of the law; • The degree of economic liberty and economic opportunity between different segments of the population. 	<p><i>Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Individual Country Ratings and Status, FIW 1973-2016, Freedom House 2016, accessed August 1, 2016,</i></p>

	Freedom House gives each country a score from 1 to 7. 1 represents the greatest degree of liberty, 7 represents the smallest degree of liberty.	
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Economic Indicators

Indicator	Definition	Source
Annual GDP/Capita	Used as a measure of standard of living within a country. It is determined by calculating the gross domestic product divided by the midyear population. The data are in current USD.	<i>World Development Indicators 1991-2015</i> , World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016.
Annual GDP/Capita Growth Rate	Annual percentage growth rate is based on constant local currency.	<i>World Development Indicators, 1991- 2015</i> , World Bank National Accounts Data, OECD National Accounts Data Files, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016.
Income Distribution (Gini Index)	Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or household within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The Gini index of 0 represents perfect income equality, while a Gini index of 100 represents perfect income inequality.	<i>World Development Indicators</i> , World Bank Development Research Group, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The data was obtained from primary household surveys from different government statistical surveys, and World Bank country departments.

Development Indicators

Indicator	Definition	Source
Life Expectancy at Birth	Indicates the number of years a newborn child would live if the current trends of mortality were to remain constant throughout the newborn's life.	<p><i>World Development Indicators</i>, World Bank, accessed July 1, 2016.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>World Development Indicators</i>, National Statistics Offices, World Bank. • <i>World Population Prospects</i>, United Nations Population Division. • <i>Population Data</i>, Eurostat: Demography, Population and Projections.
Annual Number of Under-Five Years Old Deaths	Measures the annual number of children who die before becoming five years of age.	<p><i>World Development Indicators</i>, World Bank, accessed July 1, 2016.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original estimates were developed by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation. Agencies include: UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, and the UN DESA Population Division.

Conflict Indicators

Indicator	Definition	Source
Annual Battle Related Deaths	Measures the deaths due to battle-related conflicts between the warring parties in the conflict. All deaths – military and civilian – are included in this measure.	<i>World Development Indicators</i> , World Bank, accessed July 1, 2016. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original estimates were developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
Annual Battle Related Deaths	This indicator also measures the deaths due to battle-related conflicts. I choose to use another conflict indicator to increase the robustness of my findings, as the World Bank data were missing values for certain years and countries. Although the values for both sets of data do not equal, the trends are very similar.	<i>Conflict by Type and Actor Version 6: Battles 1997-2015</i> , Armed Conflict Locations & Event Data Project, accessed July 1, 2016.

Appendix II: Countries of Focus in Sub-Saharan Africa

Institutional Indicators

Type	Countries	Ratified Countries	Signed Countries	Haven't Signed or Ratified
GAC	10	6	3	1
AU	53	23	23	7

Number of Electoral Democracies

Type	Total Number of Countries	2007	2015	Improvement?
GAC	10	5	4	no(worse)
AU	53	24	23	no(worse)

Political Rights

Type	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
GAC	5.33	3.89	3.22	4.10	no(worse)
AU	5.20	4.63	4.44	4.51	no(worse)

Civil Liberties

Type	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
GAC	4.44	4.00	3.33	3.90	no(worse)
AU	4.67	4.52	4.15	4.42	no(worse)

Economic Indicators

Average GDP/Capita (Current USD)

Type	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
GAC	1477.84	1480.04	2758.19	3158.02	yes
All	1053.51	1065.58	2226.89	2503.57	yes

Average Annual GDP/Capita Growth Rate

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	Difference
GAC	1.53	2.53	yes	1%
AU	1.79	1.65	no	-0.14%

Average Annual Income Distribution (GINI Index)

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	% Change
GAC	40.69	39.64	yes	-2.57
AU	43.62	43.31	yes	-0.70

Development Indicators

Average Life Expectancy at Birth

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	Increase	% Change
GAC	52.24	58.78	yes	6.54	12.52
AU	54.35	59.46	yes	5.11	9.40

Average Annual Number of Under-Five Years Old Deaths

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	Reduction	% Change
GAC	143115.86	105243.22	yes	37872.64	-26.46
AU	77326.24	61876.18	yes	15450.07	-19.98

Conflict Indicators

World Bank Average Annual Battle Related Deaths

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	Reduction	% Change
GAC	1201.68	348.40	yes	853.28	-71.01
AU	1034.20	484.05	yes	550.16	-53.20

Armed Conflict Location & Event Average Annual Battle Related Deaths

Type	1997-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	Reduction	% Change
GAC	560.91	389.65	yes	171.26	-30.53
AU	620.20	243.95	yes	376.26	-60.67

Appendix III: Are Countries That Have Ratified the Charter Better Off?

Institutional Indicators

Number of Electoral Democracies

Status	Total Number of Countries	2007	2015
Ratified	23	11	10
Signed not Ratified	23	11	10
Haven't Signed or Ratified	7	2	3

Political Rights

Status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Ratified	5.68	4.50	4.23	4.48	no (worse)
Signed not Ratified	4.78	4.65	4.43	4.48	no(worse)
Haven't Signed or Ratified	5.00	5.00	5.14	4.71	yes

Civil Liberties

Status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Ratified	4.95	4.50	4.14	4.35	no (worse)
Signed not Ratified	4.35	4.57	4.04	4.43	no(worse)
Haven't Signed or Ratified	4.83	4.43	4.57	4.57	no

Economic Indicators

Average GDP/Capita (Current USD)

Status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?	% Change Since 1991
Ratified	558.17	485.37	960.11	1190.27	yes	113.24
Signed not Ratified	1072.67	1065.54	2749.83	2975.46	yes	177.39
Haven't Signed or Ratified	2802.69	2889.21	4564.64	5308.33	yes	89.40

Average Annual GDP/Capita Growth

Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	1.18	2.28	yes
Signed not Ratified	2.40	1.06	no (worse)
Haven't Signed or Ratified	1.80	1.41	no(worse)

Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Difference
Ratified	1.18	2.28	1.10
Signed not Ratified	2.40	1.06	-1.34
Haven't Signed or Ratified	1.80	1.41	-0.39

Country Comparison	Difference in Difference
Ratified - Signed	2.445062085
Ratified - Neither	1.492554854
Signed - Neither	-0.952507231

Average Annual Income Distribution (GINI Index)

Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	% Change
Ratified	42.82	43.17	no (worse)	0.81
Signed not Ratified	43.57	43.61	no(worse)	0.09
Haven't Signed or Ratified	49.26	43.00	yes	-12.71

Development Indicators

Average Annual Life Expectancy at Birth

Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	Increase	% Change
Ratified	50.95	56.52	yes	5.57	10.94
Signed not Ratified	56.15	60.73	yes	4.57	8.15
Haven't Signed or Ratified	59.61	64.97	yes	5.36	8.99

Average Annual Number of Under-Five Years Old Deaths

Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	Reduction	% Change
Ratified	111225.27	87882.69	yes	23342.58	-20.99
Signed not Ratified	52943.46	44925.53	yes	8017.93	-15.14
Haven't Signed or Ratified	46058.59	32121.20	yes	13937.39	-30.26

Conflict Indicators

World Bank Average Annual Battle Related Deaths

Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?	Reduction	% Change
Ratified	663.98	540.24	yes	123.74	-18.64
Signed not Ratified	752.73	362.22	yes	390.51	-51.88
Haven't Signed or Ratified	5781.20	667.00	yes	5114.20	-88.46

Armed Conflict Location & Event Average Annual Battle Related Deaths

Status	1997 - 2007	2008- 2014	Improvement?	Reduction	% Change
Ratified	355.33	302.83	yes	52.50	-14.77
Signed not Ratified	764.58	191.05	yes	573.54	-75.01
Haven't Signed or Ratified	1090.05	185.73	yes	904.32	-82.96

Appendix IV: The Charter and the Gap

Institutional Indicators

Type	Ratified Countries	Signed countries	Haven't Signed or Ratified
Top Ten	1	6	3
Bottom ten	4	6	0

Number of Electoral Democracies

Type	2007	2015	Improvement?
Top	5	5	no
Bottom	7	7	no

Political Rights

Type	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Top	4.3	4	4.2	4.2	no
Bottom	6.1	4.4	4.2	4.4	no (worse)

➤ *Top*

Charter Status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Ratified	5.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	no
Signed not Ratified	4.00	4.50	4.67	4.67	no
haven't Signed or Ratified	4.67	4.00	4.00	4.00	no

➤ *Bottom*

Charter Status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Ratified	6.25	4.75	4.50	3.75	yes
Signed not Ratified	6.00	4.17	4.00	4.83	no

Civil Liberties

Type	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Top	4.2	4.1	3.8	4	no(worse)
Bottom	5.1	4.7	4.4	4.7	no(worse)

➤ **Top**

Charter Status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Ratified	4.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	no
Signed not ratified	3.83	4.50	4.00	4.50	no(worse)
haven't Signed or Ratified	5.00	4.00	4.00	3.67	yes

➤ **Bottom**

Charter Status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Ratified	5.25	4.50	4.50	4.00	yes
Signed not Ratified	5.00	4.83	4.33	5.17	no(worse)

Economic Indicators

Average GDP/Capita (Current USD)

Type	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?	% Change Since 1991
Top	3204.30	3379.74	7759.34	7372.47	no(worse)	130.08
Bottom	295.47	228.12	330.41	425.11	yes	43.88

➤ **Top**

Charter status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Ratified	3345.83	3183.15	6161.22	5691.69	no(worse)
Signed not Ratified	2253.09	2132.95	7065.21	6925.51	no(worse)
Haven't Signed or Ratified	5059.53	5938.85	9680.30	8826.66	no(worse)

➤ **Bottom**

Charter status	1991	1999	2007	2015	Improvement?
Ratified	350.04	270.48	364.85	454.91	yes
Signed not Ratified	259.09	199.88	307.44	405.25	yes

Average GDP/Capita Growth (Annual %)

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Top	4.51	1.09	no(worse)
Bottom	-0.06	0.97	yes

➤ **Top**

Charter status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	0.93	0.34	no(worse)
Signed not Ratified	5.88	1.08	no(worse)
Haven't Signed or Ratified	2.99	1.37	no(worse)

➤ **Bottom**

Charter status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	0.16	1.28	yes
Signed not Ratified	-0.20	0.76	yes

Average Income Distribution (GINI Index)

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Top	49.82	52.67	no(worse)
Bottom	40.23	42.98	no(worse)

➤ **Top**

Charter Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	64.79	63.38	yes
Signed not Ratified	44.12	46.51	no(worse)
Haven't Signed or Ratified	53.75

➤ **Bottom**

Charter Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	39.69	39.33	yes
Signed not Ratified	40.60	46.64	no(worse)

Development Indicators

Average Life Expectancy at Birth

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Top	60.91	64.39	yes
Bottom	50.56	57.23	yes

➤ *Top*

Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	57.00	55.10	no(worse)
Signed not Ratified	59.22	63.42	yes
Haven't Signed or Ratified	65.60	69.43	yes

➤ *Bottom*

Charter Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	50.33	58.05	yes
Signed not Ratified	50.72	56.37	yes

Average Annual Number of Under-Five Years Old Deaths

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Top	27439.79	27296.31	yes
Bottom	91199.71	73029.38	yes

➤ *Top*

Charter status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	76010.00	59040.40	yes
Signed not Ratified	31922.52	34835.30	no(worse)
Haven't Signed or Ratified	2284.27	1636.97	yes

➤ *Bottom*

Charter status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	71811.78	51440.83	yes
Signed not Ratified	104125.00	87421.75	yes

Conflict Indicators

World Bank Average Annual Battle Related Deaths

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Top	1085.95	586.5	yes
Bottom	571.6	529.26	yes

➤ *Top*

Charter Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	1546.20	929.70	yes
Signed not Ratified	932.53	145.15	yes
Haven't Signed or Ratified	..	1126.00	..

➤ *Bottom*

Charter Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	200.75	1392.60	no(worse)
Signed not Ratified	719.94	313.43	yes

Armed Conflict Location & Event Average Annual Battle Related Deaths

Type	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Top	1336.58	132.45	yes
Bottom	298.86	140.72	yes

➤ *Top*

Charter Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	5.60	5.00	yes
Signed not Ratified	2137.24	52.60	yes
Haven't Signed or Ratified	0.40	395.80	no(worse)

➤ *Bottom*

Charter Status	1991-2007	2008-2015	Improvement?
Ratified	32.98	11.83	yes
Signed not Ratified	476.12	226.65	yes

Appendix V: Members of the African Union³¹⁵

Country	Status	Electoral Democracy?	2015 GDP/Capita (Current USD)	1991-2015 Annual Growth (%)	2014 Life Expectancy (Years)	1991-2015 Average Annual Battle Deaths (#)
Algeria	2	no	4206.03	1.23	74.8	771.9
Angola	2	no	4102.12	1.90	52.3	1678.0
Benin	3	yes	779.07	1.26	59.5	..
Botswana	1	yes	6360.64	2.53	64.4	..
Burkina Faso	3	no	613.04	2.63	58.6	..
Burundi	2	no	275.98	-1.58	56.7	540.3
Cameroon	3	no	1250.78	0.29	55.5	442.0
CAR	2	no	306.78	-1.61	50.7	112.2
Cape Verde	2	yes	3131.13	5.59	73.1	..
Chad	3	no	775.70	2.78	51.6	328.8
Cote d'Ivoire	3	yes	1398.69	0.15	51.6	211.3
Comoros	2	yes	..	-0.43	63.3	56.0
Congo	2	no	1851.20	0.58	62.3	2361.3
Djibouti	3	no	..	0.08	62.0	53.3
DRC	2	no	456.05	-1.94	58.7	1313.5
Egypt	1	no	3614.75	2.17	71.1	117.3

³¹⁵ Countries in red refer to Global Affairs Canada's countries of focus. For Status, 3 = ratified, 2 = signed but not ratified, 1 = haven't signed or ratified the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

Equatorial Guinea	2	no	11120.86	17.13	57.6	..
Eritrea	1	no	..	1.59	63.7	11460.2
Ethiopia	3	no	619.14	3.66	64.0	2427.0
Gabon	2	no	8311.48	-0.06	64.4	..
Gambia	2	no	..	0.15	60.2	..
Ghana	3	yes	1381.41	2.96	61.3	..
Guinea-Bissau	3	no	573.03	-0.12	55.2	176.5
Guinea	3	no	531.32	0.05	58.7	323.5
Kenya	2	yes	1376.71	0.83	61.6	18.4
Libya	1	no	4643.31	1.65	71.7	1126.0
Lesotho	3	yes	..	2.80	49.7	68.0
Liberia	2	yes	455.87	1.86	60.8	536.4
Madagascar	2	yes	411.82	-0.66	65.1	..
Mali	3	no	744.35	3.94	58.0	163.7
Malawi	3	yes	381.37	1.75	62.7	..
Mozambique	2	no	525.01	4.58	55.0	554.0
Mauritania	3	no	..	1.24	63.0	4.5
Mauritius	2	yes	9116.83	3.61	74.2	..
Namibia	2	yes	4695.77	2.22	64.7	21.0
Nigeria	3	yes	2640.29	2.68	52.8	1017.0
Niger	3	yes	358.96	0.03	61.5	35.6
Rwanda	3	no	697.35	3.71	64.0	495.8
South Africa	3	yes	5691.69	0.74	57.2	1292.4

Senegal	2	yes	910.79	0.84	66.4	145.9
Seychelles	1	yes	15476.02	2.52	73.2	..
Sierra Leone	3	yes	693.41	0.77	50.9	961.3
Somalia	2	no	551.86	..	55.4	1268.6
South Sudan	3	..	730.58	-8.20	55.7	770.0
Sao Tome & Principe	2	yes	..	2.74	66.4	..
Sudan	3	no	2089.40	3.32	63.5	1637.8
Swaziland	2	no	3154.75	0.92	48.9	..
Tanzania	1	yes	864.86	2.18	64.9	..
Togo	3	no	547.97	0.23	59.7	..
Tunisia	2	yes	3872.51	2.59	74.1	..
Uganda	2	no	675.57	3.27	58.5	516.1
Zambia	3	yes	1307.79	1.90	60.0	..
Zimbabwe	1	no	890.42	-1.31	57.5	..