

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

An Essentialist Approach to God

by

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
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is an attempt to restate an essentialist approach to natural theology with special reference to St. Anselm's Monologium, chapters I-XVI. The essentialist approach taken requires that the status of 'reality' be accorded to such 'natures' as truth, beauty and justice. Such status is not generally accorded these 'natures' due to what the author calls "Naive Realism" and "Critical Idealism." Both these positions are found to be untenable. The linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy is not taken to contribute to the issue of the thesis. These 'natures' are said to be significant of the Supreme Nature who is the Creator.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	1
Introduction	2
Notes (to Introduction).	15
Section I	17
I.A Naive Realism	17
I.B Critical Idealism	28
I.C Analysis	42
I.D Science	47
I.E Existence	49
Notes (to Section I)	56
Section II	58
II.A The Essentialist Way	58
II.B Monologium. Preface, Chapters I & II	59
II.C Monologium. Chapter III	63
II.D Monologium. Chapter IV	66
II.E Monologium. Chapters V, VI, VII	69
II.F Monologium. Chapters VIII, IX, X	77
II.G Monologium. Chapters XI-XIV	80
II.H Monologium. Chapters XV, XVI	81
II.I	83
Notes (to Section II)	89
Bibliography	91

AN ESSENTIALIST APPROACH TO GOD

PREFACE

God is said to be present to us, informing our very being, preserving our very life and motivating all that we truly desire. God, it is said, can be recognized in the Beauty of the world around us, or in the smile of an innocent and loving face. God is in all, and all are in God.

This is remarkable talk--most of us have no cognizance of any such thing at all. The position of this thesis is that this remarkable circumstance is not due to the being of God but to the being of ourselves. The reason of our ignorance is to be located in a couple of philosophical speeches we moderns make to ourselves about the world, and its persons, and what can be taken to be real. These two philosophical positions are criticized in section I below. In tandem, we will be developing the allied notions of 'form,' 'concept' and 'nature' with which we can make sense of the natural theology in section II.

INTRODUCTION

The philosophical speeches that secularize us I take to be grounded in two philosophical positions. The first I have called 'Naive Realism' and the second 'Critical Idealism.' While neither position would appear to have contemporary adherents, they do isolate two philosophical prejudices that I believe contemporary (secular) minds find easy to either follow or alternate between. The prejudices of these positions are that all that can be said to be knowable and real is either (i) extended (a thing in space) or (ii) of duration (a thing in time). The result of these prejudices is that universal terms (especially, justice, beauty, truth and the other 'goods') do not name any part of what is real.

The discrete, material bodies and 'things' around us certainly are extended in space; hence these, and so the physical universe thought of as the collection of these, qualify as 'real.' What has been said, done and thought can clearly be said to have, or have had, duration (extension in time) and so these too are 'real'; for example, since enduring, minds can in some sense be said to exist. What cannot be said to be real are any natures, essences, forms or concepts which bridge minds to things. Such are usually taken to be either convenient rules for the manipulation and description of extended things or merely the record of what happens to have been said or thought by some minds at some

time. This is a nominalistic account; there are no standards or measures (natures, bridge notions, etc.) to what we say other than that which is taken to genuinely exist, namely, spatio-temporal things, happenings, and what has been thought, said, judged, etc. That is, whatever we entertain of a more general, final or explanatory nature (e.g., that this act is simply 'wrong' or 'right,' that that 'causes' this, that we are faced with something simply 'beautiful,' etc.) is, if meaningful and significant at all, either of two options: (i) a 'generalization' and an 'abstraction' which might help to organize things but does not go beyond the spatial-temporal things which can alone give rise to it, or (ii) a historical enumeration of some definite mental/verbal contents. On this second option, it follows that everything we say, the sense of any of our speeches, must be conventional. That is, our speech about the nature of things as a whole, or of goodness, or of any theoretical speech (e.g., religious, ethical, scientific) can only have sense within a conventional framework. Phrases and words like, 'the good life,' 'justice,' 'evil,' 'beauty,' 'truth,' do not refer to some nature or Platonic Idea but gather what sense they have by enumeration of how they happen to be used in some societies in some circumstances with some behaviours. Any speech about anything other than spatio-temporal things and happenings has no significance and can refer to nothing and so draws

its only meaning from either (i) spatio-temporal things as a handy way to refer to a grouping of these, or (ii) from the context of a human 'form of life' or the way of seeing things or of getting things done within a particular community of people. This form-of-life or socially determined way of seeing or doing is itself radically unquestionable for the questions we might put to it are themselves only socially meaningful and so on. Another more fashionable way to say something similar to this is that logical form and theoretical considerations are themselves products of and reducible to what that human community has done and is doing with words and gestures. With regard to the consideration of forms or theories the idea here is not to ask for some meaning (as though such forms and theories might be of the nature of reality) but rather to ask for the use. Another variant on this position is to hold that there is no immediate access to any standards, measure, rational forms or natures by which we could make a speech about inviolable 'rights' or 'natural justice' or 'God,' etc. What there is, is the facts of usage, common agreements or the rules we learned in the nursery about words and how to get things done.

The linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy has not, I think, seriously changed this nominalist-realist issue (this is what is at stake). The issue rather becomes, it

seems to me, either of two positions which are illustrated by the earlier Wittgenstein (of the Tractatus) and the later Wittgenstein (of the Investigations). The first is that there can be no philosophical propositions; that is, one can say nothing meaningful about logical form or the form of the world. The second is that meaning and intelligibility is restricted to the form-of-life, or language game, or 'use' which determines the way we look at things.(1)

Gustav Bergmann has characterized the first path taken in the early Wittgenstein(2) and, I take it by extension, to his followers. I take Bergmann to be saying that these philosophers have mistakenly crossed a 'verbal bridge' to an ontological conclusion. In the consideration of logical truths such as so called sentential tautologies, we can isolate this bridge. In considering such, Bergmann sees Wittgenstein asking the 'new question': "how does any sentence, including these logical truths, manage to express what it does?" Now we are to take some example of a logical truth--it expresses a 'logical form.' We are told the expression of this logical form merely shows itself, it is not something that can be straightforwardly named. The bridge is walked when Wittgenstein tells us it is ineffable and then that it is nothing.(3) Bergmann takes this to mean that form is 'without ontological status.' In being ineffable or rendered invisible I take this to mean form is non-existent (see I.E below). Now Wittgenstein of the

Tractatus does not say, and does not wish to say, that form does not exist. Nevertheless, because ineffable, form cannot be said to be visible, or to 'stand out,' or to be experienced and this is to be nothing (again see I.E below). The depreciation of form is underscored in the logical atomism of the Tractatus, where, as Anthony Quinton says, "To understand a complex proposition is to know with what collection of elementary propositions it is equivalent in meaning." (4) The form of the complex proposition is superfluous as 'it' adds no meaning above its contents. Further, the truth of a complex proposition is to be wholly determined by the truth or falsity of its components, the form of the complex being irrelevant. I take the depreciation of form to be a mistake.

This mistake I take to be a fallacy involving the confusing of two senses of 'to exist.' The more encompassing and commonsensical notion is that when something is present to me, so is its existence (or ontological status). There is no contradiction here with the idea that something can exist without being presented and that existence can be represented by phrases such as 'there is . . .'. The other, more technical use of 'exist' involves the notion that what exists is simple, that is, can be directly referred to by naming or pointing. I take Wittgenstein's fallacy (and not just his) to say if something does not exist in this more narrow second sense (it cannot be straightforwardly named),

it therefore does not exist in the first sense (is not present at all, is nothing).

This fallacy suggests a better approach. If we are presented with some true(S) sentence (S), we ask how it expresses what it does; i.e., what fact or state of affairs (F). Now (S) expresses (F), and if (S) is true it is so on the account of what makes it true, namely (F). Consequently, the truth of (S) is grounded ontologically and so, as is common sense, such grounding cannot be accounted for but by an 'ontological assay.' This thesis is such an assay. That presence sought for is not something straightforwardly named but neither is it ineffable. The 'presence' we hope to find are 'bridge notions' which deny the bifurcation between thoughts and the world and which allow theoretical speech, philosophical propositions and some way to talk about the form of things.

In what I take to be the second position of linguistic philosophy, as per the later Wittgenstein, form is no longer something we must be silent about. However, from the point of view of this thesis, form (natures) is still lost, being now rendered invisible, by endless human chatter. If you have some question about the nature or form of something you have only to see that understanding the nature of something is simply to have acquired the ways and techniques of using the language which prompted the question in the first place. Once one gets acquainted with all the variety and

multiplicity of uses of human language and the form of life in which they are grounded, one will have no further puzzles and wonders. There is no access to any standards, measure, form or nature which is not best 'understood' by the mediated, public, linguistic behaviours, these being grounded in some already structured, established form of life. As Wittgenstein says, "What has to be accepted, the given is--so one could say--forms of life." (6) With Stanley Cavell, (7) I take Wittgenstein's Investigations to be Kantian-like. Kant believed himself to have drawn the limits of all conceivable experience and to have shown many philosophical puzzles and wonders as misguided attempts to know something beyond these limits. Wittgenstein's appeal to ordinary language is to be seen under his more general project-to-show human understanding its conditions, and so limits, in the complex ways of language and forms of life. It is grammar which tells us "what kind of object anything is" (8) and which expresses essence. (9) I take such a position to be a variant of critical idealism and to be dealt with in II.B below.

The first position of the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy was that there are no philosophical propositions. "There are no philosophical propositions" states nihilism, as Bergmann says of Wittgenstein. (10) I take nihilism to be a situation where there is no way to

state, or no rational, accessible way to state the truth, rationality or worth of any sentences. There are no standards or natures against which we can evaluate any speech that are not conventional. One is left merely to chatter with no way to justify anything, neither what we say nor its opposite. Consequently there is no justification of any speech that is meaningful and the language of justification is senseless. Everything is permitted and this is nihilism.

The second position of the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy was that we are restricted to our forms-of-life and the language games or 'uses' which determine what we can mean by our words. Nihilism still persists in this second position; we still have no accessible standards or 'natures' against which we can evaluate speeches and positions that are not relative to our forms-of-life and so conventions.

There are those who would defend against the nominalist reduction of terms like 'beauty' and 'justice' to abstractions, conventions or nothing. I do not think, however, either of the following two typical defenses adequate: (i) It would seem that any coherent reduction of these is itself a speech. As such it would be, on its own accounting, either nonsense or merely a conventional way of looking at things--either way not much to be concerned with.

However, this is insufficient. It may well be that human thinking and making sense is fundamentally such as to be itself not accessible or subject to the rules of rationality and sensibility that everything else must be. This problem, of 'self-reference,' leads, I think, to the continued need to show, as this thesis does show, what the problem with these 'reductions' is. (ii) It may seem outrageous to jettison claims of reality to either 'beauty' or 'justice' on the mere grounds of language and what our words mean. However, how else but by language can we 'make visible' or 'prove' the existence of anything like 'beauty' or 'justice?' Unlike a streetlamp or new species of tree, we cannot merely point out the issue with our bodily senses. The issues that face us here are only to be settled on the basis of acts and possibilities of recursive self-consciousness, as I will show (section I below). Some sort of speech is indeed essential to any decision on the reality of these things for those for whom they are not manifest or present. Further, if we do not explicate and somehow express the presence or visibility of the reality of such things as 'justice' and 'beauty,' then they will be rendered or left as invisible and so as nothing. 'Justice' and 'beauty' I take to be instances of 'bridge notions' which are used in statements to express the 'form' or 'nature' of things. Other bridge notions are 'fit,' 'complete,' 'belongs-to,' 'truth,' 'worthiness,' and 'goodness.' As we

shall see in Section II below, these bridge notions allow us to ascribe the sense and existence of the word 'God.' Consequently if these bridge notions are invisible or nothing to us then so also is 'God.'

In our considerations into what is real we must underline the felt worth of forgetting the dull consciousness, with its endless chattering self, and of entering that exhilarating state of perceiving and judging justly, or clearly in the apprehension of reality. What is real is independent of what we say about it and is the measure of any sense and value our speeches may have. Nihilism is the direct result of a denial of either the worth of seeing reality or of the first order reality of worth. If either (i) any speech about what is real is equally worthy or worthless, as any other speech, or (ii) if worthiness is not a subject for rational inquiry into reality, then we are in a situation where the language of justification makes no sense and any speech cannot be said to be any better than any other and so speech is itself indistinguishable from chatter and noise, and so, of course, no better than silence.

The usual nihilism is to deny the reality of goodness because it is one of those 'general terms' which are then treated as 'abstractions' or as conventions. 'Good' is then reduced to a second order adjunct of the personal or

collective will, i.e., "I'm for this." I take nihilism (though it is clearly a logical and practical possibility) to be a reductio ad absurdum. The reductio can be stated more generally; without the classical association between goodness (worth, beauty, etc.) and reason (what is real vs. illusory), goodness becomes denatured and reasons are no longer worth hearing. In this case there is no justification for choosing conventional speech, or any speech which would replace it, or any speech which anyone might feel like spontaneously asserting, or any of the negations of these--all of which reduces sense, reason, justification and intelligence to nothing. Now we have said this is something like a 'logical possibility,' but for anyone engaged in any rational inquiry--mathematicians, historians, political philosophers, etc.--it is a more clearly self defeating reductio ad absurdum. It may even be, if it makes sense to assert, that since man is a rational or speaking animal, nihilism is not even a logical possibility for man as man--its practice would be something like annihilation or reduction to something other than man.

This thesis cannot be scholarly in either of the contemporary senses of a research into historical sources or of an enumeration of what someone or some group of people says about some issue. The thesis is about the state of just these and so would be circular if it merely assumed the

techniques of analysis employed. For instance: a historian, mathematician or a logician have a common question when it comes to either ontology, or to stating the value or truth of what they do. Which interpretation of their symbols is sound?, which structure is adequate to the known world? When is the analysis complete?, or when does it fit the phenomena?, or when does this case belong to that kind or class? In every case one must step outside the analysis or research technique in order to judge whether it is adequate, 'fits' the phenomena, is a 'good' account, etc. None of these judgements can be part of the analysis or technique employed. The matter is no different when one states the issue in terms of framing hypotheses and gathering evidence. It is not a piece of evidence that says that evidence verifies or falsifies the hypothesis, nor that a hypothesis 'completes,' 'fits,' etc. the evidence. The question is always present of the recognizability of the 'fit,' 'adequacy,' etc. of what we say and propound. I am not for a moment questioning the excellence of analytic thought or of the reasonableness of propounding hypotheses and gathering evidence. Quite the contrary. I do wish, however, to point out the presence within these, of 'bridge notions.' If we could not say anything about the bridge notions involved and be appealing to something real versus illusory, then we could say nothing about the validity, reasonableness, goodness, etc. of any speech (opinion,

analysis, theory, hypothesis) put forward, nor of its negation, and so on. The notions this thesis wants to establish (and then use theologically) are just such bridge notions and not part of any of the usual methods, techniques, and analyses.

We are left, then, to think through the the theology of section II without any such apparatus and this is something some philosophies dealt with below say we cannot do. That is why we discuss naive realism and critical idealism and their parallels in contemporary analysis below. Kant, Hume, Wittgenstein, and St. Anselm are thinkers who are discussed but, in consideration of what has just been said, they are discussed because they are taken to be typical philosophical positions and explicate the bridge notions we need if we are not to be nihilists. I am considerably less interested in the question of whether each of these men precisely held the position I ascribe to them, for it is irrelevant to the existence of God. An illustration of some feature of things is of little importance once the thing is grasped.

This thesis will thus take the following form: Section I.A examines naive realism which reveals itself to be naive and dependent on concepts, which leads to I.B and the consideration of critical idealism which is shown as regressive and nihilistic. Section I.C considers modern philosophical analysis and believes it to be of no help one

way or another to the argument of the thesis. Section I.D claims as illusory the apparent support the natural sciences give to nominalism. Section I.E gives what I take to be a better account of what 'reality' or 'existence' means. Section II takes this account and derives the existence of God from the existence and presence of what we have called 'bridge notions.'

NOTES

1. For example, see Ludwig Wittgenstein; Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958) part I, paragraphs 122, 23; part II, p. 226.

2. Gustav Bergmann, "The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein," in Logic and Reality (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 225-241.

3. Bergmann, p. 228.

4. Anthony Quinton, "British Philosophy," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 393.

5. We limit ourselves to true sentences as a convenience. For congenial positions regarding 'false' statements see Gustav Bergmann, Logic and Reality, pp. 147-148, pp. 45f. More systematically, see Gustav Bergmann, Meaning and Existence (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press,

1960), chpt. 13 and Stanley Rosen, The Limits of Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1980), chapter 3, for analyses of the ontological copula.

6. Wittgenstein, part II, p. 226.

7. Stanley Cavell, "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Philosophical Review, 71 (1962), pp. 67-93.

8. Wittgenstein, part I, paragraph 373.

9. Wittgenstein, part I, paragraph 371.

10. Bergmann, Logic and Reality, p. 228.

SECTION I

I.A NAIVE REALISM

The first philosophical position we will consider is that of the naive consciousness--which assumes that anything which exists is particular and is known, if it is, because, acting on our sensory surfaces, it is received by us from 'out there.' This states two positions, dualism and empiricism. With regard to the generality and unity which is so patently part of our experience and language this philosophical speech is 'conceptualist'; words can express what they do by the presence of a general concept in the minds of the hearers corresponding to the particular existing things around us, having been abstracted from them. The following account of what this philosophical position is attempting will display and make visible the present element of form or concept which is mistakenly discounted. It is the forms of things or their 'fit' which we need to establish the reality of--these forms are what are present to us and give us what we know of 'beauty' or 'justice' or 'truth' (or more generally, 'goodness').

Humes' famous example of the billiard table isolates the issue. If I remain relatively passive, as spectator, the balls are seen to move about the table and I have no seen 'reason' to make predictions as to future motion, nor

knowledge of what is happening when I avert my eyes. The connections are simply not present to my senses. That is, the senses do not provide us with the bridges either between us and the billiard table with its events nor the bridges among the balls and their motion. This is a valuable observation yet provides us no good account of what we come to know about the movement of balls on the table. If there is no connection between oneself and the balls then our accounting of it, including the minimum things Hume wants to draw attention to, lapses into silence. Not only are what arrives at my sensory organs (percepts) relative to me spatially but also the organization of my particular sense organs is relative. Physiology assures us of the transforming activity of our sensory surfaces, and that these organs vary among people. The eye and ear for instance modify what they receive considerably before passing on a stimulus to the nerves. What the nerves pass on to the brain is much modified there. But what is given to consciousness is not electrical pulses, or brain waves, but the sensations of some things (balls). Contrary to the naive consciousness then, there are connections and unities (concepts)--between us and the billiard balls, among the billiard balls, and also among the actions and reactions on the table, etc. Without such connections the billiard table has been lost altogether in our idiosyncratic sensory organization. Nothing can be said, or as was later made

clear, percepts without concepts are blind.

A better assay of what is present to our consciousness yields a whole series of connections of concepts and precepts, impressions and structures, pointing out the unity called 'this billiard table.' While Hume is right about the unities not being given at our sensory surfaces he is wrong about us knowing nothing about them. This is true not just of the unity between me and the thing but also true of the structures and unities called the laws of dynamics which can be discovered on the billiard table.

We actually do not see the billiard table or balls at all without the presence of definite conceptual elements. Neither the 'that' of a thing nor 'what' it is, is apprehended without concepts. Were we truly passive receptors of data from 'out there' there would be no knowledge at all, only the unheard and unseen roar and flood of waves and particles and sensory surfaces. There would be no tables, no balls and not even my self. Concepts are not just a recording of the facts of happenstance habits of association--likely to be idiosyncratic, arbitrary and a relative sort of thing. Hume may often be right about the clumsy way people conceptualize, but not necessarily nor always. We experience the workings of concepts regularly with the opposite sort of result. Even in the following empirical example, the naive consciousness can be seen to rely on unities or concepts.

When we walk down the street the lamp posts ahead of us appear as smaller than those close to us. The road itself narrows as it appears closer to the centre of our field of vision. There are various people spread across the field of vision, some in motion. If we cross the street impressions and surfaces change. But while my impressions are idiosyncratic and relative to me I know the street to remain about the same width and the lamp posts are the same size and further, that the street is itself independent of my looking at it from whatever angle. The conceptions of identity, perspective, duration, shadow, etc. have been the key to my knowing what is real.

But even this accounting is partial and open to the influences of reflexive thought. The models we use to represent things are limited; e.g., our 'understanding' according to science up until recently has usually been taken to be along the lines of physical work. The picture of atoms as hard little balls does have some range of applicability, as in most technologies, yet we must qualify that picture as very 'rough.' Still, even if limited, in each case the "bridge has been crossed" to reality as witnessed by the utility of our representations if by nothing else. I in no way want to suggest that conceptions are always a matter of pragmatic choice, but only that there is a practical sort of reductio ad absurdum to the position

that our conceptions are merely abstractions of ours which we put together according to habit and circumstance from particular 'data' received from 'out there.' The objection is that we have present in our conceptions not only abstractions but some knowledge of the structure of things which is how it is that much of our technologies 'work' in differing circumstances and in different times and places. We have crossed some bridge from the enumeration and description of spatio-temporal things to some structure or interrelations of the things which is then applied and tested and qualified with great practical success. To say that such things as are expressed by the laws of dynamics are "no more than handy enumerations for descriptions of bodies in motion" is (i) to express not nameable things but part of their interrelations or form (and this is what we are seeking), or (ii) to say nothing articulate or, (iii) to state the extreme form of logical positivism or the verification principle (and this is absurd).(1) These models we use to represent things are clearly conceptual in some sense. These conceptualizations are also clearly subject to further judgement; i.e., they are to some degree idiosyncratic and person/culture/time relative. But notice, these schemas are themselves judged 'appropriate' or 'fit' or 'true' to some fields of inquiry--something is present to us so that we can make these judgements which is outside the particular representation of things in question (which is

being judged). The laws of dynamics are not only personal and cultural in the sense of preferring tea to coffee or jeans to kilts but are 'true' or a 'good' accounting of the form or structure of things in motion in certain circumstances. Here we have a statement of the form or nature of things which is a statement about reality and not only a piece of natural history of human cultures or how someone happens to see things. Statements of 'beauty' and 'justice' are just such statements of the form or nature of things--instead of the laws of dynamics we may have a statement about the world (beauty) or of obligations to our fellows (justice). Now minds and thinking are and have been part of the world. The record of the content of this thinking through time would be something like a history of concepts conjoining with percepts to provide conventional and socially relative representations or ways of seeing (some of which may be true, others not). But it does not seem that our thinking is wholly determined by and limited to the history and culture into which we happen to have been born. There is also something present to us by which we can explain and recognize such conventions as conventions or make a statement about the form of things (such as the laws of dynamics and their range of application) which is not relative to culture or person. What is present we call 'natures,' 'forms' or 'concepts' by which any such claims can be judged 'appropriate,' 'unfit,' 'true,' 'false,'

'partial,' etc.

Concepts arise and conjoin within me. That they are all dependent on me or fully determined by me is a considerably different claim. Concepts and structures may arise in any number of people in any number of ways but no matter who thinks of the laws of dynamics or of the simple truths of trigonometry, the concepts involved are the same concepts; i.e., they are numerically identical. It is an unfortunately common mistake which is very persistent that my thoughts are mine and so they are some private matter of mine. The commonplace of today is that the perceptual and not the conceptual is the 'public' and verifiable element in our experience which is common to all mankind. This is backward. What is given to the senses is clearly dependent on my constitution and time and space of my observation. Vision is detached and perspectival. The unrepresented at our sensory surfaces is very partial and uni-perspectival. Distortion is possible, perhaps inevitable, because how X looks (its appearance) is, to this point, exactly how X looks to me. But we know that given perspectives are supplemented with others and other senses, memories, etc. The point to notice is that this self-correcting, self-checking occurs only by the presence of the unifying direction of thought. There is a similarity between the 'movement' of sensory realignment and the 'movement' of

conceptual activity. Our knowledge of an X or our knowledge of a landscape is perfected and accorded a unified 'what' by overcoming our perspectival sensory apprehensions of 'that.' For example, we see that bush over there but on moving sideways we now see other features of 'that' and see that what it was all along is a man stooping down. But also, our conceptual knowledge of 'unity,' 'belonging-to,' and 'fit' are perfected and accorded a unified 'what' by overcoming perspectival apprehensions of 'that.' For example, our accounting for the man's physical appearance has required considerable realignment over the centuries so that one can now be certain that genetic codes and the complexities of DNA are what is essential. That some tribal culture ascribes physical appearance to diet is perhaps not altogether false but does, to state the reality of it, need some perfecting. Perhaps the man is a wholly conditioned organism and any moral claims about him are more accurately translated into the mechanisms of natural selection. Perhaps the nature of man is beautiful and fit for justice. What is present, though not fully 'captured' or 'expressed' in all these perspectives, conflicts and the possibility that they can be known as true or false, is the nature or form of man. Our current societies preference for explanations of man's nature in spatio/temporal terms I take to be (merely) one of those cultural conceptual perspectives that need some perfecting. To express the presence to minds

of the different sort of unifying and schematizing we shall designate concept(B) for mental entities either personal or cultural and concept(A) for the presence(s) which are not personal or cultural. The conceptual(B) 'work' of the individual while apparently not idiosyncratic and relative is at the same time partial and perspectival--just as is his sensory 'work.' However, it must be noted that we test our structures and realign them for greater comprehensiveness and internal coherence. That is, thought is recursive and reflexive in a way that sensation is not. One cannot make progress in accounting for the patterns of physical appearances of humans or of their being fit for justice by simply changing the lighting conditions or realigning ones line of sight; one has to think. Conceptual realignment can only happen because of the presence, in each of its perspectives, of the source, or of the ground, or of the 'that' of those perspectives--that is, by concepts(A) or something which 'bridges' us to the thing(s) (however partially). Without such a bridging presence, representations could not be changed without losing sight of what they are of, and that they are our representations and perspectives. Sensory realignment can happen by virtue of the unifying presence of concepts. Conceptual realignment can happen by virtue of the unifying presence and what we call concepts(A) and recognize as the nature or form of the thing we are trying to account for. We would have a

regress in both cases if it were not for the presence of some unifying element in what we know of both. Sensory experience would collapse without such a presence as we have seen directly above. Conceptual realignment would also be impossible and collapse into silence were it not for the presence of concepts(A) over and above our received conceptual(B) structures (this is for section I.B to show). The point of these regresses here is at least pragmatic and factual--sensory realignment and also conceptual realignment are palpable facts of human doing.

More points ought to be made regarding these concepts. The conceptual structure which arises in me is independent of me. Elasticity, force, mass, velocity, etc. combined in a certain way are the laws of dynamics and it is no matter at all whether it pleases me or not, the approximate course of events on the billiard table can be predicted and known either ahead of time or out of sight. As this can be said about the form or pattern of bodies in motion, why not 'goodness' or 'beauty' or some other such expression(S) of the presence(F) of form or pattern?

I can legitimately ask to what extent, how 'applicable,' and how 'fit' any structure or form is to the events on the billiard table but this only underscores that the conceptual structure arising in me is not idiosyncratic and arbitrary. Doubt is always a matter of the

applicability of some 'what' (structure, form, shape,) to some 'that' (percept, impression, manifold). To doubt that concepts are in some sense real, which is to doubt the possibility of conceptual activity, is meaningless. Such a doubt is meaningless because it would then have no structure, no 'shape' and so no answer and so is no question. An example would be the behaviourist who says "man has no nature, he is one organism among others and differences named are purely arbitrary." What I take it he is really saying (i.e., makes sense) is that some particular account (say a classical account of the unique status of man) is something mistakenly applied to man and other organisms. It is to be noted that he is appealing to some 'nature' or 'form of things,' which is not purely a sensory matter, that he hopes is visible to us, so that we too may see that his account is more 'fit' and 'appropriate.' He cannot be saying there are no 'forms' or 'natures,' for then there would be a kind of dualism where there was no bridge to reality, no way of seeing the worth of his account nor to what it is he is appealing. Such a doubt is a case of misapplying a sensible question about any particular conceptual(B) activity with the question of the concepts(A) employed. This mistake is an old one and has to do with taking concepts as something we can treat of separately from the synthetic activity of someone faced with an X. If the world around us is represented by the grace of concepts it

does not follow that all concepts are representations of ours (artifacts) and so capable of the same sort of analysis as are phenomena--which is the mistake of critical idealism.

We are, on an account of knowing as above, participant in reality and it in us. Dualisms are not right as they leave out the bridge notions--concepts(A). No matter what someone says or what we learned in the nursery, the presence of bridge concepts(A) allows us to realign, correct and judge what is the good or worth or truth of these sayings. Only on this ground can we capture the fallacy of the genetic fallacy, and the fallacy of authority. What some one has said, or how I happen to, or my culture does, represent things are not the only data available to thinking.

I.B CRITICAL IDEALISM

By this point we ought to have been delivered, with the aid of Hume's observations, from naive realism. We should have recognized that we are organized so that impressions or percepts are given to us unconnected, that is, the 'world' is not given and so not known. It is a well known step from here to the position that all schemata (language, art or science) are phantasms--projected or created--and show us not the nature and reality of things but, at best, the nature of some minds or cultural way of seeing. To naive

realism, everything which has not the sort of reality which is directly and immediately given from outside is fraud or perhaps useful illusion--the effect of the activity of self trying to mirror the reality of things with connections, similarities, causes and other projected abstractions not given to human understanding. Such a philosophy, however, is not a popular option and its consequences have been taken to be avoided only by what we might very generally call "Kant's Copernican revolution." One of the more recent followers of this "remedy" has described it for us as follows:

Instead of measuring the content, meaning, and truth of intellectual forms by something extraneous which is supposed to be reproduced in them, we must find in these forms themselves the measure and criterion for their truth and intrinsic meaning.(2)

Myth, language, art and science are all rescued by seeing in them their own individual human 'reality' and dignity. As Cassirer(3) continues,

For the mind, only that can be visible which has some definite form; but every form of existence has its source in some peculiar way of seeing, some intellectual formulation and intuition of meaning.

This is quite different from what we have indicated to this point. We agree that every existence that we know anything of is by "intellectual formulation and intuition of meaning" but this is not of "some peculiar way of seeing," nor is

some "way of seeing" of ours the source of formulations and intuitions. Rather we know by virtue of the natures, concepts(A), and forms of things and ourselves. Visibility is by and has its source in the 'what'--the present form or nature of the thing (see above pages 23-24).

Bridge concepts or forms (e.g., that by which we can say that "this belongs to that" or that "this analysis fits that complex") are not present to us in the same manner as sensations of particular simples. If you take whatever knowledge we have of the former as necessarily being known like sensations of simples are, then you will take actual, particular human judgements and representations as your simple, bedrock data. That is, 'concepts' will only mean 'concepts(B)'--those used by the people whose judgements and representations you are investigating. If you take these concepts (historical facts, concepts(B)) to be the necessary conditions of human thinking/meaning then you have idealism. If there are no concepts outside of those used in forming the judgements we are analyzing, you will see that one is radically bound by our 'forms of perception,' 'form of life' or 'culture' under which you learned how to form judgements, and so what 'truth' or 'beauty' or 'justice' mean--that is, how they are used. Even if 'conventionalist' in the sense of limiting to facts of usage under certain 'forms-of-life' or 'culture' or in Cassirer, "symbolic forms," many contemporary philosophies treatment of concepts

can still be called idealist. They still absolutize particular historical uses, judgements and concepts as either the necessary way humans cognize, or what "making sense" is about.

If there is no presence of concepts(A) or natural forms, then the forms of sensation can only be accounted for by discursive categories (for example, what has been thought, said, written down, etc.). For instance, these peculiar ways of seeing are appropriate subjects of the social sciences in Cassirer. In Kant, intuition is of the structures of oneself or one's constructions, i.e., what has been thought in himself. This states the latent historicism in all these accounts. Contrary to this denotative, discursive approach to what concepts are, we say that there must be concepts(A) and that they must be contextual, being the form of things and ourselves and not themselves simple, straightforwardly nameable things either in ourselves or in our intellectual history.

The variants of 'critical idealism' are perhaps more well known today than is realism. Yet, as far as knowledge is concerned, it is the position of this thesis that such moves have nothing whatsoever to add. The naivete of naive realism has here merely shifted from object to subject. Before we substantiate this it is well that we discuss the self, its extension through concepts, its representations

and its impressions.

Among the things we have impressions of is the self. It will be immediately realized that I am the stable and unifying element in my perceptions; that is, while observing something I can also observe myself confronting the things. I see a thing and see that it is 'I' who sees it. Further, after the thing, say a hard black ball, disappears from my field of vision, something has occurred in my self. A picture or representation of the ball has become associated with myself. I have been extended with the new representations I can now recall from my memory.

These representations of mine can, like myself and billiard tables, street lamps, etc., become objects of my attention. Thus I have an inner 'world' which can be distinguished from the outer 'world.' A legion of confusions arise with the failure to grasp the difference between concepts(A) and my representations (mental pictures or concepts(B)).

A different family of troubles arise from the failure to distinguish representations from the things of the world. The change that arises in me as I confront an X has resulted in concomitant representations (mental pictures). For the critical idealists, these have become the only accepted objects of human observation and so the limits of significant speech are determined.

The generically Kantian view, which is certainly

popular today, is that we are limited to our representations because humans are taken to be organized such that experience is of changes in ourselves, and not of the things-in-themselves which purportedly 'cause' these changes. I know my representations or mental pictures and cannot somehow assimilate some reality independent of these. As we have already seen in part, recent physics and psychology convince us we must go beyond what is obvious to common perceptual experience, It is our organization, and its conditions, that are the necessary and general elements in our percepts and sensations. It might seem to follow from this that we only know anything according to, in the form of, and to the extent that our organization, place and time allow. For instance, the colours we see around us we know to be modifications of our visual organs. What seems to follow is that we are restricted to our subjective perceptions and our mental pictures (our representations). If the form of our life, our circumstances and the organization of ourselves do not yield the purely subjective and idiosyncratic this is because of what is taken to be the structure of all human thoughts or of what "making sense" is about. (The words of some contemporary analysts would be 'sense,' 'logic,' 'use,' 'grammar,' etc.) Something is left out of account in all these philosophical positions. It is just a mistake to move from what anyone is able to conceive or make sense of to the position that he has thereby defined

the limits of any possible human knowing and meaning.

With a view to displaying the unhelpful, self defeating and question-begging nature of this whole thinking, I take the moment of the Kantian revolution to proceed somewhat as follows. As we have seen above, and of this physiology will convince us, what is impressed on our sensory surfaces is considerably altered by them after which nerves are stimulated, passing this along to the brain where more modification occurs until we have the consciousness of the sensation. Further, as we have seen, sensations are discrete elements (individual colours, textures, patterns, sounds, etc. are all present singularly) with which the unifying activity of mind forges a unified perceptual field (a street) or object (say a billiard table). What seems to be given to the person is foremost this unified mental picture (of the street or table). In fact, this is all that is given to consciousness. Even the consciousness of 'sensations' is only something achieved by representing or picturing 'them' to oneself. What is present to our minds are not sub-atomic matter in motion (the external thing(s)) nor nerve stimuli, nor processes in the brain, but pictures; not, that is, "things as they are in themselves out there," but rather what appears to us through the organizing of our minds (our categories and forms of perception).

It is difficult to underestimate the generality of this

sort of accounting. It dominates our intellectual climate, in different forms, in a way that naive realism once did. Indeed, much of modern philosophy revolves around these questions. Descartes thought what we first and most trustworthily come to know is the existence of our own minds. Even Locke thought that what we are immediately acquainted with is our ideas. What it is that exists beyond the contents of our minds now becomes a leading question (encapsulating our desire to 'relate' in our language, wonder and desire). However, while it is a truism that any knowledge has something or some direction as an object for our minds, it is a simple fallacy that our minds therefore determine the thing or direction.

The following lines will show this entire model of knowledge to be no useful guide to accounting for the relation of impressions to the mental representations associated with them. This model of knowledge also does not show that our mental pictures (or any such human artifice) are what we are limited to in our knowing.

In language no more extended than what has developed to this point and in the continuing spirit of a wondering self, consider the following: the critical philosopher merely exchanges the naive belief of the realist in substantial reality immediately known from outside us for the same belief inside us. The critical philosopher asks us to observe the sensory organs which modify then transmit

'impulses' (or some such) to our nerves which then pass 'impulses' to the 'brain' which then modifies them again and finally give us mental pictures. To the critical philosopher, however, each of these phases must be a discrete representation itself. As the sense organ is a picture, so are the nerve impulses and the brain processes yet another--what is to join them? Presumably a mental picture of these mental pictures hanging together. And how do we know these as 'ours' but by another mental picture which in turn is one of many others comprising myself. What we have are pictures of pictures of pictures, presumably all this not becoming a regress because of the 'structure of the mind' or 'form of life' or 'symbolic form.' However, to us, all of these would be themselves mental pictures, and so on. On analysis the position collapses into a kind of solipsism; at any rate the result is silence, as soon as the question of justification for what we take (due to our organization or form-of-life) the nature of things to be is asked. But of course, critical philosophies are recognizable, yet only by illegitimately assuming the naive realists' simple confidence in perception but in this case to perceptions of self or processes and forms within the self. However, as introspection seems, at least to me, the self affords us no such pride of self-authenticating inner percepts. I am not saying we cannot turn our attention to our mental pictures, only that if we accept ourselves as limited to our mental

pictures, ourselves become vacuous and mental pictures hang chaotically no where in particular. Percepts without concepts are blind. This applies to inner percepts as much as outer. What is clearly missing is the ability we do have, to 'bridge' out of this regress and recognize representations and mental pictures as ours and as subject to correction and some kind of relation to reality.

It might be thought that the critical idealist is mistaken only as regards his conclusions. The critical analysis of naive realism leads not to "the world is my mental picture" but rather to critical realism. The things of the world are not directly known yet can be inferred indirectly from the analysis of subjective representations-- but how are all these representations connected? That is, what are the environmental, physiological and psychological processes behind the overwhelmingly common structure of our human 'ideas'? One might well, it would seem on this accounting, save the appearance of this uniformity by inferring a common cause which determines their arising in the form and structure in which mental pictures do manifestly arise (a sociological fact).

Yet realism cannot be restated in this way due to the lack of a 'bridge.' This new realist also would have us turn attention to our mental pictures, that is, again to inner percepts. But as the arguments of the critical idealist have placed us, these new percepts are themselves

mental pictures . . . (regress again). This realist has the same difficulty as a fictional character, or of being in a dream. One does not have the resources to judge any truth of character while within the fiction. Something more must be added to or qualified in the critical arguments. I think it can be seen that this 'realist' kind of movement makes no progress over the critical idealist which itself makes no improvement on the skeptical results of critical arguments applied to the naive man's simple realism.

However, as we have seen above there is knowing and the utility of our schematas. This is by conceptual activity. This could be the means of stepping outside the fiction, so to speak, yet the critical philosophies of modern times have misunderstood that activity and so rendered it impotent. Before we get on to this mistake in accounting for conceptual activity (below) we will firm up and give an idea of the generality of the critical positions criticized above.

The critical philosopher is indeed constructive, but what is made is not truth but the historical picture of some ever-past particular structure (person/circumstance/culture relative) of mind, which is merely the record of the minds contact with reality and not at all a necessary feature of anything. All that is known to these idealists is what has been reported, hoped, imagined, spoken, projected, etc, of

reality. One has no 'bridges' on these accounts which would always allow a fresh insight, correction and realignment of this historical record of minds, speeches and conceptions. This is why I have included some of linguistic philosophy under 'critical idealism'; if you take the fixed denotative meanings of words as an ultimate sort of datum you are making the same 'move' and restricting the possibilities of fresh accounts of meaning and fresh 'meanings' by absolutizing 'usage' or what has been meant, learned in the nursery, etc. Regarding such a bridge notion as 'truth,' these idealists do not leave one with the resources to say that this account is 'better than' that one, that the facts 'fit' this theory, or that this investigation is 'appropriate' but not that one, etc. At least, one can 'say' these sorts of things but on the idealist account one cannot express any presence which would provide grounds to overturn or confirm any or all that has been conceived, said, judged, or meant. I take this impoverished account of human possibilities to be, in the case of truth, absurd, nihilist, and self-defeating for any person attempting to state a rational account of anything. The 'presence' missed (the presence of bridge notion(s)) I take to be (or to reflect) the apprehension by us of (and in some sense 'unity with') the form of things or of the world. That is, the great dualist divide of 'fact' or 'object' on the one hand from 'mental complexes' on the other cannot be complete.

Reality is bridged when reality takes the form of human consciousness (a necessarily non-discursive, immediate state). Bridge notions arise out of this 'seeing' (of the 'form' or 'nature' of that part of reality) and provide that presence through which we can align and 'better' our conceptions and conventions and recognize them as such.

It is critical to notice here that in the case of 'truth' we have isolated the presence of something (necessary to this 'truth' and allied notions of rationality and intelligibility) which naive realism and critical idealism say we cannot rationally talk of. We have not only argued that these positions are incomplete positions but demonstrated the presence of an instance (truth) of a class of existents called 'bridge notions' (natures or concepts(A)). While not straightforwardly nameable, nor 'simple,' nor particular, yet 'truth' has not been ineffable either.

If we seek any clarity or end to our conscious mental life then we recognize truth as a good, a thing desirable. But there are other bridge notions or concepts which reflect the presence of form and also may well reflect part of what is real. Justice and beauty reflect the apprehension of the form or nature of persons. Justice is a statement about what properties are 'appropriate to' or 'belong to' a person or society. There is a unity between a person and his acts;

e.g., it does not 'belong to' and is a 'disunity' with the nature of man that he either acts or is treated cruelly and without cause. Beauty is a statement about the fit and unity of the elements within some whole--that they "belong together thus" or are "appropriate" together. The apprehension of these are apprehensions of form or the presence of bridge notions. The presence of these allow us to claim that men are fit for dignified treatment and informed by beauty as much as that they are fit for bipedal motion and informed by DNA. Bridge notions, it should be noted, are always contextual (except in the sense of being that through which fresh, non-conventional conceptions and representations arise). Being contextual, they are not listable but not altogether ineffable either. If 'rational' means 'public and discursive' then these notions are not rational, but also not irrational; they are, rather, pre-rational.

I.C ANALYSIS

The positions which deny ontological status to such concepts(A) as we have been seeking to establish, have done so on account of what 'ontological status' (to exist) has been taken to mean--which is for these nominalists, singular, individual, things (extended or enduring simples). If we draw attention to some predicative speech, something more will be assayed. For example, "the tree is green" will yield for these thinkers two simples: an individual named 'the tree' and a character named 'green.' The question to be put to this nominalist account has to be, as Bergmann asks, "Is this assay complete? More strongly, could it possibly be complete or must it yield something else?"(4) Clearly, as we have been arguing thus far, there is more. For the predicative sentence to express what it does, there must be present unities, differences, self identity, the presence of these to our 'minds,' etc., otherwise the complex expressed by "the tree is green" would not be expressed and would not be expressed successfully to us. Exactly what is missing are the bridge notions which are about the unities present and by which we can express anything about the form of the singular things (e.g., that the tree is truly green, that 'green' stands in a certain relation to the tree that is visible and intelligible, etc.).

If we are to ask for explanations then we are looking

for something which speaks of finality, and this is only by bridge notions (see end of this part). Only thus can we express the form of our accounts arrived at as true, beautiful, complete, etc. The impoverished ontological assay of Wittgenstein to which we have drawn attention, results eventually in the loss of the world altogether--his "epigones talk about language." (5) What this means for explanations one epigone makes clear in The Concept of Mind. (6) Ryle believes many great philosophers have made a mistake "in supposing that the question 'How are mental-conduct concepts applicable to human behaviour?' is a question about the causation of that behaviour." (7)

Mistakes like this are what lead us to adopt theories that there exists 'volitions' or 'will' or 'mind' over and above the simple description of human behaviour. More particularly, Ryle seems to take these philosophers to have introduced such things as mental occurrences and faculties in order to distinguish between intelligent and unintelligent, or between purposive and non-purposive behaviour. These philosophers have introduced 'causes' (minds, faculties, volitions) as a criterion for distinctions, which is a category mistake and one need not look to any such causes to describe the distinction. This way of stating the issue makes Ryle's reduction obvious. Philosophers have been interested in the difference between stones and men (for example) and have introduced 'souls' and

'minds' not to describe the behavioural differences (the obvious) but to account or explain them. Ryle mistakes these philosophers intention. Ryle reduces explanations to 'really' being attempts at descriptions of nameable singulars.

Hofstadter finds Ryle's undervaluing of explanatory theory 'astounding' and 'remarkable,' (8) and while it is remarkable, it is understandable if one rejects what we have called bridge notions. Hofstadter points out what is something of an absurdity in Ryle. In discussing Ryle's finding something implausible in the discoveries of "hidden causes," we get the following:

Professor Ryle's remarks are like saying: We know quite well what caused the wire to conduct electricity. Its ends were attached to a live battery; and wires are disposed to conduct electricity when their ends are connected to live batteries, which are disposed to produce such currents in wires. If scientists were to think, as Professor Ryle does, that we know well enough the causes of electrical behaviour of metals at that level, just how much of modern mathematical physics should we have?(9)

If however, as we have argued for, bridge notions do express something present and real to us, then explanations and causes are legitimate questions with legitimate answers.

An example of a better account of the elements in explanations and analyses can be given. Behold a person leaning on a tree; among other things the person 'has' fingers, eyes, a nose, etc. There is something like a unified manifold (the person) which is extended and

enduring. The identity that is the person is also known by differences in the scene we are beholding--the one thing moves from place to place (the person) while the other (the tree) does not, the fingers 'belong' to the hand which 'belongs to' the person not the tree, one we would resist cutting down and using in a furnace, the other not especially so. Now there must be something by virtue of which the unity that is the person, ties the person's distinct characteristics together and allows us to differentiate the person from his environmental circumstances (such as the tree). That something is either (i) purely in the mind of the beholder; whether because of what is taken to be the necessary structure of my mind or because conventional ways of seeing have structured my mind, or (ii) nothing independent, a 'place name' or abstraction standing for the really real things of sensation received from 'out there,' or (iii) part of reality, being the form of the person though also being in the mind of the beholder. If the 'ties' are as per (i), we have some form of idealism or form of contemporary 'analysis.' Option (ii) is of the naive consciousness. These two options have been argued against as regressive and incomplete. Option (iii) may seem to also be regressive--e.g., what ties the 'ties' to the thing and its characteristics? This purported regress is only possible by the forced and arbitrary understanding of the form or 'tie' as being another particular thing. We

should be able to resist absolutizing the substance-attribute way of thinking long enough to see that the 'tie' is not like the simple, straightforwardly nameable, individual thing with characteristics predicated of it. The 'tie' is not in the person but is the unity, is the form of the characteristics, that is the thing. The 'tie' is what we see of the thing which is present and visible to us (in our minds).

When we seek to analyse 'a person,' we break down or articulate the elements and structure of 'a person.' There are flesh, blood, genetic codes, molecular codes, atomic structures, etc. But any such account or explanation is full of the presence of unities and 'ties' if it is ever to proceed at all. Are the steps in the analysis 'complete,' is the data 'appropriate,' which 'belongs-to' which, and finally, is this account 'true' of the person? There are clearly syntheses throughout and these are of the ties which are according to one of the three options above. The case is no different in the case of truth than of beauty or justice which are 'seen' and 'present' to the person and our beholding as the unities and finalities that define the person and what can be said to be his properties.

While such bridge notions (unities, 'ties' as in 'truth,' 'beauty,' 'justice') give rise to what is public and are key to our knowing what is real, they are not themselves public. I see no way around this. Analysis

cannot be thought of as somehow independent of cognition which is in someone's mind. We cannot just begin analytically with 'evidence,' 'formal structures,' or 'semantics'; we also need to account for how evidence or structures mean something to us. Analysis points in the direction of the subject as well as of the object, and to a bridge of unity between the two. This is also why a complete, definite 'list' of bridge notions cannot be given although we can say some things about them. Just as one cannot list what it is that allows the Pythagorean proof to be 'seen,' one can only run through the steps or retrace the steps until it is seen.

I.D SCIENCE

Up until the twentieth century the 'natural' sciences described themselves in terms of solid, inanimate bodies moving in a fixed three dimensional space and of a uniform flow of time. Such a picture could well find the bridge notions we have been arguing for superfluous. Thus we have had 'positivism' and 'naturalism' resting on a rational extension of the 'positive' and 'natural' sciences to man's life also. The translation of 'good,' 'God,' 'Natural Right' into something non-expressive of anything real is well enough known. However, science has replaced the solidity of simple bodies with interweaving patterns of

energy which removes any support to 'positivism' and 'naturalism' other than social inertia, and 'double think.' In science we talk of patterns, unities, forms, fields but in philosophy some still treat science as if it supported their nominalism of real, discrete 'things' plus abstractions (or grammatical unities) which are merely 'about' them. Rather than thinking in terms of concrete particular bodies which have characteristics which the bodies instance and exemplify here and there, we should perhaps think in terms of unities, natures, characteristics which have spatio temporal instances and exemplifications here and there in space and time (bodies and minds) and which give these whatever sense, visibility and presence they have. This inversion of the usual metaphysical scheme would also invert our account of causes. While it is true that men require instantial fathers and this is part of the necessary conditions for persons coming to be, one can object to the placing of these auxiliary circumstances in space and time into essential, eternal natures which are the 'real' primary causes. We have found no good reasons to ignore the possibility that persons are framed by beauty, and fit for justice, as well as by DNA and environmental factors. Perhaps all of these natures determine what a person is and through which people come to be what they are.

No matter what model of science, only bridge notions

can state what 'good' or 'worth' science is. Only bridge notions can state the 'appropriateness' of some technique and that one avenue is 'better' to research than another given scarce resources. Within science, only bridge notions can state the 'fit' or 'completeness' of any evidence to any hypothesis, etc.

I.E EXISTENCE

Experience considered in general, or any in particular, will yield on analysis non-relative, a-temporal, necessary foundations. The sense of these foundations, is not that of any imposed categories (cognitive or 'cultural') but rather what we have called concepts(A) or natures. I call these natures "foundations" because these are what fundamentally are, that is, what is visible, what it is we experience, and so what we truly know. In order to answer what it is we know of existence and what sense the word has, we want to enunciate the classical principle that to be is to be something.

To know, perceive, or have any determinate experience is to 'point out' or determine by delimiting what is known. That aspect of what we know that structures or permits such pointing or delimiting is the limit or boundary of the 'thing' known. Whether the experience is sensory or intellectual, this structuring, bounding, shape is 'that'

which is seen or grasped, partially or fully, darkly or clearly. We can refer to this shape, pattern, rule, nature, form, concept(A), etc. as the 'what' of what it is that is experienced (mixed with forms of matter, space, time in the case of bodies). A person, for instance, is a juxtaposition of life, some such rule as DNA, intelligence, beauty (we are asserting) and other natures with extension and duration. Any experience or knowledge is of such a juxtaposition, which is what we know of being and non-being in whatever senses we may possibly have.

Our experiences are not of an undifferentiated One nor of ceaselessly jagged differences but of a harmony of unities and differences. If we seek to understand or analyse we exhibit this harmony by specifying and delimiting unities. We recognize and so can count the ten lamp posts (despite perspectival encumbrances) in front of us. We count the ten people, who differ from each other, and differ collectively from the lamp posts and both of these from the number ten. Each lamp post, person, street or collection 'stands out,' is seen and recognized due to elements which remain the same throughout time, space, perspective and point of view. Existents are mixtures of one and many, that is, unities and differences. Concepts(A) or 'natures' are the form or pattern of these mixtures. That is how a thing can both be known and be what it is. That is how it stands out, is visible, is experienced, can be any thing and finally just

be.

If one is concerned with what has been called (mere) 'appearances' or 'becoming' the matter is no different. Something changes or moves or endures (or does not). If it changes, it differentiates itself across distinguishable moments but remains recognizable throughout because in its 'standing forth' it is self-identical, what is still distinguishing the thing from any- and every- thing else is its form, pattern, etc. If the thing differentiates only across moments or places the distinguishing is only numerical--still we have nothing but the mixture of unities and differences.

Concepts(A) (natures, forms) are the necessary condition for understanding and knowledge of anything, as we have seen. As we have also seen, concepts(A) delimit and differentiate one thing from another and are (singly or in combination) the 'that' of self-identity. Therefore they are what 'allows,' or 'through which' a thing can stand apart from anything else, which just means that through which a thing exists. Visibility and intelligibility (in principle) and existence have their condition in the rule we have called the concept(A) or nature of the thing--a mixture of unities, patterns, structures, etc.

Among other positions, the Aristotelian 'version' of essentialism is mistaken; we have seen that concepts(A) or natures are the existential condition of any existent.

Conditions are prior to their consequences and so not classificatory terms for sorting out a posteriori. As to the criticisms of such a position, as we are taking here, arising from the assumptions that we are creating a radically separate realm of additional 'things,' J.N. Findlay says

The arguments in this famous polemic, first stated in Aristotle's Academic treatise On the Ideas and briefly summarized in two places in the Metaphysics (I, 9 and XIII, 4,5) and thereafter wearisomely repeated and endorsed throughout the history of philosophy, are, however, among the most total ignorationes elenchi in the whole of philosophical history. For they assume that Plato believed, in full seriousness, in a world of firmly identical, particular existents, sorted into classes by their intrinsic character and behaviour, and that he then gratuitously invented a second world of detached Eide to take care of their common features (whether for existence or for knowledge) without seeing that these Eide could do nothing towards fulfilling such an absurd task. Whereas the whole thrust of Platonism (despite its manifold metaphors), the thrust derived from its origin in the flux-theory of Heraclitus and Cratylus, and from its yearning towards a reformed version of Eleatic constancy, was to deny that there was anything genuinely seizable and knowable, or anything truly causative and explanatory, in the flowing realm of particular things and matters of fact . . . (10)

Whether or not consistent with Findlay, to be consistent with what we have said in this section, one has to puzzle, even doubt the existence of (in any sense but conventional abstractions) such Aristotelian and common sense "matters of fact," separate from that which informs them. We are arguing for an inversion of the usual ontology, not an

extension of it to include the reality of justice, beauty, truth.

We do not take natures to be totally separate from things, this would be to make a thing separate from its existence and intelligibility--against every argument to this point. What we can experience as present are the concepts(A) or natures of spatio-temporal things which are their form and are nothing extraneous to 'them.' Natures or concepts(A) taken as possibilities which are sometimes actualized as existent things is wrongheaded. Wrongheaded also is the conception of ideals which sometimes are instantiated as existent things. Rather, reality is a whole, what we mean by existent particulars is the mixture of some natures with the nature of matter, and perhaps also the natures of succession and extension (time and space). A thing is not a materialization of some other 'real' essence.

In this first section I have tried to follow a natural movement from the naive consciousness to critical idealism to a realism with regards to what have been called 'bridge notions' or 'forms.' The empiricism of naive realism absolutizes the data of the senses (variously, according to different 'schools'). The critical idealist absolutizes particular judgements and other human doings (quite like many contemporary linguistic analysts absolutize the fixed and static denotations we learn in the nursery). All these

absolutes are false. Critical idealism I take to have begun when Kant took human thinking to be fully constituted by, rather than merely including, acts of judgement. Judgements are public and nameable, thus all human thinking was taken to be discursive, definable, listable and straightforwardly nameable--its limits circumscribed and human understanding 'defined.' This absolutizing of what Kant took to be all possible forms of experience ends in the absolutizing of the 'great divide' between the world as it is and mental complexes which attempt to represent it. Kant's "copernican revolution" is clear: we 'make' the 'objects' or the 'things' and have no knowledge of them as they are in themselves. More generally what we know is our structure, not the structure or form of the world indifferent to any representations of it.

But it seems to me there is much altogether incoherent about any such position which absolutizes what is anybody's particular mental structure, what anyone learned in a nursery, or what any group says or says we are limited to. Please attempt, self-reflectively, to attend to this structure of our human thought and then some object which it has structured. What is the relation of our structures to this new 'object'? The relation can only be another 'object,' this time 'mental' (a representation); that is, another structure of ours. Now we have a structure of ours somehow representing a structured object (which is itself a

representation--a structure of ours). Now can we account, explain, or say anything about the way we have structured some object? Such could only be another representation. What we have, in this position, is any act of self-reflection or doubt being lost in a regress of self-structuring representations instead of issuing in a corrected view which it so palpably often does. Or take reflection on the structure or categories of our thought--is this structure necessary to all thought? Are these the structures of all possible human judgements? Of course any answer would itself be structured within the conceptual structure that happens to be ours and so any answers would be representations of ours, as would be the 'structure' in question, so we have again, representations of representation and so on.

Thus, under the philosophy of critical idealism, self-reflection itself is extinguished as is any possible evaluation of what we say, or explanation, and finally consciousness itself. This is an absurd conclusion for a philosophy which sets out to explain human reason. Such are the consequences of having no access outside one's own mental structures to the structure of the world (no bridge notions). The philosophical positions that disallow ontological status to bridge notions (natures, concepts(A)) consider themselves to be 'critical,' 'careful,' conservative and even skeptical. We have suggested however

that their arguments are from fully loaded accounts of ontology, epistemology, meaning and the fully circumscribed possibilities of human knowing and speaking. We have suggested these positions are incoherent and collapse upon themselves. We have tried to show they arbitrarily abort some knowledge of presences we have called bridge notions. In the case of one of these notions, 'truth,' the positions end up in the absurdity of nihilism. The other bridge notions which also speak of the form of things, e.g., beauty, justice, are similarly free from any weight of these arguments against them as a class.

We would rather retain the child's observation that senseless cruelty is to be recoiled from and wisdom and beauty to be desired, and all this as real and present as much or more than anything else. We have tried to be skeptical of any silencing or reducing of this consciousness of good and evil with ornate philosophical speeches about the necessary limits of human knowing and meaning.

NOTES

1. The verification principle originally appeared to be a powerful and simple formulation. However, before long the effort to elucidate the principle and defend it against regress(es) had transformed it beyond recognition. See W.T.

Jones, The Twentieth Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre, 2nd ed. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 245-249.

2. Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myths, trans. Susanne Langer (Harper & Brothers, 1946), p. 8.

3. Cassirer, p. 8.

4. Gustav Bergmann, "The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein," in Logic and Reality (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 229.

5. Bergmann, p. 241.

6. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949).

7. The mistake Ryle makes I take from Albert Hofstadter's "Professor Ryle's Category-Mistake," The Journal of Philosophy XLVIII(9), pp. 257f., where the issue is more fully discussed.

8. Hofstadter, p. 268.

9. Hofstadter, p. 268.

10. J.N. Findlay, Plato, The Written and Unwritten Doctrines (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 33.

SECTION II

II.A THE ESSENTIALIST WAY

If we are to seek some end and rest to our mental life then we seek that through which explanations, articulations, accountings can come to a terminus; finality is in terms of 'goodness,' 'fit,' 'truth,' 'beauty,' and other such statements about the form of things. The perpetual quest for certainty from 'out there' need not be vain; we have established the presence of bridge notions and so the end of the "iron maiden" of dualism. The following 'way' is not by abstraction (or philosophizing into the blue) but by systematically considering the presence and recognizability of the nature or form of goodness.

Anselm's 'way' is an oft taken path; the natures (concepts(A)) are either the thoughts of God, they are God, or they are significant of His 'substance.' Whichever way, as we know something of concepts, and that they are realities, we know something of God and that He is. From Philo, through the Fathers of the Christian church, and especially in Clement of Alexandria and Augustine we find a similar notion which then becomes widespread in western Christianity.(1) In support of this, one citation is probably enough. Reading our "natures" for Platonizing "ideas" the following illustrates our point. It is from

H.A. Wolfson's discussion of a passage from Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio, (2)

In a fifth passage, where he again tries to prove the existence of ideas, he starts out by showing that our ideas of number and wisdom are neither derived from sense perception nor are they mere fictions of our mind, but that they reflect the existence of a supersensible real and immutable number and wisdom. In this he follows Plato. Then he tries to show that the totality of ideas are contained in the idea of truth. In this, too, he follows Plato. Finally he concludes that "truth itself is God", by which he means to say that, inasmuch as truth, which is the totality of ideas, is spoken of in the New Testament as being the Logos, for Jesus, who is the Logos incarnate, says of himself, "I am the truth", it is also God.

II.B MONOLOGIUM. PREFACE, CHAPTERS I & II

Anselm tells us that the work is a meditation "on the Being of God." (3) While scripture has much to say about God, it is realized here that revelation can only be such once the basic themes, such as who God is, have been established. Otherwise how would a revelation be recognized as such? and be recognized as from God, and as belonging to a tradition of such revelation, etc.? It is part of the intent of the meditation that "nothing in Scripture should be urged on the authority of Scripture itself" and so we are clearly dealing with 'natural' theology and are appealing to no greater authority than reason alone (as Anselm explicitly tells us in chapter I). Anselm feels there is nothing in the meditation inconsistent with "the Catholic Fathers, or

especially . . . St. Augustine."

The 'way' of the meditation is taken by its author to be the easiest of among many to convince one "of the existence of one Nature which is the highest of all existing beings, which is also sufficient to itself in its eternal blessedness." The rest of the description of this Nature especially interests us here: ". . . which confers upon and effects in all other beings, through its omnipotent goodness, the very fact of their existence, and the fact that in any way their existence is good." Plainly we are dealing with a description of God as cause, but it is none of teleological, efficient, or material causes which Anselm refers to. Rather, that 'through which' a thing is, is answered by reflection on predicative speech. The 'through which' should alert us to the exemplary causation and essentialism which soon becomes clear. It will also be clear that Aristotelian essentialism is not what Anselm is using. Predicative speech, specifically regarding 'goodness' and human desire, is where this theology begins.

What men suppose to be good they desire. At some point it seems natural to wonder at these goods and inquire into their cause. Now it is to be noticed that one can, at least to some extent, discern or recognize good things. One can even say, as with many attributes, that here it exists in greater, and there in lesser, degree. But it is clear that

such grading and recognizing is by some fact which is a unity across such instances. In the case of goodness Anselm asks, "must we not believe that there is some one thing, through which all goods whatever are good?" Unless we are nominalists, what we discern is the presence or visibility of Goodness (or of a related, subordinated nature such as is desired; justice, beauty, life, wisdom, etc.) which is this "one thing." Nevertheless this is not always recognizable due to the derived goodness of what is useful, and so derivatively recognized as good. As Anselm explains; "nothing is ordinarily regarded as good, except either for some utility--as, for instance, safety is called good, and those things which promote safety--or for some honorable character--as, for instance, beauty is reckoned to be good, and what promotes beauty."

Anselm concludes from such predicative speech that all goods "if they are truly good, are good through that same being through which all goods exist, whatever that being is." Anselm is plainly no nominalist systematically translating and reducing the visibility and presence of form, such as are considered good into some abstraction, to 'nothing' or to being 'really' about the arbitrary habits of collecting things (as though Beethoven's Ninth could be adequately analyzed as vibrating surfaces according to sociological norms). As present and visibly so, existence or 'being' is retained as our focus. Such a superordinating

Good, informing and realizing all these other goods is surely a great good and "a good through itself, since every other good is through it." Goodness which participates is not something utterly distinct from good things and so its goodness is inherent.

Awareness of the present unity of desirability, no matter how partial and blundering our insight, is what allows our reorientation and correcting conceptions of what is truly desirable. It is also that by virtue of which a desirable act is such and so is a necessary element in any accounting for it. As Anselm concludes, "There is, therefore, some one being which is supremely good, and supremely great, that is the highest of all existing beings." These superlatives speak of the terminus of inquiry into goodness. What is meant by 'great' Anselm tells us plainly, "I do not mean physically great, as a material object is great, but that which, the greater it is, is the better or more worthy,--wisdom for instance." (This is contrary to some contemporary opinions of what Anselm means by great, some suggesting he means self-existence by it . . . which would seem to imply Anselm is using existence as a predicate, which he is not, in these chapters at least.)

II.C MONOLOGIUM. CHAPTER III

As we have seen "all good things are such through something that is one and the same." Anselm now generalizes further, "whatever is, apparently exists through something that is one and the same." If one were searching with eyes of German Critical Idealism one might suppose Anselm has mistakenly taken existence as a character just as he has taken correctly goodness. Such a theory would be quite wrong as we see when Anselm continues to support himself:

For, everything that is, exists either through something, or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing. For it is altogether inconceivable that anything should not exist by virtue of something.

We have here not some abstract conception nor mental picture to which Anselm is trying to attribute existence. Nor is he referring to some sea of unrealized possibilities to which some have 'existence' as a character and so 'existence' is what is recognizable in all actual things and that by virtue of which they exist. This is a gloss not at all supported by the texts we are considering nor by this 'essentialist way' generally. Kant suggests there is a contradiction in introducing existence "into the concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility." (4) The thesis agrees with this as long as 'concept' means concept(B), the conceptualizations and representations that men have made and spoken. We do not take there to be anything necessary or absolute in such

contingent structures. It is the critical idealist who absolutizes either the structures of himself or 'grammar' (ever relative to some form of life) who traffics in this anthropomorphism. The thesis does not believe we are left to our own structures, nor to the fixed denotative meanings of words we learned, nor to the dualism of self versus unknown or unmeaning reality as it is in itself. We have present to us some notion of the form of things which bridge us to reality and, for example, the cases of goodness to their recognizability as good. Justice, beauty and the other goods are not mere instances of a Kantian 'concept.' Indeed it is clear that here Anselm is referring to existents all along, only utterly generalized, i.e., "everything that is." What we have as would be expected for a man drawing on classical philosophy is the notion that to be is to be something.

"To be is to be something (some unity)" does not say that existence is antecedent on predicative speech. Rather predicative speech is preceded by the presence and visibility of whatever exists. This visibility gives whatever sense we have of 'exists,' that is, exhibits whatever is present in our experience of whatever is (see section I.E above).

Anselm continues, "Whatever is, then, does not exist except through something." Either there is one such being

(nature, concept(A)) or a multiplicity. If a multiplicity then these are themselves through one being or through themselves as self-informing (self-existent) or through each other mutually. Anselm shows that they are not through each other, "For not even beings of a relative nature exist thus mutually." For example, while 'masters' and 'slaves' are designated in a mutual and relative way, "these relations exist through the subjects to which they are referred." These subjects, of course, are 'through something' as testified to in their recognizability and unity by which they even could have such relations. But if the multiplicity are 'through themselves' then they all cohere around this attribute of being "able to exist each through itself." That is, they are what they are (self-informing) through this unity "which is one." In this case the multiplicity of natures through which any thing is what it is are themselves either constitutive of a superordinating unity or are themselves informed and so there remains the presence of that one being through which these are the natures they are. Anselm is unclear here as to exactly what relation and status the multiplicity of informing natures have to the recognizable unity they share. He does not need to be explicit, only that there is such a unifying presence which informs everything and makes them what they are. So we are left with the position that everything that is, is through something that is one and the same. Consideration

of the unities which allow for predication leads to more superordinating unities, which is a necessarily convergent process.

II.D MONOLOGIUM. CHAPTER IV.

Anselm now adds that "if one observes the nature of things he perceives, whether he will or no, that not all are embraced in a single degree of dignity." Our attention is to go to the nature of things and not strictly to the things. Anselm now says something that is bound to cause pause to a modern reader; "For he who doubts that the horse is superior in its nature to wood, and man more excellent than the horse, assuredly does not deserve the name of man." This strikes us as unlikely only because of a mistaken account of these 'natures' which follows the Aristotelian account of the Platonic effort rather than that which we have advocated. If these natures are only another layer of 'things' above the things, it would seem no more obvious that the nature of a horse was of 'greater dignity' than the nature of wood than that a horse was somehow of 'greater dignity' than a piece of wood (which it is not). Yet Anselm speaks as if this were the most obvious of facts. Nor would it seem he means by greater or lesser dignity something like greater or lesser being; a piece of wood, a horse, or a man are all real.

Anselm continues with what seems to him plainly apparent;

although it cannot be denied that some natures are superior to others, nevertheless reason convinces us that some nature is so preeminent among these, that it has no superior. For, if the distinction of degrees is infinite, so that there is among them no degree, than which no higher can be found, our course of reasoning reaches this conclusion: that the multitude of natures themselves is not limited by any bounds. But only an absurdly foolish man can fail to regard such a conclusion as absurdly foolish.

Among natures there is some preeminent or highest nature; this seems obvious to Anselm. If there were no such highest nature it would follow that there is not a limiting and bounding of these natures, which is taken to be a reductio ad absurdum. The absurdity may not be obvious to us; after all, these natures are conceivably just brute, or could go on numerically forever like any number of series, or even sets of numbers. We just do not plainly see that these natures must be bounded by some preeminent Nature.

While we do not see that these consequences do follow from a consideration of the natures of things, we ought to. Consideration of where we have gotten to this point in elucidating 'concepts' (Anselm's 'natures') will show that Anselm is correct. Some natures are indeed of more dignity, or superior to others. For instance, the nature of man exceeds, in excellence, the nature of a horse for the former includes rationality and the possibility of wisdom which the latter does not. It is absolutely better to be

wise or rational than not (other conditions being equal). To state otherwise is to make rationality not something desirable in the justification of our choices and this is to make 'justification' senseless and nihilist (see Introduction above). The horse has mobility and animal vitality while wood does not, and the wood has life whereas a stone does not. It seems a natural enough assumption that having wisdom, rationality, vitality and life are better than lacking any of them. These natures are goods and their inclusion in a complex nature such as Man is recognizably better than their not being included. Further, all these goods (as we have seen) are 'through' and recognizable through goodness which is the ground of their being good. This is to say that they converge, no matter how numerous, on the cause of them all, i.e., goodness, which is this preeminent nature which can have no superior (nothing more excellent than). The distinction of degrees is convergent, not divergent, that is how we recognize as good (more so or less) all these goods. Goodness is the limit or bound of these things we call more or less good. Without such a visible and present Nature we could not make judgements about degrees of dignity and these natures of wisdom, rationality, life, etc, would not be and not be recognizable as what they are--goods.

So we do have the notion of a bounding and inclusive

nature preeminent among such natures the existence of which we have deduced from the existence and 'whatness' of these 'natures.' It follows that "there is a certain nature which is the highest of all existing beings." Anselm provides transition to the next three chapters by adding that this highest of existing beings can only be such because "it is what it is through itself, and all existing beings are what they are through it." As to goodness, this highest nature "is through itself good and great."

II.E MONOLOGIUM CHAPTERS. V, VI, VII

Here Anselm explicitly appeals to the principle, already mentioned and defended, that to be is to be something. From that through which any thing is what it is, to that through which every thing derives its existence, is a movement Anselm uses to establish that "this Nature, and all things that have any existence, derive existence from no other source than it." Once shown, chapter VI explains the self-existence of this Nature and in chapter VII the existence of every other being.

We are given an example of the movement in question,

For instance, what derives existence from matter, and exists through the artificer, may also be said to exist through matter, and to derive existence from the artificer, since it exists through both, and derives existence from both.

The parallelism of being something (through which) and deriving-existence-from continues (I will underline Anselm for emphasis). We have already established that a) "all existing beings are what they are, through the supreme Nature" and b) "that Nature exists through itself" and c) "other beings through another than themselves." Consequently, (i) "all existing beings derive existence from this supreme Nature," and (ii) "this Nature derives existence from itself," and (iii) "other beings (derive existence) from it." We have now the notion of this Highest Nature as self-existent Creator. We should reiterate that the expression 'through which' is pointing to or representing the presence of the informing, shaping, nature of any thing. This nature is necessary to any thing being what it is and the recognizability of it as such. As these natures include the formal natures including extension and duration (among spatio-temporal things) and existence means to be present or visible as something, it seems appropriate to say any thing derives its existence from these, or more ultimately, from the one highest Nature.

In chapter VI Anselm inquires into what way the Supreme Nature exists through itself, for the same meaning is not always attached to either of the phrases 'existence through' nor 'existence derived from.' How does this Nature exist through itself? Anselm says, "what is said to exist

through anything apparently exists through an efficient agent, or through matter, or through some other external aid, as through some instrument." But as we have already established, this Nature is not through any of these but only vice versa. "What is to be inferred?" Anselm asks with what might be taken to be the only other alternative--that it is "through nothing"? But as we have already seen, according to the principle that to be is to be something, saying something is through nothing "is as false as it would be absurd to say that whatever is is nothing." However, Anselm entertains the possibility that this Nature might derive existence from nothing. In this case, the Supreme Nature is derived from nothing either (i) through itself, (ii) through another, or (iii) through nothing. We have already seen (iii) as impossible and (ii) would imply another which would itself be the Supreme Nature under consideration, and (i) would suggest that 'itself' existed before itself and derived itself. These are all without need of refutation being either absurd or already dispensed with. What we are left with is something of a 'negative way'; we have some notion of the informing creative presence of the Supreme Nature yet cannot apply the attributes of being-informed-by or being-made-visible, or even 'real' in the way we can to all other beings. To sum up this 'negative way';

The Supreme Substance, then, does not exist

through any efficient agent, and does not derive existence from any matter, and was not aided in being brought into existence by any external causes. Nevertheless, it by no means exists through nothing, or derives existence from nothing; since, through itself and from itself, it is whatever it is.

While we have not here any multiplication of layers of being we do clearly have a difference in nature and so a different existent. While things around us are explained and known through this Supreme Nature (however proximately) it would be absurd if we could explain and know the Supreme Nature this way; then this would be through another, more comprehensive and superordinated being, i.e., as long as we continue to explain and know the Supreme Nature in this way we are confused. We have some notion 'that' the Supreme Nature is by virtue of 'what' is present to us in all existents. Still, it does not follow that we are or need to be omniscient.

The concern now is with regards to every being other than the supreme being. Anselm does not doubt that the solid world which we see consists of more basic elements (such as, for him, earth, water, fire, and air). Further, these more basic elements "can be conceived of without these forms which we see in actual objects," i.e., as what appears to be the "material of all bodies." Whatever one's conception of the more basic 'stuff' of which physical things might be said to be composite, Anselm makes the

following point:

But I ask, whence this very material that I have mentioned, the material of the mundane mass, derives its existence. For, if there is some material of this material, then that is more truly the material of the physical universe.

The question of where any such more basic material derives its existence can only can be supposed to be one of the following three: (i) from the Supreme Nature, or (ii) from itself, or (iii) from a third being. The third option is vacuous or as Anselm says, "does not exist." This is because it cannot possibly mean anything or be any part of our experience. The first two categories above are exclusive of everything meaningful in the only sense of what it means to 'exist' whatsoever. Consequently we have either the universe itself (including the visible and invisible and any such matter of these), i.e., that which is informed or derived, or, that which is not informed nor derived.

We should recall at this point that the Supreme Nature is experienced in the unifying presence of form or structure (of good, 'fit,' appropriateness, beauty, etc.) and that these are either constitutive or converging on their nature or visibility, that is, the Supreme Nature. The physical universe, considered purely as a collection of nameable individuals can yield no such presence and convergence. All that would be of such (if we could imagine such a universe) would be the measures of extension and duration (which would

also yield motion) and while we could give 'explanations,' they could only be recitations of other bodies in time and place, presumably in 'prior' duration--the priority in time displaying, somehow, causation. Still, there could be nothing that would express as 'appropriate' or 'true' or 'fit' or 'causative' the relation of the one set of facts to the other that could itself be anything other than the straightforward facts of historical usage of these words and concepts. That is, all accounts, would be conventional. To pick up the argument again we were at the point of asking where the physical universe and its material derives its existence from and were left with either (i) the Supreme Nature or (ii) the universe of things and its matter.

However, the Universe and its matter cannot be said to derive existence from itself for then "it would in some sort exist through itself"--that is it would be self guaranteeing, brute, and have no need of the 'that through which.' In this case we have asked the question as to what the universe is derived from and given the answer by referring one back on oneself, in a way rendering the question meaningless. We are referred to the things themselves, or to matter itself, presumably to previous times and permutations in extended bodies as brute and final. In this case we have no case to wonder or to explain but only the further description of more and other spatio-temporal things. Perhaps this is exactly what is intended--

it would be consistent with modern nominalism and would have ended the platonic philosophizing we have begun with at its root. Goodness, truth, appropriateness, beauty and other visibilities of form would be nothing if not either convenient enumerations of straightwardly nameable individuals or cultural ways of seeing and talking about such. These general terms would, and only could have no greater status than the motion and matter of bodies in flux, that is, they would be abstractions. As we have seen already this would render all human speeches as without any measure or standard but themselves and this is nihilism. If we are not willing to accept the consequences of this nominalism and nihilism then we cannot say that the universe and its matter is 'through itself' and so cannot say that it derives its existence from itself but only from another, and the only 'other' is the Supreme Nature.

Furthermore, it is not matter in, nor the material of, this Supreme Nature that is formed into the physical universe. Whatever we know of the Supreme it is not that which is informed or measured but is that through which everything is, is measured, and from which it is derived. It follows that it is not the substance of the Supreme Nature which is the matter of which things are formed, for then it would be the object of informing and this would be to cast this Nature in terms of everything else, i.e., as

being through some other. This would contradict what we have already established this Nature to be. If our conception of the physical universe is of the informing of some substratum called 'matter' then we must say that everything that is, is not through some such, nor is the existence of all from such, but rather from nothing, that is, from no 'material.' That is, what we mean by matter, if explicated, ('mass,' 'extension,' 'duration') is itself a nature or form. There is no special status accorded to matter, nor for space and time. Anselm's Supreme Nature is not limited nor illuminated by our unfortunate insistence on granting such dignity to space, time and spatio-temporal things.

We have also in Anselmian Essentialism the greatest distance from pantheism possible. The Notion of the Supreme Nature developed to this point is of something. Even if the natures (forms, concepts(A)) are what we experience because they are what is truly there to know, and that these natures are constitutive of God or the mind of God, we still do not have pantheism. While 'matter' or 'extension' or 'duration' are forms in the mind of God, the juxtaposition of these with the forms of say, life, is not in the mind of God, and this juxtaposition is the physical universe. That is, the juxtaposition is a limit to God (self-imposed). The physical universe as spatio-temporal flux is turned over to the blind necessity we know so well and science describes.

The chain of things and facts are not natures or forms; a man may be 'fit' for justice and dignity but as a thing, as a collection of things (molecules, culture, blood) one can find no such finality as the form or nature of him (and of beauty and justice) provides. There is no finality in any of it, including the structures of ourselves or our conventions. The goodness, beauty, etc. which are significant of God's essence (see II.H below) are real, we have argued, but not necessarily part of the physical universe. Either the stupidity of men or the blindness of physical laws often enough blot out any beauty that had existed in a person. If the world were God, the presence of finality in goodness, beauty, etc. would be absolute--and neither we nor the world would be at all. While this is hardly precise and the relation between the Supreme Nature and the physical universe is something perhaps only that Nature could know of, we can at least say, as we have established to this point, that it derives its existence and its knowability, and its variety, fitness and beauty from no other. The Supreme Nature is essentially other than the things of the physical universe around us and any 'matter' which we might imagine to be prior to them.

II.F MONOLOGIUM, CHAPTERS VIII, IX, X

Anselm now explains how it can be said that except for

the Supreme Being, "all things have been created by that Being from nothing," namely, "not from anything," which I take to mean not from the physical universe (in accordance with what has been established in previous chapters). Before any such thing was created there was "some model, or likeness, or rule" in the 'thought' of the Supreme Nature as to "what sort, and how," it should be created. In the Supreme Nature, Creatures "were not what they are now," namely, in the physical universe, that is (according to the varying accounts of this universe) of mass, extension, and duration. Creation is the mixture of the natures of 'things' with the natures of matter, space and time.

Anselm, in Chapter X moves to taking a view of all these issues from the side of the physical universe:

But this model of things, which preceded their creation in the thought of the creator, what else is it than a kind of expression of these things in his thought itself; just as when an artisan is about to make something after the manner of his craft, he first expresses it to himself through a concept?

Anselm distinguishes three ways in which one might express these models in the thought of the creator, by which their existence was derived and their existence known.

We can express something through sensible signs (perceptible to the bodily senses) either by sensible use of these signs or by imagining them to ourselves. Anselm says that either of these two ways of expression "are in the language of one's race," that is, I take it, idiosyncratic

and relative to time and place. The other way of expression is without signs perceptible to the bodily sense, i.e., without 'matter,' extension and duration, i.e., the "that through which" (the concept, likeness, rule, etc.). These later expressions are "natural, and are the same among all nations." Anselm calls the latter kind of expression the "proper and primary word, corresponding to the thing." As we take Anselm to be meaning what we have called 'natures' then this use is natural enough, for they are that by which we recognize and know and so that by which we manage to express linguistically what we do. Indeed as Anselm says of these words,

Such an expression of objects existed with the supreme Substance before their creation, that they might be created; and exists, now that they have been created, that they may be known through it.

The otherwise helpful analogy with the artisan first conceiving "in his mind what he afterwards executes" is "very incomplete."

For the supreme Substance took absolutely nothing from any other source, whence it might either frame a model in itself, or make its creatures what they are; while the artisan is wholly unable to conceive in his imagination any bodily thing, except what he has in some way learned from external objects, whether all at once, or part by part; nor can he perform the work mentally conceived, if there is a lack of material, or of anything without which a work premeditated cannot be performed.

II.G MONOLOGIUM. CHAPTERS XI-XIV

To this point we have these natures, through which every being is and is what it is, located as the 'expression' or 'word' of the Supreme Nature by virtue of which everything known is known and everything created is created. The parallel here with the Philonic logos doctrine of the Catholic fathers is difficult to miss. Continuing in this vein, chapter XI shows us that "this expression of the supreme Being is no other than the Supreme Being." Further, chapter XIII continues this and underscores that while creation may be of things in time, the creation is not something that happened at some distant time but is 'present':

Just as nothing has been created except through the creative, present Being, so nothing lives except through its preserving presence.

Chapter XIV makes a point which ought to be clear already, namely that it is "manifestly absurd" that "the creative and cherishing Being cannot, in any way, exceed the sum of the things it has created." The Supreme Being is not an abstraction from the experiences of created things. Nor, if Anselm is right about the nature of things being determined 'presently' by the Supreme Nature, is the current fashion of explaining human and non-human existence by reference to history(5) likely to lead to much understanding.

II.H MONOLOGIUM, CHAPTERS XV, XVI

In Chapter XV Anselm wonders if

among the names or words by which we designate things created from nothing, any should be found that could worthily be applied to the Substance which is the creator of all;

There are words that can be so applied, but not in the way these same words apply to things, persons and acts. The ways are different (as befits the different essence represented) yet intimately related also.

Anselm rejects the use of 'relative expressions'--such as "the highest of all beings" or even of 'supreme' or 'greater,' as being significant of the substance of the Supreme Nature. Now clearly this Supreme Nature is that by which relative predication (such as of goodness) can be made for reasons we have already established; because that through which a thing can be recognized as more or less good is that through which it is what it is, derives its existence from and is known through. Although Anselm has used as descriptions "highest" and "greatest" regarding the Supreme Nature, this chapter states clearly he has not meant them relatively, as would be commonly understood, but in a different way as he now explicates.

In consideration of whatever is "not of a relative nature" Anselm suggests that

either it is such that, to be it is in general better than not to be it, or such that or that in some cases, not to be it is better than to be it.

What is not relative in the world around us is the presence or visibility of those natures which we have already referred to as goods: truth, justice, life, wisdom, etc. (what is good). It cannot be a relative matter that it is better, all things considered, to be wise than not, or true than not, or just than not, for otherwise they would not be recognized as the goods they are--that is, "natural, and are the same among all nations." As we have explained, if these goods are not recognizable then, for whatever reason, we have conventionalism and nihilism (which is absurd). This Supreme Nature can then be said, because it is that through which every good is such, to be "whatever is, in general, better than that what is not it." Again,

Hence, this Being must be living, wise, powerful, and all powerful, true, just, blessed, eternal, and whatever, in like manner is absolutely better than what is not it.

What we have in our experience that is significant of the Supreme Nature are then these visible natures which Anselm has already called the word or expression of the divine mind which is the Supreme Nature (chapter XII). This expression, or word is then the immanent, mediating face of the Supreme Nature. Again the presence of the philonic-patristic doctrine of the Logos is hard to miss.

When we say the Supreme Nature is just, wise, etc., it is easy for us to make the mistake of taking this to say of

what character this Being is (along the lines of what attributes can be predicated of a substance). This would amount to saying that the Supreme Nature is called just by "participation in this quality, that is justice," or as we might say by 'exemplifying' it. But as Anselm says,

this is contrary to the truth already established, that it is good, or great, or whatever it is at all, through itself and not through another. So, if it is not just, except through justness, and cannot be just, except through itself, what can be more clear than that this Nature is itself justness?

When we say the Supreme Nature 'possesses justness' what we more properly mean and should conceive is it of being justness, that is, "not of what character it is, but what it is." Further what has been said of justness we are compelled to say also of the other predicates. It seems clear that when Anselm says of the Supreme Nature that it is highest or preeminent he ought properly be taken to be not placing this Being anywhere on the scale of excellence but that it is the measure of excellence altogether. The Supreme Nature is Justness, Wisdom, Truth, Goodness, Beauty, etc. We can include also 'Being' in the sense of to be something which this Being is supremely.

II.I

E.L. Mascall has written clearly, and in criticism, of the essentialist approach to Theism.(6) Mascall has some

specific criticisms of what he takes to be St. Anselm's 'proof,' which we will treat in the immediately following paragraph below. First of all, Mascall tries to introduce this essentialist way as opposed to his Thomistic, 'existentialist' way. It is pointed out that in the strict sense of proof, proving the existence of God "hardly seems to have occurred to the prescholastic writers." (7) This, Mascall thinks, is due to "the essentialism which dominated their philosophy" which is explained:

For essences are expressed in concepts, they are not affirmed, as is existence, in a judgement (quoting St. Thomas); and while judgements, which receive formulation in propositions, are fit matter for argumentation, concepts lend themselves rather to contemplation.

This is puzzling; surely Mascall is not saying that the essentialists like Augustine or Plato only contemplated but never argued. That is absurd. Perhaps he is rather saying that these men did not argue like in modern western philosophy, which is true. Essential to essentialism are the bridge notions we have explicated. They inform us that any dualism which expects to receive reality (existence) from 'outside' of us is confused. It is, however, true that such a dualism will lead us to the unending search of modern philosophy for certitude. It may be of interest to note that essentialism is not part of modern philosophy but, as we can show with Mascall's words above, the bridge notions of essentialism are more basic than his existential

judgements. Propositions and judgements require the notions of exemplification, individuality and universality and so the notions of 'belonging to' and 'unity' and so concepts(A) (see Introduction and Section I above). These notions are the very stuff of essentialism. Either the formulation or the affirmation of a positive existential judgement will require the use and presence of 'fit,' 'belongs-to,' 'is a member of,' etc.; that is, one always needs concepts and these are either nominal (abstractions) or natural (essences). If the former, then 'God exists' or 'Man has rights' can amount to no more than the assertion of words we 'use' successfully in some form-of-life, or some other understanding of the 'reality' of abstractions--perhaps as emotive terms (which is not what the orthodox theologian seeks). If natural concepts (concepts(A)) then we have already granted existence (presence, visibility) and some existential judgements require external evidence, i.e., "There is a man behind those trees," but some may not, e.g., "what is wise is, all things being equal, also good." Mascall's superficial grasp of essentialism leads to particular mistakes regarding Anselm. For instance, he presumes that Anselm is answering an inquirer who has a notion of God "because God has revealed himself to them." (8) The inquirer is taken to now investigate whether such can be said to actually exist. Anselm has told us plainly (Monologium, preface and chapter I) that this is not what he

is doing.

Mascall believes Immanuel Kant's account of Anselm's proof--both that Anselm uses 'existence' as a predicate and that it is therefore radically defective.(9) The 'argument' we have tried to explicate from the Monologium chapters I-XVI does not see it so and does not need such a predicate. The whole casting of Anselm's proof has been a great controversy with some, those who would defend the idea of a 'Necessarily Existent' settling on the exact issue which we have tried to instance in this thesis. With regards to such a God, Charles Hartshorne quotes C.S. Peirce as follows:

Where would such an idea, say as that of God, come from, if not from direct experience? . . . No: as to God, open your eyes--and your heart, which is also a perceptive organ--and you see him. But you may ask, Don't you admit there are any delusions? Yes: I may think a thing is black, and on close examination it may turn out to be bottle-green. But I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such thing as black. Neither can I think that a certain action is self-sacrificing, if no such thing as self-sacrifice exists, although it may be very rare. It is the nominalists, and the nominalists alone, who indulge in such skepticism, which the scientific method utterly condemns.(10)

We would add that better than 'black' even are 'justice,' 'beauty,' 'truth' and the class of these goods.

Hartshorne(11) has pointed out that various critics of Anselm are constantly casting the argument in ways that distort it out of all recognition. Kant and his followers have rendered the essentialist way unstatable as it should

be by what they take 'concept' and 'meaning' and 'existence' to be and by what they suppose men are limited to. Thus follows Mascall's account of the failure of the essentialist approach.

It seems to this thesis best to follow the Monologium and stick to an assay of what is present (what exists) than to start with judgements, propositions and hypotheses and then to seek evidences which might confirm or falsify them, as though we were seeking to confirm the existence of something in the physical universe. We also thereby avoid the historical relativities of any particular place/time set of conceptual(B) machinery and ways of ratiocination which people like Kant have wrongly supposed to be free of the ego and its effects.(12) The truth and value of any of these conceptual schemas is by virtue of what we have called 'bridge notions' which are indeed 'things' to contemplate and which allow us to argue about the worth of any superstructure of human thinking. It seems to follow from this that it would be better, if possible, to state one's natural theology in terms of such bridge notions (the essentialist approach) than any derived set of notions. Further, the relationship between faith and reason must, at this level, disappear for there can be no statement of the limits of human knowing, loving, seeing, etc. which is not said from within a particular conceptual superstructure.

That is Kant's, and our, mistake; we take a particular superstructure of thought (Kant's representation or mental picture of himself) and believe, fallaciously, that there is no other possible structure, simply assuming there were no bridge notions present to him. Section I.B displays the self-defeating nihilism of this philosophical position.

As is likely apparent now, if it has not been all along, philosophic Realists and Nominalists do not share the same account of meaning. That is, there is no stability of meaning and words with which the two can easily discuss anything at all. We have here tried to show that nominalism is self-defeating and/or nihilistic. If one is a Platonizing realist with regard to the bridge notions we have been isolating, then the consideration of goodness leads to monotheism. We have tried here to demonstrate the thing rather than to talk about it.

The problem of inspiration is of how any religious, artistic or ethical appeal to bridge notions can be rendered visible and meaningful to discursive and public speech. This problem remains. What we can state is that we have grounds for belief in the existence of God, and of the reality of Beauty and Justice and for some (incomplete) knowledge of these.

NOTES

1. Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Volume 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1970), pp. 257-286.

2. Wolfson, p. 284.

3. Saint Anselm, Basic Writings, trans. S.W. Deane (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962), p. 35. All quotes are from this edition; the relevant chapters are given in the text or in the chapter headings (e.g., II.C Monologium, Chapter III). I have stopped at Chapter 16 of the Monologium perhaps 'arbitrarily'. My intention in this thesis is to derive a Creator God and so the minimum of a rational theology (Anselm does more).

4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martins Press, 1965), A597.

5. George Grant, Time As History (Toronto: C.B.C., 1969).

6. E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (Archon Books, 1967), chapter II.

7. Mascall, p. 19.

8. Mascall, p. 20.

9. Mascall, see chapter II.

10. Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964), p. 299.

11. Hartshorne, chapter IX.

12. See Iris Murdoch, "The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts," The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 77f.

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