

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Sub-Regional Security in the North Pacific:
Canadian Interests and Involvement

by

Shawn C. MacWha

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Ophtalmologie	0381
Orthophonie	0460
Pathologie	0571
Pharmacie	0572
Pharmacologie	0419
Physiothérapie	0382
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Santé mentale	0347
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Chimie pharmaceutique	0491
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Généralités	0605
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
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
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
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Abstract.

This thesis addresses the changing nature of Canadian involvement in Northeast Asian security since the Second World War. It argues that while Ottawa recognized the importance of stability in the North Pacific during the Cold War its military involvement in this sub-region was modest. This was due to its preoccupation with European security, its limited resources and the belief that American deployments to East Asia would suffice to safeguard expanding Canadian interests. However, with the end of the Cold War and a changing American role in Asia Canadian interests are no longer adequately protected by existing security frameworks. In order to compensate for this Ottawa has begun to take a more active role in North Pacific security relations. Consequently, Canada has sought to establish a multilateral security process in Northeast Asia in order to facilitate dialogue and help ensure continued sub-regional stability.

Acknowledgments.

I would like to begin my acknowledgments by thanking my supervisor, Dr. Don Barry. Dr. Barry proved to be a patient and helpful mentor who guided me through the complexities of Canadian foreign policy and academic writing. By providing me with scholarly insight and access to a number of pertinent conferences and meetings Dr. Barry was pivotal to the completion of this project.

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Although there are a number of people outside of the department who are deserving of mention I feel a special sense of gratitude towards Sandra and Barry Rossiter, Nathalie Schyrer, Steven Mataiji and my bother and his wife Andrew and Elise MacWha.

Dedication.

For the last five years my best friend has been Christine Wilson. Christine was pivotal to my academic, emotional and physical survival throughout the program. I therefore dedicate this thesis to her.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval Page.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgments.....	iv
Dedication.....	v
Table of Contents.....	vi
List of Tables.....	viii
List of Graphs.....	ix
List of Abbreviations.....	x
 Chapter 1: Northeast Asia and Canada's National Security.....	 1
1.1 Preface.....	1
1.2 Geographic and Chronological Parameters.....	2
1.3 Evolving Notions of National Security.....	7
1.4 Potential Ramifications for Canada.....	10
1.5 Approach.....	11
 Chapter 2: The Historical Context of Canadian Involvement in Asia-Pacific Security.....	 13
2.1 Canadian Security Perceptions in the Cold War Era.....	13
2.2 The Korean Conflict.....	16
2.3 Military Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.....	19
2.4 The Off-Shore Islands Disputes.....	21
2.5 The International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (ICSC).....	23
2.6 Canada's Role in the Vietnam War.....	24
2.7 Canada, Asia and the Post-Vietnam Years.....	27
2.8 Non-Military Involvement During the Cold War.....	29
2.9 Summary.....	31
 Chapter 3: Canada's Asian Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era.....	 33
3.1 Expanding Regional Interests.....	33
3.2 Economic Interests.....	34
3.3 Societal Interests.....	39
3.4 Political Interests.....	44
3.5 Environmental Interests.....	48
3.6 Military Interests.....	53
3.7 Summary.....	57
 Chapter 4: Threats to Sub-Regional Stability in Northeast Asia.....	 59
4.1 The Post-Cold War Strategic Environment.....	59
4.2 Direct Military Confrontation.....	61

4.3 Interstate Instability.....	70
4.4 Intrastate Instability.....	73
4.5 Summary.....	76
Chapter 5: The Evolution of Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific.....	78
5.1 The Divergence of Interests and Threats.....	78
5.2 A Bilateral Tradition.....	79
5.3 The Acceptance of Multilateralism.....	82
5.4 The Importance of Multilateralism to Canada.....	84
5.5 The Basis for Regional Multilateralism.....	85
5.6 Proposals and Nascent Institutions.....	87
5.7 Future Security Cooperation in the North Pacific.....	95
5.8 Summary.....	104
Chapter 6: Summation and Observations.....	106
6.1 Summation.....	106
6.2 Agenda for Further Research.....	110
6.3 Conclusion.....	113
Bibliography.....	115

List of Tables.

Table 1 Environmental Security Interests.....	50
Table 2 Potential Sources of Conflict In Northeast Asia.....	68

List of Graphs.

Graph 1 The Growth of Trans-Pacific Trade 1950-1990.....	35
Graph 2 Canadian International Trade By Region, 1992.....	37
Graph 3 Trade With Northeast Asia Involving Western Canada.....	38
Graph 4 Immigration from Asia 1985-1991.....	42
Graph 5 Immigration by Region 1991.....	44

List of Abbreviations.

AMM	Annual Foreign Ministers' Meeting (of ASEAN states)
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSD	Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CF	Canadian Fighter
CFB	Canadian Forces Base
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNA	Chinese News Agency
CSCA	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific
EU	European Union
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
GMT	Greenwich Mean Time
HMCS	Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Control Commission (singular of ICSC)
ICSC	International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
JSDF	Japanese Self Defense Forces
LAIA	Latin American Integration Association
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPCSD	North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Conferences

PLA	People's Liberation Army
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conferences (of ASEAN states)
PRC	The People's Republic of China
RoC	Republic of China
RoK	Republic of Korea
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
UNTCOK	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1. NORTHEAST ASIA AND CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY.

1.1 Preface.

Since the purchase of Rupert's Land in 1870 and British Columbia's admission into Confederation in 1871 Canada has been, geographically, a three ocean country. In terms of foreign and defense policy, however, a variety of historical, political, military, and cultural factors have generated within Canada a preoccupation with Trans-Atlantic affairs. By contrast, interest in the Pacific Basin has remained limited. Despite Canada's long-standing access to the Pacific Rim, it has remained, diplomatically and militarily, a single ocean country until quite recently. As David Dewitt and Paul Evans have observed, "Caught between European origins and North American realities, Canada has spent the last century seeing the world through a North Atlantic prism."¹

This thesis will consider the evolving nature of Canadian involvement in Asian security issues since the end of the Second World War. Its purpose is to demonstrate that while in the past Canadian involvement in Asian security was largely the product of global concerns current actions are motivated by direct regional interests. Furthermore, it will be argued that Canada has a legitimate national security interest in ensuring the continued stability of the Pacific Rim. This thesis will show that the creation of a multilateral security framework for Northeast Asia would be conducive to the establishment of regional and sub-regional stability and subsequently fall within Canada's national security interests.

Central to this thesis will be an examination of changing concepts of national security and the impact which the post-Cold War international order has had upon Canada. In the years immediately following the Second World War, Canadian foreign and defense policies were based almost entirely upon the assumption that Canada's national security was irrevocably linked to European security. Consequently, Canada was a strong supporter of collective defense arrangements for the North Atlantic region in the post war years and was one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

¹ David B. Dewitt and Paul M. Evans, The Changing Dynamics of Asia Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 3), (North York: York University Press, January 1992), p. 1.

Conversely, Canada was hesitant to become involved in issues directly related to Pacific security, preferring to leave the affairs of that region to the United States and the former colonial powers. While Ottawa recognized the importance of stability in Asia there was a conviction held by successive governments that Canada lacked sufficient resources to act in Europe, North America and Asia simultaneously. Canadian involvement in Asian security during the Cold War was therefore reluctant, and almost exclusively motivated by global rather than regional concerns.

This Eurocentric view of Canadian security began to change towards the end of the 1980s and with this development came a reevaluation of Ottawa's approach to stability in the North Pacific. With the warming of Soviet - American relations after the mid-1980s and the changing nature of United States (US) involvement in Northeast Asian security Canada assumed a more proactive role in ensuring the continued stability of the North Pacific. Commencing with its call for the establishment of the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) in 1990 the federal government has pursued an Asia policy motivated by a growing realization that regional stability in Asia has a direct impact upon Canada's interests. Thus a consideration of the relevance of Asia to Canadian interests, as well as some of the efforts to safeguard these concerns is prudent given the continuing danger of instability in the North Pacific.

1.2 Geographic and Chronological Parameters.

In studying issues pertaining to Asian security it is first necessary to establish the geographical parameters of the area being considered. A number of terms are used to refer to the nations of the Pacific Basin. The term Pacific Rim is generally used to denote all of the countries in Eastern Asia, Oceania, North America and, by some accounts, the nations of Western Central and South America. This region is also referred to as the Asia-Pacific, although the term is typically understood to exclude the Latin American states. Asia itself can be divided into 4 sub-regions; South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and the South Pacific.² Finally, the region known as East Asia encompasses the states in Northeast and Southeast Asia as well as Australia and New Zealand.

² South Asia generally refers to the region encompassing India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan. The term Southeast Asia refers to the countries of

This thesis will be concerned, to the extent possible, with the security of Northeast Asia, which, with the inclusion of Canada and the US, can also be referred to as the North Pacific. This sub-region is composed of 9 political entities; Canada, the US, Russia, Japan, the People's Republic of China (China or the PRC), the Republic of China (Taiwan or the RoC), the Republic of Korea (South Korea or the RoK), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea or the DPRK) and Mongolia. The reason for focusing upon this sub-region is that it alone in East Asia lacks an effective multilateral security forum capable of addressing post-Cold War security concerns. As was concluded by the Government of Canada,

Only in this last sub-region (the North Pacific), where the interests of the two superpowers and two great powers interweave, where there is a significant concentration of conventional and nuclear forces, which is not fully represented in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), and where growing instability would have an adverse effect upon Canada's political, economic, social and environmental interests is there no multilateral forum to allow the timely discussion of policy. Existing bilateral mechanisms in the North Pacific could be usefully complemented by a wider dialogue.³

Stewart Henderson, a Canadian government official specializing in Asian security has noted that a sub-regional forum for the discussion of security related matters in the North Pacific has been recognized by most concerned states as being desirable.⁴

Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) as well as the members of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). The South Pacific is typically synonymous with Oceania.

³ Dewitt and Evans, The Changing Dynamics of Asia Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective, pp. 2-3. In South Asia the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) allows for the discussion of security issues among the states of that sub-region, as does the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Pacific Forum in their respective sub-regions.

⁴ Stewart Henderson, Canada and Asia Pacific Security: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Recent Trends. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 1), (North York: York University Press, January 1992), p. 18.

The conceptual basis for examining regional and sub-regional security is put forward by Barry Buzan in his book People, States & Fear. He uses the term "security complex" to denote a situation "where a set of security relationships stands out from the general background by virtue of its relatively strong, inward-looking character, and the relative weakness of its outward security interactions with its neighbors."⁵ He defines a security complex as being "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."⁶ The principal consideration in defining such a complex is that the perceived security concerns of member states are focused upon each other rather than upon neighboring countries.⁷ Given the contemporary and historical patterns of enmity between the nations of Northeast Asia, where all major powers have fought each other in the past, such a perception exists.⁸ Thus it can be said that a distinct security complex in Northeast Asia exists wherein the security of one state cannot be seen as independent of the security of the entire sub-region.

At first glance the inclusion of Canada and the United States into the Northeast Asian security complex may not seem realistic, but it is appropriate. Despite the distance separating the US from Northeast Asia the massive forward deployment of American military power to the theatre, existing bilateral security arrangements between the US, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and the importance of Northeast Asia to the well-being of the United States means that it is not feasible to consider the security of America and the sub-region as being exclusive of each other. Thus by Buzan's definition the United States can be considered as a member of the Northeast Asian security complex despite the fact that it is not geographically continuous with it. Similarly, the importance of sub-regional security to Canada's own national security implies that Canadian security cannot be viewed as being entirely independent of Northeast Asian stability. While the reverse of this may not be true Buzan concedes that security

⁵ Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear, 2nd edition, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 193.

⁶ Ibid., p. 190.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 193-194.

⁸ Chapter 4 of this thesis will deal extensively with the application of this concept to the nations of Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era.

complexes may often include "by default" a number of minor states.⁹ In this respect the inclusion of such actors as Canada and Mongolia in the Northeast Asian security complex is possible. Additionally, the linkages between Canadian and American security provide another rationale for including Canada in such a grouping. In itself this may not be sufficient cause for Canada's inclusion, but given the other considerations mentioned above it does solidify Ottawa's claim to be a legitimate sub-regional actor. Nevertheless, Canada's inclusion in the Northeast Asian security complex is perhaps the most tenuous of all parties involved.

Accepting Canada and the US in the Northeast Asian security complex, it is now possible to refer to a North Pacific complex, and for the remainder of this thesis these terms will be used interchangeably. It should, however, be obvious that the inclusion of North American states in the Northeast Asian complex does not, by extension, include Asian states in the Western European complex, to which Ottawa and Washington also belong.

The geographical parameters of this thesis will, to the extent possible, be limited to the North Pacific. In many cases, particularly concerning Canada's past activities in Asia, it will be necessary to consider security issues outside of the above described sub-region. This is necessary because Canadian policy towards Asia throughout most of the Cold War often failed to differentiate between the sub-regions of Asia. Thus while this study will focus upon issues affecting the sub-region referred to as Northeast Asia, geographical parameters should not be considered as absolute.

The chronological parameters of this study are easier to establish than its geographical constraints. With the exception of chapter 2, which will deal primarily with the history of Canada's involvement in Asian security issues, this thesis will generally be restricted to considerations of the post-Cold War era. It must be recognized, however, that the transition between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras was a gradual one. As the international agenda changed during the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the final recovery of Europe and Japan from World War Two, the emergence of China as a global actor, the growing influence of the developing world and the intensification of economic interdependence, the

⁹ Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, p. 195.

superpowers found it increasingly difficult to manage the international order.¹⁰ The dynamics of Soviet-American relations permanently changed as the two superpowers attempted to cope with these new realities. In some respects the intensity of the Cold War diminished - resulting in a period of *détente*. This was most notably demonstrated by a number of arms control agreements reached during the early 1970s. While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the American arms build-up under the Reagan administration again intensified the Cold War, superpower relations entered a renewed warming trend after Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. Notwithstanding these trends it can be suggested that Soviet - American relations dominated the international scene until well into the late 1980s. While it is difficult to ascribe any specific date to the end of the Cold War the events of late 1989 and early 1990, including the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, which preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, suggest that the superpower competition had ended. Thus the end of the Cold War, in Northeast Asia and elsewhere, was not so much a precipitous event but the culmination of two decades of developments. During this time the superpowers, while remaining the dominant international actors, gradually lost influence throughout the world. As this occurred the world became, in some ways, less stable and efforts were undertaken to create a new international order capable of safeguarding global security. Post-Cold War efforts to establish a new security framework in Northeast Asia are direct extensions of this process. A series of speeches delivered by then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark (1983 - 1991) in Victoria, Tokyo and Jakarta during July 1990 indicated that Ottawa had recognized the end of the Cold War in this region.

While some portions of chapter 3 considering the evolving nature of Canadian interests in Northeast Asia may examine trends reaching back to before the end of the Cold War this is merely to illustrate the expanding relevance of this sub-region over time. Also, some of the trends in chapter 4 discussing the historical roots of animosities involve past developments, but again, this reflection is necessary to illustrate the current strategic situation in the sub-region. Thus to

¹⁰ For a consideration of this process see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. "Power and Interdependence Revisited" International Organizations. Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn 1987, pp. 725-753.

the extent possible, considerations of Northeast Asian security will be examined in the context of the post-Cold War era.

1.3 Evolving Notions of National Security.

Pivotal to any discussion of Canada's changing attitudes towards stability in the North Pacific is a consideration of the changing perceptions of national security during and after the Cold War. In the past it has been argued that the concept of national security is an inherently ambiguous notion.¹¹ Despite the claims of some, such as Barry Buzan and Arnold Wolfers that it is highly problematic or even impossible to ascribe any coherent definition to the concept of national security it is possible to establish a working definition of the term. Such a definition, however, must be two-tiered in order to recognize the differences between the various intensities of threat to national security. National security can therefore be defined as the preservation of the state in its existing form and the safeguarding of its overall well-being or prosperity. Threats to national survival can be considered as first tier security concerns while threats to national welfare are second-tier concerns.

During the Cold War the perceived locus of national security of the Western democratic powers (and many other states) was predominantly military in nature. Buzan, for example, has noted that in the Realist dominated circles of foreign and defense policy formulation the notion of national security "shrank conceptually" to the point where it became synonymous with military power.¹² At the most basic level, therefore, security was generally seen as the protection of a state's territorial and institutional integrity. As Terriff has stated, "The security of a state generally involves the preservation of national territorial space (including airspace and territorial waters), the protection of lives and property, and the maintenance of national sovereignty."¹³

Such a conceptualization represents the first tier of national security calculations. In the face of all possible threats, the most dangerous challenge to national survival is obviously the destruction of the state. Thus, barring the

¹¹ Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 165.

¹² Buzan, People, States & Fear, p. 8.

¹³ Terry Terriff, "The 'Earth Summit': Are There Any Security Implications?", Arms Control. Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 165.

unforeseen, the most basic consideration of national security in the short to medium term must remain military security. As Buzan has argued, "A state and its society can be, in their own terms, secure in the political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions, and yet all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure."¹⁴ This development, however, was clearly an artificial compression of a much broader notion of security, inspired by the primacy of the military threat and the existence of nuclear weapons.

In the absence of any direct or implied military threat, first tier security concerns become less pressing and the second tier of security becomes more relevant. This is the situation in which Canada and the other Western democracies now find themselves. As Robert Jervis has observed, with the absence of a serious military threat to the developed states the foreign policies of these countries are now better able to reflect their non-military national interests such as economics or even environmental protection.¹⁵ This in turn will allow these states to focus their attention towards a variety of "non-traditional" security threats representing those aspects of national interest previously eclipsed by the threat of nuclear war. As Terriff has observed, "with the end of the cold war [sic], threats and risks to security which appeared rather trivial compared to the threat posed by nuclear weapons, have come to feature centrally in the evolving security environment."¹⁶ The current international situation therefore, permits a conceptual reexpansion of the notion of Canadian national security in order to address second tier security concerns.

Obviously there are a large number of variables associated with such an expanded consideration of national security. Buzan, for example, lists five areas which he considers to have some effect upon security: economic, societal, political, environmental and military.¹⁷ These factors, particularly the first four, can therefore be considered as dimensions of the second tier of security. Accepting that there is no imminent military threat facing the survival of a country (first tier security concerns) a less militaristic, more comprehensive

¹⁴ Barry Buzan, "Is international security possible?", in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Kenneth Booth, (London: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 35.

¹⁵ Robert Jervis, "A Usable Past For The Future", Diplomatic History, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 1992, p. 83.

¹⁶ Terriff, op. cit., p. 165.

¹⁷ Buzan, People, States & Fear, p. 19.

approach to security can be used. In such a context, the notions of national security forwarded by Richard Ullman become quite appropriate,

a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.¹⁸

This aspect of national security will be focused on for the remainder of this thesis. Clearly, in the post-Cold War era economic, societal, political and environmental developments can jeopardize the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or restrict available policy options and as such represent threats to national security. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that military developments may also jeopardize the well-being of the state without necessarily threatening its survival. Thus military considerations are valid aspects of second tier security calculations. Furthermore, it is obvious that the importance assigned to any one factor may be fluid and is largely a function of the perceived threats of the time. As Hans Morgenthau has noted, "...the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated."¹⁹

Second tier concepts of national security provide the basis for examining Canada's changing approach to sub-regional stability in Northeast Asia. It will be shown that while policy-makers in Ottawa were primarily concerned with military threats in the past, Canada's contemporary policies towards the North Pacific are a product of recent threat perceptions based upon expanded views of Canadian national security.

It should be cautioned that there is a danger in automatically projecting the expanded definitions of national security held by Canada onto Northeast Asian actors. For example, delegates to the March 1993 *Conference On The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific* held in Vancouver recognized that in

¹⁸ Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", International Security. Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, p. 133.

¹⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 8-9.

many Asian states such as North Korea or Taiwan security was still largely seen in military terms.²⁰ It should therefore be recognized that the expanding paradigm of national security is an evolutionary process wherein issues considered to be security related by one state may not be considered so by another. Canada must therefore accept that while societal or environmental considerations may represent its principal security concerns in Northeast Asia the overall security environment, as dictated by local actors, may remain militarily based.

1.4 Potential Ramifications for Canada.

This thesis has several important implications for Canada. While the direct military threat to Canada posed by the nations of Northeast Asia is currently limited the countries of this sub-region, as well as Asia as a whole, are increasingly important to Canada for a variety of other reasons. In economic terms, the Asia-Pacific now represents Canada's second largest trading partner. As a nation where over 20% of jobs are generated by international trade it is clearly vital to this country's national security, as defined by Ullman, to maintain the stability of both markets and suppliers in this region. Furthermore, with an aggregate population of almost two billion people, many with a growing amount of disposable income, the countries of the Pacific Rim are expected to become increasingly important to the well-being of the Canadian economy. Many of the Asian economies are among the fastest growing in the world, with Asia already accounting for a greater proportion of the net global output than the United States.²¹

Aside from economic interests Canada is also developing increasing cultural ties to the countries of the Pacific Rim. Already over 50% of Canada's immigrants come from Asia, and it is expected that by the turn of the century there will be over one million Canadians of Asian descent.²² Such a

²⁰ David B. Dewitt and Paul Evans, eds., The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report. (North York: York University Press, July 1993), p. 10.

²¹ Tom Hockin, "An Address by the Honourable Tom Hockin, Minister for International Trade, to the Canada-Japan Industrial Co-Operation Forum Inaugural Meeting", Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement 93/59, October 19 1993, p. 2.

²² Joe Clark, "Canadian Partnership in Pacific 2000", Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement 89/23, May 16 1989, p. 2.

transformation of the country's ethnic composition could lead to a dramatic shift in domestic political pressures resulting in a new foreign policy decision-making environment for both federal and provincial politicians. Future Canadian leaders may well face widespread public demands for action on issues pertaining to Asian security and will have to be prepared to deal with these concerns in some manner.

As will be seen in chapter 3 Canada also has a variety of political, environmental and even military security interests in the North Pacific. Any war or instability arising from or involving Northeast Asia could disrupt regional and sub-regional interests and adversely affect the well-being of the Canadian state. In a theatre which already has three nuclear powers, (Russia, the US and the PRC) with three neighboring nuclear states (India, Pakistan and, for now, Kazakstan) and several countries on the threshold of obtaining weapons of mass destruction the potential ramifications of a serious conflict in Northeast Asia are global in scope. Even the prospects of a non-nuclear conflict in this sub-region have been a source of serious concern for several North American and Asian strategists. Clearly a conflict in Northeast Asia could result in the death and displacement of millions of people, create widespread ecological damage, and cost billions of dollars in lost or damaged trade and capital. Thus the military situation, while currently not posing a direct threat to Canada, may indeed represent an indirect threat to a wide variety of Canadian interests. Finally, in a more extreme scenario, some writers have already suggested that a direct military threat to North America could arise from China or even Japan by as early as the year 2000.²³

1.5 Approach.

In order to assess the evolving nature of Canadian interests and involvement in Asian security issues this thesis will address several key aspects of past and contemporary Canadian activities in Asia. Initially, Canadian involvement in Asian security during the Cold War will be examined in order to establish the principal motives behind the dominant trends in foreign and defense policies towards Asia during this period. Following this, Northeast Asia's

growing importance to Canada in terms of economic, societal, political, environmental and military considerations will be discussed. An examination of the evolving post-Cold War security environment within Northeast Asia will then follow. Particular attention will be paid to potential sources of conflict and instability within this sub-region since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the partial withdrawal of the United States. This will bring to the reader's attention the principal threats to contemporary Canadian interests in the North Pacific. Finally, consideration will be given to a variety of proposed responses to the changing security situation in Northeast Asia. These include proposals ranging from South Korea's call for the formation of a North Pacific version of NATO to Australian and Canadian suggestions advocating the creation of a forum for security related dialogue.²⁴ The merits and possible weaknesses of the proposals will be examined in order to determine what course of action is most consistent with Canada's current security objectives in the North Pacific. The thesis will conclude with a summation of Canada's current interests, and options for involvement in Asian security. By following this format this study will illustrate the increasing importance of Northeast Asia to broad notions of Canada's national security as well as provide some discussion of the options facing Canadian foreign policy-makers in the future.

Having established the purpose and approach of this thesis, as well as the geographical and chronological parameters, it is now possible to move on to an examination of Canadian involvement in Asian security during the Cold War in order to determine what factors, if any, motivated Canadian policy-makers throughout this era. An assessment of Canadian motives and actions in the North Pacific during the Cold War is essential to an understanding of the changing nature of Canadian involvement in the post-Cold War era.

²⁴ Edith Terry. "North Korean Threat May Spark Asian NATO", The Globe and Mail. November 25 1991, p. A9.

CHAPTER 2. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY.

2.1 Canadian Security Perceptions in the Cold War Era.

In order to understand the motives for Canada's past involvement in issues related to Asia-Pacific security it is first necessary to understand Ottawa's basic perceptions of national security during the Cold War. As discussed in chapter 1, during the Cold War the concept of national security was more narrowly defined than at present in that it was viewed almost exclusively in military terms. This realization faced Canadian policy-makers soon after the Second World War and the resulting behavior demonstrates the predominance which military aspects of national security held over other aspects of the national interest.

The years immediately following World War Two marked the zenith of Canada's military, economic and political influence as a world actor. Even then Canada recognized that it lacked the resources to project its influence around the world in the same manner as the United States or the United Kingdom. The Canadian government therefore assumed that its national security needs would be addressed through the establishment of a series of international organizations headed by the United Nations (UN).²⁵ Thus by the time of the San Francisco Conference, Canada had recognized that the most effective method for a middle power such as itself to protect its interests and have some say in critical international issues was through the use of multilateral channels.²⁶ Unfortunately, the inability of the United States and the USSR to cooperate in the UN Security Council quickly eroded the credibility and effectiveness of that organization as an instrument of collective security. By the late 1940s it was clear to Canadian decision-makers that the world had become divided into two opposing camps and that this situation posed a serious military threat to Canada and its national security. This realization ultimately led Ottawa to reexamine its security perceptions and to participate in the NATO alliance.²⁷

²⁵ Louis St. Laurent. The Foundation of Canadian Policy in World Affairs. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, Canadian Information Service, February 17 1947), p. 6.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁷ This topic is dealt with at length in Robert A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO 1946-1949. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959).

On November 11 1949, the Honourable Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defense in the St. Laurent government, argued in parliament that Canadian defense policy was essentially based upon seven key assumptions. These points summarized below, effectively set the tone for Canadian security perceptions in the Cold War era.

1. The only possible aggressor is the Soviet Union.
2. Any war with Soviet Union would be a world war involving all western peoples.
3. The best way to prevent such a war was to confront communism with strength.
4. Such strength required the cooperative efforts of all western states.
5. Canada therefore would welcome the North Atlantic Treaty as a supplement to the UN.
6. As an attack upon Canada could only be made from the air or sea emphasis must be placed upon continental security.
7. The best place to defeat communism is as far away from Canada as possible.²⁸

Given this post war security environment, coupled with the recognition that Canada alone was incapable of meeting the Soviet threat consistently on all fronts, it became clear that Ottawa was going to have to prioritize its overseas security interests. In the late 1940s, due largely to established cultural ties, existing and projected trade patterns and the recent experience of two major wars it was obvious that apart from North America, European security was of paramount importance.²⁹ Furthermore, the fact that Europe was the central theatre of the East-West confrontation meant that the very survival of the Canadian state in its current form relied upon the security of Western Europe. This had obvious ramifications for Canada concerning the emphasis placed upon Asian security. Denis Stairs has observed, "...Ottawa placed a higher value upon the defense of the 'free world' in Europe and North America than in the Far

²⁸ Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates. Vol. II 1949, November 11, p. 1663.

²⁹ Dewitt and Evans, The Changing Dynamics of Asia-Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective, p. 1.

East..."³⁰ Thus throughout the Cold War Ottawa's security perceptions were viewed in terms of Canada's NATO commitments, the defense of North America and a continuing role for the UN as an instrument of coping with peripheral or indirect security threats.³¹ While the relative importance of the European or North American theatres shifted to the latter in the 1970s as Soviet capabilities put Canada in greater danger of military attack it can be said that they were generally considered to be of almost equal significance. Indeed, it was only under the Trudeau government that the iron link between European and Canadian security was seriously questioned.³² Issues related to Asian security were clearly considered to be peripheral in importance under this Atlanticist approach to national security. This in itself, was not a flawed policy, as Dewitt and Evans argued, "...there was little in Asia of the 1950s and 1960s to warrant comparable attention (as that assigned to Europe) from such a Eurocentric country (as Canada)..."³³

Despite the peripheral importance assigned to Asia Canada became involved in matters directly related to the security of this region throughout the Cold War. Although Canada prepared for a European conflict for over 40 years it was only in Asia that the military was actually called upon to fight. This apparent irony can be explained quite readily. Canadian involvement in matters pertaining to Asia-Pacific security such as the Korean and Indochinese conflicts was motivated primarily by a concern that an indirect security threat in Asia could inadvertently grow to involve the superpowers. It was feared that such an escalation could potentially expand into Europe (and even North America) and threaten what Canada considered to be its real security interests. Thus while Canada was not concerned *per se* with Asian security Ottawa was willing to become involved, even militarily, in Asia in order to moderate the behavior of the belligerents and lessen the chances of a superpower conflict.

³⁰ Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint. (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 81.

³¹ Brian L. Job, Canadian Interests And Perspectives Regarding The Emerging Pacific Security Order. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 2), (North York: York University Press, January 1992), p. 10.

³² J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette. (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 8.

³³ Dewitt and Evans, The Changing Dynamics of Asia Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective, p. 1.

2.2 The Korean Conflict.

Canada's first efforts to affect an issue pertaining to Asian security in the post war era were in Korea. Canada's Cold War involvement on the Korean peninsula began rather reluctantly in 1947 when the United States nominated Canada for membership in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) without prior consultation with Ottawa.³⁴ While the Canadian government was initially hesitant about becoming involved in a region in which it had little experience it agreed to join the commission in order to avoid embarrassing the US by refusing its nomination as well as to demonstrate the potential utility of the UN as a problem solving mechanism for international crises. Ottawa had, by this time, already accepted that the UN would not serve as a global instrument of collective security. Nevertheless, it was still hoped that the organization could be used as a tool for addressing minor or regional tensions.

Participation in UNTCOK called for Canada and seven other states to supervise democratic elections in the Soviet and American occupied portions of the Korean peninsula.³⁵ However, when the Soviets occupying the territory north of the 38th parallel refused UNTCOK observers access to that portion of the country (effectively preventing the conduct of the elections) there were calls by the United States to hold elections in those areas accessible to UNTCOK personnel. This, the Americans felt, would serve to establish a legitimate democratic government in Korea which would eventually assume control over the entire peninsula. Canada initially opposed the Americans on this issue and suggested that such an election "would tend to harden the 38th parallel into a permanent and therefore disruptive international boundary".³⁶ However, in spite of Canadian objections, the UN pursued this course of action which ultimately resulted in the legal partition of the Korean peninsula and the establishment of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.

Canadian participation in the UNTCOK process was indicative of later actions in Korea in two respects. First, it illustrated a strong desire to ensure stability in Northeast Asia, particularly when the United States and the USSR

³⁴ Denis Stairs, "Confronting Uncle Sam, Korea 1948", in Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945, ed. J.L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Copp Clark Inc., 1969), p. 60.

³⁵ The other members of UNTCOK were; Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria.

³⁶ Stairs, "Confronting Uncle Sam, Korea 1948", p. 61.

were directly opposing each other. As the 1949 Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs noted, "...the attainment of stability and prosperity in the East (The Far East) would be a major contribution to the preservation of world peace..."³⁷ Secondly, Canada demonstrated a willingness to disagree with the Americans over the relative danger of communist expansion in Asia. As shall be seen, these two Canadian positions are indicative of a long-standing and coherent policy towards security and stability in Asia during the Cold War. These positions were again illustrated by Canadian decisions regarding hostilities on the Korean peninsula following the invasion of South Korea by the North on June 25, 1950.

Following the attack upon South Korea it was the firm belief of the St. Laurent government that the hostilities had been instigated by the Soviet Union. It was feared that aggression on the Korean peninsula could simply be a feint, designed to draw Western (American) attention away from Europe.³⁸ Canada, concerned predominantly with what it considered to be more direct threats in Europe, saw it to be in its strategic interests to prevent the United States from becoming entangled in a war in Asia. Consequently, Ottawa sought to moderate American involvement in the Korean conflict so as to prevent this possibility. The Americans, however, were intent upon stopping communist expansion in Korea, particularly if the North was acting upon Soviet instruction. It was the American belief that the Soviets were testing Western resolve in Korea and that to stop anywhere short of complete victory would set a dangerous precedent. According to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the effective employment of military force in Korea would demonstrate to the Soviets the West's willingness to meet communism in the battlefield and would, in the long run, lessen the chances of a global war.³⁹

Ironically, these opposing perspectives on the Korean conflict led both the United States and Canada to view the UN as the most effective means of dealing with the crisis. The American government wanted a UN sponsored operation in

³⁷ Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, Department of External Affairs Annual Report 1949, 1950, p. 33.

³⁸ Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, p. 141.

³⁹ Lester B. Pearson, Mike. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, eds. John Munro and Alex Inglis, (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1973), Vol. II 1948-1957, p. 152.

Korea principally to demonstrate to the American people that the US was not alone in confronting communism. While the US was willing to contribute the bulk of the UN's fighting forces and equipment there was a valid concern within the Truman administration that if America was left to fight alone in Korea there would be an increase in isolationist tendencies in Congress which could adversely affect Western security from Korea to Europe.⁴⁰

For Canada's part, it was felt that military action under the direction of a multilateral organization would be the most effective way of dealing with the situation in Korea. Not only would a UN command offer Canada a better forum for influencing American decisions, it would also demonstrate the utility of the UN to cope with international crises and set an important precedent for the future of collective security. During negotiations in New York immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Canada actively lobbied to ensure that any military action taken would be a "genuine United Nations operation under a unified command".⁴¹ Pursuant to this goal, the government's decision to deploy a sizable military force to Korea reflected a desire to legitimize Canadian initiatives within this unified command.⁴²

It can be stated that the principal motive for Canadian involvement in the Korean conflict was a desire to influence American policy in an effort prevent the outbreak of a major Asian conflict involving the Soviet Union or China. In the words of Pearson,

I would like to emphasize also that it is not the purpose of this government to support any course of policy which will extend the scope of the present conflict in Korea; a conflict which should be confined and localized if it is in our power to do that; and if not, a policy which should avoid giving anyone else an excuse for extending it.⁴³

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁴¹ "External Affairs in Parliament", *External Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 9, September 1950, p. 343.

⁴² Canada's maximum force contribution to the United Nations' command operating in Korea included 3 naval destroyers, a squadron of transport aircraft and a full infantry brigade. At peak commitment there were almost 10 000 Canadians serving in Korea, the third largest contingent deployed through the United Nations.

⁴³ "External Affairs in Parliament", p. 345.

A secondary consideration concerning involvement in the Korean conflict was a desire to demonstrate the effectiveness of the UN as an institution of collective security. There was a well founded concern in Ottawa, as well as other national capitals, that if the UN was seen to be impotent in Korea many smaller states would lose faith in the institution and the credibility of the organization would begin to seriously erode. Such a development was clearly contrary to Ottawa's hopes that the UN could be used to prevent or constrain peripheral conflicts outside of the European or North American theatres.

There were, during the course of the conflict, numerous issues over which the Canadian and American governments conflicted. Disagreements between them typically involved differences of opinion concerning the appropriate levels of intensity for the conflict or a willingness to negotiate with the Chinese.⁴⁴ Throughout the course of the war it was apparent that Canada was content to simply reestablish the *status quo* in Korea and return the military focus of the Western powers to Europe. The US, as already noted, saw it as paramount to stop communism wherever it expanded and in the case of Korea to roll back the communists with an eye towards unifying the country and fulfilling the original UNTCOK mandate.

In the case of the Korean war Canadian actions were therefore determined largely by a strategic outlook focused upon Europe, not Asia. While the Canadian military was deployed in sizable numbers to this conflict it was not done to protect specific regional interests in Northeast Asia but rather to prevent a superpower conflict which could spread to Europe. That this objective was pursued through the framework of the UN is entirely consistent with Canada's aspirations for that organization as an instrument capable of settling regional disputes before they grew to involve both superpowers in direct confrontation.

2.3 Military Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

Despite the fact that Canada deployed a significant military force to Korea from 1950-1953 Ottawa was generally uninterested in participating in any of the on-going defense arrangements being established in the Pacific Basin in the early 1950s. This is clearly illustrated by Canadian reluctance to enter into bilateral

⁴⁴ These issues were discussed at length, in Denis Stairs The Diplomacy of Constraint and Lester B. Pearson Mike. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson.

security arrangements with Asian states as the Americans were doing or to become involved in any of the nascent collective defense organizations forming in the region such as the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty signed in 1951 or the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed in 1954.⁴⁵ While there was isolated domestic pressure calling for Canada to join these organizations the St. Laurent government resisted these demands. In any case, as Lester B. Pearson noted, Canada was not invited to join either of these organizations and while Ottawa could have pressed for membership limited Canadian resources and existing commitments to European and North American defense meant that participation, if it occurred, would have been minimal.⁴⁶ Thus it was clear, by as early as the 1950s, that Ottawa was unwilling, except under extraordinary circumstances, to commit military resources to Asia outside of the framework of the United Nations.

It should be stressed that Canadian reluctance to participate directly in Asian defense arrangements should not be seen to denote indifference to the security environment of the Asia-Pacific. Ottawa was well aware of the concerns of its Asian allies and was eager to do everything within its limited capabilities to guarantee the safety of these states.⁴⁷ Indeed, Canada was eager to see certain states, particularly members of the Commonwealth (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand), participate in some form of regional defense cooperation. Nevertheless, it was a matter of accepted policy that Canada had no intention of committing forces to the Pacific beyond its most basic territorial

⁴⁵ The South East Asia Treaty organization was created as a defensive pact between Australia, New Zealand, The United Kingdom, The United States, France, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.

⁴⁶ Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates. Vol. I Session 2, 1951, October 22, pp. 256-257 and Vol. V 1953-1954, May 28, pp. 5224-5225.

⁴⁷ For example, a Department of External Affairs despatch from Paris to Ottawa dated February 5 1953 noted "At present time Australia is almost certainly the most important non-NATO country with which some regular contact is desirable and might be feasible; this contact might be accomplished with least difficulty by some form of NATO-ANZUS association..." Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, "Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council to Secretary of State for External Affairs" in Government of Canada, Department of Supply and Services, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 19 1953. 1991. pp. 794-796.

defense needs.⁴⁸ This approach clearly reflects the priority which Canada assigned to European and North American security during this era and accounts for the almost complete lack of military presence in East Asia with the exception of the Korean conflict and a limited number of troops assigned to the International Control Commissions in Indochina.

2.4 The Off-Shore Islands Disputes.

Canadian reluctance to become directly involved in issues pertaining to Asian security was also illustrated by actions taken during the off-shore islands disputes of 1954-55 and 1958. While the details of this topic have been covered sufficiently by others it should be pointed out that Canadian policy during this time was once again motivated by a desire to contain what was considered to be a peripheral conflict.⁴⁹

Not entirely dissimilar to the Korean conflict, this dispute was largely a product of America's desire to confront communism wherever it arose in Asia. The dispute essentially revolved around the efforts of the PRC to seize the islands of Quemoy and Matsu from nationalist Chinese forces. While Canada maintained that the fate of the off-shore islands was a Chinese issue linked to the outcome of the civil war, the US argued that these islands were crucial to the defense of Formosa, and hence Western interests in Northeast Asia. The differing American and communist Chinese positions concerning these islands obviously brought these powers into conflict and threatened, once again, to spark a major war in Asia. Canada's conviction that threats emerging from the Asia-Pacific were secondary in importance to those facing Europe was once again demonstrated by the policies of the Canadian government as tensions between China and the US heated. Pearson stated in parliament, in reference to the first crisis of 1954-55 (considered to be the more dangerous of the two),

What I fear most in this matter is that even limited intervention,

⁴⁸ Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Memorandum from Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs" in *Ibid.*, pp. 801-805.

⁴⁹ Robert Reford addresses this topic in his work Canada and Three Crises. (Lindsay: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968) as does Donald Masters in Canada in World Affairs 1953-1955. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959).

defensive in purpose, by the United States might have a chain reaction with unforeseen consequences which could cause the conflict to spread beyond the locality where it began, and even across the ocean.⁵⁰

To offset this possibility Canada attempted to moderate American behavior in this region as it had done in Korea. Canada continually advised the US to exercise caution with regard to this issue and repeatedly tried to convince the Americans that the islands were crucial neither to the defense of Formosa nor to the security of US interests. At one point during the first crisis Ottawa even suggested the deployment of an international naval patrol to police the Formosa Strait (which was to include a sizable Canadian contingent).⁵¹ This demonstrated, once again, a Canadian willingness, albeit reluctant, to dispatch military force into a region considered secondary in importance to its national security in order to lessen tensions and limit the possibility of a major war.

As Canadian efforts to manage this crisis through dialogue with Washington and multilateral mechanisms such as the UN failed Ottawa became increasingly critical of American intransigence. While Canada had been willing to offer military forces in order to lessen tensions Ottawa made it clear to the Americans that Canada did not see this issue to be a direct security threat and would not become involved if fighting erupted. In an interview given to MacLean's Magazine in 1957 Pearson bluntly stated this Canadian position, "We have told the Americans openly that if they get into trouble out there by coming to the assistance of Chiang Kai-Shek, if his Off-shore Islands [sic] are attacked, they can't count on us because that's a civil war and we'll take no part in it."⁵²

The Canadian approach towards the off-shore islands dispute was therefore consistent with earlier policies which sought to avoid the occurrence of a large-scale conflict involving the United States in Asia. To accomplish this Canada was even willing, at one point, to divert precious military resources (including its sole aircraft carrier) to a region of peripheral importance. Additionally, in the pursuit of this objective Canada was willing to openly oppose

50 Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates. Vol. III 1955, March 24, p. 2344.

51 Reford, op. cit., p. 67.

52 Lester B. Pearson, "Where Canada Stands in the World Crisis", MacLean's Magazine. July 6, 1957, n.p.

the Americans, and for the first time in the Cold War era, retract the implicit promise of Canadian assistance should the US become entangled in combat.

2.5 The International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (ICSC).

Canadian participation in the tripartite International Control Commissions for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from 1954-1973 represents yet another Canadian effort to encourage peace and stability in Asia.⁵³ Much like Canada's earlier nomination to UNTCOK, its nomination to the ICSC on July 18 1954 came as a surprise to the Canadian government. On July 28 Ottawa reluctantly accepted its role in the ICSC. The commissions were charged with a variety of responsibilities associated with monitoring the 1954 Geneva Peace Accord intended to end the hostilities in Indochina. While Canada was hesitant to become involved in an operation outside of the United Nations framework (it was simply a multilateral arrangement agreed to by the concerned parties) the Canadian government realized the importance of the missions to regional stability. As John Holmes noted, "To have rejected it...would have caused the whole settlement to become unstuck, for the composition of the ICC (International Control Commissions) was one of the most delicate and latest compromises reached."⁵⁴ From the Canadian perspective it was seen as important that another conflict in Asia be avoided, especially as this conflict held the potential of drawing the attention of the United States, and to a lesser degree France, away from issues of European security.⁵⁵

Participation in the commissions was initially expected to be of relatively short duration. While this was true for the commissions in Cambodia and Laos progress in Vietnam was slow. When it became obvious that the Vietnamese commission was not going to accomplish its objectives in a reasonable amount of time Canada expressed an interest in withdrawing from the commitment. However, Poland and India insisted that the participants had an obligation to remain involved until the objectives of the ICC had been met. Fearing that

⁵³ An excellent study of this topic can be found in Douglas Ross In the Interests of Peace. (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1984) as well as in Charlotte S.M. Girard Canada in World Affairs 1963-1965. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1980).

⁵⁴ John Holmes, "Geneva: 1954", International Journal. Vol. XXII, Summer 1967, p. 472.

⁵⁵ Dewitt and Evans, The Changing Dynamics of Asia Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective, p. 1.

withdrawal would cause a destabilizing vacuum in Indochina which would result in a state of military and political anarchy Ottawa reluctantly stayed on with the commission in Vietnam.⁵⁶

In the end the Canadian commitment to Vietnam lasted for almost 20 years, requiring Canada to deploy up to 200 troops at a time (mostly officers), as well as numerous officials from the Department of External Affairs, into a theatre in which Canada had traditionally argued it had only passing interest. That Ottawa accepted this burden is indicative of the Canadian desire to establish conditions conducive to stability in Asia. Canada's continuation in Vietnam, even when the commission became essentially symbolic, reflected a deep seated reluctance to unilaterally abandon a commitment which theoretically facilitated regional stability in East Asia. As such it can again be argued that Canadian participation in Asian security was a product of broader Canadian aspirations to avoid the outbreak of a major regional conflict. Thus Canadian participation in the ICC process can be seen as consistent with other Cold War security policies concerning the Asia-Pacific.

2.6 Canada's role in the Vietnam War.

As with Canada's earlier involvement with Asian security Canadian policy towards the war in Vietnam was marked by a strong desire to prevent an escalation of the conflict to the point at which it would detract from European security. Official Canadian policy towards the war was based primarily upon two convictions. The first was the firm belief that South Vietnam was a "true victim of Northern aggression" and that the United States was justified, even morally, in intervening on behalf of the South Vietnamese people.⁵⁷ The second conviction, however, was that the utility of America's military approach to the situation had questionable merit. Canada was among the most persistent of America's allies in calling for restraint in Vietnam. Ottawa was concerned that if the administration of President Johnson succumbed to the "hawkish" pressures to escalate the war in Indochina there was a strong possibility that the PRC would enter into the war against the United States. According to Douglas Ross,

⁵⁶ Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

⁵⁷ Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

Throughout the 1960s, Canadians held to their traditional Eurocentric emphasis in setting strategic priorities. Ottawa still favoured accommodation of Chinese interests and consistently argued against any provocative or destabilizing challenges to Chinese interests by US national security planners.⁵⁸

These two beliefs resulted in what was perhaps one of the most strained periods in Canadian-American relations since confederation. As the US continued in its efforts to halt the spread of communism in Asia it grew to see Canadian criticism of its military activities as being naive and frustrating. More and more the United States began to see Canadian input as unhelpful in Asia while Ottawa persisted in its view that American intensification of the conflict was dangerously reckless.

Due to Canadian concern regarding the danger of American entanglement in Southeast Asia there were efforts on behalf of the Canadians to influence American policy and facilitate a cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. For example, the Seaborn missions in 1964 sought to end the conflict by establishing dialogue and understanding between Hanoi and Washington. While the Seaborn missions were originally requested by Washington, Canada refused to serve solely as an American mouthpiece and often expressed Canadian concerns, observations and suggestions while in the US and North Vietnam. However, as the efforts of Seaborn began to prove fruitless Canadian criticism of US aggression in Vietnam became increasingly more vocal.

The low point in Canadian-US relations during the Vietnam War undoubtedly came about as a result of Pearson's Temple University Speech on April 2, 1965. Throughout the spring of 1965, particularly after the Americans began their *Rolling Thunder* bombing campaign in February, Canadian criticism of American activities had become quite pronounced. While Pearson's Temple speech was, in itself, generally quite supportive of American aims in Indochina the Prime Minister suggested that a timely suspension of aerial bombing by the US could go a long way in establishing the conditions necessary for dialogue with the north. Due to the rather unfortunate timing of this suggestion, in light of President Johnson's delicate political position (he was being pressured to intensify American efforts in Vietnam), as well as the fact that it was presented in the

United States, relations between the two leaders were irreparably damaged and following the speech Canada's influence upon the United States concerning Vietnam was almost completely negated.

There were, of course, other Canadian attempts to limit or end the hostilities in Vietnam following the Temple debacle such as the Ronning missions of 1966 but by this point neither Hanoi nor Washington demonstrated any interest in listening to Canadian diplomacy. In this respect Canadian foreign policy toward Vietnam can be viewed largely as a failure. As John English noted, concerning Pearson's role in Vietnam,

The aggressive peacemaker of the 1950s who had pulled the eagle's tail feathers when General MacArthur threatened to take the Korean conflict to a nuclear conclusion, and who had pushed the British towards sensible compromise during the Suez madness, now seemed curiously inactive, incapable of an imaginative response to clear, present dangers.⁵⁹

Whatever the success of Canadian policy in Vietnam it is clear that the objectives remained consistent with earlier Canadian involvement in Asia. Throughout the Vietnam war Canada retained its Eurocentric perspective on international security and acted in a manner consistent with those beliefs. As with Korea and the ICSC Ottawa sought to ensure stability in Asia and prevent its principal Western ally from becoming entangled in a peripheral theatre. To accomplish this goal, Canada sought to moderate American behavior through a number of diplomatic missions and was clearly willing to confront the United States when it felt that the Americans were being unreasonable in their approach to North Vietnam or China.⁶⁰ This reflects a degree of continuity in Canadian policy towards East Asia which lasted well into the 1970s and 1980s.

⁵⁹ John English, "Speaking Out on Vietnam, 1965" in Canadian Foreign Policy, eds., Don Munton and John Kirton, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1992), p. 148.

⁶⁰ Some scholars have suggested that America's refusal to exempt Canada from the "Nixon Shocks" economic reforms of August 1971 was at least partially due to American displeasure over Canadian criticism of its Vietnam policies. See, for example, Peter C. Dobell Canada in World Affairs, 1971-1973, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), p. 124.

2.7 Canada, Asia and the Post-Vietnam Years.

Throughout the later half of the 1970s and the 1980s Canadian involvement in Asian security issues was more limited than in earlier years. This was largely due to the fact that the United States was extremely cautious of becoming involved in Asian conflicts in the years following its defeat in Vietnam. While Washington was willing to maintain its security arrangements with countries such as Japan and South Korea defense planners in the Pentagon were far more hesitant in employing military force to halt the spread of communism in Asia after 1975. Canada felt little need to become directly involved in Asian security as Ottawa's single greatest concern - a regional conflict expanding into a global war - was less likely to occur than it had been in the past. This is not to say that there was no conflict in Asia at this time for there were several interstate conflicts and intrastate disturbances. However, aside from simmering Sino-Soviet tensions, none of the Asian conflicts of the late 1970s and 1980s threatened to erupt into a major confrontation, and more importantly from a Canadian perspective, none of them required a significant Western military contribution. Canada did view such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the build-up of the Soviet Pacific Fleet with concern, but so long as the Americans and other Western powers did not overreact and provoke a Soviet response Canada did not perceive its strategic interests to be immediately threatened.⁶¹

Thus in the years following the Vietnamese conflict Canadian involvement in Asian security took on a different tone. As it was no longer necessary to moderate American behavior in this region (or at least attempt to) Canada sought to enhance Asian security through the improvement of bilateral relations and the negotiation of confidence and security building measures. For example, the recognition of the People's Republic of China by Ottawa on October 13, 1970 had several implications for the overall security of Northeast Asia. Recognition from Ottawa, and later from Washington, provided the PRC with symbolic Western backing which ultimately forced the Soviets to ease their pressures against China in the Ussuri and Amur river basins. This had the effect of lessening the chances

⁶¹ For an examination of the Soviet military buildup in the Far East see Richard B. Foster, James E. Dornan Jr. and William M. Carpenter eds. Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia. (New York, Crane, Russak & Co., 1979) or Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup. (Dover MA.: Auburn House, 1986).

of a Sino-Soviet war in Northeast Asia, which could have conceivably sparked a global conflict. Furthermore, Canadian recognition of the PRC ultimately allowed for expanded trade links between China and the West.⁶² Such enhanced trade relations translated into a distinct economic interest in maintaining cordial relations with China among the Western powers and as such tensions were not as easily aroused.⁶³

Apart from recognition of the PRC Canada also sought to establish conditions conducive to regional security by other means during this period. Canada continued to contribute to UN efforts in Asia, including the UN Command Military Armistice Commission and the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, although UN efforts in Asia were quite limited in scope until the end of the 1980s. Canada also participated in limited defense cooperation in the North Pacific during this time through involvement in a variety of military exercises with the United States and other Asian allies. Nevertheless, while Canada continued to participate in small scale military cooperation in the North Pacific it was essentially symbolic in nature. As Douglas Ross and Frank Langdon have argued, "Canadian defense policy towards the Pacific and Asia was largely an empty shell of official statements and White Papers."⁶⁴

Canada's approach to Asia-Pacific security throughout the 1970s and 1980s was nonetheless entirely consistent with the earlier policies of the 1950s and 1960s. However, as the danger of US entanglement in Asia diminished, so too did Canada's perceived need to manage conflict in this theatre. Ottawa was therefore free to focus its attention more thoroughly upon the security of Europe and North America. Had the Americans become involved, once again, in an Asian conflict it is likely that Canada would have again sought to constrain American behavior in some manner reminiscent of Canada's actions in Korea, the off-shore islands disputes or Vietnam.

62 Gérard Hervouet, Le Canada face à la Asie de l'est. (Laval: Nouvelle Optique, 1981), p.

78

63 Ibid., p. 93

64 Frank Langdon and Douglas Ross, "Towards a Canadian Maritime Strategy in the North Pacific Region", International Journal, Vol. XLII, No. 4, Autumn 1987, p. 848.

2.8 Non-Military Involvement During the Cold War.

In addition to direct military and diplomatic involvement in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War Canada sought to enhance regional stability through other means as well. For example, it was the opinion of Pearson as early as 1950 that the best defense against communism in Asia was not military force but economic prosperity.⁶⁵ By halting the spread of communism, Ottawa was confident that the US would feel less obligated to intervene in Asian affairs and would not become distracted from more pertinent commitments. The concept of halting communism through economic aid was discussed at length during the January 1950 Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held in Colombo Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). It was decided at this conference that a consultative committee should be formed amongst members of the Commonwealth and the United States which would examine appropriate methods of combating communism by means of economic aid. This initiative was to become known as the Colombo Plan and involved (for Canada's part) a contribution of \$25 million a year for 6 years directed towards technical and developmental assistance in South Asia.⁶⁶

The Colombo Plan represented a different form of Canadian involvement in Asian security, but one which was, all the same, intent upon stemming the spread of communism and thereby encouraging stability. As this plan could be achieved without assuming undesired military commitments it allowed Canada to remain militarily focused upon the problems of Europe and as such this was an optimal approach for exerting influence in Asia.⁶⁷

Indeed, throughout the Cold War Canada utilized developmental assistance programs as a tool in combating communism. India received, by far, the greatest amount of foreign aid while the remainder of Canada's Asian assistance was directed primarily towards the countries of South and Southeast Asia such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaysia. As a matter of policy, aid to the nations of Northeast Asia was typically avoided. This sub-region had traditionally been the recipient of substantial assistance from the US

⁶⁵ Pearson, Mike. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, p. 107.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 111.

⁶⁷ Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, Department of External Affairs Annual Report 1950, 1950, p. 4.

(and later Japan) and it was the opinion of the directors of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) that Canadian aid to this area would be of lesser humanitarian or political utility than funds directed towards South Asia.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, it should be remembered that while Canadian aid was ostensibly directed towards meeting a variety of humanitarian, economic and political concerns security interests were the primary motive behind the dispersal of funds.⁶⁹

The usefulness of foreign aid as an instrument of limiting conflict in this region should not be overstated. Despite Ottawa's optimism that economic development would diminish the appeal of communism and slow the spread of conflict in Asia Canada remained cognizant of the fact that more severe measures could occasionally be necessary in order to guarantee Western security interests. Recognition of the practical limits of developmental assistance was enunciated by Pearson during the first off-shore islands dispute when he observed that,

Confronted by the appalling defense and political problems involved in the emergence of a free Asia, it is easy to lapse into the comfortable belief that we can save Asia - and that is how it is often put - with economic aid alone; that we can buy off communism and purchase peace for ourselves merely by stepping up our economic assistance. That, as I see it, is unhappily nothing but a comforting illusion.⁷⁰

Closely linked to economic assistance is the issue of international trade patterns. The Canadian government saw an increase in bilateral trade with the nations of East Asia as a means of elevating the standard of living in the various nations of this region and reducing the appeal of communism. In the next chapter Canada's evolving trade patterns with East Asia will be considered in some detail, but for now it is sufficient to note that this too was a device of Canadian security policy in East Asia during the Cold War.

⁶⁸ Dobell, *op.cit.*, p. 342.

⁶⁹ Granatstein and Bothwell, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

⁷⁰ Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. III 1955, March 24, p. 2338.

2.9 Summary.

In sum it can be said that there was a remarkable degree of continuity in Canadian foreign policy towards Asia for the duration of the Cold War. Involvement in the security of this region was clearly motivated by the desire to limit Western entanglement in the conflicts of Asia. This desire reflected Canada's predominant concern with European and North American security and the belief that large-scale Western involvement in Asian conflicts would detract from the West's ability to defend itself against Soviet aggression where it more directly threatened Canada's perceived security interests. Those instances in which Canada deployed military forces to the region or directed a considerable amount of diplomatic effort into the resolution of a local conflict were therefore primarily the result of fears that an otherwise indirect threat to Canadian security interests could grow to become a more direct concern.

There were, of course, other motives for Canadian involvement in Asian security during the Cold War. One such rationale for Canadian action, not only in Asia but elsewhere in the world as well, was a desire to project the credibility of the UN. After it became clear in the late 1940s that the UN would not become the instrument of global collective security originally envisioned by Canada Ottawa came to see the organization as a means of managing peripheral conflicts which held the possibility of sparking a superpower confrontation. As such Canada, when feasible, sought to utilize the UN as an instrument through which local Asian conflicts could be constrained and American behavior moderated. This Canadian perspective was evident as early as the UNTCOK missions and remained a central element of Canada's national security perceptions throughout the Cold War.

Ironically, Canadian participation in matters related to Asian security generally declined after the early 1970s. However, it was in the early and mid-1970s that direct Canadian interests in Asia began to develop. Following the recognition of the PRC and the maturation of the Japanese economy the nations of Northeast Asia began to become increasingly important to the well-being of the Canadian economy. In addition, Canada also began to expand its cultural and political ties with the region. Thus at the very time that East Asia's importance to Canada began to rise Canadian involvement in the security of this region declined.

It is now necessary to consider Canada's evolving interests in this region, from a purely domestic perspective, in order to establish the relative importance of Northeast Asia to the contemporary well-being of the Canadian state. Such an assessment will help to explain Canada's current security interests in the North Pacific. The following chapter, therefore, will examine Canada's growing economic, societal, political, environmental and military interests in the countries of Northeast Asia in order to demonstrate that the motives associated with Canadian involvement in that sub-region during the Cold War have ceased to reflect Canada's current security interests in this area. This will facilitate a later discussion concerning what Canada's current strategic options are in this region, and how future Canadian policy will have to address these national interests.

CHAPTER 3.

CANADA'S ASIAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA.

3.1 Expanding Regional Interests.

The preceding chapter argued that Canada's foreign policy towards Asia during the Cold War was almost exclusively the product of military based security perceptions. These perceptions, furthermore, were grounded principally on the assumption that Canadian and European security were inextricably intertwined. It is now necessary to consider Canada's contemporary security interests in Asia, and particularly Northeast Asia, in order to determine whether or not Cold War policies are still appropriate in the post-Cold War era.

In order to illustrate the current significance of Northeast Asia to Canada's current national security interests it is necessary to return to the expanded notions of security dealt with in chapter one. To recall; while it is true that during the Cold War the threat of a nuclear exchange had a dampening effect upon the importance attached to second tier security interests it is also true that in the post-Cold War era such concerns have received renewed attention. This is certainly the perception of the Canadian government. Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1992 to 1993, noted that in the post-Cold War era economic, social, political and environmental, as well as more traditional military concerns, all constituted aspects of national security.⁷¹ Just as Cold War strategists such as Hans Morgenthau and Thomas Schelling argued that in the Realist dominated security regimes of the Cold War military matters reigned paramount, contemporary strategists have begun to stress the importance of a multifaceted approach to security studies.⁷² Broad based considerations of security, such as those discussed by Buzan and Ullman in chapter 1 are therefore instrumental in defining what constitutes Canada's current national interests in Northeast Asia, and how challenges to these interests constitute threats to national security.

⁷¹ Barbara McDougall, "Adapting for Survival: Global Security from Sarajevo to Maastricht to Rio", Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement 92/56, November 5 1992, p. 2.

⁷² A literature review of some of the most recent works on national security in the post-Cold War era can be found in Michael Write "The Future of National Security, in So Many Words", The Washington Post Weekly, November 22-28 1993, p. 36.

In order to assess Canada's current security interests in this new atmosphere it is necessary to accept that Canada has a vested interest in preserving the well-being and prosperity of the state, as described in chapter one. This goal is dependent upon a number of factors which are inherently transnational in nature. Buzan has identified five dimensions of security which will provide the basis for examining contemporary Canadian security interests in Northeast Asia. These dimensions of security consist of economic, societal, political, environmental and military considerations. An evaluation of post-Cold War security interests based upon these factors is consistent with official Canadian assessments of national security. As Barbara McDougall stated in 1992, "...Canada's interests in the region are too intricate to be described simply in economic or cultural terms. The reality of Asia-Pacific today is a reality replete with challenges across the full range of our foreign policy."⁷³

3.2 Economic Interests.

Brian Job and Frank Langdon have recently argued that "...Canada's security interests in the Asia-Pacific derive from its economic stake in the region."⁷⁴ Since Canada's recognition of the PRC in 1970 and Mitchell Sharp's recommendation that Canada endeavor to reduce its dependence upon the American market (what was known as the Third Option) in 1972 Canada's economic ties with Asia, and particularly Northeast Asia, have become increasingly important to the strength of the national economy. As Evans has observed, "In retrospect, 1970 seems to have been a watershed...A combination of careful promotion by the Canadian state and public enthusiasm for China catalyzed a vast outpouring of energy and activity across the Pacific..."⁷⁵


The increasing importance of Trans-Pacific trade to the Canadian economy since the end of the Second World War can be seen clearly in graph 1 "The Growth of Trans-Pacific Trade 1950-1990." While Asian markets accounted for

⁷³ Barbara McDougall, "Canada and the Pacific Century", Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement 93/12, February 19 1993, p. 2.

⁷⁴ Brian L. Job and Frank Langdon. "Canada and the Pacific", in Canada Among Nations 1993-1994, eds., Christopher J. Maule and Fen Olsen Hampson, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), pp. 287-288.

⁷⁵ Paul M. Evans, "The emergence of Eastern Asia and its implications for Canada", International Journal, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 516.

only 3.7% of Canada's exports in 1950 that figure had risen to over 10% in 1990. Import figures for the same years grew for 4.8% to 12.0%. The growing



Source: Canada Yearbooks 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1993.

importance of Asian trade to Canada during these years should not be underestimated. In 1983 Trans-Pacific trade exceeded Trans-Atlantic trade for the first time in Canadian history. Furthermore, the trends demonstrated in graph 1 have generally continued into the first three-quarters of 1993. By the early 1990s the countries of the Pacific Rim accounted for 15.1% of Canada's imports and 10.5% of its export market.⁷⁶ More pertinent to this study, trade with the nations

⁷⁶ Statistics Canada defines the Pacific Rim as including the following territories; Hong Kong, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, PRC, Indonesia, Japan, DPRK, RoK, Nepal, Philippines, Macau, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. Cocos Islands, Nauru, Norfolk Island, Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, Tokelau, Niue, Cook Islands, New Zealand, Solomon

in the Northeast Asian sub-region accounted for the overwhelming majority of Pacific Rim trade. Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, North Korea and South Korea accounted for almost 80% of Canada's Trans-Pacific trade, representing over 8.25% of total exports in the early 1990s. These figures for Northeast Asia are in fact artificially low, due to the exclusion of transbaikal Russia from the calculations. The relative importance of this trade, while much less than that of trade with the US, is nevertheless, quite significant when compared to trade with Europe, Latin America or other regions of the world. This can be seen in graph 2 "Canadian International Trade By Region 1992".

A further consideration when assessing the importance of Northeast Asia to the Canadian economy is the increasing proportion of exports which are finished products. Commodities such as telecommunications equipment, electrical goods and specialized instruments have become increasingly important exports for Canada and are expected to play an growing role in future Trans-Pacific trade.⁷⁷ In this respect Northeast Asian markets are becoming increasingly important to Canada not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.


A final consideration of Northeast Asia's growing economic significance to Canada concerns the overwhelming importance of Trans-Pacific trade to the economies of the four western provinces. As can be seen in graph 3 "Percentage of Canadian Trade With Northeast Asia Involving Western Canada" the vast majority of Canada's Trans-Pacific trade originates in the west. In British Columbia, for example, trade with Asia accounts for over 65% of that province's total exports. Over 80% of Canada's trade with Japan (which alone accounts for over 60% of Canada's trade with Asia) originates in the western provinces.

The importance of Asian trade is, therefore, not only of great relevance to Canada as a nation, it is particularly vital to the economies in the west where, in the case of British Columbia, trade with Asia even exceeds trade with the US.

Islands, Kiribati, Pitcairn Island, Tonga, Western Samoa, Wallis Futuna Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Guam and the United States outlying islands.

⁷⁷ Government of Canada, "Minister Wilson Welcomes Visit Of Chinese Vice-Premier Zhu Rohgji", News Release 100. April 27 1993, p. 3.


Graph 2
Canadian International Trade By Region, 1992.



Source: Statistics Canada, International Trade Division.

The impact of the Asian economies upon Canada's well-being can be expected to grow, providing that the conditions conducive to regional stability are maintained. Not only is there a well established trend (as indicated in graph 1) indicating the growing importance of Trans-Pacific trade to Canada, the Asian economies themselves are poised to become the center of the global marketplace. The World Bank has estimated that East Asia will account for over half of the net growth in world trade (representing over \$3 Trillion) between 1990 and 2000.⁷⁸ By the turn of the century it is expected that Asians will account for

approximately 60% of the world population and over one billion of these people will have some level of disposable income - 400 million, more than those living in



Source: Statistics Canada, International Trade Division.

the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) bloc, will possess disposable incomes equal to First World standards.⁷⁹ In this respect it is reasonable to expect that if allowed to develop unfettered by conflict, instability or widespread political unrest the nations of East Asia, which already account for a greater portion of Canadian trade than Europe, will become even more vital to Canada in the coming years.

⁷⁹

Ibid., p. 1.

Having established the current and potential importance of North Pacific trade to the Canadian, and particularly the western Canadian, economy it is a relatively simple matter to identify the impact that a major disruption of trade could have for national security calculations. As Job and Langdon write,

...Canada has "security" interests concerning the Asia-Pacific, which may be summarized as any threats to peace and stability in the region that could disrupt regional economic expansion, growing prosperity, and Trans-Pacific trade and investment flows.⁸⁰

The implications of instability in or around Northeast Asia for Canadian national security are therefore significant, simply from an economic standpoint. Canadian exports to that sub-region totaled over \$12.6 billion in 1992 (and approached \$10 billion in the first three-quarters of 1993). As every billion dollars worth of exports represents between 10 000 and 15 000 jobs the impact of any substantial trade disruptions would be severe.⁸¹ When combined with the potential loss of strategic imports, direct foreign investments and other important aspects of the North Pacific economic relationship it is clear that Canada does have a significant and growing interest in the maintenance of stability throughout East Asia. This interest clearly translates into an issue of national security considering the number of jobs involved, the importance of Trans-Pacific trade to the western economies and the growing potential of Asian markets for Canadian industry.

3.3 Societal Interests.

Yet another security concern related to conditions in Northeast Asia is the potential influence upon Canadian foreign policy which immigrants from this area may seek. The impact of domestic interest groups upon foreign policy has been the focus of considerable study in recent years and this literature has clear applications to security interests. Two of the most important works on this topic

⁸⁰ Job and Langdon, "Canada and the Pacific", p. 266.

⁸¹ Roy MacLaren, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Roy MacLaren, Minister for International Trade, to the Canada China Trade Council", Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada. Statements and Speeches 93/61, November 13 1993, p. 2.

have been Kim Richard Nossal's book The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy and Canada as a Principal Power by David Dewitt and John Kirton.

Nossal argues convincingly that the behavior, and at times the agenda, of foreign policy-makers is often shaped by the domestic environment.⁸² While Nossal notes that the actual administration of Canadian foreign policy has been relatively isolated from societal pressures, especially high-priority issues such as foreign policy and defense, he concludes that domestic pressures can be quite influential in the policy setting environment.⁸³ As Nossal states, "At a more general level societal preferences may determine what specific policies are pursued by a state."⁸⁴

Further insight into the role which societal actors can play in the formulation of foreign policy can be gained from Dewitt and Kirton. Stressing the linkages between realism and complex interdependency Dewitt and Kirton endeavor to demonstrate that Canadian foreign policy is a product of domestic, national and international concerns.⁸⁵ They see an erosion of the delineation between domestic and international politics and the consequent rise in influence of societal actors in the formulation of foreign policy. Dewitt and Kirton state that associational interest groups may often play an important roles in the foreign policy process.⁸⁶ Although their further assertions that societal interest groups may affect not only the parameters of foreign policy formulation but also the actual implementation of such policies is of more questionable validity there is clearly a general sense of agreement between Nossal, Dewitt and Kirton up to this point.

The linkages between societal influences upon foreign policy, immigration and national security revolve around the ability of ethnic based associational interest groups to exert influence upon the federal government regarding foreign policy considerations. As Nossal observes, "Canada's multi-ethnicity has also

⁸² Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. 2nd edition, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1989), p. 87.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 108-109, 113.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 109.

⁸⁵ David R. Black and Heather A. Smith. "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature", Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol. XXVI, No. 4, December 1993, p. 757.

⁸⁶ David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power. (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p. 169.

been reflected in foreign policy, as many recent immigrants, no less than the newly arrived English in decades gone by, have been prone to define their foreign policy in ethnic terms."⁸⁷ In this sense it is possible that immigrants from Asia will lobby Ottawa to enact policies which reflect their concerns with Asian issues, many of which will undoubtedly be security related.

Given the propensity of immigrants (when politically active) to attempt influence on foreign policy on matters related to their homeland it is prudent to consider the growing number of Asians entering the country and the effect which these people may have upon Canadian foreign policy. Between 1985 and 1991 the number of Asians immigrating to Canada rose substantially. While less than 40 000 Asians entered Canada in 1985 that number had risen to over 120 000 by 1991 (See Graph 4). While the majority of these immigrants originated from outside of the Northeast Asian sub-region a substantial number did come from this area. Hong Kong, for example, was the single largest source of Canadian immigrants in the early 1990s, accounting for more new Canadians than all of the Americas combined including the United States.⁸⁸ In total, over 43 000 people immigrated to Canada from the countries of Northeast Asia during 1991. The potential political influence of these new Canadians, in the event of regional instability in their homelands, could have a significant impact upon the demands placed upon the federal government to act on issues affecting Asian security in the future. As Diana Lary pointed out,

...with large numbers of the Hong Kong middle class now either in Canada, or back in Hong Kong as Canadian citizens, anything that happens in Hong Kong in the run up to 1997 and after will have repercussions in Canada and on Canadian policy in Asia. If things go badly, many Canadian citizens will want Canada to take a strong line.⁸⁹

Hong Kong, however, is not the only source of immigrants or potential ethnic interest groups. South Koreans, Taiwanese and Chinese from within the


⁸⁷ Nossal, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁸⁸ Government of Canada, Department of Employment and Immigration. *Immigration Statistics 1991*. 1991, pp. 26-30.

⁸⁹ Diana Lary, "Immigration and Foreign Policy: Separate Concerns?", *Behind the Headlines*. Vol. 50, No. 2, Winter 1992-1993, p. 29.

Northeast Asian sub-region, as well as Vietnamese, Filipinos and others from adjacent areas may well have legitimate concerns regarding their homelands if

Graph 4
Immigration from Asia 1985-1991.



Source: Immigration Canada

conflict or instability arises in the North Pacific. As the majority of Canada's immigrants now come from Asia (See Graph 5) the potential for a large group of Canadians expressing their interests in a future Asian conflict rises accordingly. Such demands could consequently translate into pressure upon Ottawa to act on security issues in Northeast Asia. The range of potential action is extensive, and could include such activities as the deployment of Canadian peacekeepers to an Asian conflict or the imposition of political or economic sanctions upon a country with which Canada currently enjoys profitable economic linkages to name but a few.

Perhaps the most worrisome concern, from the perspective of national security, is not the possibility of ethnic interest groups demanding Canadian action (military, economic or political) in an Asian conflict but the threat that elements of opposing "sides" in an Asian conflict could import their troubles into Canada. While this caution may sound alarmist Nossal reminds his readers of the near simultaneous bombings of a Canadian Pacific flight in Tokyo and an Air India flight over the North Atlantic in June 1985 killing a combined total of 331 people.⁹⁰ Lary adds "when ancestral hatreds and grievances have not been obliterated by time, immigrants and their descendants can involve Canada in dangerous situations."⁹¹ Thus while Canada has largely escaped the problems associated with ethnic clashes, potential security concerns associated with ethnic tensions cannot be entirely dismissed.


Apart from the "negative" security ramifications of large-scale Asian immigration there are, of course, several potential benefits associated with immigration. Immigrants from Asia represent a valuable bridge between Canada and the nations of that continent. Asian immigrants, through their knowledge of local languages, customs and business practices, offer Canadian companies excellent opportunities to access the growing markets of that region. Furthermore, Canadians of Asian descent are exceptionally well qualified to facilitate political and security dialogue between the nations of Northeast Asia and Canada could use these people to further safeguard critical national interests. In this respect it is clear that immigration does not necessarily pose a security threat to Canada. Indeed, despite the potential difficulties discussed above there is every reason to believe that Asian immigrants will be an asset rather than a liability to Canada's North Pacific security concerns in the coming years.

It can therefore be argued that immigration from East and Northeast Asia does, in some cases, proffer a legitimate security interest which may become more pronounced in the future. As Nossal, Dewitt and Kirton point out domestic interest groups can exert significant political pressure upon decision-makers. Lary expands upon this notion to warn that under certain conditions ethnic groups, and specifically Asian ethnic groups, could act in this way.

⁹⁰ Nossal, *op. cit.*, p. 119, footnote 18.

⁹¹ Lary, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

Graph 5
Immigration by Region 1991.



Source: Immigration Canada

The potential security interest for Canada based upon societal groupings of Asian descent therefore ranges from increased domestic pressure to become somehow involved in Asian related security issues to the less likely possibility of ethnic violence within or involving Canada. Nevertheless, it is these very people who are most suited to address the security problems of the North Pacific and who have the knowledge and skills necessary to negotiate peaceful resolutions to regional tensions.

3.4 Political Interests.

Canadian political interests in Northeast Asia are consistent with a broad range of global objectives. These interests, furthermore, remain remarkably

similar to Cold War concerns and values such as the maintenance of international stability, the rule of law in international and domestic settings and the establishment of conditions conducive to economic and social justice.⁹² These interests are generally motivated by a desire to protect Canadian economic, environmental, and military concerns as well as various societal values. From the Canadian perspective the entrenchment of these values in the international (hence sub-regional) order is seen as fundamental to the establishment and preservation of long term security. In an address to the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies in 1992 former Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall clearly enunciated this point. "Basic human rights, the development of democratic values and institutions, the rule of law, and the establishment of responsible and responsive governments and administrative infrastructures are critical to lasting peace and stability."⁹³

Thus it can be seen that there is a clear conceptual linkage between conditions of social justice and Northeast Asian security. The relevance of this to Canada is obvious. A war or serious instability in Northeast Asia could clearly threaten Canadian interests throughout East Asia, through the disruption of trade, widespread population displacement, serious ecological damage and other such scenarios. It is obviously a key aspect of Canadian political objectives to lessen the chances of such a conflict. Moreover, a war or other such instability could quite likely have adverse effects upon past or on-going efforts to realize democratization in portions of Northeast Asia. While such a conflict would affect more obvious Canadian interests such as economic or environmental concerns the postponement of liberalization in Northeast Asia would represent in itself, the compromise of an ideological interest. Support for the acceptance of universal human rights and democratization is therefore a pivotal aspect of Canada's political interests in this region.⁹⁴ This objective is pursued through a variety of means, such as government-to-government communication, poverty relief and

⁹² Job and Langdon, "Canada and the Pacific", p. 287.

⁹³ McDougall, "Adapting For Survival: Global Security From Sarajevo To Maastricht To Rio", p. 9.

⁹⁴ Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Foreign Policy Themes And Priorities 1991-92 Update, 1991, p. 11.

humanitarian assistance and public encouragement of good governance and economic policies.⁹⁵

An important aspect of this policy should, however, be noted. The nature of human rights and related dialogue between Asians and North Americans is often quite contentious due to divergent expectations of citizen rights and responsibilities. Canadians (and Americans) must realize that policy objectives along the above mentioned lines are politically sensitive issues among Asian states. Canada has begun to accept this reality and there is growing consensus that foreign policy objectives in Northeast Asia should not be entirely conditional upon progress in any single policy area. If our relations with the non-democratic nations of the North Pacific, particularly China, are to proceed smoothly in the future there must be a willingness to demonstrate that human rights issues are but one aspect of a broader Canadian agenda and that each aspect can proceed independently of the other. It can therefore be argued that barring extreme situations such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing Canada's economic, environmental and other objectives in Asia should not be seen as dependent upon political objectives. Complications in one area do not necessarily preclude simultaneous progress in another policy area.

Another key aspect of Canada's political interests vis-a-vis Northeast Asia, and the broader Asia-Pacific, is Ottawa's desire to participate in the establishment of a distinct regional or sub-regional community. As Joe Clark, former Secretary of State for External Affairs (1984-1991), noted during the formative stages of the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD),

For decades, Canada has been preoccupied with constructing an Atlantic community. That community has been built. It is successful. It will endure. Now is the time to also turn our energies to strengthening the Pacific community, a community of common action, common purpose and common values.⁹⁶

This objective has, in recent years, taken on a new importance for Canadian foreign policy-makers as efforts are made to safeguard Canadian interests in the

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹⁶ Joe Clark, "Notes For A Speech At A Luncheon Hosted By The Foreign Correspondents Press Club Of Japan", Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement 90/41, July 24 1990, p. 4.

Northeast Asia through multilateral channels. The growing importance attached to political efforts aimed at constructing a community in the North Pacific will be the focus of chapter 5. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the formation of such a community is one of Canada's principal political interests in Northeast Asia.

To these political objectives can be added certain concerns more directly related to conventional security perceptions such as the need to establish confidence and security building measures (CBMs) between nations and the encouragement of conventional and nuclear disarmament.⁹⁷ The examination of such policy objectives can generally be considered to be a political interest rather than a military interest as the establishment of CBMs is, in itself, a political rather than military process. While CBMs invariably involve the military they are established through diplomatic channels and as such they are best considered as a political process. Such policy goals therefore, clearly illustrate that the Canadian government perceives there to be a firm linkage between security and political issues. As Barbara McDougall has observed;

Regional co-operation still needs strengthening so that the causes of insecurity and tension motivating nuclear proliferation and military build-ups can be addressed. Stronger International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and better controls on suppliers of nuclear technology are needed to cope with the possibility of covert nuclear weapons programs.⁹⁸

With three, and possibly four, nuclear powers present within the North-Pacific (the United States, Russia, China and perhaps North Korea) and the remainder of the nations within the sub-region, except Mongolia, capable of manufacturing such weapons the issue of CBMs and disarmament in this area is perhaps more acute than anywhere else in the world. The existence of 3 nuclear armed powers (India, Pakistan and Kazakhstan) immediately bordering the sub-region adds to the need for constructive measures in this field. As recently as 1990 tensions between India and Pakistan became sufficiently intense to raise serious concern within military and diplomatic circles over the possibility of a

⁹⁷ Government of Canada, Foreign Policies Themes And Priorities 1991-92 Update, p. 7.

⁹⁸ McDougall, "Adapting For Survival: Global Security From Sarajevo To Maastricht To Rio", p. 9.

nuclear exchange.⁹⁹ If such an exchange were to occur between countries so closely bordering the North Pacific sub-region the potential security risks would be profound. For these and related reasons the establishment of CBMs within the region is a primary objective of the Canadian government.

It can therefore be said that Canada does have a clearly stated and consistent political agenda for the conduct of international relations. This agenda, based upon the twin desires of ensuring regional and global security and the enhancement of political and economic rights for populations (objectives which are seen as complimentary by the Canadian government) are the cornerstone of Canada's overseas political interests. In the Asian context, Canadian political interests can therefore be seen as a regional application of the above described objectives.

Given the above discussion of issues pertaining to human rights, democratization and the establishment of CBMs within the North Pacific it is clear that Canada does have a variety of legitimate political interests in this sub-region. Interests range from the establishment and maintenance of friendly diplomatic relations within the area to those aspects discussed above and even to such issues as the recently announced objective of attracting more Asian students to Canadian universities.¹⁰⁰ In many respects these political interests are interconnected with military, economic, environmental and cultural considerations and for this reason it is obvious that political interests in Asia, alone and in conjunction with other issues, are pivotal to the broader context of Canadian national security.

3.5 Environmental Interests.

Despite the vast distances which separate Canada from the countries of Northeast Asia the issues of environmental degradation and environmental threats to long-term security within this sub-region are becoming increasingly important to Canada's own national security. In recent years considerable study has been directed towards examining the linkages between environmental and

⁹⁹ Paul George, President, Geopolitical Risk Intelligence Services, Ottawa Ontario "Post-Cold War Security in the North Pacific", (A personal interview, February 14 1994).

¹⁰⁰ Government of Canada, "MacLaren Encourages Efforts to Boost Canadian Education Exports to the Asia-Pacific Region", Press Release 16, January 31 1994.

security issues and it is becoming clear that these two interest areas are not mutually exclusive.¹⁰¹ As Vaclav Smil has noted,

Environmental concerns have become a major addition to new, expanded definitions of national and international security...Rapidly growing evidence demonstrating severe environmental degradation in many countries and pointing to the possibility of unprecedented global changes makes it impossible to ignore the quality of natural environments and the state of the biosphere as key elements of long-term security.¹⁰²

Accepting the proposition that environmental interests constitute a legitimate component of national security calculations Canadian interests in Northeast Asia can be classified into three broad categories. First, there are those environmental concerns such as atmospheric warming or nuclear pollution which have an impact upon global, and hence Canadian, ecosystems. Second there are developments within Asia which could affect the security of the entire Pacific Basin such as mass human migrations or the depletion of fish stocks. Finally, there are those issues which would have only regional effects in Asia such as decreasing supplies of fresh water or declining soil productivity. A number of potential security interests, and the extent of their influence can be seen in Table 1. There is, of course, a degree of overlap between these categories and an environmental issue which is global in nature would obviously have Trans-Pacific and regional implications. Additionally, one type of security concern may be intricately connected to others. For example, mass human migration may be the product of water shortages, declining agricultural productivity of other environmental conditions.

In recent years Canadian foreign policy makers have become increasingly aware of these environmental security linkages. As early as 1990 Joe Clark,

¹⁰¹ For an example of some of these studies see Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict", International Security. Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 79-112 or Terriff, op. cit., pp. 163-190.

¹⁰² Vaclav Smil, Potential Environmental Conflicts Involving Countries of the North Pacific. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 4), (North York: York University Press, February 1992), p. 1.

admitted that environmental issues represented a long-ignored component of national security calculations.¹⁰³ It is, therefore, clear that Canada does have a

Table 1 Environmental Security Interests.

Interest	Global	Pacific Basin	Regional
Global Warming	*		
Ozone Depletion	*		
Loss of Biodiversity	*		
Deforestation	*		*
Loss of Fisheries		*	
Nuclear Pollution		*	
Human Migration		*	
Water Shortages			*
Acid Deposition			*
Agricultural Decline			*

Note: This list is intended to be illustrative of potential environmental interests in the North Pacific, and not exclusive.

series of legitimate environmental interests in the North Pacific which apply to the broader sense of national security.

In considering those environmental conditions within Asia which most directly affect the Canadian ecosystem perhaps the most pressing concern is the issue of global warming. Smil, for example, has observed, "Environmental and socio-economic consequences of a rapid planetary warming caused by rising emissions of anthropogenic gases altering the atmosphere's radiation balance have become a prominent part of recent international security concerns."¹⁰⁴

While the direct linkages between emissions of greenhouse gases and an overall rise in the planet's ambient temperature have yet to be universally accepted concern over potential ramifications of global warming is widespread. As Terriff has noted the possible consequences of rapid climatic changes include major alterations of ecosystems, decreased agricultural productivity, increased human mortality and the potential for large-scale population shifts.¹⁰⁵ In the most

¹⁰³ Joe Clark, "Canada and the Asia Pacific in the 1990s", Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement 90/40, July 17 1990, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰⁴ Smil, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁰⁵ Terriff, op. cit., p. 174.

extreme cases environmental degradation such as this could directly affect Canadian territory with obvious national security implications. In less severe cases environmental degradation could directly affect only Asia, but nevertheless jeopardize Canadian economic, political and similar interests there.

The countries of Northeast Asia, and particularly China, are expected to contribute substantially to the emissions of greenhouse gases in the coming years and this accordingly represents a valid Canadian security concern. According to one estimate, annual Chinese coal consumption (which accounts for the overwhelming majority of that country's greenhouse gas emissions) could rise from 868 million tons in 1990 to over 2000 tons by the year 2000 if current rates of economic growth are maintained.¹⁰⁶ Smil further warns that it will be virtually impossible for China to stabilize its emissions of greenhouse gases during the next 20-30 years, and as such the PRC is expected to become the world's largest source of such gases by the year 2010.¹⁰⁷ While the situation in other Northeast Asian states is not so severe, countries such as North Korea are also expected to contribute substantially to global gas emissions in the future. It is clear that such trends, if left unchecked, may contribute to widespread regional or global ramifications such as those described by Terriff.

There are, of course, other environmental conditions originating in Asia which may have a significant impact upon Canada's ecosystem. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, for example, has identified 6 major environmental problems beyond global warming which he considers to be of potential security concern. These problems include; ozone depletion, acid deposition, deforestation, degradation of agricultural land, constricting water supplies and the depletion of fish stocks.¹⁰⁸ In addition to these can be added a number of other possibilities such as a large-scale accident involving nuclear energy (almost all of the nations in the North Pacific sub-region possess at least 1 nuclear reactor), the continued dumping of radioactive waste in the seas of Japan and Okhotsk and large scale population displacements.

¹⁰⁶ Richard L. Grant, "China and its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1994, p. 67.

¹⁰⁷ Smil, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold", *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall 1991, pp. 88-89.

The issue of population displacement is perhaps the best example of a non-global environmental issue which could have security ramifications on both sides of the Pacific. As Takashi Sugimoto warns,

Assuming that for whatever reason, a large scale population outflow from China takes place, it is inconceivable that Taiwan and Hong Kong... could absorb it all. Clearly, population problems originating from China would have a major effect not only upon the immediate region but on the entire world.¹⁰⁹

While Sugimoto's claim that effects would be global may be extreme (Europe, South America and Africa being difficult to reach or unlikely destinations for "boat people") the large numbers of illegal Chinese immigrants arriving along the west coast of North America under current conditions (estimates range from between 30 000 and 100 000 per year) suggests that in the event of a mass Chinese exodus Canada and the United States could be the destination for literally millions of refugees.¹¹⁰ It should further be noted that the potential for substantial outward migration does not exist solely from China. North Korea and Russia also represent areas where human displacement is possible in the future. Whatever the source, there can be little doubt that a massive influx of people into a country unprepared for such a shock can present a real threat to national security.¹¹¹

Finally, there are a variety of regional issues which, while not directly threatening Canada, do represent a challenge to Canadian interests. Smil, for example, identifies acid deposition as being a regional issue which could strain international relations in East Asia.¹¹² It is not inconceivable that future environmental irritants to international relations in Asia such as this could reach the point where armed conflict may become a possibility. This would already seem to be the case in the Middle East where a number of Egyptian officials have stated that the only matter which could drive their country to war again would be

109 Takashi Sugimoto, Mass Migration Pressures In China. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 5), (North York: York University Press, February 1992), p. 2.

110 George, op. cit., February 14 1994.

111 Sugimoto, op. cit., p. 3.

112 Smil, op. cit., p. 7.

access to fresh water - clearly an environmental issue.¹¹³ Such a conflict in Asia could jeopardize Canadian economic, political, military and cultural interests to the extent that they be considered a threat to national security.

Thus there is a clear linkage between environmental issues and Canadian national security. Environmental security interests range from the global to the local and are often compound in nature, representing a variety of ecological problems. While current sentiment among the majority of regional actors suggests that environmental concerns should not necessarily be considered in any forthcoming security negotiations, it remains clear that Canada does have environmental interests in the North Pacific and that these concerns will have to be somehow addressed in the medium to long term.¹¹⁴

3.6 Military Interests.

Canada's military interests in the North Pacific are generally quite limited in scope. As Brian Job has argued "while Canada is a Pacific state, it is not, nor can it become, a Pacific power in any military sense."¹¹⁵ In the early 1990s Canada maintained no combat-capable forces in Northeast Asia, and force deployment to the Canadian west coast was limited to 2 helicopter equipped frigates, 5 other frigates, 1 fleet replenishment ship and 6 coastal patrol vessels. In addition, there was 1 Maritime Reconnaissance squadron assigned to Pacific waters equipped with 4 CP-140A Aurora aircraft and 3 CF-18 fighter jets.¹¹⁶ It can be argued from a military standpoint that Canada not only lacks a unilateral force projection capability in the Pacific, but that Canada is incapable of protecting its own sovereignty along its west coast. Furthermore, Canada is

¹¹³ Gleick, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹¹⁴ Dewitt and Evans, The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report, p. 10.

¹¹⁵ Brian L. Job, "Canadian Defense Policy in the Pacific", Canadian Defense Quarterly. Vol. 21, No. 1, Special No. 2, August 1991, p. 32.

¹¹⁶ Forces on the East Coast include 3 submarines, 2 helicopter equipped destroyers, 5 helicopter equipped frigates, 2 other frigates and 2 fleet replenishment ships. Air elements include 3 maritime reconnaissance squadrons (12 CP-140A) and an anti-submarine warfare squadron equipped with 26 Sea-King helicopters. Fighter coverage, out of CFB Bagotville varies.

unlikely to obtain such capabilities in the near future given the post-Cold War draw down of Western military budgets.¹¹⁷

Such chronic military weakness, is not however, necessarily a cause for serious alarm. With the decline and dissolution of the Soviet Union it can be argued that the emergence of a direct strategic threat to Canada from Asia in the short to medium term is highly unlikely.¹¹⁸ This is not to say that there will be no emergent threat in the future. A resurgent Russia, a nuclear Japan or a modernized Chinese military are all examples of potential security threats to Canada proper but these scenarios are considered unlikely to emerge until at least early in the next century. The current view in the Departments of Foreign Affairs and National Defense is that, at present, Canada is not concerned with the emergence of long term strategic threats in Asia.¹¹⁹ In any event if such a strategic challenge were to arise in it would undoubtedly draw the attention of the United States and be preceded by a significant force build-up.

Despite the absence of a direct military threat to Canada from the North Pacific Ottawa does, nevertheless, possess certain military interests in the region. Job observes, "...it (Canada) must act appropriately to secure its interests - political and economic stability, Canadian sovereignty, resource and environmental protection in these waters and with US and Asian rimland countries."¹²⁰ In this respect Canadian military interests, beyond the protection of national sovereignty, are largely the product of non-military security concerns. Since the 1987 Defense White Paper the Department of National Defense has made, within the constraints of the Department of Finance, a concerted effort to address these security concerns in the Pacific. The 1992 statement of Canadian Defense Policy stated,

¹¹⁷ John Lamb and Robin Hay, "A Pacific Arms Control Agenda for Canada", Arms Control Communiqué. No. 54, September 14 1988, p. 1.

¹¹⁸ Brian L. Job and Frank Langdon, The Evolving Security Order of the Asia Pacific: A Canadian Perspective, (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 15), (North York: York University Press, September 1992), p. 18.

¹¹⁹ Personal interviews with anonymous sources at the Department of National Defense and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa Ontario, February 11 and 14, 1994 respectively.

¹²⁰ Job, "Canadian Defense Policy in the Pacific", pp. 32-33.

Against the prospect of possible changes in Asia-Pacific security relations, and in light of the increasing need for fisheries patrols, environmental surveillance and drug interdiction, we will distribute our forces more evenly between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets to achieve a better balance of maritime capabilities between the East and West coasts.¹²¹

Efforts to realize this balance are currently underway, and the HMCS Vancouver, one of Canada's new frigates, is scheduled to arrive to the Pacific by late 1994. If all 12 Halifax class frigates currently under construction enter service (there is the possibility that some will be sold upon completion) current military plans call for the deployment of 5 of these vessels to the west coast. Additionally, if modern submarines are purchased, as currently planned, it is expected that an underwater capability will be established in the Pacific.¹²² These force modernizations and the attainment of a more balanced fleet on each coast should not, however, be seen to contradict earlier statements concerning the inability of Canada to act as a military power in the Pacific. Even with these changes the Canadian Pacific fleet will be only just capable of achieving the coastal surveillance and sovereignty protection objectives outlined above.

Nevertheless, the enhancement of naval forces along Canada's west coast can be seen to reflect a contemporary security interest in this region. As noted earlier, and as will be discussed at length in chapter 5, Canada's premier foreign policy objective in the North Pacific is the establishment of a multilateral security framework designed to alleviate regional tensions and lessen the chances of international conflict.¹²³ As many Asian states are reluctant to accept Canada as a legitimate regional actor, due to its relative economic, military, political insignificance to the Pacific Rim, Canada's inclusion in any nascent security architecture may be partially based upon Asian perceptions of Canada's commitment to its own security. As Job argues, "...Canada should cement its claim for the relevancy of its participation in any security dialogue in the North Pacific by demonstrating that it takes seriously its own specifically Canadian,

121 Government of Canada, Department of National Defense. Canadian Defense Policy 1992, April 1992, p. 10.

122 Ibid., p. 22.

123 Douglas Ross and Simon Dalby. "Canadian Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region", Barometer, Winter/Spring 1991-92, p. 9.

security interests in this theatre."¹²⁴ By increasing Canada's military commitment to its own west coast Ottawa can demonstrate such a willingness to safeguard Canada's military interests in this area.

Another area of potential Canadian military interest in the North Pacific lies in the field of peacekeeping. Canada has a long-standing tradition of involvement in Asian peacekeeping missions as well as an on-going policy of participation in peacekeeping operations whenever feasible. While economic and manpower constraints are likely to limit the number of missions in which Canadian forces will be involved in the future it can be expected that the military will continue to participate in as many missions as possible.¹²⁵ Given Canada's historical ties to Indochina, Korea, Japan and China it is considered likely that Canada would participate in any new peacekeeping mission in East Asia barring extreme circumstances.¹²⁶

Finally, there is the possibility of Canadian involvement in a major Asian conflict if a US led multilateral effort were undertaken to affect the outcome. Canadian participation in the Second Persian Gulf War provides a clear precedent for such an action. If Japan, South Korea or possibly Taiwan were to come under attack it is highly probable that the US would assist its ally and if a Gulf-style multilateral coalition force were formed Canada would almost certainly be expected to participate. While this scenario is currently considered to be unlikely there is a general consensus that if such a series of events were to occur Canada would deploy forces into this region.¹²⁷

Canadian military interests in the North Pacific are therefore generally consistent with a foreign policy aimed at establishing conditions of peace and stability in the region. With no forward deployment of forces and no strategic threat facing Canada the chances of Canadian forces becoming involved in combat in this theatre are considered low. Nevertheless, Canada does have a vested interest in establishing a credible military presence in the North Pacific in order to meet a variety of sub-strategic threats and foreign expectations. In this

¹²⁴ Job, "Canadian Defense Policy in the Pacific", p. 37.

¹²⁵ Government of Canada, Canadian Defense Policy 1992, p. 34.

¹²⁶ Personal interview with anonymous source Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa Ontario, February 9 1994.

¹²⁷ Based upon a series of interviews at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa Ontario, February 9-16 1994.

sense, while Canada's military involvement in this region is, and will remain, limited Canadian military interests in the North Pacific are real.

3.7 Summary.

Using this paper's assumption that military based perceptions of Canadian national security are now largely obsolete and that post-Cold War notions of interdependency are now necessary it is clear that Canada does have numerous legitimate security interests in the North Pacific. Moreover, it is clear that while Canadian security interests in Asia during the Cold War were predominantly motivated by European based strategic concerns this is no longer the case. Contemporary Canadian interests in the North Pacific, while retaining some military considerations, are now much more diverse in scope. Indeed, having examined Canadian interests in light of Buzan's five security factors it has been seen that Canada has several valid security concerns related to economic, societal, political, environmental and military matters. While diverse interests undoubtedly did exist during the Cold War strategic concerns regarding the superpower competition and a preoccupation with European security dampened Canadian attention and involvement in Northeast Asian security. In the post-Cold war era however, Canada has become freer to consider the broader range of its national security interests and as such the nature of Canadian involvement in Northeast Asian security has begun to change. Furthermore, it should be obvious that these security interests are not mutually exclusive, but intertwined. As Buzan has argued, "These five factors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages."¹²⁸

Thus it can be stated that while the nations of the North Pacific do not present Canada with a direct, old-style military threat to the very existence of this country there are a variety of Canadian interests in the region which could be adversely affected by unrest. Such unrest could lead a number of potentially harmful situations such as large-scale economic disruptions in Asia, and then Canada, severe planetary ecological damage, mass inward migration to British Columbia or even internal strife between rival ethnic groups. For these reasons it

¹²⁸ Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, p. 20.

is safe to conclude that Canada's overall national security, as defined by Ullman, can be seriously affected by developments in the North Pacific.

Having accepted this assertion it is now necessary to consider the most prevalent threats facing these diverse interests in order to determine the danger facing Canadian security interests in the North Pacific. This examination will be the focus of the following chapter, and it will be illustrated that Canada's security interests in this region are not entirely secure. Methods to address the threats identified in the following chapter will then be considered in chapter 5 in an effort to determine what course of action, if any, is best suited to preserving Canada's national security interests in the North Pacific.

CHAPTER 4. THREATS TO SUB-REGIONAL STABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA.

4.1 The Post-Cold War Strategic Environment.

Having examined the various components of Canada's security interests in Northeast Asia it is now necessary to consider the range of potential threats facing these interests. Such an examination will demonstrate that, despite the end of the Cold War, there remain scenarios in which Canadian interests, and in some cases national security may be compromised.

As was discussed in chapter 2 security relations in Northeast Asia from the late 1940s until the end of the 1980s were largely the product of the Cold War superpower competition. However, since the mid-1980s a new strategic situation in the region has begun slowly to evolve independent of the larger global context. Dewitt and Evans have identified 5 sources of change, spanning both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, which have begun to affect the nature of international relations in the Asia-Pacific,

1. Growing Economic Interdependence of the Region.
2. The Economic Integration of Eastern Asia.
3. The End of the Soviet-American Confrontation.
4. A Restructuring of the Security Relations in Europe.
5. The Collapse of the Soviet Union as an Asian Actor.¹²⁹

These trends, particularly those involving the decline of the USSR, have acted to alter the threat scenarios facing Northeastern Asia. With growing economic interdependence and integration coupled with declining military threats based upon Cold War rivalries the chances of conflict in Northeast Asia have diminished substantially in the last decade. In spite of these developments it is still not possible to state that the potential for instability in this region has completely disappeared. As Evans has observed,

Contemporary security relations in Eastern Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific present a paradox. On the one hand, they are now probably more benign, with regional tensions

¹²⁹ Dewitt and Evans, The Changing Dynamics of Asia-Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective, pp. 3-6.

more relaxed and peace interest stronger, than at any point in this century...On the other hand, military spending has risen sharply, and there are grim prospects of the proliferation of both conventional and nuclear weapons systems. A host of territorial disputes remain unresolved. And, looking to the future, these are deepening anxieties about re-emergence of traditional regional rivalries and a militarized Japan.¹³⁰

In addressing the issue of threats to sub-regional stability it must be realized that security calculations for the foreseeable future will ultimately continue to be undertaken in a state-centric international order. With this in mind, Dewitt has recently observed that all of the various security approaches currently being pursued in Northeast Asia are based upon an assumption of the primacy of state interests and the realization that competing interests may at some point lead to international tension and conflict.¹³¹ In the post-Cold War era non-military dimensions of security such as economic, societal or environmental concerns will play an increasing role in the interrelations of regional actors, and could indeed be the source of future conflicts. Nevertheless, perceived threats to military security or the use of the military to defend other interests will continue to reign paramount in any assessment of Northeast Asia's strategic environment. As Buzan argues, "Of these five dimensions (military, political, economic, societal and environmental), the military one attracts disproportionate attention in thinking about security...it is because military means can dominate outcomes in all other sectors."¹³² In this respect it can be argued that in the short to medium term the predominant range of threats facing Northeast Asia, and hence Canadian sub-regional interests, will be military in nature. Although, environmental, societal and other factors may antagonize regional tensions, for the foreseeable future it will ultimately be military based threats to state security that present the greatest dangers to Canadian interests.

Given the continued primacy of the state in regional security calculations and the aforementioned dominance of military considerations of state security it

¹³⁰ Evans, *op.cit.*, p. 512.

¹³¹ David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific", unpublished paper, 1993, p. 15.

¹³² Buzan, "Is international security possible?", p. 35.

is now possible to consider a variety of threat scenarios facing Northeast Asia. These threat scenarios can be classified into three general categories: direct military confrontation, interstate tensions and intrastate instability. These threats to sub-regional stability may, in turn, jeopardize Canadian interests as specified in chapter 3, and in the broadest sense Canadian national security (although not necessarily the survival of the Canadian state).¹³³ The economic disruption, environmental degradation, political repercussions and military implications of the Persian Gulf War need only to be considered in order to illustrate the potential effects of a regional conflict upon Canadian interests. It is therefore obvious that sub-regional security threats within the North Pacific have a direct bearing upon the well-being of the Canadian state. In this respect it is prudent to examine in closer detail the range of threats facing Northeast Asia in order to determine how to best address these issues in the future.

4.2 Direct Military Confrontation.

There is, as Evans has noted, a general agreement that the current strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific is the most benign that it has been this century. Nevertheless, a number of factors suggest that the possibility of conflict in the North Pacific is growing. As Aaron Freidberg has observed, "While civil wars and ethnic strife will continue for some time to smolder along Europe's peripheries, in the long run it is Asia that seems far more likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict."¹³⁴ Freidberg outlines a number of conditions which may contribute to the realization of his prediction. Resurgent nationalism, historical animosities, conflicting ideologies and a lack of regimes between states are all identified as cause for concern when considering the future of East Asian security.¹³⁵ Thus while many analysts think that the end of the Cold War in Northeast Asia does promise to usher in a more peaceful regional order it is also true that a real potential for military conflict still exists.

¹³³ David Dewitt and Brian L. Job. "Asia Pacific Studies in Canada", An unpublished paper prepared for the conference on "The Future of Asia Pacific Security Studies and Exchange Activities" Bali, Indonesia. December 12-15 1993, p. 21.

¹³⁴ Aaron Freidberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia", International Security. Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 7.

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 14-19.

The existence of sub-regional tension can generally be attributed to three developments linked to the end of the Cold War. First, with the collapse of Russo/Soviet power in the Pacific and the partial withdrawal of American forces from East Asia there is the possibility that aspiring powers will act to fill the newly created power vacuum and seek regional hegemony. Such a development raises the possibility of competition among local states. In any emergent power struggle the most obvious candidate for dominance is China. Barber B. Conable Jr. and David M. Lampton foresee a dramatic shift in the Northeast Asian balance of power as the PRC attains economic and military superpower status in the coming years.¹³⁶ Moreover, Paul Beaver has observed that "China is moving from a regional power to a regional superpower."¹³⁷ Thus while Chinese Premier Li Peng has repeatedly assured neighboring states that Beijing has no expansionist aspirations, the PRC's role as a future Asian power cannot be in doubt.¹³⁸ As the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to modernize and acquire force projection weapons China will play an increasingly pivotal role in regional and sub-regional security calculations.

Such aspirations for regional hegemony, however legitimate, may eventually lead the PRC into conflict with other powers. A recent Chinese military publication entitled Can the Chinese Army Win Next War? identified the United States as China's most likely adversary in the future. It indicated that China and the US could come into conflict over a number of issues such as the retaking of Taiwan or an overly aggressive American stance in Korea.¹³⁹

In yet another scenario Gerald Segal identifies the potential for a future Sino-Japanese rivalry. As Segal points out, "History would suggest that a decline of the superpowers and the rise of China and Japan is likely to lead to increased rivalry between the Asiatic great powers."¹⁴⁰ Given the outstanding territorial

¹³⁶ Barber B. Conable Jr. and David M. Lampton. "China: The Coming Power", Foreign Affairs. Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 133-149.

¹³⁷ Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous", The New York Times. January 11 1993, p. A1.

¹³⁸ Li Peng, "Chinese Views on a New World Order", Beijing Review. Vol. 35, No. 7, February 17-23 1992, p. 13.

¹³⁹ Patrick E. Tyler, "China's Military Regards US As Main Enemy in the Future", The New York Times. November 16 1993, p. A5.

¹⁴⁰ Gerald Segal, "North-East Asia: Common security or Á la carte?", International Affairs. Vol. 67, No. 4, October 1991, p. 761. See also Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military

disputes between Japan and the PRC over the Senkaku islands and the possibility of future competition over scarce markets and resources there is certainly the potential for friction between these two states.

Any rivalry between Japan and China would, of course, be contingent upon Japanese aspirations to acquire greater political and military influence. Japan already has the world's second largest defense budget and the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) possess some of the most advanced weapons systems available.¹⁴¹ If Japan were to pursue a greater military presence in East Asia (commensurate with Tokyo's economic interests) there is little doubt that Japan could become a regional power comparable to China or the United States. Pertinent to this scenario Japan has already warned that it can no longer guarantee that it will endorse the nuclear non-proliferation treaty when it comes up for renewal in 1995.¹⁴² While Tokyo has, thus far, categorically denied that it plans to acquire nuclear weapons Japan's capacity, and motive, to produce them is widely accepted.

In the post-Cold War era therefore, there appears to be an increasing risk that various Northeast Asian states will compete for enhanced influence or even hegemony in light of the superpower decline. While China and Japan are the most likely aspirants for regional dominance others have noted that in the future a united Korea may also possess the economic and resource base required to seek great power status. Additionally, although currently out of the equation, Russia cannot be discounted as a serious regional actor with the long term capacity to play a major role in security calculations. In any case it is clear that the security dynamics of Northeast Asia in the coming years will possess the potential for large scale military competition as states seek increased influence.

The second post-Cold War development which has affected strategic calculations in Northeast Asia is the declining influence which the United States and Russia currently hold over former client states. Throughout the Cold War it

Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region", International Security. Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993-94, p. 86.

141 "Asia's Arms Race", The Economist. February 20 1993, p. 20.

142 A recent report by the British Ministry of Defense has concluded that Japan currently possesses all of the components needed to produce nuclear weapons, and has the expertise required to assemble such weapons very quickly. As such, it is assumed that Japan could become a nuclear power in a matter of months if the strategic situation so required. Nick Rufford, "Japan to 'go nuclear' in Asian arms race", The Sunday Times. January 30 1994, p. 1.

was common practice for the superpowers to moderate the behavior of client states in order to lessen the chances of a regional war breaking out which could grow into a major conflagration.¹⁴³ Such behavior, for example, led the US to pressure both Taiwan and South Korea to abandon their nascent nuclear programs in the 1970s lest they destabilize the region. However, in the post-Cold War order the United States and Russia (particularly the latter) have largely forsaken their client states and incurred a consequent decrease in influence over them. It has been postulated that the lack of superpower discipline may result in increased conflict in previously stable regions. For example, Du Gong, director of Beijing's Institute of International Affairs, concluded in 1992 that the removal of superpower constraints from client states resulted in a loss of equilibrium leading to "a series of new imbalances, contradictions and conflicts in international relations."¹⁴⁴ In a worst case scenario the lack of superpower discipline could lead to the emergence of rogue states which pursue independent foreign policies with little regard for their influence upon regional or sub-regional stability. In Northeast Asia the most obvious example of this is North Korea.

Of all of the states in Northeast Asia the DPRK, more than any other, has been deprived of its superpower guarantors. As noted in The Economist, "Since the collapse of the Soviet Union...and China's 'betrayal' in establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea last year, North Korea has all but lost its two international sponsors and protectors."¹⁴⁵ As a result of this abandonment Kim Il-sung's regime, feeling vulnerable to domestic and external pressures, has opted to enhance the DPRK's military capability. Of particular significance, North Korea has apparently sought to acquire nuclear weapons in an attempt to offset the erosion of its military position on the Korean peninsula. Another motive would appear to be a desire to obtain economic and security guarantees from the US and neighboring powers.¹⁴⁶ While informed sources in the United States, China and Russia seem to agree that the DPRK does not yet possess nuclear

¹⁴³ For an excellent discussion of this Cold War phenomena see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International Order", in The Cold War and After, ed., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, (Cambridge MA.: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 1-44.

¹⁴⁴ Du Gong, "On the Changing Patterns of International Relations", China Report, Vol. 28, No. 1, January -March 1992, p. 30.

¹⁴⁵ "The hermit kingdom strikes back", The Economist, July 17 1993, p. 19.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

weapons there is a general agreement that such weapons are within North Korea's grasp.¹⁴⁷ Obviously, the potential security ramifications of a nuclear North Korea are widespread and extend well beyond the prospects of a limited nuclear exchange on the Korean peninsula. For example, it has been suggested that if the DPRK were to deploy nuclear weapons, other Asian states such as South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan may feel obligated to acquire similar systems, potentially initiating a nuclear arms race in the North Pacific.¹⁴⁸ International pressures aimed at dissuading or preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons may also prove to be destabilizing. North Korea has typically responded with hostility to international ultimatums regarding its nuclear program and has stated that any efforts to affect the policies of Pyongyang would be seen as an act of war. In response to this admiral Charles Larson, the senior US military officer in the Pacific, recently commented that the possibility of a major war on the Korean peninsula had "increased significantly in the last year."¹⁴⁹ If such a war were to occur, with or without the use of nuclear weapons, it would be very costly. The Americans and South Koreans, while confident of victory, recognize that the damage to South Korea would be extensive and that Seoul could be destroyed before the North Korean army could be beaten back. The US military's official battle plan for Korea, known as USFK 50-27 Major Regional Contingency - West, estimates that a war with North Korea would require up to 4 months of "very high intensity combat" utilizing the full resources of the South Korean military and an American deployment similar in size to that seen in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.¹⁵⁰

Given the on-going tensions concerning the issue of nuclear proliferation and North Korea it is generally agreed that the situation on the Korean peninsula is the greatest single threat to sub-regional security at present. As such, it is clear that the end of the client state system presents a significant challenge to regional

¹⁴⁷ Government of the United States, Hearing before the Committee On Governmental Affairs United States Senate, Proliferation Threats of the 1990s. February 23 1993, p. 99. Information pertaining to Russian and Chinese opinions was obtained during confidential interviews with government sources in Ottawa Ontario, February 15 1994.

¹⁴⁸ "The hermit kingdom strikes back", p. 19.

¹⁴⁹ Terry McCarthy, "US fears war possible over nuclear dispute", The Ottawa Citizen. December 2 1993, p. A8.

¹⁵⁰ Barton Gellman, "North Korea: A Military Strategist's Worst Nightmare", The Washington Post Weekly. December 20-26 1993, p. 14.

security in Eastern Asia. While the DPRK appears to be the only state within the Northeast Asian sub-region seriously affected by this trend there are also a number of states on the theatre's periphery such as Pakistan and Vietnam which have also lost superpower support and many consequently strike out on more self-interested paths regardless of their broader security implications.

In addition to the emergence of a rogue state another threat scenario linked to the declining superpower influence in Northeast Asia is the possibility that tensions which may once have been dampened by superpower guarantors may now be ignored in Washington or Moscow and allowed to run their course.¹⁵¹ As Desmond Ball has argued,

Not only has the salience of regional conflict been enhanced in relative terms by the disappearance of the East-West conflict, but the end of that conflict has 'removed the tempering mechanism' that often serves to help keep regional tensions under control.¹⁵²

While it is very unlikely, given the bilateral security guarantees which exist between the US, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, that Washington would be willing or able to ignore a major conflict in Northeast Asia, as defined, the same may not be true of territories adjacent to the sub-region. For example, an Indo-Pakistani conflict, or an effort by Hanoi to reassert Vietnamese dominance over Indochina may be outside of the American (or Russian) range of control yet may have serious implications for Northeast Asian security calculations. For these reasons it is conceivable that the absence of the client state system in Northeast Asia may ultimately result in increased tensions and direct military conflict. As Freidberg has argued with alarming simplicity, "An Asia in which alignments were more fluid, more complex, and less certain might be more likely to see crises escalate into wars."¹⁵³

The final ramification of decreased East-West tensions which has altered the security environment of Northeast Asia is the resurgence of nationalistic feelings and historical animosities. James Tang has noted that even during the Cold War many Asian states which sought US protection did not necessarily view

151 Freidberg, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

152 Ball, *op.cit.*, p. 87.

153 Freidberg, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

the Soviet Union as the predominant threat, but were more concerned with regional antagonisms.¹⁵⁴ As such, it is conceivable that American and Soviet troop deployments in Northeast Asia, coupled with the superpower tendency to moderate the behavior of client states, resulted in the artificial suppression of historic animosities. With the reduction of American (and Russian) forces in the sub-region states may once again seek to settle long-standing grievances. For example, Table 2 illustrates the wide variety of outstanding territorial and historical disputes which may threaten Northeast Asian stability in the future.

In this respect it is China that represents the greatest source of concern. Despite assurances from senior Chinese leaders that the PRC is willing to establish friendly relations with all countries many fear that Beijing may seek, at some point in the future, to expand China's sphere of influence to include territories which it perceives to be historically Chinese.¹⁵⁵ Given China's invasion of Tibet in 1950, and past clashes with Vietnam over ownership of disputed territories in the South China Sea there is certainly precedent for such concern. A map published in a 1954 Chinese textbook delineating the sphere of influence which China enjoyed prior to the 1840 Opium War included present day Nepal, Myanmar, Thailand, Indochina, Malaysia, Korea, Mongolia and parts of Bangladesh, India and Russia. While there is no indication that China has any aspirations of recovering these lands it has been suggested that a sense of lost territory permeates Chinese thinking concerned with security issues.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, while the parties to the territorial disputes concerning the Spratly and Paracel islands now appear to have agreed on the need for a peaceful solution to the problems as recently as the early 1990s this area was considered to be the likeliest source of conflict in East Asia.

Yet another regional antagonism involving China is the issue of Taiwanese independence or reintegration. While it has generally been accepted that a direct military confrontation between mainland China and Taiwan is unlikely, Beijing

¹⁵⁴ James Tang, Multilateralism in Northeast Asian International Security: An Illusion or a Realistic Hope? (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 26), (North York: York University Press, April 1993), p. 6.

¹⁵⁵ Peng, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁵⁶ Kristof, *op. cit.*, p. A4.

TABLE 2**Potential Sources of Conflict In Northeast Asia**

Type of Dispute	Area of Dispute	Countries Involved.
Territorial	Kurile Islands	Japan, Russia.
	Liancourt Rocks	Japan, RoK.
	Senkaku Islands	Japan, China.
	Paracel Islands	China, Vietnam.
	Spratly Islands	China, Vietnam, RoC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines.
Historical	Korean Peninsula	DPRK, RoK, US.
	Greater China	China, RoC Honk Kong, Macao.
	Chinese Border	China, India. China, Vietnam .

has refused to renounce its right to reintegrate the island by force if necessary.¹⁵⁷ As recently as October 1992 high ranking Chinese politicians warned Taipei that if it attempted a dramatic shift from the *status quo* by declaring independence or acquiring nuclear weapons, relations between the two China's could deteriorate to the point of conflict. For example, Li Ruihan, fourth ranking man in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo, stated that if Taipei were to declare independence "we would suspend our economic reform and take all possible means to stop such an action".¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it should be noted that the April 1993 Taiwan Straits Agreements signed in Singapore represents a milestone in the development of peaceful and cooperative relations between the PRC and the RoC. The agreements signed in 1993 address such issues as economic exchange, cooperation in the energy resources sector, strengthening of cultural, educational, scientific and technological ties and provide for the discussion of a broad range of topics such as maritime disputes and the repatriation of people entering each

¹⁵⁷ "Under the eye of the dragon", *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 24 1994, p. 23.

¹⁵⁸ "PRC's Li Ruihan Warns Against Independence" Taipei, CNA, 07:53 GMT, in English, *FBIS-Chi*, October 30, 1992, p. 47.

others territories.¹⁵⁹ Such negotiations are indicative of the desire on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to foster improved relations between the two Chinas and alleviate tensions.

China, of course, is not the only Northeast Asian state with outstanding territorial and historical grievances. As seen in Table 2 Russia, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are also party to a number of territorial disputes, not to mention the continued division of the Korean peninsula. While issues such as the Northern Territories Dispute or the Japanese-South Korean disagreement over the fate of the Liancourt Rocks may in some way sour relations in the sub-region the likelihood of their being a source of military conflict is limited. In this respect it can be argued that if historical or territorial disputes in Northeast Asia do lead to conflict they will, in some way, likely involve China.

Given the post-Cold War developments discussed above it is clear that while there is a real possibility of a lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia there is also the potential for intensified rivalries and even large-scale military confrontations. As early as 1979 neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz argued that multipolar systems were inherently unstable. While the virtues of bipolarity supported by Waltz are open to interpretation there is widespread, (although by no means unanimous) agreement that this may be the case in Asia.¹⁶⁰ Thus the new security order emerging in Northeast Asia, wherein one superpower and several great powers vie for regional and sub-regional influence, is a potentially dangerous environment. As Friedberg concludes,

Asia will not lack for crises, whether they are handled well or poorly, in the years ahead. To the south, disputes over borders and resources (especially oil and natural gas) could engage the interests of Japan, China and India as well as the members of ASEAN. The relationship between China and Taiwan may yet be resolved through the use of force. To the north, the future shape of Korea and the manner in which it is determined will be matters of intense concern to Japan, China, Russia and perhaps the United States, to say

¹⁵⁹ "Wang-Ku Bilateral Talks Conclude in Singapore" Beijing, Xinhua, 07:22 GMT, in English, FBIS-Chi, April 29, 1993, pp. 44-45.

¹⁶⁰ See, for example, Friedberg, *op. cit.*, p. 9 or Tang, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

nothing of the Korean people themselves.¹⁶¹

4.3 Interstate Instability.

Direct military confrontation is not the only threat to Canadian security interests in Northeast Asia. An unstable international order marked by interstate competition and decreased cooperation may also jeopardize a variety of Canadian interests. As Job and Langdon have observed,

In the last two years, Ottawa has come to the realization that the maintenance of a stable and peaceful security order in the Asia-Pacific is important to Canada, first because the region's economic prosperity and growth is contingent upon the absence of hot or cold wars, and second because key elements of success of several of Canada's major international policy goals, e.g., control of weapons proliferation, protection of human rights, and strengthened UN peacekeeping capacity, depend upon what happens in the post-Cold War environment of the Asia-Pacific.¹⁶²

The most obvious indication of the existence of regional insecurities is the growing arms competition which has emerged throughout Eastern Asia. While some analysts have argued with merit that the ongoing acquisition of advanced weapons systems by several regional actors is not technically an arms race there can be little doubt that the countries of the Asia-Pacific are arming themselves at an unprecedented rate.¹⁶³ Moreover, the very nature of these arms acquisitions underscores the perceived vulnerabilities of many states in the region. Jonathan Pollack has observed that while regional security calculations during the Cold War were "threat driven" they are now "uncertainty based".¹⁶⁴ This sense of uncertainty has potentially been a primary impetus for the regional arms competition. As Ball argues,

In light of the end of the Cold War and the changing regional

¹⁶¹ Freidberg, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁶² Job and Langdon, "Canada and the Pacific", pp. 280-281.

¹⁶³ Ball, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-95.

¹⁶⁴ "Asia's Arms Race", *op.cit.*, p. 20.

security environment, many countries in East Asia have determined to embrace their defense self-reliance to enable them to deal better with regional contingencies on the basis of their own resources.¹⁶⁵

To be sure, a number of other factors may contribute to the East Asian military build-up. These include increased national wealth, a desire for prestige and expanding responsibilities in light of the partial US withdrawal. Nevertheless, Pollack and Ball agree that a general sense of vulnerability and uncertainty has permeated the Northeast Asian security environment leading many states to seek enhanced military capabilities.

The expansion of East Asia's military arsenals has occurred at an alarming rate. In the early 1990s, for example, the Asia-Pacific accounted for over 35% of all global arms imports - more than any other region.¹⁶⁶ Of these imports, 35% went to the countries of Northeast Asia, which already possesses the preponderance of weapons in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁶⁷ In addition to arms purchases, a number of countries including Japan, China and Russia (not to mention the United States) possess significant arms production capabilities. The fact that the majority of East Asian weapons procurements involve advanced weapons systems is an additional point of concern. Not only has there been a quantitative proliferation of weapons in the region but also a qualitative improvement in overall capability. Of even greater significance are the efforts by some Northeast Asian states, as well as states along the region's periphery, to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. Almost all of the states within Northeast Asia possess some form of ballistic missile as well as the technological capability to manufacture chemical, biological and, in many cases, nuclear weapons. If a conflict were to occur in the North Pacific involving such weapons the ramifications would be severe. These developments demonstrate that despite the relatively peaceful environment in Northeast Asia there is still an on-going arms competition which erodes security. As Michael Klare has warned, "Unless fresh arms control efforts are undertaken soon, the Pacific Rim could be

¹⁶⁵ Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁶⁶ Gerald Segal, "Managing the New Arms Races in the Asia/Pacific", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 83.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

the site of periodic military convulsions in the 21st century, as Europe was in the twentieth century."¹⁶⁸

Regional arms competition, of course, is not the only source of interstate tension in Northeast Asia. In fact it is often a symptom of other causes. Tensions may also be aggravated by politically motivated acts of terrorism. While generally not a major issue in Northeast Asian relations there have been some instances of terrorism in the past such as North Korea's attacks upon South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1983, for example, a bomb planted by North Korean agents in Rangoon Burma (now Myanmar) killed 17 representatives of the South Korean government including 4 cabinet ministers. Four years later a North Korean bomb exploded onboard a South Korean airliner killing 115 passengers and crew. However, these attacks, while serious, are neither the cause of instability between Seoul and Pyongyang nor the most common expression of tensions.

Another, perhaps more worrisome, threat of terrorism facing Northeast Asia is, yet again, linked to the DPRK. Kim Il-sung's regime has long been the recipient of economic support from Koreans sympathetic to the North living in Japan. By one account there are over 300 000 supporters of the DPRK in Japan and this faction annually supplies anywhere from \$600 million to \$2 billion to Pyongyang to help finance the North Korean government.¹⁶⁹ Although Japanese and other intelligence agencies are aware of this cash flow, Tokyo has thus far been reluctant to halt these transfers lest doing so spark unrest and possible terrorist acts by members of the "Chosen Soren" (the principal organization sympathetic to North Korea in Japan). In this respect the threat of terrorists acts, although not their actual occurrence, has indirectly contributed to North Korea's military and nuclear build-up, which could ultimately destabilize the sub-region and have dire consequences for Japan itself. Although the prospects of other Northeast Asian states employing terrorism as a political means seems low, it is clear that North Korea is willing to use this technique when considered necessary. Thus it can be said that terrorism does pose a threat to sub-regional stability, although in most cases its effect will be either indirect or symptomatic of larger problems.

¹⁶⁸ Klare, Michael. "The Next Great Arms Race", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 152.

¹⁶⁹ "Cash from Japan flows into North Korea", The Globe and Mail, November 2 1993, p. A2.

It is therefore obvious that there are a number of issues within Northeast Asia which reflect, or contribute to, instability. While those concerns discussed above address only some of the more serious threats to sub-regional stability they do illustrate that such tensions exist and that they can threaten, through escalation into conflict, or of themselves, Canadian interests and aspirations in the North Pacific.

4.4 Intrastate Instability.

The final threat category which could jeopardize security in Northeast Asia concerns the issue of intrastate instability. As Dewitt and Job recently concluded "Threats to security arise not only from interstate interrelations but also from domestic and regional instabilities caused by tensions of an ethnic or nationalistic nature and by sharp disparities in conditions of life."¹⁷⁰ Significant intrastate instability can threaten sub-regional security in two ways. First, there is the possibility of a regime facing a severe internal crisis and lashing out at neighbors in an effort to divert public attention from domestic problems. Gaddis has argued that the decline of a state is a dangerous process which is often accompanied by erratic, desperate behavior.¹⁷¹ It is conceivable that if a state such as North Korea were to face imminent collapse the leadership may opt to strike out at neighboring states. In 1993 then Deputy US Defense Secretary William Perry underlined the danger of such a scenario arising in the DPRK, observing, "This is a government which has clearly failed and in my opinion is going to collapse sometime in the next few years. Our concern is, if it goes out with a cataclysm, we don't want it to be a cataclysm with nuclear weapons."¹⁷²

A second danger arising from intrastate instability or collapse is the possibility that problems which led to the collapse, or those produced by it, could become transnational in nature and destabilize neighboring states. For example, David Shambugh has noted that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent states in Central Asia has had the indirect effect of enhancing Islamic militism in China's western provinces of Qinghai and Gansu

¹⁷⁰ Dewitt and Job, "Asia Pacific Studies in Canada", p. 5.

¹⁷¹ Gaddis, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁷² As quoted in Jeffry R. Smith, "North Korea's Strongman: Canny or 'Crazy'?", The Washington Post Weekly, October 4-10 1993, p. 18.

and in the autonomous regions of Ningxia-Hui and Xinjiang-Uighur.¹⁷³ In another scenario, as envisioned by Sugimoto, intrastate instability could lead to "large-scale population outflows" from China, North Korea or possibly Russia.¹⁷⁴ Such migratory pressures, which were described in chapter 3, can often represent a security threat to an unprepared recipient.

As well, it should be noted that intrastate instability may constitute, in itself, a threat to a number of Canadian interests. Obviously, severe domestic unrest could disrupt local and even regional trade flows to the detriment of economic interests. Internal unrest could also lead to a Tiananmen style crackdown in any number of states which would be inconsistent with Ottawa's aspirations for regional democratization and respect for human rights. Given these possible situations it is arguable that severe internal instability within Northeast Asian states does represent a threat to Canadian security interests.

Having accepted this it is also necessary to illustrate the reality of such a threat in Northeast Asia. Returning to William Perry's remarks concerning North Korea it is apparent that the Pyongyang regime is in trouble. Within the last 5 years there have been repeated reports of food riots and insurrection throughout the DPRK and suggestions that the military has been deployed against the general population on numerous occasions.¹⁷⁵ Elsewhere, it has been reported that in late 1992 10 North Korean Generals were executed for planning to overthrow Kim Il-sung's government.¹⁷⁶ Such developments indicate the erosion of central control and legitimacy and suggests the possibility of state collapse.

North Korea may not be the only Northeast Asian state in danger of collapse. There have also been numerous suggestions that China may face mounting internal pressures in the future.¹⁷⁷ Some analysts have even suggested that due to secessionist movements in Tibet and the Northwest, a growing economic rift between the prosperous coastal regions and the impoverished interior, and a possible succession crisis following Deng Xiaoping's death that the

¹⁷³ David Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy in the post Cold-War Era", Survival, Vol. 34, No. 2, Summer 1992, p. 96.

¹⁷⁴ Sugimoto, op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁷⁵ T.R. Ried, "North Korea Shaken by Riots", The Manchester Guardian Weekly, August 29 1993, p. 17.

¹⁷⁶ "Nuclear Mishap Alleged", The Globe and Mail, August 25 1993, p. A6.

¹⁷⁷ See, for example, China: A Country Report. (Rochester: Political Risk Services, 1993)

PRC may not even remain intact through the coming years.¹⁷⁸ While such predictions are perhaps overly alarmist there can be little doubt that economic growth and post-Cold War changes have presented Beijing with delicate domestic problems. As The Economist has stated,

The memories of warlordism and imperial conquest make China's leaders leery of letting power go from the center. The collapse of Soviet communism and the ethnic, economic and political disorder it threatens on their sensitive northern border has alarmed them further. From Tibet, through Xinjiang to Inner Mongolia, political controls are being tightened on China's own minorities.¹⁷⁹

If Beijing's fears prove to be true and there are increased secessionist pressures from various regions throughout China, a broad range of Canadian interests could be adversely affected. The mounting pressures for change in China suggest that sooner or later some potentially destabilizing developments may occur in the PRC. The same Economist article went on to warn, "One way or another, China's communist dynasty is coming to an end. It can go quietly, if it helps in introduce the changes that must come. Or it can keep fighting them, and put China's stability at risk."¹⁸⁰

Thus while assertions that China might collapse in the immediate future are perhaps pessimistic it is possible that there will be some level of intrastate instability in the coming years which may threaten a variety of sub-regional security interests. If, as Sugimoto suggests, this unrest leads to large scale population movements out of China the stability of neighboring states could be seriously compromised.¹⁸¹

The issue of intrastate instability has therefore been shown to represent a legitimate threat to sub-regional security calculations in Northeast Asia. Not only does such instability jeopardize security interests within the immediately affected

178 George, *op. cit.*, February 14 1994, see also Shambaugh, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

179 "To change China", The Economist, February 1, 1992, p. 14.

180 Ibid., p. 15.

181 See also Won Bae Kim, Population Movements in the North Pacific. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 8), (North York: York University Press, February 1992).

state, such threats are often transnational in nature. While the prospects for severe internal unrest are generally restricted to North Korea, and to a lesser extent China, the former's proximity to South Korea and the latter's immense population mean that such instability could have profound implications throughout Northeast Asia. In addition, it should also be remembered that while not immediately included in the Northeast Asian sub-region, instability in the newly created Central Asian Republics could also have a significant impact upon regional security calculations, particularly those involving China.¹⁸² In this respect future security considerations involving the North Pacific will have to take into account the necessity of addressing issues pertaining to intrastate instability if they are to be fully effective.

4.5 Summary.

Having considered the broad categories of potential security threats facing Northeast Asia it is clear that Canadian security interests within this region are not assured. While it is true that the end of the Cold War has, at least in the short-term, produced the most benign security environment the countries of Northeast Asia have witnessed this century it is also true that a number of historical, nationalistic and domestic forces threaten to erode sub-regional stability. Even now, the threat of a major war on the Korean peninsula, and to a lesser extent, the possibility of a Sino-Taiwanese conflict cannot be entirely discounted. Due to a number of factors, often intertwined, arising from the end of the Cold War the potential for direct military confrontation, international tensions or intrastate instability threaten the entire range of Canadian interests within Northeast Asia and pose a threat to Canada's second tier security concerns.

A final consideration which should also be addressed concerning sub-regional stability in Northeast Asia is the fact that there is a growing epistemic community which would argue that a systemic breakdown of the international order is currently occurring which renders nugatory the role of the state in security calculations.¹⁸³ Such a dramatic paradigm shift, if it occurs, would be

¹⁸² Robert Scalapino, Historical Perceptions and Current Realities Regarding Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 20), (North York: York University Press, October 1992), p. 6.

¹⁸³ An epistemic community is a group of scholars who believe in a particular body of knowledge or school of thought. See for example, Booth, op. cit.

global in scope and would create potentially insurmountable challenges to concepts of national security in the North Pacific and elsewhere.

Given these challenges, it would appear that if nothing is done to deal with existing and potential sources of tension the security of Northeast Asia will be further jeopardized in the future. As Segal has argued,

When the Cold War overlay was lifted, the Europeans at least had a pattern of institutionalized multilateralism which helped to maintain stability while a new regional order was being constructed. This was a major advantage. When shifting power balances unsettle the North-East Asian region, concern rises that the process may yet get out of hand.¹⁸⁴

It is this absence of institutional mechanisms coupled with the dangers associated with a reordering of the sub-regional power balance that illustrates the need for the institution building process in Northeast Asia to continue. The following chapter will examine some of the attempts made, thus far, at establishing a new Northeast Asian security framework as well as some of the characteristics that a successful institution would appear to require. In doing so it will be demonstrated that Canada has not only recognized its security interests and some of the threats to these interests, but also the need to address these issues before the international order deteriorates to the point where regional cooperation becomes unfeasible.

¹⁸⁴ Segal, "North-East Asia: Common security or *À la carte*?", p. 760.

CHAPTER 5.

THE EVOLUTION OF MULTILATERALISM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC.

5.1 The Divergence of Interests and Threats.

Earlier chapters of this thesis have discussed the evolution of Canadian security interests in Northeast Asia. Additionally, an examination of the changing nature of threats to the stability of the North Pacific has been undertaken in order to demonstrate the impact which the end of the Cold War has had upon sub-regional security calculations. This chapter argues that while the existing bilateral security arrangements in the North Pacific remaining from the Cold War are, in many cases, still appropriate means of ensuring sub-regional security there is also an increasing need for multilateral institutions to address a variety of contemporary concerns. Some of the proposed and existing regional and sub-regional institutions designed to address security issues will be examined in order to illustrate the evolution of multilateralism within the Asia-Pacific. The failure, thus far, of these institutions to establish a comprehensive and effective security architecture in the North Pacific will also be considered. Finally, a series of recommendations concerning the essential requirements for a successful security framework for Northeast Asia will be presented. This will ultimately identify not only the need for multilateral augmentation of existing security arrangements but also some of the characteristics which this process is likely to possess.

Based upon the conclusions presented in chapter 3 it should be clear that Canada has a variety of security interests in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, it has also been illustrated that a number of factors related to the end of the Cold War have dramatically altered the security environment within this theatre. Thus while Canada's national interests in the sub-region involve a number of non-traditional security dimensions, the threats facing these interests remain essentially military in nature. The logical extension of this line of reasoning is that a new security architecture, more relevant to the current strategic environment in Northeast Asia, is necessary to ensure sub-regional stability and thereby safeguard Canadian interests in the future. As Stuart Harris, of the Australian National University has noted,

The need for a new policy framework stems from the fact that despite the end of the Cold War, the countries of Northeast Asia,

as in Asia as a whole, do have real or perceived concerns and will face new or enlarged stresses in the face of rapid economic and political change.¹⁸⁵

It should be noted that despite calls for creating a multilateral security instrument in the North Pacific there is almost unanimous agreement that the existing bilateral security arrangements in this sub-region should be maintained. Indeed, a continuation of US led security arrangements in the region are seen by many to be the cornerstone of the future Northeast Asian security framework.¹⁸⁶ As delegates to the March 1993 *Conference For The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific* agreed, "the debate is in fact about complimenting or strengthening - not replacing - bilateral security relations with a multilateral framework. Bilateral ties will continue for the foreseeable future and can serve as critical avenues for consultation."¹⁸⁷ While such a framework may be ill suited to address a number of crises in Northeast Asia the existence of US backed security guarantees continues to provide the sub-region with a measure of order and stability. Nevertheless, there is widespread and growing support for the notion that a multilateral approach to security may be useful in addressing concerns before they reach crisis level.

5.2 A Bilateral Tradition.

Throughout the Cold War the security arrangements of the North Pacific were largely the product of the global superpower confrontation. While the presence of an additional great power (China) in Northeast Asia resulted in a strategic environment different from that found in Europe, it can be said that the international order in the North Pacific was generally characterized by the superpowers being locked in a competition for regional influence. The result of this competition, as Robert Scalapino has argued, was a regional order based

¹⁸⁵ Stuart Harris and James Cotton, eds. The End of the Cold War in Northeast Asia. (Boulder: Longman Cheshire Press, 1991), p. 271.

¹⁸⁶ Walter A. McDougall, "The US and Japan: Partners or Else", The New York Times. August 29 1993, Section 4, p. 15.

¹⁸⁷ Dewitt and Evans, The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report, p. 17.

upon superpower dominated bilateral agreements.¹⁸⁸ In particular, the regional security order was determined by US-Japanese (US-Japan Security Treaty 1952), US - South Korean (US-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty 1954), and US-Taiwanese (Taiwan Relations Act 1979) security arrangements. The Soviet Union, for its part, maintained looser security ties with Mongolia and the DPRK. For both the Americans and the Soviets, bilateral agreements were seen as preferable to more complex arrangements due to the diverse historical, social and political order in Northeast Asia. As the US position clearly states,

We have complemented our presence through the development of a range of bilateral security arrangements. This approach worked well because of the diverse threat perceptions, disparate cultures, histories, political systems and levels of economic development among our friends in the region.¹⁸⁹

In the post-Cold War era it has become increasingly clear that bilateral arrangements are alone incapable of addressing the broader issues of Northeast Asian security. James Tang has observed "As fundamental changes take place in East Asia and the interplay of regional powers becomes more complex, whether or not bilateral arrangements are adequate to maintain regional security has become a question of wide interest."¹⁹⁰ The reasons for this are not difficult to discern. In addition to the changes in the international order discussed in the previous chapter Harris has noted the bipolar arrangements in the North Pacific during the Cold War existed *in spite* of the "multipolarity of interests" which existed in Asia.¹⁹¹ With the end of the Cold War and the diminished threat of global conflict regional actors have once again sought to address interests outside of the superpower competition. Thus the security framework established by the superpowers during the Cold War, and designed to deter each other, is no longer suited to manage regional security concerns. It has therefore been concluded that

¹⁸⁸ Robert Scalapino, et. al. eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 1.

¹⁸⁹ Government of the United States, Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, 1992, p. 4.

¹⁹⁰ Tang, op.cit., pp. 1-2.

¹⁹¹ Harris and Cotton, op.cit., p. 3.

the maintenance of existing or revamped bilateral security arrangements alone is inappropriate for the post-Cold War security environment.

In order to augment the existing security architecture, and overcome the inadequacies of a purely bilateral system, a number of analysts have suggested the development of a multilateral approach to regional security.¹⁹² As Harris has observed,

The familiar policy framework has gone and a new one, recognizing the importance of multipolarity and pluralism in the region, the shifts in regional relationships as well as the importance of historical continuities, and the significance of the growth of nationalism, needs to be developed.¹⁹³

The establishment of a multipolar order in Northeast Asia, despite its apparent utility, does however, face some resistance. Tang has argued that a bilateral tradition, historically rooted in the Imperial Chinese tributary system and reinforced by postwar American practices, bodes ill for the formation of any multilateral structure.¹⁹⁴ Foot concurs with Tang adding that the US led security framework during the Cold War has acted as an impediment to post-Cold War regional cooperation.¹⁹⁵ Following the end of the superpower conflict there has remained a great deal of skepticism regarding the benefits of multilateralism among national leaders on both sides of the Pacific. It was feared that multilateralism would prove incapable of solving the broad range of historical, economic and security concerns in the North Pacific and that a shift to multilateralism would undermine the effectiveness of US led bilateral security guarantees. Early attempts at multilateralism were therefore viewed with some trepidation. As will be shown in greater detail, proposals by the former Soviet Union, Australia, Mongolia, South Korea and Canada in the late 1980s and early 1990s were generally seen as premature, unwieldy or inappropriate by the

192 See, for example, Tang, *op. cit.* or Scalapino et. al. *op. cit.*

193 Harris and Cotton, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

194 Tang, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-8.

195 Rosemary Foot, Fragmentation in Northeast Asia Versus Integration in Western Europe: Some Cold War and Post Cold War Comparisons. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 16), (North York: York University Press, September 1992), p. 8.

majority of regional actors. Henderson has noted, "the initial problem for many governments was the need to sift 'serious' proposals and initiatives from those grounded in Cold War thinking and designed solely for unilateral advantage."¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, evolving security perceptions in the post-Cold War era have led a number of states to question the wisdom of relying solely upon a hub and spoke regional order based upon the US. This has resulted in a gradual, and at times begrudging, acceptance of multilateralism as a viable tool for the creation of a post-Cold War security structure in Northeast Asia.

5.3 The Acceptance of Multilateralism.

Although there is a generally accepted desire held by all Northeast Asian states (except perhaps North Korea) to see a continuation of US led bilateral security arrangements in the North Pacific there is also a role for multilateralism in the region. Asians are increasingly worried about a number of regional issues and the resolution of such issues is often best achieved through multilateral discussion. Dewitt and Evans have identified numerous policy areas wherein multilateral negotiations may facilitate understanding, and hence stability, between states.

1. Conceptual clarification and development of various notions of security.
2. Analysis of regional security environment.
3. Examination of "core" security issues.
4. Establishment of confidence building measures (CBMs).
5. Consideration of regional security cultures.
6. Consideration of the relationship between economic development and security.
7. Study of the linkage between regional and global security.¹⁹⁷

It is increasingly important to establish dialogue between states in order to address these and other transnational concerns in order to enhance security. Furthermore, there is the hope among several countries that the establishment of

¹⁹⁶ Stewart Henderson, "Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in Asia Pacific", Canadian Foreign Policy. Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1992/93, p. 104.

¹⁹⁷ Dewitt and Evans, The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report, pp. 3-4.

multilateral institutions will create a habit of dialogue that will facilitate future talks on more specific security issues. The appeal and utility of such an approach to regional security is perhaps best summarized by Evans' analysis of Canada's East Asian policy. That policy, he argues,

...is based on the idea that a multilateral process, and later framework, are needed to supplant and eventually replace the current security structure. At its heart lies the concept of cooperative security which is based upon two central ideas. One is that today's threats to security go beyond the traditional military ones and are increasingly diverse and multidimensional...The second idea is that the management of these issues is best handled through multilateral channels involving a process of discussion, negotiation and compromise.¹⁹⁸

At a more theoretical level, Bjorn Hette has identified 3 characteristics associated with the emergence of rejuvenated notions of regional multilateralism (which Hette calls regionalism) in the post-Cold War era.

1. Whereas the old regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new thinking is taking shape in a more multipolar world order.
2. Whereas the old regionalism was created from outside and "from above" (i.e. by the superpowers) the new is a more spontaneous process from within and "from below" (in a sense that constituent states themselves are main actors).
3. Whereas the old regionalism was specific with regard to objectives, the new is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process.¹⁹⁹

Such developments can clearly be applied to the North Pacific. In the East Asian context Hette concedes that the "degree of regionness" (regional multilateralism) is low due to a variety of historical factors. Nevertheless he suggests that the end of the Cold War has proffered new opportunities for regional cooperation.²⁰⁰ Indeed, there has been growing support for the idea of

¹⁹⁸ Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

¹⁹⁹ Bjorn Hette and Andras Inotai. *The New Regionalism*. (Helsinki: The United Nations University Press, 1994), pp. 1-2.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

multilateralism in recent years. For example, David Hitchcock has argued, "A consensus exists now in most of East Asia that the changing times call for a new form of cooperative security..."²⁰¹ Of particular significance is the growing support in the US for expanded regional security cooperation. President Clinton has recently declared American acceptance of "regional security dialogues in Asia...as a way to supplement our alliances and forward military presence..."²⁰²

Thus it can be said that the conditions associated with the end of the Cold War have led to a gradual acceptance of multilateralism in Northeast Asia. Despite the existence of divergent interests and historical animosities Dewitt and Evans have argued, "Differences notwithstanding, history and culture need not prove insurmountable obstacles to regional cooperation."²⁰³

5.4 The Importance of Multilateralism to Canada.

The relevance of creating a multilateral framework in Northeast Asia for the pursuit of Canadian regional interests should not be overlooked. Canada was one of the first and strongest supporters of regional arrangements. The reasons for this, given Canada's multilateral tradition, should be obvious. As early as St. Laurent's 1947 Gray Lecture it has been a clear objective of Ottawa to pursue many of its international goals through the vehicle of multilateral cooperation. As a country which is heavily dependent upon trade and which has a variety of overseas interests, Canada's own security relies upon an international order maintained through a commonly accepted system of rules. Being a middle power Canada has often sought to establish or enforce such rules in coalition with other lesser powers in an attempt to effect influence upon greater powers. Tom Keating, in his recent study Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy discusses this trend in Canadian politics and concludes that "multilateralism has been viewed as the most effective strategy for pursuing national policy objectives."²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ David I. Hitchcock Jr., "East Asia's New Security Agenda", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1994, p. 94.

²⁰² As quoted in Ibid., p. 92.

²⁰³ Dewitt and Evans, The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report, p. 7.

²⁰⁴ Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993), p. 13.

In the context of the North Pacific, Canadian efforts to facilitate the establishment of a new security framework should therefore be seen as a logical extension of traditional foreign policy approaches. As Evans has observed, "This commitment to regional multilateralism is less visionary than interest driven. Middle powers like Canada tend to feel more comfortable in multilateral settings."²⁰⁵ Thus, from a Canadian perspective, multilateral diplomacy in the North Pacific offers the means of pursuing a number of different policy objectives and influencing greater regional powers in a familiar diplomatic environment.

The importance of such a policy objective should be clear given Canada's extensive regional interests in the Asia-Pacific. As Keating has warned,

It would seem, however, that in the absence of enhanced multilateral connections and an institution based in the region, the potential for impoverished relations between Canada and the states of the Pacific Rim may very well remain untapped.²⁰⁶

In conjunction with existing bilateral arrangements new multilateral institutions may serve as a forum wherein various sources of instability can be addressed, and international cooperation established, before a state of crisis arises. If conflicts do arise, such institutions may compliment the capacity of bilateral security agreements to resolve them as easily as possible. For these reasons the development of a multilateral framework in Northeast Asia is pivotal to the protection of Canadian interests in the post-Cold War era.

5.5 The Basis for Regional Multilateralism.

Despite the reluctance of Northeast Asian actors to embrace the formation of a multilateral security framework certain trends suggest that such a development may be feasible. For example, the on-going integration of the Pacific Rim appears to be conducive to the establishment of at least some multilateral organizations. The nations of the North Pacific are becoming increasingly dependent upon each other economically, and recent years have witnessed the

²⁰⁵ Evans, *op.cit.*, p. 520.

²⁰⁶ Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 239.

proliferation of transportation, communication and social contacts.²⁰⁷ Such a trend underscores the rationale for an institutional framework, and facilitates its implementation. As Dean Forbes has observed,

Economic growth and closer economic unity within the Pacific Basin has [sic] so far taken place without institutional support of the kind now in existence in Europe, or that which occurred between Atlantic nations...However, a number of governments have seen the need for supportive institutional structure which could aid economic development and the advent of the 'Pacific Century'.²⁰⁸

The need and potential for integration should not be seen as being restricted to economic considerations. As Foot has argued, the end of the Cold War offers numerous opportunities for cooperation in a number of policy areas.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, it should be recalled that while there exists no distinct institution in the North Pacific dedicated to addressing military or security issues there are a number of organizations concerned with other transnational interests. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conferences (PECCs) and even the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process (APEC) all represent efforts to establish multilateral dialogue on social and economic issues in the Pacific Rim. Nevertheless, despite the development of such institutions, it remains clear that the North Pacific currently lacks sufficient institutionalization to address the full spectrum of sub-regional security concerns.

Recent years have, however, witnessed efforts by several regional actors to implement an appropriate security framework for the North Pacific. These efforts indicate a growing recognition of the limits of the existing framework and acceptance of the notion that multilateralism may present at least a partial solution to the problem of sub-regional security.

²⁰⁷ Dean Forbes, "Towards the Pacific Century: Integration and Disintegration in the Pacific Basin", The Far East and Australasia. (London: Europa Publishers 1993), pp. 24-26.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

²⁰⁹ Foot, op.cit., p. 9.

5.6 Proposals and Nascent Institutions.

It is generally agreed that the Soviet Union was the first Pacific power in recent times to identify the need for a new regional security order. In May 1985 Moscow began to call for a reevaluation of security perceptions in Asia and suggested that a more comprehensive approach to regional security be undertaken.²¹⁰ To this end the USSR proposed a number of concrete, Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) type, mechanisms designed to settle regional disputes by negotiation, to establish a variety of confidence building measures (CBMs), and to initiate a process of naval arms control. Such a framework would place a number of Northeast Asian security concerns into "baskets" of related issues where states would discuss and ideally resolve disagreements through the use of binding resolutions. These ideas were refined by General Secretary Gorbachev in the late 1980s and eventually became known as the Vladivostok-Krasnoyarsk Track. Key components of this approach to regional security included a proposed five nation forum (US, USSR, PRC, India and Japan) and a series of trilateral negotiations between the US-USSR-Japan to address various security concerns.

The Soviet proposals were greeted with some skepticism. Moscow's preoccupation with naval arms control was generally seen as an effort to undermine American power in the region and many states such as Japan and South Korea were uncomfortable with this prospect.²¹¹ As well, many states such as the US and China saw the Soviet proposals as moving too swiftly towards the formation of binding institutions which was generally regarded as being undesirable.

Following the 1991 coup attempt in Moscow and the collapse of the USSR Russo/Soviet policy in the Asia-Pacific declined rapidly. Since then the Russian federation, while professing to be a Pacific power, has failed to present a cohesive policy towards this region. It can be assumed that Moscow has remained attentive to developments in this region, and is very anxious to be included in any

²¹⁰ Yuri Bandura, Addressing Asia. (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1987), p. 26. See also Eduard Ryabtsev, For the Security of Asia. (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1988).

²¹¹ Henderson, "Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in Asia Pacific", p. 105.

nascent security framework, but it is generally agreed that Russia will remain a peripheral actor until at least the turn of the century.²¹²

The second series of proposals for the establishment of a regional security framework emerged from South Korea in 1988. Then President Roh Tae Woo proposed the formation of a "Consultative Conference for Peace" primarily concerned with reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. The conference process, which was to have included representatives from both Koreas, China, Japan, the US and the USSR, was broadly designed "to examine diverse ideas concerning the peace, stability, progress and prosperity within the region."²¹³ While there was initially tentative acceptance of the South Korean idea there was sufficient concern among the North Koreans and Chinese that the proposal was an attempt to vilify their governments to scuttle the arrangement.²¹⁴ Furthermore, lesser powers such as Canada expressed disappointment at being excluded from the process. In any event, as Woo's proposals were primarily focused upon the resolution of problems on the Korean peninsula they were seen as lacking sufficient breadth to cover the entire range of sub-regional security issues.

The next country to propose a renewed security framework for Northeast Asia was Mongolia. Anxious to demonstrate its newfound independence from Soviet influence, as well as to ensure its inclusion in any sub-regional institutions, Ulan Bator proposed an 8 nation security forum (Mongolia, USSR, US, PRC, Japan, Canada and both Koreas). This initiative, first proposed by President Batmunkh in 1989, sought to establish a mechanism for dialogue on economic, societal, environmental and humanitarian issues.²¹⁵ Although Mongolia's proposals were quickly dismissed as being a reiteration of earlier Soviet initiatives the ideas forwarded by Mongolia were significant in the sense that they established a precedent for the inclusion of smaller or more peripheral powers in regional security discussions.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²¹³ Stewart Henderson *La Sécurité En Asie-Pacifique Perspectives Et Mesures Canadiennes*. (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs and International Trade), p. 4.

²¹⁴ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Chae-Han Kim. "Prospects for a New Regional Order in Northeast Asia", *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*. Vol. III, No. 2, Winter 1991, p. 73.

²¹⁵ Henderson, "Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in Asia Pacific", p. 108.

Another proposal for the formation of an Asian security framework emerged from Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In July 1990, building upon earlier calls for the initiation of CBMs and arms control measures, Australia's Foreign Minister Gareth Evans called for the formation of a European-style security framework in Asia.²¹⁶ Referred to as the Asia Pacific Security Dialogue (APSD) his suggestion called for the creation of a broad multilateral forum wherein a number of issues could be discussed. However, this process received almost instant criticism from many Asian states, as well as the US, as being an overly institutionalized, Eurocentric approach to Asian problems. Australia's proposals also underscored the dangers of being too inclusive in the formation of a security framework. As will be recalled from chapter 1 Northeast Asia represents a distinct security complex. While some security issues do indeed affect the entire Pacific Basin others are more specific to the region's composite sub-regions.²¹⁷ Thus any proposals for a post-Cold War security framework must take into account both the geographical and the conceptual scope of any desired institution.

Fortunately for Canada, Ottawa was able to witness the reactions of various states to the above described initiatives. In a series of speeches during 1990 then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark proposed a much less specific basis for future regional cooperation. In what was to become known as the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue process Clark envisioned the gradual enhancement of confidence and cooperation between North Pacific states through a series of official and unofficial contacts. Arguing that the Asia-Pacific could essentially be divided into four sub-regions (read security complexes); South Asia, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and the North Pacific, Ottawa stressed the need for a multilateral organization in the latter area. Based upon this belief the NPCSD focused upon security issues concerning Canada, the US, USSR, PRC, Japan and both Koreas.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ "What Australia Needs is a Europe-Style CSCA" International Herald Tribune, July 27 1990, n.p.

²¹⁷ Dewitt and Evans, The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report, p. 2.

²¹⁸ Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, The Canadian Initiative for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, 1990, p. 2.

The strength of the Canadian proposal lay, ironically, in its *laissez-faire* approach to regional security. It did not seek to establish immediately any particular framework or decision-making institution. Instead the NPCSD sought to create a habit of dialogue through which future progress could be made.²¹⁹ The NPCSD would allow for discussion of issues in a number of security areas such as the environment in order to enhance confidence where it was most easily obtained. In this sense the NPCSD, like no other initiative, sought to build regional institutionalism from the ground up.

Yet another appealing aspect of the NPCSD was its two-track approach. Under the official track, governments from the seven states included in the process could engage in direct state-to-state dialogue concerning a variety of sub-regional issues - where there was potential for international agreements. The non-governmental track (NGO) allowed for a broader range of participation amongst institutions, regional experts and government employees acting in an unofficial capacity. Ideally, discussion conducted at the NGO level would allow for an exchange of ideas between regional actors without committing anyone to specific positions or policies. Nevertheless, understanding obtained through discussions at the NGO level could be applied towards official negotiations, providing for a better chance of successful international dialogue.²²⁰

In addition to the various national proposals for a renewed regional security framework there have also been efforts by existing multilateral institutions to address security concerns. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been somewhat concerned with security issues among its member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines) since its inception in 1967.²²¹ However, it cannot be called a problem solving organization and is perhaps best referred to as a "conflict

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²²⁰ Henderson, "Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in Asia Pacific", p. 114.

²²¹ For a more detailed consideration of early security cooperation within ASEAN see Amitav Acharya's A Survey of Military Cooperation Among the ASEAN States: Bilateralism or Alliance? (Toronto: York University Center for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper 14, May 1990).

avoidance" system wherein multilateral efforts are undertaken to constrain the tensions leading to disputes.²²²

In the post-Cold War era there has been growing conviction within ASEAN that it should attempt to exert greater influence upon the broader Asian security environment. Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, Singapore's defense minister, said of Asian's security initiatives,

With the Cold War over, the world is now in a state of flux. Although the Asia/Pacific is the fastest growing region in the world, security is something we cannot take for granted, particularly as this region has a long history of turmoil and turbulence.²²³

Such an awareness has prompted ASEAN to apply itself to a broad range of regional security issues. Starting in 1991, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) - held since 1978 and which had hitherto been concerned with economic, social and political issues - began to address security issues. Furthermore, attendance at the ASEAN PMCs was expanded to include the Soviet Union and China, as well as ASEAN's partners in dialogue (Canada, The US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand And the European Union).²²⁴ This development signified a newfound willingness on the part of ASEAN to promote Asian security. By February of 1992 the government leaders at the annual ASEAN summit, held in Singapore, furthered this process by formally placing security related issues on the agenda of the ASEAN annual Foreign Ministers' Meetings (AMM).

Perhaps the most significant development vis-à-vis security which has occurred through ASEAN has been the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In July 1993 ASEAN Foreign Ministers, meeting in Singapore, established the groundwork for annual ARF conferences. The first meeting of the ARF is scheduled to take place in Bangkok in July 1994. The ARF represents the

²²² Simon Sheldon, The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation. (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1988), p. 66.

²²³ Ning Hong Yeo, Interview with Jane's Defense Weekly. February 19 1994, p. 52.

²²⁴ ASEAN's partners in dialogue include the major trading partners of the organization. Through ASEAN's partners in dialogue process these states are consulted with when ASEAN formulates economic, social and now defense policies.

most inclusive regional forum for the discussion of security issues developed thus far and presents an opportunity for ASEAN states, along with their partners in dialogue, Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea to address a wide variety of transnational issues. However, the ARF is neither a concrete decision making body nor a collective defense arrangement. Dr. Yeo has stated, "The ARF is not a multilateral security mechanism but a forum where Asia/Pacific countries can talk with one another so as to better understand each other's security concerns."²²⁵ Nevertheless, there has been favorable response to the ARF. The United States, which has traditionally been reluctant to embrace any form of multilateralism in the region lest it undermine America's bilateral security arrangements, has begun to see such forums as being useful for discussing various transnational security issues.²²⁶ In addition, Canada, which has generally been supportive of multilateral ventures for Asia in the post-Cold War era, has reacted favorably to the ARF process. Asian states are also quite supportive of the ARF as it allows the security agenda to be set by ASEAN's six member states rather than great powers. It is believed by many Asian leaders that regional security interests will not be sidelined by larger geopolitical concerns. The ARF also allows for a more inclusive approach to regional security, which is in line with ASEAN's concerns about the growing economic interdependence of the entire Pacific-Rim.²²⁷ Finally, the ARF presents an opportunity to establish effective multilateral diplomacy in an already tested organization.

The exact form which the ARF will eventually take is still uncertain. It is anticipated that the first meeting will be "exploratory in nature" and will serve to establish the mechanisms for future dialogue.²²⁸ Canada, for its part, has certain aspirations for the ARF process. Writing on the future of arms control and security in the Asia-Pacific Gary Smith, the Director General of the Asia-Pacific Branch at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has listed several areas of concern which Canada would like to see addressed through the ARF. Of particular importance are the "two broad sets of thematic issues"

²²⁵ Yeo, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

²²⁶ David E. Sanger, "Asian Countries, in Shift, Weigh Defense Forum", The New York Times, May 23 1993, p. A16.

²²⁷ Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific", p. 11.

²²⁸ Yeo, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

encompassing preventative diplomacy and non-proliferation.²²⁹ Smith suggests that long-term Canadian goals for the ARF process will be to facilitate discussion pertaining to the development of a set of basic principles for relations within the region, the establishment of conflict prevention and management instruments and continued support for arms control measures. Whether these objectives are immediately realized or not, it is clear that once the dialogue process is fully established the ARF will serve as a medium for "prophylactic" diplomacy wherein tensions can be dealt with through dialogue rather than conflict.²³⁰ It is, however, not expected that the ARF will evolve into a structured decision-making body. Robert Scalapino has described the ARF process as being "soft" in the sense that it is an organization best (and perhaps only) suited for dialogue.²³¹

Notwithstanding these limitations, the potential importance of the ARF as an instrument of regional cooperation should not be ignored. Although it is not expected to become an Asian version of NATO it does present an opportunity for most of the major Asia-Pacific actors to discuss regional security concerns. Dr. Yeo has observed, "that we have managed to bring together such a diverse grouping to discuss security matters is by itself a significant achievement."²³²

The developments concerning ASEAN, therefore, are significant not because they will result in the establishment of decision-making institutions (they likely will not) but in the dialogue process which they facilitate. In essence, the ASEAN PMC/ARF process represents an extension (although not intentional) of the official track of the NPCSD process whereby a number of common security interests can be discussed in a formalized environment. Indeed, government officials in Ottawa have spoken with some satisfaction of the fact the ASEAN has "borrowed" and "emulated" a number of Canadian initiatives.²³³ As such, the ASEAN PMC/ARF process does allow for the discussion of a number of regional security concerns, but not necessarily the resolution of them.

229 Gary Smith, "Arms Control and Security Building in Asia Pacific" CANCAPS Bulletin, No. 2, May 1994, p. 8.

230 "A sort of safety", The Economist, July 31 1993, p. 32.

231 Robert A. Scalapino, "A Framework for Regional Security Cooperation in Asia", The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. V, No. 2, Winter 1993, p. 23.

232 Yeo, op. cit., p. 52.

233 Based upon personal interviews, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, February 16 1994.

Finally, some note should be made of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. Under the Clinton administration the US has claimed that APEC represents the cornerstone of America's Asian policy. Speaking at the APEC summit in Seattle last November President Clinton spoke of America's role in Asia. "We are helping the Asia Pacific to become a genuine community, not a formal legal structure but rather a community of shared interests, shared goals and shared commitments to mutually beneficial cooperation."²³⁴ Despite Washington's predilection for the APEC process there is little indication that it will ever be anything more than a loose forum for economic negotiations. While Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States are hoping that APEC will lead to a political structure linking their economies to the growth of East Asia, several Asian states are not ready for such a political commitment.²³⁵

It would appear that policy-makers in the US are beginning to realize the limits of APEC. Despite the grandiose proclamations of Clinton in Seattle Henderson has observed, "It would appear that Washington no longer considers the newly-institutionalized Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as a possible alternative vehicle to the ASEAN PMC for multilateral discussions of a broadened security agenda."²³⁶ Despite the recent media attention focused upon APEC, and the camaraderie expressed at the Seattle summit, APEC is an inappropriate forum for security issues. APEC was established as, and will likely remain, a body for intergovernmental dialogue on economic, not security, issues and any efforts to go beyond this capacity in any official sense can be expected to fail.²³⁷

Whatever the future utility of APEC as a security institution it can be said that there has been, in recent years, a trend towards the development of multilateral security approaches in the Asia-Pacific. Some of these proposals, such as those put forward by Mongolia or Canada were directed specifically

²³⁴ Clay Chandler and Daniel Williams. "Clinton's Pacific Rim Vision: Hit or Myth", The Washington Post Weekly, December 5 1993, p. 15.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

²³⁶ Henderson, "Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in Asia Pacific", p. 118.

²³⁷ Chung-Min Lee, "What Security Regime in North-East Asia?", in Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era, Part II, Adelphi Paper 276, April 1993, p. 7.

towards the North Pacific sub-region while others address the broader Asia-Pacific. More recently, there has been a tendency to focus upon the latter type of organization, capable of addressing issues affecting the entire Pacific-Rim. Nevertheless, despite the success of the NPCSD and the ASEAN PMC/ARF process there remains no effective multilateral body in the North Pacific capable of discussing security related issues or making decisions on such topics.

The remainder of this chapter will consider the continuing absence of such a body and suggest that its evolution should be a long term goal of Asia-Pacific powers. As Scalapino puts it, "The momentum towards Pacific-Asia security cooperation must not be slowed."²³⁸ Additionally, a number of suggestions concerning the essential characteristics of such an organization will also be identified as a guide for future policy-makers and researchers.

5.7 Future Security Cooperation in the North Pacific.

In light of the continued absence of an effective multilateral security organization in the North Pacific, continuing efforts must be undertaken to facilitate its eventual development. If such an organization were to develop it should possess certain characteristics if earlier mistakes are to be avoided. The first consideration in any future security cooperation is the need to focus attention upon the various sub-regional security complexes which exist in Asia. While it is true that certain security issues are regional in scope Asia-wide approaches to dialogue are not always optimal.²³⁹ Hitchcock, for example, warns that with a wide diversity of threats and interests spanning the Asia-Pacific the ASEAN PMC/ARF process may be incapable of handling all concerns effectively.²⁴⁰ Elsewhere, South Koreans, while expressing support for Asia-wide dialogue, warn that the most significant threats to stability exist in Northeast, not Southeast, Asia. As Hee-Suk Shin, director of Korea's Foreign Ministry Institute of Foreign Affairs and Security has said "the ASEAN PMC formula, although worthy of pursuit and support...will have a limited relevance to Northeast Asia."²⁴¹ Moreover, Tang has identified the difficulty of transposing multilateral

²³⁸ Scalapino, "A Framework for Regional Security Cooperation in Asia", p. 25.

²³⁹ Hitchcock, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

²⁴¹ As quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 103.

institutions from Southeast to Northeast Asia and has suggested that the success of such an endeavor is unlikely.²⁴² Thus there is considerable concern within the North Pacific community that reliance upon broader regional frameworks may ultimately overlook more pressing concerns within the sub-region. This apprehension would appear to be well founded given the diversity of security environments between Southeast Asia and the North Pacific. While Canada would be wise to seek inclusion in any Asia-wide security organization it should not lose sight of the fact that its principal interests are in Northeast Asia and that the security of that theatre may be separate from the broader Asian context. Continued efforts should therefore be made to facilitate the development of a North Pacific security structure. Scalapino has suggested that future cooperation on a variety of issues facing the North Pacific would perhaps best be accomplished through the development of a "regime" comprised of "the US, Japan, Russia, the PRC, the RoK, the DPRK, Mongolia and Taiwan" (and, presumably Canada).²⁴³ Ultimately, Hitchcock suggests that a Northeast Asian forum such as this could become an official, sub-regional body which could then cooperate with ASEAN based organizations to address Pacific-wide regional concerns.²⁴⁴ In any case it should be clear that there remain a number of security issues which cannot be dealt with at the regional level and as such the pursuit of a sub-regional security framework should remain a priority.

Having stressed the importance of focusing upon sub-regional institutions the importance of inclusiveness within these grouping must also be emphasized. Canada should endeavor to ensure that future security arrangements in the North Pacific include all of the states within the security complex. The framework would therefore include; Canada, the US, Russia, Japan, the PRC, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan. While the inclusion of the first seven states in the formation of a security framework is widely accepted as a "given" the involvement of the latter two is less readily accepted.

The inclusion of Mongolia in any future organization should not, however, be difficult to orchestrate. While its geographical location does not lead to immediate association with North Pacific security it is clearly part of the

²⁴² Tang, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁴³ Scalapino, "A Framework for Regional Security Cooperation in Asia", p. 32.

²⁴⁴ Hitchcock, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

Northeast Asian security complex. While it is true that Mongolia does not represent, in itself, a threat to regional stability its security is, nevertheless, tied to that of its neighbors.²⁴⁵ As Henderson has pointed out, Mongolia's relative strategic insignificance, and its current isolation from the international system is no reason to exclude it from the local security process. In any case, Henderson rightly observes that in the future Ulan Bator may serve as a "bridge" between the North Pacific and the newly independent states of Central Asia.²⁴⁶ Given the potential for conflict between the Central Asian republics and Russia or the PRC such a contact may be quite important to regional security in the future. Accordingly, Mongolia's participation in any security organization could prove quite useful.

In any event, Mongolia's omission from earlier initiatives was often merely the result of being overlooked. As efforts are undertaken to formulate a comprehensive security framework such errors are unlikely. There is now general acceptance for the idea of Mongolian participation as suggested by Scalapino's above described regime and the conclusion of the 1993 *Conference On The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific* which argued for the inclusion of Mongolia in future negotiation.²⁴⁷

The inclusion of Taiwan in any future security framework is a much more contentious issue given Taipei's relations with the PRC. While most non-Chinese analysts feel that Taiwanese participation in security negotiations is desirable Beijing has steadfastly refused to accept any representation of the Republic of China (RoC) in multilateral talks. Nevertheless, there can be little debate about Taiwan's significance in regional security considerations. As President Lee Teng-hui stated in 1992,

The ROC's geopolitical and strategic position makes it an important part of the Asia/Pacific region. Such major issues as the security of the Taiwan Straits and sovereignty over the South China Sea directly involve the ROC. The exclusion of the ROC from the Asia/Pacific security mechanism would

²⁴⁵ Henderson, "Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in Asia Pacific", p. 108.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

²⁴⁷ Dewitt and Evans, *The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report*, p. 2.

damage the functional integrity of the system and would be a great loss for the region..."²⁴⁸

While the PRC is likely to balk at any official Taiwanese representation in multilateral institutions, efforts must be undertaken to somehow include Taipei in the process. Perhaps this could be achieved through simply granting Taiwanese delegates observer status during government-to-government meetings (much like the early representation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in international negotiations). Another option may be to base future negotiations on the concept of economic units or military forces rather than sovereign states. This would allow both China's to attend negotiations without recognizing each other's sovereignty.

It is, however, clear that Taiwan, possessing a 400 000 strong military and representing one of the most significant sub-regional security dilemmas must somehow be included in any forthcoming security framework. The membership of any future security organization in the North Pacific must not be limited to those nations which conveniently fit into the framework. The process, in order to be effective, must include every state linked to the Northeast Asian security complex, regardless of how palatable that may or may not be to composite states.

Another trait which Canada must endeavor to include in any security arrangement is the continuation of the two-track approach to regional dialogue. Support for regional multilateralism is still tentative among many Asian states and a two-track approach will allow for the presentation and clarification of a number of issues at the unofficial level. An official level of discussion must also be maintained so as to implement any agreements which are deemed feasible during NGO negotiations.

Support for a two-track process is already extensive. Such an approach was, in fact, seen as one the strongest features of the NPCSD.²⁴⁹ Other nations have also developed second track approaches to regional security. For example, the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California has dedicated a considerable amount of research towards security in the North Pacific

²⁴⁸ Fredrick Chien, Interview with *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 22 1994, p. 32.

²⁴⁹ Segal, "North-East Asia: Common security or Á la carte?", p. 764.

as has the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).²⁵⁰ The benefits of such undertakings are obvious. As Scalapino has observed, "the thrust (of track-two discussions) is to solicit new ideas and policies relating to security as well as other matters, with the format being constructed so that Asia-Pacific governments are represented but without the need for them to take official positions or proceed to formal negotiations."²⁵¹ The range of potential discussions for the second-track process is virtually unlimited. For example, Dewitt and Evans note that forums may allow for the consideration of delicate issues such as domestic policies or historical animosities as well as conceptual expansion of existing notions and the proposition of new areas of study.²⁵² It is therefore through the use of track-two negotiations that the sources of intrastate instability discussed in chapter 4 may be addressed in the future.

Certain improvements to the track-two process could, however, be undertaken. Of particular utility would be an expansion of participation within the NGO process. For example, there already exists strong support for the inclusion of military officials in negotiations. As Dewitt and Evans point out, in many Asian states the military has the dominant voice in the consideration of security matters and without their support there can be little progress towards the formation of international organizations. They note that the consensus at the *Conference On The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific* supported the inclusion of a number of different participants at future negotiations.

Beyond the military, participants saw value in including representatives of a variety of other groups in track-two discussions, in part to avoid the trap of preaching to the converted. Politicians, business people, journalists, economists, scientists, UN staff, NGOs (not only in the security, but also in the human rights, development and environmental fields), women, younger scholars - all were suggested as examples of

²⁵⁰ In total, there are over 20 track-two forums for regional dialogue already in existence including; The Asia-Pacific Roundtable, The Pacific Symposium, The Asian Peace Research Association, The Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Pacific Armies management Seminar. Additionally, there are several conference series conducted by various universities such as York University, The Australian National University or Stanford University.

²⁵¹ Scalapino, "A Framework for Regional Security Cooperation in Asia", p. 25.

²⁵² Dewitt and Evans, *The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report*, pp. 25-26.

groups with potentially useful perspectives.²⁵³

As well, efforts should be undertaken to facilitate and encourage cultural exchanges between such groups. Experience gained through such exchanges may enhance transparency and understanding between nations and ultimately assist in the reduction of sub-regional tensions. It must be ensured that persons who participate in cultural exchanges be included in subsequent track-two negotiations so that understanding gained through such contact is not lost. Candidates should therefore be selected on the basis of their suitability for a continuing commitment to the enhancement of understanding between the nations of the North Pacific. Ideally, representatives from national militaries, foreign ministries, universities and journalists should be considered for such exchanges. The duration of exchanges should be long enough to completely familiarize participants with the attitudes and procedures of their host nations.

Despite the utility of track-two negotiations some caution must also be exercised in this arena. There is increasing concern that the number of conferences and seminars addressing regional issues is beginning to wear on the academic and governmental expertise available.²⁵⁴ As the number of conferences grows, the ability of experts to attend all of them falls and the result is a potentially diluted process. Efforts should therefore be undertaken to consolidate the track-two process within the North Pacific. The formation of the CSCAP represents one such attempt to better manage the "academic resources" available for the study of Northeast Asian security issues although consensus regarding its long-term effectiveness is not present.²⁵⁵ Future effort should therefore be directed towards the coordination of appropriate research and every effort must be taken to ensure that duplication of study is avoided. The danger of weakening the two-track process should not however discourage future efforts to maintain NGO dialogue. As long as attempts are directed towards managing the process it will remain an important and viable component of regional security dialogue.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

The fourth characteristic desirable in any future security organization is a predisposition towards a gradual approach. Tang has suggested,

Perhaps in the search for a multilateral framework to resolving [sic] regional security problems in Northeast Asia, we do not need to be in a great hurry to formulate rigid structures at the present stage. The most important thing is that there must be a recognition that common security can be achieved by multilateral political cooperation and the process of multilateralism should be further developed. The empty spaces can be filled in later.²⁵⁶

Scalapino agrees with Tang and suggests that the principal objective of any process should be to ensure that dialogue, and if possible, institutions should be established to address specific issues. Scalapino then postulates, "Over time, it may be possible to consolidate certain institutions, joining them in the future"²⁵⁷ Despite the potential for conflict discussed in chapter 4, it is better to move slowly and surely in the creation of a security framework which is inclusive and effective rather than rush the process and repeat the mistakes of earlier initiatives. Thus, efforts to achieve issue-specific agreements are, for the time being, preferable to a more comprehensive framework. Returning to Scalapino, he warns, "In a transitional and uncertain era, we should not assume that we can present *final* programs or construct *permanent* institutions."²⁵⁸

Thus the formation of issue-specific frameworks such as the recently negotiated treaty between six nations to restrict fishing in the Bering Sea can be seen as a productive step towards the ultimate formation of a sub-regional security order.²⁵⁹ Other security related areas which could also be addressed through issue-specific institutions or agreements include the environment, population management, transparency of military matters or the development of atomic energy.

Future efforts to create a security framework must therefore be content with gradual progress in the short to medium terms. As President Clinton stated

256 Tang, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

257 Scalapino, "A Framework for Regional Security Cooperation in Asia", p. 6.

258 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

259 "6 Nations May Restrict Fishing in Bering Sea", *The New York Times*, February 14 1994, p. A4.

during his 1993 visit to South Korea "the challenge for the Asia-Pacific in this decade...is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet threats and opportunities" such that issue-specific arrangements may act "like overlapping plates of armor [sic] individually providing protection and together covering the full body of our common security concerns"²⁶⁰ Only after the creation of the composite plates can the formal institutionalization of the entire suit of armor occur in the North Pacific.

The final desirable trait in a new security framework is a North American acceptance of increased Asian influence in regional matters. Canada and the US must remain sensitive to the aspirations of regional actors such as China to possess influence commensurate with their economic, political and military power. Given the emerging importance of China as a regional superpower, observations such as those made by Segal suggesting "If the only order China will tolerate is the old one of Sino-centrism, then North-east Asia, and indeed East Asia beyond, may be at considerable risk" can be seen as counterproductive.²⁶¹ To be sure, the only order which Washington would accept in the Americas would be one dominated by the US and to deny China (or Japan or Russia) that influence in their neighborhood would be both hypocritical and potentially dangerous. As former President Richard Nixon argued shortly before his death, "In the future, particularly on foreign policy issues, we should treat China with the respect a great power deserves and not as a pariah nation."²⁶²

While Western analysts tend to agree that China is not an expansionist power the booming Chinese economy and the modernization of the PLA means that in the future Beijing will wield significant influence. Such influence, which will only continue to grow, should receive just consideration by policy-makers in Ottawa and Washington in the future. Returning to Nixon, he cautions, "We should not underestimate China's ability to disrupt our interests around the world if our relationship becomes belligerent rather than cooperative."²⁶³ What Canada and the US must decide is whether or not to abandon Eurocentric views of the international order and accept the PRC (or Japan) as a "legitimate" regional

²⁶⁰ As quoted in Hitchcock, *op.cit.*, p. 104.

²⁶¹ Segal, "North-East Asia: Common security or Á la carte?", p. 767.

²⁶² Richard M. Nixon. *Beyond Peace*. excerpt presented in *Time*. May 2 1994, p. 26.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

power just as the US or Germany is accepted. As The Economist has rightly pointed out, "Even if...China goes democratic, it will still want to be the chief power in Asia, and one without whose consent America and Russia and Europe can do nothing important in that half of the world."²⁶⁴

The future success of a regional organization therefore partially depends upon the ability of North Americans to accept this development and avoid potentially antagonistic attempts to thwart it. This, of course, does not mean that Ottawa and Washington must completely acquiesce to the whims of Beijing. It does, however, suggest that China's security perceptions, domestic policies and military modernization should be viewed as in the context of China's legitimate aspirations to act as a prominent regional actor. It should also be noted that a similar argument, although perhaps with less merit, could be made concerning Japan's future role as an Asian superpower.

That a more understanding Western outlook concerning this issue is developing is suggested by several recent statements. In Canada, Foreign Affairs minister André Ouellet has stated "while some Westerners might hope that democratic reform would proceed at a faster pace, this is an area for the Chinese to decide for themselves."²⁶⁵ During an address to students at the University of Moncton Prime Minister Chrétien noted that it would be presumptuous of Canada to think that it could influence the Chinese government regarding domestic issues.²⁶⁶ Similarly, a senior official in Washington, speaking of Sino-American disputes over human rights and trade observed that "we know it's an important relationship, we can't afford to have bad relations...[and] these frictions can be overcome."²⁶⁷ Future North American policies towards Northeast Asian powers (particularly China) must therefore continue to empathize with differing perceptions of domestic and international affairs. To do otherwise risks the development of antagonistic relations across the Pacific which will ultimately

²⁶⁴ "Back to the future", The Economist, January 8 1994, p. 22.

²⁶⁵ Jeff Sallot, "Liberals seek trade ties with China", The Globe and Mail, November 29 1993, p. A4.

²⁶⁶ Edward Greenspoon, "Canada can't sway China on rights, PM says", The Globe and Mail, March 19 1994, p. A4.

²⁶⁷ Daniel Williams and Jeffry R. Smith "The White House's China-Friendly Overtures", The Washington Post Weekly, November 14 1993, p. 14.

erode the effectiveness of multilateral institutions and the security of the North Pacific.

5.8 Summary.

A number of factors concerning the need for and future shape of the North Pacific security architecture should now be clear. First, while there is widespread support for a continuation of US led bilateral security and forward deployment in the North Pacific there is also a consensus that, by itself, such a framework is insufficient to meet the security concerns of the post-Cold War era. Second, in order to compensate for this deficiency there is growing support for the establishment of a multilateral security process to augment the existing structure. Third, a number of attempts to initiate this process have already been undertaken, and while these efforts have not been entirely successful, it is reasonable to expect that the long-term evolution of an effective framework is possible. Finally, if such a process were to proceed, experience suggests that a number of conditions must first be met if the framework is to succeed.

1. The pursuit of a security framework in the North Pacific should occur independent of attempts to create an Asia-wide security forum. Issues specific to the Northeast Asian security complex are best dealt with in a sub-regional organization.
2. Any framework established in the Northeast Asian sub-region must be entirely inclusive of regional actors. As such membership must be extended to Canada, the US, Russia, Japan, the PRC, both Koreas, Mongolia and Taiwan.
3. A two-track approach to negotiations should be utilized, with informal negotiations testing the feasibility of initiatives before discussion at the official level.
4. The development of the security architecture must proceed at a pace acceptable to all parties. Issue-specific arrangements should be established whenever possible with the long-term goal of creating a comprehensive organization to oversee stability throughout the sub-region.
5. North America must recognize the fact that Asian actors, primarily China, Russia and Japan, may have "legitimate" aspirations for regional influence and that efforts to prevent these objectives will create antagonism across the Pacific.

If these criteria are met it is feasible to expect that some form of sub-regional security structure will emerge in Northeast Asia. Tang has argued that there is little consensus regarding what exactly the future structure would look like. It is, nevertheless, safe to assume that future institutions will incorporate the above described characteristics. In the short to medium terms it can be expected that a number of issue-specific organizations will emerge which address security concerns piecemeal while in the long-term it is conceivable that some blanket institution could emerge. The development of a North Pacific version of NATO (such as South Korea has occasionally suggested) or any type of collective defense organization, remains highly unlikely. Nevertheless, the gradual evolution of a CSCE type framework, while currently disfavored by most Northeast Asian states, does appear to be a possibility.

CHAPTER 6. SUMMATION AND OBSERVATIONS.

6.1 Summation.

This thesis has studied the evolving nature of Canadian involvement in Asian security issues since the end of the Second World War. It has been shown that throughout the Cold War Canadian security perceptions and involvement in Asia were motivated primarily by military concerns. This military based emphasis on security was a direct result of the US-USSR competition and was characterized by a preoccupation with first tier security threats. Indeed as early as 1950 there was some apprehension expressed in parliament that Canadian cities were vulnerable to attack by Soviet bombers indicating that during the Cold War the physical survival of the state was a security concern.²⁶⁸ While Canada was well aware of the fact that its second tier security interests, related to its prosperity as a state, were also dependent upon a stable international order such considerations were typically peripheral to military interests.

Thus throughout the Cold War Canada's security perceptions were based upon a desire to ensure its territorial and institutional integrity. As such, any conflict involving either superpower, wherein the possibility existed of intervention by the other, was viewed by Canada as a potential threat to national survival. A great deal of effort was therefore directed towards limiting conflict in the international order. This objective was complimented by a desire to safeguard the well-being of the state through the protection of its overseas interests. Due to a self-recognized inability to influence the strategic environment in North America, Europe and Asia simultaneously Canada opted to focus its attention upon the defense of the first two regions, leaving the defense of the latter to the United States and the former colonial powers. This was primarily the result of the historical, political, cultural and economic ties which existed with Europe at the start of the Cold War and the fact that Europe was the central theatre of the superpower confrontation. The fact that Canada's first and second tier security interests were perceived to lie in Europe rather than Asia meant that throughout the Cold War era Asian security was seen as being secondary in importance to North American or European security.

²⁶⁸ Government of Canada. House of Commons Debates. Vol. II 1950, June 26, p. 4127.

The fact that Canada did become involved in Asian security issues during the Cold War was not a product of direct national security interests in the region but was rather motivated by a desire to prevent a superpower conflict that could inadvertently involve Europe or result in a military attack upon Canada. Canada therefore intervened in Asian conflicts in an effort to resolve them or to moderate the behavior of the United States lest it become entangled in a major war with the Soviet Union or China in a region considered to be peripheral to Canadian interests.

While the Canadian decision to view Europe as more important than Asia to its national security interests was appropriate in the early years of the Cold War it has become less so in recent years. By the 1970s and 1980s Asia had become increasingly important to Canada in terms of trade, cultural influences and political interests. In this respect by the mid-1980s Asia began to rival Europe as the locus of security interests. However, in the established Cold War order Canada was neither capable of, nor willing, to shift its focus away from Europe and as such a rift developed between Canadian interests and involvement in Asian security.

In the post-Cold War era the absence of a direct military threat to Canada and the restructuring of the international order means that Ottawa now needs to readdress its security interests in Northeast Asia. With the partial American withdrawal from Asia Canadian interests are no longer fully safeguarded by existing security frameworks. Furthermore, interests pertaining to the well-being of the Canadian state and its inhabitants are now becoming increasingly important to national security calculations. As has been demonstrated Canada now has a broad range of economic, societal, political, environmental and military interests in the Asia-Pacific (which arguably exceed national interests in Europe) and hence a vested security interest in the stability of that region. The importance of the Asia-Pacific to Canadian national security can be expected to grow in the future. As Job and Langdon have recently concluded, "If the Asia-Pacific remains politically stable and comparatively peaceful...East Asia could well become the sort of center of the world's attention - economically, politically and militarily - that Europe used to be."²⁶⁹

²⁶⁹ Job and Langdon, "Canada and the Pacific", p. 294.

Throughout this thesis the nations of Northeast Asia have been the focus of particular attention. This is due to the fact that the North Pacific is the only sub-region in the Asia-Pacific which currently lacks a multilateral forum capable of addressing post-Cold War security concerns. Furthermore, the countries of this area are the focal point of Canada's security interests in Asia. This is, from a national security perspective, the most important Asian sub-region as well as being the one least capable of managing security crises.

Having established the motive for Canadian involvement in Northeast Asian security the study identified some of the challenges to regional and sub-regional stability which could undermine Canadian interests. It was shown that the security environment in the North Pacific is potentially volatile and that conflict or serious instability in Northeast Asia is a distinct possibility. Given the various threat scenarios facing the countries of Northeast Asia (and hence the interests of Canada) and the inadequacies of the existing regional order to cope with these threats it is prudent to pursue the establishment of a new regional order.

This thesis has suggested that this shortfall in sub-regional security could be best offset through the establishment of a multilateral framework to compliment the current security architecture.²⁷⁰ In recent years significant progress has been made towards achieving a restructuring of the East Asian security architecture. While multilateral proposals set forth by individual states have generally met with little acceptance, institutional attempts to rework the regional security order have enjoyed some success. With the implementation of the ASEAN Regional Forum later this summer the nations of East Asia will finally have a formalized institutional framework in which to address a variety of security matters. While this organization will not immediately be a "hard" institution, capable of making and enforcing decisions, this cannot be ruled out in the future. Dr. Ning Hong Yeo recently postulated,

As for the ARF, it is still very early days yet. For a start, the ARF will need time for greater dialogue and interaction. As better understanding develops, it is possible that it may evolve

²⁷⁰ Barbara McDougall, "Address at the Vancouver North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue Conference.", Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada. Statements and Speeches 93/20., March 21 1993, p. 6.

into a more substantive co-operation, but it is certainly far too early to think of a peacekeeping and peacemaking force under the ARF.²⁷¹

In any case, the ARF offers the nations of East Asia and the North Pacific a valuable opportunity to discuss a variety of important transnational issues which will ideally lead to better understanding and cooperation. Such transparency may, in the future, be pivotal to the security of the region.

Similarly, ASEAN's recent focus on security matters suggests that greater stability may be achieved within the Southeast Asian sub-region. Currently ASEAN lacks the structure necessary to be considered a collective defense or security organization, but this is increasingly seen as a matter of choice rather than an indication of incompatibility. As Malaysia's Defense Minister, Data' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak, has suggested,

...there is nothing to prevent ASEAN from acting collectively if there is the political will [to do so]. We can interoperate now. We can understand each other because of our bilateral arrangements. If there is a need to have an ASEAN military, it could be done almost overnight.²⁷²

While Razak's comments may seem optimistic it would nevertheless appear that bilateral security arrangements in Southeast Asia are capable of being translated into a multinational security organization. As such, it is feasible that ASEAN could act collectively against a common threat from within or beyond its association.

However, the gains made within ASEAN have not been replicated in the North Pacific. In addition, the dialogue mechanisms established through the ARF may be inappropriate for the full range of security issues facing the Northeast Asian sub-region.²⁷³ There is, therefore, a need to establish a renewed security structure specifically designed for the North Pacific. While such an architecture need not be as concrete as those in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) or Europe (NATO,

²⁷¹ Yeo, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²⁷² Data' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak, Interview with *Jane's Defense Weekly*, December 13 1993, p. 32.

²⁷³ Hitchcock, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

Western European Union) the creation of a sub-regional body dedicated to the discussion of pertinent security issues is becoming increasingly relevant to the stability of the Northeast Asia. If such an organization does develop it is reasonable to expect that it will have to meet the basic criteria set out in the previous chapter if it is to be successful. Perhaps the key point to remember is that progress in the North Pacific faces a number of obstacles and that "institutionalization is likely to be incremental and slow."²⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the growing degree of economic integration, and the transnational nature of key security issues, suggests that the formation of some form of multilateral security structure in the future is possible.²⁷⁵

That Canada has a vested interest in facilitating this process is obvious. Despite the fact that throughout the Cold War Canada's involvement in Eastern Asia was largely the product of European or global concerns in recent years it has developed an independent agenda for the Pacific Rim. No where in the region are Canadian interests as acute as in Northeast Asia and as such the incentive for Canadian participation in the formation of a sub-regional security structure is significant. In light of the diminishing danger of first tier security threats and the changing role of the US in Asia it is clear that governmental attention should now be diverted towards the safeguarding of Canada's second tier interests. As a nation dependent upon continued access to economic markets for its prosperity, with a variety of social, political and environmental objectives for the international order, Canada must endeavor to participate in the realization of such a security framework. Thus the federal government should pursue, through diplomatic, institutional and other foreign policy means, the establishment of a sub-regional security architecture for the North Pacific.

6.2 Agenda for Further Research.

While several efforts to promote multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, and specifically Northeast Asia, have been attempted in recent years the process is by no means complete. There remain a number of issues that must be studied if the full potential for regional and sub-regional cooperation is to be attained. As such there are several areas concerning security in the North Pacific that could benefit

²⁷⁴ Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 528.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 528.

from further academic research. This is a role in which Canada should continue to involve itself.²⁷⁶

In the first place a more detailed inventory of the threats facing the North Pacific should be undertaken. Many existing studies have concluded that a variety of threats, ranging from piracy and drug trafficking to nuclear proliferation, face the sub-region. However, detailed examinations of specific threat scenarios (except for North Korea's nuclear program, and to a lesser extent, the modernization of the PLA) have generally been lacking. In order to understand and address the root causes of instability in Northeast Asia comprehensive studies of each threat category should be accomplished. Why is drug trafficking a threat to regional stability? How does it affect Canada? What are the avenues of trade and how can they be stopped? Questions such as this have generally received insufficient attention from the security community, which is too often concerned with more obvious military threats. Such research could be quite useful in a two-track process and assist in the development of some level of multilateral cooperation to alleviate tensions one issue at a time.

Related to this, further work should be undertaken to examine the feasibility and procedures for linking issue-specific organizations or agreements together in order to create some form of security regime. Multilateralism in the North Pacific will likely take root slowly and build upon the success of a number of composite institutions. Ultimately, as Hitchcock has suggested, these institutions may be joined, resulting in a comprehensive security architecture.²⁷⁷ While Canada has extensive experience in the process of institution-building in Europe and elsewhere it is not clear, or even likely, that procedures used in that region can be employed in Asia. Nevertheless, Vladimir Ivanov has suggested,

There is a need to study the possible role the multilateral arrangements can play in the regional political and security relations, to examine the theory and practice of existing multilateral institutions in other regions and their relevance to the North Pacific.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶ Henderson, "Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in Asia Pacific", p. 119.

²⁷⁷ Hitchcock, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

²⁷⁸ Vladimir I. Ivanov, Emerging Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Its Impact on Regional Development and Stability Beyond the Cold War. (North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue

As such, further research should examine what institutional frameworks are most likely to apply to the North Pacific. In this endeavor some knowledge may be drawn from the success of Southeast Asia but experience suggests that the process will be significantly different in the North Pacific.²⁷⁹

Linked to the idea of institution-building some research effort should also be directed towards enhancing the long-term legitimacy of multilateral institutions. Speaking of the UN and the CSCE Tom Keating has warned,

As demands on institutions increase it will be even more important to pay close attention to their longer term health. The surplus of credibility experienced in the early 1990s could easily turn into a surfeit of legitimacy if these institutions are not consistent in the application of their decisions...²⁸⁰

While a sub-regional institution in Northeast Asia, built carefully from a solid foundation in the post-Cold War era, may not suffer from such deficiencies efforts must be made to guarantee this. Thus as Keating suggests, research concerning how best to oversee the long-term viability of multilateral institutions would be prudent.

Another area where additional research may be useful in the development of a new security framework is consideration of how to expand bilateral linkages between the nations of Northeast Asia. For example, the Canada-Japan Forum 2000 project was a very effective review of the relationship between these two countries and suggested a number of potential approaches to continued bilateral, and innovative multilateral initiatives, which could be managed by Tokyo and Ottawa. Just as bilateral cooperation among the ASEAN states has been seen as instrumental in the formation of more comprehensive linkages so too could this process be emulated in the North Pacific.²⁸¹ The Canadian government and non-governmental institutions should therefore encourage a course of study aimed at

Research Programme, Working Paper Number 6), (North York: York University Press, February 1992), p. 12.

²⁷⁹ Scalapino, "A Framework for Regional Security Cooperation in Asia", p. 24.

²⁸⁰ Tom Keating, "The Future of Multilateralism", Behind the Headlines. Vol. 51, No. 1, Autumn 1993, p. 13.

²⁸¹ Razak, op. cit., p. 32.

assisting not only the establishment multilateral contacts in the North Pacific, but also of entrenching those bilateral agreements which will facilitate this process.

Finally, there are a number of themes concerning non-traditional security perceptions and notions of regional security which could also benefit from further consideration. Ivanov, for example, identified the need for clarification in a number of areas including; the nature of the new strategic environment in Asia, the possibility of greater economic cooperation in the Pacific Rim and the potential linkages between economics and security.²⁸² Similarly, Dewitt and Evans suggest that further study into the dangers of over-institutionalization, the feasibility of enhanced military transparency and the connection between global and regional security could benefit the process of negotiation and institution-building in Northeast Asia.²⁸³ While many of these topics have already been the focus of considerable attention a continuation of this process will ensure that perceptions do not become out-dated and overtaken by events.

6.3 Conclusion.

In conclusion it is clear that significant changes are forthcoming in the North Pacific security structure. It should be a policy objective of the Canadian government to ensure that the future security of Northeast Asia will be safeguarded by a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements reflecting the interdependence of the sub-regional actors. Additionally, efforts should be undertaken to see that Northeast Asia will also be linked to a broader Asian security regime which will address a wide variety of transregional issues pertinent to security calculations. While the formation of "hard" collective defense arrangements such as an Asian equivalent to NATO seems highly unlikely for the foreseeable future, it is possible that the level of defense and security cooperation between the nations of Northeast Asia will reach levels which were, until recently, considered unrealistic. Overseeing and facilitating this structure should be a well established and effective habit of dialogue between governments and non-governmental institutions which will continually permit the interaction necessary to maintain regional cooperation. By recognizing the need for this procedure, and

²⁸² Ivanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

²⁸³ Dewitt and Evans, *The Agenda For Cooperative Security In The North Pacific - Conference Report*, pp. 29-31.

actively taking a part in it, Canada will ultimately gain its place in what will perhaps become the most dynamic and influential region in the world.

The fact that future sub-regional security issues will likely be dealt with in a multilateral framework bodes well for Canadian interests. Returning to Keating's observations of the UN and various European institutions he suggests, "the radical transformations taking place in the international system hold considerable promise for the multilateral institutions that have formed such an important part of Canadian foreign policy."²⁸⁴ That this also become true of Northeast Asia should stand as one of Ottawa's primary policy goals into the twenty-first century.

²⁸⁴ Keating, *The Future of Multilateralism*, p. 13.

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