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Grief and Trauma Volunteers: Beliefs and Attitude that Motivate and Sustain

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the present study was to explore factors that motivate and sustain individuals who volunteer to help victims of grief and trauma. A study group of 49 Victim Service advisors, palliative care, and pastoral care hospital visitors are compared with a group of 51 community service volunteers. Quantitative data, gathered by using the Volunteer Functions Inventory, as well as qualitative responses, indicated that grief and trauma volunteers are primarily motivated by altruistic values. Results from the Belief in a Just World scale indicated that grief and trauma volunteers were relatively more likely than the comparison group to perceive the world as a place where people often do not deserve the negative outcomes they encounter. The Attributional Complexity Scale suggested that grief and trauma volunteers prefer a complex attributional style as they consider situations they encounter in their volunteer work. Implications for volunteer training and support are discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to volunteers, an extraordinary group of people who give their labor of love so selflessly for the benefit of others. In particular, this volume commemorates volunteers from the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede; Victim Services units from Airdrie, Cochrane, the City of Calgary, Okotoks, High River, Black Diamond, and Turner Valley; the palliative care team at the Peter Lougheed Center; and pastoral care visitors at the Rockyview Grief Counselling Center.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Volunteerism is a vital Canadian social force. In 1997, 31.4% of the Canadian

population, about 7.5 million individuals, volunteered their time, energy, and skills

(Canadian Center for Philanthropy, 1998). Their contribution of 1.1 billion volunteer

hours was the equivalent of 578,000 full-time paid positions. This special form of

humanitarianism has benefited society at many levels. Volunteers' generosity gifts the

direct recipient(s) of their care, while it enhances the life experience of each ordinary

citizen by improving community spirit and by providing a structure for a caring

community.

The present study explores the specialized work of volunteers who care for

bereaved and traumatized people. Generally, grief and trauma (GT) volunteerism

addresses social needs that are not adequately addressed by the combined efforts of the

public and private sector. This study examines the response of Victim Service, Palliative

Care, and Pastoral Care volunteers. Victim Service advisors step in to provide victims of

criminal activity with crisis support and to make referrals to other support and service

agencies when appropriate. These volunteers help reduce the stress experienced by

victims who become Crown witnesses. Volunteers orient their clients to court processes

and accompany them during court proceedings. When appropriate, they offer assistance

in writing Victim Impact Statements for court presentation. When sudden death incidents

occur (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, homicide, or suicide), volunteers frequently

accompany police officers as they notify next of kin, then stay with the victims after the police officers depart. The volunteer's role is to offer support while the victim stabilizes and also to help victims as they begin to make connections with their own support networks. Pastoral care and palliative care hospital visitors provide caring support for those who face serious or terminal illness. For patients who have no family, friends, or other support systems available, the volunteer may be their only visitor in the last hours of their life. These volunteers assist by talking with their client, listening, offering a comforting touch, or by simply lending a quiet, supportive presence. When patients request prayers or the Sacrament of communion, many pastoral care volunteers are able to answer their need.

This study contributes to current research on human prosocial behavior by examining how GT volunteers adapt to the distress of witnessing undeserved or inexplicable suffering in ways that allow them to sustain their volunteer efforts. It examines factors that move people to volunteer in GT roles and then continue to support them in this role. These understandings are vital for the continued growth of GT volunteerism.

Previous research investigating prosocial helping behavior has primarily explored spontaneous helping behavior. Additional research efforts are needed to explore volunteerism because this process differs significantly from individual acts of spontaneous assistance (Clary & Snyder, 1991; Clary et al., 1998). For example, when a bystander observes victimization, he or she makes an impromptu decision whether to

engage in a brief, one-time act of helping. Situational factors heavily influence this decision (Piliavin & Charng, 1990). These factors may include an awareness of how others are responding and a concern about what others will perceive if one does or does not help. The "bystander effect" may lessen one's sense of personal responsibility to act. This occurs when an observer refrains from acting because they perceive that others present are available or capable of helping. Planful, sustained helping in the form of volunteerism is substantially different from spontaneous helping because volunteers become active at a time of their choosing. Volunteers are guided by dispositional factors rather than situational cues as they carefully deliberate before selecting a suitable role (Clary & Snyder, 1991). Before engaging in sustained helping, the volunteer has an opportunity to consider personal variables such as his or her own plans and purposes for volunteering. As they become involved over time in a helping activity, volunteers will continually re-evaluate whether these motives are sufficiently met to support the continuation of their role. The situational demands of the potential helping role, including time commitment, anticipated investment of physical and emotional energy, and realistic financial costs associated with involvement, are important considerations for the potential volunteer.

The Problem

The present study focused on gathering information about volunteers who become committed to roles that consistently place them in contact with clients who are suffering grief or acute trauma. This group of volunteers is not only poignantly aware of human

tragedy, but somehow they find strength, hope, and desire to continue with their work. They continually place themselves in a position of grappling with a troubling question of why "ordinary people…should have to bear extraordinary burdens of grief and pain (Kushner, 1981).

To develop an understanding of how these individuals are sustained in their volunteer work, the study explores several aspects of the volunteer's approach to their role. The study asks a number of questions including:

1. What factors do GT volunteers believe were important in drawing them into service? To what extent do the GT volunteers in this study experience the functional factors that motivated them to participate in the first place and has this level of experience been satisfying for them?

2. What are the supportive beliefs, values, and attitudes that GT volunteers recognize as most significant within their volunteer role?

3. If the belief that the world is just or fair could be represented on a continuum from "total acceptance" to "total rejection", where would the beliefs of GT volunteers generally fall?

4. How do GT volunteers explain causality when "bad things happen to good people"? Do they tend to be simplistic, judging other's character and behaviors as either right or wrong? Or are they motivated to consider a broad range of factors, including present and past context as well as a variety of external and internal factors?

The Rationale

The present study administered a mail-back questionnaire to a sample of GT volunteers and to a group of community service (CS) volunteers. The group of CS volunteers selected for this study has been formed to organize and present the Western Showcase pavilion of the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede. It was expected that these CS volunteers would provide contrasting responses to those of GT volunteers in terms of the plans and purposes that moved them toward their particular volunteer role. Also, since their volunteer work does not involve interaction with grief or trauma, it was expected that they would have significantly less experience in dealing with these types of incidents. As a result, their responses to questionnaire items were expected to contrast with those of the GT volunteers. It was hoped that these differences would help illuminate factors that strengthen and support GT volunteerism.

Hypotheses

1A. GT volunteers will be motivated to a greater extent by Value functions (Clary et al., 1998) than CS volunteers (e.g. humanitarian concerns). CS volunteers will be motivated to a greater extent by Social functions than GT volunteers. An example of a Social function would be to volunteer out of a desire to enjoy participating with other like-minded individuals who are also engaged in hosting a community social event.

Rationale: The purpose of measuring the GT volunteer's identification with Value functions is to establish that these volunteers are aware of other's suffering and that this awareness acts as a motivation for volunteerism. GT volunteers are expected to respond

strongly to the value-related volunteer motivational factors that are presented in the questionnaire because these items closely describe the mandate of GT volunteerism. Four of the five statements describe concern for the less fortunate or for a particular social group. Two of the five items measuring a Value motivation describe working for a cause that is personally significant or having a need to simply help. These two latter statements describe the mandate of both volunteer groups. The items addressing Social functions represent primary factors offered by CS volunteer opportunities (e.g., a desire to be involved with others who also consider volunteering important or who share an interest in community service).

      1B. It was expected that GT and CS volunteers would indicate that they had experienced satisfactory levels of the Volunteer functions significant to them. Rationale: The GT and CS volunteer groups have both demonstrated commitment to their volunteer task through their longevity. Previous research has indicated that volunteers are more satisfied when they receive benefits that match the functions that they consider important at the outset (Omoto & Snyder, 1995; Clary & Snyder, 1991; Clary & Snyder, 1999). High levels of satisfaction have been shown to lead to sustained helping activity (Clary et al., 1998).

      2. It was expected that volunteers would express, in their own words, the importance of many of the volunteer functions addressed elsewhere in the questionnaire when they were asked how they found support through difficult times within their volunteer role. The open-ended format was intended to encourage

participants to respond freely with any beliefs, attitudes, or values that served to support them in their volunteer role.

3A. GT volunteers will have a relatively low belief that the world is just or fair compared to CS volunteers (i.e., low Belief in a Just World or low BJW; Lerner, 1980). An awareness of injustice will motivate certain individuals to respond to undeserved suffering in their immediate community by stepping forward as GT volunteers.

Rationale: Research has shown that for observers of injustice, increased perception of victimization seems to increase helping behaviors (Harrell & Goltz, 1980). This increased awareness may provide an important motivational factor for engaging in GT volunteerism and for continuing with that focus. Since the study's pool of GT volunteers have remained involved for period of at least 1 year it was reasoned that they would have repeatedly witnessed undeserved suffering during the course of their volunteer role. Research has shown that those who have personally experienced pronounced social injustice will have a much lower tendency to believe that the world is just or fair (Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Smith & Green, 1984; Begue & Fumey, 2000). Possibly vicarious experience with injustice would have a similar effect.

Previous research suggests that people with a strong perception that the world is just, are motivated to cognitively defend this perception when they witness undeserved suffering (Lerner, 1980). One way of rationalizing injustice, or of relieving distress, is to either derogate victims or blame them for their plight. This type of response would not be conducive to long term helping, nor would it explain motivation to intervene on behalf

of victims. It was therefore expected that volunteers would find alternate means to adjust to the distress of witnessing undeserved suffering.

3B. GT volunteers will have a greater tendency than CS volunteers to look to the future as a time when justice will be restored (Ultimate Justice Belief).

Rationale: One way that GT volunteers might adapt cognitively to the tragedy they witness would be to develop a strong belief in Ultimate Justice (Lerner, 1980, Mäes, 1998). In other words, even though the difficulties these volunteers witness in the present are clearly undeserved or unfair, volunteers may believe that one day in the future of this life, or in an afterlife, victims will be compensated for the suffering they endure in the present context.

4. GT volunteers will be more motivated to explain and understand human behavior than CS volunteers, and they will prefer complex rather than simple explanations. Compared to CS volunteers, the GT volunteer will tend to consider a broader range of factors as they explore possible causal explanations.

Rationale: Prior research has indicated that helping may be most pronounced for observers when they perceive that the victim is not responsible for their situation (DePalma, Madey, Tillman, & Wheeler, 1999). This suggests that a volunteer's desire to look for more complex causal explanations may support the GT volunteer because it allows them, as an observer, to consider factors that are beyond the victim's control.

5. The present study presents an opportunity to show a relationship between the BJW and attributional complexity (i.e., a low BJW may be linked to a

complex attributional style while a high BJW may be linked to a simple attributional style).

Rationale: A high BJW has been related to fundamental attribution error, that is, a tendency to minimize the influence of external factors and to over-emphasize the influence of internal factors (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986). Prior research has shown that a high BJW leads to attribution of blame to the victim (Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Kleinke & Meyer, 1990; Taylor & Kleinke, 1992). A simple attributional style leads to ascribing cause to specific behaviors and characteristics, to contemporaneous events, and to concrete factors that pose an influence within the immediate environment (Fletcher et al., 1986). In contrast to this, attributional complexity leads an observer to consider a broad range of internal and external causal factors including abstract concepts (e.g., beliefs, values, or attitudes). A complex attributional style seeks explanatory factors from both a present and an historical time context. It considers factors from the immediate environment, from the community, and from the wider social context. Someone with a simple attributional style has little awareness of the power that other individuals have on a person's behavior or of how an individual may influence the way others respond to them.

Overall, a low BJW and a complex attributional style are personal variables that would offer significant support to the GT volunteer. The low BJW removes a need to defend oneself against the threat to a personal justice belief system when injustice or suffering are witnessed. Attributional complexity provides the volunteer with a greater

potential to make meaning from their volunteer experience while respecting the victim within their social context.

An Overview

Overall, the aim of the study is to increase understanding of the general patterns of motivation that direct individuals to work in areas of grief and trauma and then continue to support them as they remain active in that role over a lengthy time period. The study will explore motivations that participants have consciously considered and it will explore motivations that other research has shown to operate outside of an individual's awareness. Specifically, the study will collect data that will indicate the participants' relative belief in terms of whether they perceive that the clients they serve deserve what they get in the world, or get what they deserve. The study questionnaire will provide an assessment of how GT volunteers attribute causal responsibility for their client's situations. Answers to these questions will expand current understanding of how volunteers adapt to the stress of working within tragic and emotionally intense circumstances.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter two discusses a number of motivational factors that have been found to create an impulse for sustained helping behavior or volunteerism. The literature review describes potential other-oriented, value-driven motivators as well as self-oriented purposes that have been found to positively influence helping behavior. This chapter will also review literature that has studied how justice beliefs and attributional styles may influence the nature of individual's response to others' suffering. It will highlight the role of causal attribution in alleviating the distress the volunteer may experience as they witness traumatic and emotionally painful events.

The Altruism-Egoism Debate

For centuries moral philosophers have debated whether humans are truly capable of altruism; the predominant perspective in Western philosophy and psychology has supported universal egoism (Smith, 1981; Batson, 1991). This concept suggests that individuals are motivated to reap some egoistic benefit as a result of engaging in altruistic volunteer acts. Egoistic benefits for helping behaviors range from the intrinsic satisfaction one may receive as a result of supporting a positive outcome for another individual, to more obvious benefits such as enhancing career possibilities. Overall, universal egoism insists that even the most noble and heroic acts are motivated by a desire for self-benefit, that no matter what virtuous act humans may perform, they are primarily looking out for themselves.

This scholarly viewpoint contrasts sharply with the rationale given when front-line volunteers are asked why they have entered into and are continuing to work within

the volunteer sector. In a survey of a broad range of volunteers in 30 Canadian urban centers, 75.1% of the study respondents cited altruism as their primary motivation (Anderson & Moore, 1978). Almost two decades later, 96% of a large sample of Canadian volunteers indicated that a desire to help others and a belief in the purpose and goals of their chosen organization were their most significant motivators for volunteering (Canadian Center for Philanthropy, 1998). Smith (1981) warns that we must not take the responses of these volunteers at face value. He notes that simply asking volunteers "why they have chosen to volunteer" will elicit altruistic types of responses. Since altruism is a socially desirable motivation, it may mask more significant reasons for volunteering.

By carefully defining altruistic and egoistic behavior, Batson (1991) permits a less cynical analysis of human volunteer behavior than the view put forward by proponents of universal egoism. According to Batson's definition, when a helper's ultimate goal is the welfare of another and when personal benefits or costs do not determine the decision to help, altruism should be considered the primary motivation for helping. By focusing on the helper's intention rather than the consequences of their behavior, this definition expands altruism to include situations where critical personal costs for helping are not incurred by the helper, therefore suggesting that self-sacrifice is not necessarily a factor of altruistic behavior. Batson's definition recognizes that helpers may reap personal benefits for their actions (e.g., self-praise or public recognition; relief of the discomfort experienced when observing another's distress). As long as the helper's motivation is primarily derived from concern about another's welfare rather than personal consequences, their behavior falls under the altruistic category.

Often egoistic and altruistic motives are tightly intertwined as volunteers exhibit selfless concern for others while pursuing personal benefits (Clary & Snyder, 1999). In fact, it may be difficult for an observer or even a volunteer to objectively determine the primary nature of the motivation that underlies a specific helping behavior. For example, a volunteer may explore their suitability for a career within the justice system as well as improve their application for admission to a related training program while simultaneously providing victims of criminal activity with much needed support, information, and referral to community resources. It may be that a desire to improve the welfare of victims has drawn the individual to a career interest in justice issues and is also a primary motivator for their volunteer choice. On the other hand, this individual's career interest may be related to a fascination with criminology, and volunteerism would then be an intermediate goal in preparation for the egoistic, ultimate career goal. Regardless of whether volunteer's efforts are motivated by altruistic or egoistic functions, both are prosocial in nature (Omoto & Snyder, 1990; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995), benefiting the helper, the recipient and often society at large.

A careful differentiation of the altruistic or egoistic motivations of the volunteer groups represented in this study is beyond the scope of the present study and has, therefore, not been undertaken. While elements of the study will show evidence of unquestionable egoism, possible examples of altruism will not be questioned or evaluated

in the analysis. The present study recognizes the outstanding prosocial value that has been contributed by the representative volunteer groups to their recipients, their communities and to society at large.

<div align="center">A Functional Approach to Volunteerism</div>

The functional approach to volunteerism builds on the theorizing of Katz (1960) and Smith, Bruner, and White (1956) who observed that any single attitude would serve a distinctly different function for different individuals. They suggested that if an attitude could be temporarily changed in some way, it would only be maintained if the new attitude were able to satisfy the same functions served by the original attitude. Later, researchers in prosocial behavior perceived that a functional analysis of the motivational processes involved in volunteerism would increase our understanding of this social phenomenon in a similar fashion (Clary & Snyder, 1991; Snyder & Omoto, 1992, Clary et al., 1998). Since the decision to volunteer, involves a deliberate, thoughtful process, they reasoned that it would be beneficial to examine the plans and purposes, or needs and goals of the individual volunteer. They conjectured that these factors would have substantial influence on the volunteer's decision to engage in a particular service area, to become committed to that role, and to maintain an ongoing interest in this branch of volunteering.

Clary and Snyder (1991) reviewed the literature on classic functional theorizing regarding attitudes as well as research data from a diverse range of studies on sustained helping behavior. Based on their analysis, they identified four general volunteerism

functions and began to formulate a volunteer motivational inventory. To ensure that ego-enhancing and ego-protective functions were discriminated by the inventory, Clary and colleagues (1998) expanded this list to include a total of six psychological and social functions. While these six functions describe general volunteerism quite adequately, future research may reveal that modifications are necessary to capture salient factors for GT volunteerism.

Generally, volunteers indicate that two or more Volunteer functions, as described below, are important to them (Clary & Snyder, 1999). Volunteers motivated by the Value function act on a wish to express deeply held personal values. They may use volunteer work as a means of channeling their humanitarian and altruistic concerns into victim support or community service.[1] The Understanding function describes the goal of wanting to learn more about a specific interest area or the world in general through volunteer activity. For GT volunteers this might include an interest in learning about the justice system, the health care system, or the various ways that diverse cultures may deal with issues of death and dying, etc. The Understanding function also provides many volunteers with an opportunity to practice skills already developed but not otherwise needed in their daily lives. The Career function is closely related to the Understanding function. Volunteers with a career orientation may plan to use volunteerism to develop skills relevant to a desired future career or to investigate their aptitude or suitability for a career choice (Anderson & Moore, 1978; Jenner, 1982). Volunteer activity may allow

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[1] Note that the Value function is generally altruistic in nature, while the five remaining functions are egoistic (Clary & Snyder, 1991).

the volunteer to spend time with others engaged in the activity or it may simply allow them to be judged favorably by important reference groups who value volunteerism. Clary et al. (1998) describe this motivator as the Social function. The Enhancement function describes positive emotions, such as a sense of satisfaction, that volunteers may experience as they grow and develop personally during the volunteer work term (Anderson & Moore, 1978). Research has indicated that many volunteers do enjoy a higher level of self-esteem (Jenner, 1982) and may also experience an enhanced level of positive affect as a result of their volunteer role (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; Carlson & Miller, 1987; Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980). Finally, the Protective function helps one to avoid threatening awarenesses about the self, to cope with inner conflicts or anxieties, or may even help the volunteer to work through personal problems. Emotions such as guilt about being more fortunate than others, or sadness about observing another's misfortune, may be relieved through helping (Schroeder et al., 1995).

Research has supported functional theory which states that a specific volunteer activity will satisfy a broad range of idiosyncratic needs and goals and these motivators will vary widely among a group of volunteers (Omoto & Snyder, 1990; Clary et al., 1998). In terms of the present study group, we may expect volunteers to be attracted to grief and trauma work for a number of reasons. For example, they may be interested in programs that offer high quality in-service training regarding justice or health care related topics; they may wish to contribute in a vital way to their community; or they may wish to experience a deeper sense of purpose in their lives. While an individual may engage in volunteer work with a primary goal in mind, two or more functions are often significant

in their volunteer role (Clary & Snyder, 1991). For example, GT volunteers may be driven by humanitarian concerns and they may also look for the sense of satisfaction that comes out of helping others.

A successful volunteer experience is most likely when volunteers choose their roles thoughtfully and volunteer agencies attend as much as possible to meeting the needs and motives of individual volunteers throughout their ongoing experience in the volunteer role (Snyder, 1993; Clary et al., 1998). During screening and placement, it will be important to realize that one's enduring disposition, stable traits, and social attitudes may influence their choices of situational contexts; the situation they choose may allow them to act out these trait variables (Herek, 1987; Snyder & Ickes, 1985; Clary et al., 1998). For example, community health volunteers tend to have "altruistic personalities" characterized by a tendency to be more empathic, and to have higher internal "moral" standards, greater self-efficacy, and greater emotional stability than non-volunteers (Allen & Rushton, 1983). Snyder and Omoto (1992) found that volunteers who are primarily motivated by Value functions might also have relatively high scores on nurturance, empathy, and social responsibility. A study of AIDS volunteers indicated that volunteers who tended to score higher on concern for others (i.e., suggesting a Value function), preferred tasks involving close personal interpersonal contact with patients (Snyder & Omoto, 1992). Those volunteers who identified relatively egoistic motivations for volunteering were more satisfied performing roles involving minimal contact with the client (e.g., telephone contact only).

Research has indicated that an awareness of volunteer functions may help agencies predict or even protect the longevity of their volunteers. For example, career motivation has been found to predict early intention to leave, therefore increasing volunteer turnover (Miller, Powell, & Seltzer, 1990). For women, the career function may be used to predict that an extensive level of participation may drop to a supplementary level when the volunteer is able to move into her chosen career (Jenner, 1982).

In general, volunteers tend to be most satisfied when they receive greater (rather than fewer) benefits that match the functions they consider most important as they begin their volunteer role (Clary & Snyder, 1999). Rubin and Thorelli (1984) found that when volunteers were egoistically motivated and they did not receive the benefits of gratitude or signs of progress they had anticipated, these absences lead them to drop out of the volunteer role. In a study of AIDS volunteers, Omoto and Snyder (1995) found that the more egoistic motivations (especially personal skill development and feeling better about self, (i.e., Understanding, Protective or Esteem Enhancement functions) positively influenced duration of service, while the more altruistic Values function lead to decreased longevity. Contrasting results found in other research suggest that it may be premature to conclude that egoistic functions predict improved longevity (Clary & Ornstein, 1991; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998). Gender composition varied among these studies, and different volunteer behaviors were measured, making meaningful comparisons difficult. More research is needed before conclusions can be drawn.

Belief in a Just World

The preceding section has described a variety of motivators that have been shown to move GT volunteers into action on behalf of the less fortunate in society. For the most part, volunteers are aware of the operation of these functions and they have used them to thoughtfully position themselves in suitable volunteer work. A major tenet of the present study is that volunteer's beliefs, values, and attitudes, operating beyond their conscious awareness, will also profoundly influence them. Specifically, the Belief in a Just World (BJW), described as a fundamental belief (Lerner, 1980) and as a stable attitude (Rubin & Peplau, 1975), may inhibit the volunteer's ability to respond to client circumstances if it is relatively strong.

Theoretical Foundation of the Belief in a Just World

The BJW is closely related to Cognitive Balance theory. Heider (1958) proposed that people experience a sense of justice and cognitive harmony when "goodness and happiness" or "wickedness and discontent" coexist. When an apparently virtuous person meets with misfortune or when someone of bad character or behavior does not experience a punishing outcome, people experience cognitive dissonance or disharmony. They anticipate that such an imbalance is temporary and that sooner, if not later, the good person will experience happiness when they are rewarded and the bad person will experience discontent when they are punished. Because the cognitive relationship between goodness and reward and between wickedness and punishment is very strong, people frequently make an errant assumption that a negative outcome (e.g., sudden death,

serious illness, or criminal victimization) is caused by the victim's character or past behavior.

Similarly, BJW theory suggests that people have a fundamental expectation that "good things happen to good people" and "bad things happen to bad people" (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). When one witnesses or personally experiences injustice, this belief is challenged and the justice motive is created. This motivation drives individuals to take action to restore justice when it is reasonably efficient for them to do so. Alternately, the justice motive will stimulate an observer to cognitively maintain their perception of a just world. This may be accomplished by blaming the victim's fate on their behavior, by derogating the victim's character or by denying or minimizing the existence of the injustice (Lerner, 1980). An observer may respond to the discrepancy between their own situation and that of a victim by justifying their own privileged position, thereby alleviating any discomfort they may be experiencing (Reichle, Schneider, & Montada, 1998).

Alternatively, the observer of injustice may adapt cognitively by anticipating that the restoration of justice will occur in a future time-frame (Lerner, 1991; Mäes, 1998). For the religious observer, life after death may hold the promise of a time when the good or innocent victim will be compensated for their present suffering. Similarly, a secular response might be to anticipate the "silver lining" or personal growth that may one day develop from the suffering experienced today. This variant of the BJW is referred to as a belief in Ultimate Justice. It may be particularly beneficial when injustice is extreme

(e.g., the suffering or death of a child), and the perceiver is unable to maintain a their belief in the security and stability of the world by denying or reinterpreting the details of the trauma (Lerner, 1991).

BJW theory states that a just worldview is fundamental in the sense that it is an essential means that most people use to maintain a sense that their environment is secure and stable (Lerner, 1980). The strength of the BJW, however, is thought to vary across individuals. Rubin and Peplau (1975, p. 66) describe it as an "attitudinal continuum extending between the two poles of total acceptance and total rejection of the notion that the world is a just place." Also, a BJW may be experienced with differing strengths across the various domains of an individual's life, including the personal, interpersonal, and socio-political spheres (Montada, 1998; Furnham & Proctor, 1989). The closer that injustice occurs to one's sphere, the greater the need to explain and make sense of what has happened (Lerner & Miller, 1978).

The Impact of Justice Beliefs on Grief and Trauma Volunteerism

The BJW is a personal variable that may have a profound impact on GT volunteerism. Following the reasoning of BJW theory, the strength of the GT volunteer's BJW could indirectly impact their readiness to advocate on behalf of their clients. GT volunteers often work with clients who suffer emotionally and physically as a result of critical life events. As they observe another's suffering, we might expect volunteers to follow a human tendency to act as "intuitive jurors", deciding "on the spot" whether the suffering was deserved (Bies, 1987). BJW theory suggests that volunteers with a relatively strong BJW will defend against acknowledging the insecurity and instability

that is prevalent in the world. One way to accomplish this would be to decide that the client is responsible for their own negative outcome. Such a pronouncement would allow the observer to maintain their perception of a Just World while also protecting them from being affected personally by the victim's circumstances. The response from a volunteer with a relatively low BJW would be strikingly different. This volunteer's perception that the world is not necessarily fair, or just, would enable them to perceive the injustice in the current situation. In the context of GT volunteerism, volunteers may assume that their clients are entitled to good health, long-life, possession of property, etc. The volunteer's attention to a broad array of situational information may lead them, as observers, to decide that a critical incident has stripped the client of a similar entitlement. The heightened awareness of the volunteer with a low BJW, enables them to perceive the client as a victim of injustice (Montada, 1992).

When volunteers perceive that an injustice has occurred, they will tend to experience prosocial emotions, possibly including outrage against the perpetrator and empathy for the victim (Montada, 1992). These feelings, as well as existential guilt, prompt the volunteer to take responsibility for acting on behalf of their client in the form of continued commitment to volunteerism. In the case of the volunteer with a relatively high BJW, the denial of injustice interferes with the arousal of prosocial emotions, and therefore lessens their tendency to feel social responsibility toward assisting a victim.

In specific situations, a strong BJW may support altruism, when help is easy to provide, the task does not go against any other strongly held social values, or the helping activity is sanctioned by an authority (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). Since a

commitment to GT volunteerism often demands a donation of significant time, energy, and personal resources, it is improbable that a strong BJW could support ongoing altruism under most conditions. Although the ability of the BJW to support egoistic concerns has received little research attention, Zuckerman (1975) found that one type of egoistic benefit was directly correlated with BJW scores. He discovered that individuals with a high BJW were more inclined to offer help to others when they were anticipating their own imminent time of need. He proposed that an individual's helpful behaviors allowed them to perceive themselves as more deserving of their own good fortune in the near future. Since Zuckerman's findings were related to a study of spontaneous helping behavior, additional research is needed to test this application within sustained helping behavior.

The belief in Ultimate Justice is another cognitive adaptation may be especially salient for GT volunteers because it is not linked to victim blame or derogation as a means of coping with the distress of observed injustice. Rather, a study of responses to cancer and cancer victims suggests that Ultimate Justice Beliefs may actually strengthen the observer's ability to act in a supportive role (Mäes, 1998). This study showed that Ultimate Justice beliefs were positively correlated to positive characterization of cancer patients. Also, these beliefs were inversely correlated to a tendency to ascribe responsibility for the disease process to the victim. Ultimate Justice Beliefs were linked to the observer's ability to make meaning of the circumstances of serious illness and to anticipate the future with optimism.

The Development of a Belief in a Just World

Furnham (1991) explains the functional importance of developing the BJW as a normative value. When an individual personally participates in the victimization of a minority, their JW beliefs allow them to rationalize the propriety of these behaviors. When disturbing, unjust events are commonplace and even condoned within a society (e.g., the injustices of apartheid), JW beliefs may develop and be maintained to help the society cope with the trauma. As a society, a consensual view of the "reality" of the situation is developed. Since JW beliefs successfully reduce distress, they are socialized into the culture so that succeeding generations may also have that benefit.

In Western society, children are often taught explicitly that the world is a just place (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). They watch television stories that show superheroes crushing evil. Many are still read fairy stories where the good and beautiful heroes and heroines are eventually rewarded with everlasting happiness and wealth. Moving toward the Christmas period, most children become immersed in the myths of the season. They anticipate that they will receive an abundance of gifts based on their behavior in the months and weeks preceding Christmas. Many parents who are affiliated with traditional Christianity or Judaism instruct their children that goodness, virtue, and faithful adherence to the Scriptures, will ultimately be rewarded in heaven while the outcome of evil will be eternal damnation. Parents may teach their children to equate power and prestige with virtue. They do this when they caution their children to respect their elders and people in authority, including teachers and policemen, but they fail to show children

how to differentiate between the admirable and less favorable characteristics and behaviors of these figures.

The development of a BJW has been linked to early cognitive-development (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). Piaget noted that young children have an inherent tendency to create a causal link between bad intent and negative outcome (Piaget, 1965). He referred to the tendency to believe that mishaps are punishments for earlier faults or mistakes as "immanent justice" reasoning. Jose (1990) demonstrated that children also assume that a positive outcome is causally linked to previous good behavior or virtuous character.

At a conscious level, children gradually develop familiarity with normative, conventional justice rules. They learn to intentionally draw on these social morals to help them make rational judgments. As most children mature, they no longer outwardly rely on earlier immanent justice reasoning as they gradually learn through personal experience with injustice that negative outcome is often random and arbitrary. They lose their absolute trust in authority figures as they become aware that parents and other idols of the past, frequently make unfair judgments against them. Also, as they grow, children begin to have the opportunity to experience egalitarian relationships between themselves and their peers.

While Piaget noted that by age 11 to 12, only 34% of children retain a belief in immanent justice, he also felt that some adults retained this belief. Lerner (1998) suggests that immanent justice beliefs are much more prevalent in adult experience than Piaget has proposed. Lerner indicates that these beliefs are not lost with maturity but rather are maintained in the preconscious, where they continue to influence social

judgments and emotional responses to injustice. According to Lerner, the simple childhood causal schemas described by Piaget, comprise a counternormative justice belief that is automatically engaged frequently in adult life and is accompanied by emotions like anger, guilt, shame, and anxiety.

When Injustice Threatens Belief in a Just World

Observers of victimization will quickly appraise the situation, developing a perception of the victim's behavior and character and of the level of negativity of the outcome. The greater the actual discrepancy between the victim's behavior or personality and the outcome, the greater the force of the threat to the observer's BJW. Observers will attempt to restore injustice by intervening actionally whenever that is not a costly alternative (Lerner, 1980; Drout & Gaertner, 1994). Increased perception of victimization may, in fact, even increase efforts to help (Harrell & Goltz, 1980; Drout & Gaertner, 1994) when the observer is readily able to manage the costs of helping. However, when intervention is not possible or is not easily undertaken, the observer may resort to cognitive adaptation to defend their BJW (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lincoln & Levinger, 1972). Longitudinal research evidence indicates that cognitive reappraisals can be an effective means to defend JW beliefs, and in fact, may even strengthen the JW position (Reichle, Schneider, & Montada, 1998).

An individual's cognitive response to any situation involves an interaction of both normative and counternormative justice systems (Lerner, 1998; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999). The dominant system at a given moment will direct the response. Generally, the preconscious rapidly produces moral intuitions about what is "good" or "just" whereas

the conscious, rational processing of a similar situation occurs at a much slower, deliberate pace. If an event does not emotionally charge the individual, and if they have time or incentive to engage in rational processing, they will probably respond with conventional morality judgments. However, when undeserved or inexplicable suffering is portrayed and there is no means to restore justice actionally, the observer will often become emotionally distressed. When an emotional response is coupled with pressure to respond in a timely manner, the preconscious system will likely dominate. In an emotional, time-limited setting, individuals will respond to a primitive need to live in a secure, predictable world and they will alter their subjective perception of the event to create a sense of order.

If enough time is available, an individual's response to injustice will indicate an interaction of both levels of justice beliefs (Lerner, 1998; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999). This is apparent when people take a position arrived at preconsciously, and they use their conscious system to rationalize their choice. Bies (1987) suggests that witnesses of injustice are "intuitive jurors" who seek to determine whether an observed negative outcome is deserved. This judicious reasoning is reached rapidly and is then rationalized, perhaps by noting that the victim has made errors in judgment, engaged in risky behavior, or failed to correct longstanding problems. The apparent logic of the observer's analysis does not take into consideration potential uncontrollable factors or forces external to the victim.

It has been suggested that observers prefer to adjust their perception of the victim's behavior rather than his or her character because this allows them to maintain an

illusion of controllability (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Commonsense indicates that personality characteristics are difficult to change, let alone control, therefore they are the less preferred explanatory choice. An observer may reason that if the victim had acted differently in the given situation, the outcome would have been better.

A study by Madey, DePalma, Bahrt, & Beirne (1993) illustrates that caregivers may bias their perceptions of behavior and characteristics as they respond to patients with negative health outcomes. Nursing and undergraduate students were presented with patient case histories that manipulated the perceived patient responsibility for disease onset. The study findings indicated that patients perceived to have been responsible for their health outcome, were attributed more negative personal characteristics than those who were perceived as not responsible. Nursing students presumed that these patients would not comply with doctor's instructions. Undergraduate participants assigned a lower quality of care to those they judged responsible for their disease.

The justice motive can paradoxically promote injustice in circumstances where observers choose cognitive adaptation to instances of injustice (Montada, 1998). For example, BJW scores have been negatively correlated with sympathy, warmth, and concern for persons with AIDS (Murphy-Berman & Berman, 1990). A strong BJW may underlie a lack of concern for other's suffering, and this in turn, may prompt an observer to refrain from sharing personal resources to alleviate suffering. This chain of influence is suggested by the findings of a study by Connors and Heaven (1990). They found an indirect relationship between BJW scores and the endorsement of AIDS research and care

for AIDS sufferers. A strong BJW may promote maintenance of the status quo when it inhibits an observer from interfering with or protesting against injustice because the observer has been able to rationalize that the world is just as it is (Montada, 1998).

The level of identification of an observer with the victim may increase the complexity of the interaction of BJW and reactions to injustice. For example, a study by Kleinke and Meyer (1990) found that men with a high BJW rated female rape victims more negatively than men with a low BJW. Women, however, who had a low BJW rated the victim more negatively than women who had a high BJW. The researchers explained that women would generally identify more strongly with a female rape victim than would men, and would therefore be less inclined to derogate her character. When women with a high BJW are conflicted by having their "just world ideal" threatened, they are reluctant to blame a victim realizing that the same injustice could be inflicted on them as well. In another study, mock civil trial jurors had an opportunity to compensate a rate victim for her suffering by offering her a monetary reward (Foley & Pigott, 2000). When victim derogation was not provided as a means to reconcile just world beliefs, female jurors with a strong BJW advocated on behalf of the victim. BJW moderated the amount of monetary damages awarded in the mock civil trial. Female jurors with a strong BJW restored justice by awarding comparatively more damages to the victim than did low BJW female jurors. Their actions allowed them to defend their BJW by restoring a deserving outcome to a woman of good character. Men with a high BJW awarded less money than did men with a low BJW. It was concluded that this scenario would have

been more threatening male participants' justice beliefs and therefore, they may have found the plaintiff more deserving of her victimization than did the female participants.

Studies of observer's response to criminal victimization suggest that evaluation of the perpetrator's responsibility for their actions, their character (Taylor & Kleinke, 1992), as well as the fairness of their sentencing, provide observers with an additional means of defending their BJW (O'Quinn & Volger, 1989). Compared to low BJW observers, those with a high BJW tended to believe the perpetrator's sentencing was just when it was reasonably punitive. Under these circumstances, they also indicated less sympathy for the perpetrator, blamed the perpetrator more for his behavior, and were less likely to think the victim deserved their victimization. However, when the perpetrator received a sentence that was blatantly unfair, high BJW observers responded by blaming the victim for their own victimization. It seemed that receiving an unjust sentence may have made participants view the perpetrator as a victim of the criminal justice system and they responded by blaming the original victim for this outcome.

Correlates of a Belief in a Just World

Compared to spontaneous helping situations, non-spontaneous helping presents few situational surprises or demand for action. This is possible because volunteers actively seek out situations that are comfortable for them in terms of the tasks that will be required and their own ability to match the demands of the situation. While individuals are influenced in their volunteer decisions by motivational factors, they also tend to be guided into volunteering situations by dispositional factors (Snyder & Ickes, 1985; Schroeder et al., 1995). The "prosocial or altruistic personality" summarizes personal

variables that are typical of the volunteer committed to helping others (Allen & Rushton, 1983; Piliavin & Charng, 1990). Individuals with a prosocial personality have been found to be generally empathic and high in moral development. They have a willingness to accept responsibility for their own actions and for the well being of others. They exhibit other-oriented empathy, a tendency to extend their concern to others who exist beyond the confines of the altruist's own social boundaries. These individuals exhibit self-efficacy, that is, they are confident that they will be capable of meeting inevitable challenges as they strive to act on the behalf of others. They tend to be low in need for approval, suggesting a lack of concern for maintaining the status quo.

Research examining the relationship between personal variables and a strong BJW create a profile strikingly dissimilar to the correlates of the prosocial personality just described. Research has indicated that having a strong BJW is positively correlated with an internal locus of control, an uncritical acceptance of authority, the belief that powerful people are good and powerless people are bad, and a strong belief in an active God (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). High JW believers have been found to be more likely to approve of the social status quo (Smith & Green, 1984) and to admire current political leaders (Rubin & Peplau, 1973; Feather, 1991). Also, high JW believers tend to show strong agreement with the work ethic ideal, a belief that hard work will be rewarded (Smith & Green, 1984). They often have more negative attitudes toward the poor and underprivileged groups (Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Furnham & Gunter, 1984). Their strong BJW may provide a rationale for inaction because they perceive that the status quo is fair (McGraw & Foley, 2000). The individual who does not perceive social inequity or who

can rationalize injustice, does not need to be critical of self in terms of character or behavior. Overall, these findings suggest that high JW beliefs would act as a deterrent for involvement in GT volunteerism.

Problems with Belief in a Just World Measurement

A great deal of Just World research has consisted of constructing experimental situations to learn about the processes involved with the BJW (Furnham, 1998). In general, research has tended to depend heavily on North American university students, thereby focusing on young, middle class, white, educated individuals. On one hand, students may have a heightened awareness of socio-political injustice issues compared to the general population; therefore, their response may not be representative of the larger population (O'Connor, Morrison, McLeod, & Anderson, 1996). As a result of their youth, students may not yet have had significant opportunity to experience incidents of suffering or injustice in their close personal or interpersonal spheres, and therefore may remain somewhat idealistic about their own lives and those close to them. Hunt (2000) is critical of current Just World research because it may reflect a "white only" experience as a result of a failure to incorporate diverse ethnic groups in study samples. This constricted focus has prevented extensive comparison of the influence demographic variables on the BJW.

The most widely used measurement instrument has been the Just World Scale, a 16 item questionnaire developed by Rubin and Peplau in 1973, then revised and expanded to 20 items in 1975. Psychometric properties of the original and revised scales have been weak with internal validity measures ranging from .53 to .81 (Furnham &

Procter, 1989). To improve the reliability of Just World scale, many researchers have separated the scale into items measuring a belief that the world is just (JW) and items measuring a belief that the world is unjust (UJW) (Furnham & Procter, 1989). Separate analysis of these items has shown them to be orthogonal. An example of the use of this approach is Furnham's (1991) cross-cultural study of gender differences in justice beliefs. Furnham separated the scale into JW and UJW components when he found that 5 of the 12 countries represented in his study showed unsatisfactory reliability using the Rubin and Peplau (1973) scale. Furnham found that the Israeli male had greater JW beliefs than the Israeli female, while the Zimbabwean female had greater JW beliefs than the Zimbabwean male. American, Israeli, and South African men had greater UJW beliefs than the women did in those countries. When scores were totaled across cultures, Furnham found there were no significant gender differences in JW or UJW beliefs.

Furnham and Procter (1989) criticize the Rubin and Peplau (1975) Just World Scale because it does not identify a belief in a random world (i.e., a world where rewards and punishments are not consistently awarded and are therefore, not predictable or expected to occur in a logical pattern.

It has been proposed that just world beliefs may apply unevenly to the personal, interpersonal and socio-political domains of one's life (Furnham & Procter, 1989). Uncertainty may be introduced into the Belief in a Just World because it does not specify which of these domains respondents should consider as they complete the scale. To respond to this shortcoming, Furnham constructed the Multidimensional Belief in a Just World Scale (MBJWS) with the intention of measuring three types of justice beliefs

interacting in three separate domains. The interaction of a just, unjust, and random worldview within the personal, interpersonal, and socio-political domains, creates a 3X3 grid, capturing nine different just world beliefs. Unfortunately, the internal consistency for the nine subscales of the MBJWS has been low, in fact lower than the consistency of the Rubin and Peplau scales (Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lipkus, 1991). It is therefore, not a viable alternative for the Rubin and Peplau scales.

Critics of the Rubin and Peplau scales (1973, 1975) propose that the scale is multidimensional. Furnham (1998) observes that the JW and UJW items have similar, yet different correlates, suggesting that the concept is not a unitary dimension. Ambrosio & Sheehan (1990) analyzed responses from American undergraduate students and then conducted a factor analysis of their responses using the Rubin and Peplau (1973) scale. They isolated four factors and found significant gender differences on the total scores. Similarly, Hyland and Dann (1987) used responses from British undergraduates and concluded that the Rubin and Peplau (1975) scale consisted of four factors. They found no gender differences on total scores. Lea and Fekken (1993) examined three separate samples of Canadian undergraduates using the Rubin & Peplau (1975) scale. Like Hyland and Dann (1987), these researchers consistently found four factors in each of their samples, however, these factors were not similar to those found by Hyland and Dann.

This array of findings is difficult to interpret for two important reasons. Each of these research studies utilized a university student sample; therefore generalization to the

larger social structure would potentially be inaccurate. Since each of the studies was conducted in a different culture, discrepancies may be at least partially due to cultural differences in JW beliefs. These cultural effects may be confounded with weaknesses in the BJW scale itself, making it difficult to decipher the meaning of the discrepancies noted above.

In a review and critique of available Just World scales, Furnham and Proctor (1989) question whether the Rubin and Peplau (1975) scale measures the same concept as set out in the theory. While many researchers have assumed that the BJW as measured by the Rubin and Peplau (1973, 1975) scales is stable across time and situation (Furnham, 1998), others use terminology inferring that they perceive the scale measures a much more changeable concept. For example, note the discrepancy between Ambrosio and Sheehan (1990) who refer to the Rubin and Peplau (1975) scale as a measure of attributional process and Ahmed and Stewart (1985) who describe it as a measure of attitudinal consistency. Lerner (1980) raises similar concerns and proposes that the scale may measure the particular attributional style that individuals employ to maintain a BJW rather than actually measuring the degree to which they hold a BJW. Lerner (1998) suggests that the available Just World scales are phrased to measure agreement with immanent belief systems, therefore strong agreement would generally indicate a naïve system of justice beliefs. Lerner expects that most educated, worldly, and especially underprivileged people would be inclined to indicate marginal acceptance at best of the items presented by the questionnaires. Lerner also explains that questionnaires present an opportunity for respondents to engage in conventional morality logic.

Research findings by Smith and Green (1984) support Lerner's hypothesis. These researchers found that those have personally experienced inequality have weaker JW beliefs. Their study found that American blacks have lower BJW scores than whites, and that income levels are positively correlated with BJW scores. Similarly, the unemployed have been found to have weaker JW beliefs than the employed and minority groups also tend to have lower JW scores (Begue & Fumey, 2000).

Lipkus (1991) has recently constructed a promising, new 7- item scale as an alternative to the Rubin and Peplau (1975) scale. The items of the Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS) are carefully worded so that each justice statement is general rather than domain specific. Lipkus presented the scale to independent samples of American undergraduate students. Overall, study results indicated that the internal consistency for the scale was acceptable at an alpha of .827, factor analysis suggested unidimensionality, and gender was not a confounding variable. O'Connor et al., (1996) administered this scale to Canadian undergraduate students and found an internal reliability of .80. Factor analysis, however, indicated some inconsistency with the American findings. The Canadian study produced one factor for females and two for males. By removing one item from the original seven, a re-analysis of results produced a one factor solution.

The Rubin and Peplau (1975) scale has been used in the present study despite the problems that continue to plague this measurement instrument. A significant proportion of this scale addresses criminal justice and health issues that are salient to GT volunteers represented in this study. As a result, this scale may be more relevant to this group of

participants than the GBJWS. While inconsistent internal reliability has created doubts about the usefulness of the Rubin and Peplau (1973, 1975) scales, other findings continue to encourage researchers to persist in using these scales in their investigations (Furnham & Procter, 1989). Specifically, a significant number of studies have shown satisfactory face, concurrent, and predictive validity by finding significant correlation with other reliable self-measures. Use of the Rubin and Peplau scales permits the present study to make comparisons to the extensive research that has been conducted over the past 20 years. It is important to note that interpretation of present study scores derived from the Rubin and Peplau (1975) scale can be meaningful if the shortcomings of the scale are kept in mind. Lerner (1998) suggests that just world scales may provide useful information if the scales are interpreted in relative terms. In particular, he indicates that those who tend to agree more strongly to items on the BJW scale would be more likely to derogate victims or blame them for their plight than those who register a lower score.

The Role of Causal Attribution in Cognitive Adaptation to Injustice

Causal analysis may help victims or observers establish meaning within tragic or difficult circumstances. By acquiring an understanding of what caused an event to happen, one is able to feel more secure about the future because they now may have the potential to avoid the development of similar occurrences in the future (Utne & Kidd, 1980; Taylor 1983; Spilka, Shaver, & Kirkpatrick, 1985; Montada, 1992). Causal analysis may also contribute a sense of mastery if the cause is believed to be no longer present, therefore not threatening for the future. Lerner (1980) suggests that the strength of one's belief in the existence of a just world directly affects the stress one experiences

when witnessing injustice. Observers with a low BJW do not tend to be as distressed, and report less relief from engaging in a causal analysis (Lupfer, Doan, & Houston, 1998).

The preceding sections have shown how observers of injustice may initially look to internal factors, specifically negative aspects of the victim's character and behavior, to defend a BJW that has been threatened. Attributing an external cause for an injustice may provide an alternate form of relief for observers with a high BJW (Lerner, 1980; Utne & Kidd, 1980; Lupfer et al., 1998) when blaming the victim or derogating their character is not feasible. External causal factors include variables like the influence of other individuals or God on a tragic incident. Helpers are generally more responsive to external, uncontrollable causation because this attributional style assumes the victim is not responsible for their fate (Utne & Kidd, 1980; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). Causes that are perceived as controllable, such as the victim's behavior or some aspects of their personality, tend to generate anger and lack of pity for the victim while uncontrollable causes generate sympathy, no anger, and offers of help (Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).

Potential Relationship between Justice Beliefs and Attributional Style

Lupfer and colleagues (1998) propose that strong believers may tend to place greater importance on attributional analysis because they are more distressed by the possibility of injustice. They suggest that those with a strong BJW are able to make a clear judgment of causality by utilizing a complex attributional style. In a relatively small study, Lupfer et al. (1998) found support for this proposal. The participants in this

study who perceived the world as more just, also tended to have a preference for complex attributional analyses.

Earlier attributional theory suggests that the tendency to prefer simple schemata to complex schemata is closely related the immanent justice style of logic (Kelley, 1973). As discussed previously, immanent justice reasoning is characteristic of an individual with a high BJW. Other literature also suggests that attributional complexity will not be positively correlated to the strength of the BJW. Fletcher et al. (1986) describe attributional complexity as the preference to look to both internal and external sources of information. They note that less complex individuals tend to commit fundamental attribution error. This type of error describes the tendency of people to overestimate the causal role of internal determinants or personal characteristics while simultaneously underestimating the role of external determinants or situational factors. Note that the fundamental attribution error is strikingly similar to the description of immanent justice reasoning.

As a result of the above theoretical discrepancies, additional research is needed to discover possible conceptual links between attributional complexity and the BJW. As an alternative to Lupfer et al.'s (1998) proposal, it may be that simple attributional schemata also allow an individual with a high BJW to achieve causal clarity. The simpler style might enable an individual to arrive at a causal solution more rapidly and decisively because they would have fewer possibilities to consider.

Attributions Involving God as an External Factor

People often turn to God in negative outcome situations to find meaning in the experience, to express their feelings about what has happened, and to ask for help in dealing with the difficult situation (Pargament & Hahn, 1986). Highly religious individuals may be less inclined to derogate a victim as a result of their belief in Ultimate Justice (Lerner & Miller, 1978). Religion offers an assurance that there will be an after-life that will be free of suffering and where the bereaved will at last be reunited with their loved one (Cook & Wimberley, 1983). This hope may make death less frightening for them than it is for individuals without a religious faith. Parents of terminally ill children also turn to a form of ultimate justice belief when they perceive that their child's participation in medical treatment will generate new knowledge related to their child's disease or condition. They may be sustained by the hope that will one day other children with a similar affliction will benefit from their own child's sacrifice (Cook & Wimberley, 1983; Chodoff, Friedman, & Hamburg, 1964).

Religious belief systems are often accessed for causal analysis when secular belief systems fail to provide satisfactory explanations. The choice of religious or secular belief system may depend on which system offers the greatest promise of control over future events (Spilka et al., 1985). Kunst, Bjork, and Tan (2000) found that the more religious people are, the more they will make religious causal attributions when they are personally confronted with events that have no apparent causal explanations. In the Kunst et al. study, religious conservatism was significantly correlated to causal

attributions of God's will, evil spiritual forces, and chance. Pargament & Hahn (1986) found similar results in a study utilizing imaginal health scenarios. Participants of this study often explained that their health problem was due to either chance or to God's will when their health outcome was not contingent on prior behavior. Some of these individuals perceived that a negative health experience provided them with a God-given opportunity to learn. Others assumed that they must have done something wrong to anger God. In Pargament and Hahn's study, participants relied heavily on external attributions to explain causality. The authors propose that participants might have used internal attributions as well, had they been asked to imagine these events had happened to someone else.

CHAPTER III: METHOD

This study was designed to reveal underlying motivational factors, justice beliefs, and attributional styles of volunteers who support victims of grief and trauma. A group of community service volunteers was utilized by the study to provide comparative data. The design and method of this study are described in the following sections of this chapter. A description of the participant groups is followed by a discussion of the distribution of the questionnaire and the components of the study questionnaire. Procedures used to analyze the results and the limitations of the study will also be described.

Participants

Volunteers from Victim Services agencies (i.e., Cochrane, Airdrie, Calgary, High River, Okotoks, Turner Valley and Black Diamond), a palliative care group from the Peter Lougheed Center, and a pastoral care group from the Rockyview Hospital formed the Grief and Trauma (GT) study group of 49. This represented a response rate of 49.49% of the GT volunteers who were invited to participate (N=99). Volunteers from a large committee affiliated with the Calgary Stampede Board formed the community service (CS) comparison group. A total of 51 of these volunteers returned the survey, representing 35.97% of the CS volunteers approached (N=139). Of the 238 questionnaires that were distributed to the volunteer agencies in this study, 105 were returned, providing an overall return rate of 44.18%. Because a significant amount of data were missing from 5 respondents, data from the remaining 100 participants were entered into the analysis.

The GT and the CS groups were very similar in terms of age (see Table 1) and meaningful religious affiliation. The mean GT volunteer age was 51.83 while the mean CS volunteer age was 51.96. Religious affiliation was meaningful to a large proportion of both volunteers groups (69.4 % GT; 58.8% CS). Overall, these volunteers were affiliated with predominantly Western religious ideologies (31.3% Catholic; 59.4% Protestant; 3.1% Latter Day Saints; 1.5% Islam; and 4.7% "other" category).

Table 1.

Comparison of Participant's Age by Group

Age	N		% of Participant Group	
	GT	CS	GT	CS
18-24	3	2	6.1	3.9
25-34	7	1	14.3	2.0
35-44	7	5	14.3	9.8
45-54	8	23	16.3	4.5
55-64	9	14	18.4	2.7
65-74	10	3	20.00	5.9
75-84	4	1	8.2	2.0
Age Total	48	49	98	96.1

The CS volunteers were relatively more affluent than the GT volunteers. Their mean household income fell within the "$60,000 to $79,999" level while the GT mean income fell within the "$40,000 to $59,999" level. See Table 2 for a detailed comparison. The groups also differed in terms of their gender composition with the CS group having a larger contingent of male volunteers. The GT groups were comprised of 85.4% female and 14.6% male while the CS groups was comprised of 60.4% female and 39.6% male volunteers.

Table 2.

Comparison of Annual Income Levels of Volunteer Groups

	N		% of Participant Group	
Income Category	GT	CS	GT	CS
less than 10,000	4		8.0	
20-39,999	13	4	26.6	7.8
40-59,999	10	13	20.4	25.5
60-79,999	6	9	12.2	17.6
80-99,999		6		11.8
more than 100,000	6	14	12.2	27.5
Total	39	46	79.6	90.2

Finally, the CS volunteers had served longer than the GT volunteers ($\underline{M}$=10.6 years; 5.5 years, respectively). Overall, most GT and CS volunteers indicated that they had experienced acting in a supportive capacity for others, either with those who faced serious illness, had been criminally victimized, or who had been bereaved by a sudden death. See Table 3 for descriptive statistics. The majority of volunteers indicated that they had life experience, volunteer experience, or both life and volunteer experience in each of these areas. However, a number had no experience supporting serious illness (3% GT; 14% CS), criminal victimization (12% GT; 35% CS), or bereavement as a result of sudden death (2% GT; 13% CS).

Table 3.

Levels of Experience as a Helper		N or %	
	Illness	Crime	Sudden Death
Volunteer and life experience	34	26	47
Volunteer experience only	1	8	1
Life experience only	48	19	37
No experience	17	47	15
Total	100	100	100

Procedure

Administrative personnel at each of the GT sites represented in this study indicated the number of volunteers on their roster who had served their agency for a minimum of one year and who were currently active. No other selection criteria was used such as age, gender, race, education, religion, etc. The administration at each GT site passed a Study Packet containing a cover letter (Appendix A), the Volunteerism Questionnaire, and a mail back envelope to the participants who qualified (N=99). The researcher attended an organizational meeting of the CS volunteers and orally presented information regarding purpose of the study, confidentiality, and anonymity of the participants. Study Packets, identical to those received by the GT volunteers, were then passed out to each CS volunteer in attendance (N=139). In both groups, those participants who chose to become involved in the study completed their questionnaires and mailed them back in an envelope that was provided.

Instruments

The Volunteerism Questionnaire began by requesting demographic information, including the name of the participant's volunteer agency, length of volunteer service, other volunteer activity, age, gender, estimated annual household income, and religious affiliation. Respondents were then asked two qualitative questions: "What were the factors that motivated you to become involved as a volunteer with this agency?" and "What are the beliefs, values, or attitudes that support you at times when you become discouraged in your volunteer role?" These questions were intended to provide both

support for and additional information to the measuring instruments included in the questionnaire.

The following measuring instruments were incorporated into the Volunteerism Questionnaire: the Volunteer Functions Inventory (Clary et al., 1998); the Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975); the Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher et al., 1986) and the Ultimate Justice Scale (Mäes, 1998). The psychometric properties of these instruments will be discussed in the following sections.

The questionnaire concluded by asking participants to engage in causal attribution for the incidents that they recalled while they were in a supportive role as a volunteer or in their personal life experience. Incidents included supporting others who had been affected by any of the following possibilities: serious illness, criminal victimization, or bereavement due to sudden death. Participants who had neither volunteer or life experience in any of these areas, were invited to waive the final section of the questionnaire.

Volunteer Functions Inventory

To measure the plans and purposes that motivated the groups of volunteers to become involved with their chosen field, and to determine the degree that they had experienced these factors during their volunteer work term, the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI; see Appendix B) was administered (Clary et al., 1998). The VFI also asks respondents to indicate whether their purposes for volunteering have been

satisfactorily met and whether they intend to continue volunteering in the next calendar year.

The VFI is comprised of 7-point Likert style questions. The present study, however, presented the VFI in a 6-point Likert format to make this section consistent with the other sections of the questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate the accuracy of 47 statements in relation to their volunteer experience (e.g., "I am genuinely concerned about the particular group I am serving"). Ratings ranged from "1 = strongly disagree" to "6 = strongly agree".

The first two sections of the VFI have six subscale scores, indicating Value, Understanding, Social, Career, Enhancement, and Protective functions. Examples of statements representing each function are as follows:

- "I am concerned about those less fortunate than myself" (Value).

- "I can learn more about the cause for which I am working" (Understanding).

- "My friends volunteer" (Social).

- "Volunteering can help me get a foot in the door at a place where I'd like to work" (Career).

- "Volunteering makes me feel important" (Enhancement).

- "No matter how bad I've been feeling, volunteering helps me to forget about it" (Protective).

The first 30 questions of the VFI measure the significance of each of the above motivational functions as a reason for volunteering at the current agency, while the next

12 questions measure the level that each of these functions has been experienced as a volunteering outcome. Then, five questions address how satisfied the volunteer has been with their experience of these functions in their volunteer work term. As a final question, respondents are asked to indicate whether they intend to continue volunteering with their present agency, another agency, or not at all in the upcoming year. Scoring for each section of the VFI is based on the sum of the Likert scale responses. The higher scores indicate the factors that are most important for an individual volunteer.

Clary et al. (1998) initially tested the VFI using a large, diverse sample of active volunteers (N=434). In a second study (N=535), they sampled university students, a younger group for whom volunteering was assumed to be less salient. For both of these studies, Clary et al. used a LISREL factor analytic technique to determine that a six-factor VFI provided optimal goodness-of-fit. Chi-square analysis was also performed to support the validity of the six-factor solution. Using data from the first study, Cronbach's alpha coefficients were calculated to support the internal consistency of each subscale. These values ranged from .80 to .89 (Career, $r = .89$; Enhancement, $r = .84$; Social, $r = .83$; Understanding, $r = .81$; Protective, $r = .81$; and Values, $r = .80$).

A third study (N=65) demonstrated temporal stability of the VFI over a 1-month period (Values, $r = .78$; Understanding and Enhancement, $r = .77$; Social and Career, $r = .68$; and Protective, $r = .64$; all $ps < .001$).

The Just World Scale

This scale was designed to measure stable differences in how individuals perceive whether the world is a place where people generally deserve their fates (Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Appendix C). Respondents are asked to indicate their agreement to 11 statements on a 6-point Likert scale indicating that the world is just. For example, statement 21 declares, "It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail." Nine additional statements are worded in the opposite direction and therefore must be reverse scored. The reverse wording indicates that the world is not just, as in statement 25, "I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has." Participants are asked to indicate the accuracy of these 20 statements using ratings ranging from "1 = strongly disagree" to "6 = strongly agree". In the Rubin and Peplau (1975) study, mean individual item scores were calculated to indicate the overall tendency of the sample to either accept or reject the notion that the world is a just place. This study reported that a mean individual item score of 3.08 was found for a sample of Boston undergraduate students, indicating a slight tendency to reject the belief that the world is a just place.

Rubin and Peplau (1975) found an internal reliability of .80 for the scale. Subsequent research using the full 20-item scale has produced inconsistent internal reliabilities ranging from .54 to .79 (Smith & Green, 1984; Feather, 1991; Ambrosio & Sheehan, 1991; Taylor & Kleinke, 1992; Lea & Fekken, 1993; Whatley, 1993; Tomaka & Blaskovich, 1994; Tanaka, 1999). The inconsistent internal reliability and lack of research attention to determining test-retest reliability have been criticized as major weaknesses of the Just World Scale (Furnham, 1998).

In spite of the psychometric challenges noted above, a substantial body of research has contributed to the construct validity of Rubin and Peplau's (1975) Just World Scale. This research has linked the individual's Just World score to their reaction to rape victims (Kleinke & Meyer, 1990; Whatley, & Riggio, 1993; Drout & Gaertner, 1994; Ford, Liwag-McLamb, & Foley, 1998) and to AIDS victims (Connors & Heaven, 1990). Similarly, it has connected judgments of drunk drivers (Taylor & Kleinke, 1992), and perceptions of criminals and victims to Just World scores (O'Quinn & Volger, 1989; Foley & Pigott, 2000; McGraw & Foley, 2000). Reactions to personal deprivation or victimization (Janoff Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Hafer & Olson, 1993), and ego-centric fairness bias (Tanaka, 1999) have also supported the construct validity of the Just World Scale.

Rubin and Peplau (1975, p. 70) state that the scale taps "an underlying general belief that can meaningfully be viewed as a single attitudinal continuum." Ahmed and Stewart (1985) also identify a single factor. More recently, Hyland and Dann (1987) and Lea and Fekken (1993) have conducted factor analysis to identify four factors. These latest studies, however, have not agreed on the specific factors that make up the Rubin and Peplau (1975) Just Word Scale; therefore, their results are equivocal. Current research efforts are focused on developing a new scale (O'Connor et al., 1996; Furnham & Proctor, 1989; Lipkus, 1991; Furnham, 1998).

Ultimate Justice Items

A tendency to believe that a present injustice will be corrected in the future enables observers of injustice to anticipate a positive outcome in an altered time frame

(Lerner, 1980; Mäes, 1998). Mäes (1998) developed a 4-item, "Belief in Ultimate Justice Scale" to measure this tendency (Appendix C). An example of these items is "Even amidst the worst suffering, one should not lose faith that justice will one day prevail and set things right". In a study of attitudes toward cancer and cancer patients (N=326), internal consistency for the Ultimate Justice Scale was found to be .86. The four items taken from this scale were randomly placed among the Just World statements in the Volunteerism Questionnaire. The present study included an additional item to measure Ultimate Justice beliefs in response to criminal victimization (i.e. item 14, "Criminals will ultimately answer for their deeds"). Just World items and Ultimate Justice items were summed separately to produce either Belief in a Just World score or an Ultimate Justice score.

Attributional Complexity Scale

Fletcher et al. (1986) developed the Attributional Complexity Scale (Appendix D) to measure individual differences in the development of seven attributional constructs, each ranging along a simple-complex dimension. This scale presents 28 statements, with 4 items representing each of the seven attributional constructs. These constructs describe the tendency of complex individuals to have:

— a heightened motivation to explore human behavioral processes

— a preference to search for complex rather than simple explanations of behavior

— a tendency toward metacognition concerning attributional processes

— a tendency to consider the influence of social variables on others' behavior

— a tendency to infer abstract internal explanations for behavior

- a tendency to infer abstract external explanations with reference to contemporary events

- a tendency to refer to external events as explanations operating from the past

Respondents indicate their agreement with each item using a 6-point Likert style response from "-3 = strongly disagree" to "3 = strongly agree." The present study used a 6-point Likert scale ranging from "1 = strongly disagree" to "6 = strongly agree" to achieve a consistent presentation with other sections of the questionnaire. Half of the items suggest complex attributional constructs (e.g., "I believe it is important to understand our own thinking processes"). The second half, representing simple constructs, are reverse scored (e.g., "I don't usually bother to analyze and explain people's behavior"). When the sum of the responses is calculated, higher scores are indicative of more complex responses.

In their initial administration of the Attributional Complexity Scale, Fletcher et al. (1986) used a principal-components analysis to demonstrate that the scale measures a single factor. Their results also indicated that the scale possesses adequate internal reliability (coefficient alpha = .85) and test-retest reliability (r = .80 over an 18 day period). Follow up studies supported the scale's discriminant and convergent validity.

Causal Attribution Task

Prior research examining how individuals use causal attribution when faced with the task of making meaning of uncontrollable negative events has often asked participants to respond to vignettes or case studies (Jones & Aronson, 1973; Lupfer et al., 1998; Madey et al., 1993; Kunst et al., 2000). To make the attribution process

more salient to participants, the present study asked them to reflect on incidents of serious illness, bereavement as a result of sudden death, or criminal victimization during which they had acted in a supportive role for the victim (Appendix E). Participants were asked to identify whether this had occurred in their volunteer work, in their personal lives, or both. Participants were then invited to engage in causal attribution for these events using a range of internal, external, or random causal factors (chance). The causal factors selected for the questionnaire were derived from results of previous research that utilized a series vignettes depicting life-altering and non life-altering events (Lupfer, Tolliver, & Jackson, 1996). In the prior study, participants engaged in spontaneous attributional analyses of the scenarios; content analysis of these responses yielded a list of factors that that formed the core of those used in the present study. Participants in the present study were asked to assess how frequently they perceived each factor was directly responsible for the negative outcome they had witnessed by using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from "1 = never a factor" to "6 = always a factor".

In the present study, attributions to internal categories were intended to identify a tendency toward using victim blame or victim derogation as an attributional style. The internal factor choices included personal habits and personality, causal factors that appear controllable. It was expected that a reliance on using internal factors as an explanation of negative outcome would support BJW findings. Attributions to external factors or chance generally suggest that victims do not have control over their negative

outcome. In the Volunteerism Questionnaire, external factor choices included attributions to the influence of other individuals, God, or evil spiritual forces. Some external factor choices had a positive tone while others were negative in nature. Positive choices included:

- "The experience is a working through of God's will or purpose"

- " The experience is meant to provide an opportunity to experience God's love or reward"

It was expected that a tendency to use these positive attributions would support the Ultimate Justice Belief findings. Negative attribution choices included:

- "The experience is a manifestation of evil spiritual forces"

- "The experience is a result of other's negative influence"

- "The experience is God's punishment for past behavior"

CHAPTER IV: RESULTS

This chapter reviews the descriptive and inferential analyses that were performed using data from the study questionnaire as well as an overview of responses to qualitative questions. Each of the study's research questions will be addressed in order in this chapter. In answering each question, a comparison will be made between the GT volunteer group and the CS volunteer group, with the intention of discriminating some of the qualities of the GT volunteer from volunteers who do not routinely deal with grief or trauma in their volunteer duty.

An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests; therefore controlling the probability of incorrectly rejecting a true H_0 to 5%. Power calculations revealed that the study sample sizes (harmonic mean of the sample sizes = 50) provided an adequate probability for correctly rejecting a false H_0 for large or medium effect sizes. Calculations indicated power = 98% for a large (.80) effect size, 71% for a medium (.50) effect size, but only 17% for a small (.20) effect size.

Missing values were not replaced for any of the measurement instruments that were incorporated into the Volunteerism Questionnaire (i.e., the Just World Scale, the Ultimate Justice Scale, the Attributional Complexity Scale, and the Volunteer Functions Inventory). Instead, participant responses were excluded from analysis of any instrument that had not been completed in its entirety. This was done to avoid misinterpretations of scores that would have been falsely low.

Standardized alpha coefficients indicated that reliability was adequate for responses to both the BJWS, the Ultimate Justice Scale and the Attributional Complexity Scale (r=.73, .73, .93, respectively). The Volunteer Functions Inventory also yielded acceptable reliability with standardized alpha coefficients ranging from .78 to .89 (Value, r=.78; Social, Enhancement, and Protect, r = .80; Understanding, r = .82; and Career, r = .89).

<div align="center">Research Question #1A</div>

What factors do GT volunteers cite as important in drawing them into service?

This question was addressed by using the first section of the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) (Clary et al., 1998). Likert scale responses were summed to yield a possible range of scores of 5 to 30 for each volunteer function. In the present study, cumulative scores above 17.5, the midpoint of the range, were determined to indicate relative interest in a function while scores below 17.5 indicated relative disinterest.

GT volunteers indicated that Value, Understanding, and Enhancement were salient functions while Social, Career and Protect were relatively unimportant (ranked from highest to lowest mean group score). Similarly, CS volunteers indicated that the Understanding, Value, Enhancement, and Social functions were salient reasons to volunteer, while the Career and Protect functions were of lesser importance. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics, comparing the results for the GT and CS groups.

Hypothesis #1A proposed that GT volunteers would be motivated to a greater extent by Value functions (Clary et al., 1998) than CS and that CS volunteers would be

motivated to a greater extent by Social functions than GT volunteers. Levene's test of

equality of error variances indicated unequal variance between groups [measuring Value

and Social functions respectively, F (1,95) =15.689, p = .001; F (1,95) =4.754, p = .032].

Therefore, non-parametric inferential statistics were used to test this hypothesis. The

Kruskal-Wallis test supported the hypotheses that Value functions were significantly

more salient for the GT volunteers [χ^2 (1, N=97) = 40.36, p<.001], while Social functions

were significantly more influential for the CS volunteers [χ^2 (1, N=98) = 13.318,

p<.001]. Mean rank for Value was 66.16 (GT) and 29.98 (CS); for Social was 39.46

(GT) and 60.39(CS).

Table 4.

A Comparison of the Importance of Volunteer Functions By Group

Agency		Value	Understanding	Enhancement	Social	Career	Protect
GT	Mean	27.65	23.83	19.19	14.60	14.08	13.71
	N	48	47	48	48	48	48
	S.D.	2.41	5.09	5.66	6.09	7.43	5.63
CS	Mean	22.16	22.90	19.62	17.64	12.98	12.86
	N	49	51	50	50	50	50
	S.D.	4.72	4.61	5.52	5.31	7.17	5.12
Total	Mean	24.88	23.35	19.41	16.15	13.52	13.28
	N	97	98	98	98	98	98
	S.D.	4.65	4.84	5.57	5.88	7.28	5.37

Note: Possible range of scores for each Function was 5 – 30.

Research Question #1B

To what extent do the GT volunteers in this study experience the functional factors that motivated them to participate in the first place and has this level of experience been satisfying for them?

Responses to the second section of the VFI were used to indicate the degree to which volunteers had experienced each of the six functions. Hypothesis 1B proposed that levels of Experience functions would closely match Motivational Functions. Responses to each of the Experience Functions produced a possible range of scores from 2 to 12. Cumulative scores above 7, the midpoint of the range, were determined to indicate a relative degree of experience with a particular function in the course of volunteer work while scores below 7 indicated relative inexperience with that function.

Overall, GT volunteers indicated that they had experienced the Value, Understanding, Social, and Enhancement functions (ranked in order of most to least significant). Although GT volunteers had not been seeking Social functions when they engaged in volunteer work, they indicated that these functions had been an important part of their volunteer experience. The CS volunteers indicated experience with Social, Understanding, Enhancement, and Value functions (again ranked in order of most to least significant). Although Social functions had been less important than the Value, Understanding, and Enhancement functions at the outset of volunteering, these factors were identified as the most salient during the volunteer term for the CS volunteers. Value functions, second in their influence in the decision to volunteer, were ranked fourth in the volunteer's actual experience. Both groups indicated that the Career and Protect

functions had not been important in their experience. See Table 5 for descriptive statistics.

Table 5.

A Comparison of the Experience of Volunteer Functions							
Group		Value	Understanding	Social	Enhancement	Career	Protect
GT	Mean	10.22	9.49	8.98	8.41	5.47	4.98
	N	49	47	49	49	49	49
	S.D.	1.90	2.37	3.22	2.56	3.34	2.90
CS	Mean	7.45	8.92	9.76	8.16	5.08	4.14
	N	49	51	51	51	49	50
Total	Mean	8.84	9.20	9.38	8.28	5.28	4.56
	N	98	100	100	100	98	99
	S.D.	2.43	2.32	2.91	2.31	3.06	2.54

Note: Possible range of scores for each Function was 2 - 12.

Satisfaction levels were indicated by the final questions of the VFI. Likert responses to five items presented a possible range of scores from 5 to 30. Both groups indicated a very strong level of satisfaction with their volunteer program (GT, $M=27.12$, $SD=3.37$, N=48; CS, $M=25.56$, $SD=4.15$, N=48). In addition, when asked whether they intended to continue with their current agency, the majority of the volunteers indicated their positive intention (GT=85.11%, CS=94.12%). Some intended to continue

with their current volunteer work and also work with another agency (GT=4.3%), while others intended to volunteer only at another agency (GT= 4.3%; CS=5.88%). A few volunteers did not plan to continue volunteering at all in the upcoming year (GT=6.38%).

Participant's responses to the qualitative question, "What factors motivated you to become involved as a volunteer with this agency?" generally supported the results of the VFI. GT volunteers wrote predominantly about Value functions such as caring for people and having a desire to help people who might not otherwise be able to cope. Many related that they felt a social need to offer support to victims was not being met. For them, GT volunteerism was a means of giving something valuable back to their community. For some, volunteerism provided an opportunity to express deeply held religious values. Judging by the frequency of responses, the Understanding function of volunteerism was apparently second in importance for GT volunteers as they spoke of their desire to learn about the health profession, the criminal justice system, or the helping professions. Responses reflecting an Enhancement function were relatively infrequent. Typically these statements mentioned that volunteerism helped the volunteer feel good, better, or more fulfilled. A few volunteers alluded to Career functions when they spoke of the hope that volunteerism would help them get into a chosen school or profession or they stated that volunteerism would give them a chance to use career related skills. Social and Protect functions were rarely cited as reasons for volunteering.

Qualitative responses from the CS volunteers spoke most strongly about the Social and Value functions of their volunteer choice. Social functions were cited most

frequently, describing volunteers' enjoyment of involvement with other volunteers. They also described their awareness that volunteerism would provide opportunities to meet new people, make new friends, and to interact with a diverse range of individuals. Belief in the Stampede organization, civic pride, and a desire to give valuable service to the community were typical Value responses. CS volunteers were also keen to gain in Understanding through their volunteer work. They hoped to use their volunteer term to learn about themselves and others, to learn and apply new skills, and to grow in their knowledge of the organization of the Stampede. The CS volunteers rarely provided examples of Career, Protect, and Enhancement functions.

Research Question #2

What are the beliefs, values, and attitudes that GT volunteers cite as being supportive toward their volunteer role?

GT volunteers offered a variety of responses to the qualitative question, "What are the beliefs, values, or attitudes that support you at times when you become discouraged in your volunteer role?" As expected, many volunteers remarked about the significance of personal values, factors that had originally motivated them to engage in GT volunteerism (e.g., "I can make a difference in other people's lives", "I am needed", or "I can make the world a better place to live to raise our families"). They were also aware of personal benefits received through volunteerism such being enriched by their clients and finding fulfillment or sense of purpose. Volunteers offered information beyond what had been gleaned by the VFI. They spoke of receiving support from

friends, family, and team members. A few looked to church members, prayer or meditation for sustenance. For a few, an ethical imperative helped sustain their participation (e.g., "everyone must help others").

Responses often indicated how GT volunteers use cognitive adaptation to deal with difficulties in their volunteer work. For example, a number of volunteers used downward comparison, reminding themselves that others were experiencing more difficult times than they were themselves. Many described their ability to stay positive, reminding themselves that challenging times come and go. Sometimes volunteers stepped back to assess their involvement within their volunteer role. For example, a number remarked that they had chosen this role and therefore could discontinue whenever they decided. Some volunteers stated that their role was to offer understanding and assistance but that they could not control how others thought or acted. Although it would be possible to connect with some clients, some might not respond; only the client could take responsibility for their own behavior.

Many CS volunteers described personal characteristics that enabled them to overcome difficulties they encountered during their volunteer role. These included being dependable, cheerful, and positive; being respectful of the group and its overall goals; having a strong work ethic; being mature; having a sense of humor; and finally, having a desire to do good for others. Like the GT volunteers, the CS volunteers also realized that they had chosen their role and had the ability to leave it whenever they might choose. They reminded themselves that problems come and go and that some volunteers are able to contribute more time than others. CS volunteers looked forward to the benefits of their

volunteer term including the enjoyment of socializing during the event itself, and of being a part of a large successful organization. They looked forward to personal growth through learning new skills, and to receiving incentives offered by the organization to its volunteers. CS volunteers looked to support from family, friends, other volunteers, the organization, and the public.

Research Question #3

If the belief that the world is just or fair could be represented on a continuum from "total acceptance" to "total rejection", where would the beliefs of GT volunteers generally fall?

Hypothesis #3A proposed that GT volunteers would have a relatively lower BJWS than CS volunteers. This hypothesis was supported by using a univariate analyses of variance, entering the Attributional Complexity Scores as a dependent variable. Levene's test of equality of error variances indicated that the error variance of BJWS, the dependent variable, was equal across groups, $F(1,90) = .178$, $p = .674$. A comparison of the GT and CS means for BJWS indicated a significant difference, $F(1,90) = 4.483$, $p = .037$. This difference in group means produced a somewhat less-than-moderate effect size of .43, and power $= .52$. See Table 6 for descriptive statistics.

Hypothesis #3B suggested that GT volunteers will have a greater tendency than CS volunteers to hold Ultimate Justice beliefs. In other words, GT volunteers might cognitively adapt to a perception of injustice in the present context by believing that justice would be restored in the future. Levene's test of equality of error variances indicated that the error variance of the Ultimate Justice Score was equal across groups,

F (1,88) =.2.294, p = .133. While the mean GT volunteer score was higher than the mean

CS volunteer score (M=19.19, SD=3.78; M=18.12, SD=5.02, respectively), a

univariate analysis of variance indicated that this difference was not significant, F (1,90)

= 1.33, p= .252.

<div align="center">Research Question #4</div>

How do GT volunteers explain causality when "bad things happen to good people"?

Do they tend to be simplistic, judging other's character and behaviors as either right

or wrong? Or are they motivated to consider a broad range of factors, including

present and past context as well as a variety of external and internal factors?

Hypothesis #4 proposed that GT volunteers would present higher Attributional

Complexity than CS volunteers. The Attributional Complexity Scale presents 28

statements, each describing an attributional quality. Half of the statements indicate a

complex attributional style, while the other half are reverse worded, indicating a simple

attributional style. Responses to the simple statements are reverse scored so that the

cumulative score will be directly proportional to the complexity of the participant's

attributional style.

A univariate analysis of variance was used to test and support Hypothesis #4 with

Attributional Complexity entered as a dependent variable along with BJWS. Levene's

test of equality of error variances indicated that the error variance of the dependent

variable, attributional complexity in this case, was equal across groups, F (1,90) = .038, p

= .846. A significant difference in group means was found, F (1,90) = 9.544, p= .003,

indicating that the GT volunteers presented a more complex attributional

style compared to the CS volunteers. The effect size for this difference in means was intermediate between moderate and large (d =.62), yielding power = .85. See Table 6 for relevant descriptive statistics.

Table 6.

Descriptive Statistics for Research Questions #3 and #4				
Scale	Agency	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
BJWS	GT	48	76.15	12.02
	CS	44	81.07	10.09
	Total	92	78.50	11.35
Attributional Complexity	GT	48	30.81	31.30
	CS	44	11.68	27.78
	Total	92	21.66	31.03

The final section of the questionnaire was also intended to address Research question #4. Participant's responses to this section are summarized in Table 7. A tendency to attribute causality to internal factors was measured by summing the participant's Likert scale responses to their perception of the likelihood that victim's personal behaviors or character acted as the causal factors of their experience of serious illness, sudden death or criminal victimization.

Similarly, a tendency to believe that injustice occurs randomly was measured by summing responses to "chance" across the three types of events. Causal attributions to God's will or the opportunity to experience God's reward were summed as positive external attributions. Finally, attributions to other's negative influence, evil spiritual forces, and God's punishment, were summed to measure attributions to negative external forces. When mean values for each category were compared, there did not appear to be a substantial difference between groups, therefore no further statistical analysis was undertaken.

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Table 7.

Summary of Causal Attributions					
Agency		Blame	Chance	Positive External	Negative External
GT	Mean	20.32	10.07	14.07	16.71
	N	44	40	40	38
	S.D.	4.43	2.93	6.19	4.29
	Mean item score	3.39	3.36	2.35	1.86
CS	Mean	18.87	10.64	13.62	15.62
	N	38	36	32	32
	S.D.	5.04	3.72	7.35	5.15
	Mean item score	3.15	3.54	2.27	1.73
Total	Mean	19.65	10.34	13.87	16.21
	N	82	76	72	70
	S.D.	4.75	3.32	6.68	4.70
	Mean item score	3.27	3.45	2.31	1.80
Note: Potential Range of Scores		6 - 36	3 - 18	6 - 36	9 - 54

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION

The results of the present study provide data that support a commonsense assumption that GT volunteers become involved in their volunteer task primarily because they have a deep concern for the welfare of others. The results also support previous research that has shown that volunteers are typically motivated by multiple factors, including both altruistic and egoistic goals (Clary et al., 1998). The GT and CS volunteer groups in this study both claimed high levels of satisfaction during their volunteer term, and overall, gave strong indication that they intended to continue their commitment in the following year. It may be inferred that the level of satisfaction enjoyed by these volunteers was linked to the ability of the volunteer experience to provide adequate levels of the functions that were salient to the volunteers as they began, and remained involved in, their volunteer duty.

Some caution is advisable when interpreting these results. Like any other self-report instrument, the Volunteer Functions Inventory (Clary et al., 1998) is subject to the influence of social desirability. Since altruism is a highly regarded personal characteristic, volunteers who are cast in a helping role, may have a deep desire to see themselves as altruistic and to present this facet of themselves to others. As a result, they may have a tendency to exaggerate their responses to Value function items. Likewise, participants may minimize responses to Protective functions items to avoid revealing vulnerabilities (e.g., struggling with personal problems, experiencing feelings of guilt about being more fortunate than others, or being lonely). In general, volunteer's responses may be influenced by expectations of how they "should" fill their volunteer

role. If they idealize the role as self-less, it will be difficult for volunteers to acknowledge their attraction to the egoistic benefits of volunteering. For example, they may be reluctant to indicate that their decision to volunteer was influenced by a desire to be well regarded by others socially important to them. The above concerns suggest that the Volunteer Functions Inventory should be interpreted carefully, realizing that many volunteers will naturally respond to a desire to put their best foot forward as they answer the questionnaire.

Study findings indicated that GT volunteers had a slight tendency to reject the belief in a Just World compared to CS volunteers who had a slight tendency to accept this conviction (item mean = 3.307, 4.05, respectively). In other words, GT volunteers tended to see the world as a place where "bad things can happen to good people." This finding has considerable face validity in terms of the extensive experience GT volunteers have had as third-party witnesses to others' suffering. According to the study's demographic data, a large proportion of the GT volunteers have been supporters of the seriously ill (94%), of those victimized by criminal activity (75%), and of those bereaved as a result of a sudden death incident (96%).

There was a possibility that gender might pose as a confounding variable in the present study since male volunteers tended to have higher BJWS scores than their female counterparts (respectively, $\underline{M}$= 78.0, $\underline{SD}$= 10.3; $\underline{M}$ = 73.4, $\underline{SD}$ = 10.5). Anova calculations indicate that gender differences were not significant in the present study, $\underline{F}$ (1,86) = 3.252, $\underline{p}$=.075. This result supports a meta-analytic review of 33 previous research

studies, which was unable to find a meaningful relationship between gender and BJWS scores (O'Connor et al., 1996).

As expected, the GT volunteers indicated a preference for engaging in a more complex attributional style compared to a simpler style preferred by CS volunteers. A complex attributional style enables the GT volunteer to employ multiple schemata (Fletcher et al., 1986) as they seek a causal solution for the distress they frequently witness. GT volunteers with a complex attributional style are able to consider simple explanatory factors (e.g., the victim's behavior or character). More importantly, they may also focus on abstract internal and external variables, influential factors from the past, the impact of complex behavioral chains, and the influence of interactional behavioral patterns between the victim and other individuals. The GT volunteer with a complex attributional style will be in a position to recognize factors beyond the victim's character and behavior that have contributed to their negative outcome. This awareness may often evoke empathy for the victim and will therefore support the volunteer's decision to continue to offer assistance (DePalma et al., 1999).

Lupfer et al. (1998) found a moderate positive correlation ($r=.34$, $p=.04$) between the Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) and the Attributional Complexity Scale scores (Fletcher et al., 1986) when they administered these scales to a small sample of 35 university students. In the same study, these researchers found that participants with a high BJW experienced greater distress, compared to those with a low BJW, when their justice beliefs were threatened. The study also found that the opportunity to engage in causal analysis significantly reduced the distress that had been experienced by

participants with a high BJW as a result of their justice beliefs being threatened. Lupfer et al. (1998) postulated that individuals with a high BJW have a greater need to engage in causal analysis because they are more distressed by injustice; therefore, they are more alert to attributional issues. They suggested that a complex attributional style would allow high BJW individuals to achieve relief through greater causal clarity.

The present study found no correlation between BJW and Attributional Complexity scores (r=.02, p=.84), suggesting that these personal variables are not linked in a meaningful way. To explain the discrepant results between the present study and the Lupfer et al. (1998) study, a number of factors should be considered. First of all, the Lupfer et al. study was based on a relatively small, homogenous sample (N=35) compared to the present study (N=100), therefore the results are less generalizable. The participants in the earlier study were university psychology students, a group of individuals who would generally be expected to have a higher than average interest in understanding human behavior, and therefore, would probably tend toward a relatively complex attributional style. The difference between the mean scores of university students from the Fletcher et al. (1986) study (M=39.6, female; M=31.6, male) and the mean scores from the volunteers in the present study is noticeable (M=25.9, female; M=18.2, male). The women in the Fletcher et al. (1986) study had a significantly more complex attributional style compared to the men, t(287) = 3.48, p<.001. Anova calculations were used to alleviate concern that gender differences may have been a confounding variable in the present study, F (1,88) = 1.086, p=.300.

It is possible that the BJWS scores in the Lupfer et al. (1998) were also impacted by the fact that the sample was drawn from a university student population. These participants may have held a somewhat idealistic worldview compared to the present sample. Typically, university students are members of a privileged socio-economic group. In terms of normative adult development, the average university student has not yet experienced significant major life roles (e.g., career development, parenting, caring for an aging parent, retirement, etc.) and the difficulties that may accompany these roles. The probability of experiencing critical life events will inevitably increase as these young adults continue to develop following their university years. Overall, a relative inexperience with trauma could account for higher Just World Scale scores in the Lupfer et al. (1996) study.

Compared to the university student sample, the present study sample was more heterogenous. Participant age ranged from 18 to 84 years, suggesting that participants represented many different stages of adult development and potentially had a greater range of life experience with traumatic incidents. Annual household income statistics indicated that the sample ranged from lower to upper socio-economic levels (less than $10,000 to over $100,000). Considering both life and volunteer experience, the GT volunteers had extensive exposure to traumatic life events; many of the CS volunteers had encountered critical life events in their personal lives. Together, the GT and CS volunteer groups produced a sample that would probably have been more representative of the general population than the sample of university students used in the former study.

It was expected that GT volunteers might cognitively adapt to the distress of watching others suffer by looking to a future time when they believed justice would be restored to these victims. Overall, study findings indicated that both GT and CS volunteers showed a slight tendency to accept the Ultimate Justice Belief (item mean=3.70). There was no significant difference, however, in the level of Ultimate Justice Beliefs between the GT volunteers and the comparison group of CS volunteers. The questionnaire presented Ultimate Justice items as a belief that, at a future time, suffering, injustice, misfortune, and illness would be compensated for in some way. It is interesting to note that a significant percentage of the present study participants indicated that their religious affiliation was meaningful to them (GT = 69.4%, CS = 58.8%). Since most of these individuals subscribe to predominant Western religious ideologies (Catholic = 31.3%; Protestant = 59.4%) we expected that they would have a preference to look to a future after-life for a time of security, stability, and freedom from trauma. Responses to the items in the last section of the questionnaire, however, did not reflect a tendency to use this form of Ultimate Justice belief to the extent that we expected. It may have been that the Ultimate Justice statements were not any more salient for participants with a religious affiliation than they were for those without affiliation because they did not directly refer to the possibility of reconciliation in an afterlife.

Contrary to the study's hypothesis, there was no apparent difference in the tendency of either group to attribute causality to internal, external, or chance factors when they considered either third-party life or volunteer experiences. Both groups of volunteers indicated their perception that the victim's personal habits or personal

characteristics were causally responsible for negative outcome, "occasionally" to "often" (mean item score = 3.39 GT, 3.15 CS).

It was anticipated that the tendency to place blame on the victim's personal habits or personality (i.e., internal factors) would be directly related to BJW scores, however, these variables were not found to be meaningfully correlated (r =-.10, p=.42). The failure to find a relationship may be partially explained by considering that the influence of personal salience and social desirability on participant's ability to respond to each of these sections of the questionnaire. The final section of the questionnaire made justice issues personally relevant by asking the participants to relate to events they had actually experienced. The Just World Scale presented justice belief statements in general terms, perhaps setting the stage for participants to respond without becoming personally involved. Participants may have wished to enhance their level of apparent sophistication when responding to the Just World Scale, and would therefore have been reluctant to record perspectives that they realized were somewhat naïve. When asked to make causal attribution for personally experienced events, participants may have been uncomfortable with recording responses that would violate socially accepted norms relating to treatment of victims. These influences may have falsely lowered the BJWS measurement and also constricted participant's tendency to make attribution to internal factors.

Cognitive adaptation theory maintains that when individuals face tragedy or serious personal difficulty, they respond by using cognitive adaptations that allow them to process the event in such a way that they are able to restore or even improve upon previous psychological functioning (Taylor, 1983). Attributing causal responsibility to a

beneficent deity or having a conviction in a positive future are both effective, socially accepted coping resources (Taylor, 1983; Pargament & Hahn, 1986). As predicted, the tendency to attribute cause to positive external factors (i.e., God's will or an opportunity to experience God's reward), was correlated to Ultimate Justice scores (r =.38, p=.01).

Participants indicated a perception that these positive external factors were causal "rarely" to "occasionally" (mean item score = 2.35 GT; 2.27 CS). These results suggest that even though attributions to "God's will" or the possibility of "God's reward" may be comforting for supporters of victims, it is difficult for them to comprehend God's hand in the tragedies they witness. Even though individuals use attributions to God as a coping mechanism to understand negative, life-altering events, a recent study has found that they have a much stronger tendency to make religious attributions in the event of positive, life-altering events (Lupfer et al., 1996). Lupfer et al. found that 18% of their participants primarily looked to God to make meaning about positive life-altering events. Yet, when the same participants were presented with negative, life-altering outcomes, only 6% attributed a moderate level of responsibility to God.

Negative external factors (evil spiritual forces, other's negative influence, or God's punishment) were the least popular attributional choice in the present study. These causal factors were perceived by participants as occurring "never" to "rarely" (mean item score = 1.86 GT; 1.80 CS). These results are partially similar to the Lupfer et al. (1996) study which found that 1% of participants attributed a low level of responsibility to Satan or the Devil in the events of negative, life-altering outcomes. Unlike present study

results, Lufper et al. found that 29% of their participants believed "other's influence" was moderately responsible for negative, life-altering events.

Finally, chance causality was perceived to occur "occasionally" to "often" by participants (mean item score = 3.36 GT; 3.54 CS). Again, these results parallel findings of the Lupfer et al. (1996) study in which 15% of participants indicated moderate levels of attribution to "luck" or "chance". The popularity of this attributional choice over both studies supports Furnham & Procter (1989) who proposed that "random" justice beliefs should be incorporated into a justice belief measurement instrument.

Implications of Study Findings for Volunteer Training and Support

GT volunteers strongly indicated that it is important for them to serve the needs of others; they expected that the experience of volunteering would provide them with a sense of meaning, purpose, and fulfillment. In their responses to a qualitative question about how they found support for difficult times during volunteerism, some described their ability to remain focused on the difference they were able to make in the life of a single individual. In other words, they did not dwell on societal or individual problems that they had not been able to help resolve, but continued to reflect on the positive changes they had been able to facilitate.

To respond to the volunteers' need to find fulfillment in their volunteer work, agencies need to find ways to vividly communicate the impact that individual volunteer support makes in client's lives. Many agencies seek feedback from victims after a critical event has reached a resolution. One way of enhancing an individual volunteer's

sense of fulfillment would be to share the client's supportive post-service feedback comments with the appropriate volunteer. Volunteer agencies can also enhance the level of volunteer's contribution to both the agency and its clients by encouraging volunteer involvement in victim needs assessment and program design. Volunteers might dialogue with post-victims about the quality of their experience with the agency. This process could provide valuable feedback that would promote enhancement of the agency's services. In many cases it would provide an opportunity for the volunteer to receive oral appreciation for a job well done. Volunteers could then share their ideas in a joint meeting with administration and together they could brainstorm how program design could most effectively accommodate victim needs.

Many volunteer agencies engage in volunteer appreciation programs to encourage the enhancement of the volunteer's self-esteem and self-efficacy. These incentives may be invaluable in terms of meeting the volunteer requirement for Enhancement functions. As volunteers join in these celebration events, and as they work closely together, these experiences may also satisfy Social functions. Although they did not specifically seek out opportunities to build social networks, GT volunteers reported that they had experienced social benefits when friends, family, and acquaintances learned about their volunteer involvement. Also, volunteers noted that they had the opportunity to develop new friendships as they worked alongside others who shared a desire to contribute to the welfare of the community.

Volunteers indicated that they were keen to grow in understanding about the helping professions and the criminal justice system. The present study also found that the GT volunteers preferred a complex attributional style, indicating that these volunteers had considerable interest in understanding human behavior. Training programs might respond to both of these study findings by providing information that would broaden the context of volunteer's understanding of client's experiences. For example, volunteers who work with the seriously ill and their families could be offered cultural diversity training in regard to beliefs related to death and dying, or to various mourning rituals. Deepened cultural understandings would guide volunteers in their responses to clients and would also positively affect the volunteer's ability to make meaning of the client's behaviors during the critical event. For volunteers who work within the criminal justice system, volunteer programs might offer training related to rehabilitation programs, abnormal psychology, or any other topic that might help volunteers grow in their ability to explore all facets of a criminal event.

GT volunteer agencies screen applicants to ensure that they engage staff who will be respectful of the client's values. It is imperative for volunteer training programs to also facilitate volunteers to become self-aware regarding biases, prejudices, and values (Cormier & Cormier, 1998). Volunteers who tend to be open-minded, accepting individuals, may be surprised to learn that value differences often have a subtle presence in the helping role. It is apparent from study findings that GT volunteers tend to engage in metacognition about their own attributional processes; this suggests that volunteers would enjoy and benefit from learning more about these processes. An introduction to

Heider's Cognitive Balance theory (1958) and Belief in a Just World theory (Lerner, 1980) would provide an entry into a thoughtful discussion about how unexamined values may influence observers' responses to injustice. Volunteers could be invited to discuss how these concepts might operate in their own lives, in current news events, and within their volunteer experience.

Strengths of the Study

The present study made an important contribution to the body of research studying the construct of a Belief in a Just World Scale by focusing on GT volunteers, a group who have had extensive life experience as observers of injustice or undeserved suffering. A significant weakness of previous BJW research is that it has depended heavily on samples drawn from post-secondary student populations. By comparing the BJWS scores of GT volunteers to those of CS volunteers, the study was able to support the concurrent validity of the Belief in a Just World Scale. The present study also added support for the construct validity for the Attributional Complexity Scale by measuring the attributional style of participants for whom causal analysis is a salient issue.

Many prior studies have presented imaginal events to their participants, and then measured a variety of the participant's responses to those events (Jones & Aronson, 1973; Pargament & Hahn, 1986; Lupfer et al., 1998; Kunst et al., 2000; Foley & Pigott, 2000). The present study asked participants to recall events from their own experience and then to engage in an overall summary causal attribution of those events. The strength of latter approach was that it permitted volunteers to respond to events that had been memorable

for them and it opened a greater potential for the participants to become emotionally engaged with the drama of the significant events they recalled.

Limitations of the Study

Volunteers in the present study have served from 1 to approximately 30 years. It should be noted that the reasons volunteers supplied for their original involvement are subject to self-perception bias and the influence of social desirability. Since participants' responses are based on memory, they may be subject to loss or time distortion. It is possible than one or more changes in motivation, or purpose for involvement, may have occurred in the time that has elapsed since entering volunteer work. Longitudinal research is needed to explore this possibility.

Responses to the Belief in a Just World Scale may superficially reflect the participant's normative justice belief system rather than the counternormative system that is operative during stressful, time-limited contexts. As participants respond to the questionnaire, in the comfort of their homes, they have time and social desirability incentives to engage in normative belief systems. It is probable that BJWS items do not elicit adequate emotion to produce a reliance on preconscious belief systems. As Lerner (1998) suggests, the uncertainty of whether participants are responding from normative or counternormative belief systems, dictates that we must interpret responses in relative terms. In the case of the present study, we may suggest that those who tend to agree more strongly to items on the scale would be more likely to derogate victims or blame them for their plight than those who register a lower score.

The present study sample does not extend knowledge of how ethnic diversity may affect BJW or attributional complexity. Information regarding the ethnicity of the present sample is not available because ethnicity was not included in the demographic section of the questionnaire. It is probable that extra care would also have been required to raise the diversity of the sample by locating volunteer groups that were comprised of non-Anglo Saxon individuals.

Suggestions for Improvement of the Present Study

In addition to comments made in the previous paragraphs, a number of suggestions follow for changes to the design of this study.

The final section of the questionnaire (pages 115-118, Appendix E) invited participants who had not experienced being in a supportive role for victims of critical life events (including illness, criminal victimization, and bereavement following sudden death), to waive that section. If participants had followed the instructions precisely, only five participants would have stopped at this point, yet as many as 30 participants failed to respond to parts of this section. The high percentage of drop-off for the final section of the questionnaire was problematic because it introduced a strong possibility of self-selection bias. As numbers of respondents dropped, power was lost from potential comparisons of groups means so that only large effect sizes could potentially be identified.

A number of factors may account for volunteer's lack of participation in the final section of the questionnaire. Firstly, it may be that those who discontinued were more emotionally engaged during the recall of personal experiences. According to Lerner

(1998), immanent justice reasoning is preserved in the preconscious, and is often activated when individuals are vividly confronted and become emotionally engaged with an event. Uncomfortable emotions, like guilt, anger, or anxiety may have influenced them to discontinue the questionnaire without registering a response. Causal attributional tendencies toward using internal factors (i.e., blaming or derogating the victim), associated with immanent justice reasoning, would then be falsely lowered. Secondly, the length and the intensity of the questionnaire may have been overwhelming or onerous to many volunteers. The incentive provided for volunteer participation was to contribute to volunteer research and to provide data that would be helpful to their own agency's program. These incentives may have been too weak to motivate participants to finish a questionnaire that they may have found to be demanding. For the CS volunteers in particular, it must have been difficult to make a connection between many questionnaire items and their type of volunteer duty.

Ideally, it would have been preferable to ask all participants to respond to this section because this would have elicited data to allow comparison between volunteers with extensive experience in a supportive role to those who had either limited (only volunteer or only life experience) or no experience. In addition, a larger sample size would have been desirable for this section because this would have created enough power to identify a small effect size. To respond to the concern for the length of the questionnaire, and to the possibility of losing responses due to the demanding nature of the questionnaire, it might be advisable to separate the causal attribution task into a separate study. The separate study could then also include a shorter Just World

questionnaire, such as the relatively new, 7-item Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS; Lipkus, 1991). This would allow comparison of BJWS and GBJWS scores for GT volunteers between two separate study samples. This design would provide an additional opportunity to test the construct validity of the Belief in a Just World by preparing for a comparison between attributional tendency toward blame and victim derogation and Just World scores.

<center>Direction for Future Research</center>

GT volunteerism presents an inviting opportunity to use longitudinal research to study how Just World Beliefs are affected over time by continued exposure to traumatizing events. The present study does not analyze whether study participants began volunteerism with a low BJW or whether they developed that perspective over time. This is an important distinction to make in terms of BJW theory and for construct validity of the Belief in a Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975).

Volunteerism also presents an opportunity to compare how attributional tendencies may be differentially triggered according to the significance of the relationship between the helper and the victim. In the present study, many volunteers had both life and volunteer experience with certain types of critical life events. Since volunteer and life experiences were prevalent for the majority of GT volunteers, and the questionnaire did not ask participants to respond specifically to either, causal attribution tendencies stemming from each type of relationship were confounded. CS volunteers, however, presented the possibility for a more straightforward analysis since their experience with similar critical events was limited to life experience (i.e., they had no

volunteer experience of these events). Future research projects might explore the nature of significant relevant relationships in both volunteer and life experiences at a greater depth. Participants could also be asked to respond specifically with causal attributions to experiences in both domains.

Conclusion

The present study has provided an analysis of factors that generally inspire GT volunteers to engage in work with clients who suffer from the effects of serious illness, criminal victimization, or bereavement as a result of sudden death. The Volunteer Functions Inventory indicated that the GT volunteers in this study had experienced the volunteer functions most important to them, and that they were sufficiently satisfied with their volunteer experience to continue their commitment for at least another year. As such, the study data provided convincing support for the application of functional theory to volunteerism. Functional theory proposes that volunteers seek out a helping activity that may potentially satisfy their psychological needs and motives (Clary et al., 1998). The volunteer situation lends satisfaction to the extent that it is able to respond to the individual volunteer's need. In the case of the GT volunteers in the present study, high levels of satisfaction with salient volunteer functions help to explain sustained helping activity that has continued as long as 25 years for some volunteers. The qualitative responses given by participants strongly reflected the significance of factors similar to those tapped by the VFI. In addition, volunteers indicated cognitive coping responses that they use to maintain their motivation. For example, volunteers remarked that they felt responsible to offer understanding and assistance to victims. However, they did not

take responsibility for the victim's response or their choice to accept or reject the volunteer's offer. Volunteers described the importance of support received from family, friends, church members, and other volunteers. Finally, they anticipated receiving personal benefits as a result of being an active volunteer. Specifically, these included finding a sense of purpose and being enriched by the clients one was able to work with.

The Belief in a Just World Scale indicated that GT volunteers expect that bad things can and will happen to good people. The realization that traumatic events can occur for anyone, allows the GT volunteer to experience feelings of compassion and empathy for victims (Montada, 1992). This perspective removes a need for the volunteer to deny or minimize the significance of traumatic life events on the client. The study also indicated that GT volunteers have a keen interest in understanding and exploring human behavior. It is probable that this tendency supports them in their volunteer work because it allows them to perceive victims of misfortune within a broad non-judgmental context.

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Appendix A

Cover Letter

University of Calgary Letterhead

Research Project Title: Grief and Trauma Volunteers: Beliefs and Attitudes that Motivate and Sustain

Investigator: Sharon Ashton

This cover letter should give you the basic idea of what this research project is about. If you find you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to contact the investigator or the supervisor of this project using the information listed below. Please take the time to read this letter carefully and to understand any accompanying information. Your decision to complete and return the questionnaire will be interpreted as an indication of your consent to participate.

The purpose of this project is to increase understanding of the factors that motivate individuals to volunteer and that help them to sustain their activity in that work. Also, it is to explore how volunteers cope with some of the stressors they may encounter as they pursue their volunteer role. The information that participants provide on this questionnaire will help us achieve these goals.

You will be at virtually no risk as you work through this questionnaire. It will probably take about 30 minutes for you to answer all of the questions. When you are finished, we ask that you place the questionnaire in the postage-paid envelope provided, then mail it back to us at your earliest convenience.

Since we do not ask participants for their name and the questionnaires are not signed, all responses we receive will be completely anonymous. In addition, we will keep the content of each individual response confidential. We will ensure this by publishing only group statistics in the final research study. Also, we protect the information you provide by storing all original data in a locked filing cabinet while we conduct the project and for 3 years following publication of results. Three years after publication, the original data will be shredded. During the entire storage period, the researcher will have sole access to the original data.

As a participant in this study, you will not directly benefit. Potentially, the study could provide insight that may be used to enhance training or support for volunteers who work within your agency. At the completion of the study, we will provide a written summary of the findings to the agency you volunteer for. If you are personally interested in obtaining a copy of this summary or if you would like to inquire about the findings of the research study, we invite you to request information by contacting the investigator or supervisor at either of the telephone numbers listed below.

If you have further questions concerning matters related to this research, please contact:

<div align="center">

Sharon Ashton at (403) 547-4481 (Principal investigator) or

Dr. Lisa Harpur at (403) 220- 7573 (Supervisor)

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If you have any questions or issues concerning this project that are not related to the specifics of the research, you may also contact the Research Services Office at 220-3782 and ask for Mrs. Patricia Evans.

Appendix B

The Volunteer Functions Inventory

(Clary, E. G., Snyder, M., Ridge, R. D., Copeland, J.,

Stukas, A. A., Haugen, J., & Miene, P., 1998).

Please indicate how important a number of possible reasons may be for you for volunteering at your organization.

Using the 6-point scale below, please indicate how important or accurate each of the following possible reasons for volunteering is for you in doing volunteer work at this organization. Record your answer in the space next to each item.

Strongly disagree	-1	Slightly agree	-4
Moderately disagree	- 2	Moderately agree	-5
Slightly disagree	-3	Strongly agree	-6

Rating

1. _____Volunteering can help me get my foot in the door at a place where I'd like to work.

2. _____My friends volunteer.

3. _____I am concerned about those less fortunate than myself.

4. _____People I'm close to want me to volunteer.

5. _____Volunteering makes me feel important

6. _____People I know share an interest in community service.

7. _____ No matter how bad I've been feeling, volunteering helps me to forget about it.

8. _____I am genuinely concerned about the particular group I am serving.

9. _____ By volunteering, I feel less lonely.

10. _____I can make new contacts that might help my business career.

11. _____Doing volunteer work relieves me of some of the guilt over being more fortunate than others.

12. _____I can learn more about the cause for which I am working.

13. _____Volunteering increases my self-esteem.

14. _____Volunteering allows me to gain a new perspective on things.

15. _____Volunteering allows me to explore different career options.

16. _____ I feel compassion toward people in need.

17. _____ Others with whom I am close place a high value on community service.

18. _____ Volunteering lets me learn through direct "hands on" experience.

19. _____ I feel it is important to help others.

20. _____ Volunteering helps me work through my own personal problems.

21. _____ Volunteering will help me succeed in my chosen profession.

22. _____ I can do something for a cause that is important to me.

23. _____ Volunteering is an important activity to the people I know best.

24. _____ Volunteering is a good escape from my own troubles.

25. _____ I can learn how to deal with a variety of people.

26. _____ Volunteering makes me feel needed.

27. _____ Volunteering makes me feel better about myself.

28. _____ Volunteering experience will look good on my resume.

29. _____ Volunteering is a way to make new friends.

30. _____ I can explore my own strengths.

During the time you have volunteered with this agency, please indicate the amount of agreement or disagreement you personally feel with each of the following statements about volunteering outcomes. Be as accurate and honest as possible so that we can better understand your organization.

For each statement, record a score from the 6 point scale below in the space provided.

Strongly disagree	-1	Slightly agree	-4
Moderately disagree	- 2	Moderately agree	-5
Slightly disagree	-3	Strongly agree	-6

Rating

31. _____ In volunteering with this organization, I made new contacts that might help my business or career.

32. _____ People I know best know that I am volunteering at this organization.

33. _____ People I am genuinely concerned about are being helped through my volunteer work at this organization.

34. _____ From volunteering at this organization, I feel better about myself.

35. _____ Volunteering at this organization allows me the opportunity to escape some of my own troubles.

36. _____ I have learned how to deal with a greater variety of people through volunteering at this organization.

37. _____ As a volunteer in this organization, I have been able to explore possible career options.

38. _____ My friends found out that I am volunteering at this organization.

39._____ Through volunteering here, I am doing something for a cause that I believe in.

40. _____ My self-esteem is enhanced by performing volunteer work in this organization.

41. ____ By volunteering at this organization, I have been able to work through some of my own personal problems.

42. ____ I have been able to learn more about the cause for which I am working by volunteering with this organization.

43. ____ I am enjoying my volunteer experience.

44. ____ My volunteer experience has been personally fulfilling.

45. ____ This experience of volunteering with this organization has been a worthwhile one.

46. ____ I have been able to make an important contribution by volunteering at this organization.

47. ____ I have accomplished a great deal of "good" through my volunteer work at this organization.

48. One year from now, will you be (please circle your best guess as of today):

    A.   volunteering at this organization.
    B.   volunteering at another organization
    C.   not volunteering at all

Appendix C

The Belief in a Just World Scale

(Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A., 1975)

The Ultimate Justice Scale

(Mäes, J., 1998)

The next section of this questionnaire investigates the different ways that people in a think about justice and fairness for themselves and other people. These concepts may have special significance for certain volunteer roles. Using the scale below, please indicate your reaction to each statement as honestly and accurately as you can but don't spend too much time thinking about each one. Again, there are no right or wrong answers.

Strongly disagree	-1	Slightly agree	-4
Moderately disagree	- 2	Moderately agree	-5
Slightly disagree	-3	Strongly agree	-6

1. _____ Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as careless ones.

2. _____ People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good fortune.

3. _____ In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by the referee.

4. _____ Even amidst the worst suffering, one should not lose faith that justice will one day prevail and set things right. *[1]

5. _____ In the long run, the injustice suffered during illness, will be offset in some unforseen way.*

6. _____ The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely gets elected.

7. _____Although evil men or women may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out.

8. _____ Canadian parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired in their

children.

9. _____ It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in Canada.

10. _____ In almost any business or profession, people who do their job well rise to the top.

11. _____ Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.

12. _____ Even persons who suffer from severe misfortune can expect, that in the end, something good will happen to balance everything out.*

13. _____ Men who keep in shape have almost no chance of suffering a heart attack.

14. _____ Criminals will ultimately answer for their deeds.**

15. _____ By and large, people get what they deserve.

16. _____ Even terrible illnesses are often compensated for by good luck later in life. *

17. _____ It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in Canadian courts.

18. _____ Basically, the world is a fair place.

19. _____ Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded.

20. _____ Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school.

21. _____ It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail.

22. _____ When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good reason.

23. _____ Crime doesn't pay.

24. _____ People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves.

25. _____ I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation that he has.

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[1] Note: Items marked (*) are part of the Ultimate Justice Scale (Mäes, 1998). Item 14,

marked (**) is an addition to the Ultimate Justice Scale.

Appendix D

Attributional Complexity Scale

(Fletcher, G. J., Danilovics, P., Fernandez, G., Peterson, D., & Reeder, G. D., 1986)

The next section of the questionnaire has been designed to investigate the different ways that people think about themselves and other people (e.g. friends, acquaintances, clients, etc.). There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your own perceptions. Please answer each question as honestly and accurately as you can but don't spend too much time thinking about each answer.

Using the scale below, record your response in the space next to each item.

Strongly disagree	-1	Slightly agree	-4
Moderately disagree	- 2	Moderately agree	-5
Slightly disagree	-3	Strongly agree	-6

1. _____ I don't usually bother to analyze and explain people's behavior.

2. _____ Once I have figured out a single cause for a person's behavior, I don't usually go any further.

3. _____ I believe it is important to analyze and understand our own thinking processes.

4. _____ I think a lot about the influence that I have on other people's behavior.

5. _____ I have found that the relationships between a person's attitudes, beliefs, and character traits are usually simple and straightforward.

6. _____ If I see people behaving in a really strange or unusual manner I usually put it down to the fact that they are strange or unusual people and don't bother to explain it any further.

7. _____ I have thought a lot about the family back ground and personal history of people who are close to me, in order to understand why they are the sort of people they are.

8. _____ I don't enjoy getting into discussions where the causes for people's behavior are being talked over.

9. _____ I have found that the causes for people's behavior are usually complex rather than simple.

10. _____ I am very interested in understanding how my own thinking works when I make judgments about people or attach causes to their behavior.

11. _____ I think very little about the different ways that people influence each other.

12. _____ To understand a person's personality/behavior, I have found it is important to know how that person's attitudes, beliefs, and character traits fit together.

13. _____ When I try to explain other people's behavior, I concentrate on the person and don't worry too much about all the existing external factors that might be affecting them.

14. _____ I have often found that the basic cause for a person's behavior is located far back in time.

15. _____I really enjoy analyzing the reasons or causes for people's behavior.

16. _____I usually find that complicated explanations for people's behavior are confusing rather than helpful.

17. _____I give little thought to how my thinking works in the process of understanding or explaining people's behavior.

18. _____I think very little about the influence that other people have on my behavior.

19. ____I have thought a lot about the way that different parts of personality influence

other   parts (e.g. beliefs affecting attitudes or attitudes affecting character traits.)

20. ____I think a lot about the influence society has on other people.

21. ____When I analyze a person's behavior, I often find the causes form a chain that

goes back in time, sometimes for years.

22. ____ I am not really curious about human behavior.

23. ____ I prefer simple rather than complex explanations for people's behavior.

24. ____ When the reasons I give for my own behavior are different from someone

else's, this often makes me think about the thinking processes that lead to my

explanations.

25. ____ I believe that to understand a person you need to understand the people who that

person has close contact with.

26. ____I tend to take people's behavior at face value and not worry about the inner

causes for their behavior (e.g. attitudes, beliefs, etc.).

27. ____I think a lot about the influence that society has on my behavior and personality.

28. ____I have thought very little about my own family background and personal history

in order to understand why I am the sort of person I am.

Appendix E

Causal Attribution Task

The final section examines volunteer's reactions to witnessing difficulty in other's lives. To help us understand your experience, please answer the following questions.

1. Does your volunteer work place you in contact with clients who (Circle the correct response for each item)

a) face serious illness? **Yes No**

b) have been victimized during a criminal activity? **Yes No**

c) have experienced the sudden, unexpected loss of a loved one? **Yes No**

In your life experience outside of volunteer work, have you been in a supportive role with anyone who (Circle the correct response for each item)

a) faces serious illness? **Yes No**

b) has been victimized during a criminal activity? **Yes No**

c) has experienced the sudden, unexpected death of a loved one? **Yes No**

If you answered "No" to all of these questions, you do not need to complete the last section of the questionnaire.

If you answered "Yes" to any of the questions, please go on to the final section.

The following categories suggest possible explanations you may use as you search for the cause of the misfortune that you witness in the course of your volunteer work or other life experience. Reflecting on your volunteer and/or life experience, please indicate how well you believe each factor is able to account for the cause of other's difficulties in life.

Select from the 6 point scale below to measure your reaction and write your score in the space provided.

Never a factor	1	Often	4
Rarely	2	Very Often	5
Occasionally	3	Always a factor	6

As you think about your experiences, estimate the degree to which you perceive that serious illness is a direct result of the following factors:

a) ____ the ill individual's personal habits (e.g. lifestyle practices such as exercise, diet, substance use, etc.)

b) ____ the individual's personality (e.g. negative mood, outlook, etc.)

c) ____ chance

d) ____ a manifestation of evil spiritual forces at work in the individual's world

e) ____ the negative influence that other people have had on the individual

f) ____ the experience is the working through of God's will or purpose for the individual

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g) ____ the individual's experience is meant to provide an opportunity for them to experience God's love or reward

h) ____ the experience is God's way of punishing or showing anger for the individual's past behaviors

Again, using your best estimate and your own experience as a guide, to what degree do you estimate that one's sudden, unexpected death is a direct result of the following factors:

a) ____ the deceased individual's personal habits (e.g. lifestyle practices such as exercise, diet, substance use)

b) ____ the deceased individual's personality (e.g. negative mood, outlook, lack of focus, etc.)

c) ____ chance

d) ____ a manifestation of evil spiritual forces at work in the individual's world

e) ____ the negative influence that other people have had on the individual

f) ____ the experience is the working through of God's will or purpose for the individual

g) ____ the experience is God's way of punishing or showing anger for the individual's past behaviors

h) ____ the individual's experience is meant to provide an opportunity for them or their loved one's to experience God's love or reward

Once again, thinking about your experience as a helper, and using the same scale, estimate the degree to which you perceive that criminal victimization is a direct result of the following factors:

a) ____ personal habits of the victim that make them vulnerable to crime (e.g. walking alone)

b) ____ weaknesses in the victim's personality (e.g. gullibility, carelessness, etc.)

c) ____ chance

d) ____ a manifestation of evil spiritual forces at work in the world

e) ___ a working through of God's will or purpose for the victim

f) ____ the negative influence other people have had on the victim (i.e. others are responsible for the victim's vulnerability).

g) ____ experience provides an opportunity for the victim to experience God's love or reward

h) ____ the experience is God's way of punishing the victim or showing anger for their past behaviors

THANK YOU FOR TAKING YOUR TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE SEND BACK THE COMPLETED FORM IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.