

**Canadian Forces Leadership Effectiveness: Competing Values  
Perspectives on Bilingualism**

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# **CANADIAN FORCES LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS: COMPETING VALUES PERSPECTIVES ON BILINGUALISM**

## **CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

The importance of communications and language for military effectiveness is well understood as life and death “operations depend on messages that must be understood ‘loud and clear’ before action can be undertaken” (Crossey, 2005 as cited in van Dijk & Soeters, 2008, p. 303). Indeed, various field studies have identified “adverse effects of the language barrier on the information structure within international (military) organizations” (van Dijk & Soeters, 2008, p. 313). In addition, “observation [has] demonstrate[d] that language incompetence restricts and perhaps even reduces the range of managerial power, whereas language proficiency on the other hand aggrandizes one’s hold on communicational and managerial processes” (Marschan-Piekkari et al., 1999; Hoon et al., 1996 as cited in van Dijk & Soeters, 2008, p. 311).

In spite of existing laws guaranteeing equal status for both official languages in Canada, institutional bilingualism has not become a reality across the various federal departments. The situation in the Canadian Forces (CF) institution is no different and it remains difficult for the military organization, focused on executing the many missions assigned by the Government of Canada to make significant progress on the official languages front. Despite the important institutional efforts undertaken over the years by the CF to conform (at least in spirit) to the *Official Languages Act of Canada*, recent reports by the

Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages (OCOL) noted that the CF fell significantly short of meeting the official languages requirements, notably on Part V of the Act regarding *Language of Work* ([http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/dnd\\_mdn\\_022006\\_e.php](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/dnd_mdn_022006_e.php)).

The value of linguistic proficiency in both official languages for CF officers in leadership positions is on the surface, undisputed. Yet, a significant portion of CF leaders are unable to communicate (read, write, and comprehend) functionally in both English and French. The general literature on the importance of bilingualism in the workplace highlights its usefulness for effective communication in the public sector (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat [TBCS], <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12515&section=text#cha1>), and in business (Padilla, 2002). However, little has been written about bilingualism in the military, and even less is known from the perspectives of military leaders themselves on the importance of bilingualism as a leadership attribute within the military culture.

Consistent with the language of qualitative inquiry, “phenomenon of interest” is analogous to the term “research question,” thus is more appropriately used in this and in the following chapters. The phenomena of interest for the researcher are the central concepts that informants experience: bilingualism and leadership (Creswell, 2007). There are several key terms contained within the following statement of purpose: To explore the *perspectives of leaders and future*

leaders of the Canadian Forces on *bilingualism, as a communication tool*, for enabling the *transformational leadership culture* of the CF. Broken down, the excerpt *perspectives of leaders and future leaders* means the “emic” or personal views of leader - and future leader informants (2007), while *bilingualism, as a communication tool*, applied to the realities of military service, means the use of official languages (English and French) to communicate and operationalize the linguistic vision of the CF. In the words of General Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS):

*My vision for the Canadian Forces (CF) is of an integrated Team Canada. This team will draw strength from its ability to conduct operations in English and in French.[...] In today's world, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and information-driven, our ability to operate in English and in French gives us an edge. Members of the Canadian Defence Team truly are sensitive to different cultures. [...] I firmly believe that the language skills of the CF will be one of the traits that put us on the map as we build an integrated Team Canada that defends this great country at home and abroad.*

<http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/ps/hri-irh/olp-mtp/olptm-mtplo-eng.asp>

As well, the term *culture*, examined through an ethnographic lens, means the culture-sharing group Creswell (2007) labels the “unit of analysis [...] one that shares learned, acquired behaviors – to make explicit how the group works” (p. 242). In the context of military leadership, *transformational leadership* is, “in effect, just another name for effective or superior leadership [as] superior CF leaders, or transformational leaders, give followers valid reasons to be hopeful and committed” (Department of National Defence, 2005, p. 70).

## THE CASE FOR BILINGUALISM IN THE MILITARY

Although English is widely considered the international language of military affairs, history has provided us with many examples where a lack of linguistic commonalities between troops in the field has led to unfortunate military outcomes. One incident occurred during the First World War when misunderstood orders from francophone Belgian officers to Flemish speaking Belgian troops caused unnecessary casualties (van Dijk & Soeters, 2008, p. 307). This led to the Belgian law of 1938 which promulgated stringent bilingualism standards for the entire Belgian military, especially for officers. Under this law, during the recruitment phase, candidate officers must first be tested for language proficiency in their declared mother tongue (French or Flemish) and also in their secondary language (Belgian Department of National Defence [BDND], <http://www.rma.ac.be/clng/fr/rma-clng-examens%28fr%29.html>). As well, to be accepted in the Belgian regular force military, officer “recruits” must prove that they have an elementary command of their second language. If they fail the language test, they are given another chance and must pass a second test within one year after the first language test as they continue their basic military training. If the officer candidates fail again, they are released from the Belgian military. Also, in order to receive an officer commission, they must successfully pass another and more complex second language test for “effective” proficiency in their second language. Again, failure means they are dismissed from the Belgian military. Finally, as they progress in

rank, Belgian officers must be tested again in their second language to be considered for promotion to the more senior ranks of Major and beyond.

## **BILINGUALISM IN CANADA'S FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS**

The history of Canada is marked by linguistic duality. However, it is only in 1969, with the passing of the first *Official Languages Act* by the Parliament of Canada that English and French received equality of status and were recognized as the official languages of this country. In 1988, a revised version of the *Official Languages Act* was adopted with a preamble that identified the right of federal employees to work in the language of their choice. The realities of institutional bilingualism and its application in the CF organizational context require a broader historical review of bilingualism in Canada's federal institutions.

The Department of National Defence (DND) is a federal department established under the *National Defence Act* (NDA) statute (DND, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about-notresujet/index-eng.asp>). Although “[i]n principle, [it] operates as an institutional entity separate from the Department of National Defence” (DND, 2003, p. 12), the CF institution is the military arm of DND, under the NDA. Despite its unique (military) character and relationship with DND, the CF institutional obligations towards bilingualism find their source in the Official Languages Act (OLA) (Department of Justice Canada, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/O-3.01.pdf>). Recognizing that the history of Canada has made both English and French “fundamental characteristics of the Canadian



identity” (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages [OCOL], [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/ola\\_llo\\_e.pdf](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/ola_llo_e.pdf)), the Canadian Parliament adopted the OLA in 1969. The OLA was later amended in 1988 to ensure that its major provisions were made “executory” and more in line with the country’s Constitution and the 1982 Canadian Charters of Rights and Freedoms (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat [TBCS], [http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs\\_pol/hrpubs/tb\\_a3/olaannot-eng.pdf](http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/hrpubs/tb_a3/olaannot-eng.pdf)). The primary purpose of the OLA is to “ensure respect for English and French and equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in federal institutions” (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/ola\\_llo\\_e.pdf](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/ola_llo_e.pdf)). In particular, the OLA mandates federal government departments and institutions “to provide services to English- and French-speaking Canadians in the language of their choice” and in some designated bilingual regions of the country to provide federal employees “the right to work in the official language of their choice” (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/ola\\_llo\\_e.pdf](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/ola_llo_e.pdf)).

In light of the Canadian demographics, the OLA appears to be relevant. According to a 2006 national census conducted by Statistics Canada, 58% of Canadians declared English and 22% stated French as their mother tongue (Statistics Canada [SC], <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-555/p1-eng.cfm>). The expression “mother tongue” refers here to the “first language learned at home during childhood and still understood by the individual at the time of the census” (SC, as cited in OCOL, <http://www.ocol->

[clo.gc.ca/html/def\\_06\\_e.php](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/def_06_e.php)). The census also identified that 75% of Canadians had English and 24% French as their “first official language spoken” and that close to 15% of employed Canadians were using more than one language at work (SC, as cited in OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/canada\\_06\\_e.php](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/canada_06_e.php)). A 2006 Environics Focus Canada opinion research study found that 72% of Canadians were “personally in favour of bilingualism for all of Canada” (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/evolution\\_opinion\\_section\\_1\\_e.php#Anchor\\_1](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/evolution_opinion_section_1_e.php#Anchor_1)). As well, 89% of Canadians thought that “in today’s global economy, people with an ability to speak more than one language will be more successful” (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/evolution\\_opinion\\_section\\_4\\_e.php](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/evolution_opinion_section_4_e.php)). Despite these figures and favourable public perceptions, the latest OCOL 2009–2010 annual report confirmed “that federal institutions are failing to provide Canadians with adequate service in both official languages, have not created an equitable workplace and are falling well short in promoting Canada’s linguistic duality” (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/release\\_communique\\_02112010\\_e.php](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/release_communique_02112010_e.php)).

In 2002, the TBCS, the Canadian government administrative body responsible for official languages in federal institutions, commissioned a comprehensive study (using both quantitative and qualitative methods) on the *Attitudes towards the use of both official languages within the Public Service of Canada* (TBCS, <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/BT22-85-2002E.pdf>). Although the study revealed that 70% of public servants throughout the country “thought that official language policies were fair” (TBCS, p. 6), it also made it

clear that some public servants perceive the OLA and bilingualism policies as useless or inefficient. It also showed an obvious difference of opinions between the two main Canadian linguistic groups. “For some Anglophones, the policy is seen as wasteful and ineffective pandering. For some Francophones, by contrast, any failure of the policy is insulting evidence of their continued victimization by an uncaring and disrespectful majority” (TBCS, p.18). The geographic dimension was also identified as of significant importance and some of the respondents thought the bilingualism policies should only be relevant “where there are French-speaking minorities of a significant size” (TBCS, p. 20). The further removed in distance they were from French-speaking communities or from the bilingual region of Ottawa, the more pronounced this opinion was present amongst respondents (particularly the Anglophones). In fact, the OLA requirements were perceived by Anglophones as “more institutionally than personally relevant” (TBCS, p. 21). The study also found that in general, Canadian public servants think the performance of their respective departments takes precedence over the “need for services in both official languages” (TBCS, p. 17). It is important to note that unlike their civilian DND counterparts who are public servants, CF personnel are not members of the Public Service. However, the CF institution administers its own official languages program (DND, <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/ps/hri-irh/olp-mtp/doc/olptm-mtplo-eng.pdf>) in accordance with policies and directives which “are firmly in keeping with Government of Canada official languages policy and practice” (DND, p. 11).

Language is a powerful tool for communicating culture. Understanding the values, beliefs and assumptions of those followers military leaders seek to influence (in the military context, to really “know” your troops) is at the core of good leadership and is an essential element of transformational leadership. As leadership is a central function of military effectiveness, bilingualism thus can significantly impact the ability of CF officers to lead people and the CF institution. The phenomena of interest (central research question) for the researcher are the perceptions and perspectives of leaders and future leaders of the CF, on bilingualism as a communication tool and a leadership attribute, as well as the organizational policies and practices related to bilingualism, applied specifically to CF officers, for supporting the transformational values-based leadership model of the CF.

## **THESIS STATEMENT**

While bilingualism is deemed to be a central value of Canada’s society and identity, it is but one of many competing and complex demands the CF, as a federal institution, must consider integrating as part of its effectiveness-driven organizational culture through coherent institutional policies and practices. The analysis revealed that as important as the constitutional and societal imperatives are, it is English as the CF language of work, and not bilingualism as an attribute for leadership, that prevails as the central driver for military effectiveness. The implications on the primary functional purpose of the CF include the tensions (competing values) resulting from the institutional requirement to meet the

bilingualism agenda while at the same time, relying almost exclusively on English to operate and execute successful military missions. In this sense, bilingualism efforts in training, time and expenses are in direct competition with some of the functional core military values and activities required to meet the effectiveness-driven military imperatives.

## **CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **OFFICIAL LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY DRIVERS**

In a comparative study examining how bilingualism is integrated into the militaries of several officially multilingual nations (Belgium, Canada, Finland, Ireland and Switzerland), Jeffrey de Fourestier (2010) pointed out that linguistic legislation and policies have been incorporated into the military structures of officially multilingual countries because “language forms a central element of each country’s culture and value system” (p. 92). According to de Fourestier, it is therefore the social responsibility of those military institutions to reflect the significance of official languages in their “military force organization.” The author distinguishes between the military “operational language” which during certain operations may be specified to be English and the “language of work” which is “used in an official capacity in the daily routine of the workplace” (2010, p. 92). His study found that Switzerland, with four declared official languages (OL) and the least amount of OL legislation had the “best overall OL capacity at all levels within its forces (100%)” (2010, p. 95). Belgium with three OL (Flemish, French and German), also has a 100% bilingual capacity amongst its officer cadre and 41% when all ranks are considered. In contrast, despite being the country with the most OL legislation, Canada has the military with the lowest second language proficiency with 15% of its regular force personnel (all ranks considered) and 46% of its officers having some bilingual capacity (2010, p. 97). Of note, only the CF provides comprehensive second language training to some of its military personnel. In all the other nations examined as part of the study, including

Switzerland and Belgium (who, like Canada both share French as their official second language), “[m]embers [...] who require second OL ability are expected to acquire it on their own and on their own time” (2010, p. 102). These findings seem to indicate that linguistic policies on their own may not truly contribute to OL proficiency and that in the case of Belgium and Switzerland, institutional commitment towards instilling a culture of bilingualism among their military forces may be the real driver.

In the CF, the major institutional incentive for OL proficiency stems from the personnel management system in place for promotion consideration whereby up to five points can be attributed to officers (and two points for non commissioned members) depending on rank and linguistic ability. It appears this incentive and the CF OL policies in place may not be enough to make bilingualism truly valued within a CF organizational culture focused on operational military effectiveness. In fact, “[w]ithin parts of the CF, ability in both OLs as a professional qualification is not part of the universally accepted culture, despite the CF being officially a bilingual institution” (de Fourestier, 2010, p. 102). To further enlighten this study and raise a better understanding of the cultural challenges associated with the official languages imperative in the CF, a historical review of how bilingualism was introduced and has been managed in the Canadian military context is useful.

## **BILINGUALISM IN THE CF: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Despite its ever-increasing multicultural character, the Canadian society remains profoundly marked by the linguistic duality determined centuries ago by the country's two founding nations, France and the United Kingdom (U.K). Undoubtedly, the military defeat of Montcalm's forces to British Major-General James Wolfe's troops on the Plains of Abraham in 1759 followed by the capitulation of Montreal a year later sealed the Conquest of New France by the British Empire. As much as this turn of events would forever affect the structure and identity of Canada's society by firmly establishing the ruling majority's political and judicial system, it would also equally contribute to significantly shape the culture of Canada's military as an institution deeply rooted in English traditions, customs and language (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988). As such, after the Conquest and contrary to the conditions that existed under the French colonial regime, which afforded the French speaking military elite social leverage and status, "French Canadians were not allowed to enlist or hold an officer's commission in Canada" (1988, p. 32) which meant that francophone soldiers were confined to some of the few provincial militia corps organized in Quebec in 1777 and in New Brunswick in 1794.

To fight the Russians on the Crimean war front (1853-1856), the U.K. reduced the bulk of the British regular army serving in Canada to only 3,284 (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988, p. 40). This led to the Militia Act of 1855 which created a true Canadian volunteer militia force of 5,000 men initially, growing to 35,000 in 1863. Although they represented 80 per cent of the population of the



territory of Canada East after the Union Act of 1840, French Canadians formed up to 28 per cent of the territory's volunteers and the dominance of English in the Canadian Militia was such that "very little was done officially in French" (1988, pp.43-45). In fact, in 1863, very few French Canadians (17 out of 136 officers) held positions of command in the Militia of Canada East and although French was used within some of the francophone volunteer companies in the military district surrounding Quebec City, English was imposed as the language of command of the entire Canadian Militia. According to Bernier and Pariseau (1988), the reality was that "the use of French [...] was barely tolerated" (p. 45).

This situation persisted after the Confederation of 1867 when a Permanent Active Militia (PAM) was established in Canada. Divided into 10 units, three of which were located in the province of Quebec, the PAM became the regular army of the country. Despite the important presence of francophones within the PAM, English remained the dominant language of training and administration within the Canadian military (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988). Overall, despite some important reforms that occurred at the turn of the century when the Dominion was literally forming its own armed forces (independent from the British), Canada's military was created after the British model and traditions. This had an effect on the linguistic front and "except for a few infantry battalions in Quebec, the French fact would continue to be ignored in the Department of Militia and Defence and in the Naval Service" (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988, p. 65).

The start of the First World War saw the creation of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion (French Canadian), a French-speaking infantry unit that was formed after great political and public debate, and this just one month after the U.K. declared war on Germany bringing into the fight the “colony” of Canada. To face the German threat overseas, the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence at the time, Sam Hughes, decided not to mobilize the existing (non active) reserve units, some of which were French-speaking (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988, p. 71). Instead, he ordered the recruitment of field troops for a newly formed Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF). In doing so, no plans were made to form any French-speaking units and therefore, out of the 33,000 men who formed the initial contingent of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division that was sent to Europe in October 1914, some 1,245 French-speaking volunteers were scattered throughout the various anglophone units of the CEF. According to Bernier and Pariseau, this was by no means an unintended oversight. Minister Hughes was known to be a strong opponent of the ‘francophone fact’ in Canada. In fact, mixing his personal views with the military requirements of a nation at war, “he wanted to make the rebellious French Canadians who insisted on being different from other people see reason. They had to become plain Canadians or become extinct” (1988, p. 69).

Not surprisingly, recruitment for service in the War amongst the French Canadian population was difficult. In the end, and although a total of 15 French Canadian infantry battalions were raised during the Great War out of a total of

260, only the 22<sup>nd</sup> Battalion saw action at the front. According to Pariseau “francophones were very under-represented, partly because the army they were asked to join was not a reflection of their history and culture” (1994, p. 3). On the social and political fronts, the conscription of 1917 enacted in Canada to address the lack of volunteers for a war that was dragging on was very unpopular in the province of Quebec. This situation contributed in dividing even further the two main linguistic and cultural communities of Canada.

After the war, the CEF was demobilized and the permanent force (Active Militia) remained at only 5,000 personnel (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988, p. 92). In 1920, the first French Canadian unit, the highly decorated 22nd Battalion which had distinguished itself in several battles in France and Belgium was officially incorporated into the permanent force and assigned to Quebec City. Of note, and perhaps a sign of the deeply rooted British tradition of the Canadian army, it was only eight years later that the title of the unit was “Frenchified” to what it is now, the Royal 22e Régiment (R22eR). Still, when World War 2 broke out in 1939, 184 officers and men formed the R22eR, which represented only 4.4 per cent of the total permanent force of Canada and the large majority of their training, drill and administration was still being conducted in English (1988, p. 97). Of the 1,000 non permanent Militia units called for service in 1938, 14 were French-speaking, all in the infantry. Yet demographically, French Canadians represented close to 30% of the Canadian population at the time. The situation was no different for francophones in the Royal Canadian Air force (RCAF) and

the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) as “there was only room for French Canadians who spoke English. Unilingual Francophones were systematically excluded, while unilingual Anglophones had little difficulty serving in their own language” (1988, p. 103). Although a good proportion of French Canadians served in the Second World War (close to 26%), their service (except for those serving with the R22eR or with 425 Squadron, a French Canadian unit formed in 1942 by the RCAF) was performed in English and within a British rooted mentality and culture (1988, p. 117).

The post-war period saw the question of the under-representation of francophones in the officer corps of the Canadian military be raised with the creation in 1946 of the National Defence Council (NDC) charged with developing policy for the Department and the three services (the Army, the RCAF and the RNC). In an effort to reflect the demographics of the Canadian population, Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence from 1946-1954) who had served during the first World War “favoured 30 per cent [francophone] representation in the Canadian Armed Forces” (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988, p. 149) and he urged the military to consider bilingualism as an added qualification for the promotion of officers. Although there was a realization within some circles that the teaching of French to English-speaking officers could bring some useful operational benefits to the organization, Claxton faced strong resistance from the senior leadership of the three services who thought that English should be the only “language of combat.” As such, the question of bilingualism in the Canadian military remained

a low priority. If in 1949 the Canadian Army opened an all arms school in Saint-Jean (Quebec) “where basic training [to French-Canadian recruits] could be given in French, followed by three months of English training” (1988, p. 150), the RCAF operated completely in English and recruits had to be deemed competent in the language of Shakespeare before being allowed to enlist. In the RCN, the traditions were still very British and English was the only official language.

In an effort to avoid the potential political fallout of another unpopular conscription and obtain proper French-Canadian participation of volunteers to serve in the Korean War (1950-1953), the Canadian Army established the “Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems” chaired by a francophone officer, Brigadier-General J.P.E. Bernatchez. According to Jean-Yves Gravel (a well-known Québécois military historian and author) the report identified that French Canadians hesitated to enlist because they perceived the organization to be English; with limited opportunities for career advancement as a result of the language barrier they faced (Gravel, 1959 as cited in Bernier & Pariseau, 1988, p. 152). To them, serving in the Canadian military outside the R22eR often meant service in “predominantly English protestant communities” outside Quebec where, combined with the lack of French education opportunities for their children, they would lose their mother tongue and religion.

In 1960, a United Nations call for multinational military assistance to help restore order in the Belgian Congo saw a contingent of less than 300 Canadian

signalers and combat personnel deploy to Central Africa. There, knowledge of French was an essential asset and the Canadian military acknowledged the military operational advantage gained by having bilingual elements within its ranks. In the early sixties, with important social changes occurring in the province of Quebec during the “Quiet Revolution”, the federal government faced increasing demands from French Canadian activists and politicians for more autonomy and recognition of Quebec’s distinctive character within the federal structure. As such, in the face of rising nationalism in Quebec, the Canadian government saw the subject of bilingualism as one of the important national unity challenges that had to be addressed in order to improve relations between the two main linguistic groups forming the Canadian society. The *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* was therefore established in 1963. As part of its investigation of the bilingual practices and policies present within the various federal departments, the commission asked DND *how much French was used in the Department?* DND answered that “English was the language of work in the Forces because it would be too difficult, and even dangerous in action, to operate [...] in both languages” (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988, p. 188).

The appointment of General Jean Victor Allard to the top military post of the Canadian military in 1966 as the first French Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) marked a significant development in the evolution of bilingualism in the CF. Concerned primarily with the fact that francophones were leaving the military in much greater numbers than their English-speaking peers, Allard

established a study group headed by Colonel Armand Ross whose task was to “recommend ways to ensure that Francophone military personnel would enjoy the same opportunities as Anglophones” (Letellier, 1987, p. 3). Under the leadership of General Allard, many initiatives were put in place to improve the status of French within the newly unified (since May 1967) CF. Among them was the creation of a Bilingualism Secretariat in August 1967 mandated to coordinate “all bilingualism activities in the Forces” (Bernier & Pariseau, 1988, p. 211). Despite their efforts, both General Allard and the Secretariat faced some strong resistance within elements of the CF leadership as some thought that progress on the language front would be “detrimental to the efficiency of the Armed Forces” and that “it would divide the Forces into two distinct groups” (Letellier, 1987, p. 23-24). However, in line with the Ross Report and recommendations made by the *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (published in September 1969), DND announced its intentions to create more French Language Units (FLUs). In essence, this meant going beyond the existing R22eR and 425 Squadron so to “provide for certain bases and units of the three environments (land, sea, and air) to have a majority of Francophone personnel and to use French as the language of work” (Library & Archives Canada, <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/dunton1967-1970-ef/dunton1967-70-eng.htm>).

Although a significant measure, the creation of FLUs was only the beginning of more to come in the formulation of a comprehensive bilingualism

and biculturalism programme for the Canadian military with the adoption by the Parliament of Canada in July of 1969 of the *Official Languages Act* (OLA) and the establishment of the OCOL mandated to ensure that federal institutions comply with the Act. On the heels of 1971 White Paper on Defence, which clearly acknowledged that the institution “had a significant role to play in promoting national unity” and that it had to “reflect the bilingual and bicultural nature of the country,” (DND, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/downloads/Defence%20in%20the%2070s.pdf>), the military introduced in 1972 (published in English only) its *Implementation Programme and Plan to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces* (DND, 1977, p. 9) which pursued 10 objectives, the principal three of which were to ensure that both the English and French languages became equal in status, rights and privileges “as to their use in the Canadian Forces”; secondly that “the linguistic and cultural values of both English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians” would be reflected in the organization, and; lastly that by 1987, the two official language groups (nationally represented at 73 per cent anglophone and 27 per cent francophone) became proportionally represented “throughout the rank structure at all levels of responsibility and in all trades and classifications of the Canadian Forces” (DND, 1977, p. 10).

Designed to be implemented in three phases (1972-1977, 1978-1982, and 1983-1987, respectively) over a 15 year period, the programme introduced an important concept that became known as the *Canadian Forces Bilingualism and*



*Biculturalism Model.* The model consisted of designating all CF establishments as FLUs, ELUs (English-speaking units) or National (bilingual) units with a minimum of 50 per cent of francophones serving in FLUs, approximately the same percentage of anglophones serving in ELUs and a proportional representation of 72 per cent anglophone and 28 per cent francophone personnel in National units (DND, 1972, p. 4). However, because the bulk of the CF bilingual capability (98% of the 15,854 bilingual military personnel across the Forces) was with francophones, the vast majority of the designated bilingual positions were filled by French-speaking members (Letellier, 1987, pp. 213-216). Thus, as the representation of francophones was much less than that of anglophones (16.5% of officers and 22.8 % of other ranks were francophones in 1974), this created a situation where there was no longer enough French-speaking personnel to fill the FLU positions (Bernier & Pariseau, 1994, pp.116-117). In the end, many of the FLU positions assigned to francophone members were filled by unilingual anglophones.

Over time, the programme was updated in 1980 with 57 specific goals and named the *Official Languages Plans (Military)* to differentiate the military portion of DND (the CF) from the civilian side (whose OLA requirements are governed by PSCTB) and reflect some of the changes that had occurred since 1972. The DND report entitled *Assessment of the last 15 years on Bilingualism* concluded that regarding “the progress accomplished in relation to the three objectives and the 57 goals of the 1980 plan, there is still much work to be done” (1987, pp. 24-

25). After a new OLA was passed in 1988, DND continued its efforts towards compliance with its *Master implementation Plan*. Produced in 1989, it had a 13-year outlook on increasing bilingualism in the CF. Two broad principles were being followed in this new plan: “that service members should be able to pursue meaningful careers in their first official languages and, that leaders should lead in the official languages used by those they lead” (DND, 1992, p. 4). As such, DND favoured a “universal approach” of building a bilingual officer corps by “offering basic training and professional or trades training in French” (1992, p. 4). This was in fact recognizing that bilingualism was an asset for officers and that it would be required to advance beyond certain rank levels. The measure created some resentment amongst many anglophone officers who argued that they were now at a disadvantage for career progression compared to their francophone peers as many felt that “they had been denied access to [second] language training” (1992, p. 31).

In fact, in 2001 the OCOL received two complaints regarding the bilingual officer corps policy of the CF. One of the complainants argued the policy was discriminatory against unilingual members of the institution as “knowledge of the second official language may be worth as much as 5% of the final mark awarded by a [CF] Merit Board in evaluating officer candidates for promotion” (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/2001\\_02\\_e.pdf](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/2001_02_e.pdf)). The second complaint focused on the perceived inability of the CF to offer enough second language training to anglophone members of the CF. The OCOL investigated the two cases and

concluded the following: “It is acceptable, in evaluating candidates for promotion, to consider knowledge of the second official language as a criterion, since bilingualism is tangible evidence of leadership” (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/2001\\_02\\_e.pdf](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/2001_02_e.pdf)). However, the OCOL also stated that “the proportion of marks awarded for bilingualism should vary with rank.” Regarding the second complaint, the OCOL agreed in principle with the complainant. This brought the CF to modify its policy in May 2001 and acknowledge “that language training must be made an operational priority and must be more effectively provided” (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/2001\\_02\\_e.pdf](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/2001_02_e.pdf)).

Close to 35 years after the enactment of the first OLA, DND was still struggling to conform to the spirit and intent of the Act. Following the government of Canada *Action Plan for Official Languages* announced in 2003 (Privy Council Office [PCO], [http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/pco-bcp/website/06-07-27/www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/olo/default.asp@language=e&page=action&doc=cover\\_e.htm](http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/pco-bcp/website/06-07-27/www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/olo/default.asp@language=e&page=action&doc=cover_e.htm)) and in yet another attempt to achieve institutional bilingualism, DND launched its *Official Languages Strategic Plan – 2003-2006* which re-enforced the universal approach principle where “second language competency becomes a normal and integral part of the professional development stream for both officers and non-commissioned members” (DND, [http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/dol\\_strat/pdf/Full\\_Strategic\\_Plan\\_e.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/dol_strat/pdf/Full_Strategic_Plan_e.pdf)). Amongst other priorities identified was the requirement to “achieve 100% of generals and

colonels [the senior leadership of the CF] having language skills of CBC” (DND, [http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/dol\\_strat/pdf/Full\\_Strategic\\_Plan\\_e.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/dol_strat/pdf/Full_Strategic_Plan_e.pdf)) and ensuring that “military bilingual positions [are] correctly categorized and filled with the appropriate skills.” A language profile of “CBC” is obtained through formal testing where “C” means “superior” proficiency in reading, “B” indicates “medium” competency in writing and “C” represents “superior” skills in oral interaction (DND, [http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/dol\\_strat/pdf/Full\\_Strategic\\_Plan\\_e.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/dol_strat/pdf/Full_Strategic_Plan_e.pdf)).

Failing to demonstrate tangible progress towards achieving bilingualism as per the adopted universal bilingualism principle, the department introduced in October 2006 its *National Defence Official Languages Program Transformation Model 2007-2012* (DND, <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/ps/hri-irh/olp-mtp/olptm-mtplo-eng.asp>) which was officially launched in April 2007. As we speak, this program is still the bilingualism model in place for Canada’s military.

The *National Defence Official Languages Program Transformation Model 2007-2012* marked the end of the universal model and the adoption of the functional approach to bilingualism whereby the main thrust is now placed on ensuring that “linguistically qualified personnel [are] in the right place and at the right time to effectively support Canadian Forces (CF) operations and to comply with the Official Languages Act” (DND, <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/ps/hri-irh/olp-mtp/olptm-mtplo-eng.asp>). The stated goal of the Transformation Model is to ensure that DND personnel are led, trained, administered and supported in the

official language of their choice. In essence, the functional approach takes into consideration the unique roles and responsibilities of the Canadian military and the fact that for operational reasons, its uniformed members are regularly required to move from posts to posts (16% change position each year), train, and deploy on demanding operations in order to accomplish the department's missions and mandates (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/DND\\_e.pdf](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/DND_e.pdf)). As such, the OL transformation model allows Commanding Officers the flexibility to employ both the civilian and military personnel assigned to the various units and formations across the organization in a way that the bilingual functions and services that are required by the OLA (when and where they are required) are met. In other words, to obtain compliance with the OLA, DND now sees the bilingual capacity of a unit measured "as a whole" rather than on "an individual positional basis." As long as there is bilingual capacity somewhere within the unit, when and where bilingual functions are required, DND considers that the OLA requirements, notably those falling under *Part IV – Communications with and services to the public* - can be satisfied.

Among other changes introduced, only the general officer cadre at the rank of Lieutenant-General and above (a total of 15 officers across the CF) is required to attain a language profile of CBC. As well, only those Colonels, Brigadier-Generals and Major-Generals assigned to posts that are officially identified as bilingual are required to obtain a CBC language competency. Finally, CF officers selected to command "national-level" training schools and

70% of officers at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonels and Commanders that are selected for promotion to Colonel or Captain (Navy) have an obligation to have a CBC linguistic proficiency (DND, <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/ps/hri-irh/olp-mtp/olptm-mtplo-eng.asp>)

In a speech delivered in March 2007 before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Official Languages, the OCOL stated that the military's recent OL transformation model was an admission of failure by DND and that the new five-year timeline for assessing results is unacceptable (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/speeches\\_discours\\_01032007\\_e.php](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/speeches_discours_01032007_e.php)). If DND justifies its OL Transformation Model by arguing that the Canadian military is a "unique" institution, the OCOL was clear in saying that the OLA "does not confer special or preferred status on the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. The Act applies equally to all federal institutions" (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/speeches\\_discours\\_01032007\\_e.php](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/speeches_discours_01032007_e.php)). It is important to note that the OCOL has not endorsed the Transformation Model adopted by DND. In a March 2011 analysis of the progress made by DND and more than half way into the implementation of the military OL transformation model, the OCOL reported that despite some progress, "there is much that remains to be done before the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces are fully compliant with the Official Languages Act" (OCOL, [http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/DND\\_e.pdf](http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/DND_e.pdf)).

The difficulty for the CF in reconciling with bilingualism policies lies with its demanding and distinct functional roles and responsibilities which present unique institutional leadership challenges. As such, a focus on the CF organizational values, norms, its' traditions, doctrine and culture is required as these all define what the CF construes as "values-based leadership".

## **THE CF VALUES-BASED LEADERSHIP CONSTRUCT**

In line with the *Canada First* Defence Strategy, the CF's primary role is to defend and protect Canada's sovereignty and interests (<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/roles-eng.asp>). Like many other Western modern military organizations, the CF is responsible under the civilian authority of the nation's elected government for the lawful application of force where and when required, in support of state objectives (Department of National Defence [DND], 2003, p. 4). Evidently, military service is risky and the outcome of operations, missions, and battles are often a matter of life and death, not only for the personnel directly involved but also for the state itself. Because of this, military effectiveness becomes the number one priority for an organization like the CF. Indeed, the major difference between the military and most of the other organizations lies in the fact that CF members voluntarily agree "to give up their lives in the service of their country, referred to as the *clause of unlimited liability*" (Scoppio, 2007, p. 17). Unlike corporations, the CF does not pursue commercial goals. It exists under legal, national and societal imperatives to perform a functional military role. Because of the inherent dangers and unique

responsibilities associated with military service and for the reason that military organizations function collectively, leadership forms the core tenet of military effectiveness. Indeed, “leadership is at the service of collective effectiveness” (Fleishman et al., 1991; Hackman & Walton, 1986; Lord, 1977 as cited in Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001, p. 7).

In line with this principle, the CF conceptualizes leadership from a systems approach perspective. In a nutshell, the CF considers that performance and effectiveness come from the interaction of “three different categories of variables: individual characteristics, group characteristics and organizational or institutional characteristics” (DND, 2005, p. 2). From this perspective, the CF members’ conduct, skills, and accomplishments contribute to the effectiveness of the CF but the extent of their contributions is also moderated or influenced by group aspects such as the amount and quality of training they receive, the unit structure, the leadership variables, the communications practices adopted by the group, etc. In turn, the institutional values, the norms and policies, the traditions, doctrine, etc. also guide and influence individual and group behaviours to form a construct of what CF effectiveness is expected to be. Indeed, “criteria for organizational effectiveness are not entities to be discovered [...]. Rather, [they] are collective statements about human preferences, values, and the relative importance of outcomes. They are made-up things” (Wenck, 2003, p. 6). As well, the CF is a national institution that operates under Canadian laws embedded in the Constitution. As a result of this and because the CF acts on



behalf of a democratically elected government and the population of Canada, it also has a legal and moral obligation to respect and uphold the cultural values of the broader Canadian society. It also must expend resources responsibly and efficiently. These social norms and institutional responsibilities also help define the CF construct of military effectiveness. Hence, under an organizational theory systems approach, the entire conceptual underpinnings of CF leadership are values-based (DND, 2005).

To perform the unique roles and missions entrusted to the CF by the state (and the population of Canada), the CF, like all other professional militaries operates under its own set of ethical values and professional norms referred to as the CF *ethos*. The CF ethos is another social construct which for the CF is defined as comprising the military “values, beliefs and expectations that reflect core Canadian values, the imperatives of military professionalism and the requirements of operations” (DND, 2003, p. 25). Those military values which guide the actions of all CF members are captured in the following qualities: Duty, Loyalty, Integrity and Courage (2003, p. 31). In essence, the CF values-based leadership concept ties the unique legal and moral responsibilities of military service with the fundamental beliefs and values upheld by the Canadian civic society. By doing so, it meets both the functional and social imperatives of military effectiveness: defending the sovereignty and the interests of the nation while operating inside Canadian laws and values. As such, the values-based leadership framework defines the effectiveness of the CF institution as a whole

(how it wants to see itself and how it wants society and the state to see it). It also embodies and crystallizes the culture of effectiveness that pervades the CF organization.

Within an effectiveness driven, values-based leadership framework, the CF defines effective leadership as “directing, motivating and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success” (DND, 2005, p. 30). Like other militaries of the world, the CF works as a stratified hierarchy. As CF leaders gain in experience and rank, the complexity and ambiguity of responsibilities augment accordingly. At the tactical level of conflict, where “combat elements are manoeuvred and employed to achieve military objectives assigned to them” (2005, p. 12) and to some extent also at the operational level, where “military objectives are determined by operational commanders in accordance with military strategy” (p. 12), CF leaders generally exercise direct face-to-face leadership. In the CF, this type of leadership relates to the “leading people” function where “direct influence processes are more commonly used when leading people in the performance of day-to-day operations and activities” (p. 7). It involves leading, directing and motivating troops, teams, “units and higher formations in the execution of operations and implementation of policy” (p. 4) and is usually performed by lower to mid-level (but also sometimes more senior) leaders of the CF. Within the CF military values-based leadership ethos-driven construct, the leaders operating at this level mostly perform “leading

people” tasks orientated towards functional military effectiveness. As such, while operating in a professional and lawful manner, they focus on the functional imperatives of military effectiveness in order to accomplish the mission. For the most part, the “leading people” dimension of leadership involves more transactional type behaviours (contingent reward and management by exception) than transformational leadership (DND, 2007a).

Conversely, the leadership responsibilities usually performed by the more senior leaders of the CF (Colonels, Captains (Navy) and General type officers) fall more into the “leading the institution” domain than within the “leading people” dimension. As leaders move up in rank with more time and experience in the senior echelons of the CF hierarchy, they are typically elevated to more central headquarters’ functions where they have less direct interface with troops. At this level, leaders mostly perform indirect influence forms of leadership (DND, 2007b). This includes articulating and communicating compelling organizational goals and vision, creating forward-thinking long term strategies, advancing policies and priorities that support and guide the judicious employment of military forces and securing governmental resource allocations that sustain the institutional mandates assigned to the CF (2007b). It also involves embedding (or transforming) the CF culture and values to align them with the ideals of the institution or of the larger society, acting as credible spokespersons of the CF organization to the government and the public, etc (2007b). Leaders of the institution are also moral “agents of change”, “partnership brokers” and “stewards

of the military profession” (DND, 2005, p. 98). Most importantly, “[i]nstitutional leaders have a particular responsibility for safeguarding Canada’s moral commitment to CF members in recognition of the unique service that they provide to Canadian society” (2007b, p. 104).

As discussed, the general responsibilities associated with the “leading the institution” CF construct are believed to be more complex and require a higher degree of creativity, interpersonal and visionary acuity, cultural awareness, inspirational motivation agility, and openness to change. It also demands leaders to become personnel “champions.” As such, within the CF values-based institutional effectiveness model, “leading the institution” responsibilities are mostly relevant to transformational leadership behaviours. In this sense and in line with Bass’ model, transformational leadership “is about providing a sense of personal meaning, value, and purpose [...] simply extend[ing] and supplement[ing], rather than replac[ing], transactional leadership, but address[ing] higher-order individual needs (DND, 2005, p. 69). In essence, the CF institution equates both effective and superior leadership with transformational leadership, as “[s]uperior CF leaders, or transformational leaders, give followers valid reasons to be hopeful and committed” (2005, p. 70).

An in-depth review of leadership theories and their application within the military context is now required before conclusions about the values and efficacy of CF OL policies can be reached.

## CHAPTER 3 - LEADERSHIP THEORY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

An effectiveness-driven CF organizational culture requires leaders that both understand and contend with the tensions that followers experience with respect to OL policies and imperatives and with the expressed need for English to remain the common operational language. The premise that leadership is a central function of military effectiveness calls for both a clarification of leadership definitions, and a review of leadership theories through the ages. Joseph Rost (1993) found more than 220 definitions for the term *leadership* in his review of leadership theory covering the first nine decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (as cited in Bradley & Charbonneau, 2000; Champagne, 1999). In fact, according to Stogdill (1974), “there are almost as many definitions of *leadership* as there are people who have tried to define it” (as cited in Northouse, 2007, p. 2). Leadership is indeed a mysterious and elusive concept. For a long period, leadership was conceived simply as having authority over others (McKay, 2008). According to McKay (2008), the word “leader” in Old English (‘leden’) refers to the functional aspects of being “a guide” or “to show the way” (p. 15).

With industrialization becoming the main social and economic driver of many western societies during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the focus of human activity in these societies rapidly became the employment of a large number of workers for the accumulation of capital. To stay competitive and increase their revenues, industries began putting the emphasis on productivity. Later on, driven by the “industrial paradigm” (McKay, 2008, p. 18), management-orientated sociologists

developed an interest in identifying what factors made some commercial entities more successful than others. Not surprisingly, leadership theory started to develop in the early 1900s. Since then, the manner in which leadership is conceived has never ceased to evolve and its potential applications and underpinnings continue to be explored by many management and organizational theorists in today's capitalist and efficiency-driven modern economies.

One of the first leadership theories to be developed was the "trait" school of thought which focused its attention on the personality of leaders and their "inherent" qualities (Northouse, 2007). In line with trait thought, it was argued that leaders were born with special talents and characteristics which made them part of a breed of extraordinary individuals capable of motivating followers towards achieving specific objectives. Indeed, Bernard (1926) "believed that it was the internal qualities of the individual that made them a leader" (as cited in Yardley & Neal, 2007, p. 21). In the early 1950s, the trait movement was eclipsed by the "behaviourist" school which dominated leadership theory until the seventies (McKay, 2008). Behaviourists like Halpin and Winer (1957), and Hemphill and Coons (1957) approached leadership as a process where the focus was more on what the leaders did than who they were (as cited in Yardley & Neal, 2007). The context, the environment (contingent upon internal and external situational factors) and the behaviours exhibited by managers and leaders had to be considered in the equation. Among certain behaviours thought to be influential in the leadership process were "task" or "relationship" orientated

activities where “task behaviors facilitate goal accomplishment [...and] relationship behaviors help subordinates feel comfortable with themselves, with each other, and with the situation in which they find themselves” (Northouse, 2007, p. 69). One of the conclusions of behaviourist thought was that certain leadership styles were more or less appropriate for certain situations (Northouse, 2007). Several behaviourist theories were also developed later, some of which emphasized the relationship that exists between leadership and the culture of organizations, in particular as it relates to the management of change within those organizations (Shein, 1985; Cameron & Quinn, 1999 as cited in Yardley & Neal, 2007).

While the increased emphasis on organizational culture and change came from behaviourists' contentions that leadership styles shifted according to situational contexts, modern leadership schools recognized the potentially prosperous characteristics of North American life and culture. In fact, the mid-seventies marked the advent of the “new leadership” school of thought which has since influenced most of today's western management and organizational leadership practices. According to McKay (2008), the requirement for a fresh managerial leadership outlook was necessary because the cultural norms had significantly changed in North America as a result of the prosperity that followed the Second World War. Indeed, an enhanced focus on individualism signified the complete rejection of Taylor's scientific management paradigm that marked the early part of the twentieth century. Increased competition, globalization, the

Internet all contributed to a realization that organizations needed to adopt flexible management models and adapt to change if they were to survive in a capitalist driven economy (Katzenback, 1998 as cited in Dionne, Yammarino, Atwater, & Spangler, 2004). In this context, proponents of the new leadership school like Kotter (1990) posited that if “management is about coping with complexity [...] leadership, by contrast is about coping with change (as cited in Young & Dulewicz, 2005, pp. 229-230). Two classically flexible types of leadership used to make change described by Burns (1978); transactional and transformational leadership marked the advent of “higher order” leadership theory still relevant today across organizations, including military institutions.

## **TRANSACTIONAL AND TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP**

Because “transformational leadership appears to be extremely important for modern work” (Lim & Ployhart, 2004, p. 610), it is considered the most influential theory to come out of the new leadership movement. Transformational leadership originated with Burns (1978) and is a process characterized by a superior order of exchanges between a leader and followers based on “emotions and values” (Yukl, 1999, p. 285). In contrast with the traditional and routine exchanges that occur between leaders and followers (at the transactional level) whereby followers comply with a leader’s demands in order to receive wages, avoid sanctions or for self-gratification, “transformational leadership goes beyond exchanging inducements for desired performance by developing, intellectually



stimulating, and inspiring followers to transcend their own self-interests for a higher collective purpose, mission, or vision” (Howell & Avolio, 1993, p. 891).

Bass (1985) further refined the domains of transactional and transformational leader-follower exchanges identified by Burns by recognizing that transactional leader behaviours do motivate followers to accomplish tasks assigned to them either through “contingent reward leadership” (an exchange whereby a leader motivates followers to do things through gratification or punishment) or “management by exception” when leaders focus on follower mistakes to guide their actions or intervene only when things go wrong (as cited in Howell & Avolio, 1993, p. 891). Hence, these types of exchanges are considered of a “lower order” by transformational theorists since they do not modify “followers’ attitudes, values, and beliefs to align them with those of the organization and steer their followers towards self-development and greater-than-expected accomplishments” (Bass, 1998 as cited in Charbonneau, 2004, p. 565). However, while acknowledging that transactional and transformational leadership behaviours caused different kinds of effects on followers, and contrary to Burns, Bass did not consider the two types of leadership to be mutually exclusive (Howell & Avolio, 1993). In fact, various studies (Avolio & Bass, 1988; Bass & Avolio, 1990; Koh, Terborg & Steers, 1991; Tosi, 1982) have confirmed that transformational behaviours can be successfully complemented by transactional contingent reward leadership (as cited in Howell & Avolio, 1993).

In line with Bass' (1985) theory, transformational leaders motivate followers to transcend the transactional requirements which merely fill basic individual needs and achieve more than what was originally anticipated. This "superior" moral engagement on the part of followers is obtained through behavioural and charismatic actions from the leaders designed to raise follower "awareness of the importance and value of designated outcomes" (Bass, 1985 as cited in Hater & Bass, 1988, p. 695). In this process, "dispirited" followers are transformed "into active followers by heightening motivation and instilling a sense of purpose" (Burns, 1978, as cited in DeGroot, Kiker & Cross, 2000, p.356). As such, according to the model developed by Bass, transformational leaders are presumed to be "intellectually stimulating, considerate, idealistic, and inspiring" (Johnsen, Eid, Pallesen, Bartone, & Nissestad, 2009, p. 2213).

Bass' transformational leadership model approaches the leadership process from a behavioural perspective in terms of what a leader can do to bring about change and instill a higher order of moral commitment from followers towards an organizational objective or value. It is based on four main thrusts: *idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation* and *individualized consideration* (Bass, Jung, Avolio, & Berson, 2003). In line with the model, each of these factors interact and play a role in enabling a leader to inspire followers not only to adhere to the goals of the organization but motivate them to fully internalize the underlying organizational assumptions and values

behind these goals. As such, Howell and Avolio (1993) found transformational leaders:

Concentrate their efforts on longer term goals; place value and emphasis on developing a vision and inspiring followers to pursue the vision rather than work within existing systems; and coach followers to take on greater responsibility for their own development, as well as the development of others. (pp. 891-992)

The first two transformational model factors are often considered as lumped into one single factor, *charisma* bringing us back to some of the “trait” school tenets. In fact, trait leadership theory experienced a short revival in the mid-seventies just before the coming of the new leadership school (McKay, 2008). Indeed, new leadership thought considers leader characteristics (reframed as charismatic leadership) as important aspects intervening in the transformational leadership process because they act on “followers’ valences, emotions, nonconscious motivations, and self esteem” (House, 1977 as cited in House, 1996, p. 333). The validity of the trait approach had been challenged in the past by many researchers who criticized the subjectivity involved in the promulgation of specific leader attributes. The universal applicability of some fixed leader qualities and their roles within the leadership process were also questioned, the argument being that certain leader characteristics were only relevant to some particular situations, and may not be pertinent to others (Northouse, 2007). Also, while trait leadership placed all the emphasis on the leader, it failed to recognize the “role played by followers in validating charisma in these leaders (Bryman, 1992; House, 1976 as cited in Northhouse, 2007, p. 178). Today, the charismatic dimensions (idealized influence and inspirational

motivation) of the transformational leadership model acknowledge these contentions. As such, the model places the scope of influence of charismatic leadership behaviours within the domain of inspirational appeals which “refer to the use of values, and ideals to arouse an emotional response [...] presented in such a way that it resonates with the target’s needs, values and ideals” (Yukl, 2002; Yukl & Seifert, 2002, as cited in Charbonneau, p. 567).

In fact, contemporary transformational leadership theory equates charismatic leadership with both idealized influence and inspirational motivation. As Yukl (1999) pointed out, inspirational motivation appears to be highly related to the charismatic leadership idealized influence factor. Idealized influence is at play when “leaders [...] act as strong role models for followers [who] identify with [...] and want very much to emulate them. [...] They are greatly respected by followers, who usually place a great deal of trust in them. They provide followers with a vision and a sense of mission” (Northhouse, 2007, p. 182). The visionary aspect of idealized influence is particularly salient in the leadership process as it is believed to play a significant role in increasing the commitment of followers towards the accomplishment of a common mission (Bennis & Nanus, 1985; House et al., 1991 as cited in DeGroot, Kiker, Cross, 2000, p.358). By articulating a clear and inspiring vision, using expressive symbols and language, the leader sets an example and “becomes the model of behaviour to follow” (Bass & Stogdill, 1990 as cited in DeGroot et al., 2000, p.358).

The next transformational leadership factor, intellectual stimulation refers to leader behaviours that challenge followers to think “out of the box”, be creative, innovative and challenge the established reality of “their own beliefs, and values as well as those of the leader and the organization” (Northouse, 2007, p. 183). In essence, followers are encouraged to see through the various dimensions of issues brought to their attention by the leader, approach problems from diverse angles and think creatively about solving them (Bass, 1985; Bass & Avolio, 1990, as cited in Rafferty & Griffin, 2004, p. 333). Based on Bass’ work (1985), intellectual stimulation is defined as “enhancing employees’ interest in, and awareness of problems, and increasing their ability to think about problems in new ways” (Rafferty & Griffin, 2004, p. 333).

The last factor involved in the transformational leadership process falls under the category of supportive leadership. It is termed individualized consideration; a supportive leader will act in a way that will demonstrate individual consideration for the well being of each of his followers. In this sense, the leader will strive to create conditions (a climate) that will help his followers develop and enhance their personal skills, knowledge and general sense of accomplishment (Northouse, 2007). Individualized consideration is defined as “behaviour on the part of a leader that indicates that he or she respects his or her followers and is concerned with followers’ feelings and needs” (Rafferty & Griffin, 2004, p. 333). Some examples of supportive type behaviour may include listening carefully and attending to the needs of followers, acting as a coach or

helping followers go through personal difficulties. In other words, it is about showing (in a genuine and active way) that a leader cares for his followers (Northouse, 2007).

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the broad principles behind the transformational leadership process aim to go beyond the normal one-dimensional transactional types of exchanges that occur between persons in leadership positions and the people who report to them. Transformational leadership approaches leader-follower relations as a mutual and dynamic process whereby followers' needs, emotions and values are considered. As such, this type of "higher level" and morally engaging leadership is appealing to modern management orientated organizations as they try to cope with fast evolving societal norms and the reality of constant change and uncertainty affecting their activities. Despite its extremely wide popularity, transformational leadership has drawn some criticism, notably that it puts too much emphasis on the personality traits (charisma) of leaders rather than on their behaviours (Bryman, 1992 as cited in Northouse, 2007), or that it suffers from a "bias toward heroic conceptions of leadership" and includes "ambiguous constructs" (Yukl, 1999, p. 286). Nuancing these contentions, Yukl concludes that "[t]ransformational leadership seems widely relevant, but there may be situations where it is unnecessary or has negative consequences" (1999, p. 301).

## COMMUNICATIONS ENABLES TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The researchers's contention that bilingualism may significantly impact the ability of CF officers to lead people and the CF institution is supported broadly with respect to what the literature reveals on the role of communication in effecting transformational leadership. Communications in transformational leadership is significant because "[l]eader influence is grounded in cognitive, social, and political processes [and] leadership is contextually defined and caused" (Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001, p. 6). Beyond its moral dimension, transformational leadership involves an influence process. Admittedly, transformational leadership acknowledges that followers can influence the behaviours and the effectiveness of leaders as much as leaders can inspire followers to transcend their own interests in the pursuit of common (organizational) visionary goals and values. In fact "[l]eader effectiveness is defined as a function of the dynamic that occurs between leader and followers" (2001, p.14). Leadership is about humans and human interaction is at the core of the transformational leader-follower relational exchange. As such, communications is a crucial enabler of at least two of the three transformational leadership factors described in this chapter: *idealized influence-inspirational motivation* and *individualized consideration*. Although one could argue that communications also enables the *intellectual stimulation* factor, in the sense that "leaders create a climate that encourages the reframing of problems and the expression of ideas" (Bass, 1985, as cited in Charbonneau, 2004, p. 567), the researcher contends that communications has less significance within the

*intellectual stimulation* factor and as such will not consider this aspect in this chapter.

As previously stated, the charismatic factor of idealized influence-inspirational motivation is one of the pillars of transformational leadership and communications is central to the enabling of idealized influence-inspirational motivation. Indeed, transformational leaders behave in such a way that they become examples to follow by setting high and appealing moral standards. They also articulate a creative, expressive and persuasive vision and present behaviours that inspire followers to internalize a need to change their beliefs and values. To lead by example, establish credibility (as credible sources of information to the followers) and trust, transformational leaders need to be transparent, coherent, and define the world, using language that relates to the world conceptualized by their followers. They also need to explain, clarify and connect emotionally with their followers so that their request “resonates with the [followers’] needs, values and ideals” (Yukl et al., 1996, as cited in Charbonneau, 2004, p. 567). To touch upon followers’ emotions and move people towards a committed desire for change, transformational leaders must rely on communicating a vision “as empathetic language that involves the reinforcement of [a] group’s collective identity” (Shamir et al., 1993, as cited in Dionne et al., 2004, p. 183). According to Rafferty & Griffin (2004), oral communications “or the use of appeals and emotion-laden statements” (p. 332) is present in the vast



majority of definitions of inspirational type leadership as it plays a key role in motivating and arousing the emotions of followers.

In the same vein, Bass (1985) said inspirational leaders add an affective layer to the influence process (as cited in Rafferty & Griffin, 2004) and Yukl (1999) posited that “at the group level [...] the core transformational behaviors should probably include facilitating agreement about objectives and strategies, facilitating mutual trust and cooperation, and building group identification and collective efficacy” (p. 290). As well, inspirational leaders stimulate enthusiasm by communicating messages that build confidence in the ability of group members to accomplish tasks (Yukl, 1981, as cited in Rafferty & Griffin, 2004). Indeed, “by appealing to the self-interests of followers as well as their shared values, transformational leaders can help their followers collectively maximize performance” (Howell & Avolio, 1993, p. 892). In essence, the communications skills of leaders play a crucial role in the dissemination and follower integration of organizational objectives. In fact, Berson and Avolio (2004) report a significant amount of research that positively correlates “communication skills with leadership processes” (p. 630). Among others, they cite Barge and Hirokawa (1989) linking leader effectiveness with “how an individual expresses himself or herself,” Baum, Locke and Kirkpatrick (1998) who established a rapport between “visionary leadership [...] communications skills [...] and organizational performance outcomes,” Bass (1985) who associated transformational leadership with the “use of metaphors and images as a means of articulating

one's vision" and Conger and Kanungo (1998) who "argued that the style of oral communication is a critical distinguishing factor in whether the leader's message will be recalled and embraced by followers."

Similarly, since *individualized consideration* is defined as "expressing concern for followers and taking account of their individual needs" (Rafferty & Griffin, 2004, p. 333), it would be difficult to dismiss communications as an important enabler of this transformational leadership aspect. Indeed, the *individualized consideration* factor of transformational leadership invites leaders to be attentive to their followers' affective needs and demonstrate a true preoccupation for their personal and professional well-being. To be supportive and behave in a manner that demonstrates genuine concern for their followers, considerate leaders must be agile at listening to (and at communicating with) followers. In fact, effective leaders have good communications skills, are good listeners and they work well with others. "They build trust and promote teamwork and collaboration [...]. They listen closely to diverse points of view and treat others with dignity and respect" (Northouse, 2007, p. 189). As cited in Dionne et al., (2004), past research (Dyer, 1995; Oser et al., 1989; Stevens & Campion, 1994; Swezey & Salas, 1992; Zander, 1994) has demonstrated that "increased listening, prompt feedback and openness to suggestions within [a] team [are] necessary for effective performance" (p. 184). Thus, to be attentive to follower well-being and be able to perceive how they see the world, understand their values and beliefs and develop an affective connection with them, a "considerate

leader is responsible for constructing a one-to-one relationship with each team member, listening to concerns and addressing individual needs (Bass, 1994; Yammarino et al., 1998 as cited in Dionne et al., 2004, p. 185). Because transformational leaders help create and transmit the shared meanings that people maintain within organizations (thus they contribute to the shaping of organizational cultures), they are considered in many ways “social architects’ for their organizations” (Northouse, 2007, p. 187). Indeed, “[b]y showing individualized consideration as well as providing inspirational motivation, transformational leaders may increase their followers’ emotional response and attachment to the leader and the team” (Avolio et al., 2001 as cited in Boies & Howell, 2009, p. 220).

The existing research and theory discussed in this chapter appear to validate the importance of communications in enabling transformational leadership processes to occur between leaders and followers. Although many methods of communications are available to leader-follower interactions, a high degree of language competency and creativity is necessary to codify or demystify the concepts that define our socially constructed world. An idealized, influential and inspirational motivator and an individually considerate leader will be agile in sense-making and listening. As well, such a leader will be imaginative in using metaphors and empathic language and will understand how messages are processed and filtered to make them resonate with follower beliefs and expectations. As such, an effective transformational leader will be adept at

appreciating the various verbal and non-verbal language nuances, the interpretations and meanings that emotionally convey appealing calls for transformational-type follower responses.

While leadership theories, specifically transformational leadership shed much light into the nature of leader-follower interactions, the literature on military communication and effectiveness in general is scarce at best, and even less is known about theoretical models through which this topic can be viewed and understood.


## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – THE COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK**

The theoretical framework underpinning this research study, the *competing values framework* (CVF) is embedded within organizational and communications theory. This model has proven useful for evaluating the relationships that exist between leadership roles and organizational effectiveness (Belasen & Rufer, 2007; Cameron et al., 2006 as cited in Belasen & Frank, 2008, p. 127) and for the current study. The CVF framework was selected because it applies to the CF when examining organizational effectiveness and communication specifically. The framework emphasizes two dimensions of effectiveness (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). The first dimension involves the development of people within the organization (internal focus), and the development of the organization itself (external focus). The second involves a preference for organizational structure and a balance between the competing

values of (or contrast between) stability and control, and flexibility and change (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). As will be argued in the following paragraphs, the CF institution embodies both internal and external dimensions as well as the values, roles and functions emphasized by the CF values-based leadership model of effectiveness. More specifically, the CVF focuses on the cultural variables that are present within organizations and how leadership behaviours can serve to manage those competing organizational cultural dimensions (Yardley & Neal, 2007, p. 22). “The impetus [...] is the belief that organizational culture is an important social characteristic that influences organizational, group, and individual behaviour” (Hartnell, Yi Ou, & Kinicki, 2010, p.1).

In accordance with the theoretical underpinnings for this work, a large proportion of transformational behaviours are believed to be enabled by compelling, inspirational, adaptive, creative, considerate and visionary communications practices. Thus, through transformational communications, institutional leaders embed (or transform, as social “agents of change”) the various competing organizational and societal values that define the cultural identity of the CF organization. As such, the CVF is particularly relevant to the phenomenon of interest because it allows this research to approach and appreciate how the CF institution may value bilingualism within the many different and opposing demands and pressures that Canada’s military organization faces in cultivating a culture of military effectiveness. Indeed, the CVF was originally developed and proposed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) as

a model for analyzing organizational effectiveness (as cited in Hartnell et al., p. 2). As can be seen in Figure 1, the CVF model identifies two broad competing value dimensions for “effective management” (Vilkinas & Kartan, 2006, p. 506), illustrated by one vertical flexibility-control and one horizontal internal-external focus dimensions. The resulting CVF construct is four quadrants corresponding to “what people value about organizational performance” or the four core cultures that compete within an organization (Yardley & Neal, 2007, p. 25).



**Figure 1.** The Competing Values Framework (Belasen & Frank, 2008, p. 129)

According to Quinn, Hildebrandt, Rogers, and Thompson (1991) the *human relations* quadrant values human resources and emphasizes teamwork,

morale and cohesion aspects as opposed to the *rational goal* quadrant which focuses on control, productivity, efficiency and planning. The *open systems* value dimension is externally focused, stresses readiness, flexibility, adaptation and growth while the *internal processes* orientated culture has an internal focus with an inclination towards control, stability, and information management (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). As well, the *human relations* and *open systems* value dimensions involve leadership roles of *facilitator*, *mentor*, *innovator* and *broker*.

The first of these two roles are “aimed at generating a motivated work force driven by commitment and involvement” while the last two “rely on creativity and communication skills to bring about change and acquire resources necessary for change management” (Belasen & Frank, 2008, pp. 128-129). Indeed, in line with the model, the facilitator “expresses opinions, seeks consensus, and negotiates compromise” while the mentor “is aware of individual needs [...], facilitates development and listens actively” (Quinn et al., 1996 as cited in Vilkinas & Kartan, 2006, p. 507). Finally, the innovator is “creative, envisions, encourages and facilitates change” while the broker “develops [...] networks, acquires [the] needed resources and is politically astute” (2006, p. 507). Hence, the organizational values and the corresponding communications enabled leadership responses that belong within the top two quadrants of the CVF tend to involve or demand transformational leadership behaviours.

Conversely, the *internal processes* and *rational goal* orientated roles of *monitor*, *coordinator*, *director* and *producer* are more aligned with transactional type managerial activities. In fact, according to CVF theory, the monitor “checks on performance and provides a sense of continuity and stability” while the coordinator “maintains structure [...] and sees rules and standards are met” (Vilkinas & Kartan, 2006, p. 507). For his part, the director “sets goals, clarifies roles and establishes clear expectations” (2006, p. 507) and the producer is orientated towards goal achievement behaviour. As such, the CVF places these organizational value dimensions and the corresponding less transformational and more linear type leadership roles associated with these values in the two lower quadrants.

Military transformational leaders are therefore required to manage competing organizational cultural dimensions and enact leadership behaviours that a) *facilitate* (by seeking compromise and/or by negotiating) the application of OL policies and practices at the operational level; b) *mentor* by listening to and by paying attention to needs of followers in the face of incoherent OL practices and uncertainty caused by those competing imperatives; c) *innovate* (by envisioning) ways in which both bilingualism and functional military imperatives can be met, and d) play a *broker* role (by being politically astute) to help introduce solutions to the various pressures created by the institutional management of the bilingualism agenda. As Belasen and Frank stated “the CVF highlights the contradictory nature inherent in organizational environments and



the complexity of choices faced by managers when responding to competing tensions. These responses include a variety of managerial roles differentiated by situational contingencies” (2008, p.128).

## CHAPTER 4 – METHOD

The purpose of the study is to gain insights from CF Officer (as senior leaders) insiders' perspectives, and on how those perceptions shape CF Officers' own understandings and actions related to bilingualism as an attribute for being (or becoming) a transformational leader. The study drew upon the methodological principles of *ethnographic research* to acquire insights into the perspectives of CF leaders and future leaders to accurately describe their views, and the activities they engage in relation to the phenomenon of interest (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

### RATIONALE FOR ETHNOGRAPHIC LENS

Rooted in anthropology, ethnography is generally referred to as “the description of people and their culture” (Schwartz & Jacobs, 1979, as cited in Altheide, 1987, p. 66) and is a social inquiry approach where researchers usually participate in people's lives often for extended periods of time in order to gain understanding of the emerging focus of inquiry (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Researchers typically collect data from a range of sources such as “from the field”, where people's actions and accounts are examined in their natural context, by *participant observation* and/or through *informal conversations*, and from *documentary evidence*. Data collected is typically obtained from relatively small samples, and the open approach to the collection of data is characterized by its unstructured or semi-structured methodology. According to Hammersley and

Atkinson (2007), “the analysis of data involves interpretation of the meanings, functions, and consequences of human actions and institutional practices [...]” (p. 3). Given that the aim of this study is to describe and understand the perspectives of CF leaders and future leaders and the activities they engage in relation to bilingualism as an attribute for being (or becoming) a transformational leader, an ethnographic lens is therefore appropriate.

## **RAPID ETHNOGRAPHY**

Given the very short timeline for the study, and the fact that the researcher is a ranked member (Lieutenant-Colonel) of the CF, and a student at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), thus already immersed in the culture, the use of *rapid ethnography* is justified as the most appropriate and pragmatic approach to study the phenomenon. Rapid ethnography, which is rooted in “rapid assessment process” (RAP) methodology is defined as an “intensive, team-based ethnographic inquiry using triangulation, iterative data analysis, and additional data collection to quickly develop a preliminary understanding of a situation from the insider's perspective” (Beebe, 2001, p.1). Millen (2000), explains that its “core elements include limiting or constraining the research focus and scope, using key informants, capturing rich field data by using multiple observers and interactive observation techniques, and collaborative qualitative data analysis” (p. 280).

The majority of rapid ethnography principles were observed in this study. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) argue that ethnographers make few distinctions between interviewing and participant observations. They do acknowledge however that “the perspectives elicited in interviews do not provide the direct access to some cognitive and attitudinal base from which a person’s behaviour in ‘natural’ settings is derived in an unmediated way, they may still be capable of illuminating that behaviour” (p. 108-109). The researcher contends that a “shared identity” with the informants (being a senior officer himself), allowed for proper contextual and cultural understanding of behaviour thus justifying the absence of *participant observation* as a form of data collection in the traditional sense. Because the researcher was not part of a research team, and for the purposes of this study, the researcher did not use multiple collaborators to capture and analyze data as this was not required, nor was it practical.

## **SAMPLING, PARTICIPANTS AND SETTING**

Using a *rapid ethnographic* framework to study the phenomenon, a total sample of 15 participants was recruited from the Canadian Forces College (CFC) 2010-11 student cohorts, in Toronto, Ontario. The sample size for the study was guided through data saturation, that is, until no new information was uncovered from the interviews (Creswell, 2007). The setting for the semi-structured individual interviews was the CFC site itself, where a private room was provided.

Permission to access the setting and the informants was obtained through official military channels.

A convenience sample of 12 CF officers at the ranks of Major and Lieutenant-Colonel, themselves students attending the Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP) at CFC in Toronto, who represent a group of senior officers identified as having the potential to become future institutional leaders of the CF, attended in-person semi-structured interviews that lasted between 30 to 45 minutes. Three even more senior CF officers at the ranks of Colonel and Captain (Navy) attending the National Security Programme (NSP) who, upon promotion to the next rank (General officer) will in effect join the current leaders of the institution, were also interviewed as part of this study. The NSP participants were purposively selected and recruited on the basis of their rank and of their position of influence and leadership within the CF. While the main objective of the JCSP “is to prepare selected senior officers [...] for command and staff appointments in the contemporary operating environment across the continuum of operations in national and international settings” (DND, <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/226-eng.html>), the NSP “is designed to create effective institutional leaders by enhancing and refining the knowledge and capabilities of the participants as future institutional leaders and national security professionals” (DND, <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/DP4/NSP/NSP3/rationale-eng.pdf>).

Following research ethics board (REB) approval from both the CF organization and the University of Calgary, conveniently selected JCSP and purposively selected NSP students were hand-delivered or e-mailed an information letter and consent form inviting them to participate in this study. Those informants who agreed to be interviewed signed the consent form and were reminded of their voluntary participation at the onset of the interviews. All interviews were conducted by the researcher (a fully bilingual CF officer), audio-recorded, and transcribed verbatim for the analysis. Seven participants whose primary language was French chose to be interviewed “en français”. The eight other officers whose mother tongue was English elected to be interviewed in that language.

French audio and English audio files were respectively transcribed by French-speaking and English-speaking transcriptionists, both of which were experienced in qualitative transcription work. Given the nature and subject of the study, this was a crucial way in which the unique linguistic nuances in the actual language of each of the informants were captured in the transcripts.

Several steps were also taken to preserve informants’ anonymity and confidentiality. For example, interview notes and transcripts were anonymized by the researcher with regard to the name of the individual respondent and any other factors which could specifically identify a particular individual. Removing any identifying features from the notes/transcripts ensured anonymity of

participants. In addition, interview files were assigned a code corresponding to a master list of participant names which were kept in a separate location from the interview file, interview transcripts were password-protected and kept on a secure computer-drive only accessible by the researcher. For the purposes of this research, and referred as such in the Results and Discussion sections of this study report, interview files in English were coded with the first letter of the code being an “E” and the interview files in French were coded with the first letter of the code being an “F”.

In addition to the data collected from the informants in the interviews, an extensive review of documents within the domain of the CF and the Government of Canada, specifically, policies and procedures, administrative orders, historical assessments, official documentation, and doctrine related to leadership, bilingualism, and organizational communication was conducted and key information was carefully noted, and later triangulated with the analysis of the transcripts. According to Miles and Huberman (1994) triangulation is “a method of confirming findings [that] is supposed to support a finding by showing that independent measures of it agree with it or, at least, do not contradict it” (p. 266). The type of triangulation employed for this study is termed “method triangulation”, in this instance the combination of documents review and interview data (p. 267), for the purposes of corroborating the findings using multiple modes of evidence as to “seeing or hearing multiple *instances* of it from different *sources* by using

different *methods* and by squaring the finding with others it needs to be squared with” (p. 267).

## **DATA ANALYSIS**

A thematic approach to qualitative data analysis was used (Owen, 1984) to analyze the interview data. Transcripts were coded using a qualitative thematic analysis approach to identify cross-cutting emergent themes related to the phenomenon of interest, across interviews. Owen’s (1984) approach is rooted in relational communication research which is helpful to understanding how human beings use communication to interpret their relationships. This method of analysis is therefore appropriate in ethnographic research as the researcher is not only interested in participants’ meaningful behaviours, but also in the communication of those meanings. As Altheide (1987) stated: “Like all ethnographic research, the meaning of a message is assumed to be reflected in various modes of information exchange, format, rhythm and style, e.g., aural and visual style, as well as in the context of the report itself, and other nuances” (p. 68). According to Owen (1984), thematic analysis provides a range of explanations (interpretations) about relationships that go beyond existing relational research “because it relies not on recall of relationship events or on perceptions of imagined encounters, but on unimposed lay conceptions of actual communication episodes in current relationships” (p. 274).



Zorn (n.d.) who adapted Owen's thematic analysis approach (1984) for analyzing interviews and field notes proposed a pragmatic method for coding this type of data. Owen's criteria for thematic analysis include; a) *recurrence*, "when at least two parts of a report had the same thread of meaning, even though different wording indicated such a meaning" (1984, p.275); b) *repetition*, "an explicit repeated use [...] of key words, phrases or sentences" (p. 275); and c) *forcefulness*, which in oral discourse refers to "vocal inflection, volume, or to dramatic pauses [...]" it also refers to the underlining of words and phrases, the increased size of print or use of colored marks circling or otherwise focusing on passages in the written reports" (p. 275-276). Zorn's (n.d.) approach emphasizes the link between the text to be analyzed, and the research question (phenomenon of interest), thus allowing for the emergence of themes that most directly explain the phenomenon. Following a rigorous process, interview transcripts and field notes were read and re-read several times, and using Owen's (1984) thematic analysis criteria of recurrence, repetition and forcefulness of communication, major themes were ultimately identified by their frequency, and by how closely they related in meaning to other themes and the research question. For this analysis, the documents reviewed were also analyzed thematically and triangulated with the interview data in order to "cross-validate information gathered from interviews" (Noor, 2008, p. 1604).

## CHAPTER 5 - ANALYSIS

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Themes uncovered from the respondents' perspectives formed the researcher's thesis that English as the language of work, as opposed to bilingualism, is the core driver for CF effectiveness-driven imperatives, and that the implications related to meeting the bilingualism agenda in the face of this reality create pressures that are related to the functional purpose of the CF and the core military values and activities required for the organization to meet the mission accomplishment objectives. In essence, these competing values and tensions are captured in the CF values-based leadership model of effectiveness.

The thematic analysis used to make sense of the interview data for this study uncovered seven major themes that directly relate to the initial research question, being the central concepts that informants experience towards *bilingualism* and *leadership*. Although in some instances the perspectives of French-speaking informants differed slightly from those of some English-speaking officers, the themes identified below are deemed to be valid representations of the views and attitudes of the informants in relation to the phenomena of interest, whether or not they were expressed from a Canadian anglophone or francophone cultural background. The seven themes that were unveiled from the analysis are the following: *English for effectiveness (CF language of work)*, the *societal/legal institutional imperative*, the *cost/benefit*

*equation, a mechanistic/incoherent institutional approach to bilingualism, the operational value of bilingualism, leading and transforming through communications, and finally, bilingualism as a cultural acuity enabler.*

The first major theme relates very closely to the second theme in the sense that the informants unanimously identified that despite having an institutional vision and focus on conforming to the OLA and to the societal imperative, the CF privileges **English as the language of work**. Indeed, a majority of the officers interviewed said that was necessary for the **effectiveness** of the organization. When asked to provide his perspectives about the CF vision for workplace bilingualism, a JCSP officer stated:

A common vision? I guess again, my operational experiences...I tend to work with English-speaking allies and my experiences within the military have predominantly been with single language units, specifically, like English language units, so there's varying degrees to the importance or the opportunity to use a second language, depending on where you are. [...], you know, in a lot of ways, my early experiences in the single-language units, there's not necessarily a common vision, because it's not... in a way... it's not really applicable. Maybe that's not a fair way of putting it, but the single-language units, there wasn't an expectation for me to do any business or do any talking outside that language. And, a lot of my training, has been predominantly in the English language, just the nature or the history or the legacy of that training so, you know, it's in a way, [...] you know, coming back to the centre, the ability to speak in the second language has been kind of outside of work I've really done, it has nothing to do with my day-to-day work (EF06).

This was also a central theme uncovered from the analysis of NSP student discourses. One NSP Officer argued for a pragmatic application of bilingualism in the CF, "for operational effectiveness, sometimes the draft

document has to go out, sometimes the unilingual message has to go out and you have to deal with the ramifications or the other version of it, at some other point” (EG07). Another NSP officer, a francophone stated that his expectations regarding the language of work are nonexistent because he fully appreciates the fact that the nature of military operations requires a common language, and that although he fully supports the CF institutional legal and social concern for bilingualism, “we need to advance the files and sometimes, so not to compromise the attainment of national or inter-departmental goals, we have to use a common language [loose translation]” (FG07). This was also echoed by a French-speaking JCSP student who explained that the Naval environment is almost exclusively English, the bases, the units, the training, “you are either an anglophone or you are assimilated [loose translation]” (FE05). The same officer added that in meetings (even when they occur in Montreal), for time management and effectiveness purposes, people “switch to English to get it done.” In the same vein, another JCSP informant described that “even in the bilingual units I served in, from time to time, English was the predominant language [loose translation]” (FB02). Validating his own views on English as the common language of operations in the CF even further, this respondent explained the following:

the majority of francophones with whom I have worked rapidly use English to function in order to consolidate everything. [...] Yes, it facilitates things immensely. To... master the language of work which will be English because operations, particularly in the Navy, are in English throughout the whole world, every nation falls under this obligation therefore... it's English that becomes the language of work [loose translation].

The reality expressed by the vast majority of informants regarding the CF language of work is the central theme emerging from the analysis as it relates to the essential purpose of the military organization focused on efficacy for accomplishing the mission.

The second theme, the ***societal/legal institutional imperative*** is defined here as the constitutional obligation (in accordance with the OLA) and the social responsibility conferred to the CF institution to truly reflect the bilingual character of Canada's nation. If a quarter of the country's population has French as its primary language and if the CF organization recruits its members from all of Canada's demographics and cultures, then the societal imperative appears to be justified, at least on the surface. On this aspect, an NSP participant said:

that certainly is consistent with government policy and more importantly, it's reflective of our country and recognizing that you've got close to over 30% of the Canadian population whose mother tongue is French and the fact that this country was founded on sort of those two languages, it's something that we need to continue to do (EG07).

Echoing that position, a French-speaking JCSP student argued that because Canada is multicultural, a trait the nation takes pride in, the CF has a responsibility to represent that multicultural reality and embrace the values the country embraces: multiculturalism and the ability to speak more than one language. That same officer stated "that's exactly where we should go, where our leaders should be [loose translation]" (FD04). Several informants thought it was also important and advantageous for the CF to be seen an example to follow as an effective bilingual federal institution amongst the many other departments

still considered by some respondents to be significantly struggling with the “language issue”. When asked his perspectives on bilingualism in the context of leadership, a JCSP student posed the following question: “How can you be an institutional leader if you are not capable of speaking the official languages of Canada? [loose translation] That’s it (FF06)!” However, the *societal/legal institutional imperative* is viewed by many respondents as coming with a price. A JCSP officer considered the following:

Elements of our military... our military will sit within the continuum of societal and functional imperatives. So... [Samuel P.] Huntington’s theory on civil-military relations [1957], essentially. One could argue a bilingual officer corps or CF is required for societal imperatives in Canada, being a bilingual country, and that comes at a cost (ED04).

Although language proficiency in both OL was perceived by respondents to be highly relevant in order to meet the national societal and constitutional imperatives they, themselves valued, other functional military demands may contend with those social/legal institutional requirements. Also, the price of integrating bilingualism into CF institutional practices and culture was interpreted by several informants to be considerable.

Indeed, the third theme, the ***cost/benefit equation*** is described in terms of the considerations between what it costs the CF institution in time, effort, treasure (pure money) and military preparedness to implement bilingualism and the perceived benefits and outcomes of those investments. The entire sample of informants agreed bilingualism was, at least institutionally, necessary to reflect the dual identity of Canada’s two founding nations. However, many (both English

and French-speaking officers) stated the CF expended significant resources to second language training with some questioning the validity of the bilingual capacity that was produced out of those activities and expenditures. Several also stated that personal motivation was a factor in whether or not true bilingual capacity was developed and that second language efforts were afforded mostly for anglophones since the vast majority of French-speaking CF members were already bilingual. This statement from a JCSP officer is particularly revealing:

Francophones become generally more fluently bilingual than Anglophones, with less training and in less time. The anglophones, like I said, it might have to do with not being immersed in the second language, but generally don't attain the same degree of fluency in their second language and don't necessarily have the same motivation, because the larger world even in Canada, the working language is English. I don't know if I've answered the full question, but, the standards are equal whether the CF has focused resources to ensure that anglophones become bilingual enough. I'm not certain that um....there's no doubt that training is provided, huge expense in training. [...] So the standards are equivalent, the efforts and resources dedicated might not be (EA01).

Like many other respondents including several French-speaking, this JCSP officer explained that the geographical reality of Canada does not necessarily justify a major institutional CF focus on bilingualism. In other words, in English-speaking designated units and regions (which represent the vast majority of the CF organization and its various locations across Canada), where the usage of French is almost totally absent, bilingualism may not be valued as a sound or functionally useful investment for the CF.

I think there's an institutional vision that's probably Ottawa-centric; if not in application, because that's one of our few bilingual cities, if you will. The reality is in English Canada, at English units, there's no functional requirement for this bilingualism, so it's seen as a tax. And this is where

there is this dichotomy... there's these competing demands. So, domestically, [...] I think some people within the Forces see bilingualism as a societal imperative, which doesn't help them at all, in terms of the execution of the military task. They see it as a tax. And to a certain extent, that could be the case, you know, in a cost/benefit analysis - does everyone need to be bilingual in the CF? If it takes so much time to get everyone to that level, what aren't they doing by learning this hard skill set, that they may or may not, I don't want to say ever use, but will use infrequently. So, I think that's the dilemma. So [...] you've got an institutional vision that may be a bit utopian, and maybe in its full execution and implementation is counter to the realities on the ground. [...] [S]o I guess how much is required for it be functional? And I think that's the cost/benefit analysis that needs to occur, because I don't think you'll ever be able to deliver a high level of bilingual service throughout the country to satisfy the needs of maybe, very few people without that coming at the expense of something else. So, in the end, what do you want, what is the greatest good for the greatest number - so, the utilitarian approach. I think that's what you see, that's the reality on the ground that everyone grapples with; which isn't contrary to the vision; it's just resource constraint (ED04).

Indeed, when approaching the bilingualism agenda for the CF organization from a functional perspective, one can perceive that the considerable efforts, time and money expended for second language proficiency may be interpreted to be competing with some of the core military necessities deemed essential for meeting the effectiveness-driven operational obligations of the CF.

The fourth theme, the ***mechanistic/incoherent institutional approach to bilingualism*** is defined as the way the CF institution administers its bilingualism policies, perceived to be process-oriented, short sighted or inconsistent with the realization of the institutional goal conceptualized to be the pursuance of "true bilingual capacity" within the CF leadership. This theme also relates to the perceived gap between the institutional vision (and desire expressed by the CF)



to adopt bilingualism and the perceived CF commitment towards implementing it across the organization. Like most of the other respondents, a francophone JCSP officer, questioned the real motivations of the CF for its current practices aimed towards developing a bilingual officer corps, arguing that since the vast majority of francophone officers have become proficient in their second language out of necessity to work in an English-speaking CF organization, the current CF efforts may only focus on allowing anglophones to obtain a language profile, a necessary service requirement for them to progress beyond a certain rank.

The real question for me is why do people learn a second language? Me, I learned a second language, it was an obvious choice when I joined the CF [...], first by necessity, secondly because I wanted to. [...] What forces an anglophone to learn French? What really motivates an anglophone to learn French? Why does an institution want these people [...]... I think there is a bilingualism policy in the CF but I wouldn't say there is a culture [of bilingualism] that people are truly concerned with, dedicated to it, sold on it. I would say not. [...] It's a way for them to achieve their ends [loose translation] (FA01).

One NSP informant thought institutional bilingualism in the CF was failing because it was purely articulated in a process-driven fashion. As such, he stated that there is no real bilingualism vision in the CF except to meet the legal obligations and that the emphasis on bilingualism for career progression was an element of division and frustration amongst CF members. In the end, this senior officer said bilingualism “is imposed to people without any institutional concern for the true objectives behind the process of becoming bilingual and that... That is really disappointing [loose translation]” (FG07). Another NSP respondent felt the incoherent institutional approach creates pressures and an unpredictable environment where CF members may be reluctant to use French because “some

leaders believe in it and some others don't [loose translation]" (FH08). According to this officer, people eliminate the risks associated with this incoherent approach by assuming English as their day-to-day language of work. The following statement from another JCSP informant is also telling:

There's no culture of institutional bilingualism in the CF yet. It's a forced bilingualism that, for certain ranks you need to ascertain certain proficiency. As we saw yesterday in one of our senior leaders in the Forces, who was in my uniform - he can't speak French, but it seems glossed over. So, I don't think we're a bilingual institution yet. We're in an institution that offers bilingual opportunities; I guess is the best way to put it. Or, sometimes bilingual efficiencies because some people are able to do stuff in both languages [...] (EC03).

A significant portion of officers explained that the CF had made important progress on the language front over the last few decades but that there was still a lot to accomplish, institutionally. Many denounced the incoherent but common CF practice which consists of posting anglophone members, freshly qualified from French-language courses back to unilingual English-speaking units or in predominantly anglophone regions where they quickly lose their bilingual proficiency for lack of practice. Furthermore, several informants used the terms "we pay lip service" to characterize the current CF bilingualism efforts and questioned the organization's will to truly adopt bilingualism. Asked to provide his perspectives on the CF vision for bilingualism, one JCSP student said the following:

There's none. Absolutely none, we're legally bound by the government to do so and this is why we're trying to do it, but in a reality, it is a lip service. [...] A lot more could be done. We're not moving people, and there's a lot that is caused by people not wanting to move in certain areas so, I do understand that. Albeit, we're supposed to never refuse a posting, a lot of people refuse the posting, depending on where they're going. That's the

first thing. The second thing is that it doesn't make very much sense for a unit in Edmonton, for example, to have 20% of their population that will be Francophones and to try to provide them with the services, so all of these things are specifically based for legal obligations that we got from the government, so we're trying to do what... but, as soon as resources are requested, or extra monies or extra training is demanded, that's the first thing that we cut. It's a conscious decision and it's an understanding, we have to understand that this is a normal situation but unfortunately, the effort could be done differently if people were really wanting this to happen (EB02).

In essence, the process-oriented organizational management of bilingualism was viewed by several CFC respondents to be too “mechanistic” and failing to truly enable the institutional vision envisaged for bilingualism in the CF.

The next theme arising from the analysis, the ***operational value of bilingualism*** was identified by the vast majority of officers, particularly when defined as applicable in a “domestic environment”, where CF resources including service members are committed by the government to operate within the geographical territory of Canada in support of civilian regional, provincial or other federal authorities such as was the case in 1998 with the ice storm that severely affected Ontario and Quebec, Hurricane Juan that hit Halifax in 2003 or the Red River floods that occur almost yearly in Manitoba. In a domestic context, it is the informants' view that the CF ability to interact in English and French can be a factor in mission effectiveness. According to one JCSP officer, “it has been shown in 1998 [...] that we were solely incapable of employing anglophone soldiers [sent from Edmonton] in Quebec, that it had caused some serious issues with the population, and there was a lack of understanding” (EB02). Another

JCSP informant said that proficiency in both OL is particularly important “especially in any kind of domestic operations, if you are tasked to do a domestic operation in a predominantly French area, that [the] commander has got to be able to talk to the local leaders – or should be able to talk to the local leaders in their first language” (EC03). Many informants saw operational benefits for CF OL capacity in both domestic and multinational settings. A JCSP officer stated the following:

I think that, at home, it certainly provides CF officers an edge, because it allows us to truly reflect what our society wishes to reflect; whether it's well-reflected across the country or not, but certainly the national capital region is a place where being bilingual provides a massive benefit [...], and that's not just at the institutional level, [...] being able to interact effectively, [...]. So, at home, I think it's exceptionally important. I've had the opportunity to use my language skills to talk to Francophone members of society in Canada, and I think that has always paid dividends for me—even if I do so not as effectively as I would like to be able to do, but at least you're attempting to communicate at that level, and abroad, I just look at the organizations that we're involved in, the places that we sometimes deploy to, having that second language, I think, gives us... it does give us a credibility that we may not otherwise have (EE05).

In fact, several JCSP respondents were of the opinion that the ability for the CF to function in both OL greatly facilitated operational effectiveness in many United Nations' mandated theatres of operations overseas such as in Haiti or in African continent countries. These informants' views and perceptions contending that proficiency in English and French for CF “operators” can yield tangible functional military benefits are fully consistent with the CF values-based leadership construct of military effectiveness.

The next theme, termed ***leading and transforming through communications*** concerns informants' perspectives that convey the significant role played by communications, and particularly language as a way to relate to followers and the importance of language and communications in leadership effectiveness. If bilingualism was not acknowledged by all officers as being an essential prerequisite to lead CF members at the "leading people" level where transactional exchanges are more prevalent, it was unanimously and very clearly articulated that proficiency in both OL was deemed to be a crucial and necessary leadership requirement for the more senior CF officers selected to lead and transform the institution. On this subject, a NSP officer said:

And, as far as the leadership is concerned, because as far as people that you'll have working for you, and within your organization, you'll have a mix of the two, and it behoves the leadership to be able to both converse and listen to subordinates in whichever language that they are more comfortable, as far as the two official languages are concerned (EG07).

In fact, it was argued by several officers that to be transformational in the CF, a leader must be able to connect and relate to followers through communications and language. A JCSP respondent stated:

"I believe it's extremely important. If you cannot communicate, and communication is not only speaking to the individuals, it's listening, it's understanding their culture, it's understanding how they react, and what is different from your own perception... how they perceive things. So, that is the most important thing. You cannot be a leader if you are not capable of doing this (EB02).

Echoing all other informants, another officer mentioned that bilingualism "was most important for the senior leaders, it's them that must understand their soldiers. That's transformational leadership, [...] being able to appreciate their

culture and communicate with them in their tongue. A leader cannot be effective without that ability [loose translation]” (FD04). Bilingualism was also viewed by the vast majority of informants as not only being key to message transmission and nuance comprehension within the communications process but also as a vital tool to help inspire, motivate, and “touch” all CF followers, whether their primary language was English or French:

because it’s a powerful tool and [...], being able to engage a person...the language of your unit may be English, but you may within your group of people that you’re leading, have sailors, soldiers, airmen/women, who are Francophone in background, and being able to convey the information in English, and then validate that they understand it in their own language, or just communicate with them on an interpersonal level in their own language, I think, provides them buy-in, and provides them a sense of belonging that they may not otherwise have. So, from a transformational leadership perspective, I think that is one of the most powerful communication tools we have to reach out to our subordinates, peers and superiors and being able to support them in whatever language is their... whether it’s their mother tongue or whether it’s their preferred language, so... I think it’s a really powerful tool (EE05).

Several respondents also thought that bilingualism was an absolute requirement for senior leaders to relate to subordinates and demonstrate respect for the culture and spoken language of a large French-speaking portion of the CF population they speak to. In line with these informants’ views, institutional leaders who fail to recognize and understand the bilingual and bi-cultural nature of the CF personnel “workforce” lose credibility and are deemed less effective in communicating the CF vision in transformational type leader-follower exchanges. According to one JCSP officer:

It makes them more comfortable with you. If somebody’s not comfortable with you, good luck trying to lead them, right? Good luck trying to do that transformational leadership [...]. It won’t happen. Institution-wise, if you

are able to get those people to be [long pause] communicating with people in their official language, just allows them to not worry about things lost in translation. So I'll come right back to this - one, they appreciate it. I've seen it on so many people's faces. They appreciate, they get over the surprise, they get more comfortable with you, and it's so much easier to convince them to follow you. Because I mean, that's always what it is - trying to convince your boys that hey, this is where we need to go, and if you get them to buy in, it's great. That makes it so much easier, and it's again so much easier when you can explain to them in their first language. [...] if he can do it in both languages, well that gives him credibility. Otherwise, if he just comes out and does it in English, well then his credibility is shot; [...] you lose your credibility as a leader, then you might as well retire" (EC03).

Also, the real value of bilingualism in transformational leadership processes, as viewed by some informants lies in its power to make leadership exchanges more personable and more meaningful. In this sense, language proficiency in both OL provides added flexibility to the leaders' communications skill set. From the perspectives of the informants, this may be seen as an advantage in "higher order" leader-follower exchanges because it may allow transformational leaders to communicate vision more clearly by adapting to the language and culture of their followers. From this perspective, It can also be easier to inspire and motivate followers when they feel comfortable with (and valued by) institutional leaders who demonstrate that they care about their followers' needs when they make the effort to talk to them in their mother tongue. Here is what a JCSP officer had to say about this:

So let's forget about rules, conventions... let's forget about the laws; because this is transactional. You do it because you have to, because it's mandated. If you really want to transform our culture by using transformational leadership, as I understand it, you have to set the example. That means you have to be capable of improving your understanding of the other culture, but also to show your interest, to show that it matters to you; to show why it matters to you... To explain, to

discuss these things, and show an incredible amount of tolerance, without going overboard, but with the other people and their own culture. But you have to really make it matter, and you have to set the conditions for your soldiers to see why it matters and why it should become important. Every little thing counts. It's within the little actions that an officer takes, [that] a leader takes every day that this makes a difference. It's by setting up the examples, by going the extra mile, taking an extra course, listening to... talking from an English perspective, listening to francophones and discussing with them and vice-versa so that people want to make that change happen. Not having the feeling that it's forced upon them (EB02).

Although English was identified as the central driver for military effectiveness, the informants clearly viewed bilingualism as a powerful leadership attribute that can facilitate leader-follower interactions including transactional and higher-order type transformational exchanges by enabling leaders to better relate to (and connect with) their followers, thus gaining credibility in demonstrating a sense of caring for the culture and needs of the diverse people they lead and long to inspire.

The last theme speaks to the informants' views on language as a means to access one's culture. As such, bilingualism was considered by several respondents as ***enabling cultural acuity*** in the sense that the discovery of (and the ability to speak) another language can awaken people to the existence of other cultures, something that was perceived positively by the respondents in the CF organizational context. A JCSP officer introduced this subject by saying "most of us anglos realize that multilingualism - or bilingualism at the very least, is really important. It opens many doors. Self-actualization is enhanced" (EA01). Another, JCSP informant thought there was a genuine functional imperative for



the CF to have a multilingual military force because “it speaks to a mindset about learning about the world and being able to operate throughout the world, not as a foreign power, but as someone who can relate with those locals” (ED04). Even more characteristic of the Canadian context, a JCSP student stated:

I think, in fact, in terms of the overarching culture that Canada is, it actually enriches it, in my opinion. So, me, having grown up solely in English Canada, having learned French later in life, I have enjoyed that as an aspect that has added to my perspective on what my culture is and what the culture of Canada is, rather than take away from it and as related to the service, no - I think that at every level it enriches the service that we’re operating within because it just gives you that insight into the other cultures that you are operating with. It gives you a level of, I’ll use the term that we’ve used here, the cultural intelligence within which you understand where your soldiers come from, because there is a distinctly rich culture in French Canada, there is a distinctly rich culture in English Canada, and having an awareness and an understanding through the study of language and being able to communicate in that language, I think it doesn’t take anything away, it only adds. Again, I have a very idealistic view of that and I almost envy those who have grown up in French Canada, and who have grown up in Quebec, and have had the total immersion into an English environment, so they have that solid background in French before they get immersed in English, and are therefore so amazingly, bilingual. Whereas, me, I’ve grown up entirely in English Canada, with no real exposure, or opportunity for exposure to francophone society within Canada and so you always feel like you are kind of floundering to build that bilingualism that just doesn’t exist, or is very difficult to achieve for us (EE05).

In fact, an NSP officer explained that cultural acuity was the most important aspect of bilingualism, expressing his firm belief that it can be a means to understand culture, that it is a useful tool to discover other ways of thinking, other perspectives and horizons. Acknowledging that language is not necessarily culture, this senior officer conceived bilingualism as a doorway to cultural awareness.

Language means opening up to other cultures. [...] Whether I speak the language, visit a mosque to see how things work, read books, whatever the means I use, it allows me to open up. It makes me a better leader. Why? Because I talked about the various leadership styles earlier and this helps me to better adapt to the people I command. And this is fundamental if we want... especially when we talk about a special service requirement like Afghanistan and convince people that... yes, there is a reason why you are going to go there and risk your life [loose translation] (FH08).

If the bilingualism attribute was valued and viewed to increase the effectiveness of communication-based leader-follower interactions, the cultural awareness “advantage” that is thought to come with bilingual competency from the assumption that the domains of language and culture are closely interrelated adds a new and important dimension to the research question in the sense that bilingualism is perceived to be helpful in enabling military “operators” to approach the world for which they plan (and where they accomplish) their missions “fresh” and free of ethnocentric outlooks.

## **THE CVF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE CF INSTITUTION**

The CF organization privileges transformational leadership behaviours at the senior levels of its leadership cadre to support its culture of effectiveness. As such, the Competing Values Framework (CVF) model top quadrants are consistent with the values, roles and functions emphasized by the CF values-based leadership model of effectiveness as it relates to the senior cadre of military leaders entrusted for leading and transforming the CF institution. Undeniably, a military organization like the CF is extremely goal-driven. As a stable hierarchical, process and rules orientated organization, the CF military is

inherently controlling and directive. The CF's primary purpose is to accomplish the missions assigned to the military by the government of Canada. These are to protect and defend the sovereignty and interests of the country. The CF as an institution cannot fail at these missions. This is embedded within the organization's own socially constructed identity. Hence, the primary organizational culture of the CF is a culture of effectiveness. In order to perform with military efficacy, economic efficiency and meet the CF organizational success criteria embodied in the values-based construct of military leadership effectiveness, the CF institution must therefore also profoundly adhere to the organizational values identified in the lower quadrants of the CVF model and engage heavily in the managerial functions and more linear leadership roles that are appropriate to support those values.

From the perspectives of the informants and relevant to the research question, the themes uncovered from the analysis appear to support and validate the CF values-based construct of military leadership effectiveness. Indeed, the ***operational value of bilingualism*** was perceived to serve legitimate operational goals in both domestic and international military contexts. By being able to interact more freely with the population, the civilian authorities or officials from a multitude of agencies during an operation conducted within Canada, where (at least in principle) both English and French are commonly used, the CF is perceived to gain a military advantage. On the international stage, language proficiency in both OL brings credibility to the CF institution and "opens doors"

with its allies. It also gives the CF an edge under UN mandated-operations in several French-speaking countries. Most importantly, the informants identified that it spoke to a mindset of “cultural intelligence” and openness to other cultures (as an **enabler of cultural acuity**) which allowed for the CF to operate overseas and avoid being perceived by the local population as being an occupying force. Bilingualism is therefore interpreted to enhance cultural insight.

The informants not only made sense of the ability for CF “operators” to speak in English and in French in terms of effectiveness for the organization and for mission accomplishment but also for leader effectiveness. The informants believed that the **cultural acuity** associated with bilingual leaders allows them to better relate and adapt to the various cultures of their followers. As such, it was viewed that bilingualism can make leaders more effective and more convincing conveyors of information, including visionary compelling transformative-type exchanges in a variety of communications-based leader-follower situations ranging from transactional interactions to those of a “higher-order” character. According to informants’ views, to lead, inspire, motivate, move and transform, one must be able to relate to followers, show them respect and communicate with them effectively, in their primary language. Hence, under a CF values-based construct of military leadership effectiveness, bilingually-motivated leadership practices that contribute to an inspired and valued CF “workforce” are thought by informants to be in the interests of the CF institution. As such, bilingualism is perceived to have the potential to significantly impact the ability of

CF officers to both lead people and the CF institution, conceived from the informants' interpretations to be the central functional objectives of CF military leadership effectiveness.

Furthermore, informants' viewpoints on the prevalence of **English as the CF language of work** especially when associated with a military **effectiveness** concern appear to indicate that the usage of English is deeply-engrained in the CF culture which is ultimately always focused on results-orientated mission accomplishment. Similar findings are found in the international literature (de Fourestier, 2010). Interestingly, de Fourestier (2010) who studied the integration of bilingualism into the militaries of multilingual nations, made a distinction between the language of military operations (in English as specified) and the language used in daily routine work; the informants in the current study did not make such a distinction. As such, despite what is seen by many respondents as valid **legally mandated and socially motivated** attempts by the CF organization to integrate bilingualism practices into its overall management processes, current CF bilingualism policies are often perceived to be **incoherent and mechanistic**. In the face of this incoherence, the will of the organization to truly adopt bilingualism was often disputed. From a **cost/benefit** pragmatic perspective, several informants considered that bilingualism was more relevant in officially bilingual areas (notably, Ottawa) or predominantly French-speaking geographical regions such as in the province of Quebec. Furthermore, the informants also identified that for many CF members, bilingualism is often regarded as a burden

and that the current incoherent CF practices contribute to perpetuate a view, amongst CF members, that bilingualism is only pertinent if it helps them progress professionally and advance in rank or (more rarely) when it brings concrete functional benefits in garrison or “in the field”. In the end, when approached from the CF values-based construct of military effectiveness, the informants’ perspectives confirmed that the day-to-day language “to get the job done” in the CF is English and nothing else. Interestingly, these views are relatively consistent with those expressed in the 2002 survey on the *Attitudes towards the use of both official languages within the Public Service of Canada* (TBCS, <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/BT22-85-2002E.pdf>) discussed in chapter one and therefore provide, on the surface, some evidence that “little has changed” on that front.

Although the analysis revealed that bilingualism was valued for reflecting the bilingual nature of Canada’s identity and population as well as for its constitutional significance, English was confirmed by informants to be the true language of operations in the CF. Hence, if the main purpose of the CF organization is to pursue the functional objectives related to the military imperatives of mission accomplishment, thus English is viewed as a crucial enabler of military effectiveness for the CF. As such, the various pressures and tensions caused by the competing demands inherent with the management of a large and complex institution like the CF, struggling to conform to the social/legal imperatives of bilingualism and the fact that it focuses on English to function with

efficacy in both routine work and in operations create important challenges for the senior leaders of the CF. Indeed, some informants thought that the pursuit of institutional bilingualism ran against (or diverted the organization from) core military CF purpose and mandates.

The CVF epitomizes the various tensions and opposing values that an organization like the CF, focused on effectiveness must compose with as it faces increasingly complex threats while trying to meet the various societal and organizational imperatives associated with the collective nature of contemporary military action (DND, 2005). Ultimately, to remain relevant and effective, organizations (including the CF) must balance the various competing value dimensions identified in the CVF and avoid emphasizing one over the other (Buenger, Daft, Conlon, & Austin, 1996). In the CF, it is those senior leaders operating at the “leading the institution” level, the transformational stewards of the organization who have the responsibility to manage (and lead through) the various competing demands, pressures and values that the CF organizational culture embodies (or must consider adopting) as a federal institution focused on military effectiveness. Hence, senior transformational leaders of the CF are entrusted with the responsibility to develop and implement coherent and pragmatic institutional policies and practices in order to enable the institutional vision for bilingualism, through effective and inspirational communications with followers across the CF. In doing so, CF institutional leaders will transform (re-

shape) how the organizational culture socially constructs bilingualism as part of its values-based leadership construct for military effectiveness.



## CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION

The participants in this study described their strong value for bilingualism within the CF domestic context as crucial for mission effectiveness. They expressed the need for military leaders to possess the ability to communicate with their followers, the Canadian population and the civic leaders in their first language as a measure of credibility. Many spoke of the importance of proficiency in both OLs as not only necessary in domestic environments, but also as a highly-relevant attribute for CF participation in UN operations in countries where French is the dominant (or second) language spoken. They also spoke of their societal responsibilities and constitutional obligations to themselves reflect the bilingual character of Canada's population.

The administration of bilingualism policies in the CF was described by informants as overly “process-oriented”, and generally inconsistent with the pursuance of bilingual capacity because of the perceived gap between the “vision” for bilingualism in the CF and the current status of its implementation within the organization. Many informants described their disappointment and frustration that the CF only meets minimum legal obligations’ requirements with respect to developing a bilingual officer corps, and some contended that the efforts of the CF for bilingual capacity were focused on English-speaking officers requiring proficiency in French solely for the purposes of promotion to higher ranks. French-speaking informants described that one way to deal with this frustration in the face of incoherent OL practices is to simply adopt English as

their “day-to-day” language thus altogether avoiding the uncertainty and insecurity caused by using French to communicate with leaders who may or may not support its use in practice.

In spite of these frustrations, informants were unanimous in their opinions that proficiency in both OLs is especially crucial for senior leaders as an attribute for *relating* to followers in their language of choice. In this sense, informants spoke of the importance of senior leaders to be seen as appreciative of their subordinates’ culture(s), through communication and language, in order to be credible and be able to inspire and motivate them. Some informants viewed this attribute as enabling communication for higher-order leader/follower exchanges; they interpreted leaders’ genuine efforts to adapt to the language and culture of followers as a true demonstration of “caring” for follower needs. Speaking from a broader perspective, some informants spoke of bilingualism as a “mindset”, and that “cultural awareness”, born from the belief that bilingualism is a means of understanding one’s culture, can give rise to different thinking and learning about the world.

While informants were unanimous in their valuing of bilingualism, many questioned the gains of pursuing bilingual capacity (through second language training, for example) in relation to the costs, levels of effort and functional benefits related to this pursuit. In a country where the majority of the CF designated units and regions are primarily English-speaking, the use of

significant resources for French language training was felt by many to be a poor investment. This view was further validated when participants described the plain reality that the CF language of work is in fact, English, and that this is the “common language” that is necessary for organizational effectiveness, regardless of the vision and imperatives for conforming to the OLA. Informants called for a more “pragmatic” approach to enabling the vision for bilingualism in the face of needing “to get things done”.

## **STUDY IMPLICATIONS**

CF officers come, like all other CF members from every geographical area and from all social layers of Canada. As such, because the people forming the CF institution and embodying its culture represent a microcosm of the Canadian society, the attitudes and perceptions towards bilingualism identified by many Canadian public servants in chapter one appear to be present within the CF culture. This study may benefit future leaders of the CF institution as they learn about their peers’ experiences, understandings and actions related to English as the language of work, and bilingualism as an attribute for being (or becoming) a transformational leader that relates to, inspires, motivates, moves and transforms followers, by communicating with them effectively in their primary language. In this sense, from the informants’ point of view, bilingualism is indeed valued more as a leadership attribute, rather than for meeting constitutional requirements. As such, the perspectives of informants as senior CF leaders may have relevance for current and future CF institutional leaders. Indeed, senior transformational

leaders, generally called upon to lead the CF institution at the strategic level, transmit a sense of moral commitment to military missions, and instil motivation in all CF service members may benefit more broadly by appreciating the impact of effective communications in both official languages within the CF military context in the domestic environment and abroad. Understanding how bilingualism is viewed by CF leaders, “professionals of arms” operating in a transformational values-based leadership military culture is not only useful but crucial for a task oriented institution like the CF, whose main purpose is to lead people (often into harm’s way) into selflessly serve Canadians’ and Canada’s interests. Given the tensions between the imperatives of bilingualism policies and the primary functional effectiveness-driven values and activities of the military, CF leaders can advocate for and implement policies and practices that are realistic, and that minimize potential adverse organizational outcomes.

This study contributes knowledge about transformational leadership, and thus supports the development of professional CF leaders who are better positioned to achieve mission success in a values-based CF organization. New insights obtained from this study help illuminate how bilingualism policies and practices are integrated and perceived in a military organizational culture. As the function of leadership in the CF applies to both the leading people and leading the institution levels, this study helps form a better understanding of how bilingualism as an imperative may or may not be seen to contribute to the functional effectiveness of the CF institution.

## **LIMITATIONS**

A qualitative design such as ethnography is an adequate approach for exploring and describing insiders' perspectives on a phenomenon; however, it cannot imply cause and effect relationships. Data collection was limited to individual interviews and documents review. The short duration of the study and limited access to the setting prevented the researcher from conducting "field" observations. One of the main disadvantages of this short timeline is the potential for false assumptions about patterns of behaviour and/or interactions (Nurani, 2008). Observing participants interacting in English and French within the context of their daily work, and confirming first-hand, informants' accounts of their experiences might have strengthened the credibility of the findings. The characteristic of contextualization "[...] requires the data to be interpreted in the context of the situation in which they are observed" (Nurani, 2008, p. 442). In light of the characteristics of contextualization described above, the current study findings cannot be generalized to other contexts. Nevertheless, interviews and the review of specific CF policies and doctrine allowed for rich understanding of the perspectives of participants and, on the one hand, provided opportunities for confirming informants' accounts by asking clarifying questions and requesting illustrative examples, and on the other, for validating those perspectives in relation to the CF imperatives on bilingualism and leadership theory from the information uncovered in the documents review.

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