

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

A ONE-PARTY DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM:

THE CASE OF ALBERTA

BY

MICHAEL R. GEORGESON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE


CALGARY, ALBERTA


APRIL, 1974


© MICHAEL R. GEORGESON, 1974

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A ONE-PARTY DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM: THE CASE OF ALBERTA" submitted by Michael R. Georgeson in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



Supervisor, John T. Woods
Department of Political Science

Stan Drabek
Department of Political Science

A. W. Rasporich
Department of History

April, 1974

ABSTRACT

The history of Alberta politics from 1921 onward has been an object of enquiry in political science. One interpretation, that based on class analysis, has dominated the published works. This thesis attempts to provide a more satisfactory explanation of Alberta's political development by applying quite a different series of assumptions than those underlying class analysis. This explanation shares with earlier ones the assumption that there is regional-economic cleavage between Alberta and Eastern Canada. Specifically this study takes the position that regional-economic cleavage affected Albertans, who otherwise perceived a variety of life-styles, and influenced their perceptions of the federal and provincial party systems in common directions. A resulting plurality of voter perceptions and, correspondingly, of party choice led to the creation and maintenance of a one-party dominant party system in Alberta.

This thesis employs both what can be loosely termed structural and 'behavioral' concepts in developing a single model of the one party dominant party system. A Downsian framework provides the basis for the various elements of party dominance.

A party's maintenance of political power requires both its adaptation of appeals to individuals' changing conception of the 'good society', and its having the means to create some sufficient part of that society. In Alberta, one party controlled government over a series of elections because it consistently provided higher

perceived political utility for more voters than did any of its competitors. Accompanying structural changes in the party system ensured that. In later years this dominance continued even though dramatic changes occurred in Alberta's social-economic environment and its voters' perceptions.

The one-party dominant party system developed here allows one to explain the relationship between voter perceptions, party appeals and party competition in either a static or changing social-economic environment. The concepts of this model also allow the analyst to speculate upon the future development of Alberta politics and of the possibilities of maintaining the one-party dominant party system.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Dr. J. T. Woods, my supervisor, for his aid, advice, guidance and patience; without which this thesis would not have been completed; to Dr. S. Drabek, for his aid and availability to serve on my committee; to Dr. M. O. Dickerson for his constant motivation to complete this thesis . . . Thank you.

DEDICATION

IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER
WILLIAM RAYMOND GEORGESON

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter	
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	4
A. Political Parties	4
1. Rationality and Utility in Crises Periods . .	9
2. Cleavages and Political Utility	12
B. Party Systems	15
1. Method and Data: Party Systems	17
C. One-Party Dominance: A Model	25
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM	39
A. Economic Foundations	39
B. Political Activities Until 1930	48
1. The Progressive Movement	50
2. The United Farmers of Alberta	56
III. SOCIAL CREDIT 1932-1944	64
A. The Effects of the Depression	64
B. The Social Credit Movement	72
C. Economic Reform and the Election of 1935	78
D. The Aberhart Period 1935-1943	82
E. Conclusion: Social Credit 1932-1944	91
IV. THE SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY 1944-1971	98
A. Economic Diversification and Social Composition .	98
B. Factors Contributing to Social Credit's Dominance	107
C. Factors Inhibiting Social Credit Support	115
D. The Alberta Election of 1971	120
CONCLUSION	127
BIBLIOGRAPHY	133

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.1	LEGISLATIVE SEATS AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE BY POLITICAL PARTY	27
2.1	WHEAT PRODUCTION, 1890-1931	42
2.2	WHEAT AND WHEAT FLOUR EXPORTS	43
2.3	PERCENTAGE OF FIELD CROP ACREAGE IN WHEAT	43
2.4	1921 ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVES	53
2.5	1925 ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVES	55
2.6	1926 ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVES	55
3.1	THE DECLINE IN PROVINCIAL PER CAPITA INCOMES, 1928-29 To 1933	65
3.2	CANADIAN EXPORT PRICES, 1929-33	67
3.3	DEPRESSION INCREASES IN NET MONEY INCOME	67
3.4	THE INCIDENCE OF THE DEPRESSION, 1929-33	69
4.1	NET VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BUSINESS SECTORS IN ALBERTA, 1935-1969	99
4.2	ALBERTA PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM 1936-1957	103
4.3	POPULATION OF ALBERTA DIVIDED ACCORDING TO URBANIZATION 1931-1966	104
4.4	SOCIAL CREDIT DOMINANCE OVER OTHER PARTIES	114
4.5	MEAN PERCENTAGE VOTING SOCIAL CREDIT IN THE FOUR MAJOR REGIONS OF THE PROVINCE 1935-1971	116

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
2.1 PERIODS OF SETTLEMENT	40
3.1 PRICES OF WHEAT AT LIVERPOOL, AT TORONTO AND WINNIPEG, AND COST OF TRANSPORTING A BUSHEL OF WHEAT FROM REGINA, SASK., TO LIVERPOOL	66
3.2 OCEAN FREIGHT RATE FOR WHEAT, MONTREAL TO LIVERPOOL . .	66
4.1 FUTURE INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN ALBERTA	100
4.2 FUTURE INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN ALBERTA	101
4.3 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF CANADA--EMPLOYEES PERCENTAGE CHANGE 1939-1956	102

INTRODUCTION

This thesis rests upon both 'behavioral' and structural concepts. The term 'behavioral' is employed here in the causal way the discipline now employs it, to indicate the individual as the unit of analysis and to imply a statistical perspective. 'Behaviorally', an individual votes, or selects a party, in accordance with many variables, four of which include; his position in the social-economic environment, his value hierarchy, his conception of the 'good society', and, his perception of the political appeals of different parties. Structurally, when a plurality of the populace favors one party over the others, that party will control government for a number of years and over a series of elections. If no opposition party receives a 'significant' portion of the popular vote, one party will control government and maintain a one-party dominant party system.

From 1920, Albertans felt dissatisfaction with their social-economic environment because of regional-economic cleavages and expressed this in their political behavior. Cleavages prevented the establishment of what many Albertans believed to be the 'good society.' Most Albertans' life-styles were related to agriculture and they came to support political units which would, in turn, promote farmers' interests. The result was voting support for the Progressive Movement and for the United Farmers of Alberta. Support for the U.F.A. continued over three elections and fourteen years, creating a one-party

dominant party system in Alberta.

The one-party dominant party system continued from 1935, although the dominant party was Social Credit. The effects of the Depression upon the Alberta social-economic environment led a plurality of Albertans to follow Aberhart and support Social Credit's reform policies. However, certain aspects of the appeal of monetary reform ceased between 1935 and 1940. The effects of this were revealed in the 1940 election when Social Credit's maintenance of power was threatened. This weakness was overcome with the appointment of E. C. Manning as premier in 1943. Manning retained Aberhart's supporters and increased Social Credit support among various economic groups which had not favored Aberhart's policies. Similarly, an increase in Alberta's prosperity, because of oil royalties, yielded political support for Social Credit because of its administrative and distributive policies.

Manning's leadership and administration, combined with Social Credit organization and the prosperity provided by oil, contributed to the Social Credit dominance from 1944-1971. A plurality of Albertans supported Social Credit believing it to be the means to the creation of their conception of the 'good society'. Over this era, however, Alberta was becoming economically diverse and the potential for differing political groups increased. This potential was actualized when Social Credit support declined and the Progressive Conservatives ascended to power in 1971.

The future of the Alberta party system depends upon criteria similar to those which have applied throughout its history. The

existence of severe regional cleavages could contribute to the maintenance of the one-party dominant party system with the Progressive Conservatives the dominant party. However, the possibilities for a two-party or multi-party system also exist, because of the diversity of political groups. The maintenance of the one-party dominant party system will depend upon Lougheed's leadership, the Progressive Conservative strategy of maintaining regional-economic cleavages as perceived obstacles to the creation of the 'good society', and, a plurality of the populace perceiving the Progressive Conservatives as the most likely party to make progress toward creating that 'good society'. Only in this way will one party maintain a perceptual, organizational, and ideological advantage over any other party in the party system.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A. Political Parties

Political parties are, on the one hand, parts of the structure of societal institutions within a given political system, but, on the other hand, their fortunes depend on individuals' perceptions of their positions in the system. Bearing this in mind, this study is based on certain aspects of both the structural and 'behavioral' approaches. Looked at as a unit within the institutional structure, a political party attempts to gain political control and maintain that control. To do so, it attempts to optimize its appeals within a changing social-economic environment. From another point of view, then, a party is dependent upon the changing political perceptions of the populace. Voters, or specific groups of voters, develop political values following from the structure of their own political opportunities. Each individual views the parties competing to control government. A party which appears likely to favor the most rewarding situation, in terms of these values, will receive that person's vote. If a plurality of the population perceives the party as likely to provide greater rewards, that party will be successful in gaining political power. If a plurality of people retain similar perceptions, a party may control government over a series of elections.

A party attempts to become electorally successful in order to gain political power. If a party is not electorally successful, appropriate changes will very likely occur not only in its appeals to voters, but in the form and style which most support with these appeals. These changes, or party evolution, have been commented upon by three authors; Maurice Duverger, Leon D. Epstein, and Otto Kirchheimer.¹ These authors drew their conclusions on the basis of studying European and American parties and they provide insights into the processes of party evolution.

Duverger specified that party evolution was toward a mass party "which is ideological, doctrinaire, programmatic or issue-orientated,"² from the cadre or "brokerage party, which is pragmatic and patronage-orientated."³ Duverger hypothesized that the electoral success of the Socialist Parties from 1945 until 1960 was attributable to their mass characteristics.⁴ If he was correct, it follows that other parties which desired to compete more effectively would have to become mass political parties.⁵ Party evolution would be toward a mass party because each party would find it necessary for effective electoral competition. L. D. Epstein's observations of party evolution in America can be contrasted with Duverger's observations. Epstein concluded that party evolution meant declining ideological stands by parties in the American social-economic setting. Pragmatism was a necessary requirement for effective electoral competition in the pluralistic and essentially non-polarized American setting. In the American, as contrasted with the European setting, then, ideological stands would not allow for the optimization of votes for any party.

Although Epstein hypothesized that the impetus for pragmatism came from the Centrist or Rightist parties, the motivation for party evolution was clear; the maximization of votes through effective electoral competition.⁶ The point here is that, whatever their differences, Duverger and Epstein stressed that party evolution would occur in order to make a party more electorally successful, in light of the society's complexity of life-styles and individuals' expectations. Otto Kirchheimer's observations of party evolution were based on the example of the German Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties. A third situation and approach led him to a similar set of conclusions as Duverger and Epstein. From the German examples, he concluded that parties were broadening their appeals to all sections of society for electoral support. Parties would appeal to all classes, ethnic groups and different economic interests, with general non-ideological platforms. "Catchall parties," to use Kirchheimer's term, appeal to all groups of voters within the society. To accomplish this the party abandons strict ideological commitment, its leadership is strengthened, the individual party member's role is reduced, and any class identification of the party is abandoned.⁷ Kirchheimer's theory of party evolution is based on the party's ability to develop appeals which bridge basic societal cleavages. Within a specific social-economic setting, these appeals are a prerequisite for a party's electoral success. Once again then, party evolution occurs when a party attempts to increase its electoral support within a specific social-economic environment.

The social-economic setting is the composition of societal structures and voter orientations within that particular society.

Electoral success implies that a party must garner those particular votes which are required to gain a majority of representation in the decision-making unit. This is accomplished by appeals to individuals, each of whom perceives societal problems and is conditioned in light of his value system. A party attempts to convince the individual voter that it will be more successful in providing solutions to his particular problems, than any of its competitors. The party can do so only in terms that the voter will accept, and these are the terms of his own value hierarchy. A vote for a particular party is a political reflection of an individual's set of values.

The relationship of a voter's perceptions to his casting a vote for a party is provided by Anthony Downs, whose perspectives seem especially apropos of this analysis.⁸ Downs specifies that voter perception of political parties is based upon the individual's political rationality, his ability to obtain political goals efficiently, and his conception of political utility. That is, a person will vote for a party which he perceives would provide him with maximum benefit were it in control of government. Downs states that "rational men are not interested in policies per se, but in their own utility incomes."⁹ A rational man exhibits the following behavior:¹⁰

1. He can always make a decision when confronted with a range of alternatives;
2. he ranks all the alternatives facing him in order of his preference in such a way that each is either preferred to, indifferent to, or inferior to each other;
3. his preference ranking is transitive;
4. he always chooses from among the possible alternatives that which ranks highest in his preference ordering; and,

5. he always makes the same decision each time he is confronted with the same alternatives.

'Political rationality' has some limitations when employed as an analytical tool. One limitation is that uncertainty as to alternatives of individual political choices may exist in a social and political order. 'Rationality' requires a predictable order in which political choices are clear, but which would not exist, particularly in times of social collapse or political crises. Another limitation is that Downs has restricted the concept of political rationality so as not to explain the whole individual personality. Undoubtedly, however, an individual's value hierarchy will inter-mingle political and non-political elements. If, in making a political decision "a man exhibits political behavior which does not help him attain his political goals efficiently, we feel justified in labelling him politically irrational."¹¹ But 'political rationality' as a concept is supportable for individual decisions even in times of social displacement or economic stress if the process of rationality can be justifiably regarded as simplified to the point Downs describes.

Two interrelated factors are critical to an individual's political rationality and conception of political utility. Firstly, perceived political utility is dependent upon information the voter obtains about the competing parties. One method of gaining information is to compare the legislative record of the party controlling government with the hypothetical results that an individual believes would be achieved by governmental control by another party. Individuals may secure information from notables and public opinion leaders as to which party would yield them the greatest political utility. Secondly, a

voter may compare a party's appeal to what "he knows about and his conception of the good society."¹² The voter must determine how advantageous a particular party's control of government will be to the development of his conception of the ideal social-economic environment. But a voter's conception of the 'good society' may change as his participation in the social-economic environment is altered. An individual will attain certain goals, be they economic or social, so that his conception of future goals will change. This would cause an individual to perceive differing degrees of political utility in voting for the same party in different elections.

1. Rationality and Utility in Crises Periods

The special circumstances covered in this paper involve a transition from a stable societal environment to one of extreme individual displacement and quest for security. The effect of extreme social stress may result in a "short-cutting" of the rational processes for individuals. Specifically, a person may rely more heavily on a leader's interpretation of events and place a 'faith' in that leader's ability to create the 'good society'. According to the previous definition of 'rationality,' it would not be replaced by 'irrational' activity in crises situations, but simplified. Karl Mannheim describes the individual's position in a rationalized integrated social environment and the effect of crises upon the individual.

The average person surrenders part of his own cultural individuality with every new act of integration into a functionally rationalized complex of activities. He becomes increasingly accustomed to being led by others and gradually gives up his own interpretation of events for those which others give him. When the rationalized mechanism of social life collapses in time of crises; the individual cannot repair it by his own insight.¹³

Mannheim's description applies to individual rationality when partial destruction of the social system occurs. The individual loses, partially, his ability to improve his occupational or social status, and his "elaborate emotional system, intricately connected as it is with the smooth working of social institutions now loses its object-fixation."¹⁴ In this situation, the individual receives only partial fulfillment for his and his family's goals. The individual may entrust to another person, a charismatic leader as Max Weber specifies, his hopes and desires for a rationalized social order. Charisma has been defined by Weber as follows:

Charisma will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.¹⁵

Individual support for a charismatic leader represents a simplified rational process; occurring especially in periods of social chaos. Individuals who are unable to comprehend the causes, or solutions, to their social and economic displacement, support the charismatic leader because of their belief in his exceptional powers to 'normalize' life-styles. By our previous definition of rationality, individuals who support a charismatic leader will increase their political utility. This rationality is evident especially with the 'routinization of charisma' when leadership takes "on the character of a permanent relationship forming a stable community of disciples or a band of followers or a party organization of any sort of political or hierocratic organization. . . ."¹⁶ The routinization of charisma in the form of rational social institutions provides the mechanisms to

deal with issues such as fiscal reform. This justifies an individual's rational support of charismatic leadership when that leadership attempts to reform (or revolutionize) an insecure fiscal system. Reform of fiscal matters through political mechanisms provides many individuals with high political utility because of its attempts to ensure financial security which is part of their concept of rationality to support charismatic leadership and the routinization of that charisma.¹⁷

An example of charismatic leadership and the routinization of that charisma occurred in Alberta during the Depression era. Albertans who had suffered economic and social displacement during the 1930's became 'followers' of William Aberhart. They believed that Aberhart could solve the problems which they could not understand. Aberhart's charisma 'routinized' in three stages. Firstly, he secured a popular following and group of sub-leaders who spread his appeals to the general populace. Secondly, Aberhart and his sub-leaders gained political control of the Alberta government in 1935. This victory was made possible because, even in this era of partial collapse, a complex and stable infra-structure of personal associations and government institutions survived the disorder and provided the base. An example of the organizational associations were the constituency locals or groups which supported Aberhart. For many individuals, this stage of routinization meant security. As Weber states:

One of the decisive motives underlying all cases of the routinization of charisma is naturally the striving for security. This means legitimization, on the one hand, of positions of authority and social prestige, on the other hand, of the economic advantages enjoyed by the followers and sympathizers of the leader.¹⁸

The third stage of the routinization of charisma came with E. C. Manning's succession to premier in 1943. Manning, for many years the most important sub-leader to Aberhart, inherited the organizational and personnel support from the former leader and gained various elements of political support for twenty-five years because of it.

2. Cleavages and Political Utility

Cleavages, or divisions between peoples of a nation, are important determinants in the conflicts, conceptions, and attitudes of various groups. Cleavages may exist on religious, economic, or cultural bases where groups of individuals feel that certain other groups are threatening their 'life-style'. Robert Dahl and Alexis de Tocqueville observed the importance of cleavages in North America as they exist between the agrarian 'way of life' and the 'life-styles' of those in business and industry.¹⁹ This cleavage was a conflict between the "general equality in property, wealth, and control over economic enterprise"²⁰ of agrarian life and the resultant inequalities of wealth and property associated with business and industry. The outcome of this cleavage is summarized in the following statement by Dahl.

A nation of small farmers would almost automatically perceive a high degree of economic, social, and political equality. By contrast, the development of commerce, industry, manufacturers, and banking on a large scale was bound to generate inequalities--in wealth, income, control over economic enterprise, social status, knowledge, skill, and because of these, in power too.²¹

If one group's life-style appears threatened by the activities of others, because such cleavages involve 'ways of life', fierce competition for the preservation of life-styles will ensue. The severity of cleavage conflict may be indicated in the nature of political

representation and competition. It will also be reflected in the conceptions and attitudes of various competing groups affected by cleavages. A summarization of these factors is presented in the following paradigm.²²

A Paradigm: Some Factors that Moderate or
Intensify Political Conflicts

	conflict is more likely to be	
	MODERATE	SEVERE
	if:	if:
1. The distribution of attitude is	convergent	divergent
a. Attitudes of citizens are	convergent	divergent
b. Attitudes of political leaders and activists are	convergent	divergent
2. Lines of cleavage are	overlapping (cross-cutting)	non-overlapping (cumulative)
3. Threats to ways of life are	absent	present
a. Privileged groups feel	secure	seriously threatened
b. Aspiring groups feel	successful	frustrated
4. Political institutions provide		
a. Negotiations for consent but not decisions	no	yes
b. Decisions without consent	no	yes
Agreed processes for negotiating consent and arriving at decisions	yes	no

The existence of 'severe' cleavages and the effect they have upon perceived voter utility are important in the explanation of party politics. The success of political parties is dependent upon their

appeals to certain groups of people's conception of the 'good society'. In a federal system, where significant cleavages create strong regionalism, all federally prominent political parties may have low political utility for some groups of voters. Voters in outlying regions, for instance, may perceive that federal parties, with their primarily metropolitan orientation, are unable to give adequate attention to their particular demands, as was the case in Alberta. Any region may have important interests which conflict sufficiently with those of a nation as a whole to prevent the nationally orientated parties from supporting them. The federal parties are unable to appeal to the regional voters' conception of the 'good society' because of the divergent attitudes of the citizens and of federal and regional political leaders. If this is the case, regional voters could reject all the parties of the federal party system. The federal parties would be replaced by voter support for a regional or 'third' party within the federal party system.

A regional political party which attempts to secure federal representation or come to power within the regional political system may develop ideological stands as appeals. Ideology, or "a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society"²³ serves to differentiate the regional from federal parties. Where society is heterodox and conflict exists between regions, ideological appeals comprise part of the political stands adopted by regional parties. Ideologies, in this case, relate to the particular conceptions and problems of a specific region. A regional voter may be influenced by an ideology which appeals to his conception of the

'good society', in contrast to the federal parties' appeals.²⁴

However, in order to maintain regional political support, a party in control of government must attempt to create the 'good society'. This implies gaining political power which would be most probable within the regional political system. If a party gains political control by appealing to regional voter perspective, it becomes an important social agent in presenting legislation to create the 'good society'. As progress is made toward this end, a party must further modify its appeals and its corresponding organizational form and style, to maintain voter support.

The conceptual tools employed to discuss party evolution, rationality, political utility and cleavages, can be applied to the specific case of Alberta. Because of severe cleavages, Albertans have, since 1920, supported regional parties to control the provincial government and have supported 'third' parties federally. One major concomitant of this was the rejection of federal political parties because of their association with the maintenance of cleavages and the minimal degree of positive political utility they thus provided for most Albertans. Another outcome was the particular nature of party government within the Alberta political system.

B. Party Systems

The interaction of party appeals and voter choice comprise the core mechanisms of any party system. Party systems also reflect the influence of the decision-making unit for which parties compete, the nature of party appeals (whether they are ideological or piecemeal), and the societal composition of voters. Because of the importance of

these factors, any description of party systems must go beyond the characteristics associated with the participating units.

The interaction of party units invariably have attributes not fully stated in the description of the units, and while they are obviously much dependent on individual party characteristics, they also reflect other factors, not the least the broader settings--society, political system, general structure of political competition--within which parties exist.²⁵

Unfortunately the above mentioned factors have not been used in most party system classification schemes. Most observers classify party systems using electoral results and the number of competing parties as the only criteria. Electoral results over a series of elections supposedly develop into a party system pattern. The following is an example of party system classification based on election returns and number of parties.²⁶

1. Multi-party type--to this type belongs any system in which at most elections in the fairly recent past,
 - a. Three or more parties have shared the bulk of votes and public offices, and,
 - b. No single party has won a majority of either votes or offices.
2. Two-party type--to this type belongs any system which at most elections in the fairly recent past,
 - a. Two parties have shared the bulk of votes and public offices between them,
 - b. The winning party has gained a majority of the votes and offices, and,
 - c. The two dominant parties have alternated in winning majorities.
3. The modified one-party type--to this type belongs any system in which at election in the recent past,
 - a. One party has won all or almost all of the offices, but,
 - b. The second party, though it has seldom won any offices, has normally received a substantial percentage of the votes, and thus constitutes a significant center of organized party opposition.
4. The one-party type--to this type belongs any system in which at elections in the recent past,

- a. Only one party has won all or nearly all of the offices, and,
 - b. The second party has usually received only a small percentage of the popular votes.
- 5. The totalitarian one-party type--to this type belongs any system in which either,
 - a. Only one party has been permitted to participate in elections in the recent past, or
 - b. Any parties other than the dominant single party that have participated are clearly 'fronts' for the dominant party.

1. Method and Data: Party Systems

The bases of the above classification are electoral results and the number of political party participants. Party system classifications and analysis must use these sources of information; however, they are not, alone, an adequate body of data. Aggregate electoral results do not allow for the analysis of ". . . the public offices available: the rules, formal and informal for their attainment and the attitudes of politicians and voters toward these offices."²⁷ Party system characteristics are, in part, influenced by those who are party members and leaders. Aspects of party competition may reflect the personal motivation and tactics of those involved in electoral campaigns. Similarly, the number of parties and aggregate vote classification, the individual factors of which are important, provides little explanation of voter rationality, perception or choice within a particular party system. The classification assumes that votes represent a culmination of psychological processes of the voter. Votes are, however, reflections of two important factors; the realization of political power by a participant in the political system, and, the expression of a voter's perceptions and political utility toward competing parties.

Party system analysis must indicate the influences upon the voter's perceptions, an explanation of voter utility as a process of choice between competing parties, the nature of party appeals, and, the expectations of voters and party members toward a certain party controlling government. The psychological processes involved in voting provide indications as to the development of a particular party system and its maintenance or change. Aggregate votes describe the structural, rather than behavioral, repercussions of voter choice. Further explanations are necessary for a thorough explanation of party systems.

Party system integration, the level of political conflict between parties, is one criterion used in party system analysis. Party system integration can be employed to specify distinctions between different parties competing in the same party system. These distinctions can be based on the following five categories of comparison between parties²⁸:

1. Differences in fundamental views and orientations.
2. Differences in concrete goals or in the rank order of goals pursued.
3. Differences in the means of striving for concrete goals.
4. Differences in the assessment and valuation of political personalities.
5. Differences in the social composition of parties or factions, particularly their class base and the extent to which they aggregate diverse forces.

These five criteria can be employed to analyze the nature of competition between parties in a particular party system. Points 1 and 2 indicate the possible difference in party appeals to voter perceptions.

In a diverse societal setting, parties may differ as to what they perceive to be the dominant political values of the populace. This may be the result of the political perceptions held by different sections of the populace as indicated in point 5. Points 3 and 4 indicate that the parties may differ in their actual workings to gain support. Parties may perceive different dominant political attitudes of the voters and this accounts for parties giving different emphasis to leadership, or style of leadership in striving for concrete goals. These five variables are critical to the identification of party systems. Once he has identified the factors, the observer can expand his analysis by examining the impact of societal influences upon voters' perception and the historical development of the party system.

Electoral systems provide the mechanism by which parties can control the government and are therefore important in the analysis of party systems. To achieve a plurality of votes and a majority of representation, which is possible under the single-member plurality system, is the main objective of parties in such a situation. A party's attempt to gain political control is reflected in its appeals to voter perceptions. The success of these appeals will be transformed by the electoral system into legislative representation for a party. If a party does not obtain legislative representation, but does receive a portion of the popular vote, it may be unable to survive as a competitive unit within the party system. An example of this comes from Alberta politics which indicates that the provincial Liberal party was unable, from 1955 until 1971, to translate voter support into legislative representation. The result, as indicated by the following

chart of electoral results, has been a decline in both the party's political efforts and its voter support until, now, it is a negligible factor in Alberta politics..

Liberal Support²⁹

Election	Seats	Percentage of Popular Vote	Percentage Seats
1955	15	31	25
1959	1	14	2
1963	2	20	3
1967	3	11	5
1971	0	1	0

The party system of a particular time is influenced by the historical development of that system. As H. Eckstein observes:

Party systems at any point of time except their origin, are largely creatures of their own histories: once in being they become self-moving, even in the sense of self-perpetuating.³⁰

The party system of a particular time is related to the structure of governmental power of a particular political system. If groups of voters can and have historically supported one party, because of its high political utility for them, then the entire political system will be dominated by one party. If, however, voter choices are split among two parties, a two-party alternate government party system may stabilize. Similarly, if there exist numerous different perceptions of an array of parties, with the votes thus distributed, a multi-party system could develop. Once any type of these perception patterns is developed, they tend to be reinforced by political parties dependent on specific groups of voters for their support. Party appeals to specific voter perceptions, which party members know exist over a period of time, will perpetuate the party system already in existence.

An example of party system classification which involves the above factors is provided by Giovanni Sartori³¹ and Frank L. Wilson.³² Sartori indicates that party system classification must involve the number of parties, ideological polarity between parties, orientation of party units toward the political system, and the nature of party competition. F. L. Wilson incorporated these variables into the following characterization of party systems³³:

<u>Party System</u>	<u>No. of Parties</u>	<u>Polariza- tion</u>	<u>Competition</u>	<u>Consen- sus</u>	<u>Drive</u>
Moderate Dualism	2	No	Moderate	Yes	Convergent
Extreme Dualism	2	Yes	Extreme	No	Divergent
Moderate Pluralism	3+	No	Moderate	Yes	Convergent
Extreme Pluralism	3+	Yes	Extreme	No	Divergent

The advantage of such a characterization is its description of the relationships between parties, the party system and the political system. The extreme dualist system has intense party competition on polarized ideological perspectives. In such a system there would be no consensus on the values of the political system and non-acceptance of a 'loyal opposition' since an electoral majority of either party would imply system opposition by the other. A similar situation exists in the extreme pluralist party system except that the divergent drives of parties would prevent any party from forming a government. The extreme dualist and pluralist party system are reflective of an ideologically divided society. Voters commit themselves to party appeals which provide the greatest utility for themselves, but which are not conducive to goal attainment for the whole political system. Such commitment to

ideology may result because of a strict class system and class identification among segments of voters. Parties appealing to the different classes attempt to promote their causes over other classes. The result is polarization, extreme party competition, lack of consensus on political values and divergency among political parties and class voters.

The moderate dualist and pluralist party systems provide for government in which the concepts of alternate government and 'loyal opposition' are accepted by political parties. Consequently, political parties do not attempt to destroy the political system, but to oppose certain policies which a party in control of government might advocate. The political parties are largely non-ideological and pragmatic with regard to electoral competition. The moderate pluralist party system would allow coalition governments to form in order to exercise political power. It appears obvious that the moderate dualist and pluralist party systems would provide for a stable and continuous political system. The extreme dualist and pluralist party systems would relate to a disruptive and discontinuous political system. Voters in the moderate party system perceive their political utility from the non-ideological policies of parties rather than from ideological commitments. A moderate party system does not depend upon a voter's class identification, for instance, in developing its appeals. Party competition is based on the development of successful appeals to the general populace and the number of 'uncommitted' voters would be numerous and important to the election outcome.

These characteristics of party systems are applicable to the

case study of Alberta within the Canadian Federation, because party system analysis is applicable to a specific case of a regional political system within a federally organized state. The development of a regional party system is influenced by voter perceptions of both federal and provincial parties.

Regions are rarely in completely harmonious relationships with other regions in a federal system. Regional cleavages exist between different segments of the population of one country. The cleavages will affect the value hierarchy of a specific populace. Cleavages may be detrimental to an individual's life-style and in an attempt to create his conception of the 'good society', the individual will attempt to find solutions. Solutions may arise from an individual's participation in politics, where he realizes political power is a means to create his 'good society'. In a federal system, the individual participates, by voting, in two party systems--the federal and provincial. Within the province, one party may represent the voters' view of the 'good society', and thus has greater political utility for a number of people than any other competing party. If a majority or plurality of voters associate one party with greater political utility over a period of time, that party may control provincial government over a series of elections. Regional voters may associate or identify federal parties with the existence of regional cleavages. Voting for federal parties provides little, if any, positive political utility because of their perceived role of hindering the development of the 'good society'. Regional voters may, then, support 'third' parties, which have little chance of gaining national power.

Alberta's case typifies the characteristics of regional political behavior. Certain segments of the Western region's, including Alberta's, population perceived their area to be detrimentally affected by regional-economic cleavages. Cleavages in the areas of tariffs, freight rates, and national marketing policies were perceived by Albertans to be for the benefit of Eastern Canada. These cleavages were legislated upon by the federal government which appeared to show little concern for the development of Albertans' conception of the 'good society'. The existence of regional-economic cleavages was associated with Liberal or Conservative party control of the federal government. Those federal parties were providing little positive political utility for Albertans. Therefore, Albertans rejected the federal parties and supported a 'third' party in the federal party system, while, provincially, any party perceived to be in alliance with the federal parties was also rejected. A party controlling the provincial political system distinguishes itself from the federal parties and appeals to the voters' anti-federal party political perceptions. The provincial government party can maintain high political support because of its attempts to eliminate the detrimental effects of regional cleavages. These attempts provide high political utility for many provincial voters by helping to create what they conceive to be the 'good society'.

The political importance of cleavages to various people will have differing degrees of influence depending upon individual life-styles and values. For instance, a specific cleavage may detrimentally affect the financial endeavors of a large group of people. Certain policies may overcome the

detrimental effects and people's concern over that specific cleavage will end. This implies changes in an individual's hierarchy of values, perception of the 'good society', and degree of political utility perceived in a party appeal centered on that cleavage. A political party must, in turn, perceive these changes in voter concerns and develop new appeals in order to maintain electoral support. The change in appeals is necessary for any party in contention for control of a specific political system.

C. One Party Dominance: A Model

Alberta politics are better explained by employing the model sketched here, than by previous attempts. The most important of these previous works is C. B. Macpherson's Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System.³⁴ This analysis and Macpherson's agree that significant economic-cleavages existed in Canada. From this point on, however, the two analyses differ. Macpherson's Marxian analysis attempts to show that occupational base meant a 'class orientation' for the majority of Albertans. 'Class analysis' uses economic determinism as its major classification criterion. This single variable approach has been criticized because of its potential inadequacy in explaining individual behavior, in that although "we can locate a class member objectively . . . this may tell us little about the subjective correlates (social outlooks, attitudes, etc.) of class position."³⁶

Macpherson, on the basis of this single-variable criterion states that Albertans were homogenously 'petite-bourgeoise' in their political attitudes. This implies that they voted alike. But, he then qualifies his observation with following description of 'petite-

bourgeoise' political action, It,

. . . does not necessarily mean that members of a class, so defined, are sufficiently conscious of a class interest to act mainly in terms of it in making political choices.³⁷

Macpherson appears to take-up contradictory premises.

Albertans, he states, were homogenously 'petite-bourgeoise', but did not perceive themselves as being members of that class. If Albertans did not perceive their 'class position' then what has been established by the adoption of the term 'class'? The first assumption is that all Albertans voted the same way. The second assumption is that they did so for a similar reason. The third assumption is that 'class analysis' allows for a characterization of patterns of political behavior which, also, hold over time. All three of these assumptions can be shown to be false in relation to the political behavior of Albertans.

Firstly, a perusal of Alberta's popular votes indicates anything but homogeneous political behavior. In any election in the post-Liberal era no one party has received more than 56 per cent of the popular vote. This does not support Macpherson's contention of homogeneous voting. However, the popular vote statistics (see Table 1.1) are compatible with this thesis' basis of the multi-dimensional character of the voting decision. With this approach, it appears that different individuals in related or similar occupations may have voted for different parties, presumably because they perceived that their own utility incomes differed.

Secondly, the 'class theory' stresses that members of a class would support a party because of its economic appeals and promotion of that particular class's economic interests. Economic interest is the

TABLE 1.1

LEGISLATIVE SEATS AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE BY POLITICAL PARTY³⁸

Election	Total Number of Seats	Social Credit			Liberal			Conser- vative			UFA			CCF/NDP			Others			Total Popular Vote
		No. of Seats	% Pop. Vote	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Pop. Vote	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Pop. Vote	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Pop. Vote	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Pop. Vote	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Pop. Vote	% Seats	
*1905	25				23	61	92	2	35	8							4			23,336
1909	41				36	59	88	2	32	5							3	9	7	50,004
1913	56				38	49	68	18	45	32								6		96,833
1917	58				34	36	59	19	30	33							5	34	9	151,499
1921	59				14	33	24	1	11	2	38	28	64				6	28	10	298,087
**1926	60				7	27	12	4	23	7	43	41	72				6	9	10	175,137
1930	63				11	25	17	6	14	10	39	39	62				7	23	11	188,219
1935	63	57	54	90	4	23	6	2	6	3		11						5		301,752
1940	57	36	43	63	1	6	2							11			20	46	35	308,864
1944	57	51	52	89										2	25	4	4	23	7	282,106
1948	57	51	56	89	2	18	4							2	19	4	2	7	4	294,793
1952	61	52	56	85	4	22	7	1	2	2				2	14	3	2	5	3	298,335
1955	61	37	46	61	15	31	25	3	9	5				2	8	3	4	5	7	378,179
1959	65	61	56	94	1	14	2	1	24	2					4		2	2	3	413,515
1963	63	60	55	95	2	20	3		13						9		1	3	2	403,444
1967	65	55	45	83	3	11	5	6	26	11					16		1	3	2	498,341
***1971	75	25	41	33		1		49	46	63				1	12	1		1		637,969

*Source: 1905-1921 Election figures: Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1905-1921.

**Source: Government of Alberta, Provincial Election Returns, 1926-1967.

***Election data from unofficial sources.

single criterion for party support. This contrasts with this thesis' proposal of the multi-dimensional criteria involved in an individual's support for a particular party. In Alberta, not all people voted for the same party, nor did those who vote for one party do so for a single common reason. Many individuals, for example, supported Social Credit because of Aberhart's charisma. Individuals supported Social Credit for various reasons, which supports our multi-dimensional approach, but is not consistent with the assumptions of 'class analysis'.

Thirdly, Macpherson attempts to conclude, from the basis of his 'class analysis', that distinct patterns of political behavior existed in Alberta over a period of time. The evidence provided by Alberta's voting returns does not support the assumption of 'class-determined' patterns of political behavior. This conclusion is supported by Macpherson's admission that the 'petite-bourgeoise' had little or no class consciousness. Only with an identifiable class consciousness among the populace could one speculate upon 'class patterns' of political behavior which persisted even while conditions changed. These points allow one to conclude that the 'class analysis', in this situation, is inappropriate for determining 'patterns' of political behavior. From our perspective, however, 'patterns' of political behavior, over time, can be discerned through behavioral concepts of individual and aggregate behavior.

A second area of confusion and difficulty in Macpherson's analysis lies in his conception of party systems and its application to Alberta. Macpherson states that "what is to be analyzed, then, is a series of experiments in control of representative government by

popular movements, without a party system. . . ."³⁹ By the concluding chapter of his analysis, however, Macpherson states that his study "has indicated that the most probable course of political organization in Alberta is a continued rejection of the orthodox party system.

. . ."⁴⁰ Indeed, Macpherson's emphasis upon the party system has changed; from the assumption that no party system existed, to the case of one type of party system being rejected. Macpherson indicates, in conclusion, that Albertans maintained some sort of party system, but it was not the competitive two party system.

The weakness of Macpherson's characterization of party systems is in the alternatives he outlines to the two-party system. Throughout his analysis Macpherson specifies that Alberta had a 'non-party or one-party' system. The 'non-party' system is one in which "governments are not elected or supported by means of regularly organized, identified, and opposed political machines, but are chosen for efficiency in administration of policies. . . ."⁴¹ The 'one-party' system is defined as a "one-party dictatorship"⁴² in which one party controls the entire political system without opposition. But, these categories do not apply to party system classification at all. Macpherson admits to their inadequacy when he states; "To describe what has actually prevailed we have been using, with or without qualification, the terms 'one-party' and 'non-party' system. Yet, it is apparent that these categories are not adequate, and it will be better now to discard them."⁴³ The reason that Macpherson's categories are inadequate is that they do not characterize party systems. This is because, apart from all else, Macpherson refuses to accept the 'liberal-democratic' or 'pluralist'

definitions and characterizations of party systems. The 'pluralist' argument is that a party system is, at its heart, the process of competition between parties attempting to gain political control. A party system by this definition was always in existence in Alberta. Macpherson admits, in contradiction to his analysis of the 'one and non-party' systems, to the existence of an Alberta party system when he states that it "shares the attributes of the ordinary party system, at least to the extent that it operates by permanently organized and publicly identified electoral machines with some opposition from other machines."⁴⁴ His analysis is inconclusive because of these conceptually rooted contradictions.

The only alternative which Macpherson develops, after rejecting the 'one-party and non-party' system and admitting to the existence of a 'pluralist' party system, is his 'quasi-party' system. Macpherson states that a party system is a necessary part of the democratic process and that Alberta politics has been more or less democratic because of the 'quasi-party' system. Beyond this observation, Macpherson provides little analysis of the 'quasi-party' system. He defines the 'quasi-party' system "as a middle way between an alternative party system . . . and a one-party state. . . ."⁴⁵ Such a definition is too ambiguous for rigorous application to Alberta politics. This thesis proposes an alternative explanation of the Alberta party system which will be termed a one-party dominant party system.

The conceptualization of a one-party dominant party system is multi-dimensional, involving specific structural and behavioral

processes, many of which were elaborated upon earlier in this paper.

A summary of these processes is presented in the following chart.

One-party dominance implies the control of government by a single party for a number of years and over a series of elections, in competition with other political parties. The dominant political unit, whatever it may be, has a distinct advantage over other units in terms of people's perceptions. Individuals who maintain this dominant party system may support the government because it appears to be 'anti-party' where 'party' is negatively perceived. 'Parties' are viewed as out-groups and are rejected in favor of a 'business-type' government. Rejection of 'parties' in favor of this type of government would be related to various individuals' conception of the 'good society' and will result in the continued exclusion of certain political units from governmental control. A second factor of the dominant party system is that one political unit, that controlling government, has a distinct organizational advantage over other competing parties. This organization provides for 'legitimate' participation of individuals in politics where participation in favor of competing units is rejected. This participation will support the 'anti-party' appeals of the government and the positive legislative action taken to create the perceived 'good society'. Over time, then, one political unit maintains a perceptual advantage over other units which is reinforced by the organization and participation of specific groups of individuals. Although changes may occur in the dominant unit, if that unit maintains a distinct perceptual, organizational, and participatory advantage over other units, a one-party dominant party system will be maintained.

Developmental Sequence

Structural	System Construction	Regional Cleavages	A. Initial Situation Initial Formation of Appeals		B. Period of Evolution Party Appeals to Voters - Regional Economic Cleavages and 'Good Society' Platform		C. System Maturation Party Adaptation of Appeals to Changing Electorate Conception of the 'Good Society'	
			Development of Party Organization; Leadership → Constituency Organizations	Perception by Leader & Party Organization of the Effects of Cleavages on Individuals' 'Life Style'	Competition Electorally Extension of Membership	Gain Political Power Characterize Party System as One Party Dominant Criteria of Opposition	Maintenance of Political Control over a Series of Elections Perceptual, Organizational and Participatory Advantage for one Participating Unit	
Behavioral	Electorate	Individual Rationality	Organize in Light of Perceptions of Regional-Economic Cleavages → e.g. Economic Cooperatives	Initial Desire for Political Participation Notion of Regional Block Voting	Perception of Party Appeals as an Expression of Jointly Perceived Conception of the 'Good Society'	Plurality of the Populace with Similar Political Perceptions →	Support Through Voting for one Party on Several Related 'Good Society' Bases	Continued Voting Support for One-Party Because of Plurality of Perceptions, and Participation
			Perception Relative to Individuals' Hierarchy of Values → Conception of 'Good Society'	Awareness of the Potential of Political Power →	Perceived fit Between 'Good Society' & Party Appeals → Potential to Vote for Party	Decision to Vote for Single Party Because of Positive Political Utility	Reject Platforms of Opposition Parties →	Changes in Individual Value Hierarchy & Conceptions of the 'Good Society' One Party Maintains Higher Political Utility Than the Others

The chart on page 32 illustrates the behavioral and structural processes leading to the creation of a one-party dominant party system in a regional political system. The behavioral sequence, as illustrated in the lower half of the diagram, has been explained in previous sections of this thesis. Certain aspects of the structural development, however, need further explanation if the processes are to be fully understood. These elements, as they appear on the diagram are: firstly, the development of constituency organizations and extension of membership; secondly, the nature of the electoral system and the criterion of opposition; and, thirdly, the adaptation of the dominant party's appeals.

The development of constituency organizations and extension of party membership is important in three ways. Firstly, constituency organizations and membership provide mechanisms for the effective diffusion of party appeals. It represents an organized deployment of resources to ensure that the majority of the populace 'understands' the party's attempt to find solutions to cleavages and creating the 'good society'. Secondly, membership perceptions of political problems will be transmitted to party decision-makers who will employ such information in developing appeals. A large membership will represent various political perceptions of the populace. The third function of the constituency organization is to support the party's local candidate and work for him during the election campaign. Successful campaigning requires the manpower to dispense party information to the voting populace and help to identify the candidate with those informational appeals.

The single-member plurality system, in which a small increase in popular vote can provide, in a range of cases, for a disproportionate gain in electoral seats.⁴⁶ Fifty per cent plus one vote of all votes cast in each constituency, for example, would yield a complete sweep for a single party. The electoral system is also significant when competition for seats is between three parties.

The point is that a single-member plurality electoral system can itself provide for legislative majorities in cases where other methods would not. As such, a legislative majority is not a sufficient criterion for characterizing a system as one-party dominant. The characterization is partially dependent on the amount of political opposition, measured according to the percentage of popular vote for various parties. Although it is difficult, on principle, to draw the measure of opposition, there clearly is one to be drawn between this type of party system and others. Maurice Pinard concludes that if a single opposition party fails to garner one-third of the total votes cast, and if a single party consistently receives a plurality of the vote, then a party system can be classified as one-party dominant.

Pinard states,

. . . if a two party system is to be maintained--or if a multi-party system is not to be further extended--the main opposition party cannot obtain less than one-third of the vote.⁴⁷

If the opposition cannot obtain one-third of the popular vote, Pinard concludes that "opposition parties cannot be considered a viable alternative to the party in power."⁴⁸

The final element to be elaborated upon is the adaptation of party appeals in a changing social-economic environment. If a party

attempts to appeal to perceptions which are outdated, it will be rejected by certain groups of voters. A party which has become the government unit must change its appeals if changes occur in individuals' perceptions. For example, a party may change its appeal from economic reform, during periods of economic distress, to providing adequate administration and distribution in times of economic prosperity. Only through an adaptation of appeals will a party be viewed as the major means toward the creation of the 'good society' for a plurality of the populace.

Footnotes

¹M. Durverger, Political Parties, trans. by B. and P. North (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1954); L. D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1967); Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," in La Palambara and M. Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 177-201.

²H. Eckstein, "Party Systems," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (New York: MacMillan and The Free Press, 1968), p. 429.

³H. Eckstein, op. cot., p. 429.

⁴M. Duverger, op. cit., The Introduction.

⁵Ibid., p. 23.

⁶L. D. Epstein, op. cit., p. 15.

⁷Kirchheimer, op. cit., pp. 190-191.

⁸Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

⁹Downs, op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 6.

¹¹Ibid., p. 10.

¹²Ibid., p. 46.

¹³Karl Mannheim, Man and Society, In an Age of Reconstruction (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., Broadway House, 1960), p. 59.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 128.

¹⁵Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1947), p. 358.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 364.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 364.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 370.

¹⁹Robert A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I (New York: Vintage Books).

²⁰Dahl, op. cit., p. 63.

²¹Ibid., p. 65.

²²Ibid., p. 280.

²³Downs, op. cit., p. 96.

²⁴Ibid., p. 99.

²⁵H. Eckstein, op. cit., p. 436.

²⁶A. Ranney and W. Kendall, Democracy and The American Party System (New York and Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1956), pp. 156-158.

²⁷J. Schleisinger, "Party Units," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (New York: MacMillan and The Free Press, 1968), p. 430.

²⁸H. Eckstein, op. cit., p. 444.

²⁹J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, "Alberta One Party Dominance," in Martin Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics - The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1972), p. 3.

³⁰H. Eckstein, op. cit., p. 450.

³¹Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The case of Polarized Pluralism," in La Palombara and M. Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 137-177.

³²Frank L. Wilson, The French Democratic Left, 1963-1969 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971).

³³Ibid., pp. 15-20.

³⁴C. B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2d. Ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962).

³⁵Ibid., pp. 6-20.

³⁶Seymour M. Lipset, "Social Class," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 15 (New York: Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, 1968), pp. 299.

- ³⁷C. B. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 225.
- ³⁸J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, op. cit., p. 3.
- ³⁹C. B. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 5.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. 237.
- ⁴¹Ibid., p. 238.
- ⁴²Ibid., p. 238.
- ⁴³Ibid., pp. 237-238.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 238-239.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., p. 239.
- ⁴⁶Alan C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. I (No. 1, March, 1968), 55-80.
- ⁴⁷M. Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Co., 1971).
- ⁴⁸Ibid., p. 37.

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM

A. Economic Foundations

Alberta's economic and political development was related to those of other regions within the Canadian Confederation, especially Quebec and Ontario. Quebec and Ontario developed into the manufacturing, industrial and financial centers of Canada. Alberta had a physical environment well-suited to raw resources production which created an interdependence of trade and commerce between the two regions. This interdependence was the source of regional-cleavages for Albertans who were involved in specific economic activities from 1905 until 1945.

Until the mid-1920's, Alberta's economic characteristics were those of a frontier-pioneer area. The province had much productive land and a scanty population. Immigration was the main source of growth and prosperity as the immigrants' capital was spent to purchase land and equipment. Alberta's prosperity varied with the cyclical arrival of large numbers of immigrants (see Figure 2.1). The prosperity caused by the inflow of immigrant capital was not maintained after most of the available land had been purchased and homesteaded. After this, prosperity had to be maintained through the production and sale of commodities. Each individual involved in production attempted to "wrest from his physical environment and from the economic facts of his position, a net income sufficient to cover the standard of living




FIGURE 2.1 PERIODS OF SETTLEMENT² (Population of Prairie Provinces (upper), number of immigrant arrivals in Canada (middle), and homestead entries in Prairie Provinces (lower). Data from Canada Year Book.)

which will permit him to make progress as he conceives progress."¹

The commodity which Albertans produced was wheat. The Rowell-Sirois Report indicates the importance of wheat to Alberta's economic development.

This area (Prairies), which in 1913 had one-fifth of Canada's population, was almost exclusively concerned with the production of wheat and its sale on the international market. Nearly sixty percent of the gainfully occupied were directly engaged in agriculture which was dominated by this one crop.³

Wheat, combined with other farm commodities, proved to be the economic staple of Alberta. Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 indicate this point. However, the production of wheat did not ensure prosperity for farmers or for those involved in the related service enterprises. Wheat production far exceeded the domestic need and, thus, export markets were needed for sales. Several problems arose because of this need. Firstly, wheat had to be transported to terminal ports for shipping. With the large volume of wheat produced and the limited capacity of the railways, this transportation proved difficult. Secondly, the producers of wheat had to sell to line elevators which were controlled by private Eastern companies. These companies were profit-orientated and to ensure this profit, the line companies would not pay high prices for wheat. Thirdly, there were great fluctuations in transportation rates to international markets and for the price of wheat at those markets. These fluctuations in price meant little security of returns for wheat crops. If world markets were over-supplied, the price for Canadian wheat would drop. Fourthly, all phases of the production of wheat needed machinery which, initially, was imported from the United States. Eastern manufacturers desired the

TABLE 2.1

WHEAT PRODUCTION, 1890-1931*⁴

Year	World Produc- tion (millions of bu.)	Canadian Produc- tion (millions of bu.)	Canadian Produc- tion as Percent- age of World Produc- tion	Year	World Produc- tion (millions of bu.)	Canadian Produc- tion (millions of bu.)	Canadian Produc- tion as Percent- age of World Produc- tion
1890	2,091	41	2.0	1911	3,570	231	6.5
1891	2,171	42	1.9	1912	3,857	224	5.8
1892	2,319	48	2.1	1913	4,088	232	5.7
1893	2,558	41	1.6	1914	3,625	161	4.4
1894	2,516	43	1.7	1915	4,166	394	9.5
1895	2,440	54	2.2	1916	3,288	263	8.0
1896	2,469	38	1.5	1917	3,134	234	7.5
1897	2,234	52	2.3	1918	3,148	189	6.0
1898	3,012	66	2.2	1919	2,997	193	6.4
1899	2,773	59	2.1	1920	3,033	263	8.7
1900	2,633	50	1.9	1921	3,317	301	9.1
1901	2,900	56	1.9	1922	3,400	400	11.8
1902	3,118	94	3.0	1923	3,743	474	12.7
1903	3,273	78	2.4	1924	3,578	262	7.3
1904	3,144	70	2.2	1925	4,100	395	9.6
1905	3,309	107	3.2	1926	4,317	407	9.4
1906	3,493	125	3.6	1927	4,509	480	9.4
1907	3,189	93	2.9	1928	4,745	567	11.9
1908	3,171	112	3.5	1929	4,299	305	7.1
1909	3,625	167	4.6	1930	4,938	421	8.5
1910	3,576	132	3.7	1931	3,689	304	8.2

*1890-23 Yearbook of United States Department of Agriculture, 1924, p. 569.

*1924-30 Annual Reports on Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics).

TABLE 2.2
WHEAT AND WHEAT FLOUR EXPORTS*⁵

Year	World Exports (millions of bu.)	Canadian Exports (millions of bu.)	Canadian Exports as Per- centage of World Exports %	Year	World Exports (millions of bu.)	Canadian Exports (millions of bu.)	Canadian Exports as Per- centage of World Exports +
1908	621	52	8.4	1919	436	83	19.0
1909	726	57	7.9	1920	607	118	19.4
1910	792	63	8.0	1921	642	156	24.3
1911	772	59	7.6	1922	605	252	41.7
1912	776	81	10.4	1923	591	293	49.6
1913	901	112	12.4	1924	680	266	39.1
1914	680	142	20.9	1925	599	268	44.7
1915	625	92	14.7	1926	628	297	47.3
1916	674	186	27.6	1927	740	296	40.0
1917	398	223	56.0	1928	781	413	52.9
1918	329	195	59.3	1929	696	252	36.2

*Data from Annual Reports on Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics).

‡1908-16, Crop Years; 1917-29, Calendar Years.

+1908-21, Fiscal Years; 1922-29, Calendar Years.

TABLE 2.3
PERCENTAGE OF FIELD CROP ACREAGE IN WHEAT*⁶

	1900	1906	1911	1916	1921	1926	1931
Manitoba	71.3	64.5	60.0	53.3	48.1	33.3	43
Saskatchewan	74.3	64.7	57.5	64.6	65.6	69.3	67
Alberta	22.8	24.4	48.5	47.3	57.3	67.2	57
Total	69.3	60.2	56.5	58.4	60.2	62.3	60

*Agriculture, Climate, and Population of the Prairie Provinces of Canada: A Statistical Atlas Showing Past Development and Present Conditions, prepared under the direction of W. B. Hurd and T. W. Grindley (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1931).

Western market in machinery and because the more populous East generally controlled the federal government, tariffs were imposed on U.S. machinery imports. For Western farmers this meant a higher cost of machinery, an implication of which they were well aware. Fifthly, farming enterprises required capital for the purchase of machinery, seed, etc., at various times in a production year. The financial institutions, banks and credit houses, did not conduct their affairs according to the agricultural cycle. The financial institutions were setting policy according to their interests in profit, rather than to attain the goal of helping to secure prosperity for wheat producers. Like tariff policy, the financial institutions tended to be controlled in the East.

These five major cleavages prevented the Alberta wheat producers from securing a stable level of prosperity, an important component of their conception of the 'good society'. In an attempt to reform the problems associated with cleavages, the farmers organized various economic groups. The basic problem with cleavages seemed to be Eastern control of elevators, transportation, tariffs, and the banking system. Eastern control implied that decisions of great importance to Westerners were being made by groups without Western interests in mind. The profit motive and financial security for Eastern concerns were taking priority.

The farmers' reforms began with the line and terminal elevators. Farmers' groups specified the following abuses of the line elevators:

1. That a vendor of grain is at present subjected to an unfair and excessive dockage of his grain at the time of sale.

2. That doubts exist as to the farmers of the weight allowed or used by the owners of elevators.
3. That the owners of elevators enjoy a monopoly in the purchasing of grain by refusing to permit the erection of flat warehouses where standard elevators are situated and are able to keep the price of grain below its true market value, to their own benefit and to the disadvantage of others who are specifically interested in the grain trade and of the public generally.⁷

These problems were attacked in two ways. Firstly, the farmers organized their own line elevator companies. These competed with Eastern-owned elevators which made prices more competitive. Secondly, farmers perceived that the federal government had the power to correct the abuses of the line companies. The farmers' 'Siege on Ottawa' in 1910 was to protest economic abuses and had favourable results for the farmers with the passage of the Canadian Grain Act of 1912. The legislation "witnessed the intensification of government control of terminals, and the initiation of the policy of establishing supplementary government elevators under the operation of the Grain Commissioners."⁸

The farmers' success in this endeavor had two important results for future efforts. Firstly, the farmers realized that cooperation in activities was more successful than individual efforts. Secondly, they realized that through organization they could influence political decisions to their favor. The realization of political power was important in the farmers' attempts to relieve other cleavages.

The operation of railways and their freight rates were one such cleavage which the farmers desired to reform. The railways seemed incapable of providing the necessary facilities, especially in times of

boom production. The freight rates seemed too high and inhibited the possible prosperity of farmers. Generally, the farmers believed that the railways were not helping the economic development of Alberta. The farmers reasoned that because the railways' head offices were in Eastern Canada, railroad operations would favor that area. If this meant high freight rates for Albertans, then the policy would be adopted by the railways. Even if the farmers were organized, they could not create a competitive situation as they had done with the line elevators. Changes in the operation of the railways could only be brought about by the federal government, and this required participation and representation by the farmers in the policy process.

Another reason for the farmers' desire for participation in the policy process was tariff policy and specifically the issue of free trade with the United States. Free trade would have meant access to large American markets and railways and less cost for manufactured goods. The demands for free trade held a central place in the farmers' grievances directed at the federal government.⁹ The Laurier Liberals had advocated low tariffs and reciprocity with the United States since 1896. The appeal made to Albertans was summarized by Clifford Sifton's claim, "free coal oil, free clothing and free implements you shall have if the Liberal Party are returned to power."¹⁰ However, once elected the Liberals provided no policy in justification of their appeals except the introduction of a lower British preferential tariff. Liberal policies were in response to the demands of the more politically significant areas of Quebec and Ontario. Violating Eastern demands would jeopardize the Liberal's chances at capturing the great number of

legislative seats in those provinces. Eastern manufacturers, industrialists and bankers desired a continued National Policy of high tariffs.

The conflict between Eastern and Western interests over the National Policy centered on policy matters at the federal level. Farmers associated the dominance of Eastern interests with Liberal or Conservative political control.

One finds almost everywhere a persuasive distrust of Eastern Canada, indeed a feeling of cleavage, which takes the form of periodic attacks on the banks and other financial institutions with their headquarters in Toronto or Montreal, and on old-line parties with their domination by the 'interests' of Ontario and Quebec.¹¹

Eastern economic and political control was detrimental to the economic interests of wheat producers. Their attempts to establish the 'good society' for their life based on wheat production had been thwarted, the farmers perceived, by the predominance of Eastern interests in policy matters. The farmers attempted to counteract Eastern dominance in maintaining regional-economic cleavages, by forming competitive cooperative economic enterprises. However, many specific cleavages could not be relieved through this type of organization. The farmers realized that the federal government had the power to mend cleavages, but, if the government were continually controlled by Eastern dominated Liberal or Conservative parties, little reform legislation would be undertaken. If the farmers wanted policy favorable to their interests, they could not support either of the traditional parties. They would support political organizations which promoted their interests. The development of Alberta politics reflects

the specific concerns of an agrarian population with regional-economic cleavages and political participation.

Although a significant plurality of Albertans were directly involved in agriculture and had similar conceptions of the 'good society', other groups, with differing conceptions of the 'good society', also existed. Jean Burnet states that different communities existed in the towns and cities and in strictly rural areas.

The farmers and small town man are not members of the same community. They may unite for expediency at certain junctures, but they remain fundamentally distinct.¹²

Citizens of the small towns and urban areas may not have been detrimentally affected by regional-economic cleavages. Financial offices, regional head-offices, and elevator and railroad locations, which were located in cities and towns, would be composed of individuals who favored the Liberals and Conservatives because their rule meant a continuation of a profitable economic environment for them. Other individuals, who depended on these services for their livelihood, would associate positive political utility with the Liberals and Conservatives. In other words, there was no homogeneity of conceptions of the 'good society' within Alberta. The evidence for this is provided in the Alberta electoral results in both federal and provincial elections.

B. Political Activities Until 1930

The farmers' criticism of federal political parties was based on their perception of a tacit alliance between the federal Conservative and Liberal parties and those Eastern interests desiring

to maintain cleavages.

From World War I on, the various farm groups and a large section of the rural electorate found themselves in considerable disagreement with the Liberal's wheat policy. To vote Conservative was not a realistic alternative since the Tories were a party of high tariffs and made no special appeal to the demands of farmers for government marketing of guaranteed prices.¹³

The farmers' political position was a combination of three elements. Firstly, farmers realized that in order to create their 'good society' of economic stability, mending of economic cleavages, and participation in policy decisions, influence upon government had to be secured. Secondly, farmers perceived the federal party system as providing little positive political utility because of their dependence on Eastern interests which had conceptions of the 'good society' opposed to agricultural interests. Thirdly, farmers had developed a cooperative base in economic organization, such as the Grain Growers' Elevator Companies, which served as a political base as well. From this base, the farmers' political organizations would be outside the realm of the traditional parties.

To gain positive political utility from party systems, farmers had to develop their own political units. Before 1920, farmers had supported the Patrons of Husbandry, Grange Movement, United Farmers of Ontario, and the Non-Partisan League in an attempt to influence decision-making provincially and in Ottawa. Two other units, the Progressives and the United Farmers of Alberta were significant because of the support they received and the expression they gave to farmer demands. The Progressives attempted to influence the federal party system, although, generally, it failed to bring about significant

changes in the federal system. The United Farmers of Alberta was a farmer supported unit which eventually gained political control of the province. Although provincial jurisdictions were not as extensive as those of the federal government, a provincial government could legislate on local problems and exert some influence on the federal government. A farmers' provincial government "would stand up to the national government, that is, be able to make effective demands on it and resist national legislation which they regarded as exploitive."¹⁴ In this way, farmers' control of the provincial government would provide them with high political utility, in terms of their conception of the 'good society'.

The political attitudes of farmers who supported the Progressives was similar to those supporting the U.F.A. Although the Progressives were soon to lose their support, rural Albertans continued to support the U.F.A. and, subsequently, created a one-party dominant party system in Alberta.

1. The Progressive Movement

The Progressive Movement represented farmers' resentment of Eastern domination of finance and politics which was detrimental to agricultural interests. Farmers believed that the federal political parties were not solving economic problems, such as the recession of 1919, or mending regional-economic cleavages. The federal parties were thus providing little positive political utility for farmers, and the Progressives desired to reform the party system. The Progressives wanted to end party government and replace it with 'group government'.

Progressive spokesmen, such as Henry Wise Wood and William Irvine, criticized the federal party system with its ". . . hollow sham and hypocrisy, special privileges in legislation, a rotten civil service, narrow-minded nationalism and pretended patriotism of grafting politicians. . . ."15 The federal party system reflected these characteristics, so Wood and Irvine believed, because the economically powerful controlled government. The political control of the wealthy meant that ". . . 5% of our population has, through organization, made laws which 95% have to obey."16 Instead of this situation, the Progressives proposed 'group government' in which "representatives in Parliament would be non-partisan, and should deal with every question which may arise, upon its merits and from the standpoint of the farmers, showing how it will affect the country as a whole."17

Although the theory of 'group government' proved impossible to implement, it was a valuable tool for the Progressives because of its critique of the federal party system. The theory was supported by farmers because it proposed to end Eastern domination of politics and allow for 'adequate' participation of farmers in federal politics. These two factors were important parts of the farmers' conception of the 'good society' and the Progressives thus provided, in 1921, high political utility for farmers. The 1921 election results are evidence supporting the claim that the Progressives provided high political utility for farmers (see Table 2.4). The Progressives gained sixty-five seats, more than the Conservative's fifty seats and less than the Liberal's 116 seats. The Progressives won 38 out of 43 seats in Western Canada and received well over 50 per cent of the popular vote

in Saskatchewan and Alberta. Because of the single-member plurality electoral system and the relative dispersion of votes across constituencies, the Progressives gained 93.8 per cent and 91.7 per cent of the seats in those respective provinces. It is important to observe that the Liberals and Conservatives, combined, received only two seats in the Western provinces and a total of 35.3 per cent of the popular vote in Manitoba, 37.4 per cent in Saskatchewan, and 36.1 per cent in Alberta. Within Alberta, individuals securing their livelihood through banking, transportation, and in regional offices of national interests continued to support the Liberal and Conservative parties. These individuals were located mainly in the urban areas and were not detrimentally affected by the existence of regional-economic cleavages. Their conception of the 'good society' included a desire for maintaining stability or a status quo for their various enterprises. They perceived that the maintenance of Liberal rule would ensure this stability. Rural interests, which represented the majority of Albertans, had perceived the Progressives with high political utility. They did so because the Progressives attempted to end the effect of regional-economic cleavages and attempted to secure rural participation and representation in the policy process.

The support for the Progressives was also due, partly, to the 'anti-party' sentiments held by the majority of Albertans. The opposition to party government continued as a perceptual factor for many years in Alberta because government, to the exclusion of parties, could make policies favorable to rural Alberta. This perceptual 'anti-party' sentiment was an important element in future political

TABLE 2.4

1921 FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVES¹⁸

Province	Seats	Per Cent	Votes	Per Cent
P.E.I	--	--	6,453	12.3
Nova Scotia	--	--	31,897	12.3
N.B.	1	9.1	16,223	10.4
Quebec	--	--	29,197	3.7
Ontario	24	29.3	314,092	27.7
Manitoba	12	80.0	75,578	43.7
Saskatchewan	15	93.8	136,472	61.0
Alberta	11	91.7	98,160	56.8
B.C.	2	15.4	13,917	9.0
TOTAL	65	27.7	721,989	23.1

units' success in the Alberta system.

The Progressives were hindered from making progress toward the rural conception of the 'good society' by two factors. Firstly, a split occurred within the Movement as to what role Progressive M.P.'s should play within the House of Commons. The Progressive M.P.'s from Manitoba desired to align themselves with other parties in order to secure certain legislation. Its purpose came to be to force a realignment of parties within the House. The Alberta representatives desired to remain strictly non-partisan and committed to their platform of reform of the parliamentary system. The Movement split in regard to the role of its M.P.'s and the prominence of their reform ideology. The split caused 'in-fighting', which meant that little was accomplished legislatively for their rural electors. Since the Progressives failed to accomplish much through legislation, their

political utility for individuals decreased and this was reflected in their diminishing electoral support in the 1925 and 1926 elections (see Tables 2.5 and 2.6).

Secondly, the rules and regulations of the Canadian parliamentary system hindered the political effectiveness of the Progressives. The parliamentary system provides government from a party receiving a majority or greatest plurality of seats. Government includes the formation of a Cabinet to develop policy for presentation to the House of Commons. Cabinet policy, to become law, must be supported by a majority of representatives and this implies a unity of government party backbenchers. The Progressives revealed their political ineptitude, yet commitment to ideology, by not accepting these provisions. Because of their sectional support, the Progressives were unable to form a government to implement their theory of 'group government'. The alternatives were to seek cabinet positions or to unify into a strong bloc of representatives and pressure the government for favorable legislation. However, disunity prevailed in the Progressive's ranks. The lack of unity meant that certain Progressive M.P.'s supported the Liberals and maintained that party as the government. The lack of unity put the Progressives into a political dilemma. They could not participate effectively in the federal parliament without conforming to its rules. Yet, conforming to parliamentary rules would undermine their election pledge to reform the party system. By opting for the latter, the Progressives would not violate their ideology of reform, but they did forfeit any influence they could have asserted on the Liberals.

TABLE 2.5

1925 ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVES¹⁹

Province	Seats	Per Cent	Votes	Per Cent
Ontario	2	2.4	112,022	9.2
Manitoba	7	41.2	46,067	27.1
Saskatchewan	6	28.6	62,411	31.8
Alberta	9	56.3	50,603	31.5
TOTAL	24	9.8	282,181	9.0

Note: The Maritime Provinces, Quebec and B.C. are not included in this list for the Progressives were virtually eliminated in these areas.

TABLE 2.6

1926 ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVES²⁰

Province	Seats	Per Cent	Votes	Per Cent
Ontario	2	2.4	50,360	4.1
Manitoba	4	23.5	22,092	11.2
Saskatchewan	3	14.3	38,324	15.6
Alberta	11	68.8	60,740	38.7
TOTAL	20	8.2	171,516	5.3

Note: The Maritime Provinces, Quebec, and B.C. are not included in this list for the Progressives were virtually eliminated in these areas.

The Progressives lost their positive political utility for rural interests. This was so because of their inability to reform economic cleavages or the party system, both of which were important elements in rural individuals' conception of the 'good society'. In this era agrarian political efforts were also directed toward capturing power at the provincial level. Provincial government, through the various instruments of Dominion-Provincial relations, could influence Ottawa's decision-makers. Similarly, an agrarian supported provincial government would be capable of certain reforms within its jurisdictional responsibilities. Reform was an essential component of a large rural populace's conception of the 'good society' and a provincial government, controlled by a unit such as the U.F.A., could maintain high political utility if it proceeded with these reforms.

2. The United Farmers of Alberta

The United Farmers of Alberta gained provincial political power in 1921 and maintained power until 1935. The first U.F.A. election may be viewed as a result of agrarian protest occurring nationally during this era. The agrarian protest was directed at the detrimental effects of regional cleavages and toward the Liberal and Conservative parties which appeared to maintain these cleavages. The national protest involved rural perceptions of reform and political participation which was also important for rural support for the U.F.A. This support was enhanced by the realization that the provincial government could make progress toward rural conceptions of the 'good society', because of its fields of jurisdiction.

Many solutions to monetary and credit problems were within provincial jurisdiction, and many farmers believed that only through their own governments could adequate legislation be secured.²¹

The U.F.A. was perceived as being the vehicle through which the farmers' conception of the 'good society' could be realized. One component of this 'good society' was opposition to federal policies which maintained regional cleavages. Another was to pass legislation, such as that to promote the establishment of farmers' cooperative societies, as a move toward the 'good society'. Another component was to attempt to secure a high level of return for agricultural products. All of these components were embraced by the U.F.A. The Liberals and Conservatives, who found support in the urban areas, were viewed as being unable to promote the rural conception of the 'good society'. Because of their minority appeals, the Liberals and Conservatives were eliminated as alternate government parties.

The Liberal party had formed the Alberta government in 1905 until 1921. Its rule during this period was not based on the people's support for the Liberal political philosophy.

The Liberal party came into power in 1905 not because of any conviction on the behalf of Alberta voters of the validity of Liberal principles, but because a Liberal government was in power in Ottawa. The selection of a Liberal Lieutenant-Governor led inevitably to Liberal success in the first provincial election.²²

After World War I the Liberal party was faced with many political problems. Issues such as Prohibition, and the demand for Women's Rights split the party internally. The splits prevented the Liberal cabinet from responding legislatively to the demands of these groups. Another split occurred, in 1918, between supporters of the

federal Liberals and Unionists in the provincial party. This split prevented the Liberals from presenting legislation to relieve the problems associated with the economic slump of 1919-1920. A Calgary newspaper, the Albertan, observed the non-productiveness of the 1920 session of the Legislature. It described it as:

. . . one of the most uneventful ever held . . . very little legislation of any importance . . . the debates were uninteresting and commonplace . . . remarkable for what it did not, rather than what it did do.²³

A second factor undermining Liberal effectiveness was the effects of the 1920 recession. The farmers were in a position of reduced incomes, yet, exposed to continually high freight rates, high machinery costs and restricted credit markets. By 1921, rural Albertans were dissatisfied with the lack of aid and reform associated with Liberal government.

As the slump of 1920 deepened into the depression of 1921 it became clear that, for the province as a whole, the post-war boom was at an end. As the life of the fourth legislature of Alberta drew to a close, the Liberal government faced a gloomy prospect.²⁴

If the Liberals were in political trouble, the opposite was true for the U.F.A. From 1909 until 1919, the U.F.A., which had not been a political party, did influence the Liberal administration. Policies concerning irrigation, railways, prohibition, telephones, and concern over the tariff were U.F.A. views, adopted by the Liberals. Besides having concrete policies, the U.F.A. had developed an effective organization based upon its locals. These locals held direct communications with the U.F.A. leadership and this allowed the leaders to better understand rural Albertans' conception of the 'good

society'. The U.F.A., therefore, provided rural Albertans with high political utility.

The provincial election of 1921 represented rural Albertans' rejection of the 'old-line' parties. Rural voters attributed low political utility to government control by the Liberals or Conservatives.

The voter had already ceased to believe that salvation lay with the old-line parties. The conventional patterns held not allurements for him, the unconventional of terrors. Provincial patronage could not compete with the persuasive influence of the highly organized U.F.A. locals. The result of the election of 1921 followed inevitably from the U.F.A.'s decision to take direct political action.²⁵

After winning the 1921 election, the U.F.A. maintained political control, over two other elections, for fourteen years. The U.F.A. maintained a one-party dominance in the Alberta party system which was related to three factors. Firstly, the U.F.A. government provided positive political utility for the majority of Albertans--those directly and indirectly involved with agriculture. Rural Albertans perceived that what they expected from government, such as the maintenance of productive stability, was being transmitted to the U.F.A. leadership through the locals. The U.F.A. responded legislatively and were making progress toward the creation of the 'good society'. Secondly, the Liberals and Conservatives suffered from internal splits and leadership problems. However, certain groups in the urban areas still supported these parties because they received little political utility from the U.F.A. With internal splits, leadership problems and a minority basis of support, the Liberals or Conservatives provided no threat to U.F.A. dominance. Thirdly, the U.F.A. developed a theory of voter participation

which fitted into the rural population's conception of the 'good society' and was destined to remain as part of their political outlook. Participation meant communication and this was critical to the adaptation of U.F.A. appeals.

The dominant U.F.A. position was affected by the collapse of agricultural prosperity and high unemployment in urban areas caused by the 1930 Depression. The Depression changed individual value hierarchies, in both urban and rural areas, and the peoples' conception of the 'good society'. From a previous conception of reform of economic cleavages and the maintenance of prosperity, individuals now desired a security of basic necessities and a new 'vision' of the future without social and economic displacement. Although the U.F.A. may have realized this change in conception, it had neither the legislative nor financial powers to respond. The U.F.A.'s problem was its inability to adapt its appeals and thus maintain a tactical advantage over other participating units. Without this adaptation, the organizational and participatory advantages once held by the U.F.A. were no longer present. However, these elements were still critical in the perception of the Alberta party system; the one-party dominant party system would be maintained even though the dominant party would be replaced by another participating unit.

The financial collapse and social displacements created the desire, for many individuals, to seek a new form with which they could identify, become part of, and regain a self-confidence. Eric Hoffer explains the needs of individuals in this situation.

Their innermost craving is for new life--a rebirth or a chance to acquire new elements of pride, confidence, hope, a sense of purpose and want by identification with a holy cause.²⁶

The U.F.A. was unable to provide the necessary psychological identification needed by displaced individuals. In fact, it had little opportunity to adapt its appeals because of the rise of Social Credit and because of their 'unholy' leadership scandal.

The Progressive Movement and the U.F.A. had emphasized, in their appeals, various platforms that were to remain important factors in future Alberta politics. One such factor was concern with financial reform. As P. F. Sharp observes:

The agitation by the monetary experts in the movement, especially the U.F.A., prepared the ground for later doctrines. The demand for easy credit and soft money was a heritage that made the way smooth for later prophets of the new dispensation.²⁷

Another factor was the emphasis upon organized participation in politics. The farmers realized that through organization they could influence political decisions and reform what they had previously perceived as political control by other groups. Cooperative groups or locals provided a means for involvement which had been neglected during Liberal or Conservative rule.

The final factor was that agrarian parties following the Progressives and the U.F.A. could appeal to economic reform and 'anti-party' sentiments that had developed with these political units.

The U.F.A. prepared Alberta for the new party though it did not plan to do so. The earlier agitation for credit reform by J. W. Leedy, George Bevington, Henry Spencer, William Irvine and others in the U.F.A. made the transition from cooperative credit to social credit an easy one for Alberta farmers. The basic doctrine that credit controls should rest with the state was well accepted among U.F.A. members long before the Social Credit League began its agitation. The Social Creditors were reaping where others had sown.²⁸

Footnotes

¹W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), p. 239.

²W. A. Mackintosh, Economic Problems of the Prairie Provinces (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1934), p. 2.

³Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, Canada: 1867-1939 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer), p. 77.

⁴W. A. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵Ibid., p. 15.

⁶Ibid., p. 7.

⁷Sessional Papers, Numbers 81 and 81-b, p. 2, as cited in H. S. Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1928), p. 22.

⁸Ibid., p. 151.

⁹See Chapter III, Paul F. Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948).

¹⁰V. C. Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947), p. 261.

¹¹J. A. Irving, "Response of the People," Canadian Journal of Psychology, Vol. I (June, 1947), 76.

¹²Jean Burnet, Next-Year Country (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), p. 95.

¹³Seymour Martin Lipset, "Democracy in Alberta," Part II, Canadian Forum (March, 1955), p. 197.

¹⁴C. B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2d. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 21.

¹⁵Nutcracker, 1:5, July 6, 1917, as in P. F. Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948), p. 80.

¹⁶William Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1920), p. 202.

¹⁷Canadian Annual Review, 1919, p. 384, as cited in W. L. Morton, op. cit., p. 74.

¹⁸H. Scarrow, Canada Votes (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962), pp. 34-35.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 48-49.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 62-63.

²¹L. G. Thomas, The Liberal Party in Alberta: A History of Politics in the Province of Alberta, 1905-1921 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 205.

²²Ibid., p. 172.

²³Calgary Albertan, 12-4-20, as in Ibid., p. 201.

²⁴Ibid., p. 189.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 200-201.

²⁶Eric Hoffer, True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 21.

²⁷P. F. Sharp, op. cit., p. 189.

²⁸Ibid., p. 190.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL CREDIT 1932-1944

A. The Effects of the Depression

The economic collapse of the early 1930's had a severe impact on Albertans. The prosperity of the late 1920's had ended and by 1933 the average per capita income of Albertans had decreased by 61 per cent (see Table 3.1). The most severely affected groups in Alberta were those in agriculture and the unskilled workers in urban areas. Agricultural production, which was dependent upon export sales, crumbled as a viable enterprise. The price of shipping declined, but so did the price per bushel of wheat (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2), and the amount of production decreased because of drought and pestilence. Overall, the export price for wheat, the staple of Alberta farmers, dropped to 45 per cent of its 1929 value (see Table 3.2). The decline of exports, and decrease in production, meant that the percentage decrease in agricultural income was some 94 per cent from the 1928-1929 level (see Table 3.3). Alberta agriculture could not provide a 'means of living' for those involved in production. Farmers could no longer produce and sell the grain at any profit. Without an occupation, the farmers were the most detrimentally affected by the Depression.

Another group of Albertans lost their occupations because of the Depression. The unskilled workers were the first laid-off because

TABLE 3.1

THE DECLINE IN PROVINCIAL PER CAPITA INCOMES,
1928-29 TO 1933¹

Province	1928-29 Average \$ per capita	1933 \$ per Capita	Per- centage Decrease
Saskatchewan	478	135	72
Alberta	548	212	61
Manitoba	466	240	49
Canada	471	247	48
British Columbia	594	314	47
Prince Edward Island	278	154	45
Ontario	549	310	44
Quebec	391	220	44
New Brunswick	292	180	39
Nova Scotia	322	207	36




FIGURE 3.1. PRICES OF WHEAT AT LIVERPOOL (broken line), AT TORONTO (1870-1889) AND WINNIPEG (1890-1932) (solid line), AND COST OF TRANSPORTING A BUSHEL OF WHEAT FROM REGINA, SASK., TO LIVERPOOL.²




FIGURE 3.2. OCEAN FREIGHT RATE FOR WHEAT (per bushel), MONTREAL TO LIVERPOOL (data for 1875-1915).³

TABLE 3.2
CANADIAN EXPORT PRICES, 1929-33⁴

Year	All Exports (ex. gold)	Wheat	Cattle	Lumber	News print	Copper	Dried Cod- fish
1929	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1930	84	70	87	87	100	75	82
1931	66	44	59	75	91	50	56
1932	60	41	46	67	79	38	44
1933	60	45	37	68	62	44	42

TABLE 3.3
DEPRESSION DECREASES IN NET MONEY INCOME⁵

	Percentage Change 1932-33 Average Income from 1928-29 Average Income
	Percent
Agriculture--Prairies	-94
Fisheries	-72
Salaries and Wages in Construction	-68
Agriculture--Eastern Canada and British Columbia	-64
Salaries and Wages in the Exporting Industries ^a	-50
Total National Income	-40
Dividends received by Stockholders	-40
Salaries and Wages in the Protected Manufacturing Ind. ^b	-37
Income of Small Business men and the Professions--	
Individual Enterprises	-36
Salaries and Wages in the Sheltered Occupations	-30
Miscellaneous Income ^c	-18
Bond Interest, Property Income from Life Insurance and	
Interest on Farm Mortgages received by Individuals	+13

^aIncludes salaries and wages in agriculture, logging, primary mining, flour mills, fish curing and packing, pulp and paper, saw-mills and non-ferrous metal smelting and refining.

^bSalaries and wages in all manufacturing excluding central electric stations and the industries included in (a).

^cIncludes net income from urban housing and municipal public welfare and education.

of the slow-down in the cities' economic activities (see Table 3.4). The only alternatives were to leave Alberta and seek employment elsewhere, or request some help through unemployment insurance. The large number of unemployed and the limited capacity of government expenditures meant that an individual could expect only minimal support and relief.

Other groups of Albertans, including skilled workers, manufacturers, and financiers, suffered from the Depression, but not to the extent of the farmers or unskilled workers. In terms of real wages these groups did not suffer the immense decrease as had the farmers and workers. These specific groups were not to suffer the individual displacement that occurred with the loss of a 'means of living'. As a result, these groups responded in differing manners to the development of Social Credit and the appeals that were made. Generally, the farmers and unskilled workers supported Social Credit as a means to create their 'good society'. In contrast, the skilled workers, manufacturers and industrialists did not perceive Social Credit with high political utility and continued to support other parties in the Alberta party system.

The economic collapse fostered a change in the conceptions of the 'good society' for many groups in Alberta. Farmers, who during the 1920's had desired a continuance of prosperity, reform or regional-economic cleavages, and influence in politics, now came to perceive the provision of the basic necessities, food, shelter, and clothing, as a major component of their 'good society'. More than this, however, farmers perceived that the Depression affected their whole

TABLE 3.4
THE INCIDENCE OF THE DEPRESSION, 1929-33⁶

Year	The National Real Income Per Capita ^a	Real Wages Mainly in the Skilled Trades ^b	Average Annual Real Salaries & Wages Received by all Employed Wage- Earners ^c	Number of Un- employed Wage Earners ^d	Purchas- ing Power of Farm Products in Terms of Manu- factured Goods	Real Value of Dividends Received by Stock- holders ^e
1929 = 100						
1929	100	100	100	107	100	100
1930	87	101	97	341	87	111
1931	81	108	102	442	70	102
1932	71	111	105	639	64	77
1933	68	111	102	646	67	72

^aIndices of the national money income per capita divided by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics indices of the cost of living.

^bDominion Department of Labour indices of wage rates divided by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics indices of the cost of living.

^cAnnual average salaries and wages were obtained by dividing total salaries and wages paid out as estimated in the Commission's study on National Income by the total number of wage-earners employed receiving salaries and wages as estimated by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (Canada Year Book, 1939, p. 812). The resulting averages were converted to indices and divided by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics indices of the cost of living.

^dDominion Bureau of Statistics estimates, Canada Year Book, 1939, p. 812.

^eIndices of dividends paid to Canadian stockholders by Canadian and foreign corporations, divided by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics indices of the cost of living.

'life-process'. A similar situation was present with those unskilled workers of the cities. J. A. Irving describes the psychological repercussions:

Unemployment was widespread, thousands of people were living on relief, still other thousands lacked elementary provision of food, clothing and shelter. Psychologically hundreds of thousands of people experienced a profound personality disintegration: they were caught in a steel web from which there was no escape: their social environment, their feeling for the process of life, their hope for the future, all became meaningless.⁷

People suffering personality disintegration were relieved of the complex rationality which 'normal' times afforded in their conceptions. People, especially farmers and unskilled workers, were seeking for someone to explain the causes of their destitution, to commit themselves to the project of reform, and secure some psychological hope for a better future. In this light, the majority of Albertans were to become part of a mass movement in support of William Aberhart and Social Credit. Undoubtedly there existed groups which remained outside of the movement because: firstly, the effect of the Depression was not that severe on their 'life-styles', and, secondly, the goals of the mass movement were diametrically opposed to their conception of the 'good society'. For most Albertans renewing hope for the future meant reform of economic institutions and the participation in such reforms. These were characteristics of a mass of individuals who had perceived their predicament and were attempting to place a 'faith' in some mechanism for its solution. Individuals became part of the 'mass movement' because of a lack of individual identity--the loss of significance as an independent moral agent. People then opt for the

next best thing, to become part of something significant, such as a movement.

Social movements tend to appear during periods of social disintegration where profound dissatisfaction with the existing order has already arisen. The proposals for social reconstruction which inevitably arise during such periods are ultimately based upon a constillation of ideas or a philosophy which usually appears in both written and spoken forms. The followers of such a philosophy obtain a double satisfaction psychologically: they receive from it both an interpretation of the social collapse and a programme for a new social order.⁸

Eric Hoffer also observes the conditions under which individuals will undertake vast changes when he states:

For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute and they must have the feeling that possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they have access to irresistible power. They must also have an extravagant conception of the prospects and potentialities of the future. Finally they must be wholly ignorant of the difficulties involved in the vast undertaking.⁹

The mass movement in Alberta was composed of individuals who were extremely dissatisfied with their then present social-economic environment. In two ways, however, the movement was not completely homogenous. Firstly, the conditions which created the 'mass movement' were not characteristic of all segments of society. Certain groups, such as bankers, could not support a policy of economic reform because it would be detrimental to their economic positions. Secondly, individuals became part of the mass movement for different reasons. Some were in such desperate situations that the provisions for the basic necessities of life were uppermost in the conceptions of the 'good society'. Others, socially displaced, desired to reunite with their fellow individuals and thereby share the burdens of their frustrations.

Still others desired the implementation of fiscal reforms. Whatever the different motivations of individuals in the mass movement, certain common characteristics were in evidence. One characteristic was that individuals could not fully understand the causes or possible solutions to their predicaments. Secondly, individuals desired to place a 'faith' in some other individual who could relieve their specific problems. Thirdly, individuals wanted to participate in some manner, in helping to create their perceived ideal social-economic environment.

B. The Social Credit Movement

The Alberta mass movement was composed of individuals who experienced economic, personal, or social displacement and expressed a desire to relieve this situation.¹⁰ William Aberhart began in 1932, to organize this mass movement which would eventually become the Social Credit government in 1935. This goal was accomplished because of three important factors: firstly, the charismatic leadership of Aberhart, secondly, the economic reform doctrines of Social Credit monetary theory, and, thirdly, the participation of individuals in groups which were responding to leadership appeals.

William Aberhart became the 'prophet' of Social Credit after recognizing the distress which the Depression had caused in Alberta. He adopted Social Credit monetary reform policies and presented these over the mass media, especially through CFCN radio in Calgary, and intermingled them with his fundamentalist religious sermons. This mass appeal within a religious context was successful as a means of gaining support because of the influence of various fundamentalist sects and

churches which had established in Alberta.¹¹ This religious-Social Credit theory had results for many destitute Albertans' conception of the validity of Social Credit and the leadership of Aberhart.

Mr. Aberhart showed me that Social Credit and the Christian religion are the same thing. Whenever he could, he would use texts from the Bible to support his Social Credit ideas. I realized that if the Bible is true Social Credit would be a sure cure for all the sufferings of Alberta.¹²

Aberhart's combination of religion and social theory were two important elements in the majority of the populace's perception as Aberhart as leader of the movement. Aberhart could stand as the possessor of a 'potent doctrine' to cure the detrimental effects of the Depression and an 'infallible' leader who could implement reform policy. These two factors, combined with Aberhart's abilities as a speaker and organizer caused many individuals to perceive Aberhart as a charismatic leader to whom they could devote their energies. In fact, Aberhart's charismatic appeal would create a 'faith and devotion' on behalf of many of his followers.

Aberhart's evangelistic and prophetic doctrines had a tremendous appeal in Alberta. His presence and his voice also contributed to inspire in his followers a fanatical and mysterious zeal, for he spoke as 'having one authority'. His resolute and inflexible will combined with his doctrines and his strong personal attraction give him a power over his followers which verged on dictatorship.¹³

Aberhart's charisma appealed to some of the major elements of the farmers' and unskilled workers' conception of the 'good society'. Social Credit reforms, given 'legitimacy' because of Aberhart's charisma, offered an explanation of the causes and gave solutions to the effects of the Depression. Individuals were able to receive 'guidance' from Aberhart, whose charisma provided an outlet for their

social and economic frustrations. Aberhart as leader ". . . articulates and justifies the resentment damned up in the frustrated. He kindles the vision of a breathtaking future so as to justify the sacrifice of the transitory future."¹⁴

Although Aberhart's charisma may have included a faith in the future for many individuals, others would support Aberhart because of economic reform policies. It was economic reform that had provided the U.F.A. and Progressive Movement with much of its support and it became an important element in the appeal of Social Credit. The claim of Social Credit was that Albertans lacked sufficient 'purchasing power' to buy necessities, although those necessities were available. With the severe decline in income, some explanation was needed as to how to obtain the necessities of life. To provide adequate purchasing power would occur only if Social Credit and Aberhart could gain political control. If they were to become the government three major areas of reform were proposed.

Firstly, a Social Credit government would issue a basic dividend to every Albertan. This dividend would supplement incomes which had become so minimal during the Depression. The basic dividend would allow destitute people to purchase any of the basic necessities of life. Secondly, a 'just price' would be determined for all consumer products. A 'just price' would prevent unreasonable prices and allow individuals to purchase commodities in relation to their incomes. The 'just price' would prevent manufacturers from making what wheat farmers believed to be excess profits when they themselves were suffering such economic hardship. Thirdly, Social Credit specified

that it was the people's right or 'cultural heritage' that the economic system be "remedied by supplying the people with credit based upon the potential goods and services of society."¹⁵ To individuals this meant that the resources of the province would be their resources from which they would benefit. The policy derived from the 'cultural heritage' would prevent economic exploitation by Eastern firms and maintain the productive income for Albertans exclusively. A major emphasis of all these reforms was to free the individual from the perceived economic control by the banks, and loan and mortgage companies. Similarly, they would allow individuals to provide their families with adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, in this period when those basics of life were most important to their conception of the 'good society'.

The major factor in the psychological appeal of Social Credit was unquestionably the promise it held out for the satisfaction of the primary needs of food, clothing and shelter. In a depressed and debt-ridden province where thousands of people were unemployed and living on relief, and where farmers were forced to sell their products at such incredibly low levels that they were often on the verge of starvation, the prospect of a Basic Dividend and a Just Price had an almost irresistible attraction.¹⁶

As a political theory, Social Credit maintained that the State "exists solely to promote the individual's welfare, freedom and security."¹⁷ To promote the individual's welfare meant to attempt and secure for him the provisions of food, clothing and shelter. If a political unit could secure these for poverty-stricken Albertans, they would have positive political attitudes towards the unit. Freedom, especially for rural interests, meant the absence of controls that they perceived as preventing profitable return for their labor. This meant

that freedom could be obtained only by removing the financial and cost controls of the financial institutions and the railways. Freedom from these controls had long been a component of the farmers' conception of the 'good society'. In terms of security, Social Credit advocated the participation of people in government in order to express their desires about what they expected, rather than having government controlled by parties. Party control had long been associated with inadequate representation of groups such as farmers. Social Credit advocated that "in the place of the limited state dictatorship, it is proposed to restore sovereign authority to the people: they must be organized in a 'Union of Electors' through which the individual can express his desires to his Representatives in Parliament."¹⁸

One of the problems for Social Credit and Aberhart was to translate mass support into voting support. Organization was necessary for effective political action, a fact which Laurier recognized forty years earlier when he stated:

. . . it is not enough to have good principles; they must have organization also. Principles without organization may lose, but organization without principles may often win.¹⁹

The following factors ensured that the Social Credit Movement would be well-organized in its political pursuits. Firstly, the U.F.A. had developed constituency associations throughout the province and these served as forums for the development and discussion of policy. Gradually, as groups within each constituency came to support Aberhart, the locals became centers of Social Credit support. The Social Credit Movement did not have to create its own system of constituency associations, it inherited what had been developed by the U.F.A..

Secondly, Aberhart was exceptionally adept at organizing and he mobilized the available resources to his own benefit. The Aberhart method employed the mass media and mass rallies, led by trained speakers convinced of Social Credit doctrine.²⁰ The speakers, trained at the Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute, provided a flow of information to individuals in constituencies, where the 'word' of Aberhart's Social Credit was dispensed and discussed. Individuals then gathered to develop tactics for participating in the political process in support of Aberhart. Thirdly, the participation of individuals in discussion groups were important components of their conception of the 'good society'. Involvement or participation meant that individuals would have an influence on decisions affecting their futures. Also, the groups provided individuals with a forum in which they could 'externalize' their social and economic frustrations. Psychologically, individuals found a relief from the distress of the Depression by identifying with others in similar plights, thus forming an instinctive cooperation, and a base for cooperative or mass action to attempt and relieve their problems.

Participation in the life of the groups was the elementary source of satisfaction which most people obtained from the movement. A remarkable type of 'primitive comradeship' developed within the groups. The effect of group activity on the people seems to have been almost hypnotic: they forgot their sorrows, their resentments, their selfish interests: they experienced new hope, new concern for others, a release of life. . . .

On the purely organizational side, the groups provided Aberhart with a nucleus of dynamic supporters in almost every city block or rural district.²¹

C. Economic Reform and the Election of 1935

The economic reforms proposed by Aberhart and desired by specific groups of Albertans were not feasible as it turned out. The problem was that the province had no legislative jurisdiction over currency or banks, the very field in which the reforms were proposed. The B.N.A. Act gave legislative jurisdiction for these areas to the federal government. In 1935, at hearings before the Agricultural Committee of the Alberta Legislature, Dan Weir refuted the claims of Aberhart that the province could issue basic dividends or establish a just price for commodities. Regarding the basic dividends he stated:

Whether these certificates or tickets would be 'money' or a 'substitute for money' they would seem to be within the prohibition of the Bank Act. Nothing the province could do could make such certificates legal tender. Nobody would be compelled to receive them in payment of goods or services, or in payment of debts.²²

Regarding the imposition of a just price on commodities he stated:

The Supreme Court of Canada put it on three grounds; first, such action would involve imposing an indirect tax; secondly, it would be an interference with export trade, and thirdly, which may be the same thing, it interferes with the regulation of trade and commerce. They say you may, as a province, tax the actual consumer in the province, but that you cannot impose a tax on the sale of one article because that would be indirect and the tax would enter the price.²³

Arguments presented by Professor Elliot,²⁴ by C. H. Douglas at the Agricultural Hearings in 1934,²⁵ and by the Economic Safety League,²⁶ emphasized and publicized the unconstitutionality of Social Credit's monetary reforms. These arguments stressed that Social Credit's proposals for issuing credit certificates and interference with banks would be disallowed by the federal government or declared

ultra vires by the Supreme Court. Aberhart, who participated in the Agricultural Committee's Hearings, knew of these counter-arguments to the implementation of Social Credit's proposed reforms. Yet, he persisted in his claim that these reforms would be feasible in Alberta. Why? One explanation has been that Aberhart did not understand Social Credit theory and therefore could not foresee the constitutional ramifications of the reforms. Such reasoning appears naive. A more plausible explanation is that Aberhart perceived the necessity of maintaining a plan of economic reform in any election platform. Albertans who associated their economic disparity with the maintenance of orthodox economics, would enthusiastically support proposals for economic reform. The example of the U.F.A. revealed that a policy of economic reform was necessary for any successful political strategy in Alberta. This aspect gained in importance in the Depression. The refusal of the U.F.A. to adopt Social Credit monetary theories increased the political necessity of Aberhart's advocacy of it.

Before the 1935 election, the appeals of Social Credit and Aberhart seemed congruent with the major components of a majority of Albertans' conception of the 'good society'. Aberhart's charismatic leadership was supported by a 'mass' of people convinced of his 'power' to relieve their individual displacement. Social Credit's monetary reforms appealed to the conception of securing the basic necessities of life. Finally, Social Credit's organization provided for participation in the reconciliation of personal, economic, and social displacement. Irving supports this position when he states:

Underlying the remarkable Social Credit victory in that election was a mass movement which had emerged as a result of the response of the people to a two-fold challenge of the philosophy of Social Credit, the leadership of Aberhart, and the strategy and tactics developed during a process of dynamic interaction between the leader and the led.²⁷

The Social Credit Movement had distinct advantages over other competitors in the election of 1935. Aberhart was the most publicized and articulate leader in comparison to those of the other parties. Similarly, Social Credit had mobilized and organized the majority of farmers and unskilled labourers. The only party with a degree of organization was the Liberals, who had capitalized on various support groups in the urban areas. These groups felt dissatisfaction with the federal Progressive Conservatives and with Social Credit appeals. The results of the August 22, 1935 election were as follows:²⁸

Conservatives			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
40	2	19,916	6.5
Liberal			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
45	4	69,845	23.1
U.F.A.			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
45	0	33,063	11.0
Social Credit			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
63	57	163,700	54.2

Other			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
30	0	15,528	5.1
Total			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	
239	63	301,752	

The legislative majority of Social Credit was lessened because of the electoral system in use. The single-member transferable vote system in Calgary and Edmonton allowed only six of twelve Social Credit candidates to secure election. If the single-member plurality system had been used none out of twelve Social Creditors would have been elected. However, concern over the electoral system was not to be a prominent policy in the Social Credit government.

The 1935 election ended the U.F.A. as a political force in the province. The Liberal and Conservative parties received the lowest amount of support in their history of political competition in the province. Their appeals had not been congruent with the majority of Albertans' conception of the 'good society' and thus they were perceived as providing little positive political utility. In other words, the majority of Albertans desired a Social Credit government.

The conditions of politics in the province were being permanently changed. As the disorganized U.F.A. decayed politically, new norms were arising. The rise of new norms was being made possible by the emergence of a new consensus, flowing from a new concord at the deepest level of the Alberta community. A majority of the members of that community now desired the same basic goal--a Social Credit Government.²⁹

A Social Credit government meant, for farmers and many urbanites,

that the political power of government would be employed in an attempt to create their conception of the 'good society'. Reform and individual participation, directed by William Aberhart, provided the hope for a 'secure' and prosperous future. Those involved in the mass movement supporting Social Credit believed that ". . . as a whole, the movement was their dynamic assessment of the possibilities of their world."³⁰

D. The Aberhart Period 1935-1943.

The 1935 election maintained the one-party dominant party system in Alberta with Social Credit being the dominant party. The one-party dominant party system was maintained because of certain specific conditions. Firstly, the Social Credit movement was more organized and its supporters were mobilized more than were the U.F.A.'s, Liberal's or Conservative's. Secondly, the Liberals and Conservatives had, since 1920, been associated with the maintenance of regional cleavages, detrimental to the farming interests in Alberta. They had been rejected as alternative parties for control of government and this continued with Social Credit rule. These parties were able, however, to maintain some political support especially among urban financial concerns. In 1935 they were unable to gain a third of the possible popular vote, which, by our definition, is necessary if a party is to be viewed as an alternate party to control power. Thirdly, Social Credit had the most popular leader in William Aberhart. His charismatic appeal and political acumen far surpassed his opposition's.

The voting support given to the Social Credit movement was,

in one way, a mandate for the implementation of Social Credit monetary theories. Many groups of Albertans felt that the basic dividend would soon be forthcoming from the government. However, Aberhart requested an eighteen month 'trial period' in which to supposedly create the mechanisms necessary for issuing the basic dividend. His explanation was that the Alberta Treasury was lacking in funds because of the U.F.A.'s unsound financial administration.³¹ There are two other explanations for Aberhart's reluctance to implement this aspect of monetary reform. Firstly, Aberhart realized that any legislation which concerned banking or currency would infringe upon federal jurisdiction and therefore be disallowed.³² Aberhart could not allow this to happen too quickly after his election because of the high political utility of financial reform. Secondly, Aberhart had stated that "75% of those who voted for me don't expect any dividend, but hope for a just and honest government."³³ This reflects Aberhart's attempt at changing Social Credit appeals; from that of monetary reform to that of 'honest and sound' administration. The transition from monetary reform caused an array of problems for Aberhart which were to culminate in the 1940 election.

The decision to forestall any attempt to implement Social Credit economic policy was followed by the appointment of Robert Magor, an eastern financial expert, who was to give orthodox financial advice to Aberhart's government. Steps were taken to reorganize the civil service to increase its efficiency and thus, provide 'good government.' A scanty amount of legislation was passed which was related to farmer-labour groups. The only two statutes which mentioned Social Credit

were the Social Credit Measures Act³⁴ and the Credit Houses Act.³⁵

Both were declaratory statements of the "principles and objectives of Social Credit and vested in the Lieutenant-Governor in Alberta both the competence and power to enact and enforce Social Credit measures to be set forth in future legislation."³⁶ Aberhart claimed that it was necessary to make a 'solid financial foundation' for the province before Social Credit reforms could be enacted. By the end of 1935, "Aberhart had done much to reorganize the government and little to implement Social Credit schemes."³⁷ This reorganization did little to placate ardent Social Credit M.L.A.'s who wanted economic and monetary reform. By the end of 1936, "the Government's promised Social Credit system was not operative and the Premier's eighteen-month period was drawing to a close."³⁸

A conflict was developing within the movement. The backbenchers who were in contact with certain rural and urban constituency groups, began to demand that Aberhart reform measures. These demands were in relation to certain people's concern for economic reform. On the other hand, Aberhart had support, especially from southern-rural constituencies, because of his charisma and religious appeals. The conflict between Aberhart and some of the backbenchers was to be a competition between followers of Aberhart's non-economic appeals and those wanting, solely, economic reform.

The reform-minded M.L.A.'s decided on an attempt to force Aberhart into enacting Social Credit financial legislation. They were supported in their demands by John Hargrave.³⁹ Hargrave gave the dissident backbenchers a ten point plan providing for "a price discount,

the circulation of debt-free money, a dividend of five dollars a month, and government control of all exports from the province."⁴⁰

When the Provincial Treasurer, Solon Low, attempted to pass an orthodox budget on March 22, 1937, the unsurgent backbenchers' support coalesced. The insurgents refused to support an orthodox budget which they claimed simply "reflected the determination of the government to adhere to the policy of keeping expenditures in line with receipts."⁴¹

The backbenchers were actually challenging Aberhart's leadership.

Certain constituency groups were demanding reform policies, even if Aberhart refused to do so.

Our instructions to Mrs. Rogers, M.L.A., are that a Social Credit budget must be introduced at this session, that an economic council of technical experts must be employed and a Social Credit plan be implemented before the Session adjourns.⁴²

The insurgents, together with a handful of opposition members, had enough support to overthrow the government and force an election. This tactic could have proven detrimental to the movement as a whole, therefore, the backbenchers took their demands to caucus. They expected Aberhart to resign voluntarily, much as Greenfield had done for Brownlee in 1925. Aberhart refused to resign and the backbenchers were not able to find any competitor for Aberhart's leadership. The backbenchers' revolt did emphasize the importance of economic reform as a pledge of Aberhart's electoral strategy. In order to placate those desiring reform, Aberhart and his Cabinet passed the Social Credit Act⁴³ which was to establish the agencies necessary for the implementation of the basic dividend. The Act established:

. . . three distinct administrative agencies, all responsible in some measure for the operation of the system. First, a Social Credit Board, consisting of five members of the Legislature and responsible to it for the operation of the scheme; second, a provincial credit commission, a body corporate to be composed of not less than three nor more than five members appointed by the Social Credit Board, and responsible to it for the administration of that system; and third, an Alberta Credit House, a unit of departmental status, with corporate existence, to be the agency of the provincial-treasurer in circulating credits.⁴⁴

The insurgent backbenchers participated in the creation of the Bill and were committed to its implementation. The Bill regained the support of most of the backbenchers, forty-nine of whom signed a pledge of support for Aberhart's leadership.⁴⁵ The split had been overcome in the Legislature, but the same cannot be said for the populace in general. Aberhart was under criticism from many constituency groups because of his hesitancy to pass financial reform legislation. Without these reforms, many people derived little political utility from Social Credit rule.

The Premier undoubtedly felt threatened by the backbenchers' revolt. Two reforms occurred which were to strengthen the Premier's position while attempting to placate those demanding economic reform. Firstly, the political institutions were changed so as to strengthen the Cabinet and Board, both of which were directly influenced by Aberhart. Secondly, a programme of legislation was introduced in an 'apparent' attempt to establish some of the elements involved in economic reform.

The Aberhart changes in the role of Premier further transformed the Social Credit movement into a party. Unlike the U.F.A. and because of the backbenchers' revolt, Aberhart minimized the influence of

constituency groups as 'inputs' into decision-making. Legislation was to be the "implementation of the unanimous general will, the undifferentiated mass desire for economic plenty, freedom and security."⁴⁶ Aberhart's strengthening of his own leadership and the commitment of backbenchers to that policy meant that the Cabinet and Aberhart would interpret the 'general will'. This removed a great deal of the decision-making from the Legislature and minimized the role of the constituency organizations.⁴⁷ Aberhart's fear of any other threat to his premiership meant strict control of the Legislature members under the Social Credit Board.

By August, 1937, the Social Credit Board was dependent upon the Cabinet. The individual M.L.A. was bound to support Social Credit legislation proposed by the Cabinet, which dictated the timing and nature of Bills from the Board. This resulted in an increase in the power and prestige of the Cabinet and a decrease in the Legislature's powers. The backbenchers' revolt had meant that they had revolted to decrease their own effectiveness as a critical unit within the Legislature. The interrelatedness of the Board and Cabinet demanded little of the M.L.A.'s except support; not responsibility. The M.L.A.'s became public relations men for the Cabinet and Board and the constituency associations as dispensers of information. Cabinet domination was also reflected in the changed role of the Social Credit conventions. From 1932 until 1935, the conventions had provided policy development and participation in platform debates. By 1935, the conventions had become forums for fact-giving by the Social Credit 'experts'. They also served as revival meetings to maintain support for Aberhart who

would eventually have to return to the people in an election.

Aberhart's Social Credit legislation was only a means to secure his position, with as little opposition from the Legislature as possible. The Social Credit legislation was disallowed or declared ultra vires on the following grounds:

Most of the eight Alberta statutes disallowed since 1937 were invasions of the federal field of legislation, conflicting with the interests and policies of the Dominion. However, among the reasons given for disallowance of these statutes specific reference was made to the injustice of the confiscations which they proposed, and their discriminatory nature.⁴⁸

The inability of the Alberta government to pass Social Credit legislation meant the loss of one of Aberhart's 1935 election appeals. The effect was that "even the most ardent Social Credit disciples should now be convinced that such monetary theories as theirs are unworkable within our constitutional framework."⁴⁹ To replace the appeal of monetary reform and maintain political support, Aberhart emphasized that the federal government had thwarted his attempts at economic reform. Aberhart hoped that 'scapegoating' the federal government might replace or maintain his political support.

The 1940 election tested Aberhart's leadership and his ability to maintain support with the problems his administration had encountered between 1935 until 1939. The election did maintain the Social Credit government, but it was so close "that a shift of 1000 votes, properly distributed in ten constituencies would have led to Aberhart's fall."⁵⁰ The 1940 election results were as follows:⁵¹

Conservative			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
0	0	0	0
Liberal			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
2	1	2,755	.9
C.C.F.			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
36	0	34,316	11.1
Social Credit			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
56	36	132,507	42.9
Other			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	Per cent Votes
71	20	139,286	45.1
Total			
Candidates	Seats	Votes	
165	57	308,864	

Unlike the case of the 1935 election, the electoral system proved advantageous to Social Credit in the 1940 election. The maintenance of the transferable vote and the redistribution of 1939 gave Edmonton and Calgary only five members each. Calgary and Edmonton elected two Social Creditors each because of vote transfers in subsequent counts.

Social Credit faced its most serious opposition from the Independent Party.⁵² (Classified as 'other' in the above chart.) The

Independent Party included "Liberals, Conservatives, and all others who were opposed to the Social Credit movement, except the supporters of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation which was slowly and painfully developing from an alliance of labour groups within the socialistically-minded members of the U.F.A."⁵³ The Independent Party prevented the splitting of opposition votes by unifying in their criticism of Social Credit's inability to implement monetary reforms. Aberhart maintained that this had been attempted but had been thwarted by the federal government. The opposition stressed more than economic reform, its "programme was based on the government's five year record and the promised extension of welfare services."⁵⁴

The 1940 election did challenge the Social Credit government, although the opposition party was not able to unseat Aberhart. The Social Credit victory indicated certain characteristics of Alberta politics. Firstly, Aberhart had suffered a loss of support in urban areas because of the loss of economic reform appeals. His religious-political leadership did not have as great an appeal in urban areas as in the rural districts. Secondly, the C.C.F. had drawn away a certain amount of political support from persons concerned solely with economic reform. Thirdly, the maintenance of political power had created a political party out of what had been a spectacular social movement. The party's appeals of 'good government' and strong cabinet control were indications of the change which occurred under Aberhart's leadership.

It is probably a tribute to Aberhart's political acumen that he adapted Social Credit to the exigencies of the times. In the depression he championed a program of monetary reform; in power he stressed good government and provincial rights. The outcome was that in both 1935 and 1940 he was successful.⁵⁵

From 1940 until 1943 the Social Credit government made practical reorganizations and developed policies toward the 1944 election. Aberhart maintained his radio broadcasts and undertook various organizational schemes. He entered the realm of municipal reform and by 1943 "the 143 rural municipalities were reorganized and consolidated over the bitter complaints of the traditionalists who disliked disturbing old patterns of government."⁵⁶ The government reorganized educational curriculums, passed the Marketing Act and participated in insurance businesses. All reflected a greater degree of centralization in the Alberta government.

Aberhart was unable to continue his reorganization schemes or political organization in the federal realm because of his death in 1943. He was succeeded by E. C. Manning as premier and leader of the Social Credit party. Manning's leadership was to have important implications for Social Credit and politics within the province. A new political era was developing, beginning with the election of 1944 until 1971.

E. Conclusion: Social Credit 1932-1944

The Aberhart period of Social Credit government was, undoubtedly, one of the most important in Alberta politics. The effects of the Depression had caused a fundamental reorientation in many Albertans' conception of the 'good society'. This was reflected in the support

given to the Social Credit movement by farmers and unskilled workers. Their conception of the 'good society' had changed from a desire to end regional-economic cleavages and maintaining prosperity, to one of securing food, shelter, and clothing. Those destitute because of the Depression suffered both individual and social displacement to the point where their 'good society' involved an element of 'group participation' in proposed reforms. Security from want, participation and reform became the important components of the farmers' and unskilled workers' conception of the 'good society'. Throughout the period 1932-1937, Aberhart successfully appealed to these conceptions.

However, Aberhart failed to provide the economic reform which he had promised. Individuals began to perceive that Social Credit was providing little positive political utility because of its inability to reform economics, as those individuals perceived it. Other individuals supported Social Credit because of Aberhart's charisma and because of the psychological relief of participation in 'groups'. As the effects of the Depression ended, individuals were once again able to 'normalize' their life-styles. This lessened the psychological attraction which Social Credit had for many people as more and more individuals dissented from the mass movement. Similarly, as economic prosperity and enterprises increased, Alberta was developing a more diversified economic base. The diversity in economic interests between 1944 and 1959, increased the variety of conceptions of the 'good society' in the society. Even so, the perceptual, organizational and participatory factors, favoring one party over all others, continued to maintain the one-party dominant party system in Alberta.

Structurally, Social Credit was transformed from a mass movement to a political party, although they maintained the 'anti-party' perceptions of certain sections of the populace. The difficulty in the change to party was the adaptation of appeals. Appeals had to diversify because of the variety of groups which included those still in the mass movement, those removing themselves from it, and those, in urban areas, who had been opposed to it. With Manning's leadership the Social Credit party successfully adapted its appeals to a changing social-economic environment, and, therefore, maintained party dominance from 1944 until 1971.

Footnotes

¹Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, Canada: 1867-1939 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954), p. 150.

²W. A. Mackintosh, Economic Problems of the Prairie Provinces (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1934), p. 8.

³Ibid., p. 10.

⁴Royal Commission, op. cit., p. 146.

⁵Ibid., p. 150.

⁶Ibid., p. 145.

⁷J. A. Irving, "Development of the Movement," Canadian Journal of Psychology, Vol. I (March, 1947), 22.

⁸Ibid., p. 17.

⁹Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 20.

¹⁰C. B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2d. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 15.

¹¹See W. Mann, Church, Sect and Cult in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951).

¹²J. A. Irving, "Response of the People," Canadian Journal of Psychology, Vol. I (Spring, 1947), 81.

¹³J. A. Irving, "Development of the Movement," op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁴Eric Hoffer, op. cit., p. 105.

¹⁵J. A. Irving, "Evolution of the Social Credit Movement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 14 (August, 1948), 324.

¹⁶J. A. Irving, "Interpretation of the Movement," Canadian Journal of Psychology, Vol. I (Spring, 1947) 131; and K. Whalen, "Social Credit Measures in Alberta," Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 18 (November, 1952), 503.

¹⁷J. A. Irving, "Evolution of the Social Credit Movement," op. cit., p. 324.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 324-325.

¹⁹The Globe and Mail, June 20, 1893, as cited in H. J. Schultz, "Aberhart - The Organization Man," Alberta Historical Review, Vol. 7 (Spring, 1959), 26.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 21-23.

²¹J. A. Irving, "Response of the People," Canadian Journal of Psychology, Vol. I (Spring, 1947), 86.

²²Evidence of Dan Weir, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta on the Constitutionality and Economic Aspects of Social Credit before the Agricultural Committee of the Alberta Legislature (Edmonton: King's Printer, 1935), p. 2.

²³Ibid., pp. 8-9.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 11-20.

²⁵Testimony by C. H. Douglas on the Douglas System of Social Credit, evidence taken by the Agricultural Committee of the Alberta Legislature (Edmonton: King's Printer, 1934), pp. 78-85.

²⁶W. M. Davidson, The Alberta Plan - A Survey and Analysis of the Social Credit Scheme as placed before the Electors of Alberta, Economic Safety League, Calgary, 1935, p. 2 and pp. 4-6.

²⁷J. A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 225.

²⁸H. Scarrow, Canada Votes (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962), p. 221.

²⁹J. A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta, op. cit., p. 135.

³⁰J. A. Irving, "Interpretation of the Movement," op. cit., p. 140.

³¹L. F. H. Garsten, "Social Credit's Five Years in Alberta," Dalhousie Review, Vol. 20 (July, 1940), 150.

³²Evidence of Dan Weir, op. cit.

³³H. J. Schultz, "Social Credit Backbenchers' Revolt, 1937," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 41 (March, 1960), 2.

³⁴Social Credit Measures Act, I Edward VIII (first session), 1935, c. 5.

³⁵Credit Houses Act, I Edward VIII (second session), 1936, c. 1.

- ³⁶K. Whalen, op. cit., p. 505.
- ³⁷H. J. Schultz, op. cit., p. 2.
- ³⁸K. Whalen, op. cit., p. 507.
- ³⁹John Hargrave was the leader of the Greenshirts in England. His economic policies were based on Doublas Theory but were anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary, in light of Alberta politics and economics.
- ⁴⁰H. J. Schultz, op. cit., p. 3.
- ⁴¹Canadian Annual Review, 1937-1938 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1938), p. 480.
- ⁴²H. J. Schultz, op. cit., p. 6.
- ⁴³Statutes of Alberta, 1938, The Social Credit Act (third session), c. 10.
- ⁴⁴K. Whalen, op. cit., pp. 509-510.
- ⁴⁵"Today and Tomorrow," June 17, 1937, as cited in H. J. Schultz, op. cit., p. 18.
- ⁴⁶C. B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2d. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 161.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., p. 162.
- ⁴⁸D. V. Smiley, The Rowell-Sirois Report (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), p. 203.
- ⁴⁹K. J. Binns, Social Credit in Alberta (Government of Tasmania: H. H. Plumbett, Government Printer, 1947), p. 35.
- ⁵⁰J. A. Irving, "Evolution of the Social Credit Movement," op. cit., p. 335.
- ⁵¹H. Scarrow, op. cit., p. 221.
- ⁵²H. J. Schultz, "A Second Term: 1940," Alberta Historical Review, Vol. 10 (Winter, 1962), 23.
- ⁵³J. A. Irving, "Evolution of the Social Credit Movement," op. cit., p. 334.
- ⁵⁴Alberta Social Credit Platform, by the Alberta Social Credit League, 1940, as cited by H. J. Schultz, "A Second Term: 1940," op. cit., p. 19.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 26.

⁵⁶Edmonton Bulletin, February 24, 1943, as cited in H. J. Schultz, "Portrait of a Premier: William Aberhart," in Politics of Discontent, ed. by Ramsay Cook (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 21.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL CREDIT DOMINANCE 1944-1971

A. Alberta's Economy and Social Composition

From 1945 on, the Alberta economy has become more diversified with increasing development of manufacturing, mining and construction. In contrast with the 1920's and 1930's most individuals relied upon industries outside of agriculture for their livelihood during the 1950's and 1960's. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that in the era 1925-1940, the productive capacity of mining, manufacturing and construction remained constant yet behind that of agriculture. From 1945, other industries have increased their returns to the point of equalling or surpassing that of agriculture. Figure 4.3 and Table 4.1 indicate the transition from dependence upon agriculture to other industries. One of the major elements in this transition was the manpower required for oil production. As Table 4.2 indicates, oil production and income has increased steadily since the mid-1940's. The oil boom provided many persons with new occupations and was to be capitalized upon by the Social Credit government. The diversification of the Alberta economy had an effect on the growth of urban centers, many persons in which were directly involved in industry. Table 4.3 indicates the rapid growth of urban areas from 1931 until 1968. T. E. Flanagan describes many of the major groups which composed the population of the urban areas.

TABLE 4.1

NET VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
BUSINESS SECTORS IN ALBERTA, 1935-1969^a

Year	\$,000 Agri- culture	Per Cent	Manufac- turing	Per Cent	Construc- tion	Per Cent	Mining	Per Cent
1935	79,394	54	23,769	16	21,000	14	14,069	11
1940	147,781	58	37,747	15	29,000	12	27,851	11
1945	212,707	53	78,548	20	53,000	13	41,713	10
1950	331,066	44	123,893	16	147,700	20	122,543	16
1955	332,403	26	263,309	21	338,700	26	303,752	24
1960	329,278	21	339,377	22	445,551	29	439,115	23
1965	509,563	23	475,343	21	470,816	21	690,524	31
1969 ^b	620,000	19	640,000	20	760,000	24	1,093,000	34

^aSource: Don Seastone, Economic and Demographic Futures in Education: Alberta 1970-2005 (Edmonton, 1971), p. 85.

^bEstimated.

FIGURE 4.1 FUTURE INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN ALBERTA²





FIGURE 4.2 FUTURE INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN ALBERTA³

FIGURE 4.3 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF CANADA--EMPLOYEES
PERCENTAGE CHANGE 1939-1956⁴




TABLE 4.2
ALBERTA PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM 1936-1957⁵

Year	Quantity (Thousand Barrels)	Per Cent Canadian Production	Value (Thousand Dollars)
1936	1,312	87.1	3,020
1937	2,749	93.5	4,961
1938	6,751	97.0	8,775
1939	7,577	96.5	9,362
1940	8,362	96.1	10,694
1941	9,919	98.2	13,986
1942	10,117	97.9	15,515
1943	9,602	96.0	15,725
1944	8,727	87.0	14,468
1945	7,980	94.0	13,170
1946	7,138	94.1	14,348
1947	6,770	88.0	18,079
1948	10,889	89.5	35,128
1949	20,087	94.0	59,000
1950	27,548	96.1	82,216
1951	45,915	96.5	113,870
1952	58,916	96.2	139,512
1953	76,816	95.0	193,762
1954	87,637	91.8	228,319
1955	113,035	87.3	274,901
1956	143,910	83.7	355,174
1957	137,492	75.6	356,744

Source: Canadian Mineral Statistics, D.B.S.

TABLE 4.3

POPULATION OF ALBERTA DIVIDED ACCORDING TO
URBANIZATION 1931-1966⁶

Year	Calgary + Edmonton %		"Urban" (places over 1000) %		"Rural" (places less than 1000) %		Census Farms %	
1931	162,958	22	64,924	09	128,626	18	375,097	51
1936	169,181	22	62,863	08	140,348	18	400,390	52
1941	181,721	23	68,884	09	161,600	20	383,964	48
1946	213,160	26	85,158	11	165,647	21	339,365	42
1951	288,691	31	160,011	17	150,844	16	339,955	36
1956	407,782	36	227,773	20	160,360	15	327,201	29
1961	530,668	40	312,543	23	200,919	15	187,814	22
1966	707,500	48	299,907	20	178,198	13	277,598	19

. . . the oil boom had located thousands of geologists, engineers, computer programmers, accountants and executives: where the new universities, technical schools, community colleges, hospitals, and their satellite institutions have brought in additional thousands of professors, scientists, and administrators: and where the traditional professions like doctors, lawyers, and dentists would live in any extent.⁷

Alberta's economic diversification has created distinct areas of industrial predominance within the province. Flanagan has analyzed this diversification and he classifies four distinct areas of economic endeavors which include⁸:

1. The heartland, a region "which reaches north from the U.S. Border approximately up to Edmonton and West from Saskatchewan to the wooded foothills of the Rocky Mountains."⁹ The two main occupations of the region are farming and ranching with both enterprises becoming more and more mechanized and involving fewer people.

The decline of the small farmer is really due not to the oil boom, but to the general technological revolution that has finally caught up with agriculture almost everywhere in North America. With increasing mechanization, a large farm can be operated much more efficiently than a small farm and productivity considerably increased.¹⁰

2. The metropolitan areas of Calgary and Edmonton represents a second area which Flanagan describes that "with regard to demography, economics and life-style, they have more in common with places like Toronto and Vancouver, than they do with relatively nearby villages. . . ."¹¹

3. The third area is that of the Western Rocky Mountains-foothills regions where a relatively small population is involved in "coal-mining, lumbering and tourism."¹²

4. The fourth area is a large section of the province north

of Edmonton. A mixture of ethnic minorities and occupations, it is a conglomeration of sub-regions, which is itself distinct from any other region in the province.

Alberta can no longer be characterized as an agriculturally dominated province, although agriculture involves many people and contributes greatly to the province's economy. Alberta has diversified into distinct areas composed of individuals whose life-styles and conception of the 'good society' differ significantly from each other. Within each region there are also distinctions in these conceptions. At present it is only possible to give a tentative outline of these attitudes and 'ways of life'. Many in the 'heartland' still perceived reform of transportation and financial institutions as important components of their conception of the 'good society'. The urban areas are composed of many different groups each with its own conception of the 'good society'. These groups included: unskilled workers who were concerned with economic security; financiers and business people striving to create or maintain what they perceived to be a favorable 'business climate'; professionals with securing social position and preventing governmental interference in their affairs; and, those involved in education who desired expansion and increased governmental support. In the third area labourers and miners conceived as part of their conception of the 'good society', occupational security and economic well-being, while the owners and managers desired access to markets through reasonably priced transportation, profit, and a favourable 'business climate'. Many in the northern areas conceived as part of their conception of the 'good society' increased prosperity,

protection of minority rights and increased educational opportunities.

The heterodox situation during this era was different from the relative homogeneity of the 1935 mass movement which supported Social Credit. However, the Social Credit party was able to remain in control of the system because of specific characteristics of the party system. The majority of Albertans maintained a negative perception of other parties in the Alberta party system. This perception had its roots in the political history of these parties when they were rejected as alternate units to control government in the 1920's. This history stressed that these parties would not conduct government in the best interests of various groups, but would favor legislation that promoted the interests of the wealthy and influential. The Liberal and Conservative parties were also viewed as being "underlings" of their federal counterparts. If this were true, these parties would not act for the 'interests' of Albertans, but would attempt to secure support for the federal parties. Also, party members were perceived as being motivated to gain position federally, with their provincial interests being transitory. Social Credit was perceived, as had been the U.F.A., as being 'anti-party' when in control of government. This perception of Social Credit, which meant that the negative characteristics of parties were not associated with it, was an important factor in the continued one-party dominant party system in Alberta.

Another characteristic of the one-party dominant party system in Alberta was that one party had an organizational advantage over all others. Opposition parties were unable to develop on-going effective constituency organization as a support basis. Social Credit maintained,

as had the U.F.A., a complex and widespread system of constituency locals which acted as bases for the distribution of literature and were a nuclei of activity during electoral campaigns. With effective constituency locals, individuals were given the opportunity to participate in 'politics', not just at election times, but between election contests. Participation in this manner was an important element in the dominant party's organization and continued perception of 'legitimate' power.

Social Credit was the dominant party in a one-party dominant party system because of three important and historical characteristics of that party system; divided perceptions of participating political units which favored one particular unit over all others; participation by individuals in expressing their perceptions was highly advantageous to the dominant party; and, a highly developed organization gave one participating unit a strategical advantage over all others over a long period of time.

B. Factors Contributing to Social Credit's Dominance

E. C. Manning's leadership of Social Credit was one of the most important factors in that party's continued control of government. Manning was successful in maintaining traditional areas of Social Credit support and gaining support in those areas which had opposed Aberhart. Manning retained rural support because of his emphasis upon the effects of regional-economic cleavages. He also continued those religious broadcasts which appealed to those in Southern Alberta. In other words, Manning represented or appealed to various traditional

components of rural Albertans' conception of the 'good society'.

Manning was also aware of the developing economic diversity within Alberta. For many involved in mining and manufacturing, Manning developed policies that would favor industrial development with economic aid and services provided by government (see following chart). With tax incentives and policies limiting government interference in the development of industry, Manning's administration created a favorable 'business climate' to lure future development. In other words, Manning provided a 'secure' administration for industrial development, including a commitment to maintain the 'free enterprise' economic system. These policies were important in appealing to the manufacturers' and industrialists' conception of the 'good society'.

The commitment to promote manufacturing and industry in a favorable 'business climate' meant limited governmental interference in those areas. This implied that Social Credit would oppose those elements which desired governmental control or interfered in the economy. Opposing those elements which favored socialism, 'collectivism or communism', had four significant effects for Social Credit. Firstly, Social Credit's policy of opposition to socialism appealed to the business community with its desire to maintain the 'capitalist' system. Secondly, it appealed to the perceptions of 'individualism' that existed in rural, northern and western Alberta because of the nature of their occupations. Thirdly, the 'anti-party' sentiments of many Albertans were related to socialism because it appeared in the form of an organized party, which Social Credit was perceived as opposing. Fourthly, international events during and after

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OFFERING SERVICES TO INDUSTRY¹³

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Basic Functions</u>	<u>Activities</u>
Industrial Development Board of Alberta	Acts as an advisory board on industrial development.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Meets as required and at least once a year. b. Clearing house for industrial promotional ideas. c. Membership - Cities of: Calgary, Camrose, Drumheller, Edmonton, Lethbridge, Medicine Hat, Red Deer, Wetaskiwin, and the town of Ponoka. The membership is expanded when required.
The Provincial Marketing Board and its subsidiary, Marketing Services Ltd. (Crown Corporation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. To encourage the industrial development of Alberta by assisting industry to utilize natural resources of the province. b. To assist industries through the mass buying of raw materials. c. To sponsor, manage or operate industries within Alberta for the utilization of its natural resources. d. To assist in the distribution of Alberta made goods. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Purchases items in bulk for industry and holds until actually required. Purpose is to obtain best price possible. Industry submits pertinent information prior to entering into a final agreement with the Board. Agreements can be terminated at any time by the client. b. Keeps a careful watch on world production and marketing problems. c. Encourages the sale of Alberta products. <p>Note: No other province in Canada has legislation in force extending a comparable service to its citizens and industry.</p>
Research Council of Alberta.	Fundamental research projects, and Technical Information Service to manufacturing industry.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Undertakes studies on feasibility of possible new industries. These are available for distribution--list can be obtained on request.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OFFERING SERVICES TO INDUSTRY (cont'd.)

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Basic Functions</u>	<u>Activities</u>
Research Council of Alberta (cont'd.)		<ul style="list-style-type: none">b. Interested industrialists may consult the section on such matters as raw materials, market conditions, manufacturing processes, general advice, new products, substitute materials.c. Tests of fuels and lubricants. Carries on other miscellaneous testing and research for industry on a fee basis. A new multi-million dollar research laboratory completed in 1956 will make it possible to expand this service.d. Sponsors committees on various technical projects such as ground water pollution, "Trace elements," etc. Members of committees are from industry and government.e. Acts as agent in all matters pertaining to exploration and investigation of the Athabasca oil sands.

World War II had created a fear and hatred of 'communism' which, eventually, was associated with the C.C.F. in Alberta. As J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo observe:

The inspiration for the 1944 anti-Socialist campaign was the rise of the C.C.F., but after the war the world situation encouraged the government to identify a larger enemy: international communism. Fear of communism or what seemed to be communism, was strong enough to rally many Albertans behind the Social Credit government.¹⁴

The anti-socialist policy appealed to major elements of the Alberta population and continued as a political theme because "the incumbents always regard reelection as a mandate to continue their former policies."¹⁵

Since 1947, the oil and other resource industries were expanding in a political climate favorable to their expansion. The oil boom, itself, provided a new source of revenue for the government with royalty income increasing from \$1,329,740 in 1947 to \$108,956,114 in 1955.¹⁶ The Social Credit administration spent this revenue on social services, the per capita amount of which was far above that in other provinces. Provision for social services provided the Social Credit government with increased utility from those groups which benefitted from the services. In general citizens perceive government expenditures in the following way:

Each voter receives a total utility income from government activity, and a marginal income from the marginal government dollars.¹⁷

Generally, the benefit accruing to the government can be explained as follows:

Because the government . . . wishes to maximize political support, it carries out those acts of spending which gain the most votes by means of those acts of financing which lose the fewest votes. In other words, expenditures are increased until the vote gain of the marginal dollar spent equals the vote-loss of the marginal dollar financed.¹⁸

Revenue from oil royalties meant vote gain only because there was little, if any, vote loss from financing. Social Credit was in an enviable position because of its expenditures, which were to gain marginal votes. Such expenditure of revenues left opposition parties in a difficult position as to the development of alternative parties. The situation, in regard to the C.C.F., was explained by their leader Elmer Roper.

Through a superb publicity organization, the Alberta Government had sold the people of Alberta the idea that it had done wonders in health and education . . . we, therefore, had to chose between a campaign of promising something better in the way of social services than the perfection the government was claiming . . . or put forward a programme of social ownership of the rich natural resources of the province.¹⁹

Social Credit, with its leadership, policies, public expenditures and public relations maintained an organizational and ideological advantage over the opposition parties. This maintained Social Credit dominance over other parties, as Table 4.4 indicates.

In some of these elections it appeared as though the opposition might have issues which, if properly developed, could have unseated Manning. One such election was that of 1955. The opposition's issue was government financial scandals involving Social Credit M.L.A.'s and the Alberta Treasury Board. The Liberals, well-organized under H. Prowse's leadership demanded an investigation of Social Credit's financial activities and attempted to convince Albertans that the

TABLE 4.4
SOCIAL CREDIT DOMINANCE OVER OTHER PARTIES²⁰

Election	Total Seats	Social Credit			Liberal			Conservative			C.C.F./N.D.P.			Total Popular Votes
		Seats	% Votes	% of Seats	Seats	% Votes	% of Seats	Seats	% Votes	% of Seats	Seats	% Votes	% of Seats	
1944	57	57	52	89							2	25	4	282,106
1948	57	57	56	89	2	18	4				2	19	4	294,793
1952	61	52	56	85	4	22	7	1	2	2	2	14	3	298,335
1955	61	37	46	61	15	31	25	3	9	5	2	8	3	378,179
1959	65	61	56	94	1	14	2	1	24	2	--	4	--	413,515
1963	63	60	55	95	2	20	3	--	13	--	--	9	--	403,444
1967	65	55	45	83	--	1	--	6	26	11	--	16	--	498,341

Others

	Seats	% Votes	% of Seats
1944	4	23	7
1948	2	7	4
1952	2	5	3
1955	4	5	7
1959	2	2	3
1963	1	3	2
1967	1	3	2

Manning claim of 'good and honest government' was a sham. In other words, the Liberals were questioning the 'legitimacy' of the Social Credit government, and its 'anti-party' appeals. Undoubtedly these Liberal claims created a response from some groups, especially those in Calgary and Edmonton. The claim was not enough, however, to convince a plurality of the populace that the Liberal party was an alternative to Social Credit. Manning constantly stressed that he would impartially investigate opposition claims and subsequently relieved M.L.A.'s Lee and Landeryou for their involvement. Manning's claim of 'good government' still appealed to rural Alberta because of their desire to maintain an 'anti-party' political unit in control of the Alberta government. In general, many were unwilling to unseat Social Credit because of the benefits from social services they were receiving and because of their participation in 'legitimate' government, while the Liberals were advocating 'party government'. The election results of 1955 indicate that Social Credit was able to maintain its dominant position and the Liberal party, demoralized by its defeat, was unable to recoup for any future election.

C. Factors Inhibiting Social Credit Support

In order to analyze the factors inhibiting Social Credit support, it is necessary to provide a breakdown of area support for Social Credit. Such a breakdown is provided by Flanagan as shown in Table 4.5. From the table it appears that Social Credit has maintained consistently high support in the 'heartland area'.²¹ Flanagan describes this area as an "homogeneous rural society of grain growers and cattle ranchers

TABLE 4.5

MEAN PERCENTAGE VOTING SOCIAL CREDIT IN THE FOUR
MAJOR REGIONS OF THE PROVINCE 1935-1971²²

Year	"Heartland"	Cities	Mountains	North
1935	61	48	49	46
1940	47	35	40	46
1944	57	43	47	53
1948	63	49	42	52
1952	64	50	63	49
1955	52	40	53	46
1959	62	51	58	56
1963	59	49	51	60
1967	53	39	40	47
1971	49	38	37	38

served by small, non-industrial market centers."²³ The Social Credit government, with its heritage of concern over the effect of regional-economic cleavages had appealed directly to the majority of rural Albertans' conception of the 'good society'. The same can be said for Social Credit appeals to other areas before 1963.

However, since 1963, Social Credit has received declining support from the urban areas, the mountain regions and the north. Certain areas of the city, especially the high income districts, were in conflict with the basic values that Social Credit represented. The Social Credit party had, from its inception, been resentful of the upper and middle-class professions of the city because of their desire to oppose economic reform and their commitment to 'party' government.²⁴ With the growth of urban areas the numbers of lawyers, bankers, etc. increased. For them Social Credit provided little or no positive political utility because Social Credit appeals seemed overly concerned with the contrasting problems of the 'heartland'. The only alternative for these individuals was to support the Liberal or Conservative parties. Urbanization also increased the number of new citizens in the province who held no previous loyalty to the Social Credit party. They, along with young urbanites, derived their perception of political parties from the mass media, rather than from constituency groups. The cities' mass media, especially newspapers, had provided some criticism of the Social Credit government. These groups of urban voters perceived Social Credit as providing little positive political utility for them, and were resentful of Social Credit's concern over the 'heartland', even though the economic contribution of the cities

was continually rising.²⁵ The urban area groups desired more public policy in relation to their specific problems and recognition of their contribution to the economy and 'development' of the province. If Social Credit would not relate to these perceptions, those groups would give their support to another party, as they did for the Progressive Conservatives in the 1971 election.

The Mountain area and the North were also composed of groups which expressed dissatisfaction with Social Credit rule. The Mountain region contained a population involved mainly in resource production. As this type of production increased, so did the unionization of workers. Social Credit had long been opposed to any form of 'collectivism' and were not responsive to the aggregate demands of miners and lumbermen. By 1967 the Mountain region's population had elected the first N.D.P. member to the Alberta legislature, Mr. G. Turcott. These groups supported the N.D.P. and the Progressive Conservatives in 1971 because they perceived Social Credit as unresponsive to their demands and thus providing little positive political utility for them.

The Northerners also had grievances against the Social Credit government. Because of their scanty population, they believed that little or no attention was being paid to their economic or cultural problems. People such as Mike Maccagno expressed dissatisfaction with Social Credit's lack of economic initiative, or educational provisions which people in the North desired. Another concern for various groups of ethnic minorities was the protection of minority rights. The Social Credit government had passed the Communal Properties Act (1949) and

established the Communal Properties Control Board. During the 1960's opposition increased to what was perceived to be 'discriminatory' legislation passed by the Social Credit government. Although the intent of the Bill was directed toward the Hutterites of Southern Alberta, Northerners could not feel secure that their minority rights would be protected. Overall, the lack of economic initiative, the failure of proposed educational developments, and the fear of the infringement of minority rights decreased Social Credit's support from the North, which, by 1971, was given to the N.D.P. or the Progressive Conservatives.

Throughout this period Social Credit was losing the perceptual advantage that it had maintained throughout the 1940's and 1950's. The diversity of the economy had resulted in different conception of the 'good society' among different groups. Social Credit had maintained its appeals to the 'heartland' area, but was perceived as having little appeal to other areas conceptions of the 'good society'. In these areas, then, Social Credit was perceived with low political utility and specific groups were supporting alternatives to Social Credit. Similarly, the elaborate organization of constituency locals was not a source of 'legitimate' participation in government as they had been perceived earlier. Organizations in the cities, mountains and North were developed to support political units which promoted their conception of the 'good society'. Overall, Social Credit had lost its perceptual, organizational and participatory advantage in the Alberta party system. The loss of this advantage came to fruition with the election of 1971.

D. The Alberta Election of 1971

The 1971 provincial election reflected the effect of environmental changes upon the political attitudes of certain major groups of Alberta voters. Differing attitudes had developed as to the positive political utility of maintaining a Social Credit regime. The diversification of the province created different conceptions of the 'good society' and Social Credit appeared unable to adapt its appeals to this diversification. The two major competitors in the 1971 election, the Social Credit party and the Progressive Conservative party differed in their strategies, tactics and personalities, in order to appeal to what they considered the most important elements of the 'good society'.

Social Credit strategy and appeals emphasized their traditional claims of 'good government' and 'sound administration'. However, the diversity of political attitudes rendered this slogan useless to many urban-dwellers and labour groups. Their conception of government was that it should provide more than 'good and sound' administration. The Social Credit performance rating fell according to points two and three of the following analysis by Downs:

The performance rating of a government may change for the following reasons: 1) it changes its actions while other conditions remain the same; 2) it keeps the same actions, and they give rise to the same utility as before, but other circumstances change so that the ideal utility-income alters; or, 3) it keeps the same actions, but other circumstances change so that these actions no longer produce the same utility incomes.²⁶

A perusal of Social Credit's information bulletin²⁷ reveals the appeal emphasis of the party-rural Alberta. Its various sections on urban affairs would leave specific groups of urbanites quite

disgruntled about the obvious 'underrepresentation' they received. The specific Social Credit appeal was to the 'heartland' an area which could not by itself, maintain Social Credit in power.

Social Credit's leadership was also a reflection of its appeal to the 'heartland'. With Manning's resignation in 1969, the party suffered a serious rift between those 'conservatives' who desired to maintain the old-line; and those young urban members, including Robert Clark and Roy Wilson, who desired a change in Social Credit appeals. The basic problem that faced Social Credit is explained by Downs:

Because individual men become identified with certain policies, it is often necessary for a party to shift its leadership before it can shift its platform. This means that intraparty power conflicts influence just how rapidly its policies change. Different groups within the party use varying shades of the dominant party ideology as weapons against each other. In their struggle for power, each tries to convince influential party members that it is the bearer of the ideas most likely to win votes in the general elections.²⁸

The Social Credit 'old-guard' wanted to maintain an historically based platform which had been successful. The others were attempting to create a diversity of appeals in accordance with the diversity of political attitudes in the province. With the selection of Harry Strom as leader, the 'old-guard' won, but the party only reinforced its appeal to the 'heartland'. Outside of the 'heartland', Strom's personality was ineffectual in the mass media, especially television, in comparison with the Conservative leader, Peter Lougheed. Strom was not effective as a leader, when leadership is defined as follows:

. . . the ability to influence voters to adopt certain views as expressing their own will. Leaders are men with influence over voters--usually not full control of their votes, but at least some impact on their views about the best policies for parties to espouse.²⁹

A third factor in the termination of Social Credit's dominance was the increasing acceptance of the Progressive Conservative party. Manning in his book Political Realignment³⁰ stresses that an amalgamation of the Social Credit and Progressive Conservative party would be significant in developing a unified conservative position. Although Manning may not have desired the result, his book may have greatly 'legitimized' the Progressive Conservative party in Alberta. Manning's endorsement followed the developing 'anti-government party' vote of Albertans in federal elections, which had given strong support to the Progressive Conservatives in Ottawa. The Conservatives were able to capitalize on the 'anti-party' sentiments of many Albertans and this increased the perception, among many groups, that the Progressive Conservatives were the 'logical' successors to the Social Crediters.

The Social Credit loss was also due to the dynamic and effective campaign by Lougheed's Progressive Conservatives. The type of strategy used is what Downs refers to as a minority-coalition strategy. With the development of specific economic areas in Alberta and with Social Credit's appeal to only one area, minorities could be found in the cities and surrounding areas, the Mountains and the North. With the Liberals all but extinct, and the N.D.P. support restricted to a few constituencies in the North, the minority-coalition strategy was feasible. The minority-coalition strategy is described by Downs as:

. . . when the 'ins' have been governing for several terms consecutively, they have had to make so many decisions that (1) they have probably made enemies, and (2) the likelihood of a varying majority composition on several issues is high. Therefore, the opponent may be willing to abandon the majority position on some issues in the hopes of creating a successful alliance among the dissenters to government action.³¹

The Conservative election platform³² revealed that the Lougheed team was appealing to all sections of the province, but especially to the urban areas. The Conservative approach differed from the Socred one in that it was more explicit and detailed in relating to specific policies where the Social Credit government could be criticized. Their strategy was to emphasize contemporary problems, such as pollution and federal-provincial conflicts, while recognizing the value of all economic sectors in Alberta, including the 'heartland'. Lougheed's style of leadership³³ was 'modern' and carried an appeal over the media. Just as importantly, he spent many years organizing constituency locals and canvassing in every area. The image created was Lougheed as a '1970's leader', capable of dealing with the likes of his federal counterpart P. E. Trudeau.

The Social Credit problems and the Lougheed directed minority-coalition campaign led to the Progressive Conservative victory of 1971. The results were:³⁴

Social Credit			Liberal		
Seats	% Votes	% Seats	Seats	% Votes	% Seats
25	41	33	0	1	0
Conservative			N.D.P.		
Seats	% Votes	% Seats	Seats	% Votes	% Seats
49	46	63	1	12	1
Others			Total		
Seats	% Votes	% Seats	Votes	Seats	
0	.1	0	637,969	75	

The election confirmed the fact that the Conservatives had unified the minority oppositions and created a majority legislative position. Flanagan hypothesizes that the "defeat of Social Credit consists of the massive entry of new voters into the political process, together with the shift of ex-Liberals into the Conservative camp. . . ."³⁵ This was part of the minority-coalition and combined with a high turnout of voters, gave the Progressive Conservatives their victory. On the basis of the economic area characterization of the province, the premises of the minority-coalition of the Progressive Conservatives is confirmed. In the North the Conservatives won twelve of sixteen seats, in the metropolitan areas twenty-five of twenty-nine seats, and in the Mountains, two out of three seats. The Progressive Conservative victory was unlike that of 1921 or 1935. In 1921 the U.F.A. appealed to dominant political values relating to regional-economic cleavages and the rejection of 'old-line' parties. Social Credit's 1935 victory combined various appeals to different components of the 'good society' created by the mass movement of the Depression era. By 1971 a dominant political attitude or a mass movement were replaced by an economically diverse population with a variety of political attitudes and conceptions of the 'good society'.

Social Credit was replaced as the dominant party because of its inability to maintain a perceptual and organizational advantage over all other parties. That advantage is now with the Progressive Conservative party which is sufficient reason to speculate on the future continuance of the one-party dominant party system in Alberta.

Footnotes

¹T. E. Flanagan, "Electoral Cleavages in Alberta During the Social Credit Reign, 1935-1971," (unpublished paper, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, 1973), p. 9.

²"Alberta" - Province of Opportunity - A Survey of Resources and Economic Possibilities, Calgary Power, Calgary, Alberta, 1958, p. 243.

³Ibid., p. 245.

⁴Ibid., p. 179.

⁵Flanagan, op. cit., p. 30.

⁶Calgary Power, op. cit., p. 163.

⁷Flanagan, op. cit., p. 29.

⁸Flanagan, op. cit.

⁹Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰J. A. Irving, "Changing Alberta: People and Politics," Saturday Night (October 13, 1956), p. 15.

¹¹T. E. Flanagan, op. cit., p. 5.

¹²Ibid., p. 5.

¹³Calgary Power, op. cit., pp. 117-118.

¹⁴J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, "Alberta - One Party Dominance," in Martin Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics - The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 6.

¹⁵Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 42.

¹⁶J. A. Irving, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁷Anthony Downs, op. cit., p. 194.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁹Letter to the Canadian Forum, October, 1944.

²⁰J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, op. cit., p. 3.

²¹T. E. Flanagan, op. cit., p. 26 on chart.

²²Ibid., pp. 6-7.

²³Ibid., p. 9.

²⁴Ibid., p. 26.

²⁵Ibid., p. 30.

²⁶Anthony Downs, op. cit., p. 44.

²⁷A Statement by the Honourable H. E. Strom, August 3, 1971 published by the Alberta Social Credit League, n.d., n.p.

²⁸Anthony Downs, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

²⁹Ibid., p. 87.

³⁰E. C. Manning, Political Realignment, A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967).

³¹Anthony Downs, op. cit., p. 60.

³²Now - New Directions for Alberta in the Seventies, The Platform of the Progressive Conservative Party and Its Candidates, Alberta Provincial Election, 1971.

³³See Don Sellar, "Personality of the Week," Herald Magazine, Friday, September 4, 1970.

³⁴J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, op. cit., p. 3.

³⁵T. E. Flanagan, op. cit., p. 3.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has developed and applied a new conceptual framework for party systems based upon structural and behavioral processes. The processes are 'multi-dimensional' in respect to individual political behavior. This 'multi-dimensional' or 'pluralist' approach rests on the belief that the ". . . nature of man cannot be confined by any single value, expressed by any single kind of relationship."¹ Similarly the pluralist society is ". . . not only characterized socially by plurality membership in groups, associations and a wide range of communities, but also by a diversity of belief and idea and style of living."² The pluralist assumptions are an alternative to those of 'class analysis' with its single criterion explanation of political behavior. The single variable approach, as applied by C. B. Macpherson made too many unsubstantiated assumptions about individual political behavior, aggregate political behavior and the party system. The distinct advantage of this thesis' approach is that the problems associated with 'class analysis' have been overcome. Individual political behavior is explained by employing the concepts of individual rationality, hierarchy of values, conception of the 'good society' and perception of party appeals. The individual supports one political unit over another because of the perceived 'fit' between party appeals and the individual's conception of the ideal social-economic environment. This 'fit' provides the individual with high political utility when he supports, by voting, a particular party. An individual's conception of the

'good society' is composed of many factors. Party appeals are diverse, including many aspects which compose the social-economic environment. Aggregate voting behavior is the response of individuals to party appeals, the similarity of which can be termed 'groups'.

'Groups' represent the similarity of voting response to a platform of party appeals which correspond to some important factors of various individual's conception of the 'good society'. Voting support for a particular unit indicates that that party's appeals and proposed progress toward the creation of the 'good society' provides positive political utility for various groups. If certain groups, who compose a plurality of the populace, continue to support one party over others, because of its perceived high political utility, a particular type of party system will develop.

The one-party dominant party system has characteristics which favor one political unit's control for a series of elections and over a number of years. One characteristic of the one-party dominant party system is that one political unit maintains a perceptual advantage over all others, even where an outsider would say that its platform is no more attractive than those of the other. Individuals in groups nevertheless perceive that one unit provides higher political utility than the rest and they therefore support it. Apparent high political utility may be provided by the dominant unit's appeals to 'anti-party' sentiments in the populace. For instance, all competing 'parties' are thus at a disadvantage to the purported 'non-party'. It may also be provided by the superior organization which results and is maintained where participation in that organization is perceived as being

'legitimate' and a component of the 'good society' for many groups. In short, a one-party dominant party system will exist if one political unit maintains a perceptual organizational and participatory advantage over its competitors. Once these advantages become part of the nature of a party system they tend to persist no matter which party maintains control.

The one-party dominant party system has been maintained in Alberta with the U.F.A. and, later, Social Credit as dominant parties and in spite of this changeover of the dominant role. During the Social Credit rule, however, Alberta's economy diversified to the extent that specific groups in particular areas now have more widely differing conceptions of the 'good society' than they had in the earlier, simpler times. The 1971 election victory by the Progressive Conservatives was attained because of their minority-coalition campaign strategy which was in contrast to the style of the U.F.A. and, at least, the public view of Social Credit. They appealed, initially, to a variety of conceptions of the 'good society'. But since that time the Conservatives have once again stressed the classic common appeal to all Albertans, the detrimental effects of regional-economic cleavages. Two major events, the Western Economic Opportunities Conference³ and the Federal-Provincial Conference on Energy⁴ confirm the nature of the Conservative appeals. The Western Economic Opportunities Conference revealed Alberta's continuing concern with the historical cleavages such as transportation, banking and agricultural policy. At the Federal Conference on Energy, Lougheed expressed dissatisfaction with what he believed to be proposals for

federal interference in provincial areas of jurisdiction. His emphasis was to prevent revenues which should come to Alberta from going to Eastern Canada. The appeals developed by the Progressive Conservatives are two-fold. Firstly, Lougheed has specified that his government believes that the existence of regional-economic cleavages were detrimental to the economic progress of all areas of Alberta. The Alberta government wanted to reform cleavages that prevented the development of the 'good society'; whatever this means to farmers, urbanites, northerners, or groups in the mountains. Secondly, Lougheed wanted to capitalize on high oil prices in order to appeal to the maintenance of prosperity for Albertans. The maintenance of prosperity provides any party with high political utility.

It appears that the Progressive Conservatives are establishing a perceptual advantage over other parties. Firstly, the Conservatives have capitalized on the 'anti-government party' sentiments which, in Alberta, have provided for Progressive Conservative support federally. Secondly, the Conservatives in attempting to relieve regional-economic cleavages have appealed to a traditional component of many Albertan groups' conception of the 'good society'. However, it is not yet possible to determine whether the Progressive Conservatives have maintained an organizational and participatory advantage over other parties. This may be revealed in future elections, for one-party dominance is the maintenance of power by one party over a series of elections and for a number of years. In 1971, the Progressive Conservatives had not, by our criteria of opposition, been dominant. Progressive Conservative dominance will depend upon the development

and maintenance of a perceptual, organizational and participatory advantage over other parties. Unfortunately, the evidence for party dominance will rest with future elections, the results of which are beyond the scope of this analysis.

Footnotes

¹Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, Community and Conflict in Western Thought (New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1973), p. 388.

²Ibid., p. 388.

³Reports of the Western Economic Opportunities Conference, July 24-26, 1973, Calgary, Alberta.

⁴Televised statements at the Federal Conference on Energy, Ottawa, February, 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beck, J. M. Pendulum of Power. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Ltd., 1968.
- Boyd, Hugh. New Breaking: An Outline of Cooperation Among the Farmers of Western Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1938.
- Burnet, Jean. Next-Year Country. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951.
- Clark, S. D. Church and Sect in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948.
- Dahl, R. A. Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967.
- Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.
- Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties, trans. by B. and P. North. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1954.
- Epstein, L. D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1967.
- Fowke, V. C. Canadian Agricultural Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947.
- Hoffer, Eric. True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Harper, 1951.
- Irvine, William. The Farmers in Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1920.
- Irving, John. The Social Credit Movement in Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.
- Lipset, S. M. Agrarian Socialism. New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1968.
- MacGibbon, D. A. The Canadian Grain Trade. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1932.
- Mackintosh, W. A. Economic Problems of the Prairie Provinces. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1934.

- Macpherson, C. B. Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System. 2d. ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962.
- McKnaught, Kenneth. A Prophet in Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.
- Mann, W. E. Sect, Cult and Church in Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955.
- Mannheim, Karl. Man and Society In an Age of Reconstruction. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., Broadway House, 1960.
- Moorhouse, Hopkins. Deep Furrows. Toronto: George J. McLeod Ltd., 1918.
- Morton, W. L. The Progressive Party in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950.
- Nisbet, Robert. The Social Philosophers, Community and Conflict in Western Thought. New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1973.
- Patton, H. S. Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada. Cambridge: Mass.: 1928.
- Pinard, Maurice. The Rise of a Third Party. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Co., 1971.
- Ranney, A. and Kendall, W. Democracy and the American Party System. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1956.
- Robin, Martin. Canadian Provincial Politics - The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1972.
- Rokeach, Milton. The Open and Closed Mind - Investigations Into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960.
- Safarin, A. E. The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.
- Scarrow, H. Canada Votes. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962.
- Sharp, P. F. The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948.
- Smiley, D. V. The Rowell-Sirois Report. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Co., 1963.
- Thomas, L. The Liberal Party in Alberta: A History of Politics in the Province of Alberta, 1905-1921. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.

deTocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Volume I. Vintage Book, 1961.

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1947.

Willner, A. R. Charismatic Political Leadership. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.

Wilson, F. L. The French Democratic Left, 1963-1969. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Wood, L. A. Farmers' Movements in Canada. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1924.

Young, W. D. Democracy and Discontent. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969.

Articles

Angus, H. F. "Portent of Social Credit in Alberta." Pacific Affairs, 9 (Spring, 1936), 381-387.

Barber, J. D. "Leadership Strategies for Legislative Party Cohesion." Journal of Politics, 28 (May, 1966), 347-367.

Cairns, Alan C. "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1, No. 1 (March, 1968), 55-80.

Dion, L. "Concept of Political Leadership: An Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (March, 1968), 2-17.

Eckstein, Harry. "Party Systems." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 11. New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968.

Flanagan, T. E. "Electoral Cleavages in Alberta During the Social Credit Reign, 1935-1971." Unpublished paper, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, 1973.

Garsten, L. F. H. "Social Credit's Five Years in Alberta." Dalhousie Review, 20 (July, 1940), 148-153.

Hailey, A. "Ordeal by Power: The Skeleton of Manning's Cabinet." Maclean's Magazine, 77 (November 16, 1964), cover, 15-20.

Hallett, M. "Social Credit and the New Democracy Movement." Canadian Historical Review, 47 (December, 1966), 301-325.

- Hanson, E. J. "Local Government in Alberta." Canadian Journal of Economics, 16 (February, 1950), 53-62.
- Hertaman, L. "Alberta and the Intellectuals." Culture, 27 (June, 1966), 163-175.
- Irving, J. A. "Development of the Movement." Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1 (March, 1947), 17-27.
- _____. "Response of the People." Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1 (June, 1947), 75-86.
- _____. "Interpretation of the Movement." Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1 (Spring, 1947), 127-140.
- _____. "Evolution of the Social Credit Movement." Canadian Journal of Economics, 14 (August, 1948), 321-341.
- _____. "Appeal of Social Credit." Queen's Quarterly, 60 (Summer, 1953), 146-160.
- _____. "Social Credit: Prophet and Doctrine." Saturday Night, 68 (March 14, 1953), 7-8.
- Kirchheimer, Otto. "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," in La Polambara and M. Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 177-201.
- Lipset, S. M. "Social Class." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 15. New York: Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968, pp. 296-316.
- _____. "Democracy in Alberta, Part I." Canadian Forum, 34 (November, 1954), 175-179.
- Long, J. A. "Maldistribution in Western Provincial Legislatures: The Case of Alberta." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2 (September, 1969), 345-355.
- Macpherson, C. B. "Political Theory of Social Credit." Canadian Journal of Economics, 15 (August, 1949), 378-393.
- Mallory, J. R. "Prophet in Politics: W. Aberhart." Canadian Forum, 30 (March, 1951), 274-276.
- _____. "Social Credit: Party or Movement." Canadian Forum, 35 (June, 1955), 52-55.
- _____. "Disallowance and the National Interest: The Alberta Social Credit Legislation of 1937." Canadian Journal of Economics, 14 (August, 1948), 342-357.

- May, J. D. "Democracy, Organization, Michels." American Political Science Review, 59 (June, 1965), 417-429.
- Patterson, J. C. "Characteristics of Party Leaders." Western Political Quarterly, 16 (June, 1963), 332-352.
- Pinard, M. "One Party Dominance and Third Parties." Canadian Journal of Economics, 33 (August, 1967), 358-373.
- Sartori, Giovanni. "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in La Polambara and M. Weiner. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 137-177.
- Schleisinger, J. "Party Units." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 11 (New York: Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, 1968, 428-435.
- Schultz, H. J. "Social Credit Back-Benchers' Revolt, 1937." Canadian Historical Review, 41 (March, 1960), 1-18.
- _____. "Aberhart - The Organization Man." Alberta Historical Review, 7 (Spring, 1959), 19-26.
- _____. "A Second Term: 1940." Alberta Historical Review, 10 (Winter, 1962).
- _____. "Portrait of a Premier: William Aberhart." Canadian Historical Review, 45 (Spring, 1964), 185-211.
- Smiley, D. V. "One Partyism and Canadian Democracy." Canadian Forum, 38 (July, 1958), 79-80.
- _____. "Canada's Peujadists: A New Look at Social Credit." Canadian Forum, 52 (1962).
- Smith, D. E. "Comparison of the Prairie Development in Saskatchewan and Alberta (1905-1967)." Journal of Canadian Studies, 4 (February, 1969), 17-26.
- Watkins, E. S. "Politics in Alberta." Canadian Commentator, 3 (July-August, 1959), 8-9.
- Whalen, K. "Social Credit Measures in Alberta." Canadian Journal of Economics, 18 (November, 1952), 500-517.
- _____. "Alberta Socred Plan." World Affairs, 28 (January, 1963), 13.
- _____. "Successor to Premier Manning to be Elected." World Affairs, 34 (November, 1968), 13.

Whalen, K. "Premier Manning Steps Down." World Affairs, 34
(January, 1969), 14.

Other Sources

Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations,
Book I, Canada 1867-1939. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954.

Reports of the Western Economic Opportunities Conference, July 24-26,
1973, Calgary, Alberta.

Evidence of Dan Weir, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, On The
Constitutionality of Economic Aspects of Social Credit,
Before the Agricultural Committee of the Alberta Legislature.
Edmonton: King's Printer, 1935.

Testimony by C. H. Douglas on the Douglas System of Social Credit.
Evidence taken before the Agricultural Committee of the
Alberta Legislature. Edmonton: King's Printer, 1934.

Davidson, W. M. The Alberta Plan - A Survey and Analysis of the
Social Credit Scheme as placed before the Electors of
Alberta, Economic Safety League, Calgary, 1935.

Canadian Annual Review, 1937-1938. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1938.

"Alberta," Province of Opportunity. A Survey of Resources and
Economic Possibilities, by Calgary Power, Calgary, Alberta,
1958.

Binns, K. J. Social Credit in Alberta. H. H. Plembett, Government
Printer, Government of Tasmania, 1947.