THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

The Reform Party of Canada

by

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY, ALBERTA

AUGUST, 1994

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# THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

# FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommended to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Reform Party of Canada" submitted by Timothy Leo Moro in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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August 31, 1994.
Date

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# ABSTRACT

The Reform Party of Canada was established in 1987 as a Western protest party and has since won significant representation in Parliament. This thesis provides a case study of the rise of the RPC.

Smelser and Pinard have developed a value-added theory of collective behavior which suggests that specific social conditions must be fulfilled in order to produce collective action. This framework is employed in an analysis of the RPC. The setting of Western Canadian and national politics is discussed and related to the emergence of the RPC. The policies and development of the party itself are examined. An effort is made to understand both exogenous and endogenous factors through the value-added theory and Pinard's central empirical proposition is tested against the 1993 election results. The lessons provided by the RPC for third party politics are outlined and some speculation is offered on the future of the party.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# CHAPTER ONE:   INTRODUCTION

The West must bow to Ontario, the most powerful province politically, in Canada ... What is needed is a radical party with the courage of its convictions.

Grain Growers Guide 1911[1]

In Western Canada, the Progressive movement represents the almost unanimous popular opinion appreciation of the fact that the measures essential to future development and prosperity will not be carried [out] by either of the old parties.  This has been amply proved by experience...

Robert Forke
Leader, Progressive Party 1925[2]

The common issue that brought us together was a feeling of being left out of our own country.  We felt that the West's constitutional concerns were never given the same priority by the national government as those of Quebec.  Nor were the West's economic aspirations ever given the same priority as those of southern Ontario.  We believed that the solution lay not in mere protest or threats of separation, but in developing a short list of constructive changes, that is, reforms to the Canadian federal system and finding an appropriate political vehicle to promote that list in the federal political arena.

Preston Manning
Leader, Reform Party of Canada 1992[3]

The results of the 1984 federal election brought to many western Canadians great hope and great expectations.  The Progressive Conservative Party, led by Brian Mulroney, had been elected to form the largest majority government in Canadian history. The Liberal Party, which had dominated the national government despite great unpopularity throughout western Canada, was reduced to parliamentary insignificance.  To Westerners, the election

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[1] W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967) 24.
[2] Ibid. 240-241.
[3] Preston Manning, The New Canada (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992) v.

outcome promised that the virtual exclusion of the region from power in the nation's capital would be brought to an end. With the election of the Progressive Conservatives, who had been faithfully supported by the region, the expectation was that Westerners would enjoy real representation in the federal cabinet and that longstanding grievances would be fairly addressed.

The expectations were at first realized, although from the start not with the speed and whole-hearted commitment that many in the West believed was their due. The new Conservative government brought in the Western Diversification Fund, new agricultural support programs, and new energy pricing arrangements. It was not to be enough, however, for the logic of the West's place as a sparsely populated, resource-based hinterland in a federal political system was immutable. It soon seemed to many in the West that the new Conservative government was no different than its Liberal predecessor. The government appeared to be preoccupied with the issues and concerns of Central Canada, particularly those of Quebec, in spite of the presence of Western MPs in powerful cabinet posts. Federal government decisions and perhaps more importantly nondecisions which retained the status quo indicated to many in the West that the Conservative cabinet was not to be the saviour of Western interests. The past was simply repeating itself and westerners were once again to bear the brunt of the cost of Confederation.

The political history of the Canadian West includes a series of populist third parties on both the provincial and federal levels. Western alienation, which has entailed not disinterest and withdrawal from political participation but instead precisely the opposite, has led to the creation of western based, populist parties. Westerners have traditionally turned to homegrown parties outside of the established partisan framework as the vehicles through which

they might realize their political and economic aspirations. These third party movements have taken as their creed the failure of the traditional parties to provide regional justice for the West. From the United Farmers, to the Progressives, CCF and Social Credit and more recently the Western Canada Concept Party and the Confederation of Regions Western Party, the political history of the West is often that of unorthodox third party politics.

The Reform Party of Canada emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a new populist protest party in the Western tradition. The new party has drawn upon the reservoir of anger directed by Westerners at politicians in general and at the former Conservative government in particular to achieve significant levels of public support. The party has also made some inroads in gaining support from voters in Ontario and Maritime Canada. Led by Preston Manning, whose family name itself stands for powerful western third party government, the Reform Party won 52 seats in the House of Commons in the 1993 General Election.

The literature of Canadian political science, history and sociology contains many case studies of third party movements. The great majority of these works, however, take the form of chronological reviews and lack an underlying theory of the emergence of third parties in the Canadian political system. The work of American sociologist Neil Smelser on collective behaviour and social movements stands virtually alone in its field. Smelser has developed a theory to explain and predict the emergence of collective phenomena. Maurice Pinard has applied Smelser's theory to the development of the Creditiste movement in Quebec federal politics. The following thesis takes as its objective the application of the Smelser/Pinard framework to the Reform Party of Canada. It is intended to step beyond a historical chronology of the

Reform Party to examine a more generally applicable explanation for the emergence of third parties.

Neil Smelser has argued that certain preconditions must exist in order for a collective social movement to emerge and Pinard has demonstrated that these conditions were met in the province of Quebec preceding the emergence of the Social Credit Party. Chapter Two of the thesis will provide a literature review of the work of Smelser and Pinard. In addition it will discuss the criticisms which have been directed at this work and briefly review some alternatives. The chapter will additionally review some of the existing literature concerning the Reform Party of Canada.

The Reform Party has distinguished itself as a serious political force in notable contrast to the small, fringe western protest parties which emerged throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The party has captured not only the support of disenchanted Progressive Conservative voters but has drawn support from across the political spectrum. The Reform program has been designed with skill to appeal to a wide range of Canadians. The political influence of the leader Preston Manning over his supporters has been evident as the party has made the transition from essentially an Alberta/British Columbia-based party to become a national political force. The third chapter of the thesis will discuss this development and the policies of the party.

Western anger at the perceived injustice of the federal system enjoys a long and colorful history beginning immediately at Confederation in 1867. Although the specific items of concern may have changed by the early 1990s, the essential content or basis for these complaints remains largely unchanged. Western Canadians feel themselves to be politically underrepresented and economically exploited; in short, virtually in a colonial position vis-a-vis central

Canada. The historic setting of this alienation and the more recent events crucial to the emergence of the Reform Party will be reviewed in Chapter Four.

The rapid and unexpected success of the Reform Party must in part be attributed to the failure of the existing traditional parties to present themselves as compelling alternatives to the Canadian voting public. The appeal of the Reform Party is thus in some measure a product of its emergence at a time when many Canadians are seeking a viable alternative to the traditional federal parties. Nor can the role of Preston Manning be understated for clearly without him there would be no Reform Party. Manning has distinguished his party from the many small "lunatic fringe" Western protest parties of the 1970s and 1980s and has thus made the enormous leap to becoming a serious, legitimate political contender in the eyes of the Canadian public. Chapter Five will review the internal factors responsible for the rise of the Reform Party of Canada.

In The Rise of a Third Party, Maurice Pinard argues that third parties will emerge in political systems which are characterized by one-party dominance. He suggests that a system of one-party dominance is created when the major opposition party in a democratic political system is unable to win over 33 percent of the vote. Chapter Six employs the outcomes of the 1988 and 1993 elections to test the applicability of Pinard's hypothesis to the Reform Party.

The concluding chapter of the thesis will examine the fit of the Reform Party into the Smelser/Pinard paradigm. The usefulness of this theoretical framework for understanding the Reform Party and other third parties will be discussed and the ways in which the case of the RPC must alter our thinking about new political parties will be described. Finally, some speculation is offered on the future of the Reform Party of Canada.

# CHAPTER TWO:   LITERATURE REVIEW

The following chapter will provide a literature review of Neil Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior and Maurice Pinard's The Rise of A Third Party. It will begin by discussing Smelser's "value-added approach" to collective behavior and his distinction between norm and value oriented social movements. The chapter will next review, in some detail, Pinard's theory of third party development. An overview of selected popular and academic writings on the Reform Party will close the chapter.

## Determinants of Collective Behavior

The study of collective behavior has traditionally been conducted utilizing a "natural history" framework. This approach seeks to identify the chronological sequence common to the development and life of all social movements or episodes of collective action. In the Theory Of Collective Behavior, Neil Smelser proposes a different method of analysis termed "the value-added approach," one which is not dependent upon chronological considerations. The approach is drawn from the study of economics and suggests that specific social conditions must be fulfilled in order to produce collective action.[4] The Smelser theory views collective behavior as the product of circumstances particular to a single social system. Smelser is concerned with different combinations of the "determinants of social action" and their interaction with one another. He identifies six such determinants of collective behavior:

❏    "Structural Conduciveness" refers to the organizational characteristics of a society or a social order. These characteristics may act to permit or prevent episodes of collective behavior. A social structure which is conducive is the

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[4] Michael Brown and Amy Goldin, Collective Behavior: A Review And Reinterpretation Of The Literature (Pacific Palisades, California:  Goodyear Publishing Company, 1973) 124.

most basic condition necessary for any episode of collective behavior. Conduciveness merely makes possible a particular form of behavior. It does not in and of itself bring about episodes of collective action. Smelser has thus termed it an "indeterminate condition."[5]

☐ "Structural Strain" describes a long-term problem or contradiction in the social environment of a society. The distribution of economic resources within a community is often the source of structural strain. Some form of strain is necessary for collective behavior to take place. The type of strain does not, however, determine the type of collective action which may ensue.

☐ A "Generalized Belief" identifies the cause of structural strain and proposes specific solutions to eliminate the problem. This belief is necessary in order to mobilize people for participation in collective efforts. The existence of a generalized belief does not, however, guarantee that collective behavior will take place. Generalized Beliefs become significant as determinants only when conditions of structural conduciveness and structural strain are present.[6]

☐ "Precipitating factors" are those events which directly cause episodes of collective behavior. These events act to confirm the validity of generalized beliefs and provide a concrete setting for social action.[7]

☐ "Mobilization of the participants for action" is the final condition necessary for collective behavior.[8] The key mobilization factors for a social movement are leadership and a means of organization.[9]

☐ The "Operation Of Social Control" determines whether or not collective action actually does take place and, if so, in what form. Smelser distinguishes

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[5] Neil J. Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962) 133.
[6] Ibid. 80.
[7] Ibid. 17.
[8] Ibid. 7.
[9] James J. Teevan, ed., Basic Sociology (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1982) 250.

between two broad types of social controls. The first type acts to prevent episodes of collective action altogether by minimizing the conditions of conduciveness and strain.[10] The second type appears only after collective behavior has begun, and acts to direct and limit that action. The emergence of social movements is thus dependent upon the combination of these six determinants.

## Social Movements

Sociologists distinguish between norms and values when examining group behavior. A norm may be defined as a relatively precise rule specifying which behaviors are permitted and which are prohibited for group members.[11] A value may be defined as a relatively general belief that either defines what is right and what is wrong or specifies general preferences.[12] The concepts of norms and values are employed by Smelser in his discussion of social movements.

Turner and Killian describe a social movement as a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part.[13] Smelser, in turn, draws a distinction between two types of social movements. The "Norm Oriented Movement" is described as an attempt to restore, protect, modify or create societal norms.[14] The norms or rules of behavior concerned may be of any sort including the political, economic and legal. The "agitation" for a Norm Oriented Movement is often carried out by

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[10] Smelser, 17.
[11] Michael P. Carroll, "Culture" in Basic Sociology, ed. James J. Teevan (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc. 1982) 17.
[12] Ibid. 17.
[13] Lewis M Killian and Ralph H Turner, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961) 308.
[14] Smelser, 270.

organizations, including political parties and pressure groups. Following the work of Heberle,[15] Smelser notes four ways in which a political party might relate to a Norm Oriented Movement.[16] A political party may (1) be a part of a broader social movement or (2) may contain within its membership several social movements. A social movement can (3) be represented within several different political parties or (4) a movement may refuse association with any party. A "Value Oriented Movement" is described by Smelser as an attempt to restore, protect, modify or create values .[17] A secular Value Oriented Movement can provide the basis for challenging the existing political authority of a state or community. Such a movement may develop into a political party operating within the confines of the existing system or may seek to bring about political revolution. Value oriented movements are particularly likely to appear when opportunities to influence political authorities are ineffective, blocked or simply unavailable.[18] The "failure of government by political parties" is specifically cited by Smelser as an example of such a situation.[19]

Although the language of Smelser has not been used, the rise of the Reform Party of Canada has been attributed in the literature to both Norm Oriented and Value Oriented Movements. The distinction is important because it speaks to the objectives of a political party, to the motivations of its supporters and perhaps to the longevity and probable success of a new movement. A goal of changing values represents a far greater challenge to a political party than does the objective of changing norms.

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[15] See R. Herberle, "Observations On The Sociology Of Social Movements," American Sociological Review,14 (1949) 346-357.
[16] Smelser, 274-275.
[17] Ibid. 313.
[18] Ibid. 331.
[19] Ibid. 35.

## Application of the Theory

The value added theory of collective behavior developed by Neil Smelser is regarded as one of the most comprehensive and important contributions to the understanding of social movements.[20] Maurice Pinard, in The Rise Of A Third Party, applies the Smelser value added theory to his study of the Social Credit party in Quebec. In 1962 the Ralliement des Creditistes, a right wing protest movement contesting its first Canadian federal election, was able to win twenty-six seats in the province of Quebec and capture 26 percent of the popular vote.[21] Pinard examines the startling success of the Ralliement through survey data, and uses Smelser's theory as his "frame of reference." The sections to follow will summarize the key points and arguments made by Pinard in The Rise of a Third Party.

## One-Party Dominance In Quebec

The structure of the federal party system in Quebec was characterized by one-party dominance. The Liberal party dominated Quebec federal politics during the period from 1891 to 1958. The Conservatives, who formed the major federal opposition party in the province, were unable to win a majority of Quebec votes nor a majority of Quebec seats in Parliament at any election during this extended period. The party was to average only 27.1 percent of the Quebec popular vote from the federal election of 1917 until the Diefenbaker-led breakthrough in 1958.[22] The Conservatives won on average only 7.8 percent

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[20] In this regard see, for example, Joseph B. Perry Jr. and M.D. Pugh, Collective Behavior: Response To Social Stress (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1978) 39-43, and Basic Sociology 248-250.

[21] For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the Social Credit Party in Quebec, see Michael B. Stein, The Dynamics Of Right-Wing Protest (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.)

[22] Maurice Pinard, The Rise Of A Third Party, Enlarged Edition (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975) 22.

of Quebec seats during those years.[23] The Conservative party had alienated French Canadian voters through a critical series of events which included the execution of Louis Riel, the Manitoba and Ontario school crises and, most notably, the conscription crisis of 1917. The local party organization of the Conservatives throughout Quebec was as a consequence extremely weak and, for all intents and purposes, did not exist in many ridings.

Large sections of the Quebec electorate were unable to view the federal Conservatives as a viable alternative to the dominant Liberal party.[24] Opposition Conservative candidates did not offer a real choice to many Quebec voters in a federal contest. The longstanding weakness of the Conservatives therefore created a two party system highly vulnerable to the emergence of Social Credit. Many dissatisfied voters saw no alternative but to turn to a new party,[25] and thus the protracted period of one-party dominance brought about a political structure conducive to the rise of a third party.[26] Although Pinard emphasizes the primary contention of Smelser's value added theory that other determinants must necessarily be present, he suggests that no single factor was as important as the nature of the federal party system in Quebec.

## The Evidence

The one-party dominance hypothesis led Pinard to the proposition that a negative relationship should exist between the strength of the Conservative party and the electoral success of Social Credit.[27] Those constituencies in which the Conservative candidates were weakest should have been the most

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23 Ibid. 22.
24 Ibid. 23.
25 Ibid. 72.
26 Ibid. 34.
27 Ibid. 23.

conducive to Social Credit fortunes.  The hypothesis was tested by examining the outcomes of successive federal elections.  Electoral districts were classified into areas of high, medium or low Conservative strength based on the results of the 1957 and 1958 elections.  Those ridings which the Conservative party held since at least 1957 were classified as high, those captured from the Liberals in 1958 were classified as medium and those which remained Liberal throughout were classified as low.  The data show a strong negative relationship between the strength of the Conservatives in the elections of 1957 and 1958 and Social Credit victories in the 1962 federal election.[28]  In none of the strongest Conservative constituencies was a Social Credit member elected to Parliament in 1962.  Conversely, outside of Montreal, in two-thirds of the weakest Conservative districts Social Credit candidates waged successful campaigns. In short, the weaker the Conservative party was in the 1957/58 period, the stronger was the vote for Social Credit in 1962.[29]  The findings thus supported the hypothesis that it was the weakness of the federal Conservative party in Quebec which was conducive to the rise of Social Credit.[30]

The twenty-one ridings of the city of Montreal constituted an important exception to the general voting pattern across Quebec in the 1962 federal election.  The Social Credit party won no seats in the city and its candidates were able to garner only 6.1 percent of the Montreal vote compared to a 35.8 percent average in the remaining constituencies of the province.  The voting pattern found throughout Quebec - the weaker the federal Conservatives in 1957/58, the stronger the Social Credit vote in 1962 - held in Montreal but not at statistically significant levels.[31]  This result was particularly anomalous since the

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[28] Ibid. 25.
[29] Ibid. 27.
[30] Ibid. 25.
[31] Ibid. 27.

Conservative party in Quebec was at its weakest in Montreal. The failure of Social Credit candidates in Montreal was to some extent explained by lower levels of strain in the city and by the new party's concentration of its campaign efforts in the rural regions of the province.[32] More significantly, Pinard argues, differences between rural and urban voters accounted for the contrasting election returns of the third party. Urban voters evaluate the strength of a political party on the basis of its organization at the national level. The urban voter sees little of preelection events at the level of the local constituency but views that campaign instead through a national lens. The converse is true for rural voters who measure the strength of a party on the basis of its organization within their own riding. The rural voter, often through direct personal experience, is able to more easily evaluate a political party at the local constituency level and the national election campaign is given far less attention. In the 1962 federal campaign, voters in Montreal did not perceive Social Credit candidates to represent a practical alternative because of the party's weakness at the national level.[33] The rural electorate, however, was aware of the growing strength of Social Credit in their districts and made voting decisions unaffected by the poor national prospects of the party. A similar rural/urban third party pattern may be observed with the Social Credit party in Alberta, the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan, and in the southern United States.

## Third Parties Across Canada

Pinard examined the relationship between the structure of the party system and the rise of third parties across Canada by reviewing 65 federal and provincial elections in which the incumbent party was defeated or in which a

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[32] Ibid. 27.
[33] Ibid. 28.

third party emerged. The survey included the strong two party systems of the Atlantic provinces, the multi-party system of Manitoba, and systems of one-party dominance found at various times in several provinces, most notably Alberta. The election results strongly supported the hypothesis that, even in multi-party systems, third parties emerge from a structure of one-party dominance.[34]

The data suggest that a situation of one-party dominance is created when the main opposition party has been unable to gain more than 33 percent of the vote.[35] In 59 percent of the cases of one-party dominance so defined, the election outcome produced a third party vote greater than 20 percent. A further 18 percent of the cases of one-party dominance produced a third party vote of between 10 and 20 percent. The exceptions to this electoral pattern, Pinard argues, confirm the value added premise that structural conduciveness is not by itself a determinant sufficient to produce a political movement. In the converse situation, where a strong opposition party has maintained more than 33 percent of the vote, 82 percent of the cases produced no third party or a third party vote of less than 10 percent. The election survey additionally reviewed an intervening circumstance, termed a marginal situation, in which a strong opposition party formerly receiving more than 33 percent of the vote suddenly becomes weakened. In these elections 90 percent of the cases were found to have a third party vote greater than 20 percent.[36] The combination of elections in the marginal category with those defined as involving a strong opposition party does not significantly change the overall findings. In such a combined category 63 percent of the electoral contests produced no third party or a third party vote of less than 10 percent.[37]

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[34] Ibid. 37.
[35] Ibid. 37.
[36] Ibid. 38. The findings discussed in this section are drawn from Table 3.1.
[37] Ibid. 39.

## The Development of One Party Dominance

A variety of factors may be responsible for the development of one-party dominance in a democratic political system. The work of S.M. Lipset suggests that structural cleavages which act to divide a community or a larger society can play a key role.[38] Structural cleavages may serve to alienate a particular group from one or more of the major political parties and tie its support to a single party as the sole protector of its interests.[39] Such structural cleavages can take the form of economic, ethnic, regional or religious divisions.[40] The strength of social attachments within a community can be influential in the development of one-party dominance. Small communities characterized by strong social ties amongst its members are driven to political homogeneity in order to avoid the strain of significant divisions within its elite.[41] The development of one-party monopolies in western Canada particularly may have been greatly influenced by the predominance of small communities in the region. Public disclosure of blatant or widespread corruption within the top orders of government can also produce a system of one-party dominance. A strong traditional party may be virtually eliminated at the next election by the discovery of corruption amongst its top leadership. Finally, the electoral system itself can serve to bring about and reinforce the political dominance of a single party. A system of single member plurality elections, as is employed in Canada, makes it possible for a

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[38] See S.M. Lipset, "Democracy In Alberta", Canadian Forum,34 (Nov and Dec 1954) 175-177 and 196-198. Lipset argues that the British parliamentary system and the single member constituency are ill suited to a nation such as Canada with complex internal divisions.
[39] Pinard, 68.
[40] Ibid. 66.
[41] Ibid. 68. Pinard cites several sources to support the contention that elite political divisions are particularly problematic in small communities. See Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: The Case of Fluoridation Referendums", American Journal of Sociology,68 (1963) 513-526., and James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 1957) 16.

party to win a sizable majority of seats by gaining a relatively low percentage of the vote across most constituencies.[42]

## A Theory of One-Party Dominance

The general model of one-party dominance developed by Pinard may be summarized as follows.  In a democratic political system one-party dominance exists when the main or strongest opposition party is unable to win the support of one-third of the electorate.  A party system whose structure is characterized by one-party dominance is conducive to the rise of third parties.  When the major opposition party is unable to maintain at least one-third of the popular vote it will tend to be replaced by a third party.  A system of one-party dominance will typically involve extended periods of rule by the dominant party with the sporadic emergence of third parties and occasional third party victories.[43]  At the federal level, third parties will frequently emerge and flourish for some time in regions of the country where the main opposition party is weak.[44]  This is particularly true for those areas in which the third party has been successful at the provincial level.  These parties will, however, have difficulty in spreading beyond their original regional base if the weakness of the main opposition party does not extend nation wide.[45]  When the major opposition party is able to gain the support of at least one-third of the electorate a two party system will be maintained.  In this situation the main opposition party

[42] Ibid. 68. See also Alan C. Cairns "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (March 1968) 55-80.  Cairns further points out that the Canadian electoral system favours minor parties with concentrated regional support and discourages those with diffuse national support.  In this way the electoral system both reinforces and builds regional political cleavages in Canada.
[43] Ibid. 64.
[44] Ibid. 70.
[45] Ibid. 70.

will be perceived as a viable alternative to the incumbent party.[46] A system with two strong parties can nonetheless become conducive to the rise of a third party if the traditional parties are driven by crisis into political coalition.[47] The failure of a strong opposition party to contest a large number of electoral seats can additionally render such a system highly vulnerable to the development of new parties.[48]

The second edition of <u>The Rise Of A Third Party</u>, published in 1975, contains an important reassessment of the theory of one-party dominance. The theoretical discussion in this brief postscript is concerned exclusively with structural conduciveness and its impact on third party development. Pinard continues to stress, however, the necessity of the other determinants discussed in the original work. The political nonrepresentation of social groups through the existing party system is identified by Pinard as the most general structural condition conducive to the development of third parties.[49] Nonrepresentation of a specific societal group stemming from differing ideological positions, short term grievances or long term discontent makes more likely the formation of third parties. The theory of one-party dominance is said by Pinard to be only a subtype of this more general theory of nonrepresentation.[50]

Contrary to pluralist theory, Pinard proposes that a strong two-party or multi-party system may fail to represent significant constituencies in the

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[46] Ibid. 63.

[47] Ibid. 64.

[48] Ibid. 65.

[49] Ibid. 280.

[50] Ibid. 277. Pinard argues that the political nonrepresentation of social groups may take a variety of forms. He identifies nonrepresentation either through one party dominance or the failure of the existing parties to adequately aggregate the demands of social groups as the most structurally conducive factors in the rise of third parties. Other forms of nonrepresentation conducive to the emergence of new parties include the absence of primary elections and the failure of the traditional parties, in succession, to resolve serious issues. See pages 284-288 for Pinard's full discussion.

electorate.[51] Existing brokerage parties may be unable to aggregate all demands and some groups may come to feel that their interests cannot be accommodated within the current party structure. In such a situation a rejection of all existing parties by the nonrepresented group or groups will ensue and may give rise to radical or Value-Oriented political movements.[52] The mobilization of followers to the cause of a radical political movement is based on a shared, articulated ideology held by members of a specific social class or communal group. Long-term grievances against the social order form the foundation of this shared ideology and provide for the development of a communal consciousness.[53] Established political parties are repudiated because of their failure or perceived unwillingness to represent the ideology and interests of the movement. Pinard cites as examples of radical political movements the Farmers and Labour movements, the Progressive Party, the C.C.F./N.D.P. and the Parti Quebecois.

A system of one-party dominance in which opposition groups lack effective means of political representation will lead, Pinard argues, to the development of protest or Norm-Oriented political movements.[54] The recruitment of supporters to a political protest movement is based not upon ideological imperatives but upon beliefs of discontent.[55] Immediate grievances play a determining role in the mobilization of support. Existing political parties are rejected because of this dissatisfaction. The ideological content of a political protest movement is of far less importance then is the case in a radical

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[51] Ibid. 280.
[52] Ibid. 280.
[53] Pinard's discussion of an ideology of discontent - a "generalized belief" in Smelser's terms - can clearly be applied to the phenomena of western alienation. See Chapter Four of this thesis for an overview of Western alienation.
[54] Ibid. 280.
[55] Ibid. 281.

movement. The ideology of a protest movement is less encompassing, calls for a less fundamental redefinition of the social order, is less intensely adhered to by its followers and may not be shared at all by many of them.[56] As a consequence support for such a movement may be drawn from a variety of social classes and societal groupings. The Social Credit party, the Provincial Rights party of the 1900s in Saskatchewan, and the United Newfoundland party are cited by Pinard as examples of political protest movements.

## The Quiet Revolution

The election in 1960 of a new Liberal provincial government under Jean Lesage marked the beginning of what has come to be known as the Quiet Revolution in Quebec. The preceding sixteen years of rule by the conservative Union Nationale had witnessed the continued backwardness and growing stagnation of Quebec, politically, economically and socially. The Lesage administration, in a dramatic departure from the role played by previous provincial governments, began systematic efforts to modernize all aspects of Quebec society. Programs to encourage industrialization and urbanization were introduced and private hydro-electricity was nationalized as the centerpiece of extensive new government economic involvement. A reformed civil service was greatly expanded and displaced the church from its traditional roles in education, health and welfare. The provincial government itself sought enhanced power and autonomy through new political demands made on the Canadian federal order. The Quiet Revolution, as was true throughout much of the Western world in the 1960s, was the scene of considerable social unrest and a wide variety of social movements. The questioning of traditional beliefs,

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[56] Ibid. 281.

lifestyles and values characteristic of the period found a particularly fertile setting among the populace of Quebec. The emergence of a new middle class brought with it a secular, materialistic and nationalistic francophone culture. Violent demonstrations and extremist actions by terrorist groups, most notably the FLQ, accompanied popular demands for political independence. A new working-class consciousness and growing trade union militancy were also to develop during this upheaval of Quebec society.[57]

It is suggested by Smelser that in times of social change and unrest, existing vehicles for the expression of societal grievances are easily perceived as outmoded and ineffective and will rapidly be replaced by the creation of new mechanisms.[58] Pinard, citing the work of Smelser, argued that the societal unrest and political instability of the Quiet Revolution was structurally conducive to the rise of a third party. The hypothesis was tested by Pinard through a comparison of the outcomes of successive elections held at the provincial and federal level in Quebec. The data revealed a strong tendency for constituencies which switched allegiance from the Union Nationale in the provincial election of 1960 to correspondingly shift their support to Social Credit in the federal election of 1962.[59] The greater the movement toward the opposition Quebec Liberal party in 1960, the more likely was the election of a Social Credit candidate in 1962.[60] An analogous finding was noted for those few ridings in which a Liberal incumbent was defeated in the 1960 provincial contest.[61] These constituencies moved away from the Liberal party provincially and then towards

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[57] For useful discussions of the Quiet Revolution see Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 1980) and Michael D. Behiels, Quebec Since 1945 (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1987.)
[58] Pinard, 73. In this regard Pinard cites Smelser, 298-306.
[59] Ibid. 75.
[60] Ibid. 75.
[61] Ibid. 75.

Social Credit federally. Pinard additionally employed the results of his election study in this discussion. The survey data indicated that individuals who switched their provincial vote between the two traditional parties were more likely than stable voters to support the Social Credit party in the ensuing federal election.[62] Again, however, no such difference was found for electoral districts in the Montreal region and Pinard suggested that this further reflects the failure of Social Credit to appear as a viable alternative to urban voters.[63] The findings are interpreted by Pinard as demonstrating that the political change which took place at the provincial level was itself conducive to the emergence of a third party at the federal level. On this basis it is more broadly argued by Pinard that social change is conducive to further social or political change.[64]

## Social Credit and Quebec Nationalism

The Quiet Revolution brought with it a rising tide of Quebecois nationalism and increasing demands for the separation of Quebec from the greater Canadian state. The dramatic emergence of the Social Credit party in the 1962 federal election has been characterized by some as a mere byproduct of nationalist protest in Quebec.[65] This claim is investigated by Pinard using the results of his election study. The data shows that supporters of the separatist movement in Quebec were, in fact, more likely to support Social Credit, but the strength of the relationship is not great and involves very few people.[66] Further, measures of ethnic consciousness employed in the study reveal that

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[62] Ibid. 76.
[63] Ibid. 77.
[64] Ibid. 81.
[65] Ibid. 83. Pinard cites, as examples of those who argue that Social Credit success was merely a phenomenon on nationalist protest, the work of W.P. Irvine, Marcel Rioux, Herbert Quinn and Ronald Cohen.
[66] Ibid. 81.

"nationalist" respondents were no more likely than "non-nationalist" respondents to be supporters of the Social Credit party.[67] On this basis, Pinard concludes that the separatist movement and nationalist spirit of the Quiet Revolution were largely unrelated to the success of Social Credit.

## Economic Conditions

The rapid economic growth and prosperity experienced throughout Canada following World War Two began to deteriorate significantly in the late 1950s. Conditioned by postwar abundance and optimism, the expectations of many Canadians were shattered by the onset of a serious recessionary period. The average annual growth rate of Canada's economy, which had measured 2.7 percent between 1950 and 1956, was reduced to 1 percent during the 1957 through 1963 period.[68] The first five years of the Diefenbaker administration were to witness an unemployment rate in Canada exceeding that found in any other industrialized nation.[69] Unemployment, which had not risen above 4.6 percent during the 1940 through 1958 period, grew dramatically, reaching a peak of 11.3 percent of the labour force in 1961.[70] A monetary crisis, which was ultimately to force an abrupt devaluation of the Canadian dollar in 1962, developed as foreign demand for the export of Canadian raw materials declined and corporate profits plummeted.[71] The federal government incurred record deficits as it struggled unsuccessfully to rescue the beleaguered Canadian economy. The fiscal crisis was to grow so grave that mere days

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[67] Ibid. 84.
[68] Peter C Newman, Renegade In Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 1973.) 202-203.
[69] Ibid. 202.
[70] Ibid. 8, 215.
[71] Ibid. 8, 201.

before the 1962 federal election the Conservative government introduced a wartime-style emergency austerity program.

The decline of the Canadian economy during the late 1950s and early 1960s was felt perhaps most acutely in the province of Quebec. Unemployment in Quebec substantially exceeded the Canadian average both in overall rate and degree of seasonal variation.[72] Within the province itself, unemployment was particularly concentrated in rural areas where, for example, up to 50 percent of family heads were found to have been jobless in 1959.[73] The overall deterioration of the provincial economy was most damaging to the interests of Quebec farmers whose income declined annually at a rate of 4.5 percent between 1951 and 1961.[74] Large scale farm desertion and the permanent loss of economic livelihood became prominent features of the Quebec rural landscape.[75]

**Third Parties and the Economy**

Pinard argues that the economic downturn experienced by much of Quebec society was a crucial factor in the startling electoral success of the Social Credit party. The fundamental message of the Social Credit party in the 1962 federal election was that it could bring rapid economic relief to the people of Quebec.[76] Pinard contends that change in the economic circumstances of social groups is the most general factor in the development of new political movements.[77] The key to a condition of economic strain is the fact of change which affects large numbers of people and thereby creates the potential for their

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[72] Pinard, 102.
[73] Ibid. 102.
[74] Ibid. 105.
[75] Ibid. 105.
[76] Ibid. 98.
[77] Ibid. 100.

political mobilization. For this reason long-term poverty, which involves no change, is not regarded by Pinard as a source of political radicalism.

Pinard identifies three specific forms of economic change which may act to produce support for third party movements. A short term decline in the overall fiscal condition of a society following a lengthy period of prosperity is the most important form of economic change for the development of new political parties.[78] In this instance, Pinard points to the Great Depression of the 1930s as playing a crucial role in the emergence of Social Credit in Alberta and of the CCF in Saskatchewan. Similarly, a continuous, long-term deterioration of the economic circumstances of a social group can potentially provide a strong base of support for new political parties.[79] Sectors of the economy which are fundamentally unsuited or unable to adapt to a rapidly changing business environment are particularly susceptible to such a steady decline. In this regard Pinard points specifically to the cases of small farmers and small business persons as they struggle and slowly succumb to the forces of modern international economies of scale. Finally, the coming to an end of a period of steady improvement in the economic fortunes of a social group can provide a source of support for a new political party if expectations nonetheless continue to rise.[80] Pinard sums up each of these scenarios with the proposition that new political movements develop as a response to a gap between the economic expectations of a social group and its actual living conditions.[81]

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[78] Ibid. 118.
[79] Ibid. 118.
[80] Ibid. 119.
[81] Ibid. 119.

## The Data

The survey data gathered by Pinard supported the proposition that economic decline was an important factor in the rise of a new political movement in Quebec. The data showed that unemployment in respondents' families was strongly correlated with support for the Social Credit party.[82] This finding held true for both blue collar and white collar occupations, with unemployment being strongly associated with a Social Credit voting intention.[83] Pinard constructed a more general index of economic grievances based upon respondents' evaluation of their own overall financial situation. He found that Social Credit support grew with increasing levels of economic dissatisfaction.[84] Similar results were generated by an index of economic conditions created to examine respondents' perception of the financial circumstance of others living in their region. Here, the perception of a deteriorating economic situation was also found to be associated with greater voter support for Social Credit candidates.[85] Significantly, this was most particularly the case for those who themselves were living under "good" economic conditions.[86] The role played by discontent over increased taxation was additionally considered by Pinard. The data indicated that support for the Social Credit party increased greatly amongst those respondents most displeased by rising taxes.[87] This factor was found to have been tied even more strongly to Social Credit support than were economic conditions.[88]

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[82] Ibid. 107.
[83] Ibid. 107.
[84] Ibid. 108.
[85] Ibid. 109.
[86] Ibid. 109.
[87] Ibid. 113.
[88] Ibid. 112.

## Criticisms of Pinard

In a 1973 review of The Rise Of A Third Party, Andre Blais was extremely critical of the methodology employed by Pinard and suggested that one-party dominance is not a necessary condition for the development of third party movements.[89] The major methodological flaw identified by Blais was that the electoral sample employed by Pinard was "biased toward verification of the hypothesis."[90] Pinard used a sample of provincial elections to measure the success of third parties, a sample which included only those contests in which the government was defeated or in which a third party emerged. Blais points out that in such a sample the conditions required for the emergence of a third party, and particularly the condition of one-party dominance, are far more likely to be found than in the case of a competitive two party system. Pinard acknowledged the validity of this critique and responded by testing a random sample of elections regardless of their outcome.[91] The retest verified the hypothesis of one-party dominance. Specifically, it demonstrated that weak opposition parties lead to the emergence of third parties while strong opposition parties produce "status quo elections."[92]

A more serious methodological objection raised by Blais concerns the validity of Pinard's measurement instruments and the resulting definition of one-party dominance. Pinard used the average percentage of votes received while in opposition as his indicator of the strength of the main opposition party in a political system.[93] He found that a situation of one party dominance was

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[89] Andre Blais "Third Parties In Canadian Provincial Politics", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 6  (September 1973) 422-438.
[90] Ibid. 428.
[91] For his response to the criticisms outlined in this section, see Maurice Pinard, "Third Parties in Canada Revisited: A Rejoinder and Elaboration of the Theory of One Party Dominance," Canadian Journal of Political Science,6 (September 1973) 439-460.
[92] Pinard, "A Rejoinder," 458.
[93] Pinard's justification for this measure is best expressed in Pinard, "A Rejoiner," 453.

created when the main opposition party was unable to win a third of the votes.[94] Blais argued that because one party dominance is "an abstract concept" it is best measured with multiple indicators.[95] In his critique, Blais proposed five possible measures of one-party dominance.[96] Pinard, in turn, rejected the indicators put forward by Blais.[97] Of particular interest is Pinard's contention that the average percentage of seats won by an opposition party is a poor indicator of one-party dominance. As is pointed out by Blais, Pinard himself has repeatedly argued that it is ultimately the perception of party strength by the electorate that is of key importance,[98] a situation of one-party dominance exists when the opposition party or parties are not perceived as a viable alternative to the incumbent government. Cairns has demonstrated that the Canadian electoral system introduces distortions in translating votes into seats.[99] It is possible in a single member plurality system for a party to capture a relatively large percentage of the vote and yet win no seats. Blais suggested that it can logically be argued that "seats are easier to perceive than votes."[100] If this is indeed the case, then the true measure of an opposition party's strength may lie in the number of legislative seats it is able to obtain. The response of Pinard to Blais' critique of the validity of his measurement instruments does not adequately resolve the issue.

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[94] Pinard, 37.

[95] Blais, 426.

[96] The measures proposed by Blais are: (1) the average proportion of votes the main opposition party received while in opposition, (2) the average proportion of seats the main opposition party received while in opposition, (3) the proportion of votes received by the main opposition party in the last election, (4) the number of years a party has been in power and, (5) party distances [the difference between the percentage of the vote received by each of the parties in an election]. See Blais, 426-427.

[97] Pinard, "A Rejoinder," 440.

[98] See, for example, Pinard, "A Rejoinder," 440.

[99] See Cairns, "The Electoral System,"

[100] Blais, 426.

Blais proposed an alternative theory to the one-party dominance hypothesis. He attributed the success of third parties in western Canada to low levels of party identification and a high level of vote switching in the region.[101] The greater inclination of western Canadians not to identify themselves with a particular political party was described by Blais as a "cultural factor" responsible for third party support.[102] Blais asserted that there was no evidence to sustain the view that one-party dominance was responsible for the development of third parties.[103] Pinard responded that the alternative theory presented by Blais described an intermediary condition of one-party dominance.[104] He argued that in a situation of one-party dominance, voter attachment to the established parties will be weak. Supporters of the opposition party will be few in number and will be weakly attached to it. Many who support the dominant party will do so simply because of the absence of an effective alternative and will similarly be weakly attached to that party. Pinard concluded that such a political system will have "many more floating voters" and will thus be conducive to third party development.[105]

## The Reform Party of Canada In Popular and Academic Literature

The popular and academic literature examining the RPC has grown in volume with the increasing political success of the party. The following discussion will briefly examine some of the more important contributions to this growing body of work.

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[101] Ibid. 429-430.
[102] Ibid. 430.
[103] Ibid. 430.
[104] Pinard, "A Rejoinder," 449-450.
[105] Ibid. 449.

Popular Literature

In 1992 Reform Party leader Preston Manning released a book titled The New Canada,[106] which was intended to provide Canadians with an introduction to the RPC leader and a guide to Reform thinking and policies. The book is divided into three sections: an autobiography of Manning, a history of the Reform Party and a discussion of RPC policies and outlooks.

In Part One of The New Canada Preston Manning sketches the course of personal and professional development that led ultimately to his selection as leader of the Reform Party. He describes his personal perspective as having been influenced by a number of factors including his father's political career, his decision to follow Christ and his experience working as a management consultant. Manning discusses the experience and lessons of his father in government and in party politics. He notes particularly that his father was known by community neighbors as "Mr. Manning who runs the dairy farm in the valley, and goes into town to run the government during the week."[107] Manning briefly discusses his father's 1967 book, Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians. The book, for which the younger Manning did the research, advocates "social conservative" policy and argues that the ideological positions of the federal parties did not provide Canadians with real partisan choice. The Reform leader goes on to state in his own book that "political parties may cease to live as vital democratic institutions."[108] He indicates that in this way both the Liberal Party under Pierre Trudeau and the Conservative Party under Brian Mulroney alienated and ultimately lost their supporters in the West.

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[106] Manning, Preston. The New Canada. Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992.
[107] Preston Manning, The New Canada. (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992), 13.
[108] Ibid. 50.

Manning states that his political beliefs are rooted in the traditions of Western populism. He describes "the common sense of the common people" as "the most potent political force on the face of the earth."[109] Manning reviews the history of populist parties in the West, but suggests that the origins of the "reform tradition" are to be found in nineteenth century Nova Scotia, Upper Canada and Lower Canada.[110] Manning refers to the "dark side" of populism and notes the effort by his father to eliminate anti-semitism from the Social Credit Party in Alberta. He explains that rather than join one of the traditional parties, it was his intention to wait for the next wave of western populism.

Part One of The New Canada includes a chapter dedicated to discussing Manning's personal religious beliefs. Manning states that he was raised "in the evangelical Christian tradition" and describes himself as a "practising Christian." [111] He indicates that "there is a relationship between private and public morality" and that fundamentalism is distinguished by "its unwillingness to compromise on matters of moral principle."[112] Manning acknowledges that his "perspective and contributions will reflect Christian convictions," but rejects the idea that he as a religious minority should storm Babylon to impose his views on the majority.[113] He does, however, comment that many Canadians are seeking stronger values in politics.

Part Two and Part Three of Preston Manning's book are, in effect, extended political pamphlets for the Reform Party. Part Two documents the history of the RPC from its formative stages through to its growing size and popularity in 1991. Manning weaves through this chronological account facts

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[109] Ibid. 25.
[110] Ibid. 26.
[111] Ibid. 96.
[112] Ibid. 103.
[113] Ibid. 106.

and ideas important to understanding the Reform movement. He discusses the phenomena of western alienation and quotes economist Robert Mansell who argues that federal taxation policy has transferred $100 billion away from western energy producing provinces.[114] The Reform leader suggests that the failure of the Mulroney Conservatives to act on issues they themselves had specifically identified as important to the West created a "political vacuum" from which the Reform Party would arise. These issues included Senate Reform, language policy and deficit reduction. Manning puts forward his view that politicians who try to "accommodate everyone may in the end fail to accommodate anyone."[115] He expresses the strong opposition of the Reform Party to racism and cites as an example his refusal to sign the nomination papers of controversial author and newspaper columnist Doug Collins.

Part Three of <u>The New Canada</u> provides an overview of Reform Party policies in a political pamphlet-like question and answer format. A number of key points are detailed in this section by Preston Manning. The Reform leader argues that Pierre Trudeau's view of Canada as an equal partnership between English and French was "doomed from the start."[116] He suggests that the dualist view was "even in the 1960s ... profoundly out of step with the times"[117] and has acted to reduce all other Canadians to "the status of second class citizens."[118] Manning remarks that the Reform Party is "not a traditional opposition party that opposes everything the government puts forward for the sake of opposition itself."[119] He is careful to explicitly state that the RPC is a federalist, not a separatist, party. Reformers are described by Manning as believing in "equality

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[114] Ibid. 121.
[115] Ibid. 163.
[116] Ibid. 303.
[117] Ibid. 303.
[118] Ibid. 305.
[119] Ibid. 307.

of opportunity, not equality of results."[120] He argues that a true democracy and a free market economy provide the best opportunity for individuals to realize their life's aspirations. Manning refers to the work of Thomas Sowell who argues that affirmative action programs are ineffective unless the disadvantaged group themselves are making a significant effort to attain a better life. The Reform leader is highly critical of special interest groups whose activities threaten to produce "a tyranny of minorities."[121] He discusses his "unified theory of representation" in which Reform Party MPs will at different times play the roles specified by the mandate, delegate and trustee theories of representation. Manning additionally reviews the personal characteristics required of Reform Party candidates who must be deemed trustworthy by their community, be committed to reform and not simply to protest, be knowledgeable and electable. A detailed discussion of Reform Party policy is provided in Chapter Three of this thesis.

Preston Manning concludes his book by challenging readers to "leave Old Canada for New Canada."[122] He identifies three features of the "Canadian psyche" which are roadblocks to the achievement of the New Canada. Manning argues that Canadians must "abandon the fears and insecurities of [their] political adolescence." [123] Quebecers must leave behind the conception of themselves as victims while English Canadians must overcome their fear of the United States. In addition, Canadians must move beyond "narrowness and pettiness of political vision."[124] Canada requires a stronger federal system not balkanization into provincial power bases. Finally, Manning condemns the

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[120] Ibid. 314.
[121] Ibid. 320.
[122] Ibid. 352.
[123] Ibid. 355.
[124] Ibid.356.

negative influence of those who say "it cannot be done."[125] He argues that Old Canada was built in spite of this view and suggests that the same course must be followed in building the New Canada.

Murray Dobbin has been perhaps the strongest critic of the Reform Party and particularly of its leader, Preston Manning. Dobbin's book, Preston Manning and the Reform Party,[126] was first published in 1991 and brings a left of centre political perspective to bear on the RPC. It provides a wide ranging and highly critical examination of the Reform Party and its leader. Dobbin's stated intention in writing his book was to explain to potential supporters of the RPC "what effect" the implementation of Reform Party policies would have on Canada.

The first chapters of Preston Manning and the Reform Party discuss the personal background and views of the Reform leader. Dobbin is particularly concerned with the role of Preston Manning's religious beliefs in the policies and objectives of the Reform Party. Early in the first chapter of the book, he describes a visit to the Manning family church. Dobbin suggests that the church mirrors the kind attended by Preston Manning as a child. The evangelical congregation is considered by Dobbin to be "culturally conservative, dominated by wealthy families"[127] and deliberately isolated from the mainstream of Canadian society. Dobbin indicates that a belief that "the Bible is correct in all details and cannot be deviated from"[128] lies at the heart of the evangelical church. He views the religious fundamentalism of Ernest and Preston Manning

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[125] Ibid. 357.
[126] Dobbin, Murray. Preston Manning and the Reform Party. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1991.
[127] Murray Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company: 1991) 7.
[128] Ibid. 11.

as glorifying "free enterprise and the individual."[129]   Dobbin argues that the religious beliefs of Preston Manning guide his actions in both the private and public sphere and require that he act to change in the world in accordance with these views.

Dobbin identifies Ernest Manning and Social Credit, the political culture of Alberta, and the strong American influence in that province as  providing other significant anchors in the belief system of Preston Manning.  He remarks that Ernest Manning "never let up in his rhetorical attack on the welfare state"[130] and that his  "commitment to a 'pure' conservative party was taken up by his son."[131]   Dobbin suggests that the business career of Preston Manning showed a "steadfast commitment to free-market principles and strategies.  He argues that all of the ideas outlined by Ernest Manning in <u>Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians</u> have been carried forward in the political agenda of Preston Manning.

Dobbin attributes the emergence of the Reform Party primarily to the failures of the Conservative government under Brian Mulroney.  The former prime minister is described by Dobbin as "elevat[ing] contempt for the popular will to a governing principle" and thereby "creat[ing] a national party out of a western protest party."[132] The election of a Conservative government and its inability to live up to promises made while in opposition was critical to the Reform enterprise.  Dobbin argues that the failure of the Conservatives, who were the traditional opposition party, provided an opportunity long waited for by

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[129] Ibid. 10.
[130] Ibid. 20.
[131] Ibid. 28.
[132] Ibid. v.

Preston Manning. The Reform leader intended to pursue his "radical free market agenda" by riding a "wave of popular discontent."[133]

A chapter of <u>Preston Manning and the Reform Party</u> is devoted to reviewing other organizations and individuals to whom the RPC is in some fashion connected. Amongst others, the chapter discusses the role played by oil companies, the National Citizens Coalition, the Byfield family, the Northern Foundation and William Gairdner. Dobbin argues that "you can tell a great deal about ... a political party by who their friends are."[134] He states that "the friends" of the Reform Party are exclusively and strongly right wing in their political orientation. Dobbin remarks that "important sectors of the population which deserve to be consulted"[135] are not connected to the RPC. He cites as examples farm organizations, cultural groups and labour unions. Dobbin suggests that, regardless of Preston Manning's denials, the exclusive support of right wing individuals and organizations will necessarily drive the party to the right.

Throughout his book Dobbin is particularly critical of the "direct democracy" devices used within the Reform Party. The core of his criticism of the RPC as a grassroots, populist organization is presented in a chapter titled "Managing the Membership." Dobbin examines the change in Reform Party policy concerning the GST. Opposition to the new tax had been a key early policy of the RPC . He describes the Goods and Services Tax as a "gift" to Preston Manning and states that the GST provided Reformers with "an opening in the East."[136] Dobbin discusses the use by Preston Manning and then party

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[133] Ibid. 75.

[134] Ibid. 114.
[135] Ibid. 114.
[136] Ibid. 118.

policy coordinator Stephen Harper of a "straw vote" on the GST, conducted through the party newspaper, to sway delegates to the RPC 1991 Assembly. The vote indicated that Reformers favoured revision over revoking of the GST, but Dobbin points out that only one percent of the party's membership in fact voted to keep the tax. Other internal Reform Party procedures such as Task Forces, referenda, the screening of grassroots policy suggestions and the direction of resolutions at party conventions are strongly criticized by Dobbin as manipulating party members to get the right answers. Dobbin notes that policy making power within the Reform Party has been highly centralized within the party's inner circle. He concludes that "the Reform Party stands out as a party dominated by its leader and its central headquarters."[137]

Dobbin is concerned with illustrating how he believes Reform Party policy would impact on Canadians. He describes RPC social and economic policy as "negative" and "hostile to the idea and purpose of modern government."[138] Dobbin finds that the social and economic policy of the Reform Party is consistent "throughout with a conservative, free market philosophy."[139] He remarks, however, that many Reform policies "seem characterized by a calculated ambiguity designed either to camouflage the party's true intentions or permit it to deny claims against it by those who disagree with their policy."[140] The media, in Dobbin's view, have done a poor job of uncovering the real meaning of Reform Party policies. He concludes that the implementation of RPC policies would dramatically alter the nature of Canada and urges his

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[137] Ibid. 155.
[138] Ibid. 178.
[139] Ibid. 180.
[140] Ibid. 179.

readers to see that there are "no easy solutions" and "no messiahs who will lead us out of the problems we have."[141]

A more balanced, although none the less critical, examination of the Reform Party has been provided by Sydney Sharpe and Don Braid in their book titled Storming Babylon.[142] Sharpe and Braid, like Murray Dobbin, focus much of their discussion on the personal viewpoints and motivations of Preston Manning. They contend that the beliefs of Manning "are so radical they would entirely change the nature of Canada"[143] and that if Reform Party policies were implemented Canada would be "a vastly different country, and very likely a country without Quebec."[144] Sharpe and Braid are concerned that "many people are joining the Reform movement because they like bits and pieces of its policies enough to ignore the parts that do not appeal to them."[145] They suggest that the RPC is more a populist movement than a political party, although it is controlled and directed by a "modern political apparatus." The authors argue that the success of the Reform Party was due primarily to the failure of the traditional parties, particularly the Mulroney led Progressive Conservatives.

Storming Babylon reviews the joint efforts of the Mannings in the 1960s and 1970s to "create a ... resurgence on the right."[146] Sharpe and Braid suggest that the intellectual foundations of "the New Canada" are to be found in the mutual beliefs and collaboration of Ernest and Preston Manning. The goal of the Mannings, in the view of Sharpe and Braid, has always been "the wholesale transfer of major Social Credit ideals into a new party that can win

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[141] Ibid. 221.
[142] Sharpe, Sydney and Don Braid. Storming Babylon. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1992.
[143] Sydney Sharpe and Don Braid, Storming Babylon (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1992) 2.
[144] Ibid. 10.
[145] Ibid. 33.
[146] Ibid. 60.

the allegiance of modern Canada."[147] Sharpe and Braid examine three collaborative documents written by Ernest and Preston Manning between 1967 and 1970, and argue that the views and intentions expressed in these mutual efforts are fully reflected in the policies of the Reform Party of Canada. Sharpe and Braid see in these documents - Political Realignment, A White Paper on Human Resources Development, and Requests for Proposals and Social Contracts - a radical right agenda that a small minority would seek to impose on the majority.

Like Murray Dobbin, Sharpe and Braid are particularly concerned about the impact of religion on Preston Manning as a politician and on Reform Party policy. They contend that "like many populist leaders in Canadian history, the Mannings believe themselves to be religiously inspired."[148] The Manning family believe in the literal truth of the Bible. Evangelical Christianity is described by Sharpe and Braid as the source of Preston Manning's "attitudes, beliefs, goals and dreams"[149] and as "central [to his] political beliefs."[150] Sharpe and Braid argue that the ultimate political goal of Preston Manning is to create "a well ordered Christian society."[151] They suggest that the Reform leader views himself "as a kind of Christian guerrilla working in a corrupt, secular world."[152] Sharpe and Braid indicate that Preston Manning's religious beliefs cause him to view the purpose of government as being to protect the freedom of the individual to make religious choice. All forms of collectivism "in government, unions and business" are a threat to this freedom.[153] Individualism is the core

[147] Ibid. 60.
[148] Ibid. 75.
[149] Ibid. 81.
[150] Ibid. 2.
[151] Ibid. 77.
[152] Ibid. 84.
[153] Ibid. 76.

value for Preston Manning and he has, in the view of Sharpe and Braid, made it the core value of Reform Party ideology and policy.

Sharpe and Braid regard the unanimous support given to the Meech Lake Accord by all of the traditional federal parties as the key factor in the rise of the Reform Party. Canadians who opposed the accord could not turn to one of the established parties to support and express their viewpoint. Further, in the eyes of Sharpe and Braid, Canadians "came to resent the constant focus on Quebec."[154] The Reform Party, which opposed passage of the Accord, was positioned perfectly to win the support of these Canadians. The Reform Party has taken an uncompromising stance on Quebec. Provinces in the New Canada are to be absolutely equal. Preston Manning has told Quebecers to define their own future and then return to the constitutional bargaining table to determine if that vision can be reconciled with the New Canada. The Reform Party alone among federal political parties has acknowledged that Quebecers may chose to leave the Canadian state. Sharpe and Braid observe that the RPC's position on Quebec has brought the support of many people "who have no other use for Reform Party policies on economic and social issues."[155] They suggest that support for the RPC "on the Quebec issue is often motivated by anger as much as by logic."[156] Sharpe and Braid note that the "hardball" constitutional tactics employed by Preston Manning are precisely like those used by Quebec against English Canada. This tactic is viewed by Sharpe and Braid as being "responsible for much of the party's popularity."[157]

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[154] Ibid. 149.
[155] Ibid. 150.
[156] Ibid. 150.
[157] Ibid. 154.

Sharpe and Braid comment that "the bond of trust between Preston Manning and his party is unique in Canadian politics today."[158] They cite as evidence the ability of the Reform leader to convince his audiences to support the GST, despite the original opposition of the RPC itself and polling evidence showing that a large majority of Canadians oppose the tax. Sharpe and Braid remark that Manning's "bond with the party runs so deep that members accept inconsistencies from him that they simply would not tolerate in another politician."[159] However, they observe that the Reform leader "constantly walks a tightrope between the ultra-conservatives and moderates in his party."[160] The appeal of Preston Manning to his supporters, in the view of Sharpe and Braid, lies in his appearing "'average" and preaching "common sense" solutions to Canada's problems. Sharpe and Braid note in particular the personal and political contrast of the Reform leader with former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.

In the conclusion to Storming Babylon, Sharpe and Braid speculated that the future of the Reform Party was dependent largely upon the outcome of Canada's constitutional negotiations. If the constitutional debate was to end in failure, they suggested that Reform Party support could increase dramatically. If, however, the Conservative government could "save the nation," Sharpe and Braid argued that support for the Reform Party could plummet. The failure of the Charlottetown Accord and the success of RPC candidates in the 1993 general election confirms the accuracy of this speculation. Sharpe and Braid indicate that in the longer term a key question becomes "how many Canadians really want Preston Manning's policies?"[161] They cite Allen Tupper, who has

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[158] Ibid. 15.
[159] Ibid. 17.
[160] Ibid. 193.
[161] Ibid. 192.

remarked that "as more voters discover what the Reformers really stand for, they will be turned off."[162] Sharpe and Braid argue that providing simple solutions to complex problems is both the "appeal and failure" of the Reform Party. They predict regardless that Preston Manning will continue in his efforts "always hoping to convince the unbelievers that his way is the best one, not only for their country, but for their very souls."[163]

## Academic Literature

Limitations of space and the focus of this thesis have ruled out a comprehensive review of all academic work on the Reform Party of Canada. The following discussion seeks to examine academic works which have informed the writing of this thesis in its various stages of development. An effort has been made to include a range of works examining the origins, supporters, and policies of the Reform Party.

A 1992 paper by Flanagan and Lee titled "The Roots of Reform" examines the nineteenth century origins of the "reform tradition."[164] The paper, noting that Preston Manning considers the RPC to be a part of this tradition, discusses Joseph Howe and the Reform Party of Nova Scotia, George Brown and the Reform Party of Upper Canada, and the political career and beliefs of Frederick Haultain. Flanagan and Lee suggest that four themes shared by these nineteenth century Canadian "Reformers" are echoed by the concerns of the modern Reform Party. The common themes are economical government, participatory democracy, economic exploitation of the periphery by the centre and political dominance by or via Quebec. The paper proposes that the

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[162] Ibid. 192.
[163] Ibid. 195.
[164] Thomas Flanagan and Martha Lee, "The Roots of Reform," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, P.E.I., June 1992.

common themes have arisen because the nineteenth century and current day Reformers share a tradition of populism.

Flanagan and Lee incorporate Canovan's classification of populism to examine the politics of the Reform Party. They identify the RPC as being a movement of both "farmers' radicalism" and "political populism." It is the characteristics of "political populism" that Flanagan and Lee identify as being shared by the nineteenth century Reform movements and the modern Reform Party. They predict that the future development of the RPC will see the qualities of "political populism" become more important to the party than those of "farmer's radicalism. The 1993 electoral campaign of the Reform Party, which emphasized the dominance of special interests over the concerns of average Canadians, would seem to confirm the accuracy this prediction.

A paper presented by Flanagan and Ellis to the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association presents a demographic profile of Reform Party members.[165] The paper, "A Comparative Profile of the Reform Party of Canada," is based upon the findings of a 1991 telephone survey of RPC members. The survey found that the Reform membership was two-thirds male, was older than the general population, and was split nearly fifty-fifty between rural and urban residence. Reform members were found to have higher education levels than the Canadian average and to come predominantly from "the middle, middle class of Canadian society."[166] Flanagan and Ellis report that only a little over one-third of RPC members had previously belonged

[165] Thomas Flanagan and Faron Ellis, "A Comparative Profile of the Reform Party of Canada," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, P.E.I., June 1992.

[166] Thomas Flanagan and Faron Ellis, "A Comparative Profile of the Reform Party of Canada," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, P.E.I., June 1992, 8.

to another federal political party and that nearly three-quarters of these members were former Progressive Conservatives.

The paper compares the demographic characteristics of delegates to the 1989 Reform Party Assembly with those of delegates to conventions of the three traditional parties. The comparison indicated that the Reform Party gender gap was equivalent to the NDP, was "only slightly' larger than the Conservatives', and was larger than the Liberals'. Flanagan and Ellis suggest that the gender gap between the parties would have been nearly equivalent were it not for deliberate efforts by the Liberals and NDP to influence the gender distribution of convention delegates. The comparison additionally shows that delegates to the Reform Assembly were older than delegates to the conventions of the traditional parties. The paper concludes that, with the exception of age, large demographic differences did not exist between members of the Reform Party and members of the traditional parties.

Archer and Ellis have employed the results of a survey of Reform delegates to the 1992 RPC National Assembly to further examine the demographic characteristics and ideological/policy orientations of Reform members.[167] In their paper "Opinion Structure of Reform Party Activists," Archer and Ellis confirm many of the demographic characteristics of Reform members which were reported by Flanagan and Ellis. Reform Party delegates were found to be mainly older males who were well educated and who had relatively high incomes. As was found in the earlier work of Flanagan and Ellis, slightly over one-third of the delegates had been active in other parties and fully two-thirds of this group had some political experience with the Progressive Conservatives. Archer and Ellis note that in 1984 eighty percent of the Reform delegates had

[167] Keith Archer and Faron Ellis, "Opinion Structure of Reform Party Activists," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 1993.

voted for the Conservatives and that in 1988 forty-five percent of the delegates had voted Tory. The survey finds that nearly one hundred percent of RPC delegates claimed English as their first language.

Archer and Ellis report that Reform delegates viewed the RPC as being the only right of centre party in the Canadian political system. On a seven point left-right scale, the delegates placed each of the traditional parties to the left of centre. The "populist sentiment" of the Reform Party delegates is measured by Archer and Ellis through a survey question asking respondents to rate the power of different groups to influence government policy-making. The results indicate that Reformers perceive average voters and the West to have far less power over government policy than Quebec, Central Canada, lobby groups and "Charter Canadians." Archer and Ellis find that the attitudes of the Reform delegates on several policy matters showed considerable consensus. The Reformers were in strong agreement concerning opposition to the modern welfare state, concern about the government deficit, opposition to special constitutional status for Quebec, and support for changes to Canada's immigration policy. Archer and Ellis stress, however, that the Reform delegates did not show complete ideological uniformity. For example, their findings reveal that the Reformers often disagreed with one another on policy matters concerning the relationship between Canada and the United States. Archer and Ellis speculated that this division could prove fatal to the Reform Party in the 1993 general election if the campaign focused upon the North American Free Trade Agreement.

Steve Patten, in papers presented at annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, has examined the populist politics and middle class support of the Reform Party. In his 1993 paper, Patten focuses a large

part of his discussion on the conceptual definition of populism. [168] He identifies four approaches to understanding populism which have been employed by theorists - descriptive typologies of populism, populism as a product of modernization in a capitalist system, populism as an ideological expression of a specific class, and populism as the "people/ powerful interests antagonism".[169] Patten argues that a populist politics based upon the conflict between the people and powerful interests requires that a party or movement put forward to potential supporters an understanding of the identities and roles of these actors. It is important to note that this explanatory aspect of populist politics is well described by Pinard's conception of a generalized belief.

Patten's 1993 paper examines how the Reform Party identifies the people and the powerful interests in their rhetoric and policies. He suggests that for Reformers the powerful interests in the modern Canadian state are the government bureaucracy and special interest groups. The people are identified by the Reform Party, argues Patten, as middle class taxpayers who are not somehow involved with special interest groups. It is suggested by Patten that the RPC's conception of the people is narrowed by the Reform view that Canadians are united by those characteristics which are not held by special interest groups. He briefly examines RPC policy concerning bilingualism, multiculturalism and immigration as examples of the party's emphasis on the common characteristics of Canadians and rejection of divisive characteristics as the basis for policy making. Patten views the populism of the Reform Party as

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[168] Steve Patten, "Populist Politics? A Critical Re-Examination of "Populism" and the Character of Reform Party's Populist Politics," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993.

[169] Steve Patten, "Populist Politics? A Critical Re-Examination of "Populism" and the Character of Reform Party's Populist Politics," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993, 11.

seeking to mobilize the middle class against the bureaucracy and special interests which are seen to dominate government decision making.

In his 1994 paper titled "A Political Economy of Reform: Understanding Middle Class Support For Manning's Right-liberation Populism," Patten uses a regulationist approach to examine the appeal of the Reform Party to middle class Canadians.[170] The regulationist approach suggests that the postwar "accumulation regime" and supporting "social paradigm" have been destabilized by recent economic decline and constitutional crises. This "crisis of regulation" has, in turn, brought about a crisis of the party system. Patten argues that the traditional parties played an important role in defining and creating acceptance for the postwar economic and social system. The postwar consensus was supported by Canadians because of economic growth and the expectation of future prosperity. Economic decline beginning in the 1970s, however, caused Canadians to begin to question the assumptions which underlay the consensus. The constitutional crises of the 1980s and 1990s and the continued support of the major parties for the dualist view of Canada further undermined support for the consensus. As a result, the traditional parties which helped to build support for the "accumulation regime" came to be seen by some as no longer acting in the interest of most Canadians.

Patten proposes that the Reform Party has emerged at a time of crisis when Canadians are seeking to find a new "accumulation regime." The Reform Party has offered to Canadians a new and different vision of their collective future. Patten characterizes the Reform vision as "neo-liberal restructuring

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[170] Steve Patten, "A Political Economy of Reform: Understanding Middle Class Support for Manning's Right-Liberation Populism," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta, June 1994.

discourse."[171] The neo-liberal view holds that economic growth will be produced by a dramatic reduction in the role of government and particularly by the elimination of governmental intervention in the economic sphere. Patten argues that Reformers have combined neo-liberal policies with a populist attack on special interest groups. Reform rhetoric and policy suggests that average Canadians - the people - have been hurt by the dominant influence of special interest groups and by the government's unwillingness to abandon these interests and implement necessary economic reforms. This combination has been, in Patten's view, the key to middle class support for the Reform Party.

Harrison and Krahn employed a 1991 survey of Alberta residents to test the application of two populist theories to the Reform Party of Canada.[172] They suggest that each theory can explain some aspects of RPC support in Alberta. Hofstadter's theory of nativism is the first to be discussed. Nativism is defined as "a belief system combining nationalism with prejudicial attitudes based on ethnicity, religion and/or race."[173] This belief system exists "amongst social groups which hold the same status characteristics, but not the economic or political power of the dominant class."[174] Nativist attitudes are most likely to emerge during times of social and economic crisis. Harrison and Krahn create a nativist classification of survey respondents based upon ethnic heritage, religious affiliation and place of birth. Numerical values are assigned to each of these variables and are used to derive "nativist", semi-nativist" and "outsider"

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[171] Steve Patten, "A Political Economy of Reform: Understanding Middle Class Support for Manning's Right-Liberation Populism," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta, June 1994, 26.

[172] Harrison, Trevor and Harvey Krahn. Populism And The Rise Of The Reform Party In Alberta . Edmonton: Department of Sociology University of Alberta, May 1992.

[173] Trevor Harrison and Harvey Krahn, Populism And The Rise Of The Reform Party In Alberta . (Edmonton: Department of Sociology University of Alberta, May 1992) 2.

[174] Ibid. 2.

categories. Harrison and Krahn find that support for the Reform party was more likely to come from those labeled as "nativists' and "semi-nativists," than from those described as "outsiders." The "outsiders" were found to most strongly support the Liberal party. Multivariate analysis controlling for the influence of other confounding variables is used by Harrison and Krahn to confirm these findings.

Macpherson's theory of the petite bourgeoisie is the second view of populism examined by Harrison and Krahn. Macpherson argued that support for Social Credit in Alberta came from the rural petite bourgeoisie because of the quasi-colonial economic position of this class and of their province. Harrison and Krahn find that farmers provided the "only significant" class-based support for the Reform Party. Multivariate analysis was again used by Harrison and Krahn to confirm this finding, and they concluded that farmers were "significantly more likely than nonfarmers" to support the RPC.[175] Harrison and Krahn acknowledge that other variables play a role in support for the Reform Party. The 1991 survey of Albertans indicated that support for the Reform Party was more likely to come from men, homeowners, and Calgary and rural area residents. Harrison and Krahn additionally find that political alienation, opposition to multiculturalism and to Quebec as a "distinct society" and negative views of gender equality policies were positively correlated with support for the RPC.

Harrison and Krahn argue that the rise of the Reform Party is best understood through populist theory. They define populist movements and parties as phenomena which emerge in defense of social groups who perceive themselves to be threatened. Harrison and Krahn suggest that support for the

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[175] Ibid. 15.

Reform Party comes from social groups who have been negatively affected by socioeconomic change in Canada, particularly change since the 1960s. They argue that the traditional positions held by the RPC on many issues appeal to those who "have lost some power and privilege."[176] Farmers, nativist groups, and men, all of whom were "over-represented" in the ranks of the Reform Party, are cited as examples.

In her paper titled "The Past Revisited?: The Reform Party And The Dominant Explanations Of Minor Party Development," Livianna Tossutti reviews three approaches to explaining the emergence of third parties and applies each to the RPC. [177] The institutional approach is concerned with identifying how the legal structure of a political system can act to encourage or discourage the formation of new parties. Tossutti argues that several institutional factors have played a conducive role in the development of the Reform Party. Regional protest by the West within the traditional parties has been stifled by the lack of primaries and by conventions requiring strict party discipline. Tossutti suggests that as a result the party system has failed to represent the views and concerns of Western Canadians. She cites Preston Manning, who views the formation of the Reform Party as a direct response to the failure of the Conservatives and Liberals to represent the interests of the West. Tossutti additionally argues that the process of executive federalism has acted to facilitate the development of the RPC. She refers to survey data which indicates that dissatisfaction with western representation within the traditional parties and in the constitutional negotiation process was a key issue for many Reformers.

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[176] Ibid. 20.

[177] Livianna S. Tossutti, "The Past Revisited?: The Reform Party And The Dominant Explanations Of Minor Party Development," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993.

The cultural approach suggests that certain cultural qualities of a society may act to facilitate or inhibit the emergence of third parties. Several aspects of western Canadian culture are seen by Tossutti as having played an important role in the development of the Reform Party. Tossutti examines the volatility of election outcomes in the East and the West, and finds that partisanship is significantly weaker in western Canada. She refers to Blais who has argued that parties fail to retain supporters in a region if they are unable to appeal to the culture of that area. The populist tradition of the West and the religious character of past political reform movements have, in Tossutti's view, provided fertile ground for the development of the RPC.

The structural approach looks to the "social, economic and political environment"[178] of a society to find explanations of minor party development. Tossutti examines the Pinard theory of third party development as an example of this approach. She applies his theory to Reform's election outcomes in the 1988 general election. Tossutti finds that the theory of one-party dominance applies well to Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, but fits less well with British Columbia. The Reform Party was most successful in Alberta, which was strongly characterized by one-party dominance, and least successful in Saskatchewan and Manitoba which were characterized by two party competition. The relative success of the RPC in British Columbia, which at the federal level had a competitive party system, does not support the Pinard hypothesis.

Tossutti analyzes the economic conditions of the western provinces as an indicator of Pinard's factor of strain. Her results provide a partial

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[178] Livianna S. Tossutti, "The Past Revisited?: The Reform Party And The Dominant Explanations Of Minor Party Development," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993, 9.

confirmation of Pinard's theory. Tossutti finds that on a nationwide basis until 1992, support for the Reform Party, as measured by polling data, grew during difficult economic times for Canadians. However, after this period of growing popularity, support for the party dropped precipitously despite continuing economic bad times. Tossutti further refined her analysis by looking at economic conditions and support for the Reform Party in each of the four western provinces. She finds that in Alberta the RPC's 1988 election campaign was most successful in those areas which had experienced significant economic decline. However, in 1991 Reform support increased across all of the Prairie provinces during a period of relative economic recovery and then declined in 1992 despite a worsening of economic conditions. The outcomes of this analysis for British Columbia produced a similar mixed result. Tossutti suggests that the establishment of new parties may be associated with periods of economic decline, but that growth in support for the party is not necessarily linked to economic circumstances. She concludes that the institutional and cultural approaches provide better explanations for the rise of the Reform Party than does the structural approach.

David Laycock, in a paper titled "Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project," examines Reform Party views on representation and public life.[179] Laycock begins his examination of RPC political thought by discussing the party's populist conception of Canadian society. The populism of the Reform Party argues, in Laycock's view, that special interests and the government bureaucracy have formed a modern welfare state elite harmful to average people. He suggests that for Reformers a special interest is "any group that asks for or benefits from government agencies efforts to marginally offset

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[179] David Laycock, "Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project." A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993.

the operation of market principles."[180] These special interests include feminist groups, ethnic groups and public sector unions. Laycock indicates that Reform Party discourse is "usually careful" not to define business as a special interest.

Laycock describes "the people" in Reform populist thought as "all those who are not members of or represented by the special interests."[181] This definition of "the people" has, according to Laycock, strong appeal to the middle class who feel threatened by economic change and alienated from government policy making. In effect, the middle class have been told by the RPC that they are unrepresented in government decision making because of the powerful influence exerted by special interests. Further, Laycock remarks, the RPC view holds that the traditional parties have become the exclusive tool of the special interests. Preston Manning's anti-politician leadership style is seen by Laycock as a direct consequence of the Reform Party's conception of "the people."

Laycock discusses Reform Party thought on federalism and the constitution. He argues that an attack on the province of Quebec's alleged privileged status is central to the Reform Party critique of Canada's federal arrangement. Laycock suggests that Reformers view Quebec as having "held the rest of the country hostage in fiscal and constitutional terms." [182] In the Reform view, Quebec is seen as a fiscal and constitutional special interest. Laycock argues that Reform constitutional policy amounts to "an explicit rejection of the 'compact theory' of confederation and Canadian federalism."[183]

Laycock concludes his paper by arguing that the populism of the Reform Party has taken the form of a "neo-conservative re-definition of the public

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[180] David Laycock, "Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project." A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993, 4.
[181] Ibid. 6.
[182] Ibid. 8.
[183] Ibid. 9.

sphere."[184] He notes that this sharply distinguishes the Reform Party from its populist predecessors who viewed more, not less, public participation as the solution to Canada's economic and social problems. Laycock is extremely critical of this approach and suggests that Reform populism represents an attack on politics itself. He argues that in this conception citizenship could come to mean "little more than rational market behaviour."[185]

The popular and academic work discussed in this section provides valuable information and insights into the Reform Party of Canada. This work has, however, largely viewed the Reform Party in isolation from other third party movements and often focuses on very specific aspects of the RPC. It is useful to cast the Reform Party into a broader theoretical framework. Maurice Pinard has created a generally applicable explanation for the emergence of new political parties. This thesis will now turn to an examination of the fit and usefulness of Pinard's theory with the emergence of the RPC.

## The Reform Party of Canada

The Pinard theory of one-party dominance, building upon the social movement work of Neil Smelser, provides a potentially valuable tool for the analysis of third party development. The determinants of structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized beliefs, and mobilization are constructs well suited to an inquiry into the appearance of new political parties. The chapters to follow will the examine the Reform Party from this perspective, and will begin with a discussion of the history and policies of the party.

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[184] Ibid. 23.
[185] Ibid. 26.

# CHAPTER THREE:  THE REFORM PARTY OF CANADA

In times such as these, Canadians have created great "reform movements" that have challenged vested interests, changed inflexible structures and swept aside governments previously considered invincible.  Nowhere has this reform tradition been more evident than in the vast expanse of the Canadian Northwest.

Preston Manning[186]

The politics of western Canada have historically been distinguished by a tradition of populist third party or protest movements.  From the Progressives to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation to Social Credit, and including many other less successful examples, western Canadians have often turned to third parties to combat the perceived injustices of the federation.  The Reform Party of Canada emerged in 1987 as a new and potentially powerful version of a western protest party.  This chapter will discuss the formation, policies and key events in the short history of the party.

## Origins

In late 1986 three separate, largely informal groups operating in Alberta and British Columbia arrived at the conclusion that some action had to be taken to force the federal government to address seriously the longstanding grievances of western Canada.  In both Calgary and Edmonton, lawyers and oil company officials gathered to discuss possible courses of action.  Each group turned for added input to Edmonton management consultant Preston Manning, who had sent a letter to key western business leaders outlining his view that change had to be made to the federal political system.  Manning, the author of several studies for the Canada West Foundation and the organizer of two failed western political associations, advocated the formation of a new populist

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[186] E. Preston Manning, "Reform Party of Canada: Platform & Statement of Principles" (1989) 3.

movement. Simultaneously in Vancouver, Stan Roberts, a former President of the Canada West Foundation and of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, was beginning to organize a new western-based federal political party. The three groups merged to form the Reform Association of Canada.

The inaugural meeting of the Reform Association, the Western Assembly on Canada's Economic and Political Future, was held in Vancouver in May 1987 and attracted some 300 participants. The mandate of the Assembly was to develop a western agenda for change and to determine the most effective means for its advancement. The Assembly voted 75 per cent in favour of a resolution to create a new political party dedicated to securing "economic and constitutional equality for the West within Confederation."[187]

The founding convention of the new party was held in Winnipeg in October 1987. The party was officially named the Reform Party of Canada (RPC) and, after the withdrawal of the candidacy of Stan Roberts, Preston Manning was acclaimed its leader. The Reform Party was explicitly established as a western protest movement seeking change in federal institutions. The party constitution provided that no Reform candidates would be permitted to run east of Manitoba. The movement was not, however, to call for western separatism. Under the slogan of "The West Wants In", Reformers would pursue a better deal for the region within Confederation.

**The Reform Party Platform**

The official platform of the Reform Party has been built upon a foundation of longstanding western Canadian political and economic complaints. The substance of these regional issues, a concern with costly, overly interventionist,

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[187] Reform Party of Canada, "In the Reform Tradition", The Reformer (no date) 1.

nonrepresentative and nonresponsive government, has in recent times taken on a significant national resonance. Many Canadians nationwide have come to share in these concerns. The Reform Party has thus been able to retain, in principle, the integrity of its founding aims and beliefs while seeking to establish itself as a genuine national political force. The key elements of the Reform program may be considered to fall into five policy categories.[188]

Fiscal Policy

The "fiscal house" in Canada is out of order, suggest Reformers, and government must learn to live within its own means. A Reform government, having deficit reduction as its key fiscal priority, would make significant cuts in all areas of federal expenditure. Such measures would involve the wholesale elimination of some programs, including most notably official bilingualism and multiculturalism. The RPC takes the view that these two programs, in particular, constitute an inappropriate use of public funds. A Reform government would greatly reduce or eliminate altogether federal subsidies and grants to crown corporations, private business and special interest groups. As part of this deficit reduction program, Reformers would introduce measures requiring that the federal budget be balanced in each three year period or an election called. The party suggests that reductions in federal spending should begin with cuts to "the pay, pensions and perks of politicians, political parties, and parliamentary institutions."[189] As a symbolic gesture of the Reform Party's commitment to fiscal restraint, MP Deborah Grey and Senator Stan Waters voluntarily took a ten percent reduction in their salaries in October 1990. In the 1993 election

[188] The Reform Party is notable for its production of an annual "Blue Book" in which official party policy is set out. The policies described in this section are drawn from the 1991 edition of the Blue Book.

[189] Reform Party of Canada "Blue Sheet: Principles, Policies an Election Platform" (1993) 5.

campaign, the RPC put forward a plan dubbed "zero in three" to eliminate the federal deficit within three years. The plan called for $19 billion in spending cuts and $16.5 billion in new tax revenue produced by annual growth rate of 3.5 percent. A key policy in the official Reform Party platform had been strong opposition to the establishment of the federal Goods and Services Tax. The party has since reversed itself and now proposes the gradual elimination of the GST when the federal budget has been balanced. The RPC favors the creation of a flat tax system.

Economic Policy

The platform of the Reform Party strongly supports the free enterprise system and the operation of the market economy. The economic model endorsed by Reformers is primarily concerned with minimizing intervention on the part of government. The economic policies of the party, including those addressing energy, agriculture and industrial development, call for a greatly increased reliance on market mechanisms and an accordingly reduced government presence. The Reform Party supported passage of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and advocates the further elimination of international and interprovincial barriers to trade.

Social Policy

The social policies of the Reform platform are closely guided by the overriding fiscal agenda of the party. Reformers do not support the concept of universality in Canadian social programs. Party policy holds that universality is too costly because it provides for those not in need and does not adequately serve those citizens who genuinely require assistance. A Reform government

would seek to more selectively target social policy measures and to encourage communities and private sector organizations to increase their role in providing social services. The RPC has proposed that Unemployment Insurance and the Canada Pension Plan be re-organized so that they are entirely self funding. Such an approach, Reformers believe, is required in order to ensure the long term financial sustainability of Canada's social welfare safety net. The party's 1993 "zero in three" election platform called for $9 billion in cuts to unemployment insurance, welfare and old age security benefits.

The immigration policy advocated by the Reform Party is similarly based upon fiscal considerations. Immigration to Canada is to be based exclusively upon economic criteria. Potential immigrants will be judged as to whether they possess the "human capital" required to achieve quickly economic self sufficiency in Canada. The party, while maintaining its support for the acceptance of "genuine refugees", has sought to emphasize its policy of immediate deportation of illegal immigrants. During the 1993 election campaign Preston Manning suggested that, until Canada's economy improves, the number of immigrants entering the country each year should be reduced to between 100,000 and 150,000 from the current figure of 250,000.

The use of the federal spending power in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, such as education and medicare, is strongly opposed by Reformers. RPC policy proposes that funds for social programs should be transferred from the federal treasury to provincial governments in the form of unconditional grants. In this manner programs may be better tailored to accommodate local needs and clear lines of political accountability will be established.

The Reform Party election platform strongly emphasizes its commitment to the reform of the Canadian justice system. The party seeks to "make

Canadian streets, homes, schools and communities safer for all our citizens -
especially women and children."[190] This objective would be achieved through
more rigorous sentencing and parole policies and with the establishment of
more severe consequences for young offenders. Reformers oppose the
changing of the traditional RCMP dress code for religious or ethnic reasons.

Constitutional Policy

The Reform constitutional position rejects the "Old Canada" conception of
a partnership of two founding cultures and languages, and embraces instead a
vision of a "New Canada" which is to be a balanced federation of equal
provinces. Reformers argue that the ongoing issue of Quebec's position in
Confederation provides a unique opportunity to bring about significant change
to Canada's constitutional arrangements. Constitutional reform is inevitable, it
is suggested, whether Quebec chooses to remain in or separate from Canada.

At the heart of Reform Party constitutional policy lies the issue of Senate
reform. The establishment of a Triple E Senate in the Parliament of Canada
has been for many Reformers the raison d'etre of the party. The RPC platform
holds that only through such a Senate, which is elected, represents each
province equally and commands effective powers, can provincial equality be
established and protected in Confederation.

Opposition to the passage of the Meech Lake Accord was a key plank in
the Reform Party's constitutional platform. The Reform rejection of the Accord
stemmed from a number of specific complaints, of which three were of greatest
importance. The granting of distinct society status to Quebec was viewed by
Reformers as providing increased powers to that province while no comparable

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[190] Ibid.

gains were to be made by the other members of Confederation. The party contended further that the Accord's expanded unanimity requirement for the amending formula made virtually impossible any meaningful future amendment of the constitution, most particularly Senate reform. In the eyes of Reformers, the agenda of Quebec had been served in the Accord while the interests of the West had not only been ignored, but had in fact been significantly damaged. Finally, the political process through which the Accord itself was reached was attacked by Reformers as a violation of the principles of an open and democratic society.

The Charlottetown Accord was a far more problematic matter for the Reform Party than had been the earlier constitutional agreement reached at Meech Lake. A long period of extensive public consultation by the federal and provincial governments had preceded the final negotiations at Charlottetown. The new Accord was widely hailed by elected politicians and the media alike as a product of a genuine "Canada round" and, for many in the West, went far to address the longstanding constitutional concerns of the region. The Charlottetown Accord was potentially an extremely divisive issue for the RPC, as was illustrated by the position of the party's Atlantic region directors, who urged that Reformers take a neutral position in the upcoming referendum campaign. Party leader Preston Manning delayed for a full two weeks after the constitutional agreement had been reached before announcing his party's opposition to the Accord. A poll by the Angus Reid group taken the day following Manning's announcement indicated that Reform Party supporters were indeed divided with 40 percent against the Accord, 37 percent in favor and 22 percent undecided.[191] Symptomatic of this division was the resignation of a

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[191] Michael Clarkson, "Reform's Stand Cuts Yes Vote," The Calgary Herald, September 15, 1992, A1.

high profile supporter of the Charlottetown agreement, Jim Grey, chief executive officer of Canada Hunter Exploration Ltd., from the party.

The core of Reform's opposition to the Charlottetown Accord was the view that the supposed agreement was not, in fact, an actual substantive agreement but simply a guarantee of even more "constitutional wrangling" in the future. From this perspective, the Accord was at best a weakly worded constitutional outline that was unfinished with far more negotiations to follow. Reformers identified 50 specific areas which would require further negotiation before anything final was achieved.[192] In addition, the RPC argued that the open ended financial commitments contained in the Charlottetown agreement would make it virtually impossible for the federal government to balance its budget.[193] The party registered as an official "No" committee and campaigned nationwide against what Preston Manning repeatedly characterized as "the Mulroney deal." Manning told Canadians that to vote No was not a rejection of Quebec and would not risk national unity, but would instead send a message to elected representatives of all partisan stripes to put constitutional matters on the political backburner. If Canadians voted No, Manning said he would call for the establishment of a moratorium on constitutional discussions in order that governments could focus upon far more pressing economic matters.

The position taken by Preston Manning did without doubt create tensions within his party. These divisions related as much to the substance of the constitutional issues at hand as they did to the manner in which the official party

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[192] For example, it was suggested by Reformers that the agreements of Quebec's distinct society and natural resource taxation were so unclear that only further negotiation or court decisions could clarify their meanings.

[193] It was argued by Preston Manning that the federal government had made four open-ended financial commitments in the Charlottetown Accord. Specifically, these were to: [1] fund the Social Charter; [2] to provide compensation to provinces opting out of new national spending programs; [3] to provide compensation to the provinces if the federal government withdraws from an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction; and [4] to fund aboriginal self government.

positions were arrived at. In the end, however, opposition to the Charlottetown Accord did not produce damaging divisions within the Reform Party membership. In no small part this must be attributed to the rejection by Canadians of the Accord in the referendum of October 26, 1992. The referendum campaign brought the party significant national exposure through television advertising and through the intensive reporting of the mass media.

Reform policy concerning the future of the province of Quebec had been designed with the intention of establishing the party as a spokesman for the rest of Canada. The Reform platform, and indeed the carefully chosen name of the party itself, expresses a preference for the maintenance of a united Canada. National unity is not, however, to be achieved at any cost and Reformers stress that the principles of provincial equality and freedom of expression in language policy will not be compromised. The Reform Party argues that the next round of constitutional negotiations must be made to address the concerns of both English and French Canada. A "Quebec Round," as the Meech Lake Accord was often described, is not acceptable to Reformers.

The RPC view going into the 1993 general election was that the resolution of the ongoing constitutional dispute requires as a necessary first step a public clarification of minimal positions. In order to safeguard their interests, the governments of English Canada must develop a model of future constitutional arrangements for a new Canada with or without Quebec. Similarly, the government and people of Quebec must be afforded an opportunity to develop independently their vision of a new Quebec. A final negotiation process is to follow in which it will be determined if the positions of Canada and Quebec can be reconciled in a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement. As part of such an arrangement, the Reform Party is prepared to

recognize French as the predominant language of Quebec and to delegate to the provincial government the legal and financial power to preserve the "french fact."[194] Any new constitutional agreement which may be reached will be subject to public ratification through a national referendum. If a reconciliation cannot be achieved, Reformers warn Quebec to expect hard bargaining on the part of Canada over any sovereignty association or independence agreement.

## Political Reform

The Reform Party echoes the long tradition of western populism in advocating significant change to the parliamentary system of government in Canada. A Reform government would introduce a number of devices of direct democracy. The Reform platform calls for the establishment of a national referendum mechanism which would be binding upon the federal government with a majority vote of the Canadian electorate, including a majority in at least two-thirds of the provinces. Reform policy calls for national referendums to be held on moral issues such as capital punishment and abortion, and on matters fundamental to the makeup of Canadian society such as constitutional reform and language. Reformers additionally support the introduction of voters' initiatives. The Reform scheme calls for a question or legislative proposal to be placed on the ballot of the next federal election if three per cent of eligible Canadian voters sign a petition to that effect. Finally, to further ensure the accountability of elected representatives to their constituents, a recall mechanism through which a Member of Parliament may be required to

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[194] The term "preservation of the French fact" has been frequently used in speeches given by the party leader Manning. See, for example, Manning, Preston E. "The New Canada", speech given at the Jubilee Auditorium, Calgary, Alberta, 1 October 1990.

relinquish his or her seat and face a by-election would be established by the Reform Party.

Parliamentary practice is to be changed in the Reform vision of a "New Canada." It is suggested by Reformers that the first duty of elected members is not to fulfil obligations of party discipline, but is instead to represent genuinely the views of their constituents. In order that this might be accomplished, changes are to be made in the rules of Parliament to allow for the greatly expanded use of free votes in the House of Commons. The defeat of a government sponsored bill would not in itself be cause for the resignation of the government. A motion of non-confidence is to follow the defeat of a government measure and would determine the fate of that administration.

The proposals of the Reform Party would additionally bring about changes to the federal electoral system. The prerogative of the governing party to call an election at a time of its own choosing is to be eliminated. Elections are to be held on prearranged dates every four years. By-elections must be held within six months of a vacancy occurring in the House of Commons. Public funding of the electoral campaigns waged by political parties would be eliminated by a Reform government.

The above policies formed the core of the Reform Party platform going into the 1993 election. However, before turning to an examination of that election, the outcomes of the RPC's electoral debut will be discussed.

## The 1988 Election

The Reform Party ran 72 candidates in the 1988 federal election but failed to win a seat. The election, which returned a second consecutive Progressive Conservative majority government, amounted to little more than a

national referendum on the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The Prime Minister had staked the political future of his government squarely upon passage of the FTA, while the Liberal and New Democratic parties were passionate in their opposition to the Agreement. The dominance of the free trade debate was such that other issues simply did not figure in the balloting decisions of most Canadians.[195] The election platform of the then barely one year old Reform Party was to a considerable extent swamped by the overriding issue of free trade. Further, and more importantly, the support of the RPC for the Free Trade Agreement served only to render the party largely irrelevant for many Westerners. The impossibility of a national Reform Party victory meant that western Canadians who favoured the implementation of free trade were left with no alternative but to vote Conservative. A splitting of the western vote between the Conservative and Reform parties may well have delivered an election victory to the opponents of the FTA. Western voters, who would otherwise have supported the Reform Party, were driven away by the possible defeat of the free trade measures. The importance of this political calculus was most evident in the traditional Tory and free trade stronghold of Alberta. The Reform Party did, however, succeed in winning about 275,000 votes across western Canada and made a particularly respectable showing in Alberta where RPC candidates won 15 per cent of the popular vote and finished second in nine of the province's 26 constituencies. Among the second place finishers was party leader Manning who had run against External Affairs Minister Joe Clark in the rural riding of Yellowhead, and lost by approximately 6,700 votes.

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[195] The 1988 reinterview of 1984 National Election Study respondents found, for example, that free trade was mentioned as the "most important election issue" by 82 percent of the electorate. See Jon H. Pammett, "The 1988 Vote", in Alan Frizzell, Jon H. Pammett and Anthony Westell, eds., The Canadian General Election of 1988 (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1989) 122-125.

**A First Victory**

The first electoral success of the Reform Party came in unexpected and decisive fashion. In the 1988 federal election the newly created constituency of Beaver River, located in northeastern Alberta, had easily been won by Progressive Conservative candidate John Dahmer, with a plurality of over 7,000 votes. Such a result was hardly unexpected as the Beaver River region had consistently elected federal Conservative party candidates for over 30 years. However, the newly elected Dahmer had been seriously ill for some time and died of cancer only five days after his victory. The resulting by-election was set for March 13, 1989 and was to be the first electoral test for the Mulroney government since winning a second consecutive majority. The electoral history of the region and the "momentum" from the national Tory victory a mere 15 weeks previous were expected by many observers to bring about a virtual Conservative coronation in the by-election.

The Reform Party candidate was a 36 year old high school teacher, Deborah Grey, a self described ardent Christian and committed pro-lifer. Grey, who had finished fourth in the 1988 federal election, more than 9,600 votes behind the victor Dahmer, was to be the only repeat candidate in the by-election. The campaign conducted by Grey in the resource rich, rural constituency of 62,000 focused upon the traditional complaints of western Canadians. The Reform candidate attacked the high interest rate policy of the Bank of Canada, decried the lack of progress on Senate reform, demanded an end to the continued imposition of official bilingualism and stressed the strong opposition of her party to both a proposed national sales tax and the Meech Lake Accord's perceived grant of special status to Quebec. The issue of

western representation and the lack of influence possessed by backbench government MPs played an especially prominent role in the Grey campaign.

The result of the March 13 by-election was stunning to even the most ardent Reform Party supporter. Deborah Grey handily won the contest with over 11,000 votes while runner-up Progressive Conservative candidate David Broda received the support of less than 7,000 voters. Grey had won almost three times as many votes as she had received in the previous general election. The vote totals of all three established parties - the Conservatives, Liberals and NDP - were each reduced by more than half. The Reform Party had thus achieved its first electoral victory and had done so in one of the historically strongest regions of Tory support in Canada. On April 3 Deborah Grey took her seat in the House of Commons and became the first member of a regional party sent to Parliament by Albertans since 1965. The victory of the Reform candidate was labeled by the Conservative government and by many media commentators as merely a typical by-election protest vote, but for Reform Party supporters this view was contradicted to a considerable extent by the surprising success of Deborah Grey in gaining support from two entirely unanticipated groups of voters. The Beaver River riding has the largest proportions of both French speaking and Treaty Indian populations of any federal constituency in Alberta. French speaking residents make up nearly 15 per cent of the population of the riding while Treaty Indians make up a further nine per cent. Grey easily won all of the towns with large francophone populations and half of the eight Indian reserves. In gaining such significant support from groups for whom Reform Party policy is commonly regarded as far from congenial, the victory of Grey suggested that something more significant than a simple protest vote was at work.

**A Reform Senator**

The Meech Lake Accord, a package of several constitutional amendments agreed to by the eleven First Ministers in 1987, modified the appointment procedure to the Senate of Canada. The Accord provided that future appointments to the Senate were to be made by the Prime Minister from a list submitted by the government of the province in which a vacancy occurred. Ironically, for the Accord was staunchly opposed by the Reform Party, it was this provision that was to bring the second electoral victory of a Reform candidate.

Since 1985 the centrepiece of the government of Alberta's constitutional position has been its demand for the establishment of a Triple E Senate. The Meech Lake Accord provided that Senators would be selected from lists of candidates submitted by provincial governments. Utilizing this appointment procedure, the Alberta government introduced legislation providing for a provincial election to fill an Alberta Senate vacancy. The Alberta election, which was called for October 16, 1989 to coincide with province-wide municipal elections, was to be the first held for a Senate seat in Canadian history. It was intended by the Getty government that the Senatorial Selection Act would begin a process of Senate reform by pressuring other provincial governments to hold similar ballots when their seats became vacant.

The Reform Party candidate in the Senate election was a 69 year old former Canadian Forces lieutenant-general and retired Calgary businessman, Stan Waters. The campaign platform used by Waters was similar to that successfully employed by Deborah Grey in the Beaver River by-election only a few months earlier, but was distinguished by the particular virulence of its anti-federal Tory rhetoric. The Waters campaign, which had as a central theme fiscal responsibility, attacked the enormously unpopular proposed national

sales tax and demanded reductions in government spending and an end to deficit financing. The Reform candidate was also scathing in his denunciation of the Meech Lake Accord for its recognition of Quebec as a distinct society and for its unanimity provisions which, it was argued, would make impossible any future reform of the Senate. Like all candidates in the Senatorial race, Waters called for the establishment of a reformed Senate based upon the Triple E model.

The balloting in the Senate election which, surprisingly in light of much discussed citizen apathy, drew over 40 per cent of eligible Alberta voters, was easily won by Stan Waters. The Reformer drew more than 259,000 votes, which was almost twice the number received by runner-up Liberal Bill Code. The decisiveness of the Waters victory was indicated particularly by his success in both rural and urban ridings, in defiance of traditional provincial voting patterns. The Progressive Conservative candidate, Bert Brown, a longtime Senate reform activist and chairman of the Committee for a Triple E Senate, finished third with about 127,000 votes. Three independent candidates trailed far behind.

In accordance with the provisions of the Meech Lake Accord, Alberta Premier Don Getty sent a letter to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in which he listed the names and vote totals of all candidates and urged the immediate appointment of Waters. For both Getty and Mulroney, the election results were widely interpreted as a personal repudiation by Alberta voters. The appointment of Stan Waters to Canada's upper chamber did not come until fully eight months after his election victory. Nonetheless, the Senatorial election went far to establish that the earlier victory of Deborah Grey was no mere fluke

and that the Reform Party was not a fringe movement but a serious political threat to the established parties. Senator Waters died on September 25, 1991.

## The Saskatoon Convention

The annual general assembly of the Reform Party held in Saskatoon in April 1991 was to be a landmark event in the short history of the party. The 850 voting delegates were to decide in a fundamental way the future direction of the party. At issue was whether the party should amend its constitution to allow for Reform candidates east of Manitoba and if the establishment of provincial Reform branches should be permitted. The resolution of these matters would mark a crucial juncture for the Reform Party.

Preston Manning had publicly declared his support for national expansion and had suggested that were this not to occur his continued leadership of the party might be called into doubt. The official slogan of the party had been pointedly changed before the convention from the original "The West Wants In" to "Building A New Canada." Manning had additionally firmly stated his opposition to a Reform entry into the provincial arena, arguing that the relatively new party did not possess adequate resources to successfully campaign on two fronts. The mastery of Manning over his party was vividly demonstrated by the eventual resolution of these issues.

The national expansion of the party, although it was not to include running candidates in Quebec, was a very controversial and emotionally charged issue for Reformers. It seemed to many that such a move would necessarily mean relinquishing the western agenda upon which the party had been formed. Proponents of national expansion maintained, in turn, that much RPC support already existed in Ontario and Atlantic Canada, and that to remain

a narrowly focused regional movement would guarantee repeated failure in electoral efforts to form a Reform federal government. In the end the motion to allow for national expansion was decisively endorsed in a show of hands later estimated to represent 96 per cent of convention delegates. The decision was given final approval in a party wide mail-in referendum with 92 per cent of responding members opting for eastern expansion.

The matter of forming provincial Reform wings was also, at the convention's beginning, a controversial and potentially divisive issue. Reform groups from Alberta and British Columbia had been campaigning strongly in favour of provincial status despite opposition from the party's leadership. The case for provincial involvement had been greatly bolstered in the months leading up to the assembly by the findings of several polls which suggested that the party could easily form the next government of Alberta. Such poll results had created open conflict within the Reform movement between potential organizers of provincial Reform wings and opponents of party involvement at that level. A close vote was expected on the matter. It thus came as a surprise when convention delegates resoundingly voted down a motion to allow the party to expand into provincial politics.

## Public Support

The growth of public support for the Reform Party following the 1988 federal election was dramatic. Party membership grew from 28,000 in 1989 to over 100,000 in 1993. The fund raising success of the party grew accordingly and reached over $6 million in 1992.[196] The majority of RPC donations were received from individual Canadians but corporate funding had also grown

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[196] The voluntary contributions reported by the Reform Party to Elections Canada for 1992 totaled $6,246,411.

steadily. Among the corporate donors to the Reform Party have been Canadian Pacific, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and Rogers Communications.[197]

Public opinion polls documented the movement of the Reform Party from fringe status toward the mainstream of Canadian political life. By contrast, the Progressive Conservative government under Brian Mulroney was consistently found to have fallen to historic low levels of public support. Private polls conducted for the Conservatives in 1990 indicated that the Reform Party would win 40 of the 86 Western Canadian seats in the House of Commons, most of which were currently held by Tory MPs.[198] In April 1991 the Gallup organization found that 16 per cent of decided voters nationally would support the Reform Party.[199] This finding marked the first time that the party had moved into third place nationally, and placed the RPC ahead of the then governing Conservative party. The results of the Gallup Poll were confirmed in May 1991 by an Angus Reid poll which placed the Reform Party third nationally with the support of 17 per cent of decided voters.[200] Reform support remained strongest in the Prairie West, most particularly in Alberta where it was recorded as high as 51 per cent, but significant progress had been made by the party across Canada.[201] For example, the April 1991 Gallup poll found 15 per cent support for the Reform Party in Ontario, 18 per cent in British Columbia and 3 per cent in Atlantic Canada.[202] Each finding represented more than a doubling of Reform support in less than one year.

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[197] As reported by CBC Television News, "The National," July 13, 1992.
[198] John Howse, "On the March," Maclean's, October 29, 1990, 28.
[199] Gallup Canada Inc., April 25, 1991, 2.
[200] "Manning Takes PM To Task On Allegation" The Calgary Herald, May 11, 1991, A11.
[201] "Manning Is Off To Sow Seeds In Alien Soil" The Calgary Herald, June 9, 1991, C6.
[202] Gallup Canada Inc., April 25, 1991, 2.

**The 1993 Election**

The 1993 federal election was to provide the setting for a dramatic breakthrough by the Reform Party. The party ran over 200 candidates nationwide and conducted campaigns in all provinces except Quebec. Reform candidates won a total of 52 seats by electing 51 members in western Canada and one MP in Ontario. The Reform Party narrowly missed forming the Official Opposition in the House of Commons by finishing third behind the 54 seats won by the Bloc Quebecois. Chapters Four and Five review the key events leading up to the 1993 election, the political circumstances surrounding the campaign and the appeal of the Reform Party to Canadian voters. A detailed discussion of the Reform Party's 1993 election results is provided in Chapter Six.

The meteoric rise of the Reform Party to a position of national political prominence has been surprising to both party supporters and partisan opponents alike. The initial modest electoral hopes of the RPC, to win "several" western seats in the House of Commons, has been greatly exceeded. At the time of writing, the Reform Party is within three by-election victories of forming Canada's Official Opposition party.

To build a theoretical explanation for the Reform Party phenomena requires an examination of two separate, but interrelated, sets of factors. The larger Canadian political environment, both historic and contemporary, must first be considered. Aspects of the RPC itself, particularly the manner in which the party has caught and, perhaps, helped to create "the spirit of the times" must also be analyzed. Such an examination will be carried out in the chapters to follow.

# CHAPTER FOUR: LET THE EASTERN BASTARDS FREEZE IN THE DARK!

> Western alienation is best seen as a political ideology of regional discontent. [It] embodies a socially shared set of interrelated beliefs with some degree of cultural embodiment and intellectual articulation, with a recognized history and constituency, and with organized spokesmen and carriers of the creed. Western alienation encompasses a sense of political, economic, and to a lesser extent, cultural estrangement from the Canadian heartland.

Roger Gibbins[203]

> As a part of a national domain a region is sufficiently unified to have a consciousness of its customs and ideals and thus possess a sense of identity distinct from the rest of the country. The term "regionalism" properly represents the regional ideal in action as an ideology, as a social movement or as the theoretical basis for regional planning.

Rupert B. Vance[204]

It has been argued that "the reality of Canadian politics has always been regionalism." [205] Canada is divided by significant physical, socioeconomic, and psychological barriers. The nation is divided by the sheer expanse of its geography, its rugged terrain, its climatic patterns and by the distribution of its resource base. Canada is further divided by historical settlement patterns, language barriers, political cultures and economic activity. The federal political system established by the Constitution Act, 1867 was a recognition of the regional character of Canada but has itself contributed to developing the divisions of the state. The psychological divisions of the nation have developed

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[203] Roger Gibbins, Prairie Politics and Society: Regionalism In Decline (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 169.

[204] Rupert B. Vance cited in Mildred A. Schwartz, Politics and Territory (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974) 4.

[205] Canada West Foundation, Regional Representation (Calgary: Canada West Foundation, 1981) ix.

both as a natural consequence of these cleavages and as a result of being deliberately fostered by regional leaders.

Residents of the Canadian West - the prairie provinces and British Columbia - have historically felt ill served by Confederation. Western Canadians see their region as the economically exploited hinterland of Central Canada. Westerners view with suspicion the Central Canadian interpretation of "the national interest" and are leery of the motives of a federal government which is necessarily dependent for support upon the populations of Ontario and Quebec. Doug Owram has written that "the West's basic complaint concerns a hinterland status which seems to encompass everything from economics to culture and which leaves elsewhere the key powers of decision in these areas."[206] The attitudes and beliefs of western Canadians have been formed by the historical experiences of the region within the Canadian federal union. This chapter seeks to outline some of the key structures and events responsible for the creation of western alienation. Brevity dictates that only a small portion of this large topic will be addressed. The discussion will seek to demonstrate the fit of these structures and events into the Smelser/Pinard paradigm. It will be suggested that the value added model of social movements provides a useful manner in which these external factors may be related to the rise of the Reform Party of Canada. The chapter takes as its organizing principle the suggestion by Gibbins that western alienation involves three components: political elements, economic discontent, and antipathy towards Quebec.[207]

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[206] Doug Owram, "Reluctant Hinterland" in The Canadian Political Tradition, eds. R.S. Blair and J.T. Macleod (Toronto: Methuen, 1987) 104.
[207] See Gibbins, Prairie Politics 173-186.

**The Canadian Political System**

The Canadian political system at its most basic level is structurally conducive to the rise of new political parties. The system is open and democratic, and allows groups of citizens to form political parties and participate fully in elections if they so desire. The federal party system in western Canada has, until the election of 1993, been strongly characterized by one-party dominance. The Conservative party had dominated in the region since the election of the Diefenbaker government in 1957. The Liberal party had been virtually shut out in the four western provinces during this period, despite governing nationally virtually uninterrupted from 1963 to 1984.

In The Regional Decline Of A National Party: Liberals On The Prairie, David E. Smith examines the failure of the Liberal party in the prairie west since the 1960s.[208] Prior to 1957 general election, the Liberal party had been the dominant partisan entity in the prairie provinces. Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior in the Laurier Liberal government, became the first popularly recognized spokesman for the West, and his devotion to the interests of the region established the Liberal party as the representative of the new prairie society. Smith argues that the changing of Liberal agricultural policy was largely responsible for the regional decline of the party. Past Liberal approaches - as exemplified by J.D. Gardiner, Minister of Agriculture in Mackenzie King's cabinet - involved deep rural roots and strong regional spokesmen who expressed interest in the welfare of the prairie west. More recent Liberal approaches - as demonstrated by C.D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce in St. Laurent's cabinet - have involved centralized planning and research, and highly impersonal decision making. Smith argues that the shift in Liberal

[208] David E Smith, The Regional Decline of a National Party: Liberals on the Prairies [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.]

approaches resulted in Prairie residents perceiving the party as lacking concern for the problems of the region and as being preoccupied with the problems of Central Canada. The defeat of the St. Laurent Liberal government by the Diefenbaker Conservatives is considered by Smith to have been a direct consequence of the shift in Liberal agricultural policy. Huge wheat surpluses, depressed incomes and apparent lack of government concern led Westerners to shift their support to the Conservatives who had strongly identified themselves with the interests of the prairie wheat farmer.

The value added model of Smelser is helpful in understanding the role played by the party structure of the West in the development of new partisan formations. Western Canadian politics were characterized by the dominance of a single party from 1957 until 1993, with no viable political option open to voters. The electoral record clearly suggests that most Westerners did not regard the Liberal and NDP parties as representing reasonable alternatives to the then dominant Conservatives. The structure of the party system itself was thus conducive to the development of third parties. However, a significant third party movement did not emerge until the Reform Party in 1987, despite the longstanding conduciveness of the party system. This suggests that other factors must be present in order to produce a new political movement. A key variable was the fact that the Conservatives after achieving national office in 1984, fell themselves into disfavour in the West. A situation of relatively longstanding political strain developed between western Canada and the Conservative government, strain produced by the perceived failure of the Tories to serve the interests of the Canadian West. This variable was added to the pre-existing structural conduciveness of the party system and in combination with other forms of strain, precipitating events, and a generalized belief - to be

discussed in the sections to follow - contributed to the emergence of the Reform Party of Canada.

## The Conservative Party

The introductory pages of this thesis have discussed the high expectations that many in the West held of the Mulroney Progressive Conservative government when it was first elected in 1984. Allan Tupper has observed of western Canadians that "people really thought that the election of a national Conservative government with a strong Alberta representation would fundamentally alter Canadian politics."[209] The exclusion of the West from national decision-making would be brought to an end and the longstanding concerns of the region would be fairly addressed. Regional expectations were perhaps so high that the perceived failure to fulfil them by the Conservative government was inevitable.

The Mulroney Tories became, by their second term in office, the most unpopular national governing party in the history of Canadian public opinion polling. In no region of Canada was this more true than in the West where, at their low ebb in early 1991, the Conservatives received the support of only 8 percent of Prairie residents and only 10 percent of British Columbians.[210] The specific reasons for the decline of Tory popularity in the region were many, but they included a core perception held by Westerners that the national government did not represent, nor care, about their interests and desires. The Conservative government came to be viewed by many in western Canada as being no different than its Liberal predecessors.

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[209] Remark from Saturday Night magazine cited in Murray Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company Publishers, 1991) 73.
[210] Gallup Canada Inc., January 17, 1991, 1.

The implementation of the Goods and Services Tax was one of the key factors in the national decline of support for the Tory party. Polls consistently showed that more than three-in-four Canadians opposed replacing the manufacturers' sales tax with the 7 percent Goods and Services Tax.[211] In spite of massive public opposition, the Mulroney government pushed through the establishment of the GST. The determination of the government to implement the new tax was made especially evident when, in order to ensure passage of the bill through Parliament, Prime Minister Mulroney appointed eight additional members to the Senate. This "stacking" of the Senate further infuriated many Canadians.[212]

Prime Minister Mulroney became the lightening rod for national and particularly western discontent. A 1991 Gallup poll reported that only 9 percent of Prairie residents and 12 percent of British Columbians approved of the way Mulroney was handling his job as Prime Minister.[213] A second poll conducted in the same year showed that 68 percent of Canadians felt that Mulroney should resign as leader of the Progressive Conservative party.[214] The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords and the CF-18 decision were important factors in Mulroney's declining popularity. The apparent inability of the Conservative government to control the growth of Canada's national debt, scandals surrounding cabinet ministers, and high-profile patronage appointments were further factors in the unpopularity of Mulroney and his Conservative government.

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[211] See, for example, Gallup Canada Inc., November 1, 1990, 1.
[212] A Gallup Poll reported that 79 percent of Canadians opposed the appointment of the additional Senators. See Gallup Canada Inc., October 25, 1990, 1.
[213] Gallup Canada Inc., September 30, 1991, 2.
[214] Gallup Canada Inc., July 8, 1991, 1.

## Constitutional Politics

Since 1867 constitutional strains have been characteristic of the Canadian federal system. The fact that control over the natural resources of the Prairie provinces was retained by the federal government until 1930 is an important part of the mythology of western alienation. Similarly, the use by the federal government of the powers of reservation and disallowance against provincial legislation has not been forgotten by western Canadians.

The 1982 Constitution Act patriated the Constitution of Canada, provided a purely Canadian formula for future constitutional amendments, and entrenched the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Act was, however, passed over the bitter objections of Quebec, and that province alone was not a signatory to the new constitution. The Conservative government of Brian Mulroney made the political, as opposed to merely the legal, inclusion of Quebec in Canada's constitution one of its chief priorities. The Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 were each intended to resolve the outstanding constitutional issues of the Canadian federation. Each Accord was the product of intensive constitutional negotiations between the federal Conservative and provincial governments.

For purposes of this discussion, the specific provisions of each Accord are of far less importance than is the symbolic message they seemed to convey to western Canadians.[215] In each case, many in the West felt as though the constitutional concerns and interests of their region were secondary to those of Quebec. The Mulroney Conservatives seemed to some Westerners to be compromising the interests of the West in favour of those of Quebec. This western perception was more true in the case of the Meech Lake Accord, but

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[215] For a discussion of aspects of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, and the Reform Party's reactions to them see Chapter Three of this thesis.

was present nonetheless throughout the Charlottetown Accord referendum campaign. A single example drawn from each Accord illustrates this point particularly well. The distinct society clause was intended as a constitutional recognition of Quebec's unique status in Confederation. However, many in western Canada felt that the clause would have the effect of creating two classes of Canadian citizens. It was believed that the distinct society provision would place the province of Quebec in a legally superior position to the provinces of the West. Polling data consistently demonstrated the opposition of western Canadians to the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society. For example, a Gallup poll conducted in 1991 found that 82 percent of Westerners disapproved of the clause.[216] In spite of this knowledge, politicians from all three major federal parties continued to express their endorsement of the distinct society provision. Federal and provincial politicians alike came to be viewed as being out of touch with the concerns of the western Canadians. The results of the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord clearly demonstrated the extent to which this was true. The seeming preoccupation of the Conservative government with constitutional matters during a time of significant economic downturn was also a cause of anger for many in the West. It was in this situation of constitutional and political strain that the Reform Party was to make its first significant strides.

## The National Policy and the Canadian Economy

Richards and Pratt have written that "the prairie West was consciously settled and developed as an economic hinterland. This colonialism was no accident of history. It was imposed as an act of policy."[217] The National Policy

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[216] Gallup Canada Inc., July 11, 1991, 2.
[217] J. Richards and L. Pratt, Prairie Capitalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979) 15.

was developed by the Conservative government of Sir John A. Macdonald and involved three main components:  the encouragement of immigration to settle the prairies, the construction of a transcontinental railway, and the establishment of tariffs to promote the development of Canadian industry.  As is suggested by Richards and Pratt, the National Policy deliberately established a heartland/hinterland economic division in the nation.  Western Canada was to be the agricultural and resource base which would facilitate the business and industrial development of Central Canada.

A 30 percent tariff against the importation of American manufactured was introduced in 1879 by the Macdonald government.  The tariff was designed to establish a protected domestic market and thereby encourage the development of industry within Canada.  The effect of this policy was to force western Canadians to buy manufactured goods from Central Canada at prices above the international level while having to sell their products in open world markets with no tariff protection.  The tariffs were viewed as "a permanent subsidy by the periphery to Central Canadian industrial uncompetitiveness and inefficiency."[218]  The protective tariffs were to form the basis of Canadian economic development for at least the next 50 years,[219] but the regional resentment generated by the tariff structure was to last far longer, becoming a permanent part of the collective memory of western alienation.

The negative impact of protective tariffs upon the economy of the Canadian West has been greatly reduced, but as recently as 1983 had not entirely disappeared.  David Elton has reported that in 1983 Canadian tariffs cost western Canada nearly $372 million while at the same time benefiting

[218] Don Ray and Ralph R. Premdas, "The Canadian West: A Case of Regional Separatism", in Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ralph R. Premdas (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990) 203.
[219] Owram, "Reluctant Hinterland", 11.

central Canadians by over $474 million.[220] Such recent tariff protection of Central Canadian industries and manufacturing have reinforced the legacy of Western resentment caused by the original National Policy tariffs.

Railway transportation rates have similarly generated a lasting regional resentment of the federal government and central Canada throughout the West. The cost of transportation to and from the nation's heartland is a matter of considerable importance to the economic fortunes of western Canada. This is true both from the perspective of agricultural products and raw materials being shipped eastward and from the perspective of manufactured goods being delivered westward. Indeed, the importance of this matter has been such that some have argued that "no single issue has contributed more to Western Canadian discontent within Confederation than the so called national transportation policies."[221]

The publication of the first Canadian Pacific freight rate schedule took place in 1883 and since this time there "has been deliberate and admitted freight rate discrimination against the West."[222] The railways have charged higher rates in western Canada, where they have enjoyed a virtual transportation monopoly, in order to compensate for lower rates charged, and losses suffered, in the more competitive transportation marketplace of central Canada. Differential transportation rates have consistently been upheld as "fair discrimination" by federal regulatory agencies.[223] The economic resources of

[220] David Elton, "Western Grievances - A Long History", in Politics Canada, Seventh Edition, eds. Paul W. Fox and Graham White (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1991) 180.
[221] T.D. Regehr, "Western Canada and the Burden of National Transportation Policies", in Canada and the Burden of Unity, ed. David Jay Burcuson (Toronto: The Macmilland Company of Canada, 1977) 115.
[222] Ibid.
[223] David Elton and Roger Gibbins "Western Alienation and Political Culture", in The Canadian Political Process, eds. Orest M. Kruhlak, Richard Schultz and John C. Terry (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1979) 86.

the West have thus been used to subsidize the transportation costs of central Canadians. The Crow's Nest Pass Agreement, which provides for the "lowest single transportation rate on any commodity in North America,"[224] stands as the exception to uniformly higher freight rates which have been charged to Westerners. However, to compensate for losses caused by the Crow Rate on unprocessed grain, the railways have increased rates on all other goods. These discriminatory freight rate structures have been a significant barrier to efforts to diversify the economy of the West.[225]

In his 1980 book Prairie Politics and Society, Roger Gibbins commented that "Western Canada remains a sparsely populated economic hinterland within both the Canadian and North American market economies."[226] The basic economic structure and relationships established by the National Policy remain largely in place today. Barry Cooper has reported that between 1970 and 1986, western Canada paid $64 billion more to Ottawa in taxes than it received, while Ontario during the same period received an $8 billion federal surplus.[227] Westerners have long resented the virtual colonial economic status of the region vis-a-vis central Canada, and this has been the source of ongoing strain and tension in the Canadian federation. Smelser's discussion of structural strain as part of the value added model would seem to capture very well the essence of this situation. In the words of former Alberta Premier Harry Strom, "we have always had a sense of economic exploitation."[228] Further, the economy of the West is dependent upon unregulated international economic markets and upon other uncontrollable forces such as drought, flood and frost.

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[224] Ibid.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Gibbins, Prairie Politics, 175.

[227] Barry Cooper, "Thinking The Unthinkable", West, May 1990, 25.

[228] Gibbins, Prairie Politics, 173.

This factor too has contributed to a sense of economic powerlessness in the West. The Reform Party of Canada thus emerged in a region in which economic matters form a permanent backdrop of structural strain. The Smelser/Pinard model is helpful in understanding the importance of this variable for the development of third parties.

## Animosity Towards Quebec

Hostility towards Quebec is described by Gibbins as "a long-standing pillar of Western alienation."[229] The origins of this resentment of Quebec may be traced to the settlement pattern of the Canadian West. Ray and Premdas have commented that "the settlers who came to the West were in many respects different from those who occupied Central and Eastern Canada."[230] In the West the original French and English settlers were joined by Scottish, Irish, German, Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Belgian, Dutch, Scandinavian and Icelandic peoples.[231] French and English groups constituted over 80 percent of the population in central Canada but made up only 50 percent or less of the western population.[232] French Canadians living in the West were viewed by their multi-ethnic neighbours as constituting just one immigrant group among many others. Special legal and political rights for the small French population was viewed with resentment by other Westerners who themselves sought to establish, in a melting pot fashion, a unique regional identity.

Over time, the hostility of Westerners towards French Canadians and Quebec has been magnified and, in some senses, institutionalized as part of a regional identity. The opposition of Quebecers to conscription during World

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[229] Gibbins, Prairie Politics, 173.
[230] Ray and Premdas, "The Canadian West", 199.
[231] Ibid. 199.
[232] Ibid. 199.

War One, in particular, created great resentment throughout western Canada. Quebec has also become identified with the economic exploitation of the West and is viewed as receiving undue attention and favour from the federal government. In more recent times, the animosity of Westerners has been directed at two targets, official bilingualism and Quebec language laws.

The politics of language has long been a highly contentious issue in western Canada. Conflicts over Francophone education rights and separate school systems have been frequent and bitter. The Official Languages Act was passed by Parliament in 1969 and established English and French as "the Official Languages of Canada for all purposes of the Parliament and Government of Canada."[233] Although its passage was supported by all political parties, the Act had been introduced by the Trudeau Liberal government and was, as a consequence, automatically viewed with suspicion by many Westerners. The Act required that the federal bureaucracy become fully bilingual, allowing citizens to access federal government services in the official language of their choice. The federal government has also provided funds for second language training, supported radio and television stations in both official languages across the country and, where numbers warrant, has required that schools be established in either language. Further, the federal government, through its regulatory powers, has been able to require bilingual messages and advertising on commercial products.[234]

Many western Canadians have viewed official bilingualism as an unnecessary, undemocratic and overly expensive intrusion into their lives. In 1990, it was reported by Cooper that French was the mother tongue of only 2.54

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[233] Cited in Daniel V.J. Bell, The Roots of Disunity Revised Edition (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992) 115.
[234] Bell, Disunity, 116.

percent of Westerners.[235] For many Westerners the promotion of the French language has no relevance to their lives and official bilingualism is seen only as extending favoured status to a minority of Canadians. The cost of bilingualism to the Canadian taxpayer has been a concern of many in the West. The total spending of the federal government on bilingualism since 1969 has been estimated at $7 billion, and the amount spent daily on bilingual programs has been estimated at $1.62 million.[236] A 1991 Gallup Poll found that only 17 percent of British Columbians and 25 percent of Prairie residents believed official bilingualism to have been a success.[237] Official bilingualism has thus been a source of structural strain in the relationship between the federal government and the Canadian West.

In 1974 Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa introduced the first legislation limiting the use of English in Quebec. Bill 22 provided that French alone was to be the "official language" of Quebec and required school children seeking admission to English schools to "demonstrate sufficient knowledge to receive their instruction in that language."[238] In addition, the bill allowed the use of other languages on signs, but required that French predominate. The Parti Quebecois was elected to form the government of Quebec on November 15, 1976. In 1977 the PQ government passed Bill 101. The new bill differed from its predecessor in two important ways. Bill 101 required that all public signs and other forms of commercial advertising should be in French only.[239] The bill's new rules governing school admission had the further effect of denying children of immigrants and children from other parts of Canada access to

[235] Cooper, "Thinking," 23.
[236] Cooper, "Thinking," 27.
[237] Gallup Canada Inc., May 20, 1991, 1.
[238] Cited in Kenneth McRoberts, <u>Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis</u> Third Edition (Toronto; McClelland and Stewart, 1988) 227.
[239] Ibid. 276.

English language schools. On December 15, 1988 the Supreme Court of Canada overturned, as a violation of the freedom of expression provision of the Charter of Rights, the sections of Bill 101 that required French only public signs. The response of the Quebec government to the Supreme Court ruling was to introduce Bill 178 which declared that, notwithstanding the Charter, French-only would be permitted on outdoor signs.

The restriction of language rights by the government of Quebec has been a source of considerable hostility in the West. Westerners have been angered by the implication that French Canadians are, in some fashion, more equal than English speaking Canadians. Residents of the West have wondered why they should be required to support official bilingualism programs if this is not to be the case in Quebec. The actions of successive Quebec governments in this regard have been viewed by some Westerners as attacks upon national unity. The use of section 33 of the Charter, the notwithstanding clause, to override the Supreme Court ruling on Bill 101 served to amplify the anger of the West. Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon rescinded his support for the Meech Lake Accord in response to the introduction of Bill 178. More generally, Quebec's provincial language laws have clearly served to create structural strain in the Canadian federation. They have been an ongoing source of tension and recriminations between the Canadian West and Quebec. It may additionally be suggested that Bill 178 can usefully be viewed as a precipitating factor in the development of the Reform Party. For some in the West, Bill 178 implied that English Canadians had become second class citizens in their own country and the Reform Party was viewed as a vehicle through which this development might be fought.

## The Existence and Role of Western Alienation

Empirical evidence for the existence of western alienation has been presented by Roger Gibbins in <u>Prairie Politics and Society.</u>[240] Based on a study conducted in 1976, Gibbins found that "Western alienation was not a marginal disposition within the Alberta electorate."[241] He reports that over 77 percent of respondents agreed that "Alberta usually gets ignored in national politics" and that over 73 percent agreed that "the economic policies of the federal government seem to help Quebec and Ontario at the expense of Alberta."[242] Gibbins constructed an "Index of Western Alienation" ranging from low to high alienation levels and found that over 80 percent of respondents scored above the mid point of the scale.[243]

In Smelser's value added model of collective behavior, meaning is given to a social situation by a generalized belief. The generalized belief "identifies the source of strain, attributes certain characteristics to this source and specifies certain responses as possible or appropriate."[244] Western alienation may usefully be conceived of as a generalized belief. The doctrine of western alienation identifies the problems of western Canada, assigns responsibility for their causation and proposes how they might be solved. Western alienation has not involved withdrawal from the federal political process but has, in fact, prescribed greater participation in the system. The beliefs and values encompassed by western alienation have provided the foundation upon which third party movements including the United Farmers, Progressives, Social Credit and the Reform Party of Canada have been based.

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[240] For his full discussion of this study, see Gibbins, <u>Prairie Politics</u> 170-172.
[241] Ibid. 170.
[242] Ibid. 171.
[243] Ibid. 172.
[244] Neil J. Smelser, <u>Theory of Collective Behavior</u> (New York: The Free Press, 1962) 16.

**The National Energy Program**

The National Energy Program acted to confirm the beliefs of western alienation. In 1973 the formation of the OPEC oil cartel brought about the first international energy crisis, one which dramatically increased the price of oil. For Alberta, which holds most of Canada's easily accessible oil reserves, and to a lesser extent for British Columbia and Saskatchewan, this was viewed as an opportunity to achieve long term economic stability and diversity. From 1973 through to the early 1980s, Alberta's economy boomed as her oil wealth was exploited in an overheated international economy. Political conflict was equally intense during this period. The Lougheed Conservative government of Alberta engaged in ongoing energy battles with federal Trudeau Liberal administrations. The brief interlude of Tory rule in Ottawa provided by the Clark government was ironically characterized by even more intense and less successful conflict between federal and Alberta leaders. In 1980, with the fall of the Shah of Iran at the hands of a fundamentalist revolution, the price of oil again skyrocketed. Negotiations between the Clark and Lougheed government had produced no results - to the disappointment of Westerners who finally felt represented in Ottawa - and the new Trudeau administration was determined that changes to energy arrangements would be made. In the first Trudeau budget the National Energy Program was introduced as the basis of a new energy arrangement in Canada. The program was introduced unilaterally with no negotiations with the western energy producing provinces, and was as much a political act as an economic policy.

The NEP had three official objectives: security of supply, Canadianization, and fairness in pricing and taxation. These objectives were to be achieved through a new pricing and taxation regime. Oil prices in Canada

were set well below the world price and the federal share of energy taxation was increased substantially. The reaction of Alberta was one of outrage and enormous resentment. The response by the Alberta government was threefold and was announced by Premier Lougheed during a province-wide television address. Alberta's oil shipments to Eastern Canada were cut, the oil sands projects were put on hold, and a court challenge to the jurisdiction of the federal government was initiated.

The consequences of the National Energy Program, however, extended far beyond the energy sector and the details of taxation and pricing. The NEP both reinforced longstanding western resentments and fostered new ones which continue to this day to have a strong political resonance. A battle line was established in which western Canadians were represented by their provincial governments in a struggle against Ottawa, which was seen to represent only the interests of Central Canada. Many Westerners came to the conclusion that Confederation was constructed to benefit only Central Canada and that western interests were always secondary to those of the heartland. For many, the NEP was colonialism and exploitation at its starkest, and they would not forget.

The recession of the early 1980s and the coming on line of non-OPEC sources of oil dropped the bottom out of the oil market. Visions of $100 per barrel oil were shattered and the economic boom of the West came to a shuddering halt. The October 1984 election campaign of the federal Conservative party had promised to eliminate the NEP. In March 1985 the Conservative government reached agreement with the three western energy producing provinces - the Western Accord - and dismantled all pricing and taxation mechanisms introduced under the auspices of the NEP. The Western

Accord was not, however, a great political or economic victory for any of the governments concerned because of the dramatic decline in the price of oil. This was particularly the case for the Mulroney Conservatives who had lived up to their pledge and had brought to the West the long hoped for "imposition of market sensitive pricing." What could have been a great victory for the West and one in which the federal Conservatives might have basked, simply was not to be.

The legacy of anger over the NEP in Alberta and across the West lives on. It has proved a useful and highly effective political tool for western politicians in their routine attacks on the injustices of the federal union. Its resonance has been felt throughout Canada's protracted constitutional crisis as the energy producing provinces have sought a mechanism to protect themselves against another NEP.

An analysis of the National Energy Program and its effect on the Reform Party which employs the value added theory of social movements points to a problem in the application of the model. The difficulty involves the matter of time and the designation of occurrences as precipitating events. It is clear that the effects of the NEP have been important in the rise of the Reform Party. It is not, however, clear whether the NEP possesses the chronological immediacy to be categorized as a precipitating event. The imposition of the Goods and Services Tax and the Meech Lake Accord, for example, have been more recent events influencing the rise of the Reform Party. In order to conduct an empirical study, particularly one that involves comparative analysis, the researcher must determine within what time frame an event must fall in order to be categorized as a precipitating event. Smelser has formulated his concepts at a theoretical

level in order to illustrate the relationships amongst variables but has provided no guidelines for their application to real world examples.

## The CF-18 Decision

Western Canadians have often been frustrated by a perceived unwillingness on the part of the federal government to facilitate the economic diversification and secondary development of the region. In this regard, it has been argued that "the West has never been allowed to fulfil its own potential because forces in central Canada have never been willing to relinquish their privileged position."[245] As has been discussed, the election of a Tory majority government in 1984 was widely believed by Westerners to mean that regional fairness would be brought to national economic decision making. The CF-18 fighter aircraft decision was to prove this belief wrong and become symbolic of the indifference of the federal government to the economic aspirations of the West.

The New Fighter Aircraft Program was established by the federal government in 1977 and was intended to replace and upgrade Canada's fleet of fighter aircraft. In April 1980 the Trudeau cabinet decided to purchase 137 F-18A Hornet fighter aircraft from the McDonnell Douglas corporation. The planes were to be built in the United States but the maintenance contract was to be awarded to a Canadian based firm. The contract was to run for twenty years, was estimated to be worth between $1.2 and $1.8 billion, and would provide several hundred jobs in high technology industry.[246]

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[245] Owram "Reluctant Hinterland", 112.
[246] Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, The Real World of Canadian Politics (Peterborough: Broadview Press Ltd., 1989) 24.

Bids for the maintenance contract were submitted by three consortiums in November 1985. The bids of Bristol and Canadair quickly became the chief contenders for the contract. Bristol Aerospace led a consortium that was based in Winnipeg, although the company itself was owned by Rolls-Royce Ltd. of Britain. Canadair led a consortium that was based in Montreal and was a fully Canadian owned company. The ultimate decision concerning who would be awarded the maintenance contract lay with the Mulroney cabinet. A committee of experts was appointed by the federal government to examine the merits of the competing bids and found that Bristol's was less expensive and had superior technical merit. Such objective considerations alone, however, were not to form the sole basis of the cabinet decision.

A strong Quebec lobby quickly sprang into action to pressure the Prime Minister and his cabinet colleagues to decide in favour of Canadair. The Quebec lobby involved business organizations, including the Montreal Board of Trade, and political officials including Premier Robert Bourassa. By contrast, Manitoba business leaders and politicians were, at first, relatively inactive. The Bristol consortium had requested that no political lobbying be done on their behalf.

The announcement of a cabinet decision was delayed for nearly one year. The competition of the tendering process became a highly public and highly charged exercise. The findings of the technical committee were well known to the Canadian public. Public dialogue came to be centered on a Winnipeg versus Montreal axis, and tensions grew between the western provinces and Quebec. Manitobans, and western Canadians in general, felt that the maintenance contract should be awarded strictly on the basis of cost and expertise. Further, many Westerners felt that their region had been

consistently neglected by the federal government and that it was their turn to receive fair treatment. The loyalty the region had shown the Conservative Party during the long years of Liberal government was expected to be repaid. Quebecers, too, viewed the awarding of the contract as a matter of regional fairness. They believed that the federal government had long shown favoritism towards the Ontario economy and that it was now time for Quebec to benefit.[247] Further, the Tory majority government had been, in large measure, achieved through the support of Quebec voters who felt some reward was their due.

The bids submitted by the consortiums were to expire at the end of October 1986 and it was not until this month that Manitoba politicians began to vigorously lobby the federal cabinet on behalf of Bristol Aerospace. On October 30 it was reported that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had met with his caucus and recommended the acceptance of the Canadair bid. Premier Howard Pawley reacted with great anger to the report and sought the support of his fellow western premiers. Only British Columbia Premier Bill Vander Zalm agreed to lend his support to Pawley. On October 31 Treasury Board President Robert de Cotret announced that the CF-18 maintenance contract would be awarded to Canadair of Montreal. De Cotret conceded that the bid of the Bristol consortium had been technically superior and was less costly but argued that the key to the decision was the technology transfer to a wholly Canadian owned firm.

The long delay and tension surrounding the decision was now to explode.[248] Many western Canadians were outraged. To Westerners, the CF-18 decision was viewed as symbolic of the nature and meaning of federalism in Canada. Once again the federal government had demonstrated its indifference

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[247] For a discussion of this matter Campbell and Pal, The Real World of Canadian Politics 41-42.
[248] See Campbell and Pal for a full discussion of events following the CF-18 decision.

to the economic aspirations of the region. The anger was magnified by the fact that the decision had been made by a Conservative government, many of whose members had been faithfully supported by the West and who had promised to bring fairness and equity to federal economic decision making. The decision was viewed by some as nothing less than a betrayal of western Canada by the Conservatives. The Mulroney government had shown itself to be no different then its Liberal predecessors, the interests of central Canada were paramount and westerners were little better than second class citizens.

The CF-18 decision may usefully be viewed as a key precipitating event for the formation of the Reform Party of Canada. The decision generated great anger amongst western Canadians but such anger is insufficient, in itself, to generate a new political movement. Were this the case, third parties would be a much more common phenomenon all across the Canadian state. It is only in the larger setting of structural conduciveness, strain and generalized beliefs that the decision takes on its full meaning and full implications. The CF-18 decision confirmed for many western Canadians their belief that federalism operates for the benefit of Central Canada and to the detriment of the West. In a structural situation characterized by one party-dominance and with ongoing political and economic strain, some western Canadians sought a new partisan alternative. The new Reform Party was the direct beneficiary of this value added process.

# CHAPTER FIVE:  ENDOGENOUS FACTORS

The societal framework discussed in the preceding chapter has established that in western Canada an ideal setting existed for the emergence of third party movements.  Structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized beliefs and precipitating factors had each been produced by the political, social and economic landscape of the Canadian West.  It may be argued that these conditions are part of the permanent fabric of the region and exist independently of any collective political behavior undertaken by Westerners.[249]  The successful mobilization of participants to a new political banner is dependent, however, solely upon the party itself.  In its relatively brief history the Reform Party of Canada has mobilized many western Canadians to its cause.  An understanding of this determinant of collective behavior requires an examination of the Reform Party itself.  The following chapter seeks to outline those endogenous factors significant to the emergence of the RPC.

## Protest and the Appeal of a New Party

> [Canadians] believe political corruption and conflicts of interest are on the increase, that government is not listening to the public and that politicians do not have clear ideas about the future of the country.  Canadians have lost respect for national institutions, believe politicians are often untruthful and that personal aggrandizement is more important than public service as a motive for seeking public office.
>
> The Globe and Mail - CBC News Poll
> October 1990[250]

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[249] Although not expressed in the language of Smelser and Pinard it has often been suggested that regionalism lies at the heart of the identity of western Canada.  See, for example, David Jay Bercuson, "Canada's Burden of Unity: An Introduction," in Canada and the Burden of Unity. ed. David Jay Bercuson (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1977) 1-18.

[250] Hugh Winson, "Malaise Deals Tory Support Another Blow," The Globe and Mail October 29, 1990, A1, A6.

Analytically, the success of the Reform Party must be seen as a product both of the specific characteristics of the party itself and of the standing of the traditional parties in the larger political scene. Although the distinction is admittedly artificial in the real world of Canadian politics, it is nonetheless important to separate the rise of a new third party from the condition of the party system which preceded it. Opinion polls documented the ill feelings held by Canadians across the nation concerning politicians of all stripes.[251] Politicians in general were poorly regarded both as to their personal motivations and their personal abilities. The political cynicism of the Canadian public was at an all time high and was often expressed as contempt for the entire political system and all those involved in it. For example, Gallup Canada found in the early 1990s that 65 percent of Canadians believed "political favoritism and corruption to be increasing in Ottawa;"[252] that only 9 percent of Canadians had "a great deal or quite a lot of respect and confidence in political parties;"[253] and that only 11 percent of Canadians believed that Members of Parliament had "either very high or high honesty and ethical standards."[254] The role played by charges of corruption brought against members of the Mulroney cabinet and the

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[251] The negative feelings which were held by Canadians throughout the nation concerning politicians and politics in general were extensively documented by the major national polling organizations. These feelings were not limited simply to record low approval levels for the governing Progressive Conservative Party (whose approval fell to 11 percent. See Gallup Canada Inc., February 20, 1992, 1.) but were, in fact, far more generalized. For an overview of the feelings of Canadians the following are recommended:
- The Globe and Mail - CBC News Poll, The Globe and Mail October 29 and 30, 1990
- The Maclean's - Decima Poll, Maclean's January 7, 1991
Many less comprehensive polls conducted confirmed the accuracy of the above studies. For more specific topics the following Gallup Reports are of particular interest:
- Corruption in Ottawa, November 8, 1990
- Stacking of the Senate, October 24, 1990
- Behaviour of MPs, November 25, 1991
- Honesty of Political Leaders, November 14, 1991 and August 3, 1992
- Respect for Governments and Political Parties, March 16, 1992.
[252] Gallup Canada Inc., November 8, 1990, 1.
[253] Gallup Canada Inc., February 1, 1993, 1.
[254] Gallup Canada Inc., August 3, 1992, 1.

behavior of Senators during the Free Trade and GST debates should particularly be acknowledged in creating such feelings amongst Canadians.

The federal party system from the point of view of many Canadian voters had entered a period of malaise and stagnation. Gallup Canada, for example, reported that from 1991 to 1993 no federal party leader received a positive appraisal of their job performance from a majority of the Canadian public.[255] The story of the rise of the Reform Party is in large measure the story of the failure of the existing parties. Both the federal Liberal and Conservative parties were widely viewed by Westerners as having been given an ample opportunity to govern well and as having conclusively demonstrated their inability to do so. Archer and Ellis have found that fully 80 percent of delegates surveyed at the 1992 Reform Party national assembly had voted for the Conservatives in 1984.[256] The New Democratic Party was unable to move beyond its perennial status as the third party in a three party system. The unanimous consent given by all three traditional parties to the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords went far to reinforce the public perception that there was little to distinguish among them. The NDP and Liberal opposition largely failed to provide the West with compelling alternatives to the then governing Tories. In spite of new leadership under Chretien and McLaughlin, neither party was able to strongly capture the public imagination. The condition of the party system in the West generally must be regarded as conducive to the emergence of a new political force. The timing of the Reform Party's emergence is thus a matter of some importance.

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[255] See Gallup Canada Inc., September 30, 1991, 1.; June 1, 1992,1.; January 28, 1993, 1.
[256] Keith Archer and Faron Ellis, "Opinion Structure of Reform Party Activists," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 1993, 14.

The appeal of the Reform Party lay, to some extent, simply on being the new party on the Canadian political scene. For most Canadians, those involved in the RPC did not have a past political record on which they could be judged and condemned. The Reform Party appeared as a new and genuine alternative to those who viewed the traditional parties as individually bankrupt and largely indistinguishable from one another. The party stepped into a vacuum left by the perceived failure of the established parties to offer anything new to the electorate; it appeared precisely at the moment when some alternative, any alternative, was needed. The key was to present the party as a viable alternative, to give the electorate a choice where, for some, none had previously existed.

The support shown for the Reform Party was often borne of a desire to protest. It was expressed on the premise that things could not possibly be worse and a vote for the Reform Party was an opportunity to send a message to those who have brought us here. The Reform Party served as a vehicle through which the western Canadian voter could express his or her unhappiness with the performance of the traditional parties. The Reformers needed only to present themselves as a serious, genuine alternative to the traditional parties in order to gain this voter support.

## Participatory Politics

Elitism has been the predominant characteristic of politics in Canada since well before Confederation. The entire Canadian political structure - from the institutions of the monarchy and parliamentary government, to highly limited means of citizen participation, to a political culture with strong traditional values of deference to authority and acceptance of centralized leadership - has served

to concentrate power in the hands of a few. The history of western Canadian populist movements may be viewed, in part, as a reaction to the elitist character of Canadian politics. The Reform Party emerged at a moment in Canadian history when elitism in politics and government was being increasingly challenged. The enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the process of citizen involvement which preceded it created a new participatory environment in Canadian politics. The system of consociational democracy or elite accommodation, long the dominant style of government in Canada, no longer enjoyed the support or confidence of its citizenry. This was vividly illustrated by the anger expressed nationwide over the elite political process through which the Meech Lake Accord was reached.

It has been widely suggested that the results of the referendum held on the Charlottetown Accord reflected as much a rejection by Canadians of "the establishment" as they did disapproval of a particular constitutional agreement.[257] The traditional elite-driven politics practiced by the established political parties had become increasingly unacceptable. A 1991 Gallup survey revealed that 74 percent of Canadians felt that the country would be better off if its leaders followed the views of the public more closely.[258] Additionally, in the eyes of some, the lobbying efforts of interest groups had come to have excessive influence upon politicians of all partisan stripes, and often excluded the point of view of the average Canadian from policy making decisions. Preston Manning's suggestion that "safeguards are needed to protect Canadians against the tyranny of the minorities" strongly appealed to the

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[257] See, for example, Don Braid, "Kick in the Pants for Leaders," The Calgary Herald, October 27, 1992, A1, and Joan Bryden, "Now It's Time for Ottawa to Listen," The Calgary Herald, October 27, 1992, AA1.

[258] Gallup Canada Inc., June 10, 1991, 1.

viewpoint held by some Canadians.[259] The 1991 Maclean's/Decima Poll found that 60 percent of respondents favoured more direct say in government by individual Canadians as the solution to the problems facing the nation.[260] The same survey reported that 77 percent of respondents felt that government decisions should be made only after consultation with the public.[261] Further, when elected to office, Canadian politicians often disavowed previously stated policy and failed to implement election promises. The belief that the Mulroney Conservatives had abandoned their promises to was widespread across Western Canada. It was this combination of feeling excluded from the process and the perception of being deceived by those they elected that brought disenchantment with the political system to many Canadians, and particularly to those in the West.

The Reform Party invested much effort in seeking to distinguish itself from the elitist style of Canadian politics. In this regard the Reform movement fits particularly well into the "political populism" category identified by Canovan in her typology of populism.[262] The RPC called for the introduction of new devices of direct democracy including referendum, initiative and recall. The party endorsed greater use of free votes in the House of Commons and suggested that the wishes of constituents should take precedence for MPs over the dictates of the party leadership. The expressed intention of such measures was to allow Members of Parliament to genuinely represent the views of their constituents, to

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[259] Manning, The New Canada 320.

[260] See Robert Marshall, "A Shaken Nation Bares Its Anger," Maclean's, January 7, 1991, 33.

[261] Ibid. 36.

[262] Thomas Flanagan and Martha Lee, "The Roots of Reform," a paper presented to the Annual meeting of the Canadian political Science Association, Charlottetown, P.E.I., June 1992, 18. For a summary discussion of Canovan's typology see Steve Patten, "Populist Politics? A Critical Re-Examination of 'Populism' and the Character of Reform Party's Populist Politics," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993, 3-5.

enable them to be conduits for the views of their constituents. This point of view allows little room for elitist politics. The power of party discipline and of party leaders to impose their views would be considerably reduced in such a polity. The MP would be in no position to break election pledges or to disagree with the wishes of the constituency.

The Reform Party built and successfully maintained its image as a grass roots party in which all members participate fully and equally, although the reality and rhetoric differed dramatically. From its inception the Reform Party had been a strongly top down organization controlled by its leader Manning and a select few from his Calgary headquarters. Further, the transition from literal kitchen tabletop decision making into an ever larger, more complex, computerized organization lodged in high rise office accommodation had become a source of some tension within the RPC. Fears of losing touch with the movement's western rural roots and of becoming a party like the others accompanied the expansion and professionalization of the party. However, the transformation of the party did not adversely effect its base of Western support. The annual general assembly of the party, which must approve all party policy and to which all riding associations can send representatives, was an important tool for combating the perceived distancing of RPC leadership from the general party membership. The speeches of Preston Manning reiterated over and over again that all party members were invited to participate in policy formation and that they, not he, had the final say in policy matters. The party went to considerable effort to poll, by mail, all party members concerning matters such as the GST and criminal justice reforms.

The openness and participatory aspects of the Reform movement were strongly emphasized by Reformers to distinguish the RPC from the traditional

political parties. The personal disclosure form which was required to be completed by all potential Reform candidates was a part of this effort to maintain open links between party leaders and the party membership. What was crucial was not the reality of Reform Party operations, but the perceptions of the electorate. Particularly in western Canada, the party continued to be perceived by many precisely as advertised, a party which was truly different, a party which allowed the common man or woman to participate and which genuinely cared about his or her input. The obvious failings of the party to achieve this ideal were largely overlooked by party supporters or successfully explained away by party representatives.

## Leadership

Pollster Alan Gregg remarked just prior to the 1993 general election, "I [have] never seen a [Canadian] public so cynical, rudderless and full of hopelessness as Canadians are today."[263] The political leaders of the day were widely viewed by Canadians as insincere, unprincipled and lacking in important leadership qualities. For example, a 1992 Gallup Poll found that only 24 percent of Canadians agreed that Brian Mulroney was a "strong and decisive leader" while only 38 percent felt this was true of Jean Chretien and only 28 percent held this view of Audrey McLaughlin.[264] Many Canadians were seeking a new leader of any political stripe who appeared to hold a vision of the future and a willingness to pursue it without compromise or apology. For some, Preston Manning represented precisely the type of leadership they had been seeking.

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[263] "Gregg Says Canadians Rudderless," The Calgary Herald, May 20, 1992, A2.
[264] Gallup Canada, July 6, 1992, 2.

The leadership of Preston Manning has been perhaps the most important factor in the growth of the Reform Party. Prior to the 1993 election it would not have been unreasonable to describe the Reform Party as Preston Manning and to say that without him there would have been no party.[265] Manning had virtually single handedly built a party in his own image and had maintained an iron control over it. To much of the Canadian voting public, the Reform Party was solely about Preston Manning and no one else.

In the eyes of his supporters, Manning was perceived to be honest, to genuinely represent something and to be unwilling to compromise his values and beliefs merely to achieve political office. In fact, the personal beliefs and values of the Reform leader were clearly less important to some of his supporters than was the impression that he was sincere and straightforward about where he stood. Sharpe and Braid remarked prior to the 1993 general election "the bond of trust between Preston Manning and his party is unique in Canadian politics today."[266] Manning emerged as a curious type of charismatic leader whose style is perhaps best described in the words of former advisor Thomas Flanagan as "reverse charisma."[267] The slight, rather ordinary, bespectacled appearance and nasally, strained voice of the leader were both disarming and endearing to some. The lack of obvious accoutrements of power in conducting his political chores, including no entourage, limousines, nor first class travel and an insistence on carrying his own luggage, acted to distinguished Manning from other national political leaders. The appearance of maintaining a modest personal lifestyle, strong family orientation and workaholic inclinations won Preston Manning some of his support. The values

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[265] David Bercuson has stated, "There's No Party Without Preston." See Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party, 119.
[266] Sharpe and Braid, Storming Babylon, 15.
[267] John Howse, "Reverse Charisma," Maclean's July 22, 1991, 1.

publicly and very deliberately displayed by Manning, in particular his honesty, commitment to community and strong religious and moral beliefs, were attractive at a time when politicians were widely regarded as dishonest, self-serving and standing for virtually nothing. A 1992 Gallup poll showed, for example, that nearly 50 percent of Canadians believed that Members of Parliament had low or very low honesty and ethical standards.[268]

The appearance of personal humility, occasionally befuddled mannerisms, and the ability to speak in the vernacular of his audience rendered Manning personally approachable to his followers. All of this served to mark Preston Manning as one of the ordinary people. In short, he created an image of being someone to whom the average voter could relate. The appeal of Manning was and is precisely his ordinariness. This stands in some contrast to recent prime ministers who have seemed arrogant, aloof and certainly not of the ordinary people.

Manning further enjoyed the advantage of appearing to be a political outsider in spite of a reality quite to the contrary. He had never held public office and thus had not made the compromises that such a position inevitably requires. Other national leaders, whether in government or in opposition, had been shown to not always follow through with campaign promises and often to act against the clearly expressed views of their supporters. The Manning name and legacy too must be mentioned for in the West, particularly in Alberta, it is associated with personal integrity and strong, stable government. The appeal of the Reform Party to some Canadians was therefore in no small measure the appeal of Preston Manning. It was largely on this basis that the Reform Party

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[268] Gallup Canada Inc., August 3, 1992, 1.

succeeded in establishing itself as a viable partisan force worthy of the support of Canadians seeking a change.

## Reform Economic Policy

Economic strain was another key to the emergence of the Reform Party. The Canadian economy, as can be documented by a wide variety of figures from bankruptcies to unemployment to declines in GDP, underwent a period of severe recession verging on depression in most regions of the country. The Goods and Services Tax was introduced in January 1991 despite massive opposition from the Canadian public. Opinion polls repeatedly showed that over 75 percent of Canadians were opposed to the introduction of the new tax.[269] In 1992, Canada's unemployed reached over 1.6 million people and bankruptcies averaged 1,200 per month.[270] The national debt climbed from $151 billion in 1984 to over $460 billion in 1993.[271] Employment in the Alberta oil industry was reduced by over 80,000 jobs since the early 1980s[272] and the West was further hurt by massive cutbacks to CN and CP Rail and the threatened demise of Canadian Airlines. Statistics Canada reported that the real wages of Canadian workers rose by only 2 percent from 1980 to 1990.[273]

During this period the federal and provincial governments appeared to the public as being incapable of, unwilling to and disinterested in solving the economic crisis. A March 1991 Gallup Poll, for example, found that only 11 percent of Canadians had "a great deal or quite a lot of confidence" in the

[269] See, for example, Gallup Canada Inc., November 1, 1990 and January 29, 1990, 1.
[270] Carl Molllins, "Turmoil Year," Maclean's September 21, 1993, 34.
[271] Al Boras and Gord Cope, "Deficit Haunts PM's Legacy," The Calgary Herald, February 25, 1993, A21.
[272] Catherine Motherwell, "Survival Mode: Oil Companies Go Small," The Globe and Mail, March 17, 1992, A3.
[273] Drew Fagan, "Growth In Purchasing Power Hit 60 Year Low In '80's, Statscan Says," The Globe and Mail, July 6, 1993, A1.

federal government to help the economy recover from the recession.[274] The same poll reported that 57 percent of Ontarians, 58 percent of British Columbians, 68 percent of Prairie residents and 69 percent of Atlantic Canadians had "very little" confidence in the ability of the Conservative government to improve the economic situation. National leaders, until the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, had been preoccupied with the seemingly interminable constitutional crisis and, as if to show their complete disregard for the economic situation of their constituents, raised taxes in many regions of the country. Politicians, both in government office and in opposition, were increasingly viewed as having their priorities wrong and as being out of touch with the realities facing their constituents. The matters that seemed to dominate the concerns of politicians often appeared to be irrelevant to the concerns of ordinary citizens. The economic lives of entire communities crumbled and government members appeared incapable of responding. In a time of economic crisis it was widely felt that the priority of government should be to solve the financial ills of the nation and protect the interests of the Canadian people. For example, it was reported by Gallup Canada in May 1992 that six in ten adults believed some aspect of the economy to be the most serious problem currently facing the nation.[275]

The Reform slogan of "getting the fiscal house in order" strongly appealed to the overriding concern of many Canadians. The Reform Party promised immediate economic relief through reduced taxation and reduced government spending. In the longer term the party promised better economic times through reduced government intervention in the economy, the restoration of the free operation of the marketplace and the elimination of government

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[274] Gallup Canada Inc., March 14, 1991, 1.
[275] Gallup Canada Inc., May 7, 1992, 1.

deficits. Preston Manning made it clear that the number one priority of his party was to restore the fiscal health of the nation. This message was amongst the most effective offered to the voting public by the RPC. Further, the nationwide concern over the state of the economy allowed the Reform Party to expand beyond its western base. It was primarily on the basis of economic policy that the party made its entrance into Ontario and the Atlantic provinces.

David Bercuson has commented that the Reform Party "is attracting a great deal of attention in the cities among professional people, middle-class people, small and medium sized businesses, even among some immigrant groups."[276] A survey conducted at the RPC 1989 Policy Conference showed that 30.8 percent of delegates earned between $35,000 and $50,000 per year.[277] Flanagan and Ellis found in their 1991 study that Reform members were drawn primarily from the "middle, middle class of Canadian society."[278] The party crossed an important threshold to mainstream political respectability with this accomplishment. In a 1994 paper, Steve Patten suggests that the decline of the Canadian economy was the key to middle class support for the Reform Party.[279] The Canadian middle class was profoundly affected by the nation's economic recession. Along with the immediate financial effects came a more lasting fear and questioning of future prosperity and economic stability. Even amongst those who had emerged from the recession relatively unscathed, a fear that they may be the next to face financial ruin was uppermost in many

[276] Remark cited in Gallup Canada Inc., June 10, 1991, 1.
[277] Reform Party Delegates Survey conducted at the 1989 Policy Conference in Edmonton, Alberta.
[278] Thomas Flanagan and Faron Ellis, "A Comparative Profile of the Reform Party of Canada," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, June 1992, 8.
[279] Steve Patten, "A Political Economy of Reform: Understanding Middle Class Support for Manning's Right-Liberation Populism," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta, June 1994, 18.

minds.[280] The chair of the National Forum on Family Security has remarked "the middle class is now at risk and the next generation faces a dismal future."[281]

The state of the economy was therefore a key factor, if not the key factor, in the Reform Party's ability to gain support from middle class constituencies. This support was of a twofold nature. First, the RPC clearly served as a lightening rod for the expression of middle class economic dissatisfaction. Second, the Reform Party successfully convinced many in the middle class that its leadership possessed both the answers and the political will to solve Canada's economic malaise. The RPC stood alone in the federal political landscape as the only party whose policies for economic recovery and future development were framed and perceived by its supporters in a relatively positive light. The major opposition parties, the Liberals and NDP alike, were noteworthy far more for their constant negative attacks on the government's financial management than for their positive policy suggestions. The Reform Party capitalized on the exceedingly negative tact employed by its partisan rivals. Simply by appearing to offer new, proactive solutions to Canada's economic malaise - even in the form of overly simplistic slogans - and with its promise of immediate financial relief, the RPC was able to gain support from an anxious middle class.

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[280] For example, a Gallup Poll conducted in January 1993 found that only 13 percent of Canadians believed that 1993 would be a prosperous year, while 35 percent predicted an economically difficult year. The poll reported that one-in-two Canadians felt the year would bring no economic improvement. See Gallup Canada Inc., January 1, 1993, 1.

[281] Quoted in David Laycock, "Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project," a paper presented to the Annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993, 6.

**Western Protest Policies of the Reform Party**

The Reform Party was born as a self-described western protest movement and operated under the slogan "The West Wants In." The party remains western Canadian based, with its central office located in Calgary, and its strongest support is still drawn from this region. More specifically, as measured by both election results and party memberships , the RPCs is strongest in Alberta and British Columbia and has been notably less successful in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. In spite of the transition to national party status, the western protest aspect of the party remains a key to its support in the region. Western Canadian resentment of economic and political dominance by Central Canada was and is a powerful and lasting force. During the 1993 election campaign the Reform Party was viewed by many Westerners as fighting for fair political representation and powers for the West. The RPC policies concerning a Triple E Senate, equal powers for all provinces and enhanced federal representation for the less populated regions of the nation played extremely well in this regard. Preston Manning was careful not to alienate his strong regional base, frequently reminding audiences that "the West just wants to be heard" and that "we will never again permit something like the National Energy Program."[282] The Reform Party promised Westerners that they would finally be heard by Ottawa and that policy decisions would not be forced upon them without the consent of the region. The RPC appeared to many in the West to be the only party which genuinely spoke for their interests and this alone was sufficient to generate significant regional support.

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[282] Remarks of this type were offered by Preston Manning with some regularity during his speaking engagements across Western Canada .

## Reform Constitutional Policy

Patten argues that for some Canadians the legitmacy of the traditional parties was called into question by their continued support for the dualist vision underlying Canada's constitutional status quo.[283] The Reform Party engaged in a careful strategy during the most recent constitutional negotiations. The party sought to position itself as the spokesman for English Canada. Reformers steadfastly rejected the granting of special status to Quebec and were equally adamant in their opposition to official bilingualism. By running no candidates in Quebec, the RPC was the only national party that could legitimately claim not to be beholden to that province. In addition, the RPC was also the only party which openly acknowledged the possibility of Quebec leaving the Canadian union and which proposed a course of action should this come about. To English Canadian voters weary of the seemingly endless constitutional crisis, the stance of the Reform Party had considerable appeal. The RPC was viewed by some of these voters, most strongly in the West, as being the only national party not willing to compromise its principles and integrity in an attempt to entice Quebec to remain a part of the federation. Amongst these voters the opposition of the Reform Party to the passage of the Charlottetown Accord further reinforced this belief. The Reform Party and its policies for a new Canada seemed to promise, unlike any of the traditional parties, an ultimate end to the constitutional conflict with no further rounds of negotiation still to come. In the eyes of its supporters, it was only the RPC which identified and pursued the true priorities of the Canadian people.

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[283] Steve Patten, "A Political Economy of Reform: Understanding Middle Class Support for Manning's Right-Liberation Populism," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta, June 1994, 18.

The province of Quebec acted as a touchstone for a profound anger and resentment felt in the West. Westerners were angered by a political party structure which seemed only to represent Quebec to them, but not the converse. Laycock has argued that identification of Quebec as a constitutional "special interest" is central to Reform policy on the Canadian constitution.[284] The Reform Party was viewed by some as a vehicle through which Westerners might, for the first time, be represented to Quebec. Constitutional fatigue had set in, not only in the West but indeed across all of English Canada. The politicians of the three major federal parties were seen by some English Canadians as being willing, even eager, to compromise important principles in a bid to hold Quebec in Confederation. An accompanying widespread impression that Quebec's demands would be endless and ultimately could not be accommodated within a recognizable Canada acted only to multiply the resentment felt by English Canadians.[285] The Reform Party opposed the conception of Canada as a federation of two founding races and sought instead a constitutional recognition of ten equal provinces. The party called for a single, final constitutional proposal to be drafted by English Canada and presented to the people of Quebec in a decisive yes/no referendum. The results of this referendum would resolve once and for all the constitutional question in Canada. This straightforward, noncompromising constitutional stance brought the Reform Party considerable support throughout English Canada. Federal government polls indicated that 75 percent of Canadians both outside and within Quebec simply wanted a solution, any solution, to end Canada's constitutional

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[284] Laycock, "Institutions and Ideology," 12.

[285] The opposition of English Canadians to the constitutional demands of Quebec was well documented by polling data. For example, a July 11, 1991 Gallup Poll recorded 82 percent opposition in the Prairie Provinces and British Columbia to the idea of a distinct society clause for Quebec. The poll found 66 percent opposed in Ontario and 61 percent against in Atlantic Canada. See Gallup Canada Inc. July 11, 1991. 2.

difficulties.[286]   The constitutional platform of the RPC was targeted at these voters.

## The Politics of Intolerance and the Reform Party

Media discussion of support for the Reform Party has often focused upon the appeal of the party to specific constituencies who have a particular political ax to grind.  This coverage has concentrated upon the "negative appeal" of the RPC to individuals with racist, homophobic and other such motivations.  The association of the party with individuals such as author William Gairdner, who was a guest speaker at the 1991 RPC Convention, has added fuel to the fire. Reform Party members steadfastly denied allegations of racism and were quick to point to the refusal of Preston Manning to sign the nomination papers of controversial British Columbia publisher Doug Collins.  The matter  cannot be so simply discounted, however, because these constituencies did provide some measure of Reform Party support in the 1993 election.

The issues of linguistic and racial intolerance in Canada cannot be ignored in a discussion of the Reform Party.  Opposition to official bilingualism has been very prominent in the politics of the party,  which drew support in some unquantifiable amount from those voters who held a strong resentment of the "imposition" of the French language.  The platform of the Reform Party provided these people the opportunity to express their intolerance in a socially sanctioned and possibly politically effective manner.  The RPC's staunch opposition to official multiculturalism programs and insistence that all Canadians be treated equally garnered the party similar support.  The work of Harrison and Krahn suggests that support for the RPC is more likely to come

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[286] As reported by CBC Television News, "The Journal," August 4, 1992.

from "nativists" than from "outsiders."[287] They argue that prejudicial nativist attitudes expressed through populism have played a part in generating support for the Reform Party. It is important to note, however, that opposition to government sponsored multiculturalism programs also brought the RPC some sympathy from those who believe such programs have served only symbolic, political purposes and have been of little practical benefit to ethnic groups and cultures.

The policy of the Reform Party concerning the RCMP should also be addressed in this regard. The party strongly opposed the changing of the RCMP dress code for religious or ethnic reasons. In parts of western Canada particularly, the decision of the federal government to allow Sikh RCMP officers to wear turbans and aboriginal officers to grow braids has been greeted with considerable hostility. The Reform Party was the beneficiary of this often racist-motivated anger.

The Reform Party recognizes the equality of all Canadians and seeks the elimination of hyphenated Canadianism. This policy bears more than a passing resemblance to the single nationality goal espoused by John Diefenbaker. The party has called for the removal of all racial, religious, cultural, linguistic or any other group-based criteria from government programs and legislation, including the constitution. This "color-blind" policy has been the primary weapon of Reformers as they struggle to overcome their racist label.

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[287] Trevor Harrison and Harvey Krahn, Populism And The Rise Of The Reform Party In Alberta . (Edmonton: Department of Sociology University of Alberta, May 1992) 10. Harrison and Krahn develop a nativist classification on which Canadian-born, Anglo-Saxon Protestants rank highest and foreign-born, non-Anglo-Saxon or European, and neither Protestant or Catholic rank lowest. See Chapter Two for a discussion of this work.

## The Individualism of Reform Politics

At the heart of the Reform Party vision is a profoundly individualist conception of the New Canada. Sharpe and Braid have observed that "most Reformers firmly believe that the individual is paramount in society and that all group rights tend to infringe on individual rights."[288] This conception clashes strongly with the collectivist tradition and values of Quebec society and serves to fundamentally distinguish the Reform Party from its often alleged counterpart, the Bloc Quebecois.

It is for this reason of fundamentally inimical conceptions of society that many of the constitutional, governmental and even economic proposals put forward by the Reform Party stand virtually no chance of acceptance by Quebecers.  For Reformers, the rights of the individual are of the highest importance and can only be damaged by recognition of artificial and arbitrary collective rights.  The Reform Party envisages a New Canada of minimal, highly decentralized government with free operation of a market economy in which equal, self reliant citizens pursue their own best interests unimpeded by onerous bureaucracy, regulation or taxation.  This prospect had an obvious immediate appeal to politically cynical Canadian voters who felt both overtaxed and overgoverned.  An April 1993 Gallup Poll found that fully 77 percent of Canadians felt that taxes were too high.[289]

However, the New Canada proposed by Reformers has a distinctively American flavour and promises to bring significant change to Canadian life. The Reform  vision represents a fundamental departure from some traditional Canadian values and conceptions of civil society.  If Canadian voters are able to step beyond their disappointment with the traditional parties, it remains

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[288] Sharpe and Braid, Storming Babylon, 172.
[289] Gallup Canada Inc., April 29, 1993, 1.

unclear whether they will endorse in the long term the individualism espoused by the Reform Party.

Sharpe and Braid have stated that "many people are so disillusioned with the old parties that they find one thing they like about Reform policy and hang on for dear life."[290] The endogenous factors discussed in this chapter have provided a wide variety of reasons for voters to support the Reform Party. It may be suggested that underlying each of these factors internal to the RPC has been the failure of the traditional parties to provide compelling alternatives to one another. Pinard has argued that new political parties are likely to emerge when the major opposition party is unable to gain over 33 percent of the vote. In Pinard's view, the state of the party system prior to an election, as measured by the 33 percent threshold, is critical to the success or failure of third parties. The next chapter turns to an empirical examination of Pinard's theory of one-party dominance and the emergence of the RPC.

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[290] Sharpe and Braid, <u>Storming Babylon</u>, 33.

# CHAPTER SIX:   TESTING PINARD

In The Rise of a Third Party Pinard argues that new parties will emerge in political systems which are characterized by a situation of one-party dominance. He proposes, employing Smelser's theory of collective behavior, that such a political system is structurally conducive to the rise of third parties. Pinard describes one-party dominance as the most important variable in the value added model, but emphasizes that other conducive factors must be present to bring about the development of new political parties. The preceding chapters have discussed the factors conducive to the emergence of the Reform Party onto the Canadian political scene. The following chapter seeks to use the results of the 1988 and 1993 Canadian national elections to test empirically the theory of one-party dominance put forward by Pinard. The chapter is not intended to provide an in-depth examination of the election outcomes. Instead, it will concern itself solely with examining the factor of one-party dominance and the electoral success of the Reform Party.

A situation of one-party dominance is defined by Pinard as being created in a democratic political system when the major opposition party in a constituency is unable to win over 33 percent of the popular vote. This chapter will open with a brief review of the condition of the federal party system in the West in the years prior to the emergence of the Reform Party. The electoral outcomes of Reform candidates since the formation of the party will be sketched out. The applicability of the 33 percent threshold to RPC election results in 1988 and 1993 will next be discussed in some detail. The chapter will go on to examine the utility of alternative conceptions and tests of one-party dominance. A summary discussion of Pinard's central empirical proposition will then close the chapter.

## One Party Dominance in the West

The Reform Party of Canada emerged in a region characterized by the dominance of the Progressive Conservative Party in federal politics. Table 1 presents the outcomes of federal elections in Western Canada since 1980. Western Canada is defined in this and all subsequent tables as British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, the Yukon and the North West Territories. The dominance of the Conservative Party in the years prior to the 1993 general election is well illustrated. The table indicates the failure of the Liberal party in the West, a party which during those years formed either the Government of Canada or the Official Opposition. For western Canadians, representation of their regional interests in Parliament did not take place through the Liberal Party. The West had soundly rejected the Liberal Party and did not regard them as a viable alternative to which they might turn. The New Democratic Party enjoyed greater electoral success in the West than did the Liberal Party, but nationally the NDP were unable to form a government or become the Official Opposition.

| Table 1 | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| General Election Results Western Canada | | | | |
| Party | Number of Seats Won | | | |
| | 1980 | 1984 | 1988 | 1993 |
| Progressive Conservative | 51 | 61 | 48 | 0 |
| Liberal | 2 | 2 | 8 | 29 |
| New Democratic Party | 27 | 17 | 33 | 9 |
| Reform Party | - | - | 0 | 51 |

## The 1993 Election

The resignation of Brian Mulroney as Prime Minister of Canada on June 25, 1993 brought to an end a nearly 10 year chapter in national politics. Kim

Campbell was chosen Mulroney's successor as Conservative party leader and became the first female Prime Minister in Canadian history. On September 8, 1993 Campbell called a general election for October 25, 1993, and the results were to dramatically change the landscape of Canadian federal politics. The Liberal party, led by Jean Chretien, formed a new majority government with 177 elected members. Campbell's Conservative party suffered the worst election defeat in the history of Canadian federal politics. The Conservatives won only two seats while losing 167 elected members from their 1988 total. The New Democratic Party won only 9 seats and, like the Conservative party, lost official party status in the House of Commons.

The 1993 election was particularly notable for the dramatic emergence of two relatively new "third" parties into prominent stature in the House of Commons. The Reform Party won a total of 52 seats by electing 51 members in western Canada and one MP in Ontario. The RPC achieved near total electoral dominance in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta where the party won 24 and 22 seats respectively. Reform candidates were less successful in Saskatchewan where they won 4 seats and in Manitoba where the RPC won only a single seat. The lone Reform Party MP east of Manitoba was elected in the Ontario constituency of Simcoe Centre. The separatist Bloc Quebecois, led by former Tory cabinet minister Lucien Bouchard, won 54 seats in the province of Quebec and in doing so gained the status of Official Opposition in the House of Commons.

**Methodological Note**

Some of the discussion in the chapter to follow has required the comparison of 1984 and 1988 general election results. The redrawing of

federal constituency boundaries between 1984 and 1988 has created difficulties in this process. The boundaries of some constituencies were not altered and these have been labeled as Unchanged in the discussion to follow. Other constituencies have been divided into two separate ridings where one used to exist. For example, the 1984 federal riding of Calgary South was divided into Calgary Southwest and Calgary Southeast for the 1988 general election. In these cases the 1984 election results have been generalized to each of the two new constituencies. These constituencies have been categorized as Changed but Comparable for purposes of this discussion. Finally, the changes in the geographic boundaries of still other constituencies have made any comparison between 1984 and 1988 election outcomes impossible. These ridings have not been considered in the discussions which involve comparisons of 1984 and 1988 election results

**Electoral Outcomes of the Reform Party**

In western Canada, Preston Manning and the Reform Party had by the early 1990s successfully positioned themselves as a viable alternative to the traditional parties. The failure of the Liberal Party in the region combined with widely perceived failure of the Mulroney Conservatives to support and advance western interests provided an ideal situation in which to build a new regionally based political party. Table 2 provides a snapshot of the emergence of the Reform Party in the West. In the 1988 election the RPC did not win any seats in the House of Commons. In the 1993 election western Canadians elected 51 Reformers to Parliament.

| Table 2 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **The Reform Party of Canada in the 1988 and 1993 General Elections** | | | | |
| **Western Canada** | | | | |
| RPC Placing | **1993 Election** Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | **1988 Election** Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 51 | 58.0% | 0 | 0% |
| 2nd | 22 | 25.0% | 9 | 12.5% |
| 3rd | 12 | 13.6% | 8 | 11.1% |
| 4th | 3 | 3.4% | 55 | 76.4% |
| | N= 88 Constituencies with RPC candidates | | N= 72 Constituencies with RPC candidates | |

The electoral outcomes for the Reform Party in 1988 and 1993 can be used to examine the utility of Pinard's one-party dominance hypothesis. Table 3 examines the success of the Reform Party in western Canada in the 1993 general election using the 33 percent threshold established by Pinard. The table shows that the Reform Party was more successful in those constituencies where the major opposition party in that riding was unable to win 33 percent of the vote in the preceding general election. The Reform Party finished first in 63.6 percent of the constituencies where the major opposition party did not win 33 percent of the vote. By comparison, the RPC finished first in 48.5 percent of those constituencies in which the major opposition party was able to win over 33 percent of the vote in the previous election. This finding lends initial modest support to the ideas advanced by Pinard. Appendices A through C apply the 33 percent threshold to the Reform Party in the 1988 general election. These tables again indicate that Reform candidates were more successful in those ridings which were characterized by a situation of one-party dominance.

It is important to note, however, that the 1993 election results do not entirely fit the predictions made by Pinard. Table 3 does indicate that the Reform Party performed better in the under 33 percent constituencies, but it also

shows that RPC success was not absent from the over 33 percent ridings. In fact, Reform candidates finished first in nearly half of the constituencies where the major opposition party had been able to win over 33 percent of the vote. Pinard's theory thus does not account for the totality of Reform Party election results in 1993.

| Table 3 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election | | | | |
| Western Canada | | | | |
| | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | |
| RPC Placing | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 35 | 63.6% | 16 | 48.5% |
| 2nd | 11 | 20.0% | 11 | 33.3% |
| 3rd | 8 | 14.5% | 4 | 12.1% |
| 4th | 1 | 1.8% | 2 | 6.1% |
| | N=55 Constituencies | | N=33 Constituencies | |
| Gamma = .23 | | | | |

The examination of Pinard's 33 percent threshold can be further refined. Table 4 eliminates from the results those constituencies in which the RPC finished second in 1988 and hence could be considered to be the major opposition party and additionally eliminates the Beaver River constituency which Debra Gray won for the Reform Party in an 1989 by-election. The elimination of these constituencies from consideration reduces the support given to Pinard's hypothesis. The table shows that the Reform Party finished first in 56.5 percent of those constituencies characterized by one-party dominance. By comparison, the RPC finished first in 48.5 percent of the constituencies which were not characterized by one-party dominance. The table continues to indicate that the success of the Reform Party was greater in those constituencies characterized by one-party dominance, but the strength of

the relationship is reduced even further. It is worth noting that the victory of Reform's first MP, Debra Gray, in the 1989 Beaver River by-election supports the Pinard hypothesis. Gray won the by-election in a constituency which was characterized by a situation of one-party dominance.

| Table 4 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **The Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election** | | | | |
| **Western Canada** <br> **Constituencies Where The RPC Was Not The Major Opposition Party or Incumbent** | | | | |
| | Major Opposition Party <br> <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party <br> >33% in 1988 Election | |
| RPC <br> Placing | Number of <br> Constituencies | Percentage <br> Contested Seats | Number of <br> Constituencies | Percentage <br> Contested Seats |
| 1st | 26 | 56.5% | 16 | 48.5% |
| 2nd | 11 | 24.0% | 11 | 33.3% |
| 3rd | 8 | 17.4% | 4 | 12.1% |
| 4th | 1 | 2.2% | 2 | 6.1% |
| | N=46 Constituencies | | N=33 Constituencies | |
| Gamma = .11 | | | | |

A provincial breakdown of Reform Party election results in the West does not lend support to the Pinard hypothesis in three of the four provinces. These results are illustrated in Appendices D through H. In Saskatchewan and British Columbia the Reform election results were opposite to the prediction made by Pinard. In each case the RPC was more successful in those constituencies where the opposition had attained over 33 percent of the vote at the last election. The outcomes for Manitoba neither give nor take away support from Pinard. Only the results from the province of Alberta lend strong support to the 33 percent hypothesis. In this case even the removal of those constituencies where the RPC was already the major opposition party does little to diminish the support shown for the theory. These results suggest that the modest regional

support found for Pinard in the above discussion was in fact produced solely by the Alberta case. The appearance of some support for Pinard's theory in western Canada upon closer examination is made up of strong support in Alberta and the absence of support in the other provinces.

The format used by Pinard in The Rise of a Third Party to directly test the 33 percent threshold is employed in Table 5. The table compares the previous strength of the main opposition party with the success of the Reform Party in the 1993 general election. The overall results do not provide support for the ideas advanced by Pinard. As has been previously discussed, the Pinard theory is unable to fully account for the Reform Party's 1993 election results. The success of Reform candidates in ridings which previously had a strong opposition is precisely opposite to the predictions made by Pinard. Table 5 indicates that RPC candidates were somewhat more successful in those ridings where the main opposition party was unable to win over 33 percent of the vote. The differences shown by the table between the under 33 percent and over 33 percent ridings are, however, extremely modest and the gamma of .28 suggests that a weak relationship exists in the direction predicted by Pinard. Further refinements of this test continued to provide similar findings. Elimination of those constituencies in which the Reform Party finished second in 1988 and of the Beaver River riding won by the RPC in a 1989 by-election reduce the strength of support for Pinard even further. The test again shows that election performance of Reformers was only slightly better in those constituencies where the major opposition party had previously received less than 33 percent of the vote.

| Table 5 |
|---|

**One Party Dominance and the Reform Party in Western Canada**

| 1993 Election Outcome: | Previous Strength of Main Opposition Party | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Previously Weak (Vote<33%) N | % | Strong (Vote>33%) N | % |
| RPC Vote Less than 10% | 1 | 1.8% | 1 | 3.0% |
| RPC Vote Between 10% and 20% | 5 | 9.1% | 5 | 15.2% |
| RPC Vote Greater than 20% | 49 | 89.0% | 27 | 81.8% |
| Gamma = .28 | | | | |

An examination of the Reform Party's 1993 election results in Ontario provides in some ways a purer test of Pinard's hypothesis. The 1993 general election was the first time that the RPC ran candidates in Ontario. The Reform Party won one seat in the province and finished second in 57 constituencies. The success of Reform candidates in Ontario may be considered to genuinely indicate the emergence of a new party into a political system. Further, the election results from western Canada must be considered to be influenced by western alienation and regional political sensibilities. In Ontario the influence of region on voting behavior can be considered to be of less consequence. Table 6 looks at the success of the Reform Party in Ontario in the 1993 federal election and compares it with the state of the party system after the 1988 general election. These comparisons do not provide support for Pinard's theory. The table shows that the Reform Party was more successful in those constituencies in which the major opposition party had been able to win over 33 percent of the vote in the previous general election. The RPC achieved greater electoral success in those constituencies which were not characterized by one-party dominance than in those which were characterized by one party dominance.

Table 6 provides a confirmation of the idiosyncratic nature of the Alberta findings. The appearance of a regional effect of one-party dominance in the West was produced by the exceptional Alberta case. The Pinard hypothesis is unable to account for Reform Party electoral success in the other Western provinces and Ontario.

| Table 6 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **The Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election** | | | | |
| **Ontario** | | | | |
| | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | |
| RPC Placing | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 0 | 0% | 1 | 1.5% |
| 2nd | 16 | 53.3% | 41 | 60.3% |
| 3rd | 12 | 40.0% | 23 | 33.8% |
| 4th | 2 | 6.7% | 3 | 4.4% |
| | N=30 Constituencies | | N=68 Constituencies* | |
| Gamma = -.18 | | | | |
| * The RPC did not have a candidate in the constituency of Timmins-Chapleau | | | | |

Similarly, the application of Pinard's test from The Rise of a Third Party to the 1993 Ontario election results does not provide support for the theory of one-party dominance. These results are presented in Table 7. In the case of Ontario the Reform Party won over 20 percent of the vote slightly less frequently in ridings with a weak opposition than it did in ridings with a strong opposition. Further the RPC received less than 10 percent of the vote more often in ridings with a weak opposition than in ridings with a strong opposition. These outcomes do not support the hypothesis of Pinard.

| Table 7 |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| One-Party Dominance and the Reform Party in Ontario |  |  |  |  |
|  | Previous Strength of Main Opposition Party | | | |
| 1993 Election Outcome: | Previously Weak (Vote<33%) | | Strong (Vote>33%) | |
|  | N | % | N | % |
| RPC Vote Less than 10% | 4 | 13.3% | 3 | 4.4% |
| RPC Vote Between 10% and 20% | 12 | 40.0% | 33 | 48.5% |
| RPC Vote Greater than 20% | 14 | 46.7% | 32 | 47.1% |
| Gamma = -.09 |  |  |  |  |

## The Bloc Quebecois and Liberals in Quebec

In order to further investigate the predictive value of Pinard's 33 percent threshold, Table 8 examines the success of the Bloc Quebecois in the 1993 general election relative to the state of the federal party system in Quebec following the 1988 general election. This table provides some support for the Pinard hypothesis. The Bloc finished first in 83 percent of those constituencies where the major opposition party had been unable to win over 33 percent of the vote in the previous federal general election. By comparison, in those constituencies where the major opposition party had been able to win over 33 percent of the vote, the Bloc finished first in 43.5 percent of the ridings. As was found in the examination of the Reform Party's 1993 election results in the West, these outcomes do not fully fit the predictions made by Pinard. Table 8 shows that the Bloc Quebecois won more seats in the under 33 percent constituencies, but it also indicates that BQ candidates finished either first or second in all of the over 33 percent ridings. These results run counter to the prediction made by Pinard.

**Table 8**

**The Bloc Quebecois in the 1993 General Election**

| Quebec | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bloc Placing | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 44 | 83.0% | 10 | 43.5% |
| 2nd | 9 | 17.0% | 13 | 56.5% |
| 3rd | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4th | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | N=53 Constituencies | | N=23 Constituencies | |
| Gamma = .73 | | | | |

Modest support for the Pinard one-party dominance hypothesis can be found by examining the election fortunes of the Liberal party in Quebec. The Liberals formed the major opposition party in Quebec following the 1988 election by winning 12 ridings while the remainder of the province's 75 seats were won by Conservative candidates. Pinard's hypotheses would predict that the Quebec Liberal candidates would be successful only in those constituencies which were not characterized by the one party dominance of the Conservatives. This prediction is largely supported by the outcomes of the 1993 election. The results indicate that of the 9 former Conservative seats won by Liberal candidates, fully 7 seats were in constituencies where the Liberal party had previously received over 33 percent of the vote.

## Alternative Measures

Pinard and Blais have each argued that it is ultimately the perception of party strength by individual voters which determines the electoral success or failure of both established opposition and new political parties.[291] An

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[291] See, for example, Maurice Pinard, "Third Parties in Canada Revisited: A Rejoinder and Elaboration of the Theory of One Party Dominance," Canadian Journal of Political Science 6 (September 1973) 440.

alternative indicator to the 33 percent threshold based upon voter perception was developed by Pinard early in his discussion in The Rise of a Third Party. Table 9 applies this measure to the Reform Party in western Canada. This table combines constituencies whose boundaries did not change from 1984 to 1988 with those ridings whose boundaries did change, but which are still comparable. The table examines the results of the 1993 general elections relative to the outcomes of the 1984 and 1988 elections. The strength of the opposition party in each constituency is divided into strong, medium and weak. The weak category represents those constituencies where the governing party was victorious in each of the two preceding elections. The strong category represents those constituencies where the opposition parties were victorious in each of the two previous elections. This table provides support for the ideas of Pinard. The Reform Party achieved its greatest success in the 1993 election in those ridings which are categorized as having a weak opposition. The RPC was least successful in those ridings which are categorized as having a strong opposition party. These results would be predicted by the Pinard hypothesis. The support shown for Pinard is not diminished by the separation of this table into Unchanged and Changed but Comparable constituency categories.

**Table 9**

**Electoral Strength of the Traditional Parties and Success of the Reform Party**

**Comparable Changed and Unchanged Constituencies Combined**
**N=58**

| Western Canada | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1984 Election | Opposition Party Win (Liberal, NDP) | | Governing Party Win (PC) | | Governing Party Win (PC) | |
| 1988 Election | Opposition Party Win (Liberal, NDP) | | Opposition Party Win (Liberal, NDP) | | Governing Party Win (PC) | |
| Opposition Strength: | **Strong** | | **Medium** | | **Weak** | |
| | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| **Outcome 1993:** | | | | | | |
| Reform Party | 3 | 33.3% | 6 | 46.2% | 26 | 72.2% |
| Liberal | 4 | 44.4% | 4 | 30.8% | 10 | 27.8% |
| New Democratic Party | 2 | 22.2% | 3 | 23.1% | 0 | 0% |
| Progressive Conservative | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| N= | | (9) | | (13) | | (36) |

Cramer's V = .31

Table 10 applies this alternative indicator of party strength to the electoral outcomes of Reform candidates in Ontario in the 1993 general election. The results similarly are supportive of Pinard. The Reform Party was most successful in those constituencies which had a weak opposition and was least successful in those ridings which had a strong opposition.

| Table 10 |
| --- |

**Electoral Strength of the Traditional Parties and Success of the Reform Party in Ontario**

**Comparable Changed and Unchanged Constituencies Combined**
**N=87**

| 1984 Election | Opposition Party Win (Liberal, NDP) | | Governing Party Win (PC) | | Governing Party Win (PC) | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1988 Election | Opposition Party Win (Liberal, NDP) | | Opposition Party Win (Liberal, NDP) | | Governing Party Win (PC) | |
| Opposition Strength: | **Strong** | | **Medium** | | **Weak** | |
| | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| Reform Party Placing 1993: | | | | | | |
| 1st | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 1 | 2.4% |
| 2nd | 13 | 50% | 12 | 60% | 28 | 68.3% |
| 3rd | 8 | 31% | 8 | 40% | 12 | 29.3% |
| 4th | 5 | 19% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| N= | (26) | | (20) | | (41) | |
| Cramer's V= .29 | | | | | | |

## The Charlottetown Accord

The results of the Charlottetown Accord Referendum can be employed to further investigate the utility of Pinard's hypothesis. Table 11 divides the constituencies of the West, based upon 1988 election results, into those where the major opposition party received less than 33 percent of the vote and those where the major opposition received more than 33 percent of the vote. The percentage voting "Yes" and "No" for passage of the Charlottetown Accord is indicated for each of these categories.

Based upon Pinard's theory, it can be speculated that those constituencies in which the major opposition party was unable to win over 33 percent of the popular vote would be more likely to vote "No" in the referendum. In Pinard's view those constituencies are the most likely to reject the positions of the opposition parties who are perceived to be ineffective and nonrepresentative of the riding. Previous chapters have described the poor

standing of the Conservative government in public opinion prior to the Charlottetown Accord. The consensus of the Conservatives, Liberals and NDP in favor of passage of the Accord suggests that those constituencies characterized by one-party dominance would reject the Accord more forcefully than ridings in which the opposition had been able to win over 33 percent of the vote. It can be reasonably surmised that the dislike of the ruling party would combine with the rejection of the major opposition party to produce a stronger "No" vote in the under 33 percent constituencies.

This prediction is not supported by the table which indicates that ridings characterized by one-party dominance rejected the Accord slightly less than constituencies not characterized by one-party dominance. The Accord was rejected by 63.4 percent of voters in ridings where the major opposition had received over 33 percent of the vote and was rejected by a nearly equivalent 63 percent of voters in constituencies where the major opposition had received less than 33 percent of the vote. This expanded investigation does not produce further support for the Pinard hypothesis.

| Table 11 | | |
|---|---|---|
| Pinard's 33 % Threshold and the Charlottetown Accord Referendum Western Canada | | |
| | Percentage Voting "Yes" | "Percentage Voting "No" |
| Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | 37.0% | 63% |
| Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | 36.6% | 63.4% |
| Gamma = .0086 | | |

The Charlottetown Accord indicator is applied to the province of Ontario in Table 12. The table shows results which are in the direction predicted by

Pinard. However, the support given to the theory of one-party dominance is minimal. The Charlottetown Accord received only 2.8 percent more support in the ridings not characterized by one-party dominance than it did in constituencies which were dominated by a single party. Opposition to passage of the Accord was only 2.8 percent greater in ridings characterized by one-party dominance than it was in constituencies not dominated by a single party. The small differences between the two types of party systems do not provide substantial support for the theory of one-party dominance.

| Table 12 | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Pinard's 33 % Threshold and the Charlottetown Accord Referendum** **Ontario** | | |
| | Percentage Voting "Yes" | "Percentage Voting "No" |
| Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | 47.5% | 52.5% |
| Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | 50.3% | 49.7% |
| Gamma = .056 | | |

Table 13 looks at the success of the Reform Party in the 1993 general election and compares it with the outcomes of the Charlottetown Accord Referendum in western Canada. Based upon Pinard's work, it would be expected that those ridings which endorsed the Accord the least should also be those which endorsed the Reform Party the most. As was discussed above, Pinard's theory would suggest that those constituencies which rejected most strongly the consensus of the Conservatives, Liberals and NDP should also be the ridings most likely to endorse the Reform Party. Table 13 is supportive of this prediction. The table indicates that Reform candidates were most successful in those constituencies where the Charlottetown Accord was

endorsed by less than 30 percent of voters. The Reform Party was least successful in those constituencies where the Accord received over 40 percent voter support. The outcome of this comparison is thus supportive of the predictions made based upon the Pinard theory.

| Table 13 |
| --- |
| **The Charlottetown Accord Referendum and the Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election** Western Canada N=88 Constituencies |

| % Voting "Yes" In Referendum | % Vote Received By RPC candidates 1993 |
| --- | --- |
| < 30% | 43.3% |
| 30 - 39% | 37.6% |
| ≥ 40% | 31.8% |

Table 14 applies this indicator to the case of Ontario. The table has been constructed using different levels of "Yes" votes because of the greater support received by the Charlottetown Accord in Ontario. The results provide a slightly more complicated picture than was the case for western Canada. The outcomes for all but the lowest category of "Yes" votes matches the predicted relationship. Support for the Reform Party in the 1993 general election decreased as support for the Charlottetown Accord increased. Within these categories support for RPC candidates was highest in those constituencies most opposed to the Accord and lowest in those ridings most in favour of the Accord. In this regard the results for Ontario are the same as those found for western Canada. However, the lowest category of support for the Charlottetown Accord - those constituencies with less than 40 percent of voters casting a "Yes" ballot - does not support the Pinard prediction. In this case support for the RPC candidates was less than would be expected based upon the Pinard theory. This outcome suggests that variables other than support for or opposition to the established parties played a role in people's voting decisions.

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Table 14

The Charlottetown Accord Referendum
and the Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election
Ontario
N=98 Constituencies*

% Voting "Yes"        % Vote Received By
In Referendum         RPC candidates 1993
< 40%                       17.7%
40 - 49%                    22.4%
50 - 59%                    18.9%
> 60%                       14.7%
* the RPC did not have a candidate in the constituency of Timmins-Chapleau
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## The Traditional Parties and the RPC

Table 15 gives correlation coefficients between the vote for the traditional parties and Reform Party in the 1988 and 1993 elections. The table shows that the 1988 vote for the Progressive Conservatives was a strong predictor of the 1993 vote for the Reform Party. In the 1993 election the Reform Party did well in those constituencies where the governing party had been strong and the opposition parties had been weak. The findings show that the 1988 vote for the Progressive Conservatives was a strong predictor of the 1993 vote for the Reform Party. This result supports the hypothesis that the failure of the Conservative government to satisfy its 1988 supporters led those voters to support the Reform Party as a new right wing alternative.

| Table 15 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS | | | | |
| Canada | | | | |
| | Lib '93 | NDP '93 | PC '93 | RPC '93 |
| Lib'88 | .83** | .03 | -.12 | -.65** |
| Lib '93 | 1.00 | .05 | -.23* | -.74** |
| NDP '88 | -.03 | .86** | -.49** | -.51** |
| NDP '93 | .05 | 1.00 | -.47** | -.65** |
| PC '88 | -.39** | -.69** | .53** | .71** |
| PC'93 | -.23* | -.47** | 1.00 | .27** |
| RPC '88 | -.46** | -.59** | .25* | .74** |
| RPC'93 | -.74** | -.65** | .27** | 1.00 |
| Ref 'Yes' | .47** | .06 | .17 | -.32** |
| * Significance .05 | | ** Significance .01 | | |

## Conclusion

The Pinard hypothesis of one-party dominance is best suited to a political system with two or at most three political parties. The complexity of the Canadian federal political landscape makes application of Pinard's 33 percent threshold problematic. The 1993 election, for example, involved candidates from five major parties and many smaller parties. The sheer number of parties makes the winning of 33 percent of the vote far more difficult for any one party - including the winning party in each constituency. It is entirely possible to win a constituency in the Canadian political system with less than 33 percent of that riding's vote. Further, in a multiple party system the need for new third parties is lessened should the governing and major opposition parties fail to adequately represent constituent interests and viewpoints. The disgruntled voter can easily turn to another already existing party. In a multiple party system, it might further be argued that the emergence of new parties is of much less consequence to average voters. The addition of a new party to an already overcrowded political

landscape is likely to have less impact than would be the case if a new party emerged in a two or three party system.

The Pinard formula is also difficult to apply on a nationwide basis to the regionalized Canadian federal system. The electoral fortunes of political parties have varied dramatically across the country and have changed over time. While the Progressive Conservatives may be viewed as having been the dominant party in the West, this situation was not necessarily true throughout Canada. The factor of regionalism is key to any consideration of federal politics in Canada. One party has dominated in parts of Canada while an entirely different party has dominated in other parts of this country. This renders application of the 33 percent threshold as a nationwide predictor for the emergence of third parties very difficult.

The value added theory requires that other factors be present to facilitate the emergence of new political parties. One-party dominance is only one factor, although it is described by Pinard as being the most important. Other conducive factors, such as precipitating events and structural strain, must also be present. The conditions of one-party dominance were clearly present in the province of Alberta for many years before it became the birthplace and strongest supporter of the Reform Party. Prior to the development of the RPC other western based regional parties, such as the Western Canada Concept party, did emerge in Alberta but none were to achieve the success and mainstream political status of the Reform movement. Pinard's theory would suggest that although one-party dominance was present in Alberta, other factors required for the emergence of third parties did not exist. For example, it may be argued that the Progressive Conservatives, while dominant in the West, had not been afforded a genuine opportunity to prove their ability or inability to govern favourably for

the region. The short lived Clark government did not provide many Westerners with an opportunity to assess the ability of the Conservative party to govern well and represent their interests. Westerners voted for the Tories, but the party found itself in a seemingly permanent position of opposition. After the 1984 and particularly the 1988 elections many in the West began to perceive the Conservatives as not representing their region. It was only at that point - when the Conservatives no longer provided a political vehicle for many Westerners - that an opportunity was created for the emergence of a new third party into the political mainstream. The 33 percent threshold thus required the failure of the Conservative Party in the eyes of Westerners as an important variable. Only in this circumstance did the inability of the opposition Liberals and NDP to attract 33 percent of the vote in Western constituencies became important. A vacuum was opened into which the Reform Party - with good fortune and astute timing - successfully stepped.

The Pinard value added theory of third party development is useful in providing a conceptual framework to examine the emergence of new political parties. It provides a means to compare and contrast the appearance of new political parties. The theory provides a vocabulary and a framework for further discussion and represents an important step beyond the historical, chronological approach which has most often characterized the study of third parties.

However, the value of Pinard's empirical propositions is less clear. Application of the theory of one-party dominance as measured by the 33 percent threshold to the Reform Party of Canada has produced little support for Pinard. In western Canada the initial findings indicated that Reform candidates were more successful in the under 33 percent categories than in the over 33

percent categories, although the theory is unable to account for the RPC victories in constituencies which were not dominated by a single party. A more refined analysis breaking down Reform election results by province showed that the 33 percent threshold applied only in Alberta. The limited support shown for Pinard's indicator by the West as a region was in fact produced by the Alberta case. The utility of the 33 percent measure of one-party dominance was further tested through its application to the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The Ontario case produced results which were precisely opposite to those predicted by Pinard. Reform Party candidates were more successful in ridings which were not characterized by one-party dominance than they were in constituencies dominated by a single party. The case of the Bloc Quebecois did provide some limited support for the Pinard theory. BQ candidates were more successful in ridings where the major opposition party had been unable to gain over 33 percent of the vote. However, as was the case for Reformers in western Canada and Ontario, the theory cannot account for the success of Bloc candidates in constituencies where the opposition party had achieved over 33 percent of the vote.

A broadened definition of one-party dominance which moved away from the strict application of the 33 percent indicator produced greater support for the ideas of Pinard. A measure developed by Pinard based upon voter perception of party strength showed strong support for the theory of one-party dominance. In both western Canada and Ontario Reform Party candidates performed best in constituencies with a weak opposition and performed worst in ridings which had a strong opposition. A further test of Pinard's ideas based upon voting patterns in the Charlottetown Accord referendum produced less clear outcomes, but provided some support for the propositions made in The Rise of a Third Party.

As would be predicted by Pinard, the Reform Party was generally most successful in ridings with the strongest "No" vote and was least successful in those constituencies with the strongest "Yes" vote.

The tests in this chapter have suggested that the value of the theory of one-party dominance as an empirical predictor of the emergence of new political parties is dependent upon its operationalization. Although little evidence has been found to confirm the accuracy of Pinard's 33 percent indicator, the use broadened measures has produced support for the ideas underlying the theory of one-party dominance. The table of correlation coefficients has revealed a strong relationship between the 1988 vote for the Progressive Conservatives and the 1993 vote for the Reform Party of Canada. Based on this finding it may be the case that a different operationalization of Pinard's theory would provide a more accurate indicator for the possible emergence of third parties into the Canadian political system.

# CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Political scientists, I have observed, exhaust themselves in trying
to find out why things happen and, once they think they know, in
further attempting to organize their findings into some coherent
system. But so perverse is politics - not to mention the politicians -
that systems and theories collapse under the weight of exceptions.
While there is much established order in physics and chemistry,
there is mostly chaos in politics, so that the very term "political
science" may be a misnomer. After all, our most adroit, adept and
successful practitioner of politics, Mckenzie King, was also a close
student of the supernatural. He must have been on to something.

Dalton Camp[292]

The observation of Dalton Camp should not be taken as a prohibition
against the scientific study of the political world, but as a warning to those who
seek to empirically understand and explain Canadian party politics. The lesson
to be drawn from Camp is that the limitations of theories must be recognized
and readily acknowledged by their supporters. There can be no single grand
explanation of political life. This fact is inherent in the very nature of politics.
The successful practitioner of Canadian party politics depends as much on
intuition and feeling as upon empirical measures and practical experience. In
an analysis of partisan strategies and conflicts it is often difficult to distinguish
between the "art" and the "science" of politics. The real world of Canadian
politics would seem to demand equal measures of both. The rise of the Reform
Party of Canada was brought about as much by feelings of anger, betrayal and
disappointment as by rationally analyzed policy alternatives. The 1993 election
results clearly indicate that the Reform Party had caught the spirit of the times.

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[292] Dalton Camp, An Eclectic Eel (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers & Company Ltd. 1980) 101.

**Smelser/Pinard And The Value Added Theory**

The work of Maurice Pinard in <u>The Rise Of A Third Party</u> is particularly susceptible to the critique put forward by Dalton Camp. Andre Blais has attacked the "exceptions" found in the theoretical and empirical analysis of Pinard.[293] This does not, however, destroy the utility of the approach. The value added theory of collective behavior developed by Neil Smelser and applied by Pinard provides a useful framework for understanding the emergence of new political parties. The theory to this date stands virtually alone as a comprehensive, empirically testable explanation of the rise of third parties. It provides a method in which social structures, events and information may be organized and their interaction understood. The Smelser/Pinard theory allows for empirical comparison and contrast to be made between the development of different third party movements. The utility of this approach, as a means for understanding new political parties in general, is greater than the chronological case study approach which dominates the literature of Canadian political science.

It is important to note that the high level of abstraction of the value added theory poses significant problems for the operationalization of variables and leaves considerable room for debate about the validity of findings so derived.[294] Pinard argues that one-party dominance is the most important of the value added factors and that the 33 percent threshold can provide a basis for predicting the emergence of new political parties. The utility of this empirical indicator is open to question. The examination of Reform Party election outcomes did not provide support for the 33 percent threshold. In the case of

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[293] Andre Blais "Third Parties In Canadian Provincial Politics," <u>Canadian Journal of Political Science</u> ,6 (September 1973) 422-438.

[294] See, for example, Graham White "One Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Throry Reconsidered," <u>Canadian Journal of Political Science</u>, 6 (September 1973) 399-421.

Alberta, Reform candidates were more successful in those constituencies where the major opposition party had been unable to win over 33 percent of the vote. However, in the other Western provinces and Ontario, no difference or results precisely opposite to those predicted by Pinard were found. The inability of the major opposition party to win over 33 percent of the vote did not in the case of the Reform party guarantee the success of third party candidates. Tossutti's investigation of the factor of one-party dominance on Reform Party poll support and election results produced similar mixed findings.[295]

In the preface to <u>The Rise of a Third Party</u> Pinard describes theories as "hesitant steps towards the understanding of social reality."[296] The 33 percent empirical predictor may serve as a starting point toward building a more useful, more sophisticated indicator. The design of such a tool would have to consider the impact of Canada's multi party system and the importance of regional voting patterns. In providing a testable and in some cases accurate predictor, Pinard's hypothesis of one-party dominance has made an important beginning.

The value added theory works well in providing a methodology through which the emergence of the Reform Party may be understood. The RPC emerged in a political system which was structurally conducive to the rise of third parties. A system of one-party dominance in the West left some voters in the region with no real political alternative to which they could turn. On a national basis, the traditional parties - government and opposition alike - were often unable to project themselves as genuine and compelling alternatives to one another. A 1991 Gallup Poll, for example, found that none of the three

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[295] Livianna S. Tossutti, "The Past Revisited?: The Reform Party And The Dominant Explanations Of Minor Party Development," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 1993.

[296] Pinard, <u>The Rise Of A Third Party</u>, xii.

major party leaders was the choice of as many as three-in-ten Canadians for Prime Minister.[297] The united stand taken by the parties on the Charlottetown Accord likely exacerbated this problem for some voters.

Structural strain has existed in the West since the early days of Confederation. Western Canadians often felt as second class citizens in their own country. In recent times these feelings of political and economic irrelevance have not been confined strictly to the West and, in fact, took on a national resonance. Canadians nationwide came to feel that their government was distant, nonresponsive and nonrepresentative of the average Canadian. Canadians felt overtaxed, exasperated by politicians who did not seem to understand or care about their plight, and were extremely cynical about the motivations of those in public life. The mood of the public was particularly captured by a 1993 Gallup poll which found that Canadians believed the federal government wasted, on average, 47 cents of each tax dollar it received.[298]

In western Canada traditional feelings of alienation have not meant withdrawal from political involvement but have, on the contrary, been expressed in a search for new ways of participating in and changing the system. The Reform Party was built by offering Westerners just such a vehicle.

A generalized belief that the "fault" lies with the politicians and political parties of the day was clearly a national phenomenon prior to the 1993 general election. Support for the Reform Party came, however, not just from the traditionally disenfranchised of the Canadian political system. The party drew some support from virtually all regions and sectors of Canadian society, most

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[297] Gallup Canada Inc., April 11, 1991, 1.
[298] Gallup Canada Inc., January 7, 1993, 1.

importantly from the middle class. This was crucial to the Reform Party achieving legitimacy in the eyes of some as a mainstream political alternative.

Recent precipitating events acted to confirm for some Canadians the validity of their generalized beliefs about politicians. These included the passing of Quebec's language laws, the imposition of the Goods and Services Tax and, most importantly for the West, the CF-18 decision. Other events surrounding the Mulroney administration played an important role both in the West and nationally. The extensive patronage appointments made by the Mulroney government, in particular, confirmed and helped to create the cynicism of the Canadian voting public. The behaviour of Liberal Senators during the Free Trade and GST debates helped to turn all politicians into an object of some national derision. A Gallup poll found that 58 percent of Canadians believed that the behavior of Members of Parliament was disrespectful and improper.[299] The perception of an excessive lifestyle on the part of Prime Minister Mulroney in the midst of a national economic recession and his seeming indifference to public sentiment created a lasting anger and resentment amongst Canadians. The case of the Reform Party would seem to suggest that there can be multiple precipitating events for a single social movement. For example, the imposition of the GST may have been a precipitating event for some people to join or support the RPC while for other party members the Charlottetown Accord may have been the key event.

The Reform Party emerged in this conducive setting and has successfully mobilized many Canadians to its cause. The 1993 election results clearly indicate that the party has established itself as an important part of the Canadian political landscape.

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[299] Gallup Canada Inc., November 25, 1991, 1.

The mobilization strategy of the Reform Party differed in one important respect from that of the major opposition parties. The Reform Party concentrated upon presenting an alternative policy program to Canadians and spent comparatively little time engaging in negative attacks on the federal Tory administration. Reformers without doubt strongly criticized the performance of the national government, but most often did so in the context of offering an alternative plan to address a situation. Jim Cunningham said of Preston Manning "he is the only leader to talk about ideas, who suggests positive changes at least some of the time."[300] The most notable exception to this strategy was the poorly received attack launched on "the Mulroney deal" by Reformers during the Charlottetown Accord referendum campaign. The Reform approach stood in contrast to that employed by the federal Liberal and NDP opposition parties. In each case, some part of the Canadian public came to perceive the opposition as offering nothing new of substance and as being preoccupied more with negative partisan attacks than with generating solutions to Canada's problems.

The Smelser/Pinard theory of collective behavior would seem on this basis to offer a plausible explanation for the rise of the Reform Party of Canada. The model is intended, however, only to address the emergence of new social movements and does not speak to the longer term survival of such forms of collective behavior. In order to understand how a third party can survive and become a permanent part of a political system one must move beyond Smelser and Pinard.

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[300] Jim Cunningham, On the Brink: Preston Manning's Bid for Power (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd., 1991) 3.

**Lessons Of The Reform Party**

The first and most important lesson provided by the Reform Party for the understanding of third parties in Canada is also the most self evident. The rise of the Reform Party has shown simply that it is possible to build a new political party and achieve national electoral success in the Canadian political system of the 1990s. The Reform Party has gone far beyond the accomplishments of the many western-based protest parties that have preceded it by becoming part of the political mainstream of the Canadian party system. In the view of many Canadians the RPC is not simply a protest party but has become a genuine and legitimate political alternative. The winning of 52 seats in the 1993 general election provides the strongest possible support for this proposition.

The Reform Party has shown that a new third party can emerge on the Canadian political scene and become an important player in national partisan politics. The impact of the Reform Party's presence has been felt not only in Parliament, but in the policy platforms and electoral calculus of all three major parties. Further, the influence of the Reform Party has been felt at the level of provincial politics in western Canada. This has been particularly the case in Alberta where fears of the RPC developing a provincial wing brought about changes to the platforms of the both provincial Conservative and Liberal parties.

The rise of the Reform Party of Canada indicates that because of the distortions introduced by the single member plurality electoral system, it is crucial that a new political party be able to establish a concentrated geographic basis of support.[301] The impact of the electoral system is to discriminate against

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[301] For an overview of the bias of the single member plurality system, see Alan C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965" Canadian Journal of Political Science 1 (March 1968), 55-80., and Keith Archer, "Voting Behaviour and Political Dominance in Alberta, 1971-1991," in Government and Politics in Alberta eds. Roger Gibbins an Allan Tupper (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1992) 112-114.

third parties which have a diffuse basis of support and to favour those which have a strong regional basis of support. It is not sufficient for a new party to garner ten percent of the total vote, if that vote is spread throughout constituencies across the nation. It is only through the concentration of that support in a few constituencies that an emerging political party can hope to win one or more seats in the House of Commons. The Reform Party has established such a regional base of support in western Canada, most strongly in Alberta and British Columbia. The issue for a third party which has successfully established a geographic base of support then becomes how to maintain this core while seeking to establish new backing outside of the region. The future of the RPC will depend considerably upon its ability to gain support in all regions of Canada. The ambition of the party to govern Canada cannot be realized if the party is unable to transcend its western base.

It is important to recognize the extent to which the failure of the traditional parties was responsible for the rise of the Reform Party. In western Canada, a third party of the right could not have successfully emerged during the years of the Trudeau Liberal government. So long as the Progressive Conservatives could claim to be the true representatives of the region and to have been denied a chance to govern, the protest votes of the region would go to the Tory party. The election of the Progressive Conservatives in 1984 was therefore perhaps the most crucial event for the rise of the Reform Party. The administration of Brian Mulroney was unable to convince western Canadians that it would do justice to the region and indeed was unable to demonstrate to the region that its government was any better than the Liberal cabinets which had proceeded it.

As has been discussed, the newly chosen leaders of the New Democratic and Liberal Parties were not able to portray themselves as compelling alternatives in the eyes of many western Canadians. The 1993 election campaign as seen through the lens of the media and importantly as seen through the spectacle of question period involved leaders and parties more determined to attack one another than to solve the problems of the average Canadian citizen. If either of the major opposition parties had been able to convince Canadians that they represented effective alternatives to the Tory government, the emergence of the Reform Party may well have been far less dramatic.

The importance of Preston Manning to the emergence of the Reform Party cannot be overstated. It is highly unlikely that the RPC could have achieved similar levels of success without the leadership of Manning; he alone has been the key to the entire enterprise. The RPC has been the personal political vehicle of Manning virtually since the founding convention of the party in Winnipeg in 1987. Manning has maintained an iron control over all aspects of party development and he alone among Reformers has developed a truly national profile. Even in western Canada, it has largely been Manning alone who represents and speaks for the Reform Party. Local candidates may have developed some independent profiles in their immediate constituencies, but no Reformer approaches Preston Manning in this regard. The rise of the RPC suggests that very strong leadership is necessary for the development of third parties. Internally, strong leadership is required to build an organization able to effectively contest elections and to stem the dissension which invariably arises in any collective endeavor. Internal conflict has crippled several of the western-based protest movements that have preceded the Reform Party. Externally,

strong leadership is required to gain the confidence of voters. In part, this is a product of the presidential style of media coverage that has become the norm in Canada, coverage that focuses strongly on the national leaders to the exclusion of local candidates and local issues.

The Reform Party played an important role in the referendum held on the Charlottetown Accord. The Reform Party was the only major political party in Canada to oppose passage of the Accord. The position of the party concerning the Accord was not easily arrived at. The membership of the party was split over the issue and Preston Manning himself initially had mixed feelings concerning passage of the Accord. A poll taken by the Angus Reid group showed that 40 percent of Reform supporters opposed the Accord, 37 percent supported it and 22 percent were undecided.[302] The referendum campaign provided the RPC with a national stage and a degree of Canada wide exposure which the party simply could not otherwise have achieved. Preston Manning became a chief spokesperson for the "No" side as he traveled the nation attacking the "Mulroney deal" and presenting the Reform Party's own constitutional vision. The campaign lined up the Reform Party on the side opposing the Canadian establishment, including the traditional parties, major business organizations, and the mass media. The campaign and its outcome portrayed the Reform Party as being on the side of the average Canadian. Manning campaigned on a platform of "ending constitutional wrangling" and addressing the economic issues that truly concern Canadians. The referendum campaign demonstrated the importance of a third party taking policy positions which distinguish it from the political mainstream, as only in this manner can new political parties stand apart from those whom they seek to replace.

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[302] Michael Clarkson, "Reform's Stand Cuts Yes Vote," Calgary Herald, September 15, 1992, A1.

**The Future Of The Reform Party Of Canada**

Brian Mulroney announced his resignation as Prime Minister and as leader of the Progressive Conservative party on February 24, 1993. Mulroney had been the dominant force in Canadian federal politics since the election of a massive Tory majority in 1984. Public opinion polls had consistently reported record levels of disapproval for Mulroney and the governing Conservatives. A 1992 Gallup Poll, for example, found that 81 percent of Canadians disapproved of the way Mulroney was handling his job as Prime Minister.[303] The face of Canadian politics was changed with the retirement of Mulroney. The anger directed at Brian Mulroney by Canadians was clearly a key source of support for the Reform Party. For western Canadians and disaffected Tory supporters in particular, the RPC was the vehicle through which they could express their dislike for and disappointment with the former Prime Minister and his Conservative Party. Much of the success of the Reform Party in the 1993 election can be attributed to this factor. The short lived Campbell administration was unable to overcome the anger directed at Mulroney. The political calculus of the Reform Party must now necessarily change. As a party with a large parliamentary caucus, the RPC will now be judged on the basis of its performance in the House of Commons and on the national stage of Canadian politics. Brian Mulroney, who himself became a "precipitating event" for the Reform Party, has been lost and the party must rely upon internal resources to build support among Canadians.

The policy platform of the Reform Party has been coopted to some extent by all three traditional parties. The themes of economic restraint, enhanced citizen participation and increased political accountability are echoed by the

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[303] Gallup Canada Inc., April 25, 1991, 2.

Liberals, New Democrats and Conservatives alike. The new Liberal government has adapted key Reform policies including criminal justice reforms, a reduced federal cabinet, the establishment of a deficit reduction schedule and a toughening of immigration procedures. The success of the Reform Party has been built upon the distinctiveness of the party and its platform. When the RPC first appeared as a self-described western protest party, Reformers were able to campaign on a platform consisting largely of the traditional issues of western discontent. Preston Manning traveled extensively throughout the region and spoke of matters such as discriminatory freight rates and the economic exploitation of the West by Ontario. The decision of the RPC to expand into Ontario and Atlantic Canada effectively robbed the party of this platform. If Reform is to survive and find its own niche, it must in some measure remain a distinctive political entity and a genuine alternative. The future success or failure of the party will depend considerably upon this factor.

Preston Manning views the building of the Reform Party as a long term project. Manning is well aware of the history of the Progressive Party whose dramatic emergence burned out as swiftly as a prairie fire. From the start his vision of the development of the RPC has differed significantly from many of his followers in this regard. While the supporters of the RPC clearly intend it to have an immediate and significant impact Canadian politics, Preston Manning's initial goals were far more modest. The success of the Reform Party in the 1993 election far exceeded the initial hopes of the Reform leader.

The value added theory of Smelser and Pinard does not address how a social movement can be successfully maintained over time. This is clearly not a concern for single issue social movements whose lifespan will expire upon the achievement of their goal. The objective of a political party, however, is to gain

and retain political power. A party is virtually by definition a multiple issue social movement. The agenda of a political party is an ongoing one for society. To pursue this agenda the party itself must survive.

The issue of the durability of the Reform Party is a matter that only time and elections will resolve. The RPC was formed as a self described populist protest movement and has employed as its mobilization strategy "catching waves"[304] of regional and national discontent. If the party is to survive in the long run, it must make the transition to a permanent place on the Canadian political spectrum. Populism cannot provide the basis for the long term survival of a political party. The Reform Party must institutionalize itself - the very antithesis of populist politics - and establish a core of voter support if it hopes to survive as a permanent part of Canadian party politics.

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[304] Preston Manning has often described his political strategy as catching or riding waves of popular discontent. See, for example, Brian Bergman, "Reformers On The Ropes," <u>Maclean's,</u> August 9, 1993, 14.

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# APPENDICES

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**Appendix A**

**The Reform Party of Canada in the 1988 General Election**

**Western Canada**
**Unchanged Constituencies From 1984 to 1988 General Elections**

| RPC Placing | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1984 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1984 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2nd | 6 | 24.0% | 0 | 0 |
| 3rd | 5 | 20.0% | 0 | 0 |
| 4th | 14 | 56.0% | 10 | 100% |
| | N=25 Constituencies | | N=10 Constituencies | |

Gamma = 1

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**Appendix B**

**The Reform Party of Canada in the 1988 General Election**

**Western Canada**
**Constituencies Changed From 1984 to 1988 General Elections But Comparable**

| RPC Placing | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1984 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1984 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2nd | 1 | 8.4% | 0 | 0 |
| 3rd | 2 | 16.7% | 0 | 0 |
| 4th | 9 | 75.0% | 11 | 100% |
| | N=12 Constituencies | | N=11 Constituencies | |

Gamma = 1

**Appendix C**

**The Reform Party of Canada in the 1988 General Election**

**Western Canada**
**Comparable Changed and Unchanged Constituencies Combined**

| RPC Placing | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1984 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1984 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2nd | 7 | 18.9% | 0 | 0 |
| 3rd | 7 | 18.9% | 0 | 0 |
| 4th | 23 | 62.2% | 21 | 100% |
| | N=37 Constituencies | | N=21 Constituencies | |

Gamma = 1

**Appendix D**

**The Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election**
**Manitoba**

| RPC Placing | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 1 | 14.3% | 0 | 0 |
| 2nd | 3 | 42.9% | 5 | 71.4% |
| 3rd | 2 | 28.6% | 2 | 28.6% |
| 4th | 1 | 14.3% | 0 | 0% |
| | N=7 Constituencies | | N=7 Constituencies | |

Gamma = -.13

**Appendix E**

**The Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election**
**Saskatchewan**

| RPC Placing | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Contested Seats |
| 1st | 0 | 0 | 4 | 44.4% |
| 2nd | 1 | 20.0% | 3 | 33.3% |
| 3rd | 4 | 80.0% | 1 | 11.1% |
| 4th | 0 | 0% | 1 | 11.1% |
| | N=5 Constituencies | | N=9 Constituencies | |

Gamma = -.68

**Appendix F**

**The Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election**
**Alberta**

| | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPC Placing | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 21 | 95.5% | 1 | 25.0% |
| 2nd | 1 | 4.5% | 3 | 75.0% |
| 3rd | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| 4th | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| | N=22 Constituencies | | N=4 Constituencies | |

Gamma = .97

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**Appendix G**

**The Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election**

**Alberta**
**Where the RPC Was Not The Major Opposition Party Or The MP**

| | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPC Placing | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 12 | 92.3% | 0 | 0 |
| 2nd | 1 | 7.7% | 3 | 100% |
| 3rd | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| 4th | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| | N=13 Constituencies | | N=3 Constituencies | |

Gamma = 1

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**Appendix H**

**The Reform Party of Canada in the 1993 General Election**
**British Columbia**

| | Major Opposition Party <33% in 1988 Election | | Major Opposition Party >33% in 1988 Election | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPC Placing | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats | Number of Constituencies | Percentage Contested Seats |
| 1st | 13 | 65.0% | 11 | 91.7% |
| 2nd | 5 | 25.0% | 0 | 0% |
| 3rd | 2 | 10.0% | 1 | 8.3% |
| 4th | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| | N=20 Constituencies | | N=12 Constituencies | |

Gamma = -.62