

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

The Effect of a Positive Peer Culture Model on
Self-Concept and Moral Climate
of Young Offenders
in a Secure Custody Facility

by

Marla Calderwood

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
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
The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Effect of a Positive Peer Culture Model on Self-Concept and Moral Climate of Young Offenders in a Secure Custody Facility," submitted by Marla C. Calderwood in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science.



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ABSTRACT

In recent years there has been a proliferation of literature addressing the treatment of juvenile offenders. This study involved a programme evaluation within an Alberta Secure Custody Young Offender Facility. A comparison was made between a Positive Peer Culture (PPC) model and the standard correctional programme utilized by the Centre. The effects of these two types of programmes were assessed in relation to the self-concepts of the male residents and the moral climates within the units.

The literature examining Kohlberg's "Just Community" and Vorrath's Positive Peer Culture were reviewed. There was general agreement that individuals usually act within pressures from the social context. As well, if youth are "empowered," thus participating in democratic discussions acknowledging perspectives of others, provided with decision-making power, and expected to take responsibilities for both self and others, then an increasingly positive youth subculture emerges. In addition, Positive Peer Culture supporters claimed that participants will experience increased self-concept.

The effectiveness of three different residential units within the secure facility were evaluated. A Positive Peer Culture approach was implemented on two of the units, while the third functioned as it had prior to the study. Twenty-six (26) residents from each of the three units were pretested

with the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale and a Moral Climate Interview. After a 1-month treatment period, the residents were retested.

The data were collected and statistically analyzed. It was hypothesized that differential treatment of male young offenders in a secure custody facility would affect self-concept scores and the social climates amongst the residents, holding constant differences in the subjects' prior self-concepts and unit climates. If PPC claims were to be substantiated, then the experimental units would demonstrate improved self-concepts and more improved social climates.

Analysis of residents' overall self-esteem found significant differences between PPC unit programmes compared with the more traditional correctional model, in favor of the PPC programme. However, no significant differences emerged when self-concept was broken down into its more specific areas. The unit climate differences were also significant. Holding pretest scores constant, the PPC unit residents espoused to more socially appropriate collective norms (i.e., helping one another), and the degree to which members of the PPC units felt part of the group was significantly more improved than that of the control unit.

Although the treatment period was very short, the results give support to peer group treatment. PPC offers a supportive, challenging atmosphere in which delinquent youth can safely examine and often resolve issues. Recommendations are made for practice and further research.

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DEDICATION

To JAMES

who went far beyond the call of
duty; offering his unwavering
support, understanding, and
assistance.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction and
Review of the LiteratureIntroduction

Recent trends towards a more punitive approach to juvenile crime have been heavily influenced by a body of review literature that reports that the traditional treatment approach is ineffective. The response of professionals to young people's difficulties has been to "rely on the imposition of control, the effort to override a tortuous reason with behavior modification and biofeedback, to focus attention simply on physical survival by teaching skills for managing and regulating . . . [behavior]" (Gilligan, 1987, p. 17). The effectiveness of efforts to rehabilitate juvenile offenders has been perhaps the most widely debated issue in juvenile justice during the past 20 years. Several reviews (Bailey, 1966; Robison & Smith, 1971; Whitehead & Lab, 1989) of correctional interventions concluded that treatment was, on the whole, ineffective and might, in fact, be harmful to the recipients. Martinson's (1974, p. 25) conclusion that "with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism" is perhaps

the most often quoted statement on treatment efficacy. However, in recent review such positions have been countered by those documenting positive results from specific kinds of correctional programmes (Garrett, 1985; Gendreau & Ross, 1987; Hickey & Scharf, 1980; Ross & Gendreau, 1984; Wasmund, 1988). The studies that Ross and Gendreau cite include such interventions as problem-solving and interpersonal skills training, interpersonal negotiation skills, role-playing, perspective-taking, and reasoning skills training. It has also been proposed that contextual factors can either constrain or enhance this developmental process, of which the "social climate" of a programme is a key variable.

Moral Development Theories

Cognitive theories, which stress children's understanding and interpretation of their environment, have been particularly influential in the development of youth programmes of many kinds. The particular aspect of these theories that is of most interest and relevance here pertains to moral development and moral climate. This theory (Kohlberg, 1969) is concerned with the sequence of qualitative changes in moral reasoning through the life span. It is based on the work of Piaget (1965, 1974), who proposed that the individual child's

action on the external physical world around him or her ultimately leads to the child's construction of "internal" cognitive structures representing the world (Chapman, 1988). Of course, Piagetian theory then proposed that structures can be reorganized into more advanced structures through the developmental process, and that there is a universal hierarchical sequence of cognitive structural abilities/properties.

Kohlberg's Moral Development Theory

Kohlberg (1969) claimed that moral reasoning is a distinct form of cognition. For Kohlberg, moral reasoning has less to do with values (which many associate with morality), and more to do with cognitive structures through which moral situations or problems are understood.

Six hierarchical stages or levels of cognitive-structural abilities were proposed by Kohlberg. These stages parallel, though are more specific, applications of Piaget's stages of cognitive development. In fact, Walker and Richards (1979) provided substantial support for the premise that levels of cognitive development are prerequisites for moral reasoning development. The moral development stages portray a progression from exclusive consideration of the concrete and physical (Stage 1) to

the consideration of highly abstract concepts and, ultimately, moral principles (Stages 5 and 6). Piaget found young children aged approximately 5 to 11 had only developed the ability to perform internal operations on concrete objects and materials. Similarly, Kohlberg found that the reasoning ability for the same-aged group was characterized by its dependence upon the concrete, physical effect of particular actions.

Comprehending the notion of structure and the distinction between structure and content are crucial to the understanding of Kohlberg's theory:

By structure we mean general organizing principles or patterns of thought rather than specific moral beliefs or opinions. That is, we assume that concepts are not learned or used independently of one another but rather are bound together by common structural features. (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 2)

Each stage, then, represents cognitive structures that can be characterized by a theme. Kohlberg is referring to the specific values or opinions held by an individual when discussing content. He suggests that the reasons for taking a certain value position are indicative of the structure of reasoning.

For a brief description of the three levels of development: (a) pre-conventional, (b) conventional, and (c) post-conventional, in explicating Kohlberg's theory

of the development of moral reasoning see Table 1.1. The distinctions between Kohlberg's Stage 2 and Stage 3 are critical for this study. Significant differences between offender and nonoffender groups, in the realm of moral reasoning, have been documented in various studies. The offender groups are typically "arrested" at Stage 2 (Gibbs, Arnold, Ahlborn, & Cheesman, 1984). It is Stage 3 reasoning which has been postulated to be the "cognitive buffer" to delinquent activity (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983). This is to say that if a child progresses developmentally and reaches the stage where he or she is able to reason with expectations of immediate others as a focal point (Stage 3), he or she would be very unlikely to display delinquent behavior. However, there are several other factors that have to be considered in outlining the connection between moral reasoning competence and behavior, one of which is moral climate, to be described later in this thesis. Therefore, the argument made here will be that the probability of such illegal behavior will be reduced with improved cognitive-structural competence.

Table 1.1

Six Stages of Moral Development

LEVEL I. PRE-CONVENTIONAL

Stage 1: Heteronomous morality

What is right: Avoiding breaking rules backed by punishment; obedience for its own sake; to avoid physical damage to persons and property.

Reasons for doing right: Avoidance of punishment and the superior power of authorities.

Stage 2: Individualism instrumental purpose and exchange

What is right: Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet your own interests. Right is also what's fair, an equal exchange, a deal.

Reasons for doing right: To serve your own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests too.

LEVEL II. CONVENTIONAL

Stage 3: Mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conformity

What is right: Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude.

Reasons for doing right: The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypically good behavior.

(table continues)

Table 1.1 (continued)

Six Stages of Moral DevelopmentStage 4: Social system and conscience

What is right: Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.
Reasons for doing right: To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet your defined obligations.

LEVEL III. POST-CONVENTIONAL OR PRINCIPLED

Stage 5: Social contract or utility and individual rights

What is right: Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.
Reasons for doing right: Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."

Stage 6: Universal ethical principles

What is right: Following self-chosen ethical principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.
Reasons for doing right: The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles and a sense of personal commitment to them.

Effects of stage mixture. As the individual encounters his or her environment, there is the constant probability for environmental conflict, as indicated in the disequilibrium theory of Piaget (1974). This conflict may then necessitate some form of internal reorganization to re-establish equilibration. Turiel (1966) was the first to provide research focusing on this process. Blatt (1966, cited in Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989) conducted discussions with groups of elementary students, once a week for a period of 12 weeks and witnessed a developmental change in moral reasoning for 65% of the students, of one full stage. In 1975, Blatt and Kohlberg conducted a similar procedure which found an average developmental change of one-third of a stage. In each study, students with various competencies of moral reasoning were placed in groups and prompted to argue with one another. Follow-up studies demonstrated the changes to have lasting effect. Walker (1983) has also found that subjects exposed to reasoning at one full stage above that of their own, developed more than did those who experienced conflict at the same stage or two stages above their own.

Power (1988) carried out similar studies, but included categories of interactions that involved

emotional support or interference. In studying families participating in moral dilemma discussions, she analyzed their "speeches" in terms of whether they were cognitively or affectively, interfering or stimulating. She found that for the family context, supportive speeches, in addition to challenging "conflict," were important aspects in the interaction of families that had more highly developed children. Walker (1983) made a similar conclusion about the role of support, but also noted the importance of interactions including paraphrasing and perception checks, which essentially added to an atmosphere of acceptance within the family dialogue. These findings point to yet another important aspect of the process of structural change, the social "climate."

Moral climate. The Kohlbergian explanation of the relationship between context and behavior is complex. The Kohlberg group suggests an interaction of the structure of an individual's reasoning and the structure of the reasoning of the group (moral climate). Before elaborating on this thesis, it may be helpful to first illustrate the process through which the concept of moral climate has moved.

The increasing interest in the notion of moral climate or culture came about as a result of the inadequacy of the direct applications of traditional disequilibrium theory. These initial applications of Piagetian (and Kohlbergian) theory usually involved recurring classroom discussion of hypothetical moral dilemmas. Even though Kohlberg himself was initially skeptical about the effectiveness of the process, Blatt (1969) found that group discussions involving: (a) opportunities for cognitive conflict; (b) moral awareness; (c) role-taking; and (d) exposure to reasoning above one's own stage of reasoning, were effective in developing better moral reasoning competence about hypothetical issues--this effect termed the "Blatt Effect." However, this method was a process that was essentially outside the real moral worlds of the participants (whether they were students or offenders), and removed from real moral action occurring within the student sub-culture. Students could, for example, be deriving benefit from discussion of hypothetical dilemmas, but conform--both in terms of public reasoning and behavior--to a set of collective norms, or a moral climate, that is significantly less adequate than, and inconsistent with, their competence.

In order to encourage a greater degree of correspondence between moral reasoning competence and behavior, Kohlberg began theorizing about and describing the "Just Community" approach (described below) as it applied to the educational system--which was essentially an effort to "change the life of the school" (Power et al. 1989, p. 20). What Kohlberg hoped to witness was both faculty and students openly discussing those issues--the real moral problems--which are usually not openly discussed in schools and which can provide the foundation for distrust between factions, cliques, and status groups within a school.

The moral education approach. Although Kohlberg's position on the role of education within society is both philosophical and ethical, for purposes here only the technical and methodological aspects of the moral education or "Just Community" approach will be discussed. The "Just Community" programmes that Kohlberg designed and researched involved "democratic discussion and decision making" (Higgins, Power, & Kohlberg, 1984, p. 103). In addition to their regular academic activities, both students and faculty met as a large group in order to discuss and make decisions about how the school was to be run, what to do about student

discipline and attendance problems, etc. Each person had one vote. Kohlberg argued that these forums provided the cognitively stimulating and/or perspective--taking experiences required for not only the development of individual reasoning, but for more mature collective norms as well. Here "norms" refer to a complex of specific behavioral expectations that share a common value. The Kohlberg group found that the students in the "Just Community" programmes they studied tended to make decisions of responsibility which were more consistent with their competence (their prescriptive choices in response to hypothetical dilemmas), than would students who are part of a less mature moral climate. Kohlberg also hypothesized that not only is a minimal level of moral climate requisite for schools (or institutions of other types of educational facilities) to stimulate the moral growth of the students, but that there must be a minimal degree of sense of community (which is inherently a Stage 3 structure) developed within the school or institution in order for the students "to realize that their actions had consequences for a group that they really cared about" (Reimer & Power, 1980, p. 110). Thus, moral climate is comprised of at least two aspects: (a) the norms that the group espouses, and (b) the degree

to which the members of the group feel a part of the group. These, of course, are not independent of each other.

In general, there are four conditions or factors involved in the moral education approach: (a) face-to-face discussions which focus on fairness and other moral issues; (b) cognitive conflict stimulated by this discussion and higher stage reasoning; (c) participation in rule making or some form of exercise of real responsibility and power; and (d) a strong sense of community among the members of the group. However, an essential aspect of the approach is its insistence on confronting the "hidden curriculum." Kohlberg, like Durkheim (1925, 1973), rather than either ignoring this subculture or yielding to its inevitability, requires that the moral problems and inadequacies that it embodies and the moral conflicts that arise between it and the formal (staff) culture, be openly discussed. By doing so, he has moved from the discussion of hypothetical moral dilemmas designed to stimulate individual development, to discussion and decision-making about real moral problems that effect both individual judgment and group norms.

Moral Climate Research

Although it may not be necessary to defend the notion that groups have structure, a brief review and integration of research may be worthwhile at this juncture. For example, sociological or "systems" approaches to understanding groups, families, and group climate (Polsky, 1969; Watslawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967; Yalom, 1985) have highlighted the informal "rule" structure of the group. Such analyses point to predictable regularities in behavior of members of a primary group or family. For example, in observing a group of adolescent delinquents, one can readily observe the universality of the rule not to "rat" on each other; or within disordered families, rules to treat a scapegoated member or an "identified patient" (Alexander & Parsons, 1980) in a specific manner, within a circumscribed range of behavioral options. Therapeutic interventions are directed towards changing the rules upon which the system is based. What distinguishes these approaches from the Moral Education Model is that such rules are considered within a moral, hierarchical framework. The structure of such informal rules (or collective norms) is examined in the same way in which

the structure of individual moral reasoning is analyzed (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

Within the developmental area of research, the competence/performance discrepancy (or the attempt to hypothesize about the relationship between moral judgment and moral action) has been the basis for much of the research in the area of moral climate. For example, Leming (1974, 1978) has elaborated on the classical hypothetical dilemmas used by Kohlberg (which ask such questions as, "Should Heinz steal a drug to save the life of his wife?") and included questions in his structured interview such as, "What would you do?". Leming also derived "practical" dilemmas, which he used to ask both "should" and "would" follow-up questions. He found that his subjects (60, seventh- to twelfth-grade students) scored lower on the deliberative ("would") questions about the dilemmas, lower still on practical dilemmas with "should" questions, and lowest of all being asked what they would do, in response to practical, more real-life dilemmas. Thus, Leming observed a progressive lowering of quality of reasoning as his subjects moved from the purely hypothetical to moral problems which had situational complexities, and as they moved from purely isolated consideration to actual social contexts.

In his doctoral thesis, Scharf (1978, cited in Power et al., 1989) claimed that because the predominant style or structure of moral reasoning within a prison setting (of both inmates and correctional staff) was predominantly Stage 1 or Stage 2, those showing competence at a higher stage (Stage 2/3 or 3) were more likely to perceive the prison as unfair and unjust, while those of lower competence accepted the system. In addition, Scharf noted that higher reasoners were excluded from decision-making processes and were treated harshly by both inmates and correctional staff. Hence, he believed that the "lower" moral climate of the prison prevented the inmates from developing beyond their current stage. This finding is not surprising if one considers the lack of stimulation typically found within the prison setting. Scharf, however also found that even though some of these individuals were competent at Stage 3, when provided with real-life prison situations, their reasoning dropped to Stage 2. Higgins, Power, and Kohlberg (1984) also felt that as a survival strategy it was necessary to lower one's reasoning to fit with that of the prison climate:

In our view, the Stage 2 practical reasoning of the prisoners with Stage 3 competence in classical moral judgment was more a function of the prison environment than of the prisoners as personalities. We would characterize the real environment of

prison guards and inmate peer groups as a Stage 2 environment or moral atmosphere, and inmates' Stage 2 practical judgments were a realistic adaptation to it. (p. 81)

Reimer (1977) found an enabling effect of moral climate. In studying the effects on city-born Israeli adolescents of 2 years in an Israeli kibbutz compared to kibbutz-born adolescents, Reimer found that within the 2 years in the kibbutz, the first group developed to the same level of reasoning as their kibbutz-born peers. He argued that it was the general higher level of the moral climate of the kibbutz which stimulated this development. Thus, the research on moral climate has indicated that the context can have a developmentally enhancing or constraining effect on individuals.

What is a "better" moral climate? Polsky's (1969) Cottage Six is a description of a system of enforcement of informal rules by means of either physical punishment (being "beaten up") by another resident or threat of physical punishment ("ranking"). As such, most of the reasons for doing or not doing specific acts were based on the physical consequences of that action, which, in the Kohlbergian system, would be described as Stage 1 or Stage 2 reasoning. In other instances, certain acts were carried out by members of the group in exchange for favours. Even the staff members participated in this

dynamic to some extent by not "hassling" those more powerful residents (who had a great deal of control over the other residents) in exchange for a "quiet shift".

In contrast, between the first and the second years of the Kohlberg group's schools, discussion of the problem of stealing changed from complete acceptance of theft ("anybody who gets stole from deserves it because they are stupid to leave their stuff where it can get stolen") to a beginning acceptance of the idea that members of a community could trust each other (a Stage 3 notion).

What is a collective stage? Even though there may be general agreement that individuals usually make their moral decisions within pressures and forces from the context, it is another step to claim that the context can be described separately from the individuals that comprise it. How can this claim be made? How defensible is the claim that a group "has" a distinct cluster of collective norms (or a moral climate) that goes beyond or exists separately from the values of the individuals in the group and, more importantly, that interacts with the structure of intra-individual reasoning? In partial answer to this question, one can point to the success that the Kohlberg group has had at translating or

applying some aspect of the theory of individual development to the development of collective norms of the group. These researchers postulated that collective norms move through the same structural progression as the reasoning of an individual and that there not be any stage skipping or reversals. Indeed, this is what they found in the development of the schools in which they intervened. However, in some respects, the development of collective norms did not parallel the development of individual moral reasoning. There was a starting point other than Stage 1 (depending on the competence of the forming members) and the Kohlberg group theorized that there could be regression, depending upon changes in membership. Although they did not find any regression, they claimed that the starting point for the collective norms of the schools was generally at Stage 2. Also, they do not claim, as they do for individuals, that there will be a high degree of consistency of structure of reasoning across different moral issues or contexts. Instead, they allow for a great degree of variability in reasoning across norms within a group, particularly as norms are at the beginning phases of collectivity.

Most importantly, however, if the idea of a collective stage is defensible, there should be a high

degree of convergence in the opinions or predictions of each member of the group about the other members--about each norm. Power et al. (1989) do not report any figures describing this kind of variance of the (moral climate) scores of their samples.

But how is one to measure a collective norm? Simply coding public statements leaves one open to the criticism that there are many in the group who do not speak and about whom we know too little. The writer proposes, as did the Kohlberg group, that to interview each member of a group, not only about their own reasoning about the real problems that they regularly encounter, but also their perceptions of the reasoning of others in the group, is an acceptable a measure of the moral climate and the degree of acceptance of the norms. It could be argued that an individual cannot articulate a level of reasoning that is higher than his or her own, and that therefore this measure of climate cannot be valid--that the perception of the reasoning of others is limited by the competence of the individual. It is argued here, then, that the subjects could not only recognize (Walker, 1983) a superior form of moral reasoning, but could also describe it even though they might not normally use it. This is consistent with the

notion of "zone of proximal development" (Vygotsky, 1934, 1986)--the difference between actual level of development and level of potential development, i.e., that in the context of a higher level of functioning an individual is able to extend his or her normal competence.

Self-Concept and Delinquency

The relationship between delinquency and self-concept has been the subject of investigation and research for several years. Fitts and Hammer (1969) have reviewed studies pertaining to delinquent youth, which show them to score lower on various Tennessee Self-Concept Scales (TSCS) (Fitts, 1965) than nondelinquent samples. As well, they indicated lower self-concepts for recidivists versus first-time offenders. The consistent finding of delinquents' poor self-concept (Alston & Martin, 1986; Reckless & Dinitz, 1972) has been investigated further to find that nondelinquents had the most favorable overall self-concept, followed by the delinquents on probation, and finally the delinquents in detention (Bliss, 1977).

Among the more straightforward explanations of the relationship between low self-concept and delinquency is that it reflects a labeling phenomenon. Jensen (1972) found that the use of the official label of "delinquent" produces adverse effects in self-concept. Supporters of

the societal labeling theory believe that total institutions strip residents of the individual symbols of identity and this mortification contributes to the demise of positive self-concept (Goffman, 1961). Many have contended that the labeling process is degrading and that institutionalization isolates individuals from the positive experiences they so desperately need. However, research in the area of labeling and institutionalization is contradictory and by no means conclusive. Eynon and Simpson (1965) found boys confined in more restrictive, juvenile facilities experienced a more positive change in self-concept than those in less restrictive, open-camp settings. Others have observed that adolescents confined to two youth development centres did not gravitate toward negative self-images (Anson & Eason, 1985) and that the greater the child's involvement with the juvenile justice system over time, the more positive his self-image (Gibbs, 1974).

In conclusion, there is no consistent body of empirical evidence that institutionalization leads to lower evaluations of self-image amongst adolescents adjudicated as juvenile delinquent. It may be hypothesized that much of the differences in results about labeling theory might have been caused by

differences amongst institutions or programmes considered (the treatment programme, atmosphere, attitude of staff, etc.). This hypothesis is reinforced by such studies as Maskin and Flescher (1975), who illustrated that male delinquents in programmes stressing interpersonal competence and family interaction underwent greater positive change in self-concept than peers in a work-oriented programme. Perhaps the work-oriented approach concentrated too much on the delinquent, neglecting problems and conflicts.

Reckless and Dinitz (1972) have taken the position that self-concept is an important variable in a delinquents' behavior. Their research suggests that a healthy, positive self-concept serves as an insulator against delinquency and hence that self-concept is a good predictor of delinquency.

Another predominant interpretation of the self-concept/delinquency relationship is the "esteem enhancement" model (Kaplan, 1975, 1980). This model assumes that low self-esteem acts as a "drive mechanism" which propels individuals towards behavior choices that would lead to an increased regard for the self. Kaplan concludes that negative social experiences are related to lowered self-esteem, that self-derogation is associated

with subsequent delinquency, and that such behavior is related to increased self-esteem among self-derogating youth. However, supporters of this model have found that with theoretically prior casual variables controlled (grades, peer relations, family relations), self-esteem has little effect on subsequent delinquency and no increase in self-esteem results from engaging in delinquent behavior (Wells & Rankin, 1983).

McCarthy and Hoge (1984) have also found that the effect of self-esteem on delinquent behavior is negligible. Causation is modest and mostly in the opposite direction; the more delinquent behavior, the lower the self-esteem. They illustrated no significant interrelationships of delinquency and self-esteem for adolescents initially low in self-esteem, but among those initially high in self-esteem they found a somewhat greater negative effect of delinquent behavior on subsequent self-esteem.

Although there is a lack of strength and conclusiveness within the research attempting to demonstrate a casual relationship between self-esteem and delinquency, many treatment programmes continue to hold self-concept enhancement as a treatment goal. One such programme is guided group interaction (McCorkle, Elias, &

Bixby, 1958). They equate deterring future delinquency among participants with modifying the delinquent's self-concept. In their estimation, the delinquent's behavioral problems stem largely from his/her conception of self as a hostile, aggressive, inadequate person. Therefore, the objective of this programme works towards modification of the participant's self-concept.

Positive Peer Culture

Theoretical and Historical Origins

During the last decade there has been a renewal of interest in tapping the power of the peer group in the treatment of troubled youth. Group-oriented techniques have been used within a wide range of philosophical orientations including psychodynamic, behavioral, and psychoeducational. One of the most comprehensive systems of mobilizing peer group dynamics is the guided group interaction tradition as represented by Keller and Alper (1970), McCorkle, Elias, and Bixby (1958), Week (1976), and others. The application of guided-group interaction can be traced back to the 1950's to Highfield's Residential Treatment Programme for juvenile delinquents in Hopewell, New Jersey. There McCorkle et al. began applying strategies with youthful offenders that had been developed for use with incarcerated soldiers at the end

of World War II. The theoretical roots of Highfield's rested largely in sociological theory provided by Lamar T. Empey and Jerome Rabow (1961). After reviewing the evidence on theories of delinquency and its treatment, they concluded that the most important intervening variable is "the presence of a delinquent system--one which supplied status and recognition not normally obtained elsewhere." They stated that "habitual delinquents tend to look affectively both to their peers and to the norms of their system for meaning and orientation".

Harry Vorrath, after completing an internship at Highfield's and seeing the potential of GGI, began extending and modifying the existent programme to correct for initial problems. Vorrath later changed the name to Positive Peer Culture (PPC) when he became uncomfortable with poorly managed counterfeits--programmes which had incorporated isolated, convenient elements of his programme to address specific problems (Vorrath & Brendtro, 1974). Unfortunately, there are now as many variations of "PPC" as there were of "GGI" (Wasmund, 1988).

Though originating in residential treatment centres for adolescent delinquents, peer group programmes have

since been extended to varied populations in a wide range of settings, including public schools and community agencies. This approach has become one of the most widely adopted techniques applied to juvenile problems in the United States (Vinter, Kish, & Newcomb, 1976).

What is PPC?

Positive Peer Culture acknowledges that the peer group tends to have the strongest influence over the values, attitudes, and behavior of most adolescents. However, rather than attempting to overcome the peer group's power, this methodology aims to rechannel the group's influences in positive directions to achieve desired goals. PPC programmes attempt to "empower" those in treatment by making them participants in the change process. Many interested in "therapeutic programmes" have concluded that "we have reached the limits to which we can coerce, intimidate, threaten, or outright bully children into compliance" (Durkin, 1990, p. 105). A better alternative is to motivate youth to want to do what they need to do. Emphasis is placed on the peer group rather than staff as the prime agent for changing delinquent behavior. The adult in charge of a group of children in PPC establishes the nature of the behaviors to be discussed and reinforced, but exerts influence

primarily through the group and on the basis of the group process. When new delinquents enter the programme, typically experienced group members lead the supportive confrontation on their rationalizations.

Peer pressure is the critical force for change while the staff becomes a model and a catalyst for the group. The primary vehicle of change is a discussion group of approximately 10 members wherein both staff and peers identify problems displayed by group members and develop strategies to solve those problems. Positive Peer Culture group meetings follow a clear agenda that systematically involves all members and yet provides wide latitude for spontaneous individual expression. The meeting consists of four distinct parts:

1. Reporting Problems. During the first part of the meeting every member reports on the problems he/she has had since the last session as well as on other problems he/she has not yet brought to the group's attention.

2. Awarding the Meeting. After all members have reported their problems, the group decides who needs help most that day.

3. Problem Solving. Here the group members concentrate on understanding and resolving one member's

problems. The problem-solving session typically lasts almost an hour and constitutes the major portion of the meeting.

4. The Summary. Here the group leader (a staff member) engages in his/her most active role. By summarizing what has occurred he/she teaches group members to become more effective in operating their meetings.

The groups meet 5 times per week for 1-1/2 hour sessions. The group and staff are expected to consistently support positive behavior and confront and censure negative behavior while fostering an atmosphere of trust and openness. Developmentalists agree that the need to examine personal experience through the personal experience of others is critical (Fewster, 1990) and that the manner in which others relate to developing children is the mirror they use to define themselves (Durkin, 1990). Hence, PPC stresses the need to ensure a safe and trusting environment.

Vorrath and Brendtro (1974) describe PPC as "a total system for building positive youth subcultures." A positive culture is defined as a cohesive group process which promotes prosocial, responsible, caring behavior and improved self-esteem (Brendtro, Ness, & Nicolaou,

1983). Vorrath and Brendtro (1974) claim that more emphasis should be placed on the rewards of helping, as opposed to being helped. They feel that being helped may increase weakness or dependency, while helping may enhance one's self-concept. Therefore, youth are not asked if they want help, but are asked if they are willing to give help.

Troubled youth are considered to have the potential for strength and greatness, instead of the more typical view of them as being negative and destructive. PPC defines greatness as showing positive caring values. PPC asks much of youth in the knowledge that people seldom will be more responsible than they are expected to be or more helpful than they are allowed to be. This approach places rather heavy demands on individuals in that they are expected to take responsibility for not only their own behavior, but their peers' behavior as well. Typically, young offenders are met with demands to conform and obey rather than becoming the mature and productive human beings they can be. Rules, which are often geared at keeping unruly youth in submission and meeting the adults needs for control, may also provide the youth with an easy way out of making independent decisions and teaching them to "play the game."

Obedience to adult rules does not in itself prepare youth to live responsibly in the complexities and uncertainties of the real world. Thus, PPC systematically attempts to relate rules to specific values. Although the goal of PPC is to teach basic values (loving and caring for one another), it does not speak of a value system tied to a social status, culture, or to a generation; but rather a system based on the value of the human being (Vorrath & Brendtro, 1974). Such values are adopted through personally satisfying experiences with select key persons (Maier, 1990).

Specific procedures utilized in PPC programmes involve modelling prosocial behavior and the use of "relabeling" and "reversing" techniques. Relabeling refers to attempts to teach youth the concept that helping behavior is "strong," "mature," and "powerful," while aggressive, hurting behavior is "weak," "immature," and "ineffective." By continually associating such objectives with behaviors, they attempt to reverse the way delinquents typically label these behaviors. This is believed to produce a state of cognitive dissonance that will motivate attitudinal changes. Before adolescents will abandon an antisocial value system, they must question its usefulness to them. This necessitates

experiencing the inherent conflicts between conventional and antisocial systems. This can best be achieved in an environment which permits the free expression and examination of feelings--antisocial as well as social (Wasmund, 1988). PPC practitioners argue that relationships that empower individual choice are essential for positive human development and change.

Reversing is defined as the process of helping a child assume responsibility for his or her actions rather than allowing him or her to project blame onto others. Most children and youth do not recognize or admit to their problems, and unless a person accepts responsibility for a problem, he or she has little reason to change. Participants of PPC are taught that problems are neither demeaning nor disastrous. Problems are viewed as a normal part of life, and the real issue is how one deals with them. Problem solving is seen as positive. A climate is fostered so that what must be learned can be attempted, failed, and tried again with no threat of humiliation, since such attempts take "strength." Actual learning rather than temporary compliance has the potential to occur with such a model (Maier, 1987). Vorrath (1974) developed a universal language of problems, known as a "problem solving list"

(presented in the Table 1.2), to be used by all youth and adults involved in PPC programmes. These easily understood labels allow for clear and concise communication of most of the difficulties young people experience. A problem is defined as anything that damages oneself or another person. The list also defines characteristics of the young person who has resolved the problems.

An Ethical Issue

Central to any consideration of peer group treatment is the ethical issue of encouraging the use of group pressure to influence individuals. There is little doubt that if such programmes are allowed to become excessively intrusive and coercive, they can undermine the integrity of an individual's privacy. Brendtro, Ness, and Nicolaou (1983) criticize the manner in which some groups charge forth to collapse psychological defenses that have been constructed over a lifetime without concern for the reasons that a person may wish not to reveal himself fully to the group. Vorrath and Brendtro (1985) differentiate peer group treatment processes based on confrontive coercion from one based on concern such as "PPC."

Research and Evaluation

There have been few evaluations of the net effects of PPC. One of the more comprehensive evaluations of programmes was done by Stephenson and Scarpitti in 1974, shortly after PPC came into vogue. They reviewed research on programmes in New Jersey, Utah, Kentucky, California, and Oregon. They found that graduates of the group programmes seemed to be more successful than reformatory graduates who had participated in traditional programmes, but not significantly better than those from probation programmes. There is some question, however, as to the similarity of the two groups prior to placement. They also found no significant changes in attitudes and values from pretests and posttests. Their overall conclusion was that the general efficacy of these group programmes was not significantly better than traditional approaches. A number of authors have also suggested caution about claims that the peer group methodology is superior to other approaches (Gold, 1974; Sarri & Selo, 1974), suggesting skepticism until programme evaluation adequately demonstrates its utility. However, more recent studies have found positive benefits (Garner, 1982; Lybarger, 1976; Mitchell & Corkrum, 1980; Wasmund, 1979).

Table 1.2

Positive Peer Culture Problem-Solving List

1. LOW SELF-IMAGE: HAS A POOR OPINION OF SELF; OFTEN FEELS PUT DOWN OR OF LITTLE WORTH.

When solved: Is self-confident and cannot easily be made to feel small or inferior. Is able to solve his/her problems and make positive contributions to others.

2. INCONSIDERATE OF OTHERS: DOES THINGS THAT ARE DAMAGING TO OTHERS.

When solved: Shows concern for others even if he/she does not like them or know them well.

3. INCONSIDERATE OF SELF: DOES THINGS THAT ARE DAMAGING TO SELF.

When solved: Shows concern for self, tries to correct mistakes and improve self. Understands limitations and is willing to discuss problems.

4. AUTHORITY PROBLEM: DOES NOT WANT TO BE MANAGED BY ANYONE.

When solved: Is able to accept advice and direction from those in authority.

5. MISLEADS OTHERS: DRAWS OTHERS INTO NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR.

When solved: Shows responsibility for the effect of his/her behavior on others who follow him/her. Shows concern and helps rather than taking advantage of others.

6. EASILY MISLED: IS DRAWN INTO NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR BY OTHERS.

When solved: Seeks out friends who care enough about him/her not to hurt him/her. Is strong enough to stand up for him/herself and makes his/her own decisions.

(table continues)

Table 1.2 (continued)

Positive Peer Culture Problem Solving List

7. AGGRAVATES OTHERS: TREATS PEOPLE IN NEGATIVE, HOSTILE WAYS.

When solved: Gets along well with others. Respects others enough not to embarrass, provoke, or bully them.
 8. EASILY ANGERED: IS OFTEN IRRITATED OR PROVOKED OR HAS TANTRUMS.

When solved: Knows how to control and channel anger, not letting it control him/her. Can tolerate criticism or even negative behavior from others.
 9. STEALING: TAKES THINGS THAT BELONG TO OTHERS.

When solved: Sees stealing as hurting another person. Would not stoop to stealing even if he/she could get away with it.
 10. ALCOHOL OR DRUG PROBLEM: MISUSES SUBSTANCES THAT COULD HURT SELF.

When solved: Feels good about self and would not hurt self. Can face his/her problems without a crutch.
 11. LYING: CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO TELL THE TRUTH.

When solved: Has strength to face mistakes and failures without trying to cover up. Does not need to lie or twist the truth to impress others.
 12. FRONTING: PUTS ON AN ACT RATHER THAN BEING REAL.

When solved: Is comfortable with people and does not have to keep trying to prove him/herself. Has no need to act superior, con people, or play the show-off role. Is not afraid of showing his/her true feelings to others.
-

Lybarger (1976) studied the effects of PPC in several residential facilities and found an increase in self-esteem after 120 days of treatment. Wasmund (1977, 1979) and Davis, Hoffman, and Quigley (1988) found similar significant changes in the self-concept in institutionalized delinquents following admission to a programme emphasizing PPC. Davis and colleagues found that the most dramatic pre-post test gains on the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale were on the moral-ethical subtest. This is a critical issue in a programme that purports to teach caring to narcissistic young people. However, none of these studies utilized a control group and it is therefore difficult if not impossible to evaluate the independent variables. Wasmund and Brannon's (1987) research findings support the hypothesis that self-concept enhancement may be a byproduct of a more general cognitive restructuring. An offender's active endorsement of socially appropriate values as well as personal and interpersonal competence may precede improved feelings of self-worth.

Pilnick, Elias, and Clapp (1966) reported that the boys who completed the Essexfield's programme (PPC) had only a 12% recidivism rate compared to the normal 50-75% rate of other programmes. The Minnesota Department of

Corrections reported that between 1970 and 1972 there were 845 boys who experienced the PPC programme and were subsequently released on parole. By March 1975, 71.4% of these young men had not had their paroles revoked. This 28.6% rate revoked paroles compares to 50% rate prior to the institution of the PPC programme.

Tannehill (1987) reports that 70% of the students who graduated from the Youth Centre in Larned, Kansas each year are successful of not being charged for a crime for 6-8 months after leaving the programme. In a 5 year follow-up study, the success rate had only dropped to about 60%. They have no comparison data prior to programme implementation.

Wasmund (1988) illustrated that students from the peer group agencies sampled reported significantly greater satisfaction with their social climates than their nonpeer-group contemporaries, and staff/student perception were more congruent in the peer-group agencies than in the nonpeer-group agencies. The data suggest that where adult-dominated strategies of control are in vogue, we see the creation of two opposing cultures: (a) controlling adults and (b) counter-controlling youth. As Wasmund argues, control becomes self-justifying.

Peer Culture Influence

According to sociological theory, primary groups are characterized by: (a) intimate face to face contact, (b) by the mutual social support of the individuals who belong, and (c) the group's ability to prescribe, constrain, or order a considerable proportion of the behavior of its individual members. This theory is based on the obvious fact that any collection of individuals living together develop relationships of influence toward one another. Family and peers, two such primary groups, have considerable influence in American society. Typically, the two complement each other in socializing children. However, Sagi and Eisikovits (1981) suggest that "delinquent children prematurely leave the conventional educational systems, and the family has a decreased impact on them." As a result, delinquents become unduly subject to peer group pressure and to society's reactions to their deviance. "Gradually," say Sagi and Eisikovits, "the peer group becomes the delinquent child's major frame of reference." Any guilt feelings of delinquents "are not appropriately reinforced," and thus behavior controls come to be based on external threat rather than from within. This

undermines the process of the normal course of moral development.

Recent studies of age trends concerning the relative influence that parents and peers exert on children have indicated that, with increasing age, the child is more and more responsive to social reinforcers delivered by the peer group (Patterson & Anderson, 1964). The shift from parents to peers as the child's main source of influence appears to occur most typically during the sixth grade (Floyd and South, 1972).

Investigators have demonstrated that even nondelinquent "adult-oriented" children will inadvertently reinforce deviant behavior in their peers. Solomon and Wahler (1973), for example, experimentally analyzed peer reinforcement control of the problem behavior of disruptive children. They found that social attention provided by all the students in the sixth-grade classroom was found to be directed exclusively to the disruptive behaviors of five problem children. The prosocial behavior produced by the problem children was completely ignored by their classmates. The reinforcement value of peer social attention was illustrated in the finding that when the peers were trained to ignore deviant behavior in others and to

reinforce appropriate behaviors, the deviant acts of the problem children were substantially reduced and the prosocial behaviors increased in frequency.

No programme for troubled youth can be effective unless it deals with this awesome power that young people can have over one another, a force that Pilnick et al. (1966) once termed "the tyranny of adolescents." Milieu therapy, a systematic manipulation of the environment aimed at producing changes in the deviant behavior of patients, has been faced with such interference. The peer group subcultures within the total milieu operate to undermine the prosocial values of the treatment staff (Rapaport, 1960). As a result, aggressive and unethical behaviors, i.e., lying, stealing, fighting, have been found particularly difficult to extinguish in a residential setting (Shaefer & Millman, 1973). Others have similarly concluded that institutions for delinquent youth function as "teaching machines" for the acquisition, maintenance, and strengthening of deviant behavior (Duncan, 1974; Newberg, 1966).

Polsky (1959, 1969) and Cohen (1955) have graphically described its inner dynamics. In the first place, there is a strong, authoritarian power structure with the brighter and stronger youths exploiting and

tyrannizing the weaker ones. Status, masculine identification, and social acceptance are the rewards of delinquent acts. Antisocial norms and values prevail, i.e., an eye-for-an-eye justice, materialistic values, and "take what you can get away with." Hostility is so pervasive in this culture that after a while it becomes an automatic response and is displaced readily upon available targets. No one trusts here and everyone is hungry for love, acceptance, and affection (Fisher, 1972).

Although Polsky's observations are typical of what can happen in a group of troubled youth, such a structure is in no way inevitable. "Cottage Six" did not have any systematic programme designed to influence the group process or group structure directly. Thus, group processes were built on power relationships, as is the case in the majority of our correctional facilities.

It must be noted that the peer group influence is not necessarily detrimental. Indeed, the peer group has proven effective in providing the main source of socialization experience for children in countries where there is strong ideology related to nationalism and social responsibility, i.e., the Israeli Kibbutz (Reimer, 1977). It seems, therefore, that the peer group can

function as a positive socializing force if the group has been taught altruistic and high moral values by adults.

Conclusion

It is evident from the above descriptions of Vorrath's PPC approach and Kohlberg's focus on moral reasoning development and moral climate that both come to similar conclusions. Each emphasize the role of perspective taking, problem solving of issues real to them, responsibility taking, and heightened anxiety or cognitive dissonance in stimulating cognitive restructuring and growth of delinquent youth. Both models also acknowledge the tremendous influence of the moral climate of a group or the peer pressure to conform to informal rules has on individual members' performances. These obvious similarities have led the researcher to conclude that Kohlberg's assessment of moral climate is the most appropriate method of determining the successfulness of PPC in developing prosocial values and norms amongst its members.

The predominant recurring themes within the literature and the lack of methodologically-sound research evaluating the effectiveness of PPC programmes led to the design of the study described in Chapter II. The objective was to examine PPC's effectiveness in

achieving its primary goals of providing for improved self-concept of young offenders, and in enriching the social climate within secure custody facilities.

Increased knowledge of the effects of such an approach has social policy significance, practical significance for youth workers' everyday practices, and theoretical significance from a cognitive-developmental framework.

Research Questions

The present research study is designed to answer the following questions pertaining to the effectiveness of a Positive Peer Culture approach. Will differences emerge between secure custody young offender units utilizing a Positive Peer Culture (PPC) approach and a unit utilizing a traditional correctional approach in relation to:

1. The maturity of the collective behavioral norms amongst the residents, that is, the social climate of the unit.
2. The self-concepts of the residents.

CHAPTER II

Method and Experimental Design

Design

The present study utilized a quantitative research design to look at the effects of a Positive Peer Culture approach within a young offender secure custody facility.

Setting

The Calgary Young Offender Centre was selected as the setting for this study. This facility is a component of the Correctional Services Division of the Alberta Solicitor General. The Centre is designed to accommodate as many as 136 young persons, 12 through 18 years of age; held in temporary detention, remanded, or placed in secure custody by order of the Provincial Youth Court. Programme delivery for young offenders is provided through group living programmes, educational and vocational courses, recreational instruction, and other specific rehabilitative activities. Staff at the Centre work towards meeting the following goals:

1. To fulfill the requirements of the decision of the Youth Court by containing these young people.
2. To provide an educational programme which emphasizes the concept of responsibility, while influencing attitudes, insights, and self-esteem of young

offenders in such a way that the probability of re-offence is reduced.

Of the Centre's seven residential units, three were chosen for participation in this study. These units each consisted of a random sampling of the Centre population, while the other four units were dedicated to specific functions and residents, i.e., assessment/detention, severe behavior problems, pre-release, and coed. From the three units, one was randomly selected for the control group leaving the other two as intervention units. All units within the Centre were physically identical in regards to architectural floor plan, amenities, lighting, etc.

Having two intervention units was a condition requested by Centre management. They sought to have an increased number of their staff trained in the techniques and philosophies of a Positive Peer Culture model, as well as an increased number of units evaluated. Therefore, this provided the opportunity to assess if the intervention of PPC varied in its effects between these two units.

Control Unit Programme

Unit 1, the control unit, consisted of 6 youth workers, 1 unit supervisor, 3 correctional officers, and

between 16 and 20 residents at any given time. Three (3) teams of 2 youth workers were rotated through day shifts (0700-1500 hours) and afternoon shifts (1500-2300 hours), ensuring job requirements of behavior management, unit programming, and case management were fulfilled. The unit supervisor's schedule was more flexible, thus often overlapping both shifts. Coverage of night shifts (2300-0700 hours) were assigned solely to correctional officers who had virtually no contact with the subjects.

The control unit continued to function as it had prior to the commencement of the present study. The PPC intervention was not introduced to the staff or residents of this unit. The programme intent was to be resident-focused, emphasizing accountability and responsibility. The residents were to develop and work on individual goals through the utilization of Centre resources. The unit programme ensured that all residents had the opportunity to continue their education, participate in the Centre's work programme and use their free time constructively. To ensure consistency between shifts and continuity of programme, the following daily schedule was adhered to:

| | |
|-------|---|
| 07:00 | Wake-up. Shower, brush teeth, dress. Make bed and clean room. |
| 07:30 | Breakfast. |

| | |
|-------------|---|
| 08:00 | Unit chores. |
| 09:00 | School, work, or day programme. |
| 11:30 | Lunch. |
| 12:30 | Free time. |
| 13:00 | School, work or day programme. |
| 14:30 | Quiet time. |
| 15:30 | Free time.. Recreational programming. |
| 16:30 | Dinner. |
| 17:30-20:30 | Unit programming. |
| 20:30 | Unit chores. |
| 21:00 | Bedtime for level no status. Free time for other levels. |
| 22:45 | Bedtime for others. |

The system of behavior management utilized by the control unit staff was designed to teach new behaviors to the residents and curb maladaptive and noncompliant behavior. The unit's Standard Operating Procedure for behavior management involved the following:

1. A range of interventions by staff from minor cues and time-outs, praise and encouragement, to referrals to Disciplinary Boards. Disciplinary boards were convened in instances of: (a) assaults, (b) attempted escapes, (c) damage of Centre property, (d) self-abuse, and (e) continuous disruptive behavior.

Upon the occurrence of an incident, unit staff could initiate a hearing in which a board of three supervisory level employees would hear the evidence, render a verdict, and assign a consequence.

2. A level system of privileges. A four-tiered level privilege system was utilized to reward compliant, appropriate behavior. Residents earned or lost levels and respective privileges depending on how well they met behavioral expectations in the following areas: (a) peer interaction, (b) compliance of unit rules, (c) utilization of free time, (d) personal hygiene, (e) participation in programmed activities, and (f) efforts towards achieving individualized goals.

3. A regularly occurring Centre assembly which staff provided rewards and recognition for improvement and achievement.

4. A weekly inspection which provided incentives and recognition for cleanliness.

5. The disciplinary unit for male residents who were experiencing serious and continual behavioral problems.

Within the unit, all residents were expected to obey all orders, direction, and instruction given by Centre employees. Failure by a resident to comply with

unit rules or regulations was conseqenced by staff. Staff were solely responsible for controlling and supervising the young offenders' behavior. Residents were not expected to take part in the decision-making process nor were they expected to do more than "their own time." There was no expectation of residents to help one another or an avenue provided to openly discuss concerns. Changing resident behavior rather than values was the goal.

Within the control unit, emphasis was placed on the activity at hand and its outcome rather than the process that occurred throughout the activity. The most important aspect was task completion, while for the PPC intervention units the dynamics that occurred within the activity was primary.

Intervention Unit Programmes

Units 2 and 3, the experimental units, also consisted in each instance of 6 youth workers, 1 unit supervisor, and night staff. Staff allotment and shifts were identical to that of the control unit. The staffing between the three units was also comparable with respect to level of education and work experience. Unit 3 differed from the other two units in that it had been regularly conducting structured group discussions amongst

residents and staff. This may have allowed for the introduction of PPC groups to appear less foreign to both the residents and staff of Unit 3. In addition, the supervisor of Unit 3 had previous training in PPC and became more active in the implementation of this model, as compared to the supervisor of Unit 2. Another evident difference between the two intervention units was that Unit 2, like the control unit, had between 16 and 20 residents, while Unit 3 typically had 10 to 16 at any given time.

Similarities that continued to exist between the intervention units and the control unit are noteworthy. The residents' daily schedule remained consistent between units, as well as the opportunity to attend any of the Centre's programmes, i.e., recreational, vocational, lifeskills, work, etc. The use of the Centre level privilege system and Disciplinary Boards were also maintained on the intervention units due to mandatory adherence to provincial policy guidelines. Being that neither of these behavior management tools fit well with PPC philosophy, their role was minimized. Staff were encouraged to seldom utilize the option of sending residents to the Disciplinary Board to receive punishment and to progress residents through the level system while

focusing on PPC expectations, rather than basic rules. Within the intervention units, emphasis was placed on incorporating a Positive Peer Culture model as presented in the previous chapter. The premises of Positive Peer Culture are summarized as follows:

1. A climate of change demands that young people become the mature and productive human beings they can be rather than a climate of security with demands of obedience to rules.

2. PPC focuses on the here and now, without blaming the present on the past.

3. Problems are viewed as opportunities to grow and a normal part of life.

4. PPC recognizes the adolescent peer group power phenomenon and instead of attempting to control it, PPC works with it and influences it. The peer group is the vehicle for change.

5. PPC insists that people are responsible for their behavior and have the ability to change attitudes, values, and behavior.

6. PPC places onus of helping and caring for self and others on participants, and views this as strong.

Prior to implementing a PPC approach in the two experimental units, all management, supervisors,

teachers, and youth workers in direct contact with these youth were trained in the philosophies and techniques of the model. Both the researcher and a consultant with expertise in the area of PPC were responsible for training and implementation of the programme. The initial training consisted of a 4-day workshop, which was followed with 2 hours of training per week throughout the study. All staff presented as enthusiastic and eager to apply this new approach. To aid staff training all unit group meetings were audiotaped, thus allowing for specific feedback to be supplied. Within the experimental units, group meetings of 1-1.5 hours were conducted 3 times per week. The model was first introduced on Unit 3 in July and then Unit 2 in September, 1990.

Sample

The sample consisted of 78 male young offenders drawn from one Albertan secure custody facility. There were 26 subjects from each of the three Centre units. Each subject was either serving a secure custody disposition or awaiting sentencing while remanded within this institution.

The sample ranged in age from 14-19; the modal age being 16 years. Fourteen percent (14%) was Native youth,

while the remainder was predominantly Caucasian. Most of the sample previously resided in an urban setting. Since 90% of the institutional population was male, it was decided not to include females, thus controlling for gender effects.

Within the sample, a wide range of offense histories were evident. All subjects had appeared in Youth Court at least once, though some continued to await sentencing. Offense categories included (in order of prevalence): (a) theft under \$200.00; (b) break and enter; (c) theft over \$200.00; (d) robbery; (e) breach of probation; (f) robbery with violence; (g) assault; and (h) attempted murder. Table 2.1 shows the comparison of demographic variables between the subjects in each of the three groups.

In terms of the social characteristics of the Centre's population, an in-house survey taken in 1989 states that approximately 33% of the sentenced residents came from intact families, approximately 33% had previously been in some form of residential care, and approximately 72% had some form of Social Service status in the past. A high percentage (67%) reported alcohol/drug abuse in their homes and 80% admitted to practicing regular drug and/or alcohol abuse.

Table 2.1

Demographic Characteristics of the Subjects in Each of
the Three Units (N=26/gp)

| Variables | Group 1-Control | Group 2 | Group 3 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------|------------|
| Age (mean) | 16.2 years | 16.6 | 16.4 |
| Grade (mean) | 9 | 9 | 9.1 |
| Caucasian | 23 (88.5%) | 18 (69.3%) | 21 (80.8%) |
| Native | 2 (7.7%) | 6 (23.1) | 3 (11.5%) |
| Oriental | 1 (3.9%) | 2 (7.7%) | 1 (3.9%) |
| Black | 0 | 0 | 1 (3.9%) |
| Suicidal-Risk | 9 (34.6%) | 6 (23.1%) | 12 (46.2%) |
| Escape-Risk | 12 (46.2%) | 14 (53.9%) | 13 (50%) |
| Sentenced | 18 (69.2%) | 15 (57.7%) | 12 (46.2%) |
| Remand | 3 (11.5%) | 4 (15.4%) | 9 (34.6%) |
| Sentenced/ Remand | 5 (19.2%) | 7 (23.9%) | 5 (19.2%) |
| Offense Against Person | 12 (46.1%) | 13 (53.8%) | 8 (30.8%) |
| Offense Against Property | 14 (53.8%) | 12 (46.1%) | 18 (69.2%) |

Only those offenders having 1 month or more remaining in their disposition or remand status were included in the study, thus providing sufficient time for pretesting, the treatment period of 1 month, and posttesting. The three units from which the sample was drawn was a random sample of the Centre population (excluding females).

Research Procedures

With project commencement, all young offenders meeting the above criteria were pretested. Once pretesting had been completed, the intervention of a Positive Peer Culture model was implemented on two of the three selected units. Four (4) weeks after pretesting, each subject was then posttested. The process was ongoing, with each new young offender admission being pretested and then posttested. Prior to pretesting, a subject was given 3 to 5 days to become adequately familiar with the existing social climate.

Pre- and posttesting of subjects was completed by the researcher and a trained volunteer. Once a subject had been identified as meeting necessary criteria and had verbally consented to participate in the study, he was escorted to a Centre interview room. The subject was then presented with a consent form and further information pertaining to his involvement. The testing

commenced with the interviewer reading a situational dilemma aloud to the subject. The subject then orally answered questions asked by the interviewer. The entire interview was audiotaped. Once the interview was complete, the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale was administered. The subject was then returned to his unit.

Data Collection

Moral climate. Each participating offender, both intervention and control group members, were administered a modified School Dilemmas Interview (Power et al., 1989) or, in this study, called the Moral Climate Interview, consisting of three rather than four real-life dilemmas which have likely been of recent concern for all subjects in the study. The dilemma not utilized involved a group decision about whether to collectively retribute to a member of the class money stolen from her pocketbook by an unknown member of the class. The opportunity for such a situation to arise within the correctional setting was highly unlikely, thus making such a dilemma unrealistic or hypothetical to the subjects. The subjects were asked how they "would" and "should" resolve these dilemmas in their unit. Subjects were also asked how they felt other residents in their unit would react to these dilemmas. The interview had a strong prescriptive focus, that is, statements expressing the obligations of members, while

it also tapped practical judgement and the cultural context of each residential unit.

The first of the practical dilemmas was a helping dilemma, similar in form to that of Power et al. (1989), except rather than setting the dilemma in a school, it presented an unpopular youth in a custodial facility who is being bullied and teased. The question is whether to help. The second dilemma theme, like the Kohlberg's group's, was a stealing or trust dilemma, and the third a contraband or drug dilemma.

Each of the three dilemma types had two versions that varied in the minor details of the situation while continuing to ask about the norm in question. Depending on what variation was presented during pretesting, the alternative was presented at retesting. Due to questions about the equivalency of the two variations of each dilemma, the specific dilemma presented at pretesting was alternated with each new subject, thus reducing possibility of error. Both versions of the Moral Climate Interview are presented in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2

The Modified School Dilemmas InterviewHelping Dilemma (1)

Roger is a boy with a lot of problems. He is not good at school work and his mind wanders a great deal. He causes some difficulties for the other kids on the unit; he is frequently late or slow in getting his chores done (or his shower), and this causes delays in programme activities and meals. Sometimes Roger gets into fights with the other residents because he feels that they are deliberately trying to make it tough on him. It is true that the other kids laugh at him and the strange things that he does, and sometimes they call him names like "freak" and "retard."

1. Should Tony try to help Roger? Why or why not?
2. Should Tony tell the others to stop laughing at or bugging Roger? Why or why not?
3. Would you help Roger? Why or why not?
4. Would most other guys on your unit help Roger? Why or why not?
5. (If not) Do you think there should be an agreement on your unit about helping?
6. Would most of the other guys on your unit help Roger? Why or why not?
7. Would you be disappointed if no one on your unit helped a guy like Roger? Why or why not?
8. Would you say anything to someone on your unit who was bugging or laughing at a guy like Roger? Why or why not?
9. Would you report it or bring it up at a group meeting if someone was bugging or laughing at someone like Roger? Why or why not?

(table continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Helping Dilemma (2)

Sam has several months of custody left. He doesn't really care what happens to him, and he hates being here. He is thinking of suicide and he mentions this to Frank and a few other kids. Now, Sam is not a very popular guy on the unit; he talks too much and generally bugs the other kids. Now, there are a few things that you could do to help; you could try to talk him out of it, or spend some time with him, or mention it to staff, who could tell him hurting himself won't help in the long run, or something like that . . .

1. What should Frank do in this situation. Why should he do that?
2. What would you do if you knew about Sam's situation and why?
3. Would most guys on your unit help Sam, or would most guys on your unit think it would be a good thing if someone helped Sam? Why or why not?
4. So, is there an understanding or an unwritten agreement in your unit about helping one another?
5. Do you think there should be (an agreement to help)?
6. Would you be disappointed if someone on your unit did not help a guy like Sam? Would most people on your unit be disappointed?
7. Would you say anything if someone did not help? Why or why not? Would most kids on your unit? Why or why not?

(table continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Stealing Dilemma (1)

One day Marcel got called down from his unit to the Deputy Director's office. He left in a rush, leaving some of his tapes in the games room. Tom noticed the tapes, particularly two of them, the better, more popular ones. Tom is thinking of taking the two tapes.

1. What do you think Tom should do in this situation? Why?
2. Should Marcel have been so trusting like that in this situation, or should he have been more careful?
3. What would you do in this situation? Why?
4. Is there a general agreement or an unwritten understanding amongst the guys in your unit about not stealing each other's stuff? Why or why not?
5. (If not) Do you think there should be an understanding about not stealing in the unit? Why? Would you bring it up/talk about it/propose it? Why?
6. Would you be disappointed if someone in your unit stole from another? Why? Would most of the other guys be disappointed? Why?
7. Would you say something if someone stole in your unit? Would most other residents? Why or why not?
8. Finally, would you report it if someone stole on the unit? Would most others? Why?

(table continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Stealing Dilemma (2)

Bob brought back a new walkman from a Temporary Release (T.R.) a few weeks ago. Staff advised him to keep it in his personals, but he decided to keep it in his room instead, and frequently lent it out to other residents. Bob had become quite confident that he didn't need to worry about his walkman being stolen, and often left it lying around the unit. One weekend, Bob left the walkman in the games room while he was on his T.R. One of the other residents, Jack, who was just about to go on a T.R. himself, is thinking about taking it.

1. Should Jack take the radio? Why or why not?
2. Should Bob have been so trusting, or should he have kept it in his personals? Why?
3. What would you do if you saw the walkman and you were Jack? Why or why not?
4. What would most of the other boys in your unit do in Jack's situation? Why?
5. Is there an agreement in your unit about taking other guys' stuff? Why or why not?
6. (If there isn't) Do you think there should be? Why?
7. Would you be disappointed if someone in your unit stole from another? Would most other guys in your unit be disappointed? Why or why not?
8. Would you say something if someone stole from another in your unit? Would most of the other guys? Why or why not?
9. Would you report it? Why or why not?

(table continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Contraband Dilemma (1)

Frank's roommate Bob went on a weekend Temporary Release and upon his return he brought in a lighter and some marijuana. He told Frank about this and asked him not to say anything to anyone.

1. What should Frank do in this situation? Why?
2. What would you do? Why?
3. Would most guys on your unit do the same thing? Why or why not?
4. Is there an understanding or unwritten agreement on your unit about not using or bringing contraband on to your unit?
5. Do you think there should be such an agreement?
6. Would you be disappointed if someone brought contraband on to your unit? Why?
7. Would most people on your unit be disappointed?
8. Would you say anything if someone brought contraband on to your unit? Why or why not?
9. Would most kids on your unit say anything? Why or why not?
10. Would they report it to staff? Why or why not?

(table continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Contraband Dilemma (2)

Upon arriving at the Centre, each resident becomes aware of the expectation of not having or using contraband, for example cigarettes or drugs. It is made clear that if contraband is found, then either the individual responsible or the group as a whole will be consequenced. Due to a recent incident involving contraband on your unit, resulting in a group consequence, each resident made a commitment not to use or bring contraband into the unit. Then while at school a kid from another unit offers Bob a cigarette and a piece of hash. Should Bob accept it and bring it back to your unit? Why or why not?

1. What would you do? Why?
 2. Would most guys on our unit do the same thing? Why or why not?
 3. Is there an understanding or unwritten agreement on your unit about not using or bringing contraband on to your unit?
 4. Do you think there should be such an agreement?
 5. Would you be disappointed if someone brought contraband on to your unit after committing not to? Why?
 6. Would most people on your unit be disappointed?
 7. Would you say anything if someone brought contraband on to your unit? Why or why not?
 8. Would most kids on your unit say anything? Why or why not?
 9. Would they report it to staff? Why or why not?
-

The responses to these three dilemmas were analyzed in terms of the following variables measuring moral climate, for each of the three norms: (a) helping, (b) stealing, and (c) accepting contraband.

1. Stage of each norm. That is, the stage of what is expected from group members by group members in the attitudes (i.e., caring about others) and in actions (i.e., not stealing from others). This was again scored using the standard issue Scoring Manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). The responses scored, however, were those given to the question, "What do you think most others in this unit would do in this situation, and why?"

After all possible statements were matched to criterion judgement, the number of such matches at each stage was calculated, weighted by the stage, then summed and divided by the total number of matches, producing a Weighted Average Score (WAS). [A more detailed explanation of this scoring process is contained within The Scoring Manual, Volume 1 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, pp. 160-188).] The WAS (normally considered as interval data) is expressed as a single score ranging in value from 100-500, Stage 1 to Stage 5 in the Kohlbergian system. To illustrate a WAS of 100 would indicate a subject reasoning consistently at Stage 1 with respect to

Table 2.3

Nature and Meaning of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale Subscales

1. Total Positive Score. This is the most important single score on the Scale (Fitts, 1965). It reflects the overall level of self-esteem. Persons with high scores tend to like themselves, feel that they are persons of value and worth, have confidence in themselves, and act accordingly. People with low scores are doubtful about their own worth; see themselves as undesirable; often feel anxious, depressed, and unhappy; and have little faith in themselves.
 2. Identity. These are the "what I am items." Here the individual is describing his basic identity--what he is as he sees himself.
 3. Self-Satisfaction. This score comes from those items where the individual describes how he feels about the self he perceives. In general, this score reflects the level of self-satisfaction or self-acceptance.
 4. Behavior. This score comes from those items that say "this is what I do, or this is how I act." Thus, this score measures the individual's perception of his own actions.
 5. Physical Self. Here the individual is presenting his view of his body, his state of health, his physical appearance, skills, and sexuality.
 6. Moral-Ethical Self. This score describes the self from a moral-ethical frame of reference or moral worth, relationship to God, feelings of being a "good" or "bad" person, and satisfaction with one's religion or lack of it.
 7. Personal Self. This score reflects the individual's sense of personal worth, his feeling of adequacy as a person and his evaluation of his personality apart from his body or his relationships to others.
 8. Family Self. This score reflects one's feelings of adequacy, worth, and value as a family member.
 9. Social Self. This is another "self as perceived in relation to others" in a more general way. It reflects the person's sense of adequacy and worth in his social interactions with other people in general.
-

the material scored. A WAS of 250 would indicate a subject "in transition," using some Stage 3 reasoning and some Stage 2 reasoning. Similarly, a WAS of 212 would indicate a predominant use of Stage 2 reasoning with a minimal use of Stage 3.

2. Stage of community or shared sense of community valuing. These data were derived from an overall rating of the discussion of each participant about each norm, according to the guide adapted from Power et al. (1989). This rating, expressed on a 5-point scale, indicates the degree to which participants felt part of, or recognized as, a group that worked together and valued a sense of group. This variable is critically important to this study in that it measures a factor central to the goal the Positive Peer Culture intervention.

For the purposes of this study, which was primarily concerned with the group climate, only those variables describing the group--Stage of Norm and Stage of Community--were used. To ensure better the accuracy of the scoring, all interviews were first transcribed. Then, considering the highly subjective nature as well as the novelty of the Moral Climate Interview, the transcripts were scored by John Taylor, UBC, a trained and experienced scorer of this measurement tool.

Since this is a new instrument, not yet researched in any refereed journal, there is no documented data on reliability or validity. However, Power et al. (1989) demonstrated some validity through their examination of the hypothesis that democratic high schools (schools utilizing a "Just Community" approach) would develop different moral cultures than their parent, comparison schools. Data from the school dilemmas interview resoundingly confirmed this hypothesis. The "Just Community" schools created a positive cultural alternative, developing higher stages of shared norms and sense of community between students and staff. Observations within these schools also indicated dramatic effects on action: (a) stealing ceased within one of the schools just over a year after the school was started; (b) racial relations improved and interracial conflict was almost nonexistent; (c) educational aspirations were enhanced, as evidenced by the fact that over 90% of the school's graduates went to postsecondary education; (d) drug use virtually ceased; and (e) cheating was also curbed by adoption of an honor code.

Self-concept. During the same interview, each subject was administered the Research Form of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS) (Fitts, 1965). The scale has 100 self-administered items designed to measure

an individual's perception of him/herself with respect to his/her physical, moral-ethical, personal, family, and social activities. The subject was also rated on six empirical or clinical scales. However, only the data relating specifically to self-concept was utilized in the present study. That is, eight subscale scores and the Total Positive Score from the TSCS were dependent variables. Table 2.3 provides a description of each of these subscales (Fitts, 1965).

Congdon (1958, cited in Maskin and Flescher, 1975) established significant reliability ($r = .88$, $p < .01$) of the scale with a test-retest interval of 1 week. Fitts (1965) reported a test-retest reliability of .92 for the Total Positive Score, from .88 to .91 for the rows, and from .85 to .90 for the columns. Validity rests largely on correlations with measures such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Fitts (1965) found scores for normals and psychiatric patients significantly different. These differences were significantly similar ($p < .01$) to those obtained for comparisons on the MMPI ($r = .72$).

Ethical Considerations

Approval to proceed with this study was granted by the Alberta Solicitor General's Department and the Education Joint Research Ethics Committee at the University of Calgary. Participation in the proposed study was entirely voluntary. Potential subjects were in no way pressured to participate in the modified School Dilemmas interview or the completion of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale. Those residents willing to be subjects signed a consent form prior to testing (see Appendix A), thus allowing for programme evaluation.

Upon implementing a PPC approach, all residents residing on the intervention units were given the option of transferring to a non-PPC unit. There was no threat of any negative consequences resulting from a resident's decision. However, it is of importance to note that the adoption of PPC was not for the purposes of this study. The utilization of this approach within young offender facility was a pilot project decided upon by the Solicitor General's Department. Therefore, once initiated, PPC became a formal intervention technique of the Centre and therefore a mandatory Centre programme in which residents were expected to participate, much like recreational activities and lifeskills. The purpose of

this study was to evaluate the impact of such a model, not to introduce it.

All precautions were taken to ensure subject anonymity. Completed questionnaires were filed with a case number; names were not used. The audiotapes were transcribed and also identified by case numbers. All raw data was locked in a cabinet. In addition, results are expressed in aggregate form, thereby protecting the confidentiality of the young offenders participating in the study.

Missing Data

Due to the difficult nature of the population it was found that many responses given throughout the Moral Climate Interview were not scoreable, and were thus entered as missing data. Although these responses were unscorable, they provided useful qualitative information. All variables examined had at least 80% of the data pool. That is, at least 62 of the 78 cases must have been scoreable for each variable analyzed.

Statistical Procedures

Descriptive statistics were calculated for each of the 15 dependent variables, 9 taken from the TSCS subscale scores and 6 from the Moral Climate Interview. The means and range were provided for each of these variables within each the three groups. A one-way

analysis of covariance was performed with the pretest score as the covariate and the posttest score as the dependent variable. Where a significant difference emerged between groups, a post hoc test was conducted. In addition, a paired samples t-test was performed to examine mean differences between pretest and posttest scores in each group.

CHAPTER III

Results

Introduction

Twenty-six (26) subjects from each of three units within a Secure Custody Young Offender Centre were measured on 15 dependent variables. Two of the units were exposed to a Positive Peer Culture (PPC) model, while the control group continued to employ a traditional correctional approach, as described in Chapter II. All subjects were pretested within a few days of their admission to one of the three groups, and then posttested after a period of 1 month. The research question asked was, does differential treatment of male young offenders in a secure custody facility affect self-concepts or the social climates amongst residents, holding constant differences in the subjects' prior self-concepts and unit climates. If claims made by PPC supporters were to be substantiated, then the PPC units would demonstrate increased self-concepts and improved social climates.

First, descriptive statistics were performed to organize, summarize, and describe this quantitative information. The data were treated using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) programmes for descriptive statistics (Nie et al., 1977, 1981). Then, from the data, inferential statistics provided methods of

making generalizations and inferences about the population from which the subjects were drawn. The Bio Medical Diagnosis Package (BMDP) of statistical software was utilized for this analysis.

The data obtained from both the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS) and the Moral Climate Interview were analyzed using parametric statistics. These statistics were chosen based on their power-efficiency, their applicability to the data, and the data's ability to meet the necessary parametric assumptions.

One-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to establish if the mean differences among the three groups likely occurred by chance once pretest scores were adjusted. Two-tailed probability levels were applied. If a significant difference emerged, a Scheffe was performed to find between which means the difference existed.

The Tennessee Self-Concept Scale and the Moral Climate Interview were administered to 78 subjects on two occasions. Descriptive statistics for each of the three groups on all 15 variables are presented in Table 3.1. The range was provided as a measure of variability to allow for clear illustration of the outer limits of each variable. The distribution of the data appeared to

maintain a bell-shaped curve, though slightly positively skewed. Each variable demonstrated wide range.

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics between each of the three units illustrated similarities in the profiles or rank orders of the Tennessee Self-Concept subscale scores. Table 3.1 shows that all three units had their highest mean scores on the self-satisfaction subscale, with Unit 1 (the control group) scoring a mean of 48.27, Unit 2 scoring a mean of 45.38, and Unit 3 scoring a mean of 46.46 on posttest scores. The subjects within each unit then scored highest in the physical and personal subscales. Lowest scores were predominantly evident in the moral-ethical subscale, however, Unit 3 exhibited slightly lower scores on the behavior and family variables.

Examination of the moral climate posttest means of each individual unit revealed that the experimental groups achieved a high frequency of Stage 3 scores, while the control group did not exceed beyond a Stage 2 level for either the behavioral norms or the sense of community pertaining to those norms. Unit 2, a Positive Peer Culture unit, attained a mean of 2.76 for level of

Table 3.1.A.

Descriptive Statistics for Each of the Three Groups on the
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (N=78)

| Variables | | Control Group N=26 | | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | | Experimental Group 2 N=26 | |
|----------------------------|------|--------------------------|-------|---------------------------------|-------|---------------------------------|-------|
| | | Mean | Range | Mean | Range | Mean | Range |
| Total Positive Self | Pre | 41.81 | 24-67 | 33.77 | 24-54 | 35.19 | 19-67 |
| | Post | 39.92 | 22-67 | 37.77 | 26-67 | 38.42 | 24-69 |
| Identity | Pre | 40.69 | 26-57 | 31.81 | 19-51 | 31.03 | 06-64 |
| | Post | 38.58 | 26-58 | 35.96 | 19-71 | 35.92 | 16-64 |
| Self- Satis- faction | Pre | 49.31 | 28-71 | 41.35 | 27-69 | 44.77 | 27-80 |
| | Post | 48.27 | 24-77 | 45.38 | 28-81 | 46.46 | 31-83 |
| Behavior | Pre | 35.96 | 14-64 | 30.46 | 18-49 | 31.04 | 15-52 |
| | Post | 34.38 | 16-54 | 33.65 | 16-55 | 33.31 | 22-51 |
| Physical Self | Pre | 47.38 | 23-90 | 41.31 | 22-59 | 40.08 | 11-67 |
| | Post | 43.96 | 22-66 | 45.08 | 26-74 | 43.54 | 21-74 |
| Moral- Ethical | Pre | 34.08 | 18-49 | 29.85 | 14-43 | 32.27 | 11-56 |
| | Post | 33.54 | 17-53 | 33.50 | 19-56 | 35.73 | 16-58 |
| Personal Self | Pre | 47.46 | 19-68 | 38.16 | 19-67 | 41.19 | 23-75 |
| | Post | 47.88 | 20-71 | 44.92 | 23-75 | 43.27 | 26-69 |
| Family Self | Pre | 43.00 | 22-58 | 31.12 | 15-57 | 31.58 | 16-63 |
| | Post | 40.19 | 24-59 | 33.62 | 14-56 | 34.35 | 16-70 |
| Social Self | Pre | 43.42 | 31-68 | 39.04 | 23-63 | 39.88 | 24-74 |
| | Post | 42.65 | 29-73 | 40.69 | 26-74 | 41.62 | 30-71 |

Table 3.1.B.

Descriptive Statistics for Each of the Three Groups on the Moral Climate Interview (N=78)

| Variables | | Control Group N=26 | | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | | Experimental Group 2 N=26 | |
|-------------------------------------|------|-----------------------|---------|------------------------------|---------|------------------------------|---------|
| | | Mean | Range | Mean | Range | Mean | Range |
| Stage of Norm re: Stealing | Pre | 196.25 | 150-250 | 197.22 | 150-250 | 207.89 | 150-300 |
| | Post | 197.50 | 150-200 | 216.67 | 150-300 | 216.32 | 150-300 |
| Stage of Comm. re: Stealing | Pre | 1.60 | 1-4 | 2.14 | 1-5 | 2.04 | 1-4 |
| | Post | 1.56 | 1-3 | 2.76 | 1-5 | 2.74 | 1-5 |
| Stage of Norm re: Helping | Pre | 202.78 | 150-300 | 210.56 | 150-260 | 231.52 | 200-300 |
| | Post | 212.50 | 200-300 | 222.22 | 200-300 | 259.52 | 200-300 |
| Stage of Comm. re: Helping | Pre | 1.70 | 1-5 | 2.70 | 1-5 | 3.39 | 1-5 |
| | Post | 1.47 | 1-4 | 2.85 | 1-5 | 3.78 | 1-5 |
| Stage of Norm re: Contraband | Pre | 202.50 | 200-250 | 197.37 | 150-200 | 202.78 | 200-250 |
| | Post | 200.00 | 150-250 | 202.63 | 200-250 | 202.78 | 200-300 |
| Stage of Comm. re: Contraband | Pre | 1.89 | 1-3 | 2.09 | 1-5 | 2.32 | 1-3 |
| | Post | 1.74 | 1-3 | 2.04 | 1-4 | 1.95 | 1-4 |

community in relation to stealing and a mean of 2.85 for level of community in relation to helping. Both these mean scores indicate a predominant use of Stage 3. Unit 3, the other PPC treatment group, also advanced toward primary use of a Stage 3 for level of community in relation to stealing (mean of 2.74) and the norm in relation to helping (mean of 259.52). In addition, Unit 3 functioned predominantly at a Stage 4 level for sense of community in regards to helping, with a mean of 3.78.

Inferential Statistics

Analysis of covariance was performed on each of the 15 variables, using the pretest score as the covariate and the posttest as the dependent variable. When a significant difference emerged a Scheffe was utilized. In addition, a paired samples t -test was conducted to examine the mean differences between pre- and posttest scores within each group. Considering analysis of covariance provided limited support for the positive effects of Positive Peer Culture, questions arose regarding whether the evident changes within groups could offer further substantiation of peer group treatment claims.

Tennessee Self-Concept Scale Variables

Total positive self-concept subscale. When analyzing the total positive scores on the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale, which reflects an individual's overall level of self-esteem, the covariate was significant, with $F(1,74) = 141.24$, $p < .05$. Thus, the null hypothesis of no differences between the means of the three groups at pretesting was rejected.

Once the covariate was adjusted, a significant difference continued to emerge between the three groups' posttest means, with $F(2,74) = 4.3$, $p < .02$. Again, the null hypothesis of no differences between the means of the groups was rejected, indicating a significant difference between at least two of the adjusted means presented in Table 3.2.

The results from performing post hoc tests, specifically the Scheffe, give evidence of a significant difference between the adjusted posttest means of both experimental groups with that of the control group, in favor of the PPC treatments. $F_{\text{converted}}(2,74) = 8.21$, $p < .05$ was found between experimental group 1 and the control group. $F_{\text{converted}}(2,74) = 6.34$, $p < .05$ was found between experimental group 2 and the control group. $F_{\text{converted}}(2,74) = 0.12$, $p > .05$ was found between the two Positive Peer Group treatments.

Table 3.2

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Total
Positive Self Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 41.81 | 33.77 | 35.19 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 39.92 | 37.77 | 38.42 |
| Differences | -1.89 | 4.0 | 3.23 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 35.65 | 40.53 | 39.94 |

It appears from Table 3.2 that while both units utilizing a Positive Peer Culture approach experienced a numerical increase in total positive self-concept, the control unit exhibited a decrease over the treatment period. The paired samples t -test, comparing the unadjusted pretest and posttest mean scores within each group are presented in Table 3.3. The increase between occasions for each of the experimental groups was significant at $p \leq .01$. The observed t -values were 2.74 within experimental group 1; 2.98 within experimental group 2; and 1.76 within the control group. However, the

diminished scores on the control unit were not significant over the 1-month interval.

Identity subscale. On the identity subscale, the covariate was significant with $F(1,74) = 66.27$, $p < .001$. Hence, the probability is too remote that such an observed difference in pretest means reflects sampling error. After adjustment for the covariate, the groups did not differ significantly on post test scores, $p > .05$. The null hypothesis, that there was no difference, was not rejected and it was concluded that the differences between means were within the range of sampling error. The results did not provide evidence supporting the positive effects of a Positive Peer Culture model over the more traditional model on the way a young offender describes his basic identity.

Although the adjusted posttest means did not differ significantly, one can see from Table 3.4 that both PPC units experienced a numerical increase on the identity subscale while the control unit showed a decrease. As presented in Table 3.3, mean comparisons within each group found the posttest mean scores for both PPC groups to be significantly higher than the pretest scores, $p \leq .02$. The t -values were 2.47 within experimental group 1; 2.51 within experimental group 2; and 1.24

Table 3.3

Paired Samples t-Test Results: Comparisons Between Pre-
and Posttest Means Within Each Group

| | <u>t-Values</u> | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Control Group/df | Experimental Group 1/df | Experimental Group 2/df |
| Total Positive Self | 1.76 /25 | 2.74* /25 | 2.98* /25 |
| Identity | 1.24 /25 | 2.47* /25 | 2.51* /25 |
| Self- Satisfaction | .91 /25 | 1.98 /25 | 1.44 /25 |
| Behavior | 1.22 /25 | 2.40* /25 | 1.97 /25 |
| Physical Self | 1.74 /25 | 1.93 /25 | 1.76 /25 |
| Moral-Ethical | .39 /25 | 2.17* /25 | 2.21* /25 |
| Personal Self | .22 /25 | 2.80* /25 | 1.35 /25 |
| Family Self | 1.73 /25 | 1.33 /25 | 2.22* /25 |
| Social Self | .68 /25 | 1.06 /25 | 1.48 /25 |
| Norm re: Helping | 1.16 /17 | 1.00 /17 | 2.48* /20 |
| Community re: Helping | .78 /16 | .31 /19 | .81 /17 |
| Norm re: Stealing | .20 /19 | 1.94 /17 | 1.04 /18 |
| Community re: Stealing | .20 /24 | 2.03 /20 | 3.02* /22 |
| Norm re: Contraband | .57 /19 | 1.46 /18 | .00 /17 |
| Community re: Contraband | 1.00 /18 | .15 /22 | 2.11* /18 |

*t-test significance at the .05 level or higher.

Table 3.4

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Identity Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 40.69 | 31.81 | 31.04 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 38.58 | 35.96 | 35.92 |
| Differences | -2.11 | 4.15 | 4.88 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 34.30 | 37.83 | 38.33 |

within the control group. The control group's decline in scores over the treatment interval was not found to be significant.

Self-satisfaction subscale. The analysis of the self-satisfaction subscale data depicted the covariate as significant with $F(1,74) = 122.17$, $p < .001$. After mean adjustment the dependent variable, which is the analysis of the difference between groups at final testing, was not significant. There were no significant differences between groups' posttest scores in relation to how the group members described feeling about the self they perceived. Evidently, the experimental approach was no

more effective than the control setting at improving the young offenders' self-satisfaction or self-acceptance over the time period involved.

Table 3.5
Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Self-Satisfaction Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 49.31 | 41.35 | 44.77 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 48.27 | 45.38 | 46.46 |
| Differences | -1.04 | 4.03 | 1.69 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 44.66 | 48.67 | 46.78 |

The mean scores in Table 3.5 reflect the level of self-acceptance, increasing for the subjects in both PPC units, yet decreasing for residents of the "traditional" correctional unit. However, the mean differences between testing occasions were not significant within any of the groups as reported by the paired samples t -tests reported in Table 3.3. The t -values were 1.98 within experimental

group 1, 1.44 within experimental group 2 and .91 within the control group.

Behavior subscale. On the behavior subscale, the pretests differed significantly between the three groups. The $F(1,74) = 89.73$, $p < .001$. Once the means were adjusted, no significant differences emerged on the posttest scores between the three groups, $p > .05$. Beyond the range of sampling error, there were no treatment effects amongst the residents' perceptions of their own behavior.

Table 3.6

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Behavior Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 35.96 | 30.46 | 31.04 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 34.38 | 33.65 | 33.31 |
| Differences | -1.58 | 3.19 | 2.27 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 31.91 | 35.09 | 34.39 |

Table 3.6 illustrates that residents' perceptions of the way they functioned improved numerically for both PPC units, while for those residents in the control group such perceptions diminished slightly. The t -values comparing occasions within each group were 2.40 within experimental group 1; 1.97 within experimental group 2; and 1.22 within the control group (see Table 3.3). The experimental group 1's improvement from the time of pretesting to that of posttesting was statistically significant at $p \leq .03$. The changes within the other two groups were not significant.

Physical self subscale. A significant difference emerged amongst the covariate or pretest scores of the three groups with $F(1,74) = 59.23$, $p < .001$. After adjusting for pre-existing differences, the null hypothesis that differences in treatment had no effect on the physical self-concept was not rejected. No statistically significant differences were evident amongst the posttest means $p > .05$. Following the 1-month treatment period, the differences between how individuals in each of the three units viewed their bodies, their state of health, their physical appearance, their skill, and their sexuality was within the range of sampling error and not an effect of unit programme.

Table 3.7

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Physical Self Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 47.38 | 41.31 | 40.08 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 43.96 | 45.08 | 43.54 |
| Differences | -3.42 | 3.77 | 3.46 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 41.19 | 46.08 | 45.31 |

From Table 3.7 it can be seen that although the residents of the control group had initially higher perceptions of their physical selves, this lessened over a period of 1 month. On the other hand, individuals residing on the experimental or PPC units experienced a numerically improved view of their physical selves during the treatment period. However, Table 3.3 reports the mean score changes from the time of pretesting to that of posttesting as not being statistically significant within any of the groups. The corresponding t -values were 1.93 within the experimental group 1; 1.76 within the experimental group 2; and 1.74 within the control group.

Moral-ethical self subscale. Analysis of covariance did reveal a significant difference between the three groups' pretest scores on the moral-ethical subscale. The $F(1,74) = 42.77$, $p < .001$. A significant difference between the groups' adjusted posttest scores was not evident.

Table 3.8. illustrates that the individuals in both experimental groups described themselves as having increased moral worth, feelings of being a "good" person, and satisfaction with their religion or lack of it. These positive changes were statistically significant for both PPC units, $p \leq .04$. As presented in Table 3.3, the observed t -values were 2.17 within experimental group 1 and 2.21 within experimental group 2. The control group, on the other hand, reported a slight numerical decrease when describing the self from a moral-ethical frame of reference. This effect was not shown to be significantly different, with a t -value of .39.

Personal self subscale. On the personal self subscale, a significant difference emerged on the covariate, $F(1,74) = 62.88$, $p < .001$). However, once cell means were adjusted no significant difference emerged between the groups' posttests.

Table 3.8

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Moral-Ethical Self Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 34.08 | 29.85 | 32.27 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 33.54 | 33.50 | 35.73 |
| Differences | -.54 | 3.65 | 3.46 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 32.24 | 34.93 | 35.60 |

Each member of the three groups experienced a numerical increase in their reported sense of personal worth and feelings of adequacy as a person from the time of pretesting to that of posttesting. However, Table 3.9 demonstrates the PPC units to have experienced more of an improved "personal" self-concept than the control group. For the experimental group 1 this increase was statistically significant, $p \leq .01$. The t -values, as presented in Table 3.3, were 2.80 within the experimental group 1; 1.35 within the experimental group 2; and .22 within the control group.

Table 3.9

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Personal Self Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 47.46 | 38.12 | 41.19 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 47.88 | 44.92 | 43.27 |
| Differences | .42 | 6.76 | 2.08 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 44.33 | 47.75 | 44.00 |

Family self subscale. The covariate on the family self subscale was significant, $F(1,74) = 84.82, p < .001$. However, the dependent variable did not emerge as significant. While the pretest scores were initially different between the three groups, this was not the case for posttest scores between the groups once means were appropriately adjusted. Hence, the differences in treatments did not significantly affect the subject's sense of worth in reference to his closest circle of associates.

However, Table 3.10 does show a numerical increase for both PPC groups in regards to family self, while the

control group experienced a decrease over the duration of the treatment. Only the increase experienced by the experimental group 2 was statistically significant, $p \leq .04$. The observed t -values were 1.33 within experimental group 1; 2.22 within experimental group 2; and 1.73 within the control group.

Table 3.10

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Family Self Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 43.00 | 31.12 | 31.58 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 40.19 | 33.62 | 34.35 |
| Differences | -2.81 | 2.50 | 2.77 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 34.24 | 36.77 | 37.14 |

Social self subscale. The social self subscale demonstrated a significant difference between the pretest scores of the three groups, $F(1,74) = 117.99$, $p < .001$. However, no significant difference emerged between the

posttest scores of the groups once the means were adjusted, $p > .05$.

Table 3.11 illustrates that again the residents of the two PPC units experienced a numerically improved sense of adequacy and worth in their social interactions with other people. Contrastingly, the control unit residents' scores showed a slightly diminished social self-concept from occurrence 1 to occurrence 2. As reported in Table 3.3, the differences that occurred over the 1-month interval were not statistically significant for any of the groups. The t -values were 1.06 within experimental group 1; 1.48 within experimental group 2; and .68 within the control group.

Moral Climate Variables

Stage of the helping norm. The one-way analysis of covariance found the covariate not to be significant, $p > .05$. That is, no difference emerged between the three groups' pretest test scores. However, a significant difference did emerge between the dependent variables on posttest scores, $F(2,53) = 8.60$, $p < .001$.

As presented in Table 3.12, the experimental group 2 (or Unit 3) had the highest scores, the experimental group 1 had the next-highest scores, and the control group presented the lowest level of helping norms.

Table 3.11

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Social
Self Subscale

| | Control Group N=26 | Experimental Group 1 N=26 | Experimental Group 2 N=26 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 43.42 | 39.04 | 39.88 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 42.65 | 40.69 | 41.62 |
| Differences | -.77 | 1.66 | 1.74 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 40.46 | 42.14 | 42.36 |

The Scheffe found statistically significant differences between the posttest means of experimental group 2 when compared with the means of both the control group and the other PPC treatment group. When comparing the experimental group 2 with the control group, $F_{\text{converted}}(2,53) = 17.22, p < .05$. Comparison of the two experimental group means provided $F_{\text{converted}}(2,53) = 10.89, p < .05$. No significant difference emerged between experimental group 1 and the control group, $F_{\text{converted}}(2,53) = .70, p > .05$.

There was a marked increase in the stage of the helping norm from the time of pretesting to that of

posttesting for each of the three groups. It is evident from Table 3.12 that although all three units experienced an increase in regards to level of helping behavior expected of its members, it was more prevalent for the Positive Peer Culture units. Unit 3 (experimental group 2) was the only group to achieve predominant use of a Stage 3 reasoning level, and to show a statistically significant improvement during the treatment interval, $p \leq .02$. The observed t -values were 1.00 within the experimental group 1; 2.48 within the experimental group 2; and 1.16 within the control group (see Table 3.3).

Stage of community in relation to helping. Since the covariate was not significant, $p > .05$, the pretest scores between the three groups were taken to be equal. In contrast, one-way analysis of the slightly adjusted posttest scores demonstrated significant group differences, $F(2,51) = 8.12$, $p < .001$.

Statistically significant differences emerged between the posttest means of experimental group 2 and those of the control group when performing a Scheffe. $F_{\text{converted}}(2,51) = 19.61$, $p < .05$. Neither comparisons between experimental group 1 and the control group, nor between the two experimental groups, showed any significant differences. $F_{\text{converted}}(2,51) = 6.02$,

Table 3.12

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Stages
of the Helping Norm

| | Control Group N=18 | Experimental Group 1 N=18 | Experimental Group 2 N=21 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 202.78 | 210.56 | 231.52 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 212.50 | 222.22 | 259.52 |
| Differences | 9.72 | 11.66 | 28.00 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 213.19 | 222.50 | 258.70 |

$p > .05$ and $F_{\text{converted}}(2,51) = 3.42$, $p > .05$, respectively. Being that the critical value for the converted F was 6.38, significance was nearing between experimental group 1 and the control group.

The experimental group 2 displayed predominantly Stage 4 scores, the experimental group 1 displayed predominantly Stage 3 scores, and the control group functioned more at a lower Stage 2. It is evident that the Positive Peer Culture units shared a higher sense of community valuing in helping one another.

Table 3.13 reveals that units using a peer group approach experienced a slight numerical increase in the

sense of community, while the control unit experienced a slight decrease. The changes that occurred between testing occasions were not shown to be statistically significant within any of the three groups. The t -values were .31 within the experimental group 1; .81 within experimental group 2; and .78 within the control group.

Table 3.13

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Levels of Community in Relation to Helping

| | Control Group N=17 | Experimental Group 1 N=20 | Experimental Group 2 N=18 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 1.71 | 2.70 | 3.39 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 1.47 | 2.85 | 3.78 |
| Differences | -.23 | .15 | .39 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 1.59 | 2.84 | 3.67 |

Stage of stealing norm. Using pretest scores as a covariate, a one-way ANCOVA was done on the posttest scores. The covariate was significant, with $F(1,53) = 5.06$, $p < .05$. After a 1-month treatment

period, the groups did not differ significantly after adjustment for the covariate, $p > .05$.

Table 3.14 presents a numerical increase during the treatment period for each of the three groups, though not statistically significant. As presented in Table 3.3, the observed t -values were 1.94 within the experimental group 1; 1.04 within the experimental group 2; and .20 within the control group. Less encouraging is the issue that all three units continued to function at a Stage 2 level in the expected behavior of its members in regards to stealing.

Stage of community in relation to stealing. A one-way ANCOVA, with pretest scores as the covariate, showed the covariate to be significant, with $F(1,65) = 9.58$, $p < .01$. Following the 1-month treatment period, the groups differed significantly in the degree to which they were concerned about the consequences their stealing behavior would have for their group after adjustment for the covariate, with $F(2,65) = 7.24$, $p < .01$.

Conducting of the Scheffe found statistically significant differences between both of the Positive Peer Culture treatment groups when each unit's adjusted posttest means were compared with that of the control group. Comparison between experimental group 1 and the

Table 3.14

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Stages
of the Stealing Norm

| | Control Group N=20 | Experimental Group 1 N=18 | Experimental Group 2 N=19 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 196.25 | 197.22 | 207.89 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 197.50 | 216.67 | 216.32 |
| Differences | 1.25 | 19.45 | 8.43 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 199.25 | 218.01 | 213.19 |

control group found $F_{\text{converted}}(2,65) = 10.75, p < .05$. Results from comparing experimental group 2 with the control group were $F_{\text{converted}}(2,65) = 11.74, p < .05$. No significant differences emerged between the posttest means of the two treatment units, $F_{\text{converted}}(2,65) = .21, p > .05$.

From pretest to posttest scores, Table 3.15 again shows an increase in raw scores for the two PPC units and a slight decrease for the control unit. The advances made by the experimental group 2 were statistically significant, $p \leq .01$, and the experimental group 1 was nearing significance with $p = .06$. The t -values were 2.03 within the experimental group 1; 3.02 within the

experimental group 2; and .20 within the control group. As well, both the PPC units were functioning predominantly at a Stage 3, while the control unit remained at a Stage 2.

Table 3.15

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Levels of Community in Relation to Stealing

| | Control Group N=25 | Experimental Group 1 N=21 | Experimental Group 2 N=23 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 1.60 | 2.14 | 2.04 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 1.56 | 2.76 | 2.74 |
| Differences | -.04 | .62 | .73 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 1.69 | 2.67 | 2.69 |

Stage of the contraband norm. The covariate, being pretest scores, was found not to be significant, with $p > .05$; nor were there any significant group differences between posttest scores, $p > .05$. Positive Peer Culture treatment did not appear to affect the behavioral expectations of the residents in regards to the use or possession of contraband items.

From Table 3.16 we can observe that each of the three units were functioning at Stage 2 levels and displayed no stage advancement over the treatment period. The paired samples t -tests reported t -values of 1.46 within the experimental group 1; .00 within the experimental group 2; and .57 within the control group (see Table 3.3).

Stage of community in relation to contraband.

Analysis found the covariate not to be significant, $p > .05$; that is, no difference emerged between the groups' pretest means. Nor did any statistically significant differences emerge between groups' adjusted posttest means, with $p > .05$.

Table 3.17 demonstrates that each of the three units were functioning primarily at a Stage 2 level throughout the study, though all experienced a decrease during the treatment period. For the experimental group 2, the decline in mean scores over the 1-month treatment period was statistically significant, $p \leq .05$. The t -values, as presented in Table 3.3, were .15 within the experimental group 1; 2.11 within the experimental group 2; and 1.00 within the control group.

Table 3.16

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Stages
of the Contraband Norm

| | Control Group N=20 | Experimental Group 1 N=19 | Experimental Group 2 N=18 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 202.50 | 197.37 | 202.78 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 200.00 | 202.63 | 202.78 |
| Differences | -2.50 | 5.26 | .00 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 200.00 | 202.63 | 202.78 |

Table 3.17

Mean Comparisons Between the Three Groups on the Levels
of Community in Relation to Contraband

| | Control Group N=19 | Experimental Group 1 N=23 | Experimental Group 2 N=19 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Unadjusted Pretest Means | 1.89 | 2.09 | 2.32 |
| Unadjusted Posttest Means | 1.74 | 2.04 | 1.95 |
| Differences | -.15 | -.05 | -.37 |
| Adjusted Posttest Means | 1.77 | 2.04 | 1.91 |

CHAPTER IV

Discussion

Introduction

This study was designed to investigate two aspects of the effect of Positive Peer Culture treatment in a secure custody setting with male young offenders. The variables selected for study were self-concept and moral climate, due to their central role in Vorrath's (1985) work.

Major Findings

Self-Concept Variables

The major findings of this research demonstrated that young male offenders participating in a Positive Peer Culture (PPC) model showed a significant improvement in their overall level of self-concept (Total Positive Score) compared with young offenders residing in a more traditional correctional setting with no peer group treatment. It was encouraging that following the treatment period both PPC units differed significantly from the control group, while not differing significantly from one another. The Total Positive Score, or overall self-concept, was the single dependent variable from the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale to show a significant difference between treatments. Since each of the

subscale scores were added together to arrive at the Total Positive Score, these dependent variables accumulatively demonstrated the significant difference in the self-esteem of participants of a PPC programme compared with the control unit residents. Alone, the individual aspects of self-concept, or subscales, did not show sufficient improvement for the peer group treatments nor decline for the control group during the 1-month treatment period to exhibit significant group differences.

Further examination of the data revealed that subjects from both intervention units utilizing the Positive Peer Culture approach, which encouraged helping behavior and responsible decision making, experienced improvements in their tendency to like themselves, felt that they were persons of worth and acted accordingly (see Tables 3.2-3.11). Both peer treatment groups demonstrated numerical change for the better within each of the self-concept variables. These positive effects were shown to be statistically significant on five of the nine subscales for the experimental group 1 and on four for the experimental group 2 (see Table 3.3). The control unit, on the other hand, which reinforced compliance with Centre rules and staff directives, tended

to have the effect of diminishing the overall self-concepts of its residents. A numerical decrease in self-concept scores was apparent in eight of the nine areas. The control group's decline in scores between testing occasions was not found to be statistically significant for any of the self-concept variables. However, the performance of a sign test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) demonstrated the control unit to have significantly more decreases than increases amongst its self-concept variables, $p \leq .02$ (one-tailed). Although the testing of between group differences was unable to provide strong support for the Positive Peer Culture model, confirmation was provided from the changes that occurred within each of the three groups.

There are a number of possible explanations as to why the one type of analysis offered convincing affirmation of Positive Peer Culture claims, while the other did not. Firstly, the short-treatment duration may not have permitted some of the residents the time they required to benefit sufficiently from the intervention. Although some may have been more susceptible to the treatment and therefore demonstrating positive changes in self-concept over the 1-month period, others may have needed more time to experience similar improvements.

Secondly, staff training may not have been satisfactory. Thirdly, the rigidity of the hierarchical system within the setting may have also limited the treatment's effectiveness. Each of these factors are discussed more fully later in this chapter.

Analysis of the self-concept pretest scores consistently showed the control unit to have higher scores. This is difficult to explain considering the subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three units. Random assignment, however, can in no way assure equality among groups on all relevant attributes. Thus, it is quite possible that this simply occurred by chance. These differences, however, should not simply be explained away as error, but could possibly be a result of real differences among groups. If this was true, analysis of covariance would not be such an appropriate model since regression may be the cause of the improvements and not the treatment. It could be argued that for whatever reason, the PPC groups' initial scores were artificially low on the self-concept variables. If the treatment groups' pretest scores were not typical assessments of their esteem levels, then natural regression towards the mean would account for raised scores upon retesting. Although this is a plausible

explanation, the data does not tend to corroborate such a hypothesis. If natural regression was the reason for the increase in self-concept within the PPC groups, then the individuals with the lowest initial scores would be expected to demonstrate the greatest increase. This was not the case. For example, in Unit 2 (experimental group 1) the young person with the lowest pretest mean score, which was 24.22, only experienced a mean improvement of 3.22. This was less than Unit 2's individual mean improvement, which was 3.92. The individual did not display the suggested rate of change supporting a regression argument. This was found in several instances. Also, natural regression can not easily explain the consistent decline in the self-concepts of the control unit residents. Nor can regression explain why the treatment groups' moral climate pretest scores were not lower than the control groups'; yet the PPC groups continued to show significant improvement over the control unit.

However, it is possible that neither regression nor treatment effects were responsible for the improvements within the experimental units. The changes may have been a result of the Hawthorne effect. That is, the increased attention provided to the intervention units may be the

reason for the positive changes. This should be a consideration in future research.

The group within the present study that averaged the largest self-concept improvement per subject, exhibited increased variability amongst the group's posttest scores. The mean improvement experienced by individuals of experimental group 1 was 3.92, with the mean of the group's 9 standard deviations increasing from 9.18 at the time of pretesting to 11.05 at posttesting. It appears that the subjects were differentially susceptible to Positive Peer Culture treatment. Of the 26 subjects within experimental unit 1, 20 showed a mean improvement between occasions, yet the individuals' score changes ranged from a decline of 6.88 to an improvement of 22.22. On the other hand, while experimental group 2 displayed an individual improvement mean of 3.25 and the control unit residents demonstrated a mean decline of 1.58, neither group experienced increased variability. However, the variability of improvement was relatively wide within groups' individual score changes, varying from a decline of 3.55 to an improvement of 16.00 for experimental group 2, and from -20.55 to 4.33 for the control unit. It appears that some of the subjects in experimental group 1 were more prone to the positive

effects of peer group treatment than others within the same group and those of experimental unit 2. It may also be that the programme within experimental group 1 was more effective at raising resident esteem. It is difficult to determine why experimental group 2 does not show increased variability yet significant improvements are attained. The limited sample size may be a factor.

The present research offers support to both Kohlberg's (1983) and Vorrath's (1985) claims that self-concept enhancement follows interpersonal skill acquisition and the internalization of appropriate, productive values and goals. Positive Peer Culture approaches allow adolescents the opportunity to acquire skills necessary to reduce internal conflict. The results of this study depict the young offender's tendency to respond negatively to the moral-ethical subscale, which basically reflects each individual's feelings of being a "bad" person. The residents' moral-ethical esteem was initially amongst the lowest for each of the three groups, yet for those participating in the PPC programmes marked improvement was evident. As each individual's values became more congruent with current social norms, his feelings of being a "bad" person began to be overridden with those of being a "good" person.

The young offenders apparently perceived themselves as deviant, yet as they began re-evaluating their values and behavioral expectations within their group meetings, this began to diminish. It seems reasonable to assume that if changes in one's basic value system and satisfaction with these changes effect positive changes in one's overall level of self-concept, then clarification and acceptance of these basic values may be an increasingly important area of focus in dealing with young offenders.

Moral Climate Variables

The moral climate research of this study illustrated differential treatment effects between the Positive Peer Culture units and the more traditional correctional unit (or control group), holding constant differences in the units' prior social climates. The peer group treatment units demonstrated significantly improved social climates and structure of reasoning of the group compared with that of the control unit. In two of the three normative areas, helping and stealing, marked development was apparent for the PPC treatments.

The two treatment units did not experience parallel improvements in all of the moral climate variables. The effects of PPC on the level of community in relation to stealing was consistent between both treatment units,

while differing significantly with the non-PPC unit. This is an encouraging finding for those who support the fostering of a moral climate through the stimulation of cognitive conflict, social perspective taking, and real life problem solving. However, the results were not always as clear. For example, a significant difference only emerged between the experimental group 2 and the control group for the level of "community valuing" in relation to helping one another. There was no such difference between the other PPC unit and the control group, as one might have suspected. In addition, findings pertaining to the stages of the units' "helping" norms again depicted the experimental group 2 as having significantly more developed expectations of its members than the control group, as well as the other experimental group. Explanation as to why such a difference emerged between the two PPC treatments is unclear. On a positive note, both PPC groups consistently experienced changes in the same direction even if both were not significantly different from the control group.

Examination of the moral climate score changes within each group over the 1-month testing interval again illustrated the tendency of PPC groups to show an increase and the nonpeer group treatment to show a

decrease. Of the six social climate variables, both PPC units exhibited a numerical increase on five. Only on the level of community in relation to contraband possession did the peer group treatments display a drop in raw scores. The changes within the PPC treatments were statistically significant only within experimental group 2. The experimental unit 2 demonstrated a significant increase in the level of the helping norm and the level of the community pertaining to stealing, yet surprisingly showed a significant decline in the level of the community when in relation to resident possession of contraband. The control group did not reveal a significant change on any of the climate variables, though did indicate numerical decline in four of the six areas.

Some of the obvious differences in the unit programmes of the two PPC units may provide some possible explanations as to why one showed improvement over the other. Firstly, experimental group 2 had a maximum of 16 residents (though averaging 13) while the experimental Unit 1 typically maintained a resident count of 20. Within smaller groups a cohesive, caring culture can more easily be developed due to the fewer number of human relationships requiring attention. Secondly,

experimental unit 2 had been conducting structured group discussions prior to the commencement of this study, while the other had not. These groups focused on problem solving which likely encouraged resident dialogue and offered varying perspectives on issues; all of which translate well to a Positive Peer Culture setting. In addition, these group discussions reportedly emphasized "helping" one another, which is again relevant to a PPC approach. Observations suggest the implementation of PPC onto the treatment units was met with far less resistance from both the residents and the staff on experimental unit 2. Finally, the unit supervisor of experimental group 2 had prior training and experience with PPC and was thus able to offer additional support and feedback to her staff. Consequently, it appears that both the implementation and the research of such peer group treatments should acknowledge the importance of programme duration, an adaptation period, and staff expertise.

The significant treatment effects of the PPC programmes over the control unit programme imply structural advances amongst the interactions of its members, yet the specific stage to which each group had progressed remains of crucial importance. The stages of moral reasoning exercised by each of these units in

arriving at communal decisions has critical implications for this study. Since Stage 3 reasoning has been postulated to be the "cognitive buffer" to delinquent activity (Berkowitz and Gibbs, 1983) attainment of this stage would denote the further success of PPC at fostering moral behavior. A person or group of individuals at the pre-conventional level (Stages 1 and 2) approaches a moral issue from the perspective of the concrete interests of the individuals involved. They are concerned not with what the group or society defines as the right way to behave, but only with the concrete consequences they will face in deciding upon a particular action. On the other hand, a person or group of individuals at the conventional level (Stages 3 and 4) approaches a moral problem from a member-of-society perspective. They realize and take into consideration what the group expects and acts in accordance with its moral norms. The transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3 marks the transition in social relationships from that of an equal exchange of benefits to mutual commitment and trust. Considering that a Positive Peer Culture can only exist in a climate of mutual concern, Stage 3 reasoning would seem to be a prerequisite. Also within the social realm, role-taking abilities usually take an important

step forward between Stage 2 and Stage 3. With the development of Stage 3, one has the role-taking ability to step outside the two-person relationship and look at it from a third-person perspective. This allows an individual to assess how an action or interaction with another individual will be looked upon by others, i.e., one's peer group. It is encouraging that within the present study, the reasoning levels of the treatment groups do achieve the desired Stage 3, although not consistently. While both treatment units attained Stage 3 levels of community in relation to both stealing and helping norms, only the experimental group 2 progressed from a predominant Stage 2 to a Stage 3 in reasoning level of the helping norm. Also, treatment unit 2 developed a Stage 4 level of reasoning regarding the shared sense of community valuing in relation to helping behavior. This means that the group developed the ability to take the perspective of the whole social system in which it participated: the institution, society and so on, in contrast with the perspective of those in direct and immediate contact.

Of interest is the fact that in each of the treatment programmes the stage of community development appeared to advance at a faster rate than the stage of

the corresponding norm. For example, the posttest mean for the helping norm for the experimental group 2 was 259.52, which is just approaching Stage 3 reasoning. The same group's posttest mean for the level of community in regards to helping was 3.78, which is predominantly Stage 4. Due to the limited nature of this study, it can only be hypothesized that this maturational process may be an invariant developmental sequence of moral climate. The concept of valuing being part of a group or sharing a sense of community within the group logically seems a prerequisite to open, honest communication which in turn allows for members to experience other perspectives. As a result, this is likely to stimulate cognitive conflict and allow for the altering of the present structure of thinking to accommodate greater complexity of norms.

This research lends support to Kohlberg's claim that there need not be, and frequently is not, consistency of structure of reasoning across different moral issues. For example, in treatment group 2 the stage of the agreed norms regarding stealing and contraband were predominantly Stage 2, yet Stage 3 structure of reasoning had emerged regarding expectations of helping behavior. Collective responsibility or level of community also appears to lack consistency across

normative areas. Members of treatment group 2 indicate strong feelings of being part of a group that works together when referring to helping behavior with the development of a Stage 4, while group collectivity remains at a Stage 3 in reference to the effects of stealing behavior within the group, and a Stage 2 valuing of the sense of group when referring to contraband possession.

Of the three normative areas examined in the present research, only the contraband or drug dilemma depicted no advancement in either the agreed-upon norms or the sense of community. Individual responses to the contraband dilemma consistently showed strong agreement between the three units. In explanation of this finding it is possible that the subjects were afraid of being labelled a "rat" and being beaten up by their peers throughout the Centre. Another hypothesis is that they maintained a loyalty to the group or a "trust," thus not relinquishing any information regarding a peers possession of contraband.

Contamination

Although the results from the present research indicate positive effects from a Positive Peer Culture treatment, these effects may have been minimized by

contamination of the intervention. The PPC model was introduced within the pre-existing policies and procedures of the correctional facility, and frequently the two philosophies did not coincide. The PPC units were required to continue to utilize behavior management tools specified by provincial policy, though they did not clearly support the values of a Positive Peer Culture. For example, disciplinary board hearings remove decision making power from both unit staff and residents, the level privilege system reinforced compliant behavior when in staff view while reducing the young offender's open disclosure of problems and conflicts for fear of losing level privileges. Implicit messages were also given to staff and residents as to the importance of their group meetings (and PPC generally) when operational issues tended to interfere and occasionally override meetings.

Not confronting successfully what Kohlberg labeled the "hidden curriculum," may have also further contaminated the Positive Peer Culture treatment. Many employees within the correctional facility believe their mandate to be punishment and containment rather than treatment and rehabilitation. Centre staff members not trained in the philosophies and techniques of PPC appeared to see staff control (ie., staff direction,

intervention, and sanctions) as of central importance, while PPC unit staff were attempting to provide residents with opportunity and recognition for managing themselves effectively. As a result, PPC unit staff members, and possibly the residents, faced ridicule by their peers for being naive. It is unlikely that staff could effectively implement a new programme while simultaneously fighting against residents who resist the programme, staff who suspect the programme, and administrators who undercut the programme. This additional pressure, and the expressed concern that the peer group programmes would cease with the completion of the present study, may have reduced staff members' commitment to the Positive Peer Culture approach. The research was also open to contamination due to staff dilution when casual employees, not trained in PPC philosophy, were assigned to work the treatment units due to the uncontrollable absence of permanent staff members.

Evaluating the effectiveness of a new PPC programme, only just implemented, may have also diluted positive effects. All new programmes experience growing pains and PPC programmes are not immune to these. Once staff have worked through these growing issues and have gained increased confidence in PPC techniques and their

new roles, one may expect the positive findings to increase. In addition, since the data collection commenced almost immediately following programme implementation, the group meetings had only just begun to develop through the stages that mark a group's maturity and progress. It would be unfair to question if the treatment units were able to achieve their goal of building a Positive Peer Culture when they were not given sufficient time to progress to such a developmental stage.

Methodological Limitations

An important limitation of this study was the lack of ability to control for extraneous factors in the environment. For example, the influx of new admissions and the ongoing transferring and releasing of subjects constantly changed the group dynamics and group culture. Also, the stringent implementation of the PPC model was not consistently adhered to by unit staff.

Due to the high turnover rate of custodial residents, it was essential to maintain an extremely short retesting interval. Although this may have limited chances of significant findings, it realistically evaluated the effectiveness of such short term interventions.

The Centre staffing complement must also be viewed as an extraneous factor. Differences in staff members' abilities as well as implicit attitudes towards young offender management must be considered. Through the utilization of two intervention units, it was hoped that staff differences could be minimized. In addition, staff members in the intervention units were provided with ongoing training and support to ensure PPC programme quality, consistency and effectiveness.

A shortcoming of the present study can also be seen in the experimenter's involvement in both the training procedures and the evaluation procedures. Subjects' knowledge of the researcher's active involvement in the implementation of the Positive Peer Culture model may have influenced their responses on the moral climate interview. However, considering that the subjects did not consistently offer responses that they may have thought the interviewer wanted to hear, ie., the contraband dilemma, this may not have played a major role.

Recommendations

This research attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of a Positive Peer Culture method for dealing with Young Offenders in a maximum security

custodial facility. Assessment of the young offenders and the social culture of the units in which they resided suggested that peer group treatment of the type used in this study may be a viable, and practical method for promoting a healthier level of self-esteem and a more caring, prosocial climate. A variety of issues have arisen in conducting this research and the following recommendations are offered.

It is essential that interventions match the philosophy of the organization; this is not to say that a treatment approach emphasizing empowerment and increased resident responsibility cannot work within the confines of a custodial institution required to contain young people. It is crucial, however, that the values and goals of the administration have been clearly defined and consistently supported. This overall vision for the organization should be held by the policy makers in "Head Office" to the front line workers in the institution. Everyone directly and indirectly involved must have a clear understanding of the philosophies and approaches, with support to ensure possible abuses are avoided. For example, Brendtro (1983) reported so-called "PPC programmes" utilizing peer pressure to coerce conformity from participants, which is clearly not supported by a

PPC approach. Within this study, PPC and its principles were not uniformly held by employees of the Solicitor General's department involved with the Calgary Young Offender Centre and this may have effected programme implementation.

Like all programmes, PPC can only be as good as the staff implementing it. The ability of youth workers both in terms of effectiveness of applying PPC techniques and willingness to participate in such a programme exerts a powerful influence upon the outcome of the intervention. In particular, staff must possess a keen sensitivity towards the needs of each resident, the dynamics of the group and the ability to motivate the youth to do what they need to do with the peer group as the agent for change. While staff trained in PPC have rather clear techniques on which to rely, they may vary in their abilities to utilize these tools. In this study, staff levels of experience and training were comparable between units, yet the quality or content of the PPC programmes may not have been. It is important, therefore, to take these factors into consideration when carrying out research of this nature. All staff involved in the present study remained on the units they had been assigned prior to study commencement. Staff on the

experimental units were provided with the option of transferring to another unit if they did not support the concepts of PPC or they were not willing to actively participate in such a programme. However, their choices to stay may have been based more on the concern of how such actions would have been interpreted by management rather than by their implicit orientation toward youth care.

A major deficiency of this research can be seen in the limited time allotted for staff training. Staff reported not feeling confident in their conducting of group meetings which may have effected research findings. Research evaluating programme effectiveness should ensure thorough training of staff. Realistically, however it is unlikely that the Solicitor General's department will allocate more funds for training purposes when the recent trend has been that of cut backs. Ironically, peer group treatments may be the answer they have been looking for. Once young people have begun taking responsibility for one another, less staff or adult intervention is required. Interestingly, staff involved in the PPC programmes informally reported feeling more positive towards their jobs which may have the positive effect of

reducing high staff turnover rates, and again point out the financial benefits of such programmes.

The brevity of the treatment period may have also been a limiting factor. Perhaps greater changes in self-concept would have occurred if subjects were provided with more time to examine and experiment with the various prosocial attitudes. As well, it is important to determine if the positive changes noted over the short retesting interval will hold up over a more extensive time period. This will ensure that the results are not simply a short term "halo" effect resulting from the increased attention being provided to the residents of a new programme.

If one had the necessary resources available, a longitudinal study would have been most beneficial. Periodic measurements of the individuals and of the groups through time would have provided valuable information. This type of research method would have been more sensitive to developmental trends of the individuals as well as the group culture. Optimal treatment periods may have then been determined which have relevancy for sentence and release planning. The utilization of such a study could also chart stage

progression of the group culture illustrating periods of growth, regression and plateaus.

It would also be interesting to conduct a follow-up study, perhaps 3 to 6 months after involvement in such a peer group treatment, to determine the extent to which these young people maintain increased levels of self-esteem. The eventual outcomes of PPC participants are worthy of further study, for example, success of community adjustment; leadership potential after treatment; and prognosis while on probation. Follow-up studies pertaining to the moral climate of the units would be dependent on the continued dedication to PPC philosophy. Staff expressed concern that as the present research terminated so would any management effort to maintain a PPC programme.

Having three group meetings per week as opposed to the five weekly meetings recommended by Vorrath (1985) may have also lessened the treatment benefits. Compounding this difficulty were the large group sizes utilized within this study. Within such large groups the individuals did not appear to become the focus of the group's help often enough, nor were they sufficiently scrutinized by the group. As the size of the group increased, the feelings of intimacy found in the smaller

groups was lost (or at least more difficult to develop). With larger groups it appears more essential to increase the opportunity for participants to voice problems and to give and receive assistance in solving them by increasing the frequency of group meetings. It is suggested that future PPC programmes employ a minimum of five meetings per week, particularly if there is no way around large group sizes.

Casual observation of staff's approach suggested that there was almost an over-emphasis on the role of the group meeting, with minimal consideration of what was occurring the remainder of the day. Rather than challenging unit residents to confront supportively the antisocial attitudes and behaviors of their peers throughout the day, this was expected primarily during the structure of the group meeting. To build a positive youth culture the showing of positive caring values must be demanded at all times. Future training should stress the importance of "the other 23 hours."

A more extensive replication of this study to ascertain generalizability of results reported here is suggested. The current study involved males only, therefore, it is not known if females would experience similar effects from a PPC treatment or if similar

subjects would experience similar effects if residing in a less structured setting, for example, a group home. The present research also raises questions regarding what stage of a young person's disposition is most conducive to PPC treatment. Is it most beneficial: (a) upon admission to such a facility; (b) after a brief orientation period; (c) just prior to release; or (d) possibly throughout the entire residency? Since young offenders are not a homogeneous group, future study may also uncover what individual characteristics lend themselves best to PPC.

Concluding Comments

Many have criticized the Young Offenders Act, proclaimed in 1984, stating it de-emphasizes treatment and rehabilitation while stressing punishment. Increased custodial sentences have not acted as a successful deterrent. Recidivism rates have increased, particularly for those with Special Needs, since the change from the Juvenile Delinquents Act. Although the Act states that its intentions were to increase the accountability of the young offender, this does not appear to be the case once placed in custody. Rather, young offenders are stripped of any real sense of responsibility or decision-making power and are typically only expected to compliantly "do

their own time." In addition, the Act (Solicitor General Canada, 1984) states that young people:

require supervision, discipline and control, but, because of their state of dependency and level of development and maturity, they also have special needs and require guidance and assistance,

yet young offender facilities do not currently appear to be fulfilling the latter of these goals. Positive Peer Culture appears to provide a model that could assist in meeting these objectives without incurring excessive costs. The question then becomes, can such young offender facilities afford not to make changes in this direction.

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APPENDIX A

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY PROGRAMME EVALUATION

The purpose of this study is to investigate if this Centre helps or hurts its residents. This evaluation will not likely be of any value to you personally, but might help in the development of future programmes. If you agree to participate, you will go through an interview in which problems that could happen on your unit will be presented to you and then questions asked. This interview will be tape recorded and takes about 15-20 minutes. As well, if you agree, you will complete a questionnaire in which you rate how you feel about yourself in different areas. This also takes about 15 minutes to complete.

In about 30 days you will go through a similar interview and questionnaire.

Your identity will be kept confidential and your name will not be used.

You may refuse to participate or quit at any time, with no effect on your treatment in the institution or on your release date. If you happen to be a resident of Yamnuska or Rundle when Positive Peer Culture groups are introduced on your unit, you also have the option of transferring to a unit where such groups are not part of the programme, for example Sparrowhawk. To make such a transfer, submit a request form to your unit supervisor.

By signing this form you will also be giving permission to access your files or background information.

Please sign your name below if you have voluntarily agreed to help with this evaluation. If you have any questions about this study, you can contact Marla Calderwood at 239-8111 or by leaving a message at the DD's office.

Marla Calderwood (M.Sc. student)

I agree to participate in this study by completing the interviews and questionnaires, and I have received a copy of the consent form.

Resident Signature

Date

Witness

Date