

**II**  
Title

# **The Purloined Passage:**

**III**  
Subtitle

**An Architectural Inquiry  
posed between  
the  
Singular and the Sublime**

**A House and Garden for the Poets  
Edgar Allan Poe  
and  
Raymond Roussel**

**The University of Calgary  
Faculty of Environmental Design**

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Environmental Design for acceptance, a Master's Degree Project entitled

**The Purloined Passage:**

**An Architectural Inquiry  
posed between  
the  
Singular and the Sublime**

submitted by **Joanne Heinen** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Environmental Design.



Supervisor

**John L Brown**

Architecture Programme  
Faculty of Environmental Design




Peter Deacon

Department of Art  
Faculty of Fine Arts



Dr. Morny Joy

Department of Religious Studies  
Faculty of Humanities



Alan Tregebov

School of Architecture  
University of Toronto



Dean's Examiner

**Dr. Stan Stein**

Faculty of Environmental Design

Date FEB 5 1993

**I**  
**Abstract**

**The Purloined Passage:**

**An Architectural Inquiry  
posed between  
the  
Singular and the Sublime**

by  
Joanne Heinen  
January, 1993

Completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Environmental Design in the Faculty of Environmental Design,  
The University of Calgary

Supervisor: John L. Brown

This Master's Degree Project explores the relationship between aesthetic theory and architecture. It takes as its particular vehicle the design of a house and garden for the poets Edgar Allan Poe and Raymond Roussel. The intent of the work is to trace the history of the singular and the sublime as concepts in some of the most influential modern texts. Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, Hegel's *Aesthetics*, Freud's "The Uncanny," and Derrida's *The Truth in Painting*, provide the framework, the critical platform for a discussion of aesthetics. This theoretical background should be understood as informing the process of design, which is itself a study in poetic discourse and architectural form.

**Key Words**

Architecture, Edgar Allan Poe, Raymond Roussel  
Singular, Sublime

# **IV**

## **Dedicate**

To my mother,  
to that which we share



**V**  
**Table contents**

Foreword	10
X: Hegel	14
XX: Freud	30
XXX: Roussel and Kant	54
XL: Architectural Drawings	69
LV: Poe and Derrida	84

## VI

### Acknowledge

I would like to thank the Faculty of Environmental Design for its support and guidance over the course of my studies. It has been the sensitivity and tolerance of the faculty, as much as the research itself, that has truly reshaped the way I understand the world.

This work has been long in preparation, and on that account my committee should be acknowledged for, what must seem, their perpetual patience. I thank Moury Joy for her willingness to make accessible to me, what can be a very obscure discipline, and for her attentive reading of my papers. For Peter Deacon, my appreciation transcends this project to the many years that he has inspired, and maintained, my interest in the sublime. I thank him for his integrity and his painfully rigorous honesty. I would like to acknowledge Alan Tregebov for the generosity that has allowed him to give so much enthusiasm and energy to a miscellaneous displaced student. I can only hope that the intellectual agility and gentleness of spirit that Alan brought to our conversations is recorded somewhere in my project.

I would like to say a special word of thanks to John Brown for his encouragement and support throughout my studies. In a serious moment, the respect that I have for John as a teacher comes close to overshadowing the appreciation that I have for his work. I am forever grateful for his strength of mind and discipline which constantly directed me toward my own understanding of my topic. In a lighter moment, ...how do you thank someone who has taken you from perfume to crayons.

To Yjke Piera, whose ideas and conversation influenced me greatly, thank you for sharing with me your lightness of being. To my brother Douglas, your interest, support, and friendship has meant more to me over this time than you can ever know.

I would like to acknowledge and thank Loraine Dearstyne Fowlow for the very generous commitment of time put towards my presentation materials, and for acting as my analyst during this period. I realize with hindsight that the latter was probably was far more taxing then the former.

It seems inevitable that the one person who deserves the most appreciation is the one to whom it is the most difficult to express gratitude. I would like to thank Kevin Jones for his animated discussion of my project over its course, for sharing with me his wonderful, ethereal sensibilities, for his careful proof-reading of my text, and for his relentless attention to detail with the presentation materials. But most of all, I would like to thank him for caring.

## VII

### **Discuss the assumptions, method, and theme as a foreword**

As the singular and the sublime implies, this project departs from the traditional metaphysical groundwork of the individual and the collective, the particular and the general. However, it does so with the idea of redefining and revitalizing these concepts, particularly with respect to their application in the field of architecture. The transcendence of the individual is a construct intimately tied to our traditional understanding of architecture. The notion of public responsibility, although narrowly conceived, has been so thoroughly explored by the modernist school of building, as to be considered one of its major themes. The speculation that this has led to the reduction and degradation of other fields of inquiry is now common place. While many of these discussions have become stale and trivialized by their overuse within architectural discourse, the initial impetus still seem relevant. It is the intention of this project to slice through this conceptual schema from another angle, specifically through the concepts of the singular and the sublime, as a means of re-approaching the issues. However, the architectural debate is only the backdrop, the framing of the research is not thematized within this document. The primary assumption of this paper is that the study of architecture participates implicitly in the public realm by turning a critical eye to theoretical and methodological dogma.

Heterogeneity and its strategic counterpart, differentiation, are repetitive operative constructs throughout this work, they influence both the method and the form. They account for the major distinction between the philosophical inquiry and the architectural investigation. They organize the structure of the contradictory argument that attempts to unmask the synthetic strategies that constitute the principle theories of the singular and the sublime. Philosophically speaking, differentiation attacks singularity as an illusion of absolute authority that ultimately suppresses multiple view points and meaningful distinctions.

While it is the intention of this project to use a deconstructive analysis to draw attention to the potential collapse of difference implicitly projected in the name of ontological authority, it is also its desire to respect the limitations of this approach. Therefore, running contrapuntally to differentiation in the argumentative text, is a hermeneutic, or interpretive line of discussion that attempts to re-contextualize these ideas within existing structures of thought.

It should be noted that these two methodological approaches, differentiation and interpretation, which I employ within an iterative process, have certain structural similarities to Hegel's rather grand dialectic construct for reality. On this, two points of clarification are needed. Firstly, following Paul Ricoeur, dialectics are used within this project as a methodological construct, not as a model with ontological status. No claims are made about the appropriateness of this model as an analogue to any originary structure. Secondly, while dialectical movement is maintained, the synthetic moment as a static state, or point of vision, has been denied. The geometry of two terms, defined by their internal cohesion and mutually determined meaning, guides this work rather than the Hegelian triadic, hierarchical spiral.

There are many attractions of such a methodological position for design. At the broadest level, as a means of relating the philosophical inquiry on aesthetics to the design project, it allows the design process to be informed by an analysis of theoretical issues without reducing it to a simple, commensurate projection of those ideas. It does not dismiss the powers of intention and rationality, but rather attempts to incorporate these indirectly within the creative process. It allows the architectural investigation to have its own concrete object without abandoning this object to the isolation of materialism. The study of aesthetics becomes a work of meditation on traditional concepts: a re-evaluation of their significance and the implicit hierarchical demands of their structures. This internalized meditation finds its expression not so much in the architectural form but in the reformulation of the way we approach and think about design.


Such a dialectical design method also opens for reconsideration the relevance of the unified design solution. The internal tension inherent in such a methodology denies any simple or one-sided solution. It gives form to the complexity and contradiction we experience as individuals in the attempt to make sense of, or apply consistency to, opposing systems of beliefs encountered either in the world, or in ourselves.

This social schizophrenia, marked by the interpenetration of systems, also underscores my interest in both poetry and architecture, that is, the desire to participate in multiple structures and to cultivate the tension induced at the moment of displacement. For traditional poetry, this means finding a place located between the demands of rhyme and the meaning of language without reducing one to the other. Architecture combines the many demands of building and symbolic meaning in a similar way. The development of the design project, the house and garden, is a metaphor for this relationship. It is explored through the interplay between the poets Raymond Roussel and Edgar Allan Poe, who, although radically different in their aesthetic intentions, shared a rather antagonistic, and in the end, tragic relationship with their public. The intention has been to oscillate between an analysis of form and an interpretation of meaning in an attempt to give architectural expression to the poetry and ideas of these men. In this way, the development of the design parallels that of the entire project.

In 1845, Edgar Allan Poe wrote "Fifty Suggestions," an ad hoc collection of witticisms and aesthetic speculation published in *Graham's Magazine*. The corresponding text for Raymond Roussel was his "Instructions for 59 Drawings," for the poem *Nouvelles Impressions d'Afrique*, those instructions to be hand delivered by a private detective to the artist Zo so as to negate any possibility for personal contact. To maintain this tradition, I have organized my work according to a numbered series, to act as a guide through the iterative process of meditations. The order given, follows the order of development. It is appropriate then, that the reading of this work, oscillate, and remain suspended between suggestion and instruction.


## VIII

Attempt a drawing that captures the general sense of  
unresolved tension in Poe's work:  
a slug in formaldehyde



## IX

Attempt a drawing that captures the general sense of  
transparency and opacity in Roussel's work, as dictated by his meter:  
a Bridgeport milling machine





## **X**

**Write a paper that tries to locate Hegel's strategy for the  
division of the arts**



# HEGEL'S

## Aesthetics





## To sublate

Everything leads us to believe that there exists a spot in the mind from which life and death, the real and the imaginary, the past and the future, the high and the low, the communicable and the incommunicable will cease to appear contradictory.

Andre Breton, Second Surrealist Manifesto

Therefore the beautiful is characterized as the pure appearance of the Idea to sense. For the sensuous and the objective as such preserve in beauty no independence in themselves; they have to sacrifice the immediacy of their being, since this being is only the existence and objectivity of the Concept; and it is posited as a reality which presents the Concept as in unity with its objectivity and thus also presents the Idea itself in this objective existent which has worth only as a pure appearance.

G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics* I, p.111

Possibly the only thing that all of Hegel's critics agree on, is the significance of language in his philosophy. Hegel is difficult, not only with respect to his complex expression, but also because of his desire to impress language with his own particular usage. The problem of placing the singular and the sublime within his aesthetic text involves then, both interpretation and stipulation.

While the sublime exists explicitly as a category in Hegel's *Aesthetics*, the singular is caught implicitly between his notion of the particular and the individual. To complicate matters, the particular and the individual are key

The verb *aufheben*, or in English, to sublate, was used by Hegel and in association with Hegel to such a degree that *The Oxford English Dictionary*<sup>1</sup> uses Hegelian philosophy as a reference for its definition. The word can be seen as describing and illustrating Hegel's dialectical or speculative method by way of its contradictory meanings.

Oxford suggests that Hegel used the word as having the opposing meanings of both 'destroy' and 'preserve'.

Stephen Bungay, in his book *Beauty and Truth*, suggests that Hegel's use of *aufheben* derives from "normal German" in which the word has three meanings, all of which Hegel wishes to maintain.

1. to raise or hold up
2. to annul, abolish, or suspend
3. to keep, or preserve<sup>2</sup>

concepts in Hegel's philosophy that attempt to satisfy both the demands of language and the intent of his philosophical method and system. Consequently, an understanding of the singular and the sublime rest largely on knowledge of these substructures.

He further suggests that these alternative definitions correspond to the three moments of Hegel's method, in that, "[t]he move to a higher (more determinate) category annuls that below it, whilst preserving it as a moment of the new one."<sup>3</sup> In this process, the contradiction of the first two ideas is subsumed by the third.

The more precise determinations which belong to the Concept in virtue of its own nature are the universal, the particular, and the individual. Each of these determinations, taken by itself, is a purely one-sided abstraction. But they are not present in the Concept in this one-sidedness, because it is their ideal *unity*. Consequently the Concept is the *universal*, which on the one hand negates itself by its own activity into particularization and determinacy, but on the other hand once again cancels this particularity which is the negative of the universal.

Thus it is true *individuality* as universality closing only with itself in its particularizations.<sup>4</sup>

In Hegel's *Aesthetics*, the particular occupies the position of that which is the sensuous realization of the initial concept or idea. It is the counter-

On the part of the universal, Contrary, but it is subservient in this unity to it. The particular Concept is distinguished from is pre-dominant.<sup>5</sup> the universal by its

existence as 'external' or 'objective'. Accordingly, all the art forms are particular and their individual beauty is a function of its fit to the universal. The particular appears then, as nothing more than a moment of minor inconvenience; a state with limited influence or value.

This method, which encompasses opposition and resolution—resolution and production simultaneously, is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Hegel's philosophy. The idea that contradiction is a fundamental and necessary condition of existence seems an almost irresistibly attractive way of subduing the notion of paradox. The structure of the method is equally provocative, revealing the interpenetration and interdepend-

ence of its parts; a structure that, given over to the world of substance, would be cast in tension but maintain perfect equilibrium. It is, however, in this process of following Hegel into the particular, that his *Aesthetics* appears, in substance, to be static, without depth or detail.

The particular is Hegel's second moment. The particular is the external, the spatial-temporal realm. The particular is nature. In addition, constrained by the structure of the *Aesthetics*, the particular is also the forms of art: the symbolic, the classical and the romantic. It is obvious that to Hegel, the particular is not really very particular, that is, unique. There is nothing singular about his second moment.

This second moment consists of the finite world, which is not, according to Hegel, entirely deficient. It does however, contain the dark seed of the arbitrary, from which his idea of the idiosyncratic grows.

Idiosyncrasy is part of Hegel's third moment, the individual. Unfortunately, his moment of resolution cannot tolerate it. Idiosyncrasies are accidental and aberrant and cannot be a part

This leads us to a more detailed consideration of the inherently differentiated and progressive determinacy of the Ideal, which we may formulate in general terms as ACTION.<sup>6</sup>

Yet the inner and spiritual element exists nevertheless only as active movement and development. But development is nothing without one-sidedness and separation.<sup>7</sup>

Hegel's *Aesthetics* is, predictably, divided into three main parts that correspond to the universal, particular and individual development of art. Each of these parts is then, further divided and subdivided. As we follow Hegel into the fixed and the finite, in the third moment, the resolved moment of his universal theory of art (Part I, Chapter III), we stumble on ACTION (Section B, Subsection II). With the Idea of beauty in mind, and with the beauty of nature dealt with, Hegel turns his attention to the beauty of art. Hegel introduces the notion of action in an attempt to identify the

essential components of the ideal in the world. However, with this, Hegel's discourse shifts in a very subtle way. The "at the same time" drops from his vocabulary.

Many critics have noted that Hegel's texts suffer from theoretical ulterior motives.

His interest in religion and morality figures largely in each of his major works. In his *Aesthetics*, Hegel's commitment to ACTION has the unfortunate effect of severing the temporal from the spatial, to elevate the former at the expense of the latter.

In the *Aesthetics*, ACTION is necessary for DEVELOPMENT. DEVELOPMENT is the process by which the difference and the struggle of opposites is resolved. Within a half page

of the 'ideal individual', the 'universal subject'.

[W]hat is expressed in every single individual, in a contingent and particular way, is only the above-mentioned element of chance...<sup>8</sup>

Hegel's rejection of the idiosyncratic, confirms a syllogistic imbalance that resonates in both his moral and aesthetic arguments.

[T]o which, finally, are annexed all the idiosyncrasies of special character and temperament, with consequentially, all sort of weaknesses and trouble. Poverty, care, wrath, coldness and indifference, the rage of passions, concentration on one-sided aims, inconstancy, schizophrenia, dependence on external nature, the whole finitude of human existence as such become specified into the accident of quite singular physiognomies and their abiding.

On one hand, he has declared the importance of the particular and rejected it on the other. As well, the line that defines the edge of idiosyncrasy, seems to be ill-placed.

From our temporal vantage point, the relationship which Hegel assumes between idiosyncrasy and its manifestations seems obviously suspect. It also calls into question the validity of any such exercise.

Now since art brings back into this harmony with its true Concept what is contaminated in other existents by chance and externality, it casts aside everything in appearance which does not correspond with the Concept and only by this purification does it produce the Ideal.<sup>12</sup>

Hegel's purged individual manifests its blank expression throughout the Aesthetics, "little hairs, pores, little scars, warts"<sup>13</sup> removed. This attitude has, at the level of representation, harsh implications for his treatment of detail.<sup>14</sup>

paragraph, entitled *The General State of the World*, Hegel, with incredible brevity, explains how the spirit enters upon existence through the will. He also lists for us the will's guides - concepts of ethics

and law - as if these were common knowledge. It is clear that Hegel has little interest in rationalizing this argument in its entirety. However, he employs it just a few pages later to justify a distinctly temporal and narrative attitude towards the arts in general. Having identified 'collision' as the basis for all serious and important art, Hegel struggles to remain consistent.

Now since collision as such requires a solution which follows on the battle of opposites, a situation pregnant with collision is above all the subject matter of dramatic art, the privilege of which is to represent beauty in its most complete and profound development; while sculpture, for example, is in no position to give complete configuration to an action which reveals the great spiritual powers in their conflict and reconciliation; and even painting, despite its wider scope, can never bring before our eyes more than one feature of the action.<sup>10</sup>

Consequently, only the temporal arts are given the capacity to express conflict or dissonance, since harmony must appear as a result. It is clear that Hegel discounts the relevance of visual and spatial vocabularies in favour of the spoken word.

[W]hat a man is at bottom and in his inmost being comes into actuality only by his action, and action, because of its spiritual origin, wins its greatest clarity and definiteness in spiritual expression also, i.e. in speech alone.<sup>11</sup>

The implication of this in Hegel's analysis is far reaching. The arts that are not temporally founded may only appear in resolution or they are condemned to permanent ugliness. They are denied internal complexity, and as such, intellectual depth. The spatial becomes merely a linear argument stretched between the inner world and the external.

Hegel's position on the idiosyncratic is unnecessary, as well as inconsistent with his prime construct. Hegel's individual is the synthesis of the universal and the particular. It should subsume both. However, his notion of the idiosyncratic resorts to exclusion, rather than nesting progressive levels of discourse, which would seem more appropriate, even fundamental, to his larger project.

Hegel not only rejects the idiosyncratic in his analysis, but crops both ends of art. The expression of the 'inner', spiritually approved self find a somewhat unstable home in the romantic form of art. However, the romantic form is inherently defective, in that it merely reflects spirituality as opposed to seeking its unique expression in external form.

At the other end of art is the symbolic form which contains the sublime. The defect of the symbolic is its abstract or indeterminate content. In this case the idea is too infinite to be expressed. With this last cut, Hegel has successfully dismembered art, carving his name in the middle, within the eternal circle, for all time.

Hegel's preoccupations with temporal development and speech forces, within the rest of his *Aesthetics*, a rough progression from the external to the inner, from the spatial to the temporal, from the material to the spiritual. This notion of linear continuum disturbs the geometry and undermines the significance of his method. In both Parts II and III, the moment of resolution occurs at the centre, between two extremes; it becomes a compromise position rather than a new idea that sublates opposition. The argument loses tension and submits to being led.

Hegel's assumption that the arts vary in their expressive capacity leads him to some very awkward conclusions which continually erode his method. In Part II he defines three rather arbitrary relationships between idea and presentation. Of these three

Hegel's positioning of the arts in Part III, amounts to nothing more than a compromise between his spatial-temporal continuum and his desire for absolute resolution. Consequentially, he names architecture as symbolic, sculpture as classical, and painting, music and poetry as romantic. Sculpture appears as the ideal art, static and resolved in its isolated, but perpetual moment.

In the middle here, the really solid centre, is the presentation of the Absolute, of God himself as God in his independence, not yet developed to movement and difference, not yet proceeding to action and self-particularization . . .<sup>15</sup>

In the end, art denies and synthesizes instead a compromise of the universal and the particular with little or no sense of the individual. By negating internal tension and development, Hegel has distorted his method and abandoned the struggle for essential difference, which is his own basis for the importance and significance of art.

relationships but are overlaid with the history of art. Ancient Egyptian, Ancient Greek, and Christian art are used as paradigms of the three forms. The classical form, already and always in resolution, leaves little room for individual synthesis.

'forms', two he considers to be deficient. The classical, is central and elevated for its reciprocity of content and form, while the symbolic and romantic are considered mismatched and defective. However, these are not just formal

## Notes


1. J.A. Simpson, E. S. C. Weiner, eds., *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
2. Stephen Bungay, *Beauty and Truth: A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 218.
3. Ibid., 218.
4. G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts*, trans. T.M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), I:109.
5. Ibid., I:106.
6. Ibid., I:177.
7. Ibid., I:177-78.
8. Ibid., I:150.
9. Ibid., I:151.
10. Ibid., I:205.
11. Ibid., I:219.
12. Ibid., I:155.
13. Ibid., I:155.
14. Naomi Schor, *Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine* (New York: Methuen, 1987) Schor's study also concludes that Hegel did not accept detail as appropriate to the ideal, however, the construct of Schor's argument is significantly different than the one being presented.
15. Hegel, II:623.

## XI

Read lots of poetry


## XII

**Fashion a drawing after the ideal teeth in Poe's "Bernice":  
a detail from initial Poe drawing**



## XIII

Fashion a drawing after the parenthetical structure of cantos III,  
*Novelles Impressions d'Afrique*:  
a Bridgeport milling machine






# XIV

Endeavor to transcribe Poe's sense of shifting metaphor:  
an intensified contrast of second Poe drawing



## XV

Endeavor to transcribe Roussel's style of imagery:  
a loom from Diderot's encyclopedia plays figure to the ground of  
a Bridgeport milling machine



## **XVI**

**Poe's "The Philosophy of Composition"**

## **XVII**

**Roussel's *How I Wrote Certain of My Books***

## **XVIII**

**Poe's "The Poetic Principle"**

# XIX


Explore the disparate aesthetic motivations  
of the two poets and propose a spatial relationship



## **XX**

**Lose yourself in a paper which slides in and out of Freud's text  
in an effort to detail  
alternatively hermeneutic and deconstructive criticisms**







## To Sublimate

Cf, Jean Genet, *The Thief's Journal*, trans. Bernard Frechtman (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1967), p.5 'My excitement is the oscillation from one to another' [TN]<sup>1</sup>

## The Uncanny

[The German word, translated throughout this paper as the English word 'uncanny', is 'unheimlich', literally 'unhomely'. The English term is not, of course, an exact equivalent of the German one.]<sup>2</sup>

The translator's footnote to Freud's essay reads like an uncanny warning that underscores the dangers of 'co-incidence' involved in the analysis of a work that has already been translated once. Its impact, however, is more profound when we realize our impulse resonates not only in the interpretation of Freud, but within Freud's work of psychoanalysis itself.

Although Freud wrote several essays on artists and their works, the topic of aesthetics and its relationship to psychoanalysis is always addressed rather obliquely. Further, sublimation, the mechanism in psychoanalysis which is necessary for the creation of art is given only fragmentary development within his larger volume of works.

**It is not easy to say; the only factors treated with precision are the reaction-formation of disgust, shame, and morality. Artistic sublimation is mentioned but not developed;<sup>3</sup>**

This virtual absence of development has itself become the focus of analysis and interpretation in a discourse about Freud's work of psychoanalysis.

"The Uncanny" is one of the most popular sources for speculation about the relationship between psychoanalysis and aesthetics in Freud's work. In the initial pages, Freud

develops a topological metaphor, to which he returns throughout the essay. However, the positions and the relationships are not particularly clear. Freud begins the essay by comparing the difference between the subject matter of aesthetics and that of psychoanalysis to different 'strata' of mental life. Tactfully avoiding an explicit vertical hierarchy, he quickly shifts to a more territorial approach, apparently to emphasize the incidental nature of his discipline's interest.

But it does occasionally happen  
that he has to interest himself in  
some particular province of that  
subject; and this province usually  
proves to be a rather remote one,  
and one which has been  
neglected in the specialist  
literature of aesthetics.<sup>4</sup>

According to Freud, the 'uncanny' is such a province. However, its remote status does not clearly establish to which territory it belongs. Remote implies distance, but it is indifferent to boundary. Freud's metaphor leaves the scene of the discussion ambiguous. The uncanny is surely on the frontier, but it seems to be on both sides of the border.

Freud's position, or lack of position on aesthetics, is the point of departure for Sarah Kofman's, *The Childhood of Art: An Interpretation of Freud's Aesthetics*. Her "double reading" of Freud proposes a "symptomal" reading of his text—a sort of textual psychoanalysis. Kofman begins by recognizing a lack of consistency in Freud's work between what he claims are the limits of psychoanalysis with respect to art, and the limits of the applications he actually performs. She suggests that there is a difference between "what he *says* and what he *does*."

[T]hough it is acknowledged that certain tasks are not within the province of psychoanalysis, and that it can only make "contributions," these contributions reveal the *essence* of the facts, and psychoanalysis speaks the "decisive word" on man's imaginative life.<sup>6</sup>



Kofman's speculation is that this gap in Freud's reasoning echoes one of the initial oppositions to psychoanalysis itself, specifically that it undermines higher cultural values<sup>7</sup>. Since this resistance is not addressed directly it resurfaces as a compromise within Freud's work, one which is never completely abolished.

This tension can be felt in "The Uncanny." Freud aligns aesthetics with the sublime, but attempts to distance these from the 'uncanny' which "lies in the field of the frightening."

As good as nothing is to be found upon this subject in comprehensive treatises on aesthetics, which in general prefer to concern themselves with what is beautiful, attractive and sublime—that is with feelings of a positive nature—and with the circumstances and the objects that call them forth, rather than with the opposite feelings of repulsion and distress.<sup>8</sup>

Two points in this statement attract attention. The 'uncanny' may not have been the subject of aesthetic treatises, but the relationship between the frightening and sublime certainly had.<sup>9</sup> However, Freud's literacy is not really the problem, the issue is the concept of the sublime. By implication, the uncanny is opposed to the sublime and this conclusion is confirmed, if not initiated by experts from within the realm of aesthetics. The sublime is upheld as a public construct, but its aesthetic contents are being put to use elsewhere.

It is still not clear, however, if a textual crime has been committed. Is this 'shiftiness' in Freud to be read solely as disguising the problem to promote his own authority over the subject, or can it be read in a more sympathetic way? Other such readings are possible. In his book *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, Paul Ricoeur places an investigation of Freud within a 'wider' field that includes language, reflective philosophy and hermeneutics<sup>10</sup>. Ricoeur entertains his debate with Freud with two readings: an analytic and a dialectic.

**On a first and more analytical reading, Freudianism reduces its opposition as something external to itself;**

on the second and more dialectical reading, it embraces in a certain manner what it seemed to exclude.<sup>10</sup>

Ricoeur recognizes a disjunction in Freud's writing as well, but interprets it as a mixed discourse, one that forms the "*raison d'être*" for psychoanalysis. Freud describes the psychical apparatus with language and concepts borrowed from physics, and produces an energetics, a balance sheet of cathexis as the placement and displacement of energy. However the work of psychoanalysis is also a work of interpretation, of deriving meaning from meaning and representation; as in *Die Traumdeutung: The Interpretation of Dreams*, the dream-work is only accessible in and through the work of interpretation. It is the continual interplay, of these two approaches that allows psychoanalysis to oscillate. For Ricoeur, Freud's oscillation anticipates the sort of mutually informing relationship necessary for the hermeneutic cycle of belief and understanding.

It is interesting to note that the sources of 'proof' for Freud's analysis of the uncanny are the dictionary, literature, his patients, and a tentative 'third person' point of view expressed as what is commonly experienced. Freud recognizes two approaches in his pursuit of the 'uncanny'.

Either we can find out what meaning has come to be attached to the word 'uncanny' in the course of its history; or we can collect all those properties of persons, things, sense-impressions, experiences and situations which arouse in us the feeling of uncanniness and then infer the unknown nature of the uncanny from what all these examples have in common.<sup>11</sup>

The body of the essay, is hence made up of two parts: an historical, linguistic survey and a quasi-scientific investigation, that includes among other things, literature, within its field of observation. According to Freud, both courses lead to the same result and while he maintains that the latter actually preceded the former in his analysis, he offers no explanation

for the reversal of order in his text. Further, on closer examination these courses are seen to be interdependent. Literature must now hold a place in the sublime, while at the same time provide support and ground for psychoanalysis. The metaphor of science apparently allows this displacement.

For Kofman, this disjunction in Freud's texts that occurs within the process of sublimation, is a void which is "always already" waiting to be filled. The implication of continuity that is introduced within this void, effaces all the oppositions in traditional metaphysics.

**This is why what he *does* is not an "application" of psychoanalysis to art; he does not apply to art from the outside, a method belonging to a supposedly alien system. If the method is coherent, it is because each of its objects of study is but a different repetition of the same.<sup>12</sup>**

Kofman proposes that Freud's analysis poses a riddle to be deciphered, an approach analogous to his own conception to art. Kofman feels a "new mediator" is called for to re-establish the distinction that Freud has blurred. To do this, she adopts Freud's method of analysis to re-examine his text.

The first section of "The Uncanny" is primarily occupied by various excerpts from dictionaries. Freud actually writes very little. He quickly dismisses the idea that the uncanny is the product of intellectual uncertainty; the definition "uncanny = unfamiliar" is incomplete. Freud then discounts other languages as adding nothing new. His conclusions are based solely on the German excerpts which he has stressed with his italics.

Thus *heimlich* is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, *unheimlich*. *Unheimlich* is in some way or another a sub-species of *heimlich*.

Let us bear this discovery in mind, though we can not yet rightly understand it, alongside of Schelling's<sup>1</sup> definition of the *Unheimlich*.

' "*Unheimlich*" is the name for everything that ought to have remained . . . secret and hidden but has come to light.' (Schelling)

'Das Göttliche zu verhüllen, mit einer gewissen U—keit zu umgeben 658, etc.<sup>13</sup>

'to veil the divine, to surround it with a certain *Unheimlichkeit*'<sup>14</sup>

If we go on to examine individual instances of uncanniness, these hints will become intelligible to us.<sup>15</sup>

Freud suggests that *heimlich* really belongs to two sets of ideas: that which is familiar and that which is concealed. *Unheimlich* is only used in opposition to the first—since to do so to the second would bring it around to its original meaning—consequently, Freud reasons, *Unheimlich* must be a "sub species" of *heimlich*. While it is clear that this examination wants to appear to be steeped in the methods of science, its observations are instead highly selective. What Freud does not explicitly state in his text is that all of his stressed passages are either taken from, or refer to, poetry, religion or philosophy. Freud introduces the discussion with the first of two quotes by Schelling, and later in his conclusion refers to it again. However, it seems that the second quote which he leaves buried and outside of italics, is perhaps closer to his purpose. Freud lead us to the speculation that the 'un' in *unheimlich* represents the repression of the familiar. Given Schelling's second quote, it is equally possible to read the *unheimlich* as a veiling or masking of the divine.

<sup>1</sup> [in the original version of the paper (1919) only, the name 'Schleiermacher' was printed here, evidently in error.]<sup>16</sup>

Ricoeur presents his debate with Freud from within what he calls "the great antinomy of hermeneutics," that of founding and destroying. Given this frame, it is not surprising that Ricoeur's investigation pursues the interpretation of 'dreams' rather than 'symptoms' as a means of tracing the sublime. Ricoeur maintains that dreams more clearly than symptoms reveal the mixed structure in Freud's

theory since the dream-work constitutes the "mechanisms" which allow for the disguised fulfilment of wishes and desires, and as such, the reorganization of the ego.

If dreams are drawn toward discourse because of their narrative aspect, their relation to wishes or desires throws them back on the side of energy, conatus, appetition, will to power, libido, or whatever one wishes to call it. Thus dreams, inasmuch as they are the expression of wishes, lie at the intersection of meaning and force.<sup>17</sup>

The path from the oneiric to the sublime in Ricoeur follows the thematic displacement that occurs in Freud as a result of his attempt to account for cultural phenomena on a balance sheet of individual libidinal investments or cathexes. Freud's insensitivity to the discordance between these two realms lead him to assume a commensurate rate of exchange. According to Ricoeur, the problem of the sublime anticipates the problem of the superego, which also participates within an individual and a collective dynamic. However, this displacement, as a means of achieving and avoiding resolution, becomes increasingly problematic in a larger economy. As Ricoeur recognizes, placing Freud's theory at the intersection of meaning and force does not preclude the notion of violence to meaning.

Within the economics of "The Uncanny," the dictionary, which provides a public history and a public meaning, is used to hint at and confirm conclusions about the individual psyche. While Freud recognizes two sets of ideas connected to the *heimlich*, he does not acknowledge the change in position of these two meanings in relationship to the home.

*From the idea of 'homelike',  
'belonging to the house', the further  
idea is developed of something*

*withdrawn from the eyes of strangers,  
something concealed, secret; and this  
idea is expanded in many ways . . .*<sup>18</sup>

This definition actually makes spatial sense if considered as two positions. The idea of 'familiar' belongs to the home, while the idea of 'secret' belongs to the "eyes of strangers," that is, from a position outside the home. These are different points of view. With the suggestion that the *unheimlich* is what has been repressed, Freud brings into the private realm that which has been displaced from the public realm by invoking both meanings at the same time.

The thematization of authority, violence, and repression guide Kofman as she follows Freud in her analysis of the artist. By placing the artist within Freud's universalized framework, Kofman moves from Freud's distortion of the text to his assault on the artist as he is interpreted as the great man and hero, substitute for, and murderer of the father.

**Thus even Freud, who destroys the artist as idol in practice, if not in what he says, cannot completely stifle a feeling of guilt; for to a certain extent, to "apply" psychoanalysis to art is to commit a murder; that is, to do away with the artist as a genius, or a great man.**

"The distortion (*Entstellung*) of a text resembles a murder: the difficulty is not in perpetrating the deed, but in getting rid of its traces"" (Moses and Monotheism, 23:43)<sup>19</sup>

**In "applying" psychoanalysis to art, Freud advocates the murder of the father and his substitutes.<sup>20</sup>**

According to Kofman, Freud finds the birth of the hero in the division of the child's "family romance," which, determined by myth, distinguishes the noble from the humble parent. Within this myth of

the hero-father, the child must attempt to replace and murder the father, in one form or another. The great man appears as merely a victim of influence and carrier of authority to and over other men, "attracted as they are to all father substitutes."<sup>21</sup> However, within Kofman's scenario, the artist remains an enigma. He is the object of idolization, but his part in the conspiracy is not clearly addressed.

The first of Freud's 'individual case studies' in "The Uncanny," is the story of 'The Sand-Man' from Hoffmann's *Nachtstücken*. This story had already been used as a vehicle for a previous analysis—Jentsch (1906)—at the time, the lone study of this type in medico-psychological literature. Jentsch's conclusion, that intellectual uncertainty is the source of the uncanny, was a theory that Freud had already rejected. Freud isolates this story again, ostensibly for its propriety to the discussion at hand, but employs it instead to erode Jentsch's point of view.

Moreover, I would not recommend any opponent of the psycho-analytic view to select this particular story of the Sand-man with which to support his argument that anxiety about the eyes has nothing to do with the castration complex. For why does Hoffmann bring the anxiety about eyes into such intimate connection with the father's death? And why does the Sandman always appear as a disturber of love?<sup>22</sup>

The support that Freud brings to this speculation is brought to bear remotely through the psychoanalytic study of dreams, fantasies and myths. Oedipus is the only cited example of this vitiate form of punishment. Freud concludes by maintaining that the story will remain meaningless as long as the connection between eyes and castration is denied. However, the last word on the Sand-man is a footnote that reconstructs the entire story, in just such a meaningful, psychoanalytic way. This footnote ends by bringing to light that Hoffmann had himself been the child of an unhappy marriage and that his relationship with his own father had been severed at the age of three. This is, in fact, the only time Freud mentions Hoffmann's 'contribution' to his story.

In Ricoeur's discourse, authority is the antithesis to desire. Similarly, the thematic displacement from the history of the individual to the history of mankind requires a dialectic, methodological shift. It is in the way that Freud attempts to make these transitions that Ricoeur recognizes Freud's greatest weakness;

that is, his attempt to ground his system in genetic models that co-ordinate an "ontogeny" and a "phylogeny." Here lies the significance of Oedipus and the projection of the primal scene. Freud's attempt to derive the totemic meal from the Oedipus complex (a psychological "fact" discovered in Freud's own self-analysis) amounts to inscribing individual failing as the origin of our cultural traditions. Ricoeur interprets this primal myth with a new sense of tragedy.

**In short, by means of this new tragic myth he interprets the whole of history as inheriting the crime:**

"Society was now based on complicity in the common crime; religion was based on the sense of guilt and the remorse attaching to it; while morality was based partly on the exigencies of this society and partly on the penance demanded by the sense of guilt."<sup>23</sup>

By this new and apparently scientific myth, Freud breaks with any view of history that would eliminate from history what Hegel called the "work of the negative." The ethical history of mankind is not the rationalization of utility, but the rationalization of an ambivalent crime, of a liberating crime, which at the same time remains the original wound; this is the meaning of the totem meal, the ambiguous celebration of mourning and festival.<sup>24</sup>

This sense of entrapment that Ricoeur's language embodies, foreshadows his recognition that the



superego creates for Freud more problems than it solves. Projecting the superego onto history as a collective repression of the primal scene does not account for the development of culture. Moreover, this superego has trouble being accommodated within the closed economy of the id, ego, and superego that differentiate the individual topography. Ricoeur cites "On Narcissism," as the most enthusiastic attempt on Freud's part to deal with this problem. In this essay, Freud speculates that the ego, in order to maintain the satisfaction derived from the perfection of childhood seeks to recover the loss by substitution. Hence, the formation of an ideal which is displaced to an external figure. However, not even with the combined forces of narcissism, identification, and idealization is Freud able to fulfil what Ricoeur assumes to be his goal, that is: "to show 'external' authority to be an 'internal' difference."<sup>25</sup> To balance the equation, negativity must be added to the instinctual base, hence the development of the death instinct which finds its symptomatic representative in the compulsion to repeat.

With the establishment of the castration complex as the genesis of the uncanny effect created by the Sand-man, Freud turns his attention to the thematization of the doll which was the principle object of Jentsch's study. Recognizing that children are not frightened of their dolls, Freud suggests that any uncanniness attached to dolls must find its source in infantile 'belief' rather than infantile fear. With this, Freud shifts his analysis to another Hoffmann story, *Die Elixire des Teufels*, [*The Devil's Elixir*], which allows him to focus on the uncanny experience of the 'double' and the constant recurrence of the same thing. Freud sees the double as originally arising as a form of protection against the destruction of the ego, one that is rooted in the primary narcissism of the child and primitive man. Once the ego has "surmounted" this stage, the double reverses itself and shifts from the "assurance of immortality" to the "uncanny harbinger of death." However, the double does not disappear completely from the ego but holds the place for the formation of a special agency that stands over and against the rest of the ego.

The fact that an agency of this kind exists, which is able to treat the rest of the ego like an object—

the fact, that is, that man is capable of self-observation—renders it possible to invest the old idea of a double with a new meaning and to ascribe a number of things to it—above all, those things which seem to self-criticism to belong to the old surmounted narcissism of earliest times.<sup>26</sup>

In his discussion of the double, Freud tries desperately to impregnate the ego with a sense of conscience, that is a mechanism for censorship. But the process he describes does not adequately account for the loss of the ideal or its replacement by this agency of authority. The ideal, that which is generated out of self-love and projected into the world, is "surmounted and reversed." This reversal must be understood as a loss if it is to provide a space for the substitution of the superego. However, Freud later points out that the old surmounted narcissism is, in fact, still present. Analytic economics call for either a severing of the ideal or a negative drain on the system for this exchange to be complete.

The analysis of the 'I-doll', is for Kofman, the unmasking of the artist as idol, and substitute for father and creator. In her final critique, Kofman examines Freud's use of the word "gifts" as it relates to the process of sublimation. She points out that in speculating that artistic "gifts" are distributed by kindly nature Freud makes little sense; given his larger attempt to replace "Nature," "Fate," and "God" with necessity. In his tentative and partial analysis regarding creation, Kofman finds the failing of Freud's deconstruction. Freud does not remain consistent with his renunciation of 'theological ideology' and 'the father'. Kofman then takes Freud's argument to what she feels is its logical conclusion.

**It remains to be shown that the artist, who behaves like a father toward his works, is also under an illusion concerning the nature of paternity and the "gifts" he receives from his parents.**

**It remains to be shown not only that creation is explicable, but that there is no "creation" any more than there is a "gift" either in artistic activity or in procreation.<sup>27</sup>**

The psychoanalytical interpretation, according to Kofman, offers in its radical conclusion a position parallel to Nietzsche's "virile skepticism," a life stripped bare of the myth of origin as unity and instead founded in the dynamic of chance. As a substitute for procreation, creation finds its origins in the internal dynamic of sublimation, the diversion of the sexual impulses that are inhibited and divided by the death impulse, and the external ordinary repression of sexual aims by society. Once demystified as "gifts" in Freud's discourse, these sublimated impulses are subject only to chance, as haphazardly fertilized seeds. The riddle of art becomes the riddle of life, which is played within a field of gods unmasked as human beings.

To conclude his collection of examples of the uncanny, Freud uses the feeling experienced by neurotic men about female genital organs to justify his reading of the "*unheimlich*" as secretly familiar—the former home of all human beings. Since 'neurotic men' attempt to repress, make secret what is familiar, and as such, unbearable in their ordinary experience, Freud's task would seem to be to make familiar what is secret, and as such 'bearable' at this scene. Caught in this compromising situation, Freud opts for differentiation rather than unity. To ground his notion of scientific development and promote "reality testing," Freud abandons the individual as a metaphor for the collective case and begins to acknowledge a difference between the development of a personal psychic reality and the development of civilization.

Where the uncanny comes from infantile complexes the question of material reality does not arise; its place is taken by psychical reality. What is involved is an actual repression of some content of thought and a return of this repressed content, not a cessation of belief in the reality of such a content.

Our conclusion could then be stated thus: an uncanny experience occurs either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed.<sup>28</sup>

Freud appends this conclusion with scientific frankness, "admitting" that these two classes are not always distinguishable but are ultimately, intimately connected. However, this 'small' rupture seems insignificant compared to the apparent gain— closing the door that previously lay open to aesthetics. The uncanny is seen now only as a marker that indicates the location that 'belief' once occupied, a marker that within the course of history provides an "irresistibly comic effect" to civilized man who has recognized his error. The uncanny becomes vestigial, a joke, once scientific understanding has replace belief.

Given Ricoeur's understanding of belief and his belief in understanding, it is not surprising that he is unwilling to dismiss Freud's work by subjecting it only to the confines of an analytic discourse. According to Ricoeur, the dream-work cannot be exhausted by the classical form of analogue. In this sense, Freud joins Nietzsche and Marx as one of the masters of suspicion, the three great destroyers, trained in Descartes' school of doubt. A school versed in shifting the meaning of consciousness to its expression. But in Ricoeur's discourse this "destruction," this "cunning distortion," this "three-fold guile" can be embraced by the dialectic of desire and authority. For Ricoeur, the question of sublimation in Freudianism is an implicit teleology.

The whole economy of the superego is reflected in this concept of sublimation; this concept forms a kind of compromise between two requirements: to *internalize* an "outside" (authority, father figure, any form of master) and to *differentiate* an "inside" (libido, narcissism, id).

**The sublimation of the  
"lower" into the "higher"  
is the counterpart of  
the introjection of the  
"outside".<sup>29</sup>**

Ricoeur 'admits' that Freud's theory does not manage to remain consistent with respect to sublimation. Freud fails by not providing a proper theoretical instrument to differentiate the "absolute primal dialectic" of desire; to clearly distinguish and make intelligible that which is "other" than desire. The discordance between sublimation and Freud's economic framework cannot be reduced without appealing to the dialectic of archeology and teleology. Freud's concept of sublimation can only be understood in a regressive mode, since it must resort to narcissism for expression. However sublimation, if not reduced, requires the antithetical concept of progression and the reflection that each interpretation is contained in the other. Ricoeur's interpretation of Freud embraces this enigma in an "approach" to symbols which reconstructs the area of identity between progression and regression. Ricoeur's symbols include rather than exclude, and as such, maintain their origins in the ambiguity and double meaning of language and the poetic image. In this sense, Freud's enigma is already reinterpreted within the second naïveté of post-critical reflection, not as an empty concept but as the overdetermination at the origin of self-consciousness.

The enigma is everywhere, because the meaning that is always postulated is always absent in its plenitude. It is given only in distorted form through a chain of signifiers which are always already substitutive. Every text is lacunary, full of holes—the holes that it covers with its tissue in order to hide them. Yet the tissue that masks reveals at the same time by perfectly adopting the contours of what it veils.<sup>30</sup>

**'My excitement is the  
oscillation from one  
to another.'<sup>31</sup>**

# Appendix

## The Primal Scene

One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde. United, they had the courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for them individually. (Some cultural advance, perhaps command over some new weapon, had given them a sense of superior strength.) Cannibal savages as they were, it goes without saying that they devoured their victim as well as killing him. The violent primal father had doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion of this strength. The totem meal, which is perhaps mankind's earliest festival, would be a repetition and a commemoration of this memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many things - of social organization, of moral restriction and of religion.

## Totem and Taboo

The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of  
Sigmund Freud 13:141-42

## Notes

1. Sarah Kofman, 'Notes', "Ça cloche", trans. Caren Kaplan, ed. Hugh J. Silverman, *Continental Philosophy II Derrida and Deconstruction* (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), 233. Kofman's citation responds to Derrida's usage of Genet's text in *Glas*.
2. Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny", *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey, vol. 2 (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), 219.
3. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), 485.
4. Freud, 219.
5. Sarah Kofman, *The Childhood of Art: An Interpretation of Freud's Aesthetics*, trans. Winifred Woodhull (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) Trans. Note: Kofman's title is playing on the French idiomatic expression "c'est l'enfance de l'art," which means "it's elementary, a matter of first principles." As in English, the term "childhood" also connotes here an early stage in something capable of development.
6. Kofman, 3.
7. Kofman, 3. Kofman's References: The Complete Works, "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement," vol. 14:3-66 and "Resistances to Psycho-Analysis," 19:213-222.
8. Freud, 219.
9. For further discussion see: Peter de Bolla, *The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 62.
10. Ricoeur, 63-64.
11. Freud, 220.
12. Kofman, 4.

13. Cf. Extract from Daniel Saunders's *Worterbuch der Deutschen Sprache*, 22-253, in Freud, 256.
14. Cf. Extract from Daniel Saunders, trans. Freud, 224.
15. Freud, 226.
16. trans. note, Freud, 224.
- 17. Ricoeur, 91.**
18. Cf. Extract from Daniel Sanders, trans. Freud, 225.
19. Cited internally, Kofman, 15.
- 20. Kofman, 17.**
21. Kofman, 17.
22. Freud, 231.
23. Cited internally, Ricoeur, 209.
- 24. Ricoeur, 209.**
- 25. Ricoeur, 209-210.**
26. Freud, 235.
- 27. Kofman, 157.**
28. Freud, 248-49.
- 29. Ricoeur, 489.**
30. Kofman, 54.
- 31. See footnote 1.**



## **XXI**


**Extract the parti for the house and garden from the final drawing**

## **XXII**

**Develop the house as an extension of the Poe drawing series  
translated as architectural plan**

## **XXIII**

**Interpret the progression of Poe drawings so that the fragments denote  
the play of light through the house**



## **XXIV**


**Create a schematic for the house that constitutes the eighth drawing,  
in which the house attempts to encroach upon  
the garden**

## XXV

Develop the garden as an extension of the Roussel drawings  
translated as architectural section

## XXVI

Interpret the loom as the condition for water



## XXVII

Interpret the meter drawing as the condition for light

## XXVIII

Interpret the parenthetical structure as levels of grading for  
planting wells,  
as the condition of earth

## XXIX

Let the garden and the house inflect on each other;  
develop the intersection between plan and section

**XXX**

**Write a paper that explores the statue in  
Raymond Roussel's garden  
of  
Immanuel Kant**



Roussel



## To(o) Sublime

The Case of Raymond Roussel

*Sur sa poitrine à la peau blanche des dessins  
Complicqués sont formés d'un côté par des veines;  
Son corset par devant a ses agrafes pleines  
De reflets sur leur cuivre étincelant, plat.*

On the left side of her bosom, complicated designs  
are formed on the white skin by veins; the flat,  
gleaming copper of the hooks at the front of her  
corset is full of reflections.

Raymond Roussel, *La Doublure*

The Borderline of Disinterest  
Immanuel Kant

The correctness of such an ideal of beauty is evidenced by its not permitting any sensuous charm to mingle with the delight in its Object, in which it still allows us to take a great interest.

Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*

Raymond Roussel's verse from *La Doublure*, on the surface seems to describe a still life, a life with neither humanity nor desire. A life given, **yet**, exhausted by its shape.

Immanuel Kant, in his third critique, writes about judgement. He attempts to define the beautiful and the sublime by determining the universal preconditions for their experience. He seeks pure and absolute laws governing the relationship of aesthetic judgement to knowledge and understanding, reason and desire. Kant avoids the surface. The surface, **since** it applies to the description of things, seems secondary in Kant.

There is a perverse irony contained in the realization of Roussel's prophecy about his own life and work. That is, he would become famous after his death and that people would search out the clues of his life and speculate on how he played "prisoner's base." The increasing bulk of literary criticism on this man in the late twentieth century, would seem to indicate that on this account he was right. However, the interest in Roussel's writing is not in fact an affirmation of **the genius** that Roussel claimed for his life. It is, instead, an eversion of the principle that Roussel's writing takes as a point of departure and a critique of his work given the concerns and questions raised by contemporary aesthetics.

In 1918, I rejected Roussel as likely to place me under a spell from which I could see no escape. Since then I have constructed defences. I can look at him from the outside.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to note that Roussel has always received the most notice from artists. His work has enjoyed the attention of such influential twentieth century artists as Breton, Cocteau, Duchamp, Giacometti, Robbe-Grillet, and Soupault. His work has the seductive quality of shifting from the intention of meaning to the description of its object. At this level Roussel's concern is consistent with the great tension of modern art. However, there is in Roussel a concern that goes beyond this. Bound in his perfect symmetry and balance lies a question about the significance of art and its relationship with **nature's** ideal beauty. There is a sense of purpose and purposelessness about

58 Roussel that can be characterized as both tragic and absurd.

The work of Immanuel Kant is being discussed in the field of aesthetics again, with increased tension between envelopment and erosion. However, there seems to be a resignation among his critics, that there is no use in attempting to refute Kant, not because he is so coherent, but because universal frameworks of his kind are considered obsolete. Instead, recent criticism investigates Kant on **one of** two issues: consistency and context. Under question are the implications of his theory for current concepts of art, self, and humanity.

Kant's text, *The Critique of Judgement*, is not dissimilar to poetry in that it seeks, by analogy, to satisfy the demands of two systems. One senses this as early as the preface when Kant hangs judgement so carefully between reason and understanding in a state of perpetual motionless oscillation. Kant introduces his discussion of aesthetic judgement within his general framework of philosophy that differentiates knowledge, understanding, reason and desire. However, Kant's system is not without a sense of hierarchy. Kant delineates the bounds of the knowable and by doing so implies a degree of unquestionability— a realm of the **elect**— consequentially leaving desire in a very knowable and 'questionable' position. Kant poses the question of passage from cognition to desire as the topic of his third *Critique*. He attempts to place judgement as a "middle term," to bind the entire system. However, Kant concludes the preface by suggesting that the whole work is in fact about a **type** of substitution:

It is obvious that no separate division of Doctrine is reserved for the faculty of judgement, seeing that with judgement Critique takes the place of theory; but, following the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and of pure philosophy in the same way, the whole ground will be covered by the Metaphysics of Nature and Morals.<sup>2</sup>

This double analogy casts the logic as well as the goal of Kant's third *Critique* into a suspicious area where the latter can be seen to precede the former. If, for Kant, unlimited substitutions are possible within his framework, then the "ground to be covered" could just as well be understood as a beautiful poetic metaphor that casts a Königsberg winter's eve image over the entire 'passage' making all the previous sense and nonsense bearable.

As a character, Roussel's life is fascinating. As a human being it is extremely sad. This is a life that struggled to remove accident and chance from the realm of possibilities. Where the order and

pattern when changing the collar of a shirt became a highly structured activity. Where a methodology dictates what **must be** done, and so guided with mechanical obsession the nature and the course of his art and his life. A life of unquestioned resolve that allowed no possibility for the complexities of life or love. Perhaps, the most poignant expression of this rigidity is to be found in the place of his not so accidental death. A mattress dragged to the 'threshold' of his travelling companion door, locked only from his side.

In his book *Truth and Method*, Hans-Georg Gadamer discusses Kant in relationship to the adoption of the methodology of the natural sciences to the human sciences. His analysis leads him to trace humanistic concepts such as culture, *sensus communis*, judgement and taste in an attempt to understand the development and the impact of these ideas. He argues that, characteristically, the human sciences of the nineteenth century did not follow any of the traditional moralistic philosophies such as those of Vico and Shaftesbury, but instead **regarded** the philosophy of Kant and Goethe as a paradigm.

The concept of *sensus communis* was taken over, but in the removal of all political content it lost its real critical significance. *Sensus communis* was understood as a purely theoretical faculty, theoretical judgment, on a level with moral consciousness (conscience) and taste.<sup>3</sup>

Gadamer argues that these concepts have long histories of moral and political meaning **but** that Kant's critique of aesthetic judgement, which precludes any real knowledge of their object, also denies the genuine humanity involved in these concepts. He also suggests that Kant's critique provides only the notion of genius—a **rare phenomenon**—as a point of contact to self-understanding within an historical context.

Roussel wrote his first novel, *La Doublure*, at the age of nineteen. It is, of course, significant **for** Roussel that the title is a play on words between the understudy and the lining. Published under his own charge in 1896, the complete and utter failure of this



first attempt was by Roussel's own admission, a disappointment from which he would never recover. After the publication of the *La Doublure*, Roussel suffered from what his psychologist, Dr. Pierre Janet, termed a crisis.

Janet describes Roussel's case as a psychological "oddity of ecstasy"<sup>4</sup>. Through Janet's accounts, an image of Roussel as a person appears. A man whose engagement in his work coincided with an almost complete disinterest in **other** aspects of life, living in seclusion, working for long, regular and fixed hours. A **clever** man who wrote from a position of bourgeois comfort, who **minds** only his own predestined glory, the burning star he felt on **his** forehead. The crisis that Janet attempted to treat in the wake of the failure of *La Doublure*, is described by Roussel as an absence of the glorious feel of moral sunlight.

Alain Robbe-Grillet says about Raymond Roussel that he is the reversal of what we agree to call a good writer: He had nothing to say and he says it badly<sup>7</sup>. In *How I Wrote Certain of My Books*, published

Jean-François Lyotard in his book, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, suggests that Kant's concept of moral obligation is not resolved from a single point of view. As an **example**, he speculates that the you in *You ought to* and the I in *I am able to*, are in fact, two different positions whereas Kant subsumes both under the third person You. If this is true of Kant's system elsewhere, one senses this shift most acutely in the sublime—where the entire system **gives** the impression of being near collapse. Kant describes the sublime as the "representation of limitlessness, yet with a super-added thought of its totality."<sup>5</sup> Further, it is distinct from beauty in that it is "found in an object even devoid of form"<sup>6</sup>. The sublime is Idea without form or content, a sort of repository to hold open the place where all contradictions **rise**; where the tension between you and I, us and that, is **to** be fully realized. A place where morality is caught in eternal substitution between the object and subject of freedom.

posthumously, Roussel reveals the secret of his style, a new **school**, predicated on word play, a mechanical substitution of homonyms and double meanings.

In *The Differend*, Lyotard offers some interesting speculations on the nature of conflict and the desire to reduce it. Lyotard's book explores difference, drawing attention to its subject and its object as being grammatically significant in exploring the possibility of a universal rule of judgment between heterogeneous genres. This emphasis on language is aligned with his position **that** "there is no language in general, except as the object of an Idea."<sup>8</sup> Lyotard's speculations on Kant, betray by allegiance the complexities of Kant's thought; he **is** interested in the areas of Kant's texts which, in the attempt to avoid the politico-historic realm, still participate in it and **say** more than Kant intends. Lyotard uses Kant's own example of the spectators during the French revolution as a means to explore the idea of progress and its relationship to the sublime. He argues that Kant's sublime, which aligns enthusiasm with disinterest, pleasure with negative pleasure, finality with nonfinality, represents a "'subreption": the substitution of a reconciliation [réglage] between the faculties within a subject for a reconciliation between an object and a subject."<sup>9</sup> In Kant, this desire without participation, this watching without assistance, is a manifestation of respect that is at the root of civil society and underlies his notion of progress. The sublime moment is a 'sign' of history, in that this moment accompanies progress by indicating an increased sensitivity to ideas and that things are getting better. However, within the larger context of his argument, Lyotard's contrasts this with an understanding that Kant's idea of progress only corresponds to an increase in tension arising from susceptibility, and this can be shown to be as compatible with the idea that things are actually getting worse.

Roussel's work twists the meaning of narrative to be the stuff, a **methodical** filler that happens between the beginnings and ends.

The **instruction** of Roussel's method in  
*How I Wrote Certain of my Books*, is  
revealed in the two phrases:

1. *Les lettres du blanc sur les bandes du vieux billard...*  
[The white letters on the cushions of the old  
billiard table...]
2. *Les lettres du blanc sur les bandes du vieux pillard...*  
[The white man's letters on the hordes of the old  
plunderer ...]<sup>10</sup>

Roussel insists in his work that pivotal words are fixed by such constructions and the story that is driven between is a product **according to** pure imagination. Roussel had no ambition to represent the world that we live in, but rather to present one of fantasy. In some ways Roussel's work is not radically different from traditional poetry which finds its **rules**, conventionally, in the structure of rhyme and the sound of language. However, it is profoundly different in that it does not intentionally aim for meaning, in fact, it avoids it.

Roussel wrote two novels, *Impressions d'Afrique* and *Locus Solus*, using this method. Both novels are divided in half with the first part devoted to description and the latter to explanation. In the descriptive portion, Roussel, with the greatest disinterest possible, parades before his reader a carefully **collected**, but ostensibly random series of events reminiscent of circus performances. His description seems to be devoid of content but full of perplexing situations. In the second half the events are restated in such a way that, rather than providing insight into character or motivation, explains only the mechanical relationships governing them. Since both of these sections follow the same rule, there is in fact no tension between them. This tidy explanation of events goes **so far as** to annul the description without going beyond it. There is nothing left but a world of empty objects and corresponding action which is somehow set in flow by **the** mysterious powers of language in general.

In his earlier work, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, Kant distinguishes the **circumstances** for sublime expression:

Its feeling is sometimes accompanied with a certain dread, of melancholy; in some cases merely with quiet wonder; and in still others with a beauty completely pervading a sublime plan. The first I shall call the *terrifying sublime*, the second the *noble*, and the third the *splendid*.<sup>11</sup>

It is interesting to note that the sublime in this text is unmistakably emotional whereas by the third *Critique* it is alternatively aligned with indeterminate reason. This would **admit**, in part, the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime that Kant eventually adopts, and the collapse of the geometry of three to the more ideally symmetric geometry of pleasure and negative pleasure, enthusiasm and disinterest, where the sublime itself becomes the middle term. While the sublime has been purged to some extent, the ideas of the terrifying and the noble are resurrected in the third *Critique*, couched in the dynamic sublime. Here might and dominion are opposed in a peculiar way that cannot be detached **from** distinctly political, if not moral implications. It therefore becomes problematic to reconcile **such** power with either the ethical or the aesthetic.

And so, comparing the statesman and the general, men may argue as they please as to the pre-eminent respect which is due to either above the other; but the verdict of the aesthetic judgement is for the latter. War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character of the nation.<sup>12</sup>

From a contemporary perspective it is interesting and curious how Kant aligns these things in his own mind. While one example does not destroy the significance of the larger argument, it is impossible to avoid the idea that Kant's version of aesthetics is not as removed from the politics of interest as he claims. The general here swallows his double-edged sword.

Roussel's description is characterized by a lack of point of view, but on the other hand the images that it describes are filled by a strange repetition of ideas. This is particularly true in the fascination Roussel shows in the ability of nature to mechanically create **products** of beauty. The loom, from *Impressions d'Afrique*, driven by the power of the river, as if by nature's **genius**, transforms the current to produce a cape of extraordinary beauty independent of human endeavour.

The 'tooth picker' in *Locus Solus*, arranges a mosaic of human teeth, coloured in their state of decay, which shows the same indifference to human participation. This mechanical tone is certainly about process but it carries with it all artists' doubt that wedges itself between subtlety **and** ambiguity.

Is there poetry in Roussel? Is there, between the mechanics of his highly stylised writing, the voice of the unconscious or the intention of narrative double meanings? Can we read his works for **their** narrative value? At the surface of the narrative, Roussel's concerns are very simple. It is about the game (billard) of plunder (pillard). In *Impressions d'Afrique*, these two words set the parameters of the narrative that never escapes the recurring themes of the terrible and the noble, treachery and captivity, might and dominion.

The work of Raymond Roussel struggled to deliver itself from the domain of ideas, to live in a land of pure imagination and marvelous peculiarities<sup>14</sup>. In this respect it seems certainly singular that on page eleven of *Impressions d'Afrique*, Roussel invokes the name of Immanuel Kant, in bold.

Next to the helot was the bust of a thinker with puckered brow, who wore an expression of intense and fruitful meditation. On the plinth was the name: **IMMANUEL KANT**<sup>15</sup>

Nothing further is offered about Kant's significance in the book until just some fifteen pages before the end when it is revealed that:

The enthusiastic Louise was a great admirer of Kant, the portraits of whom remained distinct in her mind. Under her eyes Norbert modelled a bust of the celebrated philosopher, being careful to hollow out the interior and so leave at the top of the head only a thin layer of clay. Chenevillot placed inside the skull an arrangement of electric bulbs with powerful reflectors, whose light should represent the genial warmth of some luminous thought.<sup>16</sup>

From my reading of Roussel, I would suggest that sarcasm was not a literary device he admired.

David Carroll in his book, *Paraesthetics*, examines Lyotard's text, "The Signs of History," along with the works of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Carroll places these writings within the context of the practise and the theory of art. His concern is not for the distinction but the separation. He sees these works, among other things, as attempting to redefine a critical function for theory in the wake of an era of art where theory has become increasingly isolated. Carroll observes that in many ways Lyotard parallels Kant and if they do disagree it is in Lyotard's radical reformulation of Idea: "in contradistinction to what Kant thought, this Idea is not, for us today, an Idea of totality"<sup>13</sup>. While certainly Lyotard's statement is just as difficult as Kant's, the totality that limits Kant's notion of the sublime is suddenly torn open to expose a contemporary culture that is as terrified by idealism as it is by materialism.

## Notes

1. Jean Cocteau, Cf. John Ashbery, "Introduction", Michel Foucault, *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel* (Doubleday & Company, Inc.: Garden City, New York, 1986), xiii.
2. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 7.
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Sheed and Ward Ltd. (Crossroad: New York, 1985), 26.
4. Pierre Janet, "The Psychological Characteristics of Ecstasy", *Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works* (Atlas Press: London, 1987), 38-42.
5. Kant, 90.
6. Ibid, 90.
7. Alain Robbe-Grillet, "Riddles and Transparencies in Raymond Roussel", *Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works* (Atlas Press: London, 1987), 100.
8. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1988), xii.
9. Ibid, 165.
10. Raymond Roussel, *How I Wrote Certain of My Books*, trans. Trevor Winkfield (Sun: New York, 1975), 3.
11. Immanuel Kant, *Observation on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, trans. J. Goldwait (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1960), 46.
12. Kant, *Judgement*, 112-113.
13. Cf. David Carroll, *Paraesthetics* (Methuen: New York & London, 1987), 184. The quote is from Lyotard, *Just Gaming*, 88.
14. Kant, *Judgement*, 181. The bold text in this paper quotes Kant on genius. Kant concludes this passage: "And, to that extent, fine art is for such persons a matter of imitation, for which nature, through the medium of a genius, gave the rule."
15. Raymond Roussel, *Impressions of Africa*, trans. Lindy Foord and Rayner Heppenstall (Calder and Boyars: London, 1966), 11.
16. Ibid, 298.

### **XXXI**

Identify mourning and melancholy  
as the pivotal distinction between Poe's prose and poetry

### **XXXII**

Identify the noble, the splendid and the terrible,  
as the three major themes in Roussel

### **XXXIII**

Designate two sides of the house: mourning and melancholy  
as the private and public spaces

### **XXXIV**

Designate the splendid as the watering machine

### **XXXV**

Designate the terrible as the planting wells

### **XXXVI**

Designate the noble to be further subdivided  
as the trellis and the terrace systems

### **XXXVII**

Subdivide the private between halls of sorrow and longing

### **XXXVIII**


Subdivide the public distinguishing the halls of betrayal, deception, revenge,  
violation, concealment, confinement, and detachment

### **XXXIX**

Derive the programme of the house from its thematic mapping as it  
intersects the vertical development in the garden  
at three moments




**XL**  
**Project a plan: .25 meters**




# XLI

Project a plan: 5 meters




# XLII

Project a plan: 9 meters




# XLIII

Project a plan: 13 meters




# XLIV

Project a plan: 16.5 meters




# XLV

Project a plan: roof




# XLVI

Project a longitudinal elevation from the north



# XLVII


Project a longitudinal section from the north: 5.5 meters






# XLVIII

Project a longitudinal section from the north: 12.5 meters




# XLIX

Project a longitudinal elevation from the south




**L**  
**Project a cross elvation from the east**




# LI

Project a cross section from the east: 2.5 meters




## LII

Project a cross section from the east: 10 meters



# LIII

Project a cross section from the west: 10 meters



# LIV


Project a cross elevation from the west



**LV**

**Write a paper that examines contemporary criticism  
of Poe**





## Two subverts

Poe, Derrida, Lacan, et al.

The Geometry of the Purloined Letter

Very early in my life I took the question of the relation of *art* to *truth* seriously: even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this discordance.

F. Nietzsche, *Nachlass*

No "theory," no "practice,"  
no "theoretical practice"  
can intervene effectively in  
this field if it does not weigh  
up and bear on the frame,  
which is the decisive structure  
of what is at stake, at  
the invisible limit to (between)  
the interiority of meaning  
(put under shelter by the whole  
hermeneuticist, semioticist,  
phenomenologist and formalist  
traditions) and (to) all the  
empiricisms of the extrinsic  
which, incapable of either seeing  
or reading, miss the question  
completely.

Jacques Derrida,  
*The Truth in Painting*

Edgar Allan Poe's work is always being rediscovered...

Joan Fiedler Mele

Charles Baudelaire, Poe's first sympathetic critic, directed his reading toward the image of Poe as political victim. Between 1848 and 1856 Baudelaire translated two volumes of Poe's stories, along with several essays on the life and work of Poe. It is Baudelaire who is largely responsible for bringing Poe's work before the eyes of the French public where he has remained, unlike his native America, extremely popular. In *Fatal Destinies*, Baudelaire suggests that instead of "bad luck," which is typically written on the forehead of such unfortunate men, Poe bore the inscription "no luck."

In 1988, *The Purloined Poe* was published as a collection of critical work on Poe's "The Purloined Letter." It is a collection of essays that participates in both philosophy and psychoanalysis. The controversy in *The Purloined Poe*, which is framed by the editors John Muller and William Richardson, involves a seminar given by Jacques Lacan in 1956, who used "The Purloined Letter" as a means to illustrate a psychoanalytic point. In 1975, Jacques Derrida's now infamous essay "The purveyor of truth," was published as a response to the Lacan Seminar. *The Purloined Poe* also includes a third and possibly fourth generation of discussion as the topic spreads to the structure of the debate itself, Derrida's relationship to Lacan, as well as the background and references from which they draw. Since both these men have been cited with reference to their importance to post-structural thought, the point of argument between them is instructive with respect to the limits, as well as the internal consistence and conflict within the discourse.

"The Purloined Letter" was originally published in 1845, fifteen years after the death of Hegel and some eleven before Freud's birth. The chronology is interesting to note in the face of this debate that has grown up around this short story which references (more often than not) the work of either Hegel or Freud. While the focus of the debate is diffuse, one of the underlying and recurring themes is the geometry of the foundations of western thought, the polemic between unity, presence, and the periphery, the frame. The triangle and the quadrangle play prominently in the discussion as do notions of identity, difference, edge, and closure. In this battle about and around form, Freud and Hegel are generally identified with the triangular (Dialectical, Trinitarian, Oedipal) construct, the geometry of three.

In *Positions*, Derrida describes the nature of his work as boldly as his can to maintain the claim that his strategy of critique cannot be reduced to a simple identity equation in the form 'deconstruction = x'.

He says:

I try to respect as rigorously as possible the internal, regulated play of philosophemes and epistimemes by making them slide—without mistreating them—to the point of their nonpertinence, their exhaustion, their closure.<sup>1</sup>

Baudelaire's discussion of Poe attempts to make problematic the role of the poet within a liberal democracy. His criticism of American culture centers on its parochialism, its obsession with mercantilism, industry, and money. He characterises Poe's life in the United States as that of being in "a large cage, a great book-keeping establishment." As with many French sources, Baudelaire finds the opportunity to acknowledge the friendship between Poe's grandfather and the French General and statesman, Lafayette. This comment, made as a seemingly arbitrary biographic note, underscores the disjunction in Baudelaire's discussion as well as his politics. While he rejects the tyranny of power in post-revolutionary spirit, he fears the degradation of culture and the "tyranny of popular opinion."<sup>2</sup> Baudelaire's Poe is an abused defender of poetry and beauty, trapped in a culture which only acknowledges purpose as direct utility.

The topic of Lacan's seminar is the relationship of Freud's notion of repetition automatism to what he calls the "insistence" of the symbolic chain. Lacan recognizes in "The Purloined Letter" a repetition of behaviour that functions according to its relationship to the letter, rather than the character's intent or an event. From this he concludes that the letter itself remains intact, that is, what it "means is that a letter always arrives at its destination."<sup>3</sup>

The point that Lacan is making, as he outlines at the beginning of his seminar, is that the symbolic order is constitutive for the subject. A rough idea of what Lacan means by this is sketched by Freud's theory of an irretrievable loss in the development of consciousness montaged with the structural linguistics of Saussure, Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss.<sup>4</sup> For Lacan the signifier (speech sound) and signified (mental image) of the linguistic sign are capable of detachment and alienation. The signifier thus can be considered as an independent agent and can "slide" as the result of other signifiers acting on it. The signified that is left behind seems to suffer from a bit of an identity crisis as it is forever lost, forgotten and remembered at the same time in the act of repetition. The movement of the signifier around what was the place of the signified becomes for Lacan the symbolic order which "can no longer be conceived as constituted by man but as constituting him."<sup>5</sup> Language is viewed not simply as an act of communication, but of the sedimentation and reflection of the unconscious that, by its repetition, binds the course of human interaction. The Poe story, in Lacan's seminar, serves to confirm this "truth" by "demonstrating in a story the decisive orientation which the subject receives from the itinerary of a signifier."

Derrida's critics however, are not so shy. Christopher Norris summarises some of Derrida's deconstructive moves:

Deconstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of those 'aporias', blindspots or moments of self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly 'means to say' and what it is nonetheless 'constrained to mean.'<sup>6</sup>

Walter Benjamin, in his essay "The Flâneur" from *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, takes exception to the license that Baudelaire's translation brings to Poe's tale "The Man of the Crowd." The *flâneur*, (idler or loungeur) brings with it a set of associations, that Benjamin suggests, Poe was careful to avoid. According to Benjamin, it is in fact the men of private interest who are caricatured in Poe's story, their movement drawn from the repertoire of clowns. It is Poe's genius, "that he does not show the hopeless isolation of men in their private interests through the variety of their behaviour... but expresses this isolation in absurd uniformities of dress or conduct."<sup>7</sup>

While Freud's name appears in Lacan's text explicitly, others including Derrida, Johnson and Muller have argued that Hegel is deeply inscribed within the seminar as well. Lacan's triangular structure and the use of the term *Aufhebung* leads Derrida to the observation "that the Hegelian movement of *Aufhebung* is here reversed since the latter sublates [relève] the sensory signifier in the ideal signified."<sup>8</sup> As Johnson points out, Derrida reads Lacan as "presupposing the possibility of a successful dialectical mediation and the harmonious normalization, or *Aufhebung*, of desire." While this might seem like an accomplishment to some, for Derrida, Lacan's passage from fiction to the 'general' realm of language is seen as bridging a heterogeneous gap that betrays the implicit intention of his analysis. In this way, Lacan utilizes a Hegelian strategy without reference or critique.

The English translation of Derrida's essay "Le facteur de la vérité," "The purveyor of truth," unfortunately misses the double meaning of the French word *facteur*, the postman. However, the implicit criticism that Derrida's title inflects on Lacan's essay remains intact, that is, Lacan has at least one of his own hands on the letter. Since the letter's content is not made explicit in the story, Lacan considers it within the realm of a pure signifier, symbol of power and constitutive in an intersubjective ritual. However, throughout Lacan's seminar, the letter also exhibits psycho-sexual tendencies that make its presence as phallus unmistakable even though it is not addressed directly as such. It seems that Lacan wants to maintain the ambiguity of these two different readings. One, he wants to hold on to the letter as object—phallic symbol to address a Freudian dialogue, while at the same time employing it as the "ex-centric" place of his symbolic chain that regulates the interplay between individuals. Lacan's emphasis on the position of the letter between the jambs of the fireplace underscore an implicit sexism in his Seminar that Derrida finds consistent with Lacan's inadequate and condescending reference to Marie Bonaparte.

To 'deconstruct' a piece of writing is therefore to operate a kind of strategic reversal, seizing on precisely those unregarded details (casual metaphors, footnotes, incidental turns of argument) which are always, and necessarily, passed over by interpreters of a more orthodox persuasion.<sup>9</sup>

These "blindspots" locate the margin of a text, the hierarchical frame, the system of opposition within which the text operates.

In 1949, Marie Bonaparte's *The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe: A Psycho-Analytic Interpretation*, was published. Bonaparte was a student of Freud who, in fact, writes the foreword of this volume. Her analysis divides Poe's tales into those of the mother and the father. Through the mother, Bonaparte explores Poe's use of architectural decay, landscape, impotence and murder. *Tales of the Father* investigates the themes of revolt, passivity and conscience. Her conclusion is that Poe suffers from necrophilia, which in her opinion, explains why Baudelaire the sadist found in Poe a kindred spirit. Bonaparte reads Poe's "message" as men's erotic aggression against the mother, his first victim, and then all women. "That is why, so long as books and men exist, Poe's grim contribution, like Baudelaire's, to the 'heaven of art', will always bind men as with a spell."<sup>10</sup>

Derrida's criticism in "The purveyor of truth" plays Lacan's triangular structure against what he claims is the heterogeneous and conflictual weave of *différance*, a term Derrida uses because it implies both difference and deferral. He proposes that Lacan's analysis has distorted the geometry of Poe's text by its desire to see only triangles. This situation allows Barbara Johnson to liken Derrida and Lacan to the two schoolboys in "The Purloined Letter" whose practice at guessing in the game of 'even and odd' attracted universal admiration. Johnson suggests that "in the game of odd versus even, then, it would seem that Derrida is playing evens (4 or 2) against Lacan's odds (3)."<sup>11</sup> Since the game in the story is described as a game of identification, her implication emphasizes some of the common problems involved with 'getting even' and suggests that this, in itself, might be the dominating logic of the purloined letter.



So what is the difference between three and four? The distinction that Derrida makes and tries to maintain is that there is a significant difference between deconstruction and hermeneutics, a difference that can be, 'oddly' enough, expressed by its relationship to singularity, the geometry of one. In *Dissemination*, Derrida writes:

"Numerical multiplicity does not sneak up like a death threat upon a germ cell previously one with itself. On the contrary, it serves as a pathbreaker for "the" seed, which therefore produces (itself) and advances only in the plural. It is a singular plural, which no single origin will ever have preceded. Germination, dissemination. There is no first insemination. The semen is already swarming. The "primal" insemination is dissemination. A trace, a graft whose traces have been lost. Whether in the case of what is called "language" (discourse, text, etc.) or in the case of some "real" seed-sowing, each term is indeed a germ, and each germ a term. The term, the atomic element, engenders by division, grafting, proliferation. It is a seed and not an absolute term."<sup>12</sup>

Once located, these oppositions expose a relation of priority and subordination that reflect the initial bias presupposed by the text. This line of reasoning is as much informed by that which the text neglects as it is by that which it intends. For Derrida, displacement is seen as a radical transformation of the presence/absence opposition that lies at the basis of traditional metaphysical discourse.

"When Poe once presented himself before an editor, the editor noted that he made as neat and gentlemanly an appearance as his impoverished circumstances would allow. Such is very much the respectable figure he cuts in the recent biographies. We must rejoice in his rehabilitation, but it would be a pity if the older conception of his character, shorn of plain misrepresentations, based as it was upon a more sympathetic response to his work than ours, should be entirely allowed to lapse. The new impression may serve very well for Poe the journalist and Poe the American literary crusader, but a more fell image is needed to represent the celebrant of terror and death; the denizen not of nineteenth-century New York but of an obscure and timeless Venice of the soul."<sup>13</sup>

This rejection of the notion of singularity, unity as a primal scene, describes the sentiment from which Derrida's deconstructive project proceeds. According to Derrida, Lacan's analysis of "The Purloined Letter" repeats Freud's violation of literature perpetrated in the *Unheimlich*, by seeking to ground fiction in truth. Lacan is not really shifting the notion of truth but only borrowing it for a moment. The resulting one-sidedness of his argument guarantees its truth, its meaning, and its law. "The singular *unity* of the letter is the site of the contract of the truth with itself."<sup>14</sup> Lacan's unified solution is only the collapse of two heterogeneous fields, which if truth be taken seriously, must remain differentiated and incommensurable. The economy of this effort, that of bridging such a gap, regulates that the truth which is found in psychoanalysis can only be the truth of the system primal sign, that which it seeks to protect. This initial assumption about truth can never be removed in the process of sublation. The geometry of three always returns to the geometry of one where truth is perceived as an object to be had and not a difference to be respected. Psychoanalysis, according to Derrida, always finds itself.

Derrida's issue with the narrator in "The Purloined Letter," illustrates this difference. Lacan recognizes three positions which he refers to as 'glances' that define themselves in terms of their relationship to the letter. In the first scene this is the King who is blind to the letter, the Queen who is aware of its importance but is deluded in her ability to maintain its secrecy and so leaves it exposed, and the Minister who sees both and seizes what should remain hidden. Lacan speaks of these as being structured by three moments. He then recognizes a second scene which is a repetition of the first, or what he calls the "primal scene," in which it is the police that are blind, the minister who is deluded and Dupin who seizes the letter. Derrida's criticism is that Lacan's triangular structure has made him miss at least one position and blinds him to a third scene.

Deconstruction must neither reframe nor dream of the pure and simple absence of the frame. These two apparently contradictory gestures, systematically inseparable, are the very functions of what is being deconstructed here.<sup>15</sup>

In *the Truth in Painting*, Derrida works the frame of Kant's third *Critique* with particular emphasis on Kant's notion of the sublime. Derrida describes the language of the spatial metaphor of the third *Critique*, with its two realms separated by an abyss that is impossible to bridge, those of the first and second critiques, pure and practical reason. However, Kant places his aesthetic theory, the theory of the beautiful and the sublime in this place, in this rather symbolic position. Derrida notes the "bridge is a symbol" and "the symbol is a bridge."

The position that Lacan's analysis neutralizes, according to Derrida, is that of the narrator of the story. Lacan does not include the scene that frames the story, that of Dupin's library, as part of his analysis proper. Lacan dismisses the significance of the narrator as a double of the drama which provides a "twilighting" cast on the actors of the main stage. Derrida, however, argues that by excluding the frame of fiction around "The Purloined Letter" and by reading the text as general narration, Lacan approaches the text as if it had no border, interior or exterior, which it must acknowledge. In this undifferentiated field, the border that Lacan defines around the dialogue of the story is not driven by the text, or anything else for that matter, but by the discourse, the representation of content, the intention of meaning that Lacan already brings with him to the analysis.

In his essay "Law, Lawlessness and Philosophy in Edgar Allan Poe," Eric Mottram speculates that the "gist" of Poe's work was to undermine the perceived security held in the artifices of social and psychic orders. Mottram views Poe's work against the political and social backdrop of post-revolutionary America: a sceptical writer for a society struggling to grasp the basis of law while pursuing the promise of individualism. In this working of Poe, his internal tension—that which his readers pay to consume and that which Poe is said to have consumed far too much of—is the result of his disillusionment with the ideal of capitalist democracy as well as romantic transcendentalism. Mottram's Poe continually erodes and destabilizes both systems of order: "Poe understood that no modern system could be governed by the old general equations."<sup>16</sup>

Derrida's objection to Lacan attempts to bring into focus a discontinuity in Lacan's system. If the displacement of the signifier determines the subjects in their acts, that is, language has its own itinerary which is outside the intention of the individual subject, this itinerary must be lodged in language as opposed to the author's intentions. Lacan's resolve that the message belongs to the dimension of language, only seems to shift the ground of Lacan's examination to the domain of language, to fiction, without shifting his approach to intentionality. He looks for form in "The Purloined Letter" to confirm his truth, but not at the material, the expression of "The Purloined Letter." If Lacan is interested in what the story reveals, is he not obligated to the entire story, including the narrator and the frame?

Derrida's critique of Kant plays with the distinction that Kant makes about the beauty of the frame. As with Kant's concept of beauty in general, the beauty of the frame is dependent on its form, lest it should slide into mere adornment. The frame, the *parergon*, tests the case at the margin, and draws attention to the priority that Kant maintains for form over matter. This "conceptual schema" allows Kant to "associate the rational with the formal, the irrational with matter, the irrational with the illogical, the rational with the logical, to couple the whole lot to the subject/object pair, in order to have at one's disposal a *Begriffsmechanik*, that nothing can resist."<sup>17</sup>

Michael J.S. Williams begins his analysis of Poe's fiction, *A World of Words: Language and Displacement in the fiction of Edgar Allan Poe*, with an account of Poe's reburial in 1875, an event, no doubt, Poe would have enjoyed for its irony. Williams proceeds to explore the themes of self, language, and authority in Poe's work. His position on Poe is that the "selves" of Poe's tales are fundamentally equivocal, and that they constitute a rejection of the concept of unified self as developed by Common-Sense philosophy prevalent in early nineteenth century America. Rather than images of an indivisible self, Williams finds in Poe characters that are either fragmented or doubled. He cites Poe's frequent use of dismemberment as a related theme. Williams recognizes that language is itself an ever-present party in Poe's tales. Its association with dismemberment cause Williams to speculate that "Poe's tales suggest the possibility that fragmentation and, conversely, unity of character, can be known only as effects of language rather than as pre-existent conditions for it."<sup>18</sup>

Lacan performs a psychoanalysis on literature convinced of its "advantage of manifesting symbolic necessity more purely to the extent that we may believe its conception arbitrary."<sup>19</sup> To ground fiction in truth, Lacan must erode fiction to a kind of pulp devoid of intention so that he can decode it: to neutralize the role of the narrator in the story and the location of the scene is to ignore Poe as having intention with respect to his fiction. But, if language already undermines the intention of the subject-author, why is the intentionality of the author an issue, why is fiction more or less arbitrary than any other text? Intentionality has already been suspended. By elevating fiction as more pure, Lacan already bows to what he seeks to decipher within the text. Lacan's reading of Poe's story amounts to what we would usually call an interpretation, not of the story, but an interpretation of truth.



Derrida, however does not let this violation drop, but continues to use Lacan to 'illustrate' his own observations on formalism and hermeneutic semanticism:

"Formalism is practiced because one is not interested in the subject-author, something which might, in certain theoretical situations, constitute progress, or even a legitimate demand. But this formalism is a rigidly illogical once, on the pretext of excluding the author, one no longer takes into account either the "scription-fiction" and the "scriptor-fictor," or the narrating narration and the narrator. This formalism guarantees, as always, the surreptitious extraction of a semantic content, within which psychoanalysis applies its entire interpretive work. Formalism and hermeneutic semanticism always support one another: question of the frame."<sup>20</sup>

In this way, Derrida criticises those structures that are "blind" to the subjective/objective shift in order to assert the primacy of one over the other. His criticism of the intersubjective triangle seeks to display the implicit agenda inherent in such formulations which confuse and make problematic the objective of their discourse. As to whether Derrida is as 'guilty' of the crime that he accuses Lacan, I think, there is some sense in saying that Derrida is both aware and convinced of his own contradiction.

According to Derrida, the priority that Kant gives to form imposes a Christian creationism on the text. This implicit formalism is not a determinate system but a "formality" common to the history of art and aesthetic in general. As well, Kant imports the geometry and concepts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* into his third *Critique*, which is not based in knowledge judgments. These multiple frames perform a violence on the text that distort its internal coherence and consistency.

With respect to authority, Williams plots a course for Poe through three chapters: "Some Anxieties of Authority," "The Struggle for Authority," and "The Displacement of Authority." Williams directs his commentary toward Poe's relationship to literary authority, the problems of loss of authority over the text and the active participation of the reader in its meaning. He concludes that Poe was acutely aware of the difference between the "writing self" and the "written self" and "that language both allows us what we know of the world and paradoxically displaces us from it—inaugurating a desire that it necessarily frustrates."<sup>21</sup>

The argument presented by Paul Ricoeur in *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, has an interesting resonance with Derrida's criticism of hermeneutics. In this work Ricoeur confronts directly, that is from within the tradition of hermeneutics, some of the internal conflicts within the discussion of interpretation. Ricoeur reframes hermeneutics to include a suspicious, as well as a reconstructive form. His theoretical basis is traditional in the sense that Ricoeur defines hermeneutics as the "theory of the rules that preside over an exegesis—that is, over the interpretation of a particular text, or of a group of signs that may be viewed as a text."<sup>22</sup> However, Ricoeur's method stresses the importance of the dialectic, one that exists between belief and understanding which he describes as being cyclical. Ricoeur's theory also suggests an approach to symbols, which are not to be understood univocally but equivocally, as the ambiguity of meaning. Thus, the geometry of Ricoeur's theory may be construed as radically different from that discussed by Derrida.

Ricoeur's exegesis, which itself follows a pattern of dialectical meditations, stresses the necessity of Hegel's teleology of mind or spirit as a complementary strategy to the archeology of consciousness which he finds in Freud. Hence, in Ricoeur's thought the archeology of the subject must be informed by the notion of *telos*. Conversely, an understanding of purpose necessitates an awareness of the history of desire:

"The same connection is in Freud, but in reverse order and proportion. Whereas Hegel links an explicit teleology of mind or spirit to an implicit archeology of life and desire, Freud links a thematized archeology of the unconscious to an unthematized teleology of the process of becoming conscious."<sup>23</sup>

Ricoeur readily admits that he is of the opinion that all great philosophies cover the same things and differ only with respect to the ordering. In this way he sees a sort of inverse of Freud in Hegel. Ricoeur is not interested in confusing the two, but only allowing the meditation of one to inflect on the meditation of the other. Dennis Pahl, in his book *Architects of the Abyss: The Indeterminate Fictions of Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville*, examines the idea that nineteenth century American literature takes an antithetical approach that renders the very condition of "truth" problematic. Pahl suggests that in Poe's work the idea of authority, as a "unified identity that stands behind and originates the work,"<sup>24</sup> is denied. Instead, the denial of unity and origin of self-hood and its relationship to fiction and language are some of Poe's recurring themes. Pahl speculates that in Poe's fiction the 'self' is eroded—portrayed as either lost or dying.

Derrida explores Kant's concept of beauty as a "labor of mourning" and a "mourning of labor." Derrida's analysis centers on the 'without' in Kant's definition of beauty as finality without end. Kant's example of a tulip's superiority over a tool (encountered without its handle or purpose) indicates the ambiguous position which man occupies within Kant's aesthetics. Kant's demand for lack of purpose from his concept of beauty seems to remove it from the realm of human endeavour.

"The proposition that there is no archeology of the subject except in contrast to a teleology leads to a further proposition: there is no teleology except through the figures of the mind, that is to say, through a new decentering, a new dispossession, which I call spirit or mind, just as I used the term "unconscious" to designate the locus of that other displacement of the origin of meaning back into my past."<sup>25</sup>

Ricoeur's notion of origin appears to be dynamic rather than absolute. The reflection on, and rewriting of the past can be seen as an integral part of "becoming conscious." This perspective on purpose and its relationship to a reevaluation of the past allows Ricoeur to include what he calls a "demystifying hermeneutic" within his general theory. However, what I refer to as 'his general theory,' he would call the process of becoming conscious, that does not belong to the subject, but to the "meaning that is formed in it."

Ricoeur's discourse on Freud is both prefaced by and returns to his own speculations on the nature of his religious identity, located in the "ambiguity of the sacred." However, the nature of this religious identity has been transformed both with respect to its origins and its purpose. In his concluding chapter, Ricoeur come full circle, returning to this theme reconstituted in the idea of the Wholly Other. Thus, Ricoeur concludes by asserting that "the idols must die—so that the symbols may live." From this I interpret that it is our unquestioned, univocal ascension to a set of prepackaged truths that erodes the significance of meaning and not the other way around. Through the critical response to Poe in Derrida views Kant's conception of the sublime as not actually distinct from his development of the idea of beauty, but rather an extension of it. Derrida's critique of Kant's sublime is primarily a concern with its size. The play in Derrida's language pursues the size of the "almost too big" of which Kant attempts to "take hold." Kant subjects his sublime to mathematical analysis to conclude it is infinitely large (as opposed to infinitely small or medium). Derrida suggests that this is Kant's "double bind": attraction and repulsion by the same object. Kant's sublime is in excess to his frame and so opens an abyss, from which the imagination steps back.

recent literary work, it is possible to reconstruct his writing as something different than a mere reworking of the gothic tale or an auto-biographical account of the tragedy of his own life. The critical and self-critical attention to language, the problematic of writing and text, allows a reading of Poe's fiction which reveals an awareness of the frame of literature and its resonance within a larger forum: the determination and the conception of 'self'. In "Marginalia," Poe reports on the nature of his own margin, which, scattered with wit, maintains a distinctly philosophical and aesthetic tone. Of his point of view he informs us:

"The "pleasing-oneself-in" of the sublime is purely or merely negative to the extent that it suspends play and elevates to seriousness. In that measure it constitutes an occupation related to the moral law. It has an essential relation to morality, which presupposes also violence done to the senses. But the violence is here done by the imagination, not by reason. The imagination turns this violence against itself, it mutilates itself, ties itself, sacrifices itself and conceals itself, gashes itself and robs itself. This is the place where the notion of sacrifice operates thematically inside the third *Critique*."<sup>26</sup>

"As for multitudinous opinion expressed in the subjoining *farrago*—as for my present assent to all, or dissent from any portion of it — as to the possibility of my having, in some instances, altered my mind—or as to the impossibility of my not having altered it often—these are points upon which I say nothing, because upon these there can be nothing cleverly said. It may be well to observe, however, that just as the goodness of your true pun is in direct ratio of its intolerability, so is nonsense the essential sense of the Marginal Note."<sup>27</sup>

Does Ricoeur escape the message of "The Purloined Letter," that is, that the teleological anticipation of a hermeneutic system always determines its results, or has he merely embraced this idea? To answer this question would be an intolerable violation of the reader's privilege. What is interesting, I think, is the oscillation that Derrida's deconstruction plays within a sophisticated hermeneutic process that has become aware of its ambiguous relationship with its own process and power. Ricoeur's emphasis on the necessity of including a suspicious hermeneutic within the traditional method of constituting meaning, places both arguments in an awkward position with respect to the issue of reframing.

## Notes

1. Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 6.
2. Charles Baudelaire, *Fatal Destinies—The Edgar Poe Essays*, trans. Joan Fiedler Mele (Cross Country Press: Woodhaven, New York, and Montreal, 1981), 13.
3. Jacques Lacan, Seminar on "The Purloined Letter", in John P. Muller & William J. Richardson eds., *The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida & Psychoanalytic Reading* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), 53.
4. Muller and Richardson, 55-77.
5. Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), 46, cf. Muller and Richardson.
6. Christopher Norris, *Derrida* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), 19.
7. Walter Benjamin, "The Flâneur" from *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, in *Edgar Allan Poe: Critical Assessments*, Volume IV (Sussex: Helm Information, 1991), 210.
8. Jacques Derrida, "The purveyor of truth", in John P. Muller & William J. Richardson eds., *The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida & Psychoanalytic Reading* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), 224.
9. Norris, 19.
10. Marie Bonaparte, *The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe: A Psycho-Analytic Interpretation*, trans. John Rodker (London: Imago Publishing Co. Ltd., 1949) 697.
11. Barbara Johnson, "The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida", in John P. Muller & William J. Richardson eds., *The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida & Psychoanalytic Reading* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), 222.
12. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 304.
13. Douglas Grant, "Edgar Allan Poe: The Croak of the Raven", in *Edgar Allan Poe: Critical Assessments*, Volume IV (Sussex: Helm Information, 1991), 307.
14. Jacques Derrida, "The purveyor of truth", 183.
15. Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, cf. *Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida* (London: Methuen, 1987), 131.

16. Eric Mottram, "Law, Lawlessness and Philosophy in Edgar Allan Poe", in *Edgar Allan Poe: The Design of Order*, ed. A. Robert Lee (London: Vision and Barnes & Noble, 1987), 179.
17. Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 64-65.
18. Michael J.S. Williams, *A World of Words: Language and Displacement in the Fiction of Edgar Allan Poe* (London: Duke University Press, 1989), 19.
19. Jacques Lacan, 29.
20. Jacques Derrida, "The purveyor of truth", 181.
21. Williams, 151.
22. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation* (London: Yale University Press, 1970), 8.
23. Ibid., 459
24. Dennis Pahl, *Architects of the Abyss* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1989), xix.
25. Ricoeur, 461.
26. Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, 130-131.
27. Edgar Allan Poe, "Marginalia", *The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe*, Volume XVI, James A. Harrison ed. (New York: AMS Press Inc. 1965), 4.

## LVI

### Reference

- Baudelaire, Charles.** *Fatal Destinies—The Edgar Poe Essays*, trans. Joan Fiedler Mele, Cross Country Press, Woodhaven, New York and Montreal, 1981.
- Bernstein, J.M.** *The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
- Bonaparte, Marie.** *The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe: A Psycho-Analytic Interpretation*, trans. John Rodker, Imago Publishing Co. Ltd., London, 1949.
- Brotchie, Alastair, Green, Malcolm, and Melville, Antony.** *Raymond Roussel: Life, Death & Works*, Atlas Press, London, 1987.
- Bungay, Stephen.** *Beauty and Truth: A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984.
- Carroll, David.** *Paraesthetics*, Methuen, New York & London, 1987.
- Christ, Carol T.** *The Finer Optic: The Aesthetic of Particularity in Victorian Poetry*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1975.
- Clarke, Graham, ed.** *Edgar Allan Poe: Critical Assessments*, Volumes I to IV, Helm Information, Sussex, 1991.
- Cohen, Ted, and Paul Guyer, ed.** *Essays in Kant's Aesthetics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1982.
- Crowther, Paul.** *The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.
- De Bolla, Peter.** *The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject*, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1989.
- Derrida, Jacques.** *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981.
- Derrida, Jacques.** *Glas*, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., and Richard Rand, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1986.
- Derrida, Jacques.** *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972.

- Derrida, Jacques.** *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972.
- Derrida, Jacques.** *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1987.
- Fisher, Benjamin Franklin.** *Poe at Work: Seven Textual Studies*, The Edgar Allan Poe Society, Baltimore, 1978.
- Foucault, Michel.** *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel*, trans. Charles Ruas, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1986.
- Freud, Sigmund.** *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and trans. James Strachey, The Hogarth Press, London, 1955.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg.** *Truth and Method*, trans. Sheed and Ward Ltd., Crossroad, New York, 1985.
- Harrison, James A., ed.** *The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe*, AMS Press Inc., New York, 1965.
- Hegel, G.W.F.** *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, Vol.1 and 2, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975.
- Hegel, G.W.F.** *Hegel's Introduction to "Aesthetics"*, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979.
- Heppenstall, Rayner.** *Raymond Roussel: A Critical Study*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967.
- Kant, Immanuel.** *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H. Paton, Hutchinson, London, 1955.
- Kant, Immanuel.** *Observation on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, trans. J. Goldwait, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1960.
- Kant, Immanuel.** *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957.
- Kemal, Salim.** *Kant and Fine Art: An Essay on Kant and the Philosophy of Fine Art and Culture*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
- Kennedy, J. Gerald.** *Poe, Death, and the Life of Writing*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1987.
- Ketterer, David.** *The Rationale of Deception in Poe*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London, 1979.

- Kofman, Sarah.** *The Childhood of Art: An Interpretation of Freud's Aesthetics*, trans. Winifred Woodhull, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988.
- Lee, A. Robert, ed.** *Edgar Allan Poe: The Design of Order*, Vision and Barnes & Noble, London, 1987.
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois.** *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988.
- Makkreel, Rudolf A.** *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the "Critique of Judgment"*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990.
- Muller, John P. & William J. Richardson, ed.** *The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida & Psychoanalytic Reading*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1988.
- Norris, Christopher.** *Derrida*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987.
- Pahl, Dennis.** *Architects of the Abyss: The Indeterminate Fictions of Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville*, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1989.
- Pollin, Burton R., ed.** *Images of Poe's Works: A Comprehensive Descriptive Catalogue of Illustrations*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1989.
- Ricoeur, Paul.** *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1970.
- Roussel, Raymond.** *59 Instructions for Drawings*, trans. Trevor Winkfield, Sun, vol. 4, 2, Spring 1975.
- Roussel, Raymond.** *How I Wrote Certain of My Books*, trans. Trevor Winkfield, Sun, New York, 1975.
- Roussel, Raymond.** *Impressions of Africa*, trans. Lindy Foord and Rayner Heppenstall, Calder and Boyars, London, 1966.
- Roussel, Raymond.** *Locus Solus*, trans. Rupert Copeland Cunningham, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970.
- Roussel, Raymond.** *Nouvelles Impressions d'Afrique*, Extract (Canto 3), trans. Kenneth Koch, Art & Literature, 2, Summer, 1964.
- Saliba, David R.** *A Psychology of Fear: The Nightmare Formula of Edgar Allan Poe*, University Press of America, Washington, 1980.



- Schor, Naomi.** *Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine*, Methuen, New York, 1987.
- Silverman, Hugh J., ed.** *Continental Philosophy II: Derrida and Deconstruction*, trans. Caren Kaplan, Routledge, New York and London, 1989.
- Simpson, J.A. and E.S.C. Weiner, eds.** *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Second Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.
- Stoeckl, Allan.** *Politics, Writing, Mutilation: The Cases of Bataille, Blanchot, Roussel, Leiris, and Ponge*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1985.
- Stuckenberg, J.H.W.** *The Life of Immanuel Kant, 1882*, Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ltd., Bristol, 1990.
- Thomas, Dwight, and David K. Jackson.** *The Poe Log: A Documentary Life of Edgar Allan Poe, 1809-1849*, G.K. Hall & Co., Boston, 1987.
- Ver Eecke, Wilfried.** *Negativity and Subjectivity: A Study About the Function of Negation in Freud, Linguistics, Child Psychology and Hegel*, Paleis der Academien - Hertogsstraat, I, Brussels, 1977.
- Williams, Michael J.S.** *A World of Words: Language and Displacement in the Fiction of Edgar Allan Poe*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1988.
- Woodson, Thomas, ed.** *The Fall of the House of Usher: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.Y., 1969.