THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Global Theology and Comparative Religion

by

Mavis L. Fenn (B.A.)

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JULY, 1985

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled, "Global Theology and Comparative Religion" submitted by Mavis L. Fenn in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Supervisor,
Dr. Hugo A. Meynell
Religious Studies Department

Dr. Harold Coward
Religious Studies Department

Dr. Eva Dargyay
Religious Studies Department

Dr. Richard D. Heyman
Department of Educational Policy
and Administrative Studies

_____30th_____ July, 1985

Abstract

The paper will discuss some of the current problems in the field of comparative religion and suggest methods of procedure most likely to produce a resolution of these problems.

The introduction and chapter one contain a refutation of "global theology". This is defined as a recent phenomenon of the study of religion, based upon the presupposition that the world religions will eventually converge. It attempts to demonstrate the universalist thesis (all religions recognize the same ultimate reality but express this in culturally varying ways), and to lay the groundwork for this convergence by means of establishing "global theologies", i.e., theologies which purport to represent global religious thought on various issues such as death. Also refuted in chapter one is the "rationalist school" of religious study that maintains the possibility of there being an objective, universal viewpoint from which we can evaluate the truth claims of the various religious traditions.

Chapters two and three contain a comparative study of scripture in Advaita Vedānta Hinduism, Roman Catholic Christianity, and Yogācāra – (Svātantrika) – Mādhyamaka Buddhism, using the work of Śaṅkara, Aquinas, and Kamalaśīla. This study refutes global theology by example and illustrates in a concrete manner how the problems current in comparative religion are related to a misunderstanding on the part of some scholars regarding the limitations of the study of comparative religion, and the misuse of religious terms.

Chapter four consists in a discussion of the issues raised in chapters one to three and their relationship to methodology in the study of religion. It is asserted that the study of religion as such cannot

provide a complete understanding of the referent of religion, nor of the phenomenon of religion itself. It is further claimed that cross cultural evaluation of the truth-value of claims based upon revelation is not possible. Based upon the paradox that religious language purports to describe an ineffable reality, and upon a discussion of language and its ability to communicate meaning, several recommendations are made concerning proper procedure in the study of religion and the necessary qualifications for a scholar in this area. A structuralist approach to religion as such, combined with a phenomenological approach to individual religious traditions, is suggested as the methodological approach most likely to produce positive results. The paper concludes with a summary of the points raised, discussed, and resolved.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the intellectual, emotional, and spiritual support extended to me by the Department of Religious Studies, University of Calgary, with a special note of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Hugo A. Meynell.

I would also like to thank the Lizzie Arthur Russell Theosophical Society Trust, especially Mr. Ted Davy, and the Province of Alberta for their financial assistance.

Finally, a note of thanks for the time, support, and valuable comments given to me regarding my thesis by my friends, and colleagues Philo Hove and Pat Dold.

For Jim, Jennifer, and Christopher

with love

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

> For wisdom consists in knowing things as
> they are in their real, observable
> character, not as someone would desire
> or like them to be.[1]

The attempt to construct "global theologies" is an outgrowth of

three modern realities: The religiously plural world of the late

twentieth century; the recognition on the part of people from varying

religious traditions that those of other traditions are as sincere and

committed in their beliefs as themselves; and the growth of genuine

affection and respect among people of various religious backgrounds.

These three aspects of modern life have led many people to adopt a

universalist position on religion. They assert that all religions recog-

nize and respond to the same ultimate reality but give expression to this

in ways that are each culturally determined.

I distinguish two senses of the term "global theology". Global

theology in the first sense (subsequently referred to as g.t.1) refers

to the use of comparative studies of religion in one or more of four ways.

The first way aims to set out what the view of a particular religion is

in regards to some matter, for example death or the nature of scripture.

The second way attempts to establish the general world-view of a parti-

cular religion in such a way as to make it accessible to others. For

example, a Christian is enabled to understand what a Hindu means when he

speaks of karma or māyā. The third way consists in comparing the simi-

larities and differences among traditions in the hope that one will be

able to state something fairly general but meaningful about religion "as

such". The fourth way attempts to define the term "religion" itself. The

presupposition behind g.t.1 is that a definition of religion "as such" will

aid in religious self-definition, i.e., in determining what it means to be religious in our largely secular world. This self-definition coupled with a fairly accurate understanding of the religious beliefs of others will foster interreligious harmony. All of the above must be tempered by the realization that within each tradition there is extensive variety and some disagreement on many matters.

"Global theology" in the second sense (subsequently referred to as g.t.2) attempts to use the data of comparative religion to demonstrate the universalist thesis. It is associated closely with the work of Wilfred Smith and John Hick. One of its presuppositions is that all religions will eventually converge.[2] In connection with Smith, Harold Coward says:

> Smith's theology is thoroughly theocentric
> and contains the assumption that each human
> community, each religion, is evolving toward
> an ultimate convergence of its knowledge and
> experience with that of all other communities
> and religions.[3]

G.t.2 attempts to lay the basis for this ultimate convergence by constructing theologies which claim to represent "global" thought on the concepts studied. Such theologies are felt, by their proponents, to represent a unified pattern of religious thought, "global" in its scope, i.e., representative of the religious thought of the major world traditions. Hick writes:

> It is even possible, I shall suggest,
> to see the major world religions as
> pointing convergingly towards a common
> conception of the eschaton, the final
> and eternal state, although with partly
> different expectations concerning the
> pareschaton-the sphere or spheres,
> life or lives, through which humanity
> moves toward that end.[4]

The method followed by Hick in constructing a "global theology" on death
and the afterlife is as follows. He examines the teachings on the subject
in several religious traditions, primarily Buddhism, Christianity, and
Hinduism. He also examines the various relevant philosophical concepts
in both eastern and western religious traditions, such as problems re-
lating to personal identity. He synthesizes the views of east and west
into an admittedly Christian but "Copernican" framework, and this syn-
thesis is offered as a tentative "global theology" on death.[5] Smith
denies that such unity of thought amounts to identity.[6] He suggests
that although the pattern of the dance is the same, each dance differs,
depending as it does upon the particular dancer.[7] Hick, too, assures us
that a "global theology" does not mean a global religion, for this would
sacrifice the richness and variety of expression of the particular
religions.[8] As he describes "global theology", it would

> consist in a body of hypotheses about
> the nature of reality, expressing the
> basic common ground of the world religions,
> and receiving mythic expression and
> devotional content in different ways
> within the different historical traditions.[9]

Hick does not, in the construction of a "global theology" on death,
provide us with the promised "body of hypotheses about the nature of
reality, expressing the basic common ground of the world religions".
Instead, he presents us with a tendentious group of hypotheses which
make the conflicting truth-claims appear less significant than they are.
In attempting to indicate that each of the traditions may be partly
correct, he has intimated that none of them have an adequate grasp of the
way things probably are. He has undermined the truth-claims of each of
the traditions he used. The assumption is that the "global" view is more
probable than the view proposed by any single tradition. In effect, Hick

has set up an <u>alternate</u> theology against which each tradition can measure itself. If sincere in its ecumenism each tradition should acknowledge its limitations and attempt to conform its individual theology with the truly "global" theology. This reorientation should presumably result in new myths, practices, and devotion reflective of this "global" view, i.e., a global religion.

I will argue that this is the "hidden agenda" of g.t.2, which is also inadequate in regards to its presuppositions and methodology. I will further argue that g.t.2 is a venture harmful to comparative religion. I will show the correctness of my position through a comparative study of the concept of scripture and its interpretation in Roman Catholic Christianity, Advaita Vedānta Hinduism, and Yogācāra-(Svatāntrika)-Mādhyamaka Buddhism; using as examples the thought of Aquinas, Śaṅkara, and Kamalaśīla. This study, as well as indicating the lack of methodological rigor in g.t.2 and refuting it as a viable or valuable approach to religious pluralism, will indicate several current problems in the study of comparative religion, g.t.1. I will discuss these problems and suggest possible ways of coping with them, concluding with a brief discussion regarding the purpose and parameters of comparative religion.

Chapter 1

> The present fashion of applying the axioms
> of physical science to human life is not
> only entirely a mistake but has also some-
> thing reprehensible in it.[10]

I have four objections to g.t.2. I reject both the explicit

assertion that greater interaction between religious traditions will

lead to their eventual convergence, and the _implicit_ claim that a unitary,

"global" religious philosophy would lead to greater intercultural harmony.

I maintain that the methodology of g.t.2 distorts our understanding of the

particular religious traditions studied, and that the methodology of

g.t.2 is reductionist regarding the study of religion "as such", g.t.1.

Each of these objections will be discussed in turn.

First, greater interaction between traditions does not entail their

eventual convergence. The histories of India and of the Christian

tradition speak against this assertion. Religiously plural for centuries,

there is no indication of the convergence of India's many religions.

While the religions of India _do_ share the tenets of _karma_ and rebirth

and have influenced each other's historical development, Buddhist, Jain,

Hindu, and Sikh scrupulously maintain their particularity. Nor is there

any evidence for the convergence thesis when one looks at the historical

development of Christianity. What we may call Christian self-definition

begins around 49 C.E. with the Council at Jerusalem. What came to be

the canon of scripture was generally accepted by about the second century

C.E., and formalized within one hundred years of this date. A fairly

uniform concept of Christianity (orthodoxy) did grow from many con-

flicting views on what it was doctrinally and ritually to be a Christian.

Yet as early as 325 C.E., with the Arian controversy, we see the begin-

nings of the first major split in the Christian Church which culminated

in the excommunication of the Patriarch of Constantinople by the Pope of Rome.[11] Earlier, around 451 C.E., both the Nestorian and Monophysite churches broke away from the main body of Christendom. Most dramatically, in the four hundred and sixty years or so since the Protestant Reformation (1521), the Protestant branch of the Christian Church has segmented at a phenomenal rate, especially in North America. From the perspective of historical development, this Christian experience not only counts against the thesis of eventual convergence, but appears to count for the thesis that religious traditions tend towards greater particularity over time.

The implicit claim that a shared "global" religious philosophy would lead to greater intercultural harmony is also mistaken. I have already indicated that the establishment of such a philosophy, if it were possible, would lead almost inevitably to a world religion. Coward points out that unity without diversity leads to a denial of freedom and that a world religion would amount to religious coercion.[12] In the light of the Indian and Christian experience, one would expect a world religion to fragment almost immediately, each historical or geographic community asserting that their interpretation of the "global" religion was the most accurate or "true". By not representing the truth-claims of any particular religion but claiming that one can synthesize the general thought common to all religions, g.t.2 leaves the door open to a misunderstanding of the truth-claims of each of the religious traditions involved. As Hugo Meynell states,

> The fact is that every attempt to tackle
> the problem of apparently conflicting
> faiths or ideologies has to take into
> account the proposition, as inconvenient
> as it is undeniable, that so long as your

> faith or ideology has any cognitive
> content at all, or any practical
> implications which are not trivial,
> some persons of intelligence and good
> will are going to disagree with you.[13]

It is self-evident that misunderstanding leads to intolerance. True

understanding, combined with mutual respect, entails that we must on

occasion "agree to disagree". The social consequences of g.t.2 would

be the opposite of its stated purpose.

This distortion of the individual traditions is a direct result of

flawed methodology. All methodology contains certain presuppositions

about the nature of the phenomenon or state of affairs studied. The

presupposition of g.t.2 which results in its flawed methodology is that

the particular religious traditions are strictly instrumental in nature.

Smith, while he does not deny a cognitive content to particular religions,

lays his major stress on religion as a quality of personal living,[14] and

on the more feeling, emotive content of religious faith.

> Faith is an orientation of the personality,
> to oneself, to one's neighbour, to the
> universe; a total response; a way of seeing
> the world and of handling it; a capacity to
> live at a more than mundane level; to see, to
> feel, to act in terms of, a transcendent
> dimension.[15]

I do not deny that particular religions are instrumental or faith-oriented

in nature. What I do maintain is that the instrumental form of a parti-

cular religion takes shape in terms of the tradition's view of the "trans-

cendent dimension", absolute reality. This view of absolute reality forms

the "world-view" or framework within which adherents make sense of their

experience in the world. In order to know what would constitute an appro-

priate response to absolute reality or to establish the most appropriate

means to attain the experience of it, one must have some understanding of

its nature. This understanding of absolute reality is encapsulated in the doctrines or beliefs of the religions. Therefore, the instrumental aspect of religion is based upon the world-view of the particular tradition, upon what it claims to be true about the nature of absolute reality. To claim that religious frameworks do not make claims about the world, as Smith does,[16] is simply wrong. Meynell makes this point:

> Religious persons, and their opponents, have almost universally taken the religion which was at issue between them to be essentially bound up with certain supposed facts (that there is just one God, that Christ is strictly speaking divine as well as human, that tanha leads inevitably to dukkha, that nirvana is available by way of the Noble Eightfold Path, and so on), such that, if these supposed facts are not the case, the religious belief would be false ... it seems to me highly questionable whether a religion without truth-claims would be a psychologically possible option for any but a tiny handful of high sophisticated people. All of the great religions have been at one in claiming certain facts to be the case about man and his fate, and in justifying moral and liturgical practice on that basis. Why submit oneself to the rigours of the Noble Eightfold Path, afterall, if annihilation is in any case our lot whether we do so or spend our life in pleasure and self-indulgence?[17]

Hindus and Buddhists are separate within the Indian tradition, not just by varying meditational and devotional practice, but because the one asserts the existence of a self (ātman) while the other denies this self, the anātman doctrine. The Catholic is separate from the Protestant because the one asserts that the Pope in Rome is Christ's intermediary on earth and the other denies this.

The denial of the fact that the particular religions make truth-claims, and the desire to minimize the serious nature of these conflicts regarding the truth about absolute reality and the world of man, both

within each particular religious tradition and between different tradi-
tions, forces the proponents of g.t.2 to adopt a very suspect methodology.
Concepts are taken out of the over-all context of their tradition.   It
will be shown in the comparative study on scripture and its interpre-
tation in chapter three that, while the concept of an authoritative body
of texts, a scripture, is common to Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity,
each tradition defines what constitutes authoritative scripture somewhat

differently.   Further, the importance of scripture within the whole of
each tradition differs.   To say simply that Buddhism, Hinduism and
Christianity all have a concept of scripture without acknowledging
the differences between the traditions on this matter is misleading.
Hick takes the Buddhist, Hindu and Christian conceptions of death and
the afterlife and suggests that they may all point to the same final
end (eschaton), just disagreeing somewhat about the next to final
end (pareschaton).   Each contains a piece of the puzzle, each points to
a stage on the journey.   But this is not what each claims.   Each claims
to have a fairly accurate picture of the whole puzzle, the final end.
As Meynell states,

> I do not know of any thoughtful believer,
> let alone any informed theologian, who
> would not heartily agree that there is a
> great deal more to God or to Nirvana or
> whatever than can be captured by his
> doctrinal formulae.   But the crucial
> question is whether he could deny without
> absurdity that, for all the limitations
> and qualifications on which he may
> properly insist, they are true as far as
> they go.[18]

Buddhist and Christian claims concerning death and the afterlife, man's
final end, are radically different.   This "crucial question" is ignored

by Hick.

G.t.2 is also forced into excessive selectivity within particular traditions. It must ignore any great divergence of thought internally if it is to present the view of religion x on any issue y. Hick works from a preconceived notion of what death and the afterlife are likely about, according to the Christian-based framework he has set out in the chapter "On Method". Therefore, in Hinduism he must use the thought of Rāmānuja as representative of the Hindu position rather than Śaṅkara. In Christianity he must use Irenaeus rather than Augustine. The thought of Augustine has been of central importance in the development of Christian theology. The school of Advaita Vedānta, of which Śaṅkara is the leading exponent, has played a crucial role within the Hindu tradition in the philosophic articulation of the proper relationship between reason and revelation in man's struggle for mokṣa. Yet in constructing his "global" theology on death Hick virtually ignores the latter. The problem with taking concepts out of their traditional framework and the problem of excessive selectivity is, ironically, well stated by Smith,

> To read a statement in a Sanskrit or
> Arabic text one must know what it says
> but also what it takes for granted.[19]

A basic problem with the "global theology" on death worked out by Hick is the overall framework. It is this aspect which makes such "theologies" not viable and of little value. In order to be broad enough to encompass the thought of many traditions its statements must be so general as to be meaningless to any one tradition. But to be more specific is to become more biased, closer to the thought of one tradition rather than another. In a review of Death and Eternal Life Terence Penelhum makes this point.

> The propositions of global theology are
> sometimes offered, not on the ground that
> they are already shared by two or more
> faiths, but on the ground that they are
> thought by one and are not inconsistent
> with another.[20]

In the Introduction it was stated that Hick has, in effect, set up

an alternate religious philosophy against which the individual religious

traditions could and should measure themselves. It was stated that this

presumes "global" thought on any issue is more likely to be correct than

the view of any one tradition.[21] While this presupposition is itself

questionable, and Hick has given us no reason to accept it, it hides an

even more serious presupposition. This is that we can "know" the

probable nature of the absolutely real. This presupposition is wrong and

leads to a reductionist approach to religion "as such". In taking issue

here with Hick I must also take issue with the "rationalist" school of

religion which believes that it is possible to be objective about the

truth-claims of the various traditions, and that it is possible, at

least in principle, to construct a criterion by means of which these truth-

claims can be evaluated as to their explanatory power, i.e., truth-value.

Meynell and Lonergan are representatives of the "rationalist" school

on religion. Lonergan, in Insight, speaks of the possibility of a

universal point of view grounded upon the "dynamic structure of human

cognitional activity",[22] and Meynell states,

> There is a comprehensively critical
> viewpoint from which those of each
> faith may envisage both their own
> faith and that of others.[23]

From this critical viewpoint one is able to assess the truth-value of any

truth-claim. The truth-value of a concept is relative to its ability to

explain states of affairs. If one concept has a greater ability to

explain a state of affairs then it is the preferred concept. The truth on

any matter is arrived at by the method Meynell refers to as "coming to

know":

> There is a non-contingent connection
> between the truth on any matter, and
> what one tends to affirm. as a result
> of attending to the relevant evidence,
> envisaging the hypotheses which may
> explain it, and preferring the hypothesis
> best corroborated by the evidence. This
> principle applies in religion as well as
> elsewhere.[24]

This method of "coming to know" allows one to become objective about the

truth claims of his/her religious tradition, as well as that of others;

through rationality comes objectivity,

> It seems to me that the <u>rationality</u>
> of any belief, in the sense of there
> being better reason to believe it than
> not to believe it, is in the longrun a
> necessary condition of its <u>objectivity</u>,
> in the sense of its having truth-
> conditions over and above the subjective
> states or practical attitudes of the
> believer.[25]

While Lonergan gives several principles of criticism it is the fourth,

the canon of parsimony, which is of primary concern to me. This canon

of parsimony, in its negative aspect, excludes from consideration the

unverifiable.[26] The ability to verify, or falsify theses is necessary in

assessing various competing scientific hypotheses. Using a canon of

parsimony like Lonergan's one is in a position to come to some decision

as to which of the proposed theses is most likely, or from a negative

standpoint least likely, to be true. The most likely candidate for truth

is that hypothesis which, given our current data and experience, is the

best able to fulfill the explanatory function. Such scientific claim to

truth is <u>always</u> relative. New data, new methods of research, etc.,

could alter what we accept as true. Lonergan and Meynell are incorrect on two counts when they assert that this same theory of knowledge can be applied to religion as well.

They are wrong in the first instance because they ignore the religious concept of revelation. Revelation, in the sense of something which we could not know unless it was revealed (given) to us, or, which cannot be verified through reason but can be experienced in certain altered states of consciousness, cannot be verified through empirical means. Yet, many of the major world religions base their claims to truth upon revelation. In Method in Theology, Lonergan reviews the doctrines of the Catholic Church. We find, in DS3015, cf. 3005, this statement,

> Among the principle objects of faith
> are the mysteries hidden in God,
> which, were they not revealed, could
> not be known by us.[27] (emphasis is mine)

Such mysteries must be accepted by faith, rather than reason,

> Faith is a supernatural virtue by which
> we believe to be true what God has
> revealed, not because we apprehend the
> intrinsic truth of what has been
> revealed, but because of the authority
> of God who reveals and can neither
> deceive nor be deceived.[28]

By Lonergan's own canon of parsimony religious claims to truth cannot be considered, at least outside their religious tradition. For the same reason, conflicts regarding truth-claims between traditions cannot be evaluated by means of reason alone.

They are also wrong because their theory of human cognitional activity is incorrect. Following an aspect of Karl Popper's thought, as expressed in Objective Knowledge, I maintain that Lonergan's theory of knowledge makes the false presupposition that we can have direct sensory experience. By direct sensory experience I refer to the ability

to look with the eyes, hear with the ears, etc., in a first order manner, a direct, immediate <u>and secure</u> perception of external reality.[29] In opposition to this view Popper states,

> I suggest that there is nothing direct or
> immediate in our experience: we have to
> <u>learn</u> that we have a self, extended in time
> and continuing to exist even during sleep
> and total unconsciousness, and we have to
> learn about our own and others' bodies. It
> is all decoding, or interpretation. We
> learn to decode so well that everything
> becomes very "direct" or "immediate" to us;
> but so it is with a man who has learned the
> Morse Code, or, to take a more familiar
> example, who has learned to read a book:
> it speaks to him "directly", "immediately".

He also suggests that,

> We have reason to conjecture that there is a
> hereditary basis to our decoding skills. At
> any rate, we sometimes do make mistakes in
> decoding, especially if unusual situations
> occur.[30]

If Popper is correct then all of what we call knowledge is theory-impregnated. We begin with what innate dispositions and expectations we have and modify, clarify, reject, etc.[31] Further, we have no reason to assume that these innate dispositions and expectations are valid simply because they are <u>a priori</u>. After all, as Popper points out, we sometimes make mistakes.[32] The first step in Meynell's process of "coming to know" on any matter is "attending to the relevant evidence". But if we carry certain predispositions, etc., then the "relevant evidence" is preconditioned. Popper refutes Meynell's first step in this way:

> The fact that all our senses are in this
> way theory-impregnated shows most clearly
> the radical failure of the bucket theory
> and with it of all those other theories
> which attempt to trace our knowledge to
> our observations, or the <u>input</u> of the
> organism. On the contrary, <u>what can be</u>

> absorbed (and reacted to) as relevant
> input and what is ignored as irrelevant
> depends completely upon the innate structure
> (the 'programme') of the organism.[33]

Step two of Meynell's "coming to know" is to envisage the hypothesis which could best explain the relevant evidence. Here the three philosophers are in agreement. That which is likely to be true is that which best explains the data.[34] My question, given the theory-impregnation of the senses, is this: what would count as evidence that the Christian world-view, rather than the Hindu world-view, gives the best approximation to the truth? What each would count as evidence for its position is subjective psychologically and further based upon that which cannot be verified rationally (revelation or "mystic" experience). Therefore, there is no knowledge which can claim to be objective, especially in the realm of religion. It follows from this that there can be no universal viewpoint from which one can evaluate the conflicting truth-claims of religious traditions.

Man's ability to attain truth is severely limited. We have no reason to believe that all our innate dispositions are the same. Perhaps the Hindu and Christian world-view differ because their innate dispositions, which color their experience of the world and their rationality, are different. In an article entitled, "Is Modern Historical Consciousness Large Enough to Comprehend the Religious Experience of Scripture?", Coward says,

> It is my view that the finiteness of
> man's nature is such that his historical
> experience of the divine is also limited.[35]

He also states,

> But here too certain psychological limits
> arise and must be taken seriously by the

> theologian. In any intellectual
> exercise in which theologians attempt
> to "see" with the concepts of another
> religion, the psychological dynamics
> of their minds will never allow them to
> be completely objective or neutral in
> their perceptions.[36]

Finally, this psychologist and religious scholar comments,

> There is the fact that rival viewpoints
> may adopt starting points so different
> that they will be able to establish little
> or no common intellectual ground. And
> without the basis of this common ground,
> individual propositions cannot be discussed
> in such a way as to arrive at a positive
> "right" or "wrong" judgment.[37]

My position in this matter, supported by Popper and Coward, has consequences for Hick's g.t.2. It also has consequences for g.t.1, the current field of comparative religion. I will discuss the implications for g.t.2 now and for g.t.1 in chapter four.

Hick's theology is reductionist because he has fallen prey to the same errors as the "rationalist" school of religion. His schemata on death and the afterlife, in assuming that global thought is more likely to be true than individual thought, ignores revelation and thus fails to do justice to each tradition studied. He has ignored their claim to uniqueness without giving them any reason to abandon their world-view other than the fact that it does not happen to fit his ecumenical framework. Further, by ignoring revelation, or attempting to minimize its importance, he has provided us with another reductionist view of religion "as such". He has provided us with a theological view of religion to add to the psychological, anthropological, and sociological view. While these elements are certainly a part of any religious tradition, religion is _more_ than the sum total of its parts. Any view of religion which refuses to treat it as an holistic phenomenon is

reductionist. If we are to believe the representative writers of the religious traditions, and we should at least take what they say seriously, then religion also contains an element that is beyond our rational and finite ability to comprehend, but that we can respond to or experience. Information about this is contained in the revelation which is claimed by the tradition. It is this element that unifies the world-view of a tradition, and commands the allegiance of each person who belongs to it. Mircea Eliade rightly notes:

> A religious phenomenon will only be
> recognized as such if it is grasped
> at its own level, that is to say, if
> it is studied as something religious.
> To try and grasp the essence of such
> a phenomenon by means of physiology,
> psychology, sociology, linguistics, art
> or any other study is false; it misses
> the one unique and irreducible element
> in it - the element of the sacred.[38]

Hick's g.t.2 is reductionist because he has ignored this "sacred" element, that which cannot be schematized. While each tradition would admit that its world-view does not "capture" this sacred element at the conventional level, each does maintain that its world-view gives an understanding of it that is correct. To study and use the concepts of religion without regard to this is to presume, as Hick does, that we can "know" the referent of religion independent of revelation. The above discussion on religion and knowledge and the religious traditions themselves refute the idea that we can "know" this referent conventionally.

The next chapter will consist in a study of the concept of scripture. It will graphically illustrate the problems involved in the attempt to construct "global" theologies, and will also indicate the more general problems faced by those in the field of comparative religion. This study will be the basis of the discussion in chapter four concerning

the nature, methodology and limits of comparative religion.

Chapter 2

> The religious experience of scripture is
> one which requires that we allow ourselves
> to be grasped, even naively, by the trans-
> forming power of the word - an experience
> which seems to take us out of time.[39]

The first step in any comparative study is to justify the use of

the examples chosen. In order to represent "global" thought on scripture

a fairly broad spectrum of religious opinion on this issue must be

presented. The traditions used in this study of scripture have been

chosen for a variety of reasons; the primary reason for the choice of

Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism is that each of them have dealt in

a serious manner with the recognition that they must look to written,

codified texts as a valid means for spiritual guidance. The represen-

tatives of each of these traditions, Aquinas, Śaṅkara, and Kamalaśīla,

have been chosen because each of them deals in depth with the place of

scripture in man's search for salvation and the role that reason plays

regarding the revelation of scripture in man's spiritual quest. While

the primary focus of this paper is philosophical, the choice of examples

has also been influenced by their use in "global theologies" such as that

constructed by Hick. Further, an attempt has been made to choose

traditions and their representatives that have displayed an historical

influence in the development of their geographical community and

cultural milieu.

The Christian tradition is clearly a tradition based upon scripture

as revelation. Scripture is of vital importance to both Catholics and

Protestants. The historical and theological importance of the Roman

Catholic tradition in the formation and development of the Christian

religion make it a natural choice for this study. One cannot discuss

Catholic thought without coming to grips with Thomas Aquinas, the "angelic doctor". Aspects of his thought have been out of favour with the Church occasionally, and it has been obscured briefly by Scotism or Ockhamism in the past, but since the 1879 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII Aquinas's method and principles have received the official support of the church.[40]

What we refer to as Hindu thought has been a seminal influence in the development of religious and philosophical thought on the Indian sub-continent. The best known schools of vedāntic thought, at least in the west, are Advaita and Viśistādvaita. While the thought of Viśistādvaita, as epitomized by Rāmānuja, is probably reflected in the religious practice of more Hindus than is Advaita, in the philosophical realm it is Advaita which receives the most consideration. In Advaita Vedānta we find a formalization of the Indian understanding of scripture. The clear articulation of the proper relationship between reason and revelation makes Advaita Vedānta a good choice for comparison with the writings of Aquinas, who is also concerned with this matter. The Indian belief in the numinous power of the "word" to release one from the bonds of samsāra makes scripture of central importance in Indian philosophic thought. Within the school of Advaita, the writings of Śaṅkara dominate. Karl Potter notes that Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāsya is the single most influential philosophical text in India today.[41] He further notes that prior to Śaṅkara (late 7th, early 8th century C.E.) little is known of Advaita, although Śaṅkara makes reference to previous teachers and his "tradition".[42] While Śaṅkara is not synonymous with Advaita he is its best known exponent.

It requires a slightly longer preamble to establish that Buddhism and Kamalaśīla are appropriate subjects for a comparative study of

scripture, because some scholars maintain that Buddhism is a tradition

unconcerned with scripture.   In the <u>Dhamma-kakka-Ppavattana Sutta</u>

Śākyamuni is reported to have said the following in regards to the Four

Noble Truths,[43] the fact that he should comprehend them and the fact that

he <u>had</u> comprehended them:

> That this was the noble truth concerning
> sorrow, <u>was not, O Bhikkus, among the</u>
> <u>doctrines handed down,</u> (my emphasis)
> but there arose within me the eye (to
> perceive it), there arose the knowledge
> (of its nature), there arose the under-
> standing (of its cause), there arose
> wisdom (to guide in the path of tranquility),
> there arose the (light to dispel darkness
> from it.)[44]

This refrain is repeated twelve times and appears to denigrate the role

of scripture in leading to the mystic vision.   It is my opinion that, if

one looks more closely at the role of the "Buddha" in Buddhism, the

conception that Śākyamuni had of himself as a "revealer", and at the

concern, historically, of Buddhism regarding the proper preservation and

transmission of the <u>Dhamma</u>, one must conclude that scripture plays a

central role in Buddhism.   The following discussion will make this

assertion clear and demonstrate that it is correct.

The higher reality of Buddhism, in which it is rooted, is repre-

sented as a concentration of all the components of reality, i.e., noetic

being.[45]   Eva Dargyay translates Karma-phrin-la's description of this

noetic being:

> Noetic being (<u>chos-sku</u>) is a priori awareness,
> the aesthetic perception of everything
> perceptible, non-dual, and devoid of the
> extremes of eternalism and nihilism...[46]

Forming the link between noetic being and the samsaric world of

appearances are the "authentic beings", Buddhas; it is these intellectual

beings who ensure the accuracy of the tradition of the wisdom of noetic being.[47] This wisdom comprises the whole of being and is reserved for the Buddhas alone.[48] The transmission of this wisdom takes shape historically in the form of the "Wisdom Holder".

The historic Śākyamuni is only one of the many Buddhas, before and after him, who are the incarnation of this higher reality.[49] Śākyamuni saw himself as a revealer of the timeless truth. Revelation in the Buddhist sense is best described by the term parivartina. Parivartina means turning something over, explaining it, making visible the hidden or obscure. This is what the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas do; they "reveal", make visible and explain the timeless truth to the unenlightened; they point out the path to nirvāna and guide the way. While each person is a potential Buddha, all are bound in ignorance and must have the possibility of enlightenment shown to them.

Seen in this light the quotation from the Dhamma-kakka-Ppavattana Sutta indicates that Śākyamuni is not making a general denouncement of scripture per se, but is stating that the current doctrine of the Indian schools does not teach the timeless truth required for salvation. At this point he begins to preach the timeless truth, in the form of the Four Noble Truths and the Eight-Fold Noble Path;[50] this, he says, is the correct teaching, validated by his attainment of Buddahood; this should be taken as authoritative scripture.

Concern for the preservation of the truth and the path, as revealed by Śākyamuni, is seen in the Mahā-Parinibbāna-Sutta. Having been told that the demise of his beloved teacher is near, the devoted disciple Ānanda fears that the death of the teacher will mean the death of the teaching and therefore, of the opportunity for enlightenment. Śākyamuni

reassures Ānanda that this is not so and he lays the basis upon which a canon of scripture can be established:

> The truths and the rules of the order
> which I have set forth and laid down for
> you all, let them, after I am gone, be
> the Teacher to you.[51]

Immediately after Śakyamuni's death discussion arises as to the fate of the disciples. Rhys Davids notes that the story of Subhadda (the monk who believes that "all is permitted" after Śakyamuni's death) may be a later addition to the text for the purpose of introducing the proceedings of the First Council, convened almost immediately after the parinirvāna.[52] The First Council requested the transmission by Ānanda of the sermons and the rules for monastic discipline that had been laid down by Śakyamuni. The only conclusion one can draw from this is that the sermons and rules were to be considered authoritative doctrinally and ritually; thus, a canon of scripture was established.

Whether the First Council is fact or legend, as Conze asserts,[53] it indicates a deep concern on the part of early Buddhists to establish what was to be considered proper doctrine and for establishing an accurate means of its transmission. All four Councils reflect the development of Buddhist scripture; the Fourth Council was convened for the purpose of establishing which of the schools then in existence could be said to represent an authentic way of understanding Śakyamuni's teaching, and also dealt with the matter of producing reliable commentaries on the sermons. The same concern for the proper transmission of the teachings is shown by Mahāyāna Buddhism in its emphasis upon doctrinal lineage, and the importance of the guru/disciple relationship. The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra refers to the great merit which results from simply reproducing the scripture.[54] This is a clear indication of the central

importance of scripture.

Given the Buddhist conception of the "Buddha" as the link between

reality as seen from the perspective of nirvana and reality as seen from

the perspective of samsara, scripture represents the timeless truth and

the path to enlightenment expressed by an "authentic being" in terms

understandable to the unenlightened. The idea that Buddhism does not

depend upon written scripture for spiritual inspiration and guidance, is

wrong, as has been shown.

Kamalasila has been chosen as representative of the Mahayanana

Buddhist position primarily because his first Bhavanakrama gives a clear

and thorough discussion regarding the interrelationship between scripture,

reason, and meditation in achieving enlightenment. A further consideration

in the choice of Kamalasila is his concern with the same issues as the

Indian philosopher Sankara, with whom he is roughly contemporary. From

an historical perspective Ruegg notes that Kamalasila's commentary on the

Tattvasangraha is an invaluable source for the history of Indian philosophy,

non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist, and that it contains the first known

reference in Buddhist literature to the Advaitadarsana (philosophical

position of Advaita Vedanta).[55] He is credited, along with his teacher

Santaraksita, with the establishment of the Yogacara - (Svatantrika) -

Madhyamaka system as the main Buddhist system in Tibet at that time, an

influence which lasted centuries.[56] There are two issues which can be

raised concerning the use of Kamalasila. The first is the small number of

writings attributed to him. There are three available in English

translation: the above noted commentary on the Tattvasangraha, the three

Bhavanakramas, and the Madhyamakaloka. It should be noted that the English

version of the first Bhavanakrama, provided by Tucci, is a paraphrase of

the text.[57]   Despite these limitations, Kamalaśīla's statement of the
position on scripture is of such quality that I believe it overrides
these limitations.

Having justified my choice of traditions and their representatives,
I will now examine the views of each on scripture and its interpretation.

Chapter 3

Śaṅkara

> Reasoning is an unstable foundation as a
> basis for understanding things that should
> be realized from scripture; for it is
> notorious how arguments may be found to
> contradict any thesis, and the most pro-
> found logical philosophers have contradicted
> one another.[58]

Each of the following sections will begin with the theory of know-
ledge held by the philosopher theologian under discussion.

To Śaṅkara the ability to attain any knowledge is due to the self-
shining atman which makes possible the object's appearance and the subject's
ability to know it.[59] Advaita recognizes two types of knowledge:
anubhava and smṛti. Anubhava is the immediate, direct, and secure first
order experience of an object. It is knowledge secured through identity.
Mystic experience is an example of anubhava, the object experienced being
God or Ultimate Reality. Smṛti is representative knowledge, i.e., it
reproduces past knowledge. The memory of an event is an example of know-
ledge attained through smṛti.[60] Knowledge is true by definition; it is
self-evident unless contradicted by other knowledge.

There are six means to knowledge (pramānas) accepted by the Advaitins
as valid: perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upmāna),
postulation (arthapatti), non-cognition (anupalabdhi), and verbal testi-
mony (śabda). Pratyaksa occurs when the mind (antahkarana)[61] goes out
through the senses,[62] assumes the form of the object, and the mental state
which occurs is then transformed through the relation of the antahkarana
to the atman. Anumāna is described as knowledge which follows another
knowledge.[63] An example of knowledge attained by means of anumāna is the
knowledge that a mountain is on fire, inferred from the observation of

smoke rising from the woods.[64]   There is a second type of inference recog-
nized by the Advaitins. Tarka, technical reason, is a method of hypothe-
tical inference; if such and such is the case, then so and so must follow.
It is not accepted as a pramāna but is allowed for the purposes of removing
doubt from śabda and as an additional support for the other pramānas.

Regarding upamāna the Advaitins follow the Mīmāmsā in maintaining
that comparison occurs when a previously perceived object is seen to
be in some ways similar to a presently perceived object.[65] I see an
animal in the woods which has horns, a long tail, and a ring in its nose.
I remember seeing an animal with horns, a long tail, and a ring in its
nose in the farmer's yard and recall that he called it a bull. Therefore,
the previously seen bull is like the animal before me now. Arthāpatti
consists in the postulation of an unperceived fact which alone can explain
a situation which demands explanation.[66] One sees a fat man who fasts
during the day and postulates that he must eat at night. In the case of
verbal testimony one hears the Vedic injunction to sacrifice and postulates
that to do so must be meritorious.

Anupalabdhi is a type of immediate knowledge of the non-existence of
an object.[67] It is based upon the Advaitin assumption that absences exist
in some positive way. An absence is the non-presence of something which
should be there. An example of this would be my looking at Mary's empty
chair and perceiving her absence from it.

The most important pramāna for Śankara is śabda, verbal testimony.
In Indian philosophy there are three conditions which must be satisfied
by any method which seeks consideration as a valid means to knowledge
(pramāna). These conditions are that the method be a source for
acquiring knowledge of facts, that the knowledge attained is constituted

by the conditions that make the knowledge possible, rather than any external conditions, and the validity of the knowledge must be known by the conditions that constitute that knowledge.[68] Any verbal testimony (śabda) which fulfills these three conditions is a valid source of knowledge. The example of scientific knowledge obtained through specialists in the field is used by Datta to illustrate the implications of these conditions in modern terms, although the example does not completely fulfill the second condition. While in theory I may be able to acquire the knowledge of astrophysics or genetic science on my own through experiments, etc., for all intents and purposes I cannot; I must be dependent upon the testimony of those who are able to attain this knowledge. The application of these three conditions to the Veda by Śaṅkara is as follows: the Veda is a source of knowledge concerning dharma and Brahman; there are no other means, such as inference or perception, by means of which we can attain this knowledge; and, this knowledge is known to be valid because it produces mokṣa;[69] therefore, the Veda is an independent pramāṇa concerning knowledge of dharma and Brahman.

The Veda is the primary manifestation of Brahman, taking precedence over general revelation, avatāra (incarnation), and anubhūti (experience through meditation).[70] From the material cause, Brahman, by means of the efficient cause, śabda, the world evolves; the word has numinous power. In this metaphysical sense śabda and Veda are synonymous.

The authorlessness of the Veda establishes it as eternal and infallible revelation. Revelation in the Advaitin sense means the presence in scripture of truths which have not been authored by any person. These eternal truths are given to Brahmā upon his creation by the creative power of Brahman (Māyā), and he, in turn, gives them to the

rs_is_ who recite the _Veda_ at the beginning of each world cycle.[71] The

truths of the _Veda_ are eternal, but the expression of these truths varies

from age to age (_yuga_), dependent upon the spiritual capacity of man-

kind.[72] In an age of declining spirituality these truths may be compre-

hended best when spoken in common terms by an _avatara_. This accounts for

the great respect given by the Indian tradition to secondary literature

(_smrti_) such as the _Bhagavad-Gita_ and the _Ramayana_. Such secondary works

are authoritative when they follow the teachings of the _Veda_.

Language, the "Word", participates in the power of Brahman. Unlike

the Grammarians, who consider language identical to Absolute Reality,

the Advaitins assert that the _Veda_ can only point to _Brahman_:

> Words can indirectly indicate the Witness
> when they directly name a reflection of it;
> but they cannot directly refer to it.[73]

The _Veda_ can only point to _Brahman_ because it, and all else, is

ultimately illusory. Śaṅkara's conception of _advaita_ (non-duality) is

rigidly monist; only _Brahman_ is Absolutely Real. _Maya_ is posited by

Śaṅkara to account for our perception of differentiation in the face of

the scriptural assertion that _Brahman_ is an impersonal, undifferentiated

unity, the essence of which is consciousness (_cit_), being (_sat_) and

bliss (_ananda_), and that this attributeless (_nirguna_) _Brahman_ is all

that is ultimately Real. _Maya_ has both positive and negative aspects.

In its positive aspect it is the manifold of worldly wonders that we

perceive. In its negative aspect it is ignorance (_avidya_) which prevents

us from seeing that we are non-different from _Brahman_. Ignorance

condemns us to the relentless wheel of rebirth (_samsara_). Mandana Misra,

an advaitin of note, describes _avidya_ in these terms,

> Avidya is neither absolutely real nor
> absolutely unreal, neither identical with
> Brahman nor another thing. It is just for
> this reason that it is called avidya, maya,
> "false appearance". If it were identical
> with Brahman or different it would be ultimately
> real, not avidya. If it were absolutely unreal
> like a sky flower it would not enter into
> practical usage...Not being absolutely real,
> it can be destroyed; thus providing something
> to be removed. Likewise it does not introduce
> a second thing different from Brahman.[74]

Śankara's concept of superimposition explains how the positive and negative aspects of maya work together to forge the chain of projection and misinterpretation responsible for the transmigration of the atman. Potter gives a good explanation of superimposition:

> Avidya is not only a failure to comprehend, a
> wrong interpretation, it is also the power
> of projecting as objects of awareness
> things that, ultimately unreal themselves,
> are then misinterpreted once more as
> practical life continues.[75]

This "false appearance", maya, only has reality due to the Brahman underneath the superimposed maya. When Brahman is realized directly the maya is destroyed. The power necessary to break the samsaric chain, knowledge, is contained in the Veda, even though Veda is itself ultimately illusory.[76]

Śankara held that the Veda was divided into two sections: the dharma and the knowledge of Brahman. These two sections, being for two different groups of people, have no logical relation to each other.[77] The dharma section concerns action, and is for those not morally or intellectually capable of attaining knowledge of Brahman. Action cannot produce release from samsara (moksa) because it presupposes the distinction of agent and action, a cause and effect relationship. Moksa, the knowledge that atman is Brahman, like Brahman, has no distinctions. There are four results of action: origination, attainment, purification, and modification.[78]

Further, Śaṅkara draws a distinction between knowledge acquired by

empirical means and acquired by revelation; the knowledge that produces

moksa is not gained by an act of knowledge:

> An action is something not dependent on
> what now exists but on human intelligence,
> whereas knowledge is dependent on what
> exists and not dependent on human intel-
> ligence.
>
> In fact, liberation follows immediately
> upon knowledge of Brahman, and thus that
> knowledge cannot be viewed as a means
> conducive to some action designed to gain
> liberation.[79]

At the most action can only fulfill a preparatory role, and this is the

function of śabda in Purva Mīmāmsā.

The properly prepared individual is one who has learned to discri-

minate between what is eternal and what is not, who is non-attached to

the enjoyment of objects now and in the future, who has acquired tran-

quility and restraint, and who desires liberation, whether or not such an

individual has inquired about dharma.[80] The section of the Veda con-

cerning the knowledge of Brahman is for such people.

The mahāvākyas of the Upaniṣads (the end of the Veda, the Vedānta)

constitute the primarily authoritative and decisive part of the Veda.

The Advaita view is that the meaning of the mahāvākyas is not in the

laying down of something to be done, but in pointing out certain self-

evident truths concerning the nature of Brahman.[81] The purport of the

mahāvākyas is the principle of advaita, non-duality. Śaṅkara arrives at

this conclusion by applying to the Vedic texts the six criteria for

establishing the purport of scripture as laid down by the Mīmāmsā. These

six criteria are: the unity of the initial and concluding passages, the

recurrence of theme, a new conclusion sought to be brought out, the

fruitfulness of such conclusion, the commendation and criticism of it throughout, and the argument throughout.[82] In applying these criteria to the Veda Śankara uses as a guideline the accepted principle of interpretation, if what is said subsequently contradicts what is said earlier and if the sense of the later portion is unintelligible unless the earlier passage is abrogated (transcended) this should be done. To follow Śankara's argument through each of the six criteria over the entire Veda would be a long process, not immediately germaine to this study. It is sufficient to state that in each case Śankara concludes that the main thrust of the Veda is advaita and to summarize his argument:

> The Upanisads are the end of the Veda.
> The purport of the Upaniṣads is advaita
> (arrived at by using the six rules for
> determining purport). Since the cognition
> of advaita cannot arise without sublating
> the notion of difference, this should be
> done. Further, since the authority of a
> passage is established if able to generate
> certain and fruitful knowledge, and, the
> Upanisads remove ignorance and delusion and
> can produce moksa, advaita is the purport of
> the Veda.[83]

The principle of advaita finds its classic expression in the mahāvākya "tat tvam asi" (that thou art) found in the Chandogya Upanisad. To Śankara this mahāvākya asserts the identity of ātman and Brahman; this knowledge constitutes moksa and is found only in the Veda. While ultimately illusory itself, the Veda points to Reality; it can lead one to moksa in the same way as the dream of a snake can produce real symptoms of fear.[84]

Reason plays an important but limited role in Advaita. Reason functions at the epistemic level of life. It enables us to order, regulate, and plan our lives through an understanding of the world around us.

But, because the world reason knows has only limited reality itself,

reason cannot aid us in the realization of advaita, moksa. There is no

ontological reason, of the sort developed by Kant, in Indian philosophy.

Reason generates nothing of its own, but works only with what is

supplied by the senses or śabda. The role reason plays in scriptural

interpretation is "brush clearing". It is used to determine the purport

of scripture by means of the use of the criteria for determination,

guided by the principles of interpretation.[85]

Reason is also important in removing the false ascriptions we give

to Brahman, superimposing attributes where there are none.[86] One uses

the via negativa (negative way) to negate all positive statements

concerning Brahman. By means of reason obscurity is stripped away and we

face the truth directly. Murti describes the relationship between reason

and revelation as follows:

> Thus, scripture and reasoning reach a
> decisive conclusion. By itself
> reasoning is useless, while by themselves
> mere scriptural statements cannot remove
> doubt.[87]

The mediate knowledge of Brahman gained through scripture and

reasoning can become immediate through hearing the mahāvākyas, resulting

in moksa, the natural state of the ātman, from which there is no rebirth:

> Liberation is not transitory but is
> rather the very nature of the eternally
> liberated Self.[88]

An example of this process, the realization of one's true identity, is

found in the case of a prince kidnapped by robbers in his childhood who

is unaware of his identity, but who, immediately upon being told,

realizes himself to be a prince.[89] Simply hearing the mahāvākyas has

the power to produce moksa for the properly prepared adept due to the

numinous power inherent in them. Such sentences are considered to be "flash-lights" of the eternal truth. By concentrating upon the mahāva-kyas the adept is able to invoke their power to remove avidyā, reveal truth (dharma), and realize release (moksa); in this manner the mediate knowledge·of Brahman becomes the divine intuition of Brahman, tat tvam asi.[90]

Once moksa has been realized the Veda is recognized as ultimately unreal as all empirical experience is transcended in the experience of the one Reality, Brahman. The Veda is "the ladder" by means of which one realizes moksa. Once it is realized "the ladder" is no longer necessary; the jīvanmūkti transcends its authority.

Śaṅkara's concept of scripture and its interpretation may be summed up as follows; the Veda reveals the truth that ātman and Brahman are identical. This truth is "saving knowledge" which can precipitate moksa and end samsāra. Through reason we can determine the purport of scripture, remove our false ascriptions to Brahman, and understand the truth. Moksa is realized when this truth becomes immediate, experienced; without the Veda, moksa cannot be realized, but once advaita is realized the Veda is no longer needed. Śaṅkara's philosophical system is based upon the revealed word for both knowledge of dharma and the realization of moksa.

> Both the Purva and Uttara Mimamsa
> (the Vedanta) do not profess to be
> anything more than an Exegesis of
> the Revealed Word (the Veda)[91]

Aquinas

> For such things as spring from God's
> will, and beyond the creature's due, can
> only be known to us through being
> revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in
> which the Divine Will is made known to
> us.[92]

Following the format established in the Śaṅkara section discussion

begins with Aquinas's theory of knowledge.

There is no immediate knowledge; all knowledge is mediated by the

intellect.[93] Natural knowledge is based upon the senses, and we learn

about objects through the linking of our sensory experience with intel-

lectual ideas.[94] The object is perceived by the sense organs, an image

is created in the mind, the intellect adds its knowledge of first

principles and universals and examines the image for its nature; finally,

the intellect checks the judgements made against the first principles for

accuracy. Truth is the agreement between reason which judges and the

reality which the judgement affirms.[95] It is the creation of the inter-

mediary species (image) that allows the senses to become one with the

object without identity.[96] It is the first principles which guarantee

that what we hold to be true intellectually is a fair representation of

what exists physically. They are the first concepts developed from our

initial contacts with sense experience, preformed seeds rather than fully

developed innate ideas.[97] The difference in opinion between Śaṅkara and

Aquinas regarding the process of "knowing" is clearly stated by Aquinas:

> Natural light does not confer upon us
> knowledge of material things by participation
> alone in their eternal essences. It still
> requires the intelligible species which it
> abstracts from things themselves.[98]

Man is a composite of body and soul.[99] The body ties man to the

empirical world of the senses, but his soul, being immaterial itself,

gives man some understanding of immaterial substances like universals,
angels and God. Aquinas argues for the immortality of the soul on two
grounds; the soul knows corporeal things which would be impossible if it
were corporeal itself, and it performs operations in which the body plays
no part, such as thinking.[100] The soul is, by nature, immaterial, sub-
stantial, and immortal:

> The principle of intellectual activity,
> which we term the human soul, is a bodiless
> and completely substantial principle. This
> principle, also termed the mind or intellect,
> can act without the body having an intrinsic
> part in the activity. Nothing can act inde-
> pendently unless it is independent.[101]

Each rational soul is infused into the individual by its creator, God.[102]

The effect reflects its cause; therefore, the soul's ability to
know is due to its participation in God's rationality:

> For the light of natural reason itself is a
> participation in the divine light.[103]

However, because the effect always falls short of the cause, man's reason
is finite and subject to error. Further, while man's soul may constitute
the substantial form of the body making it human, man is not identified
simply with his soul. The soul may participate in the world of immaterial
entities, but the body participates in the material world. As is the
case with other animals, man learns by means of his senses. Poised within
the great chain of being at the pivotal point where heaven and earth,
immaterial and material meet, the body provides the soul with objects of
knowledge.[104] The intellective processes of the soul, which know and
contemplate the universals, require the material base which the body can
provide because it is aware of individuals as being. This awareness
comes from the exterior senses, and the interior senses distinguish,
discriminate, and preserve in memory what the exterior senses provide.[105]

> As form the soul subsumes into itself all
> those lower formalities which the body as an
> organized entity, animate, vegetative and
> corporeal, already possesses, so that the
> matter which it ultimately embraces is not
> merely the body of an animal but the funda-
> mental materia prima itself. The soul
> penetrates to the deepest metaphysical root
> of the man; it does not just confer ration-
> ality on an ape or galvanize a corpse.[106]

The description of "knowing" given above is a good example of how the elements of body and soul work in concert in the act of knowing.

Man's composite nature allows him to gain knowledge of God from two sources: the world and divine revelation. As the creator of the world, God is reflected in it. Self-sufficient, God is infinite Being, whose perfection overflows into a hierarchy of participated beings.[107] Unlike the lila of Brahman, God's creation of the world is an intentional act, springing from his goodness:

> Things proceed, as so many determined effects,
> from the infinite perfection of God, according
> to the determination of His intelligence and
> will.[108]

The diversity of things is not due to an illusion, which is external to the substantial nature of God, but is real and necessary to reflect the totality of his perfection,

> Accordingly his simple and unique reality is
> reflected from creatures by diverse and dis-
> similar facets. Diversity of things is
> therefore necessary, so that divine perfection
> should be imitated.[109]

Man's natural knowledge of God is rooted in the world. Each of Aquinas's "Five Ways", his proofs for the existence of God, starts from something we have observed in the sensible world and argues back from the material effect to the immaterial cause.

Man's ability to know God by means of reason alone is limited by the

finitude of reason. The knowledge of God we obtain from the world is

always imperfect·

> Our knowledge of God is only an image of
> Him; it is a less than perfect representation,
> as the effect falls short of the cause.[110]

The likeness between man and God allows for knowledge of some truths

by natural reason; for example, that God exists. The unlikeness

between man and God means that man's unaided reason can never know God's

nature; we can know that God exists but not how, in what manner, he

exists. This is because God, as the eternal cause of the world,

necessarily stands outside its temporal order. Mascall makes this point

in commenting on Aquinas's argument for God's existence from motion:

> He does indeed make it plain that the first
> mover, just because it is itself unmoved,
> must be of a radically different nature from
> all the other terms in the series; that it
> is, in fact, not merely the beginning of the
> series, but outside it.[111]

These facts present a problem because some of the truths beyond man's

rational grasp are necessary for his salvation.

Salvation, to Aquinas, meant the restoration of man's nature to its

original perfection, and the attainment of the beatific vision of God in

heaven. Man's original perfection was lost by means of an act of

willfulness so heinous that it corrputed man's nature in perpetuity. The

instrument of man's salvation is God, who takes human nature upon himself

and restores man's lost freedom through Jesus Christ, the God/man, who

though innocent himself, pays the price for mankind's sins with his

sacrificial death.[112] The knowledge of this saving act and of man's

final end is beyond the ability of man's natural reason. Therefore, God

has provided revelation:

> Man's whole salvation, which is in God,
> depends upon the knowledge of this truth.
> Therefore, in order that the salvation of
> men might be brought about more fitly and
> more surely, it was necessary that they
> should be taught divine truths by divine
> revelation.[113]

As well as divine truths beyond man's grasp, revelation also contains truths which are discoverable by reason but require exceptional ability and a great length of time to work out. Revelation makes these truths available to all, reflecting God's grace and desire to save all mankind. Finally, imparting these truths in revelation ensures that they will be free of the errors which might occur because of man's corrputed reasoning.[114]

God's revelation of himself and his will for mankind is in the sacred scripture, the foundation of the Christian faith:

> For our faith rests upon the revelation made
> to the apostles and prophets, who wrote the
> canonical books.[115]

The Church is the guardian of the sacred Scripture by the authority vested in her by Christ, through Peter and the apostles, and also possess an unwritten Rule of Faith, handed down to succeeding generations to ensure that the practices and observances of the faithful will be consistent with scriptural teaching.[116] She also provides the Creeds as an aid for the common people:

> Revealed truths, contained in Holy Scripture,
> are set forth diffusely, in a variety of styles,
> and sometimes obscurely, so that for faith to
> be elicited about its text disciplined
> investigation is demanded, and this, all who
> need to know cannot manage for themselves,
> for most, busied with other concerns, cannot
> give themselves to study. Hence the need
> to compile from its pages a concise summary
> to be proposed for everybody's belief. This
> is the Creed, which is not added to Holy Scripture,
> but rather drawn from it.[117]

While God is the author of scripture, ensuring its inerrancy, the meaning of scripture is not always self-evident.

Theology, the science concerning scripture and God, is the highest speculative science because its first principles are certain, revealed by God, and yielding certain results.[118] The theologian, guided by the doctrines of the Church, draws out the meaning of scripture and its implications for man's relations with God and his fellows, refutes errors in understanding, and contemplates the scriptural truths.[119] In discerning the meaning of scripture Aquinas distinguishes four senses of scripture: the literal, the allegorical, the tropological, and the anagogical. The allegorical sense refers to the way the Old Law signifies the things of the New, the tropological sense refers to proper moral behaviour in the example of Christ, and the anagogical sense signifies what relates to eternal glory. All these spiritual senses are based upon the literal sense, presupposing it.[120] Interpretation of single passages is done in the light of the purport of the whole of scripture. A meaning given in a spiritual sense in one passage is reiterated elsewhere in the literal sense, safeguarding against error and misinterpretation.[121] Arguments drawn from scripture must be based upon its literal sense and, if reasoned accurately are authoritative:

> For although the argument based on human
> reason is the weakest, yet the argument
> from authority based on divine revelation
> is the strongest.[122]

Reason also has a role to play in clarifying our knowledge of God, in deepening our understanding of God's nature and his purpose for mankind. Reasoning from theological first principles, statements of doctrine, the theologian uses reason as an aid to better understanding of these doctrines:

> The purpose of faith is to reach under-
> standing of what is believed.[123]

The conclusions are checked against the same first principles to ensure

accuracy, i.e., conclusions which are consistent with the teachings of

the Church, and are, therefore, grounded in infallible revelation. Like

the first principles of philosophy those of theology are the guarantors

that the results of the argument are true.

Aquinas preferred the method of the _via negativa,_ combined with the

use of analogy. His use of the _via negativa_ consisted in the subtraction

from our idea of God all that is not pure actuality of being:

> Since we cannot know what God is, but
> rather what God is not, our method has to
> be mainly negative... What manner of being
> God is not may be known by eliminating
> characteristics that cannot apply to him,
> such as composition, change, and so forth.[124]

Aquinas does not stop with the _via negativa,_ for it supposes some

acquaintance with its contrary:

> We cannot be aware of a thing's existence
> without in some way, at least vaguely,
> perceiving what it is, knowledge of
> existence implies some knowledge of nature.[125]

We must be careful when we make positive assertions concerning God because

the only language available to us is rooted in the material world and

cannot transcend it; when we use material words to speak of immaterial

things, we speak symbolically.

Three types of analogy are recognized by Aquinas: one in which a

given perfection is present in one item but only attributed to another, a

second in which one perfection exists in somewhat different way in two or

more items, and a third in which some sort of remote resemblance or

community is implied between two items that have no identity either in

reality or in signification.[126]   In the first case we attribute goodness

to a man, but recognize that God <u>is</u> Goodness itself. An example of the second type of analogy is the recognition that God holds power over creation in a manner different from the power that a monarch holds over his country. The third recognizes that while God and man are related as Creator to creature God is, in reality, "wholly other"; when we make attributions to God we recognize that they exist in Him in all possible perfection and are unitarily held, unlike the many attributes of a man. A man is many things, any and all of these may cease to be; God <u>is</u> eternally:

> Consequently God, who contains all perfections,
> should not be compared to created natures as
> common to proper, nor as unity to number, nor
> as centre to radii, but as perfect actuality
> to imperfect actualities.[127]

This examination of Aquinas's view of scripture, and of his views regarding the two ways we come to knowledge of God (world/scripture), illustrates his conception of the proper relationship between reason and revelation. While reason can put us on the way to understanding the perfect truth, which God will disclose to us after death, its role is primarily one of clarification, as an aid to understanding revelation. It is the truths of revelation that allow us to clarify, interpret, and place within a meaningful context our experience of the world. Only God can save, and he saves whom he pleases, but man can learn about, and prepare for, his final end, the beatific vision of God in heaven, through scripture:

> Hence, while in principle there is a certain
> limited knowledge of God which is accessible
> to human reason as such, in practice it is
> only in the light of revelation that the
> human reason can function adequately and
> obtain, even within its own proper limits, a
> knowledge of God which is free from error.[128]

Kamalaśila

> The Truths, and the Rules of the Order,
> which I have set forth and laid down for
> you all, let them, after I am gone, be
> the Teacher of you.[129]

Central to Buddhism and its doctrine of salvation is the denial of a substantial self; twenty-five hundred years of Buddhist philosophy attest to this. The cardinal doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) maintains that all things are empty (śunya) of independent being, "own being" (svabhāva); reality is an all-encompassing transitoriness. The immediate intuition of this highest reality, the timeless truth that all is śunya is termed enlightenment. While the content of enlightenment cannot be expressed discursively, it has been referred to by Kamalaśila as the experience of the non-perception of all dharmas.[130] The result of the experience of śunya is freedom from suffering and an accurate perception of reality (nirvāna). Nirvāna, like the experience, cannot be given discursive definition; the most one can do is liken it to a constancy amid the all-encompassing transitoriness.

We do not recognize, and therefore are prevented from experiencing, this highest, timeless truth because our perception of reality is limited, obscured by karmic impurity, ignorance and desire (tanha). Not recognizing that a substantial self is an illusion we allow our perception of it to dominate our world-view; we see things as they relate to us. The result of this limited perception is attachment, passions, suffering, and rebirth (samsara). If we want to expand and purify our perception of reality we must remove our ignorance and impurity. It is within this framework that we must place Kamalaśila's views regarding knowledge and reality.

Kamalaśila accepts two levels of awareness of reality as it is,

paratantra (i.e. pratityasamutpada); parikalpita and parinispanna. Pari-
kalpita is the level of awareness of paratantra in which subjectivity and
objectivity are believed to exist. Knowledge at this level is "theory-
impregnated" as discussed by Potter in Chapter One of this paper. This is
the level of awareness of unenlightened beings in samsāra. Parinispanna is
the level of awareness concerning paratantra that does not discriminate
subject and object. This is the level of awareness of enlightened beings
who "perceive" reality just as it is. It is the highest level of awareness
of reality, composed of the timeless truth that all is śunya. From this
level of perception nirvāna and samsāra are seen to be non-different.
Karma-phrin-las describes this:

> Some think about Nirvāna as different from
> what is manifested by Śamsāra (the epistemic
> referent of the situation); it is by thinking
> of Samsāra and Nirvāna as each being identical
> in the immediate, psychic event that the logical
> constructions of Samsāra and Nirvāna are
> resolved in noetic being (chos-sku) as such
> and that expectations and fears, which
> accompany all fictions come to an end by
> themselves.[131]

Experiencing śunya does not entail that paratantra disappears. It
does mean that the objects of awareness at this level no longer have any
power to bind us to them. Streng notes:

> The things of the apparent world are not
> destroyed, but they are reevaluated in
> such a way that they no longer have the
> power emotionally and intellectually to
> control human life.[132]

Words are a function of the level of paratantra. They are conven-
tional tools which impose difference where there is none; if all things
are devoid of svabhāva, there are no real, separate entities to be named
by words. The Buddhist position is that words have conventional meaning,
but there are no facts to back up the convention:

> We do not entirely deny the fact of words
> having their "import", for the simple reason
> that this is well-known even to the meanest
> cowherd. What we do deny, however, is the
> character of Reality which the other party
> impose upon the Import - not the Import itself.133

However, scripture can play a vital role in starting one on the path.134 Scripture uses the convention of words to point out the existence of a level of awareness of reality that is higher than that in which one is bound. In this sense, it is revelation (parivartina); it points to the highest reality. Scripture expresses in conventional terms the intuition of the reality experienced by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

In the first Bhavanakrama Kamalaśila sets out, in detail, the proper means of attaining enlightenment, by means of the One Vehicle Path composed of study (śrutamayi) of the texts, and investigation (cintamayi) and contempation (bhavanamayi) of śunya.

> (It was written) for the purpose of
> refuting what he considered to be
> serious misconceptions about the Path
> and establishing the correct philoso-
> phical theory and meditational praxis
> of the Mahayana by means of concise
> explanations supported by quotations
> from numerous Sutras.135

The treatise begins with the statement that Mahayana is comprised of three things: compassion, bodhicitta, and realization. Compassion is the root of all; it is the place where the path to Buddhahood, enlightenment, begins. From compassion springs bodhicitta, the will to reach enlightenment for the benefit of all suffering beings. Combined with practice, compassion and bodhicitta lead to enlightenment.136 Practice is vital:

> Enlightenment cannot be realized without
> practice (pratipatti); this practice
> consists, to state it briefly, in following
> both the path of gnosis (prajña) and the
> appropriate means (upaya) i.e. compassion;

these two should be practiced and
realized jointly; no progress is possible
if only one is insisted upon.[137]

Unlike Śaṅkara, Kamalaśila asserts that knowledge alone is insufficient

for enlightenment; compassion is not simply a moral virtue, preparatory

to achieving freedom, but an essential ingredient of both salvation and

the means to it. In support of this assertion Kamalaśila refers to the

authority of scripture.

To accept prajñā alone would contradict the
teaching of the Buddha; in fact such a theory
as that gnosis alone leads to Enlightenment
disagrees with what we read in the Holy texts.[138]

Both means and gnosis are necessary to avoid the extremes of affirmation

and negation; that is, to practice the Middle Path.

Enlightenment derives from three things: śrutamayī (study),

cintāmayī (investigation), bhāvanāmayī (contemplation). By means of

śrutamayī one ascertains the meaning of the truths revealed by the Buddha

expounded in the texts. Cintāmayī draws out the implicit, as well as the

explicit, meaning of the texts by means of logic (yukti) and authority

(āgama). Bhāvanāmayī completes the process by making immediate in experi-

ence the mediate truth.[139]

One must begin the quest where one is, at the parikalpita level of

awareness of paratantra. Here, scripture is the basis for the Path.

Although language belongs to this level it can be used to reach the

Unconditioned;[140] it is helpful in removing the obstacles of ordinary

experience.[141] What does scripture teach?

The sutras of the great Vehicle - teaches
(sic) us that the only reality is the non-
production of things; all the rest is
unreal; from the absolute point of view we
cannot speak either of origination or non-
origination, because both notions imply a
duality, and reality is beyond all sorts of

relative notions; whatever we say or
predicate is a non-entity.[142]

The truth of scripture must be confirmed by yukti. What is the result when the purport of the sutras is subjected to yukti?

> The consequence is that from the absolute
> point of view things are non-originated.
> We may speak of the origination of things
> only from the conventional point of view.[143]

Finally, the truth must be made "evident", i.e., experienced directly in contemplation.

The proper meditational technique is set out in great detail with advice for the removal of obstacles to samadhi (deep trance). While Kamalasila and Santaraksita are known as establishing a synthesis of the Madhyamaka and Yogacara schools there is disagreement with the Vijñavadins on a couple of points. Regarding cittamatra (mere mind), Kamalasila holds that the recognition of a lack of subject object differentiation in cognition is only another step on the path; one must move beyond cittamatra to the recognition that mind too is not absolutely real.[144] He rejects the theory that there are three separate paths for three different types of people, leading to three different forms of bodhi, with a further group permanently excluded from attaining enlightenment. There is only one Path (ekayana), which is of certain meaning and which asserts that all sentient beings will attain Buddhahood.[145] Scriptural statements which seem to assert these two Vijñavadin positions as absolute are meant only to introduce the uninformed to various steps on the Path; they are "skillful means":[146]

> There is in short no liberation except by
> this Path. Therefore the Blessed One has
> stated that there is only One Vehicle; he
> preached the path of the sravaka, etc. only
> aiming to give listeners an oportunity to
> start to understand the true path.[147]

Having achieved a steady mind, removed obstacles to samadhi, resolved doubts,

and progressed from object concentration beyond even cittamātra, the yogin

acquires the experience of truth, i.e., the non-perception of all

dharmas.[148]

Developing in concert with gnosis has been the yogin's compassion.

By means of practices such as liberality, and meditations on the sufferings

of all sentient beings, the disciple has experienced a parallel deepening

of compassion. Practice of compassion alone would not suffice, because

the perfection of the various compassionate virtues leads to perfection

only when accompanied by gnosis.[149]

Gnosis and compassion must be developed in concert to avoid the pit-

falls of assertion and negation; this is the essence of the middle path.

It is this middle path with its view of the two levels of awareness of

reality (paratantra) and the higher reality (nirvāna) that allows for the

creation of the Bodhisattva who is free of the bonds of samsāra but who

remains in it to aid those still suffering in samsāra:

> Only in this way the apratisthitanirvāna,
> viz. the permanence of the Buddhas in the
> samsāra can have a meaning. The merit
> deriving from upāya results in a corporeal
> body in the Buddha-fields, etc. brought
> about by means such as liberality, etc.;
> the Buddhas are then not in nirvana. On
> the other hand, by gnosis they suppress all
> sorts of wrong ideations, and do not there-
> fore stay in samsāra, since samsāra is the
> source of all sorts of wrong ideations.[150]

While from the absolute point of view there is no difference between the

Bodhisattva and the profane,

> Still there is a difference; the yogin like
> the magician recognizes the illusion for
> what it is and therefore he has no attach-
> ment to it, because he knows that it is not
> real: the profane on the contrary takes it
> to be real and feels attachment to it.[151]

The Bodhisattva does not deny conventional reality; he uses it for the purpose of bringing others to the truth.

In summary, we can say that for Kamalaśila scripture is the basis of the Path to enlightenment. It contains the revelation (parivartina) that there is a way out of samsāra. This revelation is backed by Śakyamuni's experience and can be verified by each person for himself. Enlightenment is unlikely without scripture, but knowledge of scripture is not sufficient on its own to cause enlightenment. The higher Reality, śunya, nirvāna is also of the nature of compassion. By means of a practice which purifies knowledge and compassion and leads to the experience of their intermingling, śunya can be experienced and enlightenment achieved:

> The cessation of accepting everything (as
> real) is a salutary cessation of phenomenal
> development. No dharma anywhere has been
> taught by the Buddha of anything.[152]

It is apparent that the three writers examined in the comparative study above hold different conceptions regarding the nature of reality per se. The empirical world has at best a tentative reality for Śankara; only Brahman is absolutely real. To Aquinas the empirical world is fully real but limited in terms of being; only God is fully actualized. Reality, according to Kamalaśila, can be perceived from two levels of awareness, the highest perception being a non-dual awareness which is contained within the all-encompassing transitoriness. Yet, it is maintained by "global" theologians, a common intellectual ground can be established. Using the data provided in the initial pages of this chapter a "global theology" on scripture will be stated, and critiqued, in order to establish if the contention of "global" theologians is valid.

The content of the "global theology" on scripture is as follows. Each of the religions is grounded in revelation. All of them view scripture as an instrumental means to attain salvation/release. Reason plays an important but limited role in each tradition. Only one of these statements survives close examination; the others lead to a misunderstanding of the traditions studied and are reductionist in terms of religion "as such".

The content of revelation is understood differently in each of the three traditions. For Aquinas it is saving information about God, the universe, man, and man's relationship to God, which is given to man by God Himself in scripture. This knowledge comes only in this manner. The instrumental function and authority of scripture are never transcended (while man is on earth). Salvation comes by means of grace and consists in the beatific vision of God in heaven which occurs after death. To Śaṅkara release comes from the immediate experience of the Vedic revelation that ātman is Brahman, the truth of which can be experienced and validated in samādhi by a properly prepared adept. The preparation and the experience are the product of self-effort, and the instrumental function and authority of scripture, having served their purpose, are transcended upon release. Kamalaśīla believed that revealed in scripture is the fact that the highest reality is devoid of mental constructs (śūnya); this would include concepts such as God, Brahman, soul and ātman. Enlightenment is the result of self-effort on the One Vehicle Path, and one is guided on this path by the three-fold method supervised by a guru. Scripture provides a guide to reason and practice and is a measure for one's experience, but is transcended in the enlightenment experience.

Clearly these three thinkers disagree regarding the nature of

absolute reality and man's final end. Two of them claim that the truth-claims of their faith can be validated through meditative experience. It is possible to say that their experience of absolute reality is the same but expressed in culturally variant ways only if one ignores their truth-claims. The statement, "Each of these religions is grounded in revelation", ignores these conflicting claims, and gives no indication of what the content of revelation is taken to be in Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism. It is reductionist regarding religion "as such", because it ignores the variety of views about the "sacred" which is the referent of religion, what revelation purports to be about.

The statement that "all of them view scripture as an instrumental means to attaining salvation/release", is also misleading and reductionist. It is misleading in that it ignores the different emphasis placed upon scripture in each of the traditions. In Christianity the authority of scripture is never transcended; it is the only access to the level of absolute reality in this life. Scripture is exceptionally important in Advaita Vedānta Hinduism; Śaṅkara recognizes no other means of release than the hearing of the mahāvākyas but even with this strong position the authority of the Veda is transcended in the immediate experience of release (mokṣa). Kamalaśīla sees scripture as a valuable aid to attaining enlightenment, but its importance is tempered for him by the guidance of the guru, the practice followed, and the levels of meditation gained. All of these important points are unaccounted for in the g.t.2 on scripture.

Also ignored are the conflicting beliefs regarding the nature of salvation/release. For Kamalaśīla and Śaṅkara release is possible in this lifetime while for Aquinas the beatific vision comes after death.

To Aquinas the beatific vision is a communion experience, to Śaṅkara it is a unitary experience of identity, and for Kamalaśīla it is an experience devoid of mental constructs. Ignoring these differences between the traditions reduces the richness and the variety of religious views on man's final end and the means by which it is accomplished.

The statement, "Reason plays an important but limited role in each tradition", is accurate. Aquinas distinguished between a kind of truth that could be known only by means of revelation and a kind that could be shown by argument from first principles. For him, reason tends to lead to the acceptance and clarification of revelation, which, in turn, will never contradict reason. To Śaṅkara reason was important in determining the primary message of the Veda; yet moksa results only when this intellectual knowledge becomes experienced directly in samadhi. For Kamalaśīla, reason is interdependent with compassion and meditation in attaining enlightenment. Without reason one cannot attain enlightenment, nor can one attain enlightenment by means of reason alone.

The implications of these divergent positions are devastating to g.t.2. Without agreement upon the content of revelation which forms the basis of each of the traditions, there is no common or "global" thought. One cannot escape from this conclusion by selecting other representatives from the same traditions because it has been established that each of them is of such importance that he cannot be ignored in presenting the Christian, Hindu, or Buddhist view. Therefore any attempt to construct a "global theology" on scripture by means of a comparative study is doomed to fail. This illustrates the impossibility of constructing an overall religious philosophy which contains "global" thought on various religious issues; such a philosophy would necessarily have to contain references to

revelation, and it has been shown that there is no common ground on this matter in major segments of three world religions.

To conclude, the results of the comparative study on scripture confirm the conclusions of the earlier argument; g.t.2 is not viable, nor is it valuable. The implications of this for g.t.1 will form the subject matter of the final chapter of the thesis.

Chapter 4

> What will be the attitude of one who
> experiences sympathy with a variety of
> conflicting ideals of life? It seems
> that he will be most at home in a liberal
> society, in a society in which there are
> variant environments but in which no ideal
> endeavours to engross, and determine the
> character of, the common morality. He
> will not argue in favour of such a society
> that it gives the best chance for the
> truth about life to prevail, for he will
> not consistently believe that there is such
> a thing as the truth about life. Nor will
> he argue in its favour that it has the best
> chance of producing a harmonious kingdom of
> ends, for he will not think of ends as
> necessarily capable of being harmonized.[153]

The lack of agreement between the traditions studied regarding the content of revelation, combined with the revelatory base of each of the religions, has serious implications for the study of comparative religion, (g.t.1), especially in light of the earlier argument that there can be no universal viewpoint from which the claims of each tradition can be evaluated.

We must take seriously the claim made by religious traditions that the nature of absolute reality is ineffable, but that this reality is embodied in scripture in an accurate, but limited, manner. This is a paradox that states that absolute reality, whether conceived of as "being" or "becoming", is both knowable and unknowable. Such a paradox reflects the metaphysical belief that absolute reality, while it encompasses the conventional level of reality, surpasses it in all possible ways. This holds in the case of Buddhism as well as for Christianity and Hinduism; while samsara and nirvana may be non-different, to the unenlightened there is a vast qualitative difference. The implications this metaphysical belief has for the study of religion are as follows. First,

when we study religions we are studying a human phenomenon which is, therefore, open to empirical method. This empirical method is used internally by each of the traditions. In addition to doctrines, religious traditions provide texts which teach the believer how to experience absolute reality for himself, or come into closer communion with it. These texts are public and open to philosophic critique as to internal consistency. Ritual is largely public and open to the scrutiny of social scientists. What is not open to scientific examination is the content of the mystical experience itself, the revelation of absolute reality. This, it is claimed, occurs at a level of consciousness beyond the limitations of time and space, and therefore, beyond the realm of intellectual critique, comparison, and evaluation. The second implication that the paradox of absolute reality has for the study of religion is the recognition that the study of religion will not provide knowledge concerning the nature of its referent, as it exists in itself. This is one of the areas in which the methodology of g.t.2 is flawed. It presupposes that one can learn the nature of the referent of religion by piecing together reports of it into a critical theory. Such a critical theory makes quasi-religious claims. Commenting on this Robert Bellah says,

> If one believes that the critical theories
> with which one explains religion are truer
> than the religious beliefs themselves, then
> one is opting for an ultimate stance which
> is at least quasi-religious.[154]

The logical consequence of the above is that we must accept the plurality of religions as a necessity, given the paradox of absolute reality and the inaccessibility of the content of religion to empirical methods of verification.

Also entailed by these conclusions is the recognition that religion

will always be open to the atheist critique of it. The atheist asserts that even if a realm of absolute reality exists, or a perception of reality unlike conventional means of perception, which is unlikely, if it is unknowable in its essence, either as being or becoming, by empirical means, then it is irrelevant to man. If it is beyond the empirical level of reality, it cannot be demonstrated by reference to nature, nor by philosophical argument. This division is between those who do not accept verification from any source other than the conventional, empirical realm of reality, and those who assert the existence of another realm of reality and its ability to verify the revelatory experience. Ken Wilber in his study of several modern physicists, who are also mystics, points out that the majority of his subjects drew the line between science and religion at verification. According to such physicists as Planck, Einstein, and Eddington, as well as the philosophers Kant and Lotze, religion and science are two different domains, equally legitimate, between which there can properly be neither conflict, nor compromise, nor parallels.[155]

Methodologically the acceptance of the paradox of absolute reality, at once knowable and unknowable, means that those of us who study religion and religions, must recognize that comparative religion cannot settle the age old question of whether or not a level of absolute reality exists, or whether it is personal or non-personal in nature, both personal and non-personal, or neither personal nor non-personal. This is not relativism in the sense that God exists _only_ if I believe; the existence of God is a matter of fact, whether I believe or not. Each of the religious traditions studied maintains that the existence of this absolute reality has important consequences for mankind; the atheist denies this and points

to religion's assertion of the final ineffability of this reality, maintaining that it makes it irrelevant to mankind. Those who believe point to the partial knowledge of God obtained from the empirical realm; those who do not believe point out that such knowledge is based upon a metaphysical presupposition that they do not accept (the existence of a realm of reality that both encompasses the conventional realm and surpasses it). The frank recognition of the paradox of absolute reality drives a permanent wedge between science, which uses only the method of empirical verification, and religion, which uses other means of verification (mystical experience) as well. Attempts to collapse these two realms and use one methodology for both are futile,

> To strive for an end that cannot be
> secured is futile, and the hope of
> satisfaction there is illusory.[156]

The scientific study of religion cannot make, nor defend, metaphysical speculations:

> Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one
> must be silent.[157]

This separation of science and religion does not entail the evaluation that science is good, specific, knowledge, and that religion is bad, vague, and meaningless. The physicists studied by Wilber appeared to have a very different view of matters,

> Briefly the position is this. We
> have learnt that the exploration
> of the external world by the methods
> of physical science leads not to a
> concrete reality but to a shadow world
> of symbols, beneath which those methods
> are unadapted for penetrating. Feeling
> that there must be more behind, we return
> to our starting point in human consciousness
> the one centre where more might become
> known. There (in immediate inward con-
> sciousness) we find other stirrings, other
> revelations than those conditioned by the

world of symbols....¹⁵⁸

If it is metaphysics we want we must turn to the individual religious traditions. These traditions make metaphysical assertions and attempt to work out the human consequences of such assertions. Because the metaphysical assertions of the religions differ, and are beyond verification at the empirical level, there can be no sort of intertraditional evaluation of the sort envisaged by Lonergan and Meynell. Evaluation must be internal and experiential as well as logical and scientific. While the abandonment of the "one true religion" does entail some relativism it is certainly not of the "anything goes" variety. The seeker must examine and work out the rationality of his/her tradition's assertions, balance them against his/her presuppositions and experience in the world, and attempt to verify matters through meditation or contemplation. Each tradition has texts available to assist him/her. Recognizing the holistic nature of each tradition, the limitations of each in ultimate terms, and the value of a faith commitment in terms of understanding and quality of life, the seeker makes his way, guided by his/her tradition, those who have gone before.

Given the above, the best approach methodologically in the study of religion as such (g.t.1) is the study of individual traditions using the phenomenological method. By phenomenological method I refer to that method which seeks to understand a religious tradition as it is understood from within. This phenomenological method has further implications for the study of religion as such (g.t.1). As Hindu scholars, Christian scholars, and Buddhist scholars are aware, the phenomenological study of any one religion and its major and minor sects is a study requiring years, and involved knowledge of one or more textual languages, the

customs of the people who profess the religion, etc. Therefore, scholars who wish to study religion as such (g.t.1) by means of this method must recognize that they will be greatly dependent upon the scholars who choose to specialize. There are ways of minimizing this dependence. A scholar should have a good, overall grasp of at least one major eastern and one major western religious tradition, and should be able to check the translations of texts. Such a "working knowledge" of other languages is a contentious issue in the religious studies field. It is maintained by some scholars that only a thorough knowledge of a language is sufficient; others claim that the ability to check the various meanings of a term against a dictionary, combined with an understanding of the functional and contextual usage of a word, is sufficient. We must recognize Aristotle's mean between the extremes here, as well as human mental and physical limitations; while the scholar of religion as such (g.t.1) may never have as deep a grasp of the individual traditions as the specialist, there is no reason why such an individual cannot have a good overall understanding of two major traditions and their languages. The medical field recognizes the need for general practitioners as well as specialists, so should we.

While the phenomenological approach to religion must remain the overriding methodology, the scholar of religion as such (g.t.1) must make use of other disciplines and more limited methodologies of religion. For example, while on its own the functionalist approach to religion that studies religion simply by the manner in which it functions in human society or psychology is reductionist, it can add to the overall understanding of a scholar already steeped in the phenomenological approach. The scholar of religion as such must look to anthropology, sociology,

psychology, philosophy, and even physics, but he must not be trapped into reducing religion to any one aspect of it. Religion is an holistic phenomenon; it must be studied by means of an holistic method.

The mystic experience, revelation, is mediated by means of language. Two aspects of language are important here: its function in naming, and its function of conveying meaning. Each of these will be examined briefly.

Wittgenstein has pointed out that the "naming" function of language is not descriptive, but preparatory to description.[159] When I show you a carved piece of wood and say, "This is the king", all I have done is name a figure. Only if you are already familiar with the game of chess does the above statement alert you to the description of the piece and its function in the game of chess, i.e., the piece which must be "checked" in order to win the game, or, which moves in a certain prescribed manner.

The descriptive function of language is one of the aspects of conveying meaning. Consider the word "mother". The term will vary in meaning when used of woman with a small child or of a woman dressed in black cloak and hat, trimmed in white and adorned with a gold cross. To ignore the context of a word, either within the sentence structure, or in relation to extra linguistic references, is likely to lead to misunder-standing. In the above case, it could lead to the conclusion that a particular nun is the mother of a small child rather than the mother superior of a convent. Ignoring the traditional context of the word "revelation" has led some to believe that all religions believe the content of revelation to be the same; this theory has been refuted above.

These aspects of language, naming and conveying meaning, illustrate that language is symbolic in nature; it is a translation, a second order phenomenon which mediates between man and his empirical reality and, in

the case of scripture, between man and absolute reality. Words do not

stand simply for objects. If they did words would not be lexically

ambiguous; each word would have a precise meaning fixed through time.

The above examples indicate that this is not the case. The comparative

study of scripture within this paper graphically illustrates the lexi-

cally ambiguous nature of words. The word "revelation" varies in

meaning in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity. To take the word out

of context is to render it meaningless. In his discussion of the compar-

ability of mystic experiences, Katz comments:

> Choosing descriptions of mystic experience
> out of their total context does not provide
> grounds for their comparability but rather
> severs all grounds of their intelligibility
> for it empties the chosen phrases, terms,
> and descriptions of definite meaning.[160]

Meaning is dependent upon the relationship between the language symbols

used and the context, or "language game", within which they occur. Change

the context and you change the meaning, as illustrated by our examples

above. This linguistic relationship may mirror extra linguistic relation-

ships such as man's relationship to the empirical world and, possibly

in the case of religious language, man's relationship to the divine.

There has been much discussion recently regarding the possibility

that language possesses "deep structure", i.e., that the structure of

the relationships communicated by language is rooted in a common human

consciousness, or a common human consciousness itself rooted in divine

consciousness or with access to it.[161] The term "divine", like the term

"absolute reality", need not be taken ontologically; it connotes only a

significance and can properly be applied to either being or becoming.

One source of support for this view comes from the comparative study

above. Śaṅkara believed that language participates in the divine. This

is why the <u>Veda</u> can point beyond itself to <u>Brahman</u>. Aquinas's theory of

knowledge assumes the participation of the "higher" intellect, that

aspect of reason which allows us to acquire some knowledge of immaterial

substances. While Kamalaśīla maintains that language is strictly con-

ventional, it is only by means of the conventional that one can begin

the path to enlightenment. The conventional word opens the door to the

Divine; through <u>saṃsāra</u> comes <u>nirvāṇa</u>. Further support for the concept

of a "deep structure" to language is found in our ability to gain access

to the religious traditions of others. It is conceded that, without a

faith commitment one cannot really "know" another religion in an holistic

manner; however, by means of a sensitive interpreter of texts and tradi-

tions, I can, <u>as a Christian</u>, gain access to the religious world-view of a

Hindu or a Buddhist. This appears to provide support for the view that

this understanding is due to the common source of these symbols in the

depth of a shared human consciousness, which perhaps has some relation to

divine consciousness.

The themes of incarnation and rebirth occur in various cultures,

some widely separated by geography or historical time. The powerful image

of the phoenix, and the themes of Othello and Lear, still appeal to us.

Jung accounted for the universality of some symbols by positing the

collective unconsciousness, resevoir of the archetypes which are symbols

of, and from, the collective history of mankind. Northrup Frye discusses

our ability to comprehend others, and their myths and symbols:

> Man lives, not directly or nakedly in
> nature like the animals, but within a
> mythological universe, a body of
> assumptions and beliefs developed from
> his existential concerns. Most of this
> is held unconsciously.... Below the
> cultural inheritance there must be a
> common psychological inheritance, other-

> wise forms of culture and imagination
> outside our own traditions would not be
> intelligible to us.[162]

All language is symbolic, but it is in religion that the language of
myth and parable predominate. Religion claims to communicate the
incommunicable and finds myth best suited to its needs:

> Religion is embodied truth, not known
> truth, and it has in fact been trans-
> mitted far more through narrative,
> image, and enactment than through
> definitions and logical demonstrations.[163]

This may account for the failure to "demythologize the gospel" by Rudolf
Bultmann and others; remove the myth and you remove the meaning, for it
is by means of the vehicle of myth that we become connected to the deep
structures of our common human consciousness. Myth does not mean
illusion or unreality, rather it appears to embody truths not communi-
cable by any other means:

> In recent years the knowledge that
> noncognitive and nonscientific symbols
> are constitutive of human personality
> and society, are real in the fullest
> sense of the word, has deepened and
> consolidated.[164]

Meaning which uses myth as its vehicle is intuited, "grasped", in a far
deeper manner than meaning intuited by conventional language symbols and
their contexts.

Language, like the phenomena it mediates, is a paradox. While
conventional, and therefore restricted concerning metaphysical matters,
it appears to have the ability to point beyond itself, to "show" meta-
physical meaning by means of myth. While complete knowledge of the
ineffable is beyond us ordinarily, language appears to allow for the
communication of the incommunicable.

Methodologically this has several implications for the study of

religion as such (g.t.1). First, when discussing religious terms, such as revelation, scripture, etc., scholars must state the meaning of these terms with reference to their context. For example, "Revelation, in the Buddhist sense, may be taken to mean...". It is obvious from the critique of g.t.2 that this is not currently being done, and that the failure to clarify terms has led to confusion about, and misrepresentation of, individual religious traditions. It is conceded that this approach will allow for less to be said concerning religion as such (g.t.1) because areas of disagreement will show more prominently than any overlap; it is best to speak shortly, precisely, and accurately than to mislead. Secondly, because it appears that religious language has the ability to communicate beyond the level of the conventional, displaying evidence of a "deep structure", the use of a metalanguage in the study of religion as such is ruled out. The construction of a metalanguage allows for precision, comparison and evaluation, but it does not allow for holistic, mythic structures, the primary means of conveying religious meaning. The use of a metalanguage is likely to lessen, rather than deepen, our understanding of religion as an holistic phenomenon.

This discussion regarding meaning, and its conveyance by means of linguistic symbols, provides us with some guidelines as to the possible construction of a theory of religion as such that would be more comprehensive, less reductionist, than any existing models, whether functional, psychological, or whatever. Meaning depends on relationships between terms, whether language is used for conventional or metaphysical purposes. Given this, and the holistic nature of religion, it appears that it is best to approach the study of religion as such (g.t.1) from a structuralist perspective, i.e., to look for the structure of the relationships exhibited

by religion. This type of study has several advantages. First, because it looks at the structure of relationships it is able to encompass several currently used methodologies. In encompassing them, but extending beyond them, a structuralist approach would provide a better explanation than any singular method; its truth-value would be greater. Second, this approach appears well suited to the phenomenon of religion itself, and most likely to reflect its holistic nature. Third, such an approach, by providing a broad picture of religion, may enable us to see elements of religion which can be reduced to non-religious elements without the necessity of viewing the entire structure reductively. This allows for modern secular thought, as well as for the phenomenological approach to individual traditions. The phenomenological approach often misses phenomena which are reducible, for example, in the Freudian manner, because of its conscious subjectivity.[165] A structuralist approach is more likely to enable us to be critically evaluative without being reductionist.

Of all the current approaches to religion it seems that the structuralist approach has the most to offer in terms of allowing one to be both sympathetic and scholarly. One must keep in mind that all methods are aids to understanding, and must be open-ended and flexible. Because of its nature we will never fully "explain" religion; any methodology that becomes rigid and dogmatic loses explanatory power, either partially or fully. In the end, whatever method is used, the best tool for the study of religion as such (g.t.1), or individual traditions, is a sensitive scholar.

This paper has dealt with three issues. First was the refutation of what was termed g.t.2, on the grounds that its presuppositions were universalist, and incorrect; that its methodology, especially its use of terminology, was faulty, and its conclusions unsupportable, on the grounds of knowledge or from evidence supplied by specific religious traditions. The "rationalist school" of religious study, that believes there can be a universal viewpoint from which all religious world-views can be evaluated, was also refuted.

The second issue dealt with the implications for the study of religion entailed by the refutation of g.t.2. It was emphasized that the paradox of absolute reality, asserted by the religious traditions, must be taken seriously, and that no study of religion can claim to provide knowledge of the referent of religion, or establish which of the tradition's conception of the absolutely real is most probable. Also stressed was that this does not entail that the phenomenon of religion is _entirely_ beyond the scholar's grasp. While the content of revelation is beyond academic criticism, each religious system, as a human phenomenon (founded on revelation), is open to empirical study as to the internal consistency of its world-view: it was presupposed that revelation seeks to tell us something important and must, therefore, be couched in human terms, accessible to human understanding and scrutiny.

The role of language in conveying both conventional and religious meaning was discussed. It was suggested that meaning, in both conventional and religious terms, amounts to the conveying of relationships between words and their contexts. It was suggested that there is sufficient evidence to support further study of the possibility that language displays a "deep structure", and that this may account for the

ability of religious language and myth to point to absolute reality, conveying religious meaning, much of it cross-cultural, as well as conventional meaning.

The final issue dealt with was the implications of the study and following discussion for methodology in comparative religion. On the basis of the nature of religion, its language, and its referent, it was suggested that a structuralist approach to religion as such, combined with a phenomenological approach to individual religious traditions, is the procedure most likely to produce a theory of religion which is high in explanatory value and not reductionist. On the basis of the discussion of language, it was pointed out that scholars must be more precise in their definitions of religious terms; while a metalanguage was rejected on the grounds that it cannot convey an holistic meaning. Thus, the paper has provided a discussion of some of the contemporary problems in comparative religion, supported its contentions with a comparative study on scripture, and made short and long term suggestions as to how some of the problems which lead to a misunderstanding of both individual religious traditions and religion as such can be solved.

NOTES

[1] Saadya Gaon, <u>Book of Beliefs and Opinions</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 249.

[2] John Hick, <u>God and the Universe of Faiths</u> (London: MacMillan, 1973), 146.

[3] Harold Coward, <u>Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions</u> (New York: Orbis Books, 1985), 33.

[4] John Hick, <u>Death and Eternal Life</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 12.

[5] Ibid; in the chapter "On Method", Hick contrasts the older, or 'ptolemaic' religious view, in which one views one's own religion as the centre and height of the religious world, with the 'copernican' view, which sees Ultimate Reality at the centre and the various religions as overlapping responses to this Ultimate Reality (30/31). He argues that apprehensions of the Eternal arise "with the force of revelation" in enlightened spirits and mixes with human cultural, philosophical and historical influences to form the world faiths (82). While mutual influence between the religions of the kind claimed by Hick is not to be denied, the central doctrines of the various religions make truth-claims about the world which <u>they</u> say are not verifiable by means of human reason alone. These "apprehensions", according to the traditions themselves, do not merely arise with "the force of revelation", they <u>are</u> revelation; and the content of their claims is not dependent upon historical time or cultural influence, but is eternal/timeless.

This is true of Christianity, which claims uniqueness and universality. It claims that its central myth (the God/man) is also historical fact. Therefore, Hick's argument for the 'copernican' position is not reflective of basic, mainstream Christianity. In this sense Hick's framework cannot be said to be truly reflective of Christian thought. His terminology, however, <u>is</u> Christian. The term theology means, "the study of God and the relations between God and the universe..." (<u>Webster's New World Dictionary</u>). How this "theology" can claim to represent Buddhist thought is difficult to see. Both of these points will be discussed at length in the body of the paper.

Throughout I will criticize Hick's framework as being too broad to be relevant to any particular tradition, and as being at times based on Christian assumptions. As has just been indicated, and will be shown at greater length below, both criticisms are valid and not inconcistent with each other.

[6] Cantwell Smith, <u>Towards a World Theology</u> (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981), 5. Cf. Hick, <u>Death</u>, 34.

[7]Smith, ibid., 26.

[8]Hick, Death, 28.

[9]Ibid., 30.

[10]Albert Einstein, Ken Wilber, Quantum Questions (Boulder: Shambhala, 1985), 5.

[11]Ninian Smart, The Religious Experience of Mankind (New York: Collins, 1964), 461.

[12]Coward, Pluralism, 96.

[13]Hugo Meynell, "Towards A New Dialectic of Religions" Religious Studies, (Vol. 18 no. 4, 1982), 421.

[14]Smith, Towards, 50.

[15]Ibid., 113.

[16]Ibid., 82

[17]Meynell, Towards, 419.

[18]Ibid., 421.

[19]Smith, Towards, 65.

[20]Terence Penelhum, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. IX no. 1, March 1979), 151.

[21]See my 3, 4.

[22]Bernard Lonergan, Insight (London: Longmans, 1975), 568.

[23]Meynell, ibid., 429.

[24]Ibid., 431.

[25]Ibid., 426.

[26]Lonergan, Insight, 590.

[27]Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Dartman, Longman and Todd, 1971), 321.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 36.

[30]Ibid., 37.

[31]Ibid., 71.

[32]Ibid., 37.

[33]Ibid., 72.

[34]Ibid., 82.

[35]Harold Coward, "Is Modern Historical Consciousness Large Enough to Comprehend the Religious Experience of Scripture?", Religious Studies Bulletin, vol. 4 no. 3, Sept. 84, 136.

[36]Coward, Pluralism, 103.

[37]Ibid., 102.

[38]Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (New York: World Publishing, 1958), xiii.

[39]Coward, "Historical Consciousness", 128.

[40]Paul Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 8 (U.S.A.: MacMillian, 1967), 114.

[41]Karl H. Potter, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. III (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 119.

[42]Ibid., 9.

[43]The Four Noble Truths: There is suffering (dukkha), suffering is the result of craving (tanha), suffering can be destroyed, and the way to the destruction of suffering is by means of the Noble Eightfold Path.

[44]T. W. Rhys Davids (trs.), Buddhist Sutras (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1969), 150.

[45] Eva Dargyay, The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), 12.

[46] Ibid. To distinguish between the Hindu conception of the absolute (sat, cit, ananda) and the Buddhist conception of absolute, which is more a steady, constant perception within the encompassing transitoriness, the term "being" will be adopted referring to the Hindu conception, and the term "becoming" will be adopted for the Buddhist conception, where it is felt to be useful to distinguish the Hindu from the Buddhist view.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] For the Four Noble Truths see footnote 43. The Noble Eightfold Path is right views, right aims, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right contemplation.

[51] Rhys Davids, Buddhist Suttras, 112.

[52] T. W. Rhys Davids (ed.); Sacred Books of the Buddhists (London: Luzac and Company Ltd., 1966), 75/76.

[53] Edward Conze, A Short History of Buddhism (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980), 27.

[54] Edward Conze, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and Its Verse Summary (Bolinas: Four Seasons Foundation, 1975), chpt. 5, v. 103, 19.

[55] David Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 93.

[56] Ibid., 89.

[57] While Tucci provides the Tibetan and Sanskrit texts for the work, I am unable to read Tibetan and am not sufficiently competent in Sanskrit to read this text.

[58] Śaṅkara, Brahmasutrabhasya II 1.9, Potter, Encyclopedia, 146.

[59] D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1972), 88.

[60] S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, <u>Introduction to Indian Philosophy</u> (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1968), 171.

[61] <u>Antahkarana</u> is composed of <u>manas</u>, <u>buddhi</u>, <u>ahamkara</u>, and <u>citta</u> Datta, <u>Six Ways</u>, 48.

[62] Senses are neither the organ of sense or the capacity but a separate substance having its locus in the organ. It is composed of the quality sensed by it (Datta, ibid., 40).

[63] Chatterjee and Datta, <u>Introduction</u>, 180.

[64] Two conditions are required for drawing an inference: the cognition of the middle term (<u>hetu</u>), smoke, in the minor term (<u>paksa</u>), mountain, and a universal relation (<u>vyapti</u>) between the major and minor term. This universal relation is established by the uncontradicted experience of the relation between the two. Chatterjee and Datta, <u>Introduction</u>, 184/185. The number of times the relation is experienced is not relevant to the perception of a universal relation. Datta, <u>Six Ways</u>, 207. To be valid an inference must have three terms and three propositions: a subject under consideration (<u>paksa</u>), an object to be known in relation to the subject (<u>sadhya</u>), and a reason for relating the object to the subject. The three categorical propositions are set out in a formal syllogism and one of them <u>must</u> be affirmative while the others may be affirmative or negative. Chatterjee and Datta, <u>Introduction</u>, 182.

[65] Chatterjee and Datta, <u>Introduction</u>, 319.

[66] Ibid., 325.

[67] Datta, <u>Six Ways</u>, 175-184.

[68] Ibid., 337.

[69] K. S. Murty, <u>Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta</u> (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), 23.

[70] Ibid., 7.

[71] Harold Coward, <u>Sphota Theory of Language</u> (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), 43, 44. See also the discussion regarding the problems this causes regarding <u>advaita</u>; <u>sabda/Veda</u> as the <u>cause</u> of the world evolution infers independence from <u>Brahman</u>; therefore, Sankara must differentiate between "material" and "efficient" causes. He faces the same problem with <u>maya</u>.

[72] Murty, <u>Revelation</u>, 40-50.

[73] Śaṅkara, <u>Upadeśasāhasrī</u> II 18.29-31, Potter, <u>Encyclopedia,</u> 242.

[74] Mandana Misra, <u>Brahmasiddi</u> I.9, Potter, <u>Encyclopedia,</u> .ibid., 352.

[75] Ibid., 71.

[76] Murty, <u>Revelation,</u> 100

[77] Potter, <u>Encyclopedia,</u> 52, 53.

[78] Ibid., 39.

[79] Śaṅkara, <u>Brahmasūtrabhasya</u> I.1.4, Potter, <u>Encyclopedia,</u> 125/6.

[80] Ibid., 122.

[81] Coward, <u>Sphota,</u> 40.

[82] Murty, <u>Revelation,</u> 81.

[83] Ibid., 81, 86-88.

[84] Ibid., 100.

[85] T. R. V. Murti, "Revelation and Reason in Vedanta", Harold Coward, <u>Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Professor T. R. V. Murti</u> (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 68/69.

[86] Ibid., 68.

[87] Ibid., 63.

[88] Potter, <u>Encyclopedia,</u> 126.

[89] Coward, <u>Sphota,</u> 46/47.

[90] Harold Coward, "The Meaning and power of mantras in Bhartrhari's <u>Vakyapadīya</u>", <u>Studies in Religion</u> II, no. 4 Fall, 1982, 365.

[91] T. R. V. Murti, "Some Comments on the Philosophy of Language in the Indian Context", <u>Journal of Indian Philosophy</u> 2 (1974), 322.

[92] Thomas Aquinas, <u>Summa Theologica</u> Part III QQI-XXVI (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 1920), 10.

[93] F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (Great Britain: Pelican, 1955), 104.

[94] Anthony Kenny, Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 72.

[95] Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1951), 231.

[96] Ibid., 226.

[97] Ibid., 216.

[98] Aquinas, I.84.5, Summa Theologica, Gilson, Christian Philosophy ibid.

[99] Thomas Gilby, St. Thomas Aquinas Philosophical Texts (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 201.

[100] Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 187; see also Copleston, Aquinas, 164.

[101] Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia.lxxv.2; Gilby, Philosophical Texts, 196.

[102] Ibid., 125.

[103] Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 144.

[104] Copleston, Aquinas, 161-163; see also Summa Theologica Ia.lxxv.2.ad3, Gilby, Philosophical Texts, 196.

[105] Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 204-206.

[106] E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London: Libra, 1949), 58.

[107] Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 27.

[108] Ibid., 124.

[109] Aquinas, opusc. xiii Compendium Theologiae 72; Gilby, Philosophical Texts, 157.

[110] Aquinas, I Contra Gentes 29, Gilby, Philosophical Texts, 68.

[111] Mascall, Existence, 74.

[112] Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3a.i.2; Gilby, Theological Texts (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 277-279.

[113]Aquinas, _Summa_, 2.

[114]Ibid.

[115]Ibid., 14.

[116]Gilby, _Theological Texts_, 345.

[117]Ibid.

[118]Copleston, _Aquinas_, 74.

[119]Gilby, _Theological Texts_, 22.

[120]Aquinas, _Summa_, 17.

[121]Ibid.

[122]Ibid.

[123]Gilby, _Theological_, 345.

[124]Gilby, _Philosophical_, 67.

[125]Ibid., 68.

[126]Paul Edwards, _The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. 8_ (U.S.A.: MacMillan Publishing, 1967), 109.

[127]Gilby, _Philosophical_, 105.

[128]E. L. Mascall, _He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism_ (U.S.A.: Anchor Books, 1970), 25.

[129]Rhys Davids, _Sacred Books_, 171.

[130]Giuseppe Tucci, _Minor Buddhist Texts Part II: Serie Orientale Roma ix, 2_ (Roma: Instituto Italiano Peril medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1958), 171.

[131]Eva Dargyay, _The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet_ (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), 55.

[132] Frederick J. Streng, _Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning_ (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), 96.

[133] Ganganatha Jha (trs.), _The Tattvasangraha of Śāntaraksita with the Commentary of Kamalaśila_ (Baroda Oriental Institute, 1937), 469.

[134] The main body of works which would have been considered "authoritative" for Kamalaśila are the _Prajñaparamita, Ratnakula, Avatamsaka_ literature. David Seyfort Ruegg, _The Literature of the Madhayamaka School of Philosophy in India_ (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 7.

Two further points should be noted here. First, the _guru_/disciple relationship in Mahāyāna is _very_ important. The omniscient _guru_ guides the disciple according to his ability; he chooses the scripture, practice, and meditational technique most suited to his disciple. There is an implication for the concept of scripture here as the _guru_ can vary the scripture used, and _its interpretation_ according to the disciple's stage of development. The adjustment of teaching and practice to the disciple's level by the _guru_ is referred to as "skillful means". Second, the method used in debate by the Mādhyamaka philosophers, the _prasanga_ method of argument is considered to be a spiritual practice as well. The Mādhyamika takes no position himself, but draws out his opponent's argument until its innate contradictions reduce it to absurdity; this is meant as an instructional tool to bring the opponent to enlightenment if possible; the rejection of all positions illustrates the ineffectiveness of reason to comprehend reality. The abandonment of faith in logic and reason _alone_ leaves one open to experience the higher reality.

[135] Ruegg, _Literature_, 99.

[136] Tucci, _Minor_, 157.

[137] Ibid., 158.

[138] Ibid.

[139] Ibid., 160.

[140] T. P. V. Murti, _The Central Philosophy of Buddhism_ (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980), 232.

[141] Coward, _Sphota_, 51.

[142] Tucci, _Minor_, 160.

[143] Ibid., 162.

[144] Ibid., 168, see also Ruegg, Literature, 95.

[145] Ruegg, Literature, 95/96.

[146] See note 134.

[147] Tucci, Minor, 172, 173.

[148] Ibid., 171.

[149] Ibid., 159/160.

[150] Ibid., 158, 159.

[151] Ibid., 174.

[152] Nagarguna, Streng, Emptiness, 89.

[153] P. F. Strawson, "Social Morality and Individual Ideal" in Philosophy Vol. xxxvi, no. 136, Jan. 1961.

[154] Robert Bellah, "Religious Studies as New Religion" in Jacob Needleman and George Baker (eds.), Understanding the New Religions (New York: The Seabury Press, 1978), 108.

[155] Ken Wilber, Quantum Questions (Boulder: Shambala, 1985), 11.

[156] Aquinas, Gilby, Philosophical, 23.

[157] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Edwards, Encyclopedia, 330.

[158] Eddington in Wilber, Quantum, 10.

[159] Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 24e.

[160] Steven T. Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism" in Steven T. Katz (ed.) Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 47.

[161] See the works of McQuarry and Chomsky. The works of Jung as well.

[162] Northrup Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (Toronto: Academic Press, 1982), xviii.

[163]Robert Bellah, <u>Beyond Belief</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 221.

[164]Ibid., 252.

[165]Ernst Gellner, "Concepts and Society"; <u>Rationality</u>, Bryan R. Wilson (ed.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 18-49.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

<u>Books</u>

Aquinas, Thomas. <u>Summa Theologica Part I QQI-XXVI</u>. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 1920.

_____. <u>Summa Theologica Part III QQI-XXVI</u>. London: R. and T. Washbourne Ltd., 1913.

Bellah, Robert N. <u>Beyond Belief</u>. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

Catterjee, S. and D. M. Datta. <u>Introduction to Indian Philosophy</u>. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1972.

Chomsky, Noam. <u>Language and Mind</u>. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1968.

Conze, Edward. <u>A Short History of Buddhism</u>. London: Unwin Paperbacks. 1980.

_____. <u>The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines</u>. Bolinas: Four Seasons Foundation, 1975.

Copleston, F. C. <u>Aquinas</u>. Great Britain: Pelican, 1955.

Coward, Howard. <u>Sphota Theory of Language</u>. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.

_____. <u>Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions</u>. New York: Orbis Books, 1985.

_____ (ed.). <u>Studies in Indian Thought (The Collected Papers of Professor T. R. V. Murti)</u>. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

Dargyay, Eva. <u>The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet</u>. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977.

Datta, D. M. <u>The Six Ways of Knowing</u>. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1972.

Edwards, Paul (ed.). <u>The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. 8</u>. U.S.A.: MacMillan Publishing, 1967.

Eliade, Mircea. <u>Patterns in Comparative Religion</u>. New York: World Publishing, 1958.

Frye, Northrop. <u>The Great Code: The Bible and Literature</u>. Toronto: Academic Press, 1982.

Gilby, Thomas. <u>St. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts</u>. London: Oxford University Press, 1951.

_____. St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Texts. London: Oxford University Press, 1955.

Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Random House, 1951.

Hick, John. God and the Universe of Faiths. London: MacMillan, 1973.

_____. Death and Eternal Life. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1976.

Jha, Ganganatha (trs.). The Tattva Sangraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. Baroda Oriental Institute, 1937.

Katz, Steven (ed.). Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. London: Sheldon Press, 1978.

Kenny, Anthony. Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

Lonergan, Bernard. Insight. London: Longmans, 1957.

_____. Method in Theology. London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1971.

Mascall, E. L. Existence and Analogy. U.S.A.: Libra, 1949.

_____. He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism. U.S.A.: Anchor Books, 1970.

Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980.

Murty, K. S. Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974.

Needleman, Jacob and George Baker (ed.). Understanding the New Religions. New York: The Seabury Press, 1978.

Popper, Karl R. Objective Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

Potter, Karl H. The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. III. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981.

Rhys Davids, T. W. (ed.). Sacred Books of the Buddhists Vol. III Dialogues of the Buddha Part II. London: Luzac and Company Ltd., 1966.

_____ (trs.). Buddhist Sutras. New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1969.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981.

Smart, Ninian. The Religious Experience of Mankind. New York: Collins, 1980.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Towards a World Theology. Philadelphia: The
    Westminster Press, 1981.

Streng, Frederick J. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning.
    Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967.

Tucci, Giuseppe. Minor Buddhist Texts Part II: Serie Orientale Roma
    IX, 2. Roma: Instituto Italiano Per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente,
    1958.

Wilber, Ken. Quantum Questions. Boulder: Shambala, 1985.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. G. E. M. Anscombe (trs.). Philosophical
    Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.

Articles

Bellah, Robert. "Religious Studies Individual Ideal". Understanding the
    New Religions. Jacob Needleman and George Baker (ed.). New York:
    The Seabury Press, 1978.

Coward, Harold. "Is Modern Historical Consciousness Large Enough to
    Comprehend the Religious Experience of Scripture?" Religious Studies
    Bulletin. Vol. 4, no. 3, Sept. 1984.

_____. "The Meaning and power of mantras in Bhartrharis Vakyapadīya."
    Studies in Religion. Vol. 11, no. 4, Fall 1982.

Katz, Steven. "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism." Mysticism and
    Philosophical Analysis. Steven Katz (ed.). London: Sheldon Press,
    1978.

Meynell, Hugo A. "Towards a New Dialectic of Religions." Religious
    Studies. Vol. 18, no. 4, 1982.

Murti, T. R. V. "Revelation and Reason in Vedānta." Studies in Indian
    Thought (The Collected Papers of Professor T. R. V. Murti). Harold
    Coward (ed.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

_____. "The Philosophy of Language in the Indian Context." Studies
    In Indian Thought, The Collected Papers of Professor T. R. V. Murti.
    Harold Coward (ed.). Delhi: Motilal Bnaradass.

Penelhum, Terence. "Book Review." Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Vol. IX, no. 1, March 1979.