

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

RHETORIC AND REALITY:
THE EASTERN QUESTION AS IDEOLOGY, 1876--78

by

DOUGLAS NORMAN HANKS

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
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


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
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
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ABSTRACT

In the Eastern crisis, Government and Opposition pursued rival doctrines of what constituted a great state. In particular, Disraelian imperialism contested the Gladstonian notion of Christian nationalism. Were it not for the prevalence of anti-Turk feeling in Britain, Disraeli would have committed the country to defend the Anglo-Turkish alliance on the grounds of traditional policy, national interest and imperial responsibility. Gladstone, on the other hand, declared England's first priority the welfare of Christendom and favoured thus Balkan emancipation. The Government was able to overcome the stigma of compromise on a question of national importance, with the acquisition of Cyprus, a symbol of British power and a vindication of Disraeli's imperial rhetoric. The ideological factor was reinforced by Gladstone's targeting of Beaconsfieldism in his preelection campaigns in Midlothian. This thesis addresses the central significance of Party ideology in the formulation of Britain's Eastern policy during the second Disraeli administration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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For Merriell, in memory of Russell Douglas

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signature Page	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Dedication	v
Table of Contents	vi
Epigraph	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: DIPLOMACY, PARLIAMENT, AND THE PRESS: A NARRATIVE	
ACCOUNT OF THE BULGARIAN AGITATION	6
A Cry of Alarm: Two Notes from Andrassy	6
Agitation and Opposition	21
The End-of-Session Debates	24
CHAPTER 2: THE EASTERN QUESTION: ENDURING THEMES IN A	
RECURRENT CONTROVERSY	38
The Moral State: A Question Of Identity	38
The Concert of Europe	44
Prestige, and the Politics of Expediency	47
CHAPTER 3: LA DANSE À TROIS: BEACONSFIELD, DERBY AND	
SALISBURY, AUGUST 1876 TO JUNE 1878	52
‘Under Currents of Communication’: Parliament’s Response to Eastern Policy	76

CHAPTER 4: ORTHODOXY OR AMBIGUITY: TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF	
BRITISH EASTERN POLICY	92
Afghanistan and the Whigs	99
Midlothian and the Significance of the Eastern Controversy	101
CONCLUSION	105
ENDNOTES	110
BIBLIOGRAPHY	143

EPIGRAPH

...What insincerity, what disengenuousness, what prevarications, what shufflings, what misrepresentations, what simulations and hypocrisies, what equivocations and palterings, what confusing ambiguities and misleading fallacies, what counterfeits, shams, cantings, juggleries, finessing, collusions, and bamboozlings, and tangles, and snares, and pitfalls, and jockeyings, and cajoleries, this Eastern Question is full of!--Lord Robert Montagu, Foreign Policy: England and the Eastern Question.

INTRODUCTION

The Eastern crisis of 1876-8 was one of the most controversial issues in British foreign policy during the 19th century. It is also one of the most complex. This thesis examines two of the central aspects of this crisis: how politics affected foreign policy and how events abroad shaped politics. In particular, it scrutinises a range of ideas, intellectual, religious and political, and their relationship to the actions and rhetoric of statesmen and parliamentarians.

During the domestic controversy sparked by the Bulgarian massacres in 1876 and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, strongly held notions of Britain's imperial destiny "compet[ed] for possession of the popular mind" with equally fervent views about Britain's place in a Christian world order.¹ The Prime Minister, Lord Beaconsfield, characterised these views as "the Imperial policy of England, and the policy of crusade."² The terms, 'imperialism' and 'Christian nationalism' are employed throughout this paper.

Disraeli was a great rhetorician, who knew how to draw from political controversy images which would define and promote his Party's views. The Eastern crisis proved particularly suited to this purpose. Largely from it, Disraeli created the new popular oratory of imperialism, an ideology by which the Party could appeal to a mass electorate, and through which the old Conservative party of country gentlemen ultimately was transformed into a popular movement.³ Ironically, however, there was nothing peculiarly imperial or expansionist about Disraeli's foreign policy--the term itself was purely a rhetorical device. Gladstone, on the other hand, took the idea of Christian nationalism, a Christian world order centred upon an idealised Europe, with deadly seriousness. This

ideal Europe was a federation of independent states, delineated by nationality but united by a common religious heritage. The Eastern Question brought into the open a clash not merely between Disraeli and Gladstone as politicians but between the ideas and images which defined their politics.

Statesmen and parliamentarians used two basic argumentative formulations to justify British foreign policy: moral action and national interest. These stood in perpetual opposition and reflected the paradox which 19th century Christian idealism confronted in an amoral world of power politics, a conflict to which the Victorian State was peculiarly sensitive.⁴ The Gladstonian entreaty of what an honourable State ought to do was countered by the Disraelian message of what a successful state had to do. This conflict revealed significant differences over basic principles of statecraft, such as, what makes a state, a policy and a world order legitimate, and, what constitutes the legitimate state authority, its people, or the government of the day? Thus, an ideological conflict involving moral and cultural values underlay the domestic conflict about Eastern policy. Gladstone's religiously-defined Nationalism and Disraeli's secularistic Imperialism represented opposing sets of identity, distinguishing rival Parties and defining a nation. The domestic conflict over Eastern policy stemmed from a conflict of moral and cultural values. Richard Millman has argued that the key distinction in the Eastern controversy was not whether one was pro- or anti-Turk "but whether one was a Christian or not[.]"--whether one accepted or rejected Gladstone's Christian definition of Britain, Europe, and even more fundamentally, of good and evil.⁵ Victorians regarded the Bulgarian massacres,

in their age of 'progressive civilisation', as an 'anachronism'. In hindsight, the surprise is rather their own idealism and naiveté in an amoral world of power politics.⁶

The conflict between imperialism and nationalism, of course, did not cleave precisely along formal Party lines of division. Although the Parliamentary system made each Party adopt the rhetoric of its leaders and assume opposing platforms, there existed a family relationship of views which transcended Party boundaries. During debates on Eastern policy, several Liberals voted for the Government. Dr. Kenealy was a pro-Government Liberal M.P., while the primary concern of the two Whig leaders, Granville and Hartington, often seemed to be preventing the Gladstonian-Radical combination from jeopardising strategic interests not far removed from those defined by Disraeli. Lords Carnarvon and Bath, on the Conservative side, were the only Conservative Parliamentarians whose sensitivity to the plight of the Balkan Christians and hatred of the Ottoman Empire overcame their sense of Party loyalty, but others wavered on the principle. While Lord Derby with his whiggish tendencies did not toe the Party line, and disliked Disraeli's prestige politics, he was passive in his obstruction to Beaconsfieldism.

In the Eastern crisis, the Opposition actively advocated Balkan nationalism, which they called a policy of emancipation. Their most frequent line of questioning ran like this: 'Why are we not doing more for the Christians of Turkey? Why leave their welfare to Russia? The Opposition tended to argue on grounds of moral responsibility, to complain that the Government's behaviour contradicted national character and sentiments. British Ministers responded with legalistic arguments about the sanctity of treaties, and with references to the reality of Empire and imperial responsibilities. Both sides appealed to

international law, which was sufficiently vague to suit the positions of either side. To some degree, these disparate ideologies and seemingly incompatible rhetoric merged into one argument: over what a great State was and how it should behave.

The interaction of these two forces shaped Britain's Eastern policy and its relationship towards Russia, Turkey and Europe during the 1870's, and the nature and rhetoric of the Conservative and Liberal Parties for forty years after. By their rhetoric, each party claimed to represent unassailable values and unimpeachable logic. In fact, however, each party followed the finely calculated course of compromise, balancing the exigencies of domestic protest and a two-party popular system of Government, against balance of power politics, the political constellation of Europe, and Ottoman decline. But the very fact of compromise made intransigent rhetoric all the more indispensable. Imperialism distinguished the Conservative Party as the Party of power, the Party that knew how to govern. Christian nationalism distinguished the Liberal Opposition as the Party of compassion and morality. During the Eastern crisis itself, that image was challenged by the Whig's support for a 'traditional' Eastern policy, which revealed only too clearly the disparity of views and the lack of unity within the Party. The British invasion of Afghanistan in 1879 changed all this. It caused the Whigs not only to help in the Liberal attack but to lead it, and thus to reunify the Party divided ever since it had been defeated. Thus in 1880, with the Conservative reputation discredited by imperial fiascos in Afghanistan and South Africa, and financial and trade failures at home, the moral issues raised by the Eastern controversy helped to push the Liberals back to power. Politics at

home had dictated British diplomacy during 1876-78, and the latter profoundly shaped the nature of British politics over the next generation.

"He...was not an advocate of war, but...it was unworthy of England, if she had any power, or...influence in the counsels of Europe, not to say to this 'thing,' which now was said to govern Turkey--whose predecessor had died of the scissors, who was himself in the way of something worse, and whose probable successor was a fanatic--'Bring these things to an end, or we will point our guns at your palaces.' We could not maintain these monsters any longer in Europe....It was time England awoke to a sense of her responsibility as a great Christian Power, and in the name of humanity did something to bring these things to an end."--A.J. Mundella, House of Commons, 7 August 1876.⁷

"What our duty is at this critical moment is to maintain the Empire of England. Nor will we ever agree to any step, though it may obtain for a moment comparative quiet and a false prosperity, that hazards the existence of that Empire."--Benjamin Disraeli's farewell remarks to the House of Commons, 11 August 1876.⁸

Chapter 1

DIPLOMACY, PARLIAMENT, AND THE PRESS:

A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE BULGARIAN AGITATION

A Cry of Alarm: Two Notes from Andr ssy

In July 1875, Turkish authorities in Hercegovina attempted to exact tax arrears by force from the Christian populace. This sparked a widespread revolt against the small and scattered Turkish garrisons.⁹ A constant stream of insurgents from Croatia, Dalmatia, Montenegro and Serbia tipped the balance against the regular army, which, by November, was decisively beaten. In order to maintain even a vestigial authority in the region, the Porte was forced to turn to Moslem volunteers, the Bashi-Bazouks. These men provided an ineffective military repression but a cruel one, to the Porte's detriment, in European eyes.¹⁰

With Bosnia in flames a diplomatic crisis was clearly at hand. The Habsburg Chancellor, Count Andr ssy, wished to forestall a Russian bid to use the Bosnian crisis in order to renew its power in the Balkans. He launched a programme of collective

mediation between the Porte, the insurgents, and Montenegro, the leading irredentist power¹¹ among the South Slavs. His plan centred on a tour by the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German Consuls throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina to hear Christian grievances. However, when France asked to participate in the Commission, the Czar invited all three Western Powers (France, Italy and Britain) to do so.¹²

Andrássy enjoyed formal Russian support. However, the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, General Ignatiev, a life-long Pan-Slavist, loathed Habsburg influence and sought to make Istanbul rather than Vienna the diplomatic locus for the Eastern Question. In particular, he tried to convert the Consular Commission into a permanent committee, answerable to a 'Ambassadorial Directorate' overseen by himself.¹³ Ignatiev found an ally of convenience in the British Ambassador Sir Henry Elliot. Both men urged the Sultan to preempt Andrássy with his own reforms. On 2 October and 12 December 1875, Abdul Aziz did so. Elliot's initial support for Ignatiev concorded with traditional Palmerstonian diplomacy. Britain, on principle, opposed interference by other Powers in Turkish affairs, and it was with this end in view that Lord Derby urged the Porte to crush the insurrection quickly.¹⁴ The Cabinet's indifference towards Balkan rebels was evinced in the Foreign Office's advocacy of disarming the Christian population--but not the Moslem. No other Government advocated this as it was sure to lead to further massacres. Not even the Turkish Government demanded that the Christians be disarmed, which led Gladstone to charge the Government with being "more Turkish than the Turks[.]"¹⁵ Derby's fears for international complication were heightened when the Sultan consented to Andrássy's

peace mission, but, as the Porte had officially requested British adherence, Vice-Consul Holmes in Mostar was appointed to the Commission.¹⁶

Abdul's proclamations did not prevent Andrassy from circulating his own five-point scheme for administrative and judicial reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His Note advocated:

1. Religious liberty, full and entire;...
2. Abolition of the farming of taxes;...
3. A law to guarantee that the product of the direct taxation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be employed for the immediate interests of the Province, under the control of bodies constituted in the sense of the Firman of December 12;...
4. The institution of a Special Commission, composed of an equal number of Mussulmans and Christians, to superintend the execution of the reforms proposed by the Powers, as well as those proclaimed in the Iradé of October 2 and Firman of December 12;...
5. Lastly, the amelioration of the condition of the rural populations, possibly through government subsidies.¹⁷

Andrassy argued that his proposals, together with Abdul's reforms, would end the rebellion, but that if the Note was not accepted, the insurrection would escalate and Montenegro and Serbia would open war with the Porte.¹⁸

Derby was prepared to endorse the Note when the Austrian Ambassador, Count Beust assured him that if the recommendations were adopted, Vienna would deny the rebels assistance from Habsburg territory.¹⁹ Derby was pessimistic about the chances of Ottoman survival,

It is too late to stand on the dignity and independence of the Sultan; a sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home, nor pay his debts, must expect to submit to some disagreeable consequences.²⁰

His qualified acceptance of the Note, however, left him isolated in the Cabinet. Disraeli and Lord Manners warned of the domestic consequences of Andrassy's proposals for land

reform and direct taxation. "[I]n the advice which we are asked to give Turkey, we are...committing ourselves to principles which are,...controvers[ial] in our own country[.]" Lord Salisbury dismissed the Note as an advocacy of intervention; this was contrary to Britain's traditional policy.²¹ Disraeli also thought Andr ssy had no right to press the Porte to reform when the Sultan had announced his intention to do so.²² Like all Ministers to some degree, he feared that Britain might become trapped in a Russian intrigue to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Disraeli thought cooperation with the Berlin initiative to be inexpedient and questioned Derby in doing so,

I cannot resist expressing to you,...my strong conviction, that we should pause before assenting to the Austrian proposal....In declining to identify ourselves,...with the note, is it necessary to appear as Turkish,...[as] the Turks? Could we not devise a course wh. might avoid that?²³

Disraeli preferred isolation to "'a simulated union, wh. will not last many months, [and] embarrass ourselves, when independent action may be necessary.'" Neither Salisbury nor Disraeli wished Britain to play second fiddle in a policy composed without its consultation.

Derby shared Disraeli's perceptions but not his priorities. Derby favoured the Note for the same reason that Elliot opposed it, in order to hasten the pacification of Bosnia.²⁴ Both realised that so long as the rebellion continued, the crisis would escalate. Elliot correctly realised that formal recognition of Christian grievances would only encourage rebellion instead of achieving pacification. But whereas Elliot still hoped to isolate the insurrectionists from Serbian, Austrian or Russian support and thus see the Turks suppress the revolt militarily, Derby doubted that this could happen--at least not soon. Elliot's first

concern was for the protection of Britain's extensive financial interests in the Balkans which he saw threatened by Austrian and Russian interference.

The adverse effect on British trade which was believed would follow any increase in Russian influence in the Balkans, was the fear underlying the argument of British interests. In Parliament this fear was acknowledged by T.H. Sidebottom:

Depend upon it, few more deadly blows could be aimed at British commerce and...trade than Russia gaining supremacy in these regions.

Derby's priority, on the other hand, was the preservation of the order and peace of Europe; if another Power could secure the status quo through diplomacy in the Balkans, he was willing to cooperate with them.²⁵ Derby wished to quell the disturbances in southeast Europe before they burned out of control; for Disraeli, playing the second was anathema, the European status quo was not sacrosanct and, at the extreme, war while not desirable, was a perfectly acceptable risk to run in defense of British interests. The willingness to gamble in policy to secure fame and fortune for his Party, distinguished the Premier from both the Foreign and Indian Secretaries. "A Govt. can only die once" he told Derby, and it was "better to die with glory, than vanish in an ignominious end." Derby, for his part, considered Disraeli's overriding concern that nations pay deference to England, "'a mere matter of vanity, & of no real consequence[.]'"²⁶

Very early in the crisis, the Premier and Foreign Minister had differing motives and policies. This contributed to the confusion over government policy. The public statements of the two chief Ministers of state often seemed contradictory and gave rise to the Opposition's main criticism of government policy, its ambiguity.

This process began in accident. The Andrassy Note undoubtedly would have been rejected by Disraeli except that the Porte again asked Britain to participate in collective mediation. Derby thus appeared more influential in Cabinet and the Government more conciliatory than was actually the case. On 18 January 1876 the Cabinet endorsed the Note in general, but without committing itself to details or to the collective demand that the Porte reply to the Note in writing.²⁷ Derby, moreover, in order to placate his suspicions and his colleagues, wrote a 37-page letter to Count Beust, which picked apart, point by point, the Austrian plan, especially its proposals for direct taxation and land purchase by the peasantry.²⁸ Yet, Derby concluded by declaring that, "Her Majesty's Government...cannot consider it to be either unreasonable or undesirable that the Cabinet of Vienna should desire to tender to the Porte suggestions for the pacification of the disturbed districts." In Parliament, he affected an air of nonchalance towards the Treaty of Paris, which forbade interference in Turkey's internal affairs, explaining that the insurrection constituted a special case legitimising diplomatic remonstrance.²⁹ The Prime Minister provided both a rhetorical and the real reason for endorsement of the Andrassy Note. Not to have done so would have left Britain isolated, and, in any case, the Porte had requested Britain's adherence.³⁰ Privately, Derby told Elliot that the Note in no way conflicted with the Treaty, as the Note was only a recommendation and therefore did not interfere between the Sultan and his subjects.³¹

The Government's adherence to the Note confused both the public and the press. The latter speculated that the Opposition might challenge the Government's 'new departure'.³² But the Whig grandees, Granville and Hartington, who headed the Opposition, proved

as confused as the public. Neither wished to challenge the Government's decision. As an issue for opposing the Government both men missed the significance of the Eastern Question, being more impressed with the potential of the new Slave Circular.³³ Only Gladstone committed himself to unconditional endorsement of the Government's decision. His enthusiasm, however, betrayed his own personal interest in the question, a certain degree of impatience with ministerial caution and a misunderstanding of government policy.

...after all this [referring to the sacrifices of the Crimean War,] it was impossible to fold our arms and say the relations of the Sultan and his Christian subjects are no concern of ours. I am most grateful, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government instead of being actuated by that principle, a principle totally inconsistent with the facts of history and the most obvious and elementary obligations of national duty, have given in their adhesion to the Austrian Note....³⁴

Ministerialists received such warm support guardedly, lest "under cloak of approving the Government," the former Prime Minister might actually be advocating a policy "directly contrary" to it.³⁵

The assassinations of the French and German Consuls in Salonica on 6 May,³⁶ and the riot and coup in Istanbul on the 10th, confirmed the failure of Andr ssy's programme. The three Imperial Courts (Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany) hastily reconvened at Berlin, the Russians arriving with their own programme for reform.³⁷ This plan imitated the measures taken in Syria in 1860-1 by France and Britain, and differed from Andr ssy's former plan in demanding material guarantees for reform. Bosnia would be pacified by a united Europe acting through its special institutions, namely, a European conference, an International Commission of Reform, and military occupation by a third Power, probably Italy. Autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina was deemed essential.³⁸

Andrássy opposed the idea of material guarantees because this would mean a European tutelage over Turkey which challenged Vienna's own prestige, influence and interests in the Balkans. He opposed autonomy for Bosnia because this was an even more direct threat to Habsburg interests in that it barred Austrian expansion to the East. And finally he opposed the idea of a conference because he thought it would only emphasise the diverging interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia.³⁹

Supported by Bismarck, Andrássy stifled this initiative and dictated a new one to replace it.⁴⁰ Unanimity was reached on the basis of two proposals. (1) The dispatch of warships into Turkish waters to protect the foreign communities and Christians, and, (2) a two-month armistice to allow "direct negotiations" between the Porte and the insurgents, on the basis of the Andrássy Note's minimum programme of five concessions.⁴¹ These were as follows:

- 1) That materials for the reconstruction of dwelling-houses and churches should be furnished to the returning refugees, that their subsistence should be assured to them till they could support themselves by their own labour.
- 2) In so far as the distribution of help should appertain to the Turkish Commissioner, he should consult as to the measures to be taken with the Mixed Commission, mentioned in the note of the 30th of December, to guarantee the bona fide application of the reforms and control their execution. This Commission should be presided over by a Herzegovinian Christian, and be composed of natives faithfully representing the two religions of the country. They should be elected as soon as the armistice should have suspended hostilities.
- 3) In order to avoid any collision, advice should be given at Constantinople to concentrate the Turkish troops, at least until excitement has subsided on some points to be agreed upon.
- 4) Christians as well as Mussulmans should retain their arms.
- 5) The Consuls or Delegates of the Powers shall keep a watch over the application of the reforms in general, and on the steps relative to the repatriation in particular.

Russia accepted the Andrassy-Bismarck proposal because it wished to avoid conflict with Austria-Hungary and the destruction of the Imperial League. Given the prevalent belief in the Ottoman Empire's imminent collapse, the Czar placed a premium on an understanding with his friends. Thus, he adopted a pro-Austrian compromise. Russia receded from an Ignatiev-styled obstruction to Habsburg expansion, and Austria-Hungary conceded that such an expansion would require compensation to Russia.⁴²

Rather than being a basis for negotiation, the new Andrassy Memorandum was a cut and dried decision of the Imperial League. The other Great Powers could not alter it, only support it. While France and Italy immediately did so, Lord Tenterden, the Permanent UnderSecretary at the Foreign Office, was highly critical of its proposals. They were too obviously designed to aid the insurgents at the Porte's expense, and to establish a pretext for subsequent intervention.⁴³ No government should be forced to pay damages to rebels. No bankrupt government could do so. Arming Christians, corralling Turkish troops, and intimating coercion would encourage not peace but insurgency. Whereas Derby had chaired the decisive Cabinet concerning the Andrassy Note, he was replaced by his chief at the Cabinet of 16 May. Disraeli brought with him a prepared statement based on Tenterden's critique. He denounced the Berlin Memorandum as a travesty of concert diplomacy:

[H.M.] Government cannot accept, for the sake of the mere appearance of concert, a scheme in the preparation of which they have not been consulted, and which they do not believe calculated to effect the object with which they are informed it has been framed.⁴⁴

It was deemed better that Turkey surrender a few provinces than submit to the dictation of the three Northern Courts.⁴⁵

The hope of restoring tranquillity by these means [the Berlin proposals] being, in Mr. Disraeli's opinion, groundless, we should then be asked to 'join in taking more efficacious measures in the interests of peace,' which, it is supposed, means taking more efficacious measures to break up the Empire. In Mr. Disraeli's opinion it would be far better for Turkey to give up Bosnia and Herzegovina altogether, as Austria gave up Italy, than to acquiesce in the new proposals, and it would also be better for us that she should do so, than adopt the alternative now offered. He would say, if Turkey agrees, we are ready to recommend an armistice and a European Conference based upon the territorial status quo.⁴⁶

The Cabinet unanimously backed the Premier, the Memorandum was rejected. Disraeli resented the unilateral actions of the Northern Courts, which treated England "as if she were Montenegro". British refusal effectively disrupted Balkans diplomacy, and as no redress of Bosnian grievances was forthcoming from Europe, Serbia and Montenegro went ahead with their plans for war, the Serbian army crossing the Turkish frontier on the first of July 1876.⁴⁷

The five Powers had hoped to present identical notes containing the Berlin proposals on 30 May. But on the 29th, a palace coup replaced Sultan Abdul Aziz with his insane nephew, Murad, and the Memorandum was never presented.⁴⁸ Initially, all this seemed to justify Disraeli's course in 'defense' of the treaties. The new Sultan would need time to effect his reforms. Refusing the Berlin Note, reinforcing the fleet, and the "friendly warning" to the Powers against their plan of assembling a European naval force in Turkish waters, was the sort of bold policy the Premier wanted for Britain.⁴⁹ Such a "policy of determination" restored Britain's influence in Europe, enhanced its prestige and ended its isolation because the other Powers, seeing Britain was determined to stand by the treaties of 1856, would align behind the British standard of conduct.

...the five Powers, after various attempts to produce effects in which they were not successful, have adopted the principle of non-interference...they have come over to us...

In the future, Disraeli told Victoria, "no leading step" would be taken "without first consulting your Majesty." Clearly the way to preserve European peace was to lead Europe. Reality, however, did not justify his exuberance. Disraeli was mistaken, as the agreements at Reichstadt and Budapest later showed, in assuming that the Imperial League was "as extinct as the Roman Triumvirate[.]" In fact, this was the last triumph for the Palmerstonian policy; by September the Government was no longer willing to advocate exclusive Ottoman control over Bulgarian and Bosnian Christians.⁵⁰

In the aftermath of the coup in Istanbul, Derby's policy began to broaden as it entered a period of transition. This change was evident in that he no longer advocated an unqualified Ottoman sovereignty, the Sultan had lost the right to deal with his internal problems without interference.⁵¹ However, as late as 21 June, he still spoke the old policy to Russia, advocating the 'order first' principle, namely, that the insurrection must be suppressed before considering schemes of better administration. Derby's ambivalence was evident in his Russian correspondence. He told Shuvalov that the British Government could not "regard the insurrection...as being exclusively...a struggle...against local oppression," the presence of "foreign Slav Committees" inhibited pacification of the insurgent provinces.⁵² Derby aimed to convey two or more different impressions simultaneously. He told the Turkish Ambassador, in order to discourage Ottoman defiance, not to expect material assistance from Britain. Yet when Derby reported this conversation to Elliot, the Foreign Secretary implied that his advice to Musurus was

merely suggestive; he denied pledging the Government to any definite course. None of this was made public at the time, the relevant dispatches being suppressed until the following session (1877).⁵³ The motive behind Derby's evasiveness and secrecy was the desire to send the Russians the opposite message sent the Turks: Derby did not wish St. Petersburg to assume that Britain was abandoning Turkey;

...it is sound policy now as much as it was in 1856 to adhere to that which diplomatists called the territorial status quo. It is possible that the language which is being used may induce foreign...Governments to think that England has changed her mind on the subject. If that impression is produced it will be a misfortune to us and to all the world.⁵⁴

Moreover, the Foreign Secretary and the Ambassador did not see eye to eye on the problem. The situation had arisen where Derby had to repeat several warnings to Turkey because he was not sure whether Elliot had conveyed them forcefully enough. This was the case, for example, with Derby's formal imperative to Elliot of 5 September 1876 which recapitulated an earlier telegram.

Any sympathy which was previously felt here towards that country has been completely destroyed by the recent lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria. [The accounts have] roused an universal feeling of indignation in all classes of English society, and to such a pitch has this risen that in the extreme case of Russia declaring war against Turkey, Her Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defence of the Ottoman Empire. Such an event, by which the sympathies of the nation would be brought into direct opposition to its treaty engagements, would place England in a most unsatisfactory and even humiliating position, yet it is impossible to say that if the present conflict continues, the contingency may not arise.⁵⁵

This warning was sent in response to Elliot's protest of the previous day in which the Ambassador defended the traditional policy of Palmerston and disparaged the general lack of moral backbone to uphold it.

To the accusation of being a blind partizan of the Turks, I will only answer that my conduct here has never been guided by any sentimental affection for them, but by a firm determination to uphold the interests of Great Britain to the utmost of my power; and that those interests are deeply engaged in preventing the disruption of the Turkish Empire is a conviction which I share in common with the most eminent statesmen who have directed our foreign policy, but which appears now to be abandoned by shallow politicians or persons who have allowed their feelings of revolted humanity to make them forget the capital interests involved in the question.

We may, and must feel indignant at the needless and monstrous severity with which the Bulgarian insurrection was put down, but the necessity which exists for England to prevent changes from occurring here which would be most detrimental to ourselves, is not affected by the question whether it was 10,000 or 20,000 persons who perished in the suppression.⁵⁶

What was really lamentable was not Ottoman brutality, a tradition only too well known, but that the Conservative Party was squeezed between too unacceptable alternatives--either to be seen to cave in to the demands of the Opposition or to alienate the electorate. The position was humiliating because issues of foreign policy could not be abandoned to the dictates of the masses without destroying the governing Party's credibility to govern. In any case, public outrage had pressed Derby far from his original position of strict nonintervention.⁵⁷

R.T. Shannon has argued that Elliot's protest on behalf of British interests "more than any other single statement...made the debate on the Eastern question...the most clearly-defined public conflict in English history on the fundamental problem of the moral nature of the state." The attitude and assumptions expressed in his dispatch were widely opposed on the basis of "two complementary principles": (1) that "states are bound by the same moral laws as individuals;" and (2) that "it is...essential that decisions of policy should conform...to absolute definitions of righteousness." These convictions were the

underlying rationale for opposition to government policy. This anthropomorphic view of the State distinguished the Liberal Party from the Conservatives.⁵⁸

The 'violet'⁵⁹ tendency in Derby's diplomacy reached its height in the dispatches of 21 September, which signified his panicked momentary abandonment of Turkey and Palmerstonism. The first, fully acknowledging Baring's final report on the atrocities in Bulgaria (published the same day), requested the Ambassador to seek a personal audience with the Sultan and demand the trial and punishment of the perpetrators, who were decorated and promoted "under a false impression of their conduct", and just reparation for the survivors.⁶⁰ This coincided essentially with the programme espoused in the hundreds of contemporary anti-atrocity meetings--peculiar language to be using if Turkey still enjoyed the moral support of the British Government. This was an act of unequivocal diplomatic interference in Turkish affairs, which previously the Government had avowedly rejected. It marked an unmistakeable shift in policy.⁶¹

The second dispatch pressed Derby's 'English Terms' on the Porte for an armistice with Serbia. In its essentials this was a similar document to the Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum, except that now Britain was applying the diplomatic pressure on Turkey.⁶² In turn, Russia tried to exploit this change in attitude towards the Porte by proposing that, should Turkey reject the 'English Terms', Austria and Russia respectively, should occupy Bosnia and Bulgaria in conjunction with a European naval demonstration. The immediate object was not the physical occupation of Ottoman territory but rather securing British support to the principle of coercion. If the British Government deemed the naval demonstration sufficient coercion in itself, the Russians

were prepared to forego occupation.⁶³ The Cabinet's rejection of this proposal left no doubt as to its position regarding coercion and restrained Derby's drift towards securing peace and order at Turkey's expense.⁶⁴

Derby had not dismissed lightly the Russian proposal, only the Cabinet held him back. His commitment to peace and order at the expense of the weakest party was increasingly at variance with Disraeli's quest for prestige. While Derby gave the impression of a timid convert to popular anti-Turk sentiment, one who wished to reassure the public as to the Government's concern, Disraeli steadfastly ignored the agitation and presented himself as a diehard Turkophile committed to the old Palmerstonian policy. The Prime Minister's bellicose speeches were totally at odds with the Foreign Secretary's dispatches, with the result that government policy appeared ambiguous.⁶⁵

October was to prove a critical month in the formulation of Britain's position regarding the crisis. The Cabinet reached a highest denomination compromise: Britain would not condone or support coercion but neither would it fight to defend Turkish territory unless Constantinople and the straits were directly threatened.⁶⁶ The meaning of nonintervention had thus been qualified from the original sense in which Disraeli had used it at the time of the Berlin Memorandum. The term was acknowledged not to mean that Britain gave Turkey a *carte blanche* guarantee of security. This had radical implications for the Palmertonist tradition in its purest sense, which had always defined Turkey-in-Europe by, and drew the line to Russian expansion along, the Danube. Such a strategy was now effectively renounced--a radical change in policy, and one that was the product of public opinion.

Agitation and Opposition

The anti-Turk agitation in the summer of 1876 was a rare instance of popular interference in official foreign policy. Never before or since in British history have public pressure groups so influenced the decisions of their country's external policy. Yet even so, their interference remained wholly negative. It partially obstructed Disraeli's policy, but popular agitation never converted the Government to a pro-Russian one or to the pursuit of the liberation of Balkan Christians, the objective envisaged by Gladstone and others.

The agitation movement originated in the outraged feelings of Victorian intellectuals, men like Bishop Fraser, Canon Liddon, the historian Edward Freeman, and W.T. Stead, journalist and editor of the Manchester Gazette. These men represented a small but influential minority of Anglican clergy and churchmen who had always opposed Disraeli's pro-Ottoman policies, and Radical and Nonconformist elements of the Liberal party.⁶⁷ Though he did not lead the agitation 'out-of-doors', Gladstone eventually became its parliamentary champion, through a gradual process. This was not completed until May 1877, when, in a series of parliamentary resolutions, he advocated concerted action between the Great Powers to enforce Balkan emancipation upon Turkey. Affairs in Bulgaria were a deeply personal threat, touching every facet of his identity, religious, national and cultural.⁶⁸ He considered it criminal that a culturally inferior race of Moslem conquerors should rule over culturally superior Hellenes, both Greek and Slav peoples who shared a common link to Byzantine culture through the Orthodox Church. For Gladstone both peoples shared the same 'religious nationality'.⁶⁹ More than any other

politician, Gladstone integrated the anti-Turk movement with the moderate majority of the Liberal Party.⁷⁰ Considering the Whig leadership's antipathy towards the movement, Gladstone's support was fundamental to the influence of the agitation on Eastern policy.

News of the atrocities in Bulgaria arrived in Britain over a period of seven weeks. The earliest press account occurred in the Pall Mall Gazette of 16 June 1876. On the 23rd, the Daily News published a letter from its Istanbul correspondent, Sir Edwin Pears. These reports were substantiated on 8 July with the publication of a second letter from Pears, and the first report from The Times.⁷¹ Five additional reports followed from Pears providing fresh evidence which corroborated the earlier accounts and rebutted Disraeli's public scepticism about "imaginary atrocities".⁷²

The combination of these early reports of atrocities and the outbreak of war between Serbia and Turkey, galvanised public opinion in England. There was a widespread fear that Britain might attack Russia, a fear justified by the Government's recent behaviour in reinforcing the fleet at Besika Bay. Where the public had passively accepted government explanations for refusing the Berlin Memorandum, many Britons now began to organise so to make the Executive assist nationalist and Christian emancipation.⁷³ Agitation was strongest in the Nonconformist north of England, where the greatest number of public meetings occurred. Public arousal was an event in itself. As a well known leader in The Times commented,

Until the last few days...the public has been quiet because it...believed that no Government would commit itself to a policy of armed interference in Eastern affairs without giving Parliament and the public a full opportunity of consideration....suddenly the position of the question changes materially [and]...the interest of the country become[s] intense...the Servian crusade tends to increase the jealousy between this country and one of the great Powers,...In

these circumstances it...becomes advisable that Parliament should be informed of...the general views of the Government.⁷⁴

As prorogation was but a month away, however, Parliament was of limited use as a platform for protest. It debated the massacres twice, time enough to introduce the subject but not to pursue the question to a division. This naturally encouraged activists to turn to other forums. Dissent continued with the public and the press.

The massacres were first mentioned in Parliament on 23 June, the day the Daily News published its first report from Pears.⁷⁵ On 10 July, the Prime Minister was asked whether the Government could verify newspaper reports of Bulgarian girls being sold publicly as slaves, and the torture of Bulgarian prisoners.⁷⁶ Disraeli privately referred to Pear's articles as the "Faery telegraphs", their sole object being, "to create a cry against the Government."⁷⁷ In Parliament he was openly sceptical, claiming the Turks had not prison accommodation to torture so large a number of Bulgarians as suggested by the press, nor was torture routine, he thought, "among an Oriental people who...generally terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner."⁷⁸ A week later the Premier was able to provide a more complete answer. In a long statement which cited many of Elliot's dispatches, Disraeli held that responsibility for atrocities was equally divided with the Christians greatly exaggerating Turkish excesses.⁷⁹ A slighted press now aimed to prove its case, and competed with the government as a broker of information about Turkey. Judgement was left to the public. The dispatches in the first Blue Book on Turkey of the 21st, tended to confirm the press reports;⁸⁰ by the end of July, both Conservative and Liberal M.P.'s recognised the newspaper accounts to be largely accurate.⁸¹ The Government was overtaken in the processing of information from

Bulgaria. Because diplomatic and consular agents were relatively silent on the topic, the Prime Minister dismissed the many reports of correspondents. Disraeli later admitted privately he would not have acted in this fashion if he had been fully and correctly informed by his consuls before going into Parliament. In all fairness to the Government and the embassy in Constantinople, moreover, the consuls were indecisive, hedging their comments in noncommittal phrases (for example, 'it appears that', 'I am inclined to think that' and, 'one can trust none of the information one receives', etc.).⁸²

Disraeli entirely missed the point, which was a question not of the accuracy but of the impact of journalism. It did not matter whether he believed the press reports but whether the public did. Robert Bourke, the Parliamentary UnderSecretary for Foreign Affairs, conceded precisely this point a few weeks later, when he said, "he did not think, so far as the effect on the minds of the English people was concerned, it mattered whether 100 persons had been killed or 50[.]" Disraeli's cavalier response to the whole issue of atrocities had compromised his Party's popularity and his personal reputation.⁸³ It remained for the Opposition in the limited time left to Parliament, to turn the Government's discredit to real advantage.

The End-of-Session Debates

The two debates at the end of July, one in the Commons and the other in the Lords, differed from the two held in the first week of August. The former two were not deliberate attacks on the Government's Eastern policy. They were professions of what that policy should be, coming from the Opposition, the far right, and ministerialists in

the middle. The two August debates condemned the Government's handling of Eastern affairs.

Ministerialists characterised the Opposition's professed concern for the welfare of the Sultan's Christian subjects, the crux of debate in the Commons on the last night of July, as being fundamentally hypocritical.⁸⁴ Discussion was candid and intelligent, revealing that participants who possessed personal knowledge of Turkey understood the causes of the crisis and its impact on domestic politics. Debate was joined on T.C. Bruce's pro-Government motion, which advocated "equal treatment of the various races and religions...under the authority of the Sublime Porte." R.W. Hanbury was one of the principal speakers for the government side. He argued that the Government's proper concern was the common welfare of all Turkish subjects, for when it came to atrocities, "there was not a pin to choose between" Christians and Moslems. Balkan emancipation was a double-edged sword. If the Turks were to be expelled from Europe then by the same principle, Greeks and other Christian peoples must be expelled from Asia. Independent Slav states in the Balkans, moreover, would be but so many "stepping stones to Russian ambition". Sectarian violence stemmed not from religious discord but from economic causes, from exploitation which left Moslem peasants as destitute as Christian ones. Furthermore, while both sides of Parliament had a tendency to rely on empty rhetoric, the Blue Book provided no substantive evidence of genuine religious persecution. Watchwords like 'patriotism' and 'fanaticism' were essentially meaningless: one's opponents were always fanatics while Englishmen were patriots, but the two terms were actually interchangeable.

A pronounced empathy and affinity for Moslems marked some ministerial speeches. In his travels in Turkey, Hanbury had found that "the virtues of sobriety, honesty, and regard for truth were almost universally practised," by most Moslems and ignored by most Christians.⁸⁵ His Islamicist remarks challenged Liberal notions of racial and religious solidarity, and national self-determination. Hanbury's speech was denounced by W. Forsyth, an independent, as a mere apology for Turkish misrule, appropriate of "a Turkish Minister in a Turkish Divan." Forsyth noted that Russia's strength in the matter was the oppression of the Slav nationalities. It was therefore in Britain's interest to redress their wrongs and deny Russia reason for sole interference.⁸⁶ He advocated Christian emancipation in the most orthodox language of Liberal nationalism.

Can we wonder, then, that those who are of the same race and religion, and who are in close contact with these people, should be stirred to the utmost sympathy with their sufferings? How can it be otherwise, when the people of this country, who are separated from them by the distance of [a] Continent...and are aliens to them in blood, language and religion, are so profoundly affected by their wrongs?⁸⁷

Forsyth was willing to see Austria and Russia jointly occupy the provinces, "to act as a police, in order to see the engagements of Turkey performed."⁸⁸ Thus, when Parliament first discussed the subject, the most radical solution was advocated not by a Liberal, but by an Independent sitting with the Conservatives.

Hanbury's 'sober honest Turk', and Forsyth's 'Slavonic league', exemplified the opposing ideologies of cosmopolitan imperialism and Liberal nationalism which were beginning to crystallise. Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, who supported Forsyth, argued that while Britain must retain control of the Mediterranean, Russian influence within it would always exist. "You can no more prevent it than Russia can prevent your influence existing

in the channel and the North Sea."⁸⁹ He praised the letter of entreaty to Derby of Russia's Ambassador to Britain, Count Schuvalov, which urged the Foreign Secretary to adopt an active policy, as "words of wisdom [and]...words of humanity". He only wished that these were the words of the Foreign Secretary himself;⁹⁰

...your policy, begun apparently in order to check Russian advance, may end in promoting it, while England, the Mother of free nations, will stand convicted before the eyes of Europe of having tried to check the enfranchisement of an oppressed people, without even having had the miserable satisfaction of succeeding in the attempt....⁹¹

Orthodoxy in policy was the Government's favoured argument but it proved a double-edged sword. Conservatives who unconditionally supported the Turkish alliance criticised the Government for abandoning this principle, while the Opposition, principally Gladstone, contested the Government's definition of the term. This issue inevitably raised the question of Britain's treaty engagements. Both sides offered rival interpretations of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which they claimed, represented the orthodox principles of Palmerstonism. Much of the ensuing controversy focused on the dry technicalities of international law, the end in view invariably being a resolution of who was obliged to do what, according to which clauses in the treaties. This discussion provided one of the Opposition's two most successful points of criticism. It exposed the ambiguity in government policy which was clear from the Blue Books. Debate over the treaties, indeed, linked the two principal themes of the controversy in Parliament: the Government's position as defender of Palmerston's Crimean system, the Opposition's criticism of the vacillating nature of Britain's policy.

Gladstone argued for Britain's European obligation as against any engagement to Turkey. The crux of the issue was the obligation Britain had incurred as a result of the Crimean War, and the surrender of Russia's self-proclaimed status as religious guardian of Orthodoxy in Turkey.

...Let us recollect in what position this fact places us relative to the Christians of Turkey....do you suppose it was the view...of those principally concerned in making...War, that [its]...effect...was to...deprive...the Christians of Turkey...of the guardianship which they before enjoyed[?]....

Thus the purpose of the treaties ending the war,

...was to substitute a European conscience, expressed by collective guarantee and the concerted and general action of the European Powers for the sole and individual action of one of them....

This conscience was to be exercised through joint diplomacy, for the

...one great result of the Crimean War...was the establishment of the great principle of European concert as against that of individual action and sole interference;...I look upon the concert of Europe as the greatest of all the results achieved by the Crimean war, as thus Europe speaks unitedly,...

Britain acquired a moral right and duty via the European Concert to ensure that the covenant of civil and religious equality between Sultan and subject was fulfilled.⁹² But Britain's Government had "unwisely abandoned...that principle of the Concert of Europe...[which it must] re-establish" if it genuinely wished to restore tranquillity to Europe.⁹³

Gladstone was anticipated that evening in the Lords. Lord Stratheden spoke on the necessity for upholding the treaties of 1856: the Treaty of Paris of 30 March, and the Tripartite Treaty of 15 April between Austria, Britain and France.⁹⁴ Stratheden argued that these treaties had predetermined British policy. Unlike Derby, who propounded

legalist arguments only when they were convenient, Stratheden was a true believer in the Ottoman cause.⁹⁵ He sought to "fortify" the Government, against "that class of politicians who opposed the Crimean War, and have not much respect for the engagements it bequeathed to us." Only a united Parliament firmly and publicly committed to upholding the treaties of 1856 could maintain peace.⁹⁶

The late Government aspire to lead the Party who established the Treaties of 1856. They owe whatever influence they have, in no small degree, to past connection with Lord Palmerston. That which the world regarded as undue subserviency to Russia was among the causes of their downfall.⁹⁷

For many Conservatives, the word Concert was irrevocably tainted by a too close association with the Holy Alliance, and was regarded as the favoured instrument of Russian diplomacy. Its use by Liberals for advocating world federation, was a decided threat to national independence, anti-Russism therefore tended to be anti-Concert as well.

...Russia always progresses towards an Extranational Government of Europe by a Cabinet of Ambassadors, who are to dictate to sovereigns, and have their decrees carried out by national Cabinets. That is Universal dominion, on the ruins of monarchies, and cataclysm of states.⁹⁸

Disraeli and Derby responded, respectively, to the arguments of the Opposition and the far right. In condemning outright Gladstone's speech as "avowedly a speech of censure", Disraeli exaggerated the case and picked a fight. Gladstone's criticisms were mild. He had not spoken about the atrocities in Bulgaria, and he declared support for the principle of Ottoman territorial integrity,⁹⁹ even though this broke the drift of his criticism, obscured the divergence between himself and the Government and confused his supporters. Significantly, Disraeli chose to attack Gladstone because of the latter's 'regret' over the Government's refusal of the Berlin Memorandum, a point which

symbolised their fundamental differences on foreign policy. Disraeli emphasised the wide base of support, indoors and out, for his rejection of the Memorandum and dispatching of the fleet.¹⁰⁰ He wished to show his policy in as balanced and impartial a light as possible, and so he emphasised Gladstone's less than consistent ramblings.

Britain, he said, had endeavored to act with the Concert but as its leader. Britain had been isolated from Europe "because she determined in favour of the principle of non-interference." The result of her steadfastness was that the five Powers had "come over to us" and thus the six Powers were "now acting in concert on the principle of non-interference."¹⁰¹ Yet the Premier also spoke of Britain's unilateral interference in Turkish affairs and of it being "productive of great good."¹⁰²

Derby found in the Lords a different and more difficult situation. He dealt perfunctorily with a motion coming from a purported supporter of the Government, offering Stratheden hollow thanks and advising the noble lord "in passing" not to press his motion to a division. He gave two reasons. First, although "for all practical purposes" the House was "of one mind" regarding the present crisis, the motion would invite dissent and produce "an appearance of disunion" where none existed. Second, the assertion of a resolution to defend the 1856 treaties implied that someone intended to break them and was thus a statement of "defiance" to all foreign States.¹⁰³ Derby much preferred no declarations at all.

Stratheden turned on his peer with the most articulate display of personal vituperation to be found in the whole period of controversy.

[T]he noble Earl the Secretary of State,...told the House in reference to what had fallen from me, that he had heard an after-dinner speech in favour of his health,

when he desired to hear a criticism of his policy. My Lords, I never listened to a phrase in either House of Parliament more thoroughly devoid of generosity and delicacy. Is anyone to be the object of derisive taunts, because he has not dwelt on the errors of the noble Earl, when a question wholly separate and different,...much more practical and grave, was brought before your Lordships?...What degree of accusation does he call for? Supposing I admitted that for the union of the three Powers in October, 1874, the inertness of the Foreign Office is exclusively responsible, would he be satisfied? Supposing I admitted--as I did last Session--that the loss of Austria as an ally may be attributed to his proceedings, would he be contented? Supposing I went further, and remarked that he ought not to have participated in the mission of the Consuls to Mostar, and thus encouraged the insurgents, would he acquit me? If I advanced another step, and urged that he ought never to have subscribed to the Andrassy Note, whose consequences are now before the world, should I respond to that appetite for criticism which it appears that in my former speech I left unsatisfied this evening? Or must I go so far as to maintain that, while he holds his present office, there is very little chance,...that the balance of the world will be restored, or the reforms essential to the cause of Ottoman integrity established? I shall if he requires it. My Lords, in asking...me to withdraw the Resolution, the noble Earl has shown but little penetration when, to speak against it, he was driven to the frivolous and feeble pretext that it contained expressions of defiance, a view which nobody who read its terms could possibly accede to...."¹⁰⁴

He concluded with a plea for the motion's acceptance, "If you negative it, you proclaim to the world that you are hostile to the European races of the Porte, and to the Treaties which enable you to come forward on the subject."¹⁰⁵ However he found no support for his motion.

Due to the uncertainty and irresolution of the Liberal Party in general and its leadership in particular, the Opposition failed to press the attack on the Government in either the Lords or Commons. Meanwhile the speeches of Disraeli and Derby in response to Liberal criticism were inconsistent. The former categorically rejected Gladstone's speech, and defiantly declared nonintervention the keystone of British policy, while the latter seemed willing to accommodate much of the Gladstonian spirit, defining the 1856 Treaty of Paris so as to render it compatible with the principle of the Concert.

Gladstone worried about the lack of accord, not merely between Whigs and Radicals, but within the front bench. This jeopardised the Party's chances to gain ground from the Government. It was "absolutely necessary" to settle the issue of the Party's official position on the East, for "whatever the 'front bench' does," Gladstone told Granville, "there will be...a motion involving blame...from some quarter." ¹⁰⁶

This motion came in the last ten days of the session, when the Opposition accused the Government of complicity in massacre. This alleged responsibility was incurred because, by its refusal to join in the Berlin Memorandum, and in dispatching the fleet to Besika Bay, Britain had encouraged the Turks to expect defense from European interference. ¹⁰⁷ The tone in Parliament now closely approximated the tone of agitation out-of-doors; the Liberals were moving towards a violent policy, that is, an anti-Turk policy of emancipation. The two debates of August represented the Opposition's first attempt since March, to actively censure the Government. The first of these, on 7 August, was purely a Radical affair, ¹⁰⁸ with A.J. Mundella's defiant Cromwellian oratory setting a standard for bellicosity towards the Turk. ¹⁰⁹ The second attack on the 11th, was also led by the Radicals. Evelyn Ashley, a prominent agitationist, moved a resolution of censure and, with strong support from Forster and Harcourt, forced the debate for the last night of the session, giving the Premier's silence on the 7th as his reason for doing so. It was however, one of Hartington's lieutenants, the progressive Liberal, Sir William Harcourt, who produced the best reasoned and most damaging criticism of government policy. ¹¹⁰

On the 7th, the Daily News published the first in a series of telegraphed reports from MacGahan, its special correspondent. Simultaneously, the long-awaited preliminary report

on the atrocities was read in Parliament. The combination of MacGahan's vivid eyewitness descriptions of the town of Batak, excerpts of which were read in the Commons, and confirmation of the carnage in the official report of the British Consul at Salonica, Sir Walter Baring,¹¹¹ finally stifled Disraeli's scepticism--at least in public. Baring confirmed that approximately 60 villages had been burnt and 12,000 Christian peasants killed in Bulgaria. It was left to Robert Bourke, the Parliamentary UnderSecretary for Foreign Affairs, to handle the Radicals' attack as best he could, fully cognisant of the fact that, "'Baring's account...justif[ies] everything that has been said by the Daily News correspondent.'"¹¹²

On both dates, Bourke was the chief spokesman for the Government. His speeches blended concession with intransigence. They were unprecedented in their official acknowledgment of the massacres and offer of sympathy towards the victims. They were also cautionary speeches against the dangers of overreaction, differing little from previous government declarations. Once again, Parliament was reminded that correspondents "were easily satisfied with a very small amount of evidence," and that they had a responsibility to see that "atrocious acts were not taken advantage of to carry out a policy hostile to England as well as to Turkey."¹¹³ Bourke skilfully used the dispatches from Elliot to defend the latter against charges of negligence and to refute accusations of Britain's complicity in Ottoman barbarism. Rather more questionably, however, he introduced statements from the Turkophile Levant Herald, which Elliot had sent in place of an official diplomatic brief of the situation. Bourke aimed to turn the table on the Opposition and use the press to the Government's advantage, and in support of his message that

caution, and a reasoned impartial judgement of the facts, should precede any action. Yet he would not defend the credibility of the Herald's pronouncements, which differed from the London papers in focusing on the Christian provocations which had produced the massacres. The statements of the expatriate press were submitted as "equally worthy of credit", even though the Herald denied the extent of the carnage which Baring's eyewitness report already confirmed. This only weakened Bourke's case for the Government as the impartial adjudicator of facts.¹¹⁴

It was the same old story. The newspapers received reports by telegraph, daily sifting through and verifying information, while the Government responded with consular reports that were weeks old. Even worse, Baring's preliminary report confirmed the press accounts which the Government had all along dismissed.

This marked Disraeli's irreversible disillusionment with Elliot. Immediately after the debate he told Derby, that Elliot and the Foreign Office had compromised his position.

We have had a very damaging debate on Bulgarian atrocities, and it is lucky for us, in that respect, that the session is dying. Had it not been for an adroit and ingenious speech by Bourke, who much distinguished himself, the consequences might have been rather serious. But two grave results are now evident: 1st. That Elliot has shown a lamentable want of energy and deficiency of information throughout; and 2nd. That our own F.O. misled me in the first replies wh. I gave on their voucher, and had I seen that despatch of Consul Reade, which never reached me, I wd. never have made those answers, and,...shd. have pressed it on you to follow up Reade's revelations. I write this now, because Hartington wants more papers, and wants them before Prorogation, that he may have more damaging debates. It is very awkward business, and, I fear, a great exposure of our diplomatic system...¹¹⁵

One document was at the centre of controversy, Lord Derby's dispatch to Elliot of 26 June¹¹⁶ which asked for inquiries into the accuracy of the atrocity reports. The problem was not the content of the letter but the fact that it was sent by bag and not by telegraph.

Confirmation of the atrocities could have been obtained within a week. Instead, two went by before even any letter of remonstrance was sent to the Porte. This, the Opposition charged, showed that the Government had no desire to be informed on Bulgaria. It had known for six weeks of the arming of Moslem irregulars in Bulgaria and their use against civilians, its strategy had been one of deliberate procrastination.¹¹⁷ Elliot's dismissal of the atrocities as exaggeration was contrasted with Baring's report.¹¹⁸

Disraeli emphatically denied that Britain incurred any peculiar responsibility for Turkey other than that shared by all the contracting Powers to the Treaty of Paris--namely, that of upholding the territorial integrity of Turkey. This precluded the letter and spirit of the Berlin Memorandum, which anticipated material interference in Turkey, a prospect inimical to the interests of England, "which, after all" said the Premier, "must be our sovereign care." Nor was Britain especially responsible for events in Bulgaria.

For all Disraeli's annoyance with Elliot, he defended the Ambassador with spirit. The Premier did not deny knowledge of events in Bulgaria. He emphasised that Ministers and Ambassador were in constant communication throughout May and June. The reports from the Consuls throughout May were indecisive, rumours were rampant and deliberately planted by the insurgents. The Government had to treat such stories with studious scepticism. Many of the stories had been wildly exaggerated or patently false, and, while the slaughter of 12,000 individuals was a horrible event, it was the "most extravagant abuse of rhetoric" to equate that slaughter with the depopulation of a province of some 3,700,000 souls.¹¹⁹

By September 1876, Disraeli's Eastern policy had three principal objects--the maintenance of Ottoman integrity, reform of the condition of the Balkan Christians, and the face-saving measure of never admitting that he had adopted the policy advocated by the Opposition. This had been from the first his "primary object". Disraeli was obsessed with the prospect of losing face, of becoming contemptible in the Public eye by bowing to a mass protest movement. In denying the influence of the Opposition or of the agitation on Government policy, Disraeli aimed

...to defeat the purpose of the Opposition, which is to induce the public to believe, that the Ministry had changed their policy in consequence of the interposition of their rivals. If that idea were to prevail, the popular excitement might,...diminish, or even cease, but Yr Majesty's ministers wo[ul]d become contemptible, and soon fall....¹²⁰

This produced a singularly ambiguous policy. The Government attempted to maintain different fronts to its public, the Porte, and to Russia. These images were often contradictory and led the Government to seem incompetent, callous, and immoral. Both the Opposition and the press were provoked to prove that the Government's policy had changed.

If the Government had been overtaken by events it was equally the case with the Opposition leaders, who understood the Balkan situation even less than the Government.¹²¹ This produced a deep commitment to fence-sitting and an official Opposition policy that looked much like Derby's because Hartington in particular shared Derby's laissez-faire attitudes. Both acted as brakes on their Parties, slowing the opposing forces of Disraelian confrontation and Gladstonian emancipation. While Gladstone praised the Government's initiative in supporting the Andr ssy Note, Granville and Hartington shared the

Government's reticence towards commitment.¹²² The Whig Lords did not criticise the Government's refusal of the Berlin Memorandum. Gladstone in turn was critical of their inaction, citing the views of two experienced diplomats, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Lord Hammond's.¹²³ At no time during the session did the Opposition leadership censure government policy in the East, though within a week and a half of prorogation, they were under considerable pressure to do so. The Daily News coverage on Bulgaria had shocked the public, the Liberal Party's neutral position towards the issue was no longer tenable, yet, Granville was unwilling to abandon it despite internal pressure from Gladstone and the 'emancipation' faction.¹²⁴

By the close of the 1876 Parliament, the lines of division had set. Ministerialists and Gladstonians had each adopted their respective platforms on the East. The former proclaimed their loyalty to orthodox policy while the latter denounced this policy as ambiguous. The Whigs stood uneasily between these two camps, despising popular agitation yet exasperated with the Government's ambiguous policy. These rhetorical positions and relationships would immediately resurface with the opening of the new session of Parliament in February 1877. Around these, several kinds of argument were prosecuted, concerning the Nature of the State and specifically its external conduct.

Chapter 2

THE EASTERN QUESTION: ENDURING THEMES IN A RECURRENT CONTROVERSY

"Nations are as men. They are 'moral persons'".--Lord Robert Montagu

The Moral State: A Question Of Identity

One of the roots of the four-year controversy over Britain's Eastern policy can be be summed up in two questions: What is the nature of the State? To what ends was it bound? Such questions need not arise if the State were interpreted in purely Hobbsian terms as existing solely in a state of nature, with nothing beyond to impose moral order upon it. But in 1876-7, the anthropomorphic and teleological view was a popular one. If States were as individuals, "free moral agents, capable of rights, liable to obligations",¹²⁵ it followed that they were also bound to the same standards of honourable conduct as were individuals.¹²⁶ Two parallel schools of thought, one secular, the other religious, led many statesmen to adopt such a moral view of the universe and the State. The Liberal utilitarian principle of 'greatest happiness' was complemented by the High Church doctrine of 'religious nationality' and its postulate of 'virtuous action'. This doctrine, for example, led Canon Liddon, one of the leading figures in the anti-Turk agitation, to define patriotism in terms of familial obligation and moral imperative.

We wish our relatives to be good men in the first instance, and then successful men, if success is compatible with goodness. I cannot understand how many excellent people fail to feel thus about their country too; it would seem to me that exactly in the proportion in which we realise that a nation is only a very overgrown family...will be our anxiety that this country should act as a good man would act; and that patriotism consists in wishing this.¹²⁷

Similarly, an influential application of utilitarian doctrine professed that in situations where "the interest of the part conflicts with the interest of the whole, the interest of the part--be it individual or State--must necessarily g[i]ve way."¹²⁸ Thus, from both a religious point of view and a secular one, the State was held to be subject to a higher Authority: the deist posited God to be that authority, the agnostic, Humanity. In Parliament, these two streams of thought, religious and secular, were not easily separated.

According to this way of thought, the State was under moral law, and limited to conduct which did not threaten the greater good of the whole. It was morally bound to observe humane conduct and avoid special pleading in all its affairs, regardless of its own special interests. It had a national conscience, a sense of right and wrong, and a corresponding duty to do what was just.¹²⁹ The popularity of such doctrines among the recently enfranchised became evident in August 1876 when news of the Bulgarian massacres was confirmed in Parliament. A great "incontinence of sympathy" arose for the victims of Ottoman repression.

With working men the question is not whether Turkey is necessary in order to maintain our highway to India, but rather 'Has Turkey done right to the Christians in the Slav provinces?' If not, then the mass of the working people would declare in a voice of thunder 'Make her do it, and we will settle the question as to the right of way to India afterwards.'¹³⁰

Events in Bulgaria tied academic questions about ethics and political philosophy to the question of Britain's relationship to Ottoman Turkey. Would this relationship continue in its traditional form of the Crimean Alliance or be replaced by one of two options: a) British coercion of Turkey in league with Russia and other Powers, or b) strict neutrality, whatever the outcome?

The Bulgarian massacres provoked widespread feelings of disgust, both because of the acts of atrocity themselves, and because of the Turkish press, which bragged of British power as if it were Turkey's own. "[I]t was a scandal to Europe that such atrocities should take place within her borders." And, "it was horrible that such crimes should be perpetrated in Europe by a Government with whom we were in alliance[.]"¹³¹ The feeling was strong that Britain had been slighted by the actions of its ally and its honour soiled by its connection to Turkey.¹³² From this arose a desire for national atonement, to be accomplished through some great altruistic act on behalf of the Balkan Christians against the Turkish overlord, as proof that the Turkish alliance had been disowned.

- 1) It was time...England awoke to a sense of her responsibility as a great Christian Power,
- 2) [T]he Government...ought to take an early opportunity of letting it be known to Turkey that we could no longer stand sponsor of a Mahomedan Government which had ceased to deserve the respect of civilized Nations, and which had done all it could to call down upon itself the just indignation of humanity and of Heaven.
- 3) [I]f sensible to the obligations of duty and honour,...[Britain] ought to insist...there be some reality in the guarantees...given by the Turkish Government [to its Christian subjects].¹³³

Ministers and their supporters responded with legalistic speeches about the legitimacy of the Turkish military suppression in Bulgaria. They did not condone the means but they did not condemn the principle. The Prime Minister was philosophical: massacre was the inevitable hallmark of civil war and was to be regretted. But the war had been triggered by rebellion and responsibility lay with the insurgents. There were no innocents at hand, but rather two groups, historical enemies, locked in mortal combat and equally accountable for atrocities: if the Turks had committed more of them it was not without provocation, if the Christians less, it was from lack of opportunity. Liberal 'agitators'

were implored to consider impartially "both sides of the question".¹³⁴ Gathorne Hardy declared that Britain, a country which had not suffered any wrongs, had no right to vindicate through violence the rights of Turkey's Christian subjects.

...However much we may feel for them, however much we may suffer with them and I cannot deny...that the Government of Turkey has been unspeakably bad I...say...that does not give us,...the right to be the executioners of Turkey,...We are not to draw the sword as Crusaders because our feelings have been offended. We are only to draw it in the interests of justice and right as regards ourselves....

His legalistic rationale for nonintervention became the Government's standard rebuttal against the moralist offensives of the Opposition.¹³⁵ Gladstone's morality was Christian, narrowly focused upon the deliverance of fellow Christians from Moslem oppression, Hardy's morality was secular, demonstrating a cosmopolitan sense of duty and responsibility. He professed impartial concern for all, Christian and Moslem alike, who were affected by the Eastern problem. Both men appealed to high moral principles, but different and competing ones.¹³⁶

The Government's apparent indifference only compounded the sense of indignation, with the Opposition making as much capital as they could from the growing estrangement.

- 1) [Englishmen] were being shamed in the face of Europe by the conduct of the Government.
- 2) Our position is humiliating...and it is revolting to the consciences of Englishmen that we should be supposed to give our moral support to a Power which has perpetrated these atrocities, unless it be proved to the contrary.
- 3) If Russia is again to occupy the place she occupied in the minds of the Christians of the East before the Crimean War, it will be the fault of those...who make speeches such as convey to the minds of Eastern Christendom that we are the enemies of Christendom.¹³⁷

Ministerialists seldom spoke of 'Christendom', but Gladstonians found it useful as a codeword for disparagement, a pointed reminder that the leader of the greatest of Christian states was not a Christian himself. Gladstone spoke of Christendom and Europe interchangeably, as if to signify the political viability of the former concept as much now as it had been in the year 1000.¹³⁸ Christendom was the motto of the anti-Turkist cause and behind it lay genuine fear that a sort of Islamic 'Restoration' was being attempted in the Balkan peninsula.

...there was an evident determination to diminish the intelligent and educated majority of the Bulgarians--and all this with the perfect connivance of the authorities....It was said the emergency was so great as to render it indispensable to put down the insurrection by any means immediately available. But the extermination of a peaceful people was not justifiable in any circumstances, and it was to be regretted that Sir Henry Elliott did not at once tell the Turkish Government that the extermination of this population for the purpose of re-adjusting the balance between Christians and Mahomedans was not justifiable under any circumstances...¹³⁹

Such fears were associated with a sentimental historicism, one which viewed the subject Christian races of the Porte as the rightful inheritors of Roman civilisation who, by an accident of history, were condemned to Asiatic despotism. Imperialists in both parties had little patience for such sentimentality and mockingly referred to the "crescentade".¹⁴⁰

Christianity and Greco-Roman civilisation were fundamental to the Gladstonian definition of Europe, as was the conviction that the Turks were patently alien.¹⁴¹ A Moslem Power could be true to Europe only by betraying itself. Thus, for the sake of Europe, Ottoman rule had to be superseded by indigenous national governments. Gladstonians promoted this policy of emancipation in a self-consciously defiant spirit. Emancipation of Balkan Christians meant Europeanisation of the Peninsula. It was an

emotional response to what was perceived as an alien offensive into Christian Europe. Though such a policy was sentimental, it was always skilfully presented as the starkly logical choice for Britons to make, and it always received respectable, if not uncritical coverage in the press. Complementing this historicist view of Europe were notions of humane government, such as

...the desire to liberate fellow Christians and fellow Europeans from Mahometan and Asiatic rule...not solely,...because the rule is infidel or alien, but because it is also incurably vicious and leaves men...no room to live their lives in security and happiness.¹⁴²

The Liberal ideology of Nationalism was intimately connected with racial precepts. Nationalism was defined as "the doctrine that unity of race is the best foundation for political unity."¹⁴³ Gladstonians revered signs of what they perceived to be religious and racial solidarity among the Christians of the Balkans. On the twin pillars of religion and race, the anti-Turk faction in Parliament defended Serbia's declaration of war on Turkey.

...[W]hen these people found men of the same race near them subjected to outrages by the Turkish troops could the House be surprised at the sympathy they exhibited? There was not an Englishman in their position who would not do the same. It was, therefore, unreasonable to charge the Servians with having begun an unprovoked war when it sprang from the natural and in some respects the most honourable feelings of humanity....¹⁴⁴

Christian and 'Mahomedan' denoted rival races of men whose progress in civilisation were contrasted. The Christian race was in the ascendant: superior in virtue, in industry, in its "native and inborn strength". The 'Mahomedan' was a "backward" and a "dwindling" race with "no element of progress among them[.]"¹⁴⁵ The decline of the Turkish Empire was the consequence of 'Mahomedan' misrule and that was the consequence of religion and race. Britain should therefore "declare clearly and distinctly

that it would prefer to see some other Government than a Mahomedan Government ruling in Turkey" this would benefit "not...Christians alone, but the poorer classes of Turks as well".¹⁴⁶

The Concert of Europe

In 1874-75, while Serb nationalists organised for insurrection, Gladstone watched the progress of the Bonn Reunion conferences between the Anglican, Old Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox Churches. He was one of a handful of men in England, fellow Anglo-Catholics, already deeply involved in Eastern affairs. While Prime Minister, he had encouraged and fostered Anglo-Orthodox contacts and remained in close touch with the Greek community in London. Gladstone admired the Eastern Church. He saw in Orthodoxy, the 'religious nationality' which, in the 1840's, he had dismally conceded could never be realised in England. The roots of his fierce anti-Turkism lay in his catholic empathy with the Eastern Christians and concern for their Churches.¹⁴⁷ Tentative plans for further conferences in 1876-7 were dashed by the Hercegovinian rising. Orthodox Church leaders refused to attend any further conferences with the Anglicans so long as the Disraeli Administration defended their Turkish oppressors; nor would the bulk of the High Church clergy, which was Tory in sympathy, follow the Anglo-Catholic party toward an anti-Turk position. Catholic ecumenicism was doubly checked by Beaconsfieldism.¹⁴⁸

For Gladstone, the humanity of a State was a function of its religion. Religion was the highest expression of humanity; humane government and humane policies were not possible without it. Early in his political career, Gladstone had written, "a political

position is mainly valuable as instrumental for the good of the Church: and under this rule every question becomes one of detail only."¹⁴⁹ Although he conceded that government policy could not always follow Christian principles,¹⁵⁰ he never lost sight of the ideal of 'religious nationality'.¹⁵¹ Public protest against the Bulgarian massacres gave him an opportunity to publicise his convictions of moral statecraft and he soon was its hero. The relationship was symbiotic, the movement gaining legitimacy through Gladstone's advocacy.¹⁵²

Gladstone's idea of religious nationality shaped his concept of the Concert of Europe.¹⁵³ The state was willed by God and represented the divine ordering of humanity. So too was the Concert a divinely inspired means of cooperation between states.¹⁵⁴ It institutionalised Christian morality in European policy. It was the only legitimate means to sanction the exercise of British power, not for self-serving ends but in the interest of Europe--or Christendom.¹⁵⁵ Gladstone welcomed any collective judicial action by the Great Powers, as an advance towards European Federation and the Parliament of Man.¹⁵⁶ His dream of a federated Europe was but an extension of his ecumenical aspirations for a catholic and European Church. The fact of the original unity of the Christian Church justified his political philosophy.

...[W]e should seek to found a moral empire upon the confidence of the nations, not upon their fears,...[A] new law of nations is gradually taking hold of the mind, and coming to sway the practice, of the world; a law which recognises independence, which frowns upon aggression, which favours the pacific, not the bloody settlement of disputes,...above all, which recognises as a tribunal of paramount authority, the general judgement of civilised mankind....It is hard for all nations to go astray. Their ecumenical judgement sits above the partial passions of those, who are misled by interest,...The greatest triumph of our time...will be the enthronement of this idea of Public Right, as the governing idea of European policy;...¹⁵⁷

The evolution of Italian and German nationalism shaped Gladstone's ideas. For peace to continue in Europe, the new states and the old must follow a new paradigm of international law, which he called the 'Public Right'. The enthronement of this idea of institutionalised moral practice in international affairs depended upon public protest, and the promotion of a body of "right-minded opinion". This objective affected Gladstone's views of specific international grievances, from Italian nationalism in the 1850's, through the Alabama claims in the 1860's, to the Eastern crisis of the late 1870's.¹⁵⁸

Gladstone in particular, and the Liberal Party in general, constantly advocated collective diplomacy as the solution to the Eastern Question. The Concert was an ideal but it was also a practical means by which to harness Russian power to the service of Europe and Christendom. If Europe did not act together Russia would act alone, and in pursuit of the right cause. As Turkey would not resist a united Europe, collective action was the best means to prevent (1) a war between Turkey and any European Powers, and (2) a general war over the division of Ottoman territory.¹⁵⁹ Thus Britain should remain a part of a collective diplomatic process. Lord Hartington shared this view:

...what I think we ought to keep in view,...is, that intervention of the mildest kind by any single Power is fraught with...danger to the peace of Europe, but...intervention...if made by the unanimous consent of...Europe...is...a far less dangerous course to be adopted.¹⁶⁰

But Gladstone criticised the Conservatives not just for their handling of the crisis but for the principle of imperialism. Britain, in concert with the other Guarantors of Ottoman integrity, had a moral right and duty to ensure the fulfilment of the Porte's promises of civil and religious equality. But ever since the Government's unilateral action in

purchasing the canal shares, it had "most unwisely abandoned...that principle of the concert of Europe"¹⁶¹ This principle had to determine all foreign policy.¹⁶²

Conversely, Disraeli feared the religious aspect of the Eastern Question. 'Jesuit influence' extended even into the Cabinet. "[I]t is difficult to argue[,]" he observed, "with men under the influence of strong religious feeling." His chief concern was Carnarvon. "The little Carnarvon", as Disraeli's private correspondence called him, had publicly declared his support for the agitation. He was an old friend of Canon Liddon's and was thought to live among a veritable "gang of Jesuits", actively involved in the 'Greek conspiracy'.¹⁶³ Carnarvon's close friend, Salisbury, also genuinely sympathised with the Ottoman Christians and shared Gladstone's High Church convictions. Peter Marsh has discussed the two men's "sense of catholic affinity" and their empathy for the suffering Bulgarian Christians. During the Bulgarian and Armenian massacres, Salisbury "retained the friendship of the foremost High Church agitators," Canon Liddon, Canon MacColl and, in the Armenian case, Gladstone. Salisbury genuinely wished to help the Turkish Christian minorities and accounted for moral considerations in his diplomacy and strategy. Despite his sincere Christian beliefs, however, Salisbury was not "'an apostle of early Christianity'", as he was characterised at Constantinople. Salisbury hoped that humanitarian desires would coincide with the national interest but, in the final analysis, his foreign policy was not governed by Christian ethics.¹⁶⁴

Prestige, and the Politics of Expediency

For Disraeli the Eastern crisis presented a paradox. Prestige was the object, but any means to achieve it was acceptable. This is what is known as Disraelian expediency. The

requirements of British power and of his politics demanded that he pursue, and be seen to pursue, an independent and leading policy, so to enhance the nation's prestige and distinguish his Party. He was not inherently pro-Turk nor anti-Russian; Britain and Russia were rivals, not enemies. Disraeli distrusted all the Great Powers, Russia no more than the rest--which did not prevent him from trying to broker alliances with the other Powers, including Russia, in order to obtain a 'commanding position'. Alternately, he professed friendship and distrust toward all three Eastern Powers.¹⁶⁵ During the war scare of 1875, he sounded Derby on the proposition of an alliance with Russia. His ideal was Palmerston's British-led Concert which would put Bismarck in his place and preserve the peace of Europe. But the 1870's were not the 1830's. Russia was irrevocably committed to the destruction of the Crimean system, which, as Gladstone had shown in 1871, remained at the core of Britain's policy in the Near East. This made a policy of Anglo-Russian cooperation difficult. The emergence of Germany too, after the Franco-Prussian War, altered the power equation. France could no longer be played against Russia while Bismarck prevented Germany and Austria-Hungary from being so either. Disraeli could neither abandon the established orthodoxy of the Crimean system, nor alienate an increasingly anti-war electorate with old fashioned Turkophile diplomacy. Saddled with the Crimean policy, unwilling to serve as a second in the existing Concert but unable to make himself first, the Turks were Disraeli's only ally when the Balkans erupted into one of its periodic episodes of anarchy.¹⁶⁶

Under these circumstances, more often than not, foreign policy seemed a question of what one could not allow to be done than of what one could do. Disraeli's diplomacy

bore a familiar pattern--refusal of Austro-Hungarian and Russian initiatives, followed by counter schemes and proposals to all three Eastern Powers, the most extraordinary of which was Disraeli's June 1876 gesture to Count Shuvalov for an Anglo-Russian entente. Disraeli felt bound to prevent the breakup of the Ottoman Empire because he thought that it suited British interests and prestige, a word, Count Münster explained to von Bülow, which existed solely in the French language.¹⁶⁷ Britain better demonstrated power and leadership by defiance rather than compliance. Disraeli summed up his reasoning in a single sentence. "To escape isolation by consenting to play a secondary part does not become your Majesty[.]"¹⁶⁸

Turkey and the other Powers, especially Russia, would naturally shape events, but Britain must respond so to enhance its independence and expedite its reemergence as a leading European Power. It must be seen to play a leading role as much as, and more so than the Eastern Powers.¹⁶⁹ The purchase of the canal shares was the first in a string of performances intended to mark his new 'English' politics. But despite Disraeli's imperial rhetoric, neither he nor his administration followed any coherent policy of expansion. For Disraeli, expansion, as in the case of Cyprus, was done for the express purpose of enhancing Britain's prestige--for Salisbury the purpose was purely strategic.¹⁷⁰

Salisbury, too, was concerned for British prestige and interests but differed from his chief regarding how to further them. Initially, from December 1875 to May 1876, like Disraeli, Salisbury preferred unilateral action and criticised Derby's cooperation with Austria-Hungary and Russia. A combination of the Bulgarian massacres, the Buckinghamshire byelection, and a change in his views regarding a Russian threat to

British interests, led him to reconsider his position. Henceforth, he tried to persuade Disraeli and Derby to protect Ottoman Christians from misgovernment and thereby deny Russia the pretext for intervention.¹⁷¹

- 1) I take the true intent...of all this agitation...to be...that...promises of better Government of Christians won't do alone. Some kind of reliable machinery must be provided for seeing that the promises are kept.
- 2) The Bucks election shows that the agitation has not been without effect on our party. It is clear enough that the traditional Palmerstonian policy is at an end. We have not the power, even if we have the wish, to give back any of the revolted districts to the discretionary government of the Porte.

Increasingly, Salisbury was willing to cooperate with Russia and completely unwilling to support Turkey in Europe. His overriding dread of another Crimea ultimately led him to oppose the Cabinet, almost single-handedly in March 1877, and plead for an alliance with Russia to destroy Turkish rule over Balkan Christians.¹⁷²

Several contrasting views of what kind of state Britain was, and what identity it should hold, competed for public influence between 1875-8. Was Britain leader or follower, independent or part of a Concert, ally or belligerent, a European and Christian Power or cosmopolitan and an imperial one? Imperial responsibility implied acceptance of foreign cultures and impartiality towards Islam--a willingness to consider Turkish as well as Christian grievances. To Disraeli, England was an 'Asian' Power as much as a European one, while Gladstonians were purblind to imperial interests. Above all, Britain must pursue its sovereign interests by sovereign means. Despite, or perhaps because of its relatively tiny standing army, Britain was a military Power preeminently entitled to concern itself with the question of the future of Turkey. For Gladstonians, conversely, England could not be England unless it was above all a moral Power and a Christian

Power. Gladstone was just as apt to refer to Britain's obligation to "Eastern Christendom". For him the term was as much a political designation as it was a religious one.¹⁷³ National identity stemmed from Britain's historic role as the champion of the twin ideals of Europe and of Christendom. Englishmen must consider the interests not only of England, but the welfare of Europe and the honour of Christendom. England, Europe, Christendom; nation, civilisation, faith; these were the idealised constructs of the Gladstonian universe. Britain's honour was its principal asset and its principal interest. Christian humanity and European ideals were essential for the maintenance of its polyglot Empire.

The question now was as regarded the future. Could we as a Christian nation and a free people, continue to give a moral countenance and support to a nation whose Government had allowed the horrors of which they had just heard to be perpetrated, unchecked and unproved until England had at length sternly remonstrated with her?¹⁷⁴

As a great Christian Power, and as the principal European Power guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Turkey, Britain was obliged to ease the oppression of Christians. "It was time...England awoke to a sense of her responsibility as a great Christian Power[.]"¹⁷⁵ This Gladstonian morality became by the time of Midlothian, the central plank in the Opposition platform.

Chapter 3

LA DANSE À TROIS: BEACONSFIELD, DERBY AND SALISBURY, AUGUST 1876 TO JUNE 1878

Discordance had first emerged within the Cabinet in December 1875 when Lord Derby was isolated over the Andrassy Note. The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum signalled a return to unanimity around Beaconsfield's view that aloofness would remind the Eastern Powers that Britain's full cooperation was needed to solve the crisis. The agitation then wrecked this consensus and the balance of power in the Cabinet. In December 1875 and May 1876, Salisbury had stood with the Premier against Derby's predilection for League-led diplomacy. The agitation cost Beaconsfield both the support of Salisbury and consensus in the Cabinet. He no longer controlled the Cabinet but only one of its two contending factions, Salisbury headed the other, Derby oscillated between the two. These were the political preconditions for what Northcote and Salisbury called "non possumus",¹⁷⁶ the negative and paralytic policy of doing nothing for Turkey and nothing against it.

By August 1876 Serbia was losing the war. Ironically, however, victory threatened disaster for Turkey. Russia's prestige was at stake. Having supported Serbia so far, Russia could not now abandon it, especially as PanSlav and military pressure on the Czar had reached a critical point.¹⁷⁷ Observers had generally recognised that war with Serbia might spark a Russo-Turkish conflict, with all its attendant implications for England. In order to avoid this danger and check the expansion of the Balkans conflict, Derby ventured to end the war between Turkey and Serbia. In order to do so he was prepared

to threaten Turkey with abandonment.¹⁷⁸ In the process, with the Cabinet's consent, he cooperated with Vienna and St. Petersburg. This cooperation was manifested in the Anglo-Russian proposal for armistice, which was presented to the Porte on 11 September—a critical moment, as British diplomacy was all that lay between Belgrade and a victorious Turkish army. This proposal called for administrative but not political autonomy in Bosnia, a return virtually to the status quo for Serbia and Montenegro, and guarantees against renewed atrocities in Bulgaria. As the three Powers had achieved a semblance of unity, on 17 September the Porte gave notice of a suspension of hostilities. But this in turn ended joint coercion and the armistice proved insubstantial.¹⁷⁹ Neither Turkey nor Russia accepted the British terms as a final settlement. Instead, through the Sumarakov mission, Russia sought a fresh agreement with Austria-Hungary for the settlement of the war. Coincidentally, Gorchakov ordered a partial mobilisation.¹⁸⁰

Fully sensible as to the moral implications for themselves and for the old policy they were pursuing, the Bulgarian atrocities outraged Ministers, excepting Beaconsfield who believed that the Christians had brought it all on their own heads. Derby too, was indifferent to the cause of Balkan emancipation but sensitive to the clamour of public opinion. Carnarvon, Cairns, Northcote, Cross, Hardy, Salisbury, Bourke, and the Queen all urged the Prime Minister to overcome Opposition charges of complicity with some gesture, such as Elliot's recall and a public proclamation of horror. Peace, they argued, would be unsatisfactory without reform in the Slav provinces. Beaconsfield dutifully passed on their messages to Derby, who adopted Bourke's idea of an investigative

commission for the punishment of guilty Turks. Both senior Ministers, however, held that for the Government to protest its innocence would be to proclaim its guilt.¹⁸¹

Beaconsfield and Derby now aimed to practice Falstaff's advice and turn affliction into commodity: they would use the agitation to achieve their own ends. The Foreign Secretary thought charges of government complicity unfair, but knew that the massacres could justify a change in policy. The old Palmerstonian policy of defending the Turkish cause in Europe

...was becoming impossible to defend, and this new stupidity of theirs give us a perfectly honourable and legitimate reason for partially throwing them over. So the 12,000...have not died in vain: they will have saved the consistency of the F.O....

That is, popular sentiment could be turned to support the Foreign Secretary's proclivity for order, peace, and isolation. Derby's ultimate objective was to keep Britain out of war, any war, and to this end his diplomacy in the autumn of 1876 was unusually vigorous.¹⁸² Derby tried to amend the administration in the Christian provinces while otherwise defending the existing order in Turkey because this was the surest way to avoid war.¹⁸³ On 4 October, with Shuvalov's help, he even secured the Cabinet's sanction to withdraw Elliot should the Porte refuse the British terms for armistice. The Cabinet's acquiescence in this Stanlerian strategy indicates the influence of the agitation:

The one essential thing now is to make a peace,...I am prepared to put any necessary amount of pressure on the Porte...Continued war means Russian intervention and their [the Turks] destruction. We could not save them, or even try it, as English feeling is now...¹⁸⁴

Ironically, in promising Bosnia local self-government, Derby was actually offering Russia less than Beaconsfield was willing to give. The latter envisioned an international

conference charged with the pursuit of a settlement based on the 'status quo', but empowered to create vassal states out of Turkish provinces. This was substantially Gorchakov's solution. Although Beaconsfield and Gorchakov differed regarding territorial concessions for Montenegro, both advocated that Bosnia become a tributary state; Andr ssy and Derby steadfastly opposed this solution. The initial attempt to secure an armistice revealed the differences between the two British Ministers.¹⁸⁵ Beaconsfield also admitted of a 'new departure' even of 'dictating' to the Porte. He told Derby,

I have been thinking...about...our new point of departure--wise and inevitable, and wise because inevitable. But...it is a course which will probably bring about a result very different from that originally contemplated....I cannot help doubting whether any arrangement,...is now practicable. I fear affairs will linger on till the spring, when Russia and Austria will march their armies into the Balkans,...if so, it is wise that we should take the lead in it [partition]....¹⁸⁶

Derby disagreed,

If once we raise the question of partition, the risk of war is great, for the Powers will all want something, and the division of the spoil is not likely to be made in an amiable manner....¹⁸⁷

Although Beaconsfield did not press the matter further with Derby, he continued to think about partition. Beaconsfield would not accept Bismarck's proposal and be satisfied solely with Egypt. Possession of the Suez Canal was insufficient to maintain Britain's security should Russia gain domination of Constantinople and the straits. These, he believed, were the strategic keys to India. If there was to be partition, Britain must secure the Dardanelles or some point on the Black Sea coast. Beaconsfield suspected the Russians would use the Constantinople conference as a diplomatic *entr e* for demanding the immediate occupation of the Balkans, and briefed Salisbury for such a contingency.

I am surprised that Bismarck should go on harping about Egypt. Its occupation by us would embitter France, and I don't see it would at all benefit us, if Russia possessed Constantinople. I would sooner we had Asia Minor than Egypt....[I]f...the Porte...would sell to us, for instance, Varna, the supremacy of Russia might for ever be arrested.¹⁸⁸

At this stage, in order to preempt any Russian plan for occupation and partition, the Prime Minister was prepared to endorse the military supervision of European Turkey, as in Syria during 1861, but unlike the latter case, only with the acquiescence of the Porte--coercion by consent. Beaconsfield believed that the Porte might accept occupation "provided it is not effected by conterminous Powers,...she may suggest, that England should occupy. Having taken this position, she must be inexorable"--and England too. With characteristic optimism, he told Salisbury that "if 6,000 French were sufficient for Syria, 40,000 English would be ample for European Turkey[.]" so long as the British commander had control of the Turkish regular army.¹⁸⁹ This scheme would satisfy all sides of the domestic controversy. Britain would demonstrate its leadership in Europe and use it in the service of oppressed Christians, assuming the status of moral guardian in the Balkans and strategic guardian in the Dardanelles--the roles it so jealously condemned Russia for assuming.

Beaconsfield "guarded himself against any opinion as to Peace or War." Because his aim was not peace but prestige, he could accept many solutions to the crisis. The product was less important than the process--that Britain be seen to play the leading role in devising it. Conservative government would thus be strengthened and political success achieved. Where Derby was emotionally committed to peace in the Balkans, Beaconsfield coolly regarded Serbia's prostration as Serbia's just reward for rebellion. The Premier

was not averse to pressuring the Turks. He was equally ready to maintain the status quo or to destroy it. There was nothing wrong with partition--if it was executed "under the friendly offices of England" and if, in return for Britain's benevolent services of saving Austria, Russia and Europe from war, Constantinople was neutralised and declared a free port under British custodianship. Whatever course, Britain and its Conservative government must be seen to be triumphant.¹⁹⁰

Both Beaconsfield and Derby understood that the Czar was reluctant to commit himself to war and that Russia was militarily and financially weak. This knowledge led them to different conclusions. Derby considered that Russian deference to peace obligated Britain to press the Porte for an armistice, and not to antagonise Russia with schemes for isolating it from Europe. Beaconsfield saw Russia's irresolution as Britain's opportunity. Conciliation and concession would gain nothing, but a bold policy of entente with Germany, consummated by a treaty, might give Britain the Balkans status quo. Beaconsfield reminded Derby of

...the importance, if we wish to secure a long peace, of coming to some understanding with some European Power....It is not only our right, but,...our duty, to enquire of France and Austria, what, in the event of the failure of the Congress, are their views and feelings with reference to their engagements under the Tripartite Treaty?...I do not understand from you, and I do not here from any other quarter, that you have ever made to [Austria], howr. guarded, any overture for joint action. I believe it has been expected. If made, it should be expressed thro' Buchanan, not Beust, but it would be more conveniently managed with reference to keeping existing engagements: the Tripartite....I have no hesitation...in saying, that it wd. be most desirable to arrive at a clear agreement with Austria for joint action, and that if the Conference fail, and Russia is arrogant and menacing, it shd. at once be intimated to Russia that the integrity of the Turkish dominions shd. not be violated.

Derby remained unconverted. Thus, Beaconsfield bypassed him and dealt directly with the Austrian Legation about an Anglo-Austrian alliance. Although a draft agreement was drawn up, nothing came of these informal conversations. Neither Beaconsfield nor Andr ssy would or could commit their countries to an alliance against Russia.¹⁹¹

Derby viewed Beaconsfield's initiatives as a threat to peace. He held that British military preparations could only heighten tension and force Russia and Austria-Hungary to reciprocate. He refused even to discuss occupation and vetoed Beaconsfield's plan to send the fleet to Constantinople. Before sending the Cabinet's 'warning' of 4 October to Russia, Derby and Tenterden carefully edited the dispatch to avoid "any expression [of]...threat". In Parliament, Derby repeatedly dismissed the Tripartite Treaty as 'virtually obsolete'. Nor was Derby keen on Beaconsfield's implausible proposition for a treaty with Bismarck to guarantee the Balkans status quo. Bismarck, after all, desired partition and had repeatedly said so.¹⁹² Derby limited his German overture to an "'earnest wish'" to work in concert with Germany.¹⁹³

Despite Beaconsfield's predilection for a diplomatic coup, in September and October, it was Derby's modest policy of coercing the Porte to keep the peace which prevailed. This policy was challenged by Beaconsfield whenever Russia made a move toward Constantinople, most notably in late September, after the Sumarokov mission and partial Russian mobilisation. Derby's power over Eastern policy began to slide in October, when Russia rejected his leadership and solution to the crisis. It vanished with the Russian ultimatum of 1 November. When it seemed that Russia would solve the crisis by force,

Beaconsfield rallied the Cabinet while Derby stood alone, calling for more time and less belligerence.¹⁹⁴

Gorchakov's proposals of late September for a joint Austro-Russian occupation of the Balkans and a European naval demonstration, irritated the Cabinet. Its meeting of 4 October marked a watershed in the politics of foreign policy. Derby's policy of peace and order met a reemerging spirit of *réalpolitik*. For the first time, the Cabinet discussed a precautionary occupation of Constantinople and decided to warn Russia that Britain would consider an occupation of Bulgaria a violation of the Treaty of Paris. In this atmosphere, Derby was isolated from Beaconsfield and most of the Cabinet. Nonetheless, his stubborn prosecution of armistice diplomacy together with Salisbury's antipathy towards Austria-Hungary, checked Beaconsfield's habitual proclivity for bluff--the logical consequence of the Premier's belief that irresolution and bankruptcy would prevent Russia from attacking Turkey. Cooperation with St. Petersburg allowed Derby to threaten the Porte with the withdrawal of the British Ambassador, because Shuvalov guaranteed that this would make Russia drop its proposed occupation. The 'threat' was communicated to Elliot along with the suggestion that, following the armistice, a conference should meet to consider the terms of peace.¹⁹⁵ Persistence again paid off with apparent success. On 10 October the Porte indicated that it would accept an armistice of five months. Turkey, however, wished not merely to avoid a break with Britain but also to dodge the conference.¹⁹⁶

Beaconsfield felt that Gorchakov's policy would make Britain a satellite of Russia. In a furtive attempt to disrupt relations between the three Northern Courts and check a

possible occupation, he made his suggestion for a treaty with Germany guaranteeing the Balkans status quo. However implausible the idea, the motive behind it was consistent with his advice to Derby to be prepared to "take the lead" in partition, and with his secret proposal to Salisbury of a preemptive British occupation of the Balkans. Beaconsfield put forward these seemingly disparate policies within a three month period. They were optional means in a Disraelian strategy of exploit to achieve a single end: the reestablishment of Britain's international credit as a Great Power. Beaconsfield's prestige politics stood against Derby's rival agenda of maintaining the existing order and peace of Europe at all cost short of national suicide.¹⁹⁷

Derby's armistice policy failed. Russia rejected the Porte's terms and on 1 November, as the Turkish army prepared to march on Belgrade, Ignatiev delivered a formal ultimatum: Turkey had forty-eight hours to cease hostilities or else Russia would break relations. Having prosecuted the war as far as it dared, Turkey conceded. Gorchakov immediately pressed Derby to call a conference. On 4 November, Britain formally invited the Powers to discuss the 'English Terms' for peace in the Balkans, with an important rider attached to meet Austrian conditions; the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire was reserved and a declaration added that the Powers sought neither territorial advantage, exclusive influence, nor commercial concessions.¹⁹⁸

Ostensibly, the conference was intended to demonstrate European unity and resolve to the Turks in their own capital. Suitably intimidated, Turkey would then accept a European proposal for reform. It was in this spirit of moral remonstrance that Derby and Tenterden drafted Salisbury's instructions for the conference.

...The course of events has made it obvious that [...] to restore tranquillity to the disturbed Provinces....] can now only be done by concert with the Powers, and it is in vain for the Porte to expect that the Powers will be satisfied with the mere general assurances which have already been so often given, and have proved to be so imperfectly executed....pacification cannot be attained by Proclamations, and the Powers have a right to demand, in the interest of the peace of Europe, that they shall examine for themselves the measures required for the reform of the administration of the disturbed Provinces, and that adequate security shall be provided for carrying those measures into operation.¹⁹⁹

Despite the admirable rhetoric, futility lay between the spirit and the letter of this document. For though the Powers had a right to demand reform, the Instructions insisted they did not possess a right of enforcing this demand. In reality the conference was simply a time-buying strategy for Britain and Russia. Beaconsfield, Alexander and Gorchakov all used the conference to buy time to complete military preparations for the defense of vital interests.²⁰⁰ Moreover, the conference was a step in a diplomatic masquerade, a gesture of solidarity towards France and of reassurance to the British public. It would show that Britain was leading European diplomacy and sustaining the Concert. If the conference failed and war ensued, blame would rest elsewhere.

Diplomatic leadership was sharply contested between London and St. Petersburg. No sooner had the Powers accepted Derby's proposal than Gorchakov tried to take it over. He notified London that since the primary concern of European diplomacy was to guarantee the salvation of Turkish Christians, a joint occupation, with Russia in Bulgaria, Austria in Bosnia, and the British fleet off Constantinople, was still a necessity.

...the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guarantees demanded by humanity, the sentiments of Christian Europe, and the general peace....[S]ince the Porte is incapable of fulfilling them, it is the right and duty of Europe to substitute itself for her to the extent necessary to ensure their execution.

Beaconsfield retorted that such a step would drive the Turks to fight. The Turkish fleet would have to be destroyed, an act which could only benefit Russia.²⁰¹

When Gorchakov told London that Turkey could not refuse the Russian proposals for autonomy with impunity, Beaconsfield responded at the Guildhall with a thinly veiled warning to Russia and encouragement to Turkey. In turn, the Czar openly reiterated Gorchakov's allusion to a military solution if the Porte persisted in obstinacy. Beaconsfield's speech, together with Derby's reassertion to Musurus on the eve of the plenary conference, that "England would not assent to, or assist in coercive measures" against Turkey, won the "deep gratitude" of the Porte. It also ensured that the conference could not secure genuine reform in the Christian provinces.²⁰²

When the preliminary conference²⁰³ opened on 11 December, Russia had been mobilising since late September,²⁰⁴ while Austria and Russia were negotiating the secret Convention of Budapest.²⁰⁵ Herein Austria-Hungary pledged, in the event of a Russo-Turkish war, to observe a benevolent neutrality and to use its diplomacy to "paralyse" any initiative by the other Powers to intervene in the conflict. In return, Austria-Hungary would receive Bosnia and Hercegovina, but it would not occupy any portion of Serbia or Montenegro. Russia's Bessarabian frontier was to be reestablished.²⁰⁶

Beaconsfield had chosen Salisbury as temporary Ambassador, should it prove necessary to act on the Cabinet's threat of 4 October to remove Elliot. A month later, when Britain finally accepted the idea of an international conference, Salisbury's candidacy as Plenipotentiary was already established. He agreed to go because he believed it might bypass Derby's inadequate diplomacy: "Making a feather-bed walk is nothing

to the difficulty of making an irresolute man look two inches into the future." He considered the venture futile, "an awful nuisance", but the "sort of proposal one is bound in honour not to decline."²⁰⁷ Salisbury was a popular choice not only with the public and the Opposition, but within the Cabinet. The decision to send Salisbury reflected again, the influence of the agitation.²⁰⁸

Beaconsfield primed Salisbury for his task,

This is a momentous period in your life and career. If all goes well you will have achieved an European reputation and position which will immensely assist and strengthen your future course.

The Premier reminded him that "we suffer from a feeble and formal diplomacy" and noted that "our communications" must be lifted out of this "slough of despond".²⁰⁹ Despite Beaconsfield's encouraging words and the attempt to turn him against Derby, Salisbury quickly experienced the Foreign Secretary's isolation and for much the same reason: an inclination to see the crisis from the perspective of the Imperial Powers, a failure to see that solidarity with Russia diminished Beaconsfield's profile. Salisbury believed that popular sentiment and national interests were not necessarily conflicting: each might serve the other. He saw Central Asia and the Balkans, Turkey and India, not as separate problems but as part of a larger question of balance of power and imperial security throughout the Old World. A settlement in Turkey might ease problems on the NorthWest frontier of India. In Constantinople, he held preliminary talks with Ignatiev which linked conclusive settlements of the NorthWest frontier to those in the Balkans, and he discovered that surprisingly substantial gains could be made for British policy in

Central Asia.²¹⁰ Realising that more might be gained by conciliation, he urged the Cabinet, through Carnarvon, to adopt a reciprocal attitude of cooperation,

A line...to express an earnest hope...you will...get others to support any request I...make for powers to squeeze the Turk...we have got out of Russia all...it is possible to get...much better terms than I...expected. She cannot concede more without danger to the Emperor's position....if these idiotic Turks refuse, war must come...²¹¹

Like Derby, Salisbury believed that the traditional Palmerstonian policy had come to an end; the districts in revolt could not be returned to unbridled Ottoman authority, therefore Turkey could no longer check Russia in the Balkans. Unlike Derby and Beaconsfield, he declined to worry for Austrian interests if Russia offered suitable terms to ameliorate the condition of the Balkan Christians and maintain British imperial security.

...Our best chance of coming to a peaceful issue of these perplexities is--in my belief--to come to an early understanding with Russia. Our danger is that we should make that impossible by hanging on to the coat tails of Austria. Austria has good reason for resisting the faintest approach to self-government in the revolted provinces. Her existence would be menaced if she were hedged on the south by a line of Russian satellites. But her existence is no longer of the importance to us that it was in former times. Her vocation in Europe is gone. She was a counterpoise to France and a barrier against Russia; but France is gone, and the development of Russia is chiefly in regions where Austria could not, and if she could would not, help to check it. We have no reason therefore for sharing Austria's tremors: and if we can get terms from Russia that suit us, it would be most unwise to reject them because they are not to the taste of Austria. I venture to press this point, because I see that Austria is urging a return to a state of things in which the lives and property of the Christian populations of the three provinces will be dependent on the promises of the Porte: and that in this policy she will be backed by the advice of Buchanan and Elliot. I feel convinced that such an arrangement, though conformable to the pure Palmerston tradition, is not suitable for the exigency; and that it would not be supported in Parliament.²¹²

In late December 1876, as British Plenipotentiary, Salisbury gave new instructions to the Head of the British military mission in Istanbul, Col. Home. Whereas Home's original

instructions were concerned solely for the defense of the Turkish capital, Salisbury requested information for a complete scheme of partition: "‘it was absolutely requisite...that the country should be completely examined, more especially those portions which may in the future be of importance to British interests.’" Such strategic locations as Varna, Bourgas, Rhodes, Cyprus, Trebizond, Kars, and Erzeroum were to be examined for their suitability as compensation, should extensive territorial changes occur in the near future.²¹³

Salisbury's focus on strategy and sentiment challenged the Premier's emphasis on prestige. The Russian ultimatum and mobilisation reinforced Beaconsfield's unrealistic wish for common action with Germany, Austria-Hungary and France so to isolate Russia. Derby's modification of the 'English Terms' to suit Andr  ssy's taste, communicated to the Porte two days after Salisbury's frank correspondence with Beaconsfield quoted above, was a clear rejection of Salisbury's pro-Russian views.

Salisbury aimed to uproot the Eastern Question by establishing a permanent "Officer of State" in Istanbul. Nominated by the Concert for a term of years, he would be "in fact, if not in name, Protector of Christians," with access to the Sultan at all times. Among his duties would be the selection of candidates for the office of Governor in Bosnia, Hercegovina and Bulgaria. Salisbury's instincts told him that the solution to the Eastern Question lay in acquiring control over the appointment of Governors;²¹⁴ after the Congress of Berlin, he pursued a similar project of supervision throughout the Ottoman Empire by the use of military consuls. Such a plan, incidentally, was consistent with

Gladstone's hopes to lay, through constant resort to collective diplomacy, the institutional foundations for a federated Europe.

Before Salisbury left England, the Cabinet had divided over the question of joint occupation of Ottoman territory. One group, led by Cairns and Carnarvon, endorsed it; the other, including Beaconsfield and Derby, opposed it. The Cabinet agreed that Salisbury should not discuss military occupation although the Powers could consider the issue later. All this, again, ensured the failure of the conference--only a united front of Ambassadors backed by the threat of force could have made the Porte change its policy. The death warrant for the conference was this sentence.

...Her Majesty's Government cannot countenance the introduction into the Conference of proposals, however...well-intentioned, which would bring foreign armies into Turkish territory in violation of the engagements by which the Guaranteeing Powers are solemnly bound.

This warrant was executed by Derby's telegram to Salisbury of 22 December: "England will not assent to, or assist in, coercive measures, military or naval, against the Porte".²¹⁵

After his first meeting with Ignatiev, Salisbury asked the Cabinet to modify these instructions. The General proposed occupation as an interim precaution, to protect Christians until the conference organised a new police force in the Balkans. Salisbury assured Derby he was looking out for a "snare", but Ignatiev's proposal was on the surface a thoroughly humanitarian gesture and, "'in the form he puts it is awkward to break off upon.'" Should new atrocities occur, "'Ignatiev will have left on record...his warning of danger[.]'" which would make it impossible for Britain to resist further pressure for Russian occupation. Cairns, Richmond, Northcote and Carnarvon all backed Salisbury. Beaconsfield had already anticipated such a query and had responded with his

idea of a preemptive British occupation. Derby did not answer at all and his silence concerned Salisbury. A personal and political animosity was evident at this time between the Foreign and Indian Secretaries, related by marriage and rivalry for the succession to Beaconsfield.

I am disturbed that I have now for a week been urging this question [occupation] on Derby and have not received from him any expression of his own or the Cabinet's opinion. Meanwhile Schouvaloff daily telegraphs to Ignatief what he states to be the decisions of the cabinet and opinions of Derby, and Ignatief shows me these telegrams. It puts me in an awkward and difficult position.

Salisbury tried to solve the difficulty by arranging a cypher system with Carnarvon.²¹⁶ But the fundamental point was this--the Cabinet was losing its ability even to make decisions.

Salisbury personally did not suffer from this problem. He cooperated with Ignatiev in a plan to secure autonomy for western Bulgaria and reform and security for the Christian population of the entire province. The Russians, however, insisted that material force was needed to secure the lives and property of Christians. This force need not be Russian but it would be if no alternative could be found.²¹⁷ Ignatiev categorically refused Salisbury's proposal that this be done by a British force, while a Russian force was equally unacceptable to the British delegation. The alternative was a small gendarmerie from a neutral power, Belgium. But Salisbury could not gain the Cabinet's approval of such a scheme. Through Carnarvon, acting as his 'representative', Salisbury urged coercion if Turkey would not submit.²¹⁸ The Cabinet again split on the issue. Russian moderation encouraged Beaconsfield to remain firm, "'Clearness of vision & firmness of purpose will triumph, for I do not think, that Russia has either quality, but is blustering with indefinite schemes.'" He was inclined to refuse even the Belgian plan.²¹⁹ Against

this, Carnarvon secured the support of Cairns and Northcote. But Derby and Beaconsfield rejected coercion under any circumstances, although agreeing that the Porte could expect no assistance in the event of war. The Cabinet accepted in principle a small gendarmerie of Belgian or Swiss troops, but only with the assent of the Porte.²²⁰

Meanwhile, political steps were being taken to draw Salisbury's fangs. Derby had supported Salisbury's choice as Plenipotentiary "because, as a leading member of the Cabinet, you would speak as one having authority and not as the diplomatists[.]" while "your going would not humiliate Elliot, whom you would find well-informed and useful as a second[.]" Once in Constantinople, however, Elliot's pro-Turkish sympathies discredited Salisbury's position. The Ambassador sanctioned the Turkish Constitution when it was promulgated on 23 December, the first day of the full conference.²²¹ French, German, Italian and Austro-Hungarian diplomats, as well as those of several minor European states, advised Salisbury that Elliot's continued presence in the capital "must lead to war." This, and the conspicuous presence of the Royal Engineers in the City, left Midhat Pasha convinced that Britain would back Turkey. Salisbury wrote to Derby,

Several of the minor diplomats, who see much of the game as spectators, assure me that the Turks are still convinced that, if there is war, England must be drawn into it on their side, and I hear this as much from Spain and Sweden, who are philoTurk, as from Greece who is of the opposite persuasion....I wish you would let the Cabinet see...in how false...a position I stand. All that I...do is undone,...by the man who is supposed to represent the views and wishes of the English Government.²²²

Nothing came of Salisbury's pleas to recall Elliot. Derby may well have felt threatened by Salisbury's attempts to dismiss his deputy. Derby had told Shuvalov that if the Ambassador were sacrificed to propitiate public opinion, he would be next, while

Beaconsfield, who had earlier wanted Elliot sacked was now willing to play the Ambassador off against his own colleague.²²³

Beaconsfield was losing patience with his Envoy, whom he considered "much duped by Ig[natiev]." Salisbury was in the ridiculous position of being "more Russian than Ignatieff", of bullying the Porte with a danger which the Russians were not yet offering. This ignored the facts that Salisbury's proposals were contingent on the abandonment of a generation old Russian policy in Central Asia and that Salisbury's heavy-handed diplomacy had been encouraged by the Prime Minister. Beaconsfield's plan for a preemptive occupation of European Turkey was confided solely in Salisbury, "I have...not, and shall not, breathe a word of it [sic]...to a single human being." If Salisbury approved, "Let it come to us,...as your proposal, which I will immediately support in the Cabinet."²²⁴

The difficulty lay in the diverging aims of these two statesmen. Salisbury was concerned with a settlement and with strategy. He genuinely wished to help the Balkan Christians, and believed this could be done as part of a bargain to further specifically British interests. Beaconsfield was more concerned with prestige and his ideas reflected an emphasis on 'victory' rather than good will. Thus he suggested a British occupation. It would give some security to the Christians while at the same time blocking any further Russian domination of the Balkans.²²⁵ Salisbury saw no loss in cooperating with Russia: "If any dangers threaten England, they are much nearer home, and will come from a far more formidable military power[.]" Germany. Salisbury was especially concerned with Germany's potential naval power. He returned from Istanbul "filled with suspicions" as

to Bismarck's role in wrecking the conference.²²⁶ If Russia were not assuaged and kept from war, the balance of power would be in Germany's favour: Britain "may be fighting for Holland before two years are out." It was imperative for Britain to acquire strategic ground in the Eastern Mediterranean now and not later, in the face of a French recovery or a German naval threat.²²⁷

Beaconsfield, similarly, wished to obtain Varna or some other "commanding stronghold in Turkey from wh. we need never recede." He, too, suspected that Bismarck "was resolved that Russia shall go to war[.]" He was plagued by the spectre of a Continental alignment against Britain, orchestrated by a revived Holy Alliance, but held that this was all the more reason to check Russia in the Balkans now. As he reminded Salisbury,

It is a most critical moment in European politics. If Russia is not checked, the Holy Alliance will be revived in aggravated form and force. Germany will have Holland; and France, Belgium, and England will be in a position I trust I shall never live to witness.²²⁸

The two statesmen shared fears and, to a point, strategies, but after this, their approach to Eastern policy diverged for the same reason as did those of Beaconsfield and Derby. Beaconsfield wished to exploit Russian weaknesses, financial, military and naval, to solve the crisis through a deliberate confrontation with Russia. Salisbury saw no need for such antagonism and believed that bad relations or war with Russia could only aid Germany.²²⁹

The split between Beaconsfield and Salisbury divided the Cabinet. In Salisbury's absence Beaconsfield and Derby had closed ranks. Derby, still keen to avoid occupation but no longer interested in coercing the Porte, ignored Salisbury's urgent requests, while Beaconsfield opposed all schemes for joint occupation. In October Derby had opposed

Beaconsfield's policy of confrontation. At the end of December he spoke as one with the Prime Minister when he telegraphed Salisbury that Russia, "ill prepared for war, would make concessions." They successfully stood between the absent India Secretary and the Ministers who were willing to consider the idea of threatening the Porte, in combination with Russia if necessary. At various times this included Northcote, W.H. Smith, Cross, Cairns and Richmond; Hardy and Manners consistently supported the Prime Minister.

As long as Derby controlled the process he was willing to threaten the Porte in order to achieve his diplomatic objectives. After Salisbury took over the reins of diplomacy, Derby stolidly opposed further coercion because this meant occupation which he believed would lead to a protracted war. Thus he ignored Salisbury's pleas for further powers to squeeze the Turk and supported Beaconsfield's view that Russia would back down, though he had earlier opposed precisely this view. This 'reversal' was consistent with his ultimate objective of maintaining peace for as long as possible. Faced with Salisbury's demands, the Foreign Secretary temporarily acquiesced in Beaconsfield's policy of bluff because this would cause one active policy to short circuit the other and restore Derby's laissez-faire approach.

Thus the conference solved nothing, but clarified everything. It was clear that Britain, having been committed to a policy of no coercion, had no influence over Turkey. Salisbury had observed this first hand; Derby painfully recognised the fact. Stanlerian strategy, solely dependent on formal diplomacy, collapsed when Turkey ignored diplomatic pressure. Turkey had chosen no longer to be a factor in Derby's diplomacy

and this in turn rendered that diplomacy meaningless. This was especially true because the Russian part of Derby's diplomacy also collapsed.

Derby misinterpreted Russia's final diplomatic initiative in which it sought to gain Europe's approval to a Protocol, as a means by which Russia might retreat from war. In fact, all Russian decision makers had decided on war. Their only debate was over how to do so. The Protocol was a last attempt by Ignatiev to dominate this process. The Protocol formally declared the Eastern Question unresolved, and that the European Powers pledged to resolve it conjointly. In practice, by this document Russia meant to acquire a formal European mandate for resolving the crisis through war. It reaffirmed the common agreement among the six Powers for the pacification of the East. It recommended, "with the least possible delay", that the Porte normalise its relations "by placing its armies on a peace footing," and institute the reforms proposed at the conference. The document concluded with a 'reservation',

If their hopes should once more be disappointed,...such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in general. In such a case they reserve to themselves to consider in common as to the means...best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian populations, and the interests of the general peace.²³⁰

Thus Ignatiev visited London, knowing that if Britain would support the Protocol as Bismarck and Descazes had done, his own policy would be secure. He was wined and dined at the Foreign Office on 17 March, the day Andr ssy and Novikov concluded the secret military Convention which freed Russia to invade the eastern Balkans.²³¹

Ignatiev rekindled Salisbury's willingness to cooperate with Russia, especially by offering Britain virtually everything it wished in Central Asia--a formal guarantee that

Russia would expand no further combined with a spheres of influence arrangement. Nor had Salisbury's views changed since Constantinople: "the old policy...of defending English interests by sustaining the Ottoman dynasty has become impracticable[.]" In Cabinet he supported Ignatiev's views, proposing to secure British interests "in a more direct way" through some sort of partition. He warned that

...If we reject the note,...we shall be alone against the other five Powers. We shall have brought on a war by this isolation. And we shall have done this to avoid accepting a note which pledges us to hardly anything to which we are not already pledged,...

After all, Salisbury urged, Vienna would not have acquiesced to a Turkish campaign if it thought the Czar would occupy Constantinople and Bulgaria permanently. A great Russian victory, moreover, would provoke the British public to clamour for territorial compensation. This could only be had in Asia, but if Britain was a cause of war between Russia and Turkey, it would have no claim to compensation. Above all, isolation could only facilitate the restoration of the Holy Alliance, whereas Britain's cooperation would tend to promote Imperial rivalries.²³²

Ignatiev, however, failed to achieve his end. On 13, 21 and 23 March, the Cabinet specifically addressed the Russian proposal. Beaconsfield and most Ministers intended to avoid giving Russia a mandate for war, precisely Ignatiev's aim. Nonetheless, they recognised the sagacity of Salisbury's warning against isolation, while Derby, wishing to continue his diplomacy, was receptive to Ignatiev's views and favoured a revised version of the Protocol. Thus Derby and Salisbury were in competition for the advocacy of the Protocol and for a position antithetical to Beaconsfield's. The Cabinet reached a consensus on the 23rd: it would support the Protocol if Russia also pledged to demobilise.

This decision was effectively a compromise of views between Derby and Beaconsfield, the latter agreeing (as with the Andrassy Note fifteen months before,) to Britain's qualified adherence, the former accepting this reservation in order to keep control of the diplomatic process. The majority of the Cabinet aligned with them. Thus Britain rejected the only element which would have caused Russia to follow through with the option of the Protocol, rendering that document useless before it was even signed. Regarding Derby's nonchalance in agreeing to the destruction of that which he promoted, Sir Charles Dilke, the Liberal M.P. for Chelsea, observed to Frank Hill, the editor of the Daily News: "'Derby rather likes declarations that destroy the force of documents he signs. Refer to the Luxembourg case of 1867.'" The Foreign Minister informed Shuvalov that if war was not averted the Protocol would be considered null and void.²³³

The contrast in the outlook and style between Derby, Salisbury and Beaconsfield was clear in the Cabinet's controversy over the Protocol: Derby, using diplomacy to delay action; Beaconsfield, distrusting Russian initiatives and motives, Salisbury equally adamant to force the issue the other way and support Russia to gain Turkish capitulation. Salisbury opposed his colleagues' demand for a formal pledge of Russian demobilisation. He accepted the Russians' promise to demobilise once Turkey had made peace with Montenegro, begun to demobilise, and begun reform.²³⁴ Salisbury's opposition to Beaconsfield had reached its zenith, his willingness to cooperate with Russia had left him isolated and his position tenuous. On the 23rd the Cabinet had rejected his scheme for partition. Beaconsfield thought such an idea perfectly Gladstonian and therefore immoral. For the sake of party unity Salisbury acquiesced in Derby's scheme of adherence to an

emasculated protocol, but found consolation in the hope that the conference had made it impossible for the Prime Minister to lead the country into another war to sustain Turkey.²³⁵

It has, I hope, made it impossible that we should spend any more English blood in sustaining the Turkish Empire. And I hope it will make English statesmen buckle to the task of devising some other means of securing the road to India.²³⁶

Salisbury's influence over Beaconsfield, however, was greater than it appeared in Cabinet, for he had succeeded in checking any intentions of the Premier to return to the Turkish alliance.²³⁷ Swartz has noted that both Northcote and Carnarvon were concerned in March 1877 that Beaconsfield was "'now entirely under Derby's influence[.]'" It is more likely, however, that what Northcote was observing was Salisbury's influence over Beaconsfield, for in explaining why Britain should sanction the Protocol, Beaconsfield repeated Salisbury's arguments, he embraced Salisbury's logic though not his conclusions.²³⁸ But as before political compromise was not a solution, it merely masked disunity and paralysis within the Cabinet and a failure of British policy.

Derby signed the Protocol but also destroyed it with his accompanying declaration.

Inasmuch as it is solely in the interests of European peace that Her Britannic Majesty's Government have consented to sign the Protocol proposed by that of Russia, it is understood beforehand that, in the event of the object proposed not being attained--namely, reciprocal disarmament on the part of Russia and Turkey, and peace between them--the Protocol in question shall be regarded as null and void.²³⁹

This declaration produced controversy in Parliament, with the Opposition denouncing the Government for sabotaging the Concert and ensuring war.²⁴⁰ The failure of the Protocol marked the collapse of Concert diplomacy. On 24 April, the Russian armies crossed the Ottoman frontiers.

"If Russia...succeeds,...as an Englishman I shall hide my head, but as a man I shall rejoice."--Gladstone to the House of Commons, 14 May 1877.²⁴¹

'Under Currents of Communication': Parliament's Response to Eastern Policy

For the nine months following July 1876, the diplomatic record was an important target of criticism for both the Opposition and the far right. The dispatches of May through September 1876, it was said, indicated that the Government, "coerced by popular sentiment" had moved toward the Opposition but would revert to a pro-Turk position whenever pressure was relaxed. The official correspondence, professed neutrality, but a "secret leaning" for the Turks lurked between the lines.²⁴²

...one of the difficulties encountered in reading through these Papers is, that, while everything that is declared in them has every appearance, of being straightforward and decisive, there yet seems to have been somewhere or other under-currents of communications which were constantly counteracting the best declarations and the best intentions on behalf of Her Majesty's Government....

Gladstone warned his public audiences "to be upon their guard;" he himself did not know "whether the Government ha[d] one policy or two".²⁴³ In Parliament, the far right warned the Government of the consequences of such duplicity.

Lords Robert Montagu in the Commons and Stratheden in the Lords were the only two consistent Conservative critics of government policy. They represented an extreme Turkophile position, but one which, like the Liberal Opposition, the Government could not ignore. Like the Opposition, Montagu and Stratheden criticised the Government for irresolution but for opposite reasons. They wished the Government to observe its treaty engagements, to retain the position which it held before the impact of the agitation. Lord Montagu publicly made the same argument which Lord Beaconsfield had made privately,

that to surrender to popular sentiment was to court popular contempt.²⁴⁴ Such irresolution would produce dire consequences.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich boldly said that Treaties were not binding. Her Majesty's Government...said Treaties were binding, but, as the sympathies of England were adverse, they would not carry them out. The third principle was, that Treaties were binding, and that we ought to carry them out; and that was the right principle. He could not but liken Her Majesty's Government in this case to the Vanguard. She was steaming slowly in a fog; the Iron Duke was steaming faster behind, and ran her down. The Government thought they would take a middle course, but he predicted that the Liberal party would come behind them...run them down, and sink them.²⁴⁵

Montagu's pessimism accorded with Northcote and Salisbury's own. In a confidential note to Sir Stafford, Salisbury agreed that the non possumus policy towards Turkey was a "remedy...worse than the disease[,]" but that there was no obvious solution to the Cabinet's quandary.

An active policy is only possible under one of two conditions--that you shall help the Turks, or coerce them. I have no objection to the latter...or to a combination of the two. With the former alone I cannot be content. But, as you know, neither the Queen nor the Prime Minister will have anything to do with the latter.²⁴⁶

Much of the debate in the new session centred on three dispatches from September 1876.²⁴⁷

Taken together, they summarised the Government's course, from obstructing the interference of others in Turkish affairs to interfering with the Porte itself. These were: (1) Elliot's dispatch of the 4th declaring British interests unaffected by the numbers of Bulgarians slain in the course of a lawful suppression of insurrection; (2) Derby's formal written rebuttal the next day; and (3), the first of two dispatches from Derby sent out on the 21st, demanding punishment of the perpetrators of the massacres and restitution to the survivors, and so interfering with Turkey's sovereign rights. This communication was not

undertaken by choice but under compulsion. Popular outrage compelled the Government to send it.²⁴⁸ Both ends of the political spectrum pointed to it, the far right with consternation, emancipationists with a mixture of scepticism and enthusiasm. Elliot's declaration of the 4th and Derby's of the 21st were held up as polar opposites, the question was which of these policies would lead the country.²⁴⁹

Lord Stratheden spoke, with some overstatement, of Dispatch No. 316 as "intervention...carried to a pitch unheard of in the annals of diplomacy." It demonstrated that the Government was willing to interfere in Turkish affairs when it suited them, no matter its professions of Turkish independence. Stratheden competed with the Opposition by providing his own counter-agitation to government policy. He defended Turkey tenaciously, arguing that Derby's dispatches reconfirmed and reinforced Britain's military obligation.

A right to interfere depended on an engagement to defend;...when the engagement to defend was given up, the right of interference would fall with it. When interference occurred the engagement to defend became more binding;...the despatch of the 21st of September surrounded with a[n]...impenetrable armour our engagement to defend. But for our Treaties we should have no more right to interfere between Turkey and her subjects than we had to interfere with the Government of France and the Communists,...²⁵⁰

Gathorne Hardy also referred to a direct contractual relationship between Britain and Turkey.²⁵¹ Both the War Minister and his Lordship, however, were on soft ground. The Ninth Article of the Paris Treaty made it clear that Turkey was the subject of an agreement, not a party to it. It signed the treaty merely as a witness. As Turkey contracted no engagement, it enjoyed no contractual status as a "Contracting Power". The Five Guarantors recognised this fact when they declared that the Sultan's Firman²⁵² gave

to them no claim or rights of interference.²⁵³ Consequently, the Guarantors were not obligated to Turkey but only to each other. Only after much initial confusion, prompted by the skewed interpretations of Ministers and critics alike, did Leonard Courtney²⁵⁴ demonstrate "We were under obligations towards the Guaranteeing Powers, but towards Turkey we were not, and,...we never had been."²⁵⁵ Turkey was not bound by the Treaty of Paris, it suffered no obligation under it, so it was wrong to speak of that Power as a "co-partner",²⁵⁶ and even if

...the instrument might be so construed as to give Turkey any interest under it, she being put under no obligations towards us, it would be what civilians called a nudum pactum, an agreement without a consideration, and therefore binding only as long as we might choose to uphold it....²⁵⁷

The Foreign Secretary concurred in this assessment and the Secretary for War never challenged it. Moreover, Hardy never argued that the Treaty of Paris compelled Britain to defend Turkey in the event of war--he expressly denied this view.²⁵⁸

Stratheden's astounding claim that Dispatch 316 actually reconfirmed Britain's obligation to defend Turkey, mirrored in reverse the Opposition's criticism. The latter argued that the dispatches of 21 September, the Constantinople conference and the London Protocol, all contravened the Treaty of Paris which forbade interference between the Sultan and his subjects. The treaty had thus been abrogated de facto as a result of British and European diplomacy. As the Government had already committed itself in the direction of emancipation, therefore it had no justification for refusing to join Europe in coercing the Porte. The proposals made at Constantinople were "almost exactly what was contemplated by those who moved to secure self-government for the Christian Provinces."²⁵⁹

It was this "common ground" which the Opposition wished to exploit, evidence for which could be found in the Cabinet's Instructions²⁶⁰ to Lord Salisbury of 20 November 1876. The impartial and judicial character of those Instructions stood in contrast to the earliest dispatches at the outbreak of the Bosnian insurrection. The latter had demonstrated complicity in Turkish oppression,²⁶¹ the former admitted of facts, principles, and sentiments common to both sides of the House, and revealed how close the Government's position had come to that of the Opposition. The document acknowledged that, together with the other guaranteeing Powers and for the sake of peace, Britain had a right to demand from the Porte not mere proclamations but effective administrative reform in the disturbed provinces. It also implied that the Porte was no longer trusted to fulfil its own promises. This was a clear admission of collective responsibility for the Sultan's Christian subjects.²⁶²

The conference had reverberations in Parliament throughout the session. The Opposition declared it a failure and a farce. Reform had not been imposed on the Porte. The government had actually encouraged Turkish obstinacy by telling the Porte Britain would not let the conference proposals be forced upon it.²⁶³ Ministerial spokesmen retorted that the conference had only been intended as a means of peaceable persuasion.²⁶⁴ Its basis "was the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Turkey"--as even Ignatiev had agreed. All that had been attempted was a temporary 'trusteeship', "with a view to restor[ing] Turkey to her full independence in the event of her carrying out certain reforms submitted to her."²⁶⁵

Other Conservatives argued that the conference had failed because its basic premise was erroneous. The idea that "the family of nations could treat one of their number as a Government treated one of its subjects," was not only delusive but fatal to the very principle of nationalism so dear to a Liberal perspective of world order.²⁶⁶ The conference failed because its fundamental proposition was unacceptable to the Porte: it could never accept a decrease in its sovereignty.²⁶⁷

Stratheden sought to absolve Turkey of blame for the conference's failure, and so discourage in particular the view that Turkey's refusal freed Britain from any treaty obligation. He argued that a crucial step was not taken that might have led to Turkish concession. Prince Gorchakov, he said, had advised the Government that a conference concerning relations between the six Powers and Turkey was the proper business of the respective Foreign Ministers. Delegates would necessarily have to refer back to their Governments which would delay the process. Gorchakov's counsel went unheeded. Thus Ignatiev remained Russia's principal representative...

...The adoption of the suggestion of Prince Gortchakoff would have led to the introduction into the Conference of influences likely to win concessions from the Porte, while it would have hindered the entrance...of a man whose presence was a strong impediment to such concessions. In fact it was inevitable that any Conference that General Ignatieff took part was doomed to failure....²⁶⁸

Turkey had not placed itself in the wrong; Britain had done so by letting an infamous enemy of Turkey dominate the conference. The responsibility of any Russian war against Turkey would lay with Britain. The argument was unfair. The Government had undertaken the precaution of advocating the use of special plenipotentiaries, precisely to avoid interference from either Ignatiev or Elliot.²⁶⁹ Stratheden's real point of course, was

that Derby had not done his job. Not surprisingly, Derby denied that the failure of the conference was irrelevant to Britain's engagements to Turkey.

...If he [Stratheden] follows that argument out to its legitimate result, it means...if you here once bound yourself by Treaty to protect any State, you are equally bound to protect it, however unwisely that State may have acted, and though it may have put itself wholly in the wrong and been the cause of its own difficulties....

Derby further denied Stratheden's implication that Britain's interference in Turkey was justified by treaty,

...our right of interference...turned upon...the moral support given to Turkey by our diplomacy that justified us in...protesting against acts which tended to make our assistance useless and our support impossible....²⁷⁰

In provoking Derby, Stratheden inadvertently helped to clarify the positions of the chief Ministers of state. Derby argued for the principle of a just annulment of contract. He justified in the Lords his decision not to declare outright that the Paris and Tripartite treaties were dead by explaining that they might still prove useful for deterring Russian aggrandisement. In the Note to Russia of 1 May 1877, he used the Treaty of Paris in this way. Confirmation in Parliament of abrogation was a dangerous message to send to Europe in wartime.

...It is one thing to say we are not going to war to maintain the Ottoman Empire, and another to take a step which might be understood by Europe...as a formal announcement of our indifference to whatever might occur....²⁷¹

Derby's view of the treaties overlapped that of the Radical, Leonard Courtney, differing only in that Derby, remaining characteristically vague on the point, would not confirm their abrogation.²⁷²

Similarly, Salisbury advocated in Cabinet the outright abandonment of Turkey. In Parliament he was more subdued, but after Constantinople he clearly assumed and publicly implied that the abandonment of Turkey was an accomplished fact.²⁷³ The comments of the two Ministers clearly challenged their chief's declared view that the Treaty of Paris remained in force. Those who argued such was the case, were countered by quoting Salisbury's declaration to the Turks that the engagements of the Treaty of Paris were not unilateral.²⁷⁴ The Turks, having rejected the proposals of the conference, waived their guarantee. Although Argyll readily admitted that at least at the beginning of the conference the treaties were in force, he would not say whether Britain was so bound after the conference and neither would Hardy.²⁷⁵ On this technical point the Opposition and the Government were in agreement against the Turkophile view of the treaties as represented by Stratheden and Montagu. Thus, on some technical but important points, there was a rudimentary consensus between prominent Conservatives and Liberals.

Surprisingly, Gladstone agreed with Hardy and Derby that the conference "had nothing to do with the Treaty itself," but had been justified on the grounds of Britain's moral support for Turkey. Gladstone argued that Britain's right and duty to interfere on behalf of the Balkan Christians stemmed from the Crimean War, which substituted "a European conscience, expressed by collective guarantee and the concerted and general action of the European Powers" for Russia's guardianship of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Collectively, Europe, was entitled to interfere with any state that threatened its tranquillity.²⁷⁶

This view suited Gladstone's concepts of the Concert and multinational Christian cooperation; it was also patently wrong. The Ninth Article of the Paris Treaty expressly denied Europe interference in Turkey's internal affairs.

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman, which, while ameliorating their condition without distinction of religion or of race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously from his sovereign will.

The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot in any case give to the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his empire.²⁷⁷

The treaty was not the transferral of a Protectorate over Turkey from Russia to Europe.

This basic fact was pointed out by the Attorney General, Sir John Holker, and had been made clear by Palmerston at the time.

We felt that it would have been utterly inconsistent with the objects and principles laid down at the commencement of the war to frame the Treaty in such a manner as to give to the Allies an authoritative right of interference between the Sultan and his subjects....²⁷⁸

Beaconsfield's assessment of Palmerston's policy was certainly more accurate than Gladstone's, and the Prime Minister used the argument of orthodoxy with greater effect, declaring he had never wavered from a British policy. Even though this policy had differed fundamentally from Palmerton's, Beaconsfield's assertion of orthodoxy was the kind of rhetoric necessary for refuting the Opposition. Beaconsfield defended government conduct at each stage of the crisis upon the broad grounds of orthodox policy, which preceding Liberal governments had followed. To have sanctioned the Berlin Memorandum would have "inevitably le[d] to the military occupation of European

Turkey[,]" and the destruction of the Crimean system.²⁷⁹ The Prime Minister emphasised that his policy was simply a continuation of that which the Liberals had followed only five years before.²⁸⁰

...as late as the end of the Session of 1871...we find...the traditional policy of England was not changed [from the time of Palmerston]...to uphold the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire was not considered an idle and obsolete policy....That was only five years ago,...therefore, the views [demanding active interference] which now seem adopted respecting the condition of the Christian population of Turkey...[has] at least the charm of novelty...²⁸¹

To acquiesce in Russia's policy of creating a chain of autonomous States in the Balkans could only produce political instability which, inevitably, a great military power must fill, to Britain's detriment. Beaconsfield argued that something like the Russian plan had existed before--in 1300 A.D.--and had led precisely to the rise of Turkish power in Europe. "And it did occur to us that if there were a chain of autonomous States and the possessors of Constantinople were again limited to 'a cabbage garden,' probably the same result might occur." In place of the Russian scheme, Beaconsfield claimed to have advanced a plan of 'administrative autonomy' for Christians in the Balkans, a policy entirely in keeping with "the traditionary policy of England" and Britain's imperial interests.

Due to Serb hostility and Turkish obstinacy the plan had failed, but that did not make the conference a failure. To the contrary, the very fact that the other Powers had consented to a conference on British terms, heralded success. The basis of the conference was acknowledgement of the independence and integrity of Turkey. This had achieved, Beaconsfield declared, the first purpose of the conference, blocking Russian aggrandisement, preferably through the Porte's cooperation with European reforms but

never through coercion of Turkey. While the Porte's actions were unfortunate, the conference had achieved the withdrawal of Russia's proposals for occupation. Russia, Beaconsfield emphasised, had surrendered to the British line.²⁸² This had prevented a Russian occupation of Bulgaria.²⁸³

Stratheden accepted this point. Though he did not call the conference a success, he looked upon it favourably for some reasons:

- 1) ...It had a tendency to put an end to the Holy Alliance by dividing or submerging [it]...
- 2) ...it had a tendency to accelerate the action of the Porte and to check arbitrary power,...
- 3) ...it had prevented the occupation of any part of the Ottoman territory....²⁸⁴

Whereas the Prime Minister allowed that the Porte had been "imprudent" in its refusal to assent to the reforms requested, Stratheden, however, dissented: "in a few weeks we should be better able to tell[.]"²⁸⁵

According to Beaconsfield, not only had British policy overcome the Russian, Britain had defined Europe's policy. With respect to Turkey, Beaconsfield argued, these were the same: maintenance of the status quo, so that "great calamities may be averted from Europe...and such a disturbance of the distribution of power as might operate most disadvantageously to the general welfare." The Great Powers consented to a conference on such a basis, and thus again had accepted Ottoman integrity and independence as a fundamental principle of European policy.²⁸⁶

While the Opposition argued in favour of collective diplomacy through consensus, Beaconsfield argued that the greatest of European states would determine 'European' policy, and that only a determined and independent policy could further British interests.

That five Powers had achieved consensus and had hoped for a sixth to join them was irrelevant. Europe was not an assembly which could impose a collective decision on dissenting states; it had no rules of order and no majority will. There were only agreements among the strongest of them, enshrined in Treaty, and it was the right and duty of the signatories to defend such agreements as defined by their own interests and honour. This was what Beaconsfield had meant when he said Gladstone "mistakes the nature of affairs."²⁸⁷ A deeper sentiment than "humanitarian and philanthropic considerations" existed: it was "the determination to maintain the Empire of England."²⁸⁸ The interest of the State was not subject to any higher interest, this was the underlying rationale of Beaconsfieldism.

Privately, Beaconsfield was willing to consider such expedients as to give Bosnia full autonomy, or for a British army to occupy the Balkans. In Parliament he affected a steadfast pose, consistently avowing the sanctity of Ottoman territorial integrity and independence. Beaconsfield argued that the integrity and independence of Turkey was a material fact, stemming from the kind of durable sovereignty which was not impaired by "limited interference with its sovereign rights." Prussia had in the same century undergone far more "humiliating conditions than ever were imposed on Turkey." But no one would dispute Prussian sovereignty.²⁸⁹ Sovereignty was not to be debated lightly in abstract discussions of religion, race, and culture. Sovereignty was a political fact of life, a material consideration with material consequences if ignored.

Salisbury's response to the debates of spring 1877 is intriguing. Not surprisingly, he evaded the issue of whether the conference had been a failure and, if so, why. Instead

he emphasised "the origin of all our troubles," the Crimean War, but this revealed more of his split with Beaconsfield than the India Secretary probably intended. He noted that checking Russian influence over Turkey had been the objective of the Crimean War, but such an objective was, "in the nature of things,...impossible to achieve." Where the Prime Minister praised Salisbury's 'success' in keeping Russia out of Bulgaria, Salisbury held that any policy of checking Russian influence in the Balkans was a "chimera". "The real influence over Turkey would fall, as it necessarily must, to that Power which was prepared to fight on behalf of the subject races of Turkey." Consequently, Britain's influence in Turkey was inconsequential. "They know that they have nothing to fear from us[.]" Whereas at Constantinople he had tried to make them afraid, in Parliament he defended the Government's openly declared course not to support or sanction coercion. The honest approach was less risky than hazarding a bluff, as Palmerston's failure during the Schleswig-Holstein war had proved. It was, moreover, the only sensible course to follow for a government working "in a glass hive" and unable to follow a secret policy.²⁹⁰

Above all, Salisbury emphasised that Britain was bound by the Treaty of Paris to grant Turkey every chance to reform itself. "It was our duty to be the last of the nations to desert the cause which we had formerly maintained[.]" The conference was the last chance which Britain owed its erstwhile ally.²⁹¹ He emphasised the continuity of this responsibility for the reform and security of Turkey down through succeeding Governments. Though this responsibility had been assumed under "an entirely false idea of the probable reform and progress of the Ottoman Empire[.]" it was

...not open to any one Party or set of men holding office together to renounce the lines of policy laid down by their Predecessors,...the statesmen of that day [the Crimean War]...are responsible [though not to blame for]...the difficulties, and...the odium,...that we bear....²⁹²

The Government had changed its policy, not due to treachery or the influence of the Opposition, but because Turkey had broken from it: "we have not deserted our traditional alliance without hesitation and...sorrow; and we shall cling to the hope that some change may occur in the Councils of Turkey which may bring back that alliance into the same state that it was before."²⁹³

The Opposition knew Lord Salisbury's views were essentially their own and that he had wished to coerce the Turks.²⁹⁴ The Duke of Argyll observed that Salisbury and Derby had more in common with him than their Cabinet colleagues in their views concerning the treaties and the status of Turkey.²⁹⁵ Robert Lowe precisely defined the nature and the consequences of the split within the Cabinet. "[T]he policy of systematic friendship for Turkey and animosity against Russia" was representative of the Prime Minister. The policy of "inaction", which consisted not so much of inactivity as diplomatic initiatives shaped to paralyse moves designed to change the status quo. Elaborate posturing which presumably was meant to acquire the appearance of activity without having to take responsibility for it, was consistent with the conduct of the Foreign Secretary. "[W]henver the noble Lord does anything which might be productive of good, he immediately follows it up by some act likely to destroy all benefit for what he had previously done[.]" The third policy, similar to that advocated by the Opposition, was representative of Lord Salisbury's concerted coercion of Turkey. The result of the competition between these conflicting policies was mischief and failure.²⁹⁶

Thus Salisbury and the Opposition agreed that the failure of British diplomacy was due to its inconsistency. Irresolution had inevitably to accompany a divided Cabinet. From the autumn of 1876 on, Salisbury's anti-Turk position gave credibility to the Opposition's own campaign; indeed, the Congress of Berlin offered the final justification for agitation. Factional competition within the Liberal Party between the Whig-led moderates and the Gladstonian coalition of Radicals and Nonconformists had the effect of increasing the incentive to make the policy connection with Salisbury stick.

Hartington and Gladstone competed to define the Party's opposition to government policy. Rivalry between them was well established when the latter initiated the most important debate of the whole controversy. On 30 April 1877, Gladstone gave notice of his intention to move five resolutions calling upon Parliament to demand coercion and Balkan emancipation.²⁹⁷ Gladstone's initiative angered Hartington who was sure the resolutions would destroy his authority. He threatened to resign if a majority of Liberals endorsed the resolutions. To forestall Gladstone, Harcourt urged Hartington to adopt "'en bloc'" Salisbury's views at the conference.²⁹⁸ Liberal opinion over the resolutions were about equally divided for and against, and there was a real danger the Party would disintegrate if no compromise was reached.²⁹⁹ The debate, from 7 to 14 May 1877, was the Eastern controversy in microcosm, incorporating all the arguments of previous debates.³⁰⁰ It marked the beginning of Gladstone's return--on the back of radical Liberalism--to political paramountcy within the Liberal Party. His speech to the Commons on the 7th, more than any other, laid the groundwork for Midlothian.

Hartington was being gradually displaced by a reemerging Gladstonian style of politics which grew steadily in influence until the Liberal victory in April 1880.³⁰¹

The independence and integrity of Turkey were indispensable to the rhetoric of the Conservative Government until the Congress of Berlin. The reality behind the rhetoric, however, was that British policy abandoned Turkish independence and integrity as early as September 1876. From this time on, Beaconsfield was prepared to accept the partition of European Turkey and of Turkey-in-Asia. Similarly, despite the solemn declaration within the Cabinet's Instructions to Lord Salisbury that the Constantinople conference must proceed on the understanding that the independence and integrity of Turkey was a political fact, this same document advocated territorial revisions for Montenegro. The amount of territory involved was insignificant (except perhaps for Montenegro and Turkey) but the fundamental point is the casualness in practice with which this principle was followed against the importance placed upon it in official declarations.³⁰² But these issues had been rendered irrelevant by the relationship between chaotic politics and failed policy in Britain. Once the Russo-Turkish war began, the old Eastern Question ended and Britain had to define a new policy.

Chapter 4

ORTHODOXY OR AMBIGUITY: TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF BRITISH EASTERN POLICY

The war slowly caused a realignment within the Cabinet, one which overcame its chronic divisiveness. Beaconsfield and Salisbury each ditched their longstanding partners, Derby and Carnarvon, and cooperated to guide the Conservative Party and Britain through the crisis. Conversely, the war widened the rifts in the Liberal Party. By the time of the Berlin Congress the Opposition had collapsed, while the Government reached the height of its popularity.³⁰³

The war initially heightened the chaos in the Cabinet: as Beaconsfield joked, no less than seven competing policies were advocated by twelve men. All Ministers agreed that at some point Russia must be checked, but disagreed on the nature of this point. Almost half of the them, particularly Salisbury, Northcote and Derby, opposed any support to Turkey (as against giving support to Russia). Carnarvon even refused to oppose Russia, which had intervened to protect the Balkan Christians from Turkish barbarism. Derby remained wedded to peace and order. He refused to place Britain on a war footing and favoured negotiating further with Russia. Beaconsfield, Hardy, Cairns and Beach formed the so-called war party. They regarded keeping Constantinople out of Russian hands as having paramount strategic importance--not even a temporary Russian occupation was acceptable.³⁰⁴

Beaconsfield's political ability is evident in his achieving a middle position and a partnership with Salisbury, the central member of the anti-Turk faction. From the high

ground of compromise the Premier united a divided Cabinet. The new alliance embodied a reconciliation between two antagonistic policies and men. Salisbury's cooperation was secured only at the price of Beaconsfield's loyalty to Derby.

Beaconsfield wished a more vigorous defence of British interests.³⁰⁵ He feared that Derby's do-nothing policy would make war with Russia more likely. By June he secretly asked Layard to obtain permission from the Porte for Britain to occupy Gallipoli.³⁰⁶ Nonetheless, as Beaconsfield informed the Queen, "there are not three men in the Cabinet who are prepared to advise...war against Russia".³⁰⁷ At the Cabinet of 16 June, he proposed a war vote of credit and increase of the army. Led by Salisbury, Carnarvon and Derby, the Cabinet rejected this plan. Beaconsfield interpreted Salisbury's position in this way: "It is...evident...that...Salisbury wishes the Russians to enter, and indefinitely occupy, Constantinople, acting, as he has done throughout, under the influence and counsel of Lyddon." Whether this was true or not, Salisbury made clear that under no circumstances should Britain fight along side Turkey.³⁰⁸ As he told Lord Lytton,

Our foreign policy has lacked a bold initiative and a settled plan. Too many different people have pulled successively at the strings....[T]he old Crimean policy should have been avowed...from the first....[A]fter two years' study of the subject,...The Russian power appears to me feeble, and...[no sort of] protection could have set the Turk upon his legs again....I would have devoted my whole efforts to securing the waterway to India--by the acquisition of Egypt or of Crete, and would in no way have discouraged the obliteration of Turkey. But the worst of our policy is that it has not been a consistent whole on either side. A bit of each train of thought has been embedded in it, surrounded by a thick mass of general inertia.

The Cabinet merely authorised a strengthening of the Gibraltar and Malta garrisons, which could be done without asking Parliament for money. The Cabinet could not act to shape events but only react to them.³⁰⁹

On 14 July, however, Gurko's cavalry seized two Balkan passes and raided down the Maritza valley towards Adrianople. This news made the Cabinet more tractable and Beaconsfield more determined. He wished to issue Russia an ultimatum and immediately dispatch the fleet to Constantinople. He expected this to provoke the resignations of Derby, Carnarvon and Salisbury, a price he was willing to pay. Beaconsfield was willing to accept a revolution in the Cabinet and war in the Party in order to deal with the political and strategic consequences of the Russian advance. However, all his Ministers, save Lord Manners and Hicks Beach, rejected both propositions.³¹⁰ The Cabinet merely agreed to tell Russia that even a provisional occupation of Constantinople "frees us from all previous engagements, and must lead to serious consequences." Soon the situation changed, however. On 21 July, Beaconsfield asked the Cabinet to treat a prolonged occupation of Constantinople as a *casus belli*. To everyone's surprise, Salisbury endorsed the request. The cause for his change of front is unclear but perhaps it stemmed from a combination of increasingly alarming reports from Layard and from Wellesley, (for whom Salisbury had much respect,) that Russia intended to occupy Constantinople, together with Russia's refusal to guarantee that it would not do so. In any case, the Cabinet quickly moved behind the new alliance between Beaconsfield and Salisbury while Derby and Carnarvon, increasingly isolated, drew together against intervention. The fall of Plevna and the rapid advance of the Russian army thereafter, threw Beaconsfield and Salisbury still more firmly together. In December 1877, Salisbury backed Beaconsfield's demand that Parliament immediately be summoned, the armed forces increased, and mediation be undertaken between Russia and Turkey.³¹¹ In January 1878 Salisbury took

the initiative in the new partnership and proposed that the British fleet enter the Dardanelles. The Cabinet accepted Salisbury's request, while Carnarvon and Derby resigned. Derby considered Beaconsfield's gambling on Russian military and financial exhaustion dangerous and unnecessary.³¹² Salisbury became Foreign Secretary at the end of March 1878.³¹³

Derby's resignation and the alliance between Beaconsfield and Salisbury reduced the split in the Cabinet. The new active foreign policy reflected a sometimes uneasy compromise between Beaconsfield and Salisbury. Yet their common loyalty to the Conservative Party kept these divergent views in check, as did necessity. Compromise was unavoidable for both men.³¹⁴ Final political power and Victoria's loyalty remained with her Prime Minister, and Salisbury was well aware that he would have to justify his Eastern policy to her. On the other hand, Beaconsfield's health was broken. He was forced to rely on Salisbury's talent, initiative and grasp of details, while the latter's Christian idealism gave his chief a means to cover his retreat from the Palmerstonian policy. Salisbury's presence within the Cabinet and at the Congress was essential, for Beaconsfield had become to all Europe, "the man of war", and the jingoist faction of his Party expected their leader to live up to this reputation. The two statesmen played different roles at the Congress of Berlin, the younger went to cut a deal, the elder to remind Continental statesmen that there might not be one.³¹⁵

From Salisbury's circular of 1 April down to the Congress,³¹⁶ Britain held the diplomatic initiative, following the formula of a diminution of Turkey in Europe and a counterpoise of British power in Asia at the Porte's expense.³¹⁷ The growing influence of

Salisbury as against Beaconsfield can be seen in the Cabinet's decision of 15 May to ignore Austrian concerns so to ensure that Alexander would sign the Protocol. Salisbury refused to consider Austrian interests at the price of forfeiting a favourable arrangement with Russia, whereas Beaconsfield had always preferred an accord with England's "'most natural allies'", Germany and Austria-Hungary.³¹⁸ The Anglo-Russian negotiations were conducted in London between Salisbury and Shuvalov.³¹⁹ The Treaty of Berlin was but the public version of the secret Anglo-Russian Protocol.³²⁰ Similarly, when the arrangement was complete as at Constantinople 16 months previously, Salisbury threatened the Porte with the unrestrained wrath of Russia:

[This] arrangement...must be accepted at once if the Sultan wishes to retain the goodwill of England....If the Sultan does not consent to the above arrangement, it will not be in the power of England to pursue negotiations any further, and the capture of Constantinople and partition of Empire will be the immediate result....³²¹

The Anglo-Turkish Convention is the best demonstration of Salisbury's attempt to amalgamate morality with *réalpolitik*. Strategic concerns produced the defensive alliance with Turkey. The cession of Cyprus stood as a second Gibraltar, as much for the British electorate as for the Czar, a symbol that Britain would defend its interests in any alteration of the status quo. Moral concern produced Turkish engagements to improve conditions for Armenians and other Christian minorities.

Both Beaconsfield and Salisbury envisioned permanent solutions to the Balkans Question: the Disraelian vision included Ottoman Turkey, the Salisburian did not. Beaconsfield believed that security lay in an alliance of British financial and naval power with the Porte's military strength. This would provide a more or less permanent buffer

to Russian expansion in the Balkans; in the Cabinet of 25 May he opposed, "‘almost alone,’" the Russian request that southern Bulgaria remain free of Turkish troops. The high church Salisbury, however, rejected further Moslem rule over any Christian populations in Europe. He thought in terms of an interim solution of some ten to fifteen years of supervised Turkish stewardship, until the Greeks and the Slavs could govern themselves and thereby replace Ottoman power in Europe completely. The Cabinet sided with Salisbury. By the time of the Congress his was the directive and the final agreements met his desire to expand local autonomy in the Balkans without compromising British interests. Britain’s policy at Berlin was bifurcated: different in the Balkans than in Asia Minor. The acquisition of Cyprus, the new defensive alliance with Turkey and the guarantee of its Asiatic frontier, provided a material means to project British power into the region and clearly delineated the Tigris-Euphrates corridor as off limits to Russian expansion. These developments and the Anglo-Turkish Convention suited the views of both Salisbury and Beaconsfield. As regards the Balkans, the Berlin settlement bore greater resemblance to Gladstonian policy than to classic Beaconsfieldism.³²²

Salisbury’s policy synthesized so many views that the Opposition could justly claim that it was theirs. That was Lord Granville’s implication when the settlement was formally debated on 18 July 1878. The anti-Turk coalition welcomed the Berlin Treaty as, "In the main," in concordance with their policy.³²³ Hence, it was not a triumph for the Government’s policy, nor proof that Beaconsfield had brought ‘Peace with Honour’. "‘What merit to have preserved peace, when peace was needlessly,...endangered?’"³²⁴

Lord Hartington criticised the Government for taking so long to acknowledge the need to replace the Treaty of Paris but praised it for adopting the policy of the Opposition.

...You may disguise it if you choose, you may use what phrases you please about the independence and power and direct authority which are left to Turkey; but disguise it as you will, that is the principle [Emancipation] which is at the bottom of the Treaty of Berlin. So far as the Treaty of Berlin is a complete settlement, it is in the direction of extending self-government to the races which were lately subject; so far as it is incomplete it points to a complete settlement in the same direction; and it is because we believe that it is...a very long step, in the direction of the policy which we have from the very beginning of these troubles advocated...that we...welcome the Treaty which has been concluded....

Far from vindicating Conservative policy, the Berlin Treaty vindicated the policy of the Opposition--and of Russia. Hartington drove home the basic inconsistency in Conservative policy over the past three years.

...You yourselves tried at the Conference of Constantinople what could be effected by peaceable means. Those means failed, and all that has been accomplished has been brought about by the war; and the course we have taken throughout has been,...to induce the Government and the country to refrain from going to war for the purpose of resisting the enterprize which had been taken in hand by Russia. If, then, you are about to vote approval of the war, how can we desire any better justification of the course we have taken?...³²⁵

While defending the war and Russia's actions in general, the unpredictable international situation which existed during the Congress and after, forced the Liberals to qualify their support of Russia. This was accomplished by attacking the Government for its hostility towards the San Stefano Treaty and its insistence that Bulgaria be reduced in size. The Big Bulgaria obtained under the Russian treaty, they argued, was more capable of resisting Russian influence than a small state. Weakening the new Bulgarian state physically by reducing its territory and population also weakened its sense of autonomy and independence, making it more dependent on Russia than it would have

been under the Treaty of San Stefano. Ministerialists countered by claiming that Roumania and Serbia were already essentially Russian satellites.

The Opposition's 'Barrier' theory was rhetorically useful regardless of its validity as strategy, because by it Liberals defended themselves against any possible accusation of treachery. The Opposition was actually distancing itself from an unqualified pro-Russian position and moving towards a more neutral one, in tune with the fluid situation in the East.³²⁶

Afghanistan and the Whigs

The one constant theme of British politics and policy during the Eastern crisis was divisiveness and indecision, each reinforcing the other. Whereas the Government overcame its version of this problem and achieved a political--and to some degree, policy--success at Berlin, with Beaconsfield attaining his greatest period of popularity in Britain, the Opposition became completely demoralised and divided. The Radicals favoured an aggressive opposition, the Whigs preferred to let time erode the Government's popularity. In any case, national jubilation soon faded. From the autumn of 1878, Beaconsfield's popularity was compromised by depressed trade, and imperial misadventures in South Africa and Afghanistan. Harvests in Britain were poor, Beaconsfield's administration had failed to balance the budget for three straight years, while income tax reached a record high--five pence in the pound. Time, and, as events turned, Lord Lytton, were on the Opposition's side. The Afghan war finally accomplished what the Eastern crisis had never done. The whole Party rallied together against Beaconsfield's Imperial policy, which provided a sense of unity the Liberals had lost since going into Opposition.³²⁷

The war thoroughly alienated the Whigs, who included many old India hands. They were particularly sensitive to Lytton's exploits: Lawrence, Northbrook, Argyll, Ripon and Halifax, not the Radicals, not Gladstone, led the Party against the Government's Afghan policy and toward revival. Hartington was an exception among the Whigs, preferring to do nothing, and believing the Government's course to be essentially correct, proving once again his propensity for being "more ministerial than the ministers".³²⁸ Without the leadership of the Whigs no coherent opposition to the Afghan policy would have been possible.³²⁹ Afghanistan gave the Whigs a reason to attack the Administration, which they had not found in the Eastern crisis, because they cared about the issue--and their reputations.³³⁰

When Lord Cranbrook claimed that the invasion of Afghanistan stemmed from the incompetence of the previous Liberal Government, the old India hands among the Whigs were driven to defend their record.³³¹ The massacre of the British garrison in Kabul gave them a chance to refute Cranbrook's allegations and return a withering criticism. British defeats at both Isandhlwana and Kabul were denounced as the crowning follies in a three-year sequence of brinksmanship, divine retribution had been visited upon an amoral policy. Kabul all the more so because Lawrence had warned against the garrisoning of the town, and predicted the murder of British troops stationed there.³³² Lord Ripon gloated over the Government's change of fortune,

How swift the retribution has been--truly the Lord God omnipotent reigneth. I really pity the Government--this seems to me to be the greatest blow, which any Govt. in our day has received because it was foretold--who is the statesman now, Lawrence or Lytton.

The outbreak of hostilities in South Africa in January 1879 again supported the view that Beaconsfield's Government was vainglorious and aggressive.³³³ The Opposition emphasised that though the Colonial Secretary had publicly censured Sir Bartle Frere for his unauthorised war with the Zulus, he yet continued as High Commissioner. Harcourt summed up the Government's attitude as "guilty as charged but do it again." The House divided on 27 March 1879 with a majority of sixty for the Government, the narrowest margin of any debate on foreign policy since the beginning of the Beaconsfield administration. On Africa, as on Afghanistan, the Liberals again mustered close to their full strength against the Government. For the first time in a foreign policy debate, some Conservatives voted with the Opposition. Foreign policy, one of the strong points in Beaconsfield's programme now became a liability--a means to rally the Liberals together and a standard with which to lead an electoral assault against the Government.³³⁴

Midlothian and the Significance of the Eastern Controversy

During autumn 1879 Gladstone turned this liability to his credit, putting to good use the lesson learned from the agitation. Gladstone held that it was the working class who responded to the moral question of Turkish rule in Europe; they, rather than the ruling classes, were the true moral force of the nation. Thus the best means of fighting the election was to continue in the train of democratic politics initiated during the period of the Bulgarian atrocities, speaking directly to the people about the immorality of the Government's policies. They, the people, had been the judges in every major foreign issue since the Civil War, their moral certitude had surpassed that of the elite.

- 1) ...[T]he popular judgement on the great achievements of the last half-century,...has been more just and true than that of the majority of the higher

orders....The superiority of the popular judgement in politics,...is,...due mainly to moral causes, to a greater mental integrity, which,...is...owing to the comparative absence of the more subtle agencies of temptation....In questions to which his budding knowledge reaches, even the child has often a more serene and effective sense of justice than a grown man;...a partial analogy obtains between the relations of age and those of class....

- 2) ...[T]hough I have been obliged...to attack the Government, I am really attacking the majority of the House of Commons....th[at] majority...has taken on itself the responsibility of the Government...th[at] majority...has, in the face of the country, made itself... absolutely...responsible in the whole of these transactions that I have been commenting upon,...and as the House of Commons has done that, so upon the coming general election will it...be determined whether that responsibility, so shifted from an Administration to a Parliament, shall again be shifted from a Parliament to a nation....If faith has been broken, if blood has been needlessly shed, if the name of England has been discredited[,]....if the country has been needlessly distressed, if finance has been thrown into confusion, if the foundations of the Indian Empire have been impaired, all these things as yet are the work of an Administration and a Parliament; but the day is coming,...which will lead the historian to declare whether or not they are the work, not of an Administration and not of a Parliament, but the work of a great and free people....let every one of us resolve in his inner conscience,...that he at least will have no share in such a proceeding;...³³⁵

Gladstone's revelation regarding the "popular judgement", reinforced by the recent wars in Africa and Afghanistan, had transformed his conception of politics, making him realise to a far greater degree than before the power of the electorate and the need to rouse it. Above all, he understood the value of the electorate in promoting his influence and leadership over a factious Liberal Party. Foreign policy and the evils of Beaconsfieldism was a subject which might unite the Party, providing a rhetorical means for turning rival interest groups into a coalition to support Gladstonian doctrine on international affairs. His Midlothian campaigns served the dual purpose of gaining victory at the polls and of unifying the Party on his terms rather than those of the Whigs. Gladstone's object was the further integration of the Radicals, which he thought could be accomplished without endangering the Party's traditional charge over land, property and

the established Church. Midlothian was as much a campaign against the Whigs as the Tories. Prosecuting a modern political campaign meant challenging the Government in public as frequently as possible. Midlothian was not chosen because it was a guaranteed seat--except for the period between 1868-74 it had been Conservative--but because this situation provided precisely the stage for a dramatic campaign against the Government. As in May 1877, Harcourt was once again furious with and humiliated by his colleague. Midlothian precipitated the final Liberal leadership crisis. Within the Party, optimism mixed with pessimism as Gladstone's success triggered a jealous rivalry among Hartington's supporters, while Hartington himself resolved that only Gladstone could lead the Liberal Party.

[Gladstone] has almost continually since his resignation chosen to act in most important matters as the leader of the party out of doors;...he has done so more conspicuously than ever during the last few weeks;...such a course renders my position intolerable.³³⁶

In November-December 1879, Gladstone's moralist condemnation of the Government followed a simple pattern: the Beaconsfield Ministry had left undone what ought to have been completed, namely, the emancipation of the whole Balkan peninsula from Turkish rule; and had undertaken what they should not have: the defence of the Porte's Asian dominions. He called upon voters to do their patriotic duty, to turn out Beaconsfield and his Ministers and replace them with men who understood right conduct. The failure of the Constantinople conference, the ensuing war, the secret convention with Turkey and the seizure of Cyprus, and the disastrous events in Afghanistan and South Africa were one and the same thing, indicative of the moral bankruptcy of Britain's policy. Beaconsfieldism became his catchphrase for all that was evil with British foreign policy,

and the latter was the focus of his electoral campaign.³³⁷ Even though the electorate arguably was most interested in bread and butter issues, foreign policy was crucial to the kind of popular campaign Gladstone had in mind. He had of necessity to keep the issue 'foreign' and doctrinaire, because domestic and practical issues such as education, Ireland, disestablishment, household suffrage etc. were so divisive for his Party.³³⁸ The Government, conversely, did not understand the significance of political agitation in 1876-7, nor Gladstone's decision to fight the election by appealing directly to the moral certitude of the people. From the autumn of 1876 the most influential men in the Conservative Ministry sat in the House of Lords. When the general election finally came, the best Conservative spokesmen (Beaconsfield, Salisbury, Cairns and Cranbrook) were, as Peers, debarred from playing an active part in the campaign. The only commoner with any speaking ability within the Ministry, Assheton Cross, the Home Secretary, was no match for the combined talents of Gladstone, Harcourt, Forster, Dilke, Chamberlain, Bright and Hartington.³³⁹ Gladstone demonstrated at Midlothian that a new set of rules determined British politics. Salisbury, soon to be heir to Beaconsfield, would be forced to play by them.³⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

Beaconsfield and Gladstone both pursued public images for their Parties which embodied--indeed, which centred on--their different approaches to foreign policy. The debates over foreign policy in the mid and late 1870's were crucial to the development of these rival images and ideologies. They were acted out in the rhetorical arena of the Eastern crisis and its outgrowth in Afghanistan.

Beaconsfield began to rely on the rhetoric of imperialism before Gladstone raised his corresponding message of the Public Right and the sanctity of the Concert. Gladstone and the Liberals took a long time to warm up to the game. As he admitted in Midlothian, "the Liberal party was not,...in the field" until 1877. This occurred because of the Liberal Party's confusion as to what was happening, and the reluctance of the Whig leadership to attack the Government on an issue of foreign policy. Gladstone, however, was considerably quicker than his peers in overcoming this confusion and in the debate of 31 July 1876, established the three principles of Public Law, the Concert and Christendom as the Opposition's counter-ideology to Beaconsfield's imperialism.³⁴¹

Throughout the crisis, Beaconsfield publicly maintained that Britain stood by the principle of the independence and integrity of Turkey. The Opposition denied such was the case, and asserted the Government was copying their policy. The far right complained that the Opposition was correct on these points. Although it was clear by September 1876 that 'a new departure was inevitable', the Government could not simply abandon its policy in the face of a taunting Opposition. Hence the importance of Beaconsfield's rhetorical emphasis on Empire, British interests and Ottoman integrity; the Opposition's

allegations of a bankruptcy of policy had to be refuted. Thwarting the Opposition remained Beaconsfield's "primary object". His policy of prestige and his innovative but not always plausible solutions to the crisis were ultimately motivated by his quest to save his Party and himself. But in order to overcome the Opposition he had first to overcome opposition within his own Cabinet. In autumn 1876, for example, he played Salisbury against Derby. He manoeuvred Salisbury out of the country, where he hoped to use the India Secretary as a tool against Stanley. Simultaneously Beaconsfield reasserted his influence over Derby (in Salisbury's absence,) then used the Foreign Secretary to thwart Salisbury's attempts to settle the crisis to Britain and Russia's mutual benefit. Beaconsfield rejected Salisbury's scheme because, while it might help the country, it would harm the Party.

The other constant in Beaconsfield's policy was the quest for prestige. This, because of his commitment to the Crimean system, his knowledge of Russian weaknesses and his propensity for dramatic strokes, usually meant antipathy towards Russia and always meant hostility towards the Imperial League. However, neither Derby nor Salisbury, the two principal men on which Beaconsfield depended for power, were prepared to accept the implications of the old system--to make Turkish integrity in Europe a *casus belli*. After news of Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria reached Britain, events outpaced the Government's ability to manage them. This cost the administration credibility, and it cost Beaconsfield control of his Cabinet. Ultimately, the agitation forced Beaconsfield to abandon the Crimean system in its original sense of maintaining a Danubian bulwark to Russian expansion. The system, however, was reapplied specifically to Asia Minor.

From August 1876 to June 1878 Beaconsfield tried to recapture the predominant influence he felt that he had enjoyed at the time of the Berlin Memorandum. While he secured honour and fame at the Congress of Berlin, his influence was less than decisive--his alliance with Salisbury carried a price, his own autonomy. Two Cabinet meetings illustrate the point. On 16 May 1876 Beaconsfield dictated the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum and dominated his Cabinet. Two years later, on 25 May 1878, Beaconsfield argued that only if Turkey again garrisoned Rumelia should Britain participate in a congress. He was overruled by Salisbury who carried the Cabinet with him.

With some reluctance, Salisbury came to accept the validity of the Prime Minister's concern for prestige and its importance for the Conservative Party. After the conference the man who had told Lytton that he, "in no way would have discouraged the obliteration of Turkey, and at Constantinople had begged the Cabinet for "powers to squeeze the Turk", adapted Disraelian rhetoric to his own use in Parliament, to defend the Government's record. The contrast between the Government's rhetoric and its diplomacy was greatest in the person of Salisbury, who spanned the gap between Beaconsfield and Gladstone. Salisbury achieved power over the making of policy because, occupying the middle ground, he alone could virtually synthesise parts of the policies of prestige and emancipation, of sentiment and strategy, without sacrificing British interests. It was Salisbury who initiated the compromise in June 1877 when he supported Beaconsfield's request to make a prolonged occupation of Constantinople a case for war. His willingness to meet Beaconsfield half way encouraged the latter to concede the old Danubian policy.

This was a turning point in the crisis, which enabled the Cabinet, to overcome its paralytic divisiveness. In the ensuing year there were many disagreements between the two Ministers as each tested the other's resolve and commitment to his own beliefs. Ultimately, however, the working compromise between Beaconsfield and Salisbury was the key to success. The political partnership provided the medium for the transferal of Palmerstonian policy from Europe to Asia, and the translation of Disraelian rhetoric into policy--Cyprus was Beaconsfield's permanent mark, a tangible symbol of Britain's commitment to its interests and its Empire. Beaconsfield defined an ideology--imperialism, Salisbury determined its application. Between them they defined foreign policy in 1878 and Conservative principles for the next forty years.

Thus, the lasting contribution of the affair was not diplomatic but rhetorical. Beaconsfield more than any other created the image of the modern Conservative Party as the Party of Empire and patriotism, and of the people to boot. Salisbury inherited this transformed Party from him. Similarly, by adopting the cause of agitation and Radicalism, Gladstone publicly promoted his religious ideology on a Party platform to a greater degree than ever before. Gladstone's ideology, however, did not survive his stewardship of a Party in the direct way that Beaconsfield's did. Gladstone's Christian nationalism was extranational and applied to a specific case, the Eastern crisis. His ecumenical ideals were crucial for Midlothian but because of their extranational character they were not manifested in any permanent landmark of British policy at the time. On the other hand, Gladstonian ideology did shape the characteristic willingness on the part of

British Liberals over the next century to accept international organisations like the League of Nations and the U.N.³⁴²

In retrospect, it is doubtful that the agitation succeeded in limiting the slaughter of Christians or Moslems in Turkey, either at the time or later. Indeed, the compromise between Christian idealism and réalpolitik of 1878, proved fatal for Armenians in 1895 and 1915. The agitation did, however, secure its immediate objective of preventing Britons from dying for the Sultan, and must be acknowledged as a triumph of majority rule.

The agitation prevented a war against Russia on Turkey's behalf. Insofar as it shaped the Government's abandonment of Turkey-in-Europe, Gladstone did make Britain pursue a Christian and European policy. On the other hand, the acquisition of Cyprus and the defensive alliance with Turkey-in-Asia followed Beaconsfield's point that Britain was more than the limited Gladstonian definition provided. The abandonment of Turkey-in-Europe justified the agitation and the Opposition, the acquisition of Cyprus justified Disraelian rhetoric. The ship of state charted a course of compromise.

ENDNOTES

Introduction

1. In the specific context of this study, the 'popular mind' is largely contained in the letters, notices and resolutions of the public meetings held throughout England, from September to the end of December 1876, which were sent to the Foreign Office. These records are kept at the Public Record Office in six volumes, FO 78/2551-6, see Richard Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875-1878 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 527 n.1; Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, 4 vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1922), II, 89.
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria 23 March 1877, in George Earle Buckle, ed., The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1928), 525.
3. Paul Smith, Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform (London and Toronto: Routledge and Kegan Paul, and University of Toronto Press, 1967), 2-3, 161.
4. R.T. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1963), 30-3.
5. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 39.
6. Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 31.

Chapter 1: Diplomacy, Parliament and the Press:...

7. The 'thing' in question was Murad V whose reign lasted ninety days, from 30 May to 30 August 1876. He was replaced by his brother, Abdul Hamid, see Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, (hereinafter cited as 3 Hansard) House of Commons, vol. 231 (7 Aug. 1876): col. 730.
8. 3 Hansard, Disraeli, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1146-7; see also Sir William Harcourt, cols. 1137-8: "the tide of European opinion was rising,...it would sweep away the petty sand castles which a feeble diplomacy was raising on an unstable beach. It would carry onward on its vast and resistless waves the fortunes of those Powers, whosoever they might be, who would emancipate Europe from the curse which afflicted her, and redeem Christendom from the shame by which she had been too long dishonoured." Disraeli's parting comments were meant to stifle Harcourt's "Rhodian eloquence".

A Cry of Alarm: Two Notes from Andr  ssy

9. Richard Millman reviews the evidence and conflicting explanations for the causes

of the Hercegovinian rebellion in his book, Britain and the Eastern Question: 1875-1878, 13-18.

10. M.D. Stojanović, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878 (1939; reprint, Northampton: John Dickens and Co. Ltd., 1968), 15, 27; David Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis Of 1875-1878: The First Year (1936; reprint, n.p. Archon Books, 1969), 125; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 13, 18, 25, 30. For a thorough analysis of the Russian involvement in the insurgency see B.H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880 (1937; reprint, London: Archon Books, 1962), chapters 1, 2 and 5.

11. See Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 126-8.

12. Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 72-7, 78-81.

13. Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 132; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 19, 32-3.

14. Derby to Elliot 12 Aug. 1875, Dis.No.13 (p.6) of Turkey No.2 (1876); Derby to Elliot 25 Jan. 1876, Dis.No.73 as above; Derby to Odo Russell 19 May 1876, Dis.No.278 (pp.173-4) of Turkey No.3 (1876): "[H.M.] Government have, since the outbreak of the insurrection in Bosnia...deprecated the diplomatic intervention of other Powers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire." All the above from, Accounts And Papers, State Papers--continued. vol.84 (LXXXIV) 1876 Session (8 Feb. - 15 Aug.) "Spain; Tunis; Turkey; Zanzibar" Edgar L. Erickson, ed., British Sessional Papers House of Commons (New York: Readex Microprint, 1967); Elliot to Derby 17 Aug., 21 Sept. and 30 Sept. 1875, in Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 138-9 nn.16-18, and 136-7, 232; George C. Thompson, Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield: 1875-1880, 2 vols. (London: MacMillan, 1886), I, 354-6; Turkish Iradé promulgating Reforms, Constantinople, 2 Oct., and Turkish Firman granting Immunities and Favours to Ottoman Subjects, 12 Dec. 1875, Doc. Nos. 454 and 455 respectively, in Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty: Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1891), 2407-17.

15. Elliot to Derby 9 May 1876, in 3 Hansard, Gladstone, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 196-7; Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 87; Thompson, I, 355.

16. Abdul Aziz consented to consular mediation at Ignatiev's behest on 19 August 1875, but the Turks were no more desirous of peace than the insurgents. On 20 September, the former launched a surprise attack against a rebel force awaiting the arrival of the Commission, see Millman, ...Eastern Question, 19-20, 22, 23. Gladstone's criticism was made in Commons, see 3 Hansard, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 196-7.

17. Andrassy Note, Buda-Pest, 30 December 1875. Appears as No.55 of Turkey No.2 (1876). English translation found on pp.79-83 of same, (marked as pp.'s 221-25 handwritten on Readex microcard), Count Andrassy to Count Beust (Communicated to

the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, January 3.) Turkey No.2 (1876) "Correspondence Respecting Affairs in Bosnia and the Herzegovina" is marked as p.137 handwritten on microcard, of vol.84 (lxxxiv) of the Readex Microprint Edition of these Papers. See also G.C. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 256-7, for paraphrased summary of Andrassy Note, and Richard Millman, ...Eastern Question, 45, and R.W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question (1935; reprint, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1962), 28.

18. Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 138-9, 163-4, 168-9; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 24, 26, 30, 32-3, 41-3, 48; Seton-Watson, 28; Thompson, I, 256.

19. Derby to Beust 25 Jan. 1876, Dis.No.72 (p.96) of Turkey No.2 (1876), p.238 handwritten of vol.84 Readex; summarised in Harris, 207-8; Millman, 56.

20. Derby to Disraeli 7 Jan. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 51-2 n.38.

21. Disraeli to Derby 9 Jan. 1876, in George Earle Buckle, ed., The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, 6 vols. (London: John Murray, 1920), VI, 18; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 49-50; Seton-Watson, 28; Harris, 204.

22. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 53; Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 204; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 88, 552-3.

23. Disraeli to Derby 9 Jan. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 19.

24. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 51-2.

25. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 455, lists fear of Russian and Austrian tariff policies, should the influence of those two States in European Turkey increase, as an important motive in British Eastern policy; similarly, India was crucial to Britain's status as a Great Power because it bore such a large share of the taxes sustaining Britain's imperial forces, see Swartz, ...Foreign Policy..., 16; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 186; Elliot to Derby 14 July, 26 July and 17 Aug. 1875, same to same 3 Jan. 1876, in Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 85 nn.107-9, 203 n.125, see also 83, 86; the commercial advantages of Ottoman rule and the corresponding threat posed by Russia were alluded to in Parliament, see 3 Hansard, Earl Grey, Lords, vol. 232 (26 Feb. 1877): cols. 991-2; T.H. Sidebottom, Commons, vol. 242 (30 July 1878): cols. 724-5.

26. Disraeli to Derby 22 May 1877, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 140; Derby Diary 24 Oct. 1876 and 13 March 1877, in Swartz, ...Foreign Policy..., 47-8 n.107, 55 n.23.

27. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 90.

28. Derby to Beust 25 Jan. 1876, Dis.No.72 (p.92) of Turkey No.2 (1876), p.234 handwritten of vol. 84 Readex, see especially p.96 (p.238 handwritten). Derby's letter is summarised in Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 207-8.

29. 3 Hansard, Earl Derby, Lords, vol. 227 (8 Feb. 1876): "if, without too deeply compromising ourselves we can stave off...a war between the Mahometan and Christian populations of Turkey,...we should have done a good work for ourselves, for Turkey, and for civilisation."

30. 3 Hansard, Disraeli, Commons, vol. 227 (8 Feb. 1876): cols. 92-4; Disraeli had expressed just the opposite sentiment to Derby on 9 Jan., namely, that it were better to stand in isolation than sacrifice any freedom of action for the sake of an appearance of unity with the other Powers, see Millman, ...Eastern Question, 53 n.41.

31. Derby to Elliot 25 Jan. 1876, Dis.No.73 of Turkey No.2 (1876); see also Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 258.

32. See Thompson, I, 267-8, for quote of the Spectator, 12 Jan. 1876.

33. Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 28-9.

34. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, Commons, vol. 227 (8 Feb. 1876): cols. 102-7; see also Times, 9 Feb.: "Lord Hartington spoke in a tone similar to that of Lord Granville....On the other hand, the remarkable speech of Mr. Gladstone makes up for any coldness or reserve on the part of the recognised leaders of the Liberal party."

35. 3 Hansard, Butler-Johnstone, Commons, vol. 227 (8 Feb. 1876): cols. 107-9.

36. For a detailed summary, see Elliot's dispatch to Derby of 7 May 1876 in Turkey No.3 (1876) "Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey, And The Insurrection in Bosnia and The Herzegovina"; and Millman, ...Eastern Question, 497 n.4.

37. Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 288.

38. Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 295; Millman, 87; Stojanović, 60.

39. Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 291-2, 296, 297, 298; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 87, 88; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 60, 63; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 283.

40. Berlin Memorandum, Berlin, 12 May 1876. Appears as Enclosure 2 in Dispatch No.248 (p.137) of Turkey No.3 (1876). The English translation appears on pp. 139-141 of same, (marked as pp's 415-17 handwritten on Readex microcard). Received by Earl Derby from Lord Odo Russell 15 May 1876. Turkey No.3 (1876). "Correspondence Respecting The Affairs of Turkey, And The Insurrection In Bosnia And The Herzegovina" is found in, Accounts And Papers, State Papers--continued. Vol.84 (LXXXIV) Spain; Tunis; Turkey; Zanzibar. 1876 Session. Turkey No.3 is marked as, p.255 handwritten on microcard, of vol.84 (lxxxiv) of the Readex Microprint Edition of these Papers. The closing sentence was Gorchakov's contribution: "If, however, the armistice were to expire without the efforts of the Powers being successful in attaining the end they have in view, the three Imperial Courts are of opinion that it would become

necessary to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might appear to be demanded in the interest of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development."--Berlin Memorandum pp. 140-1.

41. Berlin Memorandum, pp. 139-40 of Turkey No.3 (1876); also Harris, 297-8.
42. Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 291-2, 296, 297, 298; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 87, 88; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 60, 63; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 283.
43. Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 299, 305, 306; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 88-9, 92; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 34; and Stojanović, ...Balkans, 63.
44. Derby to Odo Russell 19 May 1876, Dis.No.277 (p.173) of Turkey No.3 (1876); Disraeli to Victoria 16 May 1876, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 453; Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 24.
45. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 91-2, 94.
46. Point #5 in the prepared memorandum read by the Prime Minister to the Cabinet on 16 May 1876, quoted in Buckle, Disraeli, VI, 24-6. See also Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 307; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 93-4; Seton-Watson, 33.
47. Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 23-24; Harris, ...Balkan Crisis..., 305-6; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 93-4, 101, 119; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 33.
48. The Memorandum's adjournment "sine die" was confirmed by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 9 June, see 3 Hansard, Disraeli, Commons, vol. 230 (9 June 1876): cols. 1605, 1607; see also Millman, 101.
49. Derby to Elliot 14 June 1876, Dis.No.422 (pp.253-4) of Turkey No.3 (1876); Derby to Loftus 14 June 1876, Dis.No.427 (p.260) of Turkey No.3 (1876); 3 Hansard, Disraeli, Commons, vol. 230 (9 June 1876): cols. 1607-8.
50. 3 Hansard, Disraeli, House of Commons, vol. 230 (9 June 1876): col. 1607, and Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 207; Disraeli to Victoria, Hughenden Manor 7 June 1876, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 457-8; Disraeli to Northcote, 11 September 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 62; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 37-8; Swartz, 35-6.
51. Derby to Loftus 14 June 1876 Dis.No.427 (p.260) of Turkey No.3 (1876); Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 355 and II, 9, 55.
52. Derby to Shuvalov 29 June 1876, Dis.No.506 of Turkey No.3 (1876).

53. Derby to Musurus Pasha 24 May 1876, Dis.No.295 of Turkey No.3 (1876); see also Derby to Elliot 19 May 1876, Dis.No.278 of same. The dispatch to Elliot was published as a separate parliamentary paper: Turkey No.3 (1877); see also 3 Hansard, Duke of Westminster, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 671; Thompson, I, 356-7.

54. Derby to Elliot 11 Sept. 1876, in 3 Hansard, Lord Robert Montagu, Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): cols. 502-3; Thompson, II, 59 n.2.

55. Derby to Elliot 5 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.159 (p.105) of Turkey No.1 (1877); see Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 357; also partially quoted by Gladstone in 3 Hansard, vol. 232, col. 472.

56. Elliot to Derby 4 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.221 of Turkey No.1 (1877), "Correspondence Respecting The Affairs Of Turkey."; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 22 n.2; 3 Hansard, Commons, vol. 231 (7 Aug. 1876): col. 737.

57. The sequence of diplomatic communication revealing the shift in British Eastern policy to its most anti-Turk or 'violet' position is indicated by the following telegrams and dispatches.

(1) Rejection of Berlin Memorandum, Disraeli Government's initial position of strict non-intervention. [i] Derby to Odo Russell 19 May 1876, Dis.No.277 (p.173) of Turkey No.3 (1876), (p.449 handwritten of vol.84 Readex); [ii] Derby to Elliot 19 May 1876, Dis.No.278 (pp.173-4) of Turkey No.3 (1876), (pp.449-50 handwritten of vol.84 Readex), see 3 Hansard, Evelyn Ashley, Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1086-7.

(2) Derby begins to modify his position with respect to Turkey. [i] 24 May 1876, Dis.No.295 of Turkey No.3 (1876), original report of conversation with Turkish Ambassador, no allusion to any warning to Musurus appears; [ii] Derby to Elliot 25 May 1876, Dispatch, Turkey No.3 (1877), Derby's account of his conversation and warning to Turkish Ambassador, Musurus Pasha, on 24 May; [iii] Derby to Lyons 2 Jan. 1877, Dis.No.126 of Turkey No.2 (1877), relates conversation held with French Ambassador, L. d'Harcourt, concerning Derby's warning to Turkish Ambassador, Musurus Pasha, of previous May (p.136 of vol.91 Readex); and see Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 356-7.

(3) News of atrocities in Bulgaria forces the Government to assume a more critical position towards Turkey. [i] Elliot to Derby 8 June 1876, Dis.No.443 (p.267) of Turkey No.3 (1876), (p. 543 handwritten of vol.84 Readex); [ii] Dis.No.500 (pp.332-4) of Turkey No.3 (1876), 18 June 1876, Reade to Derby, Inclosure1 in No.500, Reade to Elliot, Rustchuk, 16 June 1876; [iii] Derby to Elliot 28 June 1876, Dis.No.501 of Turkey No.3 (1876), formal request for information regarding "alleged atrocities upon Christians" in Bulgaria; see 3 Hansard, Derby, Lords, vol. 230 (26 June 1876): cols. 385-7; Forsyth, Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): col. 1092, Harcourt, cols. 1128-9; [iv] Derby to Elliot 14 July 1876, Dis.No.540 (p.373) of Turkey No.3 (1876); see 3 Hansard, Harcourt, Commons, vol. 231, (11 Aug. 1876): col. 1129.

(4) Derby-Elliot correspondence of Aug.-Sept. 1876 concerning actual change in course of British policy towards Turkey, consists of nine dispatches either written or

telegraphic. [i] Derby to Elliot, 22 Aug. 1876, Tel.No.? "The speedy conclusion of a peace,...becomes from these considerations a matter of urgent necessity." (Subsequently Dis.No.159 of Turkey No.1 (1877), 5 Sept. 1876); [ii] 29 Aug. 1876, Tel.No.172 of Turkey No.1 (1877), Elliot's reply to Derby's tel. of the 22nd: "any attempt to drive the Turks back will prove the utter destruction of whole Christian populations."; [iii] 29 Aug. 1876, Telegram, Turkey No.6 (1877), Derby's reply to Elliot's of same day, amplification of former message of the 22nd, instructing Elliot to seek to force a peace on Turkey: "you cannot be too strong in urging upon the Porte a conciliatory disposition." (Subsequently Dis.No.164 of Turkey No.1 (1877), 6 Sept. 1876); [iv] 4 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.221 of Turkey No.1 (1877), Elliot's formal protest of Derby's telegraph directives of 22 and 29 Aug.: 'number of slain Bulgarians irrelevant to British Interests'; [v] 5 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.159 of Turkey No.1 (1877), Derby's formal imperative to Elliot, (originally telegraphed on 22 Aug.); [vi] Derby to Elliot 11 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.196 of Turkey No.1 (1877), terms proper to forming basis of the pacification of the Balkans (p.129 of vol.90 Readex); [vii] Derby to Elliot 21 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.316 of Turkey No.1 (1877); [viii] Derby to Elliot 21 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.324 of Turkey No.1 (1877), provisions proper to forming the basis of pacification in the disturbed provinces, including a cessation of hostilities between Turkey and Serbia (pp.241-2 of vol.90 Readex); see also Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 9, 55, 60.

58. Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 23.

59. 'Red' and 'violet' represent opposing ends of the political spectrum in the Eastern crisis. G.C. Thompson gave the arbitrary designation 'red' to the Russophobe position of the far right, exemplified by Lords Stratheden and Montagu and closely approached by Lords Beaconsfield and Manners and Queen Victoria. The anti-Turk position of the emancipationists, who were ready to join with Russia and other Powers to enforce their demands on Turkey, best exemplified in the views of Gladstone, A.J. Mundella, and the Duke of Argyll, received the designation 'violet'. See Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 72,187.

60. Derby to Elliot 21 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.316 of Turkey No.1 (1877), formal British demand for exemplary trial and punishment of authors of massacres, and for reparations to survivors: "No political considerations...justify...toleration of such acts"; see also Derby to Elliot 14 July 1876, Dis.No.540 (p.373) of Turkey No.3 (1876): "I have to instruct your Excellency to bring M. Dupuis' Reports, which are enclosed in your dispatch of the 6th instant, to the knowledge of the Porte. You will...urge strongly [the immediate suppression of]...these outrages and [the] punish[ment of] those concerned in them; that a proclamation be issued, prohibiting under severe penalties the sale of women and children; that the immediate release be effected of all persons who are held in illegal captivity by Circassians or other parties,"; 3 Hansard, Sir William Harcourt, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): col. 1129.

61. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): col. 402, 408-9, 416; Lowe (8 May 1877): cols. 569-71; Lord Hartington, Commons, 8 Feb. 1877, quoted in Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 152, and see also 19-22, for transcript of Disraeli's Aylesbury speech of 20 Sept. 1876; Lord Robert Montagu, Foreign Policy: England and the Eastern Question (London: Chapman and Hall, 1877), 216-17.

62. Derby's terms for an armistice are found as early as 11 Sept. 1876, in Dis.No.196 of Turkey No.1 (1877), Derby to Elliot. "I...stated to Count Schouvaloff the terms which,...might properly form the basis of a pacification, and I authorized him to communicate them to his Government....[1] The status quo, speaking roughly, both as regards Serbia and Montenegro. [2] Administrative reforms, in the nature of local autonomy for Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Guarantees of some similar kinds...against the future maladministration of Bulgaria. [H.M.] Government would regard as inadmissible any modification of the Treaty of Paris unfavourable to Servia, the resumption of the right to garrison Servian fortresses, or the deposition of Prince Milan." (Subsequently sent as Tel.No.324 of Turkey No.1 (1877), 21 Sept. 1876). See also Dis.No.238 of Turkey No.1 (1877), 15 Sept. 1876, Derby to Elliot. "[T]here is no question raised of the creation of a tributary state, and that nothing more is intended by [H.M.] Government than a system of local institutions which shall give the population some control over their own local affairs, and guarantees against the exercise of arbitrary authority." See Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 61.

63. Dispatch, Shuvalov to Derby, dated: Foreign Office, 26 September 1876. Appears as No.800 of Turkey No.1 (1877). Thompson, Public Opinion, II, 64.

64. Thompson, Public Opinion, II, 64-9. This was the first Cabinet meeting (4 Oct. 1876) since the prorogation of Parliament in early August.

65. 3 Hansard, Duke of Westminster, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 671.

66. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 72.

Agitation and Opposition

67. Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 50; Michael Bentley, Politics without Democracy: Great Britain, 1815-1914: Perception and Preoccupation in British Government (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985), 225-6; Richard Shannon, The Crisis of Imperialism, 1865-1915, ed. Robert Blake, Paladin History of England Series, (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon Ltd., 1974), 124-5.

68. M.R. Temmel, "Gladstone's Resignation of the Liberal Leadership, 1874-1875," Journal of British Studies, 16 (Fall 1976): 174; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 89; H.C.G. Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 11 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), IX, xxxi.

69. Keith A.P. Sandiford, "W.E. Gladstone and Liberal-Nationalist Movements," Albion, 13, No.1 (Spring 1981), 32, 36.
70. Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 120.
71. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 310-11, 312. Pears's letters to the Daily News of 23 June and 8 July, also appear in the Blue Book of 21 July.
72. 3 Hansard, Disraeli, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 215. In all, the Daily News published seven reports from Edwin Pears. These occurred on 23 June; 8, 25, 29 July; 2, 15, 25 August; see Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 323.
73. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 304, 308-9; Millman, 119-20.
74. Times, 4 July 1876; see also, Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 308.
75. The article was alluded to in both Houses of Parliament on the 26th. Forster's notice was not prompted by the article however; it was made on the basis of private communication from Istanbul, see Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 300, 313-14; 3 Hansard, Duke of Argyll, House of Lords, vol. 230 (26 June 1876): cols. 385-6.
76. 3 Hansard, W.E. Forster, Commons, vol. 230 (10 July 1876): col. 1180.
77. Disraeli to Lady Bradford 13 July 1876, in Marquis of Zetland, ed., The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and Lady Chesterfield, 2 vols. (Ernest Benn Ltd., 1929), II, 58; Disraeli to Victoria 14 July 1876, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 471; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 40.
78. 3 Hansard, Disraeli, House of Commons, vol. 230 (10 July 1876): col. 1182.
79. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 318-19.
80. Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 12 Sept. 1876, in Zetland, ...Disraeli, II, 74; Disraeli to Salisbury 26 Sept. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 72; John P. Rossi, "The Transformation of the British Liberal Party: A Study of the Tactics of the Liberal Opposition, 1874-1880," Transactions Of The American Philosophical Society, 68, prt. 8 (Dec. 1978): 31.
81. "We must come to the conclusion that the truth of the statements made with respect to what are called the atrocities in Bulgaria will be substantially confirmed. The outcry has gone on too long, the testimony has been too various, derived from too many sources, and yet too consistent, not to be true in the main. The official persons talk of exaggeration; let this be allowed."--Times, 2 August; see also Rossi, "Transformation" 29; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 314-16, 324, 326-7.

82. For example, see Reade to Derby 18 June 1876, Dis.No.500 (pp.332-4) of Turkey No.3 (1876), Inclosure 1 in No.500, Reade to Elliot, Rustchuk, 16 June 1876: "it appears that...the Circassians...are committing atrocities, chiefly amongst the villages near the Balkans,...Not relying on Christian information I endeavored to ascertain from Mussulmans whether...the reports...were true....the Governor-General...said that, although the Circassians had...committed acts of violence,...what I had heard was exaggerated....I am inclined to think that the object...is to diminish the number of Bulgarians as much as possible,...with the apparent connivance of the authorities."; Disraeli to Derby 7 Aug. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 46, Seton-Watson, 56-7; 3 Hansard, W.E. Forster, Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): col. 1100.

83. 3 Hansard, Robert Bourke, Commons, vol. 231 (7 Aug. 1876): col. 737.

84. The Hon. T.C. Bruce was the Conservative MP for Portsmouth and Chairman of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, see 3 Hansard, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 126, 145; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 364; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 95.

85. Hanbury was Conservative MP for Tamworth, see 3 Hansard, R.W. Hanbury, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 139-140, 141, 142.

86. 3 Hansard, W. Forsyth, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 146, 149-50; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 20.

87. 3 Hansard, W. Forsyth, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 149.

88. 3 Hansard, W. Forsyth, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 150.

89. 3 Hansard, Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, M.P. for Calne, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 167.

90. 3 Hansard, Fitzmaurice, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 166.

91. Fitzmaurice, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 168; Gladstone, 180.

92. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 183-5; see also col. 193; Gladstone to Granville, 26 July 1876, in Agatha Ramm, The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-1886, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 2, 488, no. 1048; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 54-6; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 95; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 366-7.

93. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 194.

94. 3 Hansard, Stratheden, House of Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 83.

95. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 365.

96. 3 Hansard, Lord Stratheden, Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 76-8.
97. 3 Hansard, Lord Stratheden, Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 81.
98. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 95-6; Montagu, Foreign Policy:..., 305, compare with 316, 326.
99. Gladstone's answer to the Turkish problem was conservative enough: Turkish suzerainty over administratively autonomous provinces. This position he formulated early in the crisis and never wavered from it, an indication of his commitment to maintaining, if possible, the territorial integrity of Turkey. See H.C.G. Mathew, ...Gladstone Diaries, IX, xxxiv; see also Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 367: "It is in the direction of free local government and in that direction alone that we can seek a remedy for the present disorder....I am not ashamed to say that I desire the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire. I do not see how, if that is broken up, we can avoid very serious difficulties and dangers."
100. Rossi, "Transformation...", 30-1; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 50-2; Disraeli, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 202, 215; Thompson, I, 367.
101. 3 Hansard, Disraeli, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 207.
102. 3 Hansard, Disraeli, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 204-5.
103. 3 Hansard, Lord Derby, House of Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 94.
104. 3 Hansard, Lord Stratheden, Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 111-12.
105. 3 Hansard, Lord Stratheden, Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 112-13.
106. Gladstone to Granville, House of Commons, 27 July 1876, in Ramm, ...Political Correspondence..., II, 489.
107. 3 Hansard, Evelyn Ashley, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1079-80; Sir William Harcourt, col. 1125; Robert Bourke, col. 1108; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 57; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 56.
108. The most critical speeches came from A.J. Mundella, George Anderson, P.A. Taylor and Jacob Bright.
109. 3 Hansard, A.J. Mundella, Commons, vol. 231 (7 August 1876): col. 730.
110. 3 Hansard, Evelyn Ashley, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): col. 1079; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 56-7.

111. Neither Seton-Watson nor Millman accepted Sir Walter Baring's claim of impartiality. The former found him too pro-Turkish, while the latter declares him to be anti-Turkish, see Seton-Watson, 60; Millman, 149, 157, 514 n.; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 54.

112. Bourke to Derby, 25 Aug. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 166-7; 3 Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 231 (7 August 1876): col. 741; Shannon explains the reason for Disraeli's silence was his conviction that the final word on the atrocities had been spoken on the 31st, see ...Bulgarian Agitation, 54.

113. 3 Hansard, Robert Bourke, House of Commons, vol. 231 (7 Aug. 1876): cols. 737, 742; (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1108, 1109, 1118.

114. Robert Bourke, Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1110-12, 1114-16.

115. Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 46, Disraeli to Derby, 7 Aug. 1876; see also 3 Hansard, Sir William Harcourt, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1126, 1127: "If there ever was a spectacle of diplomatic impotence and administrative incapacity, it was that which was exhibited in the Papers which were now [before]...the House....[They] were a monument of diplomatic incapacity,"; Seton-Watson, 56-7.

116. Derby to Elliot 28 June 1876, Dis.No.501 of Turkey No.3 (1876): "On the 26th instant the Duke of Argyll asked me in the House of Lords whether [H.M.] Government had received from your Excellency any confirmation of the statement which appeared in the Daily News of the 23rd instant, and which gave an account of alleged atrocities upon Christians committed partly by Bashi-Bazouks and partly by Turkish regular troops in Bulgaria. I enclose a copy of the statement to which the Duke of Argyll referred, and I have to request your Excellency to inquire and to furnish me with such information as you can obtain with regard to the truth of that statement."

117. See 3 Hansard, Forsyth, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1092-4, W.E. Forster, cols. 1099, 1104; Sir William Harcourt, cols. 1127-35.

118. 3 Hansard, Evelyn Ashley, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1079-80; Sir William Harcourt, col. 1125; Robert Bourke, col. 1108; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 57; Seton-Watson, Eastern Question, 56.

119. Disraeli, Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1138-43, 1145-7.

120. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 25 Sept. 1876, quoted in Swartz, ...Foreign Policy..., 46; Disraeli to Derby 4 Sept. and 3 Nov., same to Sir Stafford Northcote 11 Sept., same to Salisbury 26 Sept. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 53, 89, 61, 72; Disraeli to Lady Bradford, Tel., 12 Sept. 1876, in Zetland, ...Disraeli, II, 74; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 9-10; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 98, 99.

121. W.E. Forster, A.J. Mundella and Evelyn Ashley are important exceptions to the general ignorance which prevailed in the Liberal Party, these men were kept fairly well informed of the situation through private correspondence with various European and American residents in Istanbul and the Balkans, see Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 57; 3 Hansard, Evelyn Ashley, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1081-2, 1086.

122. Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 28-9.

123. Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 34-5; Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 26-7.

124. Gladstone to Granville 26 July 1876, in Ramm, ...Political Correspondence..., II, 488; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy, 31: Granville and Hartington were "generally in agreement with the government's diplomatic objectives." And spoke out in opposition only "when pressed to do so by their own followers and in order to maintain control over them."; Rossi, "Transformation...", 30; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 53, 95.

Chapter 2: The Eastern Question: Enduring Themes In A Recurrent Controversy

The Moral State: A Question of Identity

125. Sir Robert Joseph Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, I, (London: 1854), in The Law Library (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, 1854; reprint, Erwin C. Surrency, ed., microfilm edition, New York: Transmedia (Oceana) Publishing Co., 1974), 47, 48, 56; W.E. Gladstone, The State in its Relations with the Church, I, 'The Moral Office of the State, and the Conscience Implied Thereby' Sects. 68-70, p.86: "the State is properly and according to its nature, moral."

126. Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 23-4; Henry Sidgwick, Elements of Politics (London: MacMillan, 1919), 298-300.

127. J.O. Johnston, Life and Letters of Henry Parry Liddon (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), 228; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 24.

128. Henry Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics, 299.

129. W.E. Gladstone, The State in its Relations with the Church, vol. I, 'The Moral Office of the State, and the Conscience Implied Thereby' Sects. 68-70, pp.86-7, 'The Idea of State Duty, or Conscience in the State, Sustained by Language and the General Sentiment' Sect. 72, p.90, 'State Action Transcends the Individual Action of Governors' Sect. 73, p.91.

130. Pall Mall Gazette, "The Competition of Barbarism", 17 Oct. 1876 and George Howell, Contemporary Review, Oct. 1876, in Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 79, 85-6;

Disraeli also acknowledged the popularity of such views in his Aylesbury speech of 20 September 1876, see Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 19-20.

131. John Bright, vol. 231 (7 Aug. 1876): col. 734; A.J. Mundella, cols. 729-30.

132. 3 Hansard, A.J. Mundella, Commons, vol. 231 (7 August 1876): col. 729.

133. 3 Hansard, Edward Jenkins, Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1120, 1123; W.E. Forster, Commons, vol. 230 (10 July 1876): col. 1184; Gladstone, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 188; see also A.J. Mundella, Commons, vol. 231 (7 Aug. 1876): col. 730; Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 50.

134. 3 Hansard, Baillie Cochrane, Commons, vol. 231 (7 Aug. 1876): cols. 730-1; P.A. Taylor, col. 732. Conversely the prominent Liberal-Radical, A.J. Mundella, complained of a "mystery-mongering Foreign Office [which] never brought out the truth unless the Press had brought it straight to them long before." See Mundella, Commons, vol. 231 (7 Aug. 1876): col. 729; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 325; Times, 8 Aug.; MacGahan wished to know on what authority Derby could claim that Christians and Moslems were equally guilty of atrocities since there were no British agents in the areas of massacre until the arrival of Baring in the last week of July. Baring saw only one burnt Turkish village and mosque, MacGahan and Schuyler saw none, see Seton-Watson, 58.

135. 3 Hansard, Gathorne Hardy, House of Commons, vol. 233 (13 April 1877): col. 1101; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 85-6.

136. 3 Hansard, Gathorne Hardy, Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): col. 498.

137. 3 Hansard, W.E. Forster, Commons, vol. 230 (10 July 1876): col. 1183; Edward Jenkins, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1120, 1123, Gladstone cols. 180-1; see also W. Forsyth, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 146, and P.A. Taylor (7 August 1876): col. 732.

138. G.C. Thompson made a similar observation: "in the mouth of the Jurist or Statesman the words 'Europe' and 'Christendom,' if not absolutely synonymous, express but slightly differing aspects of the same fact."--...Public Opinion, I, 76.

139. 3 Hansard, Evelyn Ashley, House of Commons, vol. 231 (11 August 1876): col. 1084 and Sir William Harcourt, col. 1130; Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 50.

140. This was very similar to the sentiment manifest by the Hellenists of the 1820's, who protested the injustice of continued Greek subjugation to Turkey. Thompson refers to this quasi-historical sentimental concern for European subject races, as "Historic Instinct", see ...Public Opinion, I, 75.

141. Just as the image of Christendom is fundamental to the notion of the "Crusading Spirit", so the image of Europe, heir to Graeco-Roman civilisation, is fundamental to the anti-Turkists' sentimental historicism, see Thompson, I, 76.

142. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 76-7, 84.

143. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 90.

144. 3 Hansard, W.E. Forster, Commons, vol. 231 (11 Aug. 1876): cols. 1105-6.

145. For this reason, Gladstone thought the Moslem population in the Balkan provinces were better off under Christian governments. An example of the feasibility of such an arrangement, was the Greek island of Euboea where the local gentry were Moslem, and whose lands were worked by Greek peasants, see Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 181, 200.

146. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 169-70, 171; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 32-3.

The Concert of Europe

147. R.T. Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 9, 189; Stojanović, ...The Balkans, 14-15; J.O. Johnston, ...Liddon, 200-4; the sponsor of the conferences, Johann von Döllinger, was an old friend of Gladstone's, see H.C.G. Matthew, The Gladstone Diaries, IX, xxxi-ii.

148. H.C.G. Matthew, The Gladstone Diaries, IX, xxxii.

149. W.E. Gladstone, 16 Aug. 1840, quoted in: Morley, ...Gladstone, I, 182; M.R.D. Foot and H.C.G. Matthew, eds. The Gladstone Diaries, (Oxford, 1968, 1975), III, 53; M.R. Temmel, "Gladstone's Resignation of the Liberal Leadership, 1874-1875," Journal of British Studies, 16 (Fall 1976), 159; see also Gladstone Church and State, I, 93: "religion is directly necessary to the right employment of the energies of the State as a State."

150. M.R. Temmel, "Gladstone's Resignation of the Liberal Leadership, 1874-1875," Journal of British Studies, 16 (Fall 1976), 159-60; Morley, Gladstone, I, 323, 383; H.C.G. Matthew's, Introduction to The Gladstone Diaries, III, pp. xxv, xxix, xxxii-xxxiii, and 106, 336, 676 (9 May 1841; 29 Dec. 1843; 16 Dec. 1847).

151. M.R. Temmel, "Gladstone's Resignation of the Liberal Leadership, 1874-1875," Journal of British Studies, 16 (Fall 1976), 160.

152. Gladstone to Granville, 29 Aug. 1876, in Ramm, Gladstone and Granville, I, 3; see also Rossi, "Transformation", 31.

153. Allen Warren, "'The Return of Ulysses': Gladstone Liberalism and Late Victorian Politics," Parliamentary History, 9, pt. 1 (1990), 189. Gladstone had first explained his idea of religious nationality in his book, The State in its Relations with the Church, (4 eds. 1838-41), see also H.C.G. Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, IX, xxxviii, xl.

154. Sir Robert Joseph Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, I, (London: 1854), in The Law Library, (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, 1854), (New York: Transmedia (Oceana) Publishing Co., microfilm edition, 1974), Erwin C. Surrency, ed., v, 48, 56, 86, 91-2; see also H.C.G. Matthew, IX, xxxviii.

155. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 95; Deryck Schreuder, "Gladstone and the Conscience of the State," in The Conscience of the Victorian State, ed. Peter Marsh (Syracuse University Press: 1979), 97; H.C.G. Matthew, The Gladstone Diaries, IX, 41; Allen Warren, "'The Return of Ulysses': Gladstone, Liberalism and Late Victorian Politics," Parliamentary History, 9, pt. 1 (1990), 189.

156. F.W. Newman, "Cause and Objects of the Crimean War," Fraser's, Oct. 1876, 535, 536, quoted in Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 95.

157. Gladstone aired these convictions, anonymously, in "Germany, France, and England", Edinburgh Review (Oct. 1870), 592-3; see also H.C.G. Matthew, ed. The Gladstone Diaries, VII, xl; Deryck Schreuder, "Gladstone and Italian unification, 1848-70: the making of a Liberal?" in English Historical Review, vol. 85, 477.

158. Deryck Schreuder, "Gladstone as 'Troublemaker': Liberal Foreign Policy and the German Annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 1870-1871," in Journal of British Studies, 17, No.2 (Spring, 1978), 119, 129, 134. Schreuder refers to the Gladstonian ideal of foreign policy as, "a deployment of moral capital rather than physical power"(134); Deryck Schreuder, "Gladstone and Italian unification, 1848-70: the making of a Liberal?" in English Historical Review, vol. 85 (1970), 489.

159. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 94.

160. Speech at Keighly, 3 Nov. 1876, quoted in Thompson, I, 95.

161. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 194; see also H.C.G. Matthew, The Gladstone Diaries, IX, xxxiv.

162. Arthur Tilney Bassett, Gladstone to his Wife (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1936), 10 Oct. 1880, 233; see also Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy... (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1966), 410; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 89.

163. Buckle, ...Disraeli, 95, Disraeli to Derby, 1 Nov. 1876; see also Disraeli-Derby correspondence of 19-20 Nov. pp. 95-6.

164. Peter Marsh, "Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres," Journal of British Studies, 11 (May 1972), 65-6; Onou to wife, 27-8 Dec. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 222 n.47: the Russian Dragoman attributed the phrase, "apostle of early Christianity", to the French Plenipotentiary, Chaudordy.

Prestige, and the Politics of Expediency

165. Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 159-60.

166. Shannon, ...Imperialism, 116-17.

167. Graf Münster to the German Foreign Secretary, von Bülow, 2 April 1878, in Johannes Lepsius, Bartholdy and Thimme, eds., Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinete: 1871--1914, 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927), II, 258: "und kommt es zum Kriege, so wird er ohne bestimmtes Objekt begonnen, bloß um die Machtstellung und das, was allein die französische Sprache mit einem Worte bezeichnend 'prestige' nennt, geführt."

168. Bentley, Politics without Democracy, 224; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 38-9, 40-2, 88; Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 457, Disraeli to Victoria, 7 June 1876.

169. Peter Marsh, "Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres," Journal of British Studies, 11 (May 1972), 64.

170. Bentley, Politics..., 224; see also Richard Shannon, ...Imperialism, 114.

171. Salisbury to Derby 21 Sept., Salisbury to Beaconsfield 23 Sept. 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 84, 85, see also 94-107, 130, 134-5, for Salisbury's views around the time of the Constantinople Conference; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 127-8.

172. Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 133-5 n.1.

173. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 180.

174. 3 Hansard, W. Forsyth, Commons, vol. 231 (11 August 1876): col. 1096.

175. 3 Hansard, A.J. Mundella, Commons, vol. 231 (7 August 1876): col. 730.

Chapter 3: La Danse À Trois: Beaconsfield, Derby and Salisbury...

176. Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 163-4.

177. Andrassy to Novikov, 6 Sept. 1876, in Stojanović, ...Balkans, 100, see also 90, 94, 99; Bismarck to Bülow, 14 Aug. 1876, in Die Große Politik, Doc.228, 32-4; same to same, 14 Aug. 1876, in E.T.S. Dugdale, ed. and trans., Bismarck's Relations With England, 1871-1890, vol. 1 of German Diplomatic Documents: 1871-1914 (1928;

reprint, New York and London: Barnes and Noble Inc., and Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1969), 23-5; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 103-4 n.51; George Hoover Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876--1878 (Cambridge Mass. and London: Harvard University Press and Humphrey Milford, 1941), 155, 157, 168.

178. Derby to Disraeli 31 Aug. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 173 n.26.

179. Derby to Elliot, 11 Sept. 1876, Dis.No.196 of Turkey No.1 (1877), 129; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 107-8; Rupp, ...Russia and Austria, 166 n.46, 167-70, mistakenly argues Derby acknowledged Turkey's right to resume the garrisoning of its old fortresses in Serbia; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 167-8.

180. Andrassy also suspected the Russians of planning military intervention in Turkey. It was for this reason that he opposed Gorchakov's entreaties for a conference, the latter's "ace-in-the-hole" for the purpose of evoking a war." Gorchakov ordered a partial Russian mobilisation in the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, and Charkov on 22 September 1876. See Rupp, ...Russia and Austria, 167-8, 173-6, 184-5; Salisbury to Lady Salisbury, 4 October 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 88; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 69; Derby to Elliot, 5 Oct., Disraeli to Victoria 4 Oct., Cairns to same 7 Oct. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 174, 521-2 n.35, see also 191; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 114-15.

181. Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 64; Bourke to Derby, 25 August 1876, Derby to Disraeli, 8 Sept. 1876, quoted in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 166 n.4, 172 n.24, and 169-72, 453 in general. For Derby's shrewd public denial of complicity in atrocities, see Buckle, VI, 63, which deals with Derby's reply to the Working Men's Peace Association, 11 Sept. 1876, quoted more fully in Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 421. Northcote was similarly receptive to a scheme for punishing Turkish officials involved in the massacres, Disraeli tried to dissuade him: "Don't mix yourself up with punishing Agas and compensation. What ought to be done, will be done."--Disraeli to Northcote, 11 Sept. 1876, Buckle, VI, 62.

182. Derby to Bourke, 3 September 1876, quoted in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 172 n.25, see also 166, 167, 169, 172-3, 174-5, and 188: "Derby's disinclination to fight for Turkey...would have existed without any public clamour at all,"; and Derby's reply to City of London deputation to Foreign Office, 27 Sept. 1876 in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 69, and in Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 426-7; see also Disraeli to Salisbury, 3 Sept., and to Derby, 4 Sept. 1876, in Buckle, VI, 52.

183. Disraeli to Derby, 4 Sept. 1876, same to Salisbury, 6 Feb. 1877, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 52, 114; Seton-Watson, 139; Stojanović, 108-9, 119.

184. Derby to Disraeli, 31 Aug. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 173 n.26; Disraeli to Northcote 2 Sept., same to Salisbury 3 Sept., same to Derby 4 Sept. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 51-2.

185. Derby to Adams 27 May 1876, Dis.No.305 of Turkey No.3 (1876); Derby to Russell 10 June 1876, Dis.No.402 of Turkey No.3 (1876), Disraeli to the Prince of Wales, 29 May 1876, Disraeli to Derby, 29 May 1876, quoted in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 103-4, 503 nn.51-2, see also 105-6, 108, 112; Disraeli to Derby 6 Sept., Derby to City of London deputation to FO, 27 Sept. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 53, 69, see also 63; Thompson, I, 426-7; Seton-Watson, 41, 43, 88.

186. Derby to Bourke, 3 Sept. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 172 n.25, also 166, 167, 169, 172-3, 174-5, and 188: "Derby's disinclination to fight for Turkey...would have existed without any public clamour at all,"; and Derby's reply to City of London deputation to FO, 27 Sept. 1876 in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 69, and in Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 426-7; see also Disraeli to Salisbury 3 Sept., same to Derby 4 Sept. 1876, same to Salisbury 6 Feb. 1877, in Buckle, VI, 52, 114; Seton-Watson, 139; Stojanović, 108-9, 119.

187. Disraeli to Northcote 2 September, same to Salisbury 3 September, same to Derby 4 September, 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 51-2.

188. Private Memorandum by Lord Barrington 23 Oct., Disraeli to Salisbury, 29 Nov. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 83-4, 104, 102; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 119, 124; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 109.

189. Disraeli to Salisbury, 1 Dec. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 105-6: joint occupation "would ensure another Navarino, and probably was so intended." See also Buckle, VI, 98-102; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 208-9, 532-3nn; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 109-10.

190. Barrington Private Memorandum, 23 Oct., Disraeli to Derby 4 Sept. and 4 Nov. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 52, 89, 83; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 167-8; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy..., 47.

191. Disraeli to Derby 17 Oct., 3 and 4 Nov., Disraeli to Salisbury 29 Nov. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 81, 88-9, 103; Derby to Victoria 25 Oct., Victoria to Disraeli, 1-2 Nov. 1876, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 490-1, 493-4; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 199 nn.28-9; Montgelas to Corry, 4 and 5 Nov. 1876, in Stojanović, ...Balkans, 125-7, see also 121, 123.

192. Internal Memorandum by Prince Bismarck, 20 Oct. 1876, in Große Politik, II, 69-72, and in Dugdale, ...Documents, I, 31-4; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 119.

193. Rupp, ...Russia and Austria, 185-6 n10; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 64, 68-9; Disraeli to Derby, 17 Oct., Derby to Ward Hunt 24 Oct. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 81, 100; Derby to Disraeli 29 Oct., same to same 28 Oct. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 192 n.6, 193 n.7, and 191-3 in general; Derby to Victoria, 25 Oct. 1876, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 490-1; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 95, 115, 125.

194. Derby to Disraeli, 31 Aug. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 173 n.26.
195. Andr ssy also suspected the Russians of planning military intervention in Turkey. Thus he opposed Gorchakov's entreaties for a conference, the latter's "'ace-in-the-hole' for the purpose of evoking a war." See Rupp, ...Russia and Austria, 167-8, also 173-6, 184-5; Salisbury to Lady Salisbury, 4 October 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 88; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 69; Derby to Elliot, 5 Oct., Disraeli to Victoria 4 Oct., Cairns to same 7 Oct. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 174, 521-2 n.35, see also 191; Stojanovi , ...Balkans, 114-15; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy..., 46-7.
196. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 175 n.36; Stojanovi , ...Balkans, 117-18.
197. Stojanovi , ...Balkans, 109-10.
198. Derby's Circular to all British Embassies, Proposal for a Conference at Constantinople, Dis.No.873 of Turkey No.1 (1877), 4 Nov. 1876, also in Hertslet, ...Treaty, IV, No.472, 2516, each of the attending Powers was to be represented by two Plenipotentiaries; Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 87, 89; Millman, 175-6, 195, 198; Buchanan to Derby 5 Nov., Beust to Andr ssy 7 Nov. 1876, in Stojanovi , ...Balkans, 120, see also 117-18, 119-20; Dugdale, ...Documents, I, 32, explanatory note.
199. Quoted from p.3 of Cabinet's Instructions to Lord Salisbury, dated: Foreign Office, 20 November 1876. Appears as No.1 (pp.1-10) of Turkey No.2 (1877) "Correspondence Respecting The Conference At Constantinople And The Affairs Of Turkey: 1876-77." Turkey No.2 is found in, Accounts And Papers, State Papers--continued. vol.91 (XCI) Turkey--continued. 1877 Session (8 February - 14 August). See also 3 Hansard, Assheton Cross, House of Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): col. 464.
200. Stojanovi , ...Balkans, 123.
201. Disraeli to Salisbury, 1 Dec. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 106; Disraeli to Victoria, 15 Dec. 1876, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 503-4; "General Instructions", Derby to Salisbury 20 Nov. 1876, Dis.No.1 (p.3) of Turkey No.2 (1877); Gorchakov to Schuvalov 7 Nov. 1876, Dis.No.1053 of Turkey No.1 (1877), also Loftus to Derby, 6 Nov. 1876, quoted in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 199 n.26.
202. Disraeli to Derby 4 Nov., same to same 22 Dec. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 89, 109; M nster to B low, 20 Dec. 1876, in Gro e Politik, II, 120, and in Dugdale, ...Documents, I, 44-5; Disraeli to Victoria 15 Dec., Victoria to Disraeli, 22 Dec., Salisbury to Victoria, 23 Dec. 1876, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 503-4, 505-7; Derby to Salisbury, 22 Dec. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 219 n.37, see also 201-2, 230; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 94-7; Stojanovi , ...Balkans, 121, 133-4, 135; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 262; "Speech of the Emperor of Russia...", Moscow, 10 Nov. 1876, Doc.No.473 in Hertslet, ...Europe by Treaty, 2518-19; 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1876): col. 406.

203. The preliminary Conference lasted from the 11th to the 22nd of December.
204. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, 44.
205. 8 July 1876.
206. Doc.No.265, "Text der österreichisch-russischen Konvention vom 15. Januar 1877" and Doc.No.266, "Text der österreichisch-russischen Convention additionelle vom 15. Januar 1877"(signed 18 March); Grosse Politik, II, 111-15; Seton-Watson, 142-4.
207. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 196-7; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy, 46, 49, 54; Salisbury to Lady Salisbury 4 Oct., same to same 4(?) Nov. 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 89, 91-2.
208. Shannon, ...Imperialism, 131; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy, 31.
209. Disraeli to Salisbury 10 Nov. 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 95.
210. Peter Marsh, "Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres," Journal of British Studies, 11 (May 1972), 68; John Ferris, "Lord Salisbury, Secret Intelligence, and British Policy toward Russia and Central Asia, 1874--1878," Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History, eds. Keith Neilson and B.J.C. McKercher (Westport Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 134-5, 140, 141, 142-3, 144.
211. Salisbury to Carnarvon, 22 December 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 115-16.
212. At the end of the Constantinople Conference, Disraeli again favoured a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary, but by then the secret Convention with Russia was sealed and it was too late, see Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 146; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 190, 197-8 n.22; Salisbury to Lytton 26 Sept. 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 84-5, 89; Salisbury to Disraeli 23 Sept., Disraeli to Salisbury 26 Sept., Disraeli to Derby, 3 Nov. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 70-1, 72, 88.
213. Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, Harvard Historical Studies, no. 38 (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard and Oxford University Presses, 1934), 29-30, 33, 36-7, 38, 41; W.N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement, 1878-1880, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1963), 18-19; Peter Marsh, "Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres," Journal of British Studies, 11 (May 1972), 67; Disraeli to Salisbury, 29 Nov. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 103 and 98-100 in general; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 123-4.
214. Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 70-1, Salisbury to Disraeli, 23 September 1876.

215. The Earl of Derby to the Marquis of Salisbury [Cabinet's Instructions to Salisbury], Foreign Office, 20 November 1876, appears as No.1 (pp.1-10) of Turkey No.2 (1877); Dis.No.78 (p.56) of Turkey No.2 (1876); see also Disraeli to Derby 19 Nov. 1876, Derby to Disraeli 19 Nov., Disraeli to Derby 20 Nov. 1876, in Buckle ...Disraeli, VI, 95, 96; Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, I, 44-5, von Münster to von Bülow, 20 Dec. 1876; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 206-7, 532nn; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 108-9.

216. Salisbury to Derby, 7 Dec. 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 108; Salisbury to Disraeli 11 Dec., Salisbury to Carnarvon 11 Dec. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 212 nn.9-10, see also 208-9; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy..., 70-1; Salisbury to Derby 7 Dec. 1876, Dis.No.55 of Turkey No.2 (1877): "Ignatiev...urged...military occupation, as the only means of...security...against the dangers of the moment [i.e. armed Moslem rising against the Christians];" For likelihood of Moslem rising and further massacres if disarmament were attempted, see the following: Tel.No.57 of Turkey No.2 (1877), 14 Dec. 1876, 7:25 p.m., Salisbury to Derby: "We stated that our Consuls did not believe in the danger [of further atrocities]; whereupon the Ambassadors of each of the four other Powers stated that the reports from their Consuls were in the opposite sense." And Tel.No.59 of Turkey No.2 (1877), 15 Dec. 1876, Salisbury to Derby: "I have seen Blunt and Holmes [British Consuls for Philippopolis and Sarajevo] this morning. Blunt tells me arms are being left behind at Salonica by soldiers moving to the front, he believes for the purpose of arming the Mussulmans. Holmes thinks that Mussulmans would rise if disarmament were attempted. Some kind of disarmament will certainly be pressed in the Conference. Statement therefore made by us in Conference, that our Consuls disbelieve the danger of massacre must be somewhat qualified." See also Dis.No.138 of Turkey No.2 (1877), 26 Dec. 1876, Salisbury to Derby. This relates Salisbury's conversation of the 26th with Abdul Hamid: "He dwelt much upon the indignation that any concession would arouse among his people, and spoke of his own life as being in danger;"

217. "'The question of war or peace will probably turn on this point.'"--Salisbury to Derby, 13 Dec. 1876, quoted in Millman, Eastern Question, 214, 534n.

218. Salisbury to Carnarvon 22 Dec. 1876, and same to Derby 19 Jan. 1877, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 115-16, 124; see also Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 136-7; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 263.

219. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 215 n.25; Algernon Borthwick to Montagu Corry 14 Nov., Disraeli to Corry 15 Nov. 1876, in Swartz, 46-7 nn.102-3.

220. Foreign troops were not to exceed 6,000, see Millman, ...Eastern Question, 218-19; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 133; Peter Marsh, "Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres," Journal of British Studies, 11 (May 1972), 68.

221. Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 137; Derby to Salisbury, 3 Nov. 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 90.

222. Salisbury to Derby 29 Dec. 1876, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 118-19; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 124, 135-6; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 223.

223. Shuvalov to Gorchakov, 15 Sept. 1876, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 521 n.35, and 211-12, 219, 231 for those ministers sympathetic to Salisbury's wish to coerce the Porte, see also 227, 212; Disraeli to Salisbury, Jan. 1877, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 119-20; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 262-3; Stojanović, 130; Seton-Watson, 131-3.

224. Disraeli to Salisbury, 1 Dec. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 105-6 and 98-102 in general; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 208-9, 532-3; Seton-Watson, 109-10.

225. Lee, ...Cyprus..., 34; Buckle, ...Disraeli, 109-112, Disraeli to Derby, 22 & 28 December 1876; Disraeli to Anne Lady Chesterfield, 7 January 1877; see also Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 131; Shannon, ...Bulgarian Agitation, 262-3.

226. Medlicott, ...Congress..., 18-19; Ignatiev to Gorchakov, 22 January 1877, in Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 138: "'As far as I could judge, Lord Salisbury has been converted to the idea of intimate alliance with us for Eastern affairs.'" Lady Gwendolen noted that her Father's suspicions were gradually removed over the next three years with the accumulation of evidence of "Prince Bismarck's genuine anxiety" for peace, see Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 128.

227. Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 129-30, Salisbury to Lytton, 16 February, 2 and 9 March 1877; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 156-7.

228. Disraeli to Salisbury, 29 Nov. 1876, to Lady Bradford, 8 Jan. 1877, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 104, 112-13; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 125.

229. Salisbury to Derby, 19 January 1877, Salisbury to Lytton, 27 April and 6 July 1877, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 124, 142, 154; Montgelas to Beust, 15 Nov. 1876, in Stojanović, ...Balkans, 127; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy, 35.

230. The Protocol was signed by Münster for Germany, Beust for Austria-Hungary, L. D'Harcourt for France, Derby for Gt. Britain, L.F. Menabrea for Italy, and Schuvalov for Russia. See, "Protocol relative to the Affairs of Turkey." London, 31 March 1877. Appears as No.1 of Turkey No.9 (1877). Found in, Accounts And Papers, State Papers--continued. vol.91 (XCI) Turkey--continued. 1877 Session (8 February - 14 August). Turkey No.9 is marked as, #419 handwritten on microcard, of vol.91 (xci) of the Readex Microprint Edition of these Papers. Also in Hertslet, ...Treaty, IV, 2563.

231. Lord Odo Russell felt the Russians intended three objects: "'1st,...to make England responsible for war if we reject the protocol and if we do not, 2nd, to transfer the responsibility from our shoulders on to those of the Porte and 3rd, to obtain the right hitherto denied them by the Treaty of Paris of permanent interference in the internal administration of Turkey.'"--Russell to Derby, 27 March 1877, quoted in Millman, 262.

232. Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 130, 131-2, Salisbury to Lytton, 9 March, Salisbury to Beaconsfield, 12 March 1877; Rupp, ...Russia and Austria, 334-5, 338, 342-3; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 157, 163-4; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 254-6, 262.

233. Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 133-4; Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 129; Beaconsfield to Victoria, 23 March 1877, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 525; Dilke to Hill 13 April 1877, in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 272 n.67, 256-9, 261; Seton-Watson, 157.

234. Rupp, ...Austria and Russia, 336; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 256-8, 261.

235. Disraeli to Lady Bradford 24 March 1877, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 129: "Yesterday was the most important meeting of the Cabinet which has yet been holden, and I trust we shall never hear any more Bathism, Lyddonism (sic), really Gladstonism, within those walls."; Salisbury to Carnarvon, 26 March 1877, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 138-9, 137-9 in general and 134: "The Cabinet would not hear of [Salisbury's] partition [proposal]...the Prime Minister repudiated it as immoral;--a verdict which his colleague reported with a grimly ironic smile." Rupp, ...Russia and Austria, 335, 342-3; Seton-Watson, 156; Millman, 273, 456.

236. Peter Marsh, "Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres," Journal of British Studies, 11 (May 1972), 69; Cecil, ...Salisbury, 122, Lord Salisbury to Lord Carnarvon, 11 Jan. 1877.

237. Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 133-4; Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 129; Beaconsfield to Victoria, 23 March 1877, in Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 525; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 256-9, 261, 273; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 157.

238. Compare Disraeli's Memorandum to the Queen, 13 March with Salisbury's note to Disraeli, 12 March 1877, in Swartz, ...Foreign Policy..., 55 nn.21-2, and Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 131; for the Cabinet controversy over Elliot's reinstatement read Millman, ...Eastern Question, 271.

239. The Russians countered with their own declaration: "If peace with Montenegro is concluded, and the Porte accepts the advice of Europe and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a peace footing, and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in the Protocol, let it send to St. Petersburg a Special Envoy to treat of disarmament, to which His Majesty the Emperor would also on his part consent. If massacres similar to those which have stained Bulgaria with blood take place, this would necessarily put a stop to the measures of demobilisation."--Shuvalov; see Hertslet, ...Treaty, 2566-7; 3 Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 233, (13 April 1877): col. 1090; Thompson, II, 177-9.

240. The Opposition represented Russia's case in Parliament, their views coincided with Gorchakov's--namely, that the British declaration immediately voided the document. See Lord Loftus in conversation with Prince Gorchakov, relayed to Lord Derby by telegram 6 April 1877, quoted in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 263.

'Under Currents of Communication': Parliament's Response to Eastern Policy

241. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 234 (14 May 1877): col. 972.
242. 3 Hansard, George Anderson, House of Commons, vol. 234 (11 May 1877): col. 776; Duke of Argyll, Lords, vol. 232 (20 February 1877): cols. 650, 652; Evelyn Ashley, Commons, vol. 233 (13 April 1877): col. 1126; Thompson, II, 9, 55.
243. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): cols. 472-3, 557 and vol. 234 (14 May 1877): col. 960; Duke of Westminster, House of Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 671; and Duke of Argyll, col. 650. The term, "dualism" was used confidentially by at least one Minister in reference to the vacillation within the Cabinet, see Carnarvon's letter to Salisbury, 9 Sept. 1876, quoted in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 171.
244. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 25 Sept. 1876, quoted in Swartz, ...British Foreign Policy..., 46; Disraeli to Derby 4 Sept. and 3 Nov., same to Sir Stafford Northcote 11 Sept., same to Salisbury 26 Sept. 1876, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, 53, 89, 61, 72.
245. 3 Hansard, Lord Robert Montagu, Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): cols. 504-6. Joseph Chamberlain made the same argument, see Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): col. 451.
246. Salisbury to Lytton 9 March, same to same 4 May, same to Sir S. Northcote 15 Dec., Northcote to Salisbury, 14 Dec. 1877, in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 91, 130, 135, 163-4; see also Carnarvon's letter to Hardy 12 Sept. 1876, quoted in Millman, ...Eastern Question, 171 n.20.
247. Parliament focused on five dispatches in particular: Dis.No.501 of Turkey No.3 (1876), Derby to Elliot 28 June 1876; Dis.No.221 of Turkey No.1 (1877), Elliot to Derby 4 Sept. 1876; Dis.No.159 of Turkey No.1 (1877), Derby to Elliot 5 Sept. 1876; Dis.No.316 of Turkey No.1 (1877), 21 Sept. 1876, Derby to Elliot; Dis.No.324 of Turkey No.1 (1877), Derby to Elliot 21 Sept. 1876.
248. 3 Hansard, Robert Lowe, House of Commons, vol. 234 (8 May 1877): cols. 569-70.
249. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): col. 409.
250. 3 Hansard, Lord Stratheden, Lords, vol. 232 (26 February 1877): col. 985.
251. The treaties relating to Turkey were discussed extensively in the Commons on 16 February 1877 and in the Lords on 26 February. For Hardy's interpretation, see 3 Hansard, Gathorne Hardy, House of Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): cols. 486-499.

252. Firman and the Hatti Humayoun of 1856 relating to judicial, fiscal and administrative reforms in Turkey, see Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 118; and 3 Hansard, Lord Granville, House of Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 87-8.

253. 3 Hansard, Lord Palmerston, Commons, vol. 142 (6 May 1856) cols. 125-6; cited by Lord Granville, Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 90-1; Leonard Courtney, Commons, vol. 232 (16 February 1877): col. 507.

254. Leonard Courtney was a leader writer for The Times. He was a Radical, and Liberal MP for Liskeard, see Rossi, "Transformation", 47.

255. 3 Hansard, Leonard Courtney, Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): col. 507.

256. The term, "co-partner", was used by Hardy in the debate over Britain's treaty engagements initiated by Glasdstone on 16 February, see 3 Hansard, Gathorne Hardy, House of Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): cols. 487, 490.

257. 3 Hansard, Leonard Courtney, Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): col. 508.

258. 3 Hansard, Gathorne Hardy, House of Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): cols. 492, 497; Lord Derby, House of Lords, vol. 232 (26 Feb. 1877): cols. 1006-7.

259. 3 Hansard, Joseph Chamberlain, Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): cols. 451-2; Gladstone, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): cols. 421, 422, 425, and 14 May col. 961; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 184.

260. Cabinet's Instructions to Salisbury, 20 Nov. 1876, despite the first basis for the Conference, namely, "The independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire", the British Government recommended, as "the best security for the maintenance of peace," that the Porte make territorial concession to Montenegro, see pp.1-2. Andrassy's reforms are listed on p.3.

261. 3 Hansard, Duke of Argyll, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 645-7, 648.

262. Doc.No.1 of Turkey No.2 (1877), 3, 7: "The immediate necessity of the situation is to restore tranquility to the disturbed Provinces....this can now only be done by concert with the Powers,...proof, [was] unfortunately wanting, of the determination of the Porte to act energetically without foreign pressure...and it is in vain for the Porte to expect that the Powers will be satisfied with the mere general assurances which have already been so often given, and have proved to be so imperfectly executed." See also 3 Hansard, Duke of Argyll, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 637-8, 655; Seton-Watson, 152-3 and Thompson, I, 160-2.

263. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): col. 405.

264. 3 Hansard, Lord Salisbury, House of Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 692; Lord Beaconsfield, col. 710; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 162.
265. Gathorne Hardy, Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1876): cols. 492, 497.
266. Percy Wyndham, House of Commons, vol. 234 (8 May 1877): col. 534.
267. T.C. Bruce, House of Commons, vol. 234 (14 May 1877): col. 874.
268. Gorchakov had advised this in August 1876, see 3 Hansard, Lord Stratheden, House of Commons, vol. 232 (26 Feb. 1877): cols. 984-5; Rupp, 157.
269. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 195.
270. 3 Hansard, Earl Derby, Lords, vol. 232 (26 February 1877): cols. 1006-7.
271. 3 Hansard, Lord Derby, House of Lords, vol. 234 (14 May 1877): col. 841.
272. 3 Hansard, Derby, Lords, vol. 232 (26 Feb. 1877): col. 1005, 1006; vol. 234 (14 May 1877): col. 841; Courtney, Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1877): col. 510.
273. 3 Hansard, Lord Salisbury, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 691-2.
274. 3 Hansard, Sir William Harcourt, House of Commons, vol. 233 (13 April 1877): col. 1113; Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 134; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 137; Rupp, ...Russia and Austria, 343; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 157.
275. 3 Hansard, Gathorne Hardy, Commons, vol. 232 (16 Feb. 1876): cols. 492, 497; Gladstone, col. 477; Courtney, col. 508; Derby, Lords, vol. 232 (26 Feb. 1877): col. 1007.
276. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 177-81, 183-4, 185, 188, 193, 194; vol. 234 (14 May 1877): col. 967.
277. The 7th, 8th, and 9th Articles of the Treaty of Paris 31 March 1856 are quoted in Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 118.
278. 3 Hansard, Attorney General, Sir John Holker, Commons, vol. 234 (8 May 1877): col. 565; see also Percy Wyndham, col. 534; Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, vol. 142 (6 May 1856): cols. 125-6; cited by Lord Granville, Lords, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): cols. 90-1.
279. 3 Hansard, Lord Beaconsfield, House of Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 720: "I am perfectly ready to found the vindication of our conduct with regard to the Berlin Memorandum upon that broad ground."; Shannon, ...Imperialism, 114-115.

280. 3 Hansard, Beaconsfield, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 713, 714, 715-16; see also Northcote, Commons, vol. 242 (2 August 1878): col. 1099, for a similar argument with regard to the 1869 Conference on Greece.

281. 3 Hansard, Lord Beaconsfield, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 716-17.

282. 3 Hansard, Lord Beaconsfield, House of Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 721-22, 723, 725, 726; Beaconsfield claims to have chosen Salisbury as Plenipotentiary precisely because he was India Secretary: "I selected my noble Friend because he presided over a Department where the considerations of State connected with it,...could not but be of signal service to him in the discharge of the duties which awaited him at Constantinople." (col. 723); Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 154-5.

283. This was also Northcote's position in Commons, who maintained a belief in "Turkey's willingness to reform herself", see 3 Hansard, Sir Stafford Northcote, House of Commons, vol. 232 (8 Feb. 1877): cols. 97, 102, 104; Seton-Watson, 149.

284. 3 Hansard, Lord Stratheden, Lords, vol. 232 (26 Feb. 1877): col. 983.

285. 3 Hansard, Lord Stratheden, Commons, vol. 232 (26 Feb. 1877): cols. 984-5.

286. 3 Hansard, Beaconsfield, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 710-12.

287. 3 Hansard, Disraeli, House of Commons, vol. 231 (31 July 1876): col. 207.

288. 3 Hansard, Beaconsfield, House of Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 726.

289. 3 Hansard, Lord Beaconsfield, Commons, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 712; Disraeli to Derby 29 Jan. 1877, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 117; Millman, 268.

290. 3 Hansard, Lord Salisbury, House of Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 689-90; Assheton Cross, House of Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): col. 470: "I do not like the position of the boy who writes up 'No Popery,' and then runs away. If you mean to go to war, say so. When that issue is put plainly before the country I know what the answer...will be."

291. 3 Hansard, Salisbury, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 691-92, 696.

292. 3 Hansard, Salisbury, House of Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): cols. 690-1.

293. 3 Hansard, Salisbury, House of Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 692.

294. Robert Lowe, Commons, vol. 234 (8 May 1877): cols. 568-9, 572.

295. 3 Hansard, Argyll, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 637 and cols. 640, 641, 643 in general.

296. 3 Hansard, Lowe, Commons, vol. 234 (8 May 1877): cols. 568-9, 572.

297. Formal notice was given on 30 April 1877. In this immediate object Gladstone's initiative was effective, the Postmaster General observed a surge in telegraph revenues due to the amount of telegrams sent in support of Gladstone's resolutions. Some 300 meetings occurred within a two week period in support of the resolutions, see 3 Hansard, Sir Stafford Northcote, House of Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): col. 369 and Gladstone, 7 and 14 May, cols. 402 and 957; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 192-3. Gladstone's resolutions are summarised in Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 181-2 and Rossi, "Transformation...", 51. The full text of the original five can be found in 3 Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 234 (30 April 1877): cols. 101-2:

"1. That this House finds just cause of dissatisfaction and complaint in the conduct of the Ottoman Porte with regard to the Despatch written by the Earl of Derby on the 21st day of September, 1876, and relating to the massacres in Bulgaria.

"2. That, until such conduct shall have been essentially changed, and guarantees on behalf of the subject populations other than the promises or ostensible measures of the Porte shall have been provided, that Government will be deemed by this House to have lost all claim to receive either the material or the moral support of the British Crown."

"3. That, in the midst of the complications which exist and the war which has actually begun, this House earnestly desires the influence of the British Crown in the Counsels of Europe to be employed with a view to the early and effectual development of local liberty and practical self-government in the disturbed Provinces of Turkey, by putting an end to the oppression which they now suffer, without the imposition upon them of any other Foreign Dominion.

"4. That, bearing in mind the wise and honourable policy of this Country in the Protocol of April 1826, and the Treaty of July 1827, with respect to Greece, this House furthermore earnestly desires that the influence of the British Crown may be addressed to promoting the concert of the European Powers in exacting from the Ottoman Porte, by their united authority, such changes in the Government of Turkey as they may deem to be necessary for the purposes of humanity and justice, for effectual defence against intrigue, and for the peace of the world."

"5. That an humble Address, setting forth the prayer of this House according to the tenour of the foregoing Resolutions, be prepared and presented to Her Majesty."

298. Rossi, "Transformation...", 51-4; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy..., 58; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 177.

299. Gladstone received important support from Chamberlain, who arranged a meeting of the Birmingham Liberal Association in support of Gladstone's resolutions. While Liberal unity was shaken to its roots, the Conservatives had closed ranks, Rossi, "Transformation...", 50-6; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 286-7.

300. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, Commons, vol. 234 (7 May 1877): cols. 402, 407.

301. Bentley, Politics without Democracy, 227; Rossi, "Transformation...", 51-4.

302. 3 Hansard, Lord Salisbury, Lords, vol. 232 (20 Feb. 1877): col. 690.

Chapter 4: Orthodoxy or Ambiguity:...British Eastern Policy

303. Shannon, ...Imperialism, 115-16.
304. Cairns wavered between the two groups, sometimes siding with Beaconsfield, sometimes holding aloof. Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 138-40, text and Northcote's memorandum; Stojanović, ...Balkans, 156; Bentley, Politics without Democracy, 228.
305. Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 208-10, 218.
306. Disraeli to Layard, 6 June 1877, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 142-3, Stojanović, 162.
307. Victoria to Beaconsfield 25 June, Beaconsfield to Victoria 28 June 1877, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 147, 149.
308. Beaconsfield to Derby 17 June 1877, in Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 145-6; Salisbury to Lytton 15 June, 25 May 1877, in Cecil ...Salisbury, II, 145-6; Millman, 299.
309. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 307-8; Cecil, Salisbury, II, 144; the strengthening of the Mediterranean garrisons was agreed to at the Cabinet meeting of 11 July 1877, see Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 150, 12 July 1877; Hardy's entry for 12 July 1877, in Nancy E. Johnson, ed., The Diary of Gathorne Hardy, later Lord Cranbrook, 1866--1892: Political Selections (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 329.
310. Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 151-2, Buckle misdates Beaconsfield's letter to Victoria; Beaconsfield to Victoria, 13 and 17 July 1877, in Buckle, ...Victoria, 547, 550, Victoria's journal entry for the 17th states that, "Prepared as he [Beaconsfield] was on Saturday [14 July] for only two resignations, he found that all, excepting Lord J. Manners and Sir M.H. Beach, would have resigned on Lord J. Manners' proposal for calling up the fleet to Constantinople, and on Lord Beaconsfield's advising that, should Russians go there it should be considered a casus belli." Millman, ...Eastern Question, 308-9; Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 216-17.
311. Salisbury was particularly susceptible to Col. Wellesley's intelligence reports, as these became more alarmist during the Russo-Turkish War, i.e. Wellesley's letter to Derby of 11 July which expressed his belief that the Russians would occupy Constantinople, Salisbury's commitment to British neutrality came to depend upon the question of Russian occupation of Istanbul, see John Ferris, "...Salisbury,...Intelligence, and...Policy,..." in Go Spy the Land, 115-6, 121, 129, 139; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 312, 562 n.18; Rupp, 367.

312. The decision to send an Indian brigade to Malta was taken at the Cabinet of 27 March 1878, see Millman, ...Eastern Question 412-13, 415; Seton-Watson, 320, 376.

313. Peter Marsh, "Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres," Journal of British Studies, 11 (May 1972), 70-1.

314. The essential argument against the San Stefano Treaty is summarised in Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 228-9, 231; Temperley and Penson, 363-4; Millman, 439.

315. Disraeli, the war chief, had his moment when on 18 June he ordered a special train to be made ready to carry the British delegation back to Calais should the Russians fail to concede the regarrisoning of Eastern Rumelia by Turkish regulars, see Buckle, ...Disraeli, VI, 322-8, see especially Beaconsfield to Victoria 18/19/20/21 June, and Montagu Cory to Lady Ilchester, 2 July 1878; Seton-Watson, 435-7, 439-40, 447-9.

316. The Congress of Berlin ran from 13 June to 13 July 1877.

317. Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 239, 245-6, 250, 253.

318. Millman, ...Eastern Question, 433-4, 598n; Seton-Watson, 470.

319. In his letter to Sir Henry Elliot of 3 June 1878, Salisbury clearly explains the subsequent Salisbury-Shuvalov Memoranda as the consequence of Austrian duplicity, see Cecil, Salisbury, II, 260-1, see also 250-1, the letter to Elliot contains a full account of the several failed attempts to reach a prior understanding with Andrassy, as for Germany, it was Salisbury's belief that the Emperor William was the sole stumbling block to securing German co-operation, see Salisbury's letter to R.A. Cross, 30 April 1878, 253-4; see also Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 410-11, 429; Millman, 426-8, 432.

320. Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 431-2; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 451.

321. Buckle, ...Victoria, II, 628-9; Cecil, ...Salisbury, II, 271; Salisbury to Layard 24 May 1878, in Seton-Watson, 426-7 nn.1-3; Millman, 438, 440, 445-7.

322. Seton-Watson, ...Eastern Question, 376, 379, 435-6, 439-40; Millman, ...Eastern Question, 434, 437-9, 441, 443, 447, 448-9, 598n, 601n. Salisbury as much admitted to the Cabinet on 1 June the two very different outlooks which he and Beaconsfield brought to the formulation and conduct of British Eastern policy and suggested most inobtrusively that this fact was all the more reason why both of them should attend the Congress. He acknowledged the two very different views inherent in Britain's Eastern policy, but he stressed that there was only one policy. A year before Disraeli had as much admitted that Salisbury's point of view was Gladstonian. This had also been declared in Parliament by Lord Montagu, see 3 Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 232 (16 February 1877): col. 501.

323. 3 Hansard, Lord Hartington, Commons, vol. 242 (29 July 1878): cols. 534-6; Thompson, ...Public Opinion, II, 487-8.

324. 3 Hansard, Gladstone, Commons, vol. 242 (1 Aug. 1878): cols. 672-3: "for many months past we have been unable to discern any danger to the existence of the peace which was re-established at San Stefano, excepting in the opinions, and the warlike preparations, of Her Majesty's Government. From no other quarter has there proceeded any act or indication which appeared seriously to threaten the peace of Europe." See also Thompson, II, 482.

325. 3 Hansard, Lord Hartington, Commons, vol. 242 (29 July 1878): cols. 535-6.

326. Thompson, ...Public Opinion, I, 96-7.

Afghanistan Arouses the Whigs

327. Rossi, "Transformation...", Transactions..., 77-9 86.

328. Rossi, 77-9, 81, 83, 84n.

329. Rossi, 78-9.

330. Rossi, 77-9 86.

331. Rossi, 84-6.

332. Rossi, 89, 91.

333. Rossi, 90-1.

334. Four Conservative MP's voted with the Opposition. It should be noted however that even at this stage Liberal unity was not so great as to prevent nine Liberals from voting with the Government, Joseph Cowen being the most prominent among them, see Rossi, 92-4.

Midlothian

335. See Gladstone's article entitled, "Is the Popular Judgement in Politics More Just Than That of the Higher Orders?", 185-6, 187, 188, his contribution to a "...Symposium" in the July 1878 issue of Nineteenth Century; and Gladstone's Political Speeches In Scotland, November and December 1879, edited by M.R.D. Foot, as Midlothian Speeches, 1879, 56-8.

336. Gladstone, "Is the Popular Judgement in Politics More Just than that of the Higher Orders?" The Nineteenth Century, 187; Ramm, ...Correspondence..., I, xvi-xvii; Ripon Diary 30 Nov., Hartington to Granville 7 Dec. 1879, in Rossi,

"Transformation...", 103 n.76, 105 n.101, see 103-9, 121-4, 127, for final leadership crisis, and 99-102, 119-20 in general; Hartington to Granville, 5 Oct. 1878, same to same 2,3,7 Dec., same to Rosebery 3 Dec. 1879, in Swartz, ...Foreign Policy, 109 n.36, 117 nn.83-4, about Midlothian Swartz notes that, "the appearance of risk was greater than the reality", see 113, also 103, 114-18, 121.

337. M.R.D. Foot, Midlothian Speeches, 13; Swartz, ...Foreign Policy, 114.

338. Swartz, ...Foreign Policy, 119, 121-2, 145-6.

339. Rossi, 128.

340. Rossi, 118, 101.

Conclusion

341. Foot, Midlothian..., 41-2; Rossi, 102.

342. Rossi, 127-8; John Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party: 1857-1868 (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1966), 257-8.

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