

### 3 | Health, Medicine, and Philosophy in the School of Justin Martyr

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#### Introduction

When the philosopher Seneca was forced by Nero to end his life, he chose a method informed by medical knowledge, first having incisions made in his legs and arms so he might bleed to death, and then asking his personal physician Statius Annaeus to give him poison.<sup>1</sup> Other elite Romans in this period found death in similar ways, seeking assistance from physicians if they were suffering from an illness deemed incurable or if they were forced to commit suicide.<sup>2</sup> This common task undertaken by physicians in the Roman empire, however, makes little appearance in the works of its medical writers.<sup>3</sup> Medical assistance in dying was evidently not something that ancient physicians wished to emphasise, in keeping with the general aversion that they had to discussing patients who died in their care.<sup>4</sup> Helping someone die in this way served as a reminder to physicians of the subservient status that their profession often had in the Roman empire, where many physicians, including Seneca's Statius Annaeus, were slaves or freedmen.<sup>5</sup> Philosophers like Seneca, in contrast, prided themselves on helping people prepare themselves for death, in keeping with Socrates' claim that 'those who philosophise correctly practice dying'.<sup>6</sup> Seneca's death, in this sense, encapsulated a basic difference in the popular images of philosophers and physicians in the Roman empire. A philosopher would die with the right state of mind and help others achieve this state, while a physician might simply hasten someone's death. Philosophers therefore cast themselves as something like mental health specialists, whereas physicians were often dismissed as simple craftsmen, concerned only with the bodily health of their patients.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Tacitus, *Ann.* 15.63–64.

<sup>2</sup> See Tacitus, *Ann.* 15.69; Suetonius, *Life of Lucan*; Flemming 2005: 303–6.

<sup>3</sup> For two partial exceptions, both discussing circumstances when medical assistance in dying was inappropriate, see Scribonius Largus, *Compounds* ep. 4–5 and Aretaeus, *Cur. Acut.* 2.5 with Flemming 2005: 311–14.

<sup>4</sup> See Mattern 2008: 92–94 with discussion below. <sup>5</sup> See Nutton 1992: 39.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, *Phaed.* 67e: οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν μελετώσι.

<sup>7</sup> See Nutton 1985: 28.

The contrasting images of philosophers and physicians formed part of the Roman empire's medical marketplace, a term used to describe the competing specialists who offered therapy and treatment in various forms.<sup>8</sup> Physicians and philosophers were among the most prominent members of this marketplace, especially in the second century, when many philosophers claimed for themselves the ability to heal their pupils.<sup>9</sup> The claims they made went beyond the metaphorical, inasmuch as they did offer to pupils advice in the area of regimen, one of the three branches of ancient medicine, alongside surgery and pharmacology.<sup>10</sup> Regimen focused on eating, drinking, sexual activity, bathing, massage, and other areas that might help people preserve and maintain good health.<sup>11</sup> Physicians could claim expertise in these areas, but philosophers focused special attention on appetitive desires, meaning that they were able not only to tell people what to eat or drink but also to help them overcome their urges for excessive consumption.<sup>12</sup> As Brooke Holmes shows, appetitive desires receive little attention in the Hippocratic corpus, making this something of a vulnerable area for physicians, though Galen and others in the Roman empire sought to make up for this lack.<sup>13</sup> As such, Galen and other physicians of his time developed conceptions of health, illness, and treatment that moved beyond the somatic emphasis of earlier physicians, leading them to compete more directly with philosophers as mental health specialists.<sup>14</sup> Health of the body and of the mind consequently were overlapping fields, with a range of specialists offering their own types of expertise to provide treatment. The older disciplinary boundaries between philosophers and physicians were breaking down in the second century, with physicians claiming for themselves the status held by philosophers even as philosophers asserted their expertise in bodily and mental health.

Competition in these areas has significant bearing on the claims that early Christian intellectuals made regarding their expertise in health and medicine. This has been a difficult point in scholarship on early Christians and medicine, which has offered substantially different claims about how much Christianity functioned as a healing religion. A major part of the issue has to do with different approaches to the medical marketplace of the Roman empire, and how Christians related to it. Studies focusing on Christian engagement with medicine as practised by physicians have come

<sup>8</sup> See Israelowich 2015: 30–35. <sup>9</sup> See Trapp 2017: 33–34.

<sup>10</sup> E.g., Musonius Rufus 3.7; 4.2; 16.8, with Celsus, *On Medicine* praef. 9 on the three divisions of medicine.

<sup>11</sup> See Beer 2010; Jouanna 2012. <sup>12</sup> See Holmes 2013b: 19–20.

<sup>13</sup> Holmes 2013b: 22–23. <sup>14</sup> See Boudon-Millot 2013; Gill 2018.

to different conclusions than studies whose focus on health and healing includes exorcism and magic.<sup>15</sup> A missing factor in much of this work has been consideration of how the claims or silences of Christian intellectuals on health and medicine were shaped by the norms of Roman intellectual culture. Christian intellectuals seeking to be taken seriously might not wish to associate themselves closely with physicians, given their lingering reputation as slaves or craftsmen. Similar hesitancy informed how Christian intellectuals might present exorcists and other ritual experts, given the associations that this group had with magic and a consequent lack of legitimacy.<sup>16</sup> The desire for intellectual legitimacy shaped how Christian intellectuals portrayed themselves and their coreligionists, leading them in some instances to emphasise philosophy rather than other areas of intellectual and healing activity. The larger context of Roman intellectual culture and its medical marketplace informs the claims of expertise made by Christian writers about health and medicine.<sup>17</sup>

My aim in this chapter is to explore a range of Christian claims to intellectual expertise in health and medicine by focusing on Justin Martyr and his school. I use the word ‘school’ as shorthand to describe the impact that Justin had on Christian writers in the late second century who were influenced by his works, rather than as a reference to the location in Rome where he may have taught a small group of pupils.<sup>18</sup> As such, the chapter covers Tatian, who was taught by Justin, but also Pseudo-Justin, the unknown author of a Greek work *On the Resurrection* that was subsequently attributed to Justin Martyr.<sup>19</sup> Like Tatian, Pseudo-Justin shows familiarity with Justin’s works, and he also seems to have been active in the late second century, qualifying him as a member of Justin’s ‘school’.<sup>20</sup> These three authors demonstrate some of the choices that Christian intellectuals of this period had in portraying themselves as experts with respect to health, medicine, and philosophy. In the chapter’s first part, I argue that Justin’s self-presentation as a philosopher limited and shaped his claims of expertise in health and medicine. His emphasis on a philosophical approach to death

<sup>15</sup> Contrast Twelftree 2007; Daunton-Fear 2009; and Jefferson 2014 with Ferngren 2009: 1–4 and Temkin 1991: xii.

<sup>16</sup> See Sorensen 2002: 5.

<sup>17</sup> Compare Wendt 2016 on the efforts of Christians to portray themselves as – and compete with – freelance religious experts in the Roman empire.

<sup>18</sup> For Justin’s school, see Pouderon 1998: 239–41; Georges 2012: 75–87; Ulrich 2012: 62–74.

<sup>19</sup> Tatian as Justin’s pupil: Trelenberg 2012: 195–203.

<sup>20</sup> See D’Anna 2001: esp. 282–87. Contrast Heimgartner 2001 for the argument that Pseudo-Justin should be identified with Athenagoras. Petrey (2016: 32 n. 3) reviews competing scholarly claims on all these points.

led him to portray himself and other Christians more like Seneca, rather than like an attending physician who might help people end their lives. In the process, Justin displays a dismissive attitude towards physicians, segregating the health of the body from the health of the mind, and focusing nearly all of his attention on the latter subject. In the chapter's second part, I show that Tatian and Pseudo-Justin engaged more directly than Justin with medicine and bodily health in their works, demonstrating increased awareness of the role that physicians were playing in the intellectual culture of the second century. Tatian and Pseudo-Justin display expertise in the fields of health and medicine even as they reject the status and authority held by physicians. They also emphasise that Christianity provided a better way to good health, especially by following an ascetic form of regimen. Unlike Justin, Pseudo-Justin and Tatian both acknowledge that the health of the body and the health of the mind were overlapping fields, and that intellectuals of all sorts might be concerned with both. The examples of all three authors show that the claims of Christian intellectuals about health and medicine need to be approached in the larger context of the Roman medical marketplace and of the competing claims of physicians and philosophers to present themselves as experts. Justin joined this marketplace almost exclusively as a philosopher unconcerned with physicians and bodily health, while Tatian and Pseudo-Justin demonstrate how the health of the body and that of the mind could be integrated into their self-portraits as Christian intellectuals.

## Death and Christian Philosophy

According to Tertullian, Justin was a 'philosopher and martyr'.<sup>21</sup> These two titles were fundamental to Justin's presentation of himself and of his fellow Christians, something that I have argued at length in an earlier publication.<sup>22</sup> There I compared Justin with some of his non-Christian intellectual contemporaries, showing that he had many things in common with them, particularly in his efforts to promote himself and the Christian philosophical school that he was representing. I here offer an extension and counterpoint to my earlier arguments, focusing on the limited place that bodily health and medicine have in Justin's claims to intellectual expertise. This subject has received limited scholarly attention, although it is something that makes Justin stand out from other philosophers of

<sup>21</sup> Tertullian, *Val.* 5.1.    <sup>22</sup> See Secord 2020: 46–76.

his time, including Epictetus, who told his students that a ‘philosopher’s school is a doctor’s office’.<sup>23</sup> A partial explanation of why Justin says so little about bodily health and medicine may simply be his limited education, a point that he makes about himself in his *Dialogue with Trypho*.<sup>24</sup> But an emphasis on health and medicine also seems to be at odds with his conception of an ideal philosopher. In Justin’s view, people proved themselves to be philosophers by how they faced death, in keeping with the emphasis that Seneca and other philosophers of the Roman empire placed on this point.<sup>25</sup> This focus on the connections between death and philosophy restricted how much bodily health and medicine could enter Justin’s portrayal of the ideal philosopher, given the different roles that physicians and philosophers had traditionally held in matters relating to death. In Justin’s view, philosophers were distinguished by their excellent mental control when they faced death, but the health of their bodies while they were alive was basically irrelevant, as were the physicians who concerned themselves with this subject. In this sense, Justin’s portrait of the ideal Christian philosopher makes no allowance for the increasingly crowded medical marketplace of the Roman empire in his time.

Justin’s scattered references to bodily health and medicine across his extant works reveal how little both topics featured in his self-presentation and claims to expertise. Justin clearly shows his familiarity with earlier Christian stories about miraculous healings, but he mentions these briefly and without any clear connections to his presentation of Christian philosophy. Justin offers little more than a general comparison between Christ and Asclepius, along with the claim that Christ ‘will heal all diseases (θεραπεύσειν πάσας νόσους)’.<sup>26</sup> Justin likewise suggests that Christians could expect to live again after death, when they would be made ‘corruptionless, passionless, and deathless (ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἀπαθείς καὶ ἀθανάτους)’.<sup>27</sup> But Justin offers no explanation of how Christians in his time, much less how he himself, might provide treatment or therapy to others. In this regard, the only reference that Justin makes to Christian healing among his contemporaries is to the activities of exorcists. His concern here, though, seems to be focused on answering the objections that non-Christian readers might have about the legitimacy of exorcism. Marcus Aurelius, one

<sup>23</sup> Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.23.30: ἰατρεῖόν ἐστιν ... τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον. For brief discussions of Justin on healing, see Daunton-Fear 2009: 48–51; Jefferson 2014: 58–63.

<sup>24</sup> See Justin, *Dial.* 2.4–5 with Secord 2020: 63–65. <sup>25</sup> See Edwards 2007: 78–112.

<sup>26</sup> Justin, *1 Apol.* 48.1; cf. 31.7; 54.10. For the comparison between Christ and Asclepius, see *Dial.* 69.3.

<sup>27</sup> Justin, *Dial.* 46.7.

of the addressees of Justin's apologetic works, suggests that he had been taught to put 'no faith in the claims of miracle-workers and sorcerers concerning enchantments and the sending away of demons and such things'.<sup>28</sup> Justin appears to be answering this type of objection when he says that Christian exorcists were able to 'heal [the demon-possessed people who] had not been healed by all the others – exorcists and enchanters and sorcerers'.<sup>29</sup> Justin's claim here is simply to suggest that Christians were not practitioners of magic.<sup>30</sup> But there is no connection between the activities of these unidentified Christian exorcists and Justin himself or the martyred Christian philosophers he describes. The ability of some Christians to heal is disconnected from Justin's image of himself and of the ideal Christian philosopher.

Healing forms no part of Justin's claims to expertise, even when he addresses a situation that many of his contemporaries would have deemed treatable by changes in regimen. This situation is the only reference Justin makes to a physician in his extant works. It concerns a Christian youth who sought medical assistance to help him give up sex completely:

And recently one of us, to persuade you that licentious sex is not a mystery rite for us, delivered a petition in Alexandria to the governor Felix, praying that he would allow a physician to remove his testicles. For, without the authorisation of the governor, the physicians there were saying that it was forbidden to do this. When Felix was not at all willing to subscribe [the petition], the youth remained on his own, satisfied with his own conscience and of those like-minded.<sup>31</sup>

The argumentative point of the story appears in its first sentence, demonstrating that Justin was responding to rumours about Christian sexual rites.<sup>32</sup> Emphasis on this point shapes Justin's treatment of the story, leading him to offer implicit approval of the Christian youth's desire to be castrated. This approval is at odds with how other authors of Justin's time treat pharmacological or surgical methods for libido regulation. Origen

<sup>28</sup> Marcus Aurelius, *Med.* 1.6: τὸ ἀπιστητικὸν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τερατευομένων καὶ γοήτων περὶ ἐπιφθῶν καὶ [περὶ] δαιμόνων ἀποπομπῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λεγομένοις.

<sup>29</sup> *2 Apol.* 5.6: ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἐπορκιστῶν καὶ ἐπαρστῶν καὶ φαρμακευτῶν μὴ ἰαθέντας, ἴασαντο.

<sup>30</sup> See *Dial.* 69.7 for Justin's concern on this point.

<sup>31</sup> Justin, *2 Apol.* 29.2–3: καὶ ἤδη τις τῶν ἡμετέρων – ὑπὲρ τοῦ πείσαι ἡμᾶς ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν μυστήριον ἢ ἀνέδην μίξις – βιβλίδιον ἀνέδωκεν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ Φήλικι ἡγεμονεύοντι ἀξιώων ἐπιτρέψαι ἰατρῶ τούτους διδύμους αὐτοῦ ἀφελεῖν· ἄνευ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἐπιτροπῆς τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπειρήσθαι οἱ ἐκεῖ ἰατροὶ ἔλεγον. καὶ μηδὲ ὅλως βουληθέντος Φήλικος ὑπογράψαι, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μείνας ὁ νεανίσκος ἠρκέσθη τῇ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ὁμογενωμένων συνειδήσει.

<sup>32</sup> For more regarding such rumours, see Justin, *1 Apol.* 3.1.

and Pseudo-Hippolytus both cite with disapproval the example of an Athenian cult official who applied hemlock to his genitals to control his sexual desires.<sup>33</sup> Surgical solutions were likewise not generally approved, something apparent from the Roman legislation that Justin references and from the rumours and innuendo about Origen's alleged self-castration.<sup>34</sup> In his own work, Origen suggested that it was possible for Christians to 'drive all lust from their mind' with prayer, rather than by seeking pharmacological or surgical help.<sup>35</sup> The solution Origen proposed involved regimen and the control of appetitive desires, in keeping with the methods favoured by philosophers. Even Galen, from his perspective as a physician who also claimed to be a philosopher, preferred regimen as a solution for sexual control.<sup>36</sup> When a friend asked for advice about how to give up sex completely, Galen suggested that he should simply 'shut himself off completely from spectacles, and from stories and memories with the potential for rousing him to desire'.<sup>37</sup> The consistent disapproval of pharmacological and surgical solutions for sexual regulation is at odds with Justin's perspective. Justin's Christian youth evidently turned to prayer and his 'own conscience' after his petition was denied. But Justin makes no suggestion that this was what the youth should have done at the outset and he says nothing about the ability of Christian philosophers to help the youth regulate his appetitive sexual desires. Justin seems disinterested in the potential of regimen to regulate appetitive desires and bodily health, giving this no role in his presentation of Christian philosophers.

Justin's focus, instead, is on the mental state Christian philosophers have when they face death, speaking directly to the major concerns of philosophers. How much Justin may have known about the philosophical interests of his imperial addressees is unclear, but he does refer to Marcus Aurelius as a philosopher on multiple occasions.<sup>38</sup> This philosophical focus is especially apparent through the vocabulary and themes that Justin uses in his discussion of the recent deaths by execution of three Christians in Rome.<sup>39</sup> Justin anticipates the objection that these deaths may have been little more than suicide, given that two of the three Christians involved volunteered

<sup>33</sup> See Pseudo-Hippolytus, *Haer.* 5.8.40 and Origen, *Cels.* 7.48, with Secord 2018: 484.

<sup>34</sup> Origen's alleged castration: Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 6.8.1; Epiphanius, *Pan.* 64.3.12–13. Roman legislation against castration: Caner 1997: 398.

<sup>35</sup> Origen, *Cels.* 7.48: πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας αὐτῶν ἐξελάσαντες.

<sup>36</sup> On Galen as a physician and philosopher, see Boudon-Millot 2019.

<sup>37</sup> Galen, *Affected Places* 6.6 (8.451 K): θεαμάτων καὶ διηγῆσεως καὶ μνήμης ἐπετεγείρειν δυναμένης εἰς ἀφροδίσια παντάπασιν εἴργειν ἑαυτόν.

<sup>38</sup> For examples, see *1 Apol.* 1.1; 2.2; *2 Apol.* 2.16. <sup>39</sup> Justin, *2 Apol.* 2.1–20.

the information that led to their deaths.<sup>40</sup> In response, Justin explains that these Christians made the choices that led to their deaths ‘without fear (ἀφόβως)’.<sup>41</sup> Justin adds elsewhere that Christians were ‘fearless towards death and all the other things judged to be frightening’.<sup>42</sup> This lack of fear for death was a sign that Christians were able to master their passions (*pathē*) and that they consequently had the excellent mental control of a philosopher.<sup>43</sup> Justin’s claim that Christians lived a ‘pure and passionless life (καθαρόν καὶ ἀπαθῆ βίον)’ corresponds closely to one of the chief goals that Marcus Aurelius set for himself, ‘not to be overthrown by any passion (τοῦ ὑπὸ μηδενὸς πάθους καταβληθῆναι)’.<sup>44</sup> Following Stoic doctrine, Marcus set himself with the task of regularly contemplating death in order to master his fears of it.<sup>45</sup> Marcus was also interested in the health of his body, as any reader of his correspondence with Fronto will know, but this was not a subject Justin explored in his presentation of the deaths of Christian philosophers.<sup>46</sup> The fearless way in which they approached death was the philosophical point that Justin emphasised.

With death as his focus, Justin seems to have realised that any discussion of the bodily health of his Christian philosophers might have seemed incongruous, and even unintentionally humorous. This impression comes from prevailing attitudes about death, health, and suicide in the Roman empire, especially as depicted in satirical literature. The best demonstration of this comes from Lucian’s account of Peregrinus, the philosopher and charlatan whose self-immolation following the Olympic Games in 165 CE was the final step in his lifelong goal of becoming famous.<sup>47</sup> According to Lucian, Peregrinus still feared death even after he announced his intention to jump into the flames. He demonstrated this by remaining concerned about his bodily health in the days leading up to his suicide, writhing in pain and demanding a drink of water from a physician when he was suffering from a fever.<sup>48</sup> The narrator of Lucian’s story adds a further point about Peregrinus’ continuing focus on bodily health, this time relating to some sort of eye ailment: ‘And I myself saw him not many days ago anointed, so that he might be made to weep by the pungent drug.’<sup>49</sup> As

<sup>40</sup> Justin, *2 Apol.* 2.15–20. <sup>41</sup> Justin, *2 Apol.* 3.1.

<sup>42</sup> Justin, *2 Apol.* 12.1: ἀφόβους πρὸς θάνατον καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα νομιζόμενα φοβερά. Cf. Justin, *1 Apol.* 57.2: ‘We do not fear death (οὐ γὰρ δεδοίκαμεν θάνατον)’.

<sup>43</sup> On *pathē*, see Singer 2018: 383–85. <sup>44</sup> Marcus Aurelius, *Med.* 3.4.3.

<sup>45</sup> See Marcus Aurelius, *Med.* 10.36, with Newman 1989: 1506–12.

<sup>46</sup> Marcus Aurelius, Fronto, and their interest in bodily health: Mazzini 2001 and Freisenbruch 2007.

<sup>47</sup> Peregrinus: Jones 1986: 117–32. <sup>48</sup> Lucian, *Peregr.* 44.

<sup>49</sup> Lucian, *Peregr.* 45: ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτὸς πρὸ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν εἶδον αὐτὸν ἐγκεχρισμένον, ὡς ἀποδακρῦσειε τῷ δριμύει φαρμάκῳ.

Lucian says, with a likely allusion to Christianity, Peregrinus' concern with bodily health under these circumstances was 'the same as if a man about to be put up on the cross should treat the bump on his finger'.<sup>50</sup> The same theme shows up in the *Philogelos*, a late antique jokebook, about a suicidal man from the city of Abdera: 'An Abderite who wanted to hang himself bumped his head when the rope broke. He got a bandage from the doctor, put it on the wound, and went back and hanged himself.'<sup>51</sup> This joke, along with Lucian's stories, suggests that a concern with bodily health was laughable in someone who was about to die, especially by suicide. This fits with a general pattern in ancient sources whereby people with illnesses deemed terminal would seek no further treatment and instead choose suicide.<sup>52</sup> Though Justin insisted that there was nothing suicidal in the choices of his executed Christian philosophers, he must have known that any mention of their bodily health in the moments leading up to their deaths would have seemed irrelevant and potentially even funny. In matters relating to death, it was the philosopher rather than the physician who mattered, and this comes through clearly in Justin's work.

Justin's limited claims to expertise in health and medicine make him stand out among other philosophers of the second century but nonetheless fit well with his presentation of himself and his fellow Christians. He and they were philosophers, something that they proved by how they faced death. Their lack of fear demonstrated their control over their passions, which Justin connected to the mind rather than the body. Any claims about the bodily health of Christian philosophers in the moments leading up to their death were trivial in comparison, and something that might have subjected Justin to criticism and ridicule from observers who viewed Christian martyrdom as akin to suicide. Justin may have lacked the knowledge of health and medicine that some of his better-educated contemporaries had, but he constructed his claims to expertise in such a way that his relative ignorance was irrelevant. If more of Justin's works were extant, we might have a different view of his self-presentation, particularly if we had access to his lost work of heresiology, a genre that often gave Christian authors the chance to offer encyclopaedic displays of erudition.<sup>53</sup> But, as it is, our

<sup>50</sup> Lucian, *Peregr.* 45: ὁμοιον ὡς εἴ τις ἐπὶ σταυρὸν ἀναβήσεται μέλλον τὸ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ πρόσπτιασμα θεραπεύει. For Lucian's knowledge of Christianity, see Bremmer 2007.

<sup>51</sup> *Philogelos* 110: Ἀβδηρίτης ἀπάγξασθαι βουλόμενος καὶ τοῦ σχοινίου διαρραγέντος τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπλήγη. λαβὼν οὖν ἐμπλαστρον παρὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ καὶ θεὶς κατὰ τοῦ τραύματος, ἀπελθὼν πάλιν ἀπήγξατο. On the reputation of Abderites for stupidity, see Tschiedel 1986.

<sup>52</sup> See Gourevitch 1969.

<sup>53</sup> Justin's work of heresiology: *1 Apol.* 26.8 with den Dulk 2018. Encyclopaedic elements in heresiology: Maldonado Rivera 2017.

portrait of Justin derives from works that construct his self-image and expertise in terms of death and philosophy, leaving him little opportunity to discuss bodily health and medicine. For different images of Christian intellectuals, we must turn to Justin's successors, who built from his example while also finding ways to incorporate bodily health and medicine into their self-presentation and claims to expertise.

### Christian Health and the Medical Marketplace

With Justin's successors, we move into a different world of Christian engagement with the Roman empire's medical marketplace. Pseudo-Justin and Tatian display greater erudition than Justin and put this to use in wider-ranging treatments of Greek intellectual culture in the late second century. Both authors shared some of Justin's concern with death, but their works gave them greater latitude to explore topics relating to health and medicine outside of the context of death and persecution. Pseudo-Justin deploys his knowledge of health and medicine to defend the literal reality of bodily resurrection, while Tatian critiques Greek medical practices in his *Against the Greeks*.<sup>54</sup> Tatian's critique has received much attention, with a growing trend of scholars challenging past attempts to minimise the extent of his rejection of medicine.<sup>55</sup> I follow this trend, but my aim here is to take a different approach than past work, shifting attention from Tatian's rejection of medicine to his views on bodily and mental health, subjects that have mostly been ignored even in scholarship discussing the ascetic practices attributed to Tatian by heresiologists.<sup>56</sup> The relative disinterest in this topic reflects a larger tendency to assume that good health was irrelevant or even antithetical to Christian asceticism, an idea that I challenge.<sup>57</sup> My argument is that Tatian's perspective on health depends largely on regimen and on the control of appetitive desires, features that come out more clearly when his work is compared with Pseudo-Justin's. Together, the two authors demonstrate how medical and philosophical approaches to health in the second century impacted emerging forms of Christian asceticism. Tatian and Pseudo-Justin position themselves as rejecting the Greek world, with Tatian offering a substantial critique of the Roman empire's medical marketplace. But the perspectives on health of both authors still have demonstrable similarities to

<sup>54</sup> Tatian's attack: Secord 2020: 77–119. Pseudo-Justin's argument: Petrey 2016: 19–34.

<sup>55</sup> See Crosignani 2017: 188–89 and Crawford 2021 *contra* Temkin 1991: 119–25; Amundsen 1995; Ferngren 2009: 52.

<sup>56</sup> See Hunt 2003: 144–75; Crawford 2016: 556–63. <sup>57</sup> See Secord 2018: 468.

those of their non-Christian contemporaries. An emphasis on good health forms a basic part of how Tatian and Pseudo-Justin attempted to demonstrate their expertise as intellectuals, taking places of their own in the Roman empire's competitive medical marketplace.

Tatian's critique of Greek healing and medicine hinges on the malicious influence he believes that demons have had on humanity.<sup>58</sup> This argument draws from stories of the Greek gods and from Jewish and Christian traditions about fallen angels, with Tatian equating the two groups and calling them demons.<sup>59</sup> Some of the demons, Tatian claims, became 'intemperate and luxurious (ἄσωτοι καὶ λίχνοι)', a suggestion based on how the Greek gods behaved in the works of Homer and other poets.<sup>60</sup> There was consequently much evidence for Tatian to suggest that Zeus and the other demons called gods by the Greeks were 'ruled by the same passions that also rule men'.<sup>61</sup> By this argument, the uncontrolled appetites of the 'frenzied (παραφόρων)' demons provided a negative example for Greeks to emulate, while also ensuring that Greek 'customs border on madness'.<sup>62</sup> Demons made this situation worse by making it seem that they possessed the ability to heal. Tatian cites his teacher Justin for this point, likening demons to bandits who 'kidnap men, then return them to their families for a ransom'.<sup>63</sup> This image underlies Tatian's suggestion that the supposed healing abilities of demons derived only from removing the illnesses that they had themselves caused. The reward that demons received from the people they 'kidnapped' came in the form of laudatory speeches like those offered to Asclepius by Aelius Aristides.<sup>64</sup> Demons apparently formed an appreciative audience for these sorts of speeches. 'When', Tatian explains, '[the demons] have derived enjoyment from the praise, they fly away from the sick, remove the sickness that they have contrived, and return the men to their previous [condition]'.<sup>65</sup> The people who were thus deceived by demons thought that they were healthy and that they had received divine healing. Tatian thereby attempts to undercut one major component of the medical marketplace of his time, arguing that cults of healing were baseless, part of the negative impact that demons had on human health. The

<sup>58</sup> On the epistemological capabilities of demons in relation to divination, see also Chapter 23 by Michael Hanaghan, this volume.

<sup>59</sup> See Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 7 with Crawford 2021. <sup>60</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 12.5.

<sup>61</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 8.2: τοῖς αὐτοῖς πάθειν οἷσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι κρατηθέντες.

<sup>62</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 12.10 and 33.1: ἔθη μανίας ἔχεται πολλῆς.

<sup>63</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 18.6: ζῶγρῆν τινὰς, εἶτα τοὺς αὐτοὺς μισθοῦ τοῖς οἰκειοῖς ἀποκαθιστᾶν.

<sup>64</sup> See Secord 2020: 89–90.

<sup>65</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 18.6: ἐπειδὴν τῶν ἐγκωμίων ἀπολαύσωσιν, ἀποπτάμενοι τῶν καμνόντων, ἦν ἐπραγματεύσαντο νόσον περιγράφοντες, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἀποκαθιστῶσιν.

uncontrolled passions of demons provided a poor basis for Greeks seeking divine help for bodily and mental health.

Tatian attacks another major aspect of the medical marketplace with his critique of Greek philosophers, focusing on how they failed to keep their appetitive desires under control, leading to poor bodily health. Tatian supports this argument with a collection of anecdotes drawn from the biographical traditions of Greek philosophers, emphasising stories that relate to uncontrolled desires and poor health. As such, Tatian includes a story that emphasises Plato's 'gluttony (γαστριμαργίαν)', a character trait that he also identifies in philosophers of his own time.<sup>66</sup> Gluttony features in discussions by Musonius Rufus and Galen, with the former suggesting that it leads to 'harm for the body (βλάβην ... τὴν τοῦ σώματος)' and the latter identifying it as something associated with the 'appetitive function (ἐπιθυμητικῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμεως)' of the soul.<sup>67</sup> Tatian therefore presents Plato as decidedly unphilosophical in his bodily health and self-control. A similar theme appears in Tatian's discussion of Diogenes the Cynic: 'Diogenes, who boasted about his self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκειαν) because of the jar [where he lived], was seized with pain from eating raw octopus and died of an intestinal obstruction because of his lack of self-control'.<sup>68</sup> The doxographer Pseudo-Plutarch, Tatian's contemporary, equated health (ὑγείαν) with 'moderation in diet and self-sufficiency (εὐταξίαν καὶ αὐτάρκειαν)', leading to the obvious conclusion that Diogenes' lack of self-control was unhealthy.<sup>69</sup> A climax to Tatian's stories about the ill health of philosophers comes with his account of the death of Heraclitus: '[Heraclitus] was afflicted with dropsy and practiced medicine as he did philosophy, smearing himself with ox dung. When the filth hardened, it caused cramps over his entire body, and he died in convulsions'.<sup>70</sup> Though this story was told by many other authors, none of them emphasised Heraclitus' medical failings as much as Tatian did.<sup>71</sup> This hints at the expanded interest that philosophers of Tatian's time tended to have in health and regimen. Tatian

<sup>66</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 2.1; 25.1. For the motif of Plato's gluttony, see Riginos 1976: 71 n. 3.

<sup>67</sup> Musonius Rufus 18b.1; Galen, *Affections and Errors* 1.6 (5.27 K).

<sup>68</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 2.1: Διογένης πιθάκης καυχῆματι τὴν αὐτάρκειαν σεμνυόμενος πολυπόδος ὠμοβορίᾳ πάθει συσχεθεὶς εἰλεῶ διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν ἀποτέθηκεν. Compare Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 8.341E; Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 10; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.23 and 6.76; Plutarch, *De esu* 995C–D.

<sup>69</sup> Pseudo-Plutarch, *Plac. philos.* 911B.

<sup>70</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 3.2: ὕδρωπι γὰρ συσχεθεὶς καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ὡς φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτηδεύσας βολβίτοις τε περιπλάσας ἑαυτὸν τῆς κόπρου κρατυνθείσης συνολκᾶς τε τοῦ παντὸς ἀπεργασαμένης σώματος σπασθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν. For the use of ox dung as a remedy for dropsy, see Galen, *Simple Drugs* 10.23 (12.301 K).

<sup>71</sup> For other stories of Heraclitus' death, see Fairweather 1973.

responds to this trend by emphasising the poor self-control of Greek philosophers, challenging their authority in matters relating to health.

Tatian also subjected physicians to criticism, implicating them as contributors in the malevolent efforts of demons against humanity. Tatian's critique includes a straightforward objection to the recognition and praise that physicians might receive: 'Why are you called a benefactor for healing your neighbour?'<sup>72</sup> This question responds to the common Greek suggestion that health was a great benefaction to humanity.<sup>73</sup> Tatian seems to grant that physicians might sometimes be successful in the treatment they provide, but he emphasises that this came at a cost. The argument he offers focuses on pharmacology, an area of medicine that Tatian brands as demonic. Demons, Tatian claims, 'turn people away from the worship of God with their cunning and contrive that they are won over by herbs and roots'.<sup>74</sup> These types of remedies might sometimes work, Tatian acknowledges. But, as Tatian says, 'even if you are healed by drugs (I yield this to you as an excuse), you still ought to offer witness to God'.<sup>75</sup> Tatian's point here seems to be that pharmacological remedies were an inferior method of treatment, fitting with the efforts of demons to divert humanity's 'thoughts, [which are] already inclined to lower regions, so that people are quite unable to rise up on their journey to the heavens'.<sup>76</sup> This was part of a demonic effort to keep people at the level of animals, rather than having them continue upward on their journey to the heavens. Pharmacological remedies contributed to this process because they were accessible even to animals, leading Tatian to a simple question: '[Why] do you heal yourself just as a dog does with grass, a deer with a snake, a hog with river crabs, or a lion with monkeys?'<sup>77</sup> In Tatian's view, pharmacology was not worth the associated costs. It made physicians co-conspirators with the demons they worshipped. Pharmacology might sometimes provide healing, but it also fit with the plans that demons had for humanity.

Faced with a medical marketplace dependent on the false claims of demons, Tatian offered a portrait of Christianity that emphasised its ability

<sup>72</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 18.5: τί δὲ θεραπεύων τὸν πλησίον εὐεργέτης ἀποκαλεῖ;

<sup>73</sup> See Samama 2003: index s.vv. εὐεργεσία, εὐεργετέω, εὐεργέτημα, and εὐεργέτης.

<sup>74</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 17.5: τέχνη γὰρ τῆς θεοσεβείας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους παρατρέπουσι, πόαις αὐτοὺς καὶ ῥίζαις πείθεσθαι παρασκευάζοντες.

<sup>75</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 20.1: Κἂν θεραπεύσῃσθε φαρμάκοις (κατὰ συγγνώμην ἐπιτρέπω σοι), τὴν μαρτυρίαν προσάπτειν σε δεῖ τῷ θεῷ.

<sup>76</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 16.3: τὰς γνώμας αὐτῶν παρατρέπουσι κάτω νενευκυίας, ὅπως μεταρσιούσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἐν οὐρανοῖς πορείαν ἐξαδυνατώσιν.

<sup>77</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 18.4: θεραπεύεις δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὸν ὡσπερ ὁ μὲν κύων διὰ πάσας, ὁ δὲ ἔλαφος δι' ἐχίδνης, ὁ δὲ σῦς διὰ τῶν ἐν ποταμοῖς καρκίνων, ὁ δὲ λέων διὰ τῶν πιθήκων;

to heal. Like Justin, Tatian drew on stories of miraculous healings, presenting these as a way to counter the false claims of demons about their healing powers. Tatian takes up Paul's image of a 'breastplate (θώρακι)' with which Christians are armed, claiming that they had a 'heavenly spirit (πνεύματος ἐπουρανίου)' to protect them against demons.<sup>78</sup> This protection underlies Tatian's description of a miraculous healing: '[Demons] are struck by the power of God and go away in terror, and the sick person is healed'.<sup>79</sup> People should consequently regard as inferior the methods of physicians and the pharmacological substances they use, which Tatian dismisses as 'matter (ὕλη)'. As Tatian says, 'if a person is healed by matter by trusting in it, he will be healed all the more by relying on the power of God'.<sup>80</sup> The same applies to mental health: 'How is it good to attribute to matter and not to God a cure for the mad?'<sup>81</sup> With divine support for both body and mind, Christians can expect to be healthier than Greeks. As Tatian says, Christians have risen 'above the passions (παθῶν ... ἀνώτερος)', a state that Tatian himself claims to have achieved: 'I rise above (ἀνώτερος) every type of disease; grief does not destroy my soul'.<sup>82</sup> The methods of Greek medicine might sometimes work or seem to work, but they were no match for what Christians could achieve with the power of God.

Tatian's view on Christian good health is complicated, however, by the emphasis he places on what is best described as an ascetic mode of regimen.<sup>83</sup> As Tatian surely knew, regimen was a basic component of Greek medicine, alongside pharmacology and surgery. But he neglected to mention this in his attack on Greek medical methods, focusing his attention on pharmacology and ignoring surgery completely, while acting as if control of the appetitive desires was entirely antithetical to Greek customs. This emphasis comes through in the one-sided view that Tatian offers of Greeks and in his consistent effort to claim that he, as a barbarian and a Christian, rejects their lifestyle. As such, Tatian's presentation of Greek regimen serves throughout his work as a sign of what he has repudiated. Based on this principle, Tatian emerges as someone who follows a moderate and restricted diet, objecting

<sup>78</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 16.7 with Eph 6:14 and 1 Thess 5:8. Cf. *Or. Graec.* 15.7.

<sup>79</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 16.8: οἱ λόγῳ θεοῦ δυνάμεως πληττόμενοι δεδισότες ἀπίσιν, καὶ ὁ κάμνων θεραπεύεται.

<sup>80</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 18.1: εἰ γάρ τις ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης θεραπεύεται πιστεύων αὐτῇ, θεραπευθήσεται μᾶλλον αὐτὸς δυνάμει θεοῦ προσανέχων.

<sup>81</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 17.5: πῶς ὕλη καλὸν προσάπτειν τὴν εἰς τοὺς μεμηνότας βοήθειαν καὶ μὴ τῷ θεῷ;

<sup>82</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 11.1: νόσου παντοδαπῆς ἀνώτερος γίνομαι, λύπη μου τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀναλίσκει.

<sup>83</sup> See Trelenberg 2012: 217–18.

to the training undertaken by Greek athletes: 'I saw men weighed down by bodily exercise, carrying around the burden of their flesh'.<sup>84</sup> Tatian also implies that he is a vegetarian, objecting to the carnivorous habits of his Greek addressees: 'You slaughter animals for the purpose of eating their flesh'.<sup>85</sup> Tatian never makes this point, but eating meat was commonly linked in antiquity with an increased sex drive, another subject that he treats in his critique of Greek culture.<sup>86</sup> In this respect, Tatian objects particularly to paederasty, claiming that his philosophical rival Crescens practised it.<sup>87</sup> Tatian says nothing about his own sexual habits, but he observes that 'any trace of licentiousness is kept far away' in Christian gatherings.<sup>88</sup> He adds that Christian habits are marked by 'chastity (σωφρονεῖ)', and that 'all our women are chaste (πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ παρ' ἡμῶν σωφρονοῦσιν)'.<sup>89</sup> The portrait that Tatian offers of himself and other Christians partially aligns with the charges made against him by Irenaeus and other heresiologists, who suggest that he rejected marriage completely and was part of a group that advocated 'abstinence from what is called among them ensouled [flesh]'.<sup>90</sup> But, more significantly for the present argument, Tatian ignores completely any interest in vegetarianism and sexual abstinence among his non-Christian contemporaries.<sup>91</sup> Acknowledging this would have undercut Tatian's consistent emphasis on the poor bodily and mental health of his Greek addressees. He thereby claimed for himself and other Christians exclusive access to an ascetic regimen as a means to maintain health.

Read alongside Tatian, Pseudo-Justin makes more explicit the connections between ascetic regimen and health. This comes out especially in Pseudo-Justin's treatment of sexual abstinence, a point that comes up almost incidentally as part of an attempt to refute objections to the literal resurrection of the body. His unnamed rivals evidently suggested that resurrected human bodies would still possess sexual functions, a point that disturbed them.<sup>92</sup> Pseudo-Justin offers a long response to this objection, citing the examples of people and animals who were incapable or unwilling to have offspring.<sup>93</sup> His argument includes a defence of the claim that sexual activity was unnecessary

<sup>84</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 23.1: Εἶδον ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ τῆς σωμαστικῆς βεβαρημένους καὶ φορτίον τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς κρεῶν περιφέροντας.

<sup>85</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 23.5: θύετε ζῶα διὰ τὴν κρεωφαγίαν.

<sup>86</sup> Meat and increased sex drive: e.g., Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 7.6.33.6.

<sup>87</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 8.2; 19.2; 28.3. <sup>88</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 32.2.

<sup>89</sup> Tatian, *Or. Graec.* 33.1, 5.

<sup>90</sup> Irenaeus, *Haer.* 1.28.1: τῶν λεγομένων παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐμψύχων ἀποχήν.

<sup>91</sup> Vegetarianism: e.g., Seneca, *Ep.* 108. Sexual abstinence: Secord 2018: 469–74.

<sup>92</sup> See Pseudo-Justin, *On the Resurrection* 3.1–2.

<sup>93</sup> See Pseudo-Justin, *On the Resurrection* 3.4–12.

for good health. This comes through in a discussion of the life of Jesus: ‘And when he had been born and was living the life of the flesh (I mean eating, drinking, and wearing clothing), he did not exercise only one feature of fleshly life, that of sexual intercourse’.<sup>94</sup> Pseudo-Justin offers a rationale for this choice: ‘For if the flesh lacked food, drink, and clothing, it would be destroyed. But if it were deprived of lawless sexual intercourse, it would suffer no harm’.<sup>95</sup> The immediate point is to demonstrate that resurrected human bodies could exist without having sex. But Pseudo-Justin’s claim regarding Jesus’ life also serves to validate the healthiness of total sexual abstinence. Medical authors of the second century had much to say on this topic, challenging suggestions in the Hippocratic corpus that sexual activity was necessary for a healthy life.<sup>96</sup> Among these authors, Soranus stands out as a great defender of abstinence, suggesting that ‘sexual intercourse was harmful in its own right’.<sup>97</sup> But other physicians of this period made similar points, hinting that a larger shift was taking place in attitudes towards the role of sexual activity in human health.<sup>98</sup> Pseudo-Justin’s claims about sex fit into this context. By his argument, Christians who gave up sex completely were making a healthy choice, in keeping with a growing emphasis on regimen and the control of appetitive desires among philosophers and physicians.

Pseudo-Justin has more to say about regimen, demonstrating that it was fundamental for his views on a healthy life for Christians. This comes across in a critique of physicians, but a very different type of critique from the one that Tatian offers. Pseudo-Justin’s critique begins with a standard claim made about physicians in the Greco-Roman world, namely that they would abandon patients suffering from conditions deemed incurable.<sup>99</sup> This was something that Pseudo-Justin could have encountered in medical literature, but he was more likely familiar with the theme from its frequent appearance in the rhetorical exercises used in ancient education.<sup>100</sup> Pseudo-Justin contrasts this type of physician with the care that Christians show even for people suffering from incurable conditions: ‘Why do we not imitate physicians, who, when they have a person who is despaired for and cannot

<sup>94</sup> Pseudo-Justin, *On the Resurrection* 3.14: Καὶ γεννηθεὶς δὲ καὶ πολιτευσάμενος τὴν λοιπὴν τῆς σαρκὸς πολιτείαν, λέγω δὴ ἐν τροφαῖς καὶ ποτοῖς καὶ ἐνδύμασι, ταύτην δὲ τὴν διὰ συνουσίας μόνον οὐκ εἰργάσατο.

<sup>95</sup> Pseudo-Justin, *On the Resurrection* 3.15: Τροφῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ἐνδύματος ὑστερουμένη σὰρξ καὶ διαφθαρεὶ ἄν, συνουσίας δὲ στερουμένη ἀνόμου οὐδὲν ὅ τι πάσχει κακόν.

<sup>96</sup> See Pinault 1992: 127–30. <sup>97</sup> Soranus, *Gyn.* 1.32.1: βλαβερὰ κατὰ γένος ἡ συνουσία.

<sup>98</sup> See Secord 2018. <sup>99</sup> See Staden 1990: 75–112; Rosen and Horstmanshoff 2003: 95–114.

<sup>100</sup> See Seneca, *Controv.* 4.5; Lucian, *Abdic.* 2 with Gibson 2013: 538.

be saved, allow him to be a slave to his desires?’<sup>101</sup> This was a watered-down version of Tatian’s suggestion that all Greeks were controlled by their passions and consequently slaves to their desires. But Pseudo-Justin takes his argument in a different direction, choosing not to reject Greek medicine and physicians completely, as Tatian does. Instead, Pseudo-Justin co-opts for Christians the image of a good physician, focusing on the benefit that physicians hold for people with curable conditions. He applies this image to Jesus, in keeping with the practice of some other Christian authors in referring to ‘our physician Jesus Christ’.<sup>102</sup> The language that Pseudo-Justin uses, however, shows that he had a particular type of medicine in mind. The physician Christ, Pseudo-Justin says, ‘rescues us from our desires, and regiments (δισαίτῳ) our flesh according to his own chaste and temperate regimen (δισαίτη)’.<sup>103</sup> According to this image, the physician Christ specialises in regimen, with no hint that he has anything to do with surgery or pharmacology. He helps people to control their appetitive desires, which is a sign that Pseudo-Justin has some awareness of the attention that physicians in the second century were devoting to this area. This represents a significant difference from Tatian, who completely segregated ascetic regimen from the practice of Greek physicians. Pseudo-Justin, in contrast, acknowledges that physicians might help Christians to follow an ascetic regimen, one that evidently involved no sexual activity. Regimen was of basic importance for both Tatian and Pseudo-Justin, but only the latter was willing to treat it as part of the medicine practised by physicians.

Together, Tatian and Pseudo-Justin offer substantially different perspectives on health and medicine than Justin did just decades earlier. While bodily health was an irrelevant consideration for Justin’s portrait of Christian philosophers, it became a fundamental part in the claims to expertise made by Tatian and Pseudo-Justin. In Tatian’s case, bodily and mental health were ways in which Christians could separate themselves from the negative influence of demons on the world. Medicine as practised by physicians was something to be rejected, even if this meant offering a highly selective and partial account of Greek medicine and the emphasis it placed on regimen. For Pseudo-Justin as well, Greek medicine was something to be criticised,

<sup>101</sup> Pseudo-Justin, *On the Resurrection* 10.14: καὶ οὐ μιμούμεθα τοὺς ἰατροὺς, οἵτινες, ἐπειδὴν ἀπεγνωσμένοι ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώπου σώζεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενον, ἐπιτρέπουσιν αὐτῷ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὑπηρετεῖν;

<sup>102</sup> Pseudo-Justin, *On the Resurrection* 10.17: ὁ ἡμέτερος ἰατρός Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός. For discussion of the ‘Christ as Physician’ theme, see See Fichtner 1982: 7.

<sup>103</sup> Pseudo-Justin, *On the Resurrection* 10.17: ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡμῶν ἀπροσπάσας, διαίτῳ τῇ κατ’ αὐτὸν σῶφρονι καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ διαίτη τὴν σάρκα ἡμῶν.

though largely in terms of how physicians treated patients suffering from terminal conditions. Some of Greek medicine's methods, however, were worth saving. Pseudo-Justin co-opted its emphasis on regimen and arguments about the healthiness of total sexual abstinence. For both Tatian and Pseudo-Justin, knowledge of health and medicine was key to their self-presentation as intellectuals. Tatian used this to mark himself off as a Christian and barbarian from the Greek world, while Pseudo-Justin employed it in the context of a debate about bodily resurrection that was of no interest to non-Christians. Despite their differences, Tatian and Pseudo-Justin had both moved far beyond Justin's portrait of Christian philosophers facing death fearlessly with no consideration of bodily health. In different contexts and with different goals, Tatian and Pseudo-Justin show how Christian intellectuals were entering the competitive medical marketplace of the Roman empire rather than simply calling themselves philosophers.

## Conclusion

When early Christian intellectuals engaged with issues relating to bodily and mental health, they were entering territory already occupied with competing specialists and approaches. There were philosophers like Seneca, who displayed considerable expertise in medical subjects and terminology while at the same time claiming more authority than physicians because of their interests in death and appetitive desires.<sup>104</sup> There were also physicians like Galen, who challenged older images of their profession by emphasizing their philosophical expertise and ability to treat conditions of both the body and the mind. We can add many other types of specialists to this list, including athletic trainers, exorcists, and ritual experts of all sorts. All these specialists claimed to offer something unique with respect to bodily or mental health, demonstrating just how crowded the Roman empire's medical marketplace already was. It was also a place with overlap and interactions between different specialists, something especially evident from the makeup of intellectual gatherings depicted in the works of second-century authors.<sup>105</sup> The medical marketplace was a complicated place to navigate, especially for intellectuals who lacked connections to an established philosophical or medical school.

This was the reality for Justin, Tatian, and Pseudo-Justin when they attempted to demonstrate expertise in the fields of bodily and mental

<sup>104</sup> See Nutton 1992: 38–39. <sup>105</sup> See Boulogne 1996: 2764–65; Flemming 2000.

health. As such, all three authors need to be read alongside a larger context of intellectual activity relating to these areas. Justin emerges as a figure attuned to prevailing attitudes about bodily health and death, even as he offers an image of his Christian philosophers that was out of touch with the blurred boundaries between physicians and philosophers in his time. A few decades later, Tatian shows greater awareness of bodily health and medicine, while offering what seems to be a deliberately selective image of Greek physicians, ignoring their interest in regimen as a key factor for bodily health and the control of appetitive desires. Pseudo-Justin, meanwhile, redeploys popular images of physicians almost incidentally within an argument about bodily resurrection, suggesting that Christians were following the best regimen of all under the care of their physician Christ. What emerges across all three authors is a concern to demonstrate the excellent bodily or mental health of Christians and a willingness to engage creatively with prevailing views and arguments about health and medicine. Justin, Tatian, and Pseudo-Justin entered the medical marketplace as Christians, but a full appreciation of their contributions requires engagement with these figures as intellectuals seeking to demonstrate their expertise in a crowded and competitive field.