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No-where or Now-here?

A Matter of Recognition

by

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
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
The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "No-Where or Now-Here? A Matter of Recognition" submitted by Greta Chan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



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Abstract

If two students submitted two in-class essays with similar content and diction, how would the teacher look at the coincidence? An existentialist would say that the coincidence suggests nothing meaningful; phenomena like this happen daily and widely without a reason—this is simply the way of the world. A dialogic critic, on the other hand, would not look at this as coincidence; rather he would wonder whether one student might have been directly influenced by the other and entertain the idea that the writings are a written dialogue between the two authors on the topic. A Freudian thinker would assume that one student had heard the other mentioning the topic but then he had completely forgotten it. The process of writing helped the student recall what he had heard. A Jungian, or archetypal critic, would stand back and say, “wait a minute, let’s check whether a similar content is found in the essays written by students in other classes or even other schools; if we shall see a pattern of thought recurs in the students’ writings, then we would have a strong reason to suspect that the students are collectively exposed to an influential ideology and the coincidences do not happen by chance; they are actually compulsive repetitions.” In my M.A. thesis, I shall explore coincidental contents and images in literatures as a narrative problematic through the perspectives outlined above.

In Chapter One, I shall first introduce Sigmund Freud’s conception of the primal scene, which, as elaborated by Ned Lukacher, is “a new notion of literature” that erases the dichotomy between cause and effect, disclosure and concealment, literal truth and figural lie (See *Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis*, 23). This primal scene notion brought forth by Lukacher is best exemplified in Agatha Christie’s detective fictions. At the end of Christie’s novels, the sleuths retell what happened in the crime

scenes after conducting a series of investigations. The crime scenes in Christie's narratives correspond to what I shall call *the primal scenes in literature*. Using the crime scene in Christie's *Evil Under the Sun* as an example, I shall illustrate in the second part of Chapter One the following paradoxical logics of the primal scene: 1) The primal scene is both the *cause* of fictional events and the *effect* produced by them; 2) The primal scene is both concealed and revealed by the *plot* of the events; and 3) Although the occurrences in narratives are all fiction—a figural lie—the primal scene is a literal truth produced by *logical deductions*. The primal scene is a fiction only because the occurrences in narratives are fictions in the first place.

In Chapter Two, I shall interpret William Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily" as the primal scene of Nathaniel Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid." The two short stories display a great extent of overlap and critics such as Daniel Barnes think that Faulkner might have read Hawthorne's tale before he wrote "A Rose for Emily." In my discussion of the intertextuality between Faulkner and Hawthorne, I shall challenge the traditional view of causality—that a cause must precede its effects—by postulating the hypothesis of a deferred origin.

In Chapter Three, I shall situate myself in the position of an archetypal critic and reevaluate the intertextuality between Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily" and a variety of literary texts written in both the modern and medieval time. The comparison aims to provide evidence in support of Carl G. Jung's argument that coincidences in literatures are meaningful in the way they mirror the psychological realities common to all humans.

For the goldfish in a hidden fish-tank and
the House Sparrow living in the rafters of Superstore.

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Introduction

Memories produce psychological meanings in the same way letters produce words. To recognize a word in a sequence of letters, the most basic criterion is to know the word. Look at the following arrangement:

DINGALOONYFELLUPONTHEGROUNDTHEMANINRAGSRAISEDHISHEAD

To decode the message contained in this sequence of letters, we need first to insert breaks into the sequence so as to make the words we *know* stand out from their mosaic background. If we put a space, for example, between the fourth and fifth last letters, i.e. between S and H, we will *recognize* the last word of the sequence as “HEAD.” Using the same technique, we see the word immediately before “HEAD” is either “IS” or “HIS.” To determine which word will better articulate with the word “HEAD” to produce an overall meaning, we need to put some more spaces in the sequence and to “cut” more words from the continuum of letters.

The above practice allegorizes the way in which psychological meanings are produced by inserting breaks into the linearity of memories. But the difference between the psychological and linguistic models is that we have very limited knowledge about a human being’s psychological conditions. Usually these conditions are experienced in dreams; however, owing to distortion of realities in the dream context, sometimes we have difficulty in recognizing the psychological meanings carried forward by the images in dreams.

Both Sigmund Freud and Carl G. Jung see dreaming as a form of recollecting the past. However, in this so-called “unconscious form of recollection,” layers of images are packed one on top of another. To disentangle the images, as I have highlighted above, we need to break the continuum of a big image into smaller units. This is no easy task. Consider the following example: I repetitively dreamed of a hidden fish-tank in my house. In the tank, there were some goldfish. The water was extremely dirty and the fish had not been fed for a long time because nobody in the house knew their existence. Yet the fish did not die. My response to this discovery *in the dream* was “*how* could I not know the presence of these fish?” rather than “*why* didn’t the fish die?” The dream reveals a lot of unconscious messages, depending on how the images are grouped. The goldfish alone may symbolize something; but *a number of goldfish* might mean something else. Perhaps the *number* of the fish is of no significance in the dream, I might see “starving goldfish in a fish-tank” as one symbol and yet this image might be less significant than the image of “a hidden fish-tank in a house.” The objective of dream analysis is to find the *origin* of these dream-images; and, I do not know what the images in the dream symbolize if I fail to recognize any real-life occurrence in the dream. This is not my case, for I knew exactly “where” the fish came from. Some fifteen years ago, I kept a tank of goldfish in my house. I gave a name to each fish and watched their habits daily. I wrote an article about the fish and the article was published in the school’s anniversary report. Shortly after the article was published, my whole family had a vacation in France and the house was looked after by a domestic servant. When I came home, I was shocked—only three goldfish were left in the tank. I could never know the reason for the deaths of the other fish and nobody in the house took this seriously. The

next day, my mother bought some new fish to replace the dead ones but I had lost my passion for fish. The remaining fish died one by one and when the last one was gone, we kept no pets up to the present day. When I lost my fish, I showed no anger, no tears, no emotions; I let go of the event just like the other members of the family did.

When I began to dream of the goldfish in the recent years, I knew immediately where they came from. The fish symbolize nothing; they are literal. I *recognized* them even in the dreams. The recognition brings back the traumatic event; or perhaps in this case it is not the event that is traumatic but the aftermath of the event—a prolonged suppression of emotions that delays a full understanding of the event. In the dream, I felt what I should have felt in the first place when the incident occurred. The emotions returned belatedly and unconsciously in the dreams because they had not been fully experienced or fully expressed at the right time. This origin of the affects returned and kept returning at the moments I recognized the fish in the dreams. Cathy Caruth, the editor of *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, explains my psychological condition in her introduction to Part I of the book:

While the precise definition of post-traumatic stress disorder is contested, most descriptions generally agree that there is a response, sometimes delayed, to an overwhelming event or events, which takes the form of repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts or behaviors stemming from the event, along with numbing that may have begun during or after the experience...The pathology consists, rather, solely in the *structure of its experience* or reception: the event is not assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in its repeated *possession* of the one who experiences it...modern analysts as well [as Freud] have remarked on the surprising *literality* and nonsymbolic nature of traumatic dreams and flashbacks, which resist cure to the extent that they remain, precisely, literal. It is this literality and its insistent return which thus constitutes trauma and points toward its enigmatic core; the delay or incompleteness in knowing, or even in seeing, an overwhelming occurrence that then remains, in its insistent return, absolutely *true* to the event. It is indeed this truth of traumatic experience that forms the center of its pathology or symptoms;

it is not a pathology, that is, of falsehood or displacement of meaning, but of history itself. (5)

The “enigmatic core” of my trauma is my “incompletion in knowing” what I had lost together with the fish. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud observes that when someone loses a loved object, the “object-loss [is] transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification [with the lost object]” (586). What Freud means in this description is a split of personality in mourning. In the case of trauma, this lost personality returns in “the form of repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts or behaviors.” Combining the observations of Caruth and Freud, both the fish and the mood of uncertainty brought forth by the fish—how could I *not* know the presence of these fish?—are my literal flashbacks; they symbolize nothing; they are what they were. The uncertain feeling *in the dream* describes exactly what I felt fifteen years ago. “How could I not know that the fish were starving and dying when I was in France?” Also, after losing some of my favourite fish, I became indifferent to the remaining ones. Yet they did not die immediately; they went on living *in the house*. It is “absolutely *true* to the event” that I did not see the tank of fish—for now I could recall nothing about those fish that were bought to replace the lost ones. There is no symbolism in the dreams—every occurrence is literal.

It is crucial to note that Freud’s methodology of dream analysis deviates greatly from the trauma theories put forth by Caruth, a contemporary critic. The Freudian model of dream analysis emphasizes the symbolic nature of dream images while contemporary trauma theorists foreground the *return* of an enigmatic event, usually in its literal form. In 1914, the Wolf Man consulted Freud about his obsessional thoughts. Among all the

details provided by the Wolf Man, Freud paid exceptional attention to a dream which the Wolf Man had at the age of four. In the dream, the Wolf Man saw six or seven white wolves sitting on a walnut tree before his window. The Wolf Man was so terrified by the wolves that he woke up screaming. Other occasions on which the wolf was mentioned by the Wolf Man include: 1) a fairy-tale illustration showing a wolf in an up-right posture; 2) a fairy tale about a tailor and a tailless wolf. Although Freud did take into account the wolves in the illustration and the fairy tale when he investigated the case, he *did not* think that these wolves were the *absolute* origin of the Wolf Man's dream. The most controversial, and yet the most revolutionary part of Freud's thesis about the Wolf Man's disorder is his assumption of the existence of a totally unconscious event from which all of the Wolf Man's obsessional thoughts have come. In other words, the wolves in the Wolf Man's dream are not a literal flashback to the frightening wolf story or the fairy-tale illustration that he remembers consciously, rather, it is his *unconscious* interpretation of the wolf image in the dream that gives rise to his fear. Freud calls this *constructed* and *unconscious* origin of an infantile neurosis the "primal scene" in "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (i.e. the Wolf Man's Case History).

When used in its original context, the primal scene refers to the scene of a sexual intercourse that the Wolf Man witnessed at a very early stage of life. The significance of the primal scene, as elaborated by literary critics like Peter Brooks and Ned Lukacher, is its paradoxical relation to the patient's symptomology—that it is both the cause and effect of his neurosis. In Brooks's and Lukacher's discussions of the practical aspect of Freudianism in literary criticism, both realize that the *constructed* nature of the primal scene has problematized the writing of history. Brooks observes, in *Reading for the Plot:*

Design And Intention in Narrative, that “in the place of a primal scene we would have a primal phantasy, operating *as* event by deferred action” (276). Brooks’s point is to illustrate the fact that the traumatizing event in the primal scene is *not* a recollection of the Wolf Man. Therefore, the whole issue of traumatization is turned upside down: the patient was *not* traumatized by something he knew and remembered in the past but paradoxically by a present event awaiting recognition. When discussing the etiology of narrative events in the Wolf Man’s Case History, Brooks comments that the primal scene is “the origin of all origins”—the fiction that gives rise to all fictions.

Brooks’s analysis of Freud’s narrativity has inevitably turned the Wolf Man’s infantile *history* into a fiction. As a matter of fact, postmodern critics like Brooks and Lukacher give Freud’s article the credit for being a common ground of historical writings and narratives. In the chapter entitled “The Fiction of the Wolf Man,” Brooks observes that the plot of Freud’s narrative encounters “a tension between spatial and temporal form” (272). This means the structure of the case history is neither chronological nor thematical. It is, as the modernists put it, “a stream of consciousness,” or in Freud’s own language, a series of “free associations” reflecting Freud’s own unconsciousness.

In Chapter One, I shall psychoanalyze Freud by employing the technique Brooks develops in *Reading for the Plot*. First, I shall raise the questions: what could have inspired Freud to think that the Wolf Man is traumatized by a scene of sexual intercourse between his parents? Did Freud *truly* investigate the case and come up with such a conclusion or did he cast the shadows of some of his previous patients onto the Wolf Man and approach his ailment in terms of those of the others? In other words, I shall find the primal scene that gives rise to Freud’s creation of *the* primal scene in the Wolf Man’s

Case History. Then, I shall reread the Case History with the primal scene placed at the beginning of the text (originally it is the “climax” near the end of the plot). My objective is to prove that the motifs of a narrative are manipulated by its plots. By altering the sequence of Freud’s narrative, I am able to shift Freud’s subject of analysis in the case history from the patient (the Wolf Man) to the analyst (Freud himself).

To further explore the *literary* notion of the primal scene, I shall compare the structure of “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis” to Agatha Christie’s *Evil Under the Sun*. The areas of comparison include 1) the techniques of narration—both the structures of detective fiction (especially the “whodunit” category—see endnote 8) and “Infantile Neurosis” are ideal for formalist readings. For detective fiction, the reader can fully understand the context of the novel without knowing anything about the author or the historical background of the text. When Freud interpreted the Wolf Man’s illness, he assumed that the Wolf Man had provided him with *adequate* information to solve the mystery of mental disorder and unlike Jung, Freud never turned to history to see, say, what the wolf generally meant to children. 2) To make sense of the content of a detective fiction, the reader needs to pay close attention to the *relation* among different episodes. The same technique of analysis is observed in Freud’s interpretation of the Wolf Man’s symptoms. 3) Structurally, every detective fiction is composed of two stories—the story of the investigation and the story of the crime. The story of the investigation is presented chronologically while the story of the crime is told as a *reconstruction* of a historical moment. Nobody except the criminals know what happened in the crime scene *historically* and yet this scene is retold not by the criminals but by the detective, who has no first-person experience in it at all. The whole writing of the Wolf Man’s Case History

is *Freud's* reorganization of the *memories* of the Wolf Man except the primal scene. The primal scene resembles the crime scene in such a way that the persons directly involved in these scenes are silent while someone standing outside the scenes reproduces the "truth" on behalf of them.

In Chapter Two, the meanings of the primal scene are reevaluated with respect to Ned Lukacher's discussions of the term in *Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis*. In his introduction to the book, Lukacher proposes that the primal scene is the name "of a new notion of 'literature' for which we do not have a name" (22). This new notion (or the primal scene notion) of literature is characterized as operating "a double logic in which every cause is always already an effect, every disclosure also a concealment, and every literal truth a figural lie" (23). In this chapter, I shall test Lukacher's notion of the primal scene by evaluating William Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily" as both the cause and effect of other literary texts. When the term "primal scene" is used in Chapter Two, its definition is greatly modified and widened to explore its historical, philosophical as well as literary aspects. My conception of "the primal scene in literature" is perfectly summarized by Lukacher as follows:

In my use of the term [primal scene] it becomes an intertextual event that displaces the notion of the event from the ground of ontology. It calls the event's relation to the Real into question in an entirely new way. Rather than signifying the child's observation of sexual intercourse, the primal scene comes to signify an ontologically undecidable intertextual event that is situated in the differential space between historical memory and imaginative construction, between archival verification and interpretive free play. Bringing Freud's notion of the primal scene into conjunction with Heidegger's "history of Being," I use the expression "primal scene" to describe the interpretive impasse that arises when a reader has good reason to believe that the meaning of one text is historically dependent on the meaning of another text or on a previously unnoticed set of criteria, even though there is no conclusive evidential or archival means of establishing the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The primal scene is thus the figure of an always divided interpretive strategy that points

toward the Real in the very act of establishing its inaccessibility; it becomes the name for the dispossessive function of language that constitutes the undisclosed essence of language. (24)

The construction of the primal scene is exclusively the obligation of the author in detective fictions. The author keeps in his mind the story of the crime when he constructs the story of the investigation. In a detection fiction, a primal scene is always found *inside* the text; but in a modern fiction like William Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily," the author does not explain the mystery he, or rather, language has created in the text. The primal scene, according to Lukacher, is an "undecidable intertextual event" in modern fictions. In this chapter, I shall analyze Lukacher's thematic statement that "the primal scene comes to signify an ontologically undecidable intertextual event that is situated in the differential space between historical memory and imaginative construction, between archival verification and interpretive free play" (24). I shall approach the above proposition from three different perspectives:

- 1) In a historical sense, the primal scene is a constructed memory, a metaphysical origin called up from no-where in the past to a now-here dimension. This notion of the primal scene is more or less the same as its original meaning in "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis."
- 2) In a philosophical sense, the primal scene is the lost identity of a person. Let me illustrate this by the following example: Suppose I were unable to remember anything happening on last Sunday (and today was Friday, five days later), then the I on Sunday and the I on Friday are not connected by memories. If personal identity is defined by the continuity of memory alone, the two I(s) separated by time are not the

same person. To prove that the I on Sunday is the same as the I on Friday, Anthony Quinton proposes a theory called “the continuity of soul-phases.” Quinton’s theory can be briefly explained as follows: if the I on Friday could remember the I on Thursday who in turn could remember the I on Wednesday and so on, then the I on Sunday is eventually connected to the I living five days later. When Quinton’s theory of the continuity of soul-phases is applied to the interpretation of fictional characters, the identity of, say, Emily in William Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily,” is created by joining all Emily-like characters in fictions. In Chapter Two, I produce the lost identities of Faulkner’s Emily by connecting her to the Emily in John Crowe Ransom’s “Emily Hardcastle, Spinster” and then to the personae of Emily Dickinson’s poems, who are in turn connected to the Old Maid in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s “The White Old Maid.” In this sense, the Old Maid is Emily’s lost identity and the occurrences in “The White Old Maid” are the primal scenes of “A Rose for Emily” and vice versa. To adopt Lukacher’s discourse, I have “good reason to believe,” as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Two, “that the meaning of one text is historically dependent on the meaning of another text or on a previously unnoticed set of criteria, even though there is no conclusive evidential or archival means of establishing the case beyond a reasonable doubt” (24).

- 3) As seen from the structuralist point of view, the primal scene is both the signifier and the deferred signified. In the Wolf Man's Case History, if we look at the dream as a signifying event (or a signifier), the ultimate signified event *in the text* is the primal scene. Yet we might turn this view around and look at the primal scene as a signifier; then by tracing Freud's logic of analysis backward, we will see that the flow of images will eventually take us back to the dream.

In Chapter Three, the concept of Quinton's "continuity of soul-phases" is evaluated as an alternative model to Jung's "collective unconscious." Based on his observation of the phenomenon of synchronicity in daily life as well as in literature (for example, numerous Emily-like characters are identified in texts written by authors living in different eras and places), Jung theorizes that personal minds are unconsciously connected by some primordial memories. If Jung is right, one author literally recollects the writings of other authors when their works show areas of overlaps. The primal scene, when seen from the Jungian view, does not exist in any single text but rather in the space of intertextuality. Lukacher has a similar observation when he writes, "the primal scene comes to signify an ontologically undecidable intertextual event that is situated in the differential space between historical memory and imaginative construction, between archival verification and interpretive free play"(24). Indeed, in Jung's psychological theories, we find no boundary between "historical memory" and "imaginative construction"—if we accept the concept that creation is basically a form of recollection, a regression to the primordial scenery.

In Chapter Three, I shall study the primal scene of “A Rose for Emily” as a scene produced by amplification. According to Marie Louise Von Franz, amplification is a technique frequently used in the interpretation of fairy tales or mythologies. There are, for instance, many witches in fairy tales but no witch is found in reality. For this reason, we cannot tell what a witch is just by studying a particular witch in a particular text. The witch (or rather the concept of the witch) is undefined without putting all the witches together to observe their common features. The primal scene, in this sense, is an archetype created as a result of amplification. In the closing chapter, I shall study the intertextuality between “A Rose for Emily” and some fairy tales. Here, unlike in Chapter Two where I focus my analysis on the characterization of Emily, I shall reconstruct the tale of Homer Barron by amplifying the Gothic ending of Faulkner’s tale. In other words, I shall reproduce the part of the story that Faulkner refrains from telling, although he means to tell it from the beginning to the end.

Seeing from an overall perspective, this project traces the evolution of the notion of the primal scene from its initial definition in “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis” to its literary-philosophical implications discussed by Peter Brooks and Ned Lukacher. Based on Brooks and Lukacher’s findings, I shall apply the primal scene concept to the interpretation of “A Rose for Emily” and create an imaginary dialogue between the two great psychoanalysts, Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. This also means my project is by itself the primal scene in which the conflicts between Freud and Jung are constructed retrospectively through their *effects* on modern and postmodern thinking.

1

The Primal Scene in Literature:**A Psychological View**

Today, the origin of the universe remains a myth, although various scientific theories have been employed to explain the formation of planets and species on Earth. Over history, people of different civilizations have created stories of their own to illustrate the ultimate origin of the world. Christians believe that God created heaven and Earth in six days. In the beginning, the earth was like an empty house. God furnished this house by lighting it and equipping it with species "according to their kinds." The last thing that God put into this house was a woman, who had caused the downfall of her husband and an eternal curse from God. The Chinese, however, do not believe in God's creation. They think that at the beginning, there was nothing but an egg. Inside the egg was a mixture of fire, water, soil, wood and gold. When the egg hatched, there emerged a giant and all other elements that had nurtured him in the egg. As the giant grew, he raised the sky from the ground. He did this for eighteen thousand years. Then the giant perished and the fleas living on his body hopped off and became people. When evaluated scientifically, these legends do not provide direct evidence to what existed at the beginning of the universe but what existed *in the mind* of our ancestors. The Chinese legend, for instance, was an early version of today's "big bang theory." The earth was hatched as part of the universe and was brought to existence in a mighty explosion. This

view of the universe is totally contradictory to the Biblical one. The Bible portrays God as the absolute origin of all entities and claims that man was created in the image of God. Up to the present, we do not have enough scientific evidence to validate which of these sayings is closer to reality; but we do know how people of different religions see nature and themselves through their reconstruction of prehistoric realities.

From time to time, people tend to make up mythical stories to account for natural phenomena or to envision what happens in inaccessible places. In ancient Greece, Homer created the mysterious journey of Odysseus to explore imaginatively places far off in the sea, while in modern times, science-fiction writers use their imaginations to tell people what exists in outer space. Turning inwardly into the psyche, there exists yet another world as remote and mythical as the outer world. This is the human unconscious. To rationalize occurrences in the unconscious world, psychoanalysts write *stories* about them. I shall call these stories the *primal scenes*. They came out of the *imagination* of the analysts and thus reveal not so much an objective reality but the mental activities of the analysts. For this reason, Freud's "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918 [1914])" (renamed as "the Wolf Man's Case History" in this essay) should not be read as a history of the Wolf Man's life but a revelation of *Freud's* psychic reality. The context of the primal scene¹ shows more about Freud's obsession with sex than the Wolf Man's.

The objective of this chapter is to verify this proposition by rearranging the narrative sequence of The Wolf Man's Case History. I shall demonstrate in my rewrite of the case history that a rearrangement of narrative sequence would bring to light Freud's own subjects of obsession when he diagnosed the Wolf Man's disorders. In my re-presentation of the Wolf Man's illness, my subject of analysis is paradoxically not the

Wolf Man but his analyst, i.e. the narrator of the case history. The literary-theoretical implication of this chapter is to show that narrative content is a product of narrative form. This means if the ordering of narrative events is altered, it will make a difference in the reader's overall understanding of the story.

In *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative*, Peter Brooks suggests that the Wolf Man's Case History can be restructured into four distinctive narrative frameworks. These are "(1) the structure of the infantile neurosis (the history of the neurosis); (2) the order of event in the past providing the cause of the neurosis (the etiology of the neurosis); (3) the order of emergence of past event during the analysis (the history of the treatment); (4) the order of report in the case history" (272). To further illustrate the interactions between these frameworks, Brooks introduces the Russian formalist distinction between *fabula* and *sjuzet*: explicitly, the *sjuzet* (plot) is the sequence of events as told by the narrator while the *fabula* (story) is the chronological representation of the events. Implicitly, the *sjuzet* is the *whole narrative matrix* or the totality of signification while the *fabula* is the subject of signification or the "history" referred to by narrative. Of the four structural paradigms Brooks identifies in Freud's text, only the last is the *sjuzet* of the *case history* while the other three are the *fabula*. Yet this is not the only way to look at their relationship. Actually, any one of the frameworks can serve as the *sjuzet* of an ultimate *fabula*:

In Freud's text, the *sjuzet* must ultimately be the fourth in the series of elements I identified: the order of report of the material that constitutes the "case" of the Wolf Man. But this *sjuzet* will alternately choose its *fabula* from among the three other elements, sometimes presenting the history and structure of the infantile neurosis, sometimes tracing the events that caused it, sometimes following the course of the analysis and the way event emerged during it. The "ultimate" *fabula*, one might say, is element number 2, the etiology of the infantile neurosis; but in the presentation, element number 1, the way the

neurosis manifested itself and evolved, can serve as its *sjuzet*, and so can element number 3, the way the events of childhood emerged during the analytic sessions. The history of the neurosis, element number 1, can in turn be *fabula* to element number 3 as *sjuzet*. The elements occupy shifting positions in relation to one another, as the "story" and its "plotting," and it must be the task of the fourth element, the writing of the case history itself, to recover the other elements in their complex interrelationship. (273)

Suffice it to say, any particular narrative sequence conceals in itself an untold story, which when brought to light through textual rearrangement will in turn deconstruct the message that the initial text means to emphasize. For Freud, the whole case history is the *fabula* that restructures the shattered or fragmentary memories of the Wolf Man. Yet, the case history is the *sjuzet* that suggests another *fabula*—the *fabula* about Freud himself. Since Freud wrote the case history retrospectively after he had finished all his interviews with the patient, there must have been a time when Freud sat back to look at the case as a whole. My hypothesis is that what Freud had thought during this time interval is not fully revealed in the *sjuzet* of the case history. I am suspicious in particular that Freud did not *deduce from observations* that the Wolf Man had a castration complex; instead he *had assumed* the existence of such a complex *initially*. In the following section, I am going to posit myself in Freud's position to look at the Wolf Man's symptoms. First, I shall research Freud's academic interests around the time he psychoanalyzed the Wolf Man. Then, I shall re-present the Wolf Man's Case History by shifting the primal scene to the opening scene and the dream to the climax at the end. My objective of transposing the primal scene and the dream in Freud's narration of the Wolf Man's infantile history is to confirm my suspicion that Freud had investigated the Wolf Man's disorder with his unconscious predestination.

Psychoanalyzing Freud

The Wolf Man sought treatment from Freud at the age of twenty-three. At that time, he depended on enemas to ease his severe constipation. At first glance, this would be a common physiological disorder having nothing to do with psychoanalysis. What Freud saw as unusual was the patient's special and eccentric remark on his illness: "His [the Wolf Man's] principal subject of complaint was that for him the world was hidden in a veil. This veil was torn only at one moment—when, after an enema, the contents of the bowel left the intestinal canal; and he then felt well and normal again" (311). At the age of four, the Wolf Man displayed another form of abnormality—animal phobia. The animals that once produced a restless feeling in the child include wolves in an upright posture, butterflies with striped yellow wings, beetles, caterpillars and horses (243-244). Besides animal phobias, the Wolf Man was obsessed with religion. On one occasion, he kissed the holy pictures in his room wholeheartedly, but on another, he related God to disgusting and degrading objects like animal excrement and swine (244-245). His attitude towards God kept alternating between an excessively pious attitude and a compulsive blasphemous thought.

This is the symptomology that I believe to have inspired Freud to write the case history. As a matter of fact, Freud's narrative desire is to construct a traumatizing event that will serve as the absolute origin of all these symptoms and an explanation of the following obsessive thoughts of the Wolf Man: ²

1. *A Christmas tree with Christmas presents hanging on it:*

Since Christmas day was the birthday of the Wolf Man, he expected to see double quantity of Christmas presents hanging on the Christmas tree for him. His wish turned out unfulfilled and he broke into fits of anger (243).

2. *A dream:*

The Wolf Man had the following dream at the age of four:

"I dreamt that it was night and that I was lying in my bed. (My bed stood with its foot towards the window; in front of the window there was a row of old walnut trees. I know it was winter when I had the dream, and night-time.) Suddenly the window opened of its own accord, and I was terrified to see that some white wolves were sitting on the big walnut tree in front of the window. There were six or seven of them. The wolves were quite white, and looked more like foxes or sheep-dogs, for they had big tails like foxes and they had their ears pricked like dogs when they pay attention to something. In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by wolves, I screamed and woke up..." (259)

3. *A wolf in an upright posture:*

The Wolf Man's elder sister enjoyed teasing him with an illustration in a fairy tale book. The picture shows a wolf "standing upright, striding out with one foot, with its claws stretched out and its ears pricked" (260). At an age of not more than five, the Wolf Man was extremely afraid of this picture; it made him scream like a lunatic.

4. *A fairy tale about a tailless wolf:*

The Wolf Man heard the following story from his grandfather when he was a child:

"A tailor was sitting at work in his room, when the window opened and a wolf leapt in. The tailor hit after him with his yard—no (he corrected himself), caught him by his tail and pulled it off, so that the wolf ran away in terror. Some time later the tailor went into the forest, and suddenly saw a pack of wolves coming towards him; so he climbed up a tree to escape from them. At first the wolves were in perplexity; but the maimed one, which was among them and wanted to revenge himself on the tailor, proposed that they should climb one upon another till the last one could reach him. He himself—he was a vigorous old fellow—would be the base of the pyramid. The wolves did as he suggested, but the tailor had recognized the visitor whom he had punished, and suddenly called out as he had before: 'Catch the grey one by the tail!' The tailless wolf, terrified by the recollection, ran away, and all the others tumbled down." (261)

5. *The meaning of the Russian word "grusha"*

The Wolf Man's nursery maid was called "Grusha." The word also means "pear" in Russian. The proper name "Grusha" reminded the Wolf Man of the kind of pear kept in the storeroom. It is a big pear with yellow stripes on its skin (330).

6. *A woman in a kneeling posture:*

There are up to three occasions where the Wolf Man was overwhelmed by the posture of a woman who kneeled down to do some scrubbing. The first occasion took place when the Wolf Man was two and a half years old. He saw his nursery maid, Grusha, kneeling on the floor with a pail and a short broom beside her. The next time he

encountered this posture was beside a pond where a peasant girl named Matrona was washing clothes on her knees. The Wolf Man claimed that he fell in love instantly with this girl because of her posture. He had yet another opportunity to see Matrona kneel down to scrub the floor of his house. This scene was a recurrence of the Grusha scene not just because of the kneeling posture, but also because both girls were engaged in the same activity, cleaning the floor and with the same tools—a pail and a broom (330, 333).

7. A caul:

The Wolf Man was told that he was born with a caul. For this reason, he always regarded himself “as a special child of fortune whom no ill could befall” (340).

These are the pieces of a psychoanalytic puzzle. To see the *fabula* in its wholeness, these pieces of the *sjuzhet* must be plugged one into another to produce a coherent story. There are many ways to start the game. As I observe, Freud's investigation centers on two assumptions: *the Oedipus and castration complexes*.

Freud theorized the Oedipus complex in light of *his own* affection for his mother.³ He utilized the term "Oedipus complex" to describe this incestuous feeling in "On the Sexual Theories of Children" (1908). When first discovered, the Oedipus complex took on a "positive" form: it postulates a child's sexual desire for the opposite sex parent and an unconscious hatred of that of the same sex. The "negative" form of the Oedipus complex is a reverse of the above emotions. A child possessing a negative Oedipus complex will love the parent of the same sex and feels jealous of that of the opposite. In

actual cases, an individual tends to develop *both* forms of the Oedipus complex in varying degrees; and it is the overall effect of the two forms that shapes the complete version of the complex.⁴ In the same essay, Freud introduces the castration complex and postulates that an unresolved Oedipus complex would lead eventually to a castration anxiety. The whole proposition of castration anxiety is built upon the following assumption: that the anatomical distinction between males and females would create for children an illusion that the female has had her penis cut off by a male. With this prerequisite, the threat of castration means different things to little boys and girls. For girls, castration is not a threat but a "current situation" that they are born to suffer or to remedy. This perception leads the little girl to desire the paternal penis and thus enter the Oedipal phase. For boys, the threat of castration arises from more complex fantasies. First of all, the castration agent is the father. This means a child would come to the conclusion that mother does not have a penis because father has cut it off. Seeing the father as a castrator, the little boy's anxiety of castration arises from his Oedipal rivalry with the father. Secondly, little boys fear castration because they are threatened with it when caught masturbating. Thirdly, castration anxiety arises when a male feels ashamed of his homosexual desire. The concept refers more to the fear of the loss of masculinity or erotic pleasure than its anatomical sense.

Since Freud had extensively discussed the Oedipus and castration complexes prior to his writing of the Wolf Man's case, his judgement of the Wolf Man's illness had most likely been influenced by his exceptional interest in the two complexes. Ironically, incestuous love and castration anxiety appear to be Freud's own *obsessive phantasies* evident in their frequent recurrence in his writings. Many issues that we read in the Wolf

Man's Case History had appeared in Freud's earlier cases. This means the Wolf Man had been robbed of individuality when his case was placed in Freud's psychoanalytic schema. The Wolf Man's case is indeed a typical *Freudian* interpretation of mental disorders and the "result" of the interpretation is found to be a repetition of some previous cases; one example of these is "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old-Boy" (or Little Hans's Case History). Freud wrote the case history of Little Hans in 1909 and around the same time he began his diagnosis of the Wolf Man. Therefore it was possible that Freud had looked at the Wolf Man's disorders in terms of those of little Hans. As a matter of fact, the following episodes from "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old-Boy" are found resonating with the major motifs that Freud discusses in the Wolf Man's Case History:

i) *Animal Phobia*

Little Hans was afraid of horses and thought that the horse would bite him. Freud interpreted the phobia as a projection of the child's fear of his father. In little Hans' screen memory, he had seen a horse fall down and kick. He had identified this falling horse with his father because he had secretly wished his father's fall and death.

ii) *Oedipus and Castration Complexes*

Little Hans' hostility against his father (as reflected in his identification of his father with the falling horse) was a result of his Oedipal affection for his mother. This affection was concretized in one of the child's dream-like phantasies—One night, little Hans saw two giraffes "in his room." One was big but the other was crumpled. The child took hold of the crumpled one, causing the big one to call out. Then the big giraffe stopped calling out and Hans sat down on the top of the

crumpled one. This phantasy was interpreted as a reenactment of a recurring scene in reality. Hans liked to go to his parents' bedroom early in the morning. His mother would then take him back to his bedroom and stay there with him for a while. The father was irritated and warned his wife not to indulge the child. His mother usually ignored the warning and went up to the room with him. The big giraffe was interpreted as Hans's father, while the crumpled one was his mother. Hans fantasized that his taking possession of his mother would enrage his father, who would then punish him with castration. Hans's castration anxiety was confirmed by his illusion about the horse biting off his little finger.

iii) *A "lumf" complex*

The "lumf" complex in little Hans's case history refers to the child's likening of an unborn baby to the faeces in the bowels. In a conversation between Hans and his father, Hans passed on his discussion of lumf to a discussion of his baby sister, Hanna. Freud looked at the change of topic as the child's unconscious association of lumf to his little sister: "We may well imagine what this juxtaposition signified: nothing less, in fact, than that little Hanna was a lumf herself—that all babies were lumfs and were born like lumfs. We can now understand that all furniture-vans and drays and buses were only stork-box carts, and were only of interest to Hans as being symbolic representations of pregnancy; and that when a heavy or heavily loaded horse fell down he can have seen in it only one thing—a childbirth, delivery." (269)

Another recurring motif found in the Wolf Man's Case History is the child's observation of parental intercourse. As early as 1900, Freud had fostered the idea of

interpreting the dream works of his patients as distorted sceneries of parental intercourses.⁵ Freud's reader who has read *The Interpretation of Dreams* and Little Hans's Case History would not be surprised to be informed once again that the Wolf Man was traumatized by witnessing a copulation between his parents. The detail of this copulation is quoted as follows:

He [the Wolf Man at the age of one and a half] had been sleeping in his cot, then, in his parents' bedroom... When he woke up, he witnessed a coitus *a tergo* [from behind], three times repeated; he was able to see his mother's genitals as well as his father's organ; and he understood the process as well as its significance. (268-269)

This fascinating scene is called the primal scene because it was "the earliest experiences of childhood that are brought to light in analysis" (289). This scene is *not* a recollection but an analytic construction or fabrication inviting supportive evidence. In his defensive argument about the credibility of the primal scene, Freud emphasizes that his theory is not a spontaneous whim, but a place upon which a variety of phenomena converge:

An analyst, indeed, who hears this reproach [of the imaginary nature of the primal scene], will comfort himself by recalling how gradually the construction of this phantasy which he is supposed to have originated came about, and, when all is said and done, how independently of the physician's incentive many points in its development proceeded; how, after a certain phase of the treatment, *everything seemed to converge upon it, and how later, in the synthesis, the most various and remarkable results radiated out from it; how not only the large problems but the smallest peculiarities in the history of the case were cleared up by this single assumption.* (286, italics mine)

This quotation is very much a formalist discourse: Freud has taken every word, image and episode that the Wolf Man speaks of as a symbolic representation of a *unifying* motif. Freud's practice of formalism is indeed fully illustrated in his effort to associate all the Wolf Man's obsessional symptoms to the context of the primal scene. First of all, Freud assumed that the Wolf Man had identified himself with *both* of his parents in the

primal scene. If this postulate is true, then the Wolf Man was traumatized by *two sets of* obsessional thoughts (the Oedipus and castration Complexes) and consequently would display *two sets of* obsessional symptoms. This means that of the episodes the Wolf Man reported to Freud, some reflected the symptoms of castration anxiety and some were hints to an unresolved Oedipus Complex. To sort these pieces out, Freud must first turn the images in the episodes into *symbols* because an image is neutral in meaning while a symbol is not. The recurring image of the wolf told Freud nothing until he found out what it *symbolized*. Of the seven episodes presented in this paper, two are concerned with posture. The Wolf Man was afraid of seeing a wolf in an upright posture but fond of the spectacle of a woman kneeling on the floor. When put together, the upright and kneeling postures produce an image of copulation (especially the one between animals). If the scary upright wolf posture reminded the Wolf Man of his father in the primal scene, Freud had a good reason to believe that the wolves in the dream had frightened the child in a similar way. The child's recurring fear confirms for Freud that he had seen something horrible in the primal scene. Yet Freud's reader is puzzled at this point, because nothing of horrible nature has been mentioned in the primal scene. This is true only when the scene is understood from an adult's point of view. For a child, his fear arose not from the spectacle of the scene but from his *interpretation* of the scene. Suppose the Wolf Man had identified himself with his mother in the primal scene: he would have desired sexual pleasure by the father. If this was the case, he would be liable to develop castration anxiety because the child believed that his father was going to castrate him as he had performed it on his mother. Later Freud found that this hypothesis was strengthened by the contents of a story that the Wolf Man heard from his grandfather. It was a fairy tale

about a tailor and a tailless wolf. In the story, taillessness is an allusion to castration while the climbing up of wolves on the tailless wolf is a symbolic representation of copulation.

Based on his hypothesis that "dreaming is another kind of remembering" (285), Freud suspected that the Wolf Man had recalled something other than the primal scene in his dream. Pursuing investigation in this trajectory, Freud observed that the moment the dreamer entered his dream is a traumatic repetition of the moment he entered his home on a Christmas eve. As Christmas day was the child's birthday, he expected to see double amount of Christmas presents hanging on the Christmas tree for him. His wish was not fulfilled and his disappointment enraged him. The dream could then be interpreted as a traumatic reenactment of his *disappointment*. "The window opens of its own accord" is a parallel description to "the door opens from behind": but instead of seeing Christmas presents hanging on the tree, the dreamer saw wolves sitting on it. This episode is also a reflection of the Wolf Man's castration anxiety. Because of his fear of castration, the Wolf Man repressed his homosexual libido evident in his desire for the father. His sexual dissatisfaction overlapped with his disappointment with the Christmas presents and the overall depression was transformed into the form of wolf phobia in the dream work. In short, when the Wolf Man dreamed of the wolves, which were his father-surrogate, he was once again exposed to his old sexual temptation as well as the old threat of castration. Although the wolf is a universal symbol of evil and is frightening to many children, Freud did not look at his patient's wolf phobia in this traditional manner. For Freud, the wolf frightened the dreamer not because of the cultural connotation of the wolf image but because of the dreamer's *personal* interpretation of it.

Freud realized that the castration complex alone did not provide enough information to explain the Wolf Man's other forms of phobia. Without the primal scene, the episode of wolf phobia and butterfly phobia were not connected. Freud proposed that one year after the primal scene, the child "recalled" seeing his mother kneeling down to have sex with his father when Grusha (a nursery maid) posed herself in a similar way to scrub the floor:

Very soon after this there came the recollection of a scene, incomplete, but, so far as it was preserved, definite. Grusha was kneeling on the floor, and beside her a pail and a short broom made of a bundle of twigs; he was also there, and she was teasing him or scolding him. (330)

The child responded to the scene by micturating, which Freud interpreted as a sign of erotic pleasure. This scene with Grusha was related to the image of a butterfly with striped yellow wings, but the connection would be quite incomprehensible to a reader without a knowledge of Russian. Freud discovered that the insect had actually nothing to do with Grusha the person but "Grusha" the name. In the Wolf Man's language, "grusha" means "pear." When the Wolf Man heard the name "Grusha," he recalled the kind of pear that had yellow stripes on its skin. At this point, Freud had enough *intermediate* images to relate the Wolf Man's fear of the butterfly to his traumatic "memory" of the primal scene. Here is the chain of images: the yellow stripes on the butterfly's wings reminded the Wolf Man of Grusha, who was his mother-surrogate; his identification with his mother in the primal scene triggered once again his castration anxiety. To sum up, the wolf was the patient's father-surrogate while the butterfly functioned as a symbol of his mother; both of these images had emerged from the primal scene.

Now, almost all of the Wolf Man's obsessional symptoms are explained, but the case is far from complete. In some sense, the case has not yet even started because the

Wolf Man's initial complaints have not been addressed. One of his major health problems was his heavy dependence on enemas for bowel movements. Freud claims that this physiological disorder has also a root in the primal scene. As I have discussed above, the Wolf Man had not only an unresolved Oedipus complex, but also a repressed homosexual libido. This repression proceeded into his adulthood and became prominent when he was accustomed to enemas. Unconsciously, the Wolf Man saw the enema as a means to satisfy his anal eroticism. This hypothesis is confirmed by the patient's fantasy of seeing himself wrapped in a caul, which was torn at the moment he evacuated his bowels with the help of enema. The induced evacuation represents to him the successive moments of homosexual intercourse and childbirth. After imagining himself giving birth to a child, the Wolf Man felt normal again. This recurring symptom is obviously the result of a suppressed libido. In light of the Wolf Man's other disorders, the cause of the suppression is dated back to the primal scene where he saw an intercourse but was prohibited, for a variety of reasons, to imitate either of the subjects.

The Wolf Man was cured after four years of treatment. In his case history, however, Freud never foregrounds the kind of *treatment* he has offered the patient nor the *reasons* for the disappearance of the symptoms. Freud's focus of discussion is the *causality* of his patient's mental illness rather than the process of treatment. For this reason, the Wolf Man's Case History cannot be studied as a medical report or regarded as an example of a cure. The significance of the case is not in the illness of the Wolf Man but *Freud's* conception of psychoanalysis. When reading the case, I intend to explore the *trajectory* of Freud's reasoning as well as the origins of his psychoanalytic theories rather than the Wolf Man's pathological disorders.

My reading of the case history is thus characterized as a formalist reading, which makes no attempt to evaluate the content of a text (I am not interested to know, for instance, whether the Wolf Man was completely rehabilitated after Freud's treatment), but rather attempts to analyze its structural arrangement. In my rewriting of the case, I restructure the sequence of Freud's narrative by turning his conclusions to be the assumptions of his argument. The original trajectory of Freud's narrative in section IV, "The Dream and the Primal Scene," is: a description of the dream, a sketch of the patient's childhood memories, the primal scene and a discussion summarizing that the child has suffered from castration anxiety. In my retelling of the history of Freud's analysis, the above sequence is reversed. In Freud's narrative, every detail of the Wolf Man's disorder is dated back to the primal scene while in my re-presentation of Freud's narrative, the details are traced further back to the case history of little Hans. My analysis exemplifies the poststructuralist proposition of the origin of narration—that narratives are produced not so much by events but by other narratives. Yet my narrative tells not the truth but what *I* believe to be an important aspect of the truth of *narrative*: overtly, Freud wrote a case history *about the Wolf Man*; covertly, he wrote about *his own* sexual fantasies. Apparently, the reader is being informed the unconscious world of an *infant*; actually, he is digesting the conscious thought of a man. My *fabula* is subjected to be reevaluated and entitled as the *sjuzet* again. The chain of *formalist* readings thus continues infinitely. Tzvetan Todorov points out in *The Poetics of Prose* that "to write about a text is to produce another text" (121) and "there is no difference of nature between the narratives-as-signifier and the narratives-as-signified" (125).⁶ To express Todorov's conception of narrative in terms of *sjuzet* and *fabula*, I shall rewrite the above

propositions as *to figure out the fabula of a sjužet is to produce another sjužet because there is no difference of nature between the narratives-as-sjužet and the narratives-as-fabula*. In the process of signification, the pair *sjužet* and *fabula* is functionally identical with the "signifier" and the "signified" in Saussure's linguistic model. An intensive comparison between the formalist *textual* paradigm and Saussure's *linguistic* system is illustrated as follows:

| | |
|-----------|-----------|
| Signifier | Signified |
| Sign | |
| Signifier | Signified |
| Sign | |

| | |
|---------------|---------------|
| <i>Sjužet</i> | <i>Fabula</i> |
| Text | |
| <i>Sjužet</i> | <i>Fabula</i> |
| Text | |

Freud's interpretation of the word "grusha" is a good example demonstrating the complex relationship among the *sign*, *signifier* and *the signified* in Saussure's linguistic system. The signifier "grusha" has two signifieds (the nursery maid and the pear), so it has formed two *different* linguistic signs. Alone, the word "grusha" indicates nothing (especially to readers who have no background in Russian); the signifier is illuminating only when it is interpreted as *parts of the signification system*. Freud's interpretation of

the Grusha scene is indeed a practice of formalism (and also structuralism) which foregrounds not the meaning of an individual sign but rather the *interactions* of various signs within a linguistic system. To me, the *signifier* "*fabula*" has two signifieds: "plot" and "story." *Fabula* means more of a "plot" when it is referred to as the chronological *order* of events (with the *sjuzet* as its counterpart); meanwhile, it is understood as a "story" when its *reconstructive nature* is highlighted. In the second case, the *fabula* shares a fictional context with the primal scene. After discussing the relationship between the *sjuzet* and the *fabula*, in the following section, I am going to compare the *fabula* to what I shall define as "the primal scene in literature."

The Fabula and the Primal Scene

Defined in its most general sense, the primal scene is a story within a story. But this definition is not precise enough to distinguish the role of the framing story from the framed one. To take the Wolf Man's Case History as an example, the whole essay is the *fabula* in the sense that it makes a *series of logical deductions* about the causality of the Wolf Man's illness. Strictly speaking, the *fabula* is not altogether a new composition but a rearrangement of the narrative elements of a primary story (the one that the Wolf Man told Freud directly). Yet, in the *fabula*, there is a story that the Wolf Man never told; its presence is completely unconscious to him. This extratextuality—namely, the primal scene—is a commentary that the analyst adds to the primary text and it reflects exclusively the thought of the *analyst*.

Structurally, the primal scene is an *imaginary* story inscribed in a *fabula*; functionally, it brings in the voice of the reader and is itself the *interpretation* of the primary text. To further explore the relation between the *fabula* and the *primal scene*, I shall introduce Todorov's conceptions of *reading* and *interpretation*. In *The Poetics of Prose*, Todorov distinguishes *reading* from *interpretation* by pointing out that reading dismantles the system of a *single* text while interpretation *substitutes* one text for another. This means in reading we focus on intratextuality whereas in interpretation we search for extratextuality. According to these new definitions, "reading" is a formalist discourse but "interpretation" a poststructuralist one. The act of reading produces the *fabula* but paradoxically at the expense of causing "a certain destruction of the text's apparent order" (Todorov, 141). What Todorov means by "a certain destruction" is accordingly a "deconstruction" in poststructuralist discourse:

A *certain* destruction, we said: for to destroy does not mean to ignore. The apparent order is not the only one, and our task will be to make evident *all* the orders of the text and to specify their interrelations. A literary reading cannot, therefore, be modeled on the image of the reading of myths, concerning which Lévi-Strauss observes: "Considered in the crude state, any syntagmatic chain must be regarded as having no meaning; either because no signification appears at the outset, or because we suppose we perceive a meaning but without knowing if it is the right one." The same gesture, which is the refusal to be content with the perceptible organization of a text, assumes different significations in these two cases: in the perspective of reading, each layer of the text has a meaning. (241-242)

Freud's *reading* of the Wolf Man's symptoms is, in some areas, a deconstructive reading. At one point, Freud is very sure that his patient has witnessed a coitus between his parents but at another, he *deconstructs* his postulate by adding the possibility that the Wolf Man might have seen a copulation between animals.⁷ Apparently in his *reading* of the patient's symptomatic signs, Freud "perceive[s] a meaning without knowing if it is the

right one." Equally uncertain is Freud's *interpretation* of the symptoms, or in Todorov's discourse, Freud's *substitution* of the primal scene for the patient's recollections. Since the primal scene is altogether Freud's imaginative work, it tells us more about Freud's own unconscious thought than that of the Wolf Man's. To me, interpretation (i.e. the primal scene) dismantles the *interpreter's* thought more fully than reading (i.e. the *fabula*) does because the former activity involves the act of making free associations, which uncovers unconscious ideas more readily than the logic-oriented process of reading.

In literature, however, the *fabula* does not always contain a primal scene. This means the narrator does not always *interpret* the mystery for the reader. To discuss the primal scene *in literature*, I shall start with the genre of detective fiction (the whodunit⁸ in particular) because narrative of this kind contains always a primal scene. With almost no exception, the sleuth in a whodunit explains retrospectively what had occurred in a crime scene and the steps that took him to arrive at this absolute origin of the crime under investigation.

The Sjužet, Fabula and Primal Scene in Detective Fiction

In "Typology of Detective Fiction" (*The Poetics of Prose*, 42-52), Tzvetan Todorov observes that "this novel [the whodunit] contains not one but two stories: the story of the crime and the story of the investigation...The first story, that of the crime, ends before the second begins" (44). Being a formalist, Todorov is more interested in analyzing the *recurring formal structures* of a particular genre than in the meanings of a single work. In "The Typology of Detective Fiction," Todorov analyzes the technique of dual

narrative in the “whodunit” and uses it to explain the distinction between plot and story, accordingly the *sjuzhet* and *fabula*, in a literary work:

We might further characterize these two stories by saying that the first—the story of the crime—tells “what really happened,” whereas the second—the story of the investigation—explains “how the reader (or the narrator) has come to know about it.” But these definitions concern not only the two stories in detective fiction, but also two aspects of every literary work which the Russian Formalists isolated forty years ago. They distinguished, in fact, the *fable* (story) from the *subject* (plot) of a narrative: the story is what happened in life, the plot is the way the author presents it to us. The first notion corresponds to the reality evoked, to events similar to those which take place in our lives; the second, to the book itself, to the narrative, to the literary devices the author employs. In the story, there is no inversion in time, actions follow their natural order; in the plot, the author can present results before their causes, the end before the beginning. These two notions do not characterize two parts of the story or two different works, but two aspects of one and the same work; they are two points of view about the same thing (45-46).

As Todorov observes, the “whodunit” is made up of two interpenetrating stories. For this reason, the genre is composed of two plots, or more precisely, of two sets of *sjuzhet* and *fabula*. Usually, the plot (*sjuzhet*) of the investigation story is almost synchronic with the plot of the novel. This means the investigative *procedures* are usually presented chronologically in the “whodunit” and therefore, in the story of investigation, the *sjuzhet* is identical with the *fabula*. However, in the story of crime, the *sjuzhet* is fragmentary. Each witness or suspect gives the sleuth a plot of the past event. These pieces of testimony are full of illusion; sometimes the criminals hide the truth by presenting past occurrences in wrong chronological order. At the end of the novel, when the sleuth retells the story of crime in chronological order, the reader is able to see how a shattered plot manages to cover up the truth. Agatha Christie's *Evil Under the Sun* is a brilliant example of how the narrators of the story of crime—i.e. the criminals—create suspense by manipulating the order of presentation.

Here is the *sjuzet* of the *story of crime* in *Evil Under the Sun*

On a bright and cloudless day, Arlena was found dead at Pixy Cove on Smugglers' Island. The place was accessible either from the sea or by climbing down stairs from the overhanging cliff. Arlena had been strangled and the time of death was estimated at between 10:45 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. All people staying in The Jolly Roger Hotel were asked to report their activities before and during this time interval. All those who stayed close to the crime scene were able to provide an alibi. In fact, their alibis were so perfect that they appeared to have been planned ahead. People paired up in the following combinations to prove each other's innocence:

From 10:45 to 11:45, Kenneth, the husband of the murdered woman, was typing in his room while Rosamund was reading alone at a cliff recess called Sunny Ledge. She came back to the hotel at 11:15 to take her sun glasses. When she passed Kenneth's room, she heard the sound of his typewriter. Then she opened his door and found him concentrating on his work. Without disturbing him, she went away. Rosemund did not think Kenneth had noticed her presence, but she was wrong. Kenneth reported to Poirot that he saw her in the mirror beside his desk.

Linda (the teenage daughter of Kenneth) and Christine went to Gull Cove at 10:30. Linda sunbathed while Christine sketched. They stayed together for about an hour. Then Christine asked Linda what the time was. Linda looked at her wristwatch which read 11:45. Christine took leave because she was going to play tennis with Kenneth, Rosamund and Mr. Gardener at 12:00. When Christine was on her path up the cliff, she heard Linda splashing in the waves. When Linda got back to the hotel, it was one o'clock according to the hotel clock.

At ten o'clock, Poirot saw Arlena on the hotel beach. She was trying to launch a white wooden float. Poirot helped her with the launching and she asked him not to disclose her whereabouts. Then she paddled off the beach. When Arlena's float went out of sight, Patrick (husband of Christine, and lover of Arlena) was seen descending the beach, obviously in search of Arlena. His restlessness was observed by the Gardeners, Emily and Poirot. When the three were having a chat on the beach, Mrs. Gardener complained that she was almost hit by a bottle chucked out of one of the hotel windows in the morning. After making the complaint, Mrs. Gardener asked her husband to go back to their room to fetch her a skein of wool. Mr. Gardener was then absent from the party for a moment. Five minutes after Mr. Gardener's return, Patrick invited Emily to go rowing with him. They set off at 11:30. Their boat first went past Sunny Ledge where they saw Rosamund reading on the cliff. Then their boat approached Pixy Cove. As they came close, a figure was seen lying on the beach. What happened next is quoted as follows:

The boat was fast approaching the beach. Arlena Marshall was lying face downwards on the shingle her arms outstretched. The white float was drawn up near by. Something was puzzling Emily Brewster. It was as though she was looking at something she knew quite well but which was in one respect quite wrong. It was a minute or two before it came to her. Arlena Marshall's attitude was the attitude of a sun-bather. So had she lain many a time on the beach by the hotel, her bronzed body outstretched and the green cardboard hat protecting her head and neck. (50)

Patrick jumped off the boat and Emily followed. She saw that the body was not in a lying-down position but a thrown-down one. Then Patrick examined the body and proclaimed that Arlena was dead, apparently killed by strangulation. The two witnesses

decided that Emily should row back to call the police while Patrick remained with the corpse.

When the police arrived at Pixy Cove, some objects were found around the corpse: they included a pair of scissors, an empty cigarette package, five patent bottle tops, a number of used matches, three pieces of string, one or two fragments of newspaper, a fragment of smashed pipe, four buttons, the drumstick bone of a chicken and an empty bottle of sun-bathing oil. Not far away from the corpse, the police found a cave. The air inside it smelled the scent of a perfume named "Gabrielle No. 8."

In Linda's room, Poirot found some burnt hair, fragments of green cardboard that looked like a pull-off calendar, a large irregular blob of candle grease. The day after the crime, Linda attempted suicide by taking an overdose of Christine's sleeping pills. She left a note to her father admitting to killing Arlena. Linda was saved, however.

Poirot's work was like playing a jigsaw puzzle. Every suspect has given him a strange-shaped piece, and his task was to fit it into its appointed place. Poirot outlined these pieces as:

Gabrielle No. 8.
A pair of scissors.
A broken pipe.
A bottle thrown from a window.
A green calendar.
A packet of candles.
A mirror and a typewriter.
A skein of magenta wool.
A girl's wrist-watch.
Bath water rushing down the waste-pipe (144).

When playing a jigsaw puzzle, the greatest challenge, as Poirot points out to Mrs. Gardener, is to tell, say, the difference between the fur of a rug and that of a cat. Poirot feels that among the many pieces of his jigsaw puzzle, one piece should not be taken at

its face value. Suppose this piece shows some white fur, the fur might not belong to the larger pattern of the white fur rug as people normally assume; instead, it should be fitted into an awkward position—forming perhaps the white spot of a black cat's tail. What Poirot means is that the murderer has utilized the technique of *defamiliarization* to cover up his or her crime. Of the eight suspects (Mrs. Gardener, Mr. Gardener, Emily, Rosamund, Christine, Patrick, Kenneth and Linda), at least one has his or her true identity covered up. Such a person ought to be "like" the white spot on a black cat's tail instead of being "like" a piece of the fur rug as he or she appears to be.

For Poirot, every piece of his jigsaw puzzle is a signifier deprived of the signified. The piece "bath-water rushing down the waste-pipe," for instance, signifies something more than a bath taken at noon. Who has taken the bath? Why is it that nobody admits to taking the bath? What is in the bath water? or what does the bath attempt to wash? The answers to these questions, when put together, will form the signified that sheds light on the identity of the murderer. By placing the pieces of his jigsaw puzzle on the table, Poirot has the *plot* of the story of murder but *not the story itself*. The plot, in other words, is the sum total of signification that the witnesses present to him. It is the totality of testimony; if only they were arranged in an order that would make sense to him.

Poirot's solution to the crime is greatly in debt to the following image:

It was on a morning when we were sitting out here that we talked of *suntanned bodies lying like meat upon a slab* and it was then that I [Poirot] reflected how little difference there was between one body and another. If one looked closely and appraisingly—yes—but to the casual glance? One moderately well-made young woman is very like another. Two brown legs, two brown arms, a little piece of bathing suit in between—just a body lying out in the sun. When a woman walks, when she speaks, laughs, turns her head, moves a hand—then, yes, then, there is personality—individuality. But in the sun ritual—no.
(161, emphasis added)

Before evil has actually descended on Smugglers' Island, the image of suntanned bodies lying under the sun strikes Poirot rather like a virus might invade his immune system. Later, when this virus strikes again, his memory is able to reproduce his first impression of the image. When it is reported that a "body" is found in Pixy Cove, everybody except Poirot takes it as a "corpse." Alone, the signifier "body" has no place to fit into Poirot's jigsaw puzzle. The word becomes meaningful only when the *relationship* between two of its signifieds—"corpse" and "the physical structure of a *living* human" is observed and interpreted *simultaneously*. As Poirot explains in his conclusion, the whole logic of his resolution has been inspired by his unusual comparison of the human bodies to the butcher's meat on slabs. "They are not men and women. There is nothing personal about them. They are just—bodies" (10). This remark inspires Poirot to think that the body Patrick and Emily see lying on the beach is not the dead body of Arlena, but the *live* body of someone else.

This basic assumption forms the basis of Poirot's investigation and is the center from which all his other constructions radiate. The first question Poirot asks himself is: who had actually seen the *face* of the "corpse?" The answer is Patrick. The second question is, who was the person Arlena intended to meet at Pixy Cove? From her facial expression that Poirot saw that morning, he was sure that the beautiful woman was going to meet a lover. Who could be her lover on Smugglers' Island if it were not Patrick? Finally, who could have known Arlena's whereabouts that morning? Of course Patrick himself did. Then most likely it was Patrick who had killed Arlena. But the counter-thesis is that Arlena had been killed prior to Patrick's arrival at Pixy Cove. Moreover, it was impossible for Patrick to have been at Pixy Cove before 11:45 because at that

moment he was seen wandering around the hotel beach. If Patrick was the murderer, the only opportunity for him to strangle Arlena was *after* his arrival at Pixy Cove, that is, after the discovery of the body. This plot (that Patrick arrived Pixy Cove *after* the death of Arlena) is as delusive in the story of crime as the awkward position of the white fur on the black cat's tail in Mrs. Gardener's jigsaw puzzle. The murderer's juggling with time shows how the *sjuzet* (the sequence of events presented by the criminals) conceals the *fabula* (the chronological order of events referred to by the testimonies).

The mystery has not been solved completely. The next question to tackle is: whose body was that found lying under the sun when Patrick and Emily arrived at the scene? This also means: who was Patrick's crime partner? Linda's suicidal method had provided an important hint to this question. It was Christine who deliberately let Linda know where her sleeping pills were and the dose that could kill. This was Christine's frame-up strategy. She was trying to direct guilt to Linda because she knew that the childish girl attempted to kill her stepmother by witchcraft. Christine realized that she could take advantage of Linda's guilty feeling about the black magic she secretly performed in her room. The pin, burnt hair and candle were the remains of the evil ritual. Christine created an alibi of her own by altering the time on Linda's wristwatch. When Christine departed Gull Cove, Linda's watch read 11:45, which was twenty minutes ahead of the actual time. This gave Christine twenty minutes to rush down to Pixy Cove to play the dead body of Arlena. Christine accessed the cove by climbing down the stairs from the cliff. Meanwhile, Arlena was hidden in the cave. When her part was done, Christine climbed back onto the cliff and hurried back to her hotel room to wash off the suntan that had been applied to her white-skinned body to imitate the skin color of

Arlena. The bottle that almost hit Mrs. Gardener was discarded from Christine's window: it was the empty suntan oil bottle that Christine did not want to be found in her room.

This is a brief summary of Poirot's explanation of the crime. I shall call this narrative *the fabula* because it tells what happened in the past in a continuous and coherent way. Yet in this *fabula* there is one scene that no one except the criminals witnessed. This is the scene where the "corpse" gets up and returns to the hotel. The real Arlena then comes out of the cave and is strangled by Patrick. This scene is functionally equivalent to the primal scene in the Wolf Man's Case History. It is *not a recollection* and *could not* be a recollection in the whodunit fashion. The primal scene (i.e. the crime scene) in the whodunit is featured as a scene produced exclusively by reconstruction.

As I have mentioned previously, the whole notion of Poirot's resolution is derived from an image instead of any scientific evidence. As a matter of fact, Poirot has no scientific proof to back up his theory. He cannot prove, for instance, the actual presence of suntan oil in the bath water, or Arlena's skin fibers on Patrick's nails, or Christine's finger-prints on Linda's watch, etc. The whole theory is nothing more than a fiction. In fact, Poirot is not unaware of the weakness of his theory when he announces:

I had my mosaic now—each piece beautifully fitted into its place. But unfortunately I had no definite proof. It was all in my mind. It was then that an idea came to me. There was an assurance—a slickness about the crime. I had no doubt that in the future Patrick Redfern would repeat his crime. What about the past? It was remotely possible that this was not his first killing. The method employed, strangulation, was in harmony with his nature—a killer for pleasure as well as for profit. If he was already a murderer I was sure that he would have used the same means. I asked Inspector Colgate for a list of women victims of strangulation. The result filled me with joy. The death of Nellie Parsons found strangled in a lonely copse might or might not be Patrick Redfern's work—it might merely have suggested choice of locality to him, but in Alice Corrigan's

death I found exactly what I was looking for. In essence the same method. Juggling with time—a murder committed not, as is the usual way, *before* it is supposed to have happened, but *afterwards*. A body supposedly discovered at a quarter past four. A husband with an alibi up to twenty-five past four. (170)

The irony of the case is that the culprits are found guilty not because of the evidence produced in the current case, but due to the *coincidence* that Poirot identifies between a case in the past and the murder of Arlena. The only substantial proof that relates Patrick and Christine to the death of Arlena is an old picture kept in the police file. The picture shows the husband of a murdered woman, Alice Corrigan, and the female witness who discovered the body. The two people are recognized to be Patrick and Christine. This coincidence suggests that the couple are crime partners.

The Pixy Cove mystery could not be resolved if there were not a *historical reference*—the episode of the murder of Alice Corrigan—to back up Poirot's assumption. There is now a third story, namely the historical background, outside the frameworks of both the story of crime and the story of investigation. The significance of this third story in *Evil Under the Sun* raises the question of referentiality in literature. Generally speaking, there is no genre better than the whodunit to exemplify the formalist approach to interpretation.⁹ To solve a whodunit mystery, the reader does not require any knowledge about the life of the author, the historical setting of the novel, or the political climate that produces the work; interpretation is based on the elements *inside* the text only. This is true for *Evil Under the Sun* when the mystery is examined from the *reader's* point of view; from Poirot's perspective, however, the formalist approach of interpretation is inadequate to postulate the guilt of the culprits.

Since Freud's methodology of dream interpretation is basically a formalist one, the weakness of formalism is also that of Freudianism. When Freud interpreted the

dream of the Wolf Man, he worked with the assumption that his patient had provided him with *enough* clues to solve the mystery. I shall put this assumption in brackets when I compare Freud's methodology of dream interpretation to that of his colleague Carl Gustav Jung in Chapter Three. If the Wolf Man's dream is reinterpreted in terms of Jungian archetypal figures, then the wolf can be said to function as a reification of the neurotic's unconscious obsessional idea.

The wolf carries many more negative connotations than positive. First of all, the wolf is a symbol of evil and the dark side of human nature. In Nordic mythology, the wolves represented the dark threat of death which accompanied armies in the past while in old German mythology, the wolf has a dangerously destructive figure which represented the principle of evil in its highest form. The Germans believed that at the end of the world, the Fenris wolf would get loose to devour the sun and the moon; this marks the beginning cataclysm and the end of the universe. In Rome, the wolf is believed to be the animal of the devil and the War Gods. In "Little Red Riding Hood," the wolf is a dark feminine goddess who threatens to devour little Red Riding Hood while in "The Seven Little Goats," it is a symbol of hunger and greed. Jung equates the wolf to the internal driving force that creates in people "a constant resentful dissatisfaction. " In Nordic fairy tales, the wolf is a companion of witches and great goddesses. Psychologically, a bewitched person in mythology is a figure comparable to the one with an abnormal psyche.¹⁰

According to Jung's hypothesis of the collective unconscious,¹¹ these archetypal images of the wolf pre-exist in the psyche as a heritage from the ancestors. In other words, we could have an *instinctive* fear of the wolf (due to all its bad connotations

imprinted in the psyche) even if we never had a personal interaction with the animal. In the Wolf Man's dream, the wolves come from nowhere but the collective unconscious. The dreamer's anxiety thus reveals to us more about the collective psyche than his personal unconscious. Taking a different path of analysis, a Jungian psychoanalyst would suggest that the Wolf Man's anxious feeling towards the wolf is merely an instinct, and further, that the absolute origin of such an instinct is impossible to locate. Therefore, in Jung's view, a primal scene like the one in the Wolf Man's Case History does not exist. What appears to have taken the place of the primal scene in Jungian psychoanalytic theory is a primal conception or what Freud calls *primal phantasies*. The distinction between the primal scene and primal phantasies is outlined in the following section.

Primal Phantasies and the Primal Scene

When introducing Freud's conception of "primal phantasies" in *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, Laplanche and Pontalis quote the following passage from Freud's *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*:

It seems to me quite possible that all the things that are told to us today in analysis as phantasy [...] were once real occurrences *in the primaeval times of the human family*, and that children in their phantasies are simply filling in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth. (331, italics mine)

Laplanche and Pontalis summarize the meaning of the above passage as "what was factual reality in prehistory is said to have become psychological reality." What Freud means by "primal phantasies" is accordingly highly congruent with "the collective unconscious" in Jung's diction. The basic assumption of Jungian psychology is that human intellectual

experiences or memories can be passed on to later generations genetically. A "genetic memory" of this kind is called "the collective unconscious" by Jung. Although it is well known that Jungian psychology deviates from the Freudian model—for Freud's analysis focuses mainly on the personal unconscious while Jung's emphasis is on the collective unconscious—I am not surprised to find in Freud's writing a preconception of what would later become one of his followers' major contribution. Sharing the same proposition with Jung that "real occurrences in the primaeval times of the human family" would reappear in children's phantasies as "psychical reality," Freud distinguished primal phantasies from the primal scene by ascribing a truth to the former in the collective memory (a prehistoric truth) and to the latter by virtue of its origin in a precise personal experience (an individual truth). If the scene of parental copulation in the Wolf Man's Case History was not a scene that the Wolf Man *witnessed* (i.e. a first person experience) but a memory he "inherited" from his parents, the context of the primal scene should be revised as *primal phantasies*. According to Laplanche and Pontalis, Freud discussed primal phantasies for the first time in 1915, that is, shortly after he had finished writing the Wolf Man's Case History. Presumably, Freud might have doubted the credibility of the primal scene himself and come up with the theory of primal phantasies to take its place. Like the primal scene, primal phantasies are considered as the absolute origin that provides a final solution to an enigma. "These phantasies," as Laplanche and Pontalis put it, "dramatise [a now-here phenomenon] into the primal moment or original point of departure of a history. In the 'primal scene', it is the origin of the subject that is represented; in seduction phantasies, it is the origin or emergence of sexuality; in castration phantasies, the origin of the distinction between the sexes" (332).

Freud's theory of the primal scene and primal phantasies sheds light on the origin of creativity in artistic works. If text A is said to be the *primal scene* of text B, the reader would anticipate to find in text B a defamiliarized version of text A. On the other hand, if text A is said to be the *primal phantasies* of text B, we expect to see in text A the archetypal images of the real life figures in text B. To concretize my propositions, I shall use Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid" and Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily" as examples of text A and B respectively.

The following is my summary of the opening of "The White Old Maid":

A dead young man was lying in a room of antique fashion. Then, a lady came in to kiss the corpse. After a while, another lady entered the room. The second lady climbed onto the bed to lie down with the corpse. As her head rested beside that of the corpse, a lock of hair fell onto the dead man's brow.

In the text, there is no explicit description of the relationship between the two ladies and the dead man. Equally vague are the time and place settings, the cause of the young man's death and the family background of the main character Edith. The story takes on the "once upon a time" fashion and the no-name characters are more like archetypal images in fairy tales than people with individuality. Obviously, the opening of Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid" echoes the ending of Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily." In Hawthorne's short story, this Gothic scene serves as the source of suspense, but when it reappears in "A Rose for Emily," it is the revelation of the secret kept in Emily's house. Suppose the similarities between these two stories were causally related (i.e. the writing of one author was inspired by another), we would have thought that Faulkner was in debt to Hawthorne. It would be totally absurd if I should say Hawthorne wrote "The White

Old Maid” under the influence of Faulkner. However, it is completely logical to say that some unconscious meanings in “The White Old Maid” are not recognized until we see them in “A Rose for Emily.” This suggests that some motifs in “The White Old Maid” are generated under the influence of Faulkner’s tale. For this reason, it is confusing and misleading to use the term “cause” and “effect” to describe the intertextuality between Hawthorne and Faulkner. Moreover, when I say Hawthorne had caused Faulkner to write “A Rose for Emily,” I implicitly mean that the work of Hawthorne was written at an earlier time than that of Faulkner’s. Similarly, when I say Hawthorne’s work has caused *me* to think of Emily as a ghost of Jefferson, the statement covertly reveals that I have read Hawthorne’s tale prior to thinking Emily as a ghost. In short, when event A is said to be the cause of event B, it is implied that event A takes place *chronologically* before B. Now, my challenge is: if we were able to see past and present events in the horizontal, rather than the vertical, dimension of temporality, the time-gap between “cause” and “effect” would collapse and no chronological order would then be imposed upon “cause” and “effect.”

Let me illustrate this by referring once again to my goldfish dream described in the introduction. At the moments of traumatic reenactment (the moments I discovered the hidden fish-tank in my present house), I lost my perspective on time and saw in my traumatic illusion that past and present events are simultaneous occurrences. When the depth of time diminishes in trauma, there will be no such things as “cause” and “effect” for now all events are connected horizontally in the space of time. At this extraordinary moment, what we traditionally understood as “cause” and “effect” are replaced by the concepts of “signifier and signified” or “*sjuzet* and *fabula*.” My dream is a *sjuzet* or

signifier in such a way that it conjures up my melancholic subject, which is not so much the fish but the part of myself that was lost with the fish. When this repressed subject or emotion surfaces consciousness, it expresses itself in the image of a hidden fish-tank in a house. This recurring dream image or motif is the *fabula*, the narrative that signifies nothing but is itself the signified, the Real or the literal event that wants to be told.

The paradoxical relation between the *sjuzet* and *fabula* is best illustrated by another pair of paradoxically related terms: debit and credit. I remember my first accounting lesson when the instructor poked fun at the class by asking us to define “debit” and “credit.” As the instructor had expected, nobody could precisely define the two most commonly used terms in accounting because the terms themselves are meaningless. The instructor concluded that all we needed to say was “debit is the opposite of credit and credit is the opposite of debit.” Since every transaction is simultaneously a debit and a credit, the two terms are undefined without putting up a frame of reference. The same relation applies to *sjuzet* and *fabula*: if you told me a story about what you did this morning, *to me*, your story would be a *sjuzet*. When I restructured, say, the ordering of your story, I produced the *fabula* of your story. When I told my version of your story to someone else, the story was once again a *sjuzet* as seen from that person’s point of view. Lukacher uses the same concept to analyze the relation between the dream and the primal scene in the Wolf Man’s Case History:

As we have seen, the wolf dream and the primal scene are in a differential and unstable relation to each other. The wolf dream is the *fabula* or event that *the Wolf-Man narrates to Freud*; the primal scene is the *sjuzet* or narrative reconstruction that *Freud narrates to the Wolf-Man*. But these terms can be turned around just as easily as the terms “cause” and “effect”: the primal scene is also the *fabula* or event that is reworked in the *sjuzet* or dream. In constituting the primal scene, Freud transforms the very status of the *fabula* or dream from which he had begun. Like cause and effect, *fabula* and *sjuzet* are

terms that are at once distinct and indistinguishable. There is a temporal difference between the two narratives, but that difference cannot be used to order the causal relation between them because they are constantly folding back into one another, becoming alternately first and second, second and first, cause and effect, effect and cause. (38, emphasis added)

In Freud's original narrative, he starts with the dream and proceeds towards the construction of the primal scene. This narrative sequence postulates the dream as the *sjuzet* (the signifier) and the primal scene as the *fabula* (the signified). In my retelling of the Wolf Man's infantile history, I start with the primal scene as a signifier and trace every detail "forward" to the dream. In my narrative, I transpose not only the positions of the primal scene and the dream, but also their roles as *sjuzet* and *fabula*.

In the next chapter, I shall study "A Rose for Emily" as the primal scene of "The White Old Maid." My methodology is, first, deconstructing Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid" into a series of shattered images. Then, with the literary-theoretical implication developed in the present chapter, I shall reconstruct the episodes to form a new *fabula*—which my reader would recognize to be the context of "A Rose for Emily." The whole procedure is like breaking down a Lego model and reassembling it into a new figure. The objective of Chapter Two is first to theorize that all narratives are both signifiers and signified; and secondly to postulate that a plot (or *sjuzet*) is not only the physical structure of a text, but also the content (or the *fabula*).

If "The White Old Maid" is interpreted as primal phantasy instead of the primal scene of "A Rose for Emily," the two texts are related in a totally different gesture. Their relation is like that of a picture and its negative. When one examines a negative, one sees transparent images of a realistic world. To restore the solidity and familiarity of the figures, one needs to develop the negative images into positive ones. This process of

image development in photography allegorizes the process of individuation in Jungian psychology. The archetypal figures in fairy tales carry different levels of meanings when interpreted by different people in different stages of life. In this chapter, I have shown how the unconscious thought of a person is revealed through the way he *puts together* the seemingly unrelated imagery. In my analysis of the Wolf Man's Case History, I have pointed out that Freud's psychoanalytic practice employs fundamentally the formalist approach of interpretation. Since the formalist approach is motif-oriented, a Freudian or a formalist would drive himself unconsciously towards a predestination during the analysis. This proposition will be reinforced in Chapter Two where I shall deconstruct and reconstruct Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid" using a formalist approach. Then, in Chapter Three, I shall introduce a new approach to psychoanalyze Faulkner's unconscious perception in "A Rose for Emily." From Jung's point of view, the wholeness of a person's psyche cannot be obtained by putting his shattered memories together in a jigsaw-puzzle manner, and there is no such thing as an absolute origin that gives rise to a whole set of symptomology. For Jung, psychic wholeness is grasped not by locating a traumatizing event in early childhood but through a process he calls *individuation*.

Briefly speaking, a child goes through the process of individuation when he likens the witch he reads in fairy tales to a member of his family. When the child grows older, the witch becomes something else to him and this marks another step of individuation for the child has proceeded to differentiate his own schema from the vagueness of an archetypal image. In Chapter Three, I shall explore Faulkner's path of individuation by analyzing the way in which he reifies the archetypal figures in fairy tales and mythologies.

The Primal Scene in Literature:

A Philosophical View

On February 25, 1957, William Faulkner attended a class conference at the University of Virginia and was asked the following question: “Was the ‘Rose for Emily’ an idea or a character? Just how did you go about it?” Faulkner replied, “That came from a picture of the strand of hair on the pillow. It was a ghost story. Simply a picture of a strand of hair on the pillow in the abandoned house”(26). When I first read this part of the interview, I was prompt to draw the conclusion that the primal scene of “A Rose for Emily” is a “picture” showing “a strand of hair on the pillow in the abandoned house.” But I was terribly wrong to think in this way. The primal scene, as discussed in Chapter One, is a *constructed* origin which is brought into existence through analysis, not recollection. The picture that Faulkner mentioned in the interview should not be regarded as the primal scene of “A Rose for Emily” in spite of the fact that Faulkner locates it as the origin of his creativity. What, then, is the primal scene of this gothic masterpiece of Faulkner’s? Or does the construction of the primal scene make sense at all if Faulkner remembered *consciously* the contents of the ghost story that had inspired him to write “A Rose for Emily”? At this point, it is necessary for me to clarify my theory of the primal scene: what I regard as the “primal scene in literature” is *not* a scene or a work that has

inspired the *author* to create the text, but one that the reader constructs to elucidate the *causality* of events in a plot.

Many critics have tried to construct the primal scene of “A Rose for Emily” by identifying similarities between Faulkner’s tale and the Gothic writings of Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Emily Dickinson, Charles Dickens, Robert Browning, John Crowe Ransom, etc.¹² James Stewart likens Miss Havisham in *Great Expectations* to Emily Grierson in the aspect that both women are abandoned by their suitors and both tried to freeze time in a reserved room. Stewart is not the only critic who realizes Faulkner’s indebtedness to Dickens; Joseph Gold, Walter Allen and Baruch Hochman all agree that Dickens had significant influence on Faulkner’s writing style, especially the technique of presenting events against the chronological order. Apart from being compared to the structures and contents of some great novels such as *Great Expectations*, “A Rose for Emily” is also reflected in some shorter works. Typical examples include Robert Browning’s “Porphyria’s Lover” (in Appendix I), Emily Dickinson’s poems 577, 1209, and 1344 (in Appendix II) as well as John Crowe Ransom’s “Emily Hardcastle, Spinster” (in Appendix III). Coincidentally, the name “Emily” recurs in the works and names of the authors mentioned above. Peter Hays locates resemblances not only between the context of “A Rose for Emily” and Dickinson’s poems 577, 1209, and 1344, but also between the characterization of Emily Grierson and the reclusive life of Emily Dickinson herself. Hays suggests that *the Rose* in the title of the short story is the tribute that Faulkner pays to Dickinson. Although Emily Grierson may have reminded Faulkner’s readers about the legendary life of Emily Dickinson, in terms of style and the tradition of American Gothic genre, the fiction of Faulkner is most frequently juxtaposed

to the works of Poe and Hawthorne. Critics like Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren compare the gothic house in "A Rose for Emily" to that in Poe's "The Fall of the House of Usher" while Edward Stone likens it to Hawthorne's *The House of the Seven Gables*. Although parallels between the works of Faulkner and Hawthorne have been widely identified and discussed, Daniel Barnes realizes that "none has apparently noticed the similarities between Faulkner's gothic masterpiece 'A Rose for Emily' and Hawthorne's tale of 'The White Old Maid.'" The major element that links the two stories up is the very image that Faulkner recalled when being asked about the source of "A Rose for Emily"—i.e. "a strand of hair on the pillow in an abandoned house." With this exceptional connection, perhaps Barnes is right to say that "there is evidence in plot, characterization, and the detail to indicate that Hawthorne's tale may well have served as a major source for Faulkner's story"(373). Barnes' critical approach has taken the role of language as a continuous *dialogue* between writer and reader, speaker and listener. When evaluated from the point of view of a dialogic critic like Barnes, "A Rose for Emily" is *Faulkner's* personal response to a former work. For Barnes, literary discourse is referential and intertextual; Emily's "long strand of iron-gray hair," for instance, refers to the "lock of hair" that lays on the brow of a dead man in Hawthorne's tale. Barnes' effort of tracing the origin or the indebtedness of a text to another implies his acknowledgement of the authority of an author over his work. The resemblances between Faulkner's and Hawthorne's texts suggest to Barnes that Faulkner had probably read Hawthorne's story and created his work under the influence of his predecessor. Barnes' proposition could be right, but I would rather look at the Faulkner-Hawthorne relation from a structuralist perspective.

In "From Work to Text," Roland Barthes distinguishes the text from the work: "the work can be held in the hand, the text is held in language, only exists in the movement of a discourse." This means a text does not refer to a particular work; rather it is "the activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-over coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy" (168). From this point of view, critics like Barnes and Hays, who initially intended to find the source of "A Rose for Emily," have turned out to be creating the *text* of "A Rose for Emily." In fact, Barthes defies tracing the origin of a work, believing that "to try to find the 'sources', the 'influences' of a work, is to fall in with the myth of filiation; citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and yet *already read*: they are quotations without inverted commas" (169). What Barthes means by citations or quotations are congruent with my conception of "the primal scene in literature." In Barthes' diction, the primal scene of a text is "anonymous, untraceable," and yet has already been read in the text as "quotations without inverted commas."

In this chapter, I shall postulate that Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid" and Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily" (as well as the intertextually related poems in the appendixes) are one *single text* created by no author but language. Theoretically, this means that the reader of "A Rose for Emily" is simultaneously the reader of "The White Old Maid" whether or not he has literally read Hawthorne's *work*. The basis of my argument is mainly philosophical. First of all, I shall raise the question, "what accounts for the sameness of characters in different episodes of a work or works?" For example, what suggests that Edith and the "Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet" in Hawthorne's tale are the same / different character(s)? How many different / distinguishable female characters are there in "The White Old Maid"? Secondly, if "A Rose for Emily" and

"The White Old Maid" are considered as one single text produced by language, such a text concept, as I shall argue, is parallel to the soul concept put forward by Anthony Quinton in his philosophical essay "The Soul." In light of Quinton's essay, I shall explore the soul-body relation as an allegory to the text-work relation described in Barthes' "From Work to Text."

Quinton's theory of the soul and its literary implications

The problem of defining personal identity has long been a controversial philosophical topic. Philosophers address the issue of personal identity by asking three interrelated questions. First, suppose I saw a man at the bus-stop every morning; how can I tell that the man (or men) is the same person? Second, how do I know that I am the same person as I was yesterday and will be tomorrow? Third, what defines a "person" anyway? For many people, the occasion described in question one is a common daily life experience and thus an answer can be readily produced by common sense. If I claim that I see the same person on the bus-stop everyday, I am actually speaking of the fact that I *remember* seeing a person with an appearance more or less identical to the person(s) I saw in various discontinuous moments. Naturally, people depend heavily on physical appearance as well as their own memory of that appearance as the foundation of recognition. Now let me modify the question so that we can contemplate the issue without putting too much emphasis on the physical part of a person. Suppose the person being seen did not possess a body; what would then be the ground of people's judgement?

This new question, however, is not logical. If a person did not possess a body, it was not a person, or perhaps not even a thing but a conception and it is rather incomprehensible to prove that one conception is identical with another. Therefore, the idea brought forth by the question is extremely absurd and paradoxical.

This paradox is not only a philosophical paradox but also a linguistic one. Consider Saussure's signifier-signified paradigm: is it possible that two signifiers are associated with two identical signifieds? Actually, this philosophical / linguistic paradox has been exemplified in the Wolf Man's Case History. The Wolf Man saw the horrifying wolf and butterfly in different moments of his life, but both of these signifiers conjure up the same conception—the primal scene. My concern in this chapter is: fictional characters are not human beings but conceptions being referred to by narrative structure and discourse. For this reason, the same character may shuttle among several works; it is a matter of recognition that shall unite their discontinuous appearances into one single "person."

Before deriving a hypothesis from the philosophical view of personhood to interpret fictional characters, I shall first introduce Quinton's arguments about personal identity. To define what a "person" is, Quinton takes the following two aspects under consideration: one is the body-mind relation and the other is the continuity of consciousness. Today, the most scientific and convincing way to prove that A and B are the same person is to match "their" finger prints or DNA. As suggested by clinical psychology, a body can only be associated with one personality and a body displaying multiple-personality is deemed to be abnormal. In spite of the scientific and clinical psychological emphasis on the identical *body* as the sole testimony to personal identity,

Quinton formulates a counter-thesis in "The Soul" to put forward the soul, not the body, as "the essential constituent of personality"(65). What Quinton means by the soul is "a series of mental states connected by continuity of character and memory" (59). This phenomenon can be explained by the following incidents. Suppose Daisy, my early childhood nanny, has now totally faded from my memory. My knowledge about her comes solely from my mother. My mother told me that Daisy had once lived in our house and had left us before I was three. It was not long after Daisy's leave that my family spent a holiday in Thailand where we unexpectedly met Daisy. Surprisingly, I fell into Daisy's embrace without feeling her to be a stranger. My mother thought that I, at the age of not more than three, could still remember my former nanny. Yet in my long-term memory, I can recall neither having Daisy as my nanny nor seeing her in Thailand. What I can barely remember is my having been to Thailand at a very early age.

According to Quinton's theory, my memory of the Thailand trip *and* the little girl's memory of her nanny serve together as two intermediate "soul-phases" connecting my former and later self. In other words, the present I and the I before three years old are the same person even though my current memory has no record of any occurrences which took place before the age of three. Quinton's theory of personal identity has put exceptional emphasis on the intermediate memories (e.g. my temporary memory of my nanny) when compared to some classical philosophies of personal identity.¹³

Quinton's conception of memory, however, cannot be considered a *practical* way to define personal identity. It is highly possible that the series of mental states are mis-connected. For example, because I could not remember seeing my nanny in Thailand at all, the trustworthiness of the incident depends solely on my mother's narrative. In other

words, I do not have a direct access to all the so called "intermediate soul-phases" and therefore I cannot tell whether I and the little girl in my mother's story are the same person. It is important to note that in Quinton's theory of personal identity, the function of the intermediate soul-phases is to associate two seemingly unrelated persons (e.g. the adult I and the infant I); and the weakness of Quinton's argument is that some intermediate soul-phases are not recollections of the person but a reconstructed entity. To reevaluate the Wolf Man's primal scene using Quinton's approach to personal identity, the focus of analysis would be a debate on whether the infant who witnesses the primal scene and the adult nicknamed "Wolf Man" in Freud's writing are the same person. The intermediate soul-phases that connect these two "persons" are found, ironically, not in the Wolf Man's recollections of his past, but in Freud's writing, or more precisely, in Freud's mind.

Having introduced some basic arguments of Quinton's theory of personal identity and memory, I refer once again to the issue of the man at the bus-stop. The case addresses two philosophical arguments at the same time. First, how do I, as an observer, know that I am the same person who sees a man at the bus-stop daily? Second, how do I tell that the man I see is the same person? Quinton's theory has provided a straightforward answer to question one. My witnessing is a self-evidence to my continuity of memory: on the first day I saw a man; on the second day I *remembered* seeing the man on the first day; on the third, I remembered seeing the man on the second day and so on. This "series of mental states connected by continuity of character and memory" is the evidence in support of the sameness of my personhood. Yet my own sameness does not imply the sameness of the object I see in different times. The only way to confirm a

third-person's identity is to inquire of the person whether *he* remembers *himself* being at certain places the day or days before. In a daily life practice, putting forth such a question to a stranger sounds awkward because the idea of suspecting the man's being different persons is absurd. The source of skepticism has arisen from Quinton's assumption that the bodies and souls of two persons are interchangeable. As long as the empirical experience of disembodiment has found no place in reality, the doubt of seeing a body with different souls is totally irrational.

Since the term "disembodiment" is used in "The Soul" in its literal sense, Quinton is really serious about the possibility of brain transplantation and making shift between the soul and body empirically:

It is already possible to graft bits of one human body on to another, corneas, fingers, and, even, I believe legs. Might it not be possible to remove the brain from an otherwise worn-out human body and replace it either in a manufactured human body or in a cerebrally untenanted one? In this case we should have a causally conceivable analogue of reincarnation. If this were to become possible and if the resultant creatures appeared in a coherent way to exhibit the character and memories previously associated with the brain that had been fitted into them, we could say that the original person was still in existence even though only a relatively minute part of its original mass and volume was present in the new physical whole. (72)

In this passage, Quinton challenges the hypothesis of bodily identity by providing a counter example. Might it be possible that if the brain of A were transplanted to the body of B, the new body-soul complex should be regarded as having the identity of A? This implies that after transplantation, the body of B no longer *signifies* the soul of B but that of A. Quinton's deconstruction of the body-soul relation discourages people from seeing the body as a rigid signifier strictly attached to *one* signified. This arbitrary association between the body (signifier) and the soul (signified) is further discussed in the following passage:

We use them [bodies] as convenient recognition devices enabling us to locate without difficulty the persisting character and memory complexes in which we are interested, which we love or like. It would be upsetting if a complex with which we were emotionally involved came to have a monstrous or repulsive physical appearance, it would be socially embarrassing if it kept shifting from body to body while most such complexes stayed put, and it would be confusing and tiresome if such shifting around were generally widespread, for it would be a laborious business finding out where one's friends and family were. But that our concern and affection would follow the character and memory complex and not its original bodily associate is surely clear. In the case of general shifting about we should be in the position of people trying to find their intimates in the dark. If the shifts were both frequent and spatially radical we should no doubt give up the attempt to identify individual people, the whole character of relations between people would change, and human life would be like an unending sequence of shortish ocean trips. (64-65)

If we look at the body-soul relation as one that reflects the arbitrariness of the signifier-signified system, we would notice that the above passage is presenting a poststructuralist argument. Since Quinton's body-soul displacement argument has not been empirically experienced so far, his proposition of disembodiment is a purely theoretical argument. Nevertheless, I intend to explore Quinton's hypothesis in a rhetorical sense. My argument is that fictional characters are not fixed and solid entities but arbitrary conceptions produced by narrative discourse. The *body* of a character is the textual structure of a *work* (i.e. the signifiers and their sequence of appearance) and this body is unique and protected by copyright. If one duplicates the *body* of a text, one is merely (illegally) creating an identical plagiarized *work*. The soul of a character, on the other hand, is not restricted to a particular body / work. When a reader reads a work after another, the experience is just like seeing bodies of people on different occasions. My concern is: how does the observer tell whether he has seen the same or different souls among the bodies? To explore this question in a practical way, I shall study the "bodies and souls" of a few characters created by Robert Browning, Emily Dickinson, John

Crowe Ransom, Nathaniel Hawthorne and William Faulkner. Below are the "bodies" of the characters. They are categorized into eight groups of narrative and each group is composed of two voices (the normal font denotes a first person narrative while the italics retell the scene or occurrence from a third person's point of view).

Group I

And, last, she sat down by my side
 And called me. When no voice replied,
 She put my arm about her waist,
 And made her smooth white shoulder bare,
 And all her yellow hair displaced,
 And, stooping, made my cheek lie there,
 And spread, o'er all, her yellow hair,
 Murmuring how she loved me - she
 Too weak, for all her heart's endeavor,
 To set its struggling passion free
 From pride, and vainer ties dissever,
 And give herself to me forever.

(from "Porphyria's Lover")

Was there delusion in the moonbeams, or did her gesture and her eye betray a gleam of triumph, as she bent over the pale corpse—pale as itself—and pressed her living lips to the cold ones of the dead? As she drew back from that long kiss, her features writhed, as if a proud heart were fighting with its anguish.

(from "The White Old Maid")

Group II

So, she was come through wind and rain.
 Be sure I looked up at her eyes
 Happy and proud; at last I knew
 Porphyria worshiped me: surprise
 Made my heart swell, and still it grew
 While I debated what to do.

(from "Porphyria's Lover")

Whenever you heard a lot of laughing anywhere about the square, Homer Barron would be in the center of the group. Presently we began to see him and Miss Emily on

Sunday afternoons driving in the yellow-wheeled buggy and the matched team of bays from the livery stable.

At first we were glad that Miss Emily would have an interest, because the ladies all said, "Of course a Grierson would not think seriously of a Northerner, a day laborer." But there were still others, older people, who said that even grief could not cause a real lady to forget noblesse oblige—without calling it noblesse oblige. They just said, "Poor Emily. Her kinsfolk should come to her."

(from "A Rose for Emily")

Group III

Porphyria's love: she guessed not how
Her darling one wish would be heard.
And thus we sit together now,
And all night long we have not stirred,
And yet God has not said a word!

(from "Porphyria's Lover")

In a high-backed, oaken arm-chair, upright, with her hands clasped across her breast, and her head thrown back, sat the 'Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet.' The stately dame had fallen on her knees, with her forehead on the holy knees of the Old Maid, one hand upon the floor, and the other pressed convulsively against her heart. It clutched a lock of hair, once sable, now discolored with a greenish mould.

(from "The White Old Maid")

Group IV

If I may have it, when it's dead,
I'll be contented -- so --
If just as soon as Breath is out
It shall belong to me --

(from Dickinson's poem 577)

'Away!' cried the lofty one. 'Thou hadst him living! The dead is mine!'
'Thine!' returned the other, shuddering, 'Well hast thou spoken! The dead is thine!'

(from "The White Old Maid")

Group V

Until they lock it in the Grave,
 'Tis Bliss I cannot weigh --
 For tho' they lock Thee in the Grave,
 Myself -- can own the key --

(from Dickinson's poem 577)

Sometimes she stole forth by moonlight, and visited the graves of venerable Integrity, and wedded Love, and virgin Innocence, and every spot where the ashes of a kind and faithful heart were mouldering. Over the hillocks of those favored dead, would she stretch out her arms, with a gesture, as if she were scattering seeds; and many believed that she brought them from the garden of Paradise; for the graves, which she had visited, were green beneath the snow, and covered with sweet flowers from April to November.

(from "The White Old Maid")

Group VI

We shall come tomorrow morning, who were not to have her love,
 We shall bring no face of envy but a gift of praise and lilies
 To the stately ceremonial we are not the heroes of.

(from "Emily Hardcastle, Spinster")

When Miss Emily Grierson died, our whole town went to her funeral: the men through a sort of respectful affection for a fallen monument, the women mostly out of curiosity to see the inside of her house, which no one save an old man-servant—a combined gardener and cook—had seen in at least ten years.

(from "A Rose for Emily")

Group VII

I was dapper when I dangled in my pepper-and-salt;
 We were only local beauties, and we beautifully trusted
 If the proud one had to tarry we would have her by default.

(from "Emily Hardcastle, Spinster")

When we next saw Miss Emily, she had grown fat and her hair was turning gray. During the next few years it grew grayer and grayer until it attained an even pepper-and-

salt iron-gray, when it ceased turning. Up to the day of her death at seventy-four it was still that vigorous iron-gray, like the hair of an active man.

(from "A Rose for Emily")

Group VIII

*But right across her threshold has her Grizzled Baron come;
Let them wrap her as a princess, who'd go softly down a stairway
And seal her to the stranger for his castle in the gloom.*

(from "Emily Hardcastle, Spinster")

So we were not surprised when Homer Barron—the streets had been finished some time since—was gone. We were a little disappointed that there was not a public blowing-off, but we believed that he had gone on to prepare for Miss Emily's coming, or to give her a chance to get rid of the cousins. (By that time it was a cabal, and we were all Miss Emily's allies to help circumvent the cousins.) Sure enough, after another week they departed. And, as we had expected all along, within three days Homer Barron was back in town. A neighbor saw the Negro man admit him at the kitchen door at dusk one evening.

(from "A Rose for Emily")

In a first-person past-tense statement like "I looked up at her eye," there are actually two subjects—the I that *remembers* looking up at her eye, and the I that looked up at her eye. The two I's, though separated by time, are connected by memory.

Similarly,

a third-person past-tense statement like "she bent over the pale corpse" also contains two subjects—the speaker who reports seeing the occurrence and the lady who bent over the pale corpse. In a third person narrative, however, the identity of the speaker is usually ignored or regarded as a voice with no bodily existence.¹⁴ In the opening scene of "The White Old Maid," for instance, there is apparently no one else other than a lofty girl and Edith in the room with the corpse; and yet the occurrence in the room is told through someone other than the lofty girl's and Edith's point of view. This ghostly narrator,

unlike the narrator of "A Rose for Emily," is transparent and omnipresent throughout the text. It (rather than he or she) can travel through time, space and even the bodies of many texts to retell narratives in different voices. Consider the episodes in Group I: the speaker in the first episode remembers a lady sitting down by himself and stooping over to make his cheek lie on her bare shoulder. Then (his voice shifts from the past to the present tense) he comments that the lady's heart has tried to "set its struggle passion free from pride and...give herself to [him] forever." Meanwhile, the speaker in the other episode remembers seeing a proud woman bending over to kiss a corpse. According to Quinton's proposition of the continuity of soul-phases, the speaker giving a first-person testimony and the corpse being described in the third-person narrative are the same character.

Referring once again to my memory of Daisy, the present I (phase 1) who remember *myself* (phase 2) being in Thailand in early childhood and the little girl in Thailand (phase 3) who remembers *herself* (phase 4) being with Daisy before are the same person despite the fact that the present I (phase 1) have no memory of the days I (phase 4) spent with Daisy. My knowledge of my prehistoric (i.e. the period of life that my memory keeps no record) existence has come from my mother's third-person narrative. As a matter of fact, being the same person and *having a knowledge* of one's own sameness are two different philosophical arguments. Quinton's proposition of the continuity of soul-phases, though providing a *theoretical basis* in support of the former argument, is unable to testify to either of the arguments empirically. The problem arises from the fact that only two soul-phases are liable to be connected by memory at one time and in my example, there is an unbridgeable gap between phase 2 and 3, the two I's who remember.

According to the argument developed in Chapter One (that the primal scene itself is not a memory but a scene reconstructed *with respect to* someone's memories), the scene in episode 1 is the primal scene of the occurrence in episode 2 and vice versa. When reading the first-person narrative, we do not think that the person who speaks is a corpse; similarly if we read the third-person narrative alone, we would not have known the corpse's thought. Therefore, the two episodes form a supplementary narrative to each other. Their relation is like that between Freud's narrative about the Wolf Man's infantile history and the Wolf Man's report of his symptomology. Seeing from Freud's (a psychoanalytic) point of view, the primal scene is an *unconscious memory*; from Barthes' (a structuralist) point of view, it is a *deferred origin* of narrativity; from Quinton's (a philosophical) point of view, it is *a person's former self that is unknown to the person without making certain reference to someone else's memory*. In any of the cases, the primal scene is *not* part of the conscious memories of the subject who is *supposed to* have a first-person experience of it. Whether the primal scene is understood as "unconscious memory," "deferred origin" or "constructed personhood," its meaning is always paradoxical and thus best described by oxymorons.

In light of the Wolf Man's Case History, the principles that associate one episode to another include the repetition of themes, dictions, images, postures, proper names as well as cause-effect interactions. My grouping of the episodes posed above serves to demonstrate the application of the various principles of association. Generally speaking, the narratives that are thematically connected are episodes in Group I, IV, V and VI. Group VIII is an example of making association through proper name while the episodes in Group VII are articulated by the diction "pepper-and-salt." For Group III, the sitting

posture of the two characters are the major element that suggests a relation between the two thematically obscure episodes.

At this point, my discussion of intertextuality has covered almost all the major points Barthes puts forward in "From Work to Text," which are summarized as follows:

1. *The Text is a methodological field, a process of demonstration and is experienced only in an activity of production.*

In my "demonstration" of the sameness of character, I *produce* a new identity for every character under investigation. For example, the anonymous narrator in episode 1 of group IV adapts the identity of "The Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet" when read together with an episode from "The White Old Maid." Similarly, the identity of "we" in "Emily Hardcastle, Spinster" is ambiguous, but if we look at the poem as an allusion to "A Rose for Emily," the referentiality of the pronoun "we" is less obscure. The "we" in line 1 and 3 may represent the elderly male citizens of the town while that in line 2 may refer to the female residents.

2. *The Text cannot be categorized into a particular genre and is always paradoxical in the sense that it has no generic boundary.*

Ransom's "Emily Hardcastle, Spinster" is both a poem and a short story for many of the gaps in the *poem* are filled with the context of the *short story* "A Rose for Emily." In the same way, "A Rose for Emily" is both a short story and a poem for much of its context is reflected in the poems by various poets.

3. *The Text practices the infinite deferment of the signified, is dilatory; its field is that of the signifier and the signified must not be conceived of as 'the first stage of meaning', its material vestibule, but, in complete opposition to this, as its deferred*

action. The logic regulating the Text is not comprehensive (define 'what the work means') but metonymic; the activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-over coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy.

If a character is considered *not* as a personality of a specific figure in narrative, but a loose conception created by plot and language, the Text, putting in Barthes' sentence, practices the infinite deferment of a *character*. The *plot* of "Porphyria's Lover" suggests that the "we" in "And thus we sit together now" are Porphyria and her lover. However, an earlier episode in the poem tells us that Porphyria has been strangled by her lover with her own hair. Therefore, the person who sits together with the persona at the end of the poem could be a corpse. When the ending of "Porphyria's Lover" is read together with that of "The White Old Maid" (see the episodes in Group III), a new plot is produced: "we" may refer to "The Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet" and the "stately dame;" and the story ends with one maid killing the other with a strand of hair. As illustrated in my analysis of the intertextuality between "Porphyria's Lover" and "The White Old Maid," the Text is a network—a net of *works*—and every single work in this net is a metonymy for the wholeness of the big Text.

4. *Deriving from the above argument, the Text is always plural.*

This means that Barthes does not think that a Text is produced under the influence of some proceeding texts; rather, the proceeding texts shall reappear as the deferred signified in a plural Text.

5. *The author is reputed the father and the owner of the work. In other words, the role of the author in his text is a guest who comes in not as the owner of the house*

but one of the characters the Text houses (In Chapter Three, this idea will be discussed more extensively when I re-construct Faulkner as “a guest” in the primal scene of “A Rose for Emily”).

6. *The Text deconstructs the distance between writing and reading and reading is no longer considered as a process of consumption.*

When episodes from "A Rose for Emily," "The White Old Maid," "Emily Hardcastle, Spinster" and Dickinson's "poem 577" are reread in this paper, new stories are *spontaneously* written on the reader's mind. Indeed, the processes of reading and writing are so closely mingling with each other that the so-called "reader" is unable to tell whether information is being input to or output from him.

7. *Owing to the transparency of language relations, literature has no referentiality to a world outside that of language.*

If a narrative is treated as one big signifier, the signified should not be regarded as real occurrences in reality but plots of other narratives. Miss Emily's story, for instance, does not allude to Emily Dickinson the *poet*, but Emily Dickinson the *persona* or *character* as portrayed in her poems.

Barthes' structuralist propositions resonance with Quinton's philosophy of the Soul in the following ways:

- i. The Text cannot be held in hand but in language;
The Soul cannot be touched physically but grasped conceptually.
- ii. The Text has no generic boundary;
The Soul carries no structural features.
- iii. The Text practices the infinite deferment of the signified;

The Soul lives on infinitely with an empirical experience of disembodiment.

- iv. It may take a person a short time to read a *work* but a long time to grasp a Text's deferred meanings;
It may take a person an instant to memorize someone's physical appearance but a lifetime to understand his mind.
- v. The Text is plural—preceding and succeeding texts are mutually included;
The Soul is plural in the sense that it is a product of the collective unconscious.
- vi. The Text has no author;
The Soul has no biological father.
- vii. The transparency of language combines texts into one big Text;
The continuity of memory unites a series of soul-phases into one single person.

To further explore the mechanism of making imaginary linkages between the soul-phases of a character, I shall narrow down my discussion of *intertextuality* to *intratextuality*. Among the several works introduced in this chapter, Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid" produces the most direct evidence to Quinton's proposition that the soul is "a series of mental states connected by continuity of *character* and *memory*." Indeed, Hawthorne's characterization is tailor-made to demonstrate Quinton's argument. First, the characters in the story are ghost-like; they glide through the world like the disembodied souls of the dead. Second, some characters have no name at all; their identities are inferred from their *characters* (synonymous with personalities) such as

stately, lofty, dignified, rigid, holy, feeble, humble etc. Third, seemingly unrelated characters are connected by their *memories* of the past. When the story begins, two girls make an appointment to meet in the far future. At the end, two old ladies are seen entering an old mansion. The two elderly women are believed to be the older selves of the young girls because they *remember* the meeting.

Reading “The White Old Maid” is like playing a “who’s who” identification game since most of its characters (apart from Edith, Colonel Fenwicke and “the Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet”) are anonymous. These include a “proud and stately” girl who appoints a meeting with Edith in the far future; a false maid being married to a wealthy man shortly after the death of her lover; the widow of the last inheritor of a family with a lozenge shield of arms as its emblem; and “an ancient lady” who is seen descending from a grand coach bearing the shield of arms of the honored family. Do all these women refer to the same character? If not, how many different, or rather distinguishable, women are present in “The White Old Maid”? Similarly, how many “wealthy men” are ever mentioned or implied in the story? There is the young man in his burial-clothes, the wealthy man whose marriage is an omen of evil, old Colonel Fenwicke and the “last inheritor” of the honored family. What are the relationships between these men if they are not the same individual? And in what ways do they relate to the anonymous women? Todorov writes in “Narrative-Men,”¹⁵ in *The Poetics of Prose*, that “a character is a potential story that is the story of his life. Every new character signifies a new plot. We are in the realm of narrative-men” (70). If every new character signifies a new plot, how many plots are there in “The White Old Maid”? or how many stories are included in the original plot? To discuss the relation between plot and characterization in Hawthorne’s

narrative, I shall introduce two technical terms, namely *the constructive* and *deconstructive narrative sequence*.

The Constructive and Deconstructive Narrative Sequence

The sequence of letters that I composed at the beginning of the introduction is broken down as follows:

“Ding!”
A loony fell upon the ground
The man in rags raised his head.

Grammatically, the second and third lines of this poem are complete sentences with a subject and a full verb. Contextually, they are more like dependent clauses whose meanings are incomplete without making connection with the preceeding or succeeding statement(s). Owing to the ambiguity of the onomatopoeia “ding!” and the dual meaning of the word “loony” (a homophone of “loonie”), the context of the poem is subject to a complex mode of interpretation. For someone who has not *read* the poem but *hears* someone recite it to him, the person tends to hear “loonie” instead of “loony” in line 2. The listener might think that the man in rags is a beggar who raises his head to thank his benefactor when a coin is thrown to him. For a *reader* of the poem, the connection between line 1 and 2 is less direct. First, the reader might ask, “what has caused the loony’s fall?” “Does he break something before he falls?” or “Does he tumble over something?” “What is the thing that breaks?” “Suppose it is a bottle, is the man in rags

drunk?” “Does ‘loony’ refer to just another drunkard?” etc. Then based on the assumptions he makes for line 1 and 2, the reader deduces a conclusion for line 3—the man in rags might be another drunkard who is awakened from his intoxication by a disturbing sound and occurrence.

Yet when the poem is read backward, it conveys different stories to the audience / reader:

The man in rags raised his head
A loony fell upon the ground.
“Ding!”

Hearing the same episodes in a reversed order, the audience might realize that in this “new” version of the story, the man in rags has actually raised his head *to beg* before a change is given to him. He is no longer portrayed as an apathetic man as in the previous plot. Also, the rearranged sequence reverses the causality of events described in line 2 and 3 of the original poem—the head-raising action of the man has now become the cause of the fall of the loonie, not the man's response to it. After all, the lines are prone to tell a completely different story: perhaps the man in rags raises his head to prepare for an attack, or perhaps he and the loony (a wild man) have just engaged in a game of fighting; the winner raises his head while the loser fell upon the ground. “Ding!” is the sound of the bell that signals the end of the game.

The scene in which the beggar raises his head (to ask for money or in the course of fighting) is the *primal scene* of the poem. This scene is not told in the poem. Its ghostly existence is invisible to readers who look at it from an unfavorable perspective (e.g. to read the lines in the wrong order); but for those who situate themselves in just the

right place of observation, the “ghosting of language” is ready to rise up to them from its burial ground.

It would seem, then, that the primal scene is both the cause and effect of narrative discourse and is both inside and outside the text. Consider the partially constructed scene “the *beggar* raised his head *to ask for money*”: I regard this as the primal scene because it serves as the transcendental *origin* of the up-coming event—that a loonie is heard falling on the ground. In terms of referentiality, the primal scene is not only a signifier providing clues to the causality of narratives but is also the signified event being referred to by the very same pieces of narratives. To sum up, the primal scene is a *constructed origin*, an oxymoron dissolving the boundary between the dichotomies of cause and effect, within and without, signifier and signified.

Shattering the above dichotomies, any particular narrative sequence can be read as both a constructive and deconstructive sequence, like how the primal scene can be understood as both a *sjuzet* and *fabula*. A constructive sequence is one that the order of telling *favors* the articulation of certain narrative events, images, allegories, ironies, puns, etc and to produce a unifying motif (i.e. the formalist approach to literature); whereas a deconstructive sequence erases the articulation of the above elements and defamiliarizes the motifs that a constructive sequence establishes (i.e. the poststructuralist approach). As illustrated in my discussion of the narrative sequence of the poem, the forward order of story telling *constructs* the man in rags as an apathetic panhandler who waits passively for his benefactor’s sympathy. When this man reappears in the backward narrative sequence, his passive attitude is transformed into an active one. The backward sequence has therefore *deconstructed* the man’s apathy and *reconstructed* him as an enthusiastic

fellow. This phenomenon supports Quinton's argument that two physically identical men (the man in rags) might not possess the same personality and thus are not the same person.

In Appendix IV, there are two simplified versions of Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid." The two versions contain exactly the same episodes but with different orderings. Version One presents the episodes in the order they appear in Hawthorne's original text while Version Two re-presents the story by altering the flow of episodes. When comparing the plot of "The White Old Maid" to that of "A Rose for Emily," Daniel Barnes comments that "unlike 'A Rose for Emily,' which opens with Miss Emily's funeral and proceeds through a series of flashbacks to the grim discovery of Homer Barron's corpse, 'The White Old Maid' follows a conventional linear pattern of development, beginning with a brief tableau set many years before the main action of the tale" (373). Although I do not object to Barnes' saying that "The White Old Maid" follows a "conventional linear pattern of [plot] development," I have no solid ground to affirm this comment. What I believe is that if we interpreted the episodes chronologically, a more or less coherent story would be produced. In this section, my challenge is to read "The White Old Maid" as if it were not written in a chronological order and to see what would become of the story (the *fabula*). Here, I must make it clear that I am not trying to disprove the linearity of Hawthorne's plot; my objective is to explore the *possibility* of taking an alternative route to approach the textuality of Hawthorne's tale. My attitude is that of a philosophical skeptic who *does not*, for instance, tell people that the man they see at the bus-stop daily is in fact a different person

from time to time; a skeptic is interested to know whether it is *possible* that people, under certain circumstances, are not what they seem to be.

Suppose the plot of “The White Old Maid” is a chronological representation of the events in the story: the opening scene, where two girls appoint a meeting “far, far in time to come,” is the genesis of all the succeeding events, especially the mythical gathering of two old maids in an empty house. When the episodes of “The White Old Maid” are arranged in the sequence as they appear in Version One, the narrative favors the connection of the personhood of Edith to that of the “Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet” because they seem sharing a common memory—“their” appointment with the lofty woman. Actually, in Hawthorne’s tale, nothing has directly suggested the identity of the two characters. They are referred to by different proper names and each has her own set of characteristics. Edith is “soft,” “fragile,” “gentle,” “weak and helpless” whereas “The Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet” is “insane,” “quiet,” “sad,” “free from violence,” “suffered to pursue her harmless fantasies and unmolested by the world.” Hawthorne’s characterization portrays the Old Maid as a human with divine nature. Like all human beings, the Old Maid goes through the process of aging and yet is not part of the human community. She has never had any conversation or contact with living people. In the town’s people’s eye, “she is but a shadow”—i.e. she is visible but not substantial. Her special interest in funerals suggests that she is living among the dead rather than the living. Despite the ghostly personality of the “Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet,” her visit to Colonel Fenwicke’s mansion (as well as that of the other ghostly woman) is a factual event witnessed by a crowd. Version One of “The White Old Maid” in Appendix IV preserves all these qualities of the Old Maid but Version Two presents her as a totally

different person. In the second story, the identification of Edith and the Old Maid is shattered and thus “The Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet” is no longer the holy, peaceful and suffering figure; rather she is an evil spirit prognosticating death *everywhere* with her appearance. Besides deconstructing the humanity and holiness of the Old Maid, Version Two of “The White Old Maid” introduces the message that *no human figure* other than the clergyman and his torch bearer has entered the empty house. The women who the crowd eye-witness entering the house are ghosts. Also, the scene with Edith and the lofty girl joining hands ceases to be the origin of up-coming narratives but a short digression from the main plot. Without making a connection to any material outside the work, the above textual transformation is accomplished by deconstructing the linearity of a seemingly chronological narration. To sum up the complex relation between Version One and Two of “The White Old Maid,” I shall refer once again to the terms *sjuzet* and *fabula*. Suppose Hawthorne’s tale is written in a chronological order: Version One of the story is a *fabula* while Version Two is a *sjuzet*. Owing to the fact that Version Two is constructed out of Version One, the latter (the *fabula*) is the absolute origin of the former (the *sjuzet*). Yet when I interpreted the *sjuzet* independently, I noticed that the signified *fabula* deviates greatly from the original *fabula*. In other words, the constructed origin is not identical with the absolute origin. Then, with respect to the literary implication derived from Quinton’s theory of personal identity, Version One and Two of “The White Old Maid” are two different texts with different sets of characters despite the fact that they share the same bodies. In the following, I shall further analyze this hypothesis by tracing the mutation of Hawthorne’s characters from one plot to another.

Version Two of “The White Old Maid” seems to tell the following story:

A shriek was heard from an empty old building. The sound summoned a crowd who gathered with curiosity outside the building. Among the people, only a clergyman and his serving-man had the guts to venture into the house. Then an old man announced to the crowd that the house had been without any occupant for fifteen years since the death of old Colonel Fenwicke. Hearing this, the crowd fantasized themselves seeing ghosts paying visits to the old mansion. Meanwhile, some elderly citizens told of stories about the previous residents of the house. The narratives seemed to call up the ghosts from their graves. Some people believed they saw a third visitant being admitted into the house while others engaged themselves in a discontinuous story about a legendary woman named the “Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet.” The story goes like this: there once lived an insane maid in the town. The lady was the shadow of affliction and her presence was always associated with death. One day, the Old Maid showed herself up somewhere around Colonel Fenwicke’s mansion. People began to worry about the magnificent family as it was well known to the town that a wealthy man had been cursed by the appearance of the Old Maid in his wedding. The town was right to think that some bad luck had descended upon Colonel Fenwicke’s mansion. The corpse of a young man lay on the bed while two of his lovers quarreled over the responsibility for his death. After scheduling a time to meet in the far future, the two girls left the house one by one. One of them ran into the clergyman who just entered the house. Yet the clergyman seemed not able to see the young girl. This incident suggests that the girls are the ghosts being called up from their graves by the narratives about them. Another ghost paid a visit to the house by travelling in a coach. Some folks believed that this ghostly visitant was the mythical “Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet” who had come to meet other ghosts. She was

admitted into the house by a deceased black servant. While people gathering outside the house were entertaining themselves with ghost stories and fantasies, the clergyman and his servant had ventured onto the second floor of the house. The clergyman threw open a closed door with his torch and thus extinguished the flame. The room was now illuminated only by moonbeams. In the dark, the two men saw a male corpse lying on the bed. In a high-backed chair sat the “Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet.” Another lady was found dead on the floor with her forehead resting on the knees of the Old Maid and her hand clutching a lock of hair.

The theme of the above story is explicitly told in the last statement of the fifth paragraph: “These graphic reminiscences seemed to call up the ghosts of those to whom they referred.” However, when this very same statement is read in the original text, it does not possess such a magical power to “stir up” the ghosts. In Version One, this sentence sounds like a personal remark made by the narrator and it finds no support in the context that follows. In the original text, the event that summons two elderly women to a long abandoned house centers on the opening scene. A reader of Version One would not have thought that the “graphic reminiscences” of the town people are “truly” capable of calling up the ghosts to the house. As this magical transformation of content is created exclusively by the *form* of narrative, the twice-told tale validates the formalist argument for the subordination of content to form. In the new context, the causality of events has shifted from the antecedent action in the original story to the pivotal statement discussed above. This shift of causality reveals to us that the origin of narrative is altogether an illusion manipulated by language and form.

As told explicitly in Version Two, the ghosts that the clergyman and the town people see inside and outside the house are “graphic reminiscences” —or narratives within narratives from the reader’s point of view. These ghost stories, when interpreted in light of the context of “A Rose for Emily,” are prone to bring back the legendary life of Miss Emily into the mansion of Colonel Fenwicke. In the following narrative, I shall construct the life of Faulkner’s Emily Grierson as the primal scene of the “graphic reminiscences” circulated among the crowd outside the haunted house in Hawthorne’s tale.

The discovery of a desiccated corpse in a room on the second floor of Emily’s house shocked the town and people began to make up stories about the house and its deceased residents. These stories have passed from generation to generation and finally have become a local saga. One night, when a shriek was heard from Colonel Fenwicke’s deserted house, people recalled the story of Emily and her corpse and they began to imagine Emily Grierson as a previous resident of the Fenwicke house. It was said that the “Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet” had once paid a mythical visit to the big house and yet no funeral was announced. Not until the death of Emily did the people figure out retrospectively that the Old Maid had actually come to attend the funeral of Homer Barron, whose body had been left decaying in the house ever since. The death of Homer Barron and why he was not decently buried remained a mystery to the town. It was once said that his death was somehow related to a girl called Edith and an anonymous arrogant girl. Some people thought that Edith was in fact Emily while some other likened Emily’s pride to the loftiness of the other girl; yet a third group prefers to look at the two girls as two contradictory selves of Emily. Some folks even created dialogues between the two

girls. The imaginary conversations revealed what people had thought of the struggles bearing inside Emily. They believed that Emily's pride had forbidden her weaker ego to reveal the secret of Homer Barron; "poor Emily" submitted to the proud Emily because the latter allowed her to stay alone with the corpse.

The above narrative constructs "A Rose for Emily" as the primal scene of the fragmentary narratives in "The White Old Maid," for the life of Emily Grierson is *remembered unconsciously* in the ghost stories. Like the Wolf Man, who talks about his symptomology without knowing what has caused it, the narrator of "The White Old Maid" summons the ghosts without knowing where they have come from. It is *my* narrative (functionally equivalent to Freud's writing of the case history for the Wolf Man) that generates the articulation and traces the primal scene of Hawthorne's tale *forward* to its *deferred origin*. Unlike Barnes, who proposes that "Hawthorne's tale may have served as a major source for Faulkner's story," I reverse the causal relation between the narrativity of Hawthorne and Faulkner by postulating the hypothesis of a *deferred origin*.

When read as a deconstructive sequence, Version Two of "The White Old Maid" discourages the reader from seeing the visitants to the big house as human figures. With the antecedent action (the scene with the corpse in its burial clothes) placed at the end, the new form keeps the reader from recognizing the causal relation between the young man's death and the return of the women to the house. Also, the new formal arrangement blinds the reader to the depth of time. In Version One, the early incident when the clergyman "passed in the house without a word" and that when the same clergyman "entered the house with his torch bearer" are several decades apart. This temporal

distance, however, is diminished in Version Two and the two incidents overlap to produce a sense of simultaneity of the occurrences inside and outside the house.

Speaking of its constructivity, the sequence of narrative in Version Two favors the association of certain images and themes. For example, in the opening of the story, a shriek is heard from the house and it sounds like “a heart had burst in giving it utterance.” Then it is mentioned that a girl, after bending over to kiss a corpse, writhes as though “a proud heart were fighting with its anguish.” At the end of the story, a stately dame fell dead on the floor with one of her hands “pressed convulsively against her heart.” These consecutive descriptions suggest that the incidents are causally related and the characters involved (the proud girl and the stately dame) are the same individual. Thematically, Version Two of “The White Old Maid” foregrounds the return of a forgotten history through utterance. This message is enforced in the pun “these graphic reminiscences seemed to call up the ghosts of those to whom they referred.” I consider this sentence a pun because its ghostly significance, though prone to escape attention in Version One, is called back to the text by narratives focusing on it. In a formalist reading, language serves like a ghost whose body is omnipresent but not always visible. To observe the invisible, certain arrangements such as a textual restructuration must be made. By deconstructing and reconstructing the rhetoric of “The White Old Maid,” the singular work becomes a plural text. My analysis of intertextuality in this chapter attempts to cut off the line that binds a work to its author and to let it roll down the hill of discourse like a snowball.

The Death of the Author

The infantile history of the Wolf Man is not altogether convincing because the reader is alert to the fact that the so-called “history” is composed of two texts by two different authors—the Wolf Man’s recollection of his symptomology and Freud’s narrative imperative to account for an absolute origin in the primal scene. If both of these texts were detached from their authors, the history would sound more convincing. As we have seen, many critics have tried to connect “A Rose for Emily” to other literary works; yet not many readers are willing to accept Freud’s connection of the Wolf Man’s neurosis to the primal scene. Since there is no difference between the Freudian and structuralist approach to intertextuality, it is rather ironic for a literary critic to defy the causal link between the primal scene and the Wolf Man’s neurosis on one hand and foreground the plurality of a text on the other.

Freud’s conception of the primal scene has been discussed as early as in the writings of Plato. In *Phaedo*, Plato constructs a substantial discussion of what we today understand as “the unconscious” between Cebes, Simmias and Socrates. Below is a long quotation from *Phaedo*:

‘Yes,’ replied Cebes, ‘and then there is that argument, Socrates, which you are often putting forward, that our learning is simply recollection—that argument, also, if it is sound, proves that we must have learnt what we now recollect at some previous time; and that would be impossible unless our souls had existed somewhere before appearing in this human frame—so that according to this argument as well, the soul seems to be something immortal.’

‘But what are the grounds of these arguments, Cebes?’ put in Simmias.
‘Remind me, for at the moment I can’t quite recollect.’

‘I can give you one excellent reason,’ said Cebes. ‘When people are asked something, if the question is well put, they themselves explain everything—and yet if they hadn’t got knowledge and a right account of the matter stored away inside them, they couldn’t do that; and if you next take them to the figures of

geometry or something else of that sort, it is then as clear as could possibly be that this is the case.'

'But if you are not convinced by this, Simmias,' said Socrates, 'look at the matter in this way, and see if you agree. You doubt whether what is called learning can be recollection?'

'I am not *doubting*,' said Simmias, 'but I need to do just what we are talking about, to *recollect*. I almost remember and almost believe as a result of Cebes' explanation; but I shall be none the less glad to hear how you have explained it.'

'This is my method,' he said. 'We agree, I suppose, that if a man remembers something, he must have *known* it at some time previously.'

'Yes,' he said.

'And do we also agree that when a man gets knowledge in this sort of way, that is recollection? *How* do I mean? Well, if a man sees or hears or otherwise perceives something, and not only recognizes that particular thing, but thinks of *something else*—of a thing that is the object of *different* knowledge—isn't it right that we should say that he has *recollected* this thing of which he has suddenly thought?'

'How do you mean?'

'For example, our knowledge of a man is different from our knowledge of a lyre.'

'Of course.'

'Now you know that when lovers see a lyre or cloak or something else that their loved ones are accustomed to use, what they experience is this; they recognize the lyre and form a mental image of the boy who owns the lyre. This is recollection—just as when people see Simmias they are often reminded of Cebes; and there will be hundreds of other examples.'

'Hundreds, yes,' said Simmias.

'Surely, then, this sort of thing is a kind of recollection—especially when the experience is concerned with those things which you have forgotten through lapse of time, and through not having seen them.'

'Certainly.'

'Again,' he said, 'is it possible to see a picture of a horse or of a lyre and to be reminded of a man, or to see a picture of Simmias and to remember Cebes?'

'Yes, indeed.'

'And even, seeing a picture of Simmias, to remember Simmias?'

'It is,' he said.

And does it not follow from all this that the recollection can be caused *either* by what is like *or* by what is unlike?'

'Yes.'

'But when you are reminded of something by what is like it, are you not bound also to notice whether this similar thing falls short or not in any way in its resemblance to the thing of which you have been reminded?'

'Necessarily,' he said.

'Now consider whether this is true. We say, I think, that there is a thing which is *Equal*—I don't mean a particular piece of wood that is like another, or a stone that is like another, or anything of that sort, but something over and

above all these, the Equal Itself. Are we to agree that there is such a thing, or not?’

‘Yes, certainly,’ said Simmias, ‘most assuredly.’

‘And do we really know what its essential nature is?’

‘Yes,’ he said.

‘Then where did we get the knowledge of it *from*? Surely we got that conception from the things we were talking about just now, from seeing pieces of wood or stones or any other things equal, although it is different from these; or don’t you think that it is different? Consider it in this way: do not stones that are equal, or pieces of wood, very often seem—the self-same objects—to one man, equal, to another, unequal?’

‘Certainly.’

‘Well, have the things that are *really* equal ever seemed to you to be unequal? or has Equality seemed the same as Inequality?’

‘Never, Socrates.’

Then these so-called equal things and the Equal Itself are not the same.’

‘Definitely not, in my opinion, Socrates.

‘Yet from these equal things, which are different from that “Equal”, you have conceived and acquired your knowledge of it?’

‘True,’ he said.

‘Presumably either because it is like them, or else because it is unlike?’

‘Yes.’

‘But it makes no difference,’ he said. ‘So long as from seeing one thing you form mental images of another, whether this other thing be similar or dissimilar, the process must be recollection.’

‘Certainly.’

‘Now when we have to do with the pieces of wood and the equal things we were talking about just now, do they seem to us to be equal in the same way as that which is essentially and perfectly equal, or do they, perhaps, fall short of that, in point of resemblance to what is equal?’

‘They fall short a great deal,’ he said.

‘Then we agree that when a man sees a thing, and tells himself that “the thing I am now looking at wants to be like some other thing,” but that it falls short and cannot be like that—that it is, in fact, inferior—the man who gets this notion must, I suppose, have previous knowledge of that thing to which he says that he sees a real but imperfect resemblance.’

‘He must.’

‘Well, isn’t that the case with us, so far as the so-called equal things and the Equal Itself are concerned?’

‘Absolutely.’

‘Then we must have had knowledge of the Equal *before* that time when we first saw the things that are “equal” and conceived the idea that all these things were trying to be like the Equal, but fell short.’

‘That is so.’

‘But we also agree that we derived the conception from no other source—to do so, indeed, would not be possible—than from sight or touch or from some other one of the senses. I count all of them as the same.’

‘Yes, Socrates, they are all one so far as the present discussion is concerned.’

‘Then it is through the senses that we must reach the conclusion that all the objects of sense which are “equal” aim at that which really *is* Equal, but fall short of it. Or what is our verdict?’

‘Just that.’

‘I suppose, then, that we must have acquired knowledge of the nature of the Equal Itself before we began to see and to hear and to use our other senses, if we were going to refer to that criterion things that appeared to the senses equal, on the ground that they all do their best to be like it, though they are inferior.’

‘We must have, in view of what we have admitted already, Socrates.’

‘And did we not begin to see and to hear and to enjoy our other faculties of sense the moment we were born?’

‘Certainly.’¹⁶

The Platonic treatment of the Equal Itself, when evaluated with respect to modern psychological and philosophical theories, is the meeting place of Freudianism, structuralism, and archetypal criticism. A Freudian interpretation of the Equal Itself has been discussed in Chapter One while the structuralist approach to the issue is analyzed in this chapter. In Freud’s interpretation of the causality of the Wolf Man’s infantile neurosis, he supposes that every symptom the child displays is, in Platonic expression, equal to the Equal Itself. However, this does not mean that the “equal things” and the Equal Itself are identical. On the contrary, they could be very unlike each other. In both Freudian and Platonic views, the links between the equal to the Equal is transcendental and arbitrary. Although Plato has not clarified explicitly in *Phaedo* that the Equal Itself, before making itself known in a practice of free associations, is an unconscious entity, this proposition is implied in his argument “that our learning is simply recollection.” Consider the Wolf Man’s learning of the primal scene: before he becomes fully aware of the primal scene, he feels that his symptoms are telling him something if only someone

can explain to him what exactly the thing is. Freud saw to it that to cure the Wolf Man, he must help him recollect his past by learning the meanings of his symptoms.

Plato's treatment of learning as recollection implies his belief in the immortality of the soul. Unlike the body, the soul is indestructible and incapable of dissolution. The soul pre-exists birth and continues to exist after death. It is the reservoir of knowledge and is the Equal Itself from which all other equal ideas deviate. In Freudian psychology, the Equal Itself is understood as an unconscious thought that manipulates the conscious acts; in structuralism, the Equal Itself is taken as the language that speaks trans-historically before the birth of a text and after the death of its author; in archetypal criticism, the Equal Itself is an archetype that an individual inherits unconsciously from his ancestors.

When I compared Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul and learning as recollection to a variety of modern theories, I found no other observation sounding more congruent to Plato's argument than Carl Jung's hypothesis of the collective unconscious. Jung believes that memory, like a physiological feature, can pass on to the succeeding generations genetically. These prehistoric memories exist in the form of archetypes and will remain in the unconscious side of the mind until the subject acquires a *personal understanding* of what they are. This process of learning, which Jung calls individuation, helps the person *remember* what has been passed on to him mentally.

In the next chapter, I shall explore the Equal Itself (or archetypes) in "A Rose for Emily" by analyzing the story of Homer Barron; but this is problematic because not much information about Homer is told in Faulkner's narrative. Homer Barron is, as Derrida observes, the "absent center" of "A Rose for Emily":

Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that every thing within a structure which while governing the structure, escapes structurality. This is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, *within* the structure and *outside it*. The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality *has its center elsewhere*. The center is not the center. (109)

All we know about the fate of Homer is that his corpse is left unburied in a locked room furnished as a bridal chamber. The rest of Homer's story can only be learnt through extratextuality. This constructed story of Homer, which is the primal scene or the absent center of "A Rose for Emily," is both "*within* the structure and *outside it*." This paradox is better understood when we think of how a rumor is created and spread. If the whole rumor is a historical event, then it will not be called a rumor; if the rumor has no historical basis at all, it will not be called a rumor either. Therefore, a rumor is both within and outside the structure of history. Usually, a rumor will give rise to more rumors and eventually the audience finds no center among the interrelated stories. With a similar observation, Derrida writes,

Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse—provided we can agree on this word—this is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. (110)

Indeed, when we lose track of the origin of a rumor, all that speaks to us is language itself. When detached from its origin, a rumor is at the same time a rumor generator or a site where "an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play." After all, to

approach the absent center of Faulkner's text, we need a mechanism—a methodology that would lead us from the undetermined moments in *Faulkner's* tale to “the original or transcendental signified.” In Chapter Three, I shall propose the technique of amplification—originally used by Marie Louise Von Franz to interpret fairy tales—as a pathway to approximate what Derrida calls “the center of the totality.”

The Primal Scene in “A Rose for Emily”: Reconstructing the Author

Suppose there were a human-like species which had no audio-organs at all. One day, the species had a chance to see humans dancing and they wondered what had caused the consistency of the steps of the dancers. It might appear to them that the synchronistic movements were produced by chance, but the probability for this to happen is so low that they would prefer to imagine that something unknown to them caused the phenomenon. The same doubt struck Carl Jung when he observed that meaningful coincidences¹⁷ occur everywhere in the world. Jung explains this phenomenon by putting forth the assumption that all human beings share something in common in the unconscious mind; and it is this unknown quality, which he calls the collective unconscious, that compels people to think and act in a synchronistic pattern. Note that Jung’s conception of “the collective unconscious” is better understood as “the collective mind” when the term is used in the discussion of synchronicity. Consider the following sequence of events: I felt like eating an apple, so I opened the fridge, grasped an apple and put it to my mouth. Nobody would think these correlative actions were brought together by chance because they were all coordinated by the same mind. Now consider another example: Suppose I wished to have a skateboard as a Christmas present and I did receive a skateboard on Christmas

from someone who did not know my wish. The simultaneity of these two events is deemed to be a meaningful coincidence because the individual that thinks and the individual that acts are not the same person. Jung's hypothesis of the collective unconscious theorizes the existence of a super Mind such that it coordinates individuals to think and act in a synchronistic pattern. This means I did not receive my "dream-present" by chance; the collective Mind has made it happen in very much the same way I made my wish of eating an apple come true.

Another element that Jung believes to drive people to behave consistently is the archetypes imprinted on their minds. Imagine what people would think if I announced, "I saw a ghost last night." My audience would have no idea of what *exactly* I saw, and yet the statement is not altogether incomprehensible to them—at least they do not need to consult the dictionary to see what the abstract noun "ghost" means. Jung assumes that an archetypal image like that of the ghost is imprinted universally in the unconscious mind. Besides, if nobody is able to produce a precise and conclusive description of what I saw, the word "ghost" has neither a literal nor definite symbolic meaning. In literature, a ghost may take on many different descriptions: some ghosts are vampire-like; some are phantom-like; some can pass through walls; some can foretell the future; some live in old castles while some wander in the wilderness; some are good ghosts; some are evil and so on. No two ghosts are identical and yet they have always something in common, which makes people think of them as ghosts and not other things. For this reason, it would sound naïve to an archetypal critic that a person, after reading Bram Stoker's *Dracula* or any other ghost story shall proclaim that a ghost is a blood sucker. An archetypal critic will never say *a* ghost is a phantom or a vampire or anything of this sort; rather he would

say *the* ghost, for instance, in Hawthorne's "The White Old Maid" is *the* phantom of Edith. For this reason, an archetypal critic would strongly disagree with Freud's use of the formalist approach to explain the psychological meanings of the Wolf Man's dream. It is too reckless for a psychoanalyst to conclude that the wolf in the Wolf Man's dream is a symbol of his father. The "verdict" is as unjust as announcing aloud that a ghost is a Dracula-like figure. To bring an unconscious thought into light, an archetypal critic would *amplify*, for instance, the wolf image in the Wolf Man's dream by comparing it to the wolves in other people's dreams or to the *representations* of wolves in world literature. Marie Louise Von Franz, a fairy tale critic, describes the steps of amplification in *Interpretation of Fairytales* as follows:

[First], we have to look at the comparative material before we can say anything [about the psychological meaning of a text]. We have to ask whether that motif occurs in other tales, and how it is in other tales, and take an average, and only then is our interpretation on a *relatively* secure basis. For example, there might be a fairy tale in which a white dove misbehaves. And you say that the white dove represents a witch or a wizard. Well, in *this* story it may be but if you look at what a white dove usually means you will be astonished. As a rule, in the Christian tradition the white dove signifies the Holy Ghost and in fairy tales it generally means a loving woman, a Venus-like woman. Therefore you have to ask why something which usually is a symbol for positive Eros appears to be negative in this particular story. You have a different slant on the image than if you had not taken the trouble to look up other stories. Suppose you were a doctor performing your first autopsy and found the appendix on the left and did not know, by comparative anatomy, that normally the appendix belongs on the right. It is the same with fairy tales: *you have to know the average set-up*, and that is why you need comparative material—to know the comparative anatomy of all the symbols. That background will help you to understand the specific much better, and only then can you fully appreciate the exception. *Amplification means enlarging through collecting a quantity of parallels.* When you have a collection of parallels, then you pass on to the next motif, and in this way go through the whole story.

There are two more steps to be taken, for next we have to construct the context. Let's say that in the fairy tale there is a mouse and you have amplified it but see that this mouse behaves in a specific way. For instance, you have read that mice represent the souls of the dead, witches, that they are the devil's animal, that they are Apollo's animal in his winter aspect, they are the bringers

of the pest, and they are also soul-animals because when somebody dies a mouse comes out of his corpse or he appears in the form of a mouse, and so on. You look at the mouse in your story, and some of the mice in your amplifications fit your mouse and explain it while others do not. Now what do you do? In such a case I first take the mice which explain my mouse, but I keep the other mice in my pocket, or in a footnote, because sometimes, later in the story, some of the other aspects of the mouse will appear in other constellation. Let's say that in your fairy tale it is a positive mouse and there is no witch-mouse around, but later in the story there *is* something about a witch. Then you say: 'A-ah! There is a connection between these two images, so it is a good thing that I know that mice are also witches.'

Then comes the essential step, which is the interpretation itself, i.e., the task of translating the amplified story into psychological language. There is a danger of remaining half within the mystical mode of expression and talking about 'the terrible mother who is overcome by the hero.' Such a statement becomes correct only if we say: 'The inertia of unconsciousness is overcome by an impulse towards a higher level of consciousness.' That is, we must use strictly psychological language. Then only do we know what interpretation is. (30-31)

In the following section, I shall apply Von Franz's technique of fairy tale interpretation to explore the psychological meaning of the Gothic ending of "A Rose for Emily." Before digging into the unconscious level of the text, I shall study the *conscious* message that Faulkner *intends* to convey in the story. To put in Jung's diction, I shall first investigate the *persona* of the text. Originally denoted as a mask worn by an actor in a play, the word "persona" is used by Jung to refer to the superficial appearance that an individual displays to the public. When applied to literature, the persona of a text tells *explicitly* what has happened or what a character is. In "A Rose for Emily," the persona describes Emily as "dear, inescapable, impervious, tranquil and perverse" (128). Such an exposition, however, does not fully reveal the profile of Emily, for some of her character traits are to be uncovered through amplification. Jung calls these unconscious traits the shadow. Let me further explain the connection among amplification, unconscious traits and the shadow by the following example: suppose I were a lazy person and did no

chores at home. I, as well as my friends, did not recognize my laziness for all the chores were done by my mother. Then, I had a chance to share a house with several lazy people. When I saw that nobody in the house did the cleaning, washing and mowing, I reproached my housemates without realizing the fact that I had never done any of the chores either. Under this circumstance, my shadow (which is my laziness) remained unconscious in me but was fully projected upon others. Then one day, a friend of mine pointed out that my room was no cleaner than my housemates' and I did no better than the others in sharing the responsibility of keeping the house in order. My friend was then playing the role of a reader who identifies the shadow of a character by comparing him or her to other characters displaying similar traits.

The first section of this chapter will explore both the persona (the explicit context) and the shadow (the covered-up context) in Faulkner's writing; then in the next section, the characters Emily and Homer Barron are studied as the archetypes of the anima and animus. In a general sense, the anima is a woman within a man while the animus is a man within a woman. Jung imagines that every person is composed not of one but two selves in opposite sex. This psychological make-up is similar to that of the physiological combination of the XY chromosomes in a man. The Y chromosome determines the biological sex of a man while the traits on the X chromosome exist unconsciously (or recessively in a biological sense) in the psyche. In the process of individuation, a man searches unconsciously for his anima while a woman searches for her animus. This chapter postulates writing as a process of individuation where the author's shadow—anima or animus—is unconsciously projected onto the characters. By means of amplification, I shall produce *the story of Homer Barron* as the primal scene of Emily's

story; and in this primal scene, I anticipate seeing not only the *constructed* shadow and anima of Faulkner, but also his primal phantasies—the archetypes that produce the peculiar context of “A Rose for Emily” (see my description of “primal phantasies” in the last section of Chapter One).

The Persona and Shadow in “A Rose for Emily”

When asked about the meaning of the title “A Rose for Emily” in a conference at the University of Virginia, Faulkner replied, “Oh, it’s simply the poor woman had had no life at all. Her father had kept her more or less locked up and then she had a lover who was about to quit her, she had to murder him. It was just ‘A Rose for Emily’—that’s all” (*Faulkner in the University*, 87-88). As confirmed by this conversation, Faulkner *means* to tell his reader that Emily has killed Homer Barron so as to stop him from running. Indeed, many critics including myself think that Homer is poisoned by the arsenic Emily buys from the drug store. Another motif that Faulkner has *consciously* and carefully installed in “A Rose for Emily” is the patriarchal authority of Emily’s father who “robbed her” of all chances to get married. It is interesting to see that when the first time Faulkner was asked about the originality of “A Rose for Emily,” he mentioned the strand of hair (see the beginning of Chapter Two), yet when the same question was asked for a second time, he brought in the role of Emily’s father:

Q. I was wondering, one of your short stories, “A Rose for Emily,” what ever inspired you to write this story...?

A. That to me was another sad and tragic manifestation of man’s condition in which he dreams and hopes, in which he is in conflict with himself or with his environment or with others. In this case there was the young girl with a young

girl's normal aspirations to find love and then a husband and a family, who was brow-beaten and kept down by her father, a selfish man who didn't want her to leave home because he wanted a housekeeper, and it was a natural instinct of—repressed which—you can't repress it—you can mash it down but it comes up somewhere else and very likely in a tragic form, and that was simply another manifestation of man's injustice to man, of the poor tragic human being struggling with its own heart, with others, with its environment, for the simple things which all human beings want. In that case it was a young girl that just wanted to be loved and to love and to have a husband and a family.

Q. And that purely came from your imagination?

A. Well, the story did but the condition is there. It exists. I didn't invent that condition, I didn't invent the fact that young girls dream of someone to love and children and a home, but the story of what her own particular tragedy was invented, yes....

(*Faulkner in the University*, 184-185)

The conferences at the University of Virginia were like a series of psychoanalytic conversations focusing on Faulkner. The first time Faulkner was questioned about the origin of "A Rose for Emily," he recalled a ghost story, but the second time he thought of a realistic condition—that of a father robbing his daughter of a husband. As suggested by Faulkner's free associations, the image "a strand of hair on the pillow in the abandoned house" (ibid, 26) and the motif "young girls dream of someone to love and children and a home" are, in Platonic diction, two "equal" images referring to a common entity—the Equal Itself. In archetypal criticism, Plato's "Equal Itself" is understood as *an archetypal pattern* that gives rise to all the "equal" images or motifs in an *individual work*. Take the image of Homer's corpse as an example. The *peculiar* description of the corpse in "A Rose for Emily" is: "The body had apparently once lain in the attitude of an embrace, but now the long sleep that outlast love, that conquers even the grimace of love, had cuckolded him" (130). This is just one of the many "equal images" produced by the archetype of the "unburied corpse" in literature. To figure out what other features are

included in the “unburied corpse” motif, an analyst would need to collect a large number of “equal images” and observe which part(s) of the images repeats most. The following is my amplification of the images or motifs that are “equal” to Faulkner's corpse:

- 1 In Edgar Allan Poe's “The Fall of the House of Usher,” the corpse of Madeline was put temporarily in the vault of the house she used to inhabit. It was not long after her death that her insane brother, Roderick Usher, and his friend (the narrator) began to hear strange sounds from the vault. The sounds got more and more intense and finally, in a stormy night the supposingly dead Madeline climbed up the stair and returned to the house. Her feeble body fell upon that of her trembling brother and both brother and sister died in an embrace posture.
- 2 The Gospel of John records Jesus' empty tomb and his resurrection as follows: Early on the first day of the week, while it was still dark, Mary Magdalene went to the tomb and saw that the stone had been removed from the entrance. So she came running to Simon Peter and the other disciple, the one Jesus loved, and said, “They have taken the Lord out of the tomb, and we don't know where they have put him!” So Peter and the other disciple started for the tomb. Both were running, but the other disciple outran Peter and reached the tomb first. He bent over and looked in at the strips of linen lying there but did not go in. Then Simon Peter, who was behind him, arrived and went into the tomb. He saw the strips of linen lying there, as well as the burial cloth that had been around Jesus' head. The cloth was folded up by itself, separated from the linen. Finally the other disciple, who had reached the tomb first, also went inside. He saw and believed. (They still did not understand from Scripture that Jesus had to rise

from the dead). Then the disciples went back to their homes, but Mary stood outside the tomb crying. As she wept, she bent over to look into the tomb and saw two angels in white, seated where Jesus' body had been, one at the head and the other at the foot. They asked her, "Woman, why are you crying?" "They have taken my Lord away," she said, "and I don't know where they have put him." At this, she turned around and saw Jesus standing there, but she did not realize that it was Jesus. (20:1-14, taken from New International Version of the Holy Bible)

- 3 In *Evil Under the Sun*, the "corpse" of Arlena was found lying face down on the beach with a green cardboard hat protecting her head and neck. As soon as the witness had left the beach, the "corpse" got up and climbed up the stair to return to the cliff.
- 4 In Homer's *The Odyssey*, the episode about the death of Elpenor tells what would become of the soul of a dead person whose body did not receive a decent burial. Elpenor, who was a member of Odysseus's crew, was left behind on the island of Circe because he was sleeping on the roof of a house when the crew set out to the Kingdom of Hades—the Underworld or Hell. When Elpenor was awakened by the red haze of the sun, he rushed down from the roof but fell and collided head-on with the ground. Elpenor died alone on the island of Circe. Meanwhile, Odysseus realized the absence of Elpenor but it was too late for the ship to turn back to grasp him. When the crew reached the Kingdom of Hades, Odysseus was surprised to find Elpenor there ahead of him. What Odysseus saw was but the ghost of Elpenor who implored him to return to the island of

Circe to bury his dead body. If Odysseus refused, the spirit of Elpenor would never settle, because without a burial he was not recognized by other ghosts and hence was not admitted to the Underworld.

- 5 Montague Rhodes James, a Victorian writer, created a ghost story about two men whose bodies were left rotting in an old well for more than thirty years. When discovered, “one body had the arms tight round the other” (234). The spirits of the two men were haunting a student and a teacher of a school. The teacher, who taught Spanish in the school, received bizarre sentences written in Spanish from one of his students; but the student who wrote them claimed that he did not know what had driven him to create the sentences. The Spanish writings seemed to be a form of communication between the ghosts of the two men in the well. (“A School Story” in *Classic Victorian and Edwardian Ghost Stories*)
- 6 In “The White Old Maid,” three dead bodies are mentioned. There is the body of a young man in his burial-clothes and those of two old maids in an abandoned house. What I would like to highlight here is the kiss the dead man receives and the postures of the two dead women: the Old Maid was sitting upright in a high-backed arm-chair with her head thrown back and her hands clasped across her breast; while the stately dame had fallen on her knees—with her forehead on the knees of the Old Maid and one of her hands clutching a lock of hair.
- 7 The following is a brief summary of the fairy tale “The Sleeping Beauty”:
There once lived a King and Queen who had no children. So when a princess

was born, the King held a big feast and the princess received generous greetings from twelve good fairies. But the thirteenth fairy was jealous and evil. She proclaimed that the princess would die at the age of fifteen. The other fairies had no power to undo the spell entirely but the twelfth fairy was able to soften it by changing death to a hundred-year sleep. When the princess was fifteen, she and all her people fell asleep in the castle. Round the castle a hedge of briars started to grow and they grew higher than the castle so that nothing inside the sleeping world could be seen from the outside. When one hundred years had elapsed, a brave and handsome prince rode by the castle. Soon he learned about the legend of the Sleeping Beauty and was determined to climb into the castle to see the legendary lady with his own eyes. Despite the briars, the prince was successful in making his way to the chamber where the beautiful princess lay. He felt in love with the maid immediately and gave her a kiss on the lips. The kiss broke the spell and revived the sleeping princess. Soon all other people were awakened and the castle was restored to its previous prosperity. Some days later, the prince married the princess and they lived happily ever after.

- 8 Ezekiel prophesizes the rise of Israel in the following passage: Then he [the Lord] said to me [Ezekiel], prophesy to these bones and say to them, “Dry bones, hear the word of the Lord! This is what the Sovereign Lord says to these bones: I will make breath enter you, and you will come to life. I will attach tendons to you and make flesh come upon you and cover you with skin; I will put breath in you, and you will come to life. Then you will know that I am the Lord” (*Ezekiel* 37:4-6). Christians believe that in this passage, Ezekiel is

actually prophesizing the salvation of sinners, who were condemned to death by the curse that Adam had received in Eden; and the savior is Christ who will live “happily ever after” with his bride (a symbol of the Church) in his Kingdom.

Up to this point, I have completed the first step of amplification—that of collecting parallel materials. According to Von Franz, the next step is to see which corpses in my amplification fit to explain Faulkner’s corpse and which I shall put into “my pocket” or “footnote” for later constellations. If one reads the above episodes in the sequence I present, one would notice that the narratives display a *spectrum* of motifs centralizing on the idea of resurrection (note that initially I just collected information about the “unburied corpse” and the motif of resurrection came along with my amplification). First of all, Madeline, who is still alive when being put down into the vault, awakes from her death-like sleep and appears to her brother. This theme is repeated in Jesus’ resurrection but with a stronger emphasis on Jesus’ supernatural power to rise literally from the dead. In *Evil Under the Sun*, the act of resurrection makes a totally symbolic sense because the person who revives has never been dead. In the case of Elpenor’s resurrection, his dead *body* does not come back to life; what Odysseus sees is only his spirit. The story of Elpenor reveals what ancient Greeks thought about the significance of funerals: the souls of unburied corpses would never settle until their exposed bodies were given proper funeral rites. This theme reappears in James’s “A School Story.” Nevertheless, the motif that connects James’s ghost story to “The White Old Maid” is the mythical postures of the dead bodies. Meanwhile, “The White Old Maid” and “The Sleeping Beauty” have one scene in common—the scene of kissing a corpse. After all, “The Sleeping Beauty” is linked to the passage from *Ezekiel* by the motif of salvation.

The relations among the above narratives are inter-woven and thus it is hard to determine which voice is the most dominant one. There are also many ways to sort the materials. *For me*, the contents of the narratives recur around the following four motifs:

1. The souls of the dead would not settle until their bodies are decently buried.
2. In literature, unburied corpses have a great potential for coming back to life.
3. The postures of dead bodies are always telling something about their death.
4. The act of kissing the dead symbolizes salvation through love.

Now, with the above results of amplification, I am ready for the step of screening—to find out which corpses “describe and explain” Faulkner’s corpse. Although Von Franz does not give a detail description of the *mechanism* of screening, I shall establish the task by making a series of syllogistic deductions. The following is an example of a syllogistic logic:

Humans are mammals.

I am a human.

I am a mammal.

The basic pattern of a syllogistic argument consists of two premises and a conclusion derived from the two premises. Now, consider the following series of syllogisms:

The souls of the dead would not settle until their bodies are decently buried.

Homer’s corpse is not buried.

Homer’s soul is not settled.

In literature, unburied corpses have great potential for coming back to life.

There is an unburied corpse in “A Rose for Emily.”

The corpse in “A Rose for Emily” is liable to come back to life.

The postures of dead bodies are always telling something about their deaths.

The corpse in Emily’s room “had apparently once lain in the attitude of an embrace.”

The embrace attitude of the corpse in Emily’s room tells something about his death.

The act of kissing the dead symbolizes salvation through love.

No kissing has been mentioned in “A Rose for Emily.”

(No conclusion can be produced at this point)

The above syllogistic arguments produce *a* story about Homer Barron, which is not heard in “A Rose for Emily.” This story of Homer’s is the *shadow* of Faulkner’s narrative. Physically, a shadow is produced when a solid object is illuminated by a single source of light (note that no shadow, or no sharp shadow is produced if the object is evenly illuminated from all directions). Allegorically, this means that if a text is being looked at from a particular perspective (e.g. being told or read in a particular sequence), certain areas of the text would be left out as the shadow of the bright side. In Chapter Two, I explored this phenomenon by analyzing two variant plots of “The White Old Maid.” In this section, I shall illuminate the dark side of Faulkner’s narrative by amplifying the inaudible voice of language speaking behind the scene.

According to Von Franz, “there is a danger of remaining half within the mystical mode of expression and talking about ‘the terrible mother who is overcome by the hero’”

(*Interpretation of Fairytales*, 31). Therefore, before my analysis comes to completion, all amplified motifs obtained in the previous procedures must be translated into “psychological language.” To do so, I must introduce the archetype of the *shadow*:

First, it is important to note that nobody can get rid of his own shadow for every personality has its negative side. An imaginative and creative person, for example, is at the same time a daydreamer; a strict, perseverant and self-assertive person is on the other hand a stubborn, inflexible and inconsiderate fellow. Sometimes, it is good for a person to pursue harmony and beauty; yet when a harmony admirer goes to an extreme, he will become an escapist from reality or a coward filling himself up with deceptive utopian thoughts. Also, such a person tends to give in to opponent voices even though he believes he is right. Jung calls these negative sides of personalities the *shadow*:

By shadow I mean the “negative” side of the personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, together with the insufficiently developed functions and the contents of the personal unconscious.¹⁸

Von Franz, a student of Jung, elaborates Jung’s conception of the shadow:

When an individual makes an attempt to see his shadow, he becomes aware of (and often ashamed of) those qualities and impulses he denies in himself but can plainly see in other people—such things as egotism, mental laziness, and sloppiness; unreal fantasies, schemes, and plots; carelessness and cowardice; inordinate love of money and possessions—in short, all the little sins about which he might previously have told himself: “That doesn’t matter; nobody will notice it, and in any case other people do it too.”

If you feel an overwhelming rage coming up in you when a friend reproaches you about a fault, you can be fairly sure that at this point you will find a part of your shadow, of which you are unconscious.¹⁹

Having briefly reviewed what Jung and Von Franz have said about the shadow, I return to my discussion of “A Rose for Emily.” Defined as the inferior aspects of personalities, the shadow of Emily Grierson, as commented by her town people, is “poor Emily...she carried her head high enough—even when we believed that she was fallen”

(125). In fairy tales, the shadow is usually personified as cruel witches, jealous stepmothers, greedy wolves, cunning foxes, etc; and the protagonists who work against these evil forces are portrayed as brave princes, beautiful princesses, innocent lambs, holy doves and the like. When I compare the personalities of Emily Grierson to the archetypal figures in fairy tales, I realize that positively she is a “Sleeping Beauty,” while negatively she is a witch. When the life of Emily alludes to the Sleeping Beauty, the following fairy-tale version of “A Rose for Emily” can be generated:

Emily, the only daughter of the great and mighty Griersons, was blessed with many riches when she was born. Among all the blessings, however, came a curse from the shadow of her father. The spell condemned Emily to fall into a long sleep in the house when she was sexually mature and ready to get married. When the legend about Emily, the Sleeping Beauty of Jefferson, spread over the town, suitors from far off came to “rescue” her. However, no men could come close to the “sleeping princess” because she was protected by the briars of pride—a heritage she received from the preceding Griersons. Some princes retreated without entering the house while one of them was trapped by the thorns and left there to die.

This fairy-tale version of “A Rose for Emily,” however, ends without the kissing scene and the cliché “they live happily ever after.” If “A Rose for Emily” is read as a constellation of “The Sleeping Beauty,” the constellation falls short of the traditional happy endings of fairy tales. With its plot and characterization twisted, Faulkner’s narrative presents to us the *shadow* of the Sleeping Beauty archetype. Bruno Bettelheim, a fairy tale critic, gives an excellent analysis of the negativity of “Sleeping Beauty” in *The Uses of Enchantment: the Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales*:

The long sleep of the beautiful maiden has also other connotations. Whether it is Snow White in her glass coffin or Sleeping Beauty on her bed, the adolescent dream of everlasting youth and perfection is just that: a dream. The alteration of the original curse, which threatened death, to one of prolonged sleep suggests that the two are not all that different. If we do not want to change and develop, then we might as well remain in a deathlike sleep. During their sleep the heroines' beauty is a frigid one; theirs is the isolation of narcissism. In such self-involvement which excludes the rest of the world there is no suffering, but also no knowledge to be gained, no feelings to be experienced. (233-234)

What Bellelheim puts forth in this passage is a warning: that falling into a deep and long sleep is not a beautiful experience at all. The same warning is read at the ending of "A Rose for Emily" when Homer's corpse is discovered: "The body had apparently once lain in the attitude of an embrace, but now the *long sleep* that outlasts love, that conquers even the grimace of love had cuckolded him" (130, emphasis added). Note that when Faulkner was asked to account for the title of "A Rose for Emily," he replied, "Oh, it's simply the poor woman had had no life at all." From this utterance, we can tell that Faulkner has unconsciously equated Emily to the corpse of Homer. To put this more precisely in psychological language, Emily has projected her shadow, which is a "narcissistic withdrawal," upon the decayed body of Homer. In light of Bellelheim's analysis of the sleeping motif in fairy tales, the result of my amplification—that the soul of Homer is unsettled and prone to come back to life—should be read psychologically as "the shadow of a person is on the brink of exposing itself when the person found his faults in others."

The Anima and Animus

As confirmed by Faulkner himself in the interview, Emily's "particular tragedy" was invented to mirror a more general condition in reality—that young girls dream of someone to love and children and a home. Actually, this condition is commonly seen in fairy tales. In fairy tales, princes search for their ideal princesses as if they had known beforehand who their lovers were and where exactly to find them. Although reality falls short of this fairy-tale romance, the prince-princess courtships represent the interaction between the ego and the anima in case of a man and the ego and the animus in case of a woman. In the following passage taken from "Aion: Researches into the phenomenology of the Self," Jung explains what the anima means to him:

In the case of the son, the projection-making factor is identical with the mother imago, and this is consequently taken to be the real mother. The projection can only be dissolved when the son sees that in the realm of his psyche there is an imago not only of the mother but of the daughter, the sister, the beloved, the heavenly goddess, and the chthonic Baubo. Every mother and every beloved is forced to become the carrier and embodiment of this omnipresent and ageless image, which corresponds to the deepest reality in a man... This image is "My Lady Soul," as Spitteler called her. I have suggested instead the term "anima," as indicating something specific, for which the expression "soul" is too general and too vague. (*Collected Works*, vol. 9, part II, 12-13)

As illustrated in the above passage, Jung believes that there exists in "the deepest reality in a man" an Image of a goddess who is personified as the mother, the sister, the beloved and all other kinds of feminine figures. In fairy tales, the anima is usually portrayed as women of great beauty, charm and generosity (accordingly the animus appears as heroes with great courage, power and intelligence). During the time of courtship, the anima and animus are projected outward into a search for an idealized

lover. This accounts for why some men and women repetitively fall in love with the same type of lovers. Like the ego, the anima and animus have their shadows.

Benevolent anima helps “its man” to get on to the right way while malevolent anima destroys him. In mythology, destructive anima is symbolized by beautiful women with disguised vice; they lure men to their downfalls or even deaths. In “The Process of Individuation,” Von Franz tells a Siberian tale to illustrate how a destructive anima behaves:

One day a lonely hunter sees a beautiful woman emerging from the deep forest on the other side of the river. She waves at him and sings:

Oh, come, lonely hunter in the stillness of dusk.

Come, come! I miss you, I miss you!

Now I will embrace you, embrace you!

Come, come! My nest is near, my nest is near.

Come, come! lonely hunter, now in the stillness of dusk.

He throws off his clothes and swims across the river, but suddenly she flies away in the form of an owl, laughing mockingly at him. When he tries to swim back to find his clothes, he drowns in the cold river.²⁰

Unlike in fairy tale romance, where the prince always finds his benevolent anima and makes a perfect union, the hunter (of love) in this Siberian tale, as Von Franz interprets, “ran after a wishful fantasy that could not be fulfilled.” Now, let me continue with my narration of *the story of Homer Barron* in “A Rose for Emily”:

There was once a man called Homer Barron living in Jefferson. He came from the North with a construction company to pave the road. He was a Yankee with a big voice and a good sense of humor. Wherever you saw him, you heard laughs around. In the town of Jefferson lived an elegant lady named Emily. She was rich, exalted but wicked. One day, the town saw Emily beckoning Homer. The young man followed her to her house, and that was the last time Homer was seen alive. Inside the house, Homer was led to a room furnished as a bridal chamber. After spending his first night together

with Emily, Homer woke up only to find that the beautiful lady beside him had changed into a poisonous spider. Homer attempted to get up from the bed, but he had been poisoned and was left to die on the bed.

Here, we have another fairy-tale version of “A Rose for Emily.” The Emily in this story, unlike that in “The Sleeping Beauty,” takes on the archetype of the “poison damsel,” which Von Franz describes as “a beautiful creature who has weapons hidden in her body or a secret poison with which she kills her lovers during their first night together” (*Man and His Symbols*, 190). As we have seen, the “soul” of Emily changes from time to time in different readings and with different directions of amplification; we cannot say in a definite tone that the character type of Emily belongs to such and such archetypal images. It is a great paradox that the archetypes, which are supposed to be the “original model” from which other patterns are produced, are constructed as the *end point* of amplification.

In Faulkner’s writings, there are many Emily-like characters²¹—the young girls who were doomed to live a tragic life simply because they want someone to love and a family. These characters, with their more or less common features, generate an archetypal image that the reader would distinguish as a “Faulknerian” heroine. It is not Emily or Zilphia or Minnie or any particular character that will tell us what Faulkner’s anima is. To approach the archetype that works unconsciously in Faulkner to produce all the similarities and parallels between the works, we need to go through the whole process of amplification to see what *destination* it leads us to.

As introduced at the very beginning of this chapter, Jung believes that synchronicity is a phenomenon manipulated by archetypes. To concretize this

hypothesis, let me first highlight some “coincidences” between the life of Miss Emily and Miss Zilphia (in “Miss Zilphia Gant”): Emily is dominated by her father who shuts her up from all suitors; Zilphia is overprotected by her insane mother who literally locked her in a barred room. Both Emily and Zilphia engaged in a brief courtship which traumatizes the rest of their lives. Physically, Emily is “small and spare;” because of her small skeleton, “what would have been merely plumpness in another was obesity in her” (121). Meanwhile, Zilphia “was a little plump in a flabby sort of way” (375) when she was young and “grew plumper, a flabby plumpness in the wrong places” (379) when she matured. Emily’s eyes were “lost in the fatty ridges of her face” and “looked like two small pieces of coal pressed into a lump of dough” (121); as for Zilphia, “her eyes behind the shell-rimmed glasses were a muddy olive, faintly protuberant” (379). Emily’s neighbor lamented “poor Emily” behind her while Zilphia was called “poor Zilphia” or “poor girl” in the town.

Nobody would think that these similarities between Emily and Zilphia are pure coincidences. If “A Rose for Emily” and “Miss Zilphia Gant” were written by two different authors, some critics would have looked at the parallels in terms of “indebtedness;” yet when they are created by the same person, readers will generally think that Faulkner might have based the fictional lives of the two tragic women on the *same* person in reality—that would account for the simultaneity of the contexts, images, or even dictions between the two short stories. Now, suppose Emily and Zilphia were not two fictional characters but two *human beings* whose lives are unbelievably parallel: to what then can we ascribe these “meaningful coincidences”? Was there an “Author” working behind the scene? If there were such an Author, who or what is it? Did “he”

create the lives of Emily and Zilphia out of the image of “someone?” These questions, which are connected to and arise from the basic arguments of this project, are to be answered in the conclusion where the “origin” of this project is brought to light.

Conclusion

Archetypes and Synchronicity

Biologists define the fish as “legless, aquatic vertebrate that possesses a series of gills on each side of the pharynx, a two-chamber heart, no internal nostrils and at least a median fin as well as a tail fin” (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Zoology*, 180). The fish, in biological classification, is a class of vertebrates (other classes of vertebrates include the amphibian, reptile, bird and mammal) and the members belonging to this class share certain structural similarities. The fish, in short, is just a general concept, the Equal Itself being referred to by all kinds of fish. There is not, however, a *physical model* of the fish archetype kept in the laboratory for examination. Biologists *developed* the Fish concept by observing the common features of as many fish-like species as possible—a methodology highly congruent with the process of amplification discussed above. In Chapter One and Two, I analyzed the paradox of a constructed or deferred origin through both the psychoanalytic and philosophical point of view; now, let me review the paradox through the principles Darwin developed in *The Origin of Species*. In the book, Darwin puts forth his revolutionary idea about the “origin” of species. The most controversial part of Darwin’s theory, however, is his assumption that organisms

with similar physiological structures are descendants of a common and *unknown* ancestor in the remote past. The weakest point of Darwin's assumption is the fact that he is unable to produce the "original" species from which all other related species are suspected to have branched out. A profile of this legendary ancestor can only be obtained by putting together the features of its "descendants." It is interesting to note that when the evolutionary relationships between the existing species are mapped on a tree-diagram, the place that marked "common ancestor" is always blank: this proves that up to the present day, no biologist has had the confidence to fill that blank with a name or a figurative representation. After all, the "origin" of species is still a myth, a mystery of all mysteries.

After reviewing the weakness of Darwin's theory of evolution, I shall highlight his strength, which helps to explain the phenomenon of synchronicity discussed later in this section. Darwin's most convincing and well-developed argument in *The Origin of Species* is the argument of the Natural Selection phenomenon. In the Darwinian view, organisms will carry out mutations to adapt to the changing environment. This accounts for the variety of species branching out from the same ancestor. In the process of adaptation, an organism suppresses its unfavorable characteristics and enhances the development of the favorable ones. After some generations, the descendants of the organism become a new *individual* species displaying distinguishable variations from its "original" form. This innate tendency of modifying oneself to better cope with the surrounding mirrors what happens in our psychic reality. Darwin's principle of biological evolution, when applied to the development of the psyche, explains the mechanism of *individuation*. Now, let me examine the two models side by side. If we look more closely at the mechanism of biological evolution, we will realize that nature is

actually playing an *active role* in the perpetuation of species. Although many natural phenomena occur by chance, Natural Selection is *not* a chance phenomenon: nature always *chooses* with a reason and purpose. For example, if one sees a large population of birds on a beach, it is not by chance that the birds are driven to this beach or by chance that the birds on this beach survive better than the same kind of birds on other beaches. There must be something on the beach that attracts the birds and favors their survival. Nature thus can think and act like a person to fulfill its goal.

Now imagine every person lived in two worlds: a physical outer world and a mental inner world. In the physical world, individuals have mutual interaction and on the environment. In the outer world, we are not surprised to see that the House Sparrows in Canada resemble the House Sparrows in Europe and all sparrows behave in almost the same way. It is also quite “natural” to see that the same tree provides both a shelter and fruit for the birds that inhabit it. The tree “acts” as though it knew the birds’ need. In the inner world, however, we do not think we have the kind of communication with other individuals as we do in the outer world. If two individuals wore the same clothes to a party, we would think it was just a coincidence. If two persons, who had not seen each other for a long time, were driven simultaneously by the same thought to the same place, we would think these were *meaningful* coincidences. What if coincidences of this kind did not happen by chance? What, in the mental world, plays the role that nature is playing in the biological world?

In 1977, a group of scientists, headed by Orme Johnson, designed an experiment at the Maharishi European Research University to explore the mechanism of meditation.²² Although the experiment was not designed purposefully to explore the

phenomenon of synchronicity, Allan Combs and Mark Holland, the authors of *Synchronicity: Science, Myth and Trickster*, see to it that the result of this experiment provides implicit evidence of the possibility of *causally related* coincidences (for the details, see Combs and Holland, 58-59). The research group found out that in the state of meditation, the left and right hemispheres of the brain produce waves in synchronistic pattern (i.e. correlative in both shape and frequency). Regarding this, Combs and Holland comment, “we have substantial reason to suspect that the mode of brain activity most favorable to synchronicity is the balanced, profoundly silent state experienced in deep meditation and prayer, a state which is accompanied by resonant coherence of the EEG rhythm. This is the silent resonance of the brain” (59). What Combs and Holland mean by “the silent resonance of the brain” in “deep meditation and prayer” is best explained in the following allegory: suppose the brain is a radio; when it is tuned to a certain frequency, it can receive messages given out by other brains tuning to the same frequency. This situation most likely occurs during deep meditation where the brain-waves of different individuals synchronize. If this allegory closely reflects what happens in reality, then synchronistic thoughts and behaviors are casually related and coordinated by a collective Mind.

Another experiment that backs up the argument for the existence of a collective Mind was done in the 1950s by Wilder Penfield, a Canadian neurosurgeon (see Combs and Holland, 53). Penfield observes that “during brain surgery mild electrical stimulation to the right-brain area that corresponds to the left-brain language region produces hallucinated voices.” This result was explained by two different hypotheses. Penfield’s own explanation of this was: during the surgery, the patient’s personal locked memories

were activated and the voices were actually his *recollection* of the past. This view, however, was contradictory to the fact that the patient did not recognize most of the voices. Julian Jaynes, the author of *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*, would rather think that the voices had come from “the ancient mechanism for the voices of the gods.” This implies that when the linguistic region of the right hemisphere is stimulated in a brain surgery, the subject is capable of recalling information stored in “the collective unconscious.” For more scientific researches relating to the investigation of the collective unconscious and synchronicity, see Part I of Combs and Holland’s book. My concern here is: should there be a collective Mind working as the headquarter of individual minds, this Mind must be the Author of all literatures. To obtain a fuller profile of this Author and to see how it acts upon individual authors to produce meaningful coincidences in literature, I shall first analyze the dynamic relation between the personal and the collective unconscious.

Based on Quinton’s definition of personal identity discussed in Chapter Two, I modify Jung’s proposition for the collective unconscious (see footnote 12 of Chapter One) as follows: the collective unconscious, as defined by me, is a series of personal unconsciousnesses connected and related as meaningful coincidences. Let me elaborate this by taking a second look at the “unburied corpse” motif in literatures. If the eight texts that I found containing an “unburied corpse” motif (i.e. “The Fall of the House of Usher,” the episode of Jesus’ resurrection in *The Gospel of John*, *Evil Under the Sun*, Elpenor’s death in *The Odyssey*, “A School Story,” “The White Old Maid,” “The Sleeping Beauty” and “Ezekiel’s prophecy) correspond to eight soul-phases in Quinton’s personal identity paradigm, the texts ought to be considered as *one* big Text because they are connected by

the same “memory”—their “unburied corpse.” Thinking in this way, an author’s *personal unconscious*, as reflected in his text, is plugged in to another author’s unconscious if the latter author recollects *in his text* what the former author had written. Faulkner, for instance, recollects the context of “The White Old Maid” when he *unconsciously*, or rather accidentally, creates Emily as a signifier of Edith. Since the eight texts I have used for amplification were taken from a variety of sources and put together for a particular reason, I am paradoxically the Author of these literatures—the person who actively made the meaningful coincidences happen. At this moment, it is necessary for me to clarify one point: there is no such thing as *meaningful* coincidence in the mechanical world. All kinds of simultaneous occurrence, when seen from an objective point of view, are nothing more than coincidences; meaningful coincidences exist only in a subjective interpretation of the coincidences. The repetition of the name “Emily” in “A Rose for Emily,” “Emily Hardcastle, Spinster” and the first name of Emily Dickinson is a coincidence; whether this coincidence is a meaningful one is a matter of interpretation. At this point, it is clear that the so-called “universal and trans-historical” Author working behind the scenes to produce meaningful coincidences *in literature* is actually the reader—an omnipresent observer. My observation is greatly supported by Roland Barthes in “The Death of the Author”:

Let us come back to the Balzac sentence. No one, no ‘person’, says it: its source, its voice, is not the true place of the writing, which is reading. Another—very precise—example will help to make this clear: recent research...has demonstrated the constitutively ambiguous nature of Greek tragedy, its texts being woven from words with double meanings that each character understands unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is exactly the ‘tragic’); there is, however, someone who understands each word in its duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the characters speaking in front of him—this someone being precisely the reader (or here, the listener). Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of multiple writings, drawn

from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that *someone* who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted. (171)

Obviously, "the author" in "The Death of the Author" refers to the personal author, not the collective Author. When Barthes puts forth the idea that the reader is "one place where this multiplicity [of cultures, relations of dialogue, parody and contestation] is focused," he implies that the reader is someone (an indefinite and collective noun) who possesses the collective unconscious—someone who holds together "all quotations that make up a writing" and "all the traces by which the written text is constituted."

In the modern and postmodern era, the works and thoughts of Freud have been widely studied and quoted as a significant influence on the development of literary theories. Meanwhile, Jung's academic contribution does not receive as much attention as it deserves. The writings of Jung are scarcely quoted by structuralists while in fact structuralism is closely related, if not in debt, to Jungian thinking. In the past, Jungianism (a term awaiting adoption) was applied most often to the interpretation of mythologies, fairy tales or any genre that is fit to be studied under the title of archetypal criticism. Actually, all kinds of narrative forms and contents can be traced back (or rather forward) to their archetypal images by amplification. My project testifies to this proposition using "A Rose for Emily" as an example. In Chapter Two, the plurality of "A Rose for Emily" is evaluated through the structuralist approach; in the present chapter, the same story is amplified by collecting narratives with comparable motifs. The only difference is that in

the previous chapter, the recurring context is not translated to a psychological reality, which is the major objective of archetypal criticism. Meanwhile in Chapter One, I introduce, rather unconsciously, Freud as an archetypal critic when his Oedipus Complex theory is discussed. Although Freud is seldom thought of as an archetypal critic, he is actually exemplifying the methodology of archetypal criticism when he “translates” Sophocles’ play, *Oedipus Rex*, into an early childhood psychological situation. When Freud postulated his Oedipus Complex theory, he was actually speaking in resonance with Jung that inner psychic realities correspond to happenings in a mythical world or are personified as mythical figures.

We cannot ignore the fact that Freud is a predecessor of Jung and much of Jung’s theories are pre-conceptualized unconsciously in Freud’s writings. In the following two sections, I shall conclude my thesis by introducing the “primal scene” of this project. By “primal scene,” I mean a particular text I read before but saw *belatedly* in it a summary of my whole project.

Archetypes and Predestination

Do you believe in horoscope? If you do, you also believe in the relation between archetypes and predestination. Astrologers (both western and oriental) divide people generally into twelve archetypes. In the Western culture, the twelve archetypes correspond to the twelve signs of the Zodiac while in Chinese culture, the archetypes take on the images of twelve different animals. It is interesting to see that how western astrologers look at the *origin* of a person’s fate:

If you had been able to take a picture of the heavens at the moment of your birth, that photograph would be your horoscope. Lacking such a snapshot, it is still possible to recreate the picture—and this is at the basis of the astrologer's art. In other words, your horoscope is a representation of the skies with the planets in the exact positions they occupied at the time you were born.²³

In other words, horoscope is an art of reconstructing the past rather than forecasting the future; or to put in a paradoxical sense, it seeks to reconstruct a point in the past where all future occurrences are predestined. The Chinese horoscope, however, assumes all humans are born with some animalistic qualities. These include the ox, tiger, rabbit, dragon, snake, horse, goat, monkey, rooster, dog, pig and rat. By amplification, Chinese astrologers produce a profile of each of the above animals. A person who is born in the year of, say, the dog, is expected to display some dog-like characters: loyal, friendly, diligent, protecting and somewhat providing, etc. According to such a profile (or archetype) of the dog, a fortuneteller tells a person born in the year of the dog that he is going to make a lot of friends in the year but he must be beware of some of them; they might betray him because he trusts them as a dog trusts its master. An archetype, in this sense, is also a character type, and people with similar characters tend to confront a similar fate. For example, all gamblers end up in bankruptcy and pride goes before a fall. In nature, this phenomenon is even more conspicuous. Any organism belonging to the fish archetype tends to be the food of some larger fish.

Archetypes are also a part of critical thought. A critic may find that after working through a series of investigations, he is merely *recollecting* information that he has long been storing in his mind. The Platonic “Equal Itself” functions in the mind not so much as an idea generator but as the product of creativity, or the destination that *pulls* towards

itself a stream of consciousness arising from nowhere. This phenomenon describes the production of this project.

In the summer of 1998, a year after I finished my Bachelor degree and a year before I started my graduate program, I discussed my academic plan with my present supervisor, Dr. Eric Savoy, who was going to write me a letter of appraisal. Then for some reason (which I cannot recall now), he lent me a book to read at leisure. It was Paul Auster's *The New York Trilogy*. When I returned the book to him, I did not have much to say about it; so much as I could remember, my only comment was: "Uhhh...it is easy to read but difficult to understand." He then recommended me reading another story—Julio Cortázar's "Axolotl." It was a year afterward when I returned the book to him. This time I had nothing to say at all for I just put the book in his mailbox. I totally forgot these two texts during the three years of graduate studies.

When I started writing my thesis a year ago, I felt that I had nowhere to start and nowhere to go. In the process of writing, I could not tell what exactly had pushed me towards the direction I "turn out" working on. The mechanism worked unconsciously in me for months and it was not until very recently that I noticed that my writing synchronizes with a "strange" habit of mine.

It all began with my special interest in birds, which I acquired through the habit of bird feeding. There are a lot of birds visiting my backyard daily, for abundant food is made available whether it is winter or summer. My passion for birds bestows upon me a vision that nobody else would pay attention to. Months ago when I was shopping in Superstore, I noticed that a female House Sparrow was standing on a rafter of the supermarket. I thought a lot about that sparrow after I left. I wondered whether it was

trapped? Was there any way for it to get out? If it did not know the way out, could it find food and water? I began to pray for the little creature; I could do nothing, only God could save it. The next day, I made a trip to Superstore to look for the bird; it was still there. I prayed more for it. Some days later, I went to the place again, not knowing whether I should feel happy or sad if I found the bird there. Actually, I did not need to find it this time; it was hanging around the same place where I saw it last time. Days turned into weeks and weeks turned into months and the bird was still there. In the past few months, I paid regular visits to Superstore, not intending to buy anything but spending hours and hours watching the ceiling. Now I knew where the bird usually hung around. She made the rafters above the seafood area her home. She chose this place because it was close to the junk food shelves. I saw her come down to the shelves to find food, and once she even flew into the open freezer. Every time I visited her, I left bread and muffin crumbs on the shelves and if I stayed long enough, I would see her come down to grasp the food I left. Now there seemed to be a silent communication between us. I knew where to leave the food and she knew where to find it. There were occasions when she stood so close to me that I could hear her weak chirping. And I knew the time and place she slept. Once I came in the store after nine at night and found her less vigorous than she was in daytime. After nine thirty, she hid her head in the wings and stayed in that posture until I left at ten when the store closed. One day, I saw her playing around the entrance where the automatic door was left open. I stood beside the door for almost two hours, hoping to witness the moment she left the big cage. I was very sure she saw the outside world and the way out; but all of a sudden, she flapped her wings and flew all the way back to the seafood area, leaving me all alone beside the open door. She

told me she did not want to leave the place. Every time I left the supermarket, I could not help feeling sad. I saw an image of solitude and the image got more and more intense when my backyard birds began courtships and nesting in spring time. There are no seasons, no weathers, no days and nights in Superstore.

Time was frozen not only for the bird but also for me who watched it. I did not know how old the bird was, how long she had been there and how long she *would* be there. Neither the past nor the future could be measured. The only moment that counted was the present. I did not know what she felt; it was I who thought inside her and I who felt the solitude. It was I who stood on the rafters and watched the repeated pattern of human activities. The sparrow reminded me of Cortázar's "Axolotls." The longer I watched the sparrow, the more I remembered the axolotls. In Cortázar's narrative, the axolotls lived in an aquarium in the Jardin des Plantes in Paris. When the story begins, the narrator knew nothing about axolotls. He accidentally discovered the fish-like immobile creatures when he visited the zoo. He went to see the axolotls again the next day and continued to do so every morning and sometimes morning and afternoon. When watching the axolotls became the narrator's habit, he "seemed to understand their secret will, to abolish space and time with an indifferent immobility" (6). Despite the "absolute lack of similarities between axolotls and human beings," the narrator felt that he was one of the axolotls and when his obsession continued to build up, "[he] wanted to prove to [himself] that [his] own sensibility was projecting a nonexistent consciousness upon the axolotl" (8). The horror begins when the narrator believes himself a "prisoner in the body of an axolotl, metamorphosed into him with [his] human mind intact, buried alive in an axolotl, condemned to move lucidly among unconscious creatures" (8-9).

Cortázar's narrative states the dilemma of a philosopher. The crisis that most thinkers or observers face is the inescapable fate of being changed into the objects they observe. Now when I open *The New York Trilogy*, it is no longer Auster speaking to me. I saw myself as well as my writings inside; it is I who think and produce meanings in the text. The novel, which I read at the "very" beginning, turns out to be the destination that my graduate project heading towards. The following is my interpretation of Paul Auster's *The New York Trilogy*—the primal scene of my M.A. thesis.

Return of the Origin

The New York Trilogy is a novel consisting of three interrelated stories: "City of Glass," "Ghosts" and "The Locked Room." The stories are connected in such a way that the characters, or the soul-phases of the characters, are inter-penetrating. Thematically, all the three stories are about spying and the consequence of spying. In "City of Glass," a detective fiction writer, named Quinn, pretended to be a man called Paul Auster when he worked for a woman to spy on a man called Peter Stillman. When the story began, Stillman, a philosopher, was released from prison. He had been found guilty for incarcerating his son in a room for some seventeen years for an experimental purpose. Stillman's son, who was also named Peter Stillman, was mentally retarded because of the incarceration. After spying on Stillman for some time, Quinn was interested to talk to his subject of observation. To Quinn's surprise, Stillman appeared to be a totally different person every time he approached him. This phenomenon made Quinn suspect his own spying—he became unsure of whether he followed the same or different persons from

time to time. Ironically, Quinn presents himself to Stillman as different persons as well. The first time he said he was Quinn, the next time he was Henry Dark, a character Stillman created in his book and the third time he pretended to be Stillman. When Quinn kept on spying and recording Stillman's activities in his red notebook, he began to lose his own identity. Day after day, he forgot who he was. Finally, he no longer cared about Stillman for he had turned himself into Stillman. The woman who hired Quinn to spy on Stillman disappeared with Stillman's son, seemingly to avoid Quinn, for now he was just another Stillman, as eccentric and horrible as the former one. Quinn moved into the apartment where Stillman's son used to live. He locked himself up in a room, seeing nobody and spending all his time writing. Gradually, Quinn lost his sense of time; he did not know whether it was day or night or how long a day lasted. Some food was delivered to him from time to time and it seems to the reader that Quinn is actually living in an asylum when the story ends. When Quinn exits, Paul Auster and his friend enter. Quinn's notebook had somehow fallen into the hand of Auster and he asked his friend to keep it for him.

In "Ghost," a man named Blue was hired by White to spy on Black. It was arranged that Blue to move into an apartment directly opposite to that of Black. Blue watched Black through the binoculars and recorded what he did daily in a notebook. Blue sent his report of spying to a mailbox weekly and a check was sent back to him. This arrangement went on for months. Gradually, Blue felt himself being isolated from a normal social life. He lost his fiancé because of his spying activities but he did not care. As far as Blue knew, Black had done nothing significant at all—most of the time he just sat by the window and engaged himself in reading and writing. In Blue's report, he wrote

down what Black read and ate, when he went out, what clothes he wore, what places he visited and so on. The surveillance seemed having no point at all. As the story unfolds, Blue finally learned that it was Black who hired him to do the spying; and the reason was simple: Black's life was as meaningless and pointless as Blue had thought. Black figured out that he could give a meaning to his existence by turning himself into the object of observation of another man. The only mystery that Blue wanted to find out at the end was what Black had written in his notebook. One night, Blue rushed into Black's apartment, knocked Black unconscious and grasped his notebook. When Blue returned to his apartment and read the notebook, he was overwhelmed by despair for he saw nothing there but the trivial contents that he had written in his own notebook. Blue now realized that when he sat beside the window recording Black's daily activities, Black sat by his own window recording exactly the same details. The two men, who were spatially apart, were driven by an unknown force to posit themselves in an identical situation, to think in a synchronistic pattern and to write the same contents.

In "The Locked Room," the literary implication of Quinton's personal identity theory is fully exemplified. Proper names such as Stillman, Henry Dark and Quinn reappear. The reader is baffled because the characters referred to by the same names have inconsistent backgrounds and memories. "The Locked Room" began with a man walking out on his pregnant wife without giving her any reason. The name of the man was Fanshawe. He was a writer and he had just finished a book before he disappeared. Fanshawe's wife sought help from his childhood friend—the narrator of the story who covertly revealed himself as Paul Auster. Let us regard him as Auster, then. Auster published Fanshawe's book and the reader of the book generally thought that Auster had

written the book and published it under the name of Fanshawe. To figure out where Fanshawe had gone, and why he left in this way, Auster forced himself into Fanshawe's position by marrying his wife and writing a biography of Fanshawe. After writing the biography, Auster made out that Fanshawe might have moved to Paris. Auster decided to track down Fanshawe, and so he made a trip to Paris where he bumped into a man who looked like Fanshawe. The man, however, did not recognize Auster and introduced himself as Stillman. It was six years after Fanshawe's disappearance that Auster received a letter from Fanshawe, asking him to come and see him in a house. When Auster entered the house, Fanshawe had locked himself in a room. The two men talked through the door. The man inside the room did not want to be called Fanshawe. He bought the house under the name of Henry Dark. When asked why he left his wife, he said that he had to keep moving so as to get rid of a man called Quinn. Finally, when he settled down in this house, he went out no more and paid a maid to deliver his food. The man told Auster that he had taken poison and would die soon. What he wanted Auster do for him was to take and read his notebook. After reading the notebook, Auster comments:

I read steadily for almost an hour, flipping back and forth among the pages, trying to get a sense of what Fanshawe had written. If I say nothing about what I found there, it is because I understood very little. All the words were familiar to me, and yet they seemed to have been put together strangely, as though their final purpose was to cancel each other out. I can think of no other way to express it. Each sentence erased the sentence before it, each paragraph made the next paragraph impossible. It is odd, then, that the feeling that survives from this notebook is one of great lucidity. (370)

If the above three stories were written in the notebook that Auster (the character in the story) has just read, Auster's comments describe exactly what Auster's (the author of *The New York Trilogy*) reader feels toward his writings. "I can think of no other way

to describe it—each *character* erased the character before it and each *story* made the next story impossible.” If we take Fanshawe’s words seriously, then we will identify him as Stillman and that makes the Stillman in the first story impossible. To me, Fanshawe behaves more like Blue if I look at the two men from their wives’ point of view. Yet when I evaluate the characters in terms of their self-banishment pattern, Fanshawe repeats what Black and Quinn have done. In “City of Glass,” Auster does not tell his relation with Quinn or why he has his notebook or what has become of Quinn. But these mysteries are resolved if we identify Quinn as Fanshawe. In other words, the primal scene of “City of Glass” is found in “The Locked Room.” In *The New York Trilogy*, Auster explores what a soul is by blending the identities of his characters. If the soul is defined as “a series of mental states connected by the continuity of character and memory,” then the soul of Quinn is also that of Black and Fanshawe for the mental states of these three men are connected by their obsessive characters and memories.

What if Quinn, Black and Fanshawe were three unrelated characters living in three different microcosms of a fictional world? Then we would say that their repetitive fate is a meaningful coincidence. There are still more coincidences in the novel; whether or not they are meaningful is not a matter of recognition, but a matter of comprehension. In reality, people being condemned to the same fate might have the same archetypal character imprinted in their psyches. The fates of Quinn, Stillman, Black, Blue, Auster and Fanshawe are compulsively repeated because they all belong to the same archetype—the archetype of an obsessive observer. In Auster’s novel, the characters are more like the archetypal characters in fairy tales than the round characters in modern fiction; for

this reason, they must all end in the same way—this is the way an archetypal image is created.

Auster's fiction is both realistic and mythical, depending on the point of view we look at it. Many happenings in the novel are unlikely to take place in reality. It is uncommon, for instance, to see somebody acting like Black, who hires a private detective to spy on himself. It is also unlikely for a "flesh-and-blood" person to behave like Stillman—who appears to be a different person from time to time. Although spying is an activity we will not feel strange to, the reasons for spying described in Auster's narrative are absurd. In terms of the consequence of spying, it rarely happens that a spy would end up *totally* losing his identity like Quinn does. In short, based on all the above improbabilities, we refuse to believe that the events in Auster's novel would happen in reality. Similarly, Freud's reader refuses to accept the idea that the primal scene described in the Wolf Man's Case History is a *literal* happening taking place when the Wolf Man is only one and a half year old. Nevertheless, both Freud and Caruth think that a patient of trauma carries a historical truth in his obsessive thoughts; the major difference between Freud's and Caruth's theories is that Freud postulates the primal scene as a literal truth while Caruth ascribes literality to a dream work.

Unlike Freud and Caruth, Jung regards both the happenings in dreams and primal scenes as *symbolic* representations of psychological conditions. For Jung, the primal scene in the Wolf Man's Case History is altogether a myth created by Freud; but the myth does tell us something about Freud's understanding of human nature. We may demystify the primal scene by finding out its psychological meanings. For example, the scene of a child observing his parental intercourse might represent a person's unconscious yearning

for the unification of his ego and anima. As for the mystical motifs in *The New York Trilogy*, they become realistic when we think of them as allegories of mental realities. In “The Locked Room,” for instance, Blue and Black represent the ego and the shadow. Blue observes Black closely without realizing that Black’s life is a mirror image of his own. Auster’s novel is paradoxical in such a way that it demystifies inner realities by mystifying the outer realities. The same paradox is created when we combine Freud and Jung’s observations of the primal scene: seeing from Freud’s perspective, the primal scene *literalizes* the *symbols* in dreams; from Jung’s perspective, the primal scene *symbolizes* the *literality* of psychological occurrences.

When I reread Auster’s novel, I can now see my whole thesis in it, rather like how Freud saw the whole picture of the Wolf Man’s neurosis in the primal scene. This suggests to me that I had read my own thesis long before I started planning the project. What I have done in the process of writing was, as Plato puts it, “recollecting” the lost memories. To wrap up the whole thesis in one single statement, I would say: the origin is an egg—the egg that gives birth to a chick and the egg that is born by the same chick.

Notes

¹ In "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918[1914])," the "primal Scene" refers to a scene of sexual intercourse between the Wolf Man's parents. Whether the Wolf Man had actually observed this scene or it was his own phantasy is a controversial issue that Freud had debated with himself in the essay and with Jung through letters. In this chapter, I shall argue that the primal scene was neither the Wolf Man's recollection nor his phantasy, but Freud's *personal* imagination.

Though presented as an *actual* experience of the Wolf Man's in the case history, the primal scene was not a conscious memory of the Wolf Man's and thus can only be grasped through his symptomology. Theoretically, the primal scene is the origin of all the obsessional symptoms that Freud has analyzed in the essay. Since the context of the primal scene (i.e. a parental copulation) might be interpreted by a child as a scene of violence on the part of the father, it would stir up in the child a sense of restlessness and a series of obsessional thoughts as in the case of the Wolf Man.

² I found it impossible to mention all the incidents that Freud has brought out in the case history without digressing from my discussion of the *primal scene*. Although some of the omitted episodes are also related to the causes of the Wolf Man's obsessional neurosis, I have chosen *the most direct* incidents to form the *sjuzet* of the case.

³ In a letter dated October 15, 1897, Freud confided to Wilhelm Fliess his passion for his mother and jealousy of his father:

I have found love of the mother and jealousy of the father in my own case too, and now believe it to be a general phenomenon of early childhood, even if it does not always occur so early as in children who have been made hysterics. (Similarly with the "romanticization of origins" in the case of paranoiacs—heroes, founders of religion). If that is the case, the gripping power of *Oedipus Rex*, in spite of all the rational objections to the inexorable fate that the story presupposes, becomes intelligible, and one can understand why later fate dramas were such failures (*The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Letters, Drafts and Notes to Wilhelm Fliess (1887-1902)*, 226).

This passage was found to be the first time Freud mentioned the concept of the Oedipus complex. However, it is not clear in the wording whether Freud became aware of the issue through his self-analysis or he intended to confirm the universality of the Oedipus complex with his own experience.

⁴ See Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-analysis* (282-286).

⁵ The following dream of a twenty-seven-year-old man is interpreted in section VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900): "a man with a hatchet was pursuing him [the dreamer]; he tried to run away, but seemed to be paralysed and could not move from the spot" (623). After making a series of free associations, Freud locates the source of this nightmare to a night when the dreamer (at the age of nine) heard uncanny noises from his parents' bedroom and "subsumed what happened between his parents under the concept of violence and struggling" (624). Freud argues that "what we are dealing with is a sexual excitation with which their [children's] understanding is unable to cope and which they also, no doubt, repudiate because their parents are involved in it, and which is therefore transformed into anxiety" (624). Before closing the case, Freud reassures his reader that "[he] should have no hesitation in giving the same explanation of the attacks of night terrors accompanied by hallucinations (*pavor nocturnus*) which are so frequent in children." Note that Freud *did* give *the same explanation of the attacks of night terrors* to the causality of the Wolf Man's anxiety.

⁶ These phrases appear in Chapter Nine, "The Quest of Narrative," of *The Poetics of Prose*. Todorov's central argument in this chapter is that a text tells more than what its author intends to tell. Todorov starts the chapter with an analysis on a medieval text, *The Quest of the Holy Grail*. The first point Todorov foregrounds through his discussion of the text is that interpretation is a creation, not a tautology. The interpreter does not paraphrase what the author has said, but transcends the text into a new one by adding in his own voice. Todorov's second thesis, and the most dominant one in this chapter, is that narrative is a

signification of other narratives. For instance, some meanings of the Old Testament were not discovered until the context recurs in the New Testament: "The death of Abel, in that time when there were yet only three men on earth, foretold the death of the true Crucified One; Abel signified Victory, and Cain represented Judas. Even as Cain greeted his brother before killing him, Judas was to greet his Lord before betraying him unto death. These two deaths are thus in agreement, if not in degree, at least in significance" (123). The intertextual relationship between the Old and New Testament exemplifies what Todorov means by "there is no difference of nature between the narrative-as-signifier and the narrative-as-signified." Todorov uses this phrase to discuss a similar intertextuality between *The Quest of the Holy Grail* and the Knights of the Round Table.

⁷ In the section "A Few Discussions," Freud concludes that the coitus the Wolf Man had observed in the primal scene is a *coitus a tergo* (from behind). This postulate opens up the possibility that the primal scene might be a scene of animal copulation: "Perhaps what the child observed was not copulation between his parents but copulation between animals, which he then displaced on to his parents, as though he had inferred that his parents did things in the same way" (292). Freud supports this argument with the fact that shortly before the dream the Wolf Man was taken to visit flocks of sheep (260); then the child would have the opportunity of seeing animals copulate.

⁸ The genre of the "whodunit" detective fiction is characterized by the writings of Arthur Conan Doyle and Agatha Christie. In the whodunit, crime is inspected in a retrospective fashion; that is, from effect to cause, and the detective is always immune from being suspected or victimized. These two prerequisites of the whodunit are contradictory to "the thriller," wherein the endangered detective(s) investigates the crime from cause to effect. In terms of pleasure of reading, the whodunit reader is interested in *how* the crime *had been* committed while the thriller reader is eager to know *what will* happen to the detective.

⁹ Here, I refer to the formalist aspect of treating a text as an autotelic structure. The formalist foregrounds the interaction of parts *within* a textual structure and defies its referentiality to history, social and political implications.

¹⁰ See von Franz, *Shadow and Evil in Fairytales* (213-216).

¹¹ In "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," Jung distinguishes the personal unconscious from the collective unconscious in the following way:

A more or less superficial layer of the unconscious is undoubtedly personal. I call it the *personal unconscious* [referring to Freud's implicit meaning of the "unconscious"]. But this personal unconscious [referring to his own conception of the same subject] rests upon a deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn. This deeper layer I call the *collective unconscious*. I have chosen the term "collective" because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals. It is, in other words, identical in all men and thus constitutes a common psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is present in every one of us. (3-4)

Jung does not altogether deny the personal unconscious featured by Freud's theories but further widens Freud's conception of the unconscious to include the universal aspect of the human thoughts and behaviors.

¹² Diane Brown Jones has done an extensive research on the relationship between "A Rose for Emily" and a wide range of literary works. The source of the following criticism on "A Rose for Emily" comes from Jones' *A Reader's Guide to the Short Stories of William Faulkner*. For information about the writings of the critics introduced below, consult the bibliography pages of Jones' guide (133-141).

¹³ For example, John Locke's theory on personal identity. Locke's treatment of the personal identity is pioneering in the seventeenth century as he is one of the first philosophers to define personal identity by memory instead of physical qualities. In a Lockian view, human beings are different from all other kinds of living organisms in the way that they display a twofold nature of life. The continuity of life (a life not interrupted by death) defines the identity condition of a human being, a tree, a dog, etc but not a person. To

say that A and B are the same *person* means to Locke that A possesses the memory of an experience contained in B. Locke's definition, however, is challenged by the fact that human's memory cannot extend backward to very early stages of life. Then, does it mean that the fetus at birth is not the same person as the man it grows up to be? To settle argument of this sort, Anthony Quinton puts forth the theory of continuity of soul-phases to unite two stages of life which are not connected by memory.

¹⁴ An exceptional case is a narrative like the *Sherlock Holmes* series. Although the main plot of *Sherlock Holmes* is told in a third person's voice, the speaker, Dr. Watson, is a character of the story and his existence is known to other characters.

¹⁵ By "narrative-men," Todorov refers to the voices of a *series* of narrators put forth in a fictional arrangement like that of *Arabian Nights*. The story begins with Queen Badur trying to win King Armanos' pardon by telling him a story every night. This narrative embeds other narratives in layers because every time Queen Badur adds in a character, the character has his / her story to tell. A modern text having a similar structure is Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*. In the network of intertextuality, this embedding narrative, which Todorov calls *narrative of a narrative*, is "the fate of all narrative which realizes itself through embedding" (73). What Todorov intends to explore through his dissection of the embedding structure of *Arabian Nights* is the question of origin in narration. His standpoint is clearly stated in his concluding statement: that there is "no need to search out the origin of narrative in time—it is time which originates in narrative" (79).

¹⁶ 72E-75B in R.S. Bluck's *Plato's Phaedo: A Translation of Plato's Phaedo with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices* (65-69).

¹⁷ A meaningful coincidence is distinguished from a coincidence in the following way: Suppose I met John, my high school friend, on my way to work this morning, this is a coincidence. Suppose I got on the bus and saw someone resembling John. I kept thinking of John on the bus and met John accidentally at the bus-stop when I got off; these co-related events are *meaningful* coincidences.

¹⁸ "The Personal and the Collective Unconscious." *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung*. Vol. 7, 65n.

¹⁹ *Man and His Symbols*, ed. Carl G. Jung. 174.

²⁰ *ibid.* 187-190, with illustrations in-between.

²¹ See Diane Brown Jones' *A Reader's Guide to the Short Stories of William Faulkner*, 95-106. According to Jones, "A Rose for Emily" is most closely linked to "Dry September" and "Miss Zilphia Gant." The protagonists, Emily Grierson, Minnie Cooper and Zilphia Gant, in these three stories are described as the "spinster group" by Frederick Karl. Other female characters who are associated with the images of death and decay include Mrs. Compson, Judith Sutpen, Rosa Coldfield, Joanna Burden, Caddy, Temple Drake, Elly, Charlotte Rittenmeyer and many others.

²² Orme-Johnson, D.W. (1977) Higher states of consciousness: EEG coherence, creativity and experiences of the siddhis. *Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology* 4: 581.

²³ Quoted from *Aquarius 1979 Super Horoscope*, 6. Author unknown.

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Appendix I

Porphyria's Lover

By Robert Browning

The rain set early in tonight,
The sullen wind was soon awake,
It tore the elm-tops down for spite,
And did its worst to vex the lake:
I listened with heart fit to break.
When glided in Porphyria; straight
She shut the cold out and the storm,
And kneeled and made the cheerless grate
Blaze up, and all the cottage warm;
Which done, she rose, and from her form
Withdrew the dripping cloak and shawl,
And laid her soiled gloves by, untied
Her hat and let the damp hair fall,
And, last, she sat down by my side
And called me. When no voice replied,
She put my arm about her waist,
And made her smooth white shoulder bare,
And all her yellow hair displaced,
And, stooping, made my cheek lie there,
And spread, o'er all, her yellow hair,
Murmuring how she loved me - she
Too weak, for all her heart's endeavour,
To set its struggling passion free
From pride, and vainer ties dissever,
And give herself to me forever.
But passion sometimes would prevail,
Nor could tonight's gay feast restrain
A sudden thought of one so pale
For love of her, and all in vain:
So, she was come through wind and rain.
Be sure I looked up at her eyes
Happy and proud; at last I knew
Porphyria worshipped me: surprise
Made my heart swell, and still it grew
While I debated what to do.
That moment she was mine, mine, fair,
Perfectly pure and good: I found

A thing to do, and all her hair
In one long yellow string I wound
Three times her little throat around,
And strangled her. No pain felt she;
I am quite sure she felt no pain.
As a shut bud that holds a bee,
I warily oped her lids: again
Laughed the blue eyes without a stain.
And I untightened next the tress
About her neck; her cheek once more
Blushed bright beneath my burning kiss:
I propped her head up as before,
Only, this time my shoulder bore
Her head, which droops upon it still:
The smiling rosy little head,
So glad it has its utmost will,
That all it scorned at once is fled,
And I, its love, am gained instead!
Porphyria's love: she guessed not how
Her darling one wish would be heard.
And thus we sit together now,
And all night long we have not stirred,
And yet God has not said a word!

Appendix II

Emily Dickinson's poem 577, 1209, 1344

577

If I may have it, when it's dead,
I'll be contented -- so --
If just as soon as Breath is out
It shall belong to me --

Until they lock it in the Grave,
'Tis Bliss I cannot weigh --
For tho' they lock Thee in the Grave,
Myself -- can own the key --

Think of it Lover! I and Thee
Permitted -- face to face to be --
After a Life -- a Death -- We'll say --
For Death was That --
And this -- is Thee --

I'll tell Thee All -- how Bald it grew --
How Midnight felt, at first -- to me --
How all the Clocks stopped in the World --
And Sunshine pinched me -- 'Twas so cold --

Then how the Grief got sleepy -- some --
As if my Soul were deaf and dumb --
Just making signs -- across -- to Thee --
That this way -- thou could'st notice me --

I'll tell you how I tried to keep
A smile, to show you, when this Deep
All Waded -- We look back for Play,
At those Old Times -- in Calvary,

Forgive me, if the Grave come slow --
For Coveting to look at Thee --
Forgive me, if to stroke thy frost
Outvisions Paradise!

1209

To disappear enhances --
 The Man that runs away
 Is tintured for an instant
 With Immortality

But yesterday a Vagrant --
 Today in Memory lain
 With superstitious value
 We tamper with "Again"

But "Never" far as Honor
 Withdraws the Worthless thing
 And impotent to cherish
 We hasten to adorn --

Of Death the sternest function
 That just as we discern
 The Excellence defies us --
 Securest gathered then

The Fruit perverse to plucking,
 But leaning to the Sight
 With the ecstatic limit
 Of unobtained Delight --

1344

Not any more to be lacked --
 Not any more to be known --
 Denizen of Significance
 For a span so worn --

Even Nature herself
 Has forgot it is there --
 Sedulous of her Multitudes
 Notwithstanding Despair --

Of the Ones that pursued it
 Suing it not to go
 Some have solaced the longing
 To accompany --

Some -- rescinded the Wrench --
 Others -- Shall I say
 Plated the residue of Adz
 With Monotony.

Appendix III

Emily Hardcastle, Spinster

By John Crowe Ransom

We shall come tomorrow morning, who were not to have her love,
We shall bring no face of envy but a gift of praise and lilies
To the stately ceremonial we are not the heroes of.

Let the sisters now attend her, who are red-eyed, who are wroth;
They were younger, she was finer, for they wearied of the waiting
And they married them to merchants, being unbelievers both.

I was dapper when I dangled in my pepper-and-salt;
We were only local beauties, and we beautifully trusted
If the proud one had to tarry we would have her by default.

But right across her threshold has her Grizzled Baron come;
Let them wrap her as a princess, who'd go softly down a stairway
And seal her to the stranger for his castle in the gloom.

Appendix IV

The White Old Maid (simplified)

By Nathaniel Hawthorne

Version One

The moonbeams came through two deep and narrow windows, and showed a spacious chamber, richly furnished in an antique fashion. From one lattice, the shadow of the diamond panes was thrown upon the floor; the ghostly light, through the other, slept upon a bed, falling between the heavy silken curtains, and illuminating the face of a young man. But, how quietly the slumberer lay! how pale his features! and how like a shroud the sheet was wound about his frame! yes; it was a corpse, in its burial-clothes.

The shadow of the fringed curtain was waving betwixt the dead face and the moonlight as the door of the chamber opened. A girl stole softly to the bedside. She bent over the pale corpse and pressed her living lips to the cold ones of the dead. As she drew back from that long kiss, her features writhed, as if a proud heart were fighting with its anguish. The silken curtain had waved, a second time, betwixt the dead face and the moonlight, as another fair young girl unclosed the door, and glided, ghostlike, to the bedside. There the two maidens stood, both beautiful, with the pale beauty of the dead between them. But she, who had first entered, was proud and stately; and the other, a soft and fragile thing. The fragile girl sank down on the bed, with her head rested on the pillow of the corpse and her hair mingling with his dark locks.

“Edith!” cried the proud girl.

Edith groaned and got up from the bed.

“Wilt thou betray me?” said the lofty girl calmly.

“Till the dead bid me speak, I will be silent,” answered Edith. “Leave us alone together! Go, and live many years, and then return, and tell me of thy life. He, too, will be here! Then, if thou tellest of sufferings more than death, we will both forgive thee.”

“And what shall be the token?” asked the proud girl.

“This lock of hair,” said Edith, lifting one of the dark, clustering curls that lay heavily on the dead man’s brow.

The two maidens joined their hands over the bosom of the corpse, and appointed a day and hour, far, far in time to come, for their next meeting in that chamber. The statelier girl departed, then followed by Edith. As Edith left the room, a negro slave was waiting in the passage to light her down the staircase with a wax-light. As they reached the portal of the mansion, they met the clergyman of the town who passed in without a word.

A woman, who was known as the “Old Maid in the Winding Sheet” by the town, had passed from youth to extreme age all alone. A taint of insanity had affected her whole life, but so quiet, sad, and gentle, so utterly free from violence, that she was suffered to pursue her harmless fantasies, unmolested by the world, with whose business or pleasures she had nought to do. She dwelt alone, and never came into the daylight,

except to follow funerals. Whenever a corpse was borne along the street, in sunshine, rain, or snow, whether a pompous train, of the rich and proud, thronged after it, or few and humble were the mourners, behind them came the lonely woman, in a long, white garment, which the people called her shroud. She took no place among the kindred or the friends, but stood at the door to hear the funeral prayer, and walked in the rear of the procession, as one whose earthly charge it was to haunt the house of mourning, and be the shadow of affliction, and see that the dead were duly buried.

Once, it is said, she affrighted a bridal party, with her pale presence, appearing suddenly in the illuminated hall, just as the priest was uniting a false maid to a wealthy man, before her lover had been dead a year. Evil was the omen to that marriage!

The life of the town seemed to have its very centre not far from an old mansion, that stood somewhat back from the pavement, surrounded by neglected grass, with a strange air of loneliness, rather deepened than dispelled by the throng so near it. Owing to some dispute about the right of inheritance, the mansion had been long without a tenant, decaying from year to year, and throwing the stately gloom of its shadow over the busiest part of the town.

One day, the "Old Maid in the Winding Sheet" was observed somewhere around Colonel Fenwicke's mansion; yet people saw no sign of death or funeral in that day. The town became restless, thinking that some wide calamity were prognosticated by the untimely intrusion of the Old Maid whose presence had always been associated with death and woe.

The Old Maid lifted the iron knocker and gave three raps on the door of Colonel Fenwicke's mansion. The town people wondered that the insane lady might have come to visit the ghosts that were haunting the house.

An elderly man with gray locks went forwards to explain that no one had lived in this house for fifteen years—since the death of old Colonel Fenwicke whose heir had let the mansion-house go to ruin.

Then a footstep was heard, coming down the staircase of the old mansion. The step approached till it reached the portal. The door was opened and the maiden entered. This was the last the "Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet" was seen by people.

A coach—no common spectacle in those days—drove slowly into the street. It was an old-fashioned equipage, hanging close to the ground, with arms on the pannels, a footman behind, and a grave, corpulent coachman seated high in front—the whole giving an idea of solemn state and dignity. The coach stopped at the gateway of Colonel Fenwicke's mansion. The footman ascended the steps of the old house, gave three raps, with the iron hammer, and returned to open the coach door. An old man examined the shield of arms on the pannel then whispered the name of the family to whom these bearings belonged. The last inheritor of its honors was recently dead, leaving no child. These arms betoken that the coach appertains to his widow. A lofty lady emerged from the coach. Her dress was magnificent, and her figure dignified, in spite of age and infirmity—a stately ruin, but with a look, at once, of pride and wretchedness.

She passed up the steps, the door swung open and the light of a torch glittered on the embroidery of her dress. After a momentary pause—a glance backwards—and then a desperate effort—she went in.

The decypherer of the coat of arms went closer to the door and was aghast to see that the man with the torch was old Cæsar, the black slave of the house.

The whole town was astir, so that, instead of dispersing, the crowd continually increased, and stood gazing up at the windows of the mansion, now silvered by the brightening moon. The elders, glad to indulge the narrative propensity of age, told of the long faded splendor of the family, the entertainments they had given, and the guests, the greatest of the land, and even titled and noble ones from abroad, who had passed beneath that portal. These graphic reminiscences seemed to call up the ghosts of those to whom they referred.

Some people outside the mansion thought they saw or heard a third visitant had made application at the door of the deserted house.

A few adhered to this new marvel, and even declared that a red gleam, like that of a torch, had shone through the great front window, as if the negro were lighting a guest up the staircase.

A shriek, too fearfully distinct for doubt, had been heard within the mansion, breaking forth suddenly, and succeeded by a deep stillness, as if a heart had burst in giving it utterance. The people knew not whether to fly from the very sight of the house, or to rush trembling in, and search out the strange mystery. Amid their confusion and affright, they were somewhat reassured by the appearance of their clergyman, a venerable patriarch.

The venerable clergyman ascended the steps with a torch-bearer behind him. They gave three raps with the iron hammer but nobody answered the door. "Old Cæsar cometh not," observed the priest. "Well I wot, he no longer doth service in this mansion." Then, the clergyman managed to open the heavy door. He entered the house with his torch bearer and passed up the staircase.

On the second floor of the house, the clergyman took his staff, and struck forcibly on the floor, till there came an echo from each deserted chamber, but no menial, to answer their summons. They therefore walked along the passage, and again paused, opposite to the great front window, through which was seen the crowd, in the shadow and partial moonlight of the street beneath. On their right hand, was the open door of a chamber, and a closed one on their left.

The clergyman snatched the torch from his companion's hand, and threw open the closed door with such sudden violence, that the flame was extinguished, leaving them no other light than the moonbeams, which fell through two windows into the spacious chamber. It was sufficient to discover all that could be known.

In a high-backed, oaken arm-chair, upright, with her hands clasped across her breast, and her head thrown back, sat the "Old Maid in the Winding-Sheet." The stately dame had fallen on her knees, with her forehead on the holy knees of the Old Maid, one hand upon the floor, and the other pressed convulsively against her heart. It clutched a lock of hair, once sable, now discolored with a greenish mould.

Version Two

The life of the town seemed to have its very centre not far from an old mansion, that stood somewhat back from the pavement, surrounded by neglected grass, with a strange air of loneliness, rather deepened than dispelled by the throng so near it. Owing to some dispute about the right of inheritance, the mansion had been long without a tenant, decaying from year to year, and throwing the stately gloom of its shadow over the busiest part of the town.

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