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"Andean Vice": The Indigenous Peoples
of Peru and the Wars of Independence,
1810-1824

by

Steven Garry Walker

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
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
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
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
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Abstract

From 1810 to 1825, a great revolutionary conflagration spread across Spain's American colonies. In South America, patriot armies under the command of Simon Bolívar in the North, and José de San Martín in the South, battled royalist forces in a titanic struggle for independence. Ultimately, the two Liberators converged on Peru, the last royalist stronghold on the continent. With its rich indigenous historical traditions, Peru served fittingly as the final battlefield in the Wars of Independence. Early in the sixteenth century, Francisco Pizarro and his Conquistadores rolled over the indigenous population of Peru to establish Spanish hegemony on the continent. Three hundred years later, the indigenous population suffered a similar fate at the hands of both royalists and so-called "liberators."

Acknowledgements

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INTRODUCTION

Thanks to recent works by Steve Stern, Florencia Mallon and Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, the indigenous peoples of Peru have begun to receive their historical due. Yet a large, historiographical lacuna still exists. To date, no historian has devoted a fully researched study to investigate the participation of indigenous peoples in the Wars of Independence (1810 to 1824). Of course, historians have given lip service to native wartime involvement during this formative period. Peruvian historian Ella Dunbar Temple, noted that the role of the indigenous people during the conflict is "worthy of mention."¹ Others, such as Timothy Anna, argued that the Indian role during the independence era was "minimal" and hardly merited mention, compared with participation by mestizos, pardos, and African slaves. In Anna's view these groups "formed much of the manpower of the uprisings, of the rebel and royal armies, and of the guerrilla bands."² Considering the fact that indigenous peoples comprised over sixty percent of the Peruvian population, such dismissed viewpoints are startling, and as will be argued in this thesis, quite inaccurate.³

Despite earlier views expressed by historians, indigenous peoples could not escape involvement in the process of Independence. Ever since the sixteenth century conquest, the natives served the elites as conquered human resources available to be exploited at every opportunity. This

disturbing pattern continued through the eighteenth century and at least until the culmination of the Wars of Independence. During the wars, royalist and patriot officials targeted indigenous communities to feed the various manpower and logistical demands of their armies. Despite the conclusions of many historians, indigenous peoples contributed much of the manpower of the uprisings, of the rebel and royal armies, and of the guerrilla bands.

Peru was named for a river in Ecuador, which, legend had it, flowed to a land of gold.⁴ Once the windfall of gold ran out, Peru contained rich human resources available for exploitation. Based upon silver mines, the viceroyalty became one of the sparkling jewels of the Spanish crown. As Nicole Giron de Villaseñor remarked, "from the beginning, the Inca order was replaced by chaos and difficulties, and later by an organization which reduced the Indian to nothing more than a utensil for the ambition of the [Spanish] conquerors."⁵ After the Conquest, the white elites harnessed the labour-power of indigenous peoples for many different projects. By the Eighteenth century, entrepreneurs had fully exploited the value of natives as a ready market for manufactured goods. Furthermore, highland elites recruited Indians into makeshift armies to bolster their bargaining power with Lima bureaucrats in order to effect local autonomy within the colonial system.

Stated in simplistic terms, two distinct "republics" or

groupings coexisted uneasily in the viceroyalty of Peru- the "república de españoles," and the "república de indios." Although a small minority, the Spaniards controlled social, economic and political power. Systematically, the Spanish invaders had destroyed traditional forms of government, society and culture, and forced the indigenous peoples of Peru to comply with their laws of church and state. A sedentary and agricultural people, the natives came to be viewed as suffering "la mancha india", or the Indian stain. Steve Stern argued that conquest "transformed vigorous native peoples of the Andean sierra into an inferior caste of "Indians" subordinated to Spanish colonizers and Europe's creation of a world market."⁶ Writing in 1929, John Miller observed that "the Spaniard despised the Creole, the Creole hated and envied the Spaniard, but both united in maltreating and oppressing the poor Indian."⁷

Policies established by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in the 1570s remained firmly entrenched at the beginning of the eighteenth century. These enabled the Crown to exploit the labour power of the native population at an highly efficient level. Toledo borrowed from traditional Inca practices to create the mita system of labour organization and he implemented a provincial governmental system based on political jurisdictions called corregimientos. Ironically, however, instead of "correcting" corruption, the new territorial designations governed by corregidores created a

new world of abuses for the indigenous population.⁸

There were more than 50 indigenous corregimientos scattered throughout the viceroyalty. The male population of each district, aged 18 to 55, paid an annual head tax called the tributo. In addition, the Crown mobilized one-seventh of this tributary population under the mita to provide labour in various projects for terms of about of one year. Depending on the geographical location of the corregimiento in which they lived, mita workers (mitayos) provided unskilled labour for silver or mercury mines, obrajes (textile factories), haciendas, or in a variety of public works. Aided by local indigenous rulers called caciques, the Spanish corregidores organized the labour drafts and collected the tribute.⁹ Cooperating with the corregidores, the Peruvian caciques occupied a peculiar position within the provincial administrative structure.

The mita not only disrupted village life, and uprooted families, but it also increased the likelihood of debt peonage and early death. Labourers in the great mines of Huancavelica (mercury) and Potosí (silver) faced arduous physical labour and disease. Mercury poisoning and respiratory complications from dust particles were constant threats.¹⁰ As set wages fell below subsistence levels, workers in haciendas and obrajes often contracted debts which could not be paid during their tenure of forced work. Thus encumbered, many found themselves toiling for extended periods while they worked off

debts to their employers.

Writing in the early seventeenth century, Phelipe Guaman Poma de Ayala lamented that corregidores "demand[ed] a large amount of work" from the indigenous people. Moreover, if tribute could not be paid, they "seize[d] by force" anything of value "from the fields of the poor Indians."¹¹ Guaman Poma de Ayala concluded that the corregidor was a great nemesis to the indigenous people. In fact, Viceregal appointments of corregidores based on favouritism and seldom merit, coupled with low salaries, inevitably led to largescale graft and corruption.

Beginning in 1751 exploitation of the indigenous population reached new heights when the Crown officially authorized the economic system known as the repartimiento de comercias. In part, the plan was to supplement the low wages earned by corregidores. Practised sporadically since the seventeenth century, the "reparto" boosted the economy of the viceroyalty, since many goods that had previously gathered dust in Lima warehouses now found convenient markets.¹² Corregidores purchased goods from Spanish merchants on the basis of credit. They forced these items upon the native population at arbitrarily set high prices. Debts for goods received would be collected sometimes months after distribution. Those unable to pay were often shipped off to a local obraje or hacienda where they worked off the amounts owing.

Thus, Corregidores served as labour brokers, tribute collectors and a kind of salesmen who would not take "no" for an answer. In fact, many corregidores wielded arbitrary power, and amassed considerable fortunes at the expense of the indigenous peoples.¹³ These oppressive conditions shocked two Spanish naval officers commissioned by King Philip V to report on the state of the viceroyalty. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa commented on "the tyranny of the repartimiento" and castigated the conduct of the corregidores for "supplying goods to the Indians at exorbitant prices," which were, "for the most part of no service to them."¹⁴ Although Indians lacked beards and body hair, "corregidores insisted on forcing razors upon them."¹⁵ Corregidores also peddled such useless items such as eye glasses, silk stockings, writing paper and they provided sickly mules. Juan and Ulloa concluded that most of the corregidores in Peru were corrupt, and that their "oppressive conduct," had served as "the catalyst for the [indian] insurrection" led by Juan Santos Atahualpa in the Jauja valley from 1742-1754.¹⁶

To many indigenous people, the name "Atahualpa" held special appeal. Juan Santos had adopted the name of the powerful sixteenth century Inca in part to legitimize his insurrection. It conjured up a mystical past when the indigenous peoples had been their own masters. Juan Santos proclaimed himself the new Inca, and promised to destroy corrupt Spanish officials and to restore indigenous control

over the Jauja area.¹⁷ Fighting in typical guerrilla fashion, for twelve years Santos and his devoted followers repelled a succession of Spanish counterinsurgency efforts. His movement perpetuated the "Myth of Inkarrí", an underground messianic ideology which forecasted the destruction of the Spanish colonial system and the resurrection of the ancient Inca empire and traditional cultural practices through the efforts of a great redeemer.¹⁸ The efforts of Juan Santos set the stage for Tupac Amaru's great rebellion 30 years later.

Since the conquest, the threat of a massive indigenous insurrection haunted Spanish officials. In 1576, the royal scribe for the Audiencia of Lima, Francisco Lopez, stated that a massive uprising comprising "all the Indians of the kingdom" threatened to destroy Spanish control over the colony.¹⁹ Felipe de Lujan Briceno de Balderabano, owner and operator of the Mejorada obraje in the Jauja valley, sent to the Audiencia an account of the plot divulged to him by a loyal indigenous labourer. Balderabano wrote that "Indians from Chile to Quito are aligned against God and King...they are prepared to slay all Spaniards or to die in the effort...no person with a Christian name will be permitted to live", except those "Spanish women whom the caciques will take."²⁰ Although the uprising described by Balderabano never materialized, the nightmare of a massive indigenous uprising remained in the minds of successive generations of Royal officials.

During the eighteenth century, over one hundred and forty

documented uprisings disturbed the political, economic and social tranquillity of the viceroyalty. Most of these relatively small, localized movements identified the corrupt corregidores for special attention. In 1730, during one particular rebellion in Cotabambas province, an angry mob attacked corregidor Don Juan Josef Fandino, beating him to death until "his face [became] an amorphous mass of raw flesh."²¹ However, as Scarlett O'Phelan observed in her recent research, the uprisings of the eighteenth century traditionally referred to as "Indian" in nature were in reality much more complex. Many of these violent episodes resulted from ruptured power relationships between local elites. Thus, many priests, reliant upon indigenous labour and tribute for parish revenue, often mobilized and directed peasant attacks against corregidores with whom they were in direct competition.²² However, during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the Bourbon system of administrative, fiscal and commercial reforms collided with the floundering economic climate of the viceroyalty. To counter the relentless encroachment of the colonial government in their local affairs, more and more of the highland elites viewed the indigenous peoples as potential weapons to attain a degree of political autonomy.

By the 1770s the so-called "second conquest" of America was well underway. The Bourbon metropolis deemed necessary an exhaustive program of administrative, commercial, and fiscal

reforms designed to increase the economic efficiency of the American colonies and reimpose Spanish hegemony over the region. To cut defence expenditures, a colonial army based mainly upon American regulars and trained militias replaced the system of rotated peninsular forces. American and Spanish ports were opened in the hopes that a limited "free" trade would increase economic growth. Yet Spain's participation in the Revolutionary War on the side of England's American colonies necessitated further fiscal increases which brought commercial discombobulation and exacerbated already paralysed economic conditions in Peru. As John Phelan noted, "the pressing need was an immediate and dramatic increase in royal revenue to finance" the war.²³

Towards this end, in 1777 King Charles III sent Visitador José de Areche to the viceroyalty. A decade earlier, Peru had suffered a tremendous economic blow with the transfer of Upper Peru and the Potosí silver mines to the jurisdiction of the new viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. The Visitador expanded the base of tribute taxation to include mestizos and he solidified Crown monopolies over tobacco and liquor production and distribution.²⁴ In 1778 the tax on aguardiente (cane alcohol) nearly doubled to 12.5%.²⁵ The alcabala (sales tax), applied each time a product changed hands, skyrocketed from two to six percent.²⁶ Moreover, Areche expanded the tax to traditionally exempt food items including indigenous staples such as chuno, coca, and dried meat (charqui).²⁷ In addition,

the Crown shifted the collection of the tax, traditionally entrusted to private hands, or tax farms, to the authority of the corregidores.²⁸ Thus, their presence conflicted not only with the economic interests of the indigenous population, but also with the mestizo and creole land tenants and merchants.

Areche's initiatives led directly to the anti-tax protests which erupted in highland urban centres such as Arequipa, Tarma and Cuzco. Angry mobs targeted customs houses (aduanas) for attacks and vulgar lampoons assailed the new taxes. As O'Phelan Godoy hypothesized, "The Bourbon reforms provided the Indian, mestizo, and creole population with a common source of grievance around which an incipient coalition formed."²⁹ The agent which linked these diverse elements was a mestizo nobleman and cacique named Don José Gabriel Condorcanqui, who assumed the name "Tupac Amaru."

Condorcanqui possessed the rights to the chieftaincies of Pampamarca, Surimana, and Tugasuca in the Province of Tinta in south central Peru. In addition, he enjoyed considerable local prestige as claimant to the hereditary title of Marques de Oropesa, that provided him with recognized status in the Spanish world of Cuzco.³⁰ Royalist Colonel Pablo Astete recalled that "he was held in high esteem by all classes of society."³¹ Condorcanqui insisted that he could trace his lineage to the direct descendants of the last Inca, and he spent years attempting to validate his claim. An adroit businessman, Condorcanqui felt the sting of the Areche

initiatives that depressed the local economy. His region served as a commercial centre on the "Camino Real" between Lima and Potosí. The cacique possessed special influence over a large indigenous population that revered him as a new Tupac Amaru, the "great redeemer" and champion of their cause. To the creole elites of the area Condorcanqui, basically a creole nobleman, with a creole wife, had experience dealing with the stubborn colonial bureaucrats of Lima. All these factors made Tupac Amaru a perfect leader, and Tinta the ideal location, for a broadly based rebellion.

On November 4, 1780, Tupac Amaru and his followers seized and jailed the corregidor of Tinta, Antonio de Arriaga. Claiming to be operating under Royal orders, Tupac Amaru found Arriaga guilty of indecent acts against the public and sentenced him to death. This incident touched off the largest revolt in the history of the viceroyalty. Shortly after the execution of Arriaga, Tupac Amaru recruited a force of 5,000 men, that he led northward into the province of Quispicanchis. At the town of Sangarara, rebel hopes rose when they forced an ignominious defeat on a royal militia detachment of 576 men.³² Shortly thereafter, an eyewitness recounted that Tupac Amaru entered Lampa with "more than five thousand Indians, armed with sticks and slings," and "five finely dressed Spaniards."³³ These may have been the so-called "Council of Five," a creole dominated group of military advisors, who served as a nerve centre of the rebellion.³⁴

In fact, at least initially, Andean elites inspired and controlled the movement. O'Phelan Godoy argued that "many creoles not only sympathized with the insurrection but also stimulated and supported it during the early stages."³⁵ On 23 December, 1780, Tupac Amaru himself declared: "I feel for my creole countrymen, who have been incorporated into my soul...we exist together as brothers, together in one body, destroying the Europeans."³⁶ In order to strengthen and broaden their movement, the leadership hierarchy of the rebel force sought out the indigenous masses as footsoldiers.

Royal officials such as Areche insisted that Tupac Amaru "operated with the idea that he wanted to crown himself master of [the Indians]," and that "he went about painting himself in royal designs and insignias...ruling like a king."³⁷ The rebel leader himself claimed that "by the grace of the Incan God," I am "king' of Peru."³⁸ This is what Tupac Amaru wanted people to think. However this was merely a ruse. He identified himself with the image of the Inca to legitimize the movement in the eyes of the indigenous population.³⁹ His proclamations promised that "in a short time," they would "be free" of the "thieveries of the corregidores."⁴⁰ As Oscar Cornblitt noted, "Andean elites realized the importance" of "recruit[ing] the indigenous masses," and "that the indigenous element was indispensable to fill the ranks of the rebel army."⁴¹ O'Phelan Godoy also insisted that "Indigenous support," was necessary "to provision the rebel army with the supplies that

it required."⁴²

Given these factors, what were Tupac Amaru's objectives? He spoke about "destroying the Europeans", but what did he really mean? In fact, Tupac Amaru never envisioned an independent Andean state. He insisted that his struggle was against "the perverse taxes" imposed by "the intruding European ministers."⁴³ His movement, like the Comunero revolt which erupted simultaneously in New Granada, sought to eliminate many of the harsh Bourbon initiatives implemented by Areche. All of the evidence points toward the fact that the rebels wished to work within the colonial framework. "Muera a mal gobierno," and not death to the King, became the slogan of choice.

The indigenous peoples of South Central Peru adopted Tupac Amaru as their "great redeemer." In sheer numbers, the inchoate force of 60,000 men and women who marched on Cuzco in late December 1780 attested to this fact. Nevertheless, Tupac Amaru refused to sack the city, and instead chose to occupy the surrounding high ground. This allowed Royalist forces valuable time to march upon the besieged capital. Even Areche dropped his other tasks to command a force of 700 men and six artillery pieces.⁴⁴

Armed for the most part with sticks and stones, a few muskets, and perhaps two or three crude artillery pieces, the rebels soon discovered that they were no match for a semi-disciplined army that possessed sufficient firepower. On 6

April, 1781, the royalists crushed the rebel forces near Checcacupe. Tupac Amaru, his wife, two sons, and hundreds of others were taken prisoner. On 19 May, 1781, sixty-seven of the Inca's followers, many among them creoles, were hanged summarily at Tinta. Forced to witness the brutal executions of his wife and son, Tupac Amaru was taken to be drawn and quartered. The first botched execution attempts ranked as painful examples of Spanish oppression. At one moment memorable for its horror, Tupac Amaru remained for some time suspended in mid-air, spider-like, while the horses struggled to tear him apart.⁴⁵ Finally, his executioner ordered him beheaded and dismembered. As a deterrent to others who might consider rebellion, colonial officials delivered his various body parts to towns throughout the area.⁴⁶

With Tupac Amaru and his leading supporters dead, the Peruvian revolt soon ground to a halt. In Upper Peru, the rebellion continued for two more years under the leadership of the infamous Catari brothers. By this time, the sheer numbers and destructive tendencies of the indigenous masses and new fears of social revolution, encouraged many creoles to withdraw their support.⁴⁷ Many turned to the forces of reaction which, ironically, included many loyal caciques, who relied on the Spanish government for their elite positions, and their Indian subjects as well.⁴⁸

The popular revolt indicated a overwhelming rejection of Bourbon reformism in Peru. Moreover, indigenous peoples had

served simply as exploitable resources harnessed to increase the regional power of various highland elites that wished to force a settlement of their grievances. As Cornblit claimed, "in the face of the new Caroline bureaucracy, the most affluent groups...mobilize[d] lower sectors of society," in order "to counter the pressure coming from the central government."⁴⁹

In Peru, an investigative commission of shaken royal authorities focused on how to avoid any future repetition of similar events. In 1782 the regime abolished the reparto. In 1784, new provincial Intendants and sub-delegates replaced corregidores and a new audiencia took control in Cuzco. However reform was also met with reaction. Before his recall to Spain, visitador Areche passed laws that stripped indigenous peoples of certain aspects of their culture. He forbid them to speak Quechua and to assemble in groups larger than four persons. Since the Spanish authorities believed many creoles were responsible for the rebellion, they subsequently disbanded the disciplined militias of the interior that they had dominated.⁵⁰

In the aftermath of the great insurrection, the economy of the viceroyalty weakened as Spain participated in a succession of European Wars. From 1790 to 1805, naval warfare plagued normal commercial relations with Peru. For some highland creoles, insurrection remained an attractive alternative to the status quo. Moreover, indigenous peoples

continued to be an important resource in every power struggle.

Upon relinquishing governmental control of Peru to José Abascal in July 1806, Viceroy Don Gabriel de Aviles informed that "an incident of serious importance" had captured his attention the previous year.⁵¹ Aviles told Abascal that a conspiracy in Cuzco led by two highland creoles named Gabriel Aguilar and Manuel Ubalde, threatened to rupture imperial bonds with Spain and "to hand over these American possessions to England."⁵² Apparently, Aguilar intended to marry an indigenous peasant girl from Cuzco, and then to proclaim himself Inca over a new empire.⁵³ Aided and abetted by the Indian cacique Cusiguaman, and a lawyer who specialized in indigenous affairs named Marcos Dongo, the conspirators attempted to recruit four thousand Indians who would serve as the basis of a rebel army.⁵⁴ The conspirators planned to execute all Spanish authorities as they marched on Cuzco, Arequipa, Lima, and Potosí.⁵⁵

Loyal Cuzqueños alerted Viceroy Aviles about the half baked plan of Aguilar and Ubalde. After apprehending the principal authors of the rebellion, the Viceroy ordered the sentence of death for Aguilar and Ubalde. Aviles also sentenced Dongo and Barranco to ten year sentences in North African presidios and permanently relieved Cusiguaman from his duties as cacique. The similarities to the Tupac Amaru revolt are striking. As Alberto Flores Galindo stated, "the essential element in the vision of Aguilar and Ubalde was its firm

anchorage in the Andean Utopia- in the return of the Inca and the restoration of an Incaic monarchy."⁵⁶ However, "the mere mention of the name of the Inca" was not sufficient this time to effect the massive indigenous uprising Aguilar and Ugarte anticipated.⁵⁷ The fact that Aguilar was a creole led many to discount his preposterous claim to the Inca throne. As Flores mentioned, although targeted to serve as the engine of the revolution, "not one Indian commoner figured among those implicated" in the conspiracy.⁵⁸

From the conquest to the Bourbon reforms, the indigenous peoples of Peru served as resources to be mined by the regime. They served as an essential pool of labour and a source of revenue which filled royal coffers and the wallets of highland elites. However, during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the relentless taxation demands from Lima led many highland elites to seek violent alternatives to resolve their grievances with colonial bureaucrats. For Don José Gabriel Condorcanqui, Gabriel Aguilar, Manuel Ubalde, and others, the indigenous populations of the highlands served as an exploitable mass to be manipulated in their political battles with the colonial regime. Despite the bloody consequences of an unsuccessful movement, the mobilization of indigenous peoples continued to be a popular expedient to effect reform. During the insurrections of Huánuco in 1812, and Cuzco in 1814, highland elites once again tapped into the abundant indigenous resources of the area to fill their armies and

pursue their goals of political autonomy. .

Notes

1. See Ella Dunbar Temple, ed., La Acción Patriótica del Pueblo en la Emancipación. Guerrillas y Montoneras, 6 Vols. Tomo V of Colección Documental de la Independencia del Perú (hereafter cited as CDIP) (Lima: Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia del Perú, 1971), p.xxii.

2. See Timothy Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Peru (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), p.17.

3. The following statistics are drawn from the 1795 census of the viceroyalty of Peru, conducted by viceroy Gil. Out of a total population of 1,115,207 persons, 648,615 (60 percent) were listed as Indian; 244,313 (22 percent) were mestizo; 140,890 (12 percent) white; also 41,004 free negroes and 40,385 slaves. See John Fisher, Government and Society in Colonial Peru (London: Athlone Press, 1970), pp.251-253.

4. Nicole Giron Villaseñor, Peru: Cronistas Indios y Mestizos en el Siglo XVI (Mexico City: Secretaria de Educación Pública, 1975), p.13.

5. Ibid, pp.56-57.

6. Steve Stern, Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), p.xv.

7. John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller in the Service of Peru (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green), p.15. John Miller was the brother of British adventurer William Miller, or "Guillermo" as he was known among his colleagues. William Miller served as an officer in the patriot army under José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar during the Wars of Independence in Peru. He attained the rank of General in 1823. John Miller accompanied his brother during the Peruvian campaign, and based this work upon his brother's memoirs and his own personal accounts. Future citations will distinguish between these two brothers, referring to the first as John, and to the second as William or Guillermo.

8. See Daniel Vizcardo Otazo, Realidad Económica, Política, Social, y Cultural del Perú en el Siglo XVIII (Lima: Publicaciones Mencopar, 1991), p.34.

9. Stern, Peru's Indian Peoples, p.92.

10. Ibid, p.85.

11. Phelipe Guaman Poma de Ayala Primer Nueva Coronica y Buen Gobierno Arthur Posnansky, (ed.), (La Paz: Editorial del Instituto "Tihuanacu", 1944), Foja 494.

12. See John Fisher, Government and Society in Colonial Peru, pp.10-15.

13. As David Brading noted, profits could be high for corregidores, and a return of 200,000 pesos on a five year term of office was not uncommon. See First America (London: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.471.

14. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias Secretas de America (Madrid: Ediciones Istmo, 1992), p.247.

15. Ibid, p.249.

16. Ibid., p.250.

17. See Steve Stern "The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742-1782," in Steve Stern (ed.), Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p.43.

18. See Leon Campbell, "Ideology and Factionalism during the Great Rebellion" in Stern, (ed.), Resistance, p.112.

19. "Testimonio del alzamiento y conjuración de los indios del Perú para emanciparse de la dominación de España, la que hubo de efectuarse el año de 1566 a los treinta años de la conquista." Reprinted in Manuel de Odriozola, Documentos Historicos Del Perú (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1874), Vol.III, p.9.

20. Ibid., p.9.

21. See Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century Peru and Upper Peru (Vienna: Bohlau Verlag Koln, 1985), p.81.

22. Ibid., p.277.

23. See John Phelan, The People and the King (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp.18-19.

24. See O'Phelan, Rebellions and Revolts, p.95.

25. Ibid., p.125.

26. Ibid., p.163, 167.

27. See Ward Starving, "Ethnic Conflict, Moral Economy, and Population in Rural Cuzco on the Eve of the Tupac Amaru II Rebellion," Hispanic American Historical Review (HAHR), 1988 (68), p.744.

28. See O'Phelan, p.168.

29. O'Phelan, Rebellions and Revolts, p.234.

30. See Leon Campbell, "The Social Structure of the Tupac Amaru II Army in Cuzco," HAHR, vol. 61, April, 1981, p.679.

31. Cited in Boleslao Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru y Los Orígenes de la Independencia de Hispanoamérica (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Editora Latino America, 1967), p.390.

32. O'Phelan, Rebellions and Revolts, p.231.

33. Declaration made by Chrispin Calisaya, cited in Ibid., p.231.

34. See Campbell, "Social Structure," p.681.

35. See Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, "El Mito de la "Independencia Concedida": Los Programas Políticos del Siglo XVIII y Del Temprano XIX en el Perú y Alto Perú (1730- 1814)", in Alberto Flores Galindo (ed.), Independencia y Revolución (1780-1840) (Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1987), p.156.

36. Cited in Lewin, La Rebelión, pp.397-398.

37. Cited in Julio Cesar Chaves, Tupac Amaru (Buenos Aires: Editorial Asunción, 1973), p.138.

38. Cited in Oscar Cornblitt Power and Violence in the Colonial City (Cambridge: University Press, 1995), p.114.

39. See O'Phelan, "El Mito", p.161.

40. Cited in Lewin, La Rebelión, p.416.

41. Cornblitt, Power and Violence, p.125.

42. O'Phelan, "El Mito," p.169.

43. Cited in Lewin, La Rebelión, p.416.

44. See Boleslao Lewin La Insurrección de Tupac Amaru (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1963), p.43.

45. See Lilian Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, 1780-1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), p.237.

46. See Melchor de Paz, "Distribución de los cuerpos, o sus partes de los nueve reos principales de la rebelion, ajusticiados en la plaza del Cuzco," in Luis Antonio Eguiguren, (ed.), Guerra Separatista (Lima: 1952), p.409.

47. See O'Phelan, "El Mito," p.156.

48. Leon Campbell noted that during royalist counterinsurgency efforts against the rebels, "a largely Indian army became the cheapest and most effective instrument at hand." See Leon Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, 1750-1810 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978,), p.129.

49. Cornblitt, Power and Violence, p.125.

50. See Campbell, The Military and Society, p.173.

51. See Don Gabriel de Aviles Memoria del Virrey del Peru (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1901), p.46.

52. Ibid., p.48.

53. See Alberto Flores Galindo "In Search of an Inca," in Steve Stern (ed.), Resistance, p.195.

54. See Aviles, Memoria del Virrey, p.49.

55. Ibid., p.49.

56. See Flores, "In Search of an Inca," p.205.

57. Ibid., p.205.

58. Ibid., p.206.

CHAPTER 1: "REVOLUTIONARY CONFLAGRATION (1810-1820);

THE INSURRECTIONS OF HUÁNUCO AND CUZCO"

The French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 unleashed a chain reaction of startling events that culminated in the independence of Spain's American colonies. After Napoleon unceremoniously deposed Ferdinand VII and placed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne, patriot juntas emerged throughout the Spanish provinces to proclaim allegiance to the exiled monarch. Creoles in Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Cartagena, Santiago de Chile and Mexico City, followed the Peninsular example and opened their cabildos to debate the future course of the Spanish colonies. Initially, creole leaders cited ancient Spanish precedents to legitimize popular sovereignty. However, the seeds of creole nationalism that germinated in the unstable social, economic, political and commercial climate of the eighteenth century now bloomed into full fledged revolutionary movements. Many creole leaders denounced the Bourbon legacy and focused upon destroying it. By 1811, the viceroyalties of Nueva Granada and the Rio de la Plata along with the provinces of Venezuela and Chile, became battlefields between patriot and royalist armies.

At First, Peru remained steadfast against the revolutionary fires raging around it. In 1809, the loyal viceroyalty dispatched troops to crush fledgling revolutionary patriot movements at La Paz and Quito. However, in 1810, rebels from Buenos Aires, relentlessly pursuing their own



revolutionary course, invaded and occupied Upper Peru. While Royalist forces prevented an invasion of Peru, the insurrections of Upper Peru and Chile taxed the economic resources of the viceroyalty. From 1810 to 1820, men and money continually flowed out of Peru to stem the patriot onslaughts.

In many respects the viceroyalty was an anomaly compared with the rest of Spanish South America. When internal insurrections did erupt in 1812 and 1814, independence was not the objective. The leaders of the Huánuco and Cuzco rebellions wished to work within the framework of the Spanish colonial system to achieve reforms. Indeed, they were interesting throwbacks to the great rebellions of the eighteenth century. In both uprisings, disgruntled creoles harnessed indigenous peoples to force a favourable settlement of their grievances with the colonial authorities. Once again, forces beyond their control trapped indigenous peoples of the sierra between the interests of Lima bureaucrats and highland creoles.

Peninsular initiatives, such as the annulment of the reparto in 1784, the mita in 1811, and the tributo in 1812, failed to enhance the quality of life of many of the indigenous peoples of the viceroyalty. As John Lynch noted, "by 1814 the Indian conditions were little better than in 1780."¹ The ire of highland peasants focused on the subdelegates, the successors of the once hated corregidores. Indeed, the axiom of "yo obedezco, pero no cumplo" seems to

have been very popular among subdelegates in intendancies such as that of Tarma during 1812. Intendant José Gonzalez de Prada lamented the fact that subdelegates were "interested solely in their own illegal trade," and based their "corrupt" conduct on "bribery, venality, ambition and abuse."² In a letter dated 27 July, 1811, he recognized "an implacable hatred" forming "towards the Europeans."³

Within the districts of Huánuco and Huamiliés, Subdelegates Diego García and Alonso Mejorada wielded nearly uncontested power. Notwithstanding reforms, they continued to practice the reparto, and implemented arbitrary edicts that flew in the face of traditional commercial practices. For hundreds of years, indigenous farmers of the region had sold their agricultural products in the lucrative markets of Cerro de Pasco and Huánuco. However, García and Mejorada forced them instead to sell to authorized merchants, at lower prices than before.⁴ The merchants, many of them Spaniards, peddled the products in local stores, at outrageously high prices. The subdelegates absorbed much of the profit. Thus, their actions alienated not only producers, but consumers as well. One creole resident blasted García as "a man of very little talent and great conceit, swollen from the favour he enjoys in Lima...he has a large repartimiento of mules in the province, and a public store in the city."⁵ In his research, Ruben Vargas Ugarte concluded that García and Mejorada "indiscriminately committed notable excesses...not only

against Indians but also against merchants."⁶

Rumours and murmurs of messianic movements whipped across the intendancy during late 1811 that forecasted a return of the Inca. These exacerbated an already difficult situation, and motivated indigenous peoples of the region to consider radical alternatives to the existing regime. One Indian woman recalled that, a stranger named Juan de Dios Guillermo "brought some letters which said a gentleman was coming...a descendant of the Inca king, to cut the throats of all whites," and "to take...their things and haciendas so that the Indians returned to be masters of their lands."⁷ An other, Martina Buyzha, reiterated that "it is true...he was coming to kill the Spaniards."⁸ Estevan Zarate insisted that "the Inca king was returning...he was coming to crown himself in these kingdoms, and to slaughter all Spaniards."⁹

On 22 February 1812, an angry mob invaded the city of Huánuco, striking out against Spaniards and their properties. The rioters levelled the house of Subdelegate García, and burned to the ground the public stores located in the city. They then demanded that every Spaniard abandon the city. On 23 February 1812, Gonzales de Prada announced that Huánuco "was invaded...by Indians of the partido of Panataguas and of other villages of the region."¹⁰ "The Indians," he continued, "have told the Huanuqueños that they will do nothing to them and that they want all the Chapetones to leave the city."¹¹ The insurrection quickly gained momentum and prompted Subdelegate

Mejorada to declare that "the province, although small, is totally in insurrection," and to beg that "military aid is needed to restore order."¹² He lamented "the number of insurgents growing by the thousands, [they are] brutal men, although the arms they possess are used carelessly due to their addiction to coca, which as you know, is an inherent Indian trait."¹³ He concluded: "their intentions are to wipe out all Europeans."¹⁴

While early reports such as the dispatches sent by Subdelegates García and Mejorada concentrated on the indigenous character of the insurrection, it soon became apparent that local creole elites had gained control of the movement. Before long, Don Manuel Berrospi, José de Crespo y Castillo, and Juan Antonio Navarro formed an interim government, which called itself "the Congress" of Huánuco. On 15 March, this congress informed Gonzalez Prada that "the insurrection is neither against the State nor the Crown, nor the homeland, nor the Catholic faith, but against the oppressive and tyrannical Spaniards."¹⁵ In return, the Intendant promised clemency if the rebels renounced the insurrection.¹⁶ Later, the congress sent a messenger, Asencio Bailon, who informed the Intendant that "the Spaniards...have greatly annoyed them," and "they do not trust the peaceful intentions [of] your last proclamation...and will not agree to them, unless you rid yourself of the Europeans."¹⁷ However, Viceroy Abascal refused to negotiate with the rebels. He sent

Colonel Pedro Cardenas with two infantry companies, 100 volunteers, muskets, sabres and the necessary munitions, to Tarma.¹⁸ In addition to the militiamen already mobilized from Tarma and Pasco, Gonzalez de Prada possessed a force of over 500 men to confront the rebels.¹⁹

On 17 March, 1812, 2,000 indigenous rebels under the command of Crespo y Castillo and José Rodríguez met Gonzalez de Prada's expedition outside the town of Ambo. However the rebel force, armed for the most part with rocks, sticks, and slings, melted quickly before the better equipped and disciplined royalists under Gonzalez Prada. When the battle ended, 150 dead rebels littered the field.²⁰ Having lost only five men, the royalists marched unopposed into Huánuco and arrested, tried and convicted the principal leaders of the insurrection.²¹ The heads of Haro, Crespo y Castillo, and Rodríguez remained on display impaled on stakes in the Plaza of Huánuco as a deterrent to other potential rebels until the flesh rotted off the skulls.

Thus, in the partido of Huánuco, elite and peasant grievances converged. As was the case thirty years before, local provincial administrators operated autonomously, at the expense of peasants and elites alike. Don Miguel de Eyzaguirre, fiscal in the Lima Audiencia, claimed that "the origin of these riots [was] the despotism and commercial practices of the subdelegates."²² Indigenous peoples whipped up with rumours of the return of the Inca king, served as

convenient vehicles for creoles to pursue change within the Spanish system. In the view of Heraclio Bonilla and Karen Spalding, the "creole leaders of the Huánuco rebellion obtained the forces that they needed...from the Indians of the surrounding areas."²³

In August 1814, only thirty years after the great Andean Revolt of Tupac Amaru, the southern highlands again erupted in insurrection. A dissident group of liberal creoles led by José Angulo overthrew the Cuzco Audiencia and established their own local government. This event triggered what Vargas Ugarte called "the most formidable uprising against Spanish power until San Martín's liberating expedition" of 1820.²⁴ Viceroy Abascal claimed that "the insurrection" posed "the most critical and dangerous" threat to the viceroyalty since the Wars of Independence erupted on the continent in 1810.²⁵

Tension between the conservative Audiencia and a faction of creole liberals had been building since the 1812 promulgation of the liberal Constitution. The Audiencia refused stubbornly to implement much of the liberal legislation, including the stipulation that local elections must be held to determine representatives for the new constitutional cabildo. After much protest from liberal creoles, the Audiencia relented and elections were held in early 1813. Immediately, leaders of the new cabildo challenged the Audiencia on a variety of issues, such as the procedure to appoint local Subdelegates.²⁶ Members of the Audiencia

reacted unsympathetically to what they perceived as unwarranted obstacles to their power. After a series of incidents they banished from Cuzco the alcalde mayor, Juan Ramírez.²⁷ Furthermore, in October 1813, the Audiencia ordered the arrest of a group of creoles, including José Angulo, who had been charged with planning to attack the local barracks. Tensions increased on 5 November 1813, when Spanish guards fired into an angry crowd of protesters, killing two.²⁸

Upon receiving news of the tragedy, the cabildo complained bitterly to the Audiencia and it condemned the decision to open fire. The oidores responded by arresting three cabildo members, who were imprisoned with the other "revolutionaries."²⁹ In August, 1814, the prisoners escaped, and with the support of many liberal creoles, imprisoned most of the European officials from the audiencia. The liberal rump nominated José Angulo as military commander, and invited the former interim president of the Audiencia, a local indigenous cacique named Mateo García Pumacahua, to serve as governor of the city. Pumacahua enjoyed regional fame as a strident royalist officer who had served loyally during the uprisings of 1780. The crown promoted him to Brigadier in 1808. Like José Gabriel Condorcanqui, Pumacahua commanded respect from both highland elites and indigenous peasants, and thus served as a convenient linking agent between the two groups. As Manuel Pardo, the regent of the Audiencia of Cuzco, claimed

"the brigadier Pumacahua had a decided influence upon the Indians, so much so that he was known among them as the Inca."³⁰

Immediately following the golpe, Angulo informed the Intendant of Puno, Don Pio Tristan y Moscoso, that "in reality there has been no change in government, merely the removal of officials who abused their authority."³¹ Later, he wrote Abascal and insisted that the Cuzqueños maintained their loyalty to the viceroy and the crown. However, Angulo lamented the unfair demands placed upon Cuzco to supply men, money, and food to royalist forces in Upper Peru that had impoverished the region.³² However, Abascal refused to deal with the rebels. He sent a dispatch to the people of Cuzco which heralded the return of Ferdinand VII to Spain and the imminent arrival of additional Peninsular troops. He promised them that if they renounced sedition, he would treat them with every humanity. If they refused, he would wage war upon them.³³

Enraged by the tone expressed in the viceroy's message, Angulo wrote to Abascal referring to him as the "duke of the Spanish discord."³⁴ In the face of Abascal's intransigence, the rebels recruited a large indigenous army from the local population and divided it into three columns. The first, under the command of former royalist captain José Pinelo, marched on Puno, with orders to continue on to La Paz. The second under Mariano Angulo and Hurtado de Mendoza left for Huamanga. The third led by Vicente Angulo and Pumacahua, marched on

Arequipa.

The rebel divisions attracted thousands of indigenous peoples to their ranks as they advanced on their objectives. Vargas Ugarte wrote that as Pinelo's division marched on Puno, "many Indians joined them, especially from Azangaro and Carabaya."³⁵ On 28 September, 1814, Pinelo and his indigenous force sacked La Paz. The rebel stay in the city was short lived, however. The commander of Royalist forces in Upper Peru, General Joaquin de la Pezuela, placed a force of over one thousand men, six artillery pieces and 40 horses, under the command of Juan Ramírez.³⁶ The strong force marched quickly to La Paz.

As Abascal proudly proclaimed, "the small but excellent division" contained "the hope of subjugating Cuzco and its undesirables."³⁷ Abascal noted that "Ramírez's twelve hundred men, although natives of Cuzco for the most part, were dedicated to wash the stain of the revolutionaries from their country."³⁸ Historian Horacio Ortega stated, "nearly all the royalist troops of general Ramírez, were Indians from Cuzco," who "had previously marched to Upper Peru under general Goyeneche to combat the patriot armies of Barcarce and Castelli."³⁹

Ramírez' division smashed Pinelo's poorly armed rebel mob outside La Paz, seizing ten artillery pieces, 150 muskets and capturing 180 prisoners.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, royalist colonel Vicente Gonzalez and his force of just over 100 men, dispersed

the second rebel column under Hurtado at the battle of Talavera. The rebels lost over 600 dead.⁴¹ Hurtado withdrew into the surrounding indigenous villages, recruiting men and fomenting insurrection.⁴² Early in January 1815, Gonzalez destroyed the remaining remnants of rebel resistance outside the village of Matará. However, his troops spent many months rooting out remaining insurgent bands in the area. Applying violent counterinsurgency methods, Gonzalez razed the villages of Chiara, Vilcashuaman and Pampa de Cangallo, killing 240 Indians and leaving 80 severely wounded.⁴³

The third rebel column enjoyed early success when on 12 November, 1814, it whipped a hastily organized royal force under Tristan y Moscoso outside Arequipa. Pumacahua's horde of 5,000 men entered the city shortly thereafter. However, the rebels beat a hasty retreat early in December when they received news of Ramírez' approach from La Paz. Ramírez rewarded his exhausted soldiers with a much deserved rest of three months as they prepared to meet Pumacahua's indigenous rebels.

By early March, Pumacahua had assembled over 30,000 indigenous fighters outside Cuzco to repel the expected royalist offensive. However, the rebels found themselves in a state of hopelessness that compelled their leaders to beg for mercy. In a letter to Ramírez on 28 February, Vicente Angulo implored him to "open you eyes, great general, let's deal like men, and not enemies...we are sons of a common father...I am

not responsible for the sad consequences of the war."⁴⁴ A few days later Pumacahua asked Ramírez to forgive him for his treasonous errors, and assured him by letter that "I am an Indian of a magnanimous heart, humanity governs me...I defend the faith as a good Christian, I love the king and his royal family."⁴⁵ The next day Ramírez informed the rebel leaders that "you are too vile and indecent for a general of the King to waste time answering your improper and disgusting pleas. My bayonets will humiliate your arrogance."⁴⁶

On 11 March, at the battle of Umachiri, Ramírez smashed Pumacahua's rebels. The royalist General noted that "they [the rebels] attacked us with over 36,000 men, most of them armed only with sticks, slings, and some with rocks."⁴⁷ Tristan y Moscoso lauded the "loyalty, valour and enthusiasm" exhibited by Ramírez's troops during the battle as it "punished tens of thousands of [Pumacahua's] Indians...united with the objective of dislocating these provinces from the rule of Ferdinand VII," and "the extermination of every white face...."⁴⁸

Despite the views of many royalist administrators, the Cuzco rebels did not in fact seek independence from Spain. John Fisher insisted that while some highland elites within the movement favoured independence, most "supported the rebellion simply in the hope of obtaining better government within the framework of Spanish rule."⁴⁹ It was only after Abascal refused to listen to their grievances that highland elites resorted to violence.

Like Tupac Amaru 30 years earlier, Cacique Mateo Pumacahua played a prominent leadership role in the revolt. Recognizing his influence upon the indigenous masses, creoles called upon Pumacahua to mobilize them.⁵⁰ When he executed the rebels, General Ramírez remembered the adoration showed to Pumacahua by the "natives who loved him with a passionate warmth."⁵¹ Like José Gabriel Condorcanqui before him, the mere presence of the cacique accorded the rebel movement instant credibility among local indigenous peoples, who flocked to the rebel standard in the thousands. Viceroy Abascal himself admitted the importance of indigenous peoples in the rebel movement as "these natives formed a force capable of maintaining the possession of the country."⁵² He recognized that indigenous soldiers formed a significant part of insurgent forces, and that creole groups on their own lacked the popular support needed for successful revolution.⁵³ Manuel Pardo concurred with Abascal that Indians performed an invaluable role for the Cuzqueño elites.⁵⁴ Indeed, the similarity with the Tupac Amaru revolt of 1780 is striking. Both movements originated in or near Cuzco. Highland elites dominated the leadership cadres of both movements that targeted the indigenous element of the area to fill their armies.⁵⁵ In both cases, royalist forces mobilized the local indigenous population to crush the insurgents.

In 1814, Ferdinand VII returned absolutism to Spain,

heralding the end of the constitutional experiment. Despite the relentless advances of insurgent forces and severe economic difficulties, much of Peru remained loyal to Spain. Indeed, the economy continually deteriorated throughout the decade 1810 to 1820. Silver production and commercial shipping, the base of Peruvian prosperity for centuries, plunged to the point of stagnation. Flood waters submerged the once productive mines of Cerro de Pasco and Huancavelica. In many respects, the Independence wars brought further disruption to already feeble trans-Atlantic and Pacific trade. The arrivals of Spanish vessels at the port of Callao became increasingly rare. Moreover, the decision of the Cortes in 1811 to terminate the collection of indigenous tribute severed nearly half of the viceroyalty's internal revenues.⁵⁶ This accelerated the economic descent and caused desperate reactions. Beginning in 1815, total revenues amounted to less than half the required sum needed to pay fixed monthly expenses.⁵⁷ In 1819, the Ministry of Finance in Spain estimated that the Peruvian debt had reached 20 million pesos.⁵⁸

On the military front, royalist fortunes improved as insurgent advances in Chile and New Granada fizzled during 1814 and 1815. However, the battered Metropolis could not capitalize on this reversal of fortune. While patriot insurgents in Upper Peru continued to tie down a large Royalist army, the two great South American liberators, Simon

Bolívar and José de San Martín, relentlessly pursued their dreams of continental independence. In 1817, San Martín marched his Argentine forces across the Andean cordillera into Chile to unite with Bernardo O'Higgins and his patriot army. The combined forces crushed the royalists at the battle of Maipu in April 1818, effectively terminating royalist resistance in the region. As San Martín's liberating expedition prepared for the invasion of Peru, Lord Thomas Cochrane assembled a Chilean navy to blockade Pacific ports. Royalist officials waited nervously for the inevitable invasion. Creoles were passive, unsure where to place their support. Indigenous peoples of the Peruvian highlands remained angry- uncertain how now violence would draw them into the vortex of tumult.

On the eve of San Martín's invasion, fears of a massive indigenous revolt in Peru continued to plague royalist officials and tempered many creole desires for independence. Most Peruvian creoles continued to favour Spanish domination to the potential consequences of a large scale social revolution.⁵⁹ Fighting insurgents in Upper Peru in 1818, royalist General José Canterac warned that "the General commanding an army or division in these countries must not discount his potential enemies, even though they are gauchos...Indians...descended from the Incas...they [Indians] are the enemies of the white race."⁶⁰ He noted that while "many armed Indians...[have] terrorize[d] us...many...seem to

have adopted our sober cause, compared with the hatred exhibited against us since the beginning of the revolution, this seems a paradox."⁶¹ The views of General Canterac proved quite prophetic. As in Tupac Amaru's revolt in 1780 and the Cuzco uprising of 1814, indigenous peoples assisted both sides of the conflict during the Wars for Peruvian Independence. For many of them, they did not serve out of their own volition. Opportunistic officials on both sides of the conflict compelled Indian peoples to serve their armies and to fill their lowest ranks with common soldiers who did the actual fighting.

Notes

1. John Lynch The Spanish American Revolutions 2nd Edition (London: Metheun, 1987), p.164.
2. Cited in John Fisher Government and Society in Colonial Peru, p.97.
3. Cited in O'Phelan, "El Mito", p.184.
4. See José Varallanos Historia de Huánuco (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Lopez, 1959), p.457.
5. Cited in Ibid., p.456.
6. See Ruben Vargas Ugarte Historia General del Perú 6 Vols, (Lima: G.Seix y Barral Hermanos, 1966), Vol.V, p.239.
7. Royal Authorities, Ygnacio Valdivieso and Nicolas de Berroa, interviewed people of the intendancy of Tarma in March, 1812, while investigating the causes of the insurrection. "Declaración de Marina Ynes Ramos yndia sobre la denuncia contra Juan de Dios Guillermo." Cited in Ella Dunbar Temple (ed.), Conspiraciones y Rebeliones en el Siglo XIX. La Revolución de Huánuco, Panatahuas y Huamalíes de 1812 5 Vols. Tomo III in CDIP, Vol.I Doc. File VIII, p.133.
8. "Otra de Martina Buyzha," in Ibid., p.134.
9. "Otra de Estevan Zarate yndio," Ibid., p.134.
10. "Circular a los Subdelegados de los Partidos de Jauja, Huamalíes, Cajatambo...." Josphe Gonzalez de Prada, Tarma, 27 February, 1812, CDIP, Tomo III, Vol.I, File VI, Doc.10, pp.74-75.
11. Ibid., p.75.
12. Alfonso Mejorada to Gonzalez de Prada, Guariaca, 24 Feb. 1812, Ibid., Doc.15, p.80.
13. Ibid., p.80.
14. Ibid., p.80.
15. Huánuco "Congress" to Gonzalez de Prada 15 March, 1812. Cited in Ibid., File X, Doc.32, p.279.
16. See Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Peru, Vol.V, p.241.
17. Cited in Ibid., p.242.

18. See Felix Dengri Luna, (ed.), Antologia de la Independencia del Perú (Lima: Publicaciones de la Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia del Perú, 1972), p.242.

19. Ibid., p.242.

20. See Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Perú, Vol.V, p.243.

21. Ibid., p.243.

22. See Varallanos, Historia de Huánuco, p.458.

23. See Heraclio Bonilla and Karen Spalding, "La Independencia en el Peru: las Palabras y los Hechos," in Heraclio Bonilla (ed.), La Independencia en el Peru (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos 1981), p.49.

24. Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Perú, Vol.V, p.249.

25. Jose Fernando de Abascal y Sousa Memoria de Gobierno del Virrey Abascal (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos de la Universidad de Sevilla, Vol. 2), p.227.

26. Fisher, Government and Society, p.228.

27. Ibid., p.228.

28. Ibid., p.228.

29. Ibid., p.228.

30. "Memoria exacta y imparcial de la insurrección que ha experimentado la provincia y capital del Cuzco en el Reyno del Peru." Por D. Manuel Pardo, Rejente de su real Audiencia. Lima, April 1, 1816. Reprinted in Odriozola, Documentos Historicos, Vol. III, p.37.

31. Cited in Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Perú, Vol.V, p.252.

32. Ibid., p.253.

33. Ibid., p.253.

34. Ibid., p.253.

35. Ibid., p.254.

36. Ibid., p.255.
37. Abascal, Memoria del Virrey, p.226.
38. Ibid., p.226.
39. See Horacio Villanueva Ortega (ed.), Consipiraciones y Rebeliones en el Siglo XIX, La Revolución de Cuzco de 1814 5 Vols. Tomo IV in CDIP, pp. xix.
40. Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Perú, Vol.V, p.258.
41. Ibid., p.258.
42. Ibid., p.258.
43. Ibid., p.259.
44. Vicente Angulo to General Juan Ramírez, Ayaviri, 28 February, 1815, Odriozola, Documentos Historicos, Vol. III, p.88.
45. Mateo Pumacahua to Ramírez, Colaparque, 6 March, 1815, Ibid., p.90.
46. General Mateo Ramírez to rebel Commanders, Pucará, 7 March, 1815, Ibid., pp.90-91.
47. "Diario de las operaciones del ejército del general Ramírez en su marcha de la ciudad de Arequipa para la del Cuzco," Gazeta del Gobierno de Lima, 10 May, 1815, reprinted in Ibid., p.126.
48. Moscoso's account is from the Gaceta del Gobierno d Lima Num.41, Miercoles 17 de Mayo 1815, reprinted in Ibid., p.138.
49. See Fisher, Government and Society, p.229.
50. See Bonilla and Spalding, "Palabras y Hechos," pp.50-51.
51. Ramírez to Abascal, Cuzco, 3 April 1815 in Odriozola (ed.), Documentos Historicos, Vol.III, p.134.
52. Abascal, Memoria del Virrey, p.229-230.
53. Bonilla and Spalding, "Palabras y Hechos," p.50.
54. Pardo, "Memoria exacta," in Odriozola (ed.), Documentos Historicos, Vol.III (Documentos), p.43.

55. Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Perú, Vol.V, p.249.

56. See Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government, p.55.

57. Ibid., p.16.

58. Ibid., p.16.

59. Ibid., p.77.

60. "Resumen historico de mes de junio, 1818," D. José Canterac to D. Joaquin de la Pezuela, Quartel General en Tupiza, Alto Peru, 30 June, 1818, in CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.9, p.17.

61. Canterac to Pezuela, 1 September, 1818, Tupiza, Ibid., Tomo V, Vol.1, Doc. #13 p.31.

CHAPTER TWO: "WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS:SAN MARTÍN AND INDIGENOUS INSURGENTS, 1820-1821"

An ancient Spanish proverb claims that "a cada cochino gordo, le llega su San Martín" (to every fat pig comes his San Martín.)¹ In 1818, after the route of royalist forces in Chile, José de San Martín targeted the once opulent viceroyalty of Peru as the next theatre of patriot operations. For the next two and one half years, a voluminous amount of intelligence reached Chile from patriot agents in Peru recommending various war winning strategies. Many suggested that the interior highland region, and its large indigenous population, presented the achilles heal of the viceroyalty. Such advice helped convince San Martín that a relatively small expeditionary force could defeat the royalist army. This predication rested upon the assumption that Peru's downtrodden Indians would join a massive insurrection. Like Tupac Amaru, Vicente Angulo, Mateo Pumacahua, and other insurgent leaders before him, to carry out his political objectives, San Martín sought the active participation of the indigenous population.

In fact, in 1820-21 a massive Indian insurrection erupted throughout the central highland districts of Peru that in scope and intensity rivalled the uprisings of 1780 and 1814. Patriot General Antonio Alvarez de Arenales twice led expeditions into the sierra, leaving arms, troops and officials behind him to incite the Indians of this strategic region into insurrection. However, San Martín refused to

detach a large force to occupy the highlands, and instead focused upon driving a large royalist garrison out of Lima. Above all, the Liberator desired "to settle the question without bloodshed," by winning the hearts and minds of the people.² What he meant was victory without shedding any patriot blood, and by duping the Indians of Peru into fighting his battles for him. In the end, San Martín's plan served to breath life into an exhausted royalist army, that struck out violently against the Indian insurgents.

After the astounding success of the Chilean campaign, it was clear to patriot leaders that to ensure the existence of the fledgling independent states of the South American continent, the remaining centres of royalist resistance in Peru had to be crushed. Indeed, in April, 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins reminded San Martín, "it is vital not to forget that without the liberty of Peru, there is no permanent independence."³ Commencing in 1817, patriot officials in Chile gathered intelligence from agents in Peru that yielded valuable social, political and military information. In December 1817, San Martín received a dispatch from Lieutenant Colonel José Bernadez Polledo, a patriot officer then imprisoned in Lima.⁴ Illustrating detailed knowledge of military deployments, Bernadez described royalist units, their cantonments, uniform colours and even social composition. He noted that royalist troops occupied two large pockets in Lima

and Upper Peru, with smaller detachments scattered throughout the viceroyalty. Moreover, he claimed that the interior provinces, and its large Indian population, were hungry for revolution.

Bernadez reported, "the province of Puno is totally addicted to our system, the people are simple Indians who will rise up at the first movement," and "the intendant Zarate is an intriguing American mestizo who can be won over with promises."⁵ He went on to note, "the province of Cuzco is the most powerful...the people, although they are in an oppressed state, are supportive and anxious for a revolution."⁶ Bernadez was certain that "the province of Huamanga also shares the same adhesion and is constantly in ferment" and that "Huancavelica is [also] full of Indians decided for our system."⁷ He concluded, "all these provinces proved their revolutionary disposition during the insurrection of Pumacahua and Angelo, which, like an electric storm, fired the enthusiasm of all Peru."⁸ Bernadez claimed that four to six thousand men could disembark at Pisco, where "...the negroes in the area will rise immediately, as will those in the haciendas of Ica, Chincha and Canete, from which a force of 6,000 men could be raised."⁹

An anonymous patriot partisan writing from southern Peru informed that Peruvian society consisted of three classes. The first, "of nobles and priests (these are enemies of the liberal system); the second of the middle class and mestizos

(these are intriguing, servile and without character); the third, of the Indians, Negroes and mulattoes (these are patriots)."¹⁰ He claimed that Indians wallowed in a "dejected" state, but were "honest, hard working and loyal."¹¹ Moreover, they were ideal to make excellent infantry forces since "they have great agility and can endure long journeys on foot."¹² Most importantly, they "aspired towards independence from Spanish power" and were "predispos[ed] to revolt."¹³ Yet, "the most effective method to motivate them is by employing people of influence in their villages, who can speak to them in their own language."¹⁴ Two other agents, Don José Fernández Paredes and Don José García, proposed that "the most advantageous" plan of attack would be "an expedition composed of at least 5000 men," that could "make [its] advance towards the interior provinces of Peru."¹⁵

These, and other patriot communiques convinced San Martín that the indigenous population would rebel against the Spanish government. In his view, the enlightened guidance of the liberators would instigate a massive indigenous insurrection to sweep the royalists from Peru. In 1819, San Martín proclaimed that "the objective of this expedition will be to disembark in different points of the Pacific coast," to "draw the attention of enemy forces, to wear them down with continual marches, to impose contributions on the Spaniards, and to foment insurrection...but absolutely not to become

involved in any decisive engagement."¹⁶ On 25 May, 1819, San Martín predicted optimistically that an expedition of four thousand men would be sufficient to drive the royalists from Peru.¹⁷ However first, the Spanish naval presence in the Pacific had to be destroyed.¹⁸

By the time that the patriot expeditionary force left Valparaíso in August, 1820, Admiral Cochrane's Chilean fleet had shattered Spanish naval defences and cemented an airtight blockade along the Pacific coast of Peru. In an address to the people of Peru on 5 August, 1820, O'Higgins proclaimed: "I salute you, illustrious children of the Sun, the expedition sails, destined to liberate the land of the Incas."¹⁹ His allusions to the rich historical traditions of indigenous Peru were not coincidental. Indeed, the Chilean patriots realized the importance of incorporating the Peruvian Indians in the forthcoming campaign. In June, 1820, the Chilean senate reminded San Martín to "ensure that the Indians are treated leniently," and ordered him to terminate the tribute which they paid under the Spanish government, and "if it is necessary to raise any military forces from these natives...ensure not to mix them with other races."²⁰

San Martín believed that the patriot force of 4,118 officers and men sufficient to spark a massive insurrection in the Peruvian interior provinces (see Table 1). San Martín boasted "I do not doubt that the liberating army will give to opinion in Peru the kind of movement it is prepared to

TABLE 1
Patriot Army Embarked at Valparaiso, 20 August, 1820

<u>Argentine Division</u>	
Batallón de Artillería de Los Andes	198
Batallón de Infantería de Los Andes No.7	439
Batallón de Infantería de Los Andes No.8	462
Batallón de Infantería de Los Andes No.11	562
Los Granaderos á Caballo	391
Los Cazadores de Los Andes	261
 TOTAL	 2,313
<u>Chilean Division</u>	
Batallón de Artillería de Chile	215
Batallón de Infantería de Chile No.2	600
Batallón de Infantería de Chile No.4	651
Batallón de Infantería de Chile No.5	339
 TOTAL	 1,805
 TOTAL PATRIOT FORCE (Officers and Men)	 4,118

Source: Mariano Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, Apendice, p.63.

receive."²¹ San Martín proclaimed that "it is my mission to protect the oppressed...help the disgraced," and to "tear them from the Spanish yoke forever."²²

Royalist troops were concentrated in two large pockets true to intelligence reports received earlier. Just over 7,000 royalist troops held positions in Lima and the immediate vicinity (see Table 2), while General Olañeta held Upper Peru with approximately 5,000 troops.²³ A detachment of sixty three troops remained in Guayaquil, with token forces in Arequipa and Cuzco as well.²⁴ To thwart an invasion near Pisco, Colonel Manuel Quimper held Ica with the Batallón Infantería de Burgos.

On 8 September, 1820, San Martín's liberating expedition

TABLE 2
Royalist Forces Cantoned in or near Lima, September, 1820

Infantry	
Regimiento de Infantería del Infante Don Carlos	
Batallón No.1	1,052
Batallón No.2	925
Batallón de Infantería de Numancia	775
Batallón de Infantería de Victoria	672
Batallón de Infantería de Arequipa	421
Batallón de Infantería de Los Infantes de Cantabria	975
Batallón de Infantería de Los Infantes de Burgos (Ica)	920
 TOTAL (Officers and Men)	 5,740
 Cavalry	
Escuadron de Los Húsares del Virrey	201
Escuadron de Los Húsares del Virrey (Lurin)	298
Escuadron de Los Dragones de la Union	206
Escuadron de Los Dragones de Carabayllo (Lurin)	257
Escuadron de Los Dragones de Lima	284
Escuadron de Los Dragones de Lima (Lurin)	106
 TOTAL (Officers and Men)	 1,354
 TOTAL MANPOWER	 7,094

Source: Mariano Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, Apendice, p.29.

began its landing at Pisco, 200 km south of Lima. By 12 September, the entire patriot invasion force had disembarked, and San Martín ordered units to reconnoitre the immediate area and gather supplies needed for the upcoming months. In order to expand his army, San Martín declared freed Negro slaves who enlisted voluntarily.²⁵ By 26 September, he noted that he had already recruited 650 negro slaves from local haciendas, continuing "such is the enthusiasm they have shown flocking to our banners, and their decision to follow the army...."²⁶

On October 5 San Martín ordered Major Colonel Juan

Antonio Alvarez de Arenales to penetrate the sierra with an expeditionary column of 1,000 troops.²⁷ This patriot division included the Batallones de Infantería de Chile No.2, Los Andes No.11, fifty granaderos, thirty cazadores, and 2 artillery pieces.²⁸ His son, Captain José Alvarez de Arenales, asserted that the objective of the mission was to foment insurrection among the Indian inhabitants of the region.²⁹ San Martín noted that "armaments conveyed by Arenales from Pisco are indispensable to arm the people he encounters who are disposed to follow the destiny of his troops."³⁰

Nervous Peruvian royalist officials realized that San Martín would attempt to incite the Indians, and worried about the impact of patriot contagion. Already in 1818, Viceroy Joaquin de la Pezuela deemed the Indians an unstable mass, prone to rebellion. In his view, "Indians...are naturally inclined to every kind of wickedness. In my opinion, they do not know the Catholic religion; their aversion to the King's authority and the adhesion to their Incas are indelible."³¹ As a result of their ignorance, Pezuela noted, "they are always disposed to hear and follow the suggestions of perverse leaders, who induce them to rebellion."³² On 22 July, 1820, royalist General Agustín Otermín informed Pezuela that he feared a patriot advance into the sierra, where "as you know, one finds perverted people fond of insurrection."³³ On 24 September, Pezuela warned Colonel Manuel Quimper that the patriot army "will infect the people of the interior with

subversive ideas."³⁴ On 30 September, General José de La Serna proclaimed, "the intent of the enemies will be to animate and excite the inhabitants of Peru whom they will declare independent."³⁵ He noted that "according to the opinions of those who know these regions, already there is a predisposition for this [independence] in the provinces of the interior."³⁶ On 8 October General Juan Ramírez insisted royalist forces must never abandon the sierra regions as this would "expose them to insurrection, which, for some [districts], is already the custom."³⁷

Events following the patriot landing compounded royalist anxieties. Immediately after San Martín's landing, indigenous insurrections erupted throughout the viceroyalty. For some, such as Subdelegate Manuel Antonio de Gomes of Carabaya district, this brought back bitter memories of the 1780 and 1814 uprisings. On 24 October he reported that "the same thing that happened in 1814, when the Indians...rose and revolted...is occurring anew."³⁸ The Alcalde of Juli, José Marcelo de Molina warned Intendant Don Tadeo Joaquín de Garate of Puno that "the Indians do not ignore the disembarkation of San Martín...you should not doubt the scope of the seduction of the enemy, and the courage it has given to the great part of the inhabitants to their cause...and the system of Independence."³⁹ On 25 October, Viceroy Pezuela professed that he was not surprised by "the sinister conduct of the Indians of the country, because experience has shown that they

appear loyal only when dominated by respectable forces."⁴⁰ On 4 November, Pezuela promised "to name a Military tribunal to prosecute the Indians and other individuals of Chincha treacherously turning against the King, as they have taken up arms in favour of our enemies."⁴¹

The advance of Alvarez de Arenales' division towards Ica in late October forced Quimper's battalion to withdraw from the area. In their haste, they abandoned three hundred muskets, many swords and lances, and other equipment which the patriots quickly put to use.⁴² To hold the newly acquired territory, Alvarez de Arenales distributed weapons, and left behind troops, and officials to organize provisional governments and local milicias. These became the precursors of the "montonera" guerrilla bands that soon infested the sierras. He appointed Don Juan José Salas as governor of the district, and entrusted two patriot officers, Colonel Don Francisco Bermudez and Captain Don Luis Aldao, to organize milicias and "to maintain the revolution."⁴³

On 23 October San Martín and the bulk of the patriot army re-embarked at Pisco and landed once again north of Lima at Huacho to establish their headquarters at Huaura.⁴⁴ In November, San Martín reported that "Arenales informs me...that he has arrived at Huamanga, where the people received him with the same enthusiasm that greeted him at Ica. I do not doubt that he has continued his march with success...I am sure that his division is creating serious worries for the Viceroy."⁴⁵

Arenales entered Tarma on 28 November, appointed Don Francisco de Paula Otero political and military governor of the district, and proclaimed that henceforth the indigenous inhabitants were freed from tribute payments.⁴⁶

Towards the end of November, royalist columns moved to confront the patriot expedition in the sierra whose objective, Viceroy Pezuela stated was "to disturb the back of Lima, to collect resources, and in a word, to whip the inhabitants into a general uprising."⁴⁷ From Lima, General Diego O'Reilly marched on Tarma with the Batallón Infantería de Victoria and a squadron of cavalry. Meanwhile, General Juan Ricafort departed from Cuzco with an Infantry battalion and two cavalry squadrons to pacify Huamanga. In defence against this movement, patriot officers Aldao and Bermudez organized thousands of Indians of the region, who were armed with only rocks and slings.⁴⁸ They stationed 3,000 to 4,000 Indians in the high peaks surrounding the villages of San Juan de Lucanas and Cangallo with instructions to thwart the royalist advance.⁴⁹ However, Ricafort quickly dispersed these indigenous insurgents, and claimed that his soldiers killed 1,000 of them. The royalist force laid waste to Cangallo and continued north towards Jauja. On 5 December, 1820, outside Cerro de Pasco, the patriot division under Colonel Alvarez de Arenales crushed the royalists under O'Reilly. After the defeat, royalist casualties littered the battlefield leaving fifty eight dead, and nineteen injured.⁵⁰ The patriots



FIGURE 2
THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS

captured 343 prisoners, including twenty eight officers. Their own losses were only four dead and twelve injured.⁵¹ News of the royalist defeat reached Lima at approximately the same time that Pezuela received a dispatch informing the entire Batallón de Numancia had went over to the patriot side. In Lima at the time, English traveller William Stevenson commented that "everything save hope seemed to have abandoned [the royalists], while everything favoured the cause of the liberating forces."⁵²

On 16 December, Pezuela summed up the pathetic state of the viceroyalty. In his view, the recent reverses of Ica and Cerro de Pasco as well as the "ruinous passing" of the Batallón de Numancia, all conspired to crush royalist fortunes.⁵³ The Viceroy noted that "the contagion has also arrived to the simple and suffering Indian...All, from children of tender ages, flock to enlist in [San Martín's] banners. They rebel spontaneously in order to place themselves under his orders."⁵⁴ He concluded by complaining "my army and I are already defeated and wait only for the arrival of San Martín to Lima."⁵⁵

However, Pezuela's momentary defeatist attitudes were premature. In early January, 1821, the bulk of the patriot forces under Alvarez de Arenales abandoned the sierra and joined San Martín at Huaura. Yet, as García Camba noted "after Arenales' triumphant march, nearly the entire mass of Indians in the Jauja valley rose in insurrection."⁵⁶ General

Ricafort's royalists filled the vacuum left by Alvarez de Arenales and descended upon the indigenous rebels of Huamanga, Huancavelica and Jauja.⁵⁷ In Jauja jurisdiction, patriot officers Bermudez and Aldao recruited a force of nearly 10,000 Indians armed with sticks, pikes, slings, and clubs to augment the garrison of 400 patriot regulars.⁵⁸

On 29 December, Ricafort overwhelmed the enthusiastic yet poorly armed Indian fighters outside Huancayo. García Camba noted "the enemy's resistance did not last long, our irritated soldiers killed and injured many Indians during the bloody action."⁵⁹ Paz Soldan referred to the engagement as "a horrible slaughter" that killed over 500 Indians.⁶⁰ Captain Alvarez de Arenales recalled that "the result was the complete dispersion of the patriots and the loss of all their articles of war," which "[left] Ricafort in possession of Huancayo."⁶¹ The royalists swept through the countryside, ruthlessly pacifying the area, and as Alvarez de Arenales reported, "homes were left full of dead and wounded...the citizens, the women, the temples and properties were alternatively sacrificed to the brutal and scandalous whims of Spanish officers and soldiers."⁶²

Despite this setback, patriot officials continued to organize indigenous resistance in the Jauja valley. By early January, Otero and Aldao had recruited a new force of over 1,000 Indians to disrupt royalist operations in the sierra.⁶³ On 6 January, San Martín ordered Colonel Alvarez de Arenales

to hold Canta with Aldao's Indian auxiliaries, and to "ensure that he employs them against all enemies within his reach."⁶⁴ On 7 January, San Martín ordered Aldao and Otero to "to punish severely the invader of the sierra."⁶⁵ He informed them that "during this critical moment...you can hold your ground by harassing the enemy, interfering with his communications, and depriving him of all the resources that he needs for his mobility and subsistence."⁶⁶ On 17 January, Otero and Aldao's Indian guerrillas surprised a vanguard column of twenty royalist cavalry men near the village of Moya. Using ancient tactics, the Indians rolled boulders on the royalists from surrounding hills, killing five of them, whose heads they sent to Commander Aldao as trophies.⁶⁷ As Paz Soldan noted, used properly, Indian guerrillas produced "useful results."⁶⁸ On 30 January, 1821, General Alvarez de Arenales reminded Otero of the virtues of Indian guerrillas, which could be used as cannon fodder to protect regular patriot soldiers. He noted, "The Indians can be garrisoned in the altitudes of the mountain passes, armed with boulders and slings. Provided that they are managed in a tactful manner, there will be no risk of losing our men."⁶⁹ General Arenales summarized, "the Indians, according to the report of commander Aldao, have proven their worth, with praiseworthy deeds of energy and enthusiasm, and for the same reason should be roused and electrified with your close support."⁷⁰

Fortunately for the royalists, San Martín chose not to

TABLE 3
Patriot Army Cantoned at Huaura, 15 January, 1821

Artillería del Ejército Libertador del Perú	408
Batallón Infantería de Numancia	618
Batallón Infantería de Los Andes No.7	830
Batallón Infantería de Los Andes No.8	862
Batallón Infantería de Los Andes No.11	512
Batallón Infantería de Chile No.2	508
Batallón Infantería de Chile No.4	872
Batallón Infantería de Chile No.5	785
Batallón Cazadores del Ejército	558
Regimiento Granaderos á Caballo	391
Regimiento Cazadores á Caballo	355
 TOTAL INFANTRY	 5,545
TOTAL CAVALRY	746
TOTAL ARTILLERY	408
 TOTAL MANPOWER (Officers and Enlisted)	 6,699

Source: CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.II, Doc.38, p.243.

occupy the sierra permanently and instead he focused his attentions on forcing the royalist garrison from Lima. He continued to shun any decisive battle with the royalist army, preferring instead to use irregular forces to win a "war of resources." On 4 January, he informed Otero, "under any pretext whatsoever you should not attempt a formal action against the enemies, and should only solidify the war of resources."⁷¹ He ordered him to continue mobilizing the indigenous population of the area, and to "direct them with dynamism and tact, remember, use small bands of 100 men each."⁷² In a letter to the patriot Government in Chile, San Martín informed that he had named Isidoro Villar as commander general of the guerrilla bands in the sierra, and insisted that this style of warfare could "create great difficulty for

the enemy."⁷³ He continued, "I have ordered various partidos to situate themselves in the immediate vicinity of Lima, in order to vigorously deprive the city of the resources that their tired troops require, thus undermining moral...and fomenting the spirit of desertion."⁷⁴

Basil Hall, another Englishman resided in Lima at the time, noted that "it was not only the slaves and of the mob that people were afraid; but with more reason, of the multitude of armed Indians surrounding the city, who, although under the orders of San Martín's officers, were savage and undisciplined troops."⁷⁵ He continued, "these Indian auxiliaries were so near that we could see them distinctly from the streets, perched along the heights overhanging the town...very likely to enter the place in a body as soon as the Spaniards had gone."⁷⁶ Peruvian historian Gustavo Vergara Arias noted that the guerrilla bands which swarmed around Lima at this time, were for the most part Indians, aided in their efforts by many mestizos.⁷⁷

On 29 January, 1821, royalist officers led by General La Serna orchestrated a military golpe to depose Viceroy Pezuela for his inept and weak leadership during the first few months of the war. Taking control of the viceroyalty, La Serna noted the indigenous insurrections in the interior that strangled royalist lines of communication and supply.⁷⁸ He complained, "more than 5,000 guerrillas occupy the intendancies of Huamanga, Tarma and Lima."⁷⁹ La Serna recognized that despite

the patriot defeat suffered at Huancayo, "Arenales, in his trek across the interior" had "left seeds of insurrection that suffocate the [interior] provinces."⁸⁰ As a result, the new Viceroy dispatched royalist columns to wipe out the insurgents.⁸¹

On 3 March La Serna ordered Ricafort's column to Jauja to punish Indian insurgents near Concepción and to pacify the rebellious highland districts of Huarochiri and Yauyos that strangled Lima.⁸² Clinging to the peaks of the surrounding mountain passes, Indian rebels near Concepción repelled Ricafort's advance by pelting his troops with boulders and rocks.⁸³ On 23 March, La Serna ordered Colonel Gerónimo Valdéz to Jauja with 1,200 troops to reinforce Ricafort's division.⁸⁴ The Viceroy sent another detachment of royalist forces into the valley under General José Carratalá to gather live stock and other provisions necessary for the starving royalist garrison in Lima, "and to destroy the guerrilla bands that swarmed everywhere."⁸⁵ At Ataura, in April, Valdéz attacked and destroyed completely a force of 4,000 poorly armed Indians, killing many of them.⁸⁶ García Camba recollected that "the important triumph of Ataura served as a beneficial lesson for the deceived Indians of the Jauja valley."⁸⁷

In an effort to regain the momentum for the patriot forces in the sierra, San Martín again ordered General Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales into the Jauja valley. On 21

April, 1821, three infantry battalions, a squadron of cavalry and four artillery pieces left from patriot headquarters in Huaura.⁸⁸ Captain José Arenales insisted that the main objectives of the campaign were to drive royalist detachments from the sierra, to bolster the patriot army with highland recruits, and to solidify and reanimate irregular operations in the interior districts.⁸⁹

General Alvarez de Arenales addressed his troops on 20 April telling them, "your objective is to severely punish the oppressors of the sierra for a second time."⁹⁰ As the column marched into the highlands, they encountered the remnants of brutal royalist counterinsurgency. As the patriot division passed through Cerro de Pasco, Captain Arenales noted that "all the residents...had been victimized by all sorts of violence during the Spaniard's occupation."⁹¹ Arenales recalled that royalist Colonel Valdéz swore to the people of Cerro de Pasco that if they aided the patriots in the least, he would slaughter and burn them all. Arenales commented, "To burn and raise entire villages was always a simple diversion for the Spaniards: one day history will show the great list of atrocities they have ran up."⁹²

By June, 1821, General Alvarez de Arenales concluded that his patriot forces had once again secured the sierra.⁹³ He commended Otero and other patriot governors for their efforts in sustaining irregular operations in the interior.⁹⁴ The patriot General now readied his troops for an advance upon

Cuzco. A complete royalist defeat seemed imminent.

Meanwhile in Lima, the situation for the royalists had become untenable. The patriot blockade by land and sea, combined with the insalubrious coastal climate to cripple La Serna's army. In June, the Viceroy complained that 3,000 royalist troops lay dying in Lima hospitals. La Serna insisted that at this time, thirty to forty men were dying each day of "dysentery and putrid fevers."⁹⁵ On 25 June the Viceroy commenced the royalist evacuation of Lima, ordering General José Canterac into the sierra with 3,000 troops healthy enough to march. On 6 July the viceroy marched out of Lima with a division of 2,000 semi-healthy troops, leaving behind 1,000 sick men in the fortress of Real Felipe at Callao.

On 8 July, La Serna addressed the rebellious Indians of Peru with a sermon mixed with caresses and threats. He told them to renounce rebellion and to discount San Martín's "false promises and seductions."⁹⁶ He assured them that he loved them all, and begged them to return to their villages to resume their agricultural enterprises. The Viceroy assured, "alleviate your fears for I pardon you from your past transgressions."⁹⁷ He professed to understand their "docileness" which allowed "seduction to carry [them] away."⁹⁸ La Serna then exposed fully the iron fist from its velvet glove. He threatened that if the Indians did not provide his troops with the provisions and assistance that they required, they could expect nothing less than the total

destruction of their homes "and other such brutalities."⁹⁹

As La Serna's column marched through Yauyos, angry Indians from local villages attacked their rearguard without respite. The inhospitable greeting accorded royalist troops in Yauyos was such that many detachments resorted to imitating patriot troops in order to pass through local villages. García Camba recollected "the countryside seemed so against the Spaniards, not a single shepherd would speak up."¹⁰⁰

Satisfied with the royalist evacuation of Lima, San Martín entered the capital on 7 July, virtually ignoring La Serna's escape into the sierra.¹⁰¹ Shortly thereafter, the liberator ordered General Alvarez de Arenales to abandon his advance in the interior and to return to Lima. By August, only patriot officials and guerrillas occupied the important interior districts. Remarkably, San Martín's leadership faltered during this vital moment in the war which gave the royalist army new life and prolonged the war for another four years. On 30 July, General Alvarez de Arenales informed San Martín "we have to repent for not having destroyed this enemy force when we could have done so."¹⁰² Paz Soldan chastised San Martín for his stubborn refusal to abandon his policy of non-confrontation with the royalist army.¹⁰³ He also blasted the liberator for ordering the retreat of Arenales' column from the interior at a moment when complete victory seemed assured.¹⁰⁴ William Stevenson claimed that at the time, it was impossible to calculate with certainty the disastrous

consequences of San Martín's orders as the sierra was left to the vindictive whims of Viceroy La Serna and his royalist counterinsurgents.¹⁰⁵

The royalists established permanent headquarters at Jauja in August 1821 and proceeded to regroup from the disastrous opening phase of the war. There, the royalists reestablished lines of communication and supply with Cuzco and La Paz.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the sierra offered a relatively healthy sanctuary for the royalist army decimated by disease and desertion. Less than 50 leagues from Lima, Jauja was also located in the centre of rich, exploitable deposits of mineral and human resources that promised to breath life into the moribund army.¹⁰⁷

In late August, 1821, General Canterac led a division of 3,000 men out of Jauja towards the coast on what seemed to be a suicide mission to relieve the fortress Real Felipe. There, over 1,000 royalist troops and a cache of weapons and ammunition remained following the evacuation of Lima. The division marched through the sierra without native guides as "not a single inhabitant could be found in the villages because the country was in revolt."¹⁰⁸ Remarkably, San Martín refused to attack the royalists, although patriot forces held an overwhelming advantage in numbers of troops.¹⁰⁹ Hounded by the guerrilla bands around Lima, the royalists marched back to Jauja relatively unscathed. However, as García Camba complained, the royalist stay in the sierra was not a

comfortable one. He recalled that order extended only to the territory that royalist troops actually occupied. Indeed, a hostile highland population surrounded the royalist garrison in Jauja.¹¹⁰

At his headquarters in Jauja in August 1821, Viceroy La Serna recognized the prevalent anti-Spanish character of the people of the central highlands. He noted, "among these inhabitants there is a tendency to independence, but San Martín can be assured that the officers and officials of this army will make the necessary sacrifices to ensure that these territories remain an integral part of the Spanish Monarchy."¹¹¹ Indeed, from 1821 to 1824, royalist columns roamed perpetually across the countryside of the central highlands. Unable or unwilling to distinguish loyal peasants from insurgents, they levelled many indigenous communities.

During the indigenous insurrections that erupted throughout the central highland districts in 1820 and 1821, San Martín squandered numerous opportunities to crush the royalist army. He continued to cling obsessively to his plan of winning the hearts and minds of the Peruvian people, refusing to engage a royalist army that was weakened by internal dissension, desertion and disease. While the liberator realized the strategic importance of securing the central highland provinces and understood that the large indigenous population of the sierra served as a valuable resource fervently "disposed" to independence and

insurrection, he wasted early opportunities to test his strength. As historian Ezekiel Beltran Gallando claimed, "the first campaign in the sierra under Arenales had vital importance because the people of the central region rose in arms, initiating a vast independence movement."¹¹²

Indeed, massive indigenous insurrections swept across the districts of the central highlands that raised the hopes and fears of both patriots and royalists. However, for the most part, San Martín, abandoned the Indians of the sierra to the royalists. He chose instead to focus his attentions on Lima, which held very little strategic value. Thus, he left the highlands in the hands of a small number of patriot officials, a few troops, and masses of poorly armed indigenous insurgents. The well equipped royalist army engaged in a brutal and relentless terror campaign against the Indian population, levelling entire communities with impunity.

Until the decisive battle of Ayacucho in December 1824, the indigenous population of the viceroyalty continued major roles in the process of Peruvian Independence. Royalist and patriot officials targeted the resources of highland indigenous communities and districts to fill the logistical and manpower demands of their respective armies. The indigenous peoples were caught in a cruel and brutal catch-22. They simply could not win. Patriots actively sought to enlist them to their cause. Royalists viewed them with suspicion and when in doubt eliminated them. However, both sides competed to

mine this important resource. San Martín claimed that the war in Peru was a war over resources. Unfortunately, for the indigenous people, they were the resource to be mined.

Notes

1. See William Stevenson, Historical and Descriptive Narrative of 20 Years Residence in South America (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1829), Vol.III, p.283.

2. To John Miller, San Martín's refusal to spill blood was "a benevolent motive, but the source of incalculable mischief." See Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.I, p.416.

3. General Bernardo O'Higgins to José de San Martín, Santiago, 27 April 1819, in Gustavo Pons Muzzo, (ed.), La Expedición Libertadora 3 Vols. Tomo VIII in CDIP, Vol I., Doc.224, p.395.

4. "Informe que el Teniente Coronel Jose Bernaldez Polledo (Prisionero Patriota en Lima), Entregó al Mayor Domingo Torres Durante su Residencia en Dicha Ciudad, Desempenando su Comision Para el Canje de Prisioneros." Lima, 18 December, 1817, CDIP, Tomo VIII, Vol.II, Doc.478, pp.268-283.

5. Ibid., p.278.

6. Ibid. p.278.

7. Ibid., p.278.

8. Ibid., p.278.

9. Ibid., p.280.

10. See "Otro Plan de Ataque Sobre el Peru Comunicado a San Martín," In Ibid., Doc.487, p.326.

11. Ibid., p.327.

12. Ibid., p.327.

13. Ibid., p.327.

14. Ibid., p.327.

15. "Plan Discurrído y Presentado al Excelentísimo Senor General en Jefe por Don José Fernández Paredes y Don José García, Naturales de la Esclava Capital de Lima,..." Santiago de Chile, 12 December, 1818, Ibid., Doc.489, pp.336-337.

16. San Martín to Brigadier González Balcarce, Curimon, Chile, 29 January 1819, Ibid., Doc.306, pp.42-43.

17. San Martín to Secretary of State Don J. Echevarría, Mendoza, Chile, 25 May 1819, Ibid., Doc.314, p.54.

18. Ibid., p.42.

19. "Proclama del Director del Estado de Chile al Pueblo del Peru," Valparaiso, 5 August 1820, CDIP, Tomo VIII, Vol.III, Doc. 714, p.377.

20. "Instrucciones que Debe Observar el Excmo. Senor General en Jefe del Ejercito Libertador del Perú Don Jose de San Martín." Chilean Senate to San Martin, Santiago de Chile, 23 June, 1820, Ibid., Doc.705, p.363.

21. "Proclama del General San Martín, General en Jefe del Ejército Libertador- Cesación del Gobierno Espanol en el Perú." Pisco, 8 September, 1820, CDIP, Tomo VIII, Vol. III, Doc. 726, p.404.

22. Ibid., p.404.

23. Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, p.29.

24. Ibid., Apendice, p.29.

25. In 1819, small patriot raiding expeditions landed on the Peruvian coast, during which time negro slaves were recruited into the Patriot army. As John Miller noted, "in the battalions Nos.7 and 8 were above a hundred blacks, who had been taken as recruits, the year before, from estates in the neighbourhood [of Supe]." See Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.I, p.287.

26. San Martín to Chilean Secretary of War, Pisco, 23 September, 1820, in Gen. E.P. Felipe de la Barra, (ed.), Asuntos Militares 9 Vols. Tomo VI in CDIP, Vol.II, Doc.248, p.144.

27. San Martín to Secretary of State Bernardo Monteagudo, Pisco, 23 September, 1820, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.II, Doc.248, p.144. "The division of Arenales...will place itself in the sierra and march immediately to Jauja."

28. Ibid., p.391.

29. See José Alvarez de Arenales, Memoria Historica sobre las Operaciones e Incedencias de la Division Libertadora a la Ordenes del General D. Juan Antonio Alvarez, (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Gaceta Mercantil, 1832), p.212. John Miller also insisted that the purpose of the expediton was "to favour the rising of Indians in support of the cause of Independence." See Memoirs of General Miller,

Vol.I, p.298.

30. San Martín to José Zenteno, Supe, 1 December, 1820, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.II, Doc.266, p.162.

31. Pezuela to Secretary of War, Lima, 5 November 1818. Cited in Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.51.

32. Ibid., p.52.

33. General Agustín Otermín to Viceroy Pezuela, Huaura, 22 July, 1820, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.III, Doc.8, p.15.

34. Viceroy Pezuela to Colonel Manuel Quimper, Lima, 24 September, 1820, Ibid., Doc.79, p.83.

35. General La Serna to Pezuela, Lima, 30 September, 1820, Ibid., Doc.99, p.101.

36. Ibid., p.101.

37. General Juan Ramírez to Pezuela, Tovoca, 8 October 1820, Ibid., Doc.117, p.129.

38. Manuel Antonio de Gomes to Intendente Dr. Don Tadeo Joaquin de Garate, Guzero, 24 October 1820, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc. 38, p.79.

39. José Marcelo de Molina to Don Tadeo Joaquin de Garate, Juli, 30 October 1820, Ibid., Doc. 38, p.80.

40. Pezuela to Colonel Manuel Quimper, Lima, 25 October 1820, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.III, Doc. 133, p.145.

41. "Se le Encarga al Sr. Sub-Inspector General Nombre una Comisión Militar para que Juzgue a Los Indios y Demas Individuos de Chincha que Han Tomado Las Armas Contra el Rey." Pezuela to Sub Inspector General, Lima, 4 Nov., 1820, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.III, Doc.152, p.171.

42. See Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.I, p.282.

43. San Martín to José Ignacio Zenteno, Pisco, 19 October, 1820, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.II, Doc.255, p.152.

44. See Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol I, p.79.

45. San Martín to José Zenteno, Supe, 29 November, 1820, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.II, Doc.264, p.159.

46. "Proclamación al Pueblo de Tarma." Tarma, Novmeber 28, 1820, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, pp.86-87. He proclaimed that "from this day on, you will remain free of the contribution of tribute that was once collected through force and despotism by the subdelegates."

47. Joaquin de la Pezuela, Memoria de Gobierno (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispan-Americanos Publicaciones, 1947), Vol.II, p.807.

48. Paz Soldan claimed that the numbers of the indigenous multitude organized by Aldao and Bermudez surpassed 4,000. See Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.127.

49. Cited in Andres García Camba, Memorias para la Historia de las Armas Españoles en el Perú (Madrid: Sociedad Tipográfica de Hurtelano y Compañia, 1846), Vol.I, p.374.

50. Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.99.

51. Ibid., p.99.

52. Stevenson, Historical and Descriptive Narrative, Vol.III, p.306.

53. Manifiesto del Virrey Pezuela, Lima, 16 December, 1820, CDIP, Tomo VIII, Vol. III, Doc.686, p.314.

54. Ibid., p.314.

55. Ibid., p.315.

56. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.I, p.346.

57. Ibid., p.346.

58. See García Camba, Memorias, Vol.I, p.346. Paz Soldan claimed that Bermudez and Aldao "commanded a mass of 5,000 Indians armed with sticks, slings and rejonas, very few men had muskets." Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.128.

59. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.I, p.346.

60. Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.128.

61. José Alvarez de Arenales, Segunda Campaña a la Sierra del Perú (Buenos Aires: Vaccaro, 1920), p.59.

62. Ibid., p.60.

63. Paz Soldan noted that Otero and Aldao recruited the "Indians and natives of Jauja" which "harassed the rearguard of Ricafort, killing all those who had the misfortune of encountering them." Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.132.

64. San Martín to Colonel Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales, Retes, 6 January 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.165, p.192.

65. San Martín to Francisco de Paula Otero, Retes, 7 January, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc. 167, p.193.

66. Ibid., p.193.

67. See Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.131.

68. Ibid., p.131.

69. General Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales to Paula Otero, Huaura, 30 January 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.204, pp.223-224.

70. Ibid., p.224.

71. San Martín to Otero, Retes, 4 January, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.159, p.187.

72. Ibid., p.187.

73. San Martín to Chilean Senate, 30 January 1820, Huaura, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc. 202, p.221.

74. Ibid., p.221.

75. Captain Basil Hall, Extracts From a Journal Written on the Coasts of Chile, Peru and Mexico in the years 1820,21,22 (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1824,) Vol.I, p.226.

76. Ibid., p.226.

77. See Gustavo Vergara Arias, Montoneras y Guerrillas en la Etapa de la Emancipación del Perú (1820-1825) (Lima: 1975), p.31.

78. "Extracto del Diario del Ejército de Lima que da Principio en 29 Enero de 1821 en que se encargó del Mando del Virreinato el Teniente General D. Jose de La Serna."

Reprinted in Fernando Valdés Torata, (ed.), Documentos Para la Historia de la Guerra Separatista del Perú (Madrid: Impresa de la Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Rios, 1894-1898), Vol.III (Documentos) Doc.111, p.326

79. Ibid., p.326.

80. La Serna to Secretary of War, Lima 9 Feb., 1821 in Ibid., Doc.94, p.289.

81. As García Camba noted, "one of the first occupations of the new Viceroy was to send various columns against the rebellious Indians of the interior provinces." See Memorias, Vol.I, p.382.

82. Ibid., p.382.

83. Ibid., p.383.

84. Ibid., pp.382-383.

85. Ibid., p.385.

86. Ibid., p.385.

87. Ibid., p.385.

88. Jose Alvarez de Arenales, Segunda Campaña, p.61. The force totalled approximately 4,000 troops.

89. Ibid., p.141.

90. Cited in Ibid., p.54.

91. Ibid., p.77.

92. Ibid., p.78.

93. Ibid., p.89.

94. Ibid., p.86.

95. La Serna to Secretary of War, Jauja, 21 August, in Torata, Documentos, Vol. IV, Doc.85, p.273.

96. "Proclama del Virrey a los Indios del Bajo Peru," Lurin, 8 July, 1821, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.IV, Doc.28, p.120.

97. Ibid., p.120.

98. Ibid., p.120.

99. Ibid., p.120.

100. García Camba, Memorias, pp.400-401.

101. John Miller noted that "if the liberating army, instead of going, as it did, into cantonments in the dissipated city of Lima, had seconded the efforts of those armed patriotic bands, it can hardly be doubted that the war would have been over in very few weeks." See Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.I, p.365.

102. Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales to San Martín, San Juan de Matucana, 30 July, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc. 324, p.344.

103. See Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.182.

104. Ibid., Vol.I, p.182.

105. See Stevenson, Historical and Descriptive Narrative, Vol.III, p.345.

106. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.I, p.435.

107. On 2 August, General Canterac urged the inhabitants of Tarma to "continue your important deeds in these secure mines so that you can extend the fruits of your industry in all the territory controlled by Spanish arms." See "Bando de Canterac," Jauja, 2 August, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V Vol.I, Doc.348, p.362.

108. See García Camba, Memorias, Vol.I, p.416.

109. Patriot forces in Lima at the time stood at approximately 6,000 men.

110. García Camba remarked that "knowing that with the exception of the ground which they walked on, there was not a single individual of the population of this region which recognized their authority nor obeyed their orders." Memorias, Vol.I, p.432.

111. Cited in Torata, Documentos, Vol.III, Doc.85, p.275.

112. Ezequiel Beltran Gallando, Las Guerrillas de Yauyos en la Emancipación del Perú, Lima: p.14.

CHAPTER THREE: "THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF PERU
AND THE PATRIOT ARMY, 1821-1824"

The invaluable support accorded the patriot army by the indigenous peoples of Peru from 1821 to 1824 contributed directly to Peruvian independence. Indigenous peoples performed critical roles as soldiers, spies, camp attendants and human mules. Indians also organized, filled and commanded the guerrilla bands in the sierra. Despite this level of participation, Patriot officials were not satisfied. During the final campaign against the royalists in 1824, they stripped almost every article of value from the highland populations, including men, livestock, forage and food. In a word, the natives provided a vital resource base for the various elements of the patriot army. In the aftermath of the patriot victory at Ayacucho, the deserted, dilapidated and scorched villages testified to the level of confiscation. Indeed, Peruvian and foreign creole commanders such as José de San Martín, Tomás Guido, Bernardo Monteagudo, Antonio José de Sucre and Simon Bolívar controlled the reins of military and political power and gave little thought to the Indians who served their cause. Simply stated, the "liberators" rode the backs of the indigenous people to Peruvian independence.

On 28 July, 1821, shortly after his entrance into Lima, San Martín proclaimed Peruvian independence. Soon thereafter, the self appointed "Protector of Peru" embarked on an

ambitious program of social reforms. On 12 August, 1821, he declared free all children of African slaves born subsequent to 28 July.¹ Two weeks later, he issued a decree abolishing indigenous tribute, and the hated mita.² He also outlawed the term "Indian," indicating that henceforth these people were to be known simply as "Peruvians."³ Despite this gesture, however, it is difficult to sustain the idea that San Martín was a true social revolutionary motivated by humanitarian concerns. His "reforms" were little more than military expedients, as San Martín needed African slaves and Indian soldiers for the Peruvian army he intended to construct.

Epidemic disease and the realization that the war would be long and drawn out, were all major factors in 1821 that motivated San Martín's decision to recruit a Peruvian army. Indeed, during the patriot stay on the Pacific coast at Huaura, disease literally ripped through the ranks. In April, as over 2,000 troops lay in provisional hospitals, San Martín noted "the tremendous speed with which disease decimates the Army."⁴ John Miller blamed the patriot misfortune on "intermittent fever", and claimed that "scarcely a man of the liberating army had escaped being in the sick list from this cause."⁵ However Peruvian historian Mariano Paz Soldan reported that yellow fever also decimated the patriot army.⁶ Whatever the malady, within a short period, over 2,000 patriot troops perished.⁷

In May, San Martín turned his full attention to the

formation of the Loyal Corps of Peru.⁸ Shortly thereafter, he ordered general recruiting to commence throughout the territories occupied by the patriot army.⁹ San Martín dispatched recruiting parties into the interior to round up Indian men. On 29 June, Major José Antonio Mangas, noted in a dispatch that he had been ordered to Jauja to "recruit for the new Loyal Battalion."¹⁰ After collecting 600 Indian men, Mangas occupied himself in training and organizing the fledgling battalion near Tarma.¹¹ Patriot officials in Trujillo and Ica also recruited in earnest to raise Peruvian battalions. On 20 September, 1821, the patriot governor in Ica, Juan Pardo de Zela, reported that "I have augmented my division with 200 recruits from Chincha [and] I hope to raise 100 more men."¹²

On 18 August, 1821, San Martín created the Legion Peruana de la Guardia, an elite corps which consisted of one regiment of Hussars, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Federico Brandsen; a troop of horse artillery under Captain José Alvarez de Arenales; and an infantry regiment led by Colonel William Miller.¹³ Miller's fledgling regiment had as its base cadre a motley mix of two or three hundred royalist deserters, an equal amount of mulattoes and mestizos recruited from Lima, with 600 Indians imported from the interior.¹⁴ Indeed, throughout 1821 and the first half of 1822, thousands of Peruvian Indian recruits joined the patriot army from the interior districts.

Besides comprising well over 60 percent of the Peruvian population, the indigenous peoples possessed a reputation for their hardiness and robust constitutions that made them excellent soldiers. As John Miller complained, mulattoes and Negroes "[did] not make as good soldiers as the Indians, in consequence of their inferiority in bodily strength, and more especially in the power of resisting the cold of the mountains...."¹⁵ On the other hand, Indians were built with strong, compact limbs, and could endure a tremendous amount of fatigue.¹⁶ Miller observed their "astonishing pedestrian feats" insisting that a battalion of eight hundred Indians could march fourteen leagues a day, and traversed mountain slopes like goats, without leaving stragglers behind.¹⁷ More importantly, he noted that they "subsist on a very small quantity of the simplest food."¹⁸

Throughout 1821, Indigenous people served important auxiliary roles for the patriot army. John Miller remarked on the valuable assistance they lent Colonel Miller's commando missions near Ica during the spring and summer. To mobilize the populations, Miller employed guides, such as Captain Jorge Belázquez, who spoke both Spanish and Quechua.¹⁹ Moreover, John Miller noted that whenever the patriots "fell in with Indians, they immediately engaged them to scour the country and bring in the straggling royalists."²⁰ To encourage this activity, Patriot officers supplied the successful bounty hunters with a cash award "and now and then a jaded mule."²¹

Miller also mobilized whole villages at an instant when it was fortuitous to do so. During a skirmish with royalists near Ica in August, Miller's guides were able to utilize the local indigenous population "en masse."²² As was the general rule during patriot expeditions, Miller also armed many Indians who offered to form guerrilla bands.²³ Moreover, he also used Indians as effective spies, a practice employed by all patriot officers throughout the Peruvian campaigns. On 7 May, 1821, General Alvarez de Arenales informed San Martín that "the Indians tell me that the enemies are situated in pits and trenches which they have constructed, two leagues from Cerro [de Pasco], close to Sacramento."²⁴

In April, 1822, San Martín dispatched 1,500 troops from Trujillo under the command of Colonel Andres Santa Cruz and sent him north to Ecuador to aid Colombian General José Antonio de Sucre in his campaign against the royalists near Quito. This division was composed of the Batallones Infanterias del Perú (No.4 and No.2), plus two Escuadrones de Los Cazadores del Perú.²⁵ Meanwhile, in March, San Martín ordered General Don Domingo Tristan south to Ica with the Batallones de Infanteria del Perú (No.1 and No.3), the Escaudron Granaderos del Perú, along with the Batallón de Infantería No.2 de Chile, in total, about 2,000 men.²⁶ San Martín gave Tristan 2,000 extra muskets and ammunition and urged him to arm the Indians of the region.²⁷ The Protector noted that it would be "advantageous to flatter this caste"

and "suitable to give them a general and simultaneous push."²⁸

On 7 April, General Canterac's royalist forces surprised Tristan near Ica, stopping the patriot advance dead in its tracks. In a confused engagement, the patriots lost 1,000 prisoners, 2,000 muskets and four artillery pieces.²⁹ On 2 May royalist Colonel José Carratalá complained that during the brief campaign, Tristan had applied the "foolish" policy of arming 500 Indians with muskets and sabres.³⁰ Nevertheless, Andres García Camba noted that Tristan carried special orders from San Martín "to foment the spirit of insurrection in that part of the country."³¹

In Lima, San Martín downplayed Tristan's defeat, while allowing that "the division of the south, without being smashed, has been surprised and dispersed," and that "in a long campaign everything can not result in prosperity."³² To bolster patriot spirits, he proclaimed publicly that the war in Peru would be over by the end of the year.³³ On 17 June, San Martín received news from Simon Bolívar that the patriots had smashed the royalists at the battle of Pichincha near Quito. Bolívar especially commended the performance of the Peruvian troops and promised San Martín that Colombian troops were on their way to Peru.³⁴ On 13 July, Bolívar received a jubilant reply from San Martín that "Peru will receive with enthusiasm all the troops that you can provide."³⁵

As is well known, on 27 July, 1822, the two liberators

met in Guayaquil to discuss the next phase of the war. Much of the ground covered during "La entrevista" (the interview) remains the subject of intense historical debate. However, it had become clear that Peru was not large enough to accommodate the enormous egos of both Bolívar and San Martín. Unable to win agreement, San Martín returned to Peru a shattered man. On 20 September, 1822 he withdrew altogether from the struggle and retired to Chile. It was a sad exit for a man who had accomplished so much for South American independence. In the meantime, political power in Peru devolved into the hands of a governing junta, which continued the fight against the royalists.

In Lima during September 1822, the patriot army of over 10,000 men completed preparations for a new campaign to the Arequipan coast called the "Puertos Intermedios" (see Table 4).³⁶ The exact social composition of all the units remains somewhat cloudy. However, from the composition of the Peruvian Legion that recruited the great majority of its soldiers from the highland districts, we can assume that a large number of Indians served this army. John Miller remarked, "three fourths of the [Peruvian] Legion were aboriginies, and many of them, when they joined the corps, could not speak any language but their own; the Quicha, but they soon learned the words of command in Spanish."³⁷ They were "of rather low stature, robust, and beardless, with a bright brown complexion."³⁸ The rest of the force consisted of mulattoes, some blacks,

TABLE 4
Patriot Units Cantoned at Lima, September, 1822

<u>Peruvian Units</u>	
Batallón de Infantería del Perú No.1.	700
Batallón de Infantería del Perú No.2	750
Batallón de Infantería del Perú No.3.	800
Batallón de Infantería del Perú No.4.	750
Regimiento de Infantería de la Legion Peruana	980
Regimiento de Húsares de la Legion Peruana	581
Batallón de Cazadores del Perú	679
Batallón de Infantería de Numancia	701
TOTAL	5,941
<u>Argentine Units</u>	
Batallón de Infantería de Los Andes No.7	600
Batallón de Infantería de Los Andes No.8	603
Batallón de Infantería de Los Andes No.11	735
Regimiento de Los Granaderos á Caballo	609
Compañía de Artillería de Los Andes	100
TOTAL	2,647
<u>Chilean Units</u>	
Batallón de Infantería de Chile No.2	124
Batallón de Infantería de Chile No.4	810
Batallón de Infantería de Chile No.5	572
Regimiento de Artillería de Chile	294
TOTAL	1,800
TOTAL MANPOWER (Officers and Enlisted)	10,388

Source: Mariano Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.136.

"and a few white Creoles, who were generally non-commissioned officers."³⁹ The Argentine and Chilean units also fed off the constant stream of Indian recruits that continued to flow into Lima from the interior provinces.

On 14 July, 1822, the patriot governor in Tarma, Francisco de Paula Otero, promised San Martín that he would "raise more partidas and recruit 200 single men that can be incorporated into the army."⁴⁰ On 3 November 1822, Minister

of War Tomás Guido ordered Otero to maintain pressure in the sierra and "to assemble the greatest number of recruits that you can and remit them to Lima with the greatest speed possible."⁴¹ On 9 December, Otero informed Guido that he had gathered "95 recruits" under Captain Don Santos Jurado for transport to Lima.⁴² He assured Guido that within a few days, hundreds more would be sent.⁴³ On 24 December, 1822, Tadeo Tallez, the patriot governor of Yauyos, sent a column of 42 Indian recruits to Lima including men named Gregorio Yopanqui, Mariano Yopanqui, Asencio Condor, Santiago Quispe and Pablo Yopanqui.⁴⁴

However, the interior villages had begun to feel the strain of the relentless demands for recruits. On May 22, Pedro Antonio Borgoño informed Guido that he could not comply with his orders to recruit 700 men in the Trujillo district, "because the villages have suffered much withdrawal from previous recruitments," and those men who considered themselves eligible for recruitment had fled to the mountains.⁴⁵

Late in October, 1822, a patriot expedition of 3,859 men under the command of General Rudesindo Alvarado disembarked at Callao for Arica. This force included the Batallón de Infantería No.1 de la Legion Peruana, Batallones de Infantería No. 4 and No. 5 de Chile, in addition to the Granaderos á Caballo from the Rio de la Plata.⁴⁶ Later, two thousand reinforcements expanded the expeditionary army to about 6,000

men. While there were high Hopes in Lima that this would be the campaign that would deal a death blow to the royalists, these expectations evaporated quickly.

Anticipating a patriot incursion near Arequipa, Viceroy La Serna had coalesced divisions under General Valdéz from La Paz and Canterac from Jauja.⁴⁷ The royalists suspected that the patriot army would attempt to use the Indian population of the area as auxiliaries for the campaign.⁴⁸ However, in January 1823, the patriot army suffered humiliating defeats first at Tacna, and then at Moquegua. This royalist combination bloodied the nose of the patriots, who lost over 5,000 men dead, injured and prisoners.⁴⁹ The debacle virtually destroyed the participating battalions. About 1,000 survivors limped back to Lima. These victories gave Royalist confidence a tremendous boost. García Camba claimed that the royalist successes "undermined the concept of the governing junta in Lima."⁵⁰

Meanwhile, patriot army recruiting campaigns continued throughout Peru. However forced "impressment" might be a better term to describe the collection of new "recruits" who very rarely volunteered for military service. Indeed, the indigenous people of the highlands now resisted patriot attempts to recruit them into the army. On the approach of patriot recruiting parties, indigenous populations abandoned their villages. On 14 November, 1822, Severino Buendia remarked to Francisco de Zarate that Otero had ordered him "to

recruit all the men from this Province and to dispatch them to Lima."⁵¹ Buendia related that in fact it was impossible to comply with the order since the "province remains in an empty state."⁵² On 5 December, Buendia informed Guido that although the only men which remained near Canta supported wives and children, he was "going to recruit them anyway" as "they are necessary for the preservation of the country."⁵³

Patriot officials had a difficult time moving recruits from their villages of origin to the army depots on the coast. Once apprehended for military duty, highland recruits sought to flee at every opportunity.⁵⁴ On 21 August, 1822, Marcelino Carreño sent a dispatch to Guido alerting him to a list of 12 Indian men recruited in the highlands who failed to present themselves to their respective battalions.⁵⁵ Carreño gave Guido a detailed physical description of the deserters who in turn forwarded the information to Tadeo Tellez.⁵⁶

The highland districts of the central sierra region remained a chamber of horrors for the indigenous population as repeated and constant incursions by both patriots and royalists took a frightening toll. The days of the indigenous insurrections of 1820 and early 1821 ended. Scenes of destroyed villages and columns of vagabond refugees replaced those of jubilant Indians who had welcomed "liberators" into their villages with open arms. Now, the central sierra was the fighting ground for ruthless royalist counterinsurgents, and equally violent patriot guerilla and recruitment parties. All

players fought viciously to control valuable human and material resources.

Patriot agents such as Otero and Tallez maintained irregular incursions into the sierra. They served as a bridge that linked guerrilla bands in the interior with patriot officials who shipped weapons and munitions from coast. However, these and other patriot governors in the sierra were powerless to protect the highland population against royalist counterinsurgency. Indeed, the contributions of the highland population to the patriot cause had not gone unnoticed by royalist commanders who focused their attention on wiping out any vestiges of rebellion.

On 21 October, 1821, Otero reported that royalist troops were converging on hundreds of Indian guerrillas cantoned in the villages of Ninacaca, Carguamayo and Reyes. Otero ordered the guerrilla commanders to mobilize and arm the local populations and to place them in the surrounding high ground.⁵⁷ A few days later, Otero reported that the Indian fighters had failed in their attempt to repel the royalists, who in turn destroyed the villages.⁵⁸ On 2 December, 1821, the patriot governor of Ica, Francisco Pardo de Zela, reported a "lamentable situation" near Ica as royalist Colonel Carratalá burned nearby villages including Lucanas and Puquio.⁵⁹ Ten days later Pardo informed that "in these countries, there is much repugnancy to becoming soldiers," and "the ferocity of the enemies has put this population in the

most miserable state that you can imagine..."⁶⁰ On 31 December, he informed San Martín that "the infamous Carratalá" had reduced the village of Cangallo to ashes.⁶¹ On 6 August, 1822, a royalist force commanded by General José Ramón Rodil threatened the indigenous villages of Yauyos and Ayazantes with total destruction if they continued to support the patriot war effort. He told them that "the enemies of order in Peru have deceived you well, but at the cost of your existence and interests."⁶² Rodil claimed that throughout the sierra, all the patriot army had to offer against royalist hegemony was association with the "Montoneras who are sacrificed with impunity."⁶³ He threatened them that "the brave troops under my command have discipline in order to trample you, and break you into bits, as witnessed earlier in this village and those of Viñas, Huangasca, Tana, Yapuri, Hongos, Cakra and Chucos."⁶⁴

Royalist counterinsurgency and propaganda succeeded in crushing patriotic support in many areas of the sierra. Patriot guerrillas simply could not protect the population. On 20 June, 1822, guerrilla commander Isidor Villar informed Guido that "the villages under my command are in great consternation, and patriotic support is decaying greatly, due to the total lack of defence that our side has provided them."⁶⁵ On 28 September, 1822, Mariano Paucar, patriot Alcalde at Comas, informed Otero that a division of 600 royalist troops entered that village "and completely

incinerated it," later, the royalists delivered the same retribution to the villages of Andamarca and Acobamba, leaving the inhabitants "without homes, without food, and without clothes to cover their bodies," obliging "the unhappy inhabitants of those mountains to live in forests."⁶⁶ On 25 November, 1822, Villar remarked that royalist troops torched the village of Iscuchaca and sacked Pampas, driving off all the livestock from those "miserable people."⁶⁷

Nevertheless, patriot guerrilla bands continued to harass royalist detachments. Many guerrilla organizations shared similar structures with the patriot army in that a few creole commanders led masses of Indians. In fact, as Robert Proctor pointed out, many creoles organized guerrilla parties in order to protect their properties against royalist incursions.⁶⁸ The rank and file in their units consisted of Indian recruits who spoke little or no Spanish.⁶⁹ As Peruvian historian Vergara claimed "the commanders of the guerrilla bands took the Indians of the haciendas and the mines by force in order to fill their ranks."⁷⁰ At the same time, many Indians enroled voluntarily in the guerrilla bands. Miller noted that 300 Indian men from the village of Reyes "formed themselves into Montonero parties" after the royalist destruction of their village in 1821.⁷¹

During this period, guerrilla leaders such as José Fernández Prada, José María Guzman, Nicolas Zárate, Toribio Dávalos, the Vivas brothers, and the Indian cacique Quispe

Ignacio Ninavilca achieved legendary status throughout the central highlands. One such intrepid commander, was known simply as "the blunderbuss man."⁷² He was a large bulky character who rode around with a small brass field piece cradled in his arms. The man was known to take on whole detachments of royalists by himself, and on one occasion he killed many enemy troops by loading a large bag of musket balls in his blunderbuss and blasting the contents at his opponents. Indeed, the recoil of the enormous blunderbuss was such that it often knocked him from his horse.⁷³

Unfortunately, guerrilla commanders often preyed upon the defenceless highland populations. While John Miller insisted that many guerrilla bands wreaked havoc among royalist detachments and treated the inhabitants with respect and kindness, "from this praise...must be excepted those parties which were formed principally from the dregs of the populace of Lima."⁷⁴ Proctor noted that many groups "degenerated into licensed and organized robbers under the lax and defective police of the patriot governors."⁷⁵ While Otero and others hoped to avoid a scenario where the villages "are antagonized by the guerrilla parties," they could not prevent these occurrences.⁷⁶ One report reached Otero that highlighted misconducts perpetrated by a guerilla commander named Simón Negrón. Described as "a man of questionable character," during his operations Negrón raided numerous villages to obtain animals.⁷⁷ Moreover, in the village of Huaras, he invaded the

home of an Indian women, and when she justifiably began screaming at him, Negrón thrust his bayonet into her chest, inflicting a mortal wound.⁷⁸

Don Domingo Grimaldos, patriot Alcalde of Churin, insisted that his village had served Peru faithfully, contributing men and food to the local guerrilla bands. However, he reviled one particular commander, Bernardo Antonio Delgado, who wantonly demanded "rent" from the indigenous inhabitants.⁷⁹ This matter went before a committee of Justice in the Peruvian congress in Lima, that ruled Delgado collected unscrupulously "what in another time would have been called tribute."⁸⁰ He had "exasperated the souls of those miserable people" and he was ordered "to abstain from similar unjust impositions."⁸¹ On 24 October, 1822, a patriot commission exonerated the inhabitants of Santo Domingo from further "contributions."⁸² On 22 November, 1822, congressman Francisco Valdivieso ordered Guido to lighten the load on the highland people and to procure only those "services that are indispensable for the sustenance of liberty and the exigencies of war."⁸³

However these light reprimands did little to alter patriot abuses in the sierra. Many guerrilla commanders perceived any resistance on the part of highland populations as treason. On 29 December, 1822, Isidor Villar reported that the indigenous village of Cauri near Cerro de Pasco had risen up against patriot guerrilla commanders Mariano Fano and Tadeo

Valdés.⁸⁴ Fano and Valdés attempted to employ the population as a human shield against a royalist incursion into the area. The people refused violently to comply with their wishes, and murdered Valdés in a melee that followed. However Villar insisted that Valdés "was justified in trying to remove the population in order to make a defence," and promised "to contain...the uprising," which he called "anarchy...which can not destroy us."⁸⁵

Patriot "contributions" and royalist counterinsurgency had bled many of the villages of the sierra dry by the end of 1822. Commander José Antonio Ramírez reported that the village of Pativilca was a lifeless husk completely devoid of young men due to "continual withdrawal" and "all that remains are the old and infirm."⁸⁶ He mentioned that as a result of "previous contributions" the village lacked mules and horses, and he felt obliged to return three decrepid "beasts" to the starving inhabitants.⁸⁷ On 19 December, 1822, Pedro Raulet reminded General Alvarez de Arenales that to ensure the success of future military operations, it was vital to conserve the morale of "those fine Indians [of the sierra] because the state of abandonment in which they are left will give them many reasons to hear the enemy's powerful insinuations...and they may lose the love of our government."⁸⁸

While the central highlands groaned under the pressure of royalist and patriot assaults, officials in Lima prepared for

yet another campaign to the Puertos Intermedios. During the early part of 1823, the Peruvian government undertook a thorough militarization of the country. On 8 February, Congress ordered all men in Lima aged 15 to 60 years to enlist in the local civic militias.⁸⁹ On 28 February, Congress informed the country that "the army is going to undertake new operations...Compatriots: rejuvenate the enthusiasm of 7 September, everyone, to arms!"⁹⁰ That same day Congress appointed José de la Riva Agüero the president of the republic. The next day the new president proposed to erect an Academy "for the methodic study of the military profession."⁹¹

On March 11, 1823, Riva Agüero goaded the royalists in the interior announcing a war to the death if they refused to recognize the independence of Peru.⁹² In addition, he launched a new campaign to draw recruits into the patriot army. In April he informed the public that General Canterac had arrived at Huancayo to deliver a multitude of axes and machetes to destroy homes and to slaughter families.⁹³ Based upon this propaganda he announced, "friends, the time has arrived!" and he implored them to enlist voluntarily in the patriot columns.⁹⁴ He guaranteed a total patriot victory by the end of the year.

In April, 1823 Riva Agüero named General Andres Santa Cruz commander of the Peruvian army, replacing General Alvarez de Arenales who, like San Martin, retired to Chile.⁹⁵ In May,

the long expected Colombian contingent of nearly 3,000 troops arrived under the command of general Sucre (See Table 5).⁹⁶ The numbers of the patriot army once again passed 10,000 men.⁹⁷ At this time royalist dispositions were as follows: 9,000 men under Canterac near Jauja, 1500 men under Valdéz at Arequipa, and approximately 3,000 troops under Olañeta in Upper Peru.⁹⁸

TABLE 5
Colombian Expeditionary Force, Callao, May, 1823

Batallón Ligero Rifles de Bombona	1,137
Batallón de Infantería Bogotá de la Guardia	282
Batallón de Infantería de Vencedores de Boyoca	786
Batallón de Infantería de Pichincha	676
 TOTAL MANPOWER	 2,881

Source: CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.VI, pp. 283-304.

Between 14 and 25 May, 5,000 Peruvian troops under Santa Cruz disembarked at Arica. This division consisted of Los Cazadores del Perú, six Batallones Infanterias (Legion Peruana No. 1, plus Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 6 of Peru), Las Húzares de la Legion, two squadrons of Lanzeros, and eight artillery pieces.⁹⁹ The objective was to break through toward La Paz and effect a junction with the insurgent Colonel Miguel Lanza in Upper Peru. In July, Sucre with 2,000 Colombians, pushed towards Arequipa, to relieve pressure from Santa Cruz's force. However the Colombian General soon questioned the expedition's

success.

Sucre claimed that Santa Cruz commanded only 3,000 trained troops, while all the others were green recruits.¹⁰⁰ He believed that the royalist force of General Valdéz possessed sufficient reserves to crush the patriot army.¹⁰¹ Sucre begged Bolívar to join the Peruvian campaign, arguing "if you do not come, all is lost, because all signs forecast a complete disaster."¹⁰² Sucre concluded that "a thousand evils exist which presage a total debacle...the Colombian division will crumble into ruins."¹⁰³ To make matters worse, a royalist division raided Lima on 18 June which forced congress to flee the capital into the fortress Real Felipe at Callao. In the chaos that followed, Congress deposed Riva Agüero as President of the Republic and proclaimed Sucre dictator of Peru. Riva Agüero fled to Trujillo, where he raised a personal army of 2,000 men, and in turn dissolved congress. Meanwhile, on 18 July, after collecting money and arms left behind by patriots in Lima, the royalists beat a quick retreat from the capital. By all accounts, Peru was close to anarchy, and the patriot cause hung by a thread. On 19 June, Sucre informed Bolívar that "the state of anarchy is indescribable...I have compromised my reputation and lost Lima."¹⁰⁴

When Bolívar entered Lima to a chorus of patriot cheers on 1 September, 1823, the Peruvian army in the south confronted total defeat. In October, word reached the

liberator of a new debacle for the patriots. After initial successes, the Patriot expedition had lost its momentum near La Paz. Royalist columns from Jauja and Oruro trapped Santa Cruz's army in a deadly pincer. The royalists battered the patriot column continually as it fled back to the coast in chaos. The patriots lost over 4,000 soldiers, thousands of arms, and eight irreplaceable field pieces.¹⁰⁵ Only about 1,000 troops made it back to Lima. While Sucre's Colombians withdrew from Arequipa in good order, disease ripped through the ranks as the column neared the coast. On 11 October, Sucre lamented "my fears...have been confirmed, the Army of Peru does not exist."¹⁰⁶ Years later, a bitter Riva Agüero recalled that the destruction of his army had originated with a Colombian plot hatched between Sucre and Bolívar. Riva Agüero insisted that "General Sucre attained his objective" which had been to destroy the Peruvian patriot army.¹⁰⁷

In Lima, Bolívar presided over what appeared to be an impending patriot disaster. Disease, desertion and other losses reduced the patriot army down to only some 6,000 men. On the patriot side, only five fully equipped infantry battalions remained battle ready- all from Colombia. These were, Bogotá, Voltigeros, Pichincha, Rifles and Vencedores.¹⁰⁸ After the calamitous southern campaign, the total of Peruvians, Chileans and Argentines remaining was about 2,000 men.¹⁰⁹ Political dissention within the patriot ranks now threatened to destroy Peruvian independence, and

perhaps even to resurrect royalist fortunes on the continent.

Bolívar's first priority was to repair the divisions which divided the country. As might be expected, many Peruvians, including the leading guerrilla commanders of the interior, perceived Bolívar as a Colombian interloper who had come to conquer Peru. On 16 November, Ignacio Quispe Ninavilca informed the highland population that "Colombia has come to invade our homes and to satiate their ambition with our blood. This monster Bolívar, pretends to carry us from slavery...Riva Agüero is the one who has saved us from the grasp of his fury...."¹¹⁰ Bolívar responded by declaring war on Riva Agüero and the dissident guerrilla bands.

In November, Bolívar shifted the bulk of the patriot garrison from Callao to Trujillo, and he spurred the effort to hunt down the dissident Ex-President. Riva Agüero responded by spurning the advances of an invader he viewed as a Colombian usurper. When Riva Agüero's army abandoned him and joined the patriot ranks, Bolívar ordered the arrest of the Peruvian malcontent. Bolívar then sent patriot detachments into the Sierra to hunt down guerrilla leaders who continued to reject his leadership. By the end of the year, many of the dissident guerrillas repented and agreed to rejoin the patriot forces under Bolívar.

At this point, Bolívar focused his attention upon rebuilding the Peruvian army. He had inherited a ramshackle army with low morale, whose troops had not been paid in

months. Robert Proctor expressed horror when he saw soldiers without proper shoes and stockings. Even in the Colombian units "many had only a piece of cow-hide under their feet, and not a few were barefoot."¹¹¹

Following this chaotic period, the patriots faced a revitalized royalist that built an effective strength of almost 17,000 men, divided into the armies of the North (under General Canterac at Jauja) and South (under General Valdéz at Arequipa).¹¹² John Miller noted the royalist army had been "augmented by recruits and prisoners of war compelled to serve."¹¹³ In late 1823, the patriot army presented an easy target for the powerful and confident royalists. However, in December, word reached general Olañeta in Upper Peru of the conservative golpe in Spain which smashed the liberal junta and overthrew the Constitution of 1812. An ultra conservative, Olañeta informed Viceroy La Serna, an avowed liberal, that he was withdrawing his army and territory from the Peruvian fold. Instead of focusing his forces on the vulnerable patriots, the Viceroy now sent Valdéz and the Army of the South to confront the dissident General Olañeta in Upper Peru. These events bought Bolívar valuable time for rebuilding the shattered patriot army.

In December, Bolívar sent dispatches to the governments of Colombia and Guatemala begging as many reinforcements as they could muster.¹¹⁴ The Guatemalans refused Bolívar any assistance outright, and the Colombians promised a contingent

of only 2,000 soldiers. Thus, the Peruvian population would have to make up for the shortfall. In the coming months, every district of Peru occupied by patriot forces would be scoured for human and material resources to rebuild the patriot army for the next clashes with the royalists. In this epoch, men, cattle, mules, grain and forage were far more valuable than gold. However, the acquisition of these necessities was like squeezing water from rocks. Already taxed heavily, the sierra population could offer only a fraction of what Bolívar and others demanded. Indeed, in the next few months, the indigenous population of Peru would be subjected to what John Miller called Bolívar's "cruel levies."¹¹⁵

On 24 November, General Sucre ordered Colonel Otero to comb the countryside near Tarma for livestock and recruits and to dispatch them to patriot headquarters at Huarás.¹¹⁶ Later, on 6 December, Bolívar ordered Sucre to take charge of the sierra districts and to obtain mules, livestock, fruit and recruits.¹¹⁷ On 14 December, 1823, Sucre reported that the villages had begun to deliver the recruits that he had demanded.¹¹⁸ In Huánuco on 5 January, Sucre ordered his battalion commanders to intensify their collection of recruits and livestock for the army, by fanning out across Huamalíes district.¹¹⁹ He also informed Bolívar on this day that he had collected "many recruits," but since most could not ride horses, they went to the Infantry.¹²⁰

By the end of January, the patriot army formed

cantonments in Cajamarca, Huamachuco, Huarás, Conchucos Huamalíes and Huánuco. The five Colombian battalions, and the Peruvian corps, with 4 skeleton infantry battalions (Legion Peruana No.1, and No. 1, 2 and 3 of Peru) plus a skeleton cavalry regiment (Los Husares del Perú) waited for recruits to fill their ranks. On 9 February Sucre noted that the Batallón Infantería del Perú No.1 contained 600 men and is "rising" everyday.¹²¹ He noted that he sent to Huarás for 300 muskets in order to arm the new recruits.¹²² Sucre believed that the Colombian battalions had received enough recruits.¹²³ The Batallón de Infantería de Bogotá received 200 recruits, Voltigeros and Pichincha had at least 150 each, but he was unsure about the condition of Rifles and Vencedor.¹²⁴

Since the vast majority were apt to run away, patriot recruiters ensured that pressed men from the sierra were kept under lock and key. On 25 February Sucre noted that "the recruits try to knock down the guards in order to escape."¹²⁵ He also observed that many villages were left totally abandoned with no one remaining to pay the special taxes and no livestock.¹²⁶ He wondered how it would be possible for the patriot army to operate if the highland people who should sustain the troops "hide themselves, and no one is found to pay their share."¹²⁷ Those who remained in the villages were too sick to flee with relatively healthy inhabitants. However, once they mustered sufficient strength to do so, even they managed to escape. Sucre noted that the "Peruvian recruits" he

rounded were all sick but they made every effort to flee hospitals even if they were near death.¹²⁸

On 13 February, Bolívar ordered the commander of the Batallón Infantería del Perú No.2, F.B. O'Connor, to seek recruits and to remit them to Huarás shackled as if they were prisoners.¹²⁹ He also told him to strip the countryside of provisions and livestock.¹³⁰ Bolívar also ordered the governors of all patriot departments on the coast to recruit healthy slaves up to 40 years of age who might be rounded up.¹³¹ He also issued Colombian General Jacinto Lara full authority to levy taxes of all types and to send out recruiting parties.¹³² To deter desertion, Bolívar ordered all soldiers found outside of their cantonments to be shot summarily.¹³³ Those executed were to be replaced by a brother or cousin, and barring this, by some other young man from the same village of origin.¹³⁴

As John Miller noted, Bolívar held Sucre responsible for the construction and provision of depots, a chore that required all Sucre's talent and activity.¹³⁵ Sucre directed the guerrilla bands of the sierra to perform these important tasks. As might be expected, Sucre questioned the integrity of many guerrilla commanders, whom he viewed as worthless and unwilling to act without the presence of active patriot officials.¹³⁶ Wherever possible, however, Sucre replaced inept commanders with men he deemed suitable. In fact, in March, General William Miller received command of the

guerrilla bands in the sierra during the immense logistical undertaking. John Miller reflected later that, "the montoneros in Peru, like the guerrillas in the Peninsular war, were of incalculable service as an auxiliary force."¹³⁷ The guerrillas gathered provisions, forage and fuel for the patriot army and established depots in caverns.¹³⁸

Even with the best of officers, during 1824 the procurement of resources from the highland population was no easy task. On 3 February Sucre noted that army recruiters drove away the male population and the contribution declined with each visit.¹³⁹ British traveller Robert Proctor noticed that the once flourishing cotton plantations of the Casma valley were now destitute. This, he believed, was due to "the unsettled times and the dearth of the labour, the government having carried off all the Indians for soldiers."¹⁴⁰ Moreover, the highland population resisted the ruthless patriot withdrawals of men and resources. On 18 March, Sucre noted that "in the provinces we control, nobody wants to pay a thing and [the Indians] complain that we have taken their animals, livestock, and grain."¹⁴¹ On 21 April he ordered Otero to "reestablish the reputation that has been lost in the villages of Huamalíes."¹⁴² Nevertheless, on 29 May, at Chiquian, Sucre assured Bolívar that he was going to force villagers to contribute foodstuffs.¹⁴³

As the patriot army marched deeper into the sierra, they encountered heartbreaking scenes of devastation. On 8 July,

TABLE 6
Patriot Army Cantoned at Jauja, July, 1824

<u>First Peruvian Infantry Division</u> (General José de La Mar)	
Batallón de Infantería Legion Peruana	410
Batallón de Infantería del Perú No.1	375
Batallón de Infantería del Perú No.2	428
Batallón de Infantería del Perú No.3	316
TOTAL	1,429
<u>First Colombian Infantry Division</u> (General Jacinto Lara)	
Batallón de Infantería de Vencedor	892
Batallón de Infantería de Vargas	639
Batallón Ligero de Rifles	1,008
TOTAL	2,539
<u>Second Colombian Infantry Division</u> (General Miguel Córdoba)	
Batallón de Infantería de Bogotá	747
Batallón de Infantería de Pichincha	741
Batallón de Infantería de Voltigeros	807
Batallón de Infantería de Caracas	685
TOTAL	2,980
<u>Cavalry Division</u> (General William Miller)	
Regimiento de Los Húsares de Colombia	436
Regimiento de Los Granaderos de Colombia	114
Regimiento de Los Húsares del Peru	114
Regimiento de Los Coraceros del Perú	460
Regimiento de Los Carreños del Perú	206
Escuadron de Los Granaderos de Los Andes	80
TOTAL	1,410
TOTAL INFANTRY	6,948
TOTAL CAVALRY	1,410
TOTAL MANPOWER	8,358

Source: Torata, Documentos para la Guerra Separatista, Vol.III, pp.85-86.

near Huánuco, for example, General Miller complained that the slash and burn policy implemented by the royalist army had destroyed villages and devastated the land.¹⁴⁴ On 3 August he reported from Santa Ana that "in Yauli, Pucura, Pachachaca,

and the immediate haciendas, not a single dwelling exists, everything has been destroyed and everyone has fled."¹⁴⁵

Revitalized after feeding off the highland population, the patriot army marched slowly towards Huamanga late in July, 1824. In May, two fresh Colombian units, the Batallones de Caracas and Vargas, with 1,000 men each reinforced the patriot army.¹⁴⁶ A division of 3,000 Peruvian troops also garrisoned points along the pacific coast. Thus, the patriot army at this time stood at about 11,000 men. The total number of Indians seized for military duty during Sucre's mission in the sierra is difficult to assess. However, it is clear that their numbers can be reckoned in the thousands. Close to 1,500 Peruvian Indians filled the Colombian battalions at this time. The vast majority of the Peruvian army had been filled with Indian soldiers.¹⁴⁷

On 8 August, the patriots encountered the large royalist Army of the North under General Canterac near the village of Reyes, on the plains of Junin. The battle lasted only forty five minutes, and involved only the cavalry of each army. Over 700 montoneras joined Miller's cavalry at this time and provided support for a brilliant patriot victory.¹⁴⁸ Compelled to beat a hasty retreat, Canterac abandoned hundreds of weapons, and men in his wake. Patriot losses totalled 45 dead and 99 injured, while the royalists lost 260 men dead, 80 prisoners, and injured.¹⁴⁹ Full of new confidence, the patriot army marched onwards into the sierra.

In September, the patriot throng conducted a herd of 6,000 head of cattle as they marched higher toward the summits of the Peruvian Andes.¹⁵⁰ Hundreds of mules and Indian porters lugged provisions, arms and ammunition.¹⁵¹ Dizzying elevations in excess of 12,000 feet, the weather fluctuations from snowy sub zero temperatures at night to warm and sunny at midday, took their toll on the patriot army.¹⁵² John Miller commented that the "difficulty of respiration...was so great at this time that whole battalions would sink down as if by magic...In many cases life was solely preserved by opening the temporal artery."¹⁵³

In September Sucre lamented the chronic desertions that depleted his ranks. He insisted that the patriot districts could still contribute thousands more recruits.¹⁵⁴ On 29 September, he commented "recruits are needed to fill an immense shortfall suffered in our corps and the 150 recruits I ordered are marching to fill the Colombian corps."¹⁵⁵ Unwilling to recognize the damages caused by recruitments, he claimed that "recruiting by force will keep an Army strong" and concluded "I do not consider the desertion of recruits an obstacle; if, by collecting six, four flee, two will stay: this is how the Spaniards do it...."¹⁵⁶ Even at this stage the army continued to feed off the local inhabitants. On 20 October, Sucre reported from Mamará that "we have consumed all the resources of these villages," and that "by this harvest, we remain secure."¹⁵⁷ On 26 October he proclaimed to Bolívar

that "many rifles and many recruits, my general, are essential things."¹⁵⁸

Early in December, the outnumbered patriots faced down the royalist army outside Ayacucho. Due to desertion and other factors, the ranks of both armies had plummeted dramatically. The patriot army stood at about 6,000 men with only one artillery piece. The royalists opposed them with about 9,000 troops and eleven artillery pieces. It appeared that the battle would be one sided, and this was the case- however, it was the patriot army that emerged victorious. John Miller attributed the victory to the incompetent performance of the royalist artillery.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, royalist gunners consistently aimed high during the action, and failed to knock out the patriot cannons in counterbattery work. On the other hand, patriot cannon balls consistently dropped into the royalist ranks, causing considerable damage. After an hour of punishment, thousands of exhausted royalist soldiers simply broke and ran. After the dust had settled, 1,400 dead royalist soldiers and 700 wounded lay on the field.¹⁶⁰ The patriots lost 370 killed and 609 wounded. Immediately after the battle, General Canterac capitulated.¹⁶¹ Later, 550 officers, including Viceroy La Serna and Generals Valdéz, Carratalá, Monet and García Camba, along with 3200 troops surrendered.¹⁶²

As Sucre remarked on 10 December, 1824, "this concludes the war and completes the liberty of Peru."¹⁶³ Shortly after,

preparations were made to find safe passage back to Spain for hundreds of royalist officers. In February, 1825, General Olañeta surrendered his force outside La Paz to General Sucre. Royalist General Rodil held out stubbornly in the fortress Real Felipe in Callao until February 1826, at which point the patriot siege and the rotting bodies of hundreds of dead royalist sympathizers finally shattered his will to resist. The long, bloody chapter of Peruvian history was finally closed.

From 1821 to 1824, the indigenous peoples of Peru fuelled the patriot engine which ultimately produced independence. They served auxiliary roles for the patriot army as guides, spies and guerrillas. Moreover, they served as efficient soldiers, filling the ranks of the different units of the patriot army, including the battalions of Chile, Argentina, and Colombia. Their support given to the patriot army in men and provisions during the final campaign of 1824 is literally incalculable. Many remarked on the sickly appearance of the indigenous population, and it can be deduced that many were forced to sacrifice their health and sometimes their lives, to feed the insatiable demands of the patriot army. To label their role as "minimal" seems almost a crime. Beyond their contributions to the patriot armies, indigenous men also made up much of the royalist army.

Notes

1. See John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.I, p.369.
2. Ibid., p.370.
3. Ibid., p.370.
4. San Martin to Colonel D. José Ignacio Zenteno, Huaura, 5 April, 1821, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.II, Doc.106, p.287.
5. John Miller also claimed that "a malignant tertian fever" attacked Colonel William Miller "which in a few days reduced him to a skeleton." Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.1, p.307.
6. See Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.161.
7. British traveller Robert Proctor claimed that 2,000 patriot troops died at Huacho. See Robert Proctor, Narrative of a Journey Across the Cordillera of the Andes, and of a Residence in Lima and Other Parts of Peru, In the Years 1823 and 1824 (London: Thomas Davison, Whitefriars, 1825), p.164.
8. General Alvarez de Arenales to Agustín Gamarra, Jauja, 25 May, 1821, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.II, Doc.122, p.297.
9. On 7 July, 1821, San Martín ordered "all free and single men from the age of 16 to 40 years should present themselves to serve for 6 months..." Cited in Estado Mayor General del Ejército del Peru Guerra de la Independencia del Perú- Campaña de 1822-1823 (Lima: Imprenta de la Intendencia General de Guerra, 1928), p.16.
10. José Antonio Mangas to San Martín, Huacho, 29 June, 1821, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.II, Doc.128, p.301.
11. Ibid., p.301. Manga "selected 600 men and with them...left to Tarma where I began the organization of said Battalion."
12. Juan Pardo de Zela to San Martín, 20 September, 1821, Chinchá, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.362, p.379.
13. See Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.I, p.417.
14. Ibid., p.409.

15. Ibid., p.407.

16. Robert Proctor claimed that "the Indians of the interior are a very active and hardy set of people...with a small bag of cancha, and another of coca, they travel for days without requiring any other sustenance." See Narrative of a Journey, p.314.

17. John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol. II, p.228.

18. Ibid., p.228.

19. Ibid., p.331.

20. Ibid., p.328.

21. Ibid., p.329.

22. Ibid., p.356.

23. Ibid., p.363.

24. General Alvarez de Arenales to San Martin, Hoyo, 7 May, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, p.282.

25. See Estado Major General del Ejército, Guerra de la Independencia, p.16.

26. Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.1, p.285.

27. San Martín to D. Domingo Tristan, Lima, Date Unknown, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.VI, Doc.5, p.8.

28. Ibid., p.8.

29. Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.285.

30. "Bando de Carratalá," Huancaralla, 2 May, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc. 916, p.400.

31. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.9.

32. "Proclama del Protector del Perú a Los Limeños y al Ejército Unido." CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol. VI, Doc. 9, p.46.

33. Ibid., p.46.

34. Simon Bolívar to San Martín, Quito, 7 June, 1822, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.VI, Doc.21, p.73.

35. San Martín to Bolívar, Lima, 13 July, 1822, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.VI, Doc.28, p.81.

36. Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.I, p.326.

37. Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.10.

38. Ibid., p.10.

39. Ibid., p.10.

40. Otero to San Martín, 14 July, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.820, p.293.

41. Tomás Guido to Francisco de Paula Otero, Lima, 3 November, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,115, p.74.

42. Otero to Guido, Carampoma, 9 December, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,266, pp.225-228.

43. Otero to Guido, 14 December 1822, Ibid., Doc. 1,294, pp.248-249.

44. "Lista de los reclutas que caminan a la capital de Lima, de la Provincia de Yauyos, para el Batallon de la Legion Peruana." Tadeo Tallez to Tomás Guido, Yauyos, 24 December, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,326, pp.275-277.

45. Pedro Antonio Borgoño to Tomás Guido, Trujillo, 1 May, 1822, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.V, Doc.15, p.10.

46. García Camba, Vol.II, pp.27-28.

47. García Camba, Vol.II, pp.27-28.

48. García Camba maintained that the patriots wished "to complement themselves with local people and to foment insurrection among the Indians of the region." See Memorias, Vol.II, p.31.

49. Ibid., p.46.

50. Ibid., p.56.

51. Severino Buendia to Francisco de Zarate, 14 November, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,169 p.122.

52. Ibid., p.122.

53. Severino Buendía to Guido, Canta. 5 December, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,255, p.215.

54. On 21 November, 1821, Otero remarked that "Davalos has sent me 200 unarmed Indians...Risco has sent only 300, yet about 50 are deserting each day..." Otero to San Martin, 21 November, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.456, p.466.

55. Marcelino Carreño to Tomás Guido, Santa Inés, 21 August, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc. 935, pp.418-426.

56. Ibid., p.426.

57. Francisco de Paula Otero to San Martin, Huariaca, 21 October, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.400, p.408.

58. Otero to San Martín, Cerro de Pasco, 27 October, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.419, p.423. "The enemy has continued his march to Tarma, and has burned the villages of Ninacaca and Reyes..."

59. Pardo De Zela to Bernardo Monteagudo, Ica 2 December 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.468, p.476.

60. Pardo De Zela to Monteagudo, Ica 2 December 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc. 481, p.487.

61. Pardo De Zela to San Martin, Ica, 31 December, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.512, p.520.

62. "Proclamación del general José Ramón Rodil al Pueblo de Ayazantes de la Costa." CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.900, pp. 375-376.

63. Ibid., pp.375-376.

64. Ibid., pp.375-376.

65. Isidoro Villar to Guido, Cerro de Pasco, 20 June, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.762, p. 239.

66. Mariano Paucar to Francisco de Paula Otero, Comas, 28 September, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc. 961, p.451.

67. Isidoro Villar to Guido, Cerro de Pasco, 25 November, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,213, p.161.

68. See Proctor, p.313.

69. Ibid., p.313.

70. See Vergara, Montoneras y Guerrillas, p.38.

71. See John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.139.

72. See Proctor, Narrative of a Journey, p.216.

73. Ibid., p.216.

74. See John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.138.

75. Proctor, Narrative of a Journey, p.215.

76. Otero to Guido, Carampoma, 15 November, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc. 1,178, p.130.

77. José María Guzmán to Otero, Varmarca, Date Unknown, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc. 1409, p.453.

78. Ibid., p.453.

79. "La comisión de justicia...extinguido el tributo no se ha deliverado sobre los terrenos que poseian los Peruanos...." Lima, 7 February, 1823, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.IV, Doc.1,438, p.44.

80. Ibid., p.45.

81. Ibid., p.45.

82. "La Comisión de Memoriales del Congreso Constituyente...." Lima, 24 October, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,074, p.43.

83. Francisco Valdivieso to Tomás Guido, Lima, 22 November, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,213, p.161.

84. Isidoro Villar to Otero, Cerro de Pasco, 29 November, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,233, p.195.

85. Ibid., p.196.

86. José Antonio Ramírez to Don Francisco De Zarate, Colonel of the Associated Army of the Order of the Sun, Pativilca, 10 October, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,051, p.23.

87. Ibid., p.23.

88. Pedro Raulet to General Alvarez de Arenales, Cañete, 19 December, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,310, pp.262-263.

89. "Decreto Disponiendo Alistamiento." Lima, 8 February, 1823, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.IX, Doc.12, p.17.

90. "Nobramiento Interino, etc." Lima, 28 February, 1823, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.IX, Doc.14, p.18.

91. "Disposición Sobre Creación de Academia Militar." Lima, 8 March, 1823, Ibid., Doc. 21, p.28.

92. Riva Agero to General José Canterac, Lima, 11 March, 1823, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.IX, Doc.23, p.32.

93. "Proclama del Presidente Riva Agero." Lima, April 1823, CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.IX, Doc.32, pp.42. The exact date of this proclamation is unknown.

94. Ibid., p.43.

95. See Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.62.

96. Ibid., p.63.

97. These numbers include 1,000 Chilean and Argentine troops, decimated by the first campaign to Puertos Intermedios, 1,000 Peruvian militiamen, and the 5,000 strong Peruvian Army. See Ibid., Vol. II, p.66.

98. Ibid., pp.62-63.

99. Ibid., p.64.

100. Antonio José Sucre to Simon Bolívar, Lima, 15 May, 1823, in Simon B. O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre al Libertador (Madrid: Editorial-America, 1919), p.47.

101. Ibid, p.47.

102. Ibid., p.47.

103. Ibid., p.47.

104. Sucre to Bolívar, Lima, 19 June, 1823, O'Leary, Cartas, pp.62-63.

105. Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente, Vol.II, p.225-226.

106. Sucre to Bolivar, Quilca, 11 October, 1823, O'Leary, Cartas, p.120.

107. Riva Agüero, Memorias y Documentos para la Historia de la Independencia del Perú y Causas del Mal Exito que ha Tenido Esta (Paris: Librería de Garnier Hermanos, 1858), Vol.I, p.180.

108. In August, 1823, the Batallón Infantería de Numancia changed to the Batallón Ligero de Voltigeros de la Guardia. See CDIP, Tomo VI, Vol.VI, p.302-303.

109. In November, 1823, Peruvian, Argentine and Chilean forces totalled about 2,000 troops. Colombian forces stood at about 4,000 troops.

110. "Proclama de Ignacio Quispe Ninavilca," Canta, 16 November, 1823, in Simon B. O'Leary, (ed.), Memorias del General O'Leary (Caracas: Imprenta de "El Monitor", 1883), Tomo XXI, Doc.335, p.48.

111. See Proctor, Narrative of a Journey, p.139.

112. Canterac's Army of the North stood at approximately 8,000 men at this time, Valdéz's army of the South stood at 4,000, and General Olañeta commanded about 5,000 troops in Upper Peru. See García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.102.

113. See Miller, Vol.II, p.101.

114. Bolívar to Colombian Secretary of War and Marine, Trujillo, 22 December, 1823, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXI, Doc.460, p.194.

115. John Miller, Vol.II, p.106.

116. Sucre to Francisco de Paula Otero, Huaras, 24 November, 1823, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXI, Doc.304, pp.14-15.

117. Bolívar to Sucre, Huandobal, 6 December, 1823, Ibid., Tomo XXI, Doc.369, p.89.

118. Sucre to Bolívar, Yungay, 14 December, 1823. O'Leary, Cartas, p.138.

119. See Sucre to Bolívar, Huánuco, 5 January, 1824, Ibid., p.141.

120. Sucre to Bolívar, Huánuco, 5 January, 1824, Ibid., p.143.

121. Sucre to Bolívar, Cerro de Pasco, 9 February, 1824, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXI, Doc. 784, p.472.

122. Ibid., p.472.
123. Ibid., p.472.
124. Ibid., p.472.
125. Sucre to Bolívar, Yungay, 25 February, 1824, O'Leary, Cartas, p.192.
126. Ibid., p.192.
127. Ibid., p.192.
128. Ibid., p.192.
129. Bolívar to O'Connor, Patavilca, 13 February, 1824, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXI, Doc. 832, p.523.
130. Ibid., p.527.
131. "Circular a los Departamentos de Trujillo, Huarás y la Costa." Bolívar, Pativilca, 13 February, 1824, Ibid., p.527.
132. Bolívar to General Lara, Pativilca, 14 February, 1824, Ibid., Tomo XXI, Doc. 856, p.537.
133. "Proclamación del Libertador Simon Bolívar," Trujillo, 15 March, 1824, Ibid., Tomo XXII, Doc.1022, p.97.
134. Ibid., p.97.
135. John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.151.
136. Sucre to Bolívar, Huánuco, 13 January, 1824, O'Leary, Cartas, p.192.
137. See Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.138.
138. Ibid., p.158.
139. Sucre to Bolívar, Huánuco, 27 January, 1824, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXI, Doc. 694, pp.396-397.
140. See Proctor, Narrative of a Journey, p.201.
141. Sucre to Bolívar, Huarás, 18 March, 1824, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXII, Doc.1037, p.108.

142. Sucre to Otero, Huarás, 21 April, 1824, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXII, Doc.1252, pp.239-240.

143. Sucre to Bolívar, Chiquian, 29 May, 1824, O'Leary, Cartas, p.217.

144. Guillermo Miller to Sucre, Huánuco, 8 July, 1824, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXII, Doc.1333, p.360.

145. Miller to Sucre, Santa Ana, 3 August, 1824, Ibid., Tomo XXII, Doc.1,333, p.417.

146. See Torata, Guerra Separatista, Vol.III, p.85.

147. It is interesting to note that John Miller claimed that General William Miller's habit of chewing coca leaves during the 1824 campaign "produced so favourable an impression amongst the aborigines that it procured him many volunteers." See Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.229.

148. See John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.160.

149. "Parte Oficial de la Batalla de Junin," por Andres Santa Cruz, Reyes, 7 August, 1824, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXII, Doc.1406, p.423.

150. See John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol. II, p.156.

151. See Dellipiane, Historia Militar, p.203.

152. John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.153.

153. Ibid., p.154.

154. Sucre to Bolívar, Challhuanca, 25 September, 1824, O'Leary, Cartas, p.233.

155. Sucre to Bolívar, Challhuanca, 29 September, 1824, O'Leary, Memorias, Tomo XXII, Doc.1517, p.503.

156. Sucre to Bolívar, Challhuanca, 25 September, 1824, O'Leary, Cartas, p.234.

157. Sucre to Bolívar, Mamará, 20 October, 1824, O'Leary, Cartas, p.243.

158. Sucre to Bolívar, Mamará, 26 October, 1824, Ibid., p.250.

159. Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II,
p.200.

160. Ibid., p.200.

161. Ibid., p.201.

162. Ibid., p.201.

163. Sucre to Bolívar, Ayacucho, 10 December, 1824,
O'Leary, Cartas, p.264.

CHAPTER FOUR: "THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF PERU
AND THE ROYALIST ARMY, 1820-1824"

From 1820 to 1824, the relentless Patriot onslaughts of José de San Martín, José de la Riva Agüero and Simón Bolívar forced the royalists to call upon all the resources at their disposal. Exhaustion and Civil war in Spain between Conservatives and Liberals ensured that expeditionary reinforcements would not be forthcoming. Royalist Peru would have to tap all available resources. As in the case of the patriots, the most valuable asset was the indigenous population. Royalist officials tapped the manpower of the highland districts to fuel numerous military and logistical demands within the army. Indeed, in the drastic attempt to repel the progress of the patriot army, royalists continually mined indigenous people- men, women, children and their grain, animal and forage resources. Thousands of Indians served as foot soldiers, laboured in work camps and toiled in shops to fashion military weapons and equipment. By the end of 1824, Indigenous soldiers dominated the ranks of the royalist army.

After the disastrous opening phase of the War for Peruvian Independence, the battered, exhausted and sickly royalist army retreated from Lima into the relatively healthy sanctuary of the central sierra. Liquidating large pockets of indigenous insurgency in these districts, the royalists obtained stocks of human, animal and vegetable resources to

rebuild their weakened army. Despite patriot guerrilla bands that harassed royalist forces continuously, the army controlled the highland population as unofficial victors in the war for resources.

One of the first tasks of Royalist officials in the sierra was to mobilize the labour of the local inhabitants in order to provide services for the army. As García Camba noted, "the camps of Jauja soon converted themselves into workshops, factories and forgeries."¹ Indeed, the indigenous population provided a convenient and readily available labour force at the disposal of the royalist army. Royalists soldiers forced the indigenous peoples to work in a variety of different areas. They toiled at metallurgical tasks, and forged artillery pieces, cannon balls, swords, lance points, spurs, bits and made bridles.² To manufacture uniforms for the royalist units, they spun wool and wove cloth. Others made shoes, boots, trousers, jackets, and caps.³ Indian workers tanned hides to make saddles and other leather goods.⁴ They harvested corn and ground it into meal to feed the royalist troops.⁵ To provide the necessary labour for these endeavours, royalist troops requisitioned men and women from local villages. For instance, on 27 February, 1824, royalist Colonel D. Francisco Puyol informed General Canterac that he had seized eleven women from the village of Reyes to work in the obrajes of the army.⁶

Before long, the highland districts of the central sierra

became a storehouse of vital commodities for the royalist army. In their desperate campaign to hold onto Peru, commodities such as grain, forage and livestock became vital resources for the royalist army. They stripped the highland population of these resources, while at the same time denying them to the patriots. However, ruthless royalist counterinsurgency and plundering went hand in hand. The effectiveness of the royalists in crushing the will of the inhabitants was so effective, that as García Camba recalled, "the people began to doubt the preponderance of San Martín."⁷

In a word, royalist commanders viewed Indian men as perhaps the most valuable commodity in the highlands. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Peru's indigenous people provided limited service in the royalist army. At this time, the army served the creoles more as a vehicle for social advancement than as an effective fighting force. In Peru, ill-trained and equipped local militias augmented a small nucleus of five to six hundred peninsular regulars. For many creole families, the militia offered opportunities for their sons to become officers and to achieve a degree of local prominence and prestige. Most sought to command a local company of Spaniards, or barring that, one of the "compañías de naciones." These were segregated companies of Indians, free Blacks and Mulattoes.⁸ In 1760, over 1,000 Indians served in the local infantry and cavalry militia companies.⁹

In 1763, after the disastrous Seven Year's War, during

which English land and naval forces sacked and occupied both Havana and Manila, the Spanish Bourbons undertook a complete overhaul of the defences of Spanish America. Expanded and disciplined militias upgraded the previous units, and locally raised regular formations replaced the rotating peninsular forces. In 1776, 1,458 indigenous nobles served in the Regimiento de Milicia de indios in Lima.¹⁰ As has been noted in the present study, Indian auxiliaries supported the royalist counterinsurgency campaigns in the Tupac Amaru revolt in 1780-1781 and the Cuzco uprising of 1814-1815.

On the eve of the patriot invasion, San Martín knew from intelligence reports that Indian troops dominated certain royalist units. In December, 1817, Lieutenant Colonel José Bernadez Polledo, the patriot officer imprisoned in Lima, reported that Indians comprised over two-thirds of the largest royalist infantry regiment, Infante Don Carlos.¹¹ He claimed that royalist recruiters had "torn them [Indians] from their lands by deceit."¹² During this time, a series of undated, anonymous reports also reached San Martín that further outlined Indian roles in the royalist army.¹³

As the war progressed, the patriot blockade of the Peruvian coast tightened, and coupled with the chronic political battles between Liberals and Conservatives that plagued the Peninsula, the possibility of new European troop reinforcements from Spain became more and more remote.¹⁴ With their developed reputation for being hardy and efficient

soldiers, the indigenous population offered a relatively cheap, and politically expedient way to bolster royalist ranks. After all, the drudgery and dangers inherent in the life of a foot soldier in Peru did not appeal to creoles, and recruiting them by force was impossible. Mestizos were an alternative, but their numbers were insufficient. Indians, who had suffered hundreds of years under European masters, were to be impressed at low cost to the royalist image. Acclimatized to the high altitudes and cold weather of the Peruvian sierra, highland Indians were a logical choice.

Through the war years, Patriot officials reported that royalist detachments combed the countryside of the central sierra, requisitioning anything of value that could be used by their forces. Royalist raiders carried off men, beasts, forage and food from indigenous villages. On 9 November, 1821, Juan Pardo de Zela reported that the royalist Batallón de Infantería de Castro under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Don Mateo Ramírez operated near Huancavelica with 200 Indian recruits seized from local villages.¹⁵ On 12 November, Pardo de Zela reported that royalist General Carratalá ventured out from Huamanga with the objective of smashing the Indians and guerrilla bands in the area, and "to take livestock and recruits."¹⁶ He also mentioned the arrival of royalist recruits from Puno and Cuzco to replace losses in his battalions.¹⁷

On 13 December, 1821, a report for San Martín stressed

that royalist troops near Tarma, "take as prisoners all those capable of carrying arms."¹⁸ On 13 February, 1822, Pedro José Gonzáles informed Minister of War Tomás Guido that when Carratalá passed through Huancayo, he had 1,000 Indian recruits with him.¹⁹ On 5 March, 1822, Francisco Paula de Otero alerted Guido to the fact that royalist detachments had swept through the villages of the Tarma area, seizing all male inhabitants who could hold a musket.²⁰ On 8 April, 1822, Juan Vivas reported that royalist General Canterac had departed Jauja with 2,500 troops, leaving behind 600 recruits collected from Cuzco.²¹ On 9 June, 1822, Marcelino Carreño complained that royalist troops robbed over 4,000 head of cattle from villages near Oroya.²² On 14 June, Carreño lamented that the royalists were "the raiders of temples and livestock rustlers" who destroyed the villages of Pacha, Ucumarca, Saco and Oroya.²³ On 8 December 1822, Santiago Casto informed Guido that royalist troops had raided villages near Aymara, seizing as tribute the stored grain of the inhabitants, "for the benefit of the king."²⁴

On 16 July, 1822, Ramón Morales informed San Martín that of 5,000 plus troops under Canterac in the Jauja area, "most of them are green recruits."²⁵ Many patriot officials remarked that royalist recruiting parties abused the indigenous villages of the highlands, seizing men without regard to age nor health.²⁶ On 20 January, 1823 Manuel Zespedes remarked that raw recruits composed the majority of

the royalist army cantoned near Jauja, and that royalist recruiting parties continued to sweep up refugees on the road from Huamanga, "recruit[ing] whoever they encounter."²⁷

Royalist officers kept recruits under armed guard twenty four hours a day. On 13 August, 1822, patriot agent Antonio Aliaga proclaimed that royalists treated their recruits near Jauja "like prisoners."²⁸ During the Southern campaigns of 1822 and 1823, royalist General Gerónimo Valdéz reported that the army was composed largely of "Indians taken by force."²⁹ He remarked that it was necessary to canton these recruits under armed guards composed "of the most ruthless officers and sergeants."³⁰ García Camba recalled that royalist columns returning to their cantonments in the sierra after the campaigns "took recruits forcibly from the villages in their line of march."³¹ He described this method of recruitment "a forgivable practice" due to the prevailing circumstances.³² Indeed, writing after the war in 1825, General Canterac recollected that the vast majority of troops who served in the royalist army were "soldiers in name, for in reality, they were truly prisoners."³³

As a result of what García Camba called "the unforgivable propensity" with which Peruvians deserted from the army throughout the war, royalist officials had to maintain a constant recruiting campaign.³⁴ Indeed, the high turnover rate played a role in producing an army composed largely of Indians. On 25 February, 1823 patriot guerrilla Tomás Vivas

reported that there were "very few Spaniards in their [royalist] army, since the great majority of their soldiers are Americans."³⁵ By the beginning of 1824, indigenous peoples filled the ranks of the royalist army to such an extent that they comprised the great majority of the troops. Writing in Lima in February, 1824, Robert Proctor witnessed the arrival of general Monet's royalist division in the capital. Proctor noted that of the four infantry battalions which marched into the city three "were formed almost entirely of Indians," the fourth battalion was composed of Negroes, and the "cavalry were chiefly Spaniards...."³⁶

After detaching a force of 1,000 men under the command of General Rodil to garrison the fortress Real Felipe, Monet marched his force back to Jauja to join with Canterac's army of the North, that totalled about 9,000 men. After the disastrous battle of Junín in August, 1824, the Northern army fell back towards Cuzco, leaving behind 3,000 deserters and thousands of weapons and supplies of ammunition in the process. In November, Viceroy La Serna and General Valdez linked up with the remnants of Canterac's army for one last royalist stand in the sierra.

At this time, the royalist army was divided into four divisions, cantoned among points throughout Huamanga jurisdiction. The force totalled approximately 9,000 men (See Table 7). Despite the expeditionary battalion names, the vast majority of the troops were of indigenous descent.

TABLE 7
 Royalist Army Cantoned in Huamanga Jurisdiction
 November, 1824

Vanguard Division (General Gerónimo Valdéz)
 Batallón de Infantería del Centro
 Batallón de Infantería del Cantabria
 Batallón de Infantería del Castro
 Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería del Imperial

First Infantry Division (General Juan Antonio Monet)
 Batallón de Infantería de Burgos
 Batallón de Infantería del Infante
 Batallón de Infantería de Las Guías
 Batallón de Infantería de Victoria
 Segundo Batallón del Primer Regimiento de Infantería

Second Infantry Division (General Alejandro Villalobos)
 Primer Batallón del Primer Regimiento de Infantería
 Segundo Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería del Imperial
 Batallón de Infantería de Fernando VII
 Regimiento de Infantería de Gerona (Dos Batallones)

Cavalry Division (Brigadier Gaspar Ferraz)
 Regimiento de Los Granaderos de la Guardia
 Regimiento de Los Dragones de la Union
 Regimiento de Los Dragones del Peru
 Regimiento de Los Húsares de Fernando VII
 Escuadron de San Carlos
 Escuadron de Los Alabarderos del Virrey

TOTAL MANPOWER: 9,320

Source: Carlos Dellepiane, Historia Militar del Perú, p.225

García Camba insisted that only about 500 Europeans remained in the service of the king.³⁷ He claimed that most of the royalist soldiers were either Indians seized from villages or patriot prisoners of war, many of whom were also of indigenous origins.³⁸ General Valdéz claimed that the royalist army was almost entirely patriot prisoners captured in previous campaigns and Indians taken by force.³⁹ Robert Proctor

observed that the Spanish army was composed, "in a great measure, of Indians."⁴⁰ Writing years after the war, Valdéz admitted that "our army in Ayacucho was more American than the patriot army."⁴¹ General Canterac also concurred with the previous assessment when he recollected that "...the infantry...was composed of soldiers of the country, forced to serve under our banners."⁴² Canterac also professed that indigenous men also dominated the ranks of the cavalry.⁴³

On the eve of the battle of Ayacucho, local Indians throughout Huamanga responded violently against the invading patriot army commanded by General Sucre. Throughout November, a series of indigenous insurrections produced over one thousand patriot casualties. As Mariano Paz Soldan noted, "Sucre was very far from the villages that adored him," now he was "surrounded by enemy populations."⁴⁴ On 5 November, 1824, near the village of Chuquibama, a large force of angry Indians surprised a vanguard column of patriot forces commanded by General William Miller. Hidden in the clefts and crevasses surrounding the village, the Indians poured rocks and boulders down upon the startled patriot forces, causing numerous injuries and deaths.⁴⁵ Miller's force quickly retreat from the hazardous area, "followed by the yelling Indians, increasing in numbers at every hut near which they passed...."⁴⁶ Miller insisted that royalist officers, supported by the local priests, prompted the violence.⁴⁷

Indian attacks directed against patriot forces became a

wide spread problem. Later in November, Miller reported that the Indians of Huanta, Huancavelica, Chincheros, Huando, and nearby villages, had risen against the liberating army.⁴⁸ He noted that an Indians force wiped out a patriot convoy of 100 sick men and escorts on the road to Quinua.⁴⁹ Days later, a night attack that surprised a patriot battalion marching from Jauja resulted in hundreds of casualties.⁵⁰ On 23 November, 1824, royalist Captain Don José Sepulveda reported that two patriot companies invaded Huanta, laid waste to the village, and killed many inhabitants.⁵¹ John Miller claimed that as a result of the Indian attacks, the patriot army had suffered over 1,200 casualties, which reduced effective strength below 6,000 men on the eve of the decisive battle.⁵² Miller remarked that "every circumstance occurred to increase the gloom which overhung the prospects of the patriots...All was now ominous and fearful...."⁵³

García Camba stated that the natives from Huamanguilla and from the surrounding areas, were unequivocal in their adhesion to royalist authority, "...lending all the support asked of them by the troops of the king."⁵⁴ Of course, the concept that the Indians rose because of a love for Imperial Spain and King Ferdinand is quite unlikely. On 9 November, 1824, Sepulveda wrote that constant patriot incursions into local villages to remove livestock and other resources had motivated the Indian uprisings.⁵⁵ Royalist officers simply took advantage of existing grievances to push the inhabitants

in the royalist direction. Unfortunately, the royalist army squandered the opportunity to defeat a weakened and numerically inferior enemy. After the battle of Ayacucho, the patriots emerged victorious suffering 900 casualties, a smaller number than losses incurred during the indigenous uprisings of November. Many royalist troops took the opportunity to run as far away as they could from their oppressors.

The wars of Independence provided a bloody and destructive chapter in the exploitation of the indigenous people of Peru. It was an unfortunate conclusion to over three hundred years of political and economic domination. From 1820 to 1824, the indigenous population of Peru had provided incalculable aid to the royalist army. Royalist detachments, like the horseman of the apocalypse, swept through the central highlands, conveying death, destruction, famine and pestilence to the other Indian peoples. Many men were forced into the army, and kept under guard to prevent escapes. As many royalist officers admitted, "prisoner" was a more fitting term to describe their existence than "soldier." However, the mobilization of the indigenous communities of the highlands was not enough to satiate the demands of a starving royalist army. Women, children and noncombatant people were of great value. They served the royalists in many makeshift factories to manufacture various military equipment. Even at the end of the war, royalist officers continued to squeeze every last

drop of life they could from the indigenous people.

Notes

1. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.7.
2. See Gonzalo Búlness Historia de la Expedición Libertadora (Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes, 1887), Vol.II, pp.443-444.
3. See Fernando Torata, Documentos para la historia de la Guerra Separatista del Perú, Vol.III, p.453.
4. See García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.7.
5. Ibid, p.7.
6. Colonel D. Francisco Puyol to General Canterac, Tarma, 27 February, 1824, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.IX, Doc.87, p.129.
7. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.9.
8. See Josephe de Mugaburu, Chronicle of Colonial Lima-The Diary of Josephe and Francisco Mugaburu, 1640-1697 Robert Ryal Miller (ed.), (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), p.235. In 1675, Mugaburu noted that in Lima there were "three squadrons of naciones [races] composed of free mulattos, morenos [negros], and Indians."
9. See Leon Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru- 1750-1810, p.17.
10. Ibid, p.64.
11. See "Informe de Coronel José Benaldez Polledo (Prisionero Patriota en Lima)..." Lima, 18 December, 1817. CDIP, Tomo VIII, Vol.II, Doc.478, pp.269-270.
12. Ibid., p.270.
13. One such report entitled, "Tres Informes de Patriotas Peruanos a San Martín..." claimed that "The army of Peru stands, more or less, at 7,000 men...2,000, well disciplined and armed infantry composed of Spaniards and Indians...along with 600 artillery men, 600 cavalry and 800 or 900 militiamen...the rest consists principally of negroes and mulattoes." CDIP, Tomo VIII, Vol.II, Doc.484, p.307. An other entitled "Información de Aristipo Emero a San Martin," claimed that "young and stupid Indians, Mestizos and Negroes" composed the majority of the rank and file of the royalist army. Ibid., Tomo VIII, Vol.II, Doc.496, p.369.

14. García Camba recalled that "the state of the Peninsula ...made the shipment of reinforcements impossible..." See Memorias, Vol.II, p.80.

15. Juan Pardo de Zela to Patriot Minister of War Don Bernardo Monteagudo, Huancavelica, 9 November 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.438, p.450.

16. Pardo de Zela to Monteagudo, 12 November, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.445, pp.454-455.

17. Ibid., p.455.

18. "Copiador de los oficios dirigidos al Protector del Perú," 13 December, 1821, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.I, Doc.490, p.503.

19. Pedro José Gonzáles to Minister of War Tomás Guido, 13 February, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.580, p.70.

20. Francisco de Paula Otero to Guido, Huariaca, 5 March, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.602, p.86.

21. Juan Vivas to Guido, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.641, pp.118-119.

22. Marcelino Carreño to Guido, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.741, pp.221-222.

23. Marcelino Carreño to Guido, 14 June, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.752, pp.231-232.

24. Santiago Casto to Guido, Aymara, 8 December, 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,264, pp.222-223.

25. Ramon Morales to San Martín, 16 July, 1822. CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.823, p.297.

26. On 25 September 1822, Rafael Vivas reported from Chupaico that royalists were "recruiting in full force, without pardoning the aged and infirm...committing crimes and excesses against their poor families." See CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.1,014, p.497.

27. Manuel Zespedes to Colonel Don Pedro José González, Quero, 20 January, 1823, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.III, Doc.1,394, p.431.

28. Antonio Aliaga to Don Tadeo Tellez, 13 August 1822, CDIP, Tomo V, Vol.II, Doc.943, p.433.

29. See Gerónimo Valdéz, "Refutación que hace el Mariscal de Campo Don Gerónimo Valdéz." Reprinted in Torata, Documentos para la Guerra Separatista, Vol.III, (Documentos), p.44.

30. Ibid., p.44.

31. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.216.

32. Ibid., p.216.

33. General Canterac to Spanish Minister of War, Valladolid, name unknown, 20 August, 1825, in Torata, Documentos para la Guerra Separatista, Volume III, (documentos), Doc.12, p.82.

34. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.216.

35. Tomas Vivas to Guido, Jauja, 25 February, 1823, CDIP, Tomo 5, Vol.IV, Doc.1,441, p.50.

36. Robert Proctor, Narrative of a Journey, p.356.

37. García Camba, p.238. General Valdéz agreed with this assessment. See Torata, Documentos, Vol.III (Documentos), p.62.

38. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.250.

39. See Valdéz "Refutación," in Torata, Documentos, Vol.III (Documentos), p.62.

40. Proctor, Narrative of a Journey, p.314.

41. General Valdéz to Mariano Torrente, Zaragoza, September, 1829, in Torata, Documentos, Vol.III (Documentos), Doc.10, p.74.

42. Canterac to Minister of War, Rio de Janeiro, 1 April, 1825, in Ibid., Doc.11, p.77.

43. Ibid., p.77.

44. Paz Soldan, Historia del Perú Independiente Vol.II, p.275.

45. See John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, p.182.

46. Ibid., p.182.

47. Ibid., p.181, 191.

48. Ibid., p.191.

49. Ibid., p.191.

50. Ibid., p.192.

51. See "Diario de la ultima campaña del ejército español en el Perú en 1824 que terminó con la batalla de Ayacucho, por Capitan Don José Sepulveda." Reprinted in Torata, Documentos, Vol.III (Documentos), p.14.

52. Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, Vol.II, pp.191-192.

53. Ibid., p.192.

54. García Camba, Memorias, Vol.II, p.228.

55. See Sepulveda, "Diario," in Torata, Documentos, Vol.III, (Documentos), p.6.

CONCLUSION

In 1992, Peruvian historian José de la Puente Candamo wrote that the presence of indigenous people in the process of Peruvian independence was a controversial subject that continued to spark debates among Peruvian historians. He noted, "for some, the Peruvian did not participate in the fight for Independence...for others, his participation was necessary for the final victory."¹ In 1979, Timothy Anna concluded that the Indians of Peru served merely as indifferent spectators during the Wars of Independence, unwilling to involve themselves in the struggle between the Patriot and Royalist armies. For Anna, the role of the Indian in the process of Independence was "minimal."

As has been argued throughout this thesis, Peruvian Indians could not escape involvement in the Wars of Independence. For hundreds of years, a series of masters had exploited this largely sedentary and agricultural people to fulfil political and economic agendas. Immediately after conquest, forced Indian labour became a cheap and efficient means of mining the rich silver deposits of Peru which brought untold wealth to the viceroyalty. Moreover, by subjecting them to tributos and repartamientos de comercios, the revenues of the Crown increased dramatically. However, when highland creoles sought political autonomy from Lima, Indians became valuable allies to bolster their movements. In 1780 and 1814, massive indigenous armies controlled by highland elites

flooded the sierras with the slogan of "muera a mal gobierno."

In 1820 the exploitation of Indigenous peoples reached new oppression with San Martín's patriot invasion of Peru. Patriot officials targeted the indigenous population, and sought to effect a great uprising that would sweep royalists definitively from power. However, due to questionable strategic policies followed by San Martín, such as his obsession with controlling Lima, highland insurgents were abandoned to the brutal policies of the royalist army. Indeed, royalist counterinsurgents subjected much of the highland population to bloody reprisals.

During the war, the central sierra became a warehouse of valuable commodities for both patriot and royalist armies. Men, women, animals, grain, and forage flowed out of indigenous villages and into the camps and confinements of the contending armies. Both sides mined the resources to such an extent that by the end of the war, many villages had become lifeless husks.

Some indigenous people chose consciously to join the struggle on the patriot side by fighting in guerrilla bands. For many, however, the motivation for this participation was based more on a desire to avenge royalist cruelty than veneration for the patriot cause. In fact, highland elites compelled many indigenous men to serve as guerrillas in order to protect their property against royalist intrusions.

Indigenous men filled the rank and file of both patriot

and royalist units. On the royalist side, Indians contributed the overwhelming majority of the troops. They were also well represented in the patriot ranks as well. While they comprised over sixty percent of the population, they also carried a reputation for being excellent soldiers. This combination provided sufficient impetus for recruiting teams on both sides to compel them into their armies.

However, as the war progressed, indigenous peoples resisted the continued extractions of highland resources by both royalist and patriot detachments. Squeezed from both sides, whole villages rose violently against their oppressors, not stopping to distinguish royalists from "liberators".

Much against their collective will, the indigenous people played tragic leading roles in the Peruvian struggle. In fact, many of the same social, political, and economic patterns that characterized indigenous participation in the insurrections of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are continued during this tumultuous period of Peruvian history. In a word, the indigenous population served as a valuable resource to be exploited by both sides.

Although this study must be described as barely scratching the surface in terms of determining the extent of indigenous participation during this tumultuous period, it is clear that indigenous peoples in Peru followed courses similar to their roles in Mexico and elsewhere. Writing in 1829, John Miller summed up Indian suffering.

They had been seized, tied up, beaten and had had their houses sacked more than once. Every military detachment that halted there unavoidably destroyed the crops...and stole away their oxen, sheep, goats or poultry, whenever they could lay their hands upon them. In this way, hundreds of villages and thousands of individuals have been robbed of their little all; but they were poor oppressed Indians, and humble misery seldom arrests the attention or engages the sympathies of the world.²

Clearly, now regional archival research is needed to unlock the full story of indigenous participation in the Peruvian War of Independence. Without the use of these unsung native soldiers, suppliers, and manufacturers, the war simply could not have dragged on to its final conclusion at Ayacucho.

Notes

1. José A. de la Puente Candamo, La Independencia del Perú (Madrid: Editorial Mapfre, 1992), p.21.
2. See John Miller, Vol.II, p.93.

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