

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

GLAUCON AND ADEIMANTUS

BY

DANE ANDERSON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY ALBERTA

July 24, 1990

© Dane Anderson 1990



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.


ISBN 0-315-61951-1

Canada

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES


The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled GLAUCON AND ADEIMANTUS submitted by DANE ANDERSON in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science



Dr. F. B. Cooper, Supervisor
Department of Political Science
University of Calgary



Dr. T. E. Flanagan
Department of Political Science
University of Calgary



Dr. H. A. Meynell
Department of Religious Studies
University of Calgary

Tuesday, July 24, 1990

ABSTRACT

Within the Republic, Socrates spends the bulk of his time conversing with two noble young brothers: Glaucon and Adeimantus. It seems that the conversation is also Socrates' attempt to educate the brothers. This thesis argues that Socrates' educational efforts are weighted more towards one of the brothers, namely Glaucon. Textual evidence will be presented to support this. It is further argued that this topic is essential to a basic understanding of the dialogue. A major theme of the thesis is that the Republic, as a dialogue, has a particular form which must be recognized and understood in order for it to make any sense. A dialogue is distinct from a philosophical treatise. It does not disseminate doctrine; rather, it is a drama, with dramatic structures, such as character and setting. If the drama of the dialogue is not experienced, then its meaning will remain elusive. The question of whether Adeimantus or Glaucon is Socrates' main educational object has great dramatic significance. In order to understand the Republic at all, one must appreciate its dramatic structure; the question of whom Socrates' is trying to educate is an essential component of that structure.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like most of all to thank my Supervisor, Dr. Cooper. Because of him, I am not in Law School; for that I am truly grateful. Additionally, his help in the task of completing this thesis has been invaluable.

Throughout this project, my wife, Karen, has given me more support and encouragement than any husband should rightfully expect. To her this thesis is dedicated.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
I INTRODUCTION	
II THE DIALOGUE FORM	
III MISUNDERSTANDING THE REPUBLIC	
IV CONCLUSION	
CHAPTER II: ADEIMANTUS	26
I INTRODUCTION	
II CHARACTER	
III DIALOGIC ROLE	
IV CONCLUSION	
CHAPTER III: GLAUCON	66
I INTRODUCTION	
II GLAUCON'S DIALOGIC ROLE	
III GLAUCON'S CHARACTER	
IV TRYANNY AND PHILOSOPHY	
V CONCLUSION	
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION	108
BIBLIOGRAPHY	119

CHAPTER I

I INTRODUCTION

The Republic, along with most of Plato's other works, is a dialogue. It contains characters who carry out a conversation. The conversation is carried out chiefly between Socrates and two brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, noble scions of a noble Athenian; the remainder of the dialogue's dramatis personae are either silent or have only brief speaking roles. Throughout most of the dialogue, Socrates talks with Glaucon and Adeimantus because they have both challenged him to complete a task: to defend justice as good in itself. Or so it seems. The apparent meaning of the dialogue is not necessarily its only meaning, or even its most important meaning. It is obvious that both Glaucon and Adeimantus have political ambitions. But gifted young men, such as these two, have special needs beyond those of ordinary young men. They need an education that necessarily is more specialized than the education of ordinary young men. A closer look at the action of the Republic reveals that much of Socrates' speech with these young men appears to be an attempt to educate them. However, it is clear that while both Glaucon and Adeimantus are noble and talented, they are still nonetheless different from one another. They possess different characters.

Socrates is not necessarily saying the same things to Glaucon and Adeimantus; his speech is intended to have different effects on the two brothers. In the course of the dialogue Socrates is weighting his educational efforts more towards one of the brothers. The question is: which one? This question also points towards other matters, such as the nature of philosophy and its relation to dialogues, as well as the relation of the philosopher to the city. Or, in other words, it reveals much of the dialogue's meaning. Being aware of the dramatic tension in the dialogue is necessary to understanding it. This thesis will examine the dramatic roles of Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Republic in order to indicate which of them is Socrates' primary educational target. We begin with a consideration of the formal significance of the dialogue.

II THE DIALOGUE FORM

"Plato's dialogues are the fountainhead of the Western philosophical tradition; philosophy, as we know it, begins with them."(1) While many modern philosophers find much in Plato that they consider mistaken, few would take issue with the above statement. Plato has undeniably had an immense impact upon Western civilization, which in turn has been extensively formed through philosophy. However, it is worth remembering that unlike the vast majority of philosophers since Plato, Plato did not write philosophical

treatises; he wrote dialogues. No understanding of Plato is possible without some understanding of the dialogue form.

To understand the dialogue form we begin by asking the obvious question "What is a dialogue?". Such an analysis must begin from considering what is obvious and then move on to consider the reasons why Plato wrote dialogues instead of treatises. The dialogue can only be understood through wakeful participation in its drama. It is necessary, at least initially, to accept the dialogue on its own terms, and to do so willingly. But to accept the dialogue on its own terms, one must see what these terms are. As Strauss tells us, "One cannot understand Plato's teaching as he meant it if one does not know what the Platonic dialogue is. One cannot separate the understanding of Plato's teaching from the understanding of the form in which it is presented." (2) To begin with, it is clear that the dialogue is a drama. Dramas are performed by characters in a setting. Hence, the first task in understanding the dialogue form is to discuss the role of character and setting. "Basic to the discussion of dialogic form is Plato's choice of setting and character. Setting and character should be considered an essential part of the dialogue as a whole." (3)

We shall look at setting first. Operating throughout

all of the dialogues is something that has been called "logographic necessity." (4) Essentially, this means that a dialogue is to be read as a whole that has been carefully constructed so as to convey a unified meaning. Nothing is left to chance. As Moors put it, "Since logographic necessity operates so that no element of a dialogue, regardless of how meaningless it appears to be, should be neglected, then surely the very selection of where the discussion takes place and who participates in the discussion is directly related to the meaning of the dialogue." (5) The choice of setting must have some bearing on the ultimate meaning of the dialogue. It may even be essential in the illumination of that meaning.

The Republic is no exception. Setting is crucial both to the meaning of the dialogue, and to understanding that meaning. It begins with Socrates and Glaucon returning to Athens from Piraeus after having viewed a religious festival of both native Athenians and Thracian metics. On the way back to the city, they encounter Polemarchus and his party, whereupon they return to the Piraeus. More specifically, they return to the house of Polemarchus, where there is to be a banquet. There, they meet Polemarchus' father, Cephalus, who had just been sacrificing to the gods. The banquet is forgotten, and the whole night is taken up with speech. The conversation is long, lasting through the

night into the next morning. The central part of the conversation takes place in the middle of the night, presumably in artificial light.(6) The characters are arranged in a circle (328c).

The setting of the Republic announces its major theme: the descent into Hades.(7) Socrates began the narrative by saying that he "went down to the Piraeus". The descent into Piraeus is balanced at the end of the dialogue by the descent of Er into the underworld,(8) and by the ascent from the Cave in Book VII. The down-going expressed in the setting of the Republic has multiple meanings. "It recalls the Heraclitian depth of the soul that cannot be measured by any wandering, as well as the Aeschylean dramatic descent that brings up the decision for Dike. But above all it recalls the Homer who lets his Odysseus tell Penelope of the day when 'I went down [kateben] to Hades to inquire about the return of myself and my friends' (Od. 23. 252-3), and there learned of the measureless toil that still was in store for him had to be fulfilled to the end (23.249-50)."(9) This symbol of descent also refers to the political decay Athens suffers at the end of the fifth century.(10)

As important as setting is character; it is immensely significant to Platonic dialogues as a whole and to the Republic in particular. Recognizing this leads one to ask

why Plato wrote dialogues instead of treatises. In dialogues, all of the speeches are made by characters; Plato never actually speaks in his own voice; all that must be said is said "through the mouths" of his characters.(11) This cannot be accidental. However, it presents some problems of interpretation. First of these is the question of Plato's intentions. Because of the dialogue form, because all the words are spoken by characters, "nothing that is said in them can be directly ascribed to Plato."(12) Hence, if Plato says nothing in his own voice, then what is his point of view, his "doctrine"? It is dangerous to assume that Plato inserts his "doctrine" into the mouth of a particular character, such as Socrates; "Plato is not only in Socrates -- or in the disciples Charmides, Theaitetos, Alkibiades -- but also, to a certain degree and manner, in the opponents of Socrates."(13) If Plato's "doctrine" is not to be found in the mouth of one of his characters, then where is it to be found?

There is a problem in pursuing this question. In asking where Plato's doctrine is to be found (having accepted that it is unwise to assume that it is found in the words of Socrates, or the Eleatic Stranger, or even the Athenian Stranger of the Laws), one is making the assumption that there is in fact a doctrine to be found. That in turn rests on the assumption that philosophy, and its

presentations in various texts, be they dialogues or treatises, is about "doctrines". But this assumption remains untested. That it is open to question is indicated by raising the question: what is philosophy? Voegelin called it the "love of being through love of divine Being as the source of its order." (14) If this characterization of philosophy is accepted, then it would appear that doctrine has little to do with philosophy, at least philosophy as Plato or Voegelin understood it. One must be wary of reading too much into the dialogue before one has looked carefully enough at the dialogue's form. Dialogues are neither unambiguous nor self-evident. A dialogue, said Strauss, is "one big question mark." (15)

In assuming that a Platonic dialogue contains Platonic doctrine, the dialogue's form is already being violated. Thus we return to the matter of character. The characters speak all of the words, and Plato is not one of these characters. In the Republic, unlike the Apology, Plato is not even present. In the case of the Republic, those characters present are Socrates, Polemarchus, his father Cephalus, Plato's elder brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, Thrasymachus, a teacher of rhetoric, and Cleitophon, his disciple. (16) The aforementioned all have speaking roles in the dialogue, although some less than others. In addition, four others, Charmantides, Euthydemus, Lysias,

and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, are also present, but they remain silent throughout the dialogue. In determining the Republic's meaning, in addition to paying attention to the setting, attention must also be paid to the words that the characters speak, the manner in which they present them, and the manner in which they react to the speeches other characters make. Just as important are a character's silences; what a character does not say at a certain point is often very important. All of these factors reveal the nature of each character, which is necessary to apprehend the meaning of the dialogue. An understanding of the characters involved is integral to an understanding of a dialogue. The Republic is no exception.

For the purposes of the task at hand, it is neither convenient nor necessary to discuss all of the characters involved in the Republic. Instead, focus will be on the major characters. These are Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus, and Thrasymachus. Glaucon and Adeimantus are, of course, at the heart of the present thesis; Socrates' importance is self-evident; and Thrasymachus is important, so far as the topic of this thesis is concerned, because of his interest in the brothers' education. Primary discussion of Glaucon and Adeimantus is in chapters II and III. For now, however, some preliminary comments about their involvement in the dialogue, and about Thrasymachus' rela-

tion to them, are necessary.

Voegelin states that "the Republic gains its specific meaning in the historical situation of Athens from the fact that there is a younger generation in search for the right order which it cannot find in the surrounding society." (17) Athens is in political and moral decay; the old myth of the Polis is dead. No longer does it provide a pattern of order for the best of the younger generation. In the dialogue, Glaucon and Adeimantus represent that younger generation. They sense vividly the disorder around them, and appeal to Socrates "for enlightenment and help." (18) Hence, the characters of Adeimantus and Glaucon are significant to the meaning of the dialogue as representatives of a generation that is aware of the decay of its surrounding order, and resists the disorder brought about by that decay, and is aware of the need for a teacher. But Socrates is not the only potential teacher; vying for the attention of the younger generation are the sophists, represented in the dialogue by Thrasymachus. The sophists are also aware that the old ways and myths are dead, and that consequently there is a necessity for new ways, and for teachers to teach them. The sophists travelled through Greece and advertised to teach for a fee; the primary content of their teaching was how to gain political power in the democratic assemblies. What characterizes the

political teaching of the sophists is that power is what counts; true knowledge of the nature of the political things is unimportant.

With the above comments in mind, it is clear that Thrasyarchus' involvement in the dialogue is important for two reasons. Firstly, he represents the sophists and their teachings, and he represents how they and their teachings contribute to the moral and political decay of Athens.(19) Secondly, Thrasyarchus is important because he is a teacher looking for new students, students made up of the city's best sons, represented in this case by Adeimantus and Glaucon. Hence, the dramatic significance of the verbal combat between Thrasyarchus and Socrates in Book I partly derives from the fact that Thrasyarchus is trying to impress the two young men; he is advertising himself.

The significance of Thrasyarchus is not wholly confined to his role as a sophist and teacher. In addition, Thrasyarchus represents the city, and is, so to speak, Socrates' "accuser". Socrates' philosophizing is not necessarily salutary for the city, nor is his attractiveness for the city's best young men, such as Glaucon and Adeimantus. His incessant questioning and his refutation of the myths of the city radically call into question the city's authority. The city is threatened by philosophy, and being threatened, it may become angry. So, "when

making his appearance in the Republic, Thrasymachus plays the angry city."(20)

Glaucon and Adeimantus are the audience for whose benefit the rhetorical combat between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I is fought. At the end of that combat, Socrates is clearly the victor. It has often been pointed out that Socrates' refutation of Thrasymachus is inadequate and less than entirely logical.(21) The superiority of the just life is not truly established. This does not matter. Thrasymachus' defeat is rhetorical; the teacher of rhetoric is beaten at his own game by, of all people, the philosopher. It must be remembered that their rhetorical exchange was not about establishing firm logical foundations for the superiority or inferiority of the just life; it was fought to gain the attention of Glaucon and Adeimantus. Representing the best of the city's youth, Glaucon and Adeimantus are naturally drawn to that pursuit in which they can excel: politics.(22) Thrasymachus is an "attractive" teacher to men like Glaucon and Adeimantus, because he appears to represent a way to attain the best from life, with no need to worry about justice and injustice.(23) Socrates, however, "arouses their curiosity by his rhetorical defeat of Thrasymachus."(24)

III MISUNDERSTANDING THE REPUBLIC

It is, perhaps, insufficient to assert that one must pay attention to the formal attributes of a dialogue. It is for this reason that something must be said about how not to read a Platonic dialogue. Platonic dialogues in general, and the Republic in particular, have suffered the grave misfortune of having been systematically misinterpreted and so misunderstood. This is particularly the case in the modern era. There are many texts that attempt to interpret the Republic, but most of them misunderstand the dialogue form, and, consequently, misconstrue Plato's intentions. Here we present two characteristic examples. In the course of reading for this thesis, a large number of books and articles were read. Other examples could be chosen to illustrate the point to be made. Suffice it to say that a comprehensive, or even a cursory, review of these sources, and an account of why they most often fail, is a thesis topic itself. Space precludes any fuller treatment here.

In general, the primary reason for modern misinterpretation is that modern interpreters refuse to accept the dialogue on its own terms. This is not a result of mere misunderstanding, based on faulty data. The reason is deeper. In modern Plato scholarship, there is an underlying assumption that we know better than Plato what Plato

wanted to say. What is the Republic about? Modern commentators, interpreters, philosophers, and scholars appear to have no doubts as to its meaning. It is about "moral philosophy", or, related to "moral philosophy", it is about political "idealism". In the case of moral philosophy, the Republic serves as a guide to moral and ethical conduct, telling us what we should or should not do (or at least what an Athenian of the fifth century B.C. should or should not do); in the case of political idealism, Plato inflicts upon us his vision of the ideal political arrangement, and tells us how to attain it. In this last respect, Plato is the first in the tradition of Western Utopians, a tradition that includes, among others, Thomas More, Karl Marx, Robert Owen, Henri Saint-Simon, Edward Bellamy, and many other less well-known but nonetheless fertile and dedicated contemporaries. Plato's status as a Utopian is ambiguous; he is either lauded for honourable if misguided visions, or he is excoriated for being either a proto-fascist or a proto-communist. In turn, the Republic's success as a work of either moral philosophy or political idealism is judged upon the basis of modern standards of logical rigour. Most often, those standards show Plato and his dialogues to be found wanting in logical rigour. But the assumption of modern interpreters, namely that they know exactly what Plato intends in

his dialogues, needs to be questioned.

Is any of this justified? Did Plato in fact write "moral philosophy"? Was he a political "idealist", and is his Republic an example of a "utopia"? The analysis must take two tracks. It must examine the text in order to determine if there is any textual justification for these claims. It must then comment on some of the reasons for modern interpretive assumptions.

N.P. White, in his A Companion To Plato's Republic, is a good example of a modern interpretation of the Republic as an exercise in "moral philosophy". White declares that "the main point of the Republic has to do with ethics and political philosophy rather than metaphysics and epistemology." (25) Are "ethics and political philosophy" somehow separated from "metaphysics and epistemology"? In any case, what White means by these terms is not as clear as would be desirable. That is, there are inarticulate assumptions behind these terms, fairly common in contemporary scholarly and philosophic discourse, yet they remain unanalyzed. They are then brought to bear on the text under analysis in the certainty that they will readily illuminate its meaning. This leads to serious problems, as these terms, "moral philosophy", "political philosophy", "metaphysics", and "epistemology" are themselves in need of analysis and justification. The

analysis is absent, and so the result is bound to be mixed.

Consider the following. White "urge[s] readers of all kinds not dwell too much on Book I of the Republic. It is an introduction and is not intended by Plato to be a complete, or even a fully cogent treatment of the issues which it broaches." (26) The first book of the Republic certainly isn't a "complete . . . treatment of the issues which it broaches". It is a "prelude". Like all preludes to all serious and well-crafted literary works, the prelude to the Republic establishes the framework in which the remainder of the work lives. It sets the scene, as was earlier discussed; it establishes the atmosphere, which of course is essential to a dramatic work; finally, it sketches the characters, and informs the reader of what he might expect from them in the remainder of the dialogue. In any case, someone passing over the prelude would be at a loss to understand the dramatic action from Book II onward, or to make sense of Glaucon's challenge. The effect of the the Socratic elenchus in Book I is to undermine the prevailing conceptions of justice in the Athens of the time. These have lost their life, to the point where justice is considered to be "high-minded innocence" (348c) and injustice is "good counsel" (348d). The best life is considered to be the life of the most completely unjust man, the tyrant; justice is merely an agreement among the

weak to avoid suffering injustice. The empty content of the opinions on justice expressed by Cephalus and Polemarchus lead to this. Hence, the work of Book I, the prelude, is to clear away the wreckage of a dead tradition, so that the constructive work beginning in Book II may take place. Whatever its "logical" problems may be, Book I is dramatically essential to the whole of the Republic.

White claims that the purpose and intention of the Republic "is very simple: to discover what justice . . . is, and to show that it is more beneficial, in a certain sense of that word, than its contrary, injustice . . . ;"(27) at "the beginning of Book II, Plato says that he will show that justice is good both 'for its own sake' and 'for its consequences'."(28) Is White justified in claiming this? There is no textual proof for this claim. Plato does not say that he will show this; from 357b-358a, it is Socrates who, apparently, agrees to the terms set by Glaucon as constituting a successful defence of justice. As mentioned earlier, there is no compelling reason to identify Plato's views and intentions with that of his character Socrates; they may coincide, but there is no way of telling from the dialogue itself. Rather, it appears, after following the course of the dialogue, that Glaucon's whole challenge is modified through the action of the dialogue. The error here is in ignoring the dialogue form,

assuming that it is merely incidental to Plato's intentions. White's primary thesis is that Plato is a "moral philosopher" who, in the Republic, extols a particular "ethical theory." (29) However, reading the dialogue as a dialogue, i.e., as a drama, does not support this assumption.

Broadly speaking, the errors in interpreting the Republic result from hasty conclusions regarding Plato's intentions. While the next example is different from the above, with a another emphasis, the problem is much the same. A philosopher published, some years back, a well-known article that argued that there was a fatal fallacy in the Republic. The philosopher claimed that the Republic suffers from the "fallacy of irrelevance", which "wrecks the Republic's main argument." (30) Essentially, Plato/Socrates fails to answer Glaucon's challenge in Book II, that in fact Plato/Socrates answers and advances a notion of justice that is not the one Glaucon demanded. This whole approach (and this article, along with White's book, is merely an example of a common problem) assumes that the interpreter understands the intent of the Republic. Perhaps the logical flaw Sachs detected is intentional. If that is the case, there must be a reason for it. At the very least, it ought to make one think hard on the substance of the "fallacy", and then reflect on it

within the context of the dialogue as a whole. As it is, this approach is premised on the assumption that the Republic is merely a philosophical treatise, in dialogue form, with Plato trying to prove something "philosophical" and propositional, in the manner of modern philosophers.(31) In the case of Plato and the Republic, the philosophical proposition is that "just men are happier than any men who are unjust, and that the more unjust a man is, the more wretched he will be." (32) When rigorous logic is applied to the Republic, it is found wanting, and Plato's proposition is refuted.

But the Republic is a dialogue and not a treatise. There is no good reason to believe, and ample reason to believe otherwise, that the dialogue form is incidental and anything but central to whatever teaching it presents. Modern commentators are therefore unjustified in assuming that Plato "states" anything in the Republic; all of the speeches in the Republic are made through the mouths of characters other than Plato himself. As was argued above, this must be of some significance, and must be reflected on in order to understand the dialogue. In this case, there was no need for Socrates to have answered Glaucon's challenge on the terms Glaucon stated. Within the context of the dramatic situation at the beginning of Book II, "Glaucon does not have a clear grasp of the issue" of

justice.(33) Neither he nor his brother know what justice is. So Socrates is able to rephrase the original question, that justice is good for its own sake, to whether one can be happy without justice, which is not by any means the same as asking if justice is choice-worthy for its own sake.(34) In fact, Glaucon's challenge, and especially the manner in which he frames it, is full of dramatic significance, as will be discussed more fully in Chapter III. Suffice it to say for the present that his asking the question is both an appeal to Socrates for help and guidance and a measure of how much Glaucon needs this help and guidance, to which Socrates is most sensitive.

The above two examples illustrate a common problem. In general, these modern interpretations tend to be very critical of Plato's intentions, shocked as men of modern liberal assumptions will be at suggestions of communism, a hierarchically arranged political community, ruled by "philosopher-kings", and a general lack of what is considered to be essential freedom. In a democratic age, the critique of democracy in Book VIII is not very popular either. Reactions range from mild disapproval to shock and disgust. The latter is well represented by Karl Popper's famous The Open Society And Its Enemies, Vol. 1, as well as by R.H.S. Crossman's Plato To-Day. Bertrand Russell also had some unpleasant things to say about Plato and his

Republic. These authors, as well as a few others, were largely responsible for Plato's mid-twentieth century reputation as a "fascist", inspiring a host of lesser-known scholars since then to write within this tradition. The fault common to all of these works is, as with the two works indicated above, that they neglect or ignore the dialogue form, and instead assume that Plato was merely writing a treatise such as they themselves would, or even that Plato was tabling a plan for political "action" in the manner of so many nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideologues (of which Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Hitler are only the best-known). Such attacks on Plato and the Republic have inspired spirited defenses, but these too, very often, commit the same errors as Plato's critics; they neglect or ignore the dialogue form.

To summarize the chief assumption of this thesis: in order to understand the Republic, it is necessary to understand and appreciate the dialogue form. Dialogues are not philosophical treatises, attempting to establish philosophical propositions. Dialogues are dramas, and that means that elements such as setting and character are essential to the meaning of the drama. Hence, in order to understand a dialogue's meaning, one must participate in the drama, and be alive to the meaning and significance of the dialogic setting and the nature of the characters

involved. This is not usually done; hence, most interpreters necessarily misinterpret the meaning of the dialogue. They ignore the dialogue's outward form and appearance, which is to say that they ignore the importance of setting and character.

IV CONCLUSION

A careful reading of the Republic reveals at least one salient fact: the characters of the brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus are important. Socrates spends most of the dialogue in conversation with either one of these two "sons of Ariston"; further, it is clear that much of what they say is of great importance to the matters under discussion. They are primarily responsible for the dialogue's progress beyond the end of Book I. Were it not for Glaucon's challenge in Book II, there would be no reason for the dialogue to proceed beyond the silencing of Thrasymachus. It is also clear that Socrates is greatly interested in what the brothers have to say; most of all, he hears their calls for help and guidance. And so he begins the exercise of building the city in speech in order to provide them with the account or "paradigm" of right order. The whole of the Republic, then, is a great educational enterprise. But, given that the two brothers have quite different natures, it is perhaps the case that Socrates primarily devotes his educational efforts to one of the

brothers more than the other. Analyzing which of the brothers is Socrates' primary educational target, and his reasons for making that choice, lead one to reflect on the importance of education, politics and philosophy. The Republic only gives up its mysteries after careful attention is paid to a question such as this. The following two chapters will examine in detail the dialogic role of each brother.

-
- (1) Herman L. Sinaiko, Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus, Republic, Parmenides (Chicago: The university of Chicago Press, 1965), 1.
 - (2) Leo Strauss, The City And Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 52.
 - (3) Kent F. Moors, "Plato's Use Of Dialogue," Classical World, 72 (1978), 86.
 - (4) Strauss, Ibid., p. 60.
 - (5) Moors, "Plato's Use of Dialogue", p. 86.
 - (6) Strauss, Ibid., p. 64.
 - (7) Eric Voegelin, Order And History, Vol. III: Plato And Aristotle (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), p. 52.
 - (8) Ibid., p. 54.
 - (9) Ibid., p. 53.
 - (10) Ibid., pp. 52-53).
 - (11) Strauss, Ibid., p. 50.
 - (12) Sinaiko, Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato, p. 4.
 - (13) Paul Friedlander, Plato, Vol. I, trans. by Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 167.
 - (14) Voegelin, Order And History, Vol. I: Israel And Revelation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. xiv.
 - (15) Strauss, Ibid., p. 55.
 - (16) An important note regarding the names of the characters is necessary. Not only are the characters themselves important, their names also are important. For example, Adeimantus means the "fearless", or "dauntless" one. It can also mean the "hard", or "inflexible", one. Hence, Adeimantus is both fearless

and hard. This is born out in the dialogue, where is character appears both courageous (cf. 368), and "hard" in the sense that he does not appear to be as open as his brother to Socrates' novel suggestions. as Glaucon's name, on the other hand, means "clear-eyed", which refers to his clear perception of many of Socrates' speeches in the dialogue. Thrasymachus means "bold-fighter"; this last name surely has at least a touch of irony within the context of the dialogue. "Bold-fighter" is somewhat easily tamed by Socrates in Book I. See Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon.

It is important to point out that these characters, as well as the others, were all historical personages. Hence, while their names may illuminate their dialogic roles, the fact is that Plato did not invent them. This of course raises a question mark over the whole matter of these characters' names, their literal meanings, and their importance to the meaning of the dialogue. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to be aware of questions such as this.

- (17) Voegelin, Order And History, Vol. III, pp. 51-52.
- (18) Voegelin, Ibid., p. 72.
- (19) William Boyd, Plato's Republic For Today (London: Heinemann, 1962), p. 4.
- (20) Strauss, Ibid., p. 78.
- (21) William J. Garland, "Notes On Two Socratic Arguments in Republic I," Apeiron, X (No. 2, 1976), 12-13.
- (22) Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato, translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 339.
- (23) Ibid.
- (24) Ibid.
- (25) Nicholas White, A Companion To Plato's Republic (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1979), p. 2.
- (26) Ibid., p. 8.
- (27) Ibid., p. 13.

- (28) Ibid., p. 29.
- (29) White is only one example. There are others. See also Julia Annas, "Plato And Common Morality," Classical Quarterly, 28 (1978), 438.
- (30) David Sachs, "A Fallacy In Plato's Republic," in Plato's Republic: Interpretations and Criticism, ed. by Alexander Sesonske (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1966) p. 66.
- (31) N. R. Murphy claimed that Plato wrote "before the literature of philosophy had settled down and matured into the form of direct logical statement." The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 87. Plato's primary problem, according to this interpretation, was simply that he wrote too early in the tradition.
- (32) Ibid.
- (33) Strauss, The City And Man, p. 107.
- (34) Ibid.

CHAPTER II

I INTRODUCTION

Of the two sons of Ariston with whom Socrates engages in dialogue in the Republic, Adeimantus plays the lesser dramatic role. His temperament and character limit him; he is suited neither to the life of tyranny nor to the life of philosophy. More or less politically unambitious, he is not the potential danger to the city that his brother is. By character he is "austere",⁽¹⁾ lacking the eros of his brother. Nonetheless, Adeimantus serves a number of important ends in the dialogue. Firstly, he is an intermediary, mediating between the city and the philosopher. This purpose is indicated in the opening action of the dialogue. Secondly, and most importantly with respect to the topic under discussion, he serves as a corrective to Glaucon. Adeimantus' character makes up for the deficiencies in his brother's character. Or, to say this another way, moderation and "austerity" are both relevant to a political education. Moderation is essential both to decent political life, and, ultimately, to philosophy. Therefore, in order for Glaucon to be educated, it is necessary that moderation be introduced, and an ikon of moderation is represented by Adeimantus' character. Because of his character, Socrates may discuss things with Adeimantus that

he may not, at least initially, with Glaucon. Matters that pertain to justice and politics that Glaucon neglects are introduced by Adeimantus. He is not really the target of Socrates' educational efforts; Adeimantus' primary role in the Republic is to serve as an element in his brother's education.(2)

II CHARACTER

The importance and nature of Adeimantus' role in the dialogue is determined by his character. In order to understand his role, an analysis of that character is necessary. A correct interpretation explains why he is not the primary target of Socrates' pedagogical efforts.

The first thing one must recognize is that despite the brothers both being "sons of Ariston" ("sons of the best"), sharing the same mother and father, and, presumably, a similar upbringing, Adeimantus and Glaucon are quite different. This fact has tremendous significance, far beyond the confines of this thesis. For present purposes, however, it is worthwhile noting that different characters entail different dialogic roles. Adeimantus says things that his brother does not; he responds to Socrates' speech at different times and in a manner different from his brother. Also, and just as importantly, he is silent at different times and on different topics. Similarly, certain topics rouse him, while at other times other topics

fail to rouse him. These responses and non-responses are all conditioned by his character. Even when one suspects that Socrates may subtly be guiding the course of the dialogue, it must be remembered that Socrates most of all is sensitive to the characters of his interlocutors, and that different characters are suited to different treatment and subjects.

Like his brother, Adeimantus reveals his character through his speeches, especially the first major speech the brothers make, at the beginning of Book II, wherein they challenge Socrates to defend justice.(3) Throughout the course of the dialogue Adeimantus reveals himself to be more moderate, less erotic, and generally less interesting and less important than his brother. However, this is not to say that Adeimantus is uninteresting and unimportant; he is merely less so when compared to his brother. The realm of politics and the range of political possibilities are not exhausted by erotic, courageous men like Glaucon; there is in fact a very large place in political life for the more mundane and practical sorts of men as represented by Adeimantus. Adeimantus' inclusion in the dialogue is essential.

In general, Adeimantus is "moderate, prudent, skeptical."(4) He is "more sober than Glaucon;"(5) he is even described as "solemn."(6) He is "not a friend of laugh-

ter."(7) Unlike Glaucon, Adeimantus never laughs at himself.(8) His memory is poor,(9) and he "is easily satisfied."(10) Adeimantus appears approving of moderation (389d8-389e12). This is a very brief and as of yet tentative character sketch. However, great dialogic consequences result from Adeimantus having such a character.

As was hinted earlier, moderation has important political and philosophical consequences, and Adeimantus represents an ikon of moderation in the dialogue, being "austere" and approving of moderation in others. When Glaucon initiated his challenge to Socrates (and it is important to note that it is he and not Adeimantus who does this), his speech was clearly motivated by, among other things, an erotic desire for gain. This is not at all present in Adeimantus' portion of the challenge. In general, it is much more restrained in tone and character. From his portion of the challenge, Adeimantus and Socrates move on to begin the construction of the city in speech, which is actually several cities. The first of these cities is the "healthy", or "true" city. It is an association of craftsmen, premised on the principle of each man practising one art. The city comes into being as a result of man's lack of self-sufficiency. This "healthy" city is characterized by rustic harmony, with its inhabitants living together peacefully, yet frugally; no meat,

relishes, or desserts are consumed here. The harmony of the city appears perpetual, as there are no apparent conflicts over a desire for more than the frugal life this city provides. This first city, constructed by Socrates and Adeimantus, is characterized by a seemingly natural moderation. Like Adeimantus, it is "austere".

Adeimantus is apparently satisfied with this city; presumably, he sees a place for himself in it. This is in stark contrast to his brother's reaction, disgustingly calling it a city of pigs. The full significance of Glaucon's interruption at this point will be discussed in chapter III, but for now it is worthwhile to note the difference in how the brothers react to the first city, and that it is Adeimantus who appears satisfied with it. Regardless of whether the first city is both "true" and "healthy", it is not adequate for the purposes of the evening's discussion, and it must be left behind. Justice will not be found there. Adeimantus' lack of disgust or even simple dissatisfaction over this city reveals much about his character.

Throughout the dialogue, Adeimantus appears to be "no great lover of labor." (11) It may be an exaggeration to call him indolent, but Adeimantus does lack Glaucon's erotic energy. This explains why he is satisfied with the first city. There is little question that this city is

simple and easy; it is characterized by a complete lack of erotic striving. With its inhabitants living in the orderly harmony that results from easily satisfied natures, life is orderly and simple. Adeimantus is satisfied with it for good reason. He is austere, but he also wants things easy; he wants the "easy life". Adeimantus also wants justice to be easy. In his challenge to Socrates, he pointed out how conventional opinion holds justice to be noble and fine but also toilsome and hard, while injustice and intemperance are held to be easy and pleasant. One must ask if there is a contradiction here. Can one admire and approve of moderation and still desire a life of ease, especially if moderation is conceived to be toilsome? Perhaps moderation is not so hard as common opinion holds it to be; perhaps it is easier. The erotic striving to which Glaucon is subject entails challenges and difficulties. By being austere, Adeimantus avoids the difficulties posed by an erotic nature. "Desiring a life of noble simplicity, Adimantus (sic) realizes this requires disciplined appetites." (12) The picture of life that Socrates' paints in the first city satisfies Adeimantus' desire for a moderation that is easy and simple. It will be recalled that Adeimantus is the "easily satisfied" one. (13)

Important consequences fall from Adeimantus' satisfac-

tion with the first city. It is revealed that he is "moderate". However, the significance of Adeimantus' moderation is open to question. Is moderation anything one ought to admire or approve if it is merely a means to avoid difficulty and challenge, as it so far appears to be with Adeimantus? To add to the confusion, it is Adeimantus who later criticizes Socrates for the frugality of the guardians' lives in the city of the armed camp. The "moderate" Adeimantus is indignant over the guardians' lack of wealth. This is another way of saying that Adeimantus is indignant over the guardian's lack of happiness. But is it the case that the guardians are unhappy with their apparently frugal lives? Is lacking wealth the same as lacking happiness? Adeimantus evidently thinks so. Moreover, he sees himself, presumably, as a potential guardian, so the guardian's unhappy frugality would be his unhappy frugality. But the guardians may well be very happy; certainly Glaucon, who is also a potential guardian, remains silent where Adeimantus is indignant (and Glaucon, it will be recalled, had no hesitation about rudely interrupting in disgust over the "healthy" city). Adeimantus, on the other hand, possesses a character that is "quiet and somewhat pedestrian"; he is "oblivious to the joys of war." (14) When the "happiness" of the guardians is discussed, he enters to protest their apparent (to him)

unhappiness, on account of the extreme frugality of their pecuniary condition.(15) Adeimantus, then, does not appear to be "moderate" because he is uninterested in wealth; he is "moderate" because he is "easily satisfied" and no great lover of war. Adeimantus "naturally prefers the easy life to one of great striving; he will settle for less than the best if the best proves too demanding."(16) What this reveals is that Adeimantus is not moderate at all, but "austere"; he has no eros to moderate. Thus, Socrates' dialogue with Adeimantus distinguishes between "moderation" on the one hand, and "austerity" on the other.

The nature of Adeimantus' austerity is also partly revealed by his attitude towards poetry. In his challenge to Socrates, Glaucon, the lover of poetry, made use of poetry through his imaginative alteration of the tale of the ring of Gyges' ancestor. Adeimantus, in contrast, does not make use of poetry, but rather condemns it. The love of poetry is an expression of an erotic nature; Adeimantus' attitude towards poetry, as expressed in both his challenge, and throughout the rest of the dialogue, reveals an unerotic nature.

In any of Plato's dialogues, the timing of a participant's speeches and silences reveals much of his character. Adeimantus is no exception in the Republic. He is not silent when the topic of poetry's banishment from

the city arises; he is approving. When Socrates claims that it is necessary to supervise carefully the tales the poets tell the young, in order to "insure" that only those tales conducive to virtue be told, Adeimantus agrees, saying that it is "reasonable" (378e4). In other words, it does not appear as if Socrates' "shocking" censorship at all shocks Adeimantus; clearly, Adeimantus' taste for poetry is not as intense as his brother's. He expresses no surprise, dismay, or hesitation. A little later, when the topic of banishing the mixed imitators of all from the city arises, in favour of a "more austere and less pleasing" poetry (398a8), he is again approving (398b5). Austerity is not rankling to him, and it was not he who protested at the absence of relishes in the "healthy city". Adeimantus' austerity is a result of his lack of eros. This reveals the nature of the difference between "moderation" and "austerity". Eros is great desire. Moderation is the tempering, or control, of desire. The erotic man is characterized by desire; the moderate man is characterized by his mastery of desire (which is not the same thing as saying that he "represses" those desires). Adeimantus does not have an erotic nature. He is not characterized by great desire, and so he does not need to control his desire. That is why Strauss calls him "austere" and not "moderate".

Another important facet of Adeimantus' character is his attitude towards common opinion. This attitude is related to and partly determined by his unerotic nature, and it is first revealed in his portion of the challenge. When he presents the case for justice as he sees it, Adeimantus talks about opinion, especially common opinion, and its influence on perceptions of justice. Adeimantus treats the relationship between opinion and seeming. Unlike Glaucon, and partly because he is less erotic, Adeimantus "turns to opinion,"(17) and "pays attention to what he hears."(18) "Less intrepid" than Glaucon, Adeimantus will often attempt to "restrain the course of discussion, usually doing so not on his own authority, but as a spokesman for common opinion."(19) His concern for opinion derives from close attention to what opinion says about the important questions a young man of birth and talent naturally asks, and reflects a diffidence over these matters not at all exhibited by his brother Glaucon.

One of the most powerful influences on public opinion in Adeimantus' world is poetry. Adeimantus asks what the effect of popular opinions of justice, virtue, and the gods, as voiced by the poets, would be on the souls of the young men who hear them" (365a5-8). He recognizes that these matters are related to how one should live one's life, and that he, at least, is among those young men "who

have good natures" and desire to know "what sort of man one should be and what one must follow to go through life best" (365a8-365b1). It is Adeimantus who tells us that it is the poets who say that "moderation and justice are fair, but hard and full of drudgery" (364a1-2). Conversely, these same also say that intemperance and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire and shameful only by opinion and law" (364a2-3). There is in popular opinion, as it is formed by the poets, the belief that whatever the ultimate merits of justice and injustice, justice is not something worthy for its own sake on account of its pain and unpleasantness. As Adeimantus tells us, the poets praise justice, but with qualifications. His quotes of Hesiod and Homer indicate that one can expect earthly rewards for being just. So is one just for the sake of being just or for the rewards justice brings (363b-c4)? In any case, injustice may also bring these rewards and avoid the toil of justice; there is no fear of divine retribution, for as the poets say, even the gods themselves can be placated and moved to pardon the unjust through bribery of sacrifice and offering (cf. Cephalus at 328c3, 331b2-4, and 331d7) (366b1-2). As Adeimantus clearly sees (does his "clear-eyed" brother?), poetically influenced popular opinions of justice lead the man of intelligence to conclude only this: in a world where "the seeming over-powers even the truth"

(365c), "there is no advantage in . . . being just if [one does not] also seem to be" (365b4-5). Adeimantus, poignantly conscious of and influenced by common opinion, can see the ultimate conclusion of popular opinions of justice and happiness; if one is to be happy, one ought to be unjust and seem to be just (365d1-3).

Opinion is inseparably bound up with "seeming". Adeimantus brings attention to the salient fact that justice is universally praised with respect only to its "reputations, honors, and gifts" (366e5), not for its own sake. He recognizes that opinion pays homage to the reputation of justice; it does not see the true nature of justice, and hence it can only make judgements on appearances of justice.

Adeimantus appears to be "genuinely indignant about" common opinion's and the poets' treatment of justice as being heavy with toil and effort, and of dubious reward, while injustice is made to seem easy, pleasant, and greatly rewarding.(20) This, it will be remembered, is the same son of Ariston who dislikes labour. Adeimantus, along with his brother, challenges Socrates to defend justice. Just as Glaucon's challenge was premised on his desire for a life that would satisfy his manifold erotic urges, so Adeimantus' challenge is premised on his desire for a life of order and ease. He sees, or rather hears, that justice

is commonly held to be unpleasant and difficult, although he can also see, unlike his "clear-eyed" brother, that a life of perfect injustice would be even more difficult ("Nothing great is easy": 365d). In a sense, and his challenge clearly reflects this, Adeimantus "longs for justice to be like or to be an adequate substitute for . . . honors and (sensual) pleasures."(21)

Adeimantus has a character different by far from his brother. Having less taste for eristic display and sophistic games, his demand for justice's defence is premised differently from Glaucon's. Instead of wanting to know what justice is, he wants to know what justice does. He is interested in the practical effects of justice and injustice upon the soul. He is in general more practical-minded than his brother. On the other hand, he appears less imaginative than his brother. Adeimantus does not make up or alter any poems, as does Glaucon, and his whole reason for participating in the dialogue does not seem to be based upon any desire to know the truth of the things that are. For to want to know this is a different thing altogether from wanting to know their effects upon one's life. It is important to remember that the erotic desire to know the truth of the things that are is the apparently essential characteristic of the philosopher. It does not appear that Adeimantus' character is suited to the life of the philoso-

pher.

III DIALOGIC ROLE

The remarks above should serve to outline the essentials of Adeimantus' character. His character is less interesting and problematical than his brother's, which precludes his being Socrates' primary educational target. Nonetheless, Adeimantus is crucial to the action of the Republic. He stands by his brother and makes up for his shortcomings. Socrates begins the enterprise of building the city in speech with Adeimantus, who in turn proves to be crucial to the task of taming and moderating Glaucon. Further, Adeimantus' ordinary character ensures that the dialogue remains connected to some degree to the mundane concerns of the city. As Socrates himself is critically aware, philosophy presents a problem for the city. Its relationship with the city, to say nothing of whether it is good or harmful to the city, is open to question. With the erotic Glaucon, much less concerned with the city's good than with his own, such concerns remain unexamined. With the more ordinary Adeimantus, concerned with both common opinion and with ease, such concerns necessarily arise, and arise they must if Socrates is to offer an adequate defense of philosophy. Adeimantus has important dialogic significance, and this is determined by his character. In essence, Adeimantus' primary dialogic role is twofold: he

is an intermediary between the city and philosophy, and he helps Socrates in his task of educating Glaucon.

Before a detailed analysis of Adeimantus' roles as intermediary and corrective to Glaucon can be made, a brief overview of his speeches is necessary. Socrates begins the dialogue with Glaucon; they meet up with Polemarchus and his party, of which Adeimantus is a member. He speaks briefly here, and is silent for the remainder of Book I. The significance of his short speech at the beginning of the dialogue will be discussed a little later in this chapter. Adeimantus does not speak again until well into Book II, when he joins in with his brother to challenge Socrates to defend justice. It is highly significant that Adeimantus speaks not until after his brother. Already, Adeimantus' role as a corrective to Glaucon is apparent, and Adeimantus himself understands his role in this manner: "You surely don't believe, Socrates, that the argument has been adequately stated? . . . What most needed to be said has not been said" (362d1-362d5).

As was discussed above, Adeimantus' portion of the challenge deals primarily with common opinions of justice and the problem of the relationship between seeming and being. Glaucon had been more or less oblivious to this aspect of the problem, but it is not self-evidently clear that it is indeed "what most needed to be said." In any

case, from Adeimantus' challenge, he and Socrates proceed directly to the exercise of the building of the city in speech. As a result, this first city is necessarily bound up with Adeimantus' character. Beyond this, it is also important and worthy of attention that Socrates begins the whole didactic exercise with Adeimantus and not Glaucon. Just as Socrates and Adeimantus are finishing the picture of this simple, "healthy" city, Glaucon interrupts, and Adeimantus is silent while Glaucon and his erotic, uncontained desires contaminate and transform this "healthy" city into a "feverish" one.

When the topic turns to the problem of the education of the guardians, Adeimantus breaks into the conversation, and Glaucon becomes silent (376d4-5). Adeimantus agrees that the education and rearing of young guardians will contribute to the goal of determining how justice and injustice come into being into the city. As of yet, he has no grounds at all for this supposition. In any event, Adeimantus and Socrates proceed to discuss the guardians' education. This in turn leads to a discussion of poetry. This is significant, for, as earlier discussed, Adeimantus does not appear to like poetry all that much, or at least not to the extent that his brother does. As discussed above, this exchange leads to the agreement that poetry must be supervised, something which does not seem to

perturb Adeimantus at all.

The difference in how the brothers approach poetry is crucial both to understanding their respective characters, and to understanding an important theme in the dialogue. In contrast to his brother's imaginative use of poetry in his speech, Adeimantus' speech is "so to speak nothing but an indictment of poetry." (22) His primary purpose is to move Socrates to consider poetry in any response he makes to the brothers' challenge; (23) after Adeimantus has framed his challenge through an appeal to, which is actually an "indictment" of poetry, "Socrates cannot address the implications of what has arisen . . . without considering the position and dimension of poetry." (24) "Adeimantus' presentation in Book 2 . . . requires that Socrates seriously examine the impact which the poets have had upon the fashioning of opinion. The dialogue between Socrates and common opinion, initiated by Glaucon's demands, and intensified here by the argument of Adeimantus, must now include poetry and its position in the formation of character and the regard for virtue." (25) It is the relationship between poetry and common opinion which makes poetry such a crucial topic in the Republic, and it is Adeimantus who is primarily responsible for its inclusion in the dialogue.

Speech about poetry naturally turns into speech about

the gods. This relationship had already been hinted at in Adeimantus' portion of the challenge. It is clear that the gods and their nature hold enormous significance for the city, as well as for the answer to the brothers' challenge about justice. However, the city only knows about the gods through what the poets tell; hence, what the poets have to say is vastly important for the city. And since the city has a great deal of interest in what its young are taught, so that they may become good citizens, and since poets are considered teachers, the relationship between poetry, the gods, and the education of the young is necessarily important. Socrates reminds Adeimantus that they "aren't poets right now but founders of a city. It's appropriate to know the models according to which the poets must tell their tales" (378e6-379a2). "But . . . , " asks Adeimantus, "what would the models for speech about the gods be?" (379a5-6) And this is the problem. Given that the truth of the gods is necessarily hidden from human sight, how could Socrates and Adeimantus discover the best models for these tales? Recall that the whole thrust of Adeimantus' challenge was that the tales about the gods and the just were actually such as to foster injustice instead of justice, and that justice was more profitable. Adeimantus and Socrates embark on a lengthy discussion of poetry and what it says about divine matters.

Adeimantus is more or less pushed out of the conversation at 398c7, when Glaucon laughingly interrupts after the conversation had arrived at the topic of music. The unerotic Adeimantus is neither as moved by music, nor does he know as much about it, as does his more erotic sibling. This exchange between Socrates and Glaucon continues until Book IV. The topic turns from music to gymnastic. This in turn leads to Socrates' introduction of the necessity for communism of property among the guardians, to which Glaucon assents. At 419a, Adeimantus forcibly and indignantly re-enters the conversation. He demands an "apology" from Socrates; he claims that he is "hardly making these men happy, and further, that it's their own fault -- they to whom the city in truth belongs but who enjoy nothing good from the city as do others, who possess lands, and build fine houses, and possess all the accessories that go along with these things, and make private sacrifices to the gods, and entertain foreigners, and, of course, also possess what you were just talking about, gold and silver and all that's conventionally held to belong to men who are going to be blessed? But, he would say, they look exactly like mercenary auxiliaries who sit in the city and do nothing but keep watch" (419a-420a). Two things are noteworthy about this outburst, both revealing much about Adeimantus' character. First, Adeimantus, less bold than his brother,

does not speak in his own voice, but in that of an indeterminate third person ("he"). Second, Adeimantus, supposedly "austere", evidently harbours a secret but distinct desire for wealth. Socrates gives a satisfactory apology to Adeimantus. They resume their consideration of the city, which, of course, takes on again the characteristics of Adeimantus at the expense of his brother. The city once again becomes more "austere".

With the re-introduction of the gods into the conversation, at 427b5, the city has apparently reached its completion. Socrates tells Adeimantus that with legislation and laws treating of the divine provided for, "son of Ariston . . . your city would now be founded" (427c7-427d). All that seemingly remains to be done is to find justice in the completed and founded city. In order to accomplish this, Socrates suggests that Adeimantus call in his brother "and Polemarchus, and the others" (427d2-427d3). This is Glaucon's cue to re-enter the conversation; the city is not finished, but it is gone as far as it can go with Adeimantus as Socrates' prime interlocutor.

For the remainder of Book IV, and for practically all of Book V, Adeimantus is silent. The exception, an important one, is at the very beginning of Book V, when Polemarchus takes hold of Adeimantus' cloak, and prompts

him to compel Socrates to talk about communism of women and children. At 423e6, Socrates first hinted that communism amongst the guardians would include more than mere meals and quarters, . that it would also include women, marriage, and children. This appears a stupendous suggestion, but Adeimantus merely says that this "would be the most correct way" (424a2). He does not rebel, as he earlier did at the first suggestion of communism among the guardians. In any event, it is obvious that the sombre and sober Adeimantus is not suited to the full discussion of communism of women and children that takes place between Socrates and Glaucon throughout Book V. The irony and humour of the whole discussion prevents one such as Adeimantus, with an inadequate appreciation of the ridiculousness of the whole topic, from being a useful dialogic partner.

Adeimantus re-enters the conversation near the beginning of Book VI. In the course of Book V, after discussing the marriage and child-rearing arrangements of the city, Socrates had introduced the apparently preposterous suggestion that philosophers must rule. When Adeimantus interrupts at 487b, it is to protest that suggestion. Once again, the more sober, sombre, and practical-minded son of Ariston compels Socrates to deliver an apology, and justify the rule of philosophers. In the eyes of the city, and of men like Adeimantus, philosophers

are either "queer" and "vicious", or are at least "completely useless to the cities" (487d2-487d5). To claim that such men not only must rule, but that their rule would be the only way in which cities would have any rest from evil, seems to be the very height of folly. It is necessary that Socrates be compelled to justify the rule of philosophers. However, it is only a man like Adeimantus, attentive to common opinion and the concerns of the city, that is suited to do this; Glaucon, apparently, was not worried about these matters, for it looked as though he was going to let Socrates by without an adequate defense of the rule of philosophers. In order for Socrates to make an adequate defense of philosophy, the common conception of philosophy and philosophers must be both raised and scrutinized, and it is Adeimantus who raises the common conception for scrutiny.

Throughout the remainder of Book VI, Socrates continues to explain the philosopher to Adeimantus, who is playing the part of the city's representative. Socrates accounts for why the city sees philosophers as queer, vicious, or useless. His defense is delivered in language that the city can understand. This apparently satisfies Adeimantus. When the conversation appears to be heading again into difficult ground, as the topic of the idea of the good arises, Adeimantus once again gives up his place

to his brother, whose erotic nature demands that Socrates "go through the good just as [he] went through justice, moderation and the rest" (506d2-5).

Adeimantus returns to the discussion after Glaucon and Socrates have talked about the idea of the good, the ascent from the cave, and so on. Adeimantus and Socrates discuss the cycle of regimes, and how the best city decays into worse cities. What is important about this discussion is the principle that to each type of regime corresponds a certain type of man; to the aristocratic regime corresponds an aristocratic man, to a timocratic regime corresponds a timocratic man, to an oligarchic regime corresponds an oligarchic man, and so on. Adeimantus breaks in just as Glaucon and Socrates, having discussed the timocratic regime, are about to discuss the timocratic man. Adeimantus continues as Socrates' primary interlocutor all through the remainder of the discussion of the decay of regimes, and the men that correspond to these regimes, right up until they are to discuss the character of the tyrant, when Glaucon interrupts to "take over the argument" (576b9). At this point, Adeimantus' active participation in the dialogue ends; he finishes it as a listener.

Now, a discussion of Adeimantus' purposes in the dialogue is in order. First to be considered is his role as a "mediator". Adeimantus acts as a mediator "throughout

the dialogue." (26) He stands in between the city and philosophy. Lacking Glaucon's erotic striving and great ambition, as well as his imagination and desire for the best possible life, despite the hardships that these might bring, Adeimantus is more closely associated with the city. His interests are more in accordance with it, and he is more likely to find his good in it than his brother. This is a result of his character, quieter and blander than Glaucon's. Nevertheless, for reasons to be discussed later in the chapter, Adeimantus is not wholly identified with the city.

Adeimantus' role as mediator between the city and philosophy is apparent from the dialogue's very beginning. The dialogue begins with Socrates, accompanied by Glaucon, returning to Athens from Piraeus after having prayed to the goddess and observed a religious festival of both Athenians and metics. As they return, they encounter a large party of men led by Polemarchus; Polemarchus wants them to stay in Piraeus and to go to his house for a feast, and he playfully makes a claim to superior force in order to convince Socrates and Glaucon to remain. Socrates does not appear to wish to remain and so there is an impasse between the two parties. However, Adeimantus is with Polemarchus' party. At 328a, he resolves the tension created by Polemarchus' apparently playful use of force in compelling

Socrates and Glaucon to come back to Piraeus with him. Adeimantus does so by enticing Socrates with the prospect of novelty, the torch race on horseback. The tension is apparently resolved, and both parties return to Polemarchus' house in Piraeus. It is worthwhile to note that it was not actually Socrates who agreed to this; Glaucon spoke for him. Nonetheless, go they do, and it was primarily Adeimantus who brought this about, after the impasse created by Polemarchus. Philosophy must remain and give a defense of itself to the city; Adeimantus thus stands between the many of the city, as symbolized by Polemarchus and his party, and philosophy as represented by Socrates. Adeimantus, in a sense, is responsible for the admission of philosophy into the city; he does this by "persuad[ing] Glaucon and Socrates to join the little community of men in the Piraeus."(27)

Adeimantus " . . . mediates between the Best and the Many", as symbolized in the Prologue, where he appears related to both groups: related to the Best by nature (his kinship with Glaucon), and to the Many by convention (his simply happening to be with them)."(28) This relationship is crucial to understanding Adeimantus' role of mediator. To understand this is to understand something of the dialogue's theme. If one can see that the Republic is "the true Apology of Socrates,"(29) then it is relatively simple

to make sense of the claim that "only in the Republic does he give an adequate treatment of the . . . relationship of the philosopher to the political community." (30) The nature and consequences of this relationship are not self-evident; neither is the answer to the question of whether or not the interests of philosophy and the city are in accordance. The fate of Socrates illustrates that most clearly. Hence, the dialogue itself is an examination and treatment of this theme. Adeimantus' role is to be the agent of that treatment. Being related to both the best and the many, he partakes of the nature of both, while not belonging completely to both; he is capable of being neither a good Socrates nor a good Thrasymachus. On the other hand, his character and circumstances suit him to standing between the two.

Throughout the course of the dialogue, this mediatory role is apparent. Already discussed is his pivotal role in bringing Socrates back to the Piraeus at the dialogue's beginning. When, in Book II, he joins in to add his say to Glaucon's challenge, he does so with the effects of the opinions of the city in mind. The concerns of the city had been completely absent from Glaucon's portion of the challenge. Thereafter, many of Adeimantus' speeches voice the city's concern over philosophy. He "is . . . the spokesman for common opinion, the intermediary between the

one and the anonymous many; more than once he obstinately requires the philosopher to apologize." (31) He does so at the beginning of Book IV, outraged at the description of the guardians' communism, and at what he sees as their unhappiness; he asks Socrates what his "apology" would be "if someone were to say that you're hardly making these men happy" (419a1-3).

Again, near the beginning of Book V, after Polemarchus had taken hold of his cloak and whispered into his ear, Adeimantus accuses Socrates of "robbing us of a whole section of the argument" (449c). The section of the argument in question is of course the matter of women and children being held in common amongst the guardians. Interestingly enough, Adeimantus did not object when earlier Socrates had first brought the matter up. It was only when the city, as represented by Polemarchus, took note of this with some interest, and bade Adeimantus to compel Socrates to carefully explain what he meant by this, that Adeimantus himself took note of this. The fact that Polemarchus did not directly stop Socrates himself to present his concern, but did so only through Adeimantus, is significant. Evidently the relationship between the city and philosophy is not such that direct communication is possible without intermediaries such as Adeimantus.

Later, in Book VI, Adeimantus delivers one of the most

important accusations against Socrates. He rebels at the suggestion that philosophers must rule if the city is to be just. Adeimantus demands that Socrates demonstrate how it is "good to say that the cities will have no rest from evils before philosophers, whom we agree to be useless to cities, rule in them" (487e1-3). That philosophers must rule for cities to be well-ordered and just is perhaps the best-known of Plato's "political propositions"; what is less well-known is that the city, for good reason, rebels at that prospect. Adeimantus is necessary, as the spokesman for common opinion, in order to voice the city's suspicion of philosophy. He "speaks in the name of the political men who are offended and threatened by both Glaucon's and Socrates' unconventional notions." (32)

Adeimantus is eventually won over. Socrates delivers a successful apology, and philosophy is admitted into the city. By Books VIII and IX, the city has been finished, Socrates is now its citizen, and hence Adeimantus, the "moralist and defender of civil life", can defend both Socrates and the city at the same time. (33) Adeimantus is transformed from an accuser of philosophy and Socrates to a "whole-hearted ally" in the course of Books VIII and IX. (34)

While the above remarks suggest the importance and nature of Adeimantus' role as a mediator, he has another

role in the dialogue. An important role, perhaps the major role for Adeimantus, is as a corrective to his more ambitious, erotic, and impetuous brother. It is more than clear that Adeimantus betrays little of the ambition and boldness of his brother. However, these attributes may have a price. That is, there are certain things that Glaucon, on account of his character, will neglect and leave unsaid. Adeimantus, on account of his character, ensures that these things are said. This is not to say that what Adeimantus considers "most needed to be said" really is in fact so. However, it is still important, and essential to both Socrates' defense of philosophy and to his brother's education. Adeimantus corrects his brother's deficiencies.

In his portion of the challenge, Adeimantus reinforces Glaucon's challenge by presenting a consideration neglected by Glaucon.(35) Adeimantus thinks that Glaucon's speech errs by its silence with regards to the gods; common opinion, especially as it is represented by the poets, claims that justice is good because it is rewarded by the gods; conversely, injustice is bad because it is punished by the gods.(36) The erotic and impetuous Glaucon, striving after whatever he regards as his good, is not interested in what common opinion has to say about justice and injustice. He is only interested in what is good for

him. Hence, he is unmindful of the content of popular opinions of justice and injustice. But clearly, in an attempt to answer the question of whether justice or injustice is preferable, which in turn necessarily leads to the question of what justice is, the content of those opinions must at least be examined. As it was phrased, Glaucon's challenge to Socrates did not preclude Socrates resorting to common opinion as a reply. That is, one should be just because one will be rewarded by the gods, or so says common opinion. This would circumvent the need to examine the nature of justice, which must of course proceed beyond common opinion, and it would silence Glaucon without necessarily convincing him of anything. As the challenge stands at the end of 362c, it is inadequate and insufficient to treat properly the nature of justice. It is necessary that common opinions of justice be accounted for. This enables the nature of opinion to be examined. In order for this essential task to proceed, someone who is aware of what these opinions are, someone like Adeimantus, must introduce the whole issue. Adeimantus does just this at 362d.

He is suited to do this because, as earlier stated, his less intrepid and unerotic character is more attentive to the opinions of others. This again is a result of Adeimantus' character, discussed earlier in this chapter.

Precisely because he is less erotic and imaginative than his brother, precisely because he prefers order, ease, and comfort to hardship, Adeimantus lacks his brother's independence. As a result, he is more aware of what the city regards as good and bad, just and unjust, and profitable and unprofitable. Adeimantus is crucial to the action of the dialogue because he ensures that the opinions of the city regarding these matters will be taken into account in the discussion. Presumably, Socrates, the master of political speech, is aware of Adeimantus' character and his importance in this regard, and accounts for it.

In short, Adeimantus is necessary to the construction of the city in speech, as is reflected in the fact that it is with him that Socrates begins this task. Further, Adeimantus is "necessary for the punishment of the bodily passions which is the condition of Glaucon's reform." (37) Recall that Adeimantus is "austere". Being by nature "austere" in character, Adeimantus' speech serves to provide an ikon of moderation to his erotic and impetuous brother.

Moderation is clearly a key theme in the dialogue. For one thing, it seems to be the case that justice and moderation are closely related. In order for Glaucon to have his challenge satisfied (even if that satisfaction is not necessarily on the terms that he specified at the

beginning of Book II), he must learn something of moderation. To learn something of moderation, he must become moderate. Unfortunately, nothing whatever of moderation is revealed in his speech in Book II. In fact, his very speech is a model of immoderation, revealing an immoderate soul. Adeimantus' speech, on the other hand, is a model of moderation of sorts. Adeimantus, the intermediary, provides the vehicle through which Socrates can introduce moderation to the dialogue. This proves to be the case, for it is in conversation with Adeimantus that Socrates first introduces the term "moderation."

Moderation has political significance. Socrates introduces the term at 389d. He and Adeimantus are discussing how poets must depict the gods, comparing this to how the poets do depict the gods. Generally, they show the gods to be models of excess and immoderation. This in essence conveys that excess and immoderation are salutary. However, the political association of any city is inherently premised upon moderation. Citizens must submit to rule; in order to rule effectively the rulers must rule themselves, and in order for citizens to submit to rule, they must also rule themselves (389d-e). This is true of all regimes; those regimes that are not moderate in this sense are those regimes that are unruly. In the best city, the desires and passions, for food, drink, sex, and so on, are

contained most fully; that is why it is the best regime. It is capable of submitting to rule. One of the important facts about this portion of the dialogue is that this is introduced and discussed with Adeimantus, not Glaucon. Adeimantus' natural austerity enables moderation to enter the dialogue. Adeimantus, unlike Glaucon, "links justice and moderation." (38)

With Adeimantus, Socrates begins the necessary task of reforming poetry. The whole point of Adeimantus' half of the challenge was that common opinion's conception of justice, which is articulated through the poets, is one that is inherently depraved. A close examination of these opinions reveals that justice, along with moderation, is not salutary. What is salutary is the reputation of justice and moderation. There is a disjunction between seeming and being; the poets honour the seeming of justice, not its being. If one takes the message of the poets to its logical end, one ought to be just for its rewards, not itself, and to gain its rewards, one need only seem just; one need not actually be just.

The effect of an inherently depraved image of justice in a society is that no one will desire to be just. That leads eventually to a climate in which the image of justice presented by Thrasymachus in Book I is considered true, and a desire to model oneself after that image will be

considered evidence of a healthy psyche. Adeimantus is clearly aware of these consequences, as evidenced in his first speech. Just as clearly, Glaucon is not aware of this; his speech in fact indicates his acceptance of the common image of justice. He sees his good as lying in the life of perfect injustice. Because he is comparatively inattentive to the nature and content of common opinion, he is susceptible to the corrosive effects of that opinion. This corrosion finds its ultimate end in the common desire, shared by both Glaucon and the many, for tyranny as the happiest life. The more austere Adeimantus, aware of the corrosive effects of popular, poetically expressed opinions about justice, is essential in the task of bringing these opinions out for examination, and in ensuring that Glaucon is cured of his desire for tyranny.

While on the topic of Adeimantus and opinion, it is necessary to return to Adeimantus' reaction to Socrates' suggestion at 487b. Some of the ramifications of his reaction to the suggestion that philosophers must rule have already been discussed at above. But more remains to be said. Here, Adeimantus interrupts Socrates' and Glaucon's exchange. He does so essentially in the name of common opinion. When Socrates spoke about the philosopher, Glaucon seemed too eager. He erotic desire to see the best regime actualized blinded him (he, Glaucon, meaning the

"clear-eyed one") to the objections ordinary people might have to philosophy and philosophers.

The best regime must admit philosophy into it before it can be the best regime. However, before it can, certain matters must be cleared up. The first of these is the question of what philosophy is, followed then by the question of who are the philosophers. Common opinion has an image of philosophy and philosophers, just as it does of justice. While the image may be wrong, it must be examined. What common opinion opines about philosophy and philosophers must be examined. Adeimantus is the agent to ensure that it is examined.

Adeimantus may not be important in the sense that he is a target of Socrates' pedagogical efforts, at least the primary target; he is, however, crucial in correcting and educating Glaucon. His austere, quiet, and perhaps ordinary character is more attentive to the concerns and content of common opinion. These had been completely ignored by Glaucon, whose character is such as to dispose him to ignore common opinion. But, in order for the dialogue to proceed as it must, the concerns that Glaucon neglects must be accounted for. Adeimantus corrects his brother's deficiencies. That is the significance of his speaking after his brother in Book II. Glaucon, as will be more fully discussed in the next chapter, is something of

concern to the city; he is Socrates' primary pedagogical object. Adeimantus assists Socrates' in his task of educating Glaucon. The primary role he plays in that task is in the moderating of the immoderate Glaucon. Adeimantus' austere character serves as a model of moderation to Glaucon.

V CONCLUSION

The main thesis of this chapter has been that while Adeimantus is not Socrates' prime educational target, he serves two essential roles. First, he is the intermediary between philosophy and the city. That role is symbolized by his positioning and association at the beginning of the dialogue, and is apparent throughout the dialogue. Second, Adeimantus serves as a helper to Socrates in the task of educating his brother. Glaucon is erotic, talented, and ambitious; he is also immoderate. He poses a real danger to the city. Adeimantus, on the other hand, has a different character; quiet, unerotic, relatively unambitious politically, less talented in general, he desires less. Most of all, he does not really desire fulfillment through tyranny. Conversely, however, the same characteristics of his that preclude him being a danger to himself and to the city make him useful to Socrates. His "austerity" ultimately enables the political and philosophic significance of moderation to be introduced into the

dialogue. That is, while Adeimantus himself does not possess eros, which means that he cannot be truly moderate himself, only "austere", Socrates can present him as an ikon of moderation to Glaucon, who does possess strong eros. As will be discussed in the next chapter, a lesson in moderation forms the heart of Glaucon's education.

-
- (1) Strauss, The City And Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 98. Some comment on Strauss' terminology is in order. The Random House College Dictionary defines "austere" to mean 1) "severe in manner or appearance; stern; solemn", and 2), "rigorously self-disciplined; living without excess, luxury, or ease". Given this, there may be some confusion over why Strauss would call Adeimantus "austere". Aristotle proves helpful here. In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle refers to the virtue of temperance, which is the mean between the vices of too much indulgence in sensual pleasure, and too little indulgence. To the former he assigns the name of "profligacy". The latter, however, because it is so rare, has no name. As Aristotle says: "Men erring on the side of deficiency as regards pleasures, and taking less than a proper amount of enjoyment in them, scarcely occur; such insensibility is not human. Indeed, even the lower animals discriminate in food, and like some kinds and not others; and if there be a creature that finds nothing pleasant, and sees no difference between one thing and another, it must be very far removed from humanity. As men of this type scarcely occur, we have no special name for them" (Nichomachean Ethics, III. xi. 7). Glaucon clearly corresponds to the profligate man in Aristotle's classification, while Adeimantus corresponds to the profligate man's opposite. Hence, in Strauss' language, Adeimantus is "austere".
 - (2) Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato, translated with notes and an interpretive essay (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 346.
 - (3) Leo Strauss, Ibid., pp. 90-91/
 - (4) Leon Craig, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (unpublished manuscript), p. 157.
 - (5) Strauss, Ibid., p. 91.
 - (6) John F. Wilson, The Politics of Moderation (New York: University Press of America, 1984), p. 19.
 - (7) Strauss, Ibid., p. 133.

- (8) Leon Craig, "The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic (paper presented to The Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, June 6-8, 1986), p. 45.
- (9) Wilson, Ibid., p. 81.
- (10) Ibid., p. 37.
- (11) Craig, "The War Lover," p. 45.
- (12) Craig, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, p. 26.
- (13) Wilson, Ibid., p. 37.
- (14) Strauss, Ibid., p. 104.
- (15) Ibid.
- (16) Craig, "The War Lover", p. 45.
- (17) Bloom, Ibid., p. 342.
- (18) Ibid.
- (19) Craig, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, p. 31.
- (20) Craig, Ibid., p. 154.
- (21) Bloom, Ibid., p. 343.
- (22) Strauss, Ibid., p. 91.
- (23) Kent F. Moors, Glaucon And Adeimantus On Justice (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, Inc, 1981), p. 93. Given the title of Moor's work, it would be worthwhile to give a brief discussion of what it is about and how it differs from the present topic. His book deals primarily with the role Glaucon and Adeimantus play in determining the Republic's course of argument through their respective challenges to Socrates at the beginning of Book II. According to Moors, these challenges, determined by the brothers' characters, are essential to the philosophic course of the dialogue. He supports this claim with a detailed analysis of Glaucon's and Adeimantus' challenges in Book II, which forms almost the entire bulk of his book. The present thesis differs from Moors' work both in its scope and its emphasis. Whereas Moors

concentrates on the speeches the brothers make in Book II, this thesis surveys the whole of the Republic. As well, it makes a different point. Asking whether Socrates is trying primarily to educate Glaucon or Adeimantus leads to different questions and different areas of concern than does analyzing the nature of the brothers' challenges in Book II. Nonetheless, Moors' book is a thoughtful analysis, and it shed light on the topic at hand.

- (24) Ibid.
- (25) Ibid.
- (26) Craig, An Introduction To Plato's Republic, p. 14.
- (27) Bloom, Ibid., p. 413.
- (28) Craig, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, p. 26.
- (29) Bloom, Ibid., p. 307.
- (30) Ibid.
- (31) Craig, "The War Lover", p. 44.
- (32) Bloom, Ibid., p. 413.
- (33) Ibid.
- (34) Ibid.
- (35) Moors, Ibid., p. 79.
- (36) Strauss, Ibid., p. 98.
- (37) Bloom, Ibid., p. 413.
- (38) Craig, "The War Lover", pp. 47-48.

CHAPTER III

I INTRODUCTION

Next to Socrates, Glaucon is the most important character in the Republic. He is Socrates' companion at the beginning and the end of the dialogue; Socrates "went down to Piraeus . . . with Glaucon", and went with him again when he descends into Hades. Glaucon's significance in the dialogue is both dramatic and pedagogical. He is responsible for key movements within it, as he steers the dialogue, albeit unintentionally, into waters of greater depth and peril, but also of greater philosophical significance. He is dramatically responsible for the very occurrence of the dialogue; it is he who speaks for Socrates when it is agreed that the two will accompany Polemarchus and the others back down to Piraeus. Throughout the dialogue his actions break impasses at vital topics. Glaucon's dialogic role is crucial, and his role is determined by his character. The main elements of Glaucon's character may be characterized as thymos, or courage, and eros. There is a relationship between courage and eros, and the topics Socrates discusses with Glaucon. Specifically, since it is Glaucon who challenges Socrates to defend justice, in a way that he had not when Socrates silenced Thrasymachus, and since it is with Glaucon that

Socrates discusses such things as the education of the Guardians, the philosopher-king, and the ascent from the Cave in Book VII, courage and eros must have some significant relation with these topics. Part of the dialogue's teaching is that justice, rule, and political ambition are all related to the character of a soul, especially to characteristics such as courage and eros, as well as to moderation. Finally, the whole dialogue is on one level "the education of Glaucon". Why Glaucon is in need of an education, and the form that that education takes in the course of the dialogue are questions that lead one to ponder more rigorously the meaning of the Republic. By thinking through the meaning of the form and substance of Glaucon's education, one is in turn led to consider the meaning of education in general, the role and danger of ambition in politics, the relation between justice and moderation, and the meaning of philosophy and how it relates to these questions. Above all, Glaucon's character serves to illuminate the relationship between the philosopher and the tyrant. Glaucon may be the essential key to understanding the drama of the Republic.

I GLAUCON'S DIALOGIC ROLE

Glaucon plays a crucial role in the dialogue. At the dialogue's beginning, he is accompanying Socrates on his return to Athens from the religious festival in Piraeus; it

is he who speaks for Socrates, agreeing to wait, when Polemarchus' slave bids them to wait for Polemarchus' party. Glaucon appears to be the catalyst responsible for the dialogue that results from Polemarchus' request that Socrates and Glaucon return to his house in Piraeus. It is Glaucon who, unconvinced by Thrasymachus' refutation at the end of Book I, challenges Socrates to defend justice properly. Further, Glaucon figures prominently throughout the remainder of the dialogue, participating at each of its crucial passages and movements, ending the dialogue listening to the tale of Er. More importantly, his character accomplishes something necessary: it moves the dialogue forward at each impasse. Bloom said that Glaucon "is responsible for the progress of the dialogue".(1) There is an excellent dialogic reason for this. Glaucon is of particular concern to Socrates. Apparently, Socrates knew him and liked him; most of all, he knew that Glaucon had great talents and great political ambitions.(2) Such young men pose the greatest dangers to the city. Hence, to benefit both his city and Glaucon, Socrates undertakes to educate Glaucon, and moderate or direct his potentially fatal ambition. It is for this reason that the dialogue may be read as the "education of Glaucon". Glaucon's role in the dialogue is central, as in one sense it all takes place for his benefit.

Glaucou's central role in the dialogue is apparent from its very beginning. Socrates "went down to Piraeus . . . with Glaucon . . . to pray to the goddess" (327a). As Socrates and Glaucon begin their return to the upper town, Polemarchus' slave appears and, taking hold of Socrates' cloak, bids them to wait for Polemarchus. It is Glaucon, not Socrates, who agrees to wait for Polemarchus. Then, when Socrates appears uninterested in returning to Piraeus, it is again Glaucon who speaks for Socrates, in reply to Polemarchus's apparently playful threat of force to detain the two of them; Glaucon admits that "there's no way" Polemarchus and his party could be persuaded to let them go if they "they don't listen" to persuasion. Adeimantus ultimately resolves the tension, but Glaucon bears much of the responsibility for Socrates' return to Piraeus.

Glaucou's next intervention occurs a little later in the first book. It takes place at one of the dialogue's important signposts, in this case the topic of the wages for rulers. At 347a, Socrates and Thrasymachus are discussing the nature of rule when Socrates declares that "there must be wages for those who are going to be willing to rule -- either money, or honor, or a penalty if he should not rule". Glaucon breaks in. He is perplexed by the last-mentioned item. It is significant that the

politically ambitious Glaucon breaks in just as the conversation leads to a novel view of the wages of rule, and, more specifically, the "wages of the best men" (347a9). The "son of Ariston" ("son of the best") breaks his silence when the argument carries the participants into the subject of the best men's wages. No major change in the dialogue's course takes place here, for shortly afterwards Socrates and Thrasymachus resume their exchange. But Glaucon has served notice of his interests, and the colour of the remainder of Socrates' and Thrasymachus' contest is changed. For now, everyone ought to be aware of the significance of the words Socrates and Thrasymachus exchange, and of their contest. Glaucon, Son of the Best, is a potential ruler, necessarily interested in the subject of rule, and even more interested at this point in his life in who will be his best teacher.(3) So Glaucon's interruption at 347a indicates dramatically that the contest between Socrates and Thrasymachus is to decide who will educate the next generation of rulers.

Socrates wins the contest. He defeats the politician at his own art, making speeches. It is important to appraise correctly the significance of Socrates' victory. While Socrates and Thrasymachus were supposedly arguing whether the just life was better than the unjust life, and what justice itself is (which are not the same things;

there appears to be some confusion in Thrasymachus' own mind over what he is arguing), nothing was proven by their exchange. This is apparent even from a superficial reading of the text. In fact, many modern scholars have noted this, and, as was discussed in chapter I, take it for a mistake of Socrates', and hence Plato's, "logic." This is a serious mistake. Among other things, such a conclusion prevents one from understanding what happens at the beginning of Book II. It also prevents one from understanding Glaucon's role in the dialogue. The aporetic conclusion at the end of the first book is entirely necessary and intentional. Why it is necessary and why it was intentional are questions answered by Glaucon's response at the beginning of Book II.

"Glaucon is always most courageous in everything, and so now he wouldn't accept Thrasymachus' giving up" (357a). It was clear to Glaucon that Socrates' hollow victory had decided nothing. The dramatic action of Book I was "only a prelude" (357a). The first book served two main functions: it presented and then destroyed common opinions of justice, and, even more importantly, it served to arouse Glaucon's interest. On the one hand, Glaucon could not help but be impressed by Socrates' silencing of Thrasymachus, the "bold-fighter", on his own ground; on the other hand, Socrates appears to be deliberately provoking Glaucon's

"passionate reaction."(4) Someone as intelligent as Glaucon would notice the inadequacies of Socrates' "logic"; somebody with Glaucon's powerful eros would be excited by the talk of rule, justice, and the "wages of the best men". And he is excited. Book II represents one of the dialogue's many "beginnings"; it represents a remarkable change in the dialogue's tone and character. Gone is the verbal close-quarter fighting that characterized the exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus. The remainder of the dialogue is carried on in a spirit of co-operation, which is fitting of its subject matter. To Glaucon must go much of the credit for this major transformation.

As was said, Thrasymachus' defeat was only rhetorical. The superiority of both the just life and of justice was not demonstrated, proven, or decided. And Glaucon noticed this. He "wouldn't accept Thrasymachus' giving up" because he, the "clear-eyed" one, could see that nothing about justice had been decided. Glaucon does not want to be rhetorically persuaded of anything; he wants to be "truly persuaded" that the just life is better than the unjust life. It should be noted that in some sense he has already chosen the just life as "more profitable" (347e6). However, the significance of his choice, this early in the dialogue, is highly uncertain. It cannot yet be determined why he so chose. It could be some inherent nobility of his

character, or it could be that his love of beautiful things compels him to choose the just life as "more profitable" because it appears more beautiful. On the other hand, it could be cleverness on his part, for if he enters politics, it would certainly be to his advantage to appear to prefer the just life. What is not open to doubt is Glaucon's fundamental ignorance in these matters. As of yet, he has given no indication that he truly knows what justice is, or how it could profit him. At the same time, it was apparent from the action of Book I that common opinions about justice were inadequate. And so it is necessary that the dialogue move into radically new waters, wherein the nature of justice, as distinct from common opinions about it, may be considered. Glaucon enables this to come about. Unlike Thrasymachus the "snake", Glaucon is not easily "charmed". At the beginning of Book II, his dissatisfaction with the results of Thrasymachus' and Socrates' exchange compels him to challenge Socrates to defend justice, and to "truly persuade" Glaucon that "it is in every way better to be just than unjust".

Glaucon's challenge is pivotal to the course of the dialogue. Conclusions of justice arrived at in the course of the first book were necessarily provisional; the primary purpose of the "prelude" was to demolish popular opinions of justice. However, a dramatic impasse had been reached;

Socrates had taken the argument as far as it could go with Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus as interlocutors. But the way is now clear, at the beginning of Book II, for a treatment of the nature of justice.

With Glaucon's challenge, Book II transforms the dialogue from a refutation of common opinions of justice to a positive exploration of what justice is. This transformation is "highly significant."⁽⁵⁾ It is noteworthy that Glaucon is primarily responsible for this transformation; Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus were all for various reasons inadequate to this task.⁽⁶⁾ In any case, the significance of the transformation is that the dialogue moves from an examination of common opinions of justice to a treatment of the nature of justice independent of opinion. For this, philosophy is necessary.

The form of Glaucon's challenge is also important. In essence, the manner in which he poses it demands that justice be examined in terms of its nature, as distinct from common opinions about it. Immediately after challenging Socrates to persuade him "truly" of the superiority of justice, Glaucon delivers the conditions that Socrates' defense must acknowledge. He secures Socrates' agreement to the three classes of goods: things good for their own sake, things good both for themselves and for their consequences, and, thirdly, things that are in

themselves unpleasant, but good for their consequences. Socrates supposes that justice is of the second category: good both in itself and for its consequences. But Glaucon is ignorant of justice; he knows it only from what common opinion tells of it. More importantly, he is ignorant of the good. Hence, there is no compelling reason why anyone ought to accept and be bound by Glaucon's conditions, least of all Socrates. Yet Socrates appears to accept the conditions, and his defense will apparently rest on the satisfaction of those terms. The problems modern commentators have with this were discussed in Chapter I. Glaucon's challenge, however, is crucial to the movement of the dialogue, for, premised as it is on common opinion, it has tremendous "implications" which advance the dialogue "beyond what opinion regards." (7) In order to persuade Glaucon "truly", the conditions of Glaucon's challenge "will require that Socrates philosophize." (8)

In essence, Glaucon is "the first participant of the dialogue who turns to nature as his standard." (9) He does this by describing the being of justice in terms of its coming-into-being. Beginning at 358c, Glaucon provides the first ontology of justice, an account of what it is and where it came from. He gives the "social contract" account of justice at 358e-359a. Justice, according to Glaucon, comes into being as a mean between men's desire to be

unjust and their desire to avoid suffering. Justice is the result of the attempt by the many, who are individually weak, to avoid suffering. According to this account, there is nothing inherently choice-worthy about justice itself. Glaucon is aware of the inadequacy of the social compact account of justice, namely, that it has less to do with the nature of justice, and everything to do with fear and cowardice.

In order to illustrate his point, Glaucon tells the story of the ring of Gyges' ancestor. According to this story, all men, by their nature, wish to be unjust; it is only a lack of manly vigour and opportunity that prevents this. If each man had a Gyges' ring, that would soon be obvious.(10) The tale, subtly altered from Herodotus' telling, embodies the deep-seated desire among men to live a life beyond notice, of "invisibility", doing as they please, without getting caught. There is much significance to Glaucon's telling of the story. The manner in which he alters it, as well as its theme, reveal something of Glaucon's character. The primary point of Glaucon's challenge, and of the ring story, is to move the dialogue beyond the realm of opinion, into a realm where dialectic may reveal knowledge. Glaucon's challenge and the manner of its framing establishes the "basic parameters of the body of the Republic."(11)

The form and substance of Glaucon's challenge at the beginning of Book II is important because it determines much of the direction of the remainder of the dialogue. Nonetheless, throughout there are other instances at which Glaucon intervenes or interrupts, and these, while of lesser importance than the above example, still serve to move the action of the dialogue forward at crucial impasses.

Glaucon's next intervention illustrates this. After having framed his challenge, Glaucon's brother Adeimantus breaks in and "stands by" his brother, adding what he thinks is important to the challenge. This intervention was discussed in Chapter II. Socrates is talking with Adeimantus when the enterprise of the founding of the city in speech is begun. The first city is the so-called "healthy" city, also called the "true" city. As said in chapter II, Adeimantus gives no evidence of being in any way displeased by its form. Not so with Glaucon. He is disgusted with what he calls a "city of sows". Why he is disgusted and outraged will be treated later in this chapter. But for now, it is enough to notice that his outrage at the description of the healthy city is essential to the movement of the dialogue. A dialogue about the nature of justice simply cannot end at the healthy city because as is clear from its description, the equilibrium

in the interests of the citizens will never result in injustice, as all of this city's inhabitants are apparently satisfied with their lot, and with what they do, but this is not the same as giving an account of justice. Without the threat of injustice, there does not appear to be any requirement for justice. Recall justice's usefulness for useless things at 333d-e in Book I. Hence, the healthy, "true", first city will be of no use in any attempt to learn the nature of justice. In order to explore and discover more of the dimensions of justice, it is dramatically and logically necessary that the first city be left behind. Glaucon's disgust over it enables this to happen, and the dialogue moves forward.

Glaucon's rebellion and rejection of the healthy city are important because they result in the feverish city. The "feverish" city, brought about because of certain elements in Glaucon's character, enables Socrates to discuss the purging of its injustices. This makes way for the best regime. It appears that the best city cannot exist before the healthy city has been made feverish through the presence of men like Glaucon. The "true" city may be healthy, but it is not best. The feverish city, containing all of the pleasures Glaucon finds essential to civilized existence, must be purged. The necessity for this purgation introduces the "guardians". Socrates raises the

matter of the guardians with Glaucon. But when the matter of their education arises, Adeimantus displaces Glaucon. Nonetheless, the healthy, "true" city has been discarded, and it was not Adeimantus but Glaucon who caused this.

Glaucon's early interruptions are indeed of great significance, and move the dialogue on its way to the ascent of Books V through VII; the dialogue's character, tone, and direction have been largely determined by these. It is important that Glaucon determines the "manner" in which justice is to be discussed, even if it is Socrates who determines that justice will be the topic.⁽¹²⁾ His role is thus more important than that of his brother, or any of Socrates' interlocutors in Book I. Even the primary plot of the Republic, the construction of the city in speech, is caused by Glaucon. For while it is Socrates who proposes that they look for justice in this city, this whole approach was imposed upon him by Glaucon, who had described the nature of justice in terms of its origins, its coming into being; hence, to appear to satisfy Glaucon's challenge, Socrates must also begin by describing justice in terms of coming into being.⁽¹³⁾ It is also significant that Socrates is in conversation with Glaucon twice as often as with Adeimantus. From Book II on, Glaucon and Socrates converse for 154 Stephanus pages,

whereas Adeimantus and Socrates converse for only 77.(14)

While it is important to note that Glaucon has twice the dialogic space as his brother, this does not necessarily determine the importance of his exchanges. The content does. Generally speaking, Glaucon discusses the "more radical and difficult portions of the inquiry, whenever the essential nature of something is being plumbed." (15) For example, while he was silent throughout the discussion of poetry's banishment, he laughingly re-enters the conversation at 398c4, when the topic of music arises. Music, of course, is an essential element in the guardians' education. It is also with Glaucon that Socrates "hesitantly" states the need for a "lie" (414e7). Again, the importance of the "lie" to the best city, and the potentially odious appearance of this subject, ensure that this is one of the more "abstruse" (16) topics of the dialogue, and Glaucon's role as the current respondent is noteworthy. Glaucon is also Socrates' interlocutor when the principle of communism among the guardians is introduced. Glaucon's direct participation at these junctures is important, but more important is the manner in which he reacts to Socrates' proposals. This is related to Glaucon's character, and to the education Glaucon undergoes throughout the dialogue. An understanding of character is central to understanding the Republic, both with regard to Glaucons' role in it, and

to the nature of his education.

III GLAUCON'S CHARACTER

Even though they are both "sons of Ariston", Glaucon's character is vastly different from his brother's. This difference in character determines the difference in roles. Ultimately, the difference of character determines Glaucon as Socrates' primary pedagogic target. So character, then, is obviously of great importance in the dialogue. If Glaucon is the key to understanding the Republic, then character is the key to understanding Glaucon.

Throughout the dialogue, there are frequent references to Glaucon's character. These consist primarily of either observations by Socrates, of inferences from Glaucon's speeches and actions, and even from the timing of his speeches and actions. Consequently, a fairly comprehensive picture of the young man's character can be constructed.

Courage will be considered first. It is one of Glaucon's more prominent features. It has great meaning for the dialogue, as it is his courage which continually moves it into realms of greater philosophical consequence. The first instance, it will be recalled, was at the beginning of Book II, when Socrates acknowledged that "Glaucon is always most courageous in everything". With men like Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, the dialogue had gone as far as it could go to this point.

Glaucon is necessary to move it forward. In all respects, he is more suited to carry on than were the others. Yet, Glaucon's other virtues are in themselves insufficient to accomplish this. Courage above all is necessary to break the impasse and carry the dialogue forward.

It is worth noting that Adeimantus was silent at this point, even though he too is courageous; he too, after all, distinguished himself at Megara (368a). What this then denotes is a qualification of Glaucon's courage. His courage is related to the rest of his stellar character: it is impetuous, daring, and manly. By contrast, it will be recalled from Chapter II that Adeimantus' courage is of a more moderate and restrained variety. This points out a distinction in types of courage, and this is well illustrated by the role of the two brothers in the Republic. Glaucon displays his daring early in the dialogue. Right at the beginning, he answers for Socrates when Polemarchus and his party arrives and asks Socrates to return to Piraeus. A little later, when Thrasymachus demands payment from Socrates for his "teaching", it is again Glaucon who, unbidden, speaks for others, in this instance by promising that he and the rest of the group "shall all contribute for Socrates" (337d10-11). Not only does Glaucon in these instances display impetuosity, he gives some hint of his desire to play a part in politics;

he does not hesitate to speak for others. Glaucon's courage is prominent elsewhere. When Socrates declares that for cities to be free of evil, philosophers must be kings, Glaucon predicts that "very many men" will "run full speed", outraged, in order to do him some form of harm. Nevertheless, even though he has of yet little understanding of what the philosopher or philosophy really are, he promises to come to Socrates' defense (474a9). Finally, courage is not only one of the four cardinal virtues, it is one of the necessary requirements for the philosopher (487a-b).

Glaucon's speeches and actions also display a great deal of intellectual subtlety. This was a characteristic completely lacking in Socrates' interlocutors of the first book. Remember that Thrasymachus was not truly refuted; he was rhetorically outmanoeuvred and reduced to silence. By contrast, Glaucon shows great cleverness in his challenge to Socrates. It was only too obvious that Thrasymachus ardently desired the life of the tyrant, the most unjust life possible. Glaucon too, desiring the best, desires the life of the tyrant, if that means the best life. However, instead of making his desires transparently obvious, he carefully phrases his challenge in the words of "others", the "opinion of the many". His tale of the ring of Gyges' ancestor expresses the tyrannic desire without clearly

pointing that desire to the teller of the tale. The life of the tyrant is desirable because it enables one to take all of the good things in life without being called to account for one's actions. Yet there is no point in openly desiring this life. Glaucon's myth stresses the importance of "invisibility" in the tyrannic life; there is no point in visibly desiring the life of invisibility, as did Thrasymachus. And so Glaucon ensures that his lust for tyranny is not so obvious. He accomplishes this through the myth and by appealing to the opinion of the many; for example: ". . . as the men who make this kind of an argument will say". Or, better still: ". . . don't suppose it is I who speak, Socrates, but rather those who praise injustice ahead of justice" (361d). Also of note: Glaucon takes the image of Thrasymachus' "perfect" craftsman in order to illustrate his point about "real men" pursuing injustice, only Glaucon uses the image with more finesse and greater sensitivity to its implications (360e-361a). Through speech such as this, Glaucon reveals himself as a great deal more subtle and more intelligent, and hence more dangerous, than Thrasymachus.(17)

The ring story shows something else. It shows that Glaucon is truly interested in being persuaded by Socrates that justice is preferable on its own merits to injustice. Desiring the best, he will not desire to be a tyrant if the

tyrant's life is shown to be the worst possible. Socrates, of course, is not unaware of this, and plans for it in his treatment of Glaucon throughout the dialogue.

Finally, after courage, daring, manliness, and intelligence, Glaucon's most crucial characteristic remains to be discussed. The one feature he has that sets him apart most from his brother and the rest of the party assembled is his eros. Glaucon is indeed the erotic man.(18) His many powerful desires are the compass of his soul. Powerful as they are, they threaten to take command of it. Considering his many other talents and features, Glaucon's eros poses a serious threat, both to himself and to his city.(19) He stands in serious need of education if he is to be saved. Nonetheless, while eros is dangerous, it is also present in the best souls; part of the teaching of the Republic is that eros is not in need of suppression but of education in order that the soul be its best. Eros is ultimately found in the soul of the philosopher, but instead of competing for worthless and perishable earthly honours, the philosopher's eros is directed towards the transcendent good. Glaucon's education must eventually entail the moderation of his eros; his love of beautiful things must learn to see the good in the beautiful, or the beauty of the good.

IV TYRANNY AND PHILOSOPHY

One of the major themes of the Republic is the relationship between tyranny and philosophy. Ultimately, this relationship is in turn related to the primary question of the Republic, namely, how should one live one's life. For tyranny and philosophy represent the two great alternatives, and the question of whether a life of justice and injustice is better is answered by reflecting on the nature of tyranny and philosophy. The dialogue's prelude ended and the major investigation into this began when Glaucon took up Thrasymachus' defeated argument and demanded that Socrates truly defend justice. That was crucial because of all of the characters assembled at Cephalus' house in Piraeus that night, Glaucon is the most suited to tyranny and philosophy. Glaucon, who erotically desires the best, challenges Socrates to persuade him that the just life is best, and the just man is happiest. If Socrates fails, then why should not Glaucon turn his talents and gifts to tyranny, the life which would best promise to fulfill his manifold erotic desires? Hence, the bulk of the Republic consists of Socrates' attempt to educate Glaucon, to turn him away from tyranny. To accomplish this, it is necessary for Socrates to show Glaucon, the "clear-eyed", a vision of a life more beautiful than tyranny, while at the same time to show him that

tyranny is the ugliest life possible. Socrates does this by showing Glaucon the lives that the philosopher and the tyrant live.

In Book I, it will be recalled that Thrasymachus introduces the notion of tyranny, claiming that it is the happiest life to lead. As early as here, Glaucon claims that he is not persuaded by Thrasymachus; he believes that the just life is "more profitable", and he is "not persuaded" by the list of goods that Thrasymachus attaches to the unjust man's life. This may appear to be Glaucon's repudiation of tyranny. However, it would be a mistake to take his early repudiation of tyranny at face value, given both his character and his manifest ignorance of justice and injustice. His erotic character impels him towards beautiful things, especially those beautiful things as known through sight. Perhaps the just man's life appears more beautiful. Or, on the other hand, perhaps the unjust man's life is more beautiful, and Glaucon is attracted to it. In that case, Glaucon would realize that it would be imprudent to reveal such desires. Socrates, watching Glaucon carefully, sees this.

It is necessary to return to Glaucon's challenge at the beginning of Book II. There, Glaucon described the ontology of justice in terms of its coming-into-being; Glaucon's challenge and the manner in which it is framed

reveals not only something of his character: it reveals his tyrannic impulses. The social contract account of justice, given by Glaucon, is fallacious because neither Glaucon nor anyone else for that matter actually knows where justice came from. Secondly, this account of justice is nonetheless popular with men like Glaucon because through it one exercises tyrannical ambition. One satisfies, to an extent, the lust for dominance, because one creates imaginary realms, which is almost as good as dominating real ones. One who, like Glaucon, indulges in these fantasies reveals something in their souls that the bulk of men lack: an intensely erotic impulse that may lead to tyranny.

Glaucon's account of justice also reveals both his manliness, earlier described, and his perceptivity. The "clear-eyed" one can see that if his account of justice is correct, then it is absolutely foolish for a "real man" to be bound by convention and opinion. One ought to use all of one's talents and skills, and acquire, through the skillful use of Thrasymachus' rhetorical art, which is like the Ring of Gyges, as much of the apparently good things in life, such as wealth, honour, sex, and political power as one can. The best vehicle for attaining this is, of course, tyranny. To repeat: Glaucon has a highly erotic character; he desires the best and most beautiful things of

life. The apparently best way of accomplishing this is through the life of the tyrant. But the life of the tyrant is the most unjust life there is. But if justice is merely conventional, then why be stopped by it? So then, the nature and purpose of Glaucon's challenge at the beginning of Book II is apparent. If Socrates cannot "truly persuade" him that justice is in itself better than injustice, then Glaucon has no good reason not to pursue the life of the tyrant. His talents and circumstances make him a likely candidate for this.

Glaucon fully realizes the inadequacy of the social contract account of justice, namely that it has little to do with "justice", and everything to do with fear and cowardice. As is obvious from the dialogue itself, Glaucon is anything but fearful or cowardly. It is fear alone that prevents the vast bulk of men from satisfying their true loves and desires; "real men" will not be prevented from satisfying their desires and loves by mere social compacts. To do so would be "madness". In his account of the social contract, Hobbes recognized this, and sought to counter it by making sane the insanity of "real men". Put another way, Hobbes sought to eliminate the character of the "real man". Socrates' educational strategy will not attempt to solve the "problem" of Glaucon by destroying his eros, as Hobbes would do; rather, Socrates will try to show Glaucon

that it is madness to be a tyrant, and that his erotic nature will be best satisfied otherwise. In short, Socrates' pedagogical effort takes full account of Glaucon's nature; it does not try to alter it.

Since it is apparent that Glaucon will not be deterred from attaining his desires by imaginary social contracts, he must be restrained in such a manner that takes full account of his erotic nature. Glaucon must be truly persuaded that justice is a good thing, desirable, by all real men, both for itself and for its consequences. To be accepted by Glaucon, true justice must be something more than merely an agreement among the cowardly, or at least unprideful, many. And Socrates will, in the course of the Republic, show Glaucon glimpses of a justice he can accept without altering his nature.

Socrates undertakes this task in a novel way. Since he is fully aware of the natures of his interlocutors, in this case Glaucon, he tailors his speech accordingly. He arouses Glaucon's taste for glory and manly honours by engaging him and his brother in the enterprise of founding a city in speech, ostensibly to find in it true justice. In so doing, he appeals to the tyrannic impulse in Glaucon's heart. The honour due a city's founder is greater by far than that due a tyrant who arrives in an already founded city.(20)

Socrates' strategy has other intentions and consequences. In Book I, the exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus was characterized by antagonism: the sophist and the philosopher were engaged in a contest in which there was a victor and a vanquished. Hence, there was no question of Socrates and Thrasymachus co-operating in a search for the truth of the meaning of justice. The result of their contest was Glaucon's provocation; no answer to the question of justice was determined. In order for some progress to be made on this, and in order for Glaucon to receive his education, the Republic must from this point on avoid eristic contest. The dialogue must proceed in a spirit of co-operation.(21) Both Glaucon and his brother must become Socrates' helpers. Socrates secures this friendly alliance with Glaucon and Adeimantus by securing their help in constructing a best regime in speech, for, Socrates claims, it is only through this that they will be able to answer the challenge.

One thing cannot be overemphasized. The purpose of this exercise is not to build an ideal community in this world. Reading Plato's Republic as Plato's proposal for a perfect political regime is responsible for the most grievous errors in the dialogue's interpretation; to read it thus, the dialogue's meaning and intent is darkened entirely. The Republic's text abounds with evidence that

the whole exercise of building the city in speech is not intended to be made actual. Rather, it is an element in Glaucon's and Adeimantus' (but especially Glaucon's) education. Socrates, the master of political speech, that is, speech that takes full account of the character of those who are spoken to, judges well Glaucon's character.(22) He knows which types of speech will persuade Glaucon, and which will not. The purpose of the dialogue, in large measure, is to moderate Glaucon's political ambition, to save him and his city from the fate of the tyrant. But what better way of gaining the full attention of a young, ambitious, potential tyrant, than to "play" a game of founding a city with him? In so doing, Socrates indirectly persuades Glaucon to see politics as a life of service to the city, with little reward in itself, rather than the opportunity for selfish gain, the way Glaucon has been presently led to view it, by such men as Thrasymachus.

From the founding of the city, Glaucon is enthralled. He and his brother no longer see their dialogic relation with Socrates as antagonistic. More importantly, Glaucon learns moderation through his participation in the city's founding. Two things should be noted and compared: the ostensible purpose of returning to Polemarchus' house in Piraeus was to have a banquet of food and, later, sights; secondly, Glaucon is a lover of fancy food. Recall his

rebellion at the poor fare in the "healthy" city. Yet, as is apparent from a careful consideration of the dialogue's action, the promised banquet never appears, nor does Glaucon, the lover of fancy food, seem to notice. Hence, the dialogue itself is an exercise in moderation,(23) and an element in Glaucon's education. Glaucon, the man who repudiated one city, a "healthy" city at that, simply for its boring food alone, must do without any sort of food in his effort at building the best city and finding justice.

These remarks do not exhaust the topic of food and philosophy. Glaucon was silent while Socrates discussed moderation with the moderate Adeimantus. He continued to remain silent when, from 398d8-390d1, they agreed to expunge references to food and sex from poetry (the promised dinner still having failed to materialize, one wonders what Glaucon's thoughts are at this point). At 399e6-7, Glaucon having returned as Socrates' interlocutor, Socrates declares the luxurious city purged once again, with superfluous music and music instruments having been eliminated, and Glaucon agrees, saying that "that's a sign of our moderation" (399e8). Glaucon takes great delight in music, and considers himself to be knowledgeable in musical matters. His agreement to its purging is highly significant. An even more significant event occurs only a little later, from 404c6-404e2. Socrates secures Glaucon's agree-

ment that "sweets", a "Syracusan table and Sicilian refinement at cooking", and the "reputed joys of Attic cakes" must all go by the wayside. The same Glaucon that rebelled at the absence of "relishes" in the "healthy" city had already learned to moderate his bodily eros.

Socrates' educational strategy towards Glaucon proceeds by making Glaucon see the beauty of moderation. Glaucon is a lover of beauty, and particularly beautiful sights. Glaucon will come to love moderation, and become moderate, if he can be convinced that moderation is beautiful. Moreover, proof of Glaucon's moderation is most telling if it is indirect. Instead of merely saying that he is moderate, Glaucon indicates a truly moderate disposition through moderate behaviour in the dialogue, and by failing to rebel at austerity, as he did in Book II at the "healthy" city. An example of this was his agreement that the purged city, without the very things he demanded in the "healthy" city, is good. He agrees to this because he has been persuaded that the city they are discussing is "best", and the "best" city is his city. Hence, Glaucon will agree to whatever is necessary to the best city. His love of beauty, and desire for the best takes precedence over his love of fine and sumptuous table fare.

An even better example of Glaucon's increasing moderation occurs at 430d6-430d8. Socrates here apparently tests

him. They are looking for the two remaining cardinal virtues, justice and moderation, in the city. Since they have already found courage and prudence, then if they find justice, they will not need to look for moderation. So Socrates asks Glaucon if they should dispense with moderation. Glaucon rebels. He insists that they wait for justice and treat first of moderation ("if you want to gratify me, consider this before the other"). Recall that the whole exercise, beginning with Glaucon's challenge, through the founding of the city, was conducted with the express purpose of finding justice, so that it could be determined whether justice or injustice is superior. Moreover, it was mutually agreed that this was a gravely important task. Yet Glaucon will now forego hearing about justice, in order that moderation be considered first. Only a few lines earlier in the dialogue, Glaucon was indignant when it looked as if Socrates was going to shirk altogether his promise to defend justice (427d7). In any case, Socrates agrees, saying that it would be an "injustice" to discuss justice before moderation, and thereby gives Glaucon some hint as to the nature of justice and its relation to moderation (430e1).

Thrasymachus' speech in Book I had outlined a perennial political problem, namely the question of whether rulers ruled for their own benefit or that of their subjects.

Thrasymachus was of the mind that the former was true; and that only simpletons like Socrates believed the latter. Nevertheless, there is little to fear directly from men such as Thrasymachus, for the stuff of the tyrant is not in them. Not so with men like Glaucon. Glaucon's political ambition is clearly connected with his great, erotic desires. If Thrasymachus' claim is true, then the best opportunity for gratification of erotic desires lies in rule. Through the course of the dialogue, Glaucon comes to see for himself that Thrasymachus is wrong.

Glaucon is able to see clearly that the ruler rules for his subjects' and not his own benefit through the exercise of founding the city in speech. Thrasymachus had likened the ruler to the shepherd who cares for his flock in order to make them fit to feast on. At 440d4-6, Glaucon in turn likens the spirited part of the soul to sheep-dogs "obedient to the rulers, who are like shepherds of a city". This must be compared with 345b-e, and again with Thrasymachus' introduction of the metaphor. In Glaucon's mind, no longer do rulers exist only to prey upon their flock for their own benefit; they exist rather to tend the flock. A little later, at 445a5, Glaucon, who apparently has his original challenge satisfied, gives further evidence of a continuing maturity. He can now see that one who pursues the dream of doing whatever one likes to

whomever one likes, without suffering consequences, is necessarily impossible ("ridiculous"). For, in so doing, one harms the very constitution of one's being, necessary to true happiness.

Glaucon's challenge to Socrates was prompted by the question of whether justice or injustice is more profitable. Common opinion holds that injustice is more profitable, which leads to the conclusion that the man who practices the greatest injustice and gets away with it, the tyrant, is necessarily the happiest man. In order truly to persuade Glaucon that such is not the case, Socrates must prove both that the tyrant is actually the most wretched man possible, and that another man, the philosopher, is happiest. Since Glaucon desires beautiful things, especially those beautiful things known through sight, Socrates' strategy is to convince Glaucon that the philosopher's life is the most beautiful, and the tyrant's the ugliest. This involves a comparison between the philosopher and the tyrant.

A major teaching of the dialogue is that the natures of the philosopher and tyrant are most similar. Or, put another way, the nature most capable of being a tyrant is also capable of being a philosopher. "No little nature ever does anything great either to private man or city" (495b5-6). In order to understand the Republic, it must be

understood that the character of the philosopher is the foil to the character of the tyrant. The best natures are the ones most suited to the life of philosophy, but the best natures suffer greatest when corrupted, much more than small natures.

Glaucon is so important to the Republic because he has a great nature. But just as Glaucon is possibly suited to the best life, so is he suited to the worst life, tyranny, if he were denied the proper education. With Glaucon Socrates discusses the nature of the tyrant, because he, of all the company assembled, next to Socrates himself, is most capable of being a tyrant. As Socrates and Adeimantus discuss the tyrannic regime, Glaucon interrupts, at 576b9, to "[take] over the argument", when the discussion is about to turn to the tyrant himself.

Glaucon's interruption at 576b9 is highly significant, for the conversation now turns to the happiness of the tyrant. Socrates' defense of justice, which led from the construction of the city in speech to an analysis of the soul's constitution, was provoked by Glaucon's challenge to determine the happiest man, the just man or the unjust man. Now that they are to discuss the wretchedness of the tyrant, Glaucon, displacing his brother, must resume his place as Socrates' prime interlocutor. But rather than simply be told what the best life is, Glaucon chooses for

himself. For his part, he chooses the life of the tyrant as the worst and most wretched. The revelations of dialectic themselves persuaded Glaucon; he could see them for himself (580a-d).

The relationship between tyranny and philosophy hinges on eros. The problematic nature of eros had already been foreshadowed in Book I with Cephalus' story of Sophocles and sex. Sexual desire is only one aspect of eros, and like sex, eros can be a "mad master." Both the tyrant's nature and the philosopher's nature are characterized by great erotic striving. However, there is a chasm separating the objects of their desires. This is the crux. The tyrant desires those pleasures that pertain to the body; the philosopher, those that pertain to the soul. Glaucon appears to be moved by the demands of his body; his rebellion against the "healthy" city was seemingly motivated by his disgust at its food. However, what really outraged him was the lack of opportunities for virtue and excellence, both of which can only be exercised when evil impulses have to be fought and defeated.(24) Glaucon stands astride the tyrant and the philosopher, and he may be tipped either way, depending on what he learns from the dialogue. Early in the dialogue, he "is characterized by the fact that he cannot distinguish between his desire for dinner and his desire for virtue."(25) In addition to his

desire for dinner, Glaucon also has an appetite for sex, as evidenced by his remarks throughout the dialogue. In short, Glaucon feels the strong pull of his erotic desires, which as of yet pull him in the direction of bodily fulfillment. This characterizes the soul of the tyrant.

Socrates succeeds in persuading Glaucon of the superiority of the philosopher's life by convincing him of the superiority of the philosopher's pleasures. At the same time, he convinces Glaucon of the supreme misery of the tyrant. Socrates recognizes and takes full account of Glaucon's love of beauty. When, at 506d, Socrates asks Adeimantus whether he wants to see "ugly things, blind and crooked, when it's possible to hear bright and fair ones from others?", Glaucon interrupts passionately: "No, in the name of Zeus, Socrates . . . you're not going to withdraw when you are, as it were, at the end. It will satisfy us even if you go through the good just as you went through justice, moderation, and the rest." So Socrates discusses with Glaucon the "idea" of the good. It is the "cause of all that is right and fair in everything" (517b-c). Glaucon, of course is erotically drawn to the idea of the good. But only philosophers have any idea what the good is, and how one may gain a vision of it.

The effect of discussing the good with Glaucon, fully intended by Socrates, is to turn him away from the life of

politics, or at least to turn him away from desiring that life for its own sake. If Glaucon agrees with Socrates, as he does, then he can no longer see the life of rule as the best life. He should come to see the life of politics and rule as burdensome, something that is necessary for the good of the city, but that otherwise prevents one from engaging in philosophy, the most truly erotic pleasure of all. This is precisely what happens. When Socrates describes to Glaucon the allegory of the cave, and tells him that it is necessary to compel the philosophers to descend back to the cave, from out of the sunlight above, in order to guide the city's affairs, Glaucon is surprised and dismayed at the "injustice" of this (519d). He considers this an injustice because he believes that the philosophers are being compelled to return to a worse life in the life of rule. Glaucon, who wants only the very best for himself, now sees that best lying in the life of philosophy, of gazing upon the idea of the good. The life of politics, to which his erotic ambition previously attracted him, is now a distant second-best, something one does for the good and happiness of the whole city, but not for one's own pleasure. Politics is drudgery.

So much for the happiness of philosophers. The other element in Socrates' educational strategy is to convince Glaucon of the misery of the tyrant. While Adeimantus and

Socrates discuss the tyrannic regime, Glaucon is silent. When the topic turns to the tyrannic man, Glaucon interrupts (576b9). He must be directly convinced that the tyrant is the most unhappy man. Socrates proves this by both convincing Glaucon that the tyrant cannot satisfy his desires, and that the tyrant's life is least pleasant.(26) So the tyrant, from having the most enviable life, turns out to have the most pitiful life. The tyrant is erotic; he has manifold and powerful desires; yet Socrates claims that he is unable to satisfy these desires because of his tyrannical position. The tyrant is "bound in . . . a prison" (579b); his soul is "full of confusion and regret" (577e), and "least do[es] what it wants" (577e). To those who know "how to look at a soul as a whole", the tyrant is "in truth a real slave to the greatest fawning and slavery, and a flatterer of the most worthless men; and with his desires getting no kind of satisfaction, he shows that he is most in need of the most things and poor in truth" (577d-e).

At the end of Book IX, Glaucon has his original challenge satisfied (even if it was necessarily modified through the dialogue). He agrees that the life of the just man is preferable to that of the unjust. He agrees because he has been shown, and believes he has clearly seen, the structure of the soul. On that basis, he believes that a

man is made worse for having injustice in his soul, because it makes the soul worse, and better for having justice, because it makes the soul better. The city he and Socrates founded in speech is a paradigm, not for real cities, but for the soul. At the end of Book IX, Glaucon's lesson in moderation is nearly complete. He at least now agrees that a man with his soul in the right order, with the worse parts ruled by the better, "won't be willing to mind the political things" (592a-b). Glaucon no longer has quite the same political ambitions, for if he wants what is best, as his erotic nature demands, then he will desire the just life, minding one's own affairs and soul in preference to the political life. He is now an enthusiastic "auxiliary" to justice and virtue.

Glaucon's direct participation in the Republic ends with the reply to his original challenge, framed at the beginning of Book II. He accepts that it is best for the soul to be just and to practice just things, whether other men notice it or not (612b). But further, Socrates secures Glaucon's agreement to the proposition that all of the worldly rewards that were supposed to go to the unjust man who seems just will in fact go to the just man, just as the punishments that were to be the lot of the just man who seemed unjust, will instead go to the unjust man. The point to be remembered here is not that Socrates' "logic"

is compelling and necessary; what is important is that Glaucon believes him. Glaucon wants what is best. At the beginning of the dialogue, it seemed to him that the best things for the best men were best obtained through public office. His poetic challenge at the beginning of Book II revealed his suspicion that the best of all could be best obtained through injustice, even while he was open to persuasion that the opposite was true. Now, after the educative efforts of Socrates, extending through the whole of the dialogue, the erotic Glaucon believes that the best is only to be had through justice and virtue, that justice and virtue are the best. However, in addition, Socrates persuades him that the just man can also expect concrete rewards as well, such as honour, ruling office, wealth, and marriage to whomever he wants. This is extremely important to erotic young men like Glaucon, who will not likely be persuaded to follow justice and virtue if that road is completely devoid of the above goods.

V CONCLUSION

Socrates's educational efforts were directed primarily to Glaucon because he has the nature most likely to be tempted by tyranny, and at the same time, he is most suited to being a candidate for philosopher. Glaucon's role in the dialogue is such that he was Socrates' prime interlocutor at all of the most difficult and interesting junctures.

His character suits him for this, and it is also responsible for moving the dialogue forward at the most crucial impasses. Moreover, Glaucon is mostly responsible for the eventual introduction of philosophy, as his challenge to Socrates in Book II necessitates philosophy in order to be resolved. His noble soul, at the same time it was tempted by tyranny, is conscious of the moral and political decay of Athens; his challenge is both a challenge and an act of resistance. His appeal to Socrates was answered, and Socrates persuaded Glaucon that the tyrant's life was the worst. However, he had to have been open to persuasion; it was this same erotic nature that stamped him for a potential tyrant that also ensured he would be open to Socrates' very politic persuasion. Glaucon may not ultimately be suited to being a philosopher, but he ends up a friend to philosophy, having turned his back on tyranny and injustice, realizing that he cannot obtain his good through them. Glaucon, said Strauss, "will remember for the rest of his days and perhaps transmit to others the many grand and perplexing sights which Socrates has conjured for his benefit in that memorable night in the Piraeus."(27)

-
- (1) Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato, translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 412.
 - (2) Leo Strauss, The City And Man, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Ltd, 1964), p. 65
 - (3) Bloom, Ibid., p. 339.
 - (4) Strauss, Ibid., p. 85.
 - (5) Kent F. Moors, Glaucon And Adeimantus On Justice (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, Inc, 1981), p. 4.
 - (6) Ibid.
 - (7) Ibid., p. 10.
 - (8) Ibid., p. 9.
 - (9) Bloom, Ibid., p. 340.
 - (10) Leon Craig, An Introduction To Plato's Republic (unpublished manuscript), p. 149.
 - (11) Moors, Ibid., p. 15.
 - (12) Strauss, Ibid., p. 85.
 - (13) Ibid., p. 91.
 - (14) Craig, Ibid., p. 29.
 - (15) Leon Craig, "The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic" (Paper presented to The Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, June 6-8, 1986), p. 25.
 - (16) Craig, An Introduction To Plato's Republic, p. 26.
 - (17) Bloom, Ibid., p. 345.
 - (18) Ibid.
 - (19) Ibid.
 - (20) Strauss, Ibid., p. 93.

- (21) Craig, An Introduction To Plato's Republic, p. 39.
- (22) Strauss, Ibid., p. 51.
- (23) Strauss, Ibid., p. 64.
- (24) Strauss, Ibid., p. 95.
- (25) Ibid.
- (26) Bloom, Ibid., p. 424.
- (27) Strauss, Ibid., p. 137.

CHAPTER IV

The Republic is a "saving tale". Glaucon and Adeimantus have their cry for help and guidance answered by Socrates, and they are shown a "pattern" of order that supersedes the decayed one of the city. In order to recognize the Republic as a "saving tale" one must see the drama of the dialogue; in order to do that, the drama of the dialogue must take place in one's own soul. The reader must imaginatively put himself in the places of Glaucon and Adeimantus, and experience the pathos of their situation in the context of the dialogue. That is, he must understand the dramatic significance of their need for an education, and see their appeal to Socrates as an acknowledgement of that need. Knowing that the brothers are in need of help and education, knowing something of their character, it is clear why the question of to whom Socrates dedicates his primary educational efforts, Glaucon or Adeimantus, is important.

Throughout this thesis, the primary theme has been that the Republic as a dialogue is radically different from a philosophical treatise. It has a particular form which must be apprehended before its meaning can be determined. As argued in chapter I, the failure to appreciate that form has been the primary reason for the dismal interpretive

efforts of most modern commentators of the Republic. The dialogue form is unlike a treatise in that its author, Plato, chose not to speak in his own voice. Instead, he spoke through the mouths of characters in a dramatic setting. If the dramatic nature of the dialogue is ignored, if instead the dialogue is read as a treatise, with the consequent assumption, untested and unjustified, that Plato's point of view, and more importantly his "doctrine," can be easily recognized, then the inevitable result is a failure to recognize and experience dialogue's dramatic tension.

To that end, it was necessary to relate Socrates' educational efforts in some detail. The answer to the question of who is his primary target is the key to understanding the rest of the dialogue. When due consideration is given to the two brothers' characters, and then to the speech that Socrates tailors to them both, much of the Republic's dramatic tension is made intelligible. Or, put another way, the dramatic tension of the Republic casts light on the tension between the philosopher and the city, which is apparently the dialogue's true theme.

A summary of the results so far attained is in order. A careful reading of the dialogue reveals that the question of to whom Socrates primarily directs his educational efforts is valid, and that Glaucon is the answer to that

question. It will be recalled that the primary elements of Glaucon's character were thymos and eros. Being both spirited and erotic, Glaucon is suited to great things, and he knows it. And the greatest thing regarded by the people of his city is tyranny. Sophists, poets, and Athenian demos all agree: if one is to be happiest, one must live a life of the greatest injustice, and the tyrant is considered to represent that life in its fullest. While the nobility of his upbringing enables him to sense the derangement of current opinion, resulting in an active resistance to it, there is no question that Glaucon is nevertheless tempted by this vision. His powerful eros draws him to the best, and if the life of the tyrant is the best, then he will pursue it. His talents ensure that he will be more effective at pursuing tyranny than the somewhat clumsy Thrasymachus. It is vividly clear that Glaucon represents a danger both to himself and to his city.

Glaucon's need of an education is apparent. The content of that education was primarily moderation. The characteristic that Glaucon lacks is moderation, and if education is the providing for need, then Glaucon is taught moderation. However, teaching moderation is not like teaching arithmetic; it does not consist of pouring in knowledge, as one would pour water into a vessel. In order

for Glaucon to become moderate, he must desire moderation; this is much the same as saying that Glaucon must see that moderation is desirable. Socrates' educational strategy takes full account of this need.

Essentially, as described in the last chapter, Socrates convinced Glaucon of the desirability of moderation by showing that it leads to the best life, namely philosophy. Conversely, Socrates showed that the life of perfect immoderation, the tyrant's life, is perfectly miserable. To be a tyrant is the worst fate that could befall anyone, Glaucon sees, and so he turns his back on tyranny. As Strauss pointed out, Socrates modified Glaucon's original challenge, proving not that justice is the best life, but that one cannot be happy without justice.⁽¹⁾ Throughout the dialogue, there is ample proof that Glaucon is persuaded of all this. He may not comprehend the full import of Socrates' words, but his erotic striving ceases to be tempted by injustice and tyranny. He now sees politics as drudgery, something entered for the sake of one's city, but not intrinsically desirable.

It is obvious that Adeimantus was not Socrates' primary pedagogic object. While he is noble like his brother, and is talented, and even politically ambitious to some extent, he is not his brother. He is courageous, but

not erotic; he is austere. He lacks the manifold desires that characterize his brother. Adeimantus desires order and ease, and he is not subject to an erotic striving for the best. If the best involves great difficulties and challenges, then he will not pursue it. He, unlike his brother, recognizes that the life of the tyrant involves great difficulties. As a result, he does not seriously desire to be a tyrant, and so he does not represent the danger Glaucon does. There is no urgency to his education.

Nevertheless, Adeimantus is still important to the action of the Republic, as was argued in chapter II. He fulfills two essential dialogic roles: he is the mediator between philosophy and the city, and he is Socrates' helper in the task of educating Glaucon. To summarize the former first, it will be recalled that the relationship between philosophy and the city is ambiguous, if not actually hostile. That much was outlined in the Republic's opening scene. Adeimantus' mediatory role was symbolized by his resolution of the tension caused by Socrates' and Glaucon's encounter with Polemarchus and his party. Adeimantus mediates between the many of the city and the philosopher. He represents the nobles of the city who are both bound to the city, and who yet see themselves standing apart from the multitude of the city. These men are not philosophers, nor do they understand philosophy. They may be hostile to

philosophy, yet they may also be persuaded to tolerate it. They are necessary to philosophy's acceptance in the city, for they are the link between it and the demos of the city. Therefore it is necessary for the philosopher to persuade such men that philosophy is either useful to them, or at least that it poses no danger to them. Adeimantus symbolizes this role; he does not understand most of what Socrates is talking about. Throughout the dialogue, he stands as Socrates' accuser. But, through careful and prudent speech, Socrates is able to win Adeimantus as an ally. By the dialogue's end, Adeimantus becomes a defender of philosophy, even if he does not fully understand what it is.

Adeimantus' part in his brother's education is as important as his mediatory role. We have already spoken of the primary theme of Glaucon's education: moderation. His powerful eros threatens both himself and his city. Adeimantus, on the other hand, is no such threat because of his austerity. Austerity is not moderation. Moderation is the virtue that arises when one must exercise prudent restraint in the area of desire. Naturally, the lack of desire obviates the need for the restraint of desire; Adeimantus is not moderate because he has no desires to temper. But, austerity can be difficult to distinguish from moderation, and the austere Adeimantus is approving of

moderation throughout the dialogue. This is noted by Socrates, who uses Adeimantus to introduce the topic of moderation to the dialogue, and, in the person of Adeimantus, to show Glaucon an ikon of moderation. Socrates is able to convince the erotic Glaucon that moderation is necessary to lead the best life.

The Republic is an education; it is the education of Glaucon. A close reading of the action, with careful attention to its drama, reveals this. However, it is worthwhile to discourse on the philosophical significance of Glaucon's education. It is one thing to recognize that the dialogue represents the education of a noble young Athenian; it is another to see how it relates to the practice of philosophy. At this juncture, it is important to recall the remarks made in chapter I in regard to the relation, or lack of one, between philosophy and the dissemination of doctrine. There is no compelling reason to identify philosophy with doctrine, and to look in the Republic for Plato's "doctrine" is to miss its whole point. Close attention to the dramatic significance of Glaucon's education makes this most clear.

Moderation, eros, justice, injustice, sophistry, philosophy, the city, man, and rule, are all integral themes of the Republic. Rather than simply write a treatise on these topics and their relation to each other, Plato wrote

a dialogue peopled with characters such as Adeimantus, Glaucon, Socrates, and the others. Through their dramatic interchange, the significance and meaning of these topics are introduced and explicated. The drama of the dialogue is Plato's written account of the drama that took place within his own soul; he experienced the aporia of Athen's decline and decay; from this major political crisis was born philosophy. The dialogue of the Republic is his account of the practice of philosophy and its relation to the city. Here, Socrates is compelled to remain in the city and give an account, or, more accurately, an apology for philosophy.

It has been a consistent and underlying theme throughout this thesis that philosophy and the dialogue form are intimately related. To fully participate in the dialogue's drama is to partake, in at least some measure, in philosophy. Understandably, this is a conception of philosophy radically different from the conventional understanding.

In the first chapter, a brief description, buttressed by some typical examples, of common errors committed in the interpretation of the Republic were given. Among its modern liberal critics, no aspect is regarded with more distaste than the city that Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus construct. Undeniably, if this city's description is taken at face value, it does look to be a blueprint

for a modern totalitarian state. But we know enough not to take any incident, episode, or speech in the Republic at its face value. The Republic is no more a plan for the perfect pragmatic political community than it is a dissemination of "doctrine". Perfect proof of this is present in the dialogue itself. The city in speech is Socrates' educational device. Through it, he moderates the political ambitions of a very ambitious and talented Athenian youth. Glaucon and Adeimantus may, in the context of the dialogue, actually believe that the city is possible. But throughout the dialogue, Socrates reminds them that they are only "playing".

Play is important to philosophy as a whole, and to the Republic in particular. This is apparent when the close relationship between play and education is considered. The whole of the dialogue is an education. It is also play: "Indeed, the whole of the Republic is play, from the opening scene where Socrates is about to return from the Piraeus to Athens but is pounced upon by Polemarchus and his friends, right to the closing myth of Er." (2) In Greek, the words for "child," "to play," and "education," are all similar. (3) Playing and education are thus not easily separable. The whole of the Republic testifies to this. Socrates' game with the two youths is at the same time their education. Further, Socrates' devotion to

philosophy is a form of play; there is no reason to identify philosophy, or Socrates, with seriousness devoid of play. As Ardley points out well, philosophy is meaningless if it is not understood as a form of serious play.(4)

All of this leads to one conclusion. To participate in the drama of the Republic is to engage in a profound form of play. One must be aware of its full significance as a dialogue, peopled with characters such as Glaucon and Adeimantus. Declaiming doctrinal formulas is hardly appropriate to its atmosphere (and here it is worthwhile to remember that the Republic's setting is festive). Therefore, it is imprudent, if not actually foolish, to see them presented in the speeches the characters make. Rather, by seeing the element of play in this dialogue, quite clearly and admirably conveyed in the whole enterprise of founding the city in speech, one is benefited by the education represented by the Republic. To play in this sense is to be educated. Glaucon's education becomes our education.

-
- (1) Leo Strauss, The City And Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 107.
 - (2) Gavin Ardley, "The Role Of Play In The Philosophy Of Plato," Philosophy, XLII (July, 1967), 236.
 - (3) Pais, paizo, and paideia, respectively.
 - (4) Ardley, "The Role Of Play In The Philosophy Of Plato". Ardley's whole article is devoted to a treatment of this theme. In the absence of an ability to discern this in the Republic, this article is essential to understanding it, as well as to understanding philosophy. It is also necessary to understand the problem modern commentators have in interpreting the Republic: they are too serious. A reading of Popper's very serious criticism of Plato, in the Open Society And Its Enemies, vol. 1, well illustrates this problem.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The sources consulted for this thesis fall into two main categories: those that were of some use, and those that were not. Only very few sources were of use; most were not, for reasons discussed in the first and last chapters. This characterization may be a little misleading, however. The vast majority of sources may have had little bearing on the topic, but they were useful in illustrating a common problem in modern Plato and Republic scholarship. In a sense, therefore, they were important to the thesis. But they contributed little to an understanding of dialogue form, and had even less to say about the education of Glaucon. Thus, it is necessary to divide the Bibliography into two parts: Part I consists of the works that had a direct influence on the thesis, while Part II consists of the rest.

PART I

Ardley, Gavin. "The Role Of Play In The Philosophy Of Plato." Philosophy, XLII (July, 1967), 226-244.

Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato. With Notes and an Interpretive Essay. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

Craig, Leon. An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Unpublished manuscript.

-----". "The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic." Paper presented to The Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, June 6-8, 1986.

-----". "Prologue: On Reading a Platonic Dialogue." Unpublished manuscript.

Friedlander, Paul. Plato. Volumes I & 3. Translated by Hans Meyerhoff. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.

Koyré, Alexandre. Discovering Plato. Translated by Leonora Cohen Rosenfeld. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

Moors, K.F. Glaucon And Adeimantus On Justice. Washington D.C.: University Press of America, Inc, 1981.

-----". "Plato's Use of Dialogue." Classical World, 72 (1978), 77-93.

Sinaiko, Herman L. Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus, Republic, Parmenides. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Strauss, Leo. The City And Man. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Voegelin, Eric. Order And History. Vol. III: Plato And Aristotle. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957.

Wilson, John F. The Politics of Moderation: An Interpretation of Plato's Republic. New York: University Press of America, 1984.

PART II

Annas, Julia. An Introduction To Plato's Republic. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

-----". "Plato and Common Morality." Classical Quarterly, New Series, XXVIII (1978), 435-451.

Bambrough, Renford, ed. Plato, Popper, and Politics. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Limited, 1967.

- Bertman, Martin A. "Plato On Tryanny, Philosophy, And Pleasure." Apeiron, XIX (No.2, 1985), 152-160.
- Bluck, R.S. "Plato's 'Ideal State'." Classical Quarterly, New Series, IX (1959), 166-168.
- Boyd, William. Plato's Republic For Today. London: Heinemann, 1962.
- Brickhouse, Thomas C. "The Paradox of The Philosopher's Rule." Apeiron, XV (No.1, 1981), 1-9.
- , and Smith, Nicholas D. "Justice And Dishonesty In Plato's Republic." Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXI (No.1, 1983), 79-95.
- Brown, Geoffrey. "The Character Of The Individual And The Character Of The State, In Plato's Republic." Apeiron, XVIII (No.1, 1983), 43-47.
- Carter, B.E. "The Function of the Myth of the Earthborn in the Republic." Classical Journal, XLVIII (1953), 297-302.
- Creed, J.L. "Is It Wrong To Call Plato A Utilitarian?" Classical Quarterly, XXVIII (1978), 349-365.
- Cross, R.C. and Woosley, A.D. Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. London: Macmillan & Company Limited, 1964.
- Crossman, R.H.S. Plato To-Day. Revised 2nd ed. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1959.
- Davies, J.C. "The Philosopher And The Cave." Greece and Rome, Series 2, XXIV (April, 1977), 23-28.
- Demos, Raphael. "A Fallacy In Plato's Republic?" Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by Gregory Vlastos. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1971.
- Devereux, Daniel T. "Socrates' First City In The Republic." Apeiron, XIII (No.1, 1978), 36-40.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. Plato And His Dialogues. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1932.
- Field, G.C. The Philosophy of Plato. London: Oxford University Press, 1949.

- Fite, Warner. The Platonic Legend. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.
- Galis, Leon. "The State-Soul Analogy in Plato's Argument That Justice Pays." Journal of the History of Philosophy, XII (No.4, 1974), 285-293.
- Garland, William J. "Notes On Two Socratic Arguments In Republic I." Apeiron, X (No.2, 1976), 11-13.
- Gill, Christopher. "Plato and the Education of Character." Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie, LXVII (1985), 1-26.
- Grube, G.M.A. Plato's Thought. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958.
- Hall, Dale. "Interpreting Plato's Cave As An Allegory Of The Human Condition." Apeiron, XIV (No.2, 1980), 74-85.
- Hall, R.W. "Egalitarianism And Justice In The Republic." Apeiron, VI (No.2, 1972), 7-19.
- Hitchcock, David. "The Good In Plato's Republic." Apeiron, XIX (No.2, 1985).
- Hourani, G.F. "The Education Of The Third Class In Plato's Republic." Classical Quarterly, XLIII (1949), 58-60.
- Hwang, Philip H. "Poetry In Plato's Republic." Apeiron, XV (No.1, 1981), 29-37.
- Kahn, Charles. "The Meaning Of Justice And The Theory Of Forms." The Journal Of Philosophy, LXIX (No.18, 1972), 567-579.
- Kirwan, Christopher. "Glaucou's Challenge." Phronesis, X (1965), 162-173.
- Levinson, Ronald B. In Defense of Plato. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.
- Mabbott, J.D. "Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?" Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by Gregory Vlastos. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1971.
- Malcolm, J. "The Cave Revisited". Classical Quarterly, New Series, XXXI (No.1, 1981), 60-68.

- Moline, Jon. "Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche." Archiv Fur Geschichte Der Philosophie, LX (1978), 1-26.
- Murley, Clyde. "Plato's Republic, Totalitarian Or Democratic?" Classical Journal, XXXVI (1940-1941), 413-420.
- Murphy, N.R. The Interpretation of Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951.
- ". "The 'Simile of Light' In Plato's Republic." Classical Quarterly, XXVI (No.2, 1932), 93-102.
- Nettleship, Richard Lewis. Lectures On The Republic Of Plato. London: Macmillan & Company, 1964.
- Neu, Jerome. "Plato's Analogy Of State And Individual: The Republic And The Organic Theory Of The State." Philosophy, XLVI (1971), 238-254.
- Popper, Karl. The Open Society And Its Enemies, Vol. I: The Spell Of Plato. Revised 5th ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Raven, J.E. "Sun, Divided Line, And Cave." Classical Quarterly, New Series, III (1953), 22-32.
- Reeve, C.D.C. "Socrates Meets Thrasyarchus." Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie, LXVII (1985), 246-265.
- Sachs, David. "A Fallacy In Plato's Republic." Plato's Republic: Interpretation And Criticism. Edited by Alexander Sesonske. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc, 1966.
- Santas, Gerasimo. "Two Theories of Good in Plato's Republic." Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie, LXVII (1985), 223-245.
- Shorey, Paul. What Plato Said. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933.
- Smith, Janet E. "Plato's Myths As 'Likely Accounts', Worthy Of Belief." Apeiron, XIX (No.1, 1985), 24-42.
- Tarrant, D. "Imagery In Plato's Republic." Classical Quarterly, XL (1946), 25-34.

Tate, J. "Imitation In Plato's Republic." Classical Quarterly, XXII (No.1, 1928), 16-23.

-----". "Plato And Allegorical Interpretation." Classics Quarterly, XXIII (No.3, 1929), 142-154.

Versenyi, Laszlo G. "Plato And His Liberal Opponents." Philosophy, XLVI (1971), 222-237.

Vlastos, Gregory. "Justice And Psychic Harmony In The Republic." The Journal Of Philosophy, LXVI (No.16, 1969), 505-521.

Winspear, Alban Dewes. The Genesis of Plato's Thought. 2nd ed. New York: S.A. Russell, 1956.