

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Emotional Work and Moral Agency

by

Emer O'Hagan

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

AUGUST, 1994

© Emer O'Hagan 1994



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

THE AUTHOR HAS GRANTED AN
IRREVOCABLE NON-EXCLUSIVE
LICENCE ALLOWING THE NATIONAL
LIBRARY OF CANADA TO
REPRODUCE, LOAN, DISTRIBUTE OR
SELL COPIES OF HIS/HER THESIS BY
ANY MEANS AND IN ANY FORM OR
FORMAT, MAKING THIS THESIS
AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED
PERSONS.

L'AUTEUR A ACCORDE UNE LICENCE
IRREVOCABLE ET NON EXCLUSIVE
PERMETTANT A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE
NATIONALE DU CANADA DE
REPRODUIRE, PRETER, DISTRIBUER
OU VENDRE DES COPIES DE SA
THESE DE QUELQUE MANIERE ET
SOUS QUELQUE FORME QUE CE SOIT
POUR METTRE DES EXEMPLAIRES DE
CETTE THESE A LA DISPOSITION DES
PERSONNE INTERESSEES.

THE AUTHOR RETAINS OWNERSHIP
OF THE COPYRIGHT IN HIS/HER
THESIS. NEITHER THE THESIS NOR
SUBSTANTIAL EXTRACTS FROM IT
MAY BE PRINTED OR OTHERWISE
REPRODUCED WITHOUT HIS/HER
PERMISSION.

L'AUTEUR CONSERVE LA PROPRIETE
DU DROIT D'AUTEUR QUI PROTEGE
SA THESE. NI LA THESE NI DES
EXTRAITS SUBSTANTIELS DE CELLE-
CI NE DOIVENT ETRE IMPRIMES OU
AUTREMENT REPRODUITS SANS SON
AUTORISATION.

ISBN 0-315-99442-8

Canada

Name EMER O'HAGAN

Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most nearly describes the content of your dissertation. Enter the corresponding four-digit code in the spaces provided.

PHILOSOPHY

SUBJECT TERM

0422

U·M·I

SUBJECT CODE

Subject Categories

THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS

Architecture 0729
Art History 0377
Cinema 0900
Dance 0378
Fine Arts 0357
Information Science 0723
Journalism 0391
Library Science 0399
Mass Communications 0708
Music 0413
Speech Communication 0459
Theater 0465

EDUCATION

General 0515
Administration 0514
Adult and Continuing 0516
Agricultural 0517
Art 0273
Bilingual and Multicultural 0282
Business 0688
Community College 0275
Curriculum and Instruction 0277
Early Childhood 0518
Elementary 0524
Finance 0277
Guidance and Counseling 0519
Health 0680
Higher 0745
History of 0520
Home Economics 0278
Industrial 0521
Language and Literature 0279
Mathematics 0280
Music 0522
Philosophy of 0998
Physical 0523

Psychology 0525
Reading 0535
Religious 0527
Sciences 0714
Secondary 0533
Social Sciences 0534
Sociology of 0340
Special 0529
Teacher Training 0530
Technology 0710
Tests and Measurements 0288
Vocational 0747

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS

Language
General 0679
Ancient 0289
Linguistics 0290
Modern 0291
Literature
General 0401
Classical 0294
Comparative 0295
Medieval 0297
Modern 0298
African 0316
American 0591
Asian 0305
Canadian (English) 0352
Canadian (French) 0355
English 0593
Germanic 0311
Latin American 0312
Middle Eastern 0315
Romance 0313
Slavic and East European 0314

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

Philosophy 0422
Religion
General 0318
Biblical Studies 0321
Clergy 0319
History of 0320
Philosophy of 0322
Theology 0469

SOCIAL SCIENCES

American Studies 0323
Anthropology
Archaeology 0324
Cultural 0326
Physical 0327
Business Administration
General 0310
Accounting 0272
Banking 0770
Management 0454
Marketing 0338
Canadian Studies 0385
Economics
General 0501
Agricultural 0503
Commerce-Business 0505
Finance 0508
History 0509
Labor 0510
Theory 0511
Folklore 0358
Geography 0366
Gerontology 0351
History
General 0578

Ancient 0579
Medieval 0581
Modern 0582
Black 0328
African 0331
Asia, Australia and Oceania 0332
Canadian 0334
European 0335
Latin American 0336
Middle Eastern 0333
United States 0337
History of Science 0585
Law 0398
Political Science
General 0615
International Law and Relations 0616
Public Administration 0617
Recreation 0814
Social Work 0452
Sociology
General 0626
Criminology and Penology 0627
Demography 0938
Ethnic and Racial Studies 0631
Individual and Family Studies 0628
Industrial and Labor Relations 0629
Public and Social Welfare 0630
Social Structure and Development 0700
Theory and Methods 0344
Transportation 0709
Urban and Regional Planning 0999
Women's Studies 0453

THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Agriculture
General 0473
Agronomy 0285
Animal Culture and Nutrition 0475
Animal Pathology 0476
Food Science and Technology 0359
Forestry and Wildlife 0478
Plant Culture 0479
Plant Pathology 0480
Plant Physiology 0817
Range Management 0777
Wood Technology 0746
Biology
General 0306
Anatomy 0287
Biostatistics 0308
Botany 0309
Cell 0379
Ecology 0329
Entomology 0353
Genetics 0369
Limnology 0793
Microbiology 0410
Molecular 0307
Neuroscience 0317
Oceanography 0416
Physiology 0433
Radiation 0821
Veterinary Science 0778
Zoology 0472
Biophysics
General 0786
Medical 0760

EARTH SCIENCES

Biogeochemistry 0425
Geochemistry 0996

Geodesy 0370
Geology 0372
Geophysics 0373
Hydrology 0388
Mineralogy 0411
Paleobotany 0345
Paleoecology 0426
Paleontology 0418
Paleozoology 0985
Palynology 0427
Physical Geography 0368
Physical Oceanography 0415

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

Environmental Sciences 0768
Health Sciences
General 0566
Audiology 0300
Chemotherapy 0992
Dentistry 0567
Education 0350
Hospital Management 0769
Human Development 0758
Immunology 0982
Medicine and Surgery 0564
Mental Health 0347
Nursing 0569
Nutrition 0570
Obstetrics and Gynecology 0380
Occupational Health and Therapy 0354
Ophthalmology 0381
Pathology 0571
Pharmacology 0419
Pharmacy 0572
Physical Therapy 0382
Public Health 0573
Radiology 0574
Recreation 0575

Speech Pathology 0460
Toxicology 0383
Home Economics 0386

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Pure Sciences

Chemistry
General 0485
Agricultural 0749
Analytical 0486
Biochemistry 0487
Inorganic 0488
Nuclear 0738
Organic 0490
Pharmaceutical 0491
Physical 0494
Polymer 0495
Radiation 0754
Mathematics 0405
Physics
General 0605
Acoustics 0986
Astronomy and Astrophysics 0606
Atmospheric Science 0608
Atomic 0748
Electronics and Electricity 0607
Elementary Particles and High Energy 0798
Fluid and Plasma 0759
Molecular 0609
Nuclear 0610
Optics 0752
Radiation 0756
Solid State 0611
Statistics 0463

Applied Sciences

Applied Mechanics 0346
Computer Science 0984

Engineering
General 0537
Aerospace 0538
Agricultural 0539
Automotive 0540
Biomedical 0541
Chemical 0542
Civil 0543
Electronics and Electrical 0544
Heat and Thermodynamics 0348
Hydraulic 0545
Industrial 0546
Marine 0547
Materials Science 0794
Mechanical 0548
Metallurgy 0743
Mining 0551
Nuclear 0552
Packaging 0549
Petroleum 0765
Sanitary and Municipal 0554
System Science 0790
Geotechnology 0428
Operations Research 0796
Plastics Technology 0795
Textile Technology 0994

PSYCHOLOGY

General 0621
Behavioral 0384
Clinical 0622
Developmental 0620
Experimental 0623
Industrial 0624
Personality 0625
Physiological 0989
Psychobiology 0349
Psychometrics 0632
Social 0451



Nom _____

Dissertation Abstracts International est organisé en catégories de sujets. Veuillez s.v.p. choisir le sujet qui décrit le mieux votre thèse et inscrivez le code numérique approprié dans l'espace réservé ci-dessous.

--	--	--	--

U·M·I

SUJET

CODE DE SUJET

Catégories par sujets

HUMANITÉS ET SCIENCES SOCIALES

COMMUNICATIONS ET LES ARTS

Architecture	0729
Beaux-arts	0357
Bibliothéconomie	0399
Cinéma	0900
Communication verbale	0459
Communications	0708
Danse	0378
Histoire de l'art	0377
Journalisme	0391
Musique	0413
Sciences de l'information	0723
Théâtre	0465

ÉDUCATION

Généralités	515
Administration	0514
Art	0273
Collèges communautaires	0275
Commerce	0688
Économie domestique	0278
Éducation permanente	0516
Éducation préscolaire	0518
Éducation sanitaire	0680
Enseignement agricole	0517
Enseignement bilingue et multiculturel	0282
Enseignement industriel	0521
Enseignement primaire	0524
Enseignement professionnel	0747
Enseignement religieux	0527
Enseignement secondaire	0533
Enseignement spécial	0529
Enseignement supérieur	0745
Évaluation	0288
Finances	0277
Formation des enseignants	0530
Histoire de l'éducation	0520
Langues et littérature	0279

Lecture	0535
Mathématiques	0280
Musique	0522
Orientation et consultation	0519
Philosophie de l'éducation	0998
Physique	0523
Programmes d'études et enseignement	0727
Psychologie	0525
Sciences	0714
Sciences sociales	0534
Sociologie de l'éducation	0340
Technologie	0710

LANGUE, LITTÉRATURE ET LINGUISTIQUE

Langues	
Généralités	0679
Anciennes	0289
Linguistique	0290
Modernes	0291
Littérature	
Généralités	0401
Anciennes	0294
Comparée	0295
Médiévale	0297
Moderne	0298
Africaine	0316
Américaine	0591
Anglaise	0593
Asiatique	0305
Canadienne (Anglaise)	0352
Canadienne (Française)	0355
Germanique	0311
Latino-américaine	0312
Moyen-orientale	0315
Romaine	0313
Slave et est-européenne	0314

PHILOSOPHIE, RELIGION ET THÉOLOGIE

Philosophie	0422
Religion	
Généralités	0318
Clergé	0319
Études bibliques	0321
Histoire des religions	0320
Philosophie de la religion	0322
Théologie	0469

SCIENCES SOCIALES

Anthropologie	
Archéologie	0324
Culturelle	0326
Physique	0327
Droit	0398
Économie	
Généralités	0501
Commerce-Affaires	0505
Économie agricole	0503
Économie du travail	0510
Finances	0508
Histoire	0509
Théorie	0511
Études américaines	0323
Études canadiennes	0385
Études féministes	0453
Folklore	0358
Géographie	0366
Gérontologie	0351
Gestion des affaires	
Généralités	0310
Administration	0454
Banques	0770
Comptabilité	0272
Marketing	0338
Histoire	
Histoire générale	0578

Ancienne	0579
Médiévale	0581
Moderne	0582
Histoire des noirs	0328
Africaine	0331
Canadienne	0334
États-Unis	0337
Européenne	0335
Moyen-orientale	0333
Latino-américaine	0336
Asie, Australie et Océanie	0332
Histoire des sciences	0585
Loisirs	0814
Planification urbaine et régionale	0999
Science politique	
Généralités	0615
Administration publique	0617
Droit et relations internationales	0616
Sociologie	
Généralités	0626
Aide et bien-être social	0630
Criminologie et établissements pénitentiaires	0627
Démographie	0938
Études de l'individu et de la famille	0628
Études des relations interethniques et des relations raciales	0631
Structure et développement social	0700
Théorie et méthodes	0344
Travail et relations industrielles	0629
Transports	0709
Travail social	0452

SCIENCES ET INGÉNIERIE

SCIENCES BIOLOGIQUES

Agriculture	
Généralités	0473
Agronomie	0285
Alimentation et technologie alimentaire	0359
Culture	0479
Élevage et alimentation	0475
Exploitation des pâturages	0777
Pathologie animale	0476
Pathologie végétale	0480
Physiologie végétale	0817
Sylviculture et faune	0478
Technologie du bois	0746
Biologie	
Généralités	0306
Anatomie	0287
Biologie (Statistiques)	0308
Biologie moléculaire	0307
Botanique	0309
Cellule	0379
Écologie	0329
Entomologie	0353
Génétiq	0369
Limnologie	0793
Microbiologie	0410
Neurologie	0317
Océanographie	0416
Physiologie	0433
Radiation	0821
Science vétérinaire	0778
Zoologie	0472
Biophysique	
Généralités	0786
Médicale	0760

Géologie	0372
Géophysique	0373
Hydrologie	0388
Minéralogie	0411
Océanographie physique	0415
Paléobotanique	0345
Paléocologie	0426
Paléontologie	0418
Paléozoologie	0985
Palynologie	0427

SCIENCES DE LA SANTÉ ET DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT

Économie domestique	0386
Sciences de l'environnement	0768
Sciences de la santé	
Généralités	0566
Administration des hôpitaux	0769
Alimentation et nutrition	0570
Audiologie	0300
Chimiothérapie	0992
Dentisterie	0567
Développement humain	0758
Enseignement	0350
Immunologie	0982
Loisirs	0575
Médecine du travail et thérapie	0354
Médecine et chirurgie	0564
Obstétrique et gynécologie	0380
Ophtalmologie	0381
Orthophonie	0460
Pathologie	0571
Pharmacie	0572
Pharmacologie	0419
Physiothérapie	0382
Radiologie	0574
Santé mentale	0347
Santé publique	0573
Soins infirmiers	0569
Toxicologie	0383

SCIENCES PHYSIQUES

Sciences Pures

Chimie	
Généralités	0485
Biochimie	0487
Chimie agricole	0749
Chimie analytique	0486
Chimie minérale	0488
Chimie nucléaire	0738
Chimie organique	0490
Chimie pharmaceutique	0491
Physique	0494
Polymères	0495
Radiation	0754
Mathématiques	0405
Physique	
Généralités	0605
Acoustique	0986
Astronomie et astrophysique	0606
Électronique et électricité	0607
Fluides et plasma	0759
Météorologie	0608
Optique	0752
Particules (Physique nucléaire)	0798
Physique atomique	0748
Physique de l'état solide	0611
Physique moléculaire	0609
Physique nucléaire	0610
Radiation	0756
Statistiques	0463

Sciences Appliquées Et Technologie

Informatique	0984
Ingénierie	
Généralités	0537
Agriculture	0539
Automobile	0540

Biomédicale	0541
Chaleur et thermodynamique	0348
Conditionnement (Emballage)	0549
Génie aérospatial	0538
Génie chimique	0542
Génie civil	0543
Génie électronique et électrique	0544
Génie industriel	0546
Génie mécanique	0548
Génie nucléaire	0552
Ingénierie des systèmes	0790
Mécanique navale	0547
Métallurgie	0743
Science des matériaux	0794
Technique du pétrole	0765
Technique minière	0551
Techniques sanitaires et municipales	0554
Technologie hydraulique	0545
Mécanique appliquée	0346
Géotechnologie	0428
Matériaux plastiques (Technologie)	0795
Recherche opérationnelle	0796
Textiles et tissus (Technologie)	0794

PSYCHOLOGIE

Généralités	0621
Personnalité	0625
Psychobiologie	0349
Psychologie clinique	0622
Psychologie du comportement	0384
Psychologie du développement	0620
Psychologie expérimentale	0623
Psychologie industrielle	0624
Psychologie physiologique	0989
Psychologie sociale	0451
Psychométrie	0632



THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Emotional Work and Moral Agency" submitted by Emer O'Hagan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Brenda Baker

Supervisor, (Brenda Baker Department of Philosophy)

Dennis McKerlie

(Dennis McKerlie Department of Philosophy)

Morny Joy

(Morny Joy Department of Religious Studies)

Sept. 13, 1994
Date

Abstract

This thesis argues that the emotions play an important role in moral theory by offering an account of emotional work and its importance in moral agency. Relying on de Sousa's account of emotion, I argue that the emotions can be assessed as objective, appropriate responses to morally relevant situations. I discuss several arguments which dispute the possibility of a role for the emotions in moral theory and argue that they depend on too narrow an account of moral worth. I examine the role of emotional work on the self and three modes of assessing emotional responses as appropriate. I then examine Calhoun's concept of emotional work on others. I conclude that it is not the management of others' emotions, but the facilitation of their own emotional work, undercutting Calhoun's claim that morality must be considered a cooperative venture.

Table of Contents

Approval Page	ii
Abstract	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Chapter Two: Moral Theory and the Emotions	17
Arguments From The Emotions	18
Responding to the Arguments From Emotion	31
A Resolution of the Arguments From Emotion	43
Chapter Three: Emotional Work On The Self	55
Emotional Work	56
Emotional Work On The Self	61
Assessing Emotional Responses	71
Chapter Four: Emotional Work on Others	78
Calhoun On Emotional Work On Others	80
Taking Another Look at Emotional Work on Others	89
Emotional Work on Others as Facilitation	94
How is Emotional Work on Others <i>Work</i> ?	100
Morality as Cooperative Venture	104
Chapter Five: Conclusion	108
Bibliography	116

Chapter One: Introduction

My aim in this thesis is to discuss a possible role for the emotions in moral theory. I shall challenge the view that adequate moral theory need not attend to the role of the emotions in moral agency. The project of developing a moral theory which incorporates the emotions (or some particular emotions) is beyond the bounds of this thesis. A number of philosophers have developed accounts which grant some particular emotions a central role in moral theory.¹ In this thesis, I shall not focus on a few selected emotions, but shall instead provide an account of a particular emotional and moral enterprise that I see as an important feature in moral agency. In order to develop a positive account, I shall have to make some assumptions about what emotions are like; I shall largely rely upon de Sousa's account of the emotions. In this chapter I shall provide a brief sketch of each of the following chapters and then turn to an explication of de Sousa's account of the emotions.

¹ See for example: Lawrence Blum's account of the altruistic emotions in *Friendship, Altruism and Morality* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). Annette Baier's work on the centrality of trust for moral theory in "Trust and Antitrust", in *Ethics*, 96, January 1986, pp.231-260. Nel Nodding's work on care as the fundamental moral paradigm in *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

In Chapter Two I argue that there is a place for the emotions in moral theory. Moral theory which does not recognize a role for the emotions is inadequate to the task of fully comprehending moral agency and moral worth. Attending to the emotions in our moral experience helps us to see that the development of good moral agency requires more than a narrowly cognitive appreciation of moral facts. Sound moral agency requires well-ordered emotions together with well-ordered beliefs. There are parts of moral theory, for example, the nature of right action, which abstract from specific persons and their moral characters and thus have little to say about emotion per se. Moral theories which focus on abstract questions of rightness to the exclusion of those aspects of moral experience involving moral character and agency may be adequate in their own right, but they will be incomplete insofar as they neglect important questions in moral theory and they will be inadequate to offer an account of questions involving moral agency and the development of moral character.

The emotions are important in moral agency for two reasons. First, because they function in the process of coming to have reasons for action. In this respect they can be evaluated as appropriate and inappropriate responses in a given situation. Secondly, emotions feature in moral agency as properties of individual moral character. The evaluation of sound moral agency, on my account, is not limited to the evaluation of an individual's beliefs and actions (the inadequacy of such a position is discussed in Chapter Two) but also include assessments of moral character. The emotions feature in moral character as

appropriate and even essential features of virtue. I will discuss a number of arguments dealing with the place for emotions in moral theory. I will consider, in detail, arguments advanced by Williams, Blum and Herman.

What I hope to contribute to the discussion of the emotions in moral theory is an account of the concept of "emotional work", a concept discussed by Cheshire Calhoun². Emotional work is the work that one does in order to develop more appropriate or well-ordered emotional responses, and a better emotional disposition. For example, an individual who once held sexist views and has now come to see that his sexist views were wrong may not immediately come to have the appropriate non-sexist emotions. He may still have to struggle with a tendency to react to gentle, unassertive men with hostility and derision. This individual does emotional work when he works to acquire nonsexist emotional responses - responses more objectively grounded than the sexist emotional responses - by reflecting on the impropriety of his present emotional responses given his new belief that it is wrong to hold sexist stereotypes. The idea that gives emotional work force is that it is not enough for a fully developed moral agent to possess the correct moral beliefs; she must also have the corresponding appropriate emotional responses in her motivational structure.

What is needed, and what Calhoun has not provided in her discussion of emotional work, is an account of what makes emotional work a moral enterprise;

² Cheshire Calhoun, "Emotional Work" in Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin eds., *Explorations in Feminist Ethics* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p.117.

how it is that working to have appropriate emotions is a part of sound moral agency distinguishable from (among other things) self-deception and rationalization. In Chapter Three I will explore the concept of emotional work on the self. While Calhoun does not explore the concept in any detail, she remarks that it is important for the moral agent to have her emotional house well-ordered. Calhoun states that emotional work on the self does not represent the challenge to traditional moral theory that emotional work on others does. I will offer an account of emotional work on the self, and discuss Calhoun's claim that it is a concept which fits within traditional moral theory.

A further intriguing suggestion made by Calhoun is that we not only engage in emotional work on the self, but we also engage emotional work on others. If appropriate emotions are important in moral agency as I have suggested they are, and if we are able to influence and modify the emotions of others through interpersonal interactions, then it seems that moral theory should have something to say about the possibility of and place for emotional work on others. In Chapter Four I will examine Calhoun's descriptions of emotional work on others in an attempt to clarify it as a distinct moral concept. I will argue that Calhoun's description of emotional work on others fails to explain how it is an enterprise which is both emotional and moral. I shall then make some suggestions about the nature of emotional work on others: how it is emotional, how it is moral, and how it is work.

I shall also discuss Calhoun's claim that a recognition of the role of emotional work on others in moral life will lead us to see that morality is better understood as "cooperative venture" than as "individual task". She suggests that the "agent-centred paradigm" which conceives of the moral agent as either decision maker or actor or judge of other decision makers or actors is inadequate because it ignores important features of our moral agency such as emotional work on others. Traditional moral theory which adopts the agent-centred paradigm is, in this sense, also inadequate. Calhoun's remarks about morality as a cooperative venture are very brief, and thus it is difficult to see just what sort of revision in our moral thinking she is calling for. I shall consider her claim that morality as a cooperative venture calls for a revision in our moral thinking and argue that the concept of emotional work does not require that we reconceive our moral theorizing as cooperative venture.

Before I can begin this investigation of the emotions in moral theory some preliminary remarks about the nature of the emotions are called for. I will be using the term "emotions" broadly. There is, and has been, much discussion about what constitutes an emotion. Some current work by philosophers suggests that the emotions can be narrowly defined as something like propositional attitudes. Patricia Greenspan, for example, defines the emotions as "compounds of two elements: affective states of comfort or discomfort and evaluative propositions spelling out their intentional content. Fear, for instance, may be viewed as involving discomfort at the fact - or the presumed or imagined fact (I shall say "the

thought") - that danger looms."³ Still other philosophical perspectives (that of William James, for example) attempt physiological explanations of the emotions. For James, consciousness of the physiological process constitutes the emotion.⁴ On the broad account of the emotions I am adopting, they are not reducible to desires and beliefs, nor are they reducible to physiological states, and they range from emotions which would be most commonly described as feeling states to ones which are commonly described in terms of beliefs. There are a number of arguments in the literature against the reducibility of emotions to beliefs and desires.⁵

I will develop an account of one way in which the emotions function in moral agency through the concept of emotional work. In order to ground my discussion of emotional work I will need to make some remarks about the place of the emotions in rationality and the place of rationality in emotion. I shall claim that

³ Patricia Greenspan, *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification* (London: Routledge, 1988), p.4.

⁴ William James, excerpts from "What Is an Emotion?", in Cheshire Calhoun and Robert Solomon eds., *What Is an Emotion?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp.127-141.

⁵ de Sousa argues in Chapter 6, "The Rational and the Objective," of his *The Rationality of Emotion* that our ability to assume "hypothetical attitudes" but not "hypothetical emotions" precludes the emotions from simply being beliefs. He further argues that the emotions' capacity to have a variety of formal objects prevents them from being completely identified with beliefs or desires. See chapters 6 and 7 for a full discussion of these and other irreducibility arguments. See also Amelie Rorty's "Explaining Emotions" in Amelie Rorty ed., *Explaining Emotions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp.103-126. Cheshire Calhoun also argues that the emotions cannot be reduced to propositional attitudes, in "Cognitive Emotions?" In *What Is an Emotion?*, pp.327-342.

some emotional responses are more appropriate to a given context than others, and some are not appropriate at all. The claim that emotions can be evaluated as appropriate to a given context requires that at least some emotions capture something objective about that context in the sense that they disclose features of the situation which are independent of the perceiver. If emotions were entirely subjective it would make no sense to evaluate some as morally or rationally more appropriate than others. The notion of objectivity appealed to here is the same as the notion of objectivity used when we describe particular actions as right and others as wrong. Just as we hold that some actions are right or wrong objectively, independently of how the person feels about it, similarly our emotional responses can be objectively appropriate or inappropriate.

Objectivity of this sort appeals to norms which we share and use to evaluate our conduct. I shall (somewhat briefly and summarily) offer an account of "appropriate emotion" which will help to make sense of the evaluation of emotions as appropriate or inappropriate. I will not argue for this account of the emotions in rationality but will simply present it as a framework that helps to explain the role of emotions and moral agency. I will assume this theory of the emotions when explaining and developing the notion of emotional work on the self as an instance of a way in which the emotions might have a role in moral theory.

Evaluation of the emotional responses of agents as objectively called for by the situation in which the agent finds herself is crucial to a moral position which maintains that an assessment of moral agency requires not only an assessment

of action and moral beliefs, but also an assessment of the agent's emotional states. Sound moral agency requires that the agent have appropriate emotions. Given common assumptions in traditional moral theory about the capriciousness of the emotions it seems, *prima facie*, difficult to say that one emotional response is appropriate and another is not. In order to evaluate the emotions as appropriate we need to develop some criteria for appropriate emotion, but before we can begin this we must consider what the emotions are really like.

The emotions have been categorized as passive or active features of persons. If passive (they happen to us) we cannot be held responsible for them and should perhaps be wary of their influence upon our actions. If the emotions are active (things that we choose or initiate such as a judgment) then we are fully responsible for them. This dichotomy of explanation is unhelpful in coming to a full understanding of the emotions - it seems that both passivity and activity are needed to describe and understand the emotions. The individual raised in a sexist family who is as an adult hostile towards outspoken women has not, in an important sense, chosen the reaction of hostility towards outspoken women out of an array of possible judgments including admiration and respect. But neither has hostility towards outspoken women simply descended upon him like a cloud without his awareness and complicity in the maintenance of such an emotion. It seems that the functioning of the emotions is more complicated than either the passive or active paradigms can account for.

Bernard Williams regards the emotions as both productive of action (motivational) and also as states to which we are subject.⁶ On his account emotions are phenomena which we are not simply subject to, but that we can at times can influence or change, and this puts Williams in a good position to talk about the education of the emotions:

As the phenomenologists have constantly stressed, to feel a certain emotion towards a given object is to see it in a certain light; it may be wrong, incorrect, inappropriate to see it in that light, and I may become convinced of this. When I am convinced, the emotion may go away; and it is wrong to forget the numbers of cases in which it *does* just go away or turn into something quite different.⁷

It may be that the attempt to change one's emotions through a reconsideration of the object of the emotion fails, but what Williams finds important to note is that when such considerations of emotional propriety fail to eliminate the emotion, it is not due to the fact that it is an emotion, but rather, because it is an irrational emotion.⁸

⁶ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", in *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p.223.

⁷ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", p.224.

⁸ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", p.224. This is a controversial claim. The fact that an emotion may fail to go away might not be a sign that it is irrational, but rather that the process of reconsideration is incomplete. So, either the emotion is irrational, or its persistence is an indication of the need for more careful, thoughtful reconsideration of the relevant points.

The view that emotions are relevant to moral agency leads not only to theorizing about how emotional changes result, but also to a consideration of appropriate emotion. Williams notes:

The notions of appropriateness, correctness and so forth in the object of course cry out for examination; and they wear on their front the fact they are in some part evaluative. What should be feared or hoped for, and so forth, is obviously, to some extent, a matter in which disagreements of value between societies and individuals come out. Equally this is a central matter of moral education.⁹

Once we accept the view that emotions are educable, then actions which are emotionally motivated can be morally assessed as expressions of the moral development of the person's emotions. This leads us to see the importance of moral education, for the implication is that sound moral agency issues, in part, from the development of a complex unity of judgment and emotion. This further suggests that an "admirable human being" is one who is disposed to have (and act on) certain kinds of emotional responses, and not others.¹⁰

It is helpful to view the emotions on analogy with perception. Like emotion, visual perception is neither entirely passive nor active. If an agent saw only what she wanted to see, perceptual judgments would carry no objective information about the world and would be useless. Accordingly, we view perception as a passive reception of information which originates outside us, and is in this sense

⁹ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", p.225.

¹⁰ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", pp.225-226.

independent of us. On the other hand, perception is deeply guided by the interests and needs of the agent who will be looking for salient features of the situation. Emotions can pick out objective features of a situation in the same way as vision. According to Ronald de Sousa emotions are like "species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies."¹¹ On this view emotions supplement rationality. Emotions are reason giving in the sense that they lead one to attend to certain features of a situation and in doing so pose questions which can then be answered by beliefs and judgments.

On my view, emotions set the agenda for beliefs and desires: we might say they ask the questions that judgment answers with beliefs and evaluate the prospects to which desire may or may not respond....In this way emotions can be said to be judgments, in the sense that they see the world "in terms of". But they need not consist in articulated propositions.¹²

Emotions are very much like (other) perceptual states, as we can see when we consider moral perception. When we characterize emotion as, in part, patterns of attention we can understand how it is possible that different emotional dispositions may result in different views, embodying different insights about what is morally required - the particular emotion plays a role in the agent's coming to

¹¹ de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotion", *The Rationality of Emotion*, p.196.

¹² de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotion", p.196.

have particular reasons.¹³ For example, a compassionate agent's attention to certain features of a situation will lead her to 'compassionately question' those features of the situation. Thus, she is more likely to find reasons for acting compassionately if the situation calls for it, because she has 'asked the compassionate questions'. Similarly a greedy person attends to the features of a situation in such a way as to ask "What is in it for me?" and will be likely to come to have reasons that relate to the answering of such a question. The pattern of attention (observation or questioning) is thus a kind of perceptual source of reasons, it comes before the reasons themselves but encourages them to come into being as reasons because it directs the agent toward certain salient features of a situation. Attention is active because it is to some important degree within the agent's power, but it is passive before that to which it directs the agent.¹⁴

Emotions are objective in so far as they pick out objective features of a situation. de Sousa argues that we should consider the emotions on analogy with perception. In the same way that the colour of a thing remains an objective

¹³ Martha Nussbaum acknowledges the important role emotions play in moral agency when she describes them as "composites of belief and feeling, shaped by developing thought and highly discriminatory in their reactions. They can lead or guide the perceiving agent, "marking off" in a concretely imagined situation the objects to be pursued and avoided." "An Aristotelian Conception of Rationality" in *Love's Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.78.

¹⁴ de Sousa notes that it is much easier to attend at will than to withdraw one's attention at will, that is, it is self-defeating to try not to attend to something. It is therefore reasonable to expect greater success working ourselves into a new emotion than working ourselves out of one. "The Rationality of Emotions", in Amelie Rorty ed., *Explaining Emotions* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980), p.141.

feature of it, even while depending for its existence upon other relational properties, objective emotions are not made subjective by the fact that they belong to individual agents. As secondary qualities, colours cannot be defined independently of our senses and yet they are not simply sensuous states. The colour of a thing cannot be defined strictly in terms of sensation, we need reference to standard conditions of observation and standard observers. To this extent colour depends for its existence on some relational properties. It is mistaken, however, to claim that dependence on relational properties prevents objectivity. This is to confuse dependence on relational properties with properties that the subject simply imports (which are in fact properties of the subject).¹⁵ So, an emotion is objective if it picks out objective features of a situation just as any perceptual judgment is objective if it picks out objective features of a situation.

However, emotions are motivational as well as perceptual, motivational in so far as they are reason-giving. In those cases in which the agent brings her subjective biases into the observation of a situation, in effect projecting into the situation features which may not be present rather than more accurately observing what is shown by the situation, she has "projective" rather than "objective" emotions.¹⁶ In this sense, projective emotions are themselves inappropriate or

¹⁵ de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotions", p.133. I do not intend to argue for any particular account of the objectivity of perception. I am simply arguing that objective emotions have the same objectivity as other perceptions.

¹⁶ de Sousa, "Emotion and the Conduct of Life" in *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 314.

even immoral motivators, while more objective emotions appropriately motivate action. Similarly, bad or erroneous reasons may be said to be inappropriate motivators of action, while good or correct reasons appropriately motivate action. de Sousa suggests that the objective-projective distinction is the appropriate one to use when attempting to differentiate moral emotions from nonmoral emotions because it captures the distinction between objectivity and illusion. He argues against the distinction employed by Blum in his attempt to impart moral status to some emotions. Blum distinguishes between moral and nonmoral emotions on the grounds of their basis (or lack thereof) in altruism. de Sousa is arguing that it is the truth capturing feature of emotions which is morally important, while Blum argues for the importance of their 'goodness capturing features'. Because both features are morally relevant, I will not pursue the issue here.

If we acknowledge that some emotions are in this sense objective, then we can begin to understand the concept of appropriate emotion by considering how one emotion might promote better, more accurate observation than another emotion. This is a large and complex area of inquiry. If emotions are neither entirely passive nor active but are in some sense both, and if the emotions are to some degree products of socialization, then how can anything comprehensive be said about appropriate emotion? Such a comprehensive and detailed explanation is beyond the bounds of this thesis. I will simply try to explain broadly how the notion of appropriate emotion might make sense, without addressing many of the complicated details. In short, I will sketch a possible position that allows me to

ground my claims about appropriate emotion and advance to a discussion of emotional work.

Now, there is clearly a sense in which our emotions are learned. As children we learn from our parents and others what particular emotional responses are called and when they are acceptable, and we continue to develop this sort of emotional understanding later in life through interaction in the community. As a child one might learn to be thankful, that is, to feel and express thanks to an individual who has tried to do something good for one. As a young adult a female might learn through her community that when she is whistled at she should feel flattered. de Sousa refers to these primary learning frameworks as "paradigm scenarios" which are "drawn first from our daily life as small children, later reinforced by the stories and fairy tales to which we are exposed, and, later still, supplemented and refined by literature and art."¹⁷ Paradigm scenarios provide two things: the characteristic object (targets, or occasions) of the emotion, and the set of characteristic or 'normal' responses to the situation.¹⁸ Assessment of emotions is thus a complicated process:

¹⁷ de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotions", p.142. de Sousa also acknowledges the role that biology plays in emotion, it seems that some emotional responses such as fear, for example, must be understood to some (large) degree as evolutionary features of human beings. In fact, de Sousa takes the biological explanation further than I would when he claims that "nasty emotions [such as prejudices] are the waste-products of paradigm scenarios indispensable to the development of more useful emotions." "Emotion and the Conduct of Life", p.316.

¹⁸ de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotions", p.142.

the "all-things-considered" assessment of an emotion is determined in a complicated way: first, by determining whether the evoking situation is actually an instantiation of the paradigm, and secondly, by confronting it with other applicable paradigms and working out the relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and hierarchic dominance between the relevant scenarios. This complicated process is at the center of our moral life.¹⁹

Now, this complicated and important process raises questions about the objectivity of such learned paradigms. It may be wondered: how can the education of the emotions be objective if our procedures for internalizing moral responses to paradigm scenarios and for educating others in morally appropriate forms of conduct are learned through social interaction? de Sousa makes some effort to ground the good in our biological nature, by showing how socially constructed paradigm scenarios give shape to the biologically given repertoire of feelings we have as human animals. In this thesis I shall not attempt to show that the good is objective; that is an enormous topic in its own right. I shall simply assume that the good is knowable and that the procedures for educating the emotions are assessable features of sound moral agency.

I have suggested that emotions can be perceptions of objective features of situations, that they can be evaluated for adequacy both in their perceptive character and their motivational character. Coming to have objective, appropriate emotions is hard work - the subject of this thesis.

¹⁹ de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotions", p.149.

Chapter Two: Moral Theory and the Emotions

In this chapter I will examine some current views regarding the role of the emotions in moral theory. On one account the emotions lead to problems for (impartial) moral theory, problems which may lead us to reconsider the supremacy of place granted morality. On another account the problems posed by the emotions for moral theory are answered in such a way that the emotions are given a subordinate role within moral decision making as motivators of action, but are not granted any moral status themselves. A third possibility is that the emotions come to have a role within moral theory. I will discuss some of the arguments for the priority of the emotions advanced by Bernard Williams to see if they actually present the challenge to (impartial) moral theory that he claims they do. I will then examine some of Barbara Herman's work, which defends the view that emotions compatible with or conducive to moral action are good, but they cannot themselves be considered morally worthy. I will conclude that neither of these views are correct. A more adequate view grants emotions a role in moral theory by acknowledging that emotions and moral beliefs work together in moral agency. Emotions play an integral role in moral agency, a fact which becomes apparent when we consider both how the agent perceives a situation, and how the emotions feature in good moral character.

I will begin by examining two arguments from the emotions forwarded by Williams, which I shall refer to respectively as the "integrity" and the "human gestures" arguments. I will also examine a version of the human gestures argument advanced by Lawrence Blum. I will then discuss Barbara Herman's responses to Williams' position. Herman's arguments are important, for they suggest that the emotions' apparent threat to morality is unfounded. The conclusions she draws are unsatisfying, however, insofar as they endorse a simplistic view of the workings of the emotions. I hope to show that the problems from the emotions raised by Williams are best resolved when we understand that the emotions occupy an important place in our moral lives which ought to be accounted for in moral theory.

Arguments From The Emotions

In "Persons, Character and Morality"²⁰ Williams argues that impartial morality may theoretically require that an individual give up what it is that makes her want to continue living. This, he suggests, is an absurd requirement, one that leads us to question the primacy of the moral itself.²¹ The "integrity problem"

²⁰ Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality" in *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.1-19.

²¹ Williams moves too quickly from an attack on "impartial morality" to morality itself. Having argued that impartial morality presents important problems for personal integrity, he concludes that this is a problem for morality itself, rather than for the impartiality thesis. This weakness in his argument is also noted by Lawrence Blum. *Friendship, Altruism and Morality* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p.212.

arises out of the possibility that the dictates of impartial morality require that a person give up the very thing that constitutes her reason for future existence. Human beings are, among other things, emotional creatures, attached to projects and to others in ways which are crucial for continued meaningful existence. The disparate natures of moral and nonmoral motivation, along with the supremacy granted to the moral, may wrongly lead us to overlook the importance of the nonmoral in our lives.²² We must understand, says Williams, that a necessary condition for an individual's interest in her own future is that some of her current projects, interests and desires (her "character") relate to her future actions. In order to clarify this claim, Williams introduces the notion of the categorical desire: "one's pattern of interests, desires and projects not only provide the reason for an interest in what happens within the horizon of one's future, but also constitute the conditions of there being such a future at all."²³ These categorical desires need not be grandiose, nor even conscious, but should be highly respected, given their importance to meaningful human existence.

²² Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality", p.2. Williams, here, seems to be using the traditional distinction between the moral and nonmoral, where the moral is that which is in accord with obligation and the nonmoral is that which falls outside the bounds of impartial obligatory action. While he at times argues that the problematic nature of this distinction is support for a moral theory which defines the moral more broadly, he also argues that the problems resulting from the traditional moral-nonmoral distinction support the view that morality is merely one value among many and should not be granted the supremacy of place that it has had in traditional theory. This ambiguity in Williams' work will be discussed later in this chapter.

²³ Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality", p.11.

The nature of categorical desires themselves suggest that, at least in some cases, something other than the categorical imperative should regulate our possible actions. "There can come a point at which it is quite unreasonable for a man to give up, in the name of the impartial good ordering of the world of moral agents, something which is a condition of his having any interest in being around in that world at all."²⁴ There may be cases in which one's deep attachments (to one's projects and to others) are such that they are prohibited on the impartial view. In such cases it is not clear that the rule of impartial morality should take priority over the importance of the particular attachment. In this way, impartial morality undermines itself: "Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to the impartial system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme importance to the impartial system, and that system's hold on it will be, at the limit, insecure."²⁵ In other words, that which makes life substantial is a precondition for the reasonableness of an impartial morality. Thus, impartial morality undermines itself when it prohibits action that itself provides for further meaningful existence. In order to act morally the agent may have to do that which will make her life meaningless. This conclusion is unacceptable,

²⁴ Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality", p.14.

²⁵ Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality", p.18. Elsewhere, Williams uses this line of reasoning to develop sceptical arguments against the freedom of morality from moral luck. "If the moral were really supreme, it would have to be ubiquitous: like Spinoza's substance, if it were to be genuinely unconditioned, there would have to be nothing to condition it." "Moral Luck", in *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.38.

according to Williams, and thus he challenges the view that the demands of morality are always primary. The need for personal integrity may be more crucial to meaningful human existence than the need for inviolable moral demands.

A second argument from the emotions focusses on the value found in action motivated by concern for others (what Williams calls a "human gesture"). In "Morality and the emotions"²⁶ he suggests that action motivated directly out of care for other persons may be more valuable than action motivated out of moral obligation. It is sometimes reasonable to value action motivated by the emotions over action motivated by moral obligation, and thus we are led to question the supremacy of moral value. Williams' argument is substantial and calls for careful discussion. He is seeking to establish a more definite structural relation between the emotions and right action than is found in most traditional moral theory:

That consistent or appropriate action is the criterion of moral sincerity is an idea that has been constantly stressed in recent discussion. The point I want to make is that the *appropriate action* which is demanded by this conception of moral sincerity is itself something which, often, is not independent of the emotional elements in a man's moral outlook.²⁷

An individual is sincere about a particular moral judgment if she has a disposition to perform a certain type of action in certain types of circumstances.

²⁶ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", pp.207-229.

²⁷ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", p.221.

According to Williams, in order to understand the unity between a person's actions and judgments, an understanding of the emotional structure underlying this unity is essential: "reference to a man's emotions has a significance for our understanding of his moral sincerity, not as a substitute for, or just an addition to, the considerations drawn from how he acts, but as, on occasion, underlying our understanding of how he acts."²⁸ Clearly the view that an understanding of right action requires, at least in some cases, attending to the emotional disposition of the agent poses a challenge to traditional moral theories such as Kantianism. For, if we are to agree that emotions are relevant in an understanding of moral agency, then our assessments of self, others and right action become more complicated along these lines.

It might be objected that reference to an agent's emotions cannot be essential to moral evaluation. The evaluation of an agent's actions pertains to his behaviours, moral beliefs and the facts of a certain situation, not to the agent's emotional disposition. Reasons are relevant when judging moral action, not emotions. Williams counters this objection by noting that:

²⁸ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", pp.222-223. When we consider the example of a man who thinks he has done wrong and seeks to remedy things (an agent who feels guilt) we find a connection between an emotion and moral life. It is "highly probably" that the diversity of things this man can go on to do and say "can be interpreted as one pattern of behaviour only because we understand that the man feels that he has to take reparative actions, because we see these activities of his as in various ways expressions of his feeling bad about what he has done or failed to do in the past."

what is relevant for our understanding of his moral disposition is not whether there are (in our view) grounds or reasons for action of that sort, but whether he takes there to be; whether he sees the situation in a certain light. And there is no reason to suppose that we can necessarily understand him as seeing it in that light without reference to the emotional structure of his thought and action.²⁹

We cannot presume that we can necessarily understand the agent's reasons for action without referring to his emotional structure, for to understand his reasons for action is to understand his perspective of a situation as reason-giving for him, and this requires reference to his emotions. To understand a moral disposition we must understand the emotions involved. To look at reasons in this way is to understand reasons as part of the agent's character. It is common in ethics to view reasons abstractly as independent of particular agents, and thus to consider the rightness of an action as independent of the agent's situation. But if we wish to evaluate the agent's character we cannot abstract the reasons from the structure of emotion and thought which constitutes the agent's perspective.

The human gestures argument derives its strength from the importance placed (and the importance it seems reasonable to place) on action motivated by emotion. An action motivated out of love or caring for another is arguably a better response in some circumstances, than an action motivated by duty to the rule of impartial rationality. The existence of such cases, Williams suggests, leads us to question the supremacy of place granted to morality. Williams refers to Charles

²⁹ Williams, "Morality and the emotions", p.223.

Fried's example of the drowning wife in order to illustrate his point.³⁰ The question raised is: if a man is able to save only one of two drowning individuals, and one of those people is his wife, what sort of justification is required for saving his wife? An impartial morality requires that if the man's decision to save his wife is justifiable, its justification must derive from a moral principle. Indeed, it seems that such a moral principle can be argued for. However, whether or not a plausible justificatory principle exists is not Williams' concern. In fact, he argues that in such a circumstance the search for a justificatory principle is misdirected and inappropriate:

But this construction provides the agent with one thought too many: it might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife.³¹

If the deep attachments in our lives, necessary as they are, are incompatible with the strict dictates of morality, then (says Williams) so much the worse for morality!

It might be objected that the value we place on human gestures need not lead us to question the supremacy of place granted the moral, but only to acknowledge that we have values other than moral values. However, this objection loses its force in the face of examples which require us to choose

³⁰ Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality", pp.17-18.

³¹ Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality", p.18.

between these values. In the "saving the spouse" example, if we conclude that it is better for the man to act out of love for his wife than out of moral obligation, we are admitting that there is an action better than the moral action.

Either the recipient *ought* to prefer the ministrations of the moral man to the human gesture, which seems a mildly insane requirement; or, alternatively, if it be admitted that it is perfectly proper and rational of the recipient to have the preference he has, the value of moral men becomes an open question, and we can reasonably entertain the proposal that we should not seek to produce moral men, or very many of them, but rather those, whatever their inconsistencies, who make the human gesture.³²

Lawrence Blum also recognizes the value of the human gesture and argues along similar lines that in certain circumstances action motivated by emotion is more appropriate than action motivated by duty. On the Kantian view, emotions are not themselves assessable features of moral agency for they exist outside the scope of the will (the locus of moral responsibility) and are thus not open to moral evaluation. Against this, Blum argues that emotions, and in particular altruistic emotions, are germane to moral assessments and to good moral agency. While some emotions may be capricious and unreliable, altruistic emotions are not necessarily of this sort; it is misleading to suggest that they are no different than inclinations. Blum submits that the altruistic emotions are more substantial, reliable, and directed than the Kantian tradition typically allows:

³² Williams, "Morality and the emotions", p.227.

Altruistic emotions are intentional and take as their objects other persons in light of their 'weal' and, especially, their 'woe'. Sympathy, compassion, or concern are directed towards others in virtue of their suffering, misery, pain, travail. And so the altruistic emotions have a cognitive dimension: the subject of the emotion must regard the object as being in a certain state (e.g. of suffering).³³

On Blum's "direct altruism view" an action is made good, all things being equal, in proportion to the degree that it is motivated by a regard for others.³⁴ While direct altruism isn't the only way for an action to have value, it is *one* way. In order for an action to have moral worth it is not the case that an agent must act dutifully on a universalizable principle. On the direct altruism view, altruistic action is morally good, *ceteris paribus*, whether or not the agent conceives of it as a dutiful action which is universalizable. Acting directly for the good of another is morally worthy action, and yet it is not obligatory in the sense that every other agent in relevantly similar circumstances is obliged to act in the same way.³⁵ It is precisely the move from acting out of a direct regard for the good of the other, to acting out of a sense that it is morally right to act beneficently (a view that incorporates an element of universalizability), which Blum suggests is a salient difference between altruistic and universalizable action. In effect, Blum is claiming

³³ Lawrence Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p.12.

³⁴ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, p.84.

³⁵ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, p.90.

that morally good action is not limited to only that which is the result of a good will acting on a universal principle.

It might be objected that we can understand the moral worth of altruistic action without granting benevolent emotions themselves any moral status. Altruistic actions may be morally worthy only insofar as they are supererogatory. Altruistic action does have moral value, but not because it is action motivated by emotion focussed on the good of the other. It has value in so far as it goes beyond that which is obligatory. According to Blum it is neither helpful nor appropriate to understand altruistic action as supererogatory. Supererogation is a notion working within a moral framework in which obligation and duty are the central notions, and it is this framework that Blum wants ultimately to revise. Altruistic actions are not properly conceived of as those which go beyond the requirements of duty. "They are best regarded as in an entirely different realm of moral experience, to which notions of duty and supererogation do not properly apply."³⁶ In fact, Blum's very definition of altruistic action implies that it is not the sort of thing that is motivated by duty; to act altruistically is to act out of a direct regard for the good of another.

³⁶ Blum discusses two ways in which we could understand an action going beyond duty: by involving greater sacrifice than is involved in duty, and by bringing about more good than is required by duty. He argues that altruistic action is not compatible with these criteria and further reminds us that the goods brought about by altruistic action are not entirely comparable with those brought about by action motivated by duty, in many cases. Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality* pp. 161-163.

The altruistic agent doesn't typically regard herself as under an obligation to act, and although she might sometimes see herself as under an obligation to act, in altruistic action it is not obligation which motivates her beneficent action. If we consider the sorts of actions commonly considered altruistic (often helping actions) we note that they are neither dutiful nor obligatory, so the attempt to understand them as moral actions by describing them as those that go beyond duty, is mistaken. An altruistic action such as making a timely remark to ease an unpleasant situation doesn't obviously go beyond the call of duty and so even if we accept that the supererogatory has moral worth, such altruistic action would remain excluded from the realm of the moral. We must, therefore, revise our thinking about moral worth so that actions which do not conform to the obligation model of morality can be understood as morally worthy. Blum concludes: "most altruistic acts are best regarded as within a different domain than dutiful acts."³⁷

Emotion-based action is valuable and appropriate in ways in which dutiful action is not. Interestingly, the view that emotionally motivated action is in some cases better than the duty motivated action, leads to strikingly different (even contrary) conclusions. Where Williams asserts that our valuing human gestures leads us to question the value placed on morality, Blum claims that our valuing human gestures leads us to recognize the moral value of the gesture itself. On Blum's view the fact that certain actions are motivated by altruistic emotion is

³⁷ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, pp.91-92.

essential to the rightness of the act.³⁸ In order to clarify his position, Blum provides an example of the hospital visit, with which he hopes to demonstrate that a fundamental part of the goodness of an altruistic act is the demonstration of concern for another. In this example Sue is in the hospital and her friend, Bob, visits. Bob's motivation for visiting Sue is simply a sense of duty towards Sue, not a concern for Sue's well-being. "His attitude is not one of concern for how she is doing, or of making her feel better by his visit...Bob regards her condition as constituting a morally binding reason for him to visit her, and his motivation is this sense of obligation."³⁹

Blum asks us to assume that Sue realizes that Bob's motivation in visiting her is one of duty rather than concern, and suggests that if this were the case a lesser good would be brought about for Sue than if Bob's motivation were one of concern. Sue would, we must assume, want Bob to visit because he cared for her, and the fact that Bob's *concern* does not motivate him to do the right thing results in a lesser good for Sue (though presumably some good is produced by Bob's compliance with duty). Blum concludes:

when we examine our original presumption that the (morally) appropriate thing for Bob to do in this situation is to visit Sue in the hospital, we see that part of this appropriateness involves his having certain emotions (concern) and his acting from these emotions. But this means that the motive of the action cannot be separated from

³⁸ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, p.142.

³⁹ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, pp.142-143.

the action itself, when one is considering the act as the morally appropriate act of beneficence which it is.⁴⁰

The greater good was produced for Sue when Bob acted altruistically and thus the act of "visiting a friend in the hospital" in its most excellent sense demands an appropriately emotion-based concern for the other.

I will return to Blum's account of the emotions in moral action, but for now let us simply note that both Blum's and Williams' arguments suggest that moral theory which neglects the role and importance of the emotions in moral agency is untenable. According to Blum, the propriety of the emotional response suggests that emotions have a place within a discussion of moral agency. According to Williams, the propriety of the emotional response suggests that the nonmoral action is sometimes better than the moral action, and this in turn suggests that morality should not be granted the supremacy of place it is granted in traditional moral theory. As earlier noted, Williams has argued that reference to an agent's emotions is relevant in an assessment of moral agency because in order to understand how a situation is reason-giving for a particular agent we must refer to the agent's emotional structure. Given that emotions play a central role in morality, we must further consider the appropriateness of the emotions, and this

⁴⁰ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, p.143. By constructing the example so that Sue realizes that Bob is motivated by duty rather than concern, Blum avoids the possibility that Bob might act out of duty and yet lead Sue to believe that he was visiting out of a concern for her. I shall argue, later in this chapter, that Blum's attempt to ground appropriate emotion in a good for another is wrong-headed.

leads us to acknowledge the importance of the education of the emotions.⁴¹ It is curious that Williams embraces the idea that we must attend to the education of the emotions while also concluding that the value of emotion-based action leads us to question morality's authority to regulate conduct. It is more plausible, I will suggest, to conclude that the propriety of emotion in the human gesture is best understood as a case of well-educated emotions.

Responding to the Arguments From Emotion

The integrity and human gestures arguments, suggest, at the very least, that a moral theory which ignores the emotions is problematic. Barbara Herman responds to both of these arguments and ultimately denies the emotions an integral role in moral theory. My criticism of her position will rest in part on this denial.

Herman responds to the integrity argument by questioning the idea that a sharp distinction between personal and moral integrity can be made. If it is assumed that moral and nonmoral motivation are disparate in nature it is easier to make the case that impartial morality threatens personal integrity. Herman asserts that the conflict between personal and moral integrity is not as stark as Williams presents it. It may, in fact, be true that morality restricts the actions of agents, but clearly one of the jobs of morality is to define the impermissible. So, the fact that morality is restricting cannot on its own be a criticism of morality.

⁴¹ See Williams, "Morality and the emotions", especially pp.223-225.

Williams' claim is, however, stronger than this. If morality is so restrictive that it requires that one give up what constitutes her reasons for continued existence, then morality undermines itself.

Herman distinguishes between respecting individual character and allowing unconditional attachments to projects. Impartial morality, she argues, can respect individual character and as such poses no problem for personal integrity.⁴² Respect for personal integrity does not require that morality allow for unconditional attachments to personal projects. An agent's integrity is respected if the importance of her personal projects and connections are acknowledged. It does not follow from this that the agent's personal projects and commitments should supersede morality. For example, a mother's commitment to provide well for her children can be respected by morality, but this respect for her personal project of providing well for her children does not require that she be excepted from moral demands such as 'stealing is wrong'.

While it is (psychologically) true that attachments to projects can be unconditional, it is not a requirement of the conditions of having a character that they be so. Unconditional attachments can be as much at odds with one's loves, one's other interests, even with the

⁴² Herman deals with a slightly different formulation of the integrity problem, and defends her Kantian moral theory against a number of other criticisms against impartiality in "Agency, Attachment, and Difference" in *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.184-207.

physical limitations on action, as they may be in conflict with limits imposed by morality.⁴³

On Herman's Kantian view, the limiting conditions of morality must prevail, and this does not constitute an attack on integrity. Respect for character and individual projects is compatible with the demands of an impartial morality, and according to Herman, a Kantian view can permit this.

Clearly, conflicts between personal projects and morality may impose limits on the agent's pursuit of her projects. But this fact alone cannot support Williams' criticism of Kantian impartial morality;⁴⁴ the fact that some personal projects (even if they happen to be categorical desires) are impermissible, is quite compatible with morality! "The "victory" of morality does not diminish the value of the project (unless it is the project itself that is judged immoral), and so does not constitute an attack on the agent's integrity."⁴⁵ Williams' complaint is that there may be times when morality requires that an agent deny or refuse to pursue her unconditional desires, and this requirement is too demanding. Herman responds that while some attachments to personal projects may be unconditional it is not a necessary feature of these attachments that they be so. The rule of morality doesn't diminish

⁴³ Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality" in *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p.39.

⁴⁴ The personal integrity problems Williams poses for Utilitarian Theory remain problems for Utilitarianism in a way that they don't for Kantianism. See J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 108-118.

⁴⁵ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.40.

the importance of personal projects, it simply refuses them unconditional status. Unless Williams is claiming that all personal projects constitutive of an agent's categorical desires cannot be prohibited (and it seems quite reasonable to prohibit some, such as the personal project of improving one's social status by exploiting others) he has to provide some moral restrictions, and if he does this he cannot claim that personal integrity is necessarily problematic for morality.

The integrity argument is supposed to demonstrate how it is that morality undermines itself when it makes demands of us that may constitute great personal sacrifice, and thus make like itself meaningless. The assumption at work here is that a meaningful life is generated out of personal interests alone, so that in order for morality to remain meaningful and sensible it must leave us able to try to fulfil our categorical desires. If one does not presuppose the self-interested model that Williams adopts, morality is not undermined when categorical desires remain subject to the rule of morality. Morality may even demand of us complete self-sacrifice without undermining itself, if a self-interested model is not presupposed.

Herman responds effectively to the human gestures argument forwarded by Williams. However, her commitment to a Kantian view of moral worth leaves her unable to respond adequately to Blum's slightly different formulation of the problem. The human gestures argument asserts that the more appropriate action is, in some cases, the one motivated by emotion rather than duty. According to Williams, this preference for the human gesture over moral obligation forces us to reconsider the absolute value placed on morality. Herman replies that this is a

misconception which arises out of a misunderstanding of what it is to act from principle.

It might be argued that right action is that which is justified by a moral principle, and so it is impossible for the agent to act morally from her emotions, or to respond directly to the need of others, for sound moral agency requires that the agent be motivated to act on the force of a correct moral principle. This conception of moral theory is criticizable on the grounds that it makes implausible claims about the nature of moral action and that it results in a morality concerned more with its own process (the rightness of a principle) than with the persons involved, for the moral agent acts only in response to dutiful maxims. This sort of criticism is sometimes levelled against Kantian theory. Herman attempts to rebut the criticism by arguing that when action from principle is properly understood such criticisms do not hold. In effect, Herman circumvents these criticisms by conceiving of the motive of duty as a limiting condition on action (the agent's commitment that she will not act in morally prohibited ways⁴⁶) rather than as a motivator of moral action. When the motive of duty functions as a limiting condition on action, dutiful action does not prevent the agent from being motivated by her emotions, nor does it prevent the agent from directly responding to the other. As a limiting condition the motive of duty regulates possible action but does

⁴⁶ Obligation on Herman's account arises out of the impermissibility of failing to meet a particular kind of end. "Obligatory ends emerge when no maxim of neglect of a (kind of) end is permissible." "The Practice of Moral Judgment", in *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p.81.

not change the direction of the response. When a moral agent sees that another is in need and is prepared to act accordingly, her moral check with the limiting conditions of the motive of duty doesn't change the concerned response into an abstract attempt to bring about a certain state of affairs.⁴⁷

Herman has argued, thus far, that if one properly understands action from principle, and the motive of duty as a limiting condition, it does not follow that an impartial morality neglects the emotions, nor that it is concerned more about morality than the objects of moral action. Herman further argues that it is possible for the emotions to be reconciled with impartial morality, at least to the degree they coincide with its dictates. Both Williams and Blum are, however, making stronger claims about the role of emotions in moral theory. Recall that there are three steps in Williams' argument. First, the claim that the emotional response (human gesture) is in some cases a better, more appropriate response.⁴⁸ Second, the suggestion that if it is better to act from emotion in some cases, then the best action is not always the morally right action. And third, if the best action is not always the morally right action then we must question the supremacy of place

⁴⁷ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", pp.31-32.

⁴⁸ Again the ambiguity in Williams' position is apparent in his use of "better". He sometimes suggests that the role the emotions play in morality should lead us to acknowledge the importance of the education of the emotions. Along these lines it seems reasonable to suppose that the human gesture is *better* because it is a moral action involving an appropriate emotional response. His use of "better" here, however, suggests that the emotion-based action is importantly distinct from moral action. In fact, he suggests that it is a nonmoral action which is preferable to the moral action.

granted morality. Let us examine Herman's treatment of Williams' argument by beginning with the "saving the spouse" example.

A careful look at her response to the "saving the spouse" example shows that Herman's discussion of the human gestures argument is highly qualified. Herman argues that it is appropriate (under the conditions of the example) that the agent see his relation to his wife as a reason for action. It doesn't follow from this, however, that the agent's relation to his wife provides an unconditional reason for action.

Suppose we asked, after the fact, "Why did you save *her*?" We would get the answer, "Because I love her" or "Because she's my wife." These are the reasons on which one acts, and the actions they support express the relationships they refer to. Moreover, it is morally appropriate (not in any way inappropriate) in these circumstances to act on these reasons. None of this is undermined by the agent's awareness (he need hardly be thinking of it) that in *some* circumstances the reason would not be sufficient to justify his action. (Suppose he would have to throw a child overboard to reach her.) It is in this sense that "the thought that it was his wife" is not separate from moral considerations.⁴⁹

The fact that the man acted out of love for his wife is not a problem for Herman's position. In fact, she grants that it would be reasonable for the wife to feel as though she had been "treated badly" if her husband rescued her primarily out of moral obligation, and only secondarily out of love for her. Insofar as she grants this, she does not dispute Williams' first point (the claim that the emotional

⁴⁹ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.42.

response is in some cases a better, more appropriate response than action from duty). However, she never actually gives any content to the idea that it is *better* for the man to act from love, than from duty, and that there would be something inappropriate about the man acting only out of moral obligation. She merely admits that the wife might reasonably feel slighted. While she has not attempted to deny Williams' first point she has certainly not embraced it. In fact, Herman has clearly denied that an emotion-based justification for action can ever be unconditional. This seems reasonable, for even Williams could not deny that well-intended, or noble emotions can, on occasion, lead one to act in objectively wrong ways. Herman points to the problem in Williams' position: he has not shown that human gestures are intrinsically or unconditionally valuable. Although we might agree that in some cases the emotion-based action is better, Williams has not made it clear that the reasons these actions are better are independent of morality.

In her response to the second step in Williams' argument, Herman discusses only actions which are motivationally overdetermined (that is, the agent has both the motive of duty and an emotional motive present). Herman does not include in her discussion, actions motivated only by emotion, where no motive of duty is present. She denies that if it is better to act from emotion in some cases, then the best action is not always the morally right action. Clearly, in order to make her case Herman must demonstrate that actions motivated by emotion rather than duty remain morally worthy actions. Herman's account allows that the emotion-based action is sometimes the right action, but not that it is the morally

right action. She explains that in the case of overdetermined motivations the emotion-based action is compatible with morally right action and thereby avoids agreeing with Williams that the best action is not always the morally right action.

Herman's defence of her position relies on a conception of morally worthy action as action done from a good will. On Herman's Kantian view good willing is the measure of moral worth. An action's moral worth is independent of the particular way it is performed insofar as there is no loss of good will. Moral worth is derived from the agent's commitment to right or dutiful action. Actions themselves are not the only sorts of things able to exemplify a good will, a commitment to right action, for example beneficence may also do this.⁵⁰ If an agent is committed to beneficence, but is unable to act beneficently, given the circumstance, the status of that agent's good will is not harmed. "It seems right to say that when we commit ourselves to a policy of beneficence from the motive of duty, our will is good. But this good willing is not necessarily expressed in action."⁵¹

Since moral worth is an expression of good willing it seems that the Kantian need not prefer the morally worthy (duty-based) action to the nonmoral (emotion-

⁵⁰ "A helping act is a beneficent act only if the agent offers help from the motive of duty - if the agent conceives of what he is doing as an instance of what any moral agent is required to do when he can relieve another's distress, and acts to help for that reason. Only such helping acts have moral worth. But we are also required to adopt a general policy: to be willing to help when the need is there. As we adopt this policy, we conform to moral requirements and do so from the motive of duty." Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.34.

⁵¹ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.34.

based) action. Herman tries to convince us of this using the following analogy. Imagine a case in which *X* needs help and both *A* and *B* can help him - *A* out of a motive of duty and *B* from emotional motivation. *X* prefers being helped by *B*, because *B*'s action is an expression of concern for *X*. *A* is prepared to act beneficently and has a good will. If *A* defers to *B* "whose help will bring *X* greater satisfaction", there will be no loss of good will, for *A* has a good will whether or not it is he who brings about the good for *X*.⁵² "Beneficence requires that *A* be concerned with *X*'s good; it does not require that *A* be the one who brings it about that *X* has what is good for him."⁵³ If *A* defers to *B* there is no loss of good will, and a greater good is brought about for *X*. Herman maintains that the action of a single individual who has both motives can be understood the same way: "If there is no loss of good will when a person willing to act beneficently defers to someone whose helping action is in other ways more appropriate, the same conclusion should be possible in the case of a single person."⁵⁴

If the action is overdetermined so that the agent has both the motive of duty and the emotion-based motive, and the agent defers to the emotion-based motive, there is no loss of good will, and thus no loss of moral worth for the commitment to right action remains. On this line of reasoning there is no conflict between the better or more appropriate act, and the moral act. In motivationally

⁵² Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.35.

⁵³ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.35.

⁵⁴ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.36.

overdetermined circumstances, the nonmoral act may be performed, and because there is no loss of moral worth (given the agent's moral commitment) there is no conflict between the nonmoral and moral action. On Herman's 'deferral solution' the human gesture may be performed and it will remain the case that the agent has acted in a morally worthy way, not because the human gesture is itself morally praiseworthy, but because the agent remains dutifully committed. Since it is not the case that the best action is sometimes not a morally worthy action, Williams' second premise fails.

Clearly, Herman need not accept Williams' conclusion that the human gesture is better than action motivated by duty and thus the value of moral persons is questionable. Rather, she concludes that human gestures notwithstanding, moral persons are desirable. For, even though the recipient of an action might prefer the human gesture, she would also prefer that the agent have a requisite moral commitment that could prompt her to act rightly if her emotions failed to lead her to do so.

This suggests a reason why we should seek to produce "moral men."
I may prefer that my friends help me out of their feelings for me, but it is rational to prefer that they be morally prepared to help as well, so that in the absence or distraction or exhaustion of such feelings they will still be there for me.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.36.

Herman has, it seems, dealt with the problems from emotion. There is, however, something deeply unsatisfying about her position. It is odd that a position which acknowledges the important role of learned, moral perceptions in the agent's moral understanding of a situation, refuses to grant these perceptions any moral status.⁵⁶ Herman has agreed that, in some circumstances, emotionally motivated actions are preferable and more appropriate than duty-based actions. However, on Herman's view only action motivated by duty has moral value:

The necessary condition for a dutiful action having moral worth is that the action be done from the motive of duty. When the action is overdetermined (both incentives would be sufficient by themselves as motives to produce the dutiful action), it must be the motive of duty itself on which the agent acted for the action to have moral worth. That is, we would not say the helping action had moral worth unless it was the idea that it was morally required that led to the giving of help. If the moral incentive is present but does not produce the action - that the action is morally required is not what brings the agent to act - there is no reason to credit the action with moral worth.⁵⁷

Herman's solution to the problems posed by the emotions doesn't grant the emotions status as moral features of persons. Unlike, for example, Blum, she

⁵⁶ Herman notes that a moral system which relies on the categorical imperative cannot function unless the agents employing this device come to it with some degree of moral knowledge. She introduces "rules of moral salience" which are intended to fill in this gap: "Acquired as elements in a moral education, they structure an agent's perception of his situation so that what he perceives is a world with moral features. They enable him to pick out those elements of his circumstances or of his proposed actions that require moral attention." In "The Practice of Moral Judgment", p.77.

⁵⁷ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", pp.33-34.

denies that emotional motivation is connected to moral rightness. Emotion-based motives fail to support the required internal connection between motive and rightness: "In acting from a motive attached to a moral principle, the moral rightness of the action gives the agent reason for action. In action from emotion (say responding to someone's need for help from feelings of sympathy or compassion), this is not so."⁵⁸ Clearly it is Herman's commitment to the idea that the categorical imperative exhausts our conception of moral rightness that leads her to this unsatisfying position. There seems a tension which Herman is not aware of in claiming that, in some cases, the best response in a circumstance is the 'nonmoral' which itself has no moral worth but is permitted because in the agent's deferral from duty there is no loss of moral worth.

A Resolution of the Arguments From Emotion

In this section I shall consider Herman's account of the emotions in moral theory. While she has defused the argument that morality is only one value among many, she has not granted the emotions a role in moral theory, and has merely developed a system which tolerates their expression and their potential as motivators of nonmoral action. Herman has argued that moral worth is grounded in the agent's concern for moral rightness. The actions of the good moral agent must be distinguishable from those of the agent whose actions merely happen to

⁵⁸ Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality", p.30.

appear morally correct, for in the latter case there exists no regard for the moral rightness of the action.

For a motive to be a moral motive, it must provide the agent with an interest in the moral rightness of his actions. And when we say that an action has moral worth, we mean to indicate (at the very least) that the agent acted dutifully from an interest in the rightness of his action: an interest that therefore makes its being a right action the nonaccidental effect of the agent's concern.⁵⁹

The suggestion is that "interest in the rightness of one's actions" is the agent's reflection on her own maxim's relation to rightness - an abstract and purely cognitive phenomenon. It is cognitive because it is the recognition that morality requires that a certain action be performed which makes it morally worthy. This appears arbitrarily to advantage rationality and disadvantage emotion. It is arbitrary because it is not grounded in a fully adequate conception of moral agency, but instead in a previous commitment to an account of what makes acts right - namely the categorical imperative. Reflection of this sort may be an appropriate test for interest in the rightness of one's actions in some cases, but it doesn't exhaust the ways in which a concern for moral rightness may be shown. Concern for moral rightness may well be manifest in an agent's attention to her emotional response in a particular circumstance. Consider an agent who, in a particular context, takes her emotional responses to be a sign of what is morally

⁵⁹ Herman, "On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty", *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p.6.

called for (she feels the horror of an unjust situation and thus seeks to remedy it); she may be guided in her action by her emotional response out of a concern for the rightness of her action. Let us compare this agent with an agent who simply acts to help because she is drawn by the need of others.

According to Herman, an agent's maxims are as thin or thick as her grounds of choice are simple or complex, and so assessment of a maxim requires an assessment of what the agent wills in all its subtleties. It is possible, for example, that three different agents perform the same act *A* in order to help *Y*, and yet from the point of view of what they will, the agents do very different things.

The agent who acts to help because she is drawn by the need of others acts on a different maxim than the one who acts to help on condition that her action is permissible. The agent whose helping action is chosen out of the recognition that it is morally required acts on a different maxim still....From the point of view of what they will - what good they would bring about - the three agents each do very different things as they act to bring about the same state of affairs.⁶⁰

As I have noted, action motivated strictly by emotion has no moral worth on Herman's account, for it fails to support the "required internal connection between motive and rightness." As was the case in Herman's criticism of Williams' integrity argument, emotions themselves cannot provide unconditional reasons for action. Herman is, however, too quick to dismiss all emotion-based action from the realm

⁶⁰ Barbara Herman, "Leaving Deontology Behind", in *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p.222.

of the moral. It may be that the agent who sees her emotional response as morally called for does have an appropriate concern for the morality of her actions. Like Herman's agent who acts out of emotion on the condition that her act is permissible, the agent who in the particular context takes her emotional response to be what is morally called for acts on a complex maxim which specifically includes the agent's interest in the moral rightness of her action. She differs from the Kantian in her moral epistemology, but not in her possession of a motive which meets the internal connection to rightness. Her emotions and moral beliefs work together in the processes of moral apprehension and moral action. She is, in an Aristotelian sense, virtuous. Such an agent can provide the human gesture Williams suggests is so valuable, and yet not remain open to the criticisms Herman levelled against emotion-based actions.

Consider, for example, the agent who appropriately feels gratitude for another's kindness, and consequently thanks the other. The feeling of gratitude is itself part of her perception of the situation, and while gratitude can be felt inappropriately (towards the wrong object, in unsuitable circumstances, and so on) it can also be experienced as an appropriate emotion, an important feature of sound moral agency. There exists a connection to rightness (albeit not the limited sort that Herman claims is necessary for moral worth) and the emotion itself is not considered an unconditional reason for action. Moreover, such an agent does not appear to have the 'one thought too many' in saving the spouse type examples, indeed she seems to have exactly the right response.

I have claimed that the view that the interest in the rightness of an action (which is necessary, on Herman's account, for that action have moral worth) is exhausted by an abstract rational consideration of the relation between the agent's maxim for action and rightness is false because it arbitrarily and too narrowly limits the conception of moral agency. A more broadly interpreted conception of a concern for moral rightness can avoid such problems. If we understand an interest in moral rightness broadly as a conviction which the agent adopts, then it does not seem reasonable for the agent to neglect her relevant emotional responses, for conviction is certainly not detached from feeling. Moreover, if the agent attends to her emotional state along with her principled judgments, she may be able to educate her emotions and come to see more clearly in her experience the requirements of morality. My suggestion is that the agent who works to become emotionally and rationally well-ordered will in turn become more alert to the demands of morality, and will also come to be better able to rely on her emotions for moral guidance.

A distinction emphasized by Blum might be useful at this point. He notes that in moral philosophy the distinction between apprehension and action is not sufficiently recognized - apprehension is largely taken for granted.⁶¹ It is often assumed that an agent simply sees what is morally relevant and uses that information in her deliberation about what is called for. However, much of what is crucial in making moral judgments involves "getting to" what is morally relevant.

⁶¹ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, p.133.

We commonly disagree about what the morally relevant features of a situation are (in fact, feminist ethics itself could be seen as representative of this difference in the apprehension of moral experience).⁶²

Important in Blum's position is the idea that differences in the moral perception of a situation lead to differences in response to that situation.⁶³ And thus, the compassionate agent will apprehend a situation differently than the uncompassionate agent. If, for the uncompassionate agent, nothing is obviously morally relevant in the situation, then there is nothing to be decided upon, no morally required action; there is, in fact, no moral concern. The compassionate agent, on the other hand, might find in the same situation morally-called-for action. Given that beliefs and attitudes influence an agent's perception of her experience, it is reasonable to assume that a compassionate agent attends to the salient features of a situation relating to the well-being of others. One might even hold that a spontaneous emotional response could be the primary vehicle in seeing what is called for morally (for instance, the "saving the spouse" example). One doesn't have to deny that emotional responses are fallible to hold such a position.

⁶² It could be argued that the 'ethics as justice' versus 'ethics as care' is, in large part, an example of just this sort of phenomenon. That is, differences in what is seen as important and primary in our moral experience lead to approaches which are more or less able to deal with a variety of issues.

⁶³ This is a point made elsewhere by Cheshire Calhoun: "Because what we feel is tied to how we interpret situations, helping others get the right moral perspective cannot be detached from working to correct their emotional attitudes". "Emotional Work", p.120.

In fact, it seems quite reasonable that agents who possess well-ordered emotions would have more reliable, trustworthy emotional responses.

Accepting the apprehension-action distinction leads us to see that a broader conception of the agent's interest in morally right action is called for. Sound moral agency requires both able moral apprehension and right action. The agent's interest in moral rightness is not reducible to her concerns about acting rightly during each episode of moral deliberation, nor need this concern be manifest as an abstract consideration of the maxim of her action in relation to rightness.

Martha Nussbaum puts it nicely when she states:

perception is not merely aided by emotion but is also in part constituted by appropriate response. Good perception is a full recognition or acknowledgment of the nature of the practical situation; the whole personality sees it for what it is. The agent who discerns intellectually that a friend is in need or that a loved one has died, but who fails to respond to these facts with appropriate sympathy or grief, clearly lacks part of Aristotelian virtue.⁶⁴

A concern for moral rightness must also be realized in an agent's ability to see the morally relevant features in a situation. The agent concerned with morally right action must therefore attend to her emotions, seeking an orderly and appropriate unity between belief and emotion, so that she will become better able to see and do what is morally called for. The concern for moral rightness is not simply an interest in acting morally on a given occasion, but is also an interest in

⁶⁴ Martha Nussbaum, "An Aristotelian Conception of Rationality", p.79.

healthy future agency. A further argument claims that emotions also have a role in providing a morally appropriate motive for action, and are thus more than merely instrumental in moral change. I will now turn to this issue.

Let us return to Herman's response to Williams' human gestures argument. What made Herman's position successful was her insistence that the moral agent have an unconditional attachment to morality. What makes her own account seem arbitrary is that she takes this unconditional attachment to imply the categorical imperative as the only test for moral rightness. Where Herman uses the categorical imperative as her test for moral rightness a number of moral tests could be used which would still satisfy the unconditional attachment to morality. Herman denied Williams' second premise (if it is sometimes better to do the emotion-based action, then it is not always best to do the moral action) on the grounds that the agent's action from emotion is technically morally worthy. On the 'deferral solution' proposed, the motivationally overdetermined agent can defer from the motive of duty to an emotion-based motivation without there being a loss in moral worth, for the agent's commitment to right action remains even though she does not act on it. So, on Herman's view the emotion-based action is permissible (in motivationally overdetermined cases) but has no moral worth per se - it is only the agent's commitment to duty that has moral worth.

It might at this point be objected that if Herman's narrow conception of moral worth and the deferral solution are rejected, the second step in Williams' human gestures argument cannot be stopped and we will have to agree with him

that sometimes the best thing to do is not the moral thing to do. If we accept this we seem unable to avoid his final conclusion: if the best action is, in some cases, not the moral action, we must question the supremacy of place granted morality. We can, however, avoid conceding to Williams' second premise if we reconceptualize moral worth more broadly as I have suggested above. What must be made clear is that the emotion-based action has moral value of a sort that neither Williams nor Herman have considered. To see how this might be accomplished, let us return to Blum's direct altruism view and his example of Sue and Bob.

The example of the hospital visit is supposed to illustrate the value and propriety of certain emotions. The suggestion is that Bob's actions are inappropriate or less valuable than they might be if he were to act on an emotion-based motive. After considering cases in which the human gesture seems appropriate, and produces a greater good for the recipient of the action (who feels cared for) Blum concludes:

it seemed that it was appropriate not only that the agents perform some overt act but that they do so from a certain motive; or, rather, that their act express a certain emotion which it was appropriate for them to have; for otherwise it would fail to bring about the full good to the recipient which was involved in its being an act of beneficence.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, p.159.

Clearly, what we need to know is how "full good to the recipient" is to be understood. If the full good is dependent upon the desires and attitudes of the recipient (Sue wants to feel loved by Bob) then to bring about the full good to the recipient is to maximize her desire satisfaction. But this is a nonmoral enterprise, and thus could not help us make a case for the moral worth of the emotion-based response. Blum must identify what constitutes the "full good to the recipient", for otherwise it is possible to reduce it to the satisfactions of the recipient's wants, and the good of altruism can be equated with the production of an inner state (in the recipient of the action) unrelated to any moral good.

Blum introduced the hospital visit example in the context of a larger argument aimed at showing that the (altruistic) emotions have a place in moral theory. His analysis of this example of altruistic action in terms of the "full good to the recipient" is, on my view, incomplete, for it evaluates the good of the emotion-based action solely in terms of a good result produced for the other. But action resulting in a full good for the recipient is not obviously moral. For example, if Bob acted out of concern for Sue, but acted immorally (if he killed the security guard so that he could get into the hospital to see her) the full good produced for Sue would not be a moral good. In such a case, Sue might receive the full good, for she might interpret the situation as the manifestation of Bob's unconditional commitment to her. So, the full good to the recipient would be had through Bob's emotion-based action, and yet the action would be immoral.

Blum's attempt to explain the importance of appropriate emotions in the full good to the recipient of the action is mistaken because appropriate emotion is not simply a concern about the good produced for another, but is also a feature of good moral character (it is a concern about Bob as well as Sue). My suggestion is that what is right and appropriate about the human gesture is its attachment to the moral, and it seems mistaken to try to pry them apart as Herman does when she advances the deferral solution. The attempt to disconnect the motive of duty from emotion-based motivation, in the sorts of emotional responses we have been considering, is, I believe, not only mistaken, but also psychologically implausible. Herman's deferral solution, for example, is implausible insofar as ordinary moral agents don't obviously have the capacity to defer from duty to emotion; it doesn't seem that we are entirely free to choose what will motivate us in such circumstances!

Emotions and beliefs are related in a complicated manner, and thus it is important to attend to the appropriateness of emotions, as well as to the correctness of moral beliefs. So a plausible account of moral agency acknowledges the relation between emotions and moral beliefs. The fact that the emotions can misdirect the agent does not imply that we must therefore ignore or discount them, but rather underscores the importance of attending to the emotions, and seeking to develop a reliable system of emotional responses.⁶⁶ In a case

⁶⁶ As Ronald de Sousa notes: "Common sense is quite ready to assess particular emotions as reasonable or unreasonable." "The Rationality of Emotions", pp.127-128.

such as Bob visiting Sue in the hospital, the full good to the recipient comes about when the moral action itself expresses a unity between rightness and emotion. The emotion, in this case, is not valuable merely because it will aid in better future agency. The emotional feature of the action itself has *moral value* because it is inextricably a part of the agent's moral action.

If we interpret a concern for moral rightness more broadly than the Kantian, as a conviction the agent adopts, we can see that the examples which Blum and Williams provide, both point to the fact that sometimes the morally best action is emotionally grounded action because, in the circumstances, a concern for morality calls for the emotionally grounded action.

The emotional aspect in agency is crucial in the assessment of sound moral agency and in the development of improved moral character. I shall now turn to a discussion of the role of the emotions in the improvement of moral agency, that is, how an agent might work to develop appropriate emotional dispositions where they are lacking. The work involved in such an enterprise is emotional work, and I shall in the following chapter consider the nature of emotional work on the self.

Chapter Three: Emotional Work On The Self

In the last chapter I argued that the emotionally well-ordered agent is more alert to the demands of morality and is better able to rely on her emotions for moral guidance than the agent who is not emotionally well-ordered. When we accept that morally virtuous action requires not only right action but also good moral perception, we come to see that moral agency is more complicated than we might have otherwise assumed. The emotions deserve a role within moral theory because they function in moral perception as reason-giving, and because morally virtuous action typically calls for the appropriate emotional response. In combination these roles for the emotions in moral agency have consequences for our conception of good moral character: good moral agency requires appropriate emotional responses as well as sound moral beliefs, and appropriate emotional responses are part of the agent's moral character. As Aristotle noted: "the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well."⁶⁷

In this chapter I shall offer an account of one role the emotions can play in the development of sound moral agency. Emotional work is important in sound

⁶⁷ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, David Ross trans., revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 1106a16-17.

moral agency because there are times when an appropriate emotion does not naturally accompany a correct belief, and so acquisition of the appropriate emotion requires that the agent cultivate the appropriate emotion. Moreover, there are also times when one is (better) able to arrive at the correct belief because one is observing the world through the perceptual lens of an appropriate emotion. Through the process of emotional work one may discover the ways in which some emotions guides one's attention to different features of a situation. It is because some emotions lead one to attend more accurately to experience than others, that they can be assessed for rationality and can be deemed more or less appropriate.

Emotional Work

The term "emotional work"⁶⁸ was coined by Arlie Russell Hochschild in her examination of attitudinal and behavioral requirements of workers in some occupational categories. Hochschild employs the terms "emotional labour" and "emotion work", which she defines as "...the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display; emotional labor is sold for a wage and therefore has *exchange value*....*emotion work* refer[s] to these same acts done in a private context where they have *use value*."⁶⁹ Cheshire Calhoun adopts her concept of emotional work and applies it to moral philosophy.

⁶⁸ Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

⁶⁹ Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*, p.7.

According to Calhoun, some of the moral behaviour we engage in cannot be well understood within the bounds of traditional moral theory. Important features of our moral agency which are "central to goodness"⁷⁰ are deemed insignificant or superfluous on dyadic, agent-centred accounts of moral agency. Calhoun concludes that we must revise our "moral thinking"⁷¹ in order to incorporate some of these essential features of moral behaviour. This requires that we shift "our understanding of morality away from individual task to cooperative venture."⁷² Calhoun sees emotional work as the key to this venture.

Emotional work can be work on the self, or work on others. Ultimately Calhoun focusses upon emotional work on others, which she asserts is neglected in traditional moral theory in a way in which emotional work on the self is not. Calhoun offers much worth considering. Many of the concerns she advances have far reaching implications for ethical theory. It is not entirely clear from Calhoun's description however, just how emotional work on others is to be understood, nor how forcefully it pushes us toward revising our moral thinking.

Calhoun claims that emotional work on the self fits within the scope of traditional moral theory because it survives the perception of moral agent as decision maker or actor, or judge of other decision makers or actors (the "dyadic,

⁷⁰ Cheshire Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.117.

⁷¹ Calhoun uses the term "moral thinking" in general to refer to images and concepts that stylize moral experience. Moral theorizing is included within the scope of moral thinking.

⁷² Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.119.

agent-centred paradigm"). "Emotional work on self is required lest others become victims of our mismanaged emotions. This fits a dyadic, agent-centered picture of moral activity."⁷³ She goes on to argue that emotional work on others is ignored in traditional moral theory, *not* because it fails to conform to what is important in moral agency, but rather because it falls outside of the traditional, agent-centred paradigm. "In taking on the burden of managing others' emotions, we step beyond the moral roles "agent" and "judge".⁷⁴ Calhoun concludes that we must revise our moral thinking beyond the agent-centred conception, in order to provide a space for notions such as emotional work on others.

Emotional work on the self fits within narrowly agent-centred moral theory, according to Calhoun, because it is a requisite feature of moral agency that one manage one's emotions in order to avoid abusing others. In emotional work on the self "we worry about managing the self, tidying our own moral households, looking outward only to judge others's emotional work."⁷⁵ It is unclear, however, just how the management of one's emotions falls within an agent-centred paradigm, for the agent is not simply deciding to have a particular appropriate emotion, nor is she engaged in an assessable single moral action. When we examine emotional work on the self in detail we find that it also falls outside a description of moral agent as decision maker or actor, or judge of other decision makers or actors, because

⁷³ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.119.

⁷⁴ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.119.

⁷⁵ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", pp.118-119.

it expands the concept of good moral agency beyond the realm of correct action and the possession of correct beliefs to the agent's emotional dispositions. As we shall see the emotional work an agent may engage in to acquire appropriate emotions doesn't obviously fall within an agent-centred paradigm. Emotional work on the self then, does not neatly fit within the agent-centred paradigm as Calhoun suggests it does.⁷⁶ Emotional work on the self, itself provides a challenge to traditional moral theory insofar as it expands our conception of moral agency.

Calhoun fails to explore the complexities involved in emotional work on the self, and quickly moves to a discussion of emotional work on others. Perhaps as a result, Calhoun does not recognize the extent to which emotional work on the self is important in the development of sound moral agency, and treats the management of others' emotions as fundamental. As I shall argue in Chapter Four, emotional work on others is best understood as the facilitation of others' emotional work on the self, and thus emotional work on the self remains the more fundamental concept. Nonetheless, Calhoun's focus on the importance of social interaction and its impact on the emotional states of agent's raises important issues in moral psychology.

⁷⁶ Calhoun has not qualified her use of "decision maker", "actor", or "judge". It is thus reasonable to assume that she is not intending any specially crafted use of the terms. In order to argue that emotional work on the self can be understood in such terms, while emotional work on others cannot, a detailed explanation of how these terms are intended to function would have to be provided, for as it stands it does not seem that one's engagement in emotional work on the self falls within these categories. Calhoun does not provide such an explanation.

Emotional work is a concept significant to morality for it acknowledges the important role the emotions play in sound moral agency. The fact that we find the appropriateness of our moral responses to be morally relevant and are thus led to do emotional work suggests that we should have reservations about moral theories which do not make room for the moral relevance of emotions. Appropriate emotions are relevant not only with regard to their timely expression, but also because they come to fashion one's experience:

"Feeling rules" prescribe when, where, how much, how long, about what, and toward whom different emotions should be felt. Such rules prescribe not only emotional expression, but subjective experience. Hence the need to do emotional work on ourselves.⁷⁷

Calhoun's sense of emotional work differs from Hochschild's because her use of emotional work is intended to be distinctively moral. Hochschild employs the concept to make emotional sense of whatever behaviour, moral or not, one may engage in. I shall restrict my discussion of emotional work to its distinctively moral employment. To be emotionally and morally well-ordered, one needs some degree of coherence between one's moral beliefs and emotional responses. Furthermore, because some emotions offer a more objective perception of moral situations than others, which may merely project subjective reactions to those situations, some emotional responses are more appropriately part of moral agency

⁷⁷ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.118.

than others. Emotional work is important to moral agency because appropriate emotions feature in good moral character.

Emotional Work On The Self

The idea that something like emotional work on the self is crucial to moral theory is not new. The right relation between passions and actions is essential, for example, to Aristotle, for whom virtuous action itself necessitates an appropriate emotional response:

For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue.⁷⁸

On the Aristotelian view not only is there a concern for the appropriate alignment between action and emotion, but this alignment becomes an essential objective in an inquiry which aims at "becoming good"⁷⁹. If we are to concern ourselves with becoming good moral agents (as morality itself requires of us) we must attend to that which will lead us to future virtuous character: "...for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions."⁸⁰ Moreover,

⁷⁸ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106b19-26.

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b26-31.

⁸⁰ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1105a5-6.

virtuous action must be accompanied by the correspondingly appropriate mental state if it is to be truly virtuous:

Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.⁸¹

Aristotle regarded the sort of work the individual engages in, in order to harmonize emotion with action as essential to moral thinking.⁸² Calhoun also recognizes the interplay between emotion and belief and sees it as integral to moral theory. However, Calhoun's focus is primarily not emotional work on the self, but emotional work on others. I will discuss emotional work on others in the next chapter, but before discussing emotional work on others I will examine the role which emotional work on the self plays in moral theory. I hope, ultimately, to demonstrate that moral thinking must address concerns about the relevance and

⁸¹ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1105b5-9.

⁸² Nussbaum adopts an Aristotelian ethic which acknowledges the role of the emotions in moral perception: "a person of practical insight will cultivate emotional openness and responsiveness in approaching a new situation. Frequently, it will be her passionate response, rather than detached thinking, that will guide her to the appropriate recognitions." "An Aristotelian Conception of Rationality", p.79

propriety of emotional responses that arise when we consider more broadly, what it is to be a moral agent.

I have suggested that an essential feature of emotional work on the self is the attempt to develop an alignment or fit between emotion and belief. This alignment, or 'appropriate relation', is needed so that the moral agent may develop a sound moral character. I have also suggested that emotions provide us with a perceptive lens for assessing the moral content of experience. Recognizing the morally significant features of a situation is, of course, not the same thing as assessing them, an activity which involves moral inquiry. Because emotions are grounded in paradigm scenarios which fix the object and standard responses, they set the context for moral inquiry by offering a pre-assessment. To the extent our emotions are appropriate they will offer the correct assessment. Emotional work is thus, in part, the project of coming to have more appropriate emotions which can accurately perceive objective features of moral situations.

it isn't just that sometimes we need the emotions to get to the right (intellectual) view of the situation; this is true, but not the entire story. Neither is it just that the emotions supply extra praiseworthy elements external to cognition but without which virtue is incomplete. The emotions are themselves modes of vision, or recognition. Their responses are part of what knowing, that is truly recognizing or acknowledging, *consists in*.⁸³

⁸³ Nussbaum, "An Aristotelian Conception of Rationality", p.79.

Let us consider an example: A young woman (Mary) seriously considers, for the first time, vegetarianism as a moral issue. Until now, she had always enjoyed eating meat. Prior to this interest in vegetarianism Mary had not regarded meat eating as a moral issue - that is to say, it was not an issue at all. Now, however, she finds herself doubting the acceptability of meat eating. As one might expect, Mary comes to feel uncomfortable about eating meat as she becomes aware of the moral issues surrounding vegetarianism, and at times she feels positively repelled by the prospect of eating meat. Mary considers some of the arguments against meat eating, considers the cruelty involved in factory farming, the unnecessary suffering imposed on the animals by indecent living conditions, and finally concludes that vegetarianism is the correct moral choice. Having come to a conclusion about the morality of this particular action, has Mary finished her moral work on the matter? Not necessarily.

It may be that in coming to have such a considered moral judgment she finds that she has automatically adjusted emotionally. It may be that she has come to have emotions which pick out features of experience relevant to her moral judgment that eating meat is wrong (for example, disgust over the suffering imposed on the animals). If her emotions (broadly construed) have been 'automatically adjusted' she will not be in the compromised position of having desires to do what she believes it is wrong to do. In fact, the natural way in which our emotions and beliefs seem to align themselves is a telling feature of our agency. If we were the sorts of creatures in which beliefs and emotions typically

conflicted, the project of finding meaning in life would be hopeless.⁸⁴ It is not always the case, however, that an agent's emotions and beliefs align themselves so smoothly. In some cases the agent has to work to achieve an alignment between emotion and belief; she may have to work to re-educate habitual patterns of emotional response in order to realize moral development of the sort initially envisioned.

Let us return to Mary. Mary is now convinced that part of being a good person, and acting rightly, involves refusing to eat meat. She craves meat occasionally, and when she does she works to overcome this craving - she doesn't want to desire to do something that she now believes is wrong. When she hungers for meat she reminds herself of some of the arguments that have convinced her to become an ethical vegetarian, and attempts to redescribe her desire for meat in a way which makes it unattractive to her. Such redescription may be a strategically important part of Mary's coming to have well-ordered emotions and beliefs. Mary is for the most part successful, and her cravings for this prohibited item become less frequent. Mary is pleased that her emotions have aligned themselves with her beliefs - she considers it moral progress. After some time, the thought of eating meat is no longer one which Mary must work to overcome, but instead becomes one which vaguely repulses her. Mary has been

⁸⁴ The account of the emotions which acknowledges their connection to learned paradigms acknowledges this natural relation: "paradigm scenarios, in setting up our emotional repertoire, quite literally provide the meaning of our emotions." de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotion", p.189.

successful in this piece of emotional work on herself, and has, in an Aristotelian sense, improved her moral character.

It might be argued that there is nothing within moral agency that needs explanation using the concept of emotional work on the self, rather what is needed is merely a specification of the relevant beliefs and perceptions upon which the correct moral decision bears. What is important is not that Mary's emotions are aligned with her beliefs, what matters is that Mary believes it is wrong to eat meat, and thus refrains from eating meat. The details of her moral character are of no relevance in an assessment of her moral agency. Hence, there is no need to introduce 'spurious' notions, such as emotional work on the self, into our conception of moral agency. They will needlessly complicate any moral system, and may even distract us from what is truly of moral import.

This argument ignores important features of our moral experience. If emotions function as reason-giving (as I have suggested in Chapter One) insofar as directed patterns of attention lead to patterned responses to this ordered observation, then, in this sense, emotions play a role in moral judgments. As I argued in Chapter Two, sound moral agency requires both competent moral perception and right action (which itself sometimes calls for the appropriate emotional response). So, appropriate emotions are important in moral perception, moral judgment and moral action. Aristotle responds to the view that a moral action can be evaluated apart from the emotions involved by telling us that we

have no prospect of becoming good without doing virtuous acts as the virtuous would do them:

We may remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well....the virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.⁸⁵

Reconsider Mary: let us suppose her emotional work was unsuccessful. Although she tried to overcome her periodic cravings for meat, she could not consistently do so, and thus, she never came to have well-ordered emotions and beliefs about vegetarianism. What should we say about Mary's status as an ethical vegetarian? There are a number of possibilities for the 'unsuccessful vegetarian'. First, it is possible that she might continue to believe that it is wrong to eat meat, and yet regularly try, unsuccessfully, to overcome this urge, experiencing self-contempt arising out of her inability to align her emotions and her moral beliefs. Although she manages not to eat meat, she is unable, so to speak, to bring her second order desires in line with her first order desires.⁸⁶ The result

⁸⁵ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106a14-16, 1106a21-23.

⁸⁶ "Someone has a desire of the second order with when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will." Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", in J.M. Fischer ed., *Moral Responsibility* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p.70.

is that she feels contemptuous towards herself because she is, in some sense, unable to desire (and not desire) what she feels she should (and should not).

Secondly, she might become frustrated with her own lack of progress and decide that even though it is wrong to eat meat, her efforts have convinced her that she, in this instance, cannot manage to maintain the right course of action. Thus, she resigns herself to the fact that she is not as morally upright as she had hoped to be. Here, she suffers a loss of self-respect, as she eats meat believing it to be wrong. The failure to align moral beliefs about vegetarianism with the practice of vegetarianism, lead the unsuccessful vegetarian to be deeply disappointed in her own moral agency.

On a third possibility, after putting much failed energy into attempts to overcome her craving for meat, she decides that her efforts have been sincere and that it is impossible for her to give up eating meat. While continuing to believe that meat eating is wrong, she excuses herself because she cannot help herself. In this case she fails to align her desire to eat meat with her belief that meat eating is unethical, and ultimately gives up on practicing the moral belief. Indeed, she inevitably does align her emotions with her moral beliefs, but only by a process of excuse and rationalization, only by becoming diminished as a moral agent in her own eyes. Vegetarianism turned out to be beyond her power.

In the first case Mary does the action she believes to be right but still has desires to do the wrong thing. In both the second and third cases she fails to do what she believes is right, but there is a difference between the two. In the

second case she sees herself as a moral failure because she has failed in her project whereas in the third case she excuses herself from an action which she has decided is beyond her power and is thus diminished as a moral agent.

These three possibilities for the unsuccessful vegetarian suggest that a narrow view of morality, which focusses just on actions and principles, gets the facts wrong. In each case the agent's ability to do emotional work on the self affects her prospects for sound moral agency, for she is less likely to be able to act rightly if she still desires to do what she believes is wrong, and she is less likely to perceive a situation as reason-giving in relevant ways if her attention is not properly focussed. None of these results is morally neutral. A moral view which holds that such emotional work on the self is insignificant to moral thinking fails to account for the importantly different possibilities for the unsuccessful vegetarian, for it fails to notice that emotions may affect both moral inquiry or perception and moral action. Yet, it seems clear that the course of such emotional work on the self is important to us, not merely for obviously instrumental reasons, but more importantly as moral agents concerned about our own progress, and as individuals concerned with the moral agency of others. Moral agency is more than the sum of an individual's beliefs and actions.

The vegetarianism examples (successful and unsuccessful) are meant to illustrate two things. First, the emotional complexity of moral agency needs to be addressed in our moral thinking. Secondly, narrowly construed moral theory that fails to account for such complexities is indeed; inadequate. An account of moral

development is fundamental to an inquiry aimed at "becoming good", and will recognize at least part of the project as the education of the emotions.

The emotions play a central role in moral development, and thus a moral theory which ignores the emotions is inadequate. I have suggested, to this point, that emotional work on the self is a phenomenon that moral theory must take account of. A moral theory unconcerned with the emotional side of moral agency will be unable to explain that part of moral agency which is concerned with living well, and the improvement of moral agency. Moreover, it will be unable to explain how it is that an appropriate emotional response is part of what makes an action morally correct. This inadequacy was discussed in Chapter Two. Williams asserts that sometimes we need to make reference to an agent's emotional disposition in order to properly understand a moral action. Moreover, the discussion of the supposed conflict between emotion-based and duty-based action demonstrated that particular actions (such as the saving the spouse example) cannot be understood if a dichotomy between the motive to act morally, and emotion-based action is assumed.

The view that right action calls for appropriate emotion (or cannot be understood without reference to the agent's emotional disposition) doesn't require, however, that the moral agent possess a positive and strong emotion in each instance in order for the action to be a moral action. For example, when Mary struggles with her desire to eat meat on a particular occasion, but refrains, it does not seem reasonable to say that she did not act morally because she didn't refrain

from meat eating with the appropriate emotion (it is reasonable to say that the action was not excellent in the Aristotelian sense, and that Mary's character is not yet 'as it should be'). The education of the emotions is important so that one becomes better disposed to act rightly.

Assessing Emotional Responses

I shall now offer an account of the sort of process that I take emotional work on the self to be. The recognition of a dissonance between one's emotions and beliefs is what initially prompts an individual to more closely examine her emotional responses and moral beliefs. For example, if a non-racist was not bothered by her racist response to a particular situation, the process of emotional work on the self would never get started, for she would not have acknowledged the dissonance between her emotions and beliefs. Dissonance, as I speak of it here, admits of degrees. For example, "I didn't want to help him, but I believed that I should and so I did", suggests a lesser degree of conflict than "I believe that people should not be discriminated against because of their colour, but I find that I am leery about sharing a seat on the bus with a native person." It is through the recognition of this dissonance that one is led to examine the appropriateness of one's emotions and the beliefs they imply. The evaluation of one's beliefs and emotions is neither simple, nor formulaic, nor is it something which happens only once. An individual who comes to believe that ethical vegetarianism is morally correct may automatically come to have the correspondingly appropriate emotions, in which

case she would not have the need to do emotional work on the self. She may not, however, and would thus need to do some work to acquire the appropriate emotions. Some cases will require more work than others, it might be that it is more difficult to extinguish an emotion than to acquire a new one, and some cases might present numerous emotions (and implicit beliefs) that will have to be worked through. Indeed, it seems that an important part of a conception of morality as such is that it demands work from us.

The evaluation of one's emotional responses and beliefs might take a number of forms dependent upon the particular case. I shall here suggest some features that might be involved in the evaluative process. Important in an evaluation of emotional response is a consideration of its objectivity or subjectivity. To the extent that a particular emotion allows one to see relevant objective features of a situation, it is objective, and if the emotion imports features of the agent which distract attention from objective features of the situation it is subjective. To ask about the objectivity of one's emotion is to begin to evaluate the emotion's capacity as an accurate gatherer of information.⁸⁷ Projective emotions are those which will limit the agent's ability as an objective data gatherer.

⁸⁷ de Sousa suggests that one way to help discover which emotions might be objective in a given context is through the "diagnostic use of consistency" which he describes as a test of commitment "whether one is committed to the second-order desire that the first-order emotion recur under relevantly similar conditions. If it does, that marks you as recognizing the possibility of "relevantly similar conditions." And that is all there is to the claim of universalizability: only those emotions are *subjective*, in addition to being *agent-relative*, which do not acknowledge the claim of consistency." "Emotion and the Conduct of Life", p.311.

So in the case of Mary, who believed, based upon sound argumentation that vegetarianism is the correct moral choice, the craving for meat would be projective, for it imports subjective features of Mary's emotional state which distract attention from relevant features of the situation. On the other hand, Mary's distaste at the prospect of eating meat picks out relevant features of a moral situation, in so far as it attends to the suffering of the animal, and so on. The inquiry into the status of my emotions as objective or projective is not one single step in the attempt to develop well-ordered emotions and beliefs, but rather sets a framework of inquiry within which one proceeds.

Because one's habitual emotional responses have been learned through the adoption of paradigm scenarios (as I discussed in Chapter One), one must return to the paradigm scenarios in order to understand and evaluate emotional responses. In de Sousa's terms this evaluation would amount to an assessment of emotional responses through evoking situations and paradigm scenarios. One asks whether the evoking situation is an actual instance of the paradigm scenario. In embarrassment, for example, where the paradigm involves finding oneself to be perceived foolish, one asks "does the situation which has produced my present embarrassment meet the conditions of the paradigm scenario?" Of course, there need not actually be people present who do find one foolish, it may be enough for some imagined spectator to find one foolish, for the paradigm scenario to be satisfied. But there are clearly limits to the applicability of the paradigm scenario and some cases of inappropriate embarrassment will not satisfy the paradigm.

Emotional responses may also be assessed, according to de Sousa, through an examination of the ways in which other paradigm scenarios may fit the evoking situation, and the extent to which they are compatible, or dominate one another. "A paradigm can always be challenged in the light of a wider range of considerations than are available when the case is viewed in isolation. It can be revised in the light of competing paradigms that are also applicable to the situation at hand."⁸⁸ This evaluative process involves an assessment of the fit between considered moral judgments and emotions (a sort of 'reflective equilibrium' of emotions and beliefs).⁸⁹ The vegetarian example may help to illustrate the possibility for a paradigm shift.

Before initially considering vegetarianism Mary's paradigms for meat consumption might have been those typically available in a non-vegetarian culture. The beliefs that meat is nutritious and tasty, 'part of a well-balanced diet!', and morally unproblematic are typical parts of the practice of meat eating. When eating meat was 'not an issue' for Mary the paradigm scenarios for meat eating remained intact. However, in coming to have beliefs about the cruelty involved in

⁸⁸ de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotion", p.187.

⁸⁹ I use this phrase loosely to describe the reflective nature of emotional work on the self. Virginia Held advocates a sort of reflective equilibrium of the emotions in which some emotions are themselves included, along with consider judgments and general principles, in the process of seeking a coherent moral view. Emotional work on the self is importantly different from Held's proposal because while she is discussing a justificatory process for moral beliefs, I am discussing a process through which one can examine the appropriateness of one's emotions, and their fit with moral beliefs. *Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p.28.

factory farming, for example, Mary acquires new emotional responses (through the acquisition of new paradigm scenarios) which conflict with her previous practice. Her task at this point is to align her emotions and beliefs so that she attains the most objective view. According to de Sousa "our most general emotional responsibility turns out to be this: *feel things as they really are*. And that is an injunction, not to ignore the idiosyncratic determinants of our individual Weltanschauung, but on the contrary to take them into account."⁹⁰

Conflicting emotional responses may occur in a number of ways. One may find the need to extinguish an inappropriate emotion, to acquire an appropriate emotion, or both, to clarify and sort through ambivalent emotions. We can understand what de Sousa calls the "challenging of paradigm scenarios" in terms of emotional work on the self through the agent's redescription of her experience; where she does not only evaluate an emotional response but also works to realize the most accurate paradigm scenarios. Clearly, what the agent needs to do in such cases is 'fully adopt' the most accurate paradigm scenario as her own.

One way in which an agent might do this, and thus come to have appropriate emotions, is by redescribing her experience in terms of this paradigm scenario when she is faced with conflicting or inappropriate emotional responses. For example, Mary comes to believe that meat eating is wrong for certain ethical reasons and (during the period in which she engages in emotional work on the self) experiences conflicting emotional responses. When she experiences the

⁹⁰ de Sousa, "Emotion and the Conduct of Life", p.315.

force of an inappropriate emotion (she wants to eat meat) she challenges it with a redescription of her experience grounded in the correct view that meat consumption involves cruelty and unnecessary suffering to animals. So the desire to eat meat is redescribed as a desire to partake in immoral activity. This redescription may help to refocus Mary's attention on what is morally relevant, so that she may be successfully guided by her beliefs and emotions to act well. The redescription of emotion and experience in terms of correct moral beliefs is a powerful tool in the acquisition of appropriate emotions⁹¹.

In this chapter I have suggested that the project of emotional work on the self is a complicated one in which the assessment of emotions and their implied beliefs sets a framework of inquiry into their objectivity and propriety in a given context. The aim of emotional work on the self is to align appropriate emotions with correct moral beliefs, and to acquire more objective emotions which are themselves more accurate perceptual tools, and thus aid the development of sound moral agency. Redescription of one's experience through the perceptual lens of appropriate emotion may redirect the agent's attention towards morally relevant features of a situation and thereby point to the deficiencies in a particular emotional response. The aim of the enterprise is development of well-ordered emotions and beliefs, a key feature of sound moral agency. In the next chapter

⁹¹ Martha Nussbaum alludes to the nature of such redescription when she writes: "Stories first construct and then evoke (and strengthen) the experience of feeling. So a criticism of emotion must be, prominently, an unwriting of stories." "Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of Love" in *Love's Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.294.

I shall expand upon some of these ideas in a discussion of emotional work on others.

Chapter Four: Emotional Work on Others

I have suggested that emotional work on the self is an important feature of moral theory because emotions themselves feature in moral agency. Appropriate emotions provide better moral perceptions than inappropriate emotions because they accurately discern relevant features of moral situations. They are better vehicles of moral perception than inappropriate or projective emotions. It may happen that an individual comes to hold a particular moral belief and yet fails at the same time to acquire the appropriate emotional response. In order to ensure good moral agency in such cases, the individual does, or ought to do, some work to come to have the appropriate emotional response - this enterprise has been discussed as emotional work on the self. The emotions are relevant in the development of sound moral agency and thus emotional work on the self is important in the development of sound moral agency. This suggests a further possibility: given that the acquisition of appropriate emotions is important in good moral agency, and given that individuals have the ability to influence each others' emotions, there might be an intersubjective component involved in the acquisition of appropriate emotions. I shall examine the possibility for such a moral relational enterprise by beginning and discussing Calhoun's brief account of emotional work on others.

According to Calhoun, even though emotional work on others is a significant feature of our moral experience, it is neglected in traditional moral theory because it does not fit within the agent-centred paradigm that traditional moral theory adopts. As discussed in the last chapter, Calhoun claims that emotional work on the self does fit within the agent-centred paradigm (which ignores the interactive nature of moral agency, and sees as valid only issues surrounding decision making, or the evaluation of others' actions) and thus does not pose the challenge to traditional moral theory that emotional work on others poses. I have questioned this claim on the grounds that the agent engaged in emotional work on the self is not obviously partaking strictly in decision making or action, but is rather engaged in a complicated process of emotional and moral development that cannot be accurately explained as decision making nor action. Indeed, the description of emotional work on the self as *work* suggests that something more complicated than decision making or a particular action is involved.

In this chapter I examine the conception of emotional work on others advanced by Calhoun. I shall argue that Calhoun's account is underdeveloped in two important ways. First, her illustrations of emotional work on others comprise a broad array of moral and sometimes nonmoral behaviour, so that the aim of her examples is never clearly delineated. In fact, her account of emotional work on others is so imprecise that it allows for immoral behaviour to count as emotional work on others. Secondly, Calhoun never adequately develops the claim that recognition of emotional work on others as a moral enterprise should lead us to

conceive of morality as a cooperative venture rather than as individual task. For example, even if we grant that interpersonal interactions can influence emotional and moral agency, we are not forced to conceive of morality as a cooperative enterprise, for it remains the case that some instances of emotional persuasion may be manipulative or simply nonmoral. We may, however, be compelled to acknowledge the importance of the education of the emotions.

Calhoun fails to adequately describe what emotional work on others consists in, and how it is to be delimited as a moral phenomenon. Furthermore, she fails to deal with the complicated and interesting issues which arise out of an acknowledgment that moral agency can be influenced by others (for better and worse). After exploring Calhoun's account of emotional work on others, I shall make some suggestions of my own about the nature of emotional work on others.

Calhoun On Emotional Work On Others

At this point it might be helpful to restate the claims Calhoun makes in arguing for the recognition in moral theory of emotional work on others. First, she argues that emotional work on others is the management of the emotions of the other. Second, she claims that this important phenomenon cannot be accounted for within a dyadic, agent-centred tradition of moral theory. She further argues that because there is something important and valuable in the notion of emotional work on others, we should regard ethics more as a cooperative venture than as an

individual task. Finally (and crucial to her argument) Calhoun assumes that emotional work on others is both an emotional and a moral phenomenon.

Calhoun's position is intriguing and yet unsatisfying. The call to attend to interpersonal relations opens up a space for inquiry into the propriety of these relations.⁹² Issues surrounding appropriate relations are prominent issues in feminist ethics. Some feminist philosophers argue that traditional moral theory leaves no room for an account of moral development and thereby, for example, neglects or ignores the work that parents engage in when morally educating their children.⁹³ Calhoun's position grants interpersonal relations a status which they are not usually granted in moral theory, and in this respect may be attractive to ethicists with feminist concerns. In fact, Calhoun elsewhere asserts that women should have concerns about the view that moral knowledge is available only to the rational adult agent, and need not be understood in a developmental way. She objects to the claim that

⁹² Calhoun is surprisingly silent about the propriety of specific sorts of interactions. She seems to assume that the interactions will be morally acceptable. This is a particularly odd assumption given her feminist concerns. It is odd because feminist moral philosophy often deems it necessary to deal directly with the question of appropriate relations in discussions of autonomy, social change, power, and so on, given the influence of socialization on both females and males.

⁹³ Eve Browning Cole notes that this is a criticism made of Rawls's position in *A Theory of Justice*. Eve Browning Cole, *Philosophy and Feminist Criticism* (New York: Paragon House, 1993), p.104. A good example of this focus on appropriate relations is the work of Annette Baier, who claims that the concept of appropriate trust mediates between reason and feeling. "Trust and Antitrust", in *Ethics*, 96 (2), January 1986, pp.231-260. And, "What Do Women Want in Moral Theory", in *Nous*, 19 (1), March 1985, pp.53-63.

moral knowledge is not only justified but also acquired exclusively or most importantly through rational reflection. Women have special reason to be concerned about this ideology. Women's traditional role has included the moral education of children. The significance of women's work in transmitting moral knowledge and instilling a moral motivational structure (either well or poorly) is likely to remain invisible so long as the theoretical focus remains on adult acquisition of moral knowledge.⁹⁴

According to Calhoun, feminists are attracted to the concept of emotional work on others because it names something that many women have much experience with:

"Emotional work" names something else, a work women do and are expected to do, especially in managing the domestic household. It names a familiar moral activity that nevertheless escapes moral recollection and reflection. "Emotional work" names the management of *others'* emotions -- soothing tempers, boosting confidence, fueling pride, preventing frictions, and mending ego wounds. Taking care of others, creating domestic harmony, and caring about how others fare morally calls for work on others' emotions. *This* emotional work eludes moral thinking. It falls outside our paradigms for moral activity.⁹⁵

According to Calhoun, in emotional work on others the agent is neither the primary decision maker, nor actor, nor is she the judge of another agent's actions. The emotional worker is instead concerned with the "managing of another's moral

⁹⁴ Cheshire Calhoun, "Justice, Care, Gender Bias" in *The Journal of Philosophy*, September 1988, p.457.

⁹⁵ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.118.

household". Calhoun does not clearly characterize this "managing of another's moral household", but she uses a number of examples to illustrate its role within moral experience. I will discuss three of them.

The first is an example of the sort of moral education and counselling which often eludes agent-centred thinking, as the emotional worker is neither the primary moral agent, nor the "specular judge"⁹⁶. After a class on sexual harassment a young female student comes to her professor and shares with the professor her own experience of being harassed. What bothers the student is her own emotional reaction to the experience. Cognitively she knows that the harassment was wrong, but experientially she is unable to appropriately feel its wrongness. It seems to her intellectually that she should feel harmed, or angry, or maltreated, and yet she is unable to experience her anger as justified. Instead she doubts and criticizes herself, worrying that she isn't being respectful of authority, and consequently is unable to feel and express an appropriately angry response. The professor talks to the student about the injustice of her experience, and helps her to acquire a new story, a way of understanding her experience that legitimates the anger she feels.

In this example the emotional worker is helping another to feel what she knows cognitively to be the case. "Because what we feel is tied to how we interpret situations, helping others get the right moral perspective cannot be

⁹⁶ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.119.

detached from working to correct their emotional attitudes."⁹⁷ Emotional work on others may involve telling a story differently, throwing a different light on the individual's experience, so that the individual may come to have an appropriately aligned emotions and beliefs. According to Calhoun, this transformation of emotion is crucial to the development of any moral system "since only the emotional enlivening of moral beliefs allows them to have moral force."⁹⁸ Here we witness an affinity between emotional work on the self and emotional work on others.

Just as emotional work on the self aims at improved moral agency in terms of well-ordered emotions and beliefs, this case of emotional work on others points to the importance of an alignment between considered moral judgments and appropriate emotions. Just as Mary was able to successfully transform her craving for meat (first into something she could control, and later by extinguishing it) the young student's emotions are appropriately transformed by the professor's redescription of her experience. The professor's story allows the student to understand the experience in such a way that her appropriate emotional response predominates, and her worries about respect for authority, and her self-doubts, are subdued. In the process, of course, the student's beliefs may change and her

⁹⁷ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.120.

⁹⁸ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.120. This is clearly a controversial claim. Bernard Williams highlights some of the variables involved in such an interpretation of motivation or 'having reasons' in "Internal and external reasons", in *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.101-113.

change in belief may assist her in experiencing the situation differently. However, it need not be the case that her beliefs change. The beliefs she has are only one aspect of her interpretation of the situation, and part of her distress may be that she is unable to feel the way she believes she should feel. This inability to have the appropriate feelings may cast doubt on the beliefs she has. The new interpretation may subdue those doubts by putting her beliefs in a new light.

Calhoun's second example is intended to represent the role of moral mediation in emotional work on others. A friend asks you for advice: "What should I do?" She is an unhappily married woman and is considering having an affair. Clearly, she is not asking you to restate the various formulations of the categorical imperative, nor perform a utilitarian calculus, nor asking to be enlightened as to what would properly constitute moderation in such a circumstance. In some complicated way she is asking you to concern yourself with her moral agency (what *she* should do) given the complexities of her life (given who *she* is). She may, in part, simply be looking for help in rehearsing the various perspectives on her action available to her, looking for a second opinion, or for assistance in evaluating her own responses to these perspectives. "Moral education and counseling both involve more than teaching or applying moral standards. They involve teaching others how to interpret moral situations."⁹⁹ Calhoun suggests that moral counselling is, in such a case, mediation between her prospective agency and the prospective patients of her action (her husband,

⁹⁹ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.119.

children, herself, her potential lover, etc.). In mediating between the other's possibilities for action the aim is the management of another. In this case the friend's moral house needs ordering. In such a case, says Calhoun, the dominant moral relationship is not dyadic, but an "essentially triadic and mediator-centred moral relation."¹⁰⁰

In a third example, Calhoun describes the sort of emotional work on others that focusses on "moral intervention" and the effects of a third person's agency on the well-being of another.¹⁰¹ A new member of an academic department is excessively rebuked for unknowingly violating department policy on course limits by admitting too many students. The sting of the rebuke is softened by a timely remark made by her office mate: "Don't we wish there were hordes of students beating down the doors to our classes!" Here, the office mate turned a potentially distressing situation into a mildly unpleasant one with a well-timed and friendly remark. According to Calhoun: "This, too, is emotional work - taking the emotional sting out of moral abuse with humor, commiseration, compensation, or psychological explanations that make abuse forgivable."¹⁰² In this case, emotional work on others aims at ensuring that the other doesn't feel emotional upset inappropriate to the circumstance. Here the concern of the emotional worker is that the other have a suitable emotional response in a given circumstance. The

¹⁰⁰ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.119.

¹⁰¹ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.121.

¹⁰² Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.121.

office mate attempts to place the situation in a new light so that the new department member doesn't feel overly distressed by the reprimand.

These examples cover a wide range of experience, and yet they do have in common the notion that the action of the emotional worker is directed towards the other with concern for the other's emotional well-being. Why is a concern for the other's emotional well-being morally important? According to Calhoun, it is important because our feelings influence how we interpret experience, and thus, in helping others come to correct moral views we must attend to their emotional attitudes. In certain kinds of situations the connection between a person's beliefs about what to do and the appropriate emotions is obvious, as when the feeling of gratitude for another's assistance finds its expression in thanking that person for her help. In the same way that the moral agent herself works to align her emotions with her moral beliefs (for example, the vegetarian who works to overcome her cravings for meat) moral work centred on others' agency must also involve emotion and belief: "Emotions motivate action, and we may sometimes be morally called on to reroute others' actions by managing their emotions."¹⁰³ For example, when we help a child feel gratitude for a previously unappreciated Christmas present from a loving relative, the child's action of thanking the gift giver becomes not only easier but more sincere or genuine.

In the examples offered as illustrations of emotional work on others the emotional content varies. Calhoun's description of some of the examples suggests

¹⁰³ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.121.

that in some cases the work done on the other is directed towards allowing the other to come to have an appropriate emotion (for example, the student who has been sexually harassed) while in other cases the work done is intended to aid the other's decision making (the example of the married friend) and also the work may be done to save the other from feeling inappropriately upset as a result of the abusive agency of a third party (as in the office mate example). Calhoun is certainly gesturing towards some sort of beneficial interpersonal engagement for the good of the other, but it remains unclear how, on her account, we can delineate emotional work on others from other sorts of well-intended emotional interactions or even from emotional abuse.¹⁰⁴ I believe that emotional work on others captures something important about our experience, but it remains unclear just how it is to be understood as part of our *moral* experience. We need to uncover the aspect(s) of emotional work on others which grant it status as a moral enterprise if we are to consider it a distinctively moral phenomenon.

We know that emotional work on others is the "management of *others'* emotions" and that Calhoun sees it as a moral phenomenon neglected in traditional moral theory. We also know that she describes her examples of emotional work on others as moral education, moral counselling, and moral intervention. Can the concept of emotional work on others be made lucid under

¹⁰⁴ People often manipulate others emotionally by producing inappropriate emotional responses, for example, guilt. People also interact emotionally with others in ways which are not manipulative but should not be considered emotional work, for example, offering a friendly greeting.

such a liberal account of what it comprises? I will suggest that Calhoun has not developed an explicit, coherent account of emotional work on others because she has not succeeded in identifying what it is in her examples that constitutes emotional work on others. In order to show this, I shall now briefly return to the examples of emotional work on others offered by Calhoun to see what can be made of some of her claims about emotional work on others as both an emotional and as a moral phenomenon.

Taking Another Look at Emotional Work on Others

Let us begin with the case of the sexually harassed student. What is the significant emotional feature in this example of "moral education"? Earlier I suggested that this was an example of an emotional worker helping another bring her feelings under the description of an emotional paradigm scenario which legitimates those feelings as appropriate. The professor's redescription encourages the student to experience her emotional response as congruous with her 'rational experience', the story allows her to see how anger and particular views about the immorality of sexual harassment fit together. In fact, the professor helps the student to see her emotional response to the harassment as the response actually called for and, in this sense, as the *right* way to feel about it. What makes this an instance of emotional work is that the student is brought to affirm a different perspective which brings her emotions and beliefs into alignment. In this case the emotional worker aims at providing the other with a more

appropriate emotional response, which itself provides better moral guidance and moral perception because it more adequately focusses the agent's attention in a moral situation.

An emotional response constitutes a kind of perception of a situation, and may also call for the agent to act. So, an emotion could be 'morally confused' in at least two interrelated ways. First, it could direct the agent to act wrongly and secondly it could represent a misperception of what is going on. In the harassment case the student may, for example, experience her confused anger at being harassed as a reason to apologize for over-reacting, or as self-hatred for 'allowing herself to end up in such a situation', either of which would be a misrepresentation of the situation which actually occurred and would suggest inappropriate courses of action to her. By helping her to experience her anger as both a correct perception (getting the object of her anger right) and as legitimate to feel in this case, the professor helps to enable the student to act in a way which is not morally confused.

The second example offered by Calhoun as an illumination of emotional work on others is the moral counselling of a friend who is considering an affair. The example is unfortunately underdescribed, and is thus open to at least two interpretations. On one reading the unhappily married woman's query "What should I do?" signals her attempt to procure emotional support from her friend. Sartre makes this kind of point in a defence of existentialism when he argues that

the decision to act remains the sole responsibility of the decision-making individual.¹⁰⁵ The decision to seek advice from a particular person is a decision about what advice to get - and as such is perhaps better understood as a search for the confirmation of one's own perspective. "But if you seek advice from a priest, for example, you have chosen this priest; you already knew, more or less, just about what advice he was going to give you. In other words, choosing your adviser is involving yourself."¹⁰⁶ On this account the married friend's query is understood as an invitation to support the other's decision. Friends do at times seek confirmation of their own views. However, indiscriminate support of a friend could not be correctly described as the management of another's moral household. This interpretation of the married friend example rules out the use of the concept of emotional work on others as a distinctively moral phenomenon.

On the second reading of the unhappily married friend example the relation is characterized by moral mediation. The emotional worker mediates between the friend's possibilities for action, and how these possibilities would affect the particular individuals involved. The suggestion is that the emotional worker helps the other make a thorough decision by ensuring that the various possibilities for action are considered. It is not clear just how moral mediation of this sort is an instance of emotional work on others - the management of another's emotions.

¹⁰⁵ Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Humanism of Existentialism", in Wade Baskin ed., *Jean-Paul Sartre: Essays in Existentialism* (New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1977), pp.31-62.

¹⁰⁶ Sartre, "The Humanism of Existentialism", p.44.

Helping a friend to make a sound moral decision could be considered a moral activity in certain circumstances, but as such, it is not an instance of the management of another's emotions. This example illustrates the conversational character of much moral thinking and suggests how another can provide helpful objectivity, but does not capture anything clearly identifiable as emotional work. According to Calhoun, the aim of emotional work is the "moral management of the other".¹⁰⁷ What is needed, and what Calhoun does not provide, is a clarification of the moral and emotional features of emotional work on others.

Calhoun's third example of emotional work on others focusses on moral intervention. Recall that in this case the office mate takes the sting out of moral abuse with humour - a timely remark that encourages the new professor to see that her action was not deserving of the abusive criticism it received. The aim of emotional work in this case, is the attempt to make the other feel better, or less inappropriately upset, by giving her a different perspective which suggests that a moderated emotional response is called for.

A second, and quite contrary reading of the office mate example is tenable, however, which suggests that Calhoun's account of emotional work on others is

¹⁰⁷ The description of emotional work on others as "management" is, I believe, poorly chosen. It implies that the emotional worker regulates (or attempts to regulate) the other's agency, which is itself contrary to the idea that morality be understood as cooperative venture rather than as individual task. If X is managing Y, X is in no clear sense cooperating with Y, but is rather attempting to instill a particular emotion or belief in Y. It seems incorrect to say, for example, that the professor "managed" the student when she redescribed her experience of harassment and thereby encouraged her to have an appropriate emotional response.

in need of further clarification. It seems that, on her own account, the rebuke itself might count as an instance of emotional work on others, for it too constitutes an attempt to manage another's moral household. In this case the emotional worker is concerned with the moral agency of another, and so notifies the new professor that she has acted wrongly, with the aim of getting her to feel, as well as to see, that her action was morally improper. The "moral abuse", on this reading, is an attempt at moral education. The emotional worker aims to convey to the other dissatisfaction with her (immoral) behaviour, in such a way that the emotional reaction sought will illuminate the other, leading her to see that she has acted badly.

But, it may be wondered, is it reasonable to assume that a feeling of distress or guilt will coincide with a belief that one has acted immorally? This is a complex issue¹⁰⁸. One's guilt (even if a suitable emotional response) might be excessive, badly aimed, and so on. So, even if the rebuke were, in some sense, called for, emotional mediation might still be needed. Emotional responses are multi-dimensional and so there can be multiple respects of appropriateness, and inadequacy. If, as I have earlier suggested, appropriately directed anger is a sound response for the sexually harassed student, then it seems that a reasonable reaction for a person who acts wrongly by failing to follow department policy on

¹⁰⁸ It is worth noting here that many philosophers include conceptions of guilt and other "moral sentiments" in a variety of theoretical accounts of moral phenomena, including both justice, and the emotions of self-assessment. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

course limits might be a certain amount of regret or upset about having acted badly.

In any case, the important point to notice is that Calhoun's account of emotional work on others as the management of others' emotions is so general that it allows for the possibility that what she described as moral abuse can also be seen as an instance of emotional work on others. While she has provided some interesting examples, she has not provided enough detail to produce a constructive concept, nor has she positioned herself to make legitimate the positive claims about morality as cooperative venture which she does make. It seems to me that the only one of the examples of emotional work on others that is, in fact, an instance of a distinctively moral and emotional enterprise is the example of the sexually harassed student. Calhoun's discussion of emotional work on others is provoking, however, and it is worth seeing if some further clarification can be made that will salvage the concept. I will now make some suggestions about the possible nature of emotional work on others.

Emotional Work on Others as Facilitation

Part of what emotional work on others illustrates is how concern for another leads to a concern for the other's emotional condition, and thus we come to see the need to focus on the emotional aspects of the individual's character in addition to her beliefs. I do not mean to suggest that the rational and emotional aspects of character are entirely distinct. This would clearly contradict my case for the

'emotionally aligned' ethical vegetarian, and the sense in which emotions may be understood as reason-giving. I take the relation between the emotions and rationality to be an important one, one in need of consideration if conceptions of moral character and agency are to make sense. It is the relation between 'rationality' and 'emotionality' that I am exploring in my examination of emotional work.

Emotional work (on the self or others) is important in moral theory precisely because the emotions feature in moral decision making, both as more or less appropriate responses to a given situation and as reason-giving, and in moral agency, where they are relevant in assessments of moral character. The relation between the emotions and rationality is, as we have seen, explored by de Sousa who argues that the emotions are intricately involved in rationality. Other philosophers also recognize the importance of this relation. For example, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty argues that, even for Descartes, bodily based thought (which includes the emotions) is "...necessary to guide the will's determinations in directing a soundly constructed life, since the body not only affects the content, but the sequence and association of perceptual ideas."¹⁰⁹ Rorty argues for a position which affirms an interdependence between an agent's maintenance and informational systems, and then concludes: "Find a sound body, and you'll be likely to find a sound mind. Analyze the working of a sound body, and you'll have

¹⁰⁹ A.O. Rorty, "Descartes on Thinking With the Body", in John Cottingham ed., *The Cambridge Companion To Descartes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.372.

some part of the analysis of the physical conditions for a sound mind."¹¹⁰ In much the same way, I want to claim that there exists a relation of interdependence between the emotions and beliefs, and that having a healthy or appropriate alignment of emotions and moral beliefs is part of a sound moral character.

On my account, emotional work on others is not properly described as the management of others' emotions, but is best understood as the facilitation of another's emotional work on the self. I intend by this different description to note that while management can be manipulative or abusive, facilitation leaves the other responsible for the choices she makes. Thus, facilitation respects individual self-determination and autonomy in a way that management does not. Like emotional work on the self, the enterprise of emotional work on others recognizes the moral importance of the proper alignment of emotions and beliefs, as well as the significance of appropriate emotions. In emotional work on others the emotional worker aims at encouraging the other to engage in an assessment of her own emotions and beliefs. In emotional work on the self, I suggested, the individual adopts a framework of inquiry into her emotions and beliefs after experiencing a dissonance between the two. In emotional work on others the emotional worker encourages the other to engage in a moral evaluation. The sort of dissonance which may lead an individual to engage in emotional work on her self may not be initially present in cases of emotional work on others. In the case of the sexually harassed student the dissonance was already present when she

¹¹⁰ Amelie Rorty, "Descartes on Thinking With the Body", p.388.

came to speak to her professor, and so the professor was able to aid her in the evaluation of possible paradigm scenarios and corresponding emotions. In emotional work on the other, however, it might not be that a dissonance is already clearly articulated.

Emotional work on others may sometimes be initiated by the emotional worker's suggestion that a different paradigm scenario is applicable in a given context that the other had not realized, and thereby produce a dissonance in the other. For example, a young person is extremely proud of her good looks and tennis skills. Another individual remarks that while it is reasonable to be proud of one's accomplishments, such as a good serve, one's good looks cannot be considered accomplishments, and suggests that the appropriate description of her pride in her good looks is vanity. The result, in such a case, might be that the individual recognizes the inappropriateness of her emotional response, and is moved to consider the paradigmatic difference between vanity and pride. It may also be that the individual reacts to the remark of the emotional worker with indignation and hostility, and thus would never come to see the need for an evaluation of her emotional paradigms. If the other is moved to evaluate her emotions and beliefs morally, she becomes engaged in a framework of inquiry directed towards improved emotional alignment.

As we saw with emotional work on the self, a number of methods of assessment of emotions and beliefs are relevant in emotional work on others. The first is an evaluation of an agent's emotional response in terms of its capacity to

appropriately direct attention, its status as an 'information gatherer'. A projective emotion will prevent an agent from accurately perceiving relevant features of a situation. In the case of the sexually harassed student, upon consideration of the objectivity of her emotional responses, she might begin to understand her anger as appropriately directing her focus towards relevant features of the situation, while her worries about 'respect for authority' inappropriately lead her to dismiss her awareness of the wrongness of sexual harassment. Of course a consideration of the objectivity and projectivity of her emotional responses may not lead her to conclude that her anger is objective, but it will set up a framework of inquiry in which she can further assess her emotions and beliefs.

The second method of assessing emotional responses is through an inquiry into whether or not the evoking situation is actually an instance of the paradigm scenario, and thus is minimally rational. If the evoking situation does not actually fit the paradigm scenario it is reasonable to question its capacity to produce the particular emotional response. For example, the professor's new description of the sexually harassed student's experience might suggest to the student that the situation she was in with her harasser was not legitimately a situation falling under the paradigm scenario of 'respect for authority'. This would depend on the paradigm scenario itself. Recall that paradigm scenarios involve two things: the characteristic object (targets, or occasions) of the emotion, and the set of characteristic or 'normal' responses to the situation. If the object of respect is an authority figure, and the normal response to authority figures is 'to be respectful

under all circumstances', then suggesting to the student that the situation is one in which the paradigm of respect for authority does not apply will not affect a change in her views. If, however, the paradigm scenario is set up so that the object of respect is an authority figure, and the normal response to authority figures is to 'respect them unless they violate the relevant conditions for respecting authority figures' (one condition might be that the authority figure must not be abusive), the suggestion that the experience with the harasser is not one which calls for respect for an authority figure might help the student to appropriately change her emotional response. The student might simply realize that the situation which evoked her emotional response was not a proper instance of the paradigm scenario 'respect for authority'.

The third method of evaluation of an emotional response (and relevant beliefs) is through the challenging of paradigm scenarios: the examination of ways in which other paradigm scenarios may be applied to situations, and the extent to which they are compatible with one another or compete with one another for dominance. In emotional work on others the emotional worker may challenge the paradigm scenarios implicit in the other's behaviour and speech in such a way that the other may be moved to engage in an evaluation of the compatibility and hierarchical dominance of the paradigms. For example, the professor may be said to have challenged the sexually harassed student's paradigms by redescribing the experience to her in such a way that her previously held paradigm of 'respect for authority' is inadequate. It might be that by focussing on the importance of a

paradigm scenario such as 'respect for persons' or 'abusing others is wrong', the professor prompts the student to examine the fit between this variety of possible paradigms. The idea is that the more objective paradigms will win out. In this sense the evaluation is like a reflective equilibrium of the emotions in which competing paradigms are assessed in terms of their independent merit as well as their fit with dominant paradigms. Of course the evaluation and revision of paradigms is neither a simple nor an effortless enterprise.

How is Emotional Work on Others *Work*?

Emotional work on others is *work*, because it requires effort directed towards the development of another's moral agency. In this sense it may be said to be intentionally directed moral work. The emotional worker's engagement takes the form of a plan or framework in the same way that intentional action may be said to be plan-like. According to A.R. White, an intentional action is something there is a reason for doing, because it is part of or the whole of a plan.

Intending, or having an intention, to V is, I submit, meaning to, having in mind to, planning to going to V, or being bent on Ving. An intention, like a plan, is something one can form, express or announce, put into effect carry out or execute; it is something one can have had for a long time or be full of....Like a plan, an intention takes many of its characteristics from what it is an intention or plan to do.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ A.R. White, *Grounds of Liability* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p.66.

In the case of emotional work on others the purpose and thus the reason for action is to aid the development of another's moral agency. The emotional worker's intention involves the plan or "frame of mind" in which she communicates to the other the new or challenging paradigm. So, the intention is not to "manage" the other by producing in her a particular emotional response, but is rather part of a plan to aid others in the development of moral agency. We may sometimes achieve the results of emotional work on others without intending to do so, but it seems wrong to call this emotional work on others because the effect is an unintended consequence of an activity with another purpose. In such cases the individual is not acting with the relevant intention.

There is a further sense in which emotional work on others is appropriately called *work*. Work often aims at a result which is incompletely seen in its detail and complexity, and it is the doing of the work which fills in the detail while executing the original aim. So, while the original plan is programmatic, the finished product is a working out of the problems posed by the implementation of the plan. Work, in this sense, is a complex and responsive task which calls for attention to the particularities that arise in its fulfilment. What makes this work moral (as opposed to manipulative or abusive) rests in the agent's intent and the way the intent is fulfilled. So, for example, the emotional work on others that takes place in the case of the sexually harassed student is programmatic in that it aims at the alignment of emotions and beliefs in the other, and yet it requires attention to particularities of the situation as they arise. The process of implementing the plan

is dynamic, as it requires that the emotional worker react to the emotional responses and beliefs of the student as they are uncovered, with attention, responsiveness, and sensitivity, and the project of doing this well requires effort and skill. Calhoun's account of moral work on others simply fails to address the question of the emotional worker's intent and consequently allows for instances of manipulation and abuse to count as emotional work.

Finally, by referring to this moral enterprise as "work", we are reminded that it is the sort of phenomenon that (to greater and lesser degrees) requires that the emotional worker intentionally engage herself in the enterprise. This reminder is important because emotional work on others has been described as work that women commonly do, and fail to be recognized for doing. It seems to me that, by proposing that emotional work on others is *work*, Calhoun is raising a barrier against the tendency to think that women's moral interactions are a feature of their disposition to act out of a 'natural kindness and caring for others'. Once viewed as a result of 'natural kindness' (whether a product of socialization or an essential feature of women) the moral worth of emotional work on others is diminished, for it may be seen simply as the consequence of a 'natural virtue' and thus be considered unworthy of moral recognition. The danger is, of course, that once viewed in this way emotional work on others would no longer be judged an enterprise deserving of moral commendation, and, it could be argued, women's

moral experience would (once again) have been devalued.¹¹² Of course this would be misleading and incorrect, for women are not particularly (or essentially) built for goodness and kindness. It could be argued that women are acculturated in such a way that they develop these abilities which consequently allow them to engage in emotional work on others naturally or spontaneously. However, even if this were true, emotional work on others would still be work as I have described it. For each case of emotional work on others is an individual task with a complex goal. It is not, moreover, a simple act of benevolence as it involves a view about what sound moral agency is. So, the fact that emotional work is *work* implies both that it has a directed or intentional aspect, and also that it is not simply a conditioned response, but rather a dynamic, interactive and responsive engagement with the other.

In my discussion of emotional work on the self, I suggested that the evaluative process involved was aided by the agent's redescription of her own experience in terms of the more appropriate paradigm. In emotional work on others the redescription is provided by the emotional worker, and features as an

¹¹² This is a theme developed in the work of Carol Gilligan, that has been picked up by many feminist philosophers. Recently Virginia Held has argued that we must reconsider what "moral experience" is and how it should play a role in moral theory. Her view is that: "...we need to take a stand on whether the moral experience of women is as valid a source or test of moral theory as is the experience of men - and to consider whether it may be more valid". While I disagree with some of Held's views about the nature of feminist moral theory, I strongly agree that attention to salient features of women's moral experience is a necessary feature of a more adequate moral theory. See, Carol Gilligan, *In A Different Voice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). Virginia Held, *Feminist Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p.68.

integral part of what moves the other to evaluate and possibly undergo change. Emotional work on others is *emotional* because it aims at emotional change: the acquisition of an appropriate emotion, the elimination of an inappropriate emotion, and the clarification and re-ordering of emotional paradigms. Emotional work on others is a moral enterprise because it directly concerns moral agency: it relates to the agent's moral beliefs, and to the development of improved moral agency. Emotional work (on self and others) is important to the development of virtuous character.

Morality as Cooperative Venture

Calhoun has suggested that once we recognize the importance of moral phenomena such as emotional work on others, and the fact that the dyadic, agent-centred paradigm cannot account for emotional work on others, we will be compelled to conceive of morality as cooperative venture, rather than as individual task. Accordingly, she asserts that an appropriate shift in our moral thinking would leave moral mediation and moral counselling as the fundamental moral concepts.¹¹³ This shift in our moral thinking is important, says Calhoun, because individual moral agency is open to management by others in two ways. The first way in which agency is open to management by others is through moral intervention in circumstances of abusive moral agency. We cooperate in this

¹¹³ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.119.

sense when we rely on others to intervene (where appropriate) in the immoral agency of others. This is cooperative morality in that we act and react in order to bring about a good, or simply to prevent a harm. As Calhoun notes, we may sometimes have to attempt to influence the emotions of a particular agent in order to prevent her from acting badly.

Agency is open to management by others, secondly, because we paradigmatically do our moral deliberation with others, not in private.¹¹⁴ This appears to be an empirical claim and is no doubt arguable. Furthermore, it is not obvious just how clearly such a separation can be made. Perhaps a conversation I have with a friend is morally helpful to me, in that it allows me to see that I had been blind to a particular relevant feature in my previous moral deliberations. My friend may have unwittingly mediated my action, but it would not seem correct to describe this as an instance of moral deliberation *between* people. Now, it may be that my friend's remark sparks something in me that encourages me to talk with her openly about the deliberation I am engaged in, and it is here that Calhoun's sense of mediation might come into play. However, I may not engage in further discussion with her but continue to reevaluate this new perspective on my own. Conversely, my friend may believe that she is counselling me, and yet, because I am in no way 'open' to her counsel, I am in no real sense engaged in deliberation with her. Through dialogue we open ourselves to others, and in doing so may come to possess importantly different perspectives. Through listening to others

¹¹⁴ Calhoun, "Emotional Work", p.119.

we may come to see alternate (and better) moral interpretations and judgments of a situation. We may have overlooked or been unaware of a particular feature of an experience, if working out of a narrow frame of reference. Or, we may simply have reasoned badly, and our interlocutor may have pointed this out. This being said, there does not seem to be anything about morality as such which makes it a particularly cooperative venture. Rather, the improved understanding of experience that arises out of interaction and cooperation with others is not limited to or distinctive of morality, but applies to many aspects of our understanding of life, nonmoral as well as moral.

Now, while Calhoun is not explicit about how we are to understand morality as a cooperative venture it seems reasonable to interpret it as a recognition of two important factors. First, we sometimes depend on others in order to develop and articulate our own moral thinking. Secondly, conversation can be crucial to accurate determinations of the significant moral features of a situation, for it is often through dialogue that we come to have new perspectives. Together these suggest that the development of good moral agency is in part a product of our cooperative interactions with others. If this is what Calhoun is suggesting, I can agree that morality is, in this sense, a cooperative venture. However, it doesn't follow that morality is best understood as a cooperative venture, nor that 'morality as cooperative venture' exhausts all facets of moral agency. There is much important individual work to be done. Moreover, it seems somewhat presumptuous to grant moral mediation and the moral counselling of others

primary status in moral thinking, given the hard work required to develop sound moral character in ourselves.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

In this thesis I have attempted to show that the emotions play an important role in moral theory by showing the importance of emotional work in moral agency. I have challenged the view that a complete moral theory does not need to attend to the emotions. Relying on de Sousa's account of the emotions, I have provided an account of emotional work. The emotions can be understood on analogy with perception. Non-projective emotions direct the agent's attention to relevant features of the agent's environment and, like perceptions, can offer objective information to the agent. I have presented emotions as reason-giving insofar as they lead an agent to attend to certain features of situations, and in doing so pose questions for experience and judgment. Once we acknowledge that the emotions are educable, then actions which are emotionally motivated, and the emotions which motivate them, can be morally assessed, and offer guidance in the development of moral character. On this account of the emotions it readily becomes apparent that the education of the emotions is of fundamental importance to moral theory. It is in large part through the education of the emotions that we acquire a sound moral character and improve our moral agency.

The emotions are important in moral agency for two reasons. First, they direct attention to morally salient features of experience and thereby function in the

process of acquiring reasons for action. In this respect they can be evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate responses in a given situation. Secondly, the dispositions to have emotions of a certain sort are properties of moral character. Having established that the emotions can be assessed for appropriateness and are educable, I turn in Chapter Three to a discussion of emotional work which mobilizes these themes. First, however, I discuss arguments advanced by Williams, Blum and Herman regarding the possibility of a place for the emotions in moral theory.

Chapter Two is devoted to showing that there is a place for the emotions within moral theory. I looked at two arguments, the integrity argument and the human gestures argument, in which Williams argues that attending to the emotions in experience forces us to place limits on the scope of moral theory. These arguments challenge the assumption that moral theory can neglect the role of the emotions in moral experience. In certain circumstances, emotion-based action does, in fact, seem better or more appropriate than the corresponding action motivated by duty. It does not follow from this, of course, that action solely from duty is not right action, nor does it follow that emotion-based action *per se* is nonmoral. Williams claimed that the fact that in certain circumstances emotion-based action is better than duty-based action shows that nonmoral action is sometimes better than moral action. This being the case, he concluded that morality should not be granted the supremacy of place it has traditionally been accorded; morality is only one value among many. In response to this I argued

that Williams is mistaken in assuming that the emotion-based action is necessarily nonmoral action.

Herman's response to the claim that the emotion-based action is sometimes better than the duty-based action was to propose a solution in which duty can, when appropriate, defer to emotion. According to Herman, action motivated strictly by emotion has no moral worth for it fails to support the necessary internal connection between motive and rightness. However, on her deferral solution, if the agent possesses both emotional motivation and dutiful motivation, and defers from duty to emotion for motivation, the action is morally acceptable, for there has been no loss of good will on the agent's part. Thus, her answer to Williams is that emotion-based action is sometimes better insofar as it produces some further good for the recipient of the action, but while it is morally permissible, it is not a morally better action, and in fact has no moral worth itself. I argued that this latter conclusion is a mistake which rests on Herman's overly narrow definition of moral worth.

I claimed that Herman's view that interest in the rightness of an action (necessary for an action to have moral worth) is limited to an abstract rational consideration of the relation between the agent's maxim for action and rightness is mistaken because it arbitrarily and narrowly limits the conception of moral agency. If we understand an interest in moral rightness more broadly as a conviction or concern the agent accepts, it seems unreasonable for the agent to neglect her relevant emotional responses. Indeed, to the extent that they are

objective (in the sense characterized in Chapter One) they will reveal morally relevant features of the situations she faces. Moreover, as my discussion of emotional work on the self has shown, the agent who morally assesses her own emotional responses may make improvements in her agency by coming to have more appropriate emotional responses and bringing her moral beliefs and emotions into alignment. Such an agent's emotions will have an appropriate internal connection with morality. I concluded that the emotions have a place in moral theory because the development of moral character involves emotionally and cognitively well-ordered agency.

In Chapter Three I discussed Calhoun's brief account of emotional work on the self. Calhoun describes it as something we must do in order to ensure that we are not abusive in our own agency. She claims that emotional work on the self fits within a dyadic, agent-centred paradigm and thus does not represent the threat to traditional moral theory that emotional work on others does. I questioned this claim and concluded that it is not at all clear how the enterprise of emotional work on the self can be understood within the agent-centred paradigm, for it seems that it is neither simply a process of decision making, nor the judgment of other moral agents.

In presenting my version of emotional work on the self I employed features of the account of emotion developed in Chapter One. I suggested that three features were involved in the emotional assessment involved in emotional work on the self. The first is the evaluation of an emotional response as objective or

projective. Does the emotion, in the sense in which it is perceptive, appropriately direct one's attention to objective features of the evoking situation? Secondly, the agent needs to consider whether or not the evoking situation which produces a particular emotional response is actually an instance of the paradigm scenario grounding that emotion. Thirdly, the agent may also assess emotional responses by examining the ways in which other paradigm scenarios may fit the evoking situation and the extent to which they are compatible with one another or compete for dominance. By placing the original paradigm scenario in a wider context the agent seeks to give her response a greater objectivity in its function as reason giving for action.

In Chapter Four I examined Calhoun's account of emotional work on others. Calhoun argues that emotional work on others is a fundamental moral conception in its own right, and offers a series of examples of emotional work on others. Calhoun claims that emotional work on others poses challenges for moral theory which emotional work on the self does not, forcing us to reconceive of moral theory as cooperative venture. So it is important to assess her account of emotional work on others.

I argued that her account fails to explain how emotional work on others is a distinctively moral and emotional phenomenon. Calhoun does not acknowledge that the emotional management of others can be immoral, and as a result fails to explain clearly what makes emotional work on others a moral enterprise. I proposed that emotional work on others is best understood as the facilitation of

another's emotional work on the self, and is not properly described as the management of others' emotions. Management of others' emotions suggests that the emotional worker is doing something to the other. This allows for the possibility of coercive management and manipulation, even if done for the good of the other. Facilitation, on the other hand, is an other-directed action which respects the other's autonomy because it is an enabling activity rather than a controlling activity. In facilitation one helps another to act whereas in managing one acts on the other. Like emotional work on the self, the project of emotional work on others realizes the moral importance of the proper alignment of emotions and beliefs, as well as the moral significance of appropriate emotions. In emotional work on others the emotional worker aims at encouraging the other to adopt a framework of inquiry for assessing her beliefs and emotions.

I further suggested that emotional work on others is suitably called *work* because it requires effort directed towards the development of another's moral agency. In this sense, work is a complicated and responsive exercise requiring that the worker attend to the particularities of the situation as they arise. What makes emotional work on others moral (as opposed to manipulative or abusive) rests in the agent's intent and the way the intent is fulfilled.

Finally, in Chapter Four I discussed Calhoun's claim that recognition of the importance of moral phenomena such as emotional work on others, and the dyadic, agent-centred paradigm's inability to account for them will force us to reconceive of morality as cooperative venture, rather than as individual task.

Through cooperation with others we may develop an improved understanding of experience, but this is not limited to or distinctive of morality. The development of improved moral agency is in part a product of our cooperative interactions with others. To this extent I can agree with Calhoun that morality is a cooperative venture. It does not follow, however, that we are compelled to conceive of morality as a fundamentally cooperative project. In fact, my examination of emotional work suggests that it is emotional work on the self which remains the fundamental concept, for the aim of emotional work on others is the facilitation of the other's emotional work on the self.

My hope has been to provide an account of emotional work that demonstrates a possible and important role for the emotions in moral theory. If emotional work plays the intricate role in moral agency that I have suggested, and if we require of moral theory that it be psychologically realizable, then it is a richer and more complex subject than it is sometimes taken to be. Moreover, moral agency and moral character feature more centrally in it than a consideration of duty alone would suggest. The Kantian claim that emotions cannot possess the proper internal connection to rightness in order for them to have moral worth appears to be false.

Emotional work is an important moral concept. I have not attempted to offer a formula for determining when emotional work is a moral phenomenon. I have simply characterized emotional work as moral when it is done with a moral intention. Clearly, because intentions are plan-like and open-ended they can be

complicated. One can have a good intention while doing something that might harm the development of another's agency. However, this fact has nothing to do with the character of emotional work as either moral or emotional, but rather has to do with the complexities of intentional action. The processes of coming to have more appropriate emotions, and aligning one's beliefs and emotions is difficult to distinguish from instances of rationalization, excuses, and even moral cowardice. Emotional work is hard work, and is subject to all of the characteristic forms of failure to which moral actions generally are subject. But it is also essential, because without doing the hard emotional work of character formation, no one would even have the prospect of becoming good:

But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1105b14-20

Bibliography

- Aristotle. *The Nichomachean Ethics*, David Ross trans., revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Baier, Annette. "Trust and Antitrust." In *Ethics*, 96, pp. 231-260.
- Baier, Annette. "What Do Women Want in Moral Theory." In *Nous*, 19 (1), pp. 53-63.
- Baskin, Wade ed., *Jean-Paul Sartre: Essays in Existentialism*. New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1977
- Blum, Lawrence. *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
- Browning Cole, Eve. *Philosophy and Feminist Criticism*. New York: Paragon House, 1993.
- Browning Cole, Eve and Susan Coultrap-McQuin eds., *Explorations in Feminist Ethics*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Calhoun, Cheshire. "Cognitive Emotions?" In Cheshire Calhoun and Robert Solomon eds., *What Is an Emotion?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 327-342.

- Calhoun, Cheshire. "Emotional Work." In Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin eds., *Explorations in Feminist Ethics*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp.117-122.
- Calhoun, Cheshire. "Justice, Care, Gender Bias." In *The Journal of Philosophy*, 85 (9), pp. 451-463.
- de Sousa, Ronald. "Emotion and the Conduct of Life." In *The Rationality of Emotion*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987, pp. 301-333.
- de Sousa, Ronald. "The Rational and the Objective." In *The Rationality of Emotion*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987, pp.141-170.
- de Sousa, Ronald. "The Rationality of Emotion." In *The Rationality of Emotion*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987, pp.171-203.
- de Sousa, Ronald. "The Rationality of Emotions." In Amelie Rorty ed., *Explaining Emotions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp.127-151.
- Fischer, J.M. ed., *Moral Responsibility*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Frankfurt, Harry. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." In J.M. Fischer ed., *Moral Responsibility*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 65-80.
- Gilligan, Carol. *In A Different Voice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Greenspan, Patricia. *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification*. London: Routledge, 1988.

- Held, Virginia. *Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- Herman, Barbara. "Agency, Attachment, and Difference." In *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp.184-207.
- Herman, Barbara. "Integrity and Impartiality." In *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 23-44.
- Herman, Barbara. "Leaving Deontology Behind." In *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 208-240.
- Herman, Barbara. "On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty." *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp.1-22.
- Herman, Barbara. "The Practice of Moral Judgment." In *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 73-93.
- Hochschild, Arlie Russell. *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- James, William. Excerpts from "What Is an Emotion?" In Cheshire Calhoun and Robert Solomon eds., *What Is an Emotion?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp.127-141.
- Noddings, Nel. *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Nussbaum, Martha. "An Aristotelian Conception of Rationality." In *Love's Knowledge*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 54-105.

- Nussbaum, Martha. "Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of Love." In *Love's Knowledge*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 286-313.
- Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Rorty, Amelie. "Descartes on Thinking With the Body." In John Cottingham ed., *The Cambridge Companion To Descartes*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 371-392.
- Rorty, Amelie. "Explaining Emotions." In Amelie Rorty ed., *Explaining Emotions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 103-126.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. "The Humanism of Existentialism." In Wade Baskin ed., *Jean-Paul Sartre: Essays in Existentialism*. New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1977, pp.31-62.
- Smart, J.J.C. and Bernard Williams. *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- Taylor, Gabriele. *Pride, Shame, and Guilt*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
- White, A.R. *Grounds of Liability*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
- Williams, Bernard. "Internal and external reasons." In *Moral Luck*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 101-113.
- Williams, Bernard. "Morality and the emotions." In *Problems of the Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 207-229.
- Williams, Bernard. "Moral Luck." In *Moral Luck*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 20-39.

Williams, Bernard. "Persons, Character and Morality." In *Moral Luck*.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 1-19.