

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

SOCIETAL, PARTY, AND POLITICAL ELITE
TRANSFORMATION IN POLAND
(1948-84)

by

PAUL FERENSOWICZ

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
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
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
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled, "Societal, Party, and Political Elite Transformation in Poland (1948-84)," submitted by Paul Ferensowicz in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.


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ABSTRACT

This thesis, "Societal, Party, and Political Elite Transformation in Poland (1948-84)," examines the process of change in an industrializing and socialist society. Industrialization and modernization, or the "revolution from above" as implemented by Polish Communists in 1948, together with the passing of time, have changed Poland. The Polish Communist regime, automatically dedicated to the socioeconomic and political transformation of the nation, precipitated numerous changes in Polish society. By way of feedback, changes reverberated "from the bottom" through society, the party and the political elite upon their return to "the top". In light of transformation, Polish society, the PZPR (Polish United Worker's Party, PUWP), and the political elite will be examined both individually and comparatively, in order to illustrate how each changed and to demonstrate discerned trends. The examination of change in each of the above three, is but the first step of analysis. Having identified the cause of change, the effect(s) of these changes upon Polish society, the party, and its power elite are discussed. The thesis will therefore focus on PZPR transformation and the party's adaptation to it, and subsequently consequences for Poland's political system. It has become certain that as the PZPR undergoes change it struggles to adapt, which has also resulted in its failure to maintain an equilibrium between its vanguard and representative roles. Consequently, this imbalance has resulted in intra-party tensions as well as tensions between party and society.

Concurrently, as Poland's political elite undergoes transformation itself, the elite-mass relation, due to specific historical phenomena, has become transformed into an economic relationship. Poland's post-revolutionary generation has become increasingly educated and politically sophisticated, and bases its elite-mass relationship upon the level of economic successes and benefits that the system delivers. Because the second generation of the political elite has not fulfilled the nation's economic expectations, the elite-mass relation in Poland has been tested by socioeconomic tensions. Conflicts will persist until the political elite of Poland begins to competently solve the nation's economic problems. Moreover, the party must realize that mere numerical representation of Poland's three social classes without their actual participation in decision-making will continue to erode political stability in the nation.

Yet Poland's situation is probably not entirely unique or isolated. As a Socialist state of the Eastern Bloc, it resembles the dedication of other East European Communist regimes to change. As more relevant data emerge, and as fewer questions are allowed to remain in the shadow of limited earlier research, the issues raised in this thesis can be extended into a broader exercise that comparatively analyzes Poland vis-a-vis her counterparts. The latest research, including this present thesis, will hopefully encourage others to continue in a field that promises for a long time to come to yield much interesting material for the understanding and future study of transformation in industrializing and Socialist states.

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Paul Ferensowicz

April 1987

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INTRODUCTION

The study of Polish politics since 1945, has not been undertaken systematically. Mainly historical, the literature on Polish politics has lacked theoretical grounding.¹ Significant political events in Communist Poland have not been dealt with. The Stalinist era, the Communist takeover, the Polish October and worker-party upheavals, are just some examples of major political events which have had great significance for Polish politics, but as yet have not been adequately analyzed by political scientists. Although these events have received some attention by Polish scholars, their work has been of a journalistic nature and has lacked proper documentation.² The unorganized nature of the study of Polish politics is reflected in the lack of an adequate textbook on Polish politics and government. This disparity which has characterized the study of Polish politics can also be applied to other areas of political science that deal with Communist affairs.

Specifically, the study of Polish Communist elites and studies focusing on the PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza), have been clearly lacking; or are now outdated and in need of revision. Studies which have focused on the PZPR have been largely historical and have not analyzed the internal composition and functioning of this party.³ Nor has the post-war Polish Communist political elite received systematic and comprehensive analysis.⁴ Although a number

of scholarly volumes have focused on East European Communist elites generally, they have not specifically dealt with the Polish Communist elite.⁵ A study of the internal dynamics of the PZPR and of the Polish Communist elites is clearly required. This thesis proposes to fill these two gaps.

Any study of Polish Communist elites must focus on some aspect of elite studies: political recruitment, career patterns, social background, elite-mass and inter-elite relations or elite transformation.⁶ Likewise, a study which deals with the internal composition of the PZPR, must include demographic as well as social composition data. Such a thesis would be too extensive in scope. Therefore this thesis will specifically deal with the transformation of the PZPR and Polish Communist elites in light of changes in Polish society. The process of transformation is a significant element in all Communist states because of the commitment that Communist parties have made towards transforming the political and socioeconomic conditions which they inherited upon coming to power.

Since 1945, the East European regimes have transformed their predominantly agrarian societies into more or less highly modern, industrialized, socially differentiated societies. Elite studies have documented that political parties in industrialized states have been transformed with regards to social composition and demographic characteristics. Studies of East European Communist elites have also

revealed that some transformation has occurred since 1945.⁷ This thesis will assess the rate of transformation within the PZPR and Polish Communist elites, and demonstrate its significance.

It is often assumed that socioeconomic and political changes must bring about elite transformation. Often these two processes are linked. Scholars such as Kautsky have argued that Communist elites have been transformed from revolutionaries into apparatchiki and then into technocrats as industrialization proceeds.⁸ Such an argument is both deterministic and unidirectional. It postulates a uniform and sequential mode of transformation. Such assertions can only be tested empirically. The present thesis will reveal and document the stages of Polish Communist elite transformation. Furthermore, it will examine the rate of transformation of the party.

By examining the internal composition of the PZPR, its rate of transformation can be determined. Studying this rate of change however, can only be significant if it is done in a comparative way. Thus, by comparing rates of transformation within the party with Polish society as a whole, a better understanding of this process in Communist society can be obtained. The comparative nature of the study will show how the process of transformation has affected both groups, society and the party, in terms of similarities and differences which have developed over time.

The Polish Communist elite can be studied in a similar fashion. By studying this elite, one can again compare its rate of transformation with society as a whole. Moreover, such an endeavor will provide the scholar with a measure of the degree of representativeness that the Polish elite potentially may have of its society. Putnam's law of increasing disproportion can also be tested.⁹ Comparison is the first step in comparative politics, and ultimately it is used to explain some phenomenon. This comparative study will allow one to see how the process of transformation has affected Polish society, the party, and the Polish Communist elite. Hence, this thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of Polish society, the PZPR, and the Polish Communist political elite in order to illustrate that these entities are interrelated, and that changes in them affect the stability and functioning of the Polish political system.

This study examines elite transformation by focusing on the personnel within the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee. The former two institutions in the Communist political system form the "power elite" which comprise the most important and powerful segment of the entire political elite. The writer is not denying the fact that members of the political elite are to be found within other institutions, but rather is emphasizing that the elite within the Politburo and Secretariat has the greatest influence over the allocation of resources and values in Communist socie-

ties. Consequently, the definition of the elite will be an institutional one.

Our study of the Polish Communist elite will focus upon certain time periods. Party congresses are such appropriate intervals for comparing transformation, because congresses serve as occasions for the removal and admittance of new personnel into the Politburo and Secretariat. To describe the process of transformation is only the initial task of this study.

Underlying such a process of transformation is the real question: what significance if any does this process of transformation have for Polish politics? This ought to be answered. The process of transformation will be linked to the party's relationship with society. It will be demonstrated that the party has been forced by the process of societal transformation to maintain a balance between its leading role in society while remaining representative of different social strata in Polish society. An imbalance in either means that the party will have difficulty in maintaining its elite position or that it will fail to represent various important strata of Polish society and hence be seen as illegitimate.

Failure in maintaining a balance will result in tensions within the party and society. Because the party and the political elite serve as a link to society, an unrepresentative party will create instability by being

isolated from society. Meanwhile, a mass party whose growth is unchecked will pose problems for the party's leadership in its ability to control such a large organization. Therefore, a balance must be maintained if stability is to be ensured. This balance has never been attained and thus tensions have evolved in the Polish political system. It will be shown that the process of transformation has created this problem for the elite and the party. Thus, unless the process of change is controlled by the party and its elite, further instability in the system can be expected. Hence, evidence examined here will indicate the party's ability or inability to control such changes.

The present study shall use 1948 as the starting point for analysis. This date is significant for several reasons. By that time the PZPR had successfully eliminated its political opponent, the PSL party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), headed by Mikolajczyk, and merged with the PPS (Polska Partia Socialistyczna). The PZPR then embarked on a course of industrializing the country. Industrialization and the socioeconomic policies which were instituted by the PZPR due to their political power at that time initiated the process of transformation. Transformation resulted in substantial changes within the party, political elite and society, not all of which have been successfully controlled by the party.

NOTES

¹Adam Bromke, Poland's Politics: Idealism vs Realism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967) is one of the few volumes on Polish politics which has a developed theoretical framework.

²Zygmunt Bauman, ed., Wydarzenia marcowe 1968 (Paris: Institut Litteraire, 1969); Zygmunt Korybutowicz, Grudzien 1970 (Paris: Institut Litteraire, 1983); Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds., Poznanski czerwiec 1956 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1981); Edmund Makowski, ed., Wydarzenia czerwcowe w Poznaniu 1956 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1981); Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Przesilenie grudniowe (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1981); Marek Tarniewski, Plonie komitet: Grudzien 1970 czerwiec 1976 (Paris: Institut Litteraire, 1982); Marek Tarniewski, Krotkie spiecie marzec 1968 (Paris: Institut Litteraire, 1977); Ewa Wacowska, ed., Poznan 1956-grudzien 1970 (Paris: Institut Litteraire, 1971); Ewa Wacowska, ed., Rewolta Szczecinska i jej znaczenie (Paris: Institut Litteraire, 1971).

³Jan B. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Marian K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party of Poland, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976).

⁴D.A. Tomasic, "Political Leadership in Contemporary Poland: The Neo-Stalinist Course," Journal of Human Relations, No. 1 (1961), 191-206; Richard F. Starr, The Communist Party Leadership in Poland: A Study in Elite Stability (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Ethnic Studies), pp. 1-19.

⁵Barry R. Farrell, ed., Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970); Carl Beck et al., Comparative Communist Political Leadership (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973).

⁶Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1976).

⁷Farrell, "Top Political Leadership in Eastern Europe," in op.cit., ed. Barry Farrell, pp. 88-108; Carl Beck, "Leadership Attributes in Eastern Europe: The Effect of Country and Time," in Carl Beck et al., op.cit., pp. 88-154.

⁸John H. Kaűtskű, Communism and the Politics of Development: Persistent Myths and Changing Behavior (New York: John Wiley, 1968), p. 165.

⁹Putnam, op.cit., p. 33.

CHAPTER ONE

A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

The element of change is fundamentally important in the study of the East European political and socioeconomic systems. It becomes even more important because the process of change is systematically planned and directed by the respective Communist parties which strive to realize their own definitive goals. Because East European societies are thus directed, the element of change must be continuously monitored and managed by the party. Consequently, in a socialist society of the East European type, the Communist party acquires a new and very significant role as its relationship to its social structure in general becomes of paramount and principal interest. Ultimately the party itself is changed by the very process of societal transformation it has sought to implement and control. Against this background, it is of fundamental interest to investigate the internal composition of the Communist party and its relationship to different parts of the social structure.

The study of change in Eastern Europe has not specifically focused in enough detail on how individual East European Communist parties are transformed by change implemented and controlled from the top. Moreover, political implications and significance, if any, for the functioning and political stability of East European political systems, including Poland's, has not been analyzed either.

The seizure of power in 1944 by the Polish Communists was followed by the implementation of a wide range of socioeconomic policies which were designed to transform the backward state into a modern industrial entity. Today, this dual goal of industrialization and modernization has been realized as Poland has been transformed into a more or less modern industrial state. Transformation has changed society, the PZPR, and the Polish Communist political elite. This is not to say that the economic, cultural and social elites have not undergone fundamental change. Surprisingly again, little attention and analysis has been devoted to these aspects as they specifically pertain to both the PZPR and the Polish Communist political elite, and in turn, to their respective relationship with the socialist social structure.

Because societal transformation, stimulated by industrialization and modernization, is transmitted downwards, it is expressed and becomes evident in society, i.e. Polish society, first. Various studies have documented the process of societal transformation in Poland as a result of industrialization.¹ Since society as a whole serves as a recruiting pool for the PZPR, societal transformation will then be transmitted upwards into the party as individuals from Polish society are recruited into it. Consequently a feedback system of reciprocal interaction is set up between the ruling party and society. Societal transformation is

even further funnelled upwards as the members of the PZPR are recruited into the ranks of the Polish Communist political elite. Thus, the process of societal transformation which originally was implemented from above, eventually works its way back to the ruling top.

In studying change in Eastern Europe, with specific focus on Poland, it must be remembered that

The interrelationship between the leadership structure and Communist systems is defined by a dual role for the elite, who are both the objects of social change and as well as the agents of socio-political transformation.²

Societal transformation is transferred between society, the party and the Communist political elite, through the process of political recruitment. Political recruitment is a "critical link between polity and society because it can perform the function of system maintenance and also serve as a major channel for change."³ Political recruitment becomes especially important when one is studying societal, party, and political elite transformation in a Communist society.

Societal transformation is defined as the products resulting from industrialization and modernization. These products are: increased levels of education and urbanization, social stratification, occupational differentiation, prestige, status, and hierarchy, and more importantly in the East European context, a new social class structure.⁴ All of these products are clearly visible in all East European states.

The new class structure in Polish society is the result of transformation due to the new political order. Polish sociologists have developed a specific criterion for the identification of classes. That is, socio-occupational groupings serve as the basis for the definition of social class. This thesis will adopt Szczepanski's three-tiered approach for defining social classes within Polish society, and will also draw upon R.A. Wild's definition of stratification systems.⁵

Szczepanski identifies the following three social classes: Intelligentsia, Manual Workers, and Peasants.⁶ These three large social class aggregates are all internally differentiated.

The intelligentsia are individuals who perform non-manual work. This class is subdivided into a number of categories such as creative intelligentsia, educated professionals, political officials, civil servants, economic management personnel, and white-collar workers.

The manual workers include all manuals outside of agriculture. This class included all blue-collar workers.

Peasants are manuals in agriculture. They include independent farmers, collective farmers, and wage workers in state agricultural institutions.

Although Polish sociologists use occupation as the criterion for identifying social class, Western sociologists suggest that in an industrial society like Socialist

Poland, social class also ought to include such indicators as education, income, power, life chances, attitudes and lifestyle.

This thesis will combine both Polish and Western sociological definitions of social class. Social class will be defined in terms of the distributive and the relational aspects of stratification systems.

The distributive viewpoint sees stratification in terms of unequal distribution of objective factors like amount of income and level of education while the relational aspect conceives stratification as a system of social relations.⁷

The combination of Polish and Western views on defining social class in Poland helps in describing socialist strata/class systems where the relative weight to be given to character of work versus relation to the means of production remains an issue.⁸

Party transformation is defined as the process by which the Communist party has incorporated the major elements of societal transformation in its own composition and membership. Therefore, political recruitment is a vital mechanism which links society and party and allows these elements to be transmitted into the party. It is of fundamental interest to investigate the internal composition of the Communist party and its relationship to different parts of the social structure.

With reference to Poland, therefore, the party should become a microcosm of Polish society also, if it is incorpo-

rating the components of societal transformation. This type of analysis has not been undertaken in any systematic manner by Western scholars.⁹ When such analysis has been attempted by Polish scholars, neither the full significance of the findings nor their political or ideological implications are discussed. Usually such analysis has not gone beyond an examination of the party's social class composition and has not been linked to development within society. Zygmunt Bauman wrote in the late 1950's that a detailed analysis (as attempted by this thesis) is vital to the understanding of the party's development and functioning in a socialist society.¹⁰

Societal transformation also affects the ruling elite. In East European socialist political systems, it is the party that serves as a pool for the recruitment of the future Communist "power elite." Therefore, societal transformation is eventually funnelled into the ranks of the power elite, if its party members who have entered them possess those societal attributes which were both evident within society and party. With this achieved, the process of societal transformation has run its full course during which it has initiated both party and political elite transformation. Therefore, changes which were initiated and implemented from the top eventually filter their way through society, modify it, and generate new and diverse stimuli for the party to monitor. Hence, the party becomes a target of

continuous feedback; feedback that reflects societal transformation and which should subsequently generate party transformation. Therefore, if political elite transformation is taking place, it is because changes which have developed within society and the party have been transmitted even further into the Communist power elite.

This schema follows Putnam's argument that "those seeking early indications of elite transformation should look not at the highest levels of power, but at the lowest."¹¹ In other words, before one studies political elite transformation in Poland, changes which have developed within society since 1944, must be examined. These changes include a new urban/rural distribution, a new social class structure, homogenous ethnic composition, increased levels of education, and a fairly complex occupational make-up. These changes will the composition of the Polish political elite.

Nevertheless, the Polish power elite should not be viewed as helpless in the face of this process of transformation. The incumbent power elite decides how permeable its own ranks will be. Acting as gatekeepers or as a selectorate, they decide who the eligible aspirants will be eventually entering their ranks; they decide what credentials, skills, affiliations and other criteria potential new members will have to meet.¹² Ultimately, the incumbent power elite, while it is pressured to change by the trans-

formation of the society, decides the "life chances" of all aspirants, but more importantly the selectorate has the ability to determine the very composition of its own successors by its response to those pressures.

Most scholars studying political elite transformation have concentrated first "on the social origins of elites, and second, on the skills of elites, for these seem the primary points of conjunction with broader historical change."¹³ For our purposes, this definition of political elite transformation must include those components of societal transformation in Poland as well as specific leadership attributes which are applicable to the East European Communist power elite, including Poland. Such leadership attributes are: age, ethnic origins, urban/rural background, formal and party education, duration of Communist party membership, time spent in the USSR, war time activities, jail sentences for revolutionary activity, membership in Communist youth organizations; and lastly, career backgrounds.¹⁴

Zygmunt Bauman has written that a number of problems have hampered elite studies in Poland. "A comprehensive study of the Polish power elite awaits its author."¹⁵ Indeed, as Bauman has pointed out, a lack of reliable investigation, and a lack of detailed data on its composition, internal stratification, prevailing type of career sources and levels of recruitment, behavioral patterns,

degree of inner cohesion and uniformity of attitudes, have all delayed the comprehensive study of the Polish power elite. With time, however, the data have become more accessible and reliable with regards to the party and political elites in Poland. Yet still no single study or monograph has appeared that has either dealt with political elites or with the issue of elite transformation in Poland.¹⁶

Thus this state of deficiency has left a number of unanswered questions. How, if at all, has political elite transformation taken place in Poland? Have sociodemographic changes in society been accompanied by changes in the political elite? Do divergencies exist between the two? Finally what are the political implications of political elite transformation for East European Communist systems such as Poland's? The abundance of sociological data has not been matched by political analysis examining political elite transformation. Thus, by having studied societal, party, and political elite transformation comparatively, one is more competent to understand how change has affected these three units of analysis, and whether stability or instability will result.

Underlying the process of societal, party and political elite transformation is the following fundamental question. What significance, if any, does the phenomenon of transformation hold for the functioning and stability of the Polish

political system? The process of party and political elite transformation must be linked to the overall relationship that the party and Polish Communist political elite have with Polish society. So if both the party and the Communist political elite undergo transformation, what form of a relationship is maintained with society? Societal transformation has indeed forced the party to maintain a balance between its leading role in society while remaining representative of different social strata in society. The party must theoretically at least maintain this leading role as the vanguard of the Polish working class. Yet, in practice and at the same time, it must incorporate and accommodate different social strata which are of functional importance within the social structure of its socialist society. An imbalance in either means that the party will have difficulty in maintaining its vanguard role. On the other hand, if it does indeed do so, the party will probably fail to represent other important social strata of Polish society, and hence also be seen as illegitimate. This is the major, contemporary dilemma facing the party as it undergoes its own transformation in response to societal transformation.

Poland's PZPR is therefore constantly in search of a congenial balance in its representation; a representation that upholds its traditional role and yet does so not at the expense of other social classes that demand the party's attention. But because the PZPR is forced to respond to

societal transformation and be representative of the most important and immediate strata at a given time, this has meant that the party has increasingly resorted to recruiting white-collar personnel to handle the increasing socio-economic complexities associated with a modern industrial society. Yet at the same time the party perceives its duty to be representative of the blue-collar class as dictated by ideological premise. Hence, societal, party and elite transformation have unleashed consequences that are dangerously hampering the full realization of the party's traditional ideology. It will be interesting to note how the party deals with these forces of transformation before the political equilibrium is too greatly disturbed.

To maintain a successful balance, the party must regulate its composition and admissions through political recruitment. It will be illustrated in Chapter Four that the party has changed its political recruitment policy at various times, responding to and trying to accommodate the blue-collar workers and other important social strata. The difficulty that the party has encountered in fulfilling this goal is emphasized both by party pronouncements and Polish scholars. Therefore, the PZPR recruitment policies have oscillated repeatedly between recruiting blue- and white-collar workers. At the same time, however, the party has failed to maintain a balance between the party's leading and representative roles within Polish society. Data will show

that the party's social class composition favours white-collar personnel at the expense and disadvantage of blue-collar workers. The problem is summarized by de Weyden-thal, who writes:

The ideological concern of legitimizing the PZPR as a proletarian party provided the ground for the insistence on worker and peasant recruitment. The functional concern arising from the need to cope with the growing complexity of socioeconomic problems, led to the realization that the party could fulfill its leadership responsibilities only through effective assimilation of a highly trained and qualified personnel. This inherent incompatibility between the two concerns has created a major source of membership instability and internal tension.¹⁷

This imbalance has also created political instability and tensions within the entire Polish political system. Political recruitment becomes increasingly important as some social groups are excluded at the expense of others. This exclusion of certain social groups in Polish society is the root of political instability. Because the PZPR's recruitment policies have not been able to control nor accommodate societal transformation, the party has been consequently forced to undergo its own changes. Hence, although writing about the Argentinian Socialist Party, Wellhofer's comments are also applicable to the PZPR.

The process of recruitment is seen as reflecting and affecting the developmental problems faced by the organization. They include the redefinition of the party's social specificity, and the necessity of preserving a modicum of continuity and traditional ideological goals and organizational patterns.¹⁸

The process of political recruitment has affected the developmental problems faced by the PZPR. Over time, the party has been losing its blue-collar character as white-collar personnel are coming to form the largest social class within the party. The latter therefore is severely diluting and altering the party's social class structure.

The PZPR has responded to this problem by changing its self defined role within Polish society. In 1959, the party defined its role as "the vanguard of the working class, the highest form of its organization, the guiding force of the socialist revolution".¹⁹ In the ensuing years, the blue-collar class has been downplayed in terms of importance and by 1971, the PZPR was

seen as occupying a special place in the system of organization of Polish society and striving for optimal harmonization of the interests of the various classes and strata.²⁰

Still, "the working class continues to constitute the social base of the party".²¹ Thus, the PZPR has undergone a redefinition of the party's social specificity. At the same time, however, it perceives the necessity of preserving its traditional ideological goal as being the vanguard of the Polish working class and therefore the PZPR attempts to preserve its organizational pattern of being a cadre party. Thus, the party will try to maintain an elite image but will strive to increase its membership in sectors of society where the party feels it must be represented. These two tendencies produce conflict with the PZPR's ranks and within

the Polish political system as some social groups are excluded in favour of others. Exclusion will produce conflict because the interests of individual social groups will not be arbitrated by the party. This incompatibility is strikingly dangerous to the stability of Poland's present political system.

Having indicated the likely significance party transformation has for the functioning and stability of the Polish political system, one ought to turn now to the consideration of political elite transformation and its significance in Poland's politics. What kind of relationship is to be expected between society and the Polish Communist political elite as the two undergo transformation? What is the mass-elite linkage in a socialist society that is undergoing societal and political elite transformation? Or as Putnam has asked, "What is the nature of the relationship between rulers and ruled, between representatives and represented, between leaders and the led?"²²

Elite-mass linkage has undoubtedly changed since 1944 in Poland. More importantly, elite-mass linkage with specific social strata in Polish society has become differentiated over time. Workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia have all experienced a different relationship with the Communist political elite of Poland.²³ At times, open conflict has characterized the relationship between these groups and the political elite. Poland's post-war political

history is filled with many dates (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81), all of which mark the violent character of elite-mass linkage in Poland.²⁴ All of these crises are characterized by a complicated set of socioeconomic and political factors which eventually contributed to the outbreak of hostilities between the political elite and specific social groups within Polish society.

In 1968, the conflict was, for example, between the academic and intellectual community and the political authorities over the regime's restrictions on academic and cultural life in Poland. The other dates (1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81) mark largely worker-party upheavals although the latest conflict should be seen also in a larger perspective, for the entire Polish society was intent on freeing itself from the party's over-reaching power and control.

It would nevertheless be a mistake to characterize Poland's post-war elite-mass linkage as constantly afflicted with conflict and confrontation. Although empirical evidence is lacking, one can safely assume that the population was in favour of the authorities' efforts to industrialize and modernize the country even though this entailed great individual hardship and for a certain time the lowering of living standards. Furthermore, the authorities' post-war foreign policy with regards to Poland's western boundaries has undoubtedly been supported by the majority of the population.

Elite-mass linkage in Poland has a common trait which can be indentified for it has gained importance over time as it affects Poland's political stability. This elite-mass trait can be identified in all East European states. Moreover, its importance has probably not diminished but has increased in significance as East European societies and their political elites undergo transformation. In fact, in all East European states, the society and political elites face this identical problem. However, its full ramifications were best illustrated in Poland during the 1970's prior to the 1980 crisis. Poland's elite-mass relationship is one where the masses expect a competent Communist political elite both able and willing to meet rising consumer expectations. Such a relationship was especially evident during Gierek's tenure which ended in failure as rising consumer appetites could not be fulfilled but were actually mismanaged by Poland's political elite. The latter also failed to provide competent economic management.

Today the debate in Poland is largely centered on economic reform which is supposed to bring about both economic prosperity and a stop to Poland's increasing technological gap. Scholars and publicists alike warn the Polish Communist political elite that unless economic reforms are inaugurated, the Communists ought to prepare to face an economic disaster and potentially a further round of political turmoil. In other words, the potential is there

for a situation to again place the party in direct confrontation with the masses.²⁵ However, the ability of the Communist regime to survive another round of confrontation has been questioned by one leading authority.²⁶

Unlike previous worker-party conflicts where economic demands were voiced by the Polish working class, the party is now facing an opponent which is the entire nation. Poland seems to be demanding competent administration which will bring about a functioning socialist economy capable of sustaining rising consumer demands and expectations. This is the most serious issue facing the second generation of the Polish Communist political elite. It will also be undoubtedly the most important problem facing the third generation of the political elite as it starts to assume Politburo and Secretariat posts in late 1980's and early 1990's. This political elite will rule over an increasingly sophisticated population whose rising economic expectations cannot be left unfilled for much longer if political stability is to be maintained. This problem gains all the more importance because the Polish authorities basically have no other means by which to gain legitimacy and authority. Coercion cannot be ruled out, but to resort to this recourse would not solve the pressing problem of adequate economic performance.

Gierek's implicit contract with the Polish population promised a political leadership which would provide an

abundance of economic goods in exchange for an apolitical population. This failed, however, because Gierek could not deliver on his promises. If a future Polish Communist political elite wishes to follow Gierek's strategy, competent economic leadership will have to be supplemented by a satisfactory level of economic performance. The thesis in this respect will focus on elite-mass linkage in Poland in relation to the economic question, for a sound economy is vital to the maintenance of political stability. Our second hypothesis states that if the Polish Communist political elite is unable to provide a sufficient level of economic affluence that will meet rising economic expectations, then political instability and tension will continue to characterize elite-mass linkage in Poland. Consequently, as Polish society and political elites undergo transformation, two problems arise: first, as already mentioned, the party must maintain its leading and representative roles simultaneously and also provide sound economic management to fulfill consumer expectations. A failure to achieve either will result in political tensions and a weaker party, or weaken the political elite's legitimacy within Poland. It will be illustrated in the following chapters that the party and political elite have, up to now, failed to achieve either. Before proceeding on with the analysis, the concept of political and power elite will be defined and the conceptual schema will be outlined.

A fundamental problem in the relevant literature is that the varied definitions of the concept of political elite have played havoc with the analysis of the researched political data.²⁷ Who indeed are the political and power elite in Communist Poland? How is the political and power elite distinguished from other elites and from the masses? Answers to these questions depend on the very definition of elite and political elite.

An elite identifies a minority group which possesses a criterion or criteria that separates the minority from a majority in any given society. The definition of elite in this thesis draws on Nadel's work where an elite in any society is defined as "a stratum of the population which for whatever reason, can claim a portion of superiority and hence a corresponding measure of influence over the fate of the community."²⁸ The elite

represents a collectivity of some kind, that is, a definable body within society, must also form a more or less self-conscious unit within the society, and must be regarded by others as enjoying its pre-eminent position by a corporate right which is not within the reach of everyone. This corporateness is an important element of the definition, otherwise the determination of the elite to maintain the status quo cannot be accounted for, nor could an elite be distinguished from a social class.²⁹

Lastly, an elite, because of its superior qualities, becomes a model for society to be "accepted and considered worth following."³⁰

Any definition of the term "political elite" must include the notion of power. This term especially implies that some people have more political power than others, and thus they are the "political elite".³¹ A "political elite" is an elite in politics "which attempts to exert some influence, legitimate or otherwise, over the allocation of values in society."³² According to Putnam, in studying a political elite, "it is most useful to think in terms of power over outcomes."³³ The definition of "political elite" in this thesis consists of individuals within a specific institutional setting where by virtue of its political power it has a greater "probability of influencing the policies and activities of the state."³⁴

The definition of political elite will be an institutional one, restricted to the personnel within the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee. The personnel in these three institutions will be referred to as the political elite. These three institutions are recognized by political scientists as the pinnacles of power and decision-making in East European political systems, with the Politburo at the apex. Political scientists have long recognized and acknowledged that the "most powerful position in contemporary Poland is occupied by the Political Bureau [Politburo]."³⁵ References of a similar or identical nature are made to the Soviet Politburo. Hill and Frank write that,

The Politburo is indisputably the most powerful body of men in the country. As an institution it defines broad policies, decides priorities and allocates resources. It consists of some two dozen individuals, twelve or thirteen of whom are full or voting members, the super elite of the Soviet political system.³⁶

The same can be said of the Polish Politburo.

The party's supreme administrative body is the Secretariat. Members of this body individually assume responsibility for an area or areas of policy and supervise the party's full time bureaucracy. Hence, "an individual who is elected to both Politburo and Secretariat is truly in the inner sanctum of the leadership".³⁷

The Central Committee is a body which constitutes the closest approximation to the Polish political elite, including leading party and government officials, party officials from the wojewodz level, trade union officials, diplomats, general heads of academic and scientific institutions, and a number of genuine workers and peasants. The majority of Central Committee members are full time professional party apparatchiki. Although generally the Central Committee is regarded as a lame institution, it should not be underestimated that party personnel who eventually become Central Committee members are accorded status but rather and more importantly that they have some input into the policy process. The definition employed above is an attempt at identifying the most important members of the political elite in the Polish political system.

The power elite in this thesis will thus consist of the Politburo and Secretariat. There is a general agreement in East European studies that there exists a dominant political elite comprised of Politburo members. Careful observations over time have confirmed this fact. It represents "the summit of the party, supplying the policies which determine the direction and role of Poland's development."³⁸ This narrow definition of power elite has been restricted to those who have the greatest probability of influencing the authoritative allocation of values in the schema of political stratification. Although power exists at various levels within the party's hierarchy, the very structure of the party organization ensures more power at the top than at the bottom. Concentration of power at the top is further strengthened by democratic centralism.

Although our definition of political elite has been narrow, it recognizes power inequalities possessed by individuals within these three institutions. The very definition of the Polish power elite acknowledges the political stratification of the Polish political elite in various groups. Bielasia states:

It is necessary to establish greater order in the use of the positional approach by recognizing that power is not equally distributed among and within particular organizations.³⁹

Furthermore, the institutional approach in defining political and power elites is endorsed by scholars because given the

highly structured and hierarchical nature of socialist societies, the positional approach is especially well suited to the operationalization of 'political elite' in the context of Soviet and East European systems.⁴⁰

The emphasis on these three institutions and their personnel does not mean that members of the political elite are not to be found in other institutional settings. The political elite extends also to the party and state apparatus, and the regional or wojewodz party level. However, the power elite is only located within the confines of the Politburo and Secretariat. Furthermore, it is not at all implied that political elites not found within the institutions mentioned above are without political power and influence. By concentrating however on the members of the Politburo, Secretariat and Central Committee, the definition of political and power elite was utilized to identify and distinguish this group of political elite from others. Moreover, the personnel within these pivotal institutions will most likely have the decisive say over the authoritative allocation of values and resources within Polish society.

Our definition of political and power elite follows the very core of elitist doctrine which claims that in any given society a minority of the population undertakes major decisions and decision-making which has political and socioeconomic significance. Therefore in the Polish political system, it is the personnel in the Central

Committee, Politburo and Secretariat which has the greatest influence in decision-making within society. Indeed out of a population of 37 million, a few hundred or a mere minority of the population holds and exercises an unequal amount of political power.

Many of Mosca's and Michels' observations are relevant to our study. Mosca claimed that in all societies there is a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class is directed and controlled by the first.⁴¹ Class in Mosca's definition implied political elites. Although the present political and power elite in Poland does not constitute a class, it does nevertheless rule, monopolize power and enjoy various benefits which are derived from exercising political power. Likewise, the Polish political elite are the less numerous class which rules over the masses, the more numerous class. Mosca's dichotomy, although simple, is universally applicable to all societies where rulers and ruled are to be identified.

Mosca's disciple, Michels, and his "iron law of oligarchy" also contributes to the study of Polish political elites. Michels' celebrated formulation "who says organization says oligarchy," can be applied to the study of the PZPR and the political and power elite which constitute

its pinnacles of power. Michels argues that leadership is vital to the success and survival of any organization. In any organization, i.e. political party, those who lead and direct such entities, writes Michels, are usually unaccountable to the masses. They are also usually organizational members and possess greater power because of their knowledge and technical expertise which is needed to run any organization efficiently. Since this knowledge and technical expertise is possessed by a few members who are usually the leaders, their importance is translated into political power. The successful functioning of any organization thus is reliant on a capable leadership which in turn breeds oligarchy.⁴²

The oligarchic tendencies of all East European Communist parties is evident. Not only is the political elite within the Politburo and Secretariats the most powerful, but usually such personalities have advanced through the party's hierarchical structure, and have engaged in various aspects of party work. Thus, once having reached the top, they necessarily possess valuable skills, knowledge, and the technical expertise needed to run the entire party organization. The large nature of an organization such as the PZPR means that the party's leaders come to hold much power and many advantages. It is this minority, this leadership which dictates the party's survival. This is as true of the Polish political elite as

well as of all political elites in the East European Communist parties. The very hierarchical structure of Communist parties and the ban on factionalism in addition to the adherence to democratic centralism makes it easier for oligarchs to emerge in these political systems.

Having defined our conceptual schema and its terms, it must now be operationalized. Although societal, party and political elite transformation has been outlined above, it must now be operationalized in order for the schema to work. Societal transformation will be examined by measuring the rates of change of urbanization, increased levels of education, changes in the size and composition of the new social class structure, age, and changes in the demographic and occupational structure which accompany societal transformation. Since the data are abundant with reference to all of these products of societal transformation, the term itself can be made operative. Statistical yearbooks such as Rocznik Statystyczny and Maly Rocznik Statystyczny publish the required data. Consequently societal transformation is defined as the "socioeconomic effects" of the fruition of industrialization and modernization.

In the schema outlined earlier in this chapter, it was argued that the process of societal transformation and its products are transmitted upwards into the party. On the other hand, party transformation was defined as the process by which the Polish Communist party PZPR has accommodated

the major products of societal transformation within its composition, membership and directive. Moreover, it was proposed that societal transformation can only be reflected within the party's composition and membership by having individuals recruited from society into the party who themselves have been molded by the process.

Party transformation will be operationalized by measuring the party's changing levels in urbanization, education, social class composition, age and demographic structure, and occupational make-up. Because the party has been consistently publishing data on these issues since 1960, the rate of party transformation can be operationalized and thus measured. Hence, by analysing the rates of both party and societal transformation comparatively, the divergences and convergences between the two units of analysis can be illustrated.

Lastly, it was argued that some elements of societal transformation reach the political elite, and more specifically in our case, the power elite. Political elite transformation was defined as having included both components of transformation, but also specific leadership attributes pertinent to the study of East European political elites. These were: age, ethnic origin, urban/rural background, formal and party education, duration of Communist party membership, time spent in the USSR, war time activities, jail sentences for revolutionary activities prior

to the Communist takeover, career backgrounds and Communist youth membership.

The above attributes, except age, are socializing agents which shape a political elite's values, beliefs, and outlooks. The members of a political elite who undergo different forms of socialization by these different socializing agents, should possess a different hierarchy of values, beliefs and a world outlook. Varied social conditioning experience by the members of a political elite may serve as a source of intra-elite conflict. Age reinforces the conditioning of the socializing agents. Data pertaining to all of these aspects of political elite transformation were available in Polish sources such as Trybuna Ludu. By measuring the rates of change for each individual component of political elite transformation, it will be illustrated how political elites in Poland undergo change. Having studied the rates of change from societal, party and political elites, a full picture then emerges which illustrates the many differences that exist between each and suggests how these differences affect politics.

Therefore, the real question that underlies the processes of societal, party and political elite transformation is: What impact do the latter processes, if any, have on the stability of Poland's political system? It was proposed that as the party undergoes change, it encounters the dual difficulty of being both a leading and representa-

tive force. That is, the party must still be the vanguard of the blue-collar working class while maintaining at the same time an objective representation of Polish society and hence invite into its ranks social classes other than blue-collar. It was also argued that the party has had difficulty in maintaining such a balance and consequently political tensions had emerged. Political conflict resulted as blue-collar workers were being increasingly excluded from the PZPR. Conflict, will be operationalized by examining a number of worker-party upheavals illustrating how exclusion leads to it.

The significance of political elite transformation was also proposed as being an important aspect of elite-mass linkage in a socialist society such as Poland. With reference to linkage, it was implied that as the political elite changes, as does society, the problem of competent economic management and the ability to sustain rising consumer expectations becomes the most outstanding problem in Poland. It was also hinted that this same problem faces all East European political elites as they rule increasingly sophisticated societies which are becoming greater economic consumers and to demand greater consumer benefits. Although this hypothesis remains to be tested in other East European states, this problem was vividly exemplified in Poland during the 1970's and prior to the inevitable 1980 crisis. Sufficient economic evidence exists to illustrate the entire

process of Poland's economic ferment foiled by her citizens' growing economic appetites. Hence, the tension in elite-mass linkage during the 1970's will be discussed through an examination of the mainly economic variables that precipitated the 1980 upheaval.

One can thus hypothesize that as Polish society, the party and the political elite undergo transformation, the party must firstly maintain a balance between its leading and representative roles, and secondly, provide sound economic management competent to satiate the flourishing consumer expectations of Polish society. Hence, having outlined the problem of the thesis, defined and operationalized the variables, the thesis will now attempt thoroughly to examine and analyze relevant evidence, in order to draw a conclusion. Chapters Two and Three will deal with societal and party transformation respectively. Political elite transformation is the subject of Chapter Five. Chapter Four deals with the party's recruitment policies which are aimed at maintaining a balance between the party's leading and representative roles. Lastly, Chapter Six analyzes the problems related to Poland's elite-mass linkage and the subsequent conflicts and tensions born as consequences to the party's incompetence in upholding its dynamic dual responsibility. The conclusion will provide some final remarks concerning the questions raised in the thesis, and a prognosis on the stability of future Polish politics.

NOTES

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CHAPTER TWO

SOCIETAL AND PARTY TRANSFORMATION IN SOCIALIST POLAND

Given the changes in post-war Polish society, changes in the party's composition and membership, and in the political elite, are to be expected as well.

It is hypothesized that the following trends in the party's overall composition and membership will develop. First, because Poland became nationally a homogenous country after World War II, the PZPR membership will be predominantly Polish, unlike that of the previous multi-ethnic KPP (Komunistyczna Partia Polski), and thus less concerned with proletarian internationalism. Second, industrialization will change the rural/urban population distribution. Industrialization draws vast numbers of people from over crowded and impoverished countrysides into urban centers. Table 2.1 shows Poland's changing rural/urban population distribution. Consequently, the PZPR's composition should be increasingly comprised of urban members which reflects the country's increased levels of urbanization. Likewise, the party's composition should reflect the actual female /male distribution within Polish society. However, since female political participation and interest in politics is usually lower than that of the male, it should not at all be surprising that the PZPR will likely be male dominated. Another aspect of societal transformation which will be increasingly evident amongst party members, is formal

education. Educational levels have risen impressively for the population and a similar trend should be evident among party members. A significant rise in formal education should be the norm rather than party, or inservice training. Formal education is becoming a major prerequisite in the party's recruitment policy, and subsequently it is a mechanism which allows for social mobility in society and advancement within the party for career minded individuals. Also, Poland's age structure and newly formed social class structure should reflect in the PZPR's composition and membership. The nation's post-war fecundity is high and the nation's population is of a young age. One would expect therefore, to find a fairly young and dynamic party which easily lends itself to periodical rejuvenation with the recruitment of young members into its ranks. Lastly, because Poland's post-war social class structure is composed of peasants, blue-collar workers, and white-collar workers, (because the intelligentsia and white-collar workers perform non-manual work, the term 'white-collar' in this thesis will refer to the intelligentsia and all other categories of non-manual workers), one would expect the party's composition to stem mainly from the blue-collar social class. Yet because of Poland's mounting socioeconomic complexities as associated with the process of industrialization and modernization, the party is increasingly stimulated to recruit highly educated white-collar personnel which in turn, dilutes the

party's expected blue-collar character. This aspect of party transformation will be examined within this chapter when the party's social class composition will be analyzed.

The above outline presupposes certain changes that have developed, or which are in the process of establishing themselves within the party as feedback responses to Poland's societal transformation. To understand the resultant generated changes, one must pursue a detailed analysis of societal and party transformation relative to the aforementioned issues.

Significant changes in the Polish social structure have evolved due to modernization and industrialization. Since Western and Polish sources have adequately documented societal transformation in Poland, this chapter will emphasize in greater detail party transformation which reflects the absorbed elements of societal transformation. Party transformation is a specific process by which major elements of societal transformation such as age, social class structure, urbanization, education, and occupational differentiation and prestige, are incorporated into the PZPR's membership and composition, and all of which contribute to make the party a microcosmic reflection of Polish society. This necessitates an examination of both the rates of societal and party transformation, as well as a discussion of any similarities or differences which may have developed between the first two objects of analysis:

society and party.

Matejko and other scholars have identified the resultant major changes as societal transformation has evolved and developed in Poland.¹ Societal transformation is a process which stems from industrialization that subsequent changes generated in demographics, educational levels, social stratification, occupational differentiation and prestige, hierarchy, status, and, most importantly, a new social class structure.² These changing issues are more or less absorbed by the party's overall composition and membership, and hence, one of the most significant post-war changes in Poland's macrostructure is its completely homogeneous ethnic character.

Poland no longer has national minority problems which prevented national integration during the second republic.³ This development has important political significance for the PZPR. The ruling Communist elite and party members are predominantly Polish, unlike their KPP predecessors who were comprised of various national minorities: Jews, Ukrainians, Germans, and Bielorussions. Communist and Western estimates at the time

had put the number of Jews in the party at about 22 to 26% throughout the 1930's with a particular strong concentration exceeding 50% of the urban and central areas of Poland.⁴

Table 2.2 illustrates the multinational makeup of the KPP membership. Because a large portion of the KPP's ranks

was Jewish, the party was open to anti-Semitic attacks, which resulted in the party's further isolation from the Polish populace and which limited its political success.

The PZPR is entirely Polish, but the Jewish backgrounds of some top Communist officials have been exploited for discrediting of them by other party members during periods of power struggles. This was very evident in the late 1960's, when Moczar's faction successfully used anti-Semitism in removing rivals from political office.⁵ The last remnants of high ranking Jewish Communist officials in the PZPR were removed from their party posts in 1968. Although the PZPR today is not open to ethnic-related criticism like its KPP predecessor, it is seen as serving Soviet interests.

Post-World War II Poland also experienced a change in its political system as a result of the seizure of power by the Communists. The regime looked forward to securing its position through the industrialization and modernization of Poland. The PZPR has, however, never really successfully penetrated Polish society. PZPR members form a minority within the Polish population. Table 2.3 shows PZPR members as a percentage of the total population. The Table also reveals a steady growth in the party's share of the total population interrupted only by periodic post-war political crises. Nevertheless, the party has not been able to penetrate more than 8.6 percent of the total population, a

record high registered in 1980.

A close examination of Table 2.3 reveals that with the beginning of the Stalinist era in Poland (1949-53), the party's percentage of the total population declined from 5.5 to 4.6 percent. As one scholar has noted, the party's close supervision of cadre recruitment and its over zealous efforts at weeding out class enemies had indeed reduced the party's overall numbers.⁶ Although the party's membership increased during 1954 and 1955, it plummeted after 1956 due to the political crisis of 1956 and Gomulka's verification policy of future party members.

The party's size did increase after 1962 and continued this way uninterrupted until 1970. The downturn between 1970 and 1975 can be attributed to two factors: the December 1970 workers' riots and the purge of party cadres as directed by Gierek after 1970. During the second half of the 1970's, the party's percentage of the Polish population increased significantly with a record high established by the end of the decade. It is interesting to observe that the workers' riots of 1976 did not at all impede this growth trend. However, with the 1980-81 crisis, the party's fortunes suffered a downturn.

Since 1980, the party's percentage of the population has continued to decline to levels slightly higher than those recorded in 1949. This downturn was very much affected by the rise of the trade union Solidarnosc which

reportedly drew one third of all party members into its ranks. Moreover, the imposition of martial law by Jaruzelski largely alienated Poland's social classes, including the working class, from the party. This too resulted in the party's declining ranks and its overall diminished representation of the nation's population. Moreover, since 1981, the party has instituted a vigorous verification process which has already resulted in many party members being expelled. Table 2.4 shows that the PZPR's percentage of the Polish population is much lower than levels reached by the Czechoslovak and Romanian Communist Parties, while data for the 1980's shows that the East German, Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communist Parties have higher rates of representation in their respective populations. The PZPR stands weaker in popular representation by comparison to its counterparts in Eastern Europe.

Table 2.5 illustrates the PZPR's saturation level of the Polish adult population. Although the data are brief, they do indicate a continuous growth until 1979. By 1982, however, the level had decreased as indicative of the 1980-81 crisis in Poland. Although statistics for subsequent years are not yet available, one would safely assume that this level of saturation has not increased as Poles continue to feel the after-tastes of 1980-81.

Table 2.1 reveals that Poland today is 60 percent urbanized, with the majority of the population living in

major urban centers. Nevertheless, a 40 percent rural population is still a significant minority.⁷ This same Table illustrates the movement of the population from a rural to an urban environment. The process of modernization and industrialization has produced large urban industrial centers such as Lodz, Warsaw, Wroclaw, Katowice, Poznan, Gdansk, and now Nowa Huta. Although urbanization is likely to continue, the actual mobility from the rural to the urban milieu is expected to drop off due to contemporary economic difficulties associated with urban life. If party transformation is occurring, the PZPR should reflect an urbanized membership. The dual processes of modernization and industrialization have acted as a magnet which has attracted some rural populace into the urban centers. The party has responded by recruiting increasingly within these centers. It has probably always been urban, with its rate of urbanization slowly increasing with time.

Table 2.6 illustrates the party's rural/urban breakdown. Analysis brings to light the following trends. First, the party is underrepresentative of the rural populace even though the party still recruits 25 percent of its membership from the countryside. Second, the party is clearly overrepresentative of the urban populace, but slowly becoming less so. The PZPR is an urban party.⁸

As Poland continues to urbanize, the party will likely increase its urban representation. Because the most vital

industrial plants are located in urban centers, the party will direct its recruitment efforts within industrial-urban complexes. This was increasingly achieved during the 1970's as the party concentrated its recruitment drive in the key large enterprises, or the so-called citadels of socialism.⁹ Likewise, most white-collar personnel are to be found within an urban environment. Since this category of workers is increasingly important for the party, the party's recruitment efforts will be predominantly concentrated within this environment. The party cannot help but remain urban in nature as long as the process of urbanization continues.

This very process of urbanization means that the party's representation of the countryside will decline as greater numbers of persons inhabit the cities and leave behind their rural environment. Hence, natural attrition reduces the rural populace. Yet, the party has always had difficulty in penetrating the countryside. This weakness is related to a number of interdependent causes. Although the PZPR recruits peasants, the major task of representing this social class has been left to the party's satellite party, the ZSL (Zwiazek Stronnictwa Ludowego). The ZSL's membership is overwhelmingly (95 percent) comprised of individual land-owning peasants. The PZPR has never been able to successfully represent the countryside because the rural political culture blocks party influence.

Traditionally, the rural inhabitants, like the general

populace, have been extremely wary and suspicious of all forms of political authority, foreign or indigenous.

Although the new Communist regime was able to neutralize the peasantry by instituting land reforms in 1945, subsequent party policies of attempted forced collectivization and listless agricultural policies have prevented the PZPR from more fully penetrating the rural countryside.¹⁰

Agriculture continued to be neglected through Gierek's reign as investment in this sector successively declined. Not surprisingly, Table 2.7 reveals that peasant representation within the party since 1949 has declined significantly. This weak level of representation will persist as citizens continue to leave the countryside in favour of the urban benefits promised by the modernization of Poland.

The party's underrepresentation of the rural constituency is paralleled by the party's underrepresentation of the female populace. In a state where equality is preached and supposedly upheld, the PZPR is not equally representative of both sexes. The party is overwhelmingly a male organization. Although females comprise over half of Poland's population, they are badly underrepresented within the party. Overall, the party has never been able to recruit more than 4.4 percent of the total female population into its ranks (see Table 2.8). Furthermore, females comprise only a quarter of the party's membership (Tables 2.9 and 2.10). Females are nearly half of the socialized workforce in the

country, yet the party has never represented more than 15 percent of employed females (see Table 2.11). Such representation is indeed low if one considers the females' participation in the nation's labour-force.

A steady rise in female party membership, in absolute and percentage terms, was witnessed up to 1979.¹¹ Since then, the party has lost female members and its saturation of the total female population and female workforce, has declined. The crisis of 1980-81 undoubtedly contributed to this. Females have declined in absolute terms even though their percentage of the total PZPR membership peaked at 26.8 percent in 1984. Table 2.11 illustrates that the party has never kept pace with the female population and workforce in terms of representation.

Two closely interrelated arguments can explain the disadvantaged position of Polish women within the PZPR ranks. Traditionally it has been argued that,

Women in Poland are rarely able to break into high managerial or political positions [...] They continue to assume the burden of such traditional feminine responsibilities as shopping, housework, and child rearing. They are treated with ostentatious gallantry by men while actually being patronized.¹²

The most eloquent explanation as to why women are so poorly represented by the PZPR is provided by Barbara Jancar, who writes,

Women in Communist societies may have a greater sense of practicality than men. Tied down to a job, and preferring home

and family to high risk and an uncertain future, the vast majority of women have opted out of the Communist political structure both as contributors to it and as opponents.¹³

Moreover, many women are found in low paying jobs which offer no possibility for promotion. Party membership therefore becomes irrelevant as a vehicle for career advancement.

If female underrepresentation is evident in the party, it becomes even more striking as one examines the Politburo, Central Committee and Secretariat. These bodies are predominantly male. A female has never reached the rank of party First Secretary, First Secretary of a party regional organization, or membership within the Secretariat. A female was first elected to the party Politburo in 1981 as a full member during the IX Extraordinary Party Congress. During the latest Congress (July 1986), two females were elected to the Politburo, as full and alternate members respectively. However, it can be expected that these two party organs will still continue to be male-dominated in the foreseeable future.

Female representation in the Central Committee has only risen in absolute terms; as a percentage, the females are a very small minority (see Table 2.12), never more than 23 percent of the membership in the Audit Committee. Thus the top three party institutions are totally male dominated. This sparse representation of females at the top of the

party hierarchy should not be seen as some form of conspiracy among male party members preventing women to advance to the most important structures. Females do not advance as rapidly through the party's hierarchical structure as men for reasons discussed above. Also there are fewer females than males in the party which partially accounts for the imbalances. "Plainly the world of [high party] politics is almost universally a man's world."¹⁴

Although the party seems to have fared badly in representing the female population, it has made significant strides in its educational levels of its membership. Societies undergoing industrialization and modernization usually experience a rapid increase in educational levels. Education becomes a necessity for the modernizing regime. After seizing power, the PZPR intensified its efforts at raising the educational levels of Polish society and of its own membership. Education has always been a priority of all revolutionary regimes

All East European regimes shared a common goal of rapidly transforming backward agrarian societies into modern industrial states. Societal transformation as envisaged by these Communist regimes, required a massive effort at structuring and operating an educational system whose functions were twofold. One of these was raising a reliable technical cadre capable of performing economic and administrative functions. Education was also a means by which the

party's goals could be inculcated throughout the populace. Education was and still is a functional and ideological tool controlled by the party for raising an educated and politically reliable cadre and populace.

Table 2.13 illustrates that the percentage of the populace with higher education has increased fourfold since 1955 and doubled between 1970 and 1984. The rapid progress of education among the Polish populace has also been matched if not surpassed by the party.

During the early years of the regimes's existence, political reliability rather than education were important to the party's leadership. Political scientists have referred to this category of members as the old guard.

The old guard had a history of struggle in the pre-war Communist underground. They had been partisans during the war and pioneers of reconstruction. Without formal education, they were politically minded, traditional, and past oriented people whose careers were based on their skills as propagandists and ideological virtues.¹⁵

The low level of education among party members in the early postwar years was acknowledged in the party's main organ Nowe Drogi. "The majority of party members possessed an elementary or incomplete elementary education."¹⁶ The party leadership began increasingly to criticize this state of affairs. The leadership acknowledged that party officials generally lacked the proper theoretical and professional knowledge.¹⁷ Zenon Kliszko, during the IV PZPR Congress, bluntly stated that:

Party officials of the 1940's and 1950's had been people whose interests were concentrated above all in systemic political problems, who were frequently organizers of the revolution and people's power and who devoted themselves increasingly to social work. They were characterized by political knowledge and skill, propaganda talents and the ability to talk to the masses. Such people are now giving way to a new kind of activist with substantial greater knowledge and a better orientation in questions relating to industry and agriculture. These new officials unite enthusiasm and passion for social work with a high level of general and vocational education and while the old qualities of a party activist have lost none of their relevance, they need to be supplemented with the genuine expert knowledge necessary to direct the complicated problems involved in the building of socialism.¹⁸

Clearly, the party leadership expected new party members to possess some form of education and professional training. Education and its relevance continues to be raised in all party publications with regards to the party itself. The emphasis is placed on the continuous up-grading of the educational levels of all party ranks. Education consequently becomes a means by which party members can expect advancement and promotion to higher positions within the party.

Higher education serves as a means of upward mobility within society, and career advancement within the party, and thus it stands as a prerequisite for career minded party members. Aside from this, the party is more likely to promote educated members than those who possess no educa-

tional training. Table 2.14 illustrates the significant strides made by party members in increasing their higher and technical levels of education. Since 1951, PZPR members with a higher education increased nine times percentage wise, while the level of higher education for 1960-84 more than doubled. Moreover, PZPR members without an elementary education have declined significantly. The party today is more educated than at any time in its history. The level of higher education between society and party members is indicative of the efforts made by the party in educating itself.

Table 2.13 shows that party members have always possessed more higher education than the general populace, and the discrepancy is growing instead of shrinking. In 1955, the ratio of higher education was 2:1 in favour of party members. By 1984, it was 3:1. This demonstrates how increasingly unrepresentative the party is of the general populace with regards to educational achievement. This is likely to continue as long as the party persists in recruiting personnel with higher education. Thus, one can expect the ratio to increase even more. Higher education is a prerequisite in an industrializing and modernizing state for party members will be called upon to handle complex economic and administrative problems associated with the functioning and governing of the socialized society.

This reality seems to have been accepted by the

majority of party members. Members of the party have been willing to upgrade their education after joining. Sporadic data published by the party has shown that members do increase their educational qualifications.

PZPR members in 1968 with educational qualifications obtained since joining were as follows: higher education 43.4%, further education 24.1%, secondary education 5.9%. It has been estimated that almost 25% of PZPR members had acquired higher education since joining, thus providing justification for the assertion that the party was educating itself.¹⁹

Evidence gathered from party sources for the 1970's indicates that 20.2 percent of the candidates who joined eventually raised their educational levels.²⁰ The data also reveal interesting characteristics as to which social group was more likely to upgrade its level of education. "Only 8.6% of all newly admitted workers increased their education, 6.0% of all peasants, but 30.6% of all white-collar workers..."²¹

Since higher education is now the norm for career advancement, blue-collar workers are usually excluded from higher party positions. Besides being male, education becomes the second criterion that strengthens a member's chances of reaching the ranks of the Politburo and Secretariat. Education is thus one of the most important factors in political recruitment of potential members and their success within the party.

Because of the emphasis on education, Table 2.15 illustrates that PZPR members whose education is incomplete,

continues to decline. Members with an elementary, or incomplete secondary education continue to dwindle in numbers. With time, members who fall into these two categories will likely become extinct. Party members with an incomplete higher education increased during the 1960's and 1970's yet, by 1984 this category was halved to 2.5 percent. Also, members with an incomplete technical education started to decline in numbers by 1984 and this trend is likely to continue. The general trend is to have party members with a completed education. These overall trends tend to support the premise that the party has made strides in educating itself.

The educational record is impressive. During the 1950's and 1960's, however, in-service training for most party members, was the norm. Party members attending party schools to upgrade their education did not have the same standards as regular institutions of higher learning. Members attending WUML (evening Marxist-Leninist universities) were usually attending schools in which political training dominated the curricula and standards were low. Likewise, upper echelon party members attending the Central Party School or regional schools in Katowice, Bydgoszcz, and Falenty, were not receiving the same type of education party members would have obtained at an accredited institution of higher learning.

Party statistics have not clearly revealed the status

of their members' education, especially where party training is concerned. During the 1970's, greater emphasis was placed on party members' obtaining their educational training at standard educational institutions although party schools continued to play an important role. "The WUML centres by 1980 had trained 80,000 party members."²²

Likewise, party schools in 1980 were training 1897 members in some type of post graduate work while a further 4321 had attended various seminars and courses.²³

Hence, the party has been highly successful in raising an educated Polish society as part of the process of social transformation while at the same time it has managed to outpace the educational achievements of the general population. In this sense, the party has been able successfully not only to manage the process of transformation, but surpass it as well.

Societal transformation also includes changes in the population's age structure, and since the party draws its membership from the general population, it is interesting to compare party and society. A successful political party ought to change in parallel to the general public.

Societal transformation in age structure is especially evident in Poland. World War II and Poland's post war birth rate (the highest in Europe at one point in time) are responsible for the present age structure. The Second World War inflicted heavy casualties and losses upon the Polish

state and populace.

Poland paid the highest price of all belligerent nations: of the 35 million prewar citizens of Poland, over 6 million perished. That is 220 out of every 1000 people were killed. (Corresponding figures for other Allied countries were: for Yugoslavia, 108/1000; for USSR, 40; for Czechoslovakia and France, 15; for the United Kingdom, 8; and for the United States, 1.4).²⁴

Twenty two percent of Poland's 1939 populace was lost during World War II.²⁵ The high post-war birth rate further restructured Poland's population. Out of 37 million Poles living presently, 14 million were born after the war. The war and the high birth rate have combined to produce a very young population. Table 2.16 shows that the single largest age category is comprised of persons under the age of 29 (48.4% in 1984). Also, 64.7 percent of the population had not reached forty years of age. This age structure has important relevance for the party.

Party cohorts born before Poland's independence, during the inter-war period, the war, and thereafter, will all possess different life experiences and attitudes. The Polish Communist elite must be characterized, as Jerry Hough has said of the Soviet political elite, by the

dramatic differences in life opportunities produced by these events which have had a number of direct and indirect echo effects as members of the various generations have aged and begun to rise through the political and administrative hierarchies.²⁶

Hence, members of the Communist party could be classed into

two large categories because of their age: the revolutionary and the post revolutionary generation. Concurrently, the party's composition should reflect Poland's changing age structure. Members of the revolutionary generation should give way to the post-war cohorts. Likewise, the party should be representative of the youngest elements within Polish society.

The data on the party's changing age structure reveals that the party is losing its revolutionary members and is replacing them with members of the younger generation. Those who had joined before 1948 have steadily declined. In 1948, they comprised 55.4 percent of the total membership; in 1958, 33.5; in 1963, 22.0; in 1967 and in 1969, 18.3; and only 11.0 percent in 1980.²⁷ The party continues to transform itself as new members are recruited into the party during each decade, and as older members depart. In 1958, members accepted into the party during 1949-53 and 1954-56, comprised between 18.0 and 22.0 percent of the respective membership. By 1964, this category of members declined to 18.0 percent and by 1976 these members constituted 13.0 percent of all PZPR ranks. Members accepted in 1959-68 comprised 61.1 percent of the ranks in 1968. By 1976, 56.5 percent of the members had joined between 1959 and 1971, while 19.2 percent had joined between 1972 and 1976. By 1979, 75.0 percent of the entire membership was admitted during the 1960's and the 1970's.²⁸ By 1986, 33.2 percent

of the ranks were admitted during the last six years.

Table 2.17 shows the percent of candidate members and as a total of recruits under the age of 25 admitted into the PZPR, has remained low. During the 1970's, the party intensified its efforts at recruiting young people. Between 1971 and 1975, 66.0 percent were under the age of 30, and for 1975-80, this figure had increased to 70.0 percent.²⁹ This recruitment policy has maintained a youthful party. The average age of party members has remained fairly constant during the sixties: 38.4 in 1963, and 38.2 in 1967. However, it increased slightly during the 1970's: i.e. 40.1 in 1975. By 1980 the average age of party members was 40.3.³⁰ This rose to 43.8 in 1982. Although the party has maintained a fairly young age by recruiting young people, it is having great difficulty in holding on to its youngest cohorts.

Table 2.18 also illustrates that the party is very underrepresentative of the 25-29 age category and those who have not reached 25. In fact, party representation of these age groups has been declining since 1978 and this decline was accelerated by the 1980-81 crisis. Since 1978, the PZPR has raised its level of representation of the other age group categories, especially that of the 30-39 age bracket, and 50 and above. This trend will mean that with time, the party will continue to age more rapidly than the population if it does not develop some kind of strategy designed to

attract and hold young members.

Class structure is the last element to be considered as part of the process of societal transformation. Poland's post-war social order differs greatly from that which existed in the second republic. The new political order eliminated previously existing social classes and elevated others. Wealthy landowners, petty bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia were the most important social classes during the interwar period, even though they formed a minority of the overall macrostructure (see Table 2.18). The old social order was destroyed by the new Communist regime; classes once influential were eliminated. New social classes, like the blue-collar, were elevated. Today, it is commonly recognized by Polish sociologists that three classes--the blue-collar workers, peasants and white-collar personnel--comprise the new social order.

Prior to 1945, peasants composed the largest social class. Urbanization and modernization have shrunk this class. The peasants' steady decline has been matched by the noticeable decline of peasants as part of the party's composition (see Table 2.7). The peasants have fallen from 14.5 percent of party composition in 1949 to just 9.0 in 1983. Although party pronouncements constantly lament about the peasants' low level of representation, the party has not been entirely successful in recruiting greater numbers of this class. Table 2.19 illustrates this underrepresenta-

tion. Yet representation in the party is relatively better now than in 1950, owing to the precipitous decline of peasants in the population.

The peasants are reluctant to join the PZPR, an organization which is both atheistic and which was intent on collectivizing agriculture. On the contrary, peasants are fiercely religious and traditional, and they jealously guard their status as independent landowners. Misconceived agricultural policies and the constant neglect of the countryside over urban areas has further contributed to the alienation and resentment of central authorities by the peasants.³¹ During 1980-81, the peasants demanded and eventually won the right to form an independent trade union which would represent farmers.³² The problem of peasant representation is summed up by Mason's statement that "not only does the party have trouble keeping farmers in the party, but it also does not seem able to get them to join in the first place."³³ In fact, peasants, as a social class, have the lowest rate of party saturation. In 1982, party saturation of the peasant class stood at three percent.

Those peasants who do eventually join the party reflect the many internal changes which have characterized this social group since 1945. They are overwhelmingly individual landowners. Individual land-owning peasants are further differentiated by wealth and the amount of land they own. Thus, individual peasant farms of less than 2 hectares grew

between 1950 and 1982 (Table 2.20). Yet, this category of individual land holders declined from 19 to 11 percent of party membership between 1958 and 1975. Peasant farms of between 2 and 5 hectares also decreased with a corresponding decline in party membership in this category of land holders from 35 to 33 percent. The most stable party representation, at 37 percent, is of peasants who own between 5 and 10 hectares. On the other hand, peasants who possess more than 10 hectares of land increased their party membership from 5 to 19 percent between 1950 and 1975.³⁴ For some peasants PZPR membership is a means by which their own interests can be protected. PZPR membership becomes an asset for an individual peasant when he must deal with the local administration. Peasants who are party members have an easier time securing agricultural machinery and supplies, and an easier time adapting to the socioeconomic difficulties that the independent peasant must face in Poland.

Thus, party representation of peasants is inconsistent. The smallest land holders are underrepresented, while the largest peasant landowners are overrepresented. Peasants, as individual landowners, rank low in terms of occupational prestige. Yet occupational prestige should be ruled out as a variable responsible for attracting individual large landowning peasants into the party. Hence, overall, the party is underrepresentative of the peasants.

Modernization and industrialization have contributed to

the increase in growth of white-collar personnel. This category comes to play an increasingly important role in modern industrialized societies because of their educational training and technical expertise needed for the functioning of complex industrial societies. Since the party tries to be representative of the most important strata in Polish society, it must include white-collar workers within its ranks. Recruitment of white-collar workers into the party is a fundamental concern, arising

from the need to cope with the growing complexity of socioeconomic problems. Moreover, the party could fulfill its leadership responsibilities only through effective assimilation of a qualified and highly trained personnel.³⁵

By 1983, white-collar workers were the single largest social class in the PZPR.

Since 1949, white-collar personnel, as a percentage of the party's total social composition, has increased. From a low of 22.8 percent in 1949, this social category has grown to 51.5 percent of the party's overall social composition. Out of all the three social classes, white-collar workers have grown the fastest in terms of representation.

White-collar workers have registered continuous growth because this social class has been the most stable, recording the lowest level of attrition from the party. This single factor has allowed white-collar personnel to form a majority within the party. Between 1959 and 1975, white-collar workers were a majority in the PZPR. During the mid

1970's, white-collar representation dropped off to levels comparable to the early 1950's. The partial decline of white-collar representation resulted from a political recruitment policy which placed greater emphasis on admitting blue-collar workers into the party. Concern was voiced by the political leadership that the party was losing its working class character. The downturn in white-collar representation was seen as proper and correct. Gierek's efforts at recruiting additional blue-collar workers was designed to show that the party did in fact have a close relationship with its own working class, especially after the 1976 riots.

Efforts at recruiting additional workers was a political manoeuvre. Recent statistics confirm this point that the long

established organizational patterns which put a premium on educational and professional qualifications for party membership, suggests that white-collar groups are likely to continue as the main source of its social support.³⁶

Table 2.20 shows the party has always been overrepresentative of the white-collar class. Although the white collar class has never formed more than a quarter of the total population, it is vastly overrepresented in the party. Such developments run contrary to official statements and pronouncements which continue to espouse the same ideological line that the PZPR is a workers' party and the vanguard of the working class. At the X Party Congress no

new ideological pronouncements were made even though the party today is overwhelmingly white-collar. This overrepresentation is likely to continue. In the words of one author,

This problem derives from the tendency of the party, as the leading organization, to attract and promote leaders, organizers and bureaucrats, who generally hold white-collar jobs.³⁷

Sociologists and political commentators continuously emphasize that the most significant social class in Poland is the blue-collar worker. This class is the largest today, comprising nearly 60 percent of the total population. The demographic increase in blue-collar workers has largely been the result of industrialization. At the same time, its inner composition varies in terms of income, lifestyle, education, and nature of work. Although this class is by far the most numerous and possibly the most dynamic, as was illustrated during the 1980-81 crisis, its representation within the PZPR can be called "weak". The party has not successfully incorporated this class in its scheme of representation, even though the process of transformation has brought this social class to the forefront in the new political order.

The post-war political order was created to serve the working class as guided by the Marxist-Leninist party, the PZPR. Party ideology states that

the Polish United Workers' Party is the party of Polish Communists, fighting for

the interests of the working class and all working people...it is the vanguard party of the working class.³⁸

But how truly representative is the party of blue-collar workers? Since the party's inception in 1949, workers have only formed a clear majority percentage in 1949-50 in terms of the party's social composition. During the 1950's, the blue-collar workers' total share continued to decline. In the 1960's, this figure oscillated between 39 and 40 percent, and eventually fell steadily until 1976. Although the workers were able to increase their social class representation during the late 1970's, the 1980-81 worker-party conflict resulted in a rapid diminution of the blue-collar presence within the PZPR's ranks. By 1986, the party had registered its lowest level of blue-collar representation in the party's history.³⁹ Table 2.22 shows that blue-collar workers have in the past been overrepresented in the party, but this overrepresentation has now been reversed.

Table 2.23 illustrates the fact that the party has only been successful at representing a small portion of the total workforce. What factors account for this low level of representation?

The party has always experienced difficulty in holding on to workers once they were admitted into the party. Blue-collar workers are the most unstable of all the three social classes. This class has registered the highest attrition rate. Even though the party has always recruited a large

number of workers on a yearly basis, the overall level of working class representation has not increased dramatically. This either means that blue-collar workers were advancing rapidly within the party (social mobility), or that they were leaving the party rapidly. More often than not, it has meant a rapid turnover of workers within the party. During the latest round of worker-party conflict, 55.9 percent of all expelled party members were blue-collar workers (32.2 percent were white-collar). Furthermore, 66.0 percent of crossed-off members were blue-collar workers (16.1 percent were white-collar).⁴⁰ The party has also experienced other periods where blue-collar workers were either expelled or voluntarily handed in their party cards (1956; 1970; and 1976). The loss of confidence in the party was clearly manifested in 1980-81 worker-party conflict. Continued decline of worker representation within the PZPR reflects the still large void and mistrust that separates the working class from the party.

This chapter hypothesized that several elements of societal transformation would be incorporated by the party. This process was defined as party transformation and was to constitute the PZPR into more or less of a microcosm of Polish society. The above analysis reveals that each element of societal transformation has been absorbed by the party in different ways. How successful thus has the PZPR been in actually becoming a microcosm of Polish society?

The party has successfully become an ethnic homogeneous realm which mirrors the nation's consequential post-war homogeneous state free from the responsibility of national ethnic minority representation. High ranking Jewish Communist officials were removed by the 1968 anti-Semitic campaign that was waged by certain factions within the PZPR.

With respect to urbanization, the PZPR is predominantly comprised of urban members. In fact, the party is overrepresentative of the urban population. As was pointed out, the urbanized nature of the country will necessarily and justifiably stimulate the party to continue to be urban. At the same time however, the party is underrepresentative of the rural populace, though less presently than in the past.

Education is another aspect which the party has successfully absorbed. Party members today possess a higher level of education than the general population. This gap is growing in favour of the PZPR, something which is common for all East European Communist parties. The party is most unrepresentative of the Polish population in this respect. Yet one must remember that the PZPR is a cadre party, and since party recruitment tends to favour highly educated members, this trend will continue.

The party is male dominated. This, too, is true for all East European Communist parties. As one advances in the party's hierarchical structure, females become more and more absent from higher party organs such as the Politburo and

Secretariat. Females are clearly a disadvantaged and underrepresented group in the PZPR. The party's representation of females is weak considering that they comprise half of Poland's socialized labour force.

Lastly, the analysis of Poland's post-war social class structure shows trends consistent with respect to the process of industrialization.⁴¹ Although in ideological terms the party is a vanguard of the working class, statistics reveal that the blue-collar component of the party is minimal. White-collar personnel have constituted a majority many times in the PZPR's history. Hence, the PZPR is highly overrepresentative of this social class. Although political pronouncements by the party have identified this problem and have even sought to recruit greater numbers of blue-collar workers, white-collar personnel continue to be favoured in the party's social class composition. The actual low level of blue-collar representation has been chiefly attributed to certain factors such as high attrition rates. Blue-collar workers thus are indeed underrepresented and the trend seems to be irreversible. Consequently this will weaken the party's claim to be the legitimate vanguard of the working class. This problem of representation becomes all the more significant considering that the blue-collar class is the largest social class in the society. And because the party is underrepresentative of the entire blue-collar workforce in Poland, a representation that has declined in the recent

years, one ought to monitor the nation's worker-party relations. Surely party representation inconsistencies may act as de-stabilizing forces in Poland's political system.

Overall, four trends become evident in the process of party transformation relative to what Putnam described as the law of increasing disproportion. Party members are largely male, white-collar, highly educated, and of an urban background.⁴¹ These elements of societal transformation are winning out as they are being absorbed into the process of party transformation. Females, peasants, and blue-collar workers become the losers in this process. The ultimate conclusions thus are that the party is not becoming a microcosm of Polish society and that party and societal transformations do not correspond but rather, there are significant differences between the two.

TABLE 2.1

POLAND'S POPULATION-URBAN VS RURAL
SELECTED YEARS (1938-84)
(IN PERCENT)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>URBAN</u>	<u>RURAL</u>
1938	30.0	70.0
1949	36.2	63.8
1950	36.9	63.1
1955	43.8	56.2
1960	47.7	52.3
1965	49.7	50.3
1970	52.3	47.7
1975	55.7	44.3
1980	58.7	41.3
1984	60.0	40.0

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1949-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1950-86).

TABLE 2.2

NATIONAL MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN THE KPP (1929-35)
 (in percent)

<u>National Minority</u>	<u>1929</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>1931</u>	<u>1932</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>
Poles	72	65	75	70	70	80	75.6
Jews	28	35	25	30	24	17	21.2
Ukrainians	--	3	3	--	--	--	3.2
Germans	--	--	--	--	--	3	----

Sources: Henryk Cimek and Lucjan Kieszczynski, Komunistyczna Partia Polski 1918-38 (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1984), p. 438; Jozef Kowalski, Komunistyczna Partia Polski 1935-38 (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1975), p.89.

TABLE 2.3

PZPR MEMBERS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION
(1949-85)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>(%)</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>(%)</u>
1949	5.5	1968	6.4
1950	4.9	1969	6.7
1951	4.4	1970	7.1
1952	4.4	1971	6.8
1953	4.6	1972	6.8
1954	4.7	1973	6.9
1955	4.8	1974	7.0
1956	4.7	1975	7.1
1957	4.4	1976	7.4
1958	3.5	1977	7.6
1959	3.4	1978	8.3
1960	3.8	1979	8.5
1961	4.3	1980	8.6
1962	4.5	1981	7.4
1963	4.8	1982	6.4
1964	5.2	1983	5.9
1965	5.6	1984	5.7
1966	5.9	1985	6.2
1967	6.0		

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny, 1949-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1950-86); As in 2.7.

TABLE 2.4

COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN EASTERN EUROPE
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ESTIMATED POPULATION
(1960-82)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>
Romania	4.5	7.6	9.8	12.1	13.7	14.4
GDR	----	----	----	11.3	12.7	13.1
Czechoslovakia	11.4	11.9	8.6	----	9.9	10.3
Yugoslavia	5.5	5.2	5.0	5.7	8.9	9.6
Bulgaria	----	----	----	----	9.2	9.2
Hungary	----	5.3	6.4	7.2	7.5	7.5
USSR	4.1	5.1	5.9	6.0	6.4	6.5
Poland*	3.8	5.6	7.1	7.1	8.6	6.4
Albania	----	----	3.6	4.2	3.7	5.2

Source: Michael Shamir, Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Incorporated, 1985), p. 86.

*Calculations made by Paul Ferensowicz

TABLE 2.5

PARTY SATURATION OF ADULT POPULATION (1954-82)
(as percentage)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Party Saturation of Adult Population</u>
1954	7.5
1958	8.6
1965	8.9
1968	9.9
1971	10.1
1976	10.6
1979	11.7
1982	9.0

Sources: "Portret Partii," Zycie Partii, No. 2 (1980) 14; Wladyslaw Gora, Polska Ludowa 1944-84 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1986), p.646; Jan Bluszkowski and Kazimierz Konstanski, "Szeregi partyjne na tle przemian spoleczenstwa," Ideologia i Polityka, No. 1 (1980) 74; Stefan Dziabala, "Model czlonkostwa i dynamika rozwoju szeregow PZPR," Z Pola Walki, No. 3 (1979), 174.

TABLE 2.6

PERCENTAGE OF POLISH POPULATION AND OF PZPR MEMBERSHIP
CLASSIFIED AS URBAN
SELECTED YEARS
(1960-84)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1960	47.7	69.0	0.69
1965	49.7	69.2	0.71
1967	50.9	69.6	0.73
1968	51.2	69.8	0.73
1969	51.5	70.0	0.73
1970	52.3	70.2	0.75
1971	52.8	71.4	0.73
1973	54.2	72.1	0.75
1975	55.7	73.3	0.75
1976	56.4	73.5	0.76
1978	57.5	73.9	0.77
1982	59.5	74.3	0.80
1984	60.0	74.3	0.81

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-86)

N.B. No data are available on the rural-urban distribution of party membership before 1960.

TABLE 2.7
MEMBERSHIP AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF PZPR
(IN THOUSANDS AND PERCENT) (1948-85)

YEAR	N (thou- sands)	WORKERS (percentage)	PEASANTS	WHITE-COLLAR
1949	1,361	56.8	14.5	26.1
1950	1,241	50.7	13.6	33.4
1951	11,384	49.3	13.3	35.2
1952	11,469	48.2	13.4	36.0
1953	11,567	47.7	13.0	37.1
1954	12,981	48.0	13.8	36.2
1955	13,438	45.1	13.0	39.2
1956	13,767	44.6	12.8	39.5
1957	1,283	39.9	12.8	38.8
1958	10,234	41.8	12.2	43.9
1959	10,181	40.0	11.5	43.2
1960	11,547	40.3	11.8	42.9
1961	13,062	40.1	12.0	42.9
1962	13,970	39.8	11.5	43.1
1963	14,941	39.7	11.2	43.9
1964	16,406	40.2	11.4	43.0
1965	1,775	40.1	11.7	42.7
1966	1,894	40.1	11.8	42.6
1967	19,313	39.7	11.5	43.5
1968	21,043	40.2	11.4	43.0
1969	22,035	40.2	11.4	42.8
1970	23,196	40.3	11.5	42.3
1971	22,541	39.7	10.6	43.6
1972	22,629	39.6	10.1	43.9
1973	23,225	39.4	10.2	43.2
1974	2,363	39.6	10.4	42.4
1975	2,437	41.8	9.5	41.8
1976	25,684	44.9	9.3	38.8
1977	26,656	45.6	9.3	34.3
1978	29,304	45.7	9.4	34.0
1979	30,122	45.9	9.4	33.2
1980	30,919	44.7	9.4	33.5
1981	26,906	40.2	9.4	34.1
1982	23,273	39.3	9.1	n.a.
1983	21,860	38.5	9.0	50.1
1984	21,172	40.0	9.1	51.0
1985	23,273	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Sources: Nowe Drogi, No. 3 (1954), 68-69; Nowe Drogi, No. 6 (1956), 102-06; Nowe Drogi, No. 5 (1961), 136-44; Zycie Partii, No. 10 (1968), 3-5; Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-86); Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1984 (Warsaw: GUS, 1984); Rocznik Polityczny Gospodarczy 1981-84 (Warsaw: PWE, 1985), p.151, 126.

TABLE 2.8

PERCENTAGE OF MALE AND FEMALE PZPR MEMBERS OF TOTAL
FEMALE AND MALE POPULATION
SELECTED YEARS
(1952-84)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Female %</u>	<u>Male %</u>
1952	1.4	7.5
1953	1.6	7.9
1954	1.7	8.0
1955	1.7	8.2
1956	---	8.6
1960	1.1	6.7
1965	1.9	9.4
1967	---	9.9
1968	2.6	10.6
1969	2.8	10.8
1970	3.1	11.3
1971	3.0	10.8
1973	3.1	10.9
1975	3.1	11.3
1976	3.5	11.5
1978	4.2	12.6
1979	4.4	12.8
1982	3.2	9.7
1984	2.9	8.5

Source: As in TABLES 2.5 and 2.6

TABLE 2.9

PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE POPULATION AND OF PZPR MEMBERSHIP
SELECTED YEARS (1952-84)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
1952	52.1	17.9	2.9
1953	52.0	18.2	2.8
1954	52.0	19.0	2.7
1955	51.9	19.0	2.7
1956	51.7	15.0	3.4
1959	51.6	15.0	3.4
1960	51.4	15.3	3.3
1964	51.4	17.4	2.9
1965	51.4	18.1	2.8
1967	51.4	19.8	2.8
1968	51.4	21.0	2.4
1969	51.6	21.7	2.3
1970	51.5	22.4	2.3
1971	51.6	22.8	2.2
1973	51.5	23.2	2.2
1975	51.5	23.6	2.1
1976	51.3	24.3	2.1
1978	51.5	26.1	1.9
1979	51.5	26.5	1.9
1982	51.5	25.7	2.0
1984	51.4	26.8	1.9

Source: As in TABLES 2.5 and 2.6

TABLE 2.10

PERCENTAGE OF MALE POPULATION AND OF PZPR MEMBERSHIP
SELECTED YEARS
(1952-84)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
1952	47.9	82.1	0.58
1953	48.0	81.8	0.59
1954	48.0	81.0	0.59
1955	49.1	81.0	0.60
1956	48.1	85.0	0.56
1959	48.3	85.0	0.56
1960	48.4	84.7	0.57
1964	48.6	82.6	0.58
1965	48.6	81.9	0.59
1967	48.6	80.2	0.60
1968	48.6	79.0	0.61
1969	48.6	78.3	0.62
1970	48.4	77.6	0.62
1971	48.5	77.2	0.62
1973	48.4	76.8	0.63
1975	48.5	76.4	0.63
1976	48.5	75.7	0.64
1978	48.7	73.9	0.65
1979	48.5	74.5	0.65
1982	48.5	74.3	0.65
1984	48.6	73.2	0.66

Sources: "Partia w liczbach," Nowe Drogi, No. 6 (1956) 106; Stefan Dziabala, "Model czlonkostwa i dynamika rozwoju szeregów PZPR," Z Pola Walki, No. 3 (1979) 173; Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-86).

TABLE 2.11

FEMALES EMPLOYED IN POLISH WORKFORCE AND AS MEMBERS OF PZPR

<u>Year</u>	<u>Females in Workforce</u>	<u>As Percent Workforce</u>	<u>As Percent PZPR Members</u>
1955	2,054,300	32.0	12.4
1960	2,378,500	33.1	7.4
1965	3,063,000	36.0	10.5
1970	3,884,420	39.4	13.4
1975	4,989,400	42.3	11.1
1979	5,286,500	43.2	15.1
1984	5,511,500	44.7	10.3

Source: Polska 1946-83 (Warsaw: GUS, 1984), p.xiv-xv.

TABLE 2.12

FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN THE CENTRAL AND AUDIT COMMITTEE
(1948-86)

<u>CENTRAL COMMITTEE</u>				<u>AUDIT COMMITTEE</u>		
<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>%</u>
1948	127	6	4.7	0	0	0
1954	126	6	4.7	22	1	4.5
1959	138	8	5.7	19	2	10.5
1964	158	4	2.5	25	1	4.0
1968	182	5	2.7	--	-	----
1971	207	16	7.7	36	4	11.1
1975	252	18	7.1	64	9	14.0
1980	216	24	11.1	70	11	15.7
1981	272	19	6.9	52	12	23.0
1986	---	--	----	129	18	13.9

Source: Trybuna Ludu, (1949-86).

TABLE 2.13

PZPR MEMBERS AND POLISH POPULATION WITH POST-SECONDARY
EDUCATION
(in percent)
(1955-84)

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>
Polish Population	1.5	2.1	2.7	3.5	3.6	4.5	5.3	5.6
PZPR	3.1	5.3	7.9	10.4	10.9	12.0	15.8	17.4
Ratio	2:1	2.5:1	3:1	3:1	3:1	2.5:1	3:1	3:1

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-86).

TABLE 2.14

EDUCATION OF PZPR MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES
SELECTED YEARS (1951-84)
 (IN PERCENT)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>POST- SECONDARY</u>	<u>SECONDARY</u>	<u>ELEMENTARY</u>	<u>TECHNICAL</u>
1951	2.0	----	----	----
1953	2.3	14.6	42.2	----
1955	3.1	17.2	41.9	----
1958	4.6	----	----	----
1960	5.3	8.4 c	37.5	9.8
1961	5.7	----	----	----
1965	6.5	6.7	38.3	13.8
1967	7.1	6.7	38.1	14.8
1968	7.2	6.8	38.1	15.3
1969	7.5	6.8	37.8	15.8
1970	7.9	6.9	37.6	16.2
1971	8.6	7.1	36.6	17.1
1973	9.6	8.0	34.6	17.2
1975	10.4	8.0	33.2	18.0
1976	10.9	8.2	31.7	18.9
1978	12.0	8.7	29.5	20.4
1982	15.8	10.5	25.3	22.6
1984	17.4	10.7	24.0	23.5

Sources: Partia w liczbach, "Nowe Drogi", No. 6 (1956), 105; "Stan liczebny oraz rozmieszczenie czlonkow i kandydatow PZPR," Nowe Drogi, No. 5 (1961), 143; Kalendarz Robotniczy 1963 (Warsaw: KIW, 1962), p.39; Tadeusz Palimaka, "Nasza partia," Zycie Partii, No. 10 (1968), 4; Rocznik Statystyczny 1961-85 (Warsaw: Gus, 1961-86).

TABLE 2.15

PARTY MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES WITH INCOMPLETE EDUCATION
SELECTED YEARS (1960-84)
(IN PERCENT)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>POST- SECONDARY</u>	<u>SECONDARY</u>	<u>ELEMENTARY</u>	<u>TECHNICAL</u>
1960	1.3	11.6	26.1	---
1965	2.7	8.5	16.1	7.4
1967	3.5	8.4	12.8	8.6
1968	3.7	8.0	11.4	9.5
1969	3.8	7.5	10.5	10.3
1970	3.9	7.0	9.5	11.0
1971	4.0	6.6	8.6	11.4
1973	4.3	6.0	7.7	12.6
1975	4.3	5.7	6.0	14.4
1976	4.1	5.0	5.1	16.1
1978	3.4	4.4	3.9	17.7
1982	2.8	3.9	3.3	15.8
1984	2.5	3.6	2.9	15.4

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-86).

TABLE 2.16

AGE STRUCTURE OF POLISH POPULATION
(1960-84)
(in percent)

<u>Year</u>	<u>0-29yrs</u>	<u>30-39yrs</u>	<u>40-49yrs</u>	<u>50+yrs</u>
1960	55.1	14.7	10.1	20.1
1965	53.2	14.6	10.8	21.4
1967	----	----	----	----
1968	52.4	14.3	12.2	21.2
1969	52.1	14.0	12.6	21.3
1970	52.1	13.5	13.0	21.4
1971	52.1	12.9	13.3	21.7
1973	52.1	12.4	13.2	22.3
1975	52.4	11.7	12.9	23.0
1976	52.3	11.7	12.8	23.2
1978	51.3	12.4	12.5	23.8
1982	49.6	14.5	11.2	24.7
1984	48.8	15.9	11.6	24.7

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-86).

TABLE 2.17

CANDIDATE MEMBERS AGED UNDER 25 AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL
RECRUITS TO THE PZPR
(1959-1970)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
1959	34.6
1960	35.5
1961	35.7
1962	35.8
1963	35.6
1964	37.0
1965	39.9
1966	42.1
1967	N.A.
1968	46.8
1969	46.5
1970	48.1

Sources: Czeslaw Herod, "Kształtowanie się składu i struktury społeczno-zawodowej PZPR," in Wiedza o partii, Adolf Dobieszewski, ed. 2nd edition (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1972), pp. 388-89.
N.A. not available

TABLE 2.18

AGE OF PZPR MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES
SELECTED YEARS
(1954-84).
(IN PERCENT)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>18-25</u>	<u>25-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50+</u>
1954	14.5	-----	-----	-----	16.6
1955	15.9	-----	-----	-----	17.4
1956	13.0	-----	-----	-----	-----
1957	10.0	-----	-----	-----	-----
1958	6.8	-----	-----	-----	-----
1960	8.6	17.4	33.8	18.7	21.5
1965	9.0	15.9	33.7	21.6	19.8
1967	9.5	14.8	33.3	23.5	18.9
1968	10.9	14.5	32.6	23.9	18.1
1969	10.9	14.3	32.1	24.6	18.1
1970	11.1	14.2	31.3	25.2	18.2
1971	9.2	14.3	30.8	26.5	19.2
1973	5.6	14.8	28.8	28.2	22.6
1975	5.7	15.6	27.4	28.1	23.2
1976	5.7	15.4	27.4	27.5	24.0
1978	7.8	15.7	27.6	25.5	23.4
1982	1.9	9.2	32.7	24.4	33.8
1984	0.9	6.7	32.6	24.8	35.0

Sources: "Partia w liczbach," Nowe Drogi, No. 6 (1956), 105; Wladyslaw Titkow, "Niektore problemy rozwoju partii," Nowe Drogi, No. 12 (1968), 88; Leszek Krasucki, O Kierowniczej Roli Partii (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1959), p.48; Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-86).

TABLE 2.19

POLAND'S SOCIAL CLASS STRUCTURE (1939)
(in percent)

<u>Social Class</u>	
Landowners	0.36
Bourgeoisie	2.0
Petite-	
Bourgeoisie	11.0
Intelligentsia	6.0
Peasantry	52.0
Working Class	20

Source: Jan Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York: Random House, 1970), pp.23-26.

TABLE 2.20

PERCENTAGE OF PEASANTS IN THE POPULATION AND IN PZPR
SELECTED YEARS
(1950-83)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>PZPR</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1950	47.1	14.1	3.3
1960	38.4	11.8	3.2
1970	25.1	11.5	2.1
*1983	20.0	9.0	2.2

Sources: David S. Mason, "Membership of the Polish United Workers' Party," The Polish Review, Nos.3-4 (1982), 142.

*Estimated

TABLE 2.21

LAND HOLDINGS OF INDIVIDUAL FARMERS IN POLAND
SELECTED YEARS (1950-82)
(HECTARES² AND PERCENTAGE)

<u>HECTARES²</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>
0.5-2	621.6	829.9	971.9	868.3	857.9	868.0	847.8
	20.9	25.6	28.8	26.9	27.8	30.0	29.8
2-5	991.8	1091.1	1113.5	1030.2	958.2	855.2	820.3
	33.4	33.7	32.9	32.0	31.0	29.5	28.9
5-7	477.5	475.7	472.4	463.6	425.5	327.4	358.7
	16.1	14.7	13.9	14.4	13.8	12.8	12.6
7-10	499.0	462.0	451.7	455.4	421.4	376.3	366.9
	16.8	14.2	13.3	14.1	13.7	13.0	12.9
10-15	246.3	283.6		316.2		281.4	286.2
	8.3	8.7		9.8		9.7	10.1
			374.3		424.0		
			11.1		13.7		
15-	132.6	101.1		90.5		143.8	161.8
	4.5	3.1		2.8		13.7	5.7

Source: Polska 1946-83 (Warsaw: GUS, 1984), p.50.

TABLE 2.22

PERCENTAGE OF WHITE-COLLAR PERSONNEL IN POPULATION AND PZPR
SELECTED YEARS
(1950-84)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>PZPR</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1950	20.6	28.9	0.71
1960	21.0	42.9	0.49
1970	22.3	42.3	0.53
*1984	25.0	51.5	0.48

Source: As in TABLE 2.19

*Estimated

TABLE 2.23

BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS IN POPULATION AND PZPR AS PERCENTAGE
(1950-85)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>PZPR</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1950	28.3	50.6	0.56
1960	34.3	40.3	0.85
1970	37.5	40.3	0.93
1984	60	40.0	1.50

Source: As in TABLE 2.19

*Estimated

TABLE 2.24

WORKERS IN SOCIALIZED SECTOR

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of PZPR Members (Workers)</u> <u>of Total Worker Population</u>
1950	4,803,000	7.2
1955	6,382,000	9.2
1960	7,193,000	10.5
1965	8,507,000	9.9
1970	9,869,000	10.5
1975	11,795,000	9.0
1980	12,255,000	10.7
1982	11,736,000	8.5

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1949-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1950-86).

NOTES

¹Alexander Matejko, Social Change and Stratification in Eastern Europe: An Interpretive Analysis of Poland and Her Neighbors (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974); Adam Sarapata, ed., Przemiany społeczne w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1965); Jan Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York: Random House, 1970).

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⁸The actual urban component of the PZPR may be larger than officially reported.

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³³ David S. Mason, "Membership of the Polish United Workers' Party," Polish Review, 27 (1982), 146-47.

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³⁷ David S. Mason, op.cit., p.145.

³⁸ IX Nadzwyczajny Zjazd Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej 14-20go Lipca 1981 (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1981), p.106.

³⁹ Nowe Drogi, No. 6 (1986), 19.

⁴⁰ Nowe Drogi, No. 8 (1981), 89-90.

⁴¹ PZPR membership for many individuals has provided the opportunity for social mobility. That is, many PZPR members who were originally of blue-collar or peasant background, have succeeded in advancing into white-collar ranks.

CHAPTER THREE

OCCUPATIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE PZPR

Societies which undergo societal transformation due to industrialization experience occupational differentiation and specialization. The number of occupations increases and occupations become highly specialized requiring advanced training and education. This trend is evident in all Communist societies experiencing transformation, including Poland. The examination of occupational representation in the PZPR is important to the study of society and societal changes because occupational breakdown is a good indicator of status differences and hence is more meaningful than the three-tiered social class stratification. Industrialized states like Poland require such specialists as: engineers, medical doctors, technicians, economists and university professors. Specialists are needed in industry, the economy, and in cultural and academic realms.

The need for such specialists was clearly recognized by Poland's Communist party, the PZPR, and it set out to train and educate such personnel. By now, the PZPR has indeed succeeded in raising this necessary cadre in Socialist Poland. It has also attempted to absorb many of these specialists into its own ranks. The party continues to be fully aware of the important role that educated and trained citizens occupy in an industrialized socialist state. In fact, the party's representative function dictates that such

personnel be recruited into party ranks. In the fulfillment of such a dictate, the PZPR sustains its claim of representation of the most important elements within Polish society. Conversely, however, the party's blue-collar character becomes diluted.

As a socialist society undergoes transformation, this balance between the party's leading role (the requirement to be representative of the blue-collar worker) and its representative one (the requirement to recruit white-collar specialists for the successful maintenance of socialism) becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. At best, the party must include both blue-and white-collar personnel in its occupational make-up.

This chapter undertakes a detailed analysis of the occupational make-up of the PZPR. The hypothesis is that as Polish society undergoes transformation, and as elements of societal transformation are absorbed by the PZPR, the party will become increasingly representative of and saturated with white-collar personnel. The most prestigious white-collar occupations such as university professors, engineers, medical doctors, and administrators are therefore examined. The chapter will argue that party transformation has resulted in the strengthening of its white-collar orientation at the expense of the proletariat. The political significance and consequence of such a development for Poland's political system and the party's dilemma in balanc-

ing its dual roles will be discussed in Chapter Six. The analysis of occupational stratification in the PZPR will be structured so as to coincide with the major leadership changes within the PZPR: (1949-56 Bierut), (1956-70 Gomulka), (1970-80 Gierek), (1980-81 Kania), and (1981-Jaruzelski). Ochab's reign as First Party Secretary is excluded because of its short duration. The examination of occupational changes during different PZPR leaderships allows for comparison and contrast of the party's on-going internal occupational changes. It also allows for the determination of dominant trends and an exposition of which occupational categories were favoured under which PZPR leadership. Hence, this chapter examines the party's changing occupational make-up as part of party transformation.

Occupational differentiation has grown significantly in Poland. It would be impossible to list all the various specialized and unspecialized occupations. Table 3.1 expresses the transformation of Polish society and its labor force by showing a breakdown of manual and non-manual jobs in the economy. Manual workers still dominate as the largest single occupational category in the nationalized economy, but not as the fastest growing. Blue-collar workers have grown annually by 1.9 percent, as opposed to white-collar workers who grew at 5.1 percent annually. Also, blue-collar occupations have grown faster in the

economy than in the party (1.9 vs 0.2 percent). White-collar occupations grew at 3.1 percent annually within the party while registering an annual growth rate of 5.1 percent in the economy. White-collar workers thus grew faster in both the nationalized economy and in the PZPR than blue-collar ones. Hence, the first major trend reveals that if political recruitment is prestige-driven, the party is more likely to favour white-collar occupations within the party based on annual growth rates. This aspect will be dealt with in greater detail later on.

Table 3.2 presents a breakdown of employment by sector in the Polish economy. One of the most consistent trends, due to industrialization, has been a reduction of the workforce employed in agriculture, something that has been consistent in all East European states after World War II. As industrialization proceeds, the industrial sector in the economy should become the largest employer, as evidenced in Table 3.2. Likewise, as a country enters the post-industrial phase, the service sector should be the largest employer; Poland as yet has not reached the post-industrial phase and industry still plays the dominant role in the economy. But as Poland undergoes societal transformation, the educational levels of the work-force should continue to increase. Table 3.4 illustrates that the level of higher education for Polish workers has nearly tripled between 1958 and 1984.

Table 3.3 reveals that party membership is drawn

largely from the industrial sector of the economy. Under Gierek especially, political recruitment policies were designed to focus on blue-collar workers residing in the most complex and gigantic industrial works.¹ Blue-collar workers remain the largest single occupational category in most sectors of the economy; however blue-collar workers have not always formed the single largest occupational category within the PZPR.

Occupational prestige has remained fairly stable in Poland during the last 20 years.² Table 3.5 lists the prestige ranking of various occupations in Poland while Table 3.5 reveals that the four most prestigious occupations in 1962 in Poland were white-collar ones: university professor (1), medical doctor (2), teacher (3), and engineer (4). These four also recorded the highest annual growth rates within the PZPR. In a more recent survey, Table 3.6 reveals that the four top occupations in 1975 were: university professor (1), medical doctor (2), government minister (3), and teacher (4). (Taking into account the 1980-81 crisis and the disclosure of government corruption under Gierek, it would be justified to conclude that an occupation in a government ministry has since lost prestige.) Skilled workers rank relatively high whereas unskilled workers and farmers appear near or at the bottom of the prestige scale. Ultimately, these rankings in the prestige of occupations have remained fairly consistent over

time, especially the top five positions. Clearly the higher prestigious occupations require higher education, something that is also highly valued by Polish society.³

The occupations which have received the highest ranking in terms of prestige are vital in the realms of economy, education, culture, and health and welfare. The party tries to be representative of these most important groups in Polish society. Therefore, in order for the party to be representative, it must recruit these groups. Table 3.7 shows that the aforementioned four most prestigious occupations grew the fastest within the party. It also reveals a consistent pattern of a faster growth rate for white-collar occupations than for blue-collar ones. What is so striking about this trend is that the four highest-ranked occupations in terms of prestige grew the fastest within the party in the identical order. Obviously occupational prestige and recruitment into the party are linked processes. The data also reveals that white-collar groups are more likely to be recruited than blue-collar occupations. It should be noted however, that the occupational category, blue-collar worker, is a bit misleading because it also incorporates highly skilled workers which were ranked higher than unskilled workers.

Hence, a third trend, which is very striking, reveals that white-collar occupations tend to grow faster in the party than other related occupations. Even more significant

is the fact that the four white-collar occupations of university professor, medical doctor, teacher and engineer, grew faster in the party than in the general populace (see Table 3.6). In one sense thus, Polish scholars are correct in claiming that the party has been successful at being representative of social changes within society.⁴

Blue- and white-collar occupational representation has differed significantly under various PZPR leaders. During Bierut's reign (1949-56), blue-collar workers in the party declined at a rate of 5.3 percent annually. In absolute terms, their numbers dropped from 773,048 to 614,008. It seems rather odd that a regime which claimed to represent the proletariat, and which based its legitimacy on this aspect, experienced in its nascent years an overall decline in the number of blue-collar workers in its ranks. Party analysts have suggested that this trend was a consequence of erroneous party policy which resulted in whole-scale purges and the depletion of blue-collar character. Thus, Bierut's leadership witnessed the largest growth rate, a historical high of 7.8 percent, of non-manual workers (see Table 3.8).

Table 3.9 reveals the percentage of candidates accepted into the PZPR according to social origins. Although data are missing for the years 1948 and 1949, blue-collar workers between 1950 and 1956 accounted for well over half of all new recruits accepted into the party. Yet, they declined in both absolute and percentage terms. This might have meant a

high turnover of them in the party, a speculation confirmed only by Polish party scholars.⁵ On the other hand, the constant gains made by the white-collar occupation within the party can only be explained by its stability and minimal turnover.

Under Gomulka, the blue-collar class reversed its decline in the party in absolute and percentage terms. Although both Bierut and Gomulka lamented about the low level of workers within the party, Gomulka was the first to succeed in raising the level of proletarian representation. During his tenure, the blue-collar category increased annually by 3.2 percent, and between 1960 and 1970, by 7.2 percent (see Table 3.8). Gomulka reversed the declining numbers of this class in the party, something that was maintained until 1980.

Although Gomulka succeeded in reversing the negative growth rate of blue-collar party members, the white-collar growth rate was not stymied. The latter grew at a rate of 4.5 percent as compared to blue-collar growth of 3.2 percent. The white-collar class formed, at this time, the majority in the party's social class composition. Under Gomulka, blue-collar workers declined from 44.6 to 40.3 percent in terms of the party's overall social class composition in opposition to a white-collar increase from 39.5 to 42.3 percent (see Table 3.10). Hence, even though the percentage of candidates of working class background

accepted into the PZPR oscillated between 42.9 and 51.3 percent, their position vis-a-vis the white-collar personnel was not strengthened (see Table 3.9).

Gierek could easily be credited as a miracle-worker considering his success in the recruitment of blue-collar workers into the PZPR. After the 1970 worker-party upheaval, Gierek's leadership team made it a priority to recruit blue-collar workers. Gierek's efforts must be considered as a success, for the blue-collar occupations grew at a historically high rate of 4.3 percent annually between 1970 and 1980. Blue-collar workers also peaked in absolute and percentage terms under Gierek. His leadership was the most successful in attracting and increasing blue-collar workers within the party's ranks.

Kania and Jaruzelski had the misfortune of inheriting the economic and political problems that Gierek left behind. Kania, upon assuming his post in September 1980, tried to control the workers' outburst, Solidarity's growth, and party unity. As Solidarity's strength increased, and as blue-collar workers were either expelled from the party or abandoned it in favour of Solidarity, the party's blue-collar occupational representation declined by 3.5 percent between 1980 and 1981. Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law was both designed to crush the independent trade union and to master the domestic economic and political problems which plagued the country. Hence, it should not be sur-

prising that the blue-collar occupation's representation within the party declined by a total of 5.2 percent between 1981 and 1985.

Blue-collar workers adamantly demonstrated in 1980 that the existing trade union structure was both inefficient and incapable of representing workers' demands. The alienation of the blue-collar worker from the party at the turn of the decade increased. Consequently, blue-collar representation within the party declined substantially. By 1986, workers began to show a slight increase in party membership. However, more time is required in order to assess whether this increase will continue.

Overall, the occupational representation of blue-collar workers grew annually at 0.3 percent between 1949 and 1985. This growth rate has not kept pace with the 2.2 percent annual growth of blue-collar workers as registered in the labour force. Therefore, the party has not kept pace with the representation of the single largest occupational category in Polish society.

An examination of white-collar occupations within the party reveals contrasting trends during each PZPR leadership phase. It becomes immediately evident from Table 3.7 that the party has been more favourable to white-collar occupational groups. Between 1949 and 1985, white-collar personnel grew at 3.4 percent per annum. During Bierut's reign, when workers were declining, white-collar workers grew at an

amazing rate of 7.8 percent per annum between 1949 and 1956. One party commentator stated later that this high level of white-collar growth was a mistake in party policy.⁶ Whatever the reason, white-collar growth accelerated after the unification congress.

During Gomulka's leadership, the growth rate of white-collar workers continued, but at a reduced rate of 4.5 percent. Gomulka was very distrustful of white-collar personnel. However, the percentage of white-collar workers recruited into the party remained consistent and in 1957 recorded an all time high of 47.5 percent of all candidate members admitted into the party. It was under Gomulka's leadership that major white-collar categories made significant gains in terms of representation and party saturation.

The most consistent gains were made by educated and professionally trained employees, particularly from among the technical and vocational intelligentsia. The number of technicians, engineers, and economists within the party, more than doubled in the years 1960-70; while that of doctors, teachers, and scientists increased threefold.⁷

This trend continued until Gierek assumed power in 1970.

The reduction of the growth rate of white-collar workers to 0.1 percent under Gierek was a significant decline from the 7.8 and 4.5 under previous leaders. It would have been interesting to observe whether or not this trend would have been continued under Gierek had it not been for the 1980-81 events which interrupted this development.

Under Kania, the growth rate of non-manual workers

declined by 2.0 percent although the losses suffered by this group were not as severe as that of the 4.1 percent drop in the growth rate of manual workers. This drop reflects the seriousness of the 1980-81 worker-party conflict. After the declaration of martial law, non-manual workers registered an annual growth rate of 3.6 percent while manual labourers declined by 5.6 percent per annum. One can safely predict that the white-collar occupation will continue to grow faster than its blue-collar counterpart. The white-collar workers presently form a majority in absolute and percentage terms within the party.

The foregoing examination has revealed that both occupational groups, manual and non-manual, have evolved quite differently under various PZPR leaders. If the present trend continues, the numbers of manual workers will continue to decline and form the minority in the PZPR. The party seems to be undergoing, in the words of one scholar, a process of deproletarianization.⁸

The analysis now moves to an examination of specific white-collar occupations and the degree to which they are saturated by the party. Table 3.11 shows the level of party saturation among the three most prestigious white-collar occupations; university professor, medical doctor, and teacher. The most noticeable trend is that their party saturation is higher than for any blue-collar occupation. Teachers have always recorded the highest levels of party

saturation followed by engineers and technical personnel. Second, Table 3.11 demonstrates that party saturation among university professors, medical doctors and teachers increased rapidly after 1960, only to level off by the 1980's. This trend is indicative of the gains that these groups made, especially under Gomulka's leadership. Fluctuations occur after 1970. Party saturation began to decline after 1978 and was decelerated by the 1980-81 political crisis. Because the PZPR banned all independent organization after the imposition of martial law, this act likely alienated professional groups, who were seeking some form of independent status from the party. The decline in party saturation of these white-collar occupations seems to be fairly consistent and may continue until the party's problems are solved.

The high level of party saturation of white-collar occupations should not be surprising, considering that the white-collar class grew the fastest in party. The overall level of party saturation for blue-collar occupations is lower. Table 3.12 shows that the party has always had a higher saturation of white-collar workers than that of blue-collar ones.

These trends are consistent with the process of transformation resulting from industrialization. Industrialization is accompanied by occupational stratification and prestige differentiation.⁹ This is as true of capitalist as

of socialist societies.¹⁰ It should not be surprising that the most prestigious occupations have a high rate of party saturation, and thus "state socialist societies, like capitalist societies, are hierarchically organized."¹¹ Likewise, the high rate of party saturation among the engineering and technical personnel should not be surprising, for as Hough has stated, "engineers represent the largest group among present day East European intelligentsia. And this contributes to the technocratic orientation of East European societies."¹²

The rise of the technical intelligentsia is a common occurrence in all Socialist societies, and in Poland, as admitted by one party commentator, this occupational group "was actively sought after and recruited into the party as part of party activities aimed at strengthening its composition."¹³ The recruitment of these personnel is also a functional necessity, for this group possesses the required technical knowledge necessary in industrializing a society.

Party saturation of technical and engineering personnel began to increase after 1958.

Between 1958 and 1962, the number of engineers rose from 14,830 to 28,861, to 222,635 by 1984. By 1963, 31.7 percent of all employed engineers were party members. In 1967, over 40 percent of all employed engineers were party members. By 1984, this level of party saturation was at 31.5 percent. Between 1960 and 1984, this trend had resulted in raising the proportion of party members who were engineers, technical or technical supervisory staff, from 8.4 to 10.5 percent.¹⁴

Data on party saturation of engineering and technical

personnel unfortunately could not be ascertained for every year, but Polish scholars have noted that during the 1970's, party saturation ranged between 31 and 40 percent for engineers and between 21 and 30 percent for technical personnel.¹⁵ The high level of party saturation of this occupational group is summed up by Matejko: "by entering the party ranks, engineers strengthen the party's economic and administrative powers, but also contribute to the progressive dilution of its doctrinal content."¹⁶

Yet engineers become party members for a number of specific reasons. Membership within the PZPR for technical and engineering personnel is a "source of access to information and provides possibilities for influencing decisions taken within these organizations."¹⁷ This development is true because over 80 percent of engineers who enter management ranks tend to be party members.¹⁸ Also, membership within the party may at some level be associated with political power. Engineers enter the party because of their professional commitment to their profession. Maria Hirszo-wicz has written that "they [engineers] feel a responsibility towards Polish industry and the economy as a whole, and not necessarily a commitment to the political ideology".¹⁹ The technical and engineering corps, as Szczepanski has noted, have developed a professional ethos.

They [technical intelligentsia] have become an influential pressure group with their own ideas of the industrial society, the organization of enterprises, and the

organization of work, derived from the principles of efficiency. They feel restricted by bureaucratic and unrealistic rules imposed on them by their administrative apparatus of the economy. They voice their discontent in both the professional press and during their organizational conferences and congresses. Their significance in the economy is steadily increasing. They have an ideology of scientific and sociological progress.²⁰

Therefore, when one speaks of the technical and engineering personnel and their recruitment into the party, it must be remembered that many factors, and not just prestige, as the foregoing discussion has shown, determine party membership. Either way, the prestige of engineering occupations demands party recognition.

Of all the white-collar groups however, teachers have the highest levels of party saturation, as indicated by Table 3.8. But the latest political crisis has resulted in a lowered level of saturation of teachers, as was the case with other white-collar occupations. The importance and relevance of this occupational category for a socialist society, especially Poland, has been adequately analyzed by Fiszman.²¹ The teacher's role in a socialist society, indeed in all societies, has been to act as an agent of the societies' and authorities' norms and values. Teachers are socializing agents. Party saturation of this group is high because a teacher is normally expected to become a party member. Furthermore, party membership itself is a means for promotion. On the other hand, however, party membership

entails a means of control and obedience which is required of the teacher as she or he must follow the guidelines set out by the Ministry of Education. The teacher must inculcate those values and norms which are promulgated by the authorities. But, as Fiszman points out, this has not always been successful. It seems that the most important aspect of the high saturation levels of the teaching occupation is that it indicates the party's successful attempts of having some control over this vital socializing agent of Polish society.

Having incorporated white-collar specialists into its ranks, the PZPR has successfully fulfilled its representative role (the incorporation of the most important social group within society). Conversely, the party's higher levels of saturation and representation of white-collar personnel has diluted its blue-collar character and weakened its leading role (the vanguard of the blue-collar worker). There is potential for conflict within Polish society whenever the party fails to balance these two roles. This attempt at the equilibrium of the two roles becomes a major difficulty as the PZPR undergoes transformation. Chapter Six will outline the political ramifications of an imbalance in the PZPR's leading and representative roles.

TABLE 3.1

MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL JOBS IN POLISH ECONOMY
(1949-84)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>MANUAL</u>	<u>NON-MANUAL</u>
1949	3,862,000	699,900
1958	4,370,697	1,980,119
1960	4,441,000	2,120,000
1964	4,781,112	2,356,167
1965	5,388,000	2,560,000
1967	5,356,914	2,834,086
1968	5,511,350	2,967,650
1969	5,658,016	3,085,984
1970	5,806,269	3,112,731
1971	5,987,150	3,223,850
1973	6,904,855	3,653,615
1975	7,365,328	4,266,672
1976	7,696,540	4,047,460
1978	8,040,000	3,942,000
1979	8,019,700	3,975,300
1980	7,993,000	4,007,000
1981	8,002,000	4,025,000
1982	7,642,000	3,932,000
1983	7,583,000	3,980,000
1984	7,519,000	4,089,000

Sources: Rocznik Statystyczny (Warsaw: GUS, 1949-85); Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1984 (Warsaw: GUS, 1984); Krzysztof Ostrowski, "Aktywnosc polityczna robotnikow," in Klasa robotnicza w spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym, ed. Augustyn Wajda (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1979), p. 152.

TABLE 3.2

EMPLOYMENT IN THE POLISH ECONOMY
BY SECTORS (%)

<u>SECTOR</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1984</u>
Industry	40.7	41.3	42.1	41.9	41.4	40.6	39.6	38.0
Construction	10.5	11.3	11.2	10.4	10.2	11.3	10.2	9.4
Sales/ Service	10.1	9.9	10.1	9.5	9.6	8.8	8.6	9.3
Transport/ Communication	9.5	8.7	9.4	9.5	9.5	9.0	9.2	8.9
Agriculture	7.4	8.0	5.6	5.9	7.3	7.4	7.8	7.1
Public Adm./ Law/Judicial	6.3	4.8	2.8	2.5	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.8
Education/ Culture	5.2	5.8	6.7	7.2	7.7	7.9	8.0	9.2
Communal/ Housing Ind.	2.0	2.0	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.8	4.3	4.6
Financial/Ins. Institutions	2.9	3.5	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.9	5.9
Forestry	1.9	1.5	2.1	2.1	1.8	1.2	1.2	1.3
Trade	n.a.	n.a.	0.18	0.24	0.22	0.30	0.25	0.25
Tourism	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.27	0.65	0.82	0.82

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-84 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-85). n.a. = not available

TABLE 3.3

PERCENTAGE OF PARTY MEMBERS IN SECTORS OF SOCIALIZED ECONOMY
SELECTED YEARS
(1951-1982)

<u>SECTOR</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1982</u>
Industry	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	35.0	n.a.	48.5	n.a.	n.a.	12.5
Construction	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.8	4.8	6.8	9.1	11.0	10.4	7.6
Transport/ Communication	n.a.	n.a.	2.3	7.2	6.8	13.8	16.1	n.a.	16.0	n.a.
Agriculture/ Forestry	22.7	22.3	26.2	n.a.	24.9	n.a.	21.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: As in Table 3.2

TABLE 3.4

LEVELS OF EDUCATION IN WORKFORCE SELECTED YEARS
(1958-84)
(percent of workforce)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Post- Secondary</u>	<u>Secondary General</u>	<u>Secondary Vocational</u>	<u>Basic Vocational</u>
1958	3.7	4.3	6.9	8.2
1964	4.3	4.3	8.3	11.1
1968	4.7	4.5	11.3	15.3
1970	5.3	5.6	13.6	16.9
1971	5.4	5.6	14.3	17.8
1975	6.2	6.1	16.5	21.6
1976	6.4	6.2	17.4	22.2
1977	6.9	6.2	18.1	22.5
1978	7.3	6.3	19.0	23.1
1980	8.0	6.3	20.8	24.1
1981	8.2	6.4	21.4	24.8
1982	8.6	6.4	22.1	25.6
1983	9.0	6.3	22.6	25.6
1984	9.2	6.3	23.0	26.0

Source: As in Table 3.2

TABLE 3.5

PRESTIGE RANKING OF OCCUPATIONS IN POLAND
(1962)

<u>Evaluated Occupation</u>	<u>Actual Social Prestige</u>
University Professor	(1)
Medical Doctor	(2)
Teacher	(3)
Engineer	(4)
Minister (gov't)	(5)
Qualified Steel Worker	(6)
Priest	(7)
Nurse	(8)
Metal Worker	(9)
Private Farmer	(10)
Book-keeper	(11)
Locksmith-private	(12)
Professional Officer	(13)
Militia	(14)
Salesgirl	(15)
Unskilled Building Worker	(16)
Cleaner	(17)
State Farm Worker	(18)

Source: Adam Sarapata, "Iustum Pretium," Studia Sociologiczne, No. 3 (1962), p. 106.

TABLE 3.6

RANKING OF PRESTIGE OF OCCUPATIONS BY WARSAW RESIDENTS
1958 and 1975

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1975</u>
University professor	(1)	(1)
Minister (gov't)	(2)	(3)
Teacher	(3)	(4)
Medical Doctor	(4)	(2)
Mechanical Engineer	(5)	(6)
Priest	(6)	(5)
Miner	(7)	(8)
Agronomist	(8)	(9)
Army Officer	(9)	(10)
Lathe Turner	(10)	(13)
Office Supervisor	(11)	(11)
Foreman	(12)	(12)
Small Farmer	(13)	(15)
Supervisor on State Farm	(14)	(7)
Locksmith	(15)	(14)
Tailor	(16)	(16)
Office Clerk	(17)	(18)
Shopkeeper	(18)	(17)
Typist	(19)	(19)
Unskilled Construction Worker	(20)	(20)
Unskilled Farm Labourer/State Farm	(21)	(21)

Source: Michal Pohoski et al., "Occupational Prestige in Poland, 1958-75," Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 4 (1976), p. 70.

TABLE 3.7

OCCUPATIONAL CHANGES AMONG PZPR MEMBERS
(in absolute numbers and percent)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
University Faculty	3514	6269	7546	8273	9611	11397
Members	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%
Medical Doctors	3689	9521	11025	12122	13064	11904
	0.3%	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%
Teachers	43803	97362	115022	126512	132892	141485
	3.8%	5.5%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.1%
Engineers-Technical	96970	195484	230685	258829	281990	246346
Personnel	8.4%	11.0%	11.9%	12.3%	12.8%	10.6%
Agronomist-Forestry	12288	26972	32404	35834	38232	286281
Specialists	1.1%	1.5%	1.7%	1.7%	1.7%	1.2%
Economists-Planners	45802	79289	92604	104380	109324	117316
Accountants	4.0%	4.5%	4.8%	5.0%	5.0%	5.1%
Blue-collar workers	465225	712151	766470	845071	889100	934425
	40.3%	40.1%	39.7%	40.2%	40.2%	40.3%
Pensioners	n.a.	62463	69346	80082	90723	102483
	n.a.	3.5%	3.6%	3.8%	4.1%	4.4%
Agricultural Worker	49437	52744	53513	56453	58510	61062
	4.3%	3.0%	2.8%	2.7%	2.7%	2.6%
Journalists-Artists	3029	4434	4608	4688	5010	5066
Writers	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
Lawyers-Judiciary	3744	5916	6562	6818	7126	7580
Personnel	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%

TABLE 3.7
(cont'd)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
University Faculty	12161	15889	17824	20532
Members	0.5%	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%
Medical Doctors	12061	15889	17824	20532
	0.5%	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%
Teachers	141105	144062	139880	140490
	6.3%	6.2%	5.9%	5.5%
Engineer-Technical	251168	255693	269111	228585
Personnel	11.2%	11.0%	11.4%	8.9%
Agronomist-Forestry	27925	35443	36522	32618
Specialists	1.2%	1.5%	1.5%	1.3%
Economists-Planners	117316	115689	105676	112957
Accountants	5.2%	5.3%	4.5%	4.4%
Blue-Collar Workers	894363	912798	964858	1154481
	39.7%	39.4%	40.9%	44.9%
Pensioners	108325	104334	145222	179503
	4.8%	6.2%	6.2%	7.0%
Agricultural	58219	63620	62135	63196
Workers	2.6%	2.7%	2.6%	2.5%
Journalist-Artists	5187	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Writers	0.2%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lawyers-Judiciary	8009	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Personnel	0.4%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

TABLE 3.7 (cont'd)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>Annual Growth</u> <u>Rate</u>
University Faculty	18120	18183	17331	6.8%
Members	0.6%	0.8%	0.8%	
Medical Doctors	15531	13531	12382	5.1%
	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	
Teachers	148574	126397	120524	4.3%
	5.1%	5.4%	5.7%	
Engineer-Technical	265206	248676	222635	3.5%
Personnel	9.1%	10.7%	10.5%	
Agronomist-Forestry	37217	29056	26076	3.1%
Specialists	1.3%	1.2%	1.2%	
Economists-Planners	123373	98415	86233	2.6%
Accountants	4.2%	4.2%	4.1%	
Blue-Collar Workers	1339547	935380	814567	2.3%
	45.7%	40.2%	38.5%	
Pensioners	208684	343998	n.a.	0.5%
	7.1%	14.8%	n.a.	
Agricultural	79624	56614	57286	0.4%
Workers	2.4%	2.4%	2.7%	
Journalist-Artists	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Writers	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lawyers-Judiciary	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Personnel	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: As in Table 3.2

TABLE 3.8

GROWTH RATES OF MANUAL AND NON MANUAL WORKERS
IN THE PARTY UNDER DIFFERENT PZPR LEADERS
(in percent)

<u>Leaders</u>	<u>Growth of</u> <u>Manual Workers</u>	<u>Growth of</u> <u>Non-Manual Workers</u>
Bierut	-5.3	7.8
Gomulka	3.2	4.5
Gierek	4.3	0.1
Kania	-4.1	-2.0
Jaruzelski	-5.6	3.6

Source: As in Table 3.9

TABLE 3.9

CANDIDATE MEMBERS ACCEPTED INTO THE PZPR AND THEIR SOCIAL
ORIGINS: (1947-86) (NUMBER AND PERCENT)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>CANDIDATES</u>	<u>SOCIAL CLASSES (%)</u>		
		<u>WORKERS</u>	<u>PEASANTS</u>	<u>WHITE- COLLAR</u>
1947	250,000	---	---	---
1948	182,000	---	---	---
1949	---	---	---	---
1950	53,630	56.0	22.1	19.3
1951	---	54.6	19.3	24.4
1952	34,773	51.0	15.6	32.3
1953	58,280	54.9	14.7	29.1
1954	184,692	53.2	19.0	27.0
1955	123,843	50.6	14.6	34.2
1956	94,000	49.9	15.7	33.8
1957	95,000	42.9	8.8	47.5
1958	23,000	45.5	20.4	---
1959	86,400	50.5	14.0	34.6
1960	167,403	48.8	14.3	35.1
1961	196,700	46.9	15.6	34.9
1962	132,200	47.6	10.8	38.1
1963	142,900	47.3	12.3	36.5
1964	183,500	48.0	14.4	32.9
1965	176,200	46.7	15.5	32.4
1966	164,000	48.0	14.4	32.9
1967	153,500	49.4	14.7	32.3
1968	170,000	51.3	12.0	33.1
1969	151,600	50.6	13.2	32.9
1970	170,000	51.0	14.0	31.6
1971	77,138	52.3	9.5	34.8
1972	67,261	57.4	9.0	31.5
1973	118,975	54.2	12.5	31.5
1974	133,540	63.9	15.1	19.2
1975	202,953	65.6	11.4	21.0
1976	181,000	63.2	9.6	24.4
1977	202,953	60.5	9.6	23.8
1978	348,509	---	---	---
1979	---	---	---	---
1980	291,600	---	---	---
1981	172,200	---	---	---
1982	66,247	---	---	---
1983	---	---	---	---
1984	57,863	---	---	---
1985	63,000	45.6	---	---
1986	57,863	---	---	---

TABLE 3.9 (continued)

Sources: Richard Staar, Poland 144-62: The Sovietization of a Captive People (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962, p.167; Andrew Alster and Jerzy Andrzejewski, "W sprawie składu socjalnego PZPR," Nowe Drogi, No. 4 (1951), 237; Czesław Herod, "Kształtowanie się składu i struktury społeczno-zawodowej PZPR," Nowe Drogi, No. 2 (1971), 84; Leszek Grzybowski, Robotnicy w PZPR 1948-75 (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1979), p. 225; Włodzimierz Mokrzyśczak, "PZPR Partia socjalistycznej odnowy," Nowe Drogi, No. 6 (1986), 19; Stefan Dziabala, "Model członkostwa i dynamika rozwoju szeregów PZPR," Z Pola Walki, No. 3 (1979), 168-69; Leszek Grzybowski, "Rozwój liczebny i kształtowanie się społecznego składu PZPR 1948-75," Z Pola Walki, No. 4 (1978), 37; Rocznik Statystyczny 1980-86 (Warsaw: GUS, 1986); Zenobiusz Kozik, PZPR w latach 1954-57 (Warsaw: PWN, 1982), p. 24; "Liczby dotyczące składu partii," Nowe Drogi, No. 7 (1957), 126; "Przyjęcie do partii w 1977 r.," Życie Partii, No. 4 (1978), 10.

TABLE 3.10

MEMBERSHIP AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF PZPR (1949-85)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>		
		<u>WORKERS</u>	<u>PEASANTS</u>	<u>WHITE-COLLAR</u>
1949	1,361,000	56.8	14.5	26.1
1950	1,241,000	50.7	13.6	33.4
1951	1,138,400	49.3	13.3	35.2
1952	1,146,900	48.2	13.4	36.0
1953	1,156,700	47.7	13.0	37.1
1954	1,298,100	48.0	13.8	36.2
1955	1,343,800	45.1	13.0	39.2
1956	1,376,700	44.6	12.8	39.5
1957	1,283,000	39.9	12.8	38.8
1958	1,023,400	41.8	12.2	43.9
1959	1,018,100	40.0	11.5	43.2
1960	1,154,700	40.3	11.8	42.9
1961	1,306,200	40.1	12.0	42.9
1962	1,397,000	39.8	11.5	43.1
1963	1,494,100	39.7	11.2	43.9
1964	1,640,600	40.2	11.4	43.0
1965	1,775,000	40.1	11.7	42.7
1966	1,894,000	40.1	11.8	42.6
1967	1,931,300	39.7	11.5	43.5
1968	2,104,300	40.2	11.4	43.0
1969	2,203,500	40.2	11.4	42.8
1970	2,319,600	40.3	11.5	42.3
1971	2,254,100	39.7	10.6	43.6
1972	2,262,900	39.6	10.1	43.9
1973	2,325,000	39.4	10.2	43.2
1974	2,363,000	39.6	10.4	42.4
1975	2,437,000	41.8	9.5	41.8
1976	2,568,400	44.9	9.3	38.8
1977	2,665,600	45.6	9.3	34.3
1978	2,930,400	45.7	9.4	34.0
1979	3,012,200	45.9	9.4	33.2
1980	3,091,900	44.7	9.4	33.5
1981	2,690,600	40.2	9.4	34.1
1982	2,327,300	40.2	9.1	53.1
1983	2,186,000	38.5	9.0	50.1
1984	2,117,200	38.5	9.1	51.0
1985	2,327,300	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Sources: Nowe Drogi, No. 3 (1954), 68-69; Nowe Drogi, No. 6 (1956), 102-06; Nowe Drogi, No. 5 (1961), 136-44; Zycie Partii, No. 10 (1968), 3-5; Rocznik Statystyczny 1960-85 (Warsaw: GUS, 1961-86); Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1984 (Warsaw: GUS, 1984); Rocznik Polityczno-Gospodarczy 1981-84 (Warsaw: PWE, 1985), pp. 151, 126.

TABLE 3.11

PARTY SATURATION OF SELECTED WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS
 (1960-84)
 (in percent)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Medical Doctors</u>	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>University Faculty Members</u>
1960	12.8	22.2	18.8
1965	24.0	39.3	27.8
1967	25.5	41.0	28.9
1968	27.0	44.0	29.8
1969	27.5	45.3	32.0
1970	24.1	47.0	36.3
1971	23.5	45.7	36.0
1973	25.0	46.4	38.2
1975	24.0	46.4	36.4
1976	23.9	47.4	41.1
1978	24.2	51.5	34.6
1982	20.1	35.9	32.2
1984	17.4	31.5	30.6

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny (Warsaw: GUS, 1960-85).

TABLE 3.12

PARTY SATURATION OF WHITE- AND BLUE-COLLAR PERSONNEL
(1960-84)
(in percent)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Blue-Collar</u>	<u>White-Collar</u>
1960	10.4	23.3
1965	13.2	29.6
1967	14.3	29.6
1968	15.3	30.4
1969	15.6	30.5
1970	16.0	31.6
1971	14.9	25.6
1973	13.2	27.4
1975	13.1	13.1
1976	14.9	24.6
1978	16.6	25.2
1980	17.0	25.8
1981	13.5	22.7
1982	12.2	31.1
1983	11.0	27.5
1984	10.8	26.4

Source: As in Table 3.1

NOTES

¹George Kolankiewicz, "Bureaucratized Political Participation and its Consequences in Poland," Politics, No. 1 (1980), 35-40.

²Michal Poholski et al., "Occupational Prestige in Poland 1958-1975," Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 4 (1976), 63-77; Adam Sarapata and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "The Evaluation of Occupations by Warsaw Inhabitants," American Journal of Sociology, No. 66 (1961), 581-91.

³Wieslaw Wisniewski, "Education as a Value in Polish Society," International Journal of Political Education, No. 3 (1980), 239-53.

⁴Andrzej Kurz, Spoleczna rola PZPR (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1967); Michal Sadowski, Przemiany społeczne a system partyjny PRL (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1969).

⁵Leszek Grzybowski, "Rozwoj liczebny i krztaltowanie sie społecznego składu PZPR 1948-75," Z Pola Walki, 4 (1978), 37.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Jan B. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline (Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 108-9.

⁸Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Party Development in Contemporary Poland," East European Quarterly, No. 11 (1977), 341-63.

⁹Gerhard and Jean Lenski, Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), pp. 319-22.

¹⁰David Lane, The Socialist Industrial State (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976), pp. 182-5.

¹¹Ibid., p.177.

¹²Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 59-70.

¹³Grzybowski, op.cit. p.37.

¹⁴Michal Sadowski, "Przemiany społeczne a partie polityczne PRL," Studia Sociologiczne, Nos. 30-31 (1968), 19-25; Michal Marzec, "Z problemow pracy partyjnej," Nowe Drogi, No. 4 (1964), 65.

¹⁵ Stefan Dziabala, "Model czlonkostwa i dynamika rozwoju szeregów PZPR," Z Pola Walk, No. 3 (1979), 177.

¹⁶ Alexander Matejko, Comparative Work Systems: Ideologies and Reality in Easter Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 142.

¹⁷ David Lane and George Kolankiewicz, eds., Social Groups in Polish Society (London: MacMillan, 1973), p. 206.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁹ Maria Hirszowicz and Michal Morawski, Z badan nad spolecznym uczestnictwem w organizacji przemyslowej (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1965), pp. 215-6.

²⁰ Jan Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 117-8.

²¹ Joseph R. Fiszman, Revolution and Tradition in People's Poland: Education and Socialization (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972).

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT PATTERNS: AN OVERVIEW

The process of societal transformation which is unfolding in Poland has produced a serious problem for the ruling Communist party. As Polish society grows increasingly complex, the PZPR's ability to maintain its leading role parallel to its representative one has become more difficult. A balance between these two roles must be maintained, however, for an imbalance implies that the party misrepresents such important strata as the white- or blue-collar social classes. Underrepresentation or overrepresentation especially of either of the latter two, is politically unsound. The potential of misrepresentation therefore entails the possible exclusion of a large number of citizens from any of Poland's three social classes. Hence, allegations of the party's illegitimacy may come from any misrepresented social class.

To argue for an optimal level of representation that would successfully maintain a potential balance between the white- and blue-collar classes is difficult, for the PZPR has never indicated nor stated what it considers to be a satisfactory level of representation, especially of the latter two classes. Because the party is the vanguard of the Polish working class, one would assume that at least fifty percent of the party's social class composition ought to be blue-collar. This is merely a speculation, because

ultimately a proper level of representation is still lacking. Moreover, the ability of the party to attain a precisely balanced representation and a condition of equality between its own two roles, is rather doubtful.

The party has acknowledged that a mathematical approach to systematic social class representation and parity in its leading and representative roles, is not the solution. During the XII Plenum in 1971, the party pronouncement stated:

The December [1970] events once again emphasized the numerical growth of the party is not always indicative of the society's support for its policies nor of its links with the masses, and that the strength of the party is in no simple way dependent upon its size.¹

The party has modulated its recruitment policies, oscillating back and forth between recruiting blue- and white-collar individuals at different times. Changes in party recruitment policies have witnessed the recruitment of increased numbers of white collar specialists at the expense of blue-collar workers. At the same time, since the party proclaims itself to be the vanguard of the Polish working class, it is forced to recruit blue-collar workers as well. Imbalance thus arises between these two strategies of political recruitment which, were designed to maintain parity between the party's leading and representative roles.

It seems that the PZPR's representative role is winning out over its leading one. This entails, however, a dilution of the party's blue-collar character. In other words, this

develops a potential for instability in the Polish political system.

Since 1949, the PZPR's political recruitment policies have changed three times in order to attain an equilibrium between its two roles. The policies can be roughly divided into the following three periods: 1949-59, 1960-70, 1971-80. These parallel the major leadership changes that occurred within the PZPR. This allows us to analyze the recruitment policy of each successive PZPR leadership. The analysis will determine if the particular policy was a success or failure in the overall strategy of party political recruitment.

The III Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in 1949 ended the period of massive recruitment into the PPR (Polska Partia Robotnicza, or Polish Workers' Party) prior to its unification with the PPS (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, or Polish Socialist Party) in 1948. Political recruitment into the PZPR was henceforth to be a controlled and structured process. This was in direct contrast to the PZPR's predecessor, the PPR, which relied heavily on a massive influx of members into its ranks, especially prior to its merger in 1948.² Since 1949, a candidate wishing to enter the PZPR ranks has had to:

acknowledge the ideological principles and the party statute; be active in one of its organizations; subordinate himself to party resolutions; and pay party membership dues. Furthermore, a party member should be conscious of his responsibilities vis-a-vis the party and fulfill them

conscientiously. The period of formal candidacy lasts one year and may be shortened by one half on the basis of resolution by the appropriate Party organization. The written application for membership must be accompanied by recommendations from two PZPR members in good standing with at least two years of party membership each. An individual's candidacy is considered at a general meeting of the Primary Party Organization; likewise his acceptance into the party after the specified time trial period is decided upon by the PPO in a vote by its membership subject to approval by the next higher party institution.³

This structured process of admitting individuals into the party has remained largely intact with only some minor changes.

1949-1959

Political recruitment during the 1949-59 period was designed to build a political party comprised primarily of blue-collar workers. A Central Committee resolution entitled "On the Matter of Party Growth and the Regulation of Social Composition" stressed the need to recruit blue-collar workers. Boleslaw Bierut, then First Party Secretary, was more direct in stating the party's goal:

... To ensure that 90 percent of new members should be recruited from among the workers and poor peasants and 10 percent from among the white-collar employees, and at that especially from the technical intelligentsia, the teachers and the creative intelligentsia.⁴

The goal of strengthening the party's proletarian image, however, was never realized. As already shown in Chapter Three (see again Table 3.10), the blue-collar workers' overall share of the party's composition between 1949 and 1959 declined. Conversely, the white-collar element

increased its percentage. And the percentage of candidate members of a blue-collar background admitted into the party between 1949 and 1959 declined yearly (see again Table 3.9), only to increase dramatically between 1958 and 1959.

However, the overall trend showed a definite decrease. At the same time, the percentage of candidates with a white-collar social class background increased. Thus, contrary to the pronouncements made by the party leadership, the party was developing in an opposite direction.

A major trend therefore emerged during the first phase of political recruitment into the PZPR. Namely, the party was incompetent in maintaining a balance between its leading and representative roles. The party's efforts to proletarianize the party failed. If the leadership's policies were not being implemented, then an independent mechanism was distorting or hampering party intentions.

1959-1970

As modernization and industrialization continued to develop in Poland under the guidance of the Communist party, the power elite realized that the PZPR must respond to the developing changes within Polish society through the broadening of its sociopolitical representation. Between 1949 and 1959, the PZPR was the sole representative organ of the Polish working class. However, this was changed in 1959 as the party's narrowly defined representative function was enlarged to include other social classes within Polish

society. The power elite perceived that it had to recruit other social classes if the PZPR were to fulfill its leadership responsibilities in a growing complex socialist society. Modernization and industrialization in Poland required highly skilled and trained personnel capable of undertaking the responsibilities in a complex society. Thus, the year 1959 marked an important turning point in the party political recruitment history.

At the III Party Congress, a decision to expand the party's ranks was undertaken. Recruitment was henceforth aimed at all sectors of Polish society. Roman Zambrowski, head of the party's cadre department, outlined the party's strategy:

As a ruling Party which is responsible for everything which goes on in the country, the PZPR must have its organizations in all important places of work; in institutions; in organs of authority; in villages; in universities; in schools; in short; in the entire organism of the national life where this life is being created and developed.⁵

The party tried to become more representative of Polish society by focusing its political recruitment on the white-collar sector of Polish society, and consequently this second phase of the party's political recruitment is referred to as the white-collar era.

The party's actual recruitment of white-collar personnel, as opposed to its spoken policy, has been discussed in the preceding chapter (see again Tables 3.9 and 3.10). Briefly, the proportion of white-collar candidates accepted

into the party increased to an average of 39.9 percent for the period between 1959 and 1970 as compared to 31.3 for the previous period. In absolute terms, white-collar workers in the PZPR increased from 438,576 in 1959, to 983,900 in 1970.⁶ The percent of white-collar workers' share of the party's social class composition remained fairly.

White-collar personnel therefore dominated this second phase of political recruitment because the party needed the technical specialists to run an increasingly complex socioeconomic and political environment. In the 1950's and 1960's, due to a serious skill shortage in Polish industry, the PZPR sought to incorporate the new engineering and technical graduates who were just coming into the labour force.⁷ This emphasis lasted until 1963 when the rate of blue-collar recruitment paralleled more or less the white-collar one.⁸

Indeed, the white-collar class made great strides within the party during the 1960's, and de Weydenthal writes that the "most consistent gains were made by educated and professionally trained employees, particularly from among the technical and vocational intelligentsia."⁹ Inadvertently the party was undergoing a phase of deproletarianization.

The number of technicians, engineers, and economists within the party more than doubled in the years 1960-70, while that of medical doctors, teachers and scientists increased threefold. If projected on society at large, these figures showed that, by the end of 1969, about 40 percent of all technicians belonged to the party,

while the proportion of party members among the teachers reached almost 40 percent. In general, the proportion of party members among white-collar employees reached more than 27 percent, while only 13 percent of workers and 4 percent of peasants could be found in the party's ranks.¹⁰

The data point out that the party's representative role was at that time winning out over its leading role as vanguard of the Polish working class.

Gomulka, First Party Secretary (1956-70), speaking to the Central Committee in 1965, stated:

Our party represents not only the working class but also the alliance of workers and peasants, as well as the alliance of the working class and the intelligentsia; it represents toiling masses of town and country; it represents all national interests.¹¹

Nevertheless, statistics indicate that the white-collar group began to dominate the party at this time, and that the party's blue-collar character was beginning to fade even more.

The party leadership in 1959 was well aware of the fact that an increase in the party's representation of other social groups would probably weaken its ties with the Polish blue-collar working class. It was, after all, the blue-collar class which served as the legitimizing group for the party's claim to rule. Consequently, the leadership set out to isolate some kind of mechanism which would monitor a more proportional process of recruitment into the party.

The leadership imposed a requirement of stable proportional representation for social groups in the composition.

of its membership. This policy was a failure, however, as indicated by the data. Various Polish scholars have nevertheless argued that proportional representation was successful in maintaining a balance with regards to the party's social class composition.¹² The assimilation of different social strata did not work either, and if pertinent statistics are thoroughly examined, the proportion of each social class in the party differed significantly. For example, only 13 percent of all physical laborers belonged to the PZPR, while over 40 percent of engineers, technicians and teachers were party members in 1969. In general, the proportion of party members among white-collar employees reached more than 27 percent. As a result, the party remained entrenched in its dilemma. Because it wanted to reinforce its representative role and wished therefore to recruit more sophisticated and qualified members from Poland's increasingly modernized state, the party again eroded its proletarian pillars.¹³

Hence, on the whole, stable proportional representation was a failure. The recruitment policy instituted in 1959 was really designed to cope with the growing forces of industrialization and modernization. As the party required greater numbers of skilled person, it necessarily diluted its blue-collar character.

This unbalanced representation caused major concerns for the PZPR leadership, and during the 1960's, constant

references were made to invite more workers into the ranks of the party.¹⁴ Moreover, proportional representation did not solve the party's inability in maintaining a parity between its leading and representative role. Even an exchange of party cards in 1967 did not strengthen working class representation within the PZPR. Lastly, although proportional representation contributed to the party's overall growth, party representation was not balanced between blue- and white-collar elements.

Consequently, the December event of 1970 was one of the periodical worker-party upheavals which erupted and systematically weakened ties between the party and the Polish working class. The 1970 crisis was preceded by a significant rise in white-collar personnel within PZPR ranks. As a result, the white-collar class constituted the largest social grouping within the party, even though the party's recruitment policy of proportional representation was designed to prevent an imbalance in the party's social class stratification. As described in the previous chapter (see again Table 3.8), the annual growth rates of these two social classes varied under each leadership. Ultimately, the white-collar personnel out-distanced the blue under every PZPR leadership outside of Gierek's.

1971-80

Upon Gierek's coming to power in the aftermath of the December 1970 riots, the blue-collar workers' percentage

share of the party's composition continued to decline and bottomed out to a historical low of 39.4 percent in 1973. Conversely, the white-collar percentage peaked at 43.9 in 1972 which equalled the record set in 1963. (Most likely, their numbers have increased again after the 1980-81 crisis.) This trend in the decline of blue-collar party membership worried the PZPR leadership. Concerns were voiced and the party apparatus was urged on to rejuvenate ties with the working class. The party set out to recruit greater numbers of blue-collar workers into its ranks.

The VI Party Congress in 1971 initiated a plan encouraging a greater scrutiny of the party's social class composition and a revitalization of its blue-collar character.¹⁵ Party pronouncements during the 1970's periodically echoed this call of renewal and replenishment of blue-collar stock.

Gierek's recruitment policy focused on blue-collar workers and downplayed the importance of their white-collar counterparts. Under his rule, blue-collar workers recorded their largest annual growth rates. In absolute terms, their numbers grew consistently throughout Gierek's rule from 934,425 in 1970 to 1,428,457 in 1980. A historical high of 1,428,784 members was attained in 1979 (see again Table 3.9). Hence, significant gains were made in the recruitment of blue-collar workers, especially at the end of 1974, after 1975, and until 1979. Only an insignificant drop was

recorded shortly thereafter but this decline accelerated after 1980 as the party and workers became engaged in another confrontation.

Gierek's recruitment policy was successful in stemming the growth of white-collar workers in the PZPR. In absolute terms, the number of white-collar workers barely increased from 986,00 in 1970 to 996,567 by 1980. Similarly, their percentage share of the party's social class did not fare well either for they recorded a significant drop of 8.8 percent from 42.3 in 1970 to 33.5 percent in 1980. This matched a record low of 1951. The percentage of white-collar recruits that were eventually admitted into the party declined sharply during the 1970's. Although pertinent party statistics have not been published since 1977, the level of white-collar recruitment must have been in a continuous decline up until the end of the decade because a decisive drop in the white-collars' percentage share of the party's overall social class composition was recorded for the years 1976 to 1980. Undoubtedly Gierek's recruitment policy was influenced by the December 1970 Baltic coast riots. The drive to increase blue-collar stock was further intensified after the 1976 worker-party conflict. In fact, in the words of the PZPR leadership, the 1976 upheaval served as a catalyst in accelerating worker recruitment.¹⁶ This process flourished after 1977 to the liking of the leadership which was determined to strengthen party-worker

ties. Various party media echoed this, including Zycie Partii which wrote:

The constant strengthening of the position of the party among the working class is a factor of decisive importance in the realization of the political line and the program of the party.¹⁷

Gierek's strategy was a response to the disproportionately large and steady growth in the representation of white-collars in the party during the 1960's and early 1970's. He was, however, sincere in his attempt to strengthen party-labour ties and felt that this would be best accomplished through the recruitment of blue-collar workers in large numbers.

Once again the PZPR recruitment policies were designed to strike a balance between the party's leading and representative roles. The leadership repeatedly had to deal with the philosophical and political framework of the PZPR's self-defined roles. Because the party is to be the leading political force in the nation, it necessarily must be representative of the Polish working class. This working class constitutes "the social base of the party", proclaims the party's theoretical organ.¹⁸ Consequently, the party is forced to recruit blue-collar personnel because of ideological dictates.

Under Bierut's and Gierek's leadership, it was especially evident that the party tried to pay special attention to its political dictates for practical reasons, if not all ideological. Bierut in his recruitment policy failed to

secure a strong blue-collar base. On the other hand, Gierek's recruitment efforts must be considered a great success.

The party implements certain recruitment policies, but at the same time attempts to remain representative of the most important social strata in Polish society. This policy on the importance of representation was first proclaimed in 1959 and restated in 1971. The policy basically embraces the following:

The PZPR is seen as occupying a special place in the system of organization of Polish society and striving for optimal harmonization of the interests of various classes and strata.¹⁹

The party through the 1970's and into the 1980's portrayed itself as believing that this special occupancy could be realised through mere numerical representation. The diminishing intervals between sequential worker-party upheavals suggests that active participation of social classes in decision-making during societal and party transformation is more likely to approach an optimal harmonization of the interests of various strata than recruitment that simply boosts the numerical growth of the party. The above discussion has shown how the party has oscillated in its political recruitment policies in order to strike a balance between its leading and representative roles. This mechanism is only cosmetic and temporarily, if at all successful. Consequently the party's efforts to achieve a condition of equality between its two roles of

leadership and representation have also been unsuccessful because either the blue- or white-collar workers were misrepresented. Therefore, political recruitment into the PZPR should not be considered as "the induction of individuals into political roles," as it is elsewhere, but rather in the particular case of Poland as a feedback mechanism which is used to control the process of societal transformation which forces the party to juggle its leading and representative roles.²⁰ Recruitment is only the stepping stone that should pre-empt active participation by the three social classes in further societal and party transformation.

NOTES

¹Quoted in George Kolankiewicz, "Bureaucratized Political Participation and its Consequences in Poland," Politics No. 1 (1981), 35.

²Roman Zambrowski, O masowej partii (Katowice: Trybuna Robotnicza, 1945).

³PZPR deklaracja ideowa i statut PZPR (Warsaw: Ksiązka i Wiedza, 1949), p. 749.

⁴Boleslaw Bierut, Zadania partii w walce o czujnosć rewolucyjną na tle sytuacji obecnej (Warsaw: Ksiązka i Wiedza, 1949), p. 58.

⁵Nowe Drogi, No. 4 (1959), 160.

⁶Leszek Grzybowski, Robotnicy w PZPR: 1948-75 (Warsaw: Ksiązka i Wiedza, 1979), p. 124.

⁷Jean Woodall, The Socialist Corporation and Technocratic Power: The Polish United Workers Party, Industrial Organization and Workforce Control 1958-80 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 129.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Jan B. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 108.

¹⁰Michal Sadowski, Przemiany społeczne system partyjny PRL (Warsaw: Ksiązka i Wiedza, 1969), p. 202.

¹¹Wladyslaw Gomulka, O naszej partii (Warsaw: Ksiązka i Wiedza, 1968), pp. 629-30.

¹²Andrzej Kurz, Spoleczna rola PZPR (Warsaw: Ksiązka i Wiedza, 1967).

¹³Jack Bielecki, "The Party: Permanent Crisis," in Poland: Genesis of a Revolution, ed. Abraham Brumberg (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p. 13.

¹⁴Wladyslaw Gomulka, Op.cit., pp. 463-64.

¹⁵Wladyslaw Gora, Polska Ludowa: 1944-84 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1986), p. 533.

¹⁶Edward Babiuch, "Partia klasy robotniczej-partia całego narodu," Nowe Drogi, No. 6 (1977), 9.

¹⁷ Zycie Partii, No. 11 (1977), 7.

¹⁸ Nowe Drogi, No. 1 (1976), 35.

¹⁹ Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1971), p. 115.

²⁰ Moshe M. Czudnowski, "Political Recruitment," in Handbook of Political Science, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Posby (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1975), vol.II, p. 156.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICAL ELITE TRANSFORMATION IN POLAND 1948-86

The original hypothesis stated that a comparison of the processes of party and societal transformation would reveal differences between them. That is, the full picture of societal, party and political elite transformation becomes available only when the findings on political elite transformation within this chapter are compared with the earlier data on societal and party transformation. More specifically, as elite transformation occurs, Putnam's law of increasing disproportion should become apparent. Poland's Communist power elite should be disproportionately highly educated, male and possessing a high occupational status prior to entering the elite. This power elite is expected to originate increasingly from an urban (i.e. city) environment. But only by comparing the power elite with the PZPR Central Committee and Polish society, can we see how Putnam's law of increasing disproportion actually works in Poland.

Elite transformation basically deals with two problems, the first one of which is the "social origins of elites, and the second, the skills of elites, for these seem the primary points of conjunction with broader historical change."¹ For our purposes elite characteristics must include age, ethnic origin, urban/rural background, formal and party education, time of Communist party membership, time spent in the USSR,

revolutionary activity, and military, journalistic, academic and technical career backgrounds. The definition of political elite transformation has to be expanded to include all these attributes because they are important in distinguishing the revolutionary and post-revolutionary generations of the power elite in Poland.

The definition of the political elite will be an institutional one. It will only apply to those members in the Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat. The members especially of the latter two institutions will be defined as those constituting the whole political "power elite", because they are the most powerful men, whose influence over the authoritative allocation of values in Polish society is decisive. A short discussion of the Central Committee members will also be included for comparative purposes but will not be a comprehensive examination because of limited data.

As the process of transformation unfolds, one expects certain characteristics to prevail as others lose their significance and disappear. Firstly, the revolutionary generation in the power elite, with time, will eventually give way to cadres who have no revolutionary experience and whose task will center around the successful maintenance of the system. Secondly, the level of formal education in the power elite should naturally increase over time. This criterion, aside from party membership, becomes increasingly

important for those wishing to join the ranks of the "power elite." Party schooling and in-service training, although important, should become less evident amongst the power elite as formal education becomes the norm. Thirdly, because Poland became largely homogenous after World War II, the "power elite" should be predominantly Polish. Fourthly, with time, the number of those members of the "power elite" who participated in wartime activities or who spent some time in the USSR, should decline significantly. Fifthly, because the revolutionary generation was associated largely with the KPP and PPR (Polish Workers' Party), members entering the PZPR power elite subsequently should possess less and less revolutionary experience with time. Sixthly, the "power elite" should originate more and more from an urban environment. Lastly, members of the "power elite" should have experienced different career backgrounds and specializations with the passage of time. The assumption that increased socioeconomic development produces a "power elite" of technocrats with technocratic orientations remains to be tested. This hypothesis will be considered as part of the whole spectrum of political elite transformation in Poland.² Overall, political elite transformation in Poland should produce significant changes in the attribute of the "power elite" between 1949 and 1986.

Political elite transformation in Poland can be categorized into three generations: the revolutionary,

post-revolutionary, and Socialist. The significant and dominating characteristics of each successive generation will be documented to reveal changing trends of generational change within the power elite.

The revolutionary generation of the power elite comprises individuals who belonged to the KPP, the PPR, or the CPSU. These individuals were also engaged in revolutionary activities during the inter-war years in Poland and were consequently jailed by Polish authorities who viewed such activities as politically subversive. They took part in the seizure and consolidation of power by the Communists in Poland between 1944 and 1948. The main feature which distinguishes the revolutionary generation from the post-revolutionary one is that the former were all born in partitioned Poland. Conversely, members of the post-revolutionary generation are characterized as born during Poland's inter-war years and after the seizure of Communist power.³

Members of Poland's 1948 Politburo and Secretariat were all born prior to Poland's independence in 1918. This meant that all of them were raised under the rule of partitioning powers, predominantly in the Russian sector of partitioned Poland. This original revolutionary power elite evolved out of Czarist Poland and was exposed to two distinct phenomena. Firstly, this group experienced the brunt of Russification carried out by the Czarist authorities, and secondly, it was exposed to industrialization compounded with the growth of a

large proletarian population. More importantly, Marxist and revolutionary ideas emerged as the strongest in this partitioned sector. Not surprisingly, then, all but 5 members (Gomulka, Ochab, Cyrankiewicz, Radkiewicz, and Rapacki) out of a total of 14 of the 1948 power elite were from Czarist Poland.⁴

These same members of the 1948 power elite also experienced collectively five formidable events: World War I, the Russian Revolution, Poland's Independence in 1918, Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat in 1926, and the KPP's bloody dissolution in 1938 by Stalin. The traits that this revolutionary elite generation thus acquired are partly symbolized by the memberships they held in various Communist parties at that time. Moczar and Minc, for example, were members of the CPSU, while Minc additionally held membership in the French Communist party.⁵ Likewise, a number of them participated directly in the Russian Revolution of 1917. Mazur and Zawadzki, for example, were both members of the Red Guard.⁶ Perhaps the most famous was Bierut, a professional revolutionary who worked in various sections of the Comintern (Communist International).⁷ Members of the revolutionary generation who had taken part in the Bolshevik Revolution and who spent time in the USSR, identified with the Soviet political and economic system. The Soviet model was subsequently implemented in Poland after the seizure of power by Communists in 1944. This achievement was made

possible only through Soviet assistance.

Membership in the KPP (Communist Party of Poland) was also an important denominator which united this group of revolutionaries. Eleven of the fifteen members of the power elite were members of the KPP with the exception of Cyrankiewicz, Rapacki, Swiatkowski and Matuszewski, all of whom had belonged to the PPR (Polish Worker's Party) in 1948. Out of eleven KPP members, nine had served various prison sentences (the exceptions were Minc and Berman). This group's political activities were specifically directed at overthrowing and weakening the Second Republic. Not only was the KPP opposed to Poland's re-emergent independence in 1918, but it refused to participate openly in the inter-war parliamentary system and increasingly voiced its inherent opposition towards Pilsudski and the Sanacja regime. Teresa Toranska's interviews conducted with some of the surviving members of the elite clearly bring out the hatred that these Communists had for the Second Republic.⁸ The political struggle they waged during the inter-war period is just another example of a life experience common to the majority of members of the 1948 power elite.

The revolutionary activity of this generational group was not confined to membership in the KPP. Every member of the 1948 power elite, with the exception of Cyrankiewicz and Swietkowski, were members of the PPR. This party, like the KPP, was also intent on changing the socioeconomic and

political relations which existed in the Second Republic.

At the outset of the war in 1939, most members of the 1948 power elite had either already fled to the USSR or found themselves in Soviet-annexed-and-occupied eastern Poland. Bierut, Berman, Jozwiak, Minc, Radkiewicz, Zambrowski, Zawadzki, Matuszewski, Mazur, and Ochab spent most of the war in the USSR and returned to Poland in the early 1940's to organize the Communist movement. Bierut returned to Poland in 1943 to establish the National Council of the Homeland, a sort of self-appointed underground parliament sponsored by the PPR. Jozwiak returned in 1942 to organize Communist partisan battalions for the remainder of the war. For much of the war, Swiatkowski had participated in the resistance movement. Other members such as Berman, Minc, Radkiewicz, Zambrowski, Matuszewski, Mazur, and Ochab, returned to Poland in 1944 from the USSR as political officers in the Polish Army which was then fighting alongside the Soviet Red Army on the Eastern Front. Cyrankiewicz and Rapacki, on the other hand, after a brief engagement in the 1939 Polish campaign, were captured by the Germans and spent the duration of the war in concentration camps. World War II thus served as another significant life experience which was shared by the revolutionary "power elite".

The similarity of life experiences as revolutionary activists and war veterans is not matched, however, by any other leadership attributes common to this group. Urban/ru-

ral background, education, ethnic and social class origins varied significantly.

Putnam's argument that "revolutionary leaders are typically found neither in the mansions of the establishment, nor in the hovels of the dispossessed but among over-educated groups", does not hold true for every revolutionary of the 1948 power elite.⁹ Spychalski, Berman, Swiatkowski and Minc had indeed completed their university studies. Minc specialized in economics, Spychalski in architecture, and the others in law. Cyrankiewicz, Ochab and Rapacki did not complete their studies in law. Matuszewski, an ordained priest, had finished his training at an advanced theological seminary comparable to a university setting. The others, on the other hand, such as Zawadzki and Chelchowski, failed to complete elementary schooling, while Zambrowski and Bierut allegedly had some secondary schooling. Bierut, Zambrowski, Jozwiak and Radkiewicz went on to study at the party school in Moscow, yet their area of specialization was never revealed. Mazur allegedly finished some form of vocational training.

This heterogeneity in education extended to other leadership attributes. They differed in ethnicity, even though the majority were Poles. Ochab, for example, was a Ukrainian, whereas Berman, Minc and Zambrowski were Jews. This ethnic variation in power elites would not disappear until 1968.

Unlike later members of the power elite whose social origins would be predominantly working class, the 1948 group was the most heterogenous in history (see Table 5.1). Included within this diversity were two members of bourgeois origin. The bourgeois and middle class categories would become extinct with the passage of time. Workers, peasants and intelligentsia, who reflected the new social class structure in Communist Poland, comprised the later members of the power elite. Also, the urban nature of the power elite as established in 1948 was not broken until 1975, and by 1981, the rural nature would dominate (see Table 5.2). Lastly, the average age of the 1948 power elite was 45.4, which was much older than the Soviet elite's average age of 39.0 at the time of the Russian Revolution (see Table 5.3).

The power elite had not changed significantly by the time the II Party Congress convened in 1954. Political elite transformation had not taken place. In fact, members of the revolutionary generation were added to the ranks of the power elite. Spychalski, Swiatkowski, and Matuszewski, on account of enforced Stalinism in Poland after 1948, were dropped as part of the drive against rightist nationalist deviation. Conversely, Nowak, Rokossowski and Dworakowski were added to the power elite.¹⁰ These three shared most of the life experiences and leadership attributes common to the revolutionary generation. Both Dworakowski and Nowak were members of the KPP as they had joined in the early 1920's.

Unlike Dworakowski, however, Nowak was repeatedly arrested and jailed for politically subversive activities. Both were members of the PPR. Rokossowski's revolutionary activities were restricted to membership in the CPSU. Having joined the Russian Army in 1914, Rokossowski participated in the Russian Revolution. His military career in the Soviet Army included participation in the 1920 Soviet-Polish War. As far as Dworakowski is concerned, it is not known whether he had engaged in war time activities although it is certain that Nowak was captured by the Germans and sent to a concentration camp. After the liberation of Poland, Nowak fled to the USSR and returned to Poland in 1947. Neither Nowak's nor Dworakowski's education level could be verified. Rokossowski, however, graduated from the Soviet Military Academy in 1925, and from the Academy of the General Staff in 1929.

Because Members of the revolutionary generation dominated the ranks of the power elite, there were no significant changes in leadership attributes as evidenced in Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. The number with a university education dropped to 5 out of 15 (see Table 5.7). At the same time, the number whose revolutionary activities included KPP membership, time spent in the USSR, and jail for political subversion either increased or remained the same. This reflected the revolutionaries' domination of the party's highest organs, the Politburo and Secretariat (see

Tables 5.4 and 5.5). Also, Table 5.2 shows that the urban nature of the power elite was maintained until 1970-71.

Moreover, the average age of the elite (Table 5.3) rose to 50.9 in 1954 from 45.4 in 1948. Thus, overall, the revolutionary generation continued its supreme reign.

The first significant turnover in the power elite began to take place in the late 1950's as de-Stalinization ran its course in Poland. Although the major figures of Stalinist abuses were removed in October 1956, the entire process culminated only with the III Party Congress in 1959.

Changes undertaken with the removal and addition of new members of the power elite did not, however, signify political elite transformation. The new power elite consisted of Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Spychalski, Zambrowski, Kliszko, Loga-Sowinski, Ochab, Morawski, Rapacki, Jedrychowski, Zawadzki, Albrecht, Jarosinski, Gierek and Matwin.¹¹ Nine of the fourteen were formerly in the KPP (Gomulka, Jedrychowski, Kliszko, Loga-Sowinski, Ochab, Spychalski, Zambrowski, Zawadzki, and Albrecht). During the German occupation, Albrecht's revolutionary activities included participation in two Communist organizations: Spartacus, Sickie and Hammer; and Association of Friends of the USSR. Along with Spychalski he also organized Communist partisans. After the establishment of the PPR in 1942, Albrecht became the First Secretary of the Warsaw organization. Morawski, Matwin and Jarosinski belonged to Communist youth organiza-

tions but never joined the KPP. Gierek had been a member of the French and Belgian Communist parties, while Jedrychowski was a former member of the CPSU. Rapacki and Cyrankiewicz comprised the sole contingent of remaining ex-PPS members. Likewise, with the exception of Rapacki and Cyrankiewicz, all were formerly associated with PPR (see Table 5.5). A portion of the power elite still counted prison sentences from political activity during the inter-war period among their experiences, while the number of members who had spent any time in the USSR declined from 11 to 7 (see Table 5.4). Every member, however, of the power elite in 1959 participated in World War II (see Table 5.6). On the whole, the 1959 group was different from the 1948 group only in certain characteristics.

Those changes which were becoming obvious, had occurred in the attributes of the power elite rather than in their life experiences. Table 5.1 shows that members of peasant origin declined from 4 to 1 since 1954, while members of the working class increased from 3 to 8. The number with higher education (Table 5.7) reached 11, yet no one outside of Gierek and Spychalski possessed any technical training. Ochab and Rapacki were economics specialists although a degree in law remained the norm (see Table 5.8). The number of Jews diminished to two, Zambrowski and Albrecht. Furthermore, all but one were from an urban background. The average age dropped slightly to 49.6 from 50.9 recorded at

the previous congress. This stable average especially underlined the stability of the ruling revolutionary generation.

By 1964, signs of political elite transformation were apparent for the first time. Two members of the ruling power elite, Tejchma and Jagielski, signalled the arrival of the second generation of the political elite and its successful breakthrough into the party's two most prestigious organs, the Politburo and Secretariat.¹²

Members of the second generation of the political elite were born in independent Poland, the major life experience which distinguished this group from previous members of the elite. This second generation of the power elite were born in the late 1920's or early 1930's. That is, they were too young to really participate in the actual seizure and consolidation of political power in Poland in 1944-48. Also, this generation was not associated with the KPP and had not taken part in World War II. However, some had joined the PPR prior to its unification with the PPS in 1948. Likewise, they had spent little or no time in the USSR.

Most members of the second generation began their careers in the late 1940's or early 1950's. They played no significant part in the Stalinist struggles of 1948 and 1956. According to de Weydenthal, this group's

early career experiences left little discernable effect on their political activi-

ty. This was largely because of their participation in those organizations which had been too insignificant to establish lasting identification with specifically defined groupings. Rather, this distinguishing quality of the entire group was its common experience of having gone as relatively junior staff members through a thorough organizational training in the ranks of the old apparatus or its youth appendages.¹³

This means that the second generation of power elite members passed through an party-organized framework before reaching the most prestigious party posts. Their founding fathers, as professional revolutionaries, were responsible for the philosophical and practical ground work: they naturally assumed high party posts without having to advance through the party's hierarchical structure. In contrast, the second generation had to move through the increasingly bureaucratized, organized, and urbanized party system before reaching the top. Consequently their "formation" as party activists, as members of the post-revolutionary professional elite, was more structured. They also developed different types of career specializations, whereas the previous elite's career specialization was largely that of revolutionary. Tejchma and Jagielski, representatives of this second generation, had not engaged in KPP activities.¹⁴ Neither had participated in the war nor spent time in the USSR. Jagielski, unlike Tejchma, was a former member of the PPR. Jagielski studied at the Higher School of Planning and Statistics after which he attended the party's Institute of Cadre Training where he received a doctorate in economics.

Tejchma, having studied at the Warsaw Political Science Academy, then also proceeded to study at the party's Higher School of Social Science where he obtained a master's degree in history. Regular university training followed by party training frequently characterizes the second generation's education. Tejchma's initial career began in youth organizations before admission into the party in 1952. He continued to work in youth organizations until 1963, when he became the Central Committee's head of agricultural matters. Jagielski began his career in the government also in agriculture. In 1952, as a member of the Central Committee, he was responsible for agricultural matters. This brief outline of the career patterns of the two new representatives of the second generation clearly illustrates how different their life experiences were as opposed to the revolutionary generation.

Although the second generation broke through in 1964, the revolutionaries still dominated because of the addition of Szyr, Strzelecki, and Starewicz.¹⁵ Szyr and Strzelecki had been members of the KPP, while Szyr's revolutionary activity included membership in the French Communist Party. Starewicz was a former member of the Polish Communist youth. Both Szyr and Starewicz spent the war in the USSR where they participated in activities on the Eastern Front. Strzelecki remained in Poland and was engaged with the Communist partisan forces. Table 5.5 illustrates the fact that KPP

and PPR representation in the ranks of the power elite was strengthened since the previous party Congress, however, from this date forward, it would significantly decline.

Overall, the power elite had not changed. Members with a university education dropped from 11 to 9 (see Table 5.7). The trend of combining party and regular university training was now established, as exemplified by Jagielski and Tejchma. The urban nature of the power elite remained secured (Table 5.2) although the peasant representation was increased from its previous lowest level of 1 to 4 members. On the other hand, blue-collar worker representation declined by 1 (see Table 5.1). Sixteen members of the power elite had engaged in wartime activities as compared to 14 out of 19 previously (see Table 5.6). Those who had spent time in the USSR increased in number only because of the addition of revolutionary members. (There was to be a significant decline in these members [Table 5.4] in the future.) The average age of the power elite also increased to 52.6 from 49.6. This rising average age meant that turnover of personnel could not have been extensive, or significant in generational terms.

At the time of the V Party Congress in 1968, the number of members of the second generation in the power elite increased to 5 with the addition of Olszowski, Szydlak, and Kociolek.¹⁶ Olszowski and Kociolek completed university training (in Polish literature and in philosophy, respec-

tively). Szydlak attended a two-year party course, after which he specialized in propaganda. Szydlak was the only member to have been associated with the PPR. None had participated in the war, nor had they spent any time in the USSR. All three began their careers in the youth organization before moving on to important party postings. Unlike Jagielski and Szydlak, Olszowski, Tejchma and Kociolek began their party careers well before the 1956 upheaval. This second generation's main political activity was restricted to post-Stalinist involvement rather than revolutionary or wartime fighting.

By 1968, the revolutionary generation was clearly on the decline. The power elite in 1968 showed a slight drop in its level of education from 1964, however, members with a party education had increased to 3 (Table 5.7) while members with a non-technical education still comprised a majority (Table 5.8). Working class representation increased and would continue to do so under Gierek's leadership during the 1970's. Also, those who were engaged in wartime activities declined to 13 (Table 5.6). Likewise, those who had been jailed for revolutionary activity or who had spent time in the USSR also declined. Eventually most, if not all, characteristics and leadership attributes would be displaced by the new ones of the post-revolutionary generation. Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 illustrate its decline and those attributes associated with this generation. Its average age

was now 57.0 as compared to the second generation's 40.0. The crisis of 1970 all but brought an end to the revolutionary generation in the power elite.

The 1970 Baltic riots and Gierek's subsequent consolidation of power made anticlimatic the turnover of personnel in the power elite during the VI Party Congress. In effect, the revolutionary generation's domination ended with the 1970 worker's riots. It was partially eliminated in December 1970 as changes were made in the composition of the Politburo and Secretariat. The generational turnover was complete one year later at the VI Congress.

Because the revolutionary generation overshadowed Poland's political life for over 35 years through domination of the Politburo and Secretariat, elite circulation was blocked for the second generation. It was after 1956 that this group began advancing to higher and more important position within the party. However, the majority of posts were still held by revolutionaries. Although political friction and conflict existed between the two generations, the intensity and scope of this conflict was difficult to measure because the PZPR, like all East European parties, operates in a clandestine manner and therefore shields its inner party life from outside viewers. Thus to speak of factional friction, and even more importantly, to try to identify the size and membership of such groups within the PZPR, is rather risky. It is certain, however, that the

conflict between the revolutionary and post-revolutionary generations erupted openly in 1968.

The political struggle between the two groups was covered in the press and television. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was exploited by the second generation as a pretext to launch an anti-Semitic campaign against Jewish members of the revolutionary generation. These were not only accused of being enemies of socialism, but also of being Zionists.¹⁷ Individuals who were Jewish or even suspected of having a Jewish background were removed from party and government posts. The factional struggle, therefore, between the two generations resulted in massive purges of the revolutionary generation not only in the political elite but in the party overall.¹⁸

Some observers claim that this was the largest turnover of party cadres in the PZPR's history.¹⁹ In March 1968, 164 cadre decisions were taken which included the removal of 80 ministers, vice-ministers and department heads.²⁰ That year was consequently a turning point which saw the removal of the revolutionary generation from the party's most important posts. Yet, as far as the Politburo and Secretariat were concerned, the revolutionary generation could not be unseated. Ochab was the sole Politburo member who resigned in protest over the party's handling of the so called "March Events" of 1968. Although the gates to further advancement were opened for the second generation, elite circulation at

the very top remained blocked until 1970.

The 1970 worker-party upheaval served as the ultimate catalyst which precipitated the displacement of the revolutionary generation in the political elite by the post-revolutionary one. This is the only event of its kind in Polish post-war political history where political, factional, and generational conflict surrounding the political elite burst into open battle over the absence of political elite circulation within the PZPR. It facilitated a change in the position of the Party First Secretary and also eliminated the majority of personnel who were Gomulka's associates within the ranks of the power elite. Gierek, who assumed the post of First Secretary, systematically removed his political opponents and consolidated his power already in advance of the VI Party Congress in December of 1971. That Congress confirmed Gierek's new leadership team. More importantly, this entire process incorporated, for the first time, the phenomenon of political elite transformation in Poland.

The power elite which came to power as a result of the December riots and which was confirmed at the December Party Congress, was clearly of the second generation. Fifteen of the nineteen members of the 1971 power elite belonged to the second generation. Gierek, Jaruzelski, Jaroszewicz, and Kruczek were the remaining holdovers from the revolutionary generation.²¹

Kruczek, a seasoned Communist veteran, started his political involvement in the KPP during the inter-war period. Imprisoned for political subversion, he engaged in Communist partisan activities against German forces until his capture and subsequent imprisonment in various concentration camps. After the war, Kruczek assumed a number of important party posts.

Gierek's revolutionary activity before the war, on the other hand, was confined to membership in the French and Belgian Communist parties. After being expelled from France for his Communist and trade union activities, he returned to Poland. Following a brief interlude, Gierek once again returned to France where he continued his Communist activities. During World War II, he was a member of the resistance, and organized the ZPP (Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich, Union of Polish Patriots) in Belgium. Upon returning to Poland, Gierek became a member of the PPR and after the emergence of the PZPR in 1948, Gierek assumed a post in the Katowice organization and eventually became its First Secretary, the most developed and modernized district of Poland. In fact, Gierek has been the only PZPR First Secretary to have assumed this post without having participated in revolutionary activities. Moreover, Gierek was free of any Soviet connection prior to accepting his Katowice post.

Jaroszewicz, the third member of the revolutionary

generation and teacher by training, had never joined the ranks of the KPP. During World War II, Jaroszewicz was in the USSR where he trained with the Polish Army. In 1944 he returned to Poland as a political officer where he eventually reached the rank of General. A member of PPR, Jaroszewicz assumed a number of posts in the military and in the State Planning Commission. He continued to specialize in economic affairs.

Jablonski, a professor of history and the last of the revolutionary generation, was a prominent activist in PPS. A wartime veteran, Jablonski returned to Poland to assume a number of government posts in the Ministry of Education.

Thus, the second generation of the power elite quite naturally possessed different leadership attributes. Born in the late 1920's and 30's, this second generation had no revolutionary experience, and due to age, a majority of the members were too young to participate in World War II. Likewise, most of this group's members had not spent any time in the USSR, and very few were members of the PPR. Thus, only eight of the nineteen member 1971 power elite participated in the Second World War: Werblan, Kruczek, Szlachcic, Grudzien, Gierek, Jablonski, Jaroszewicz, and Jaruzelski. Only four had spent time in the USSR: Werblan, Kruczek, Jaruzelski and Jaroszewicz. Kruczek was the only member to have possessed a criminal record for politically subversive activities during Poland's inter-war years. Nine

members formerly belonged to the PPR: Gierek, Babiuch, Jagielski, Jaruzelski, Kruczek, Szlachcic, Szydlak, Kepa and Kania. Through the 1970's, these three latter leadership attributes (war experience, time spent in the USSR, PPR membership) would further decrease in frequency.

When Gierek assumed power in 1970, many political observers claimed that his leadership team was too technocratic. The term "technocracy" implies that political elites, trained as technicians, base their judgements and policy decisions on technical efficiency and rationality, free from political values and philosophies.²² Many individuals from the second generation of the power elite possessed technocratic training, but they cannot be considered technocrats in the true meaning of the word because none of them ever held managerial posts within industry where they actually would have applied their technocratic training. The number of technically trained individuals did indeed increase (Table 5.8) under Gierek's leadership, but to conclude that decision-making was done strictly on the basis of technical knowledge requires a detailed examination of the policy process then which is far beyond the aims of this thesis. Blazynski, a prominent political commentator, however, has written that "Gierek took over as a leader of technocrats and pragmatists who were pushing forward and trying to create the new expert managerial class."²³

As examples of the changing leadership attributes,

members of the 1971 political elite such as Gierek, Kowalczyk, Grudzien and Szlachcic were technocrats with technical training in mining and metallurgy. Others, such as Babiuch, Jagielski, Frelek and Barcikowski had undergone economic and agricultural training. Still others possessed university training in the Social Sciences or Humanities: Jablonski (History), Jaroszewicz (Education), Lukaszewicz (History/Sociology), Olszowski (Polish Lit.) Tejchma (Poli. Sci./Hist.) Werblan (History), and Kepa (History).²⁴ The most significant development was that party education doubled from the last Party Congress (see Table 5.7). Combined party and university training had also doubled.

With reference to social class origin, very little had changed by 1971. Numbers of members of a working class background remained unchanged even though during Gierek's decade of rule worker representation within the power elite doubled. Peasant representation in the 1971 power elite increased only marginally, and intelligentsia representation remained consistent.

Gierek's entire leadership team remained fairly static throughout the 1970's as few members were dropped or added. By 1975, only Szlachcic had been removed from the power elite. Added to its ranks were Krasko, Kurowski, Pinkowski, Zandarowski and Wrzaszczyk, for a total of twenty four members.²⁵

Interestingly enough, Krasko, unlike the others,

belonged to the revolutionary generation. He did, however, differ substantially in that he had no previous political affiliation, particularly with the KPP, before joining the PZPR. Also, upon graduating from the University of Wilno in law, Krasko took part only in the 1939 Polish campaign, after which he resided in the former Polish territories under Soviet control. He began his career as a newspaper editor before moving into a party post in 1954. Unlike other members of the revolutionary generation (e.g. Zawadzki or Zambrowski), Krasko assumed a party post relatively later than the typical revolutionary member who did so immediately upon PZPR's birth in 1948.

Kurowski, Pinkowski, Zandarowski and Wrzaszczyk exemplified characteristics common for the second generation. None participated in the war; Zandarowski was the only one to have been a member of PPR. All four attained degrees from institution of higher-learning: Kurowski (Agricultural Economics), Pinkowski (Economics), Zandarowski (Engineering), and Wrzaszczyk (Law). Technical training thus was predominant among the second generation.

Leadership attributes did not change much by 1975 except for slight increases in worker and peasant representation. But, during the VIII Party Congress in February 1980, prior to the explosion of Poland's political and economic crisis in the summer, Gierek dismissed Krasko, Jaroszewicz, Olszowski, Tejchma and Kepa. He added Zielin-

ski, Waszczuk, Pyka, Wojtaszek, Zabinski, and Karkoszka, all of the second generation.²⁶ Most of these additions conformed to the typical leadership attributes. Technocrats thus asserted themselves in greater numbers during Gierek's leadership. Despite this, the economic mismanagement during his decade was phenomenal. This certainly casts doubt on the assertion that Gierek's power elite ruled technocratically.²⁸

By 1980, the urban nature of the power elite was restored. Throughout the 1970's, however, members of blue-collar background increased to a historical high of 16 (Table 5.1) out of a total of 23. That is, the number of these members increased by two. This fact of increased blue-collar representation was in parallel to Gierek's recruitment policies overall, or to the party's transformation under his guidance. And the average age of the power elite was 53.8, a reflection of the fairly stable nature of Gierek's team.

Gierek's team could also be called a generation of apparatchiks. Having no revolutionary or wartime experience, they assumed posts within the party in the late 1950's. They had played no part in the Stalinist struggles. They had trained in youth organizations or within the party apparatus. These apparatchik characteristics, together with its superior educational levels, especially set this second generation apart from its predecessor. Under Gierek, this

generation fully took control of the party's two most important institutions, the Politburo and Secretariat, thereby closing out one phase of power elite transformation.. Also, the argument that Gierek's leadership was technocratic seems to be true only in the sense that the number of technocratically educated members of the elite had increased. Hence, this dominance of the second generation continued into 1980, but by 1986, a third generation of the political elite was slowly beginning to infiltrate the ranks.

Another worker-party upheaval, this time in the summer 1980, succeeded as a catalyst which initiated a change in the position of Party First Secretary. Unlike the previous leadership changes, where the removal or addition of power elite members was done swiftly and where the First Secretary was promptly allowed to consolidate his power and establish his own clientele network, the 1980 worker-party conflict resulted in continuous changes within the ranks of the power elite, a process which went unabated until the IX Extraordinary Congress in 1981. The ultimate and massive changes resulted in a complete turnover of Gierek's elite team, with the exception of Jaruzelski, Kania and Barcikowski. The latter three went on to assume important party posts during those turbulent years of 1980 and 1981.²⁸ Yet this massive turnover in the power elite was not political elite transformation.

The IX Extraordinary Party Congress in July 1981 further reduced the revolutionary generation to one member, Opalko. One might have expected that during this latest crisis, as previously experienced during the December 1971 upheaval, members of the next generation would appear within the ranks of the power elite. This did not materialize for the second generation of the political elite continued to be firmly entrenched in the Politburo and Secretariat. Kania, Barcikowski, Czechowicz, Czyrek, Grzyb, Jaruzelski, Kubiak, Labecki, Messner, Milewski, Olszowski, Porebski, Romanik, Siwak, Glowczyk, Mokrzyszczak, Michalek, and Wozniak, all members of the second generation, were confirmed at the IX Congress.²⁹ Out of this total, the revolutionary generation comprised 5.0 percent.

One of the striking characteristics of this power elite was the fact that members of working class background declined significantly since the previous Congress and at a time when the party was experiencing its most serious worker upheaval (see Table 5.1). The Party Congress did, however, elect four members to the power elite who were blue-collar by origin and even by occupation (Labecki, Romanik, Siwak and Grzyb). This occurrence ought to be examined, however, within the context of time and events. The election of these blue-collar workers to the ranks of the power elite can only be seen as a mechanism through which worker representation within the ranks of the power elite was to

become a reality and not just figure as a social class category or statistic. Also, middle class ranks during this Congress were eliminated and members from the ranks of the intelligentsia of the power elite doubled. Marginal peasant representation, like that of the 1970's, continued to oscillate insignificantly. Lastly, this power elite differed from all its predecessors especially in its lack of political expertise.

Of the fifteen members, six had no experience with holding any previous posts and three others had never occupied a national political post. Never before was the Political Bureau composed of so many newcomers and so few experienced politicians. Wiatr, a participant of the Congress, wrote:

The Leadership formation patterns underwent a drastic change. Truly competitive elections in the party, intense elimination of incumbents, and promotion of non-professionals to the highest political offices made the elite formation process completely different.³⁰

It was for only the second time in party history that the power elite had originated from a rural background. Jaruzelski was the only one who had spent some time in the USSR or who had been a member of the PPR. No members possessed any records of imprisonment or previous revolutionary activity. Connection with previous foreign Communist parties was also nil (Tables 5.4 and 5.5). Members with party and university education were reduced from four to one. Table 5.8 points out that the educational speciali-

zation of this power elite emphasized technocratic training. Members held technical degrees, social science degrees, and Jaruzelski had military training. Because of the massive turnover in the personnel, the average age of the power elite dropped to 51.1 (see Table 5.3). Overall, the only deviation which characterized this second generation of the power elite in 1981 was its clear lack of political expertise, which could have resulted from the party turmoil and different selection processes at that time.

The present composition of the power elite reflects the political events in Poland since the last party congress. For the first time four out of 24 were military men: Jaruzelski, Kiszczak, Baryla, and Siwicki. The appointment of these men, the other three close associates of General Jaruzelski, signalled the increasing importance of the military's role in Polish politics.³¹ At the same time, one should remember that these men were party members and any suggestion that their political intentions were to usurp party power and dominance is misleading and a misinterpretation of the situation.

In 1981, the army had to step in to take charge of the PZPR which had grown corrupt, internally disintegrated, politically incompetent, and public discredited nationally and internationally. In other words, the army filled a political vacuum and gave the PZPR a chance at self-recon-

struction. Some claim that Jaruzelski and other personnel had planned well ahead of the 1980-81 crisis to take control of the party and that the summer events served as the justifiable opportunity.³² Increased military representation among the ranks of the power elite should be viewed within the context of interest group politics. The army's increasing importance as an interest group in Polish politics was naturally rewarded with membership in the ranks of the power elite.

This entire development was just as important as the actual process of political elite transformation which was evolving for a second time. The third generation of political elites had entered the ranks of the power elite. This generation of the power elite, unlike the previous two, was born in Socialist Poland and totally socialized in the values of Communists. It had no recollection of either World War II or Stalinist times. Its members are a native brand of Polish Communist. Highly educated and largely originating from a urban milieu, they have experienced the increasing affluence that each successive PZPR leadership had managed to bring, and thus will probably continue to demand a high level of material wealth to be generated by successes in the socialist economy.

For the first time no member of the revolutionary generation was among the ranks of the power elite in the 1986 Poliburo and Secretariat. Muranski was the new

representative of the Socialist generation, however, he still possessed many characteristics associated with the second generation. Born to a worker family, Muranski was technically trained and of a rural background. He possessed no wartime experience or stay in the USSR. Unlike other previous members of the power elite, Muranski occupied no important posts in the party before assuming his present position. He was a youth organizer and eventually became a party instructor and local Party First Secretary of his primary party organization. His only other important post was a membership in the party's executive of his city. Because Muranski is the only member of the third generation in the power elite thus far, it is difficult to make any generalizations about the nature of the third generation. He is a harbinger of the socialist generation of the power elite which will probably reach top party ranks in the early 1990's.

The power elite elected during the latest Party Congress in 1986 reflected many of the already established leadership characteristics. Members from a rural background increased from 16 to 17 out of a total of 24 (see Table 5.2). There were no members with previous membership in foreign Communist parties but membership in the PPR increased to four because of the addition of Jaruzelski, Baryla, Kiszczak and Bejgar.³³ For the first time no member had been associated with the defunct PPS party. No member

of the power elite was ever arrested or jailed (Table 5.5). Those having spent time in the USSR amounted to two; Jaruzelski and Siwicki, who both had military and wartime experience there. Changes in the social class origins in the power elite saw a slight increase in the number of members with a working class background (see Table 5.1). Furthermore, the middle class category which was previously eliminated now had three out of 24 members. Peasant representation continued to oscillate as it did under Gierek's rule, and dropped to four out of 24 members. Members with a university degree reached fifteen, a record high. Party education decreased while members with military training and education quadrupled. Members with a technical education accounted for twelve, a majority and record high. Humanities and the Social Sciences as a specialization among members were almost eliminated (see Table 5.7). As of 1971, there were no non-Poles. Lastly, the average age rose as the power elite began to stabilize itself after the turmoil that had plagued the party at the beginning of the decade.

To complete the examination of political elite transformation, one must take a look at the Central Committee, since it is a component and larger sample of the political elite in Poland. How have societal elements and the defined leadership attributes been absorbed by this component? By comparing the available data on the Central Committee against that of society, the PZPR, the Secretariat and the

Politburo, a more complete picture of political elite transformation will be possible.³⁴

Table 5.10 compares the Committee's levels of higher education against the PZPR, society, Politburo and Secretariat. Even these limited data are revealing. One would have expected the level of higher education in the CC (Central Committee) to rise continuously, yet strikingly, the level of higher education declines for CC members after 1959 until the last available year, 1971. This is surprising for a body which comprises Poland's top political elite. Further data are unavailable to confirm any recent trends. Yet considering that society, party, and power elite, have all shown increased levels of education, one would expect the same trend for the Central Committee. But education levels of Committee members are higher than among PZPR members and society. Putnam's law of increasing disproportion is supported by Table 5.10. Party members are thus expected to be better educated than the non-member in Polish society, just as members of the inner sanctum of the power elite are expected to be more educated than regular party members.

Putnam's law of increasing disproportion also states that males are most likely to occupy the highest levels of political activity. In Poland this is especially true if one examines Table 5.11. Males overwhelmingly dominate the make-up of the PZPR, CC, Politburo and Secretariat, even

though they make up less than half of Poland's population. Males are thus overrepresented within the party, CC, and power elite. When it comes to climbing the rungs of the political ladder, females are left behind largely as just party members. This aspect, moreover, is common to all East European Communist parties.

If the CC is undergoing political elite transformation parallel to the other two major bodies, then one can expect that the revolutionary generation will either be removed or eventually displaced by the post-revolutionary political elite. In 1966, half of the members of the CC had joined the Communist party before 1945.³⁵ By 1986, this category of political elite was reduced to a third, and by 1973, the revolutionary elite declined to eleven percent of the total CC membership. The revolutionary political elite was probably eliminated from the CC by the early 1970's. At the very same time, the CC was, during the 1970's, largely staffed by individuals from the post-revolutionary generation, although a significant contingent should have been comprised of third generation individuals. Since the data are unavailable, it is difficult to estimate the true size of this third generation of the political elite born and raised in Socialist Poland.

In analyzing the social class background of the Central Committee, only a few remarks can be made. After the merger of the PPS and PPR, the social composition of the first

Central Committee resulted in a decline in the numbers of individuals from a working class background to 44 percent.³⁶ This decline continued until 1956. After Gomulka's return to power in 1956, the percentage of workers within the Central Committee rose to 59 percent in 1970 only to be followed by a decline.³⁷ Because additional data are not available, it is not possible to assess further development. However, one suspects that worker representation within the CC increased during the 1970's in conjunction with Gierek's emphasis on the political recruitment of workers into the party.

Peasant representation within the CC declined steadily after 1948, and by 1970 only 18 percent of all CC members were peasants.³⁸ However, during the V and VI Party Congresses, peasant representation increased to 24 percent.³⁹ Lack of further data hamper any conclusions except that the most likely development was that peasant members of the CC declined in parallel to the decline of this social class within Polish society. Conversely, white-collar personnel within the CC have increased from 3 percent in 1948 to 15 in 1971.⁴⁰ This social class has probably continued to strengthen its representation in subsequent years and it most likely forms a majority in the CC today as it does overall in the party.

Lastly, an analysis of the power elite's social class composition in comparison with the PZPR reveals that within

the Politburo and Secretariat, members of a working class background have always been more numerous, percentage wise, than in the party, with the exception of 1954 and 1964. In fact, the overall trend since 1948 and until the last available data of 1970, has been one of growth. The percentage of power elite members of a working class background has always been higher for this political body than in the PZPR. However, since the early 1980's, the percentage of working class members has declined below the percentage of individuals comprising the blue-collar class within Polish society. A similar trend for the party was reported for the party in Chapter 2.

Members of the power elite of a peasant social class background have declined in percentage terms since 1948. Yet, their level of representation within the power elite has been higher in comparison with the PZPR party. However, since the 1970's their overall level of representation within this body has been lower, percentage wise, than the percentage of peasants in Polish society. This trend is similar to the one within the PZPR where peasants were also underrepresented (Table 5.13).

The most consistent gains have been made by the white-collar class. Members of the power elite of white-collar background have made consistent gains within the ranks of the power elite (Table 5.13). Since 1971, this social class has been overrepresented within the ranks of the power

elites in comparison to their overall social class size in Polish society. Furthermore, this same class has, as was discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, been overrepresented within the party's social composition and membership. The white-collar class has made the most consistent gains. This is in opposite to what Bohdan Harasymiw discovered in his study of the Soviet political elite.⁴¹ Harasymiw revealed that the white-collar personnel (intelligentsia), was prevented from entering the ranks of the power elite. He suggested that this may be a source of political conflict in future Soviet politics. This, however, is ruled out in the Polish situation. Overall, it is quite clear that the white-collar social class has been the main beneficiary of party and political elite transformation in Poland.

This chapter documented the changing pattern of political elite transformation in Poland. The analysed data clearly demonstrated that two generations had dominated the top party institutions and that a third is coming to establish itself. Moreover, it was shown how the revolutionary generation slowly yielded to the post-revolutionary one at the beginning of the 1970's and how in turn the latter consolidated its power during that decade. Political elite transformation in Poland is thus a political process controlled by the power elite itself which determines its scope and size and consequently the intensity and direction of elite transformation.

TABLE 5.1

CLASS STATUS OF MEMBERS OF POWER ELITES
(IN ABSOLUTE NUMBERS)
(1948-86)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
	1	2	8	6	7	8	11	16	9	11
Blue-Collar										
Peasant	7	5	1	5	3	5	6	3	6	4
White-Collar	2	2	2	3	3	6	6	3	4	9
Middle Class	3	4	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
Bourgeois	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unknown	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
<hr/> TOTAL	15	15	15	19	18	19	23	23	19	24

Source: Trybuna Ludu, (1948-86).

TABLE 5.2

URBAN/RURAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER ELITE MEMBERS
(1948-86)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Rural	6	5	2	4	3	9	12	9	16	17
Urban	7	8	12	14	14	10	11	14	3	7
Unknown	2	2	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	15	15	15	19	18	19	23	23	19	23

Source: As in Table 5.1

TABLE 5.3
AVERAGE AGE OF THE "POWER ELITE" IN POLAND
(1948-86)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AVERAGE AGE</u>
1948	45.4
1954	50.9
1959	49.6
1964	52.6
1968	52.6
1971	48.1
1975	50.8
1980	53.8
1981	51.1
1986	54.1

Source: As in Table 5.1

TABLE 5.4

MEMBERS OF THE POWER ELITE HAVING SPENT TIME IN THE USSR
1918-39

MEMBERS ARRESTED/JAILED FOR POLITICAL SUBVERSION IN POLAND
1918-39

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Arrested /Jailed	8	8	8	8	6	1	1	1	0	0
Time in USSR	10	11	7	10	6	4	5	3	1	2
Unknown	0	0	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	18	23	15	19	13	5	6	4	1	2

Sources: Trybuna Ludu, (1948-86); Marian K. Dziewanowski, "Bibliographical Sketches of Leading Figures of the Communist Regime," in Oscar Halecki, ed., East Central Europe Under the Communists: Poland (New York: Praegar, 1957), pp. 516-34; Antony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier, eds., The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland: December 1943-June 1945 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 157-83; Lidia Becela et al., Kto Jest Kim w Polsce 1984 (Warsaw: Interpres, 1984); Joseph Wisniewski, ed., Who's Who in Poland (Toronto: Professional Translators and Publishers, 1981).

TABLE 5.5

POWER ELITE MEMBERS HOLDING MEMBERSHIP IN KPP, PPS, PPR,
CPSU, FCP, BCP
(1948-86)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Communist Party of Poland	11	12	9	10	9	1	1	1	0	0
Socialist Party of Poland	4	3	2	2	1	3	2	3	1	0
Worker's Party of Poland	11	8	12	14	12	8	8	7	1	4
Communist Party of the Soviet Union	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Communist Party of France	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	0
Communist Party of Belgium	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
SUBTOTAL OF MEMBER-SHIPS	29	26	26	30	25	15	14	14	2	4
TOTAL MEMBERS	15	15	15	19	18	19	23	23	19	24

Source: As in Table 5.4

TABLE 5.6

MEMBERS OF THE POWER ELITE HAVING PARTICIPATED IN WORLD WAR II
(1948-86)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Partici- pated	15	14	15	16	12	8	8	6	1	4
Did not partici- pate	0	0	0	2	5	11	15	17	18	20
Unknown	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
<u>TOTAL</u>	15	15	15	19	18	19	23	23	19	24

Source: As in Table 5.4

TABLE 5.7

EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE POWER ELITE
(1948-86)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
University*	8	5	11	9	8	7	11	11	11	13
Higher Party School Moscow	4	4	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	1
Secondary*	2	2	1	3	2	2	2	1	0	1
Primary*	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
Vocational*	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2
Military Academy	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
Party and University Combined	0	0	0	2	2	4	4	4	1	2
Party School Warsaw only	0	0	1	1	3	6	6	7	1	1
Unknown	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	1
TOTAL	17	17	17	20	19	20	24	24	19	24
TOTAL MEMBERS	15	15	15	19	18	19	23	23	19	24

Source: As in Table 5.1

*includes incomplete studies as well

TABLE 5.8

EDUCATIONAL SPECIALIZATION OF POWER ELITE'S MEMBERS*
(1948-86)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Humanities /Social Sciences	4	2	6	5	6	7	8	6	2	2
Technical**	4	3	5	6	4	6	8	11	9	12
Unknown	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	2	1
<hr/> TOTAL	11	8	15	15	14	17	20	22	13	15
<hr/> TOTAL MEMBERS	15	15	15	19	18	19	23	23	19	24

Source: As in Table 5.1

*includes only individuals who have in/complete university training or party training.

**includes economic, agricultural, and engineering

TABLE 5.9

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POWER ELITE
(1948-86)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>JEWS</u>	<u>POLES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1948	3	12	15
1954	3	12	15
1959	3	12	15
1964	2	17	19
1968	1	17	18
1971	0	19	19
1975	0	23	23
1980	0	24	24
1981	0	19	19
1986	0	24	24

Source: As in Table 5.1

TABLE 5.10

LEVELS OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF POLITBURO, SECRETARIAT, PZPR,
and POLISH SOCIETY
(1948-86)
(in percent)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Politburo-	53.0	25.0	80.0	63.0	77.0	89.0	91.3	95.0	72.0	66.0
Secreta- riat*										
Central Committee	42.6	44.5	54.0	53.0	52.1	39.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
PZPR	n.a.	3.1	5.3	n.a.	7.2	7.9	10.4	n.a.	15.8	n.a.
Society n.a.**	n.a	1.5	2.1	n.a.	n.a.	2.7	3.5	n.a.	5.3	

Sources: Rocznik Statystyczny (Warsaw: GUS, 1949-85);
 Trubna Ludu, (1948-86); David S. Mason, Elite Change and
 Policy in Communist Poland (Ph.D diss., Indiana University,
 1977), p. 61.

*Politburo and Secretariat Combined-Includes Party Schooling
 and Incomplete and Complete Education

**not available

TABLE 5.11

PERCENTAGE OF MALES IN POLITBURO, SECRETARIAT, CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
PARTY AND SOCIETY
(1948-86)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Polit- buro /Se- creta- riat*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	95.7	91.7
Cen- tral Com- mittee**	95.3	95.3	94.3	97.5	97.3	92.3	92.9	88.9	93.1	n.a.
PZPR	n.a.	81.0	85.0	82.6	79.0	77.2	76.4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Society	n.a.	48.0	48.3	48.6	48.6	48.5	48.5	48.5	48.5	n.a.

Sources: Trybuna Ludu, (1948-85); Rocznik Statystyczny
(Warsaw: GUS, 1949-86).

*Politburo and Secretariat combined

**Includes alternate Members of Central Committee

n.a.=Not Available

TABLE 5.12

RURAL/URBAN STATUS OF POLITBURO/SECRETARIAT MEMBERS,
PZPR, AND POLISH SOCIETY
 (1948-86)
 (in percent)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Polit- buro/ Secre- tariat*										
Rural	46.0	38.0	7.1	22.2	17.6	47.3	52.1	39.1	84.2	70.8
Urban	54.0	62.0	92.9	77.8	82.4	52.7	47.9	60.9	15.8	29.2
PZPR										
Rural	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	30.8	30.2	28.6	26.7	n.a.	25.7	n.a.
Urban	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	69.2	29.8	71.4	73.3	n.a.	74.3	n.a.
Society										
Rural	n.a.	58.1	52.7	50.6	48.8	47.2	44.3	41.3	41.0	n.a.
Urban	n.a.	41.9	47.3	49.4	51.2	52.8	52.7	58.7	59.1	n.a.

Sources: Rocznik Statystyczny (Warsaw: GUS, 1949-85); Trybuna Ludu, (1948-86).

*Politburo and Secretariat Combined

n.a.=Not Available

TABLE 5.13

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF POLITBURO/SECRETARIAT, PZPR AND
SOCIETY
(1948-86)
(in percent)

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>
Polit- buro/ Secre- tariat*										
Worker	6.6	13.3	50.0	33.0	41.1	42.0	47.8	65.2	50.0	47.0
Peasant	46.6	33.3	37.1	26.3	17.6	20.8	26.0	17.3	16.6	17.3
White- Collar	13.3	13.3	13.3	15.7	17.6	31.5	26.0	12.5	37.5	39.0
PZPR										
Worker	n.a.	48.0	40.0	40.2	40.2	39.7	41.8	44.7	40.2	39.3
Peasant	n.a.	13.8	11.5	11.4	11.4	10.6	9.5	9.4	9.4	9.1
White- Collar	n.a.	36.2	43.2	43.0	43.0	43.6	41.8	33.2	33.5	51.0
Society **										
Worker	28.3	n.a.	34.3	n.a.	n.a.	37.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	52.5
Peasant	47.1	n.a.	38.4	n.a.	n.a.	25.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	20.0
White- Collar	20.6	n.a.	21.0	n.a.	n.a.	22.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	24.5

Sources: Trybina Ludu, (1948-86); David S. Mason, Elite Change and Policy in Communist Poland (Ph.D diss., Indiana University, 1977), p. 92.

*Politburo/Secretariat Combined

**Data taken from National Census

NOTES

¹Robert D. Putnam, Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Incorporated, 1976), p. 181.

²Baylis' study of the German elite and technical intelligentsia has yet to be reproduced with other East European states, including Poland. Thomas A. Baylis, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite (Berkeley, California: University of California, 1974).

³Drawing upon Bialer's work, an "elite generation is an age group whose membership is homogenous with respect to a particular life experience at a similar point of its development," in Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1980), p. 99.

⁴The five were from Austrian Poland. D.A. Tomasic, "Political Leadership in Contemporary Poland: The Neo-Stalinist Course," Journal of Human Relations, No. 1 (1961), 196.

⁵Marian K. Dziewanowski, "Biographical Sketches of Leading Figures of the Communist Regime," in Oscar Halecki, ed., Poland (New York: Praeger Incorporated, 1957), p. 526; Antony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier, eds., The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 171.

⁶Marian K. Dziewanowski, op.cit., p. 526; Antony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier, eds., op.cit., pp. 171-82; Trybuna Ludu, 24 Dec. 1956, p. 1.

⁷Marian Dziewanowski, op.cit., p. 518; Henryk Rechowicz, Boleslaw Bierut, 1892-1956 (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1977); Wladyslaw Wazniewski, Boleslaw Bierut (Warsaw: Iskry, 1979).

⁸Teresa Toranska, Oni (London: Aneks, 1985).

⁹Putnam, op.cit., p. 193.

¹⁰Dziewanowski, op.cit., pp. 520-531.

¹¹On Gomulka see: Peter Raina, Wladyslaw Gomulka: Zyciorys polityczny (London: Polonia Book Fund, 1969); Nicholas Bethell, Gomulka: His Poland and His Communism (London: Longman's, 1969); Walery Namiotkiewicz, ed., Gomulka: Dzialalnosc Wladyslawa Gomulki: Fakty, Wspomnienia, Opinie (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1985). For the

other members of the power elite listed in this quote please refer to Marian Dziewanowski, op.cit., pp. 516-34; Richard Staar, Poland 1944-62: The Sovietization of a Captive People (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1962. pp. 179-88. Likewise, career profiles have appeared in the following issues of Trybuna Ludu: Zambrowski, 23 Dec. 1957; Spychalski, 13 March 1959; Zawadzki, 4 March 1962; Cyrankiewicz, 15 Jan. 1957; Jedrychowski, 29 Dec. 1956; Loga-Sowinski, 27 Feb. 1957; Kliszko, 21 Feb. 1957; Jarosinski, 11 Jan. 1957; Ochab, 22 Dec. 1956.

¹² Information on Jagielski and Teichma has appeared in Trybuna Ludu, 21 June 1964, p. 3.

¹³ Jan B. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1978), p. 153.

¹⁴ Trybuna Ludu, 21 June 1964, p. 3.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Trybuna Ludu, 17 November 1968, p. 2.

¹⁷ For a discussion on the March events, please refer to: Celia S. Heller, "Anti-Zionism and the Political Struggle Within the Elite of Poland" The Jewish Journal of Sociology, No. 2 (1969), 133-50; Stanislaw Staron, "Political Developments in Poland: The Party Reacts to Challenge," Orbis, No. 4 (1970), 1073-95; Zygmunt Bauman, "O frustracji i o kuglarzach," Kultura, No. 12 (1968), 5-21.

¹⁸ Zygmunt Korybutowicz, Grudzien 1970, (Paris: Institute Litteraire, 1983), p. 28.

¹⁹ Michal Radgowski, Polityka i Jej Czasy (Warsaw: Iskry, 1981), p. 142.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Trybuna Ludu, 12 December 1971, p. 3.

²² See Jean Meyaud, Technocracy (London: Faber and Faber, 1964).

²³ George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 91.

²⁴ Trybuna Ludu, 12 December 1971, p. 3.

²⁵ Ibid., 14 December 1975, p. 2.

²⁶ Ibid., 17 February 1980, p. 2.

²⁷ Zdisław M. Rurarz, Byłem Doradcą Gierka (New York: Pomost, 1986), especially chapter 3, pp. 105-56.

²⁸ Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Poland's Party Politics: Extraordinary Congress of 1981," Canadian Journal of Political Science, No. 14 (1981), 813-26; George Sanford, "The Response of the Polish Communist Leadership and the Continuing Crisis (Summer 1980 to the XIth Congress July 1981): Personnel and Policy Change," in Jean Woodall, ed. Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland: Reform, Failure and Crisis (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), pp. 33-55.

²⁹ Trybuna Ludu, 21-22 July, 1981, p. 2.

³⁰ Jerzy J. Wiatr, op.cit., p. 825.

³¹ Andrzej Korbonski and Sarah M. Terry, "The Military as a Political Actor in Poland," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 159-80; Andrzej Korbonski, "The Polish Army," in Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Communist Armies in Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 103-27; Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Martial Law and the Reliability of the Polish Military," in Daniel D. Nelson, ed., Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984), pp. 225-49.

³² George C. Malcher, Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform (New York: Praeger, 1984).

³³ Trybuna Ludu, 4 July 1986, p. 4.

³⁴ Unfortunately, research work on the Polish Central Committee is almost non-existent. Recently, only one valid article has been published which focuses exclusively on this body. Yet even it does not deal with aspects pertinent to this thesis such as elite transformation, but rather with the numerical turnover and institutional affiliations of Central Committee members. Other information on the Central Committee is confined to the Pittsburgh archives for the Center of International Studies at the Pittsburgh University. In the early 1970's, however, data collection by this center was stopped, and since then, nothing has appeared on the Polish Central Committee. Carl Beck worked with the available data and wrote a number of articles dealing with the East European political elite in which he examined the Polish Central Committee also. The data in this chapter are consequently restricted and illuminate only certain aspects

of elite transformation within the Central Committee. However, the statistics already endorse Putnam's law of increasing disproportion within the Committee. Carl Beck, "Career Characteristics of East European Leadership," in Barry Farrell, ed., Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1970), pp. 157-94; Donald Pienkos, "Party Elites and Society: The Shape of the Polish Central Committee Since 1945," Polish Review, No. 4 (1975), 27-42.

³⁵David S. Mason, "Elite Change and Policy in Communist Poland," (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1977), p. 70.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., p. 59.

³⁸Ibid., p. 60.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 131-39, 152.

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT, PARTICIPATION, AND ELITE-MASS RELATIONSHIPS

In the preceding chapters, societal, party and political elite transformation in Poland between 1948 and 1984 was discussed. Conclusions can now be drawn as to the significance these transformations have upon the political stability of Poland.

Our data illustrated that societal, party and political elite transformation evolved differently among the three levels. Societal transformation, inaugurated from above was eventually transmitted back to its point of origin. Yet transformation affected society, the PZPR and the political elite in various ways.

Political stability in Poland depends upon the PZPR's relationship with society and therefore includes such concepts as elite-mass linkage, participation and recruitment. As was shown, the PZPR occupies an elite role in Socialist Poland as it strives for the optimal harmonization of the interests of the nation's three social classes. Transformation implemented by Poland's power elite has proven difficult to manage. Difficulties arise for the party because the PZPR has not met the challenge of transformation and the population's demands. Having created a new socioeconomic and political order, the PZPR has refused to allow the blue-collar workers a politically relevant range in politics. If the party is to maintain political

stability, it will have to "confront effectively the challenge of modernization and meet the demands of expanding participation, and have both will and the capacity to initiate, absorb and sustain continuous transformation."¹ Furthermore, the political elite must also provide economic affluence if political stability is to be maintained in Poland.

The preceding chapters indicated that numerical growth of the PZPR has not always been indicative of the society's endorsement of party policies nor of its elite-mass relationship. The strength of the party is in no simple way dependent upon its size or numerical representation of the nation's three social classes. Recruitment as a tool was only marginally successful in creating an equilibrium between the party's leading and representative roles, but failed to enhance the party's ability to express the interests of Poland's social groups, including the most important group, the blue-collar workers.

For the PZPR, societal transformation has forced the party to maintain a balance between its leading and representative role. The party must theoretically at least maintain its leading role as the vanguard of the Polish working class, and simultaneously be representative of the most important social strata within Polish society. It was shown that party transformation has favoured the urban, and highly educated white-collar male.

The PZPR at the same time is forced by ideology to be representative of the blue-collar workers. To maintain a successful balance, the PZPR has attempted to regulate its composition through political recruitment. Chapter Four outlined how the party has oscillated in its political recruitment policies in order to fulfill various ideological and practical mandates. Numerical representation of social groups within party ranks has been shown to be politically insufficient unless matched by a satisfactory level of the groups' political participation. The 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980 upheavals are witnesses to this fact.

In political science, "participation" means activity which aims to influence policies and the selection of leaders. Social groups in Poland have not been able actively to participate in political transformation because the party believes that an articulation of their interests may be contradictory to party ideology and its aim of transforming Polish society according to Communist doctrine. Moreover, the PZPR acknowledges itself, under the guidance of the scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology, as the only agent which is to articulate and aggregate societal interests.

The party's refusal or even incompetence in permitting a greater participation of social groups in political transformation has especially diminished the political role of blue-collar workers. Political conflict in particular, arises when this group is not given sufficient means to

control its own destiny or express its interests. The resultant political conflict and tensions arise not because blue-collar workers attempt to displace the party's pre-eminent role in the Polish political system, but in the words of one observer, because "it is an effort, grounded in occupational solidarity, to influence directly or indirectly the direction of policy-making over the issues which affect workers' interests".² Thus, as party transformation unfolds, it must realize that recruitment of members into the PZPR is not a simple solution to political stability, for "membership" in a party is at best a weak form of "participation."

Therefore, as the PZPR undergoes party transformation, it becomes faced with the problem of organizational development. This includes the redefinition of the PZPR's social specificity, and the necessity of preserving a modicum of continuity, traditional ideological goals and organizational patterns. In other words, the party must re-examine its role as the elite pre-eminent instrument in decision-making in the face of growing demands and challenges from Poland's social groups. The party's failure to reorganize legitimate interests of specific social groups will, in the words of one scholar, "contribute to the preservation of a hostile environment in which discontent and protest will inevitably flourish."³

The issue of redefinition of PZPR's political role,

argues Richard Lowenthal,

consists in justifying to the various groups of an increasingly mature society why just this party, in this composition and with this ideology, should be the ultimate arbiter of their conflicts--why, even given a broad menu of values, it should be entitled to a specific role above society and a permanent monopoly of ultimate power.⁴

In fact, Poland has faced this very problem since its seizure of power in 1945. Workers, intellectuals, and the general public at large have successively questioned the PZPR's self-defined role and its goals of transforming Polish society independent of input from such groups as the blue-collar workers.

Lowenthal has argued that the ruling party must solve this problem of status in decision-making at the stage of "citizen mobilization" during societal transformation. He adds that most East European societies, including Poland had arrived at this stage by the 1960's. Yet in Poland, the various social groups were not allowed to participate fully in societal transformation. Moreover, mere membership in the PZPR has not been seen by Poles as effective participation. It is up to the political elite to remedy its relationship with Polish society.

The significance of power elite transformation upon political stability in Poland is largely tied to its economic success. As argued, the second generation of the power elite, with its increased technocratic training, must satisfy Poland's sharpened tastes for better economic

performance and rationality. Technical rationality and economic efficiency will be of paramount importance in the eyes of contemporary citizens and therefore important in the process of societal transformation. As Polish society is transformed from a traditional to a mature socialist society, with increased levels of education, urbanization, and other characteristics of a mature industrial socialist society, the pursuit of greater technical and economic efficiency and material consumption becomes greater. Thus, as Lowenthal argues, "the belief in the central importance of material progress, measured in technical productivity and the standard of living for the good life" will become increasingly important for the political elite to realize.⁵

The need for the political elite to ensure economic abundance in Poland and to accept participation of social groups during societal transformation is thus crucial for political stability. If these needs are not resolved, the subsequent conflicts will increase in frequency. The time span between Poznan 1956 and December 1970 was fourteen years. Radom followed six years later while August 1980 erupted barely four years after that. In fact, de Weyden-thal comments that,

Serious conflict between the party and society continues to appear inevitable. The experience of recent years have shown clearly that many public groups could no longer be persuaded to accept the party's control over their activities and were ready to develop their own methods of work independent of the party and irrespective of rights...⁶

In the past, the prominent blue-collar social group, for example, has developed its own modes of "participation" which included riots, occupational strikes, and an independent trade unions to influence PZPR policies. These modes of participation were manifested in four major upheavals between 1955 and 1981.

Poznan 1956

The first instance in which the need for political participation became evident was in 1956 during the Poznan riots. Having failed to have their economic and occupational grievances addressed, the Cegielski Plant workers resorted to a mass riot in order to influence issues which touched upon the workers' economic livelihood and working conditions.

The Polish blue-collar class was affected negatively by the Six Year Plan inaugurated in 1949. The worker's real wages in those years instead of increasing by the anticipated 40 percent, rose by less than 4 percent.⁷ Minimal wages did not keep pace with the cost of living. Plant directors were rewarded, however, with bonuses which could not have been seen favourably by the workers.

Trade unions became lame institutions serving as transmission belts for the party's commands. Survey results carried out among workers pointed out that "they felt as pawns in a game of theatre and demagogy".⁸ It was reported that the Poznan workers of the Cegielski plant had sent in

4700 resolutions with regards to the production changes and the poor working conditions which existed within the plant.⁹ All such resolutions were dismissed and ignored both by the workers' councils and the trade unions. The various worker resolutions were labelled as provocations by the plant's management and by the PZPR party.¹⁰

The Poznan events and subsequent worker upheavals demonstrate the futility and political ineptitude which has repeatedly plagued the Polish political system when certain interest groups are refused participation in societal transformation. The first major worker-party conflict also exposed two significant factors which would reappear again in succeeding confrontations between these two groups. First, the existing trade union structures were incapable of transmitting workers' demands to the proper authorities. Because party organizations were unresponsive to the workers' grievances and demands, the working class was forced to go outside the institutional structures to voice their demands and pressure the PZPR in having their interests defended. The PZPR refused to allow those means of participation which could influence party policies or allow such groups to articulate their own interests. Second, the poor economic situation further stymied blue-collar workers' efforts to participate in the policy process. Thus, a dual crisis of participation and poor economic performance evolved.

The 1956 worker revolt demonstrated the degree of alienation between the party and its working class. Having been told by the official propaganda that they were the new rulers in People's Poland, the workers revolted when the officially extolled position did not match political reality. Gomulka, speaking after the June riots, stated:

Recently the working class gave a painful lesson to the party leadership and government. The workers of Poznan made use of the strike weapon and came out into the street to demonstrate on that black Thursday in June, calling in a loud voice--"Enough"--.¹¹

Although Gomulka acknowledged that the riots were justified, he did nothing to rectify the existing power structure. Therefore, even though the nation was undergoing societal transformation, with specific social groups attempting to participate in the political process, the PZPR maintained its monolithic position as being the sole arbitrator of interests, i.e., forbidding blue-collar workers any independent degree of participation.

December 1970

By 1970, Gomulka had succeeded in alienating the other two sectors of Polish society. His alienation and isolation from the population led to the badly timed price increases on December 13, 1970 which resulted in the Baltic riots.¹² The price increases (30-100 percent) affected basic food commodities which were already in short supply. This could not have come at a worse time and must have been viewed as an attempt by the workers and all social groups as an

attempt by the party to lower their standard of living.

The PZPR's vital mistake in announcing the revised pricing structure was its refusal to communicate beforehand its intentions to its regional party organizations and trade union representatives. The communique issued on December 13, 1970 had stated that after careful consultations with the CRZZ (Centralna Rada Zwiaskow Zawodowcy--Central Council of Trade Unions), the trade union representatives had fully agreed to the proposed new price structure. In fact, no prior consultations were held until December 14 when the price increases were already in effect. Because prior consultations were not carried out, the working class could not have voiced its concerns, apprehensions and protests. Therefore, the workers were again excluded from active participation in influencing policy making.

Once again, the official trade union structures which were to serve as communication channels between the workers and the PZPR failed to function. This forced the workers outside party structured arrangements to voice their concerns and protect their interests. In the words of one commentator,

The fact that the party undertook a series of such sudden and drastic measure, so deeply affecting the lives of every citizen, at such an inappropriate moment, revealed the amazing unresponsiveness of the party's leadership to the needs and moods of the masses and its separation from the population.¹³

Having rioted for three consecutive days, accompanied

by work stoppages which lasted until February 1971, the workers finally forced the party to rescind the price increases. The influential newspaper Polityka wrote that the events which took place in December "were proof that the ties between the working class and the party had been seriously strained".¹⁴ Likewise, during the VIII Plenum, in February 1971, the PZPR power elite acknowledged that the "events demonstrated that there was no officially sanctioned institution through which the working class could effectively communicate with the political elite".¹⁵ Although the power elite recognized that the workers had not been allowed to participate, they did nothing to rectify the situation. Therefore, in 1970 as in 1956, the trade union structure became incapable of expressing worker demands vis-a-vis the party and power elite, all which resulted in conflict between these two groups.

The inability of the existing trade union structure to function properly resulted in workers demanding that they be disbanded and replaced by independent trade unions which would truly represent worker interests.¹⁶ The workers were demanding some institutional format through which they could participate and influence those issues which were of interest to them. Under Gierek, no significant changes were initiated after the 1970 riots, but rather demands for better economic performance and rationality began to strain elite-mass relations.

Chapter Five suggested that political elite transformation is also significant for the stability of the Polish political system. As the Polish power elite undergoes transformation, resulting in the displacement of the revolutionary generation by the post-revolutionary generation, elite-mass relations will take on a contractual agreement between the two partners in which the power elite is obliged to provide greater economic goods to the consumer in return for an apolitical society.

At no time was this more evident than during the 1970's as the post-revolutionary generation began solidifying its power under Gierek's leadership. The economic question became the main issue in elite-mass relations because the Communist regime had no other basis on which to build its political legitimacy and authority.¹⁷

Gierek's power elite undertook the task of trying to satisfy consumer demands by attempting to expand consumption through an increase in industrial production. Elite-mass relations during Gierek's rule are thus called a contractual agreement. Gierek promised to create a Western styled consuming society, hoping in return that he would create an apolitical society satisfied by economic abundance, in turn generating political legitimacy and authority for his leadership. Needless to say, Gierek's strategy failed. Having set consumer expectation spiralling during the first half of the 1970's, Gierek's economic inefficiency could not

fulfill societal expectations, especially in the second half of the decade. This non-fulfillment eventually resulted in his downfall and removal.

Gierek founded his entire political legitimacy and authority on the premise that he would be both an efficient economic manager and provider. As Roger Dean aptly wrote in the early 1970's, the "Gierek leadership had mortgaged its own political legitimacy and the country's economic future as well".¹⁸

Radom 1976

Economic conditions deteriorated after 1975 and Poland's social groups continued to press for actual participation in societal transformation. Among them, the blue-collar workers pressed for material progress measured in technical productivity and an increased standard of living. The intelligentsia supported them as white-collar workers pressed for increased merit and reward for performance and more research and development.¹⁹

Gierek precipitated the 1976 Radom worker upheaval with his miscalculated introduction of a new pricing system in June of that same year. Food shortages were already present and other economic bottlenecks strained the situation. Price increases of food stuffs (30-100 percent) were viewed by society as an attempt by the authorities to prevent them from increasing their newly found prosperity of the early 1970's.

The price increases in 1976, as in 1970, were inaugurated without prior consultation with not only the blue-collar workers, but the other two social classes as well. In fact, no effort was made by the party to justify the increases. Not only had the party refused to consult with the social groups over decisions that were surely to affect their interests, but the PZPR itself had failed to its lesson from previous worker-party upheavals. Instead of allowing the workers some say over matters, the party insisted that any problems could be resolved through increased recruitment of respective sectors. Such was Gierek's policy which emphasized greater numerical infusion of, for example, blue-collar workers in the PZPR without actual participation in political power. The greater numbers of blue-collar workers may have given the party a more respectable social profile, but it did little to boost the party's image as a vehicle for workers' interests. A poll commissioned in 1976 by the PZPR, showed that only one in five workers believed that the party represented his interests.²⁰ This poll supported the workers' claim that membership of the party is not seen as effective participation. Participation of Poland's social groups once again was forced outside institutional arrangements because institutionalized channels of consultation and communication did not exist. The party "was in a state of inertia and it was difficult to imagine that any basic and necessary reforms could be initiated without gallons of

blood being spilled once more".²¹

August 1980

Gierek's power elite failed to deal with the growing economic problems of the second half of the 1970's. Party-blocked channels of communication continued to exclude effective participation by social groups in influencing policies. This exclusion from political transformation had increased the frequency of sequential upheavals in Poland.

The most immediate cause of the 1980 conflict was a repeat in price increases compounded by no prior consultations. As national strikes overwhelmed the nation, workers realized that only their own trade unions, controlled by them, could address the party and government and thus influence policy-making and protect their interests. This demand for independent trade unions was formulated as one of the 21 postulates in the Gdansk agreement. Demand number five read:

The new trade union should enjoy genuine opportunities for publicly evaluating the new decisions that determine working people's conditions: the principle of dividing the national income into consumption and accumulation, the distribution of the social consumption fund for various purposes--health, education, culture--the basic principle of remuneration and the lines of wage-policy, particularly the principle of automatic adjustment of wages under conditions of inflation, long term economic plans, investment policy and changes in price. The government pledges itself to ensure conditions for the exercise of these functions.²²

The workers' desire for more effective participation in societal transformation manifested itself in their demand

for the full institutionalization of their trade union that would both serve as their guardian of interests and an institutional mechanism which would be able to communicate with the PZPR and the government.

The experiment lasted for sixteen months during which the party had to acknowledge the emergence and establishment of an independent body which was not directly controlled by the PZPR, but acted as an interest group that articulated its demands on its own behalf. The PZPR leadership was not, however, about to acknowledge the trade union Solidarity as a political force, nor was it willing to have its traditional role of political leadership mutated by social groups. The PZPR wanted to recapture its pre-eminent role in the Polish political system as the sole political force. It did not want its direction of societal transformation questioned or challenged. Martial Law as declared on December 13, 1981, saw to it that the PZPR's wants were re-established just as Solidarity was disbanded.

Hence, as Poland undergoes societal transformation, the single ruling PZPR will have to permit social groups an effective form of interest articulation. Even though societal transformation is directed from the top, the post-revolutionary power elites will have to deal with a plurality of important interest groups and external forces by using party apparatus as an arbitrator.²³ Thus, party transformation must result in more than just numerical representa-

tion of the nation's social groups or increased recruitment of members into the PZPR as compensation for more effective participation of social groups in societal transformation. Political elite transformation must also succeed in producing a power elite which will be competent in procuring economic efficiency and prosperity in a society that is increasingly urbanized, educated, politically sophisticated, and demanding of economic satiation.

The PZPR has never successfully solved any of the problems relating to "participation" and elite-mass linkage. Consequently its entire existence since 1945 has been characterized by a sad record of continuous failures in economics, and in the sociopolitical realm. No other Communist regime in Eastern Europe has had this dubious distinction.

Paradoxically, the regime seems to emerge strengthened from each confrontation without having fundamentally reformed itself; it neither relinquishes its exclusive grip in power nor becomes capable of aggregating, articulation, representing or acting on behalf of the interests and aspirations of the vast majority of Poles.²⁴

In light of the latest societal conflict in Poland, it is unimaginable that the PZPR can generate any political legitimacy other than by providing better economic performance. This attempt is far-reaching considering that Polish authorities themselves have admitted that that economic standard of living which was registered in 1970, will only be reached at best in 1990. Not only will the second and

third generation of the power elite have to deal with economic performance domestically, but internationally they will find themselves forced to pursue the economic standards of the West. In the words of one prominent scholar,

The West with its material standards, life styles and economic affluence exerts a powerful psychological appeal and that given this appeal, these styles and expectations are diffused faster than the technological and institutional innovations required to sustain them, thus creating imbalances between aspiration and reality.²⁵

Hence, in the meanwhile, as societal, party and elite transformation continue to unfold in Poland, the gap between the power elite's performance and societal expectations continues to grow and foster political instability in Poland. Part of the reason for this gap is surely the discrepancy in the rates at which the society and the political elite are changing or being transformed.

It would be of interest to note how other East European Communist states, parties and power elites have been transformed. One wonders if similar patterns could be discerned in their societal, party and elite transformations. Do other East European Communist parties face the problem of achieving a balance between their leading and representative roles? How successfully have they handled political transformation? How have they handle the issues of participation, recruitment and elite-mass relations? Are the Communist elites forced to generate political legitimacy simply by increasing consumption, as was the Polish case?

Or, are there other realistic grounds for political legitimacy? The answers to these question will be found when scholars begin to analyze East European societies along the lines of this work, something which has not yet been accomplished. Therefore, to conclude that Communist Poland is unique is premature: such assertions can only be made upon studying her East European counterparts. All that was presented in this thesis was some of the aspects that have evolved out of Poland's societal, party and elite transformation and their consequences for political stability in Poland. If anything, this thesis has attempted to advance one way of looking at societal, party and political elite transformation. Ultimately, change is an important aspect for each of Poland's social groups and significant political problems can be explained by reference to the process of change in Poland.

NOTES

¹James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1973), p. 79.

²Jan de Weydenthal, "Workers and Politics," in Blue Collar Workers in Eastern Europe, eds., Jan Triska and Charles Gati (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 187-88.

³Jan de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline, rev. ed. (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 226.

⁴Richard Lowenthal, "On Established Communist Regimes," Studies in Comparative Communism, No. 4 (1974), 348.

⁵Ibid., p. 349.

⁶Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," British Journal of Sociology, No. 2 (1950), 135.

⁷Adam Bromke, "Background of the Polish October Revolution," Canadian Slavonic Papers, No. 3 (1958), 49.

⁸Jaroslav Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds., Poznanski Czerwiec: 1956 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1981), p. 55.

⁹Zbigniew Zechowski, "Z ekonomicznych zrodel sytuacji strajkowej w zakładach I.M.H. Cegielskiego wiosna 1956 r.," Kronika Miasta Poznan, Nos. 3-4 (1957), 51.

¹⁰Edmund Makowski, Wydarzenia Czerwcowe w Poznaniu 1956 (Poznan: UAM, 1981), p. 26.

¹¹Wladyslaw Gomulka, "VIII Plenum Komitetu Centralnego PZPR," Nowe Drogi, No. 10 (1956), 27.

¹²The literature pertaining to these political events is abundant, yet only in the Polish language: Antonii Czubinski, Czerwiec 1956 w Poznaniu (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1986); Zygmunt Korybutowicz, Grudzien 1970 (Paris: Institut Litteraire, 1983); Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Przesilenie Grudniowe (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1981); Ewa Wacowska, ed., Rewolta Szczinski i Jej Znaczenie (Paris: Institut Litteraire, 1971); and by the same author, Poznan 1956-Grudzien 1970 (Paris: Instytut Litteraire, 1971); Grudzien 1970, (Paris: Editions Spotkania, 1986).

¹³ Marian Dziewanowski, "The Communist Party of Poland," in The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, ed. Stephen Fischer-Galati (New York: Columbia University, 1979), p. 267.

¹⁴ Polityka, 2 January. 1971.

¹⁵ Nowe Drogi: Specjalny Numer-- VIII Plenum KC PZPR, 6-7 (February 1971), 26.

¹⁶ Ewa Wacowska, Poznan 1956-Grudzien 1970, p. 217.

¹⁷ Wladyslaw Lamentowicz, "Legetimizacja wladzy politycznej w powojennej Polsce," Krytyka, No. 13 (1983), 20-29.

¹⁸ Roger Dean, "Gierek's Three Years," Survey, No. 2 (Spring-Summer 1974), 67.

¹⁹ Richard Lowenthal, "The Ruling Party in a Mature Society," in Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies, ed., Mark Field (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 102.

²⁰ Oscar Macdonald, "Party, Workers and Opposition," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, No. 2 (1977), 3.

²¹ George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 299-300.

²² Gdansk-Sierpien 1980: Rozmowy Komisji Rzadowej z Miedzyszakladowym Komitetem Strajkowym w Stoczni Gdanskiej 23-31 Sierpnia 1980r (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Zwiolkow Zawodowych, 1981), p. 160.

²³ Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, eds., Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 32-44.

²⁴ Jan Gross, "Thirty Years of Crisis Management in Poland," Perspective for Change in Communist Societies, ed., Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 150.

²⁵ Andrew Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science (Stanford, California: Stanford University, 1986), p. 84.

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