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"DIALOGICAL ARTFORM: MUTUAL ANNEXATIONS"

by

Bruce Frederick Pashak

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
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Supervisor, Gerald Hushlak
Department of Art

Dr. Ann Calvert
Department of Art

Marcia Perkins
Department of Art

Dr. L. Miller
Department of Sociology

Dr. James Dugan
Department of Drama

Date _Sept. 13/91_

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the dialogical theorem of Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin in relation to the artforms of Bruce Frederick Pashak. Bakhtin's theorem unfolds from the basic premise that the 'self' (speaker) and the 'other' (interlocutor) in any given dialogue are mutually constituting. The 'self' and 'other' share an equal responsibility in determining meaning from within any dialogical context. The first section of this paper discusses Bakhtin's dialogical theorem in more detail. The second section explores the essential plurality of elements in Bruce Pashak's artforms in relation to Bakhtin's theorem. The latter section assumes a question-answer format, sharing an affinity with Bakhtin's theorem by leaving the statements open to the responses of the reader.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Human consciousness can never know itself in terms of intuition, and can never be presented to itself solely as a property of itself.[1] Consciousness comes to know itself through the mediation of signs (language), and in the presence of others (alterity).[2] Consequently, our being in the world is revealed historically within language as a 'dialogical being in the world with others'.[3] Consciousness cannot define itself and produce meanings in and of itself but instead must seek definition by participating in the dialogues of history (texts, images etc.) and the co-presence of the 'other':

> We do not and cannot miraculously create meaning out of ourselves. We inherit meaning from others who have thought, spoken or written before us. And wherever possible, we recreate this meaning according to our own projects and interpretations. But we are always obliged to listen to what has already been spoken, in other times and other places, before we can in turn speak for ourselves in the here and now .[4]

This paper embodies the principles of the Russian philosopher/linguist/social scientist Mikhail Bakhtin[5] and his dialogical theory. Bakhtin's theorem unfolds from the basic premise that the self (speaker) and 'other' (interlocutor), in any given dialogue, are mutually constituting. The self and 'other' share an

equal responsibility in determining meaning from any dialogical context. In this light, the self and 'other' represent two distinct characteristics of the dialogical process: a) the experiences of the self/speaker and the act of communicating them to the 'other'; and, b) the experiences of the other/interlocutor and the process of responding to the address of the speaker[6].

Bakhtin emphasizes the precedence of the social over the individual and, from this perspective, he explains that meaning in the artform is determined in three ways: a) through our use of language in the form of utterances; b) the priority of the dialogical context over the text (heteroglossia);[7] and, c) the presence of the 'other' (alterity). He locates the source of meaning in the artform as lying outside the author's sphere of consciousness and places it in the realm of sociality:

> No utterance in general can be attributed to the speaker exclusively; it is the product of the interaction of the interlocutors, and, broadly speaking, the product of the whole complex social situation in which it has occurred.[8]

Bakhtin's dialogical principles are discussed more fully below including: (1) how Bakhtin's concept of language grew out of and eventually countered the linguistical paradigm of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913);[9] (2) Bakhtin's notion of contextuality; and, (3) his notion of alterity. The second section consists of a dialogue between myself as addresser and myself as addressee.

2. SECTION ONE: THE DIALOGICAL PRINCIPLE

i. THE DIALOGICAL LANGUAGE PARADIGM

(a.)   Saussure's Linguistic Theory

Towards the middle of the twentieth century, linguistical research moved its focus away from the study of language as a system of codes that functioned separately from the experiential world, hence, only serving to describe it, towards the study of language as a social entity that incorporated our social experiences and relationships.[10]   This new research was pioneered by the French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure whose linguistic paradigm was one of the first to incorporate language into the total social context.[11] He stated that a linguistic system that functions in unison with its society naturally assumes some analogy between the two.   In this context, the structuralist theory began to see language as a social phenomenon and not just as a symbolic model used to define our world.

At the heart of Saussure's paradigm lay his concept of the sign: the idea that in any language, an object acquires meaning through the relationship of the 'signified' (concept of objects) and the 'signifier' (utterance or word) that, in turn, creates the sign.   For example,   I have a concept of a four-legged hairy animal that barks (signified), I attach the word 'dog' (signifier) to the concept and, in so

doing, I create the sign for a four-legged hairy animal that barks. The structuralist concept of semiotics maintains that signs are established by consensus in order to communicate ideas successfully.[12]

Saussure's theory of semiotics embodies these three premises: 1) persons use signs to define objects; 2) that the sign represents something other than itself and; 3) what it represents is its meaning. Meanings will vary as people make different associations among signs and their referents but, what is most significant to structuralist theory is that all signs must be established before they can be used in any given utterance. Saussure labelled this establishment of signs 'langue' and the use of those signs in speech 'parole': Langue is a formal system determined by convention that functions independently from the active dialogical context while parole is the use of that system to convey the meaning of things. [13]

Therefore, Saussure's structuralist theory maintains the following principles: a) that langue and parole be explicitly separate and that there exist a distinction between the synchronic state of language where no reference is made to time or the historical development of signs; and; b) the diachronic process or the constant evolution of language that takes place from situation to situation. What these two principles insured was that a system of linguistic rules must be established before any utterance occurs. Language is constructed by conventions and individual speakers are required to follow those conventions in order to reach a concensus of

understanding. Therefore, before speech can take place, language codes (langue) must already be established and, by necessity, precede the utterance (parole). As a result, Saussurian linguistics focussed on the study of langue over parole:

> Taken as a whole, speech (parole) is many-sided and heterogeneous; straddling several areas simultaneously... we cannot put it into any category of human facts, for we cannot discover its unity. Language (langue), on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification. [14]

One of the major differences Saussure makes between langue and parole is their ability to remain stable within the total language structure. [15] He determines that langue is the stable component of language and parole the unstable component because: a) langue is characterized by diachrony where changes in its structure are considered slow and barely detectable; and, b) parole is characterized by synchrony where changes are rapid and varied because of its contemporaneity. The unstableness of the spoken language is what led Saussure to focus his research on the more endurable langue.

(b.) Bakhtin's Linguistic Theory

Mikhail Bakhtin's studies assess the Saussurian principle that separates speech from language and attempts to synthesize the two

opposing units.   He maintains that the total domain of the language system (parole and langue) belongs to the social order and that the construction of the sign is a social activity.[16] He emphasizes that language isn't just a systematic tool   simply used by those in discourse, but rather that it acquires meaning out of the dialogical praxis of everyday social situations:

> No utterance in general can be attributed to the speaker exclusively, it is the product of the interaction of the interlocutors, and, broadly speaking, the product of the whole complex social situation in which it occurred.[17]

Bakhtin counters Saussure's structuralist notion that the constitution of the sign isn't just a consensus agreement between a group of people contained within an arbitrary closed system, but is constructed and incorporated into the intimate fabric of our very lives.[18] Therefore, the language system is just one system among all systems, all of which impact each other's destinies and determine each other's construct of meaning. Sign formulation, according to Bakhtin, can only be defined in relation to and in conjunction with all other systems:

> The idea (sign) is inter-individual and intersubjective. The sphere of its existence is not the individual consciousness, but the dialogical intercourse between consciousnesses. The idea (sign) is a living event which is

played out -at the point where two or more consciousnesses meet dialogically.[19]

and further:

> Every system of signs, no matter how limited the collectivity that adopts it by convention, can always be, in principle, deciphered, that is translated into other sign systems (other languages); therefore, there exists a general logic of sign systems, a language of languages.[20]

Bakhtin's linguistic paradigm, in contrast to Saussure's structuralist theory, is characterized in three distinct ways:[21]

1) Bakhtin assumes that the sign and its effects belong to the realm of outer experience as opposed to internalized, individual consciousnesses. More precisely, for them the sign is placed in the total context of all experiences and not solely within the immediate experiences of the dialogical participants.

2) The meaning of these outer experiences must be determined socially. The comprehension of the sign must transpire within the construct of a social unit. A social unit is defined as: a) a group of individuals who function 'intersubjectively' within the entire social construct; and, b) an indispensable aspect of the sign-making activity. Bakhtin empowers the actively social unit with the ability to define the parameters wherein they communicate their ideas.

The constitution of a sign is a shared activity between individuals and society.

3) The meanings that are generated by the language model (system of signs) must be studied inter-systemically and not as independent entities. Meanings that are generated through the language construct are always produced by the social unit. According to Bakhtin, each social unit has its own characteristic way of speaking and its own dialect. As a consequence, each unit embodies a set of values determined by the transference of experiences from member to member in any active dialogue. Because no two individuals ever entirely coincide in their experiences or participate in entirely the same social groups, every dialogue involves a negotiation of values in order to effectively transmit ideas.

In summary, Bakhtin's theory of language challenges Saussurian structuralism by stating that the construction of signs transpires within the realm of sociality. He emphasized that the signifieds and signifiers are contained within an arena of conflict that is not only defined by the physical context of the dialogue and its immediate referents but are also shaped by how they were voiced and interpreted in other dialogical contexts.[22] Bakhtin sees the construction of the sign as a mediator between conventional historical interpretations of the sign and the creative ability to alter, reverse, construct or contaminate its established meaning in the presently active dialogue. In this manner, Bakhtin's concept of

language is both given to us through historical channels and, simultaneously, created by us through our everyday experiences.

According to Bakhtin, langue and parole cannot be separated as the Structuralist theory implies primarily because the total language construct cannot escape the social customs, attitudes and manners associated with our very being.[23] The utterance is the product of a building up of resources in which the formulation of our current linguistical model is just one of its facets, another being its unique historical context that comes to bear on every subsequent discourse. Every dialogical encounter produces a unique context where new interpretations combine with established codes to form new signs. As a consequence, language acquires meaning only when it is traced through the dialogical process from which it originated to the presently active discourse where it is conditioned or reconditioned by its participants. Bakhtinian theory expresses the dynamics of living speech where meaning is produced through the struggles and contradictions of verbal transactions.

ii. CONTEXTUALITY

Bakhtin emphasizes that the generation of meaning produced from the artform is contingent upon its context.[24] He states that at any given time and in any given space, there will be a set of conditions that will ensure that a word uttered in that space at that time will have meanings different than it would have under any

other conditions.[25] Therefore, dialogical understanding can only be determined within the actual context of a dialogue.

Because of the uncontrolled open nature of Bakhtin's language paradigm, any utterance can produce multiple meanings and be understood in numerous ways. It is imperative that the dialogical participants make decisions about how meanings are constituted within a given utterance based on their interpretations of what is transpiring at the time of the interaction.[26] Meaning is based upon the experiences of the dialogical participants as they unfold within the context of the dialogue itself:

> Whatever the moment of the utterance-expression we may consider, it will always be determined by the real conditions of its uttering, and foremost by the nearest social situations.[27]

For Bakhtin, meanings are not only produced in a particular context but the context itself is always already a social entity.[28] Bakhtin states that the context is necessarily social because "the utterance is always constructed between two or more socially organized persons.[29] Therefore, the utterance is not simply the controlled domain of the speaker alone but the interactive confluence of the dialogical partners themselves. The utterance is always addressed to someone and, therefore, the act of addressing itself becomes a social activity. Meanings within the text are ultimately conditioned by variables embodied in its context.

Bakhtin's concept of contextuality emphasizes that the utterance reflects upon and is influenced by historical referents implicit in every speech act.[30] He makes it clear that speech is generic and conventional and that there is no linguistic space in which individuals can make utterances free from their historical referents. Bakhtin does not take the dialogical process beyond the limitations of convention but encourages us to interact reflectively and selectively within the parameters of the language system itself. The precoded aspects of the language system are usable but we must use them with great speculation and inquisition.

How Bakhtin positions the text historically is defined by a concept he coined: "chronotope" meaning literally "time space."[31] The chronotopic aspect of the text refers to the intrinsic connection of temporal and spatial relationships that are expressed in the artform. This is to say that there are intrinsic elements in any given artform that can be used to adequately assess its historical position in space and time.

The chronotope can be seen as a device that pierces and exposes the forces at work in the cultural system from which any particular artform is produced. The chronotopic aspect of the artform embodies its cultural distinctiveness. Specific social and cultural histories are always present in the artform and influence how it will be interpreted at any given time and in any given space:

In the artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time and history. This intersection of axes and fusion of indicators characterizes the artistic chronotope.[32]

Bakhtin further cautions that chronotopic relationships in the artform can be complicated and erratic because of the presence of 'generic chronotopes' whose meanings have been redefined over time and appropriated anew into the given dialogical context:

Certain isolated aspects of the chronotope, available in given historical conditions, have been worked out, although only certain specific forms of an actual chronotope were reflected in art. These generic forms, at first productive, were then reinforced by tradition; in their subsequent development they continued stubbornly to exist, up to and beyond the point at which they had lost any meaning that was productive in actuality or adequate to later historical situations. This explains the simultaneous existence in the artform of phenomena taken from widely separate periods of time, which greatly complicates the historical-artistic process.[33]

Even the evolutionary path of the chronotope itself has a destabilizing effect upon the dialogical context in general. This destabilizing effect only reinforces the text's inability to sustain a monological interpretation and leaves the text open to an infinite sequence of meanings:

There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogical context... Even past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all) - they will always change (be renewed) in the process of the subsequent, future dialogue.[34]

At the base of the Bakhtinian notion of contextuality lay the commonsense observation that two people cannot occupy the same physical space simultaneously.[35] What this implies is that the author's spatio-temporal position (his/her actual location in space and time) is not only constantly shifting but exclusively belongs to him/her by virtue of the fact that the same spatio-temporal position cannot be occupied by another. This concept ensures that each dialogical participant will have experiences different from one another. It is this characteristic of the Bakhtinian dialogical theory that separates it from other communication systems. Structuralism, for example, maintains that a common link existed between the speaker and listener in any dialogue because of the stability of the language (langue) they share. According to Bakhtin, Saussure presupposes "an entirely fixed communication"[36] that is based upon

a language construct that operates separately from the social context. Moreover, their position in a particular space at a specific time is also stable leaving only the utterance (parole) subject to the principles of synchrony. For Bakhtin, however, both the dialogical participants and the language they employ are dynamic, changeable and autonomous making the dialogical context the ultimate determinate of meaning:

> In reality, the relations between the author and the reader are in a state of permanent formulation and transformation; they continue to alter in the very process of communication. Nor is there a ready -made message. It takes form in the process of communication between the author and the reader. Nor is it transmitted from the first to the second, but constructed between them, like an ideological bridge; it is constructed in the process of their interaction.[37]

Bakhtin emphasizes that the dialogical participants must interact selectively within the language structure in order to effectively communicate their ideas. In the words of Bakhtinian scholar Allon White, "people make language but only on the basis of what language has made of them".[38] Therefore, Bakhtin's dialogical context embodies a dynamic communication system that is founded within the social structure of our everyday lives. As a consequence, the artform is ultimately defined by the chronotopic relationships

within the artform itself, the language we use to give it meaning and the on going transformations in our social and cultural milieu.

In summary, dialogical contextual understanding always carries more than its purely cognitive meaning. It is always sensitive to the actions and responses of the 'other'. Bakhtin's dialogical context emphasizes process over essence because meaning is only produced during the active dialogue. More precisely, the resolutions reached by the participants during the active discourse are subordinated by the question of how they arrived at their conclusions. Consequently, the dialogical context remains active, is non-totalizing and leaves the responses of the participants always open to new and varied interpretations and subject to critical questioning.

iii. ALTERITY: THE POSITION OF THE OTHER

In Bakhtin's dialogical process, the interlocutor (other) doesn't simply assume the role as a passive message receptor but becomes an active partner who is equally responsible for giving meaning to the artform.[39] In this manner, the self and 'other' come to recognize their positions, similarities and differences only within the context of the dialogue and their relationship to one another. Signification of the artform is determined inter-dependently by the dialogical process: The alliance between the self and 'other' and their experiences of the world. In the act of turning to the 'other', the dialogue itself becomes active, responsive and productive, creating

an arena where meanings are constituted through the performance of speaking and responding.

The dialogical context consists of more than the currently active discourse between the participants. It is an "architectonic singular event of communication"[40] that can encompass many dialogues simultaneously. The dialogical process can't be defined by the utterances and responses of the speakers and interlocutors alone; it also incorporates what is unsaid or unnoticed by the participants. As a result, any active dialogue will always remain open and subject to conditions beyond its immediate context. The active dialogue not only subsumes other dialogical situations but is also subsumed by them and their endless possibilities of alterity:

> There are events that, in principle, cannot unfold on the plane of a single and unified consciousness, but presuppose two consciousnesses that do not fuse; they are events whose essential and constitutive element is the relation of a consciousness to another consciousness, precisely because it is other. Such are all events that are creatively productive, innovative, unique, and irreversible.[41]

In Bakhtin's dialogical principle, the parameters of the dialogical context are constitutive of two distinct fields of vision that exist simultaneously during any active discourse: a) one field is defined by the inter-relationship of the author's experiences and the

actual act of communication (transmission of ideas from speakers to listeners); and, b) a second field of vision is defined by the experiences of the interlocutors and their responses to the speaker's address. Even the apprehension of ourselves and the comprehension of our own experiences are dependent upon the 'others' perceptions. In this light, the self is not a self-sufficient entity but needs the 'other's' constitutive abilities to find its identity:

> I become myself only by revealing myself to another, through another and with another's help. The most important acts, constitutive of self-consciousness, are determined by their relation to another consciousness... It turns out that every experience occurs on the border, it comes across another, and this essence resides in this intense encounter... The very being of man is a profound communication. To be means to communicate... to be means to be for the other, and through him, for oneself...I cannot do without the other; I cannot become myself without the other; I must find myself in the other, finding the other in me (in mutual reflection and perception).[42]

For Bakhtin, "life is dialogical by its very nature"[43] in that anything that means something arises only from the dialogical context. Accordingly, the constitutive abilities of the self and 'other' form the subject of any given text. Textual subjectivity is mutually constitutive and positioned in the realm of alterity. The subject of any text then is determined by the conditions necessary to ensure

the transference of knowledge between the author and 'other'. In this respect, Bakhtin moves away from a philosophy centered on an authoritive subject (author) to a theory that examines how the subject is constituted by the interactive relationship of the self and 'other' in the dialogical process:

> Only the other as such can be the axiological center of the artistic vision, and therefore....In all aesthetic situations, the organizing force is the axiological category of the other, the relation to the other.[44]

The production of any text, according to Bakhtin, becomes an interactive 'event' that cannot be reduced to the solo domain of the author alone:

> The artist doesn't get involved in the event as a direct participant - in such a case, he would be a knowing subject... Instead, he occupies an essential position outside the event... He does not experience it, but co-experiences it, since the event cannot be viewed as such unless, in some measure, we participate in it by evaluating it.[45]

Therefore, the interpretation of the text is dependent upon the reciprocal relationship between the self and 'other' where subjectivity is replaced by intersubjectivity.

As previously stated, Bakhtin's chronotopic position asserts that at any given moment an individual occupies a space that cannot be occupied by another. To define the space that I occupy, I need the presence of the 'other' to confirm my existence. Because I can't simultaneously occupy and observe the space I inhabit, I must rely on the observations and responses of the 'other' to define my position that ultimately determines my identity within the dialogical process. In this manner, every utterance is a calling-out to the 'other' in a social exchange of experiences that struggles toward self-identification.[46] In the act of speaking, the reciprocal relationship of the speaker to the 'other' is transformed into a dialogism (a situation dominated by heteroglossia)[47] that eventually redefines and/or accentuates the author's initial intentions. The response by the 'other' to the utterance of the speaker can redefine the author's expressions by finding more than he/she intended in the utterance. In this sense, the 'other' is not only the perceiver of how the author is experiencing the dialogue but is also actively involved by responding to his/her statements in a critical manner.[48]

The act of listening is not only the initial step for a subsequent activity of responding but is already an initiation to the 'other' to be a participant in the construction of the discourse itself. When the speaker opens a dialogue the recipient is already participating as a receiver or lender of the information transferred by the dialogue. The encounter of the other in the dialogical process is not a confrontation of two or more personalities attempting to reach consensus through a mutual understanding of signs but is a

"primordial presence before any reading of signs, a presence found in the very events and objects signified by the dialogical process".[49]

When a speaker addresses the 'other', there exists a presupposed 'active' initiation to respond. This response can either reaffirm the speaker's statement or contain the possibilities of rejecting or correcting it. This system of communication is a pre-established condition of the dialogical process wherein every utterance contains an already expected response and every response has an expectation of redefining the initial utterance. The speaker's statement offers something to the listener to comprehend while immersing the listener into the realm of 'questioning' the conditions of the initial utterance. More precisely, the response to the initial statement fulfills the expectations of the author while constituting its significance at the same time. The process of listening and responding to the statements put forth by the dialogical partners ultimately give meaning to the artform.

The dialogical process doesn't function as a mechanism to establish a universal understanding of 'events' but as a constructive strategy to unfold meanings within them. This requirement is needed to avoid reducing the meaning of the artform to personalized and/or authoritive formulations of the speaker and/or the listener. Signification within the dialogical process must always be world-oriented and open to all other discourses and their influences.

As it presents itself to the world, the dialogical process already presupposes a set of objects and events and the possibility of signifying them in a multitude of ways. The process of signification is not totally subjective or confined to the context of the dialogue but by orienting itself towards the world, meaning in the artform is produced through the openness of all possible experiences put forth by its context. Accordingly, all experiences become the property of the active dialogue where the transmission of ideas is dependent upon the constitutive abilities of the participants:

No human event unfolds or is decided within a single consciousness... After the sublimation of individuation... there appears the role of the 'other'.[50]

In the process of signifying, the participants in the dialogue construct a base of shared meanings that have a vast range of implications and a certain region of options they didn't explore.[51] The dialogical domain has a larger knowledge-base than what is immediately expressed by the individuals during the active discourse. It is necessary for the dialogical partners to selectively participate in the process of signification in order to reach a level of understanding that will open the dialogue to new directions and levels of comprehension. The dialogical process is reliant upon the participants to persistently locate meanings and definitions within the context of their discourse. Even though a consensus of meaning may be established between the dialogical partners, their

interpretations are always already being disputed by the various regions uninvestigated in the context of their discourse.

In summary, the 'other' exposes different and varying positions that are not realized by the author and, by doing so, both acknowledges and reveals the strengths and weaknesses of his/her statements. For Bakhtin, it is this revealing of what is absent in the speaker's statement by the 'other' that determines the mutually constitutive aspect of the dialogical process. The author isn't something that is self-sufficient and automonous but needs the definability and recognition of the 'always-questioning other'. Reversely, Bakhtin emphasizes the importance of the author's 'otherness' in relation to his/her dialogical partners in co-producing meanings within the artform. The 'other' offers different perspectives to the speaker's statement while at the same time serving to complete it. Therefore, self/other relationships in the dialogical process are basically interactive and co-productive:

All the characteristics and definitions of present being that launch this being into dramatic movement, from the naive anthropocentrism of myth, all the way to the devices of contemporary art, burn from the borrowed light of alterity: beginning and end, birth and annihilation, being and becoming, life, etc.[52]

As discussed in the first section of this paper, Bakhtin maintains that meaning and signification are determined by the

constituting powers of the active dialogue given his emphasis on alterity and his concentration on the utterance as the basic element of the dialogical process. Contrary to the structuralist notion of language that precodes signification by establishing a universally acknowledged sign-system, Bakhtin introduces a heteroglossic multivocal language system that defies closure. The heteroglossic artform operates in an unpredictable and self-governing manner that cannot be controlled by the author alone but is conditioned by the many voices (the author's included) that constitute the dialogical context. Therefore, the generation of meaning within the text (artform) isn't dependent upon an *a priori* condition of understanding or the authoritive voice of an all-knowing subject (author), but is contingent upon the primary tenets of Bakhtin's dialogical principle: The mutually constituting energies of the self and 'other', and the heteroglossic elements that compose the text (artform).

Bakhtin emphasizes that every dialogical context embodies a simultaneous presence of language chronotopes and an 'inevitable moment of newness' that ensures the continuous defining and redefining of the initial utterance.[53] The processes of establishing meanings in the text intersect in the utterance. In essence, every utterance participates in the process of bringing together the notions expressed in the dialogue as well as dispersing its information towards the world: The dialogical context not only includes the hermeneutics of the presently active discourse but also embodies the

intertextual relationships of other dialogical processes both historically and contemporaneously.

Bakhtin's theorem encourages dialogical continuance that opens up the door to endless interpretations and definitions of the artform. His work straddles the line between the complete stratification of signifiers that would only produce a state of nihilism and the closed system of signs as put forth by structuralist linguistic theory. "He is not the originator of a whole new episteme" stated Allon White, but transfers the problems of language construction into the realm of "interrogative confrontation".[54] Bakhtin holds the position of being the agitator of all systems of closure; in this sense, he occupies the site of contemporary disagreement.

3. SECTION TWO: THE DIALOGUE

It is the heteroglossic nature of Mikhail Bakhtin's theorem that prevents one from limiting it to rational objectivity or confining it to a closed philosophical hegemony. As a consequence, the dialogical participants haven't the ability to totally control the events that take place in their dialogue but are only allowed the privilege of entering the dialogue as it actively unfolds before them.

This section explores the essential plurality of elements that exist in the artform in relation to the dialogical principle. The statements themselves will be subjective which is unavoidable and justified given the open nature of Bakhtin's theorem which defies the

totalization of meaning in any dialogical context. The 'question and answer' format selected shares an affinity with Bakhtin's theorem by leaving the statements open to the responses of the reader.

(1)   How can meanings within the artform remain open when we, the audience, naturally assume a hierarchy of elements (the cemented surface, the figurative image etc.) when we are placed in its immediate context?   Won't there always be a presupposed arrangement of elements that will dominate our ability to interpret the total work of art?

The dialogical artform is comprised of a plurality of elements that not only define its structure but become active participants in determining the course of the dialogue itself. To infer an unalterable hierarchy of elements would assume a fixed control over how the work is read that would limit the free flow of ideas that could be exchanged between the participants. This does not mean that a hierarchy of elements cannot exist within a specific context but, most importantly, one must realize that any assemblage of elements chosen is only relevant to the conditions established at that particular time in that specific space. All the elements can assume new hierarchial positions within different contexts but each new arrangement will produce new conditions that will ultimately effect its interpretive capacity.

Any grouping of the elements can take precedence at any given time but how the particular elements in that grouping relate to one

another is determined by the conditions established by the dialogical context. For example, in the work titled "Figure to the Sea" (see slide #1), the cemented background element and the softly rendered figural element will assume a certain relationship as perceived by the dialogical partners. Each participant will define the relationship differently according to the experiences he/she brings to the dialogical context but, most importantly, his/her experiential base will always be affected by the choices made during the active discourse. The chosen arrangement of elements contains a specific kind of energy that will ultimately affect the speaker and listener's abilities to interpret the artform. As they read the artform, the artform also reads them and imparts information that will always counter any preconceived notions they may have regarding how it should be read. Therefore, each viewer will bring different experiences to the piece that will redefine the figure/ground relationship accordingly. Each grouping of elements offers new experiences to the participants that will influence how the work is read.

(2) If each element is considered free to form relationships with any and all other elements present in the dialogical context, how are we to interpret the obvious relationships established by the repetitive figure motif in the triptych "Figure Arched"?

In the triptych titled "Figure Arched" (see slide #2), the same figure repeats itself three times in various sizes, media and rendering detail. Each figure assumes its own voice or operates independently within each panel while still maintaining a specific relationship with the other figures that make up the triptych. Their affinities can not be denied and in fact they become a part of the strategy I use to encourage and enrich the dialogical capacity. The very fact that we are made aware of a repetitive image confirms that there are multiple elements involved in the artform.

The strategy of the repetitive image has now placed us into a situation where we must confront the artwork's multiple 'consciousnesses'. The triplicated figure seriously questions the authoritive position of any one particular element in the total artform. The reproduction of the image puts into question the authenticity of the 'unique' and/or original image: by definition reproduction implies to copy. In this context, we are confronted by the whole notion of originality in the artform: in what order were the figurative images produced and can we locate the original?

The independence of each figure is maintained by the strategies implicit within the structure of the artform itself:

The utterly incompatible elements... are distributed among several worlds and several full-fledged consciousnesses; they are presented not within one field of vision, but within several complete fields of vision of equal value, and not the material directly, but rather

these worlds and these consciousnesses with their fields
of vision, are joined in a higher unity of a second order,
the unity of the polyphonic (pluralistic) artform.[55]

What is implied in Bakhtin's statement is that the autonomous
personalities of the three figures participate in a specific event or
'dialogism' (higher unity of order) where open discourse ultimately
determines their identity.

(3)   Because your work usually contains the human figure
or a figurative motif, couldn't one conclude that they (the
figures) assume a dominant role in the artform?

This question touches the very heart of Bakhtin's concept of
'dialogism' which assumes the ability of each element within the
artform to maintain its autonomy.   In this light, the total artform
isn't constructed by a single consciousness (that of the author) which
absorbs other consciousnesses as objects, but functions as a collective
of multiple interactive consciousnesses.[56] The dialogical artform is
characterized by: a) the plurality of the equally authoritive positions
of the elements; and, b) the notion of heteroglossia that ensures the
primacy of dialogical context over the authoritive text.

In the drawing titled "Monolith #1" (see slide #3), the softly
rendered figure is juxtaposed in sharp contrast to the harshness of
the concrete surface upon which it lies.   These two seemingly

unrelated elements seek their identity through the differences implicit in their interactive relationship and not solely by their individual characteristics. Each individual element embodies a particular quality that distinguishes it from the others that, in turn, gives it an identity. The dialogical artform recognizes this 'identity through difference' but focuses its attention more on the interaction between the elements or how they relate to one another than the differences created by their contrasting qualities. The individual elements are not controlled by a particular aesthetic dictated by the materials from which they emerge (the cement, graphite etc.) but are set free by the interactive presence of all the elements that compose the artform. The figure and the cemented surface form a relationship that functions in accordance with the dialogical principle of identity through interaction. Therefore, plural readings of the work will always be maintained because of the uncontrollable variables that take place in all interactive relationships.

(4) Bakhtin states in his treatise on Dostoevsky that "the polyphonic artistic will is the will to combine many wills, the will to the event."[57] Doesn't "the will to the event" imply that the author has a privileged position that would contradict the basic premise of Bakhtin's dialogical theorem?

This is a complex question that can only be dealt with by examining the author's role in the production of the text and the position he/she plays in its determining its meaning. It is important

to emphasize that Bakhtin uses the term "idea-force"[58] in place of ideology to explain the relationship the author has with the text that is produced:

> The idea leads an independent life in the hero's (art element's) consciousness: it is in fact not he (the artform) who lives, but the idea, and the novelist (artist) describes not the hero's (art element's) life, but the life of the idea within him...[59]

What Bakhtin implies is that the "idea-force" embodies the entire dialogical process, that the notions injected by the author into the text become swallowed by the individual elements that compose it. Every element incorporates the author's statements and carries them into areas beyond and away from any kind of totalization that he/she may have intended. The 'idea force' doesn't embody the principle of representation alone but becomes the 'subject' of the artform itself. The idea-force isn't a concept *per se*, but a presence whose purpose is to activate the dialogical process. It manifests itself through the interactive relationships of the individual elements and the dialogical participants that become equal-valued partners in determining meanings within the dialogical context.

The dialogical process doesn't seek a common understanding and resists any form of synthesis by negating any attempt of the author to impose a hierarchy of meaning. Any connections between the multiple planes produced by the interchangeable relationships of

the elements in the artform and their individual consciousnesses must be explained and determined by its dialogical context. Because the dialogical context is always open and alterable, the artform cannot be reduced to any form of a dialectical synthesis where the author can intentionally control the images he/she produces - the author becomes only one voice among many that ultimately give definition to the work of art:

> Actually, the artistic, in its totality, does not reside in the thing, or in the psyche of the creator, considered independently, not even in that of the contemplator: the artistic includes all three together. It is a specific form of the relation between creator and contemplators, fixed in the artistic work.[60]

The 'will to the event' is a will that perpetuates the openness of the dialogical artform. The multi-leveledness of its infrastructure does not encourage the totalizing constraints of a dialectical process but, in a profoundly pluralistic manner, represents the world only in the category of simultaneous coexistence of events that defy unity.[61]

(5) **Could you explain the term "simultaneous coexistence" and how it pertains to the artform?**

The term 'simultaneous coexistence' incorporates more than just the presence of the autonomous elements found within a work of art. It is a concept that ensures the relevance of any artform, both

historical and contemporary, to coexist with any other artform at any time and in any place. Bakhtin perceived it as an essence that maintained or assured the existence of the dialogue. The multi-leveledness of the artform (its autonomous elements and its open context) is to be perceived simultaneously and not as fragmented stages contained within an historical ideology shut off from the mitigating forces of current dialogical situations:

> The ability to exist simultaneously and the ability to stand side by side or face to face opposite one another is the criterion for differentiating the essential from the non-essential. Only those things that can conceivably be presented simultaneously, which can conceivably be interconnected in a single point in time, are of the essence; such things are also capable of being carried over into eternity, for in eternity all is simultaneous, everything coexists.[62]

What Bakhtin is implying is that the dialogical participants must be selective when determining meanings within the artform. It is their responsibility to perceive what has significance. Therefore, what is depicted in the artform is not the existence of ideas that are imposed by the author but the "interaction of consciousnesses in the sphere of ideas".[63] The artform we are in communication with always co-exists in the here and now or, further, is always relevant to this space at this time.

For example, we are able to assume a chronotopic relationship between the works titled "The Arnolfini Bride's Maids (see slide #4) that were produced in 1991 and the "Arnolfini Marriage Portrait" done by Jan van Eyck (?-1441) over 600 years earlier in 1434 (see slide #5) because of their 'dialogical' relationship. In this sense, the van Eyck portrait becomes a speaking subject within the context of our active dialogue and is not inactively bound to the chronotopic time period it was produced in. It is always actively speaking and acquiring new and varied chronotopes as it enters every new dialogical context. As a consequence, the "Arnolfini Marriage Portrait's" experiential base or chronotopic background is vast due to the countless dialogues that have been absorbed into its linguistic structure that, in turn, greatly enhances its dialogical potential: When any artform enters into new dialogical situations, it incorporates those experiences into its context in the form of new chronotopes. When we say that the 'Arnolfini Marriage Portrait' has a deep chronotopic base, we are actually stating that it contains many chronotopes simultaneously.

The simultaneous coexistence of multiple consciousnesses puts into question our ability to define a text from any one particular philosophical standpoint. What emerges is a form of discourse which questions our most common conceptions of our ability to communicate.[64] Bakhtin shifts the attention we traditionally focus on the surface elements of the artform to an emphasis on its ability to become a socially active dialogical participant. In other words, the pursuit of hermeneutics isn't a self-conscious search for meaning

that is to be uncovered within the parameters of the text itself, but is an exploration of textual differences determined by social interaction. Therefore, the artform becomes a social phenomenon whose meanings are mutually constituted by the author, the 'other' and the artform itself.

The artform is incorporated into our social consciousnesses by means of our active dialogue. It is always contemporaneous and subject to change while remaining chronotopically attached to the history from where it came. In other words, The 'Arnolfini Bridesmaids' simultaneously co-exist with all artforms (in this case the 'Arnolfini Marriage Portrait') at any time and in any space. The selections made by the participants within their dialogical context determine which specific relationships will be brought to light.

(6)   **By sociality, are you commenting on our ability to communicate?**

Yes, because one of the basic principles of the dialogical process is 'alterity' or our ability to transmit our ideas effectively to others in any given dialogue. Therefore, while confronting the artform, we actually enter into a dialogue with it: We communicate with it. By examining the artform dialogically, we are not trying to uncover concealed meanings hidden in its structure but we are entering into an open dialogue with it in order to reach some level of understanding.[65]   As a consequence, the interactive relationships

between the various elements and the process of interpretation itself, coexist in a diverse social context.

Therefore, we can actively communicate with the artform as opposed to passively observing it. Our experiences become its experiences that are, in turn, communicated dialogically in other contexts. In this manner, the experiences one brings to the artform ultimately determine its dialogical capacity and define the social context wherein meanings are constituted:

> Existence reflected in a sign is not merely reflected but refracted. How is this refraction of existence in the dialogical sign determined? By an intersecting of differently oriented social interests within one and the same sign community..... with the community, which is the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result.... Signs become an arena of class (social) struggle.[66]

Similar to Saussurian structuralism, Bakhtin sees our ability to communicate as a system that contains common understandings shared by a certain group (society) at a particular time in a specific space.[67] But in contrast to structuralism, he sees that same society as having the ability to alter or 'refract' the language codes they are utilizing during the current dialogue they share. By shifting language away from its role as an instrument for describing our experiences to

the realm of sociality where it becomes a part of them, Bakhtin has placed the responsibility of signification on the dialogical participants. As a consequence, meaning within the artform is not based upon an imposition of autocratic reasoning but, rather, it is a function of alterity or the 'reaching out' to the 'other':

> The signification of discourse and the understanding of this signification.... exceeds the boundaries of the isolated physiological organisms and presupposes the interaction of the other.[68]

The text is always addressing someone and the ability to communicate through the artform implies a sense of community:

> The motivation of our action... is always a way of putting oneself in relation to a given social norm; it is, so to speak, a socialization of the self and of its action. Becoming conscious of myself, I attempt to see myself through the eyes of another person.[69]

The artform is always speaking to someone; is waiting for a response; is longing to be defined and redefined within the domain of social interaction.

(7) **Would you agree that the speaking language we use to communicate with and describe the artform plays a role in**

determining its sociality or its ability to function as a social phenomenon?

Yes, because, according to Bakhtin, meaning in the artform is not determined solely by a coded system of signs but by a language that contains an historical concept of itself that has survived and changed through our social use of it. The language codes are changed and modified according to the dialogical situations they are used in. Therefore, if the language we use is constitutively social and if the artform produced is essentially constitutive of that language, then the artform and the language we use to communicate its meaning are inescapably social.

(8) How does the artform communicate or encourage dialogue when it seems so radically opposed to a universal sense of objectivity?

The tendency to interpret the openness of the text as being radically opposed to objectivity is misleading and inaccurate. It is true that the individual elements assume an autonomy and appear to be disconnected and contradictory, but the ambiguity will dissipate once the dialogical participants chose to be more selective. A unity can be found between certain art elements through a careful process of selection but, most importantly, the selection must be based upon the individual experiences of the dialogical participants within a specific dialogical context.

Once we enter the social context of the artwork, we begin to embark upon the multi-leveledness of its pluralistic structure. As a result, questions arise that lead to other questions that lead to more questions *ad infinitum*. Bakhtin describes this system of questioning as an "elastic environment where the art elements constitute themselves only in the presence of other elements that, in turn, must be temporarily dominated if anyone is to make sense to anyone else".[70] If there is any relationship between signifieds and signifiers, it is determined primarily by the shifting positions held within the dialogical context and not by a pre-determined sign system that exists separately from the social context:

> The word (element) directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension filled environment of alien words (elements), value judgements and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers...[71]

In this light, there exists no direct one to one relationship between object and image. Once produced, the art elements become a part of the dialogical process or, in the words of Bakhtin, "they are shaped in dialogical interaction with an alien word (element) that is already in the object".[72] Therefore, the dialogical artform isn't radically opposed to objectivity but assumes a sense of objectivity

within the domain of the dialogical: objectivity is manifested through the socially active discourse of others (alterity).

(9)   **Can the artform be a receptor of our experiences that we bring to the dialogical context or are we only the privileged interpreters of codes embodied in its structure? In other words, could you explain how we (the viewers) experience the artform?**

Yes, because in the dialogical process our position as privileged interpreters will always be superseded by the context that assures that we seek our identity in the presence of the other.[73]   The key to understanding the dialogical process and our position within it then, is our ability to share our experiences that are determined by the dialogue itself.   These shared experiences become a part of the artform that can be experienced anew in other dialogical situations:

> Every element of the work can be compared to a thread joining human beings. The work as a whole is a set of these threads, that creates a complex, differentiated, social interaction, between the persons who are in contact with it.[74]

When I draw the human body, I rely on the entire history of figurative art to play a significant role in determining how it is conveyed in any dialogical circumstance.   The inter-relationship of my figurative work with all body forms as they appear in the history

of art, literature, biology, sociology, psychology et cetera, coincide to challenge any preconceived notions about how the artwork should be read. A condition is established where the production of the sign always remains a part of the on-going process of signification.[75]

For example, the figure in the drawing titled "Puzzle" (see slide #6) can be seen in the physical space before us (in the frame on the wall) while simultaneously transferred to many other symbolic spaces outside the realm of physical objectivity (spaces that are implied by the various referents noted by the dialogical participants). The sinuous, ectomorphic figure in this work seems to reflect the paranoid body language so evident in current criticism while still embodying the classical refinement of the Renaissance scizzo or preliminary drawing. As a result, the structure of the drawing itself reflects a paradoxical fusion of the traditional with the modern and the subsequent meanings we attach to it are influenced by the tensions that arise from the juxtaposition of these two genres.

In this manner, the figurative image moves selectively through history and then returns to the present with a new set of experiences it encountered along the way. Its identity goes through changes in its evolution from the contemporary to the historical back to the present situation where it is defined again by the experiences imparted within the context of the current dialogue.

In this context, the figure is simultaneously two things; a) the site of a return; and, b) the site of growth and development.

Therefore, the identifiable characteristics among signified objects (artforms) are defined by the corresponding distinctions embedded in the experiences of the dialogical participants that are, in turn, redefined by the experiences embodied in the structure of the artform itself.

(10)   Could you discuss the suite of drawings entitled the "Tate Gallery" ?

The concept started from an event, an experience that manifested itself in a suite of drawings I titled "The Tate Gallery" (see slides #7 and #8) that took a twelve month period to complete. Outside my studio one morning a bird flew into a window, had broken its neck and fell helplessly to the ground. I realized that this seemingly minor event held great significance and gave me the impetus to develop this complex series of drawings.

The bird died because it saw the landscape reflected in the window: It lost its life because the illusion of the sky and land reflected in the window became its reality. The theme of 'death through the illusion of life' became the underlying premise of the suite.   Death through illusion of life became the 'idea-force' that motivated the path of the dialogue, a dialogue that reaffirmed the power of illusions; whether in advertising or haute culture, illusions have the power to control our thinking processes. I felt compassion for the bird that suffered this fate because of its inability to discern

reality from illusion, I felt the need to commemorate the event and somehow immortalize the 'idea'.

(11)   Are you questioning reality in a Platonic sense, are you trying to establish a paradigm for what is real?

In a sense, yes, I am questioning what is real but not in a Platonic way.   In Platonic discourse, the statements in the dialogue are always sent back to the author so that he/she can confirm whether the statement is true or false.   In Platonic thinking, the author has control over the discourse and, as a consequence, the discourse itself is associated with power since it ultimately strives to dominate the effects of the statements that are exchanged during the dialogue.[76]   I am trying to limit the control of the statements I've made: They are barely controlled in themselves.

The suite not only questions what is real but confirms it at the same time.   Death appears then life reappears ad infinitum, life does not stop with death but is generated by it.   Was the landscape in the window a reality for the bird?   Or was the reflected landscape an illusion of reality?   These are questions the "Tate Gallery" series puts forth.   When we question the realness of the bird image I've drawn, its realness is contested by the actual bird encased in plastic food wrap and varathane in the panel beside it.   Which is more real?   One must only remember the bird died in the wake of this very question it just made a fatal choice.

(12)   In titling the series "The Tate Gallery", are you implying that the space we now occupy is somehow the Tate Gallery, that your experience of London England is now present, immortalized and transplaced?

Yes, this is the main principle of the dialogical process: To create an event from the experiences of other events which, in turn, will create new events endlessly. Like the circumstance of the dying bird, my experience of the Tate Gallery has become embodied in the drawings. In other words, my Tate Gallery experience didn't terminate when I left England, it became an internalized event that can present itself in any form, in any given context. I may be the caretaker of this event but the event has a life-force of its own that can't be controlled, only experienced.

Ultimately, my experience of the Tate Gallery has now become the object of our experiences we share while in communication with the series of drawings. My experience of London England has become the window that reflects the landscape, it is the transparent canvas that reveals its support through which I've communicated this experience. In this sense, the 'Tate Gallery" suite has become my objectified image of mortality, time and place. It is what Bakhtin refers to as the 'chronotope' - all the experiences that work through us and upon us within the context of our dialogue.

(13)   You stated that the 'transparent' canvas reveals its support   through   which   you've   communicated   your

experiences.   What role does the notion of 'transparency' play in the hermeneutics of your art-making process?

Transparency has always been a strong motif in my work that presents itself in various forms and degrees.   For example, in the drawing titled "Figure Standing" (see slide #9),   the interior structure of the leg and pelvic area are displayed through a sensitively crafted translucent skin that reveals the mechanics of the human body while in the process of standing.   In this case,   the transparency motif has been centralized to one specific element of the drawing - the figurative image.   It allows us access to the working structures of both the drawing (figurative image) and the human body (kinetics). The figurative image appropriates both narrative and psychological qualities that are determined by the 'types of space' we experience them in.   Narrative in the sense that it speaks to us as physical beings who occupy a physical space and psychological in the sense that it speaks to our psyche or as beings who assimilate experiences in a mental space.

'Types of space' is a central issue in all my drawings and the transparency motif acts as a connecting device or window that leads us from one type to another.   The 'types of space' I'm referring to are: a) available space or the physical space an object occupies and doesn't, yet possibly could, occupy; and, b) unavailable space or space that is symbolic and or imaginable.[77] Available space incorporates more than the space an object occupies,   it also includes empty space or the areas not occupied but can potentially be filled.   The cemented

background in "Figure Standing" becomes more than a vacuous support for the figurative element it contains. The empty space doesn't connote 'emptiness' as such, but potentially occupied space or a place where imaginative events happen. Empty space is a bridge between available space and unavailable space. Unavailable space is a complex phenomenon that embodies our experiences that cannot be demarcated or placed into available space. These experiences, that are the consequences of our active dialogue with the artform, are imaginable and only potentially realizable.

The transparency concept is a strategy that frees the artform to encounter these two 'types of space' simultaneously. It not only displays how the artform is structured but becomes a vehicle that extends the basic narrative (the conditions established by available space) to the realm of the metaphysical (conditions established by both available and unavailable space). This 'rite of entry' that has been determined by the transparent image ultimately questions where the artform is positioned and how the individual elements spatially relate to one another within and without its entire structure.

Eric Fischl, in a dialogue with art historian Donald Kuspit, talked of his glassine paintings (which are transparent) as artworks that "were still modernist to some degree because they revealed their structure and material."[78] This modernist notion of probing the artform through careful analysis is a mono-directional process that explores and questions the functional aspects of its infrastructure. In

other words, the viewer always enters the work of art in search of meaning hidden in its structure. The dialogical process not only embodies this principle but also recognizes the ability of the artform itself to transmit or reflect statements that are contained within its context. The transparent qualities found within the dialogical artform allow access to the experiences it not only embodies but generates by granting us the privilege to enter its structural space while, simultaneously, incorporating our experiences into its context. In this manner, the space that is defined by the dialogical artform both reflects and reveals; is both symbolic and narrative.

(14) What's been established is a very complicated notion of 'space' where the artform embodies the experiences from events of the past that it communicates to us in the present, from which we can manipulate, redefine and incorporate those experiences into our own that can be embedded back into the artform where they can, once again, become the experiences of others in future dialogues.

Yes?

4. CONCLUSION

Bakhtin's dialogical principle explores the notion of what it means to be present, to be socially interactive. In other words, to give this space at this time its specific contextual character. To be socially interactive implies the necessity of the 'other' to give

meaning to our sense of being in the world that, in essence, can never reach totality.

Bakhtin referred to his theorem as an "internal open-endedness" that invites dialogical continuance.[79] His dialogical paradigm opens up infinite possibilities of meaning formulation and reformulation that will always make certain an 'inevitable moment of newness' that, in turn, will always ensure the continuous becoming of the self. The dialogical artform embodies our worldly experiences and utters those experiences anew within the framework of its context. In this manner, the dialogical artform is always-speaking and always in search of a response; our place is to listen, then respond.

5. NOTES

[1]Richard Kearney, *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers* (Manchester University Press, 1984), 127-28.

[2]This is the term Bakhtin uses to describe the state of 'otherness' or the necessity to present oneself to the 'other' in order to conceive of being. Bakhtin states that we can never completely know ourselves and that the 'other' is necessary to accomplish a perception of the self that one can only partially achieve by himself. See Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 95-112.

[3]Richard Kearney, *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers* (Manchester University Press, 1984), 127.

[4]Ibid, 128.

[5]Mikhail Bakhtin was born on November 16th 1895 in the Russian city of Orel and died on the 7th of March 1975 in Moscow. His life was a difficult one that stemmed from a bone disease that led to the amputation of a leg in 1938 to a repressive Soviet regime that forced most of his major works to remain underground until late in his career. See Michael Holquist, 'Introduction', in Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin* (University of Texas Press, 1981), xxi-xxvi.

[6]Tullio Maranhao, 'Psychoanalytic Dialogue and the Dialogical Principle', in Tullio Maranhao, ed., *The Interpretation of Dialogue* (University of Chicago Press, 1990), 224-25.

[7]Heteroglossia is the base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance. It is that which assures the primacy of context over text. See Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogical Imagination* (University of Texas Press, 1981), 428, see also Gary Morson and Caryl Emerson, *Mihhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics* (Stanford University Press, 1990), 139-45, where the author's discuss the term heteroglossia in detail emphasizing that the concept

embodies the notion that language is the conglomerate of many languages. There are always many different ways of speaking, including non-verbal forms, that reflect the diversity of social experiences. Each one of these languages reflects, in an unsystematic fashion, the contingent historical and social forces that have made it.

[8]Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: *The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 30.

[9]Arthur Bronstein, Lawrence Raphael and Cj Stevens, eds., *A Biographical Dictionary of the Phonetic Sciences* (The Press of Lehman College, 1977), 183-85. Ferdinand de Saussure was born in Geneva on the 26th of November 1857 and died there on the 22nd of February 1913. He is often referred to as the 'father of modern structural linguistics' and introduced the concepts of 'langue' or the structurally coded aspect of language and 'parole' or the aspect of language that contain utterances commonly associated with speech.

[10]Caryl Emerson, 'Outer Word and Inner Speech', *Critical Enquiry* , 10 (December 1983), 246.

[11]Richard Harland, *Supersructuralism* (Methuen, 1987), 11-19.

[12]Stephen Littlejohn, *Theories of Human Communication* (Wadsworth, 1989), 53-55.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ferdinand de Saussure, 'Course in general Linguistics', quoted in Stephen Littlejohn, *Theories of Human Communication* (Wadsworth, 1989), 55.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 27.

[17]N. V. Voloshinov, 'Freudianism: A Marxist Critique', (trans. I. R. Titunik; Academic Press, 1976), 118, quoted in Tzvetan

Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialigical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 30.

[18]Caryl Emerson, 'Outer word and Inner Speech', *Critical Inquiry*, 10 (December 1983), 247.

[19]Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (trans. R. Rotsel; Ardis, 1981), 72.

[20]Mikhail Bakhtin, 'The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation', (Bocharov, 1979), 284, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 26.

[21]Caryl Emerson critically details the three distinct ways that Bakhtin's language theory counters that of Saussure's. More specifically, he states that the three points primarily attack the Saussurian concept of the sign that Emerson feels is ultimately a mental construct and that its signifiers and signifieds are contained in an arbitrary closed system. See Caryl Emerson, 'Outer Word and Inner Speech', *Critical Inquiry*, 10 (December 1983), 247-48. See also Michael Holquist, 'Answering as Authoring: Mikhail Bakhtin's Trans-Linguistics', *Critical Inquiry*, 10 (December 1983), 307-319.

[22]Susan Stewart, 'Shouts on the Street: Bakhtin's Anti-Linguistics', *Critical Inquiry*, 10 (December 1983), 273.

[23]Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984) 24-26

[24]Tzvetan Todorov discusses the importance of the dialogical context in Bakhtin's theorem from three positions shared by the interlocutors: 1) the 'I know' position; 2) the 'I want' position; and, 3) the 'I see or I love' position. Bakhtin's theory states that the interlocutors share a common horizon of spatiotemporal, semantic and evaluative (axiological) elements. See Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984) 42-54. See also Gary Morson's and Caryl Emerson's description of Bakhtin's notion of contextuality in Gary

Morson and Caryl Emerson, *Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of Prosaics* (Stanford University Press, 1990), 127-30.

[25]Michael Holquist, 'Glossary', in Michael Holquist ed., *The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin* (trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; University of Texas Press, 1981), 428.

[26]J. J. Gumperz, *Discourse Strategies* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 131-32.

[27]V. N. Voloshinov, 'Marxism and the Philosophy of Language', (trans. L. Matejka and I. R. Titunik; Seminar Press, 1973), 101, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 43.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Allon White, 'The Struggle Over Bakhtin: Fraternal Reply to Robert Young', *Cultural Critique*, 8 (winter 1987-88), 229.

[31]Bakhtin doesn't offer a concise meaning of the concept he coined 'chronotope' and as a result the term has several related meanings. Primarily, a chronotope is a means to understand experience or the nature of events and actions. More specifically, an action or experience is necessarily performed in a specific context and chronotopes give meaning to those actions. All contexts are shaped by a 'time and space' construct which is not a transcendental form, but an immediate reality of the dialogical context itself. The time and space construct can vary in quality according to the different dialogical contexts it is placed in. The context of any dialogue can assume multiple chronotopes that are constituted by both social interactions and how we represent them. Therefore, the chronotope is not a neutral abstraction that simply defines the contextual position of the dialogue but is an active dialogical participant in the production of meanings within that context. See Gary Morson and Caryl Emerson, *Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics* (Stanford University Press, 1990), 367-432. Also see Mikhail Bakhtin, 'Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel', in Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogic Imagination: Four essays by M.*

M. Bakhtin (trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; University of Texas Press, 1981), 84-258.

[32]Mikhail Bakhtin, 'Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel', in Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin* (trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; University of Texas Press, 1981), 84.

[33]Ibid, 85.

[34]Mikhail Bakhtin, 'Methodology for the Human Sciences', (trans. V. W. Mcgee; University of Texas Press, 1986), 170, quoted in Allon White, 'The Struggle Over Bakhtin: Fraternal Reply to Robert Young', *Cultural Critique*, 8 (Winter 1987-88), 220.

[35]Sven Daelemans and Tullio Maranhao, 'Psychoanalytic Dialogue and the Dialogical Principle', in Tullio Maranhao, ed., *The Interpretation of Dialogue* (University of Chicago Press, 1990), 224.

[36]Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 56.

[37]P. N. Medvedev, 'The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship', (trans. A. Wehrle; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 203-4, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 55-6.

[38]Allon White, 'The Struggle Over Bakhtin: Fraternal Reply to Robert Young', *Cultural Critique*, 8 (Winter 1987-88), 229.

[39]Joseph Pilotta and Algis Mickunas, *Science of Communication: Its Phenomenological Foundation* (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990), 64.

[40]Sven Daelemans and Tullio Maranhao, 'Psychoanalytic Dialogue and the Dialogical Principle', in Tullio Maranhao, ed., *The Interpretation of Dialogue* (University of Chicago Press, 1990), 230.

[41]Mikhail Bakhtin, 'The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation' (Bocharov, 1979), 118, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin:*

The Dialogical Principle (trans. W. Godzick; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 99-100.

[42]Mikhail Bakhtin, 'The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation' (Bocharov, 1979), 311-12, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 96.

[43]Ibid, 95.

[44]Ibid, 99.

[45]Makhail Bakhtin, 'The Problem of Content, Material and Form in the Verbal Artistic Creation' (Moscow, 1974), 33, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 100.

[46]Sven Daelemans and Tullio Maranhao, 'Psychoanalytic Dialogue and the Dialogical Principle' in Tullio Maranhao, ed., *The Interpretation of Dialogue* (University of Chicago Press, 1990), 230, see also Gary Saul Morson, 'Who Speaks for Bakhtin?: A Dialogic Introduction', *Critical Inquiry*, 10 (December 1983), 227.

[47]Dialogism is a term Bakhtin uses to describe a world dominated by heteroglossia. In other words, a thing or an event can only have meaning or be understood in relation to the whole. There is always a constant interactive energy that takes place between each element that composes the artform and, as a consequence, they all have the potential of not only conditioning one another but their entire dialogical context. See Michael Holquist, ed., 'Glossary', in Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin* (trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; University of Texas Press, 1981), 426.

[48]Joseph Pilotta and Algis Michunas, *Science of Communication: Its Phenomenological Foundation* (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990), 65.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Mikhail Bakhtin, 'The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation' (Bocharov, 1979), 312-14, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 105.

[51]Joseph Pilotta and Algis Mickunis, *Science of Communication: Its Phenomenological Foundation* (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990), 70.

[52]Mikhail Bakhtin, 'The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation' (Bocharov, 1979), 18, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 100.

[53]Sven Daelemans and Tullio Maranhao, 'Psychoanalytic Dialogue and the Dialogical Principle', in Tullio Maranhao, ed., *The Interpretation of Dialogue* (University of Chicago Press, 1990), 231.

[54]Allon White, 'The Struggle Over Bakhtin: Fraternal Reply to Robert Young', *Cultural Critique*, 8 (Winter 1987-88), 237.

[55]Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (trans. R. Rotsel; Ardis, 1973), 12.

[56]Ibid, 14.

[57]Ibid, 17-18.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid.

[60]V. N. Voloshinov, 'Discourse in life and Discourse in Poetry', *Zvezda*, 6 (1926), 248, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 21.

[61]Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (trans. R. Rotsel; Ardis, 1973), 24.

[62]Ibid.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Gerald Bruns, 'The Otherness of Words: Joyce, Bakhtin and Heidegger', in Hugh Silverman, ed., *Postmoderism Philosophy and the Arts* (Routledge, 1990), 126.

[65]Ibid.

[66]V. N. Volosinov, 'Marxism and the Philosophy of Language' (New York,1973), 23, quoted in Caryl Emerson, 'Outer Word and Inner Speech', *Critical Inquiry*, 10 (December 1983), 227.

[67]Ibid.

[68]V. N. Voloshinov, 'Freudianism: A Marxist Critique', (trans. I. Titunik; Academic Press, 1976), 31, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 30.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Susan Stewart, 'Shouts on the Street: Bakhtin's Anti-Linguistics', *Critical Inquiry*, 10 (December 1983), 276.

[71]Mikhail Bakhtin, 'Discourse in the Novel', in Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin* (trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; University of Texas Press, 1981), 276.

[72]Ibid, 279.

[73]Thomas Docherty, *After Theory: Postmoderism and Postmarxism* (Routledge, 1990), 20.

[74]P. N. Medvedev, 'The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship' (trans. A. Wehrle; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 205, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 40.

[75]Thomas Docherty, *After Theory: Postmodernism and Postmarxism* (Routledge, 1990), 18.

[76]Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, *Just Gaming* (trans. W. Godzich; University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 94.

[77]Anne Vitale, 'Drawing Conclusions: A Syntactic Approach Toward Understanding Reality', *Leonardo*, 21: 4 (1988), 353-54.

[78]Eric Fischl and Donald Kuspit, *An Interview with Eric Fischl* (Vintage, 1987), 32.

[79]Allon White, 'The Struggle Over Bakhtin: Fraternal Reply to Robert Young', *Cultural Critique*, 8 (Winter 1987-88), 237.

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