Canadianization and the No.6 Bomber Group R.C.A.F.

Date
1990
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Abstract
In December 1939 the government of William Lyon Mackenzie King signed the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan which directed much of Canada's war effort into the training of Commonwealth aircrew. Canadians were to constitute a very large proportion of the future graduates of the Plan. King's government at first intended that future Canadian airmen be grouped overseas into Canadianofficered squadrons under their own headquarters. Unfortunately King decided that his government could not afford to pay for these squadrons and he eventually agreed to send Canadian aircrew graduates overseas for service with the Royal Air Force. By 1940, the growing number of Canadians serving with the RAF were creating legal and public relations difficulties for their government. In July 1941, the Canadian Defence Minister for Air, Mr C. G. Power, went to Britain to discuss the implementation of 'Canadianization' measures designed to place Canadian airmen into their own units. As a major part of this policy, Power asked the RAF to form up a number of Canadian bomber squadrons and concentrate them into the No. 6 Bomber Group RCAF. During the summer and fall of 1942, the RAF's Bomber Command, with some reluctance, undertook to direct much of its expansion into Canadian squadrons based in Yorkshire and south Durham. The RAF also decided to equip the new and forming squadrons with the obsolescent twin-engine Wellington bomber and, during 1943, convert them to the flawed four-engine Halifax heavy bomber. These decisions were to hamper the operational ability of 6 Group for the remainder of the war. 6 Group was born on January 1 1943. Its birth was attended by a nasty row over the progress of Canadianization between high ranking British and Canadian officers. During 1943, the new squadrons performed satisfactorily until March, when they began attacking heavily defended targets in Germany. By July the statistics revealed that 6 Group morale was shaky. Too many Canadian crews were turning back, too many were being lost, and they were also being attacked at a greater rate than comparable RAF crews. Bomber Command investigated the causes three times suspecting that Canadian crews were poorly trained, of low quality, and suffering from leadership and discipline problems. However it was finally decided that these flaws were a consequence of the too-rapid squadron expansion and instability and, by December 1943, 6 Group squadrons were performing as well as and in some respects even better than their RAF counterparts. The process of Canadianization however had cost many lives and had taken a year to overcome.
Description
Bibliography: p. 356-365.
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Citation
Nuttall, L. (1990). Canadianization and the No.6 Bomber Group R.C.A.F. (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/22016
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