Subjective ethical naturalism
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1983
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Abstract
My thesis is that morality has a subjective ontological status. The main implication of this subjectivism is that if morality is to continue to have any positive role to play in human life then it must be seen as the product of human invention rather than as the product of human discovery. Furthermore, if morality is to have any positive role to play then this will arise because of the contingent nature of the human situation rather than because of any metaphysical or conceptual necessities. Because of important human contingencies, subjectivism adopts a convention or consent theory of morality. Morality is a result of the interplay of human wants and the establishment, primarily through bargaining, of a social system which seeks to satisfy those wants. Practical moralities are activist positions. What the law does in a highly formal way, morality does in a less formal way. By a close examination and analysis of current philosophical arguments supporting naturalist theories of morality I develop a subjectivist position which enhances and adds to this tradition in philosophy and which provides a better understanding of what we are doing when making moral judgements. I thereby extend the naturalistic examination of the utility of bringing behavior under rule.
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Bibliography: p. 333-342.
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Citation
Cornett, R. W. (1983). Subjective ethical naturalism (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/23990