Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48395
Title: Coalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the Liquidation Decision
Authors: Chua, Jess
Ang, James S
Issue Date: 1980
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Citation: Ang, J.S. and Chua, J. H. (1980), Coalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the Liquidation Decision, The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11, no. 1, pp.355-359.
Abstract: Conventional wisdom in economics recommends that a bankrupt firm with liquidation value greater than going-concern value be liquidated by the creditors and that a firm with going-concern value greater than liquidation value continue to operate. Recently, counterexamples to the traditional rule have been presented. This note argues that violation of the me-first rule is responsible for these counterexamples. Since violation of the me-first rule involves the absence of value-maximization on the part of some economic agents, economic theories concerned with rational behavior may justifiably still assume that the liquidation decision follows the traditional rule.
Description: Article deposited after permission was granted by publisher, 01/14/2011.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48395
ISSN: 0361-915X
Appears in Collections:Chua, Jess

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