The two-tiered illusion of self
| dc.contributor.advisor | Baker, John A. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Albahari, Miri | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2005-08-16T16:56:58Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2005-08-16T16:56:58Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
| dc.description | Bibliography: p. 263-273 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Parties from traditions in both East and West have claimed that the self lacks reality. I defend a version of this claim that uses some concepts and ideas drawn from an unorthodox (but argued-for) reading of the Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anattd). On this reading, the ordinary self is an illusion; its singular impression created by input from two sources. One source pertains to what I refer to as underlying witness-consciousness or awareness: this, I argue, is neither illusory nor mentally constructed. I argue that, through its very nature, awareness brings to the 'self a host of non-illusory features: a subjective sense of presence, the elusiveness to its own observation, unity (disparate percepts appearing to a single point of view), endurance and invariability (non-perduring, unchanging sense of presence). The other source pertains to what I call 'boundedness', and it brings to the 'self an ontological distinctness, such that the self is felt to be an individual, personalised entity with all the features of awareness. I argue that boundedness is not intrinsic to awareness, but comes about through desire-driven thoughts and emotions. When infused with the 'awareness source', their content depicts a separate self as their subject. Input from the 'boundedness-source' makes the self a mental construct, and the constructedness bestows on the self an illusory status. (For the self does not subjectively seem to be the mental construct it actually is: the self seems to be an unconstructed entity which thinks the thoughts rather than an entity whose existence depends on thoughts). In virtue of its two sources or 'tiers' - one constructed and one unconstructed -1 term the phenomenon a 'two-tiered illusion of self. The theory is to be contrasted with standard Western theories of self-as-illusion (e.g., Hume, James, Dennett) which tend to pin the selfs illusory status on unity and endurance, by regarding these features as illusory in themselves. | en |
| dc.format.extent | ix, 273 leaves ; 30 cm. | en |
| dc.identifier.citation | Albahari, M. (2004). The two-tiered illusion of self (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/12733 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/12733 | |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 0494038470 | en |
| dc.identifier.lcc | AC1 .T484 2004 A5257 | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1880/41484 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher.institution | University of Calgary | en |
| dc.publisher.place | Calgary | en |
| dc.rights | University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. | |
| dc.title | The two-tiered illusion of self | |
| dc.type | doctoral thesis | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Calgary | |
| thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) | |
| ucalgary.item.requestcopy | true | |
| ucalgary.thesis.accession | Theses Collection 58.002:Box 1485 520492002 | |
| ucalgary.thesis.notes | UARC | en |
| ucalgary.thesis.uarcrelease | y | en |
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