Psychopaths and responsibility

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dc.contributor.advisorBaker, Brenda M.
dc.contributor.authorBoetzkes, Elisabeth Airini
dc.date.accessioned2005-07-19T22:16:41Z
dc.date.available2005-07-19T22:16:41Z
dc.date.issued1975
dc.descriptionBibliography: p. 146-147.en
dc.description.abstractThe problem of the responsibility of the psychopath, which is discussed in this thesis, has been approached, until now, in terms of whether psychopaths are mentally ill. This approach is mentioned in the first chapter, but abandoned in favour of an inquiry into which capacities are necessary for having moral consciousness. Instead of asking whether psychopaths are sick and therefore not responsible, the sickness question is bypassed, and the inquiry centres around asking whether psychopaths, in lacking the capacities necessary for moral awareness, are not appropriate objects for responsibility-ascription. Since the final claim made in the thesis is one about the incapacities of the psychopath, some time is spent discussing the notion of an incapacity, and how it is related to different senses of "responsible". The discussion of the requirements for moral consciousness centres around the notion of imagining-being someone-else . The capacity for this kind of imagining is seen as one of the capacities possessed by a person with a conscience, and" having a conscience" is presented as a shorthand way of referring to what we do in practical moral decision-making. In order to successfully imagine being someone else, it is argued, one needs to be capable of a similar range of emotions, cares or concerns. If one has only a limited capacity for such experiences, he cannot successfully perform this imagining task, and is, therefore, unable to develop moral awareness. In the latter part of the thesis, the psychopath is shown to be incapacitated in the ways discussed earlier. His range of experiences is too narrow to allow him to be a successful imaginer. This, in turn, prevents him from developing moral consciousness, and exercising the capacities, or experiencing the feelings, associated with having a conscience. Since the psychopath cannot control these incapacities, it is concluded that he is not a fit candidate for ascriptions of moral responsibility for his anti-social actions.
dc.description.notesThis title is not available online. Access options are: - consulting the copy from Archives in our reading room in person - https://asc.ucalgary.ca/visiting/ - borrowing a circulating copy from the Library catalogue – https://ucalgary.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/search?vid=01UCALG_INST:UCALGARY&lang=en
dc.format.extentvi, 156 leaves ; 30 cm.en
dc.identifier82480924en
dc.identifier.citationBoetzkes, E. A. (1975). Psychopaths and responsibility (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/18370en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/18370
dc.identifier.lccBF 173 B62 1975 Microficheen
dc.identifier.other82480924en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/15605
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen
dc.publisher.placeCalgaryen
dc.rightsUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.
dc.subject.lccBF 173 B62 1975 Microficheen
dc.subject.lcshPsychology, Pathological
dc.titlePsychopaths and responsibility
dc.typedoctoral thesis
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Calgary
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)
ucalgary.thesis.accessionTheses Collection 58.002:Box 224 82480924
ucalgary.thesis.notesPLen
ucalgary.thesis.uarcreleasenoen
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