UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Press



FROM KINSHASA TO KANDAHAR: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective

Edited by Michael K. Carroll and Greg Donaghy

ISBN 978-1-55238-845-7

THIS BOOK IS AN OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK. It is an electronic version of a book that can be purchased in physical form through any bookseller or on-line retailer, or from our distributors. Please support this open access publication by requesting that your university purchase a print copy of this book, or by purchasing a copy yourself. If you have any questions, please contact us at ucpress@ucalgary.ca

Cover Art: The artwork on the cover of this book is not open access and falls under traditional copyright provisions; it cannot be reproduced in any way without written permission of the artists and their agents. The cover can be displayed as a complete cover image for the purposes of publicizing this work, but the artwork cannot be extracted from the context of the cover of this specific work without breaching the artist's copyright.

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Press
press.ucalgary.ca

Acknowledgement: *We acknowledge the wording around open access used by Australian publisher,* **re.press**, *and thank them for giving us permission to adapt their wording to our policy* http://www.re-press.org

CHAPTER 6

DIAGNOSTIC CONFUSION AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: Canada and Pakistan's "Failed State"[1]

Julian Schofield

Since the end of the Cold War, Canada and its Western allies have had a strong global interest in reducing the incidence of failed states. At first glance, Pakistan seems to fit this profile, as it confronts widespread poverty, terrorist groups, possibly insecure nuclear weapons, and substantial tracts of territory beyond the control of its central government.[2] Indeed, in 2008, the *Economist* described Pakistan as the world's most dangerous state. Yet neither Canada, nor its Western allies, are as deeply engaged in Pakistan as this description would warrant. This chapter tackles this paradox, exploring Canada's long and fitful engagement with Pakistan.

Pakistan only partially meets the failed state criteria, and it remains sufficiently strong to deter foreign intervention and resist external efforts to re-engineer its social and political institutions. As a result, neither Canada nor its allies have treated Pakistan as a failed state, despite the rhetoric of failure. Historically, Canada has mobilized aid to support Pakistan, in conjunction with its Anglo-American allies, only when the Asian nation has been under acute threat. At the same time, Canada tried to promote stability in Indo-Pakistani relations, notably through its participation in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Kashmir from 1949 until 1978.[3] Although Canadian politicians have tilted slightly to one side

or the other—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker favoured Pakistan while Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson supported India—Canada has been consistently impartial.[4] For example, Diefenbaker declined to support Pakistan's goal of a plebiscite for Kashmir,[5] and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau refused to downgrade relations with Pakistan in the early 1970s, despite an appeal by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.[6]

Ottawa was heavily involved in offering aid to Pakistan during the early stages of the Cold War, but reduced its effort in the 1970s as the bipolar conflict in Asia eased following the end of the Vietnam War. Similarly, Canada re-engaged with Islamabad after the destabilizing terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 and the collapse of the Taliban government in neighbouring Afghanistan. Compared to the stakes of the US, China, India, and Saudi Arabia, Canada's direct political influence is comparatively weak. Nevertheless, a long, cordial relationship has guaranteed a persistent minimum baseline of Canadian help for Pakistan and has ensured Ottawa's persistent engagement, however marginal, in Pakistan's survival.

Qualifying Pakistani State Failure

Pakistan is neither a failed, fragile, or weak state, nor is it under threat of imminent collapse. According to former US ambassador to Pakistan William Milam, "Pakistan is not a failed state…. But it is a country of failed politics with a failed political class."[7] Pakistan is perhaps best characterized as a multi-ethnic, semi-industrialized developing state. The three most commonly identified avenues toward contemporary state failure in Pakistan all include scenarios of state hijacking, the probabilities of which are all remote: a military-Islamist coup, civil war, or an Islamist electoral victory.

The prospects of an Islamist coup seem far-fetched. Pakistan has seen eight coup attempts between February 1951 and October 1999, and in all cases no coup has proceeded beyond the planning phase without the approval of its military, the guardian of the secular elite. Coups that did not receive this endorsement failed abruptly (1951, 1971, and 1973), including an Islamist-inspired attempt in 1994. Consent for a coup must come

either from the chief of the general staff, in consultation with his principal subordinates, or from the corps commanders' conference, which has become a routinized aspect of the Pakistani army's process of policy deliberation. The physical barrier to a successful coup is the 111th Brigade, which protects Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, and its military headquarters in Rawalpindi, buttressed by several significant corps-sized formations located nearby.

Nor is a coup likely to originate from an intelligence organization,[8] given their subordinate status within the military hierarchy. In effect, for an Islamist coup in Pakistan to produce a failed state outcome would require the conjunction of a collapse of the cohesion of the Pakistani army, a thorough political Islamist infiltration of that institution, and the emergence of a centrifugal Islamist regime. While the second outcome is plausible, the latter is more likely to be socially centripetal, given the shallow public support for Islamist governance in Pakistan.[9]

Pakistan is also unlikely to collapse as a result of civil war. Concerns in 2009 and 2010, mainly regarding Pashtun Islamist insurgents in the Swat Valley, a mere hundred kilometres from some of Pakistan's nuclear facilities, exaggerated the country's vulnerability. For the last two centuries, there have been no successful, sustained penetrations by Pashtun insurgents into the Punjab, the demographic and industrial core of Pakistan. The reasons are obvious: Pakistan's formidable military consists of 600,000 volunteers, organized in 28 divisions and equipped with 2,400 tanks, 4,200 artillery pieces, and almost 400 combat aircraft. More importantly, Pakistan has shown itself capable of effectively suppressing domestic opposition: the Bengalis of East Pakistan in 1971; the Baloch in five separate campaigns; Sindhi separatists; and the Mohajirs in Karachi in the 1990s. Efforts to interdict the sanctuaries of the Pakistan Taliban (the Tehreek-e-Taliban), the government's principal adversary along the Afghan frontier, were ongoing as of 2014. Only an upheaval in Pakistan's core, the Punjab, would have any hope of displacing the military. Revolts originating in the periphery are rarely strong enough to challenge Pakistan's army, which has little difficulty maintaining domestic control.[10] If Pakistan were to succumb to an Islamist regime at the conclusion of a civil war, the new regime would likely be at least as centralized and developmentally oriented as current secular regimes, making state failure an unlikely outcome.[11]

Outside of the Punjab, however, Pakistan's parochial and unrepresentative methods of governance have generated periodic separatist movements (mentioned above), most notably in East Pakistan in 1970–71. When unrest occurs in conjunction with foreign intervention, as it did when Indian support for East Pakistan produced the breakaway state of Bangladesh, Pakistan's weak consolidation of peripheral populations has brought it very close to failed state status. Its success in surviving Bangladesh's secession attests to its strength and resiliency.

Finally, some analysts have speculated that Islamist political parties might capture segments of the Pakistani state through the electoral process, resulting in a failure in domestic governance.[12] This too seems very unlikely. Religious parties in Pakistan typically win just 5 to 10 percent of the popular vote, rising to as much as 20 percent when boosted through ballot manipulation by domestic intelligence agencies. One leading Islamist party, Jamiat-i-Islami, did not even field candidates in the 2008 elections due to its low prospects. Moreover, Islamic political influence has been strongest when operating in conjunction with powerful military or political partners, whose support for the unity of the *ummah* (community) is likely to enhance the cohesion of the Pakistani state rather than undermine it. Clearly, Pakistan is not a traditional failed state, though it might more appropriately be described as a developmentally feeble state.

Chronic Underdevelopment

The principal source of instability in Pakistan is its chronically underdeveloped and neglected population. With an adjusted Purchasing Power Parity 2010 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of just $2,400, close to 60 percent of the population lives on less than $2 a day.[13] Pakistan consequently ranks 145th out of 187 states on the United Nations Development Programme's 2011 Human Development Index.[14] It is plagued by high infant and maternal mortality rates, and its gender-discriminating education system, which reaches only 5 percent of the population, is inadequate to the task of helping the 61 percent of Pakistan's population that is under the age of twenty-five to escape unemployment and poverty.[15]

Though Pakistan's bureaucracy is comparatively well organized, it has limited reach into society, as indicated by the fact that only 2 percent of earners pay income tax.[16] This problem is not the result of military government or shadow influence: military regimes in Pakistan usually promote macroeconomic stability and growth, and there is little evidence that reducing the defence budget would produce a peace dividend available for social spending.[17] Moreover, military-owned manufacturing can be a sensible form of industrial policy in some sectors. Similarly, Islam is not a genuine obstacle to development in Pakistan, despite its perceived hostility to Western policy goals. Its role in promoting madrassahs—religious schools—the majority of which are peaceful, mostly helps to fill an educational vacuum on behalf of the marginalized. Islam often fosters and promotes the cultural unity of Pakistan, and sustains a favourable distribution of wealth, facilitating Pakistan's comparatively good Gini co-efficient score of 3.0 (comparable to Canada's rating).[18]

Pakistan's main impediment to development is its landed and industrial elites, whose vested interest in plentiful and low-wage labour and whose desire to preserve the social order maintains a system of widespread poverty.[19] This neglect has not been sufficient to arrest socio-economic development, though. Foreign direct investment starting in the 1950s, socialist and pro-labour policies in the 1970s, and a focus on manufacturing and infrastructure through to the 1990s have contributed substantially, though slowly, to socio-economic transformation. Approximately 50 percent of Pakistanis live in towns or larger cities. Industrialization, and the capitalization and mechanization of agriculture, are proceeding, though predominantly in the Punjab. Pakistan is therefore not a failed state in the conventional sense, but a state with a feeble developmental priority, where there is an unwillingness to provide a social-political framework in which citizens can meet their basic needs. In the obstacles it faces and its development statistics, Pakistan is not much different from India.

Canadian Aid Policy in the Context of Alliance Politics

Canada's primary interest in Pakistan is linked to its involvement in Afghanistan and its response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) invocation of Article V for Collective Defence after the terror attacks of 9/11.[20] Despite the rhetoric around Pakistan's failed state status, Canadian involvement in South Asia is largely a product of Pakistan's strategic importance and not the result of a focus on the country's domestic weaknesses.[21] Indeed, Ottawa's strategic interests coincide with those of its major allies: supporting a democratic, united India, and reconstructing a secure, stable Afghanistan.[22] Canadian engagement with Pakistan has been inadequate to the task of addressing issues of nuclear security and clandestine support for Islamist militants, even when these have directly affected Canadian operations in Afghanistan.

In Ottawa, Canada's Pakistan policy springs from two locations. In the short run, Afghan policy, which drives Canada's current approach to South Asia, has been centralized within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office.[23] The two central agencies have drawn upon help from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the Treasury Board.[24] Pakistan's nominal failed state status provided these policymakers with a convenient political fiction to explain NATO's failures in Afghanistan and a tool to bolster public support for its military efforts in Afghanistan. Encouraged by the Ottawa bureaucracy, the national media easily cast Pakistan as a prototypical failed state.[25]

Yet, despite social fragility, Pakistan remains a strong state, and is regionally pivotal, with significant strategic impacts on Afghanistan, India, and China, and even on Saudi Arabia and Iran.[26] Pakistan possesses a virtual veto over the success or failure of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, where it carefully pursues a sound and deliberate foreign policy focused on neutralizing Kabul as a source of Pashtun separatism, as opposed to indicating a lack of state capacity.[27] This inaccurate failed state discourse has encouraged Canada to allow its larger allies to manage the complicated relations with Pakistan and to join NATO in making unreasonable requests of Pakistan.[28] These include pressing Islamabad to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to shut down insurgent sanctuaries, without a

quid pro quo from Kabul on its non-recognition of the Pakistan-Afghan frontier.[29] One recent and concrete policy setback, which highlighted Canada's failure to appreciate fully Islamabad's strategic interest in weakening Afghanistan, was Ottawa's proposal for joint Pakistan-Afghanistan border security, raised repeatedly in 2009, 2010, and 2011. The proposal for joint action to control borders, customs, and narcotics smuggling was ignored by the two rival states, which viewed the scheme as an unwelcome intrusion.[30]

The second, long-run influence on Canada's Pakistan policy is the historical isolation of CIDA from DFAIT. This division explains the steady persistence and consistency of Canada's developmental assistance, despite a range of troubling political incidents within Pakistan that have led Canadian allies like the United States to reduce their aid. Historically, CIDA has been reluctant to secure and wield diplomatic influence. However, in the Asian context, where Canada has traditionally put an emphasis on security at the behest of its allies, this view has been challenged, with critics complaining that Canada has not clearly linked its aid program to tangible foreign policy objectives.[31] Canada's initial support for Colombo Plan aid, which aimed to raise the standard of living in South Asia to offset the attractions of Cold War communism, was explicitly political. But this had largely wound down by the 1970s, and along with it, direct Canadian influence. Ottawa continued development aid to Pakistan until its Western allies reduced their support following the 1971 civil war in East Pakistan and India's 1974 nuclear test.[32] Instead, Canada shifted aid to Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America, and never returned to its earlier level of activity in South Asia, even as the US and Britain backed Pakistan against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. By the same token, neither did Canada reduce its support much when Soviet forces withdrew in 1989.[33] Canada has thus had a more consistent aid presence than many of its more powerful allies.

Canada's Legacy of Development Assistance

Canada shifted its preference for aid disbursement from the UN to the Commonwealth Colombo Plan with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.[34] The threat of the spread of Communist insurrection in the underdeveloped areas of the world prompted Canada to join its liberal allies in providing development assistance to Asia.[35] Pakistan in particular was viewed as suffering from widespread poverty, but it was run by a pro-Western elite, with which Canada has been able to maintain good relations for over six decades.[36] Significantly, Canada never required any political change in Pakistan as the price of its decades of largesse.[37] Between 1950 and 1967, Canada sent a third of its $227 million in Colombo Plan aid money to Pakistan.[38] By the 1990s, Canadian official development assistance (ODA) help for the Asian nation totalled almost $2 billion.[39] Of Canada's five major industrial development projects overseas between 1950 and 1965, three were in Pakistan, highlighting Canada's significant efforts.[40] By 1967, Canada ranked fourth among donors to Pakistan. But the focus on Cold War security rather than governance helped reinforce weak government institutions.[41] In the early 1980s, Canada reduced, but did not end, its economic assistance to Pakistan.[42] Pakistan's civil war in 1971, the emergence of a socialist government in Islamabad focused on corporate expropriations and debt moratoria, and the development of regional nuclear tensions in the mid-1970s created pressures from India to suspend aid, but Canada did not. Instead, it followed the US in maintaining a presence in Pakistan, variously justifying its efforts as measures to prevent regional conflict, to promote market access, and to advance human rights.[43] Through the 1980s, Canada's goals continued to include the provision of emergency assistance.[44] After 1970, Canada's ranking as a Pakistani aid donor was never higher than fourth (at 6.4 percent of aid),[45] and often lower, and absolute amounts were either static or gradually reduced from $47 million in 1970 to $36 million in 1989.[46] Overall, of the US$19.5 billion in foreign aid to Pakistan between 1950 and 1982, Canada provided US$961 million, or 4.92 percent of the total, an economically significant but politically immaterial amount.[47]

In 1965, Canada and Pakistan agreed to establish the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor to provide electricity to the city's 3.5

Figure 1: For much of the Cold War, Canada used its foreign aid to woo pro-Western Pakistan and promote economic linkages. The 1959 atomic energy agreement, signed by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and High Commissioner for Pakistan Samuel Martin Burke on 14 May 1959, did both. (Credit: Duncan Cameron/Library and Archives Canada, e010836507)

million inhabitants.[48] Once construction was completed in 1971, Canada contracted to assist Pakistan in building a nuclear fuel production plant, including heavy water and parts.[49] Subsequent to India's 1974 nuclear test, however, Canada terminated the agreement when Pakistan refused to enact full-scope safeguards. This resulted in Pakistan suffering serious slowdowns and technical challenges in the operation of KANUPP, and had a significant, negative short-term impact on Canadian-Pakistan relations.[50] Canada's efforts at segregating the nuclear dispute from Canada's broader aid assistance to Pakistan, together with its generous aid offering of C$700 million in 1979, helped preserve good relations. When Pakistan was suspected of developing a nuclear weapon in 1980, Canada complained to Islamabad, but did not, as the US did, suspend all aid.[51]

Current State of Canada's Assistance

Canada's development assistance to Pakistan changed little in the 1980s.[52] With the end of the Cold War, aid shifted to a focus on social spending, specifically nutrition, education, and women's issues.[53] Canada's ranking as an aid donor shifted between fourth and fifth in the 1990s, with annual aid valued between $39 and $52 million, consistent with amounts disbursed in the 1970s, adjusted for inflation.[54] In 1992, for example, Canada accounted for 2 percent of Pakistan's aid. Canada's reluctance to engage Pakistan was further tempered by human rights issues and concerns among the Western allies regarding Pakistan's nuclear proliferation efforts.[55] Japan, for example, cut off half a billion dollars in aid in response to Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998, and did not resume aid assistance until 2005.[56] Ottawa also believed that Canada's strategic interests would be better served in developing ties with the newly liberated states of Central and Eastern Europe, as opposed to increasing aid to Pakistan.[57]

American engagement in Afghanistan immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 2001 led to an increase in all forms of aid to Pakistan by as much as 200 percent, followed by a general decline in ODA over the next ten years as rifts emerged between Washington and Islamabad.[58] US aid from 2001 to 2011 totalled US$13.3 billion in security assistance and US$7.3 in economic and developmental aid.[59] By 2008 Pakistan was receiving US$1.5 billion in ODA annually, up from $1 billion in the 1990s, of which the top contributor was the European Union (EU).[60] Canada's annual contribution increased from C$62 million in 2002 to C$80 million by 2011. Though a significant proportion of this was in response to specific floods and earthquakes, overall ODA was consistent with levels in the 1980s and 1990s.[61] By 2010–11, Canada's bilateral aid shrank back to C$30 million ($83 million with multilateral aid),[62] placing Canada thirteenth among ODA donors to Pakistan, out of a total pool of US$1 billion.[63]

Canada's involvement in Afghanistan led it to define Pakistan as a fragile state and to resume higher levels of direct aid.[64] Canada's interest in educational programs in Pakistan also reflects its link with Afghanistan and the need to create educational alternatives to the radical madrassah network.[65] These are consistent with Canada's millennium goals, which focus on eradicating poverty, universal primary education, gender

equality, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, disease control, and ensuring environmental sustainability.[66] Efforts in Pakistan fit into Canada's overall plan of targeting the world's fragile states with C$800 million in ODA, supplemented by a further C$1.2 billion in multilateral aid.[67] Canada briefly emerged as a top-five humanitarian aid donor in 2008, following floods in Pakistan that year.[68] In 2009, Canada identified Pakistan as a "country of focus," meaning it was one of twenty states receiving 80 percent of CIDA's funding.[69]

But aid has translated into little real influence upon efforts to bolster the Pakistani state. There have been problems with the effectiveness of Canadian aid to Pakistan arising from nepotism in the aid community, and the dominant position occupied by an elite group of approximately fifty NGOs out of some 95,000 agencies operating in the country.[70] Canada has been slow to implement projects, which get bogged down by Ottawa's preoccupation with financial accountability.[71] Pakistan furthermore claims that what aid has been delivered is miniscule, given the 35,000 Pakistani casualties and the claimed US$68 billion in costs to Pakistan associated with NATO's engagement in Afghanistan since 2002.[72] In 2013, Pakistan ranked just fifteenth among Canada's bilateral aid recipients (with Afghanistan in first place).[73]

What success Canada has had in obtaining diplomatic influence from ODA has largely to do with the Pakistani elite's memory of historical Canadian contributions to Pakistan's development and their trust in Canadian intentions. This has translated into open access for Canadian aid programs and good local working relations, even with Islamist social groups.[74]

The Remaining Instruments of Influence: Commerce, Domestic Values, and Military Ties

Canada's relatively weak influence in Pakistan also stems from the two countries' limited bilateral trade.[75] The historical level of trade has remained low despite numerous attempts to increase it through such missions as Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's 1995 trade initiative in South Asia.[76] The principal reasons for this low level of bilateral trade are

perceived unfair contract competitions, institutional impediments to imports, including protectionism and corruption, and a lack of interest in Pakistan by Canadian exporters and investors. Pakistani exporters have also failed to appreciate the Canadian market, while its importers rarely think of Canada as a source for high-tech and other high-value products.[77] Pakistan's focus has instead been on trade with the US and EU.[78]

The possibility that Canada might exert some influence over Pakistan by mobilizing the diaspora community and its Canadian values has been mitigated by the small size of the expatriate communities in Canada and Pakistan. South Asian immigration to Canada grew steadily after 1962 until it numbered in the hundreds of thousands in the 1970s.[79] This has resulted in as many as 300,000 Pakistani-Canadians.[80] Two federal Pakistani-Canadian members of Parliament have represented this community: Rahim Jaffer (Edmonton-Strathcona, Conservative, 1997–2008) and Wajid Khan (Mississauga, Liberal 2004–2007, Conservative 2008).[81] But neither they nor the broader Pakistani community have tried to marshal their forces to impress Pakistan's interests on Canadian legislators.[82] Foreign Affairs officials considered reaching out to the diaspora to leverage their ties but considered it too fragmented and under-mobilized to proceed.[83] Canada's contact with the Ismaili Agha Khan Foundation has facilitated some trade and immigration but affects only a small segment of Pakistan's population.[84] Nor does the small number of Pakistani students and tourists travelling to Canada represent an effective bridge between the countries.[85] In 2005 there were 502 student visas, growing to just 902 by 2009.[86] Pakistani tourists, though the trend is headed upward, totalled a miniscule 18,700 in 2010.[87]

Canada's military influence on Pakistan comes through two avenues: its historic peacekeeping role in the region and direct military-to-military ties. Canada was an early participant in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), set up in 1949 to police a ceasefire in Kashmir.[88] Peacekeeping ties were buttressed by Canada's military links with Pakistan's military academies, especially after 1993, when the High Commission in Islamabad added a military attaché and arranged for a Canadian Forces major-equivalent to be posted to the Pakistani army's staff college at Quetta.[89] These ties were further strengthened when a small number of future Pakistani generals completed courses at the Canadian Army Staff College in Kingston during the 1990s. Canadian

Figure 2: Canada has sustained a long military presence in Pakistan, beginning in 1949, when it joined the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Brigadier H.H. Angle (right with UN armband), the first Canadian to command a UN mission, is seen checking the positions of opposing troops in Kashmir in January 1949. (Credit: UN Photo 83976)

policymakers hoped that nurturing close links with the army, given its pre-eminent role in Pakistan and its growing exposure to radical Islamist pressures, would facilitate the transmission of Canadian values.[90] However, Canada's influence on the Pakistani military has always been significantly smaller than that of the US, UK, or China, and it was realized that Canada realistically exerted very little influence.[91] The Pakistan army's consistent preference for technocratic political forms, and occasional

tolerance of democracy and secularism, had far more to do with the British political legacy than any influence Canada has exerted.[92] All ties between the Canadian and Pakistani militaries were terminated in 2001 following 9/11, though some links have since been re-established.[93]

Net Diplomatic Influence and Policy Implications

Canadian aid to Pakistan has formed part of a broader historical effort by the West to combat the appeal of hostile, illiberal ideologies—communism during the Cold War and radical Islamism since the early 1990s. According Pakistan failed state status helped legitimize these efforts, even as the label became increasingly inaccurate. The relative lack of Canadian foreign aid, low levels of bilateral commerce, and the limited range of Canada's direct domestic and military-to-military contacts have significantly limited Canada's influence on Pakistan, despite generally cordial relations. Moreover, Canada's weak position in Pakistan stands in sharp contrast to the much more dynamic roles occupied by Saudi Arabia, China, the US, the EU, Japan, and even the United Arab Emirates.[94] Ottawa is simply not in a position to push forward policies designed to avert state failure in Pakistan, even if they were required. Pakistan is too large and too complex for Canada and its small local footprint to have a meaningful impact.

Historically, fragile state rhetoric has hidden this simple truth from Canadian policymakers, who have often responded to Pakistani developments with unrealistic interventionist policies.[95] Canadian prime minister Louis St. Laurent, for instance, alienated Pakistan with his reluctant support for a Kashmiri plebiscite in the late 1940s.[96] Two decades later, Canada's neutral stance during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War led an angry mob to tear down the Canadian flag at the High Commission.[97] Ottawa's efforts to convince Pakistan to abide by the NPT in 1998 similarly failed, because Canadian policymakers ignored Pakistan's strong strategic interest in deterring India and overestimated the value of Ottawa's diminished aid.[98] More recently, Canadian attempts to foster a Pakistan-Afghan dialogue collapsed in the face of Pakistan opposition.[99] Observers with considerable knowledge of both Canada and Pakistan consider the attempted imposition of Canada's Western, liberal values as foolhardy and inappropriate.[100]

A reasonable Pakistan policy for Ottawa would be one that encourages Pakistan to moderate its domestic and foreign policies, encourages a reduction in defence expenditures and non-proliferation, promotes trade and investment, and obtains access for ODA—all policies that Canadian diplomats have in fact been pursuing with reasonable consistency.[101] To that extent, Canada's policies are most similar to those of the EU, with a shared emphasis on human rights and democratization.[102] What Canada should not do, because it lacks the power and the domestic support, is to play a major role in Kashmir, or intercede between Afghanistan and Pakistan, or India and Pakistan.[103] Canada needs to recognize that as a middle power it can follow no third path, but must remain within the policy range of its alliances.

Notes

1 Considerable thanks are due to four former high commissioners to Pakistan who aided me in this project: Marie-Andrée Beauchemin, David Collins, Louis Delvoie, and Doug Small. Further thanks are due to Victor Carvel for his insights from CIDA's standpoint.

2 Kanti Bajpai, "India and Canada: Moving Ahead," in *Canada Among Nations 2009–2010*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 160.

3 W. M. Dobell, "Canadian Relations with South Asia," in Paul Painchaud, ed., *From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau* (Quebec: Les Presses de L'Universite de Laval, 1989), 356.

4 Dobell, "Canadian Relations with South Asia," 355.

5 M. Raziullah Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982* (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1982), 28–29.

6 Dobell, "Canadian Relations with South Asia," 361.

7 William Milam, *Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting with Failure in South Asia* (London: Hurst, 2009), 243, cited in Richard Bonney, Tridivesh Singh Maini, and Tahir Malik, eds., *Warriors after War* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 31.

8 Here I refer specifically to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI), Investigation Bureau (IB), or the Federal Investigation Service (FIS).

9 Julian Schofield and Michael Zekulin, "Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in post-OBL Pakistan," *Defense and Security Analysis* 27, no. 4 (December 2011): 181–92.

10 Julian Schofield, "Pakistan's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine," in *Routledge Handbook of Insurgency*

and Counterinsurgency, ed. Paul Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (London: Routledge, 2012).

11 Julian Schofield, "The Prospect of a Populist Islamist Takeover of Pakistan," in *Escaping Quagmire: Strategy, Security and the Future of Pakistan*, ed. Usama Butt and N. Elahi (New York: Continuum, 2010), 215–32.

12 Ajai Sahni. "A New Government Takes Charge," 9 June 2005, http://satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/1_19.htm#assessment1.

13 Global Humanitarian Assistance, *Briefing Paper: Pakistan: Country Aid Factsheet* (Somerset: August 2010), 1.

14 United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Reports," http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (accessed 14 January 2012).

15 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, "Pakistan," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/jud-12916929-stl (accessed 14 January 2012); Campbell Clark, "Ottawa Bolsters Aid to Pakistan," *Globe and Mail*, 13 August 2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-bolsters-aid-to-pakistan/article4281763/ (accessed 14 November 2015).

16 David Carment and Yiagadeesen Samy, "Pakistan's Problems Now Ours," *Embassy*, 1 January 2010, http://embassymag.ca/page/view/pakistan-09-01-2010 (accessed 22 January 2012).

17 Ahmad Faruqui and Julian Schofield, "Pakistan: The Political Economy of Militarism," *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development* 2, no. 2 (2003): 5–23.

18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality (accessed 25 July 2014).

19 Interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author, Montreal-Kingston, 23–24 January 2012; interview, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin in discussion with the author, Montreal-Italy, 27 January 2012; interview, David Collins in discussion with the author, Montreal-Kenya, 28 January 2012.

20 Duane Bratt, "Afghanistan: Why Did We Go? Why Did We Stay? Will We Leave?," in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2011), 317, 321.

21 Johannes Braune, *Pakistan's Security Today and Tomorrow*, CSIS (22–23 January 2009), 11, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2013/scrs-csis/PS74-3-2009-eng.pdf (accessed 14 November 2015).

22 Dobell, "Canadian Relations with South Asia," 349, 351–52.

23 Gregory Chin, "Shifting Purpose—Asia's Rise and Canada's Foreign Aid," *International Journal* 64, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 1004; interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author.

24 Stephen Brown, "CIDA Under the Gun," in *Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre?*, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 172–207; Chin, "Shifting Purpose," 994.

25 Louis Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face: A Mission to Pakistan in the 1990s," in *Diplomatic Missions*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy Studies, 1998), 51.

26 Julian Schofield, "Pakistan's Strategic Trade with Afghanistan," *Sicherheit und Frieden* (Security and Peace), 4 (2010): 251–56; Julian Schofield, Brent Gerchicoff, and Jose Saramago, "Afghan Development Through Regional Trade," in *Afghanistan in the Balance: Counterinsurgency, Comprehensive Approach and Political Order*, ed. Hans-Georg Ehrhart (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 141–55; Julian Schofield, "Arms Races and War in the Indo-Pakistan Rivalry, 1947–1971," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 33–49.

27 Julian Schofield, "Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 17, no. 1 (March 2011): 38–49.

28 Bill Gillespie, "Canadian's Terrorism Trial Points to Pakistani Double-Game," *CBC*, 11 June 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/06/10/f-vp-gillespie-pakistan-headley.html (accessed 22 January 2012).

29 Julian Schofield and Jose Saramago, "Pakistani Interests in NATO's Afghanistan," in *Adaptation of NATO*, ed. Natalie Mychajlyszyn, 129–46, University of Manitoba Bison Papers Series 11 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2008), 129–46.

30 Gerald Schmitz, *Canadian Policy Toward Afghanistan to 2011 and Beyond: issues, Prospects and Options* (Ottawa: Reference and Strategic Analysis Division, Parliamentary Information and Research Division, 2010), 7, 17.

31 Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 71; Chin, "Shifting Purpose," 990, 992–993, 1001, 1006.

32 Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face: A Mission to Pakistan in the 1990s," 43.

33 Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, "Preventing, Substituting, or Complementing the Use of Force? Development Assistance in Canadian Strategic Culture," 3, unpublished manuscript, http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2011/Massie-Roussel.pdf (accessed 22 January 2012); John W. Holmes, "Le Canada dans le monde," *Politiqueétrangère* 33, no. 4 (1968): 300; Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada, the United States and NATO: A Tale of Two Pillars," in *North American Perspectives on European Security*, ed. Michael K. Hawes and Joel J. Sokolsky (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 213–15; Jennifer M. Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004), 152; Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 43.

34 Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, and Fen Osler Hampson, *Canada's International Policies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 156.

35 Massie and Roussel, "Preventing, Substituting, or Complementing the Use of Force? Development Assistance in Canadian Strategic

Culture," 9; Brown, "CIDA Under the Gun," 172–207.

36 Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 42; interview, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin in discussion with the author.

37 Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 42.

38 Junaid Ahmad, "Pakistan-Canada Economic Relations," MBA Thesis, Concordia University, 1976, 131.

39 Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 42.

40 Duane Bratt, *The Politics of Candu Exports* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 43, 201; Ahmad, "Pakistan-Canada Economic Relations," 138–39.

41 Ibid., 65–67, 140, 143, 153, 156–59, 162, 168.

42 Ibid., 207.

43 Massie and Roussel, "Preventing, Substituting, or Complementing the Use of Force? Development Assistance in Canadian Strategic Culture," 11, 12.

44 Interview, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin in discussion with the author; Ahmad, "Pakistan-Canada Economic Relations," 144, 154.

45 Jean-Philippe Therien, "Canadian Aid: A Comparative Analysis," in *Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal*, ed. Cranford Pratt (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 324–25.

46 Ahmad, "Pakistan-Canada Economic Relations," 161–62; David Morrison, "The Choice of Bilateral Aid Recipients," 132.

47 Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 89.

48 Duane Bratt, "Tools and Levers: Energy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy," in *Canada Among Nations 2008*, ed. Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 224; Ahmad, "Pakistan-Canada Economic Relations," 137; Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 95.

49 Ahmad, "Pakistan-Canada Economic Relations," 139; Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 96.

50 Bratt, "Tools and Levers," 221–22; Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 109, 112.

51 Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 12, 35, 47, 90.

52 Massie and Roussel, "Preventing, Substituting, or Complementing the Use of Force? Development Assistance in Canadian Strategic Culture," 12.

53 Chin, "Shifting Purpose," 1003; interview, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin in discussion with the author.

54 CIDA, *Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance 2000–2001* (Ottawa: CIDA, 2002), 30, 33, 50-51; CIDA, *Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance 1998–1999* (Ottawa: CIDA, 2000), 32, 53; CIDA, *Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance 1999–2000* (Ottawa: CIDA, 2001), 30, 51.

55 Louis Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 44–45, 47.

56 Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 248.

57 Interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author.

58 Global Humanitarian Assistance, *Briefing Paper: Pakistan: Country Aid Factsheet* (Somerset: August 2010), 2.

59 K. Alan Kronstadt, *Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002*-FY2011, prepared for the Congressional Research Service, using sources from the DoS, DoD, DoA, and USAID, 16 February 2010; Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 247.

60 Global Humanitarian Assistance, *Briefing Paper: Pakistan: Country Aid Factsheet*, 1–2; Anis Cassar, *European Aid to Pakistan: Steadily on the Rise* (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, December 2009), 2–4.

61 CIDA, *Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance 2003-2004* (Ottawa: CIDA, 2005), 30; Government of Canada, "Canada-Pakistan Relations," March 2012, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/pakistan/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/index.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=10&menu=L&view=d (accessed 21 January 2012); Global Humanitarian Assistance, *Briefing Paper: Pakistan: Country Aid Factsheet*, 2.

62 Carl Meyer, "Missed Targets, Wild Optimism as Canada Heads Into the Final Stretch in Kandahar," *Embassy*, 18 May 2011, http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/afpak-05-18-2011 (accessed 22 January 2012).

63 CIDA, *Statistical Report on International Assistance, 2009–2010* (Ottawa: CIDA, 2011), 4.

64 Carment and Samy, "Pakistan's Problems Now Ours."

65 Clark, "Ottawa Bolsters Aid to Pakistan."

66 CIDA, "Millennium Development Goals," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/JUD-13173118-GPM (accessed 1 February 2012).

67 Government of Canada, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2008-2009/inst/ida/ida01-eng.asp (accessed 22 January 2012).

68 Global Humanitarian Assistance, *Briefing Paper: Pakistan: Country Aid Factsheet*, 5.

69 Jonathan Kay, "Jonathan Kay on Pakistan: Why Is CIDA Sending Aid to de facto Enemy?", *National Post*, 1 December 2011, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/12/01/jonathan-kay-pakistan-is-unworthy-of-ottawas-aid/ (accessed 18 January 2012).

70 Tom Hussain, "Foreign Aid to Pakistan is a Victim of Nepotism," *The National*, 5 July 2010), http://journal.probeinternational.org/2010/07/05/foreign-aid-to-pakistan-is-a-victim-of-nepotism (accessed 22 January 2012).

71 Lee Berthiaume, "Progress Slow on Canadian Post-Disaster Commitments in Pakistan, Haiti," *Postmedia News*, CAIDC-RCCDI, 13 Oct 2011, http://www.caidp-rccdi.ca/news/progress-slow-canadian-post-disaster-commitments-pakistan-haiti (accessed 22 January 2012).

72 Shahid Zahur, "No Benefit from US Aid?", *Pakistan Observer*, 22 January 2012, http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=118118_ (accessed 22 January 2012).

73 CIDA, Statistical Analysis and Reporting Section, *Canada's Statistical Report on International Assistance—Fiscal Year 2006–2007* (Gatineau: CIDA, 2009), 32–34, 40, 45.

74 Louis Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 46; interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author; interview, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin in discussion with the author; interview, Doug Small in discussion with the author.

75 Louis Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 57. In 2011, there were just C$549 million in Canadian exports to Pakistan (of which 70 percent were vegetables, metals, and machinery), C$271 million in Pakistan exports (of which 70 percent were textiles and vegetables), and C$54 million in foreign direct investment into Pakistan. See "Pakistan," international.gc.ca; Statistics Canada/Industry Canada, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/tdo-dcd.nsf/eng/Home (accessed 28 October 2011).

76 Alexandre Gauthier and Simon Lapointe, *Canadian Trade and Investment Activity: Canada-Pakistan* (Ottawa: Parliamentary and Information Service, 2010), 2–4; Government of Canada, "Pakistan," http://www.international.gc.ca/world/embassies/factsheets/Pakistan-FS-en.pdf (accessed 21 January 2012); Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, "Canada's Merchandise Trade with Pakistan," http://www.asiapacific.ca/statistics/trade/bilateral-trade-asia-product/canadas-merchandise-trade-pakistan (accessed 1 February 2012); Economy Watch, "Pakistan Exports, Imports and Trade," http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/pakistan/export-import.html (accessed 1 February 2012); interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author; interview, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin in discussion with the author.

77 Asia Trade Hub, "Pakistan," http://www.asiatradehub.com/pakistan/trade.asp (accessed 1 February 2012); interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author; interview, David Collins in discussion with the author.

78 Mohiuddin Aazim, "Top Ten Trading Partners," *Dawn*, 16 January 2012, http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/16/top-ten-trading-partners.html (accessed 1 February 2012).

79 W. M. Dobell, "Canadian Relations with South Asia," 358.

80 Government of Canada, "Canada-Pakistan Relations," http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/pakistan/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_pakistan.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 17 November 2015).

81 Parliament of Canada, "Wajid Kahn," http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=97fa4cf0-c7f7-4b3e-8d59-905a0c93a8d6&Language=E&Section=ALL (accessed 1 February 2012); Tomlin, Hillmer, and Hampson, *Canada's International Policies,*

297; Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 53.

82 Interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author; interview, David Collins in discussion with the author.

83 Interview, anonymous DFAIT employee in discussion with the author, Montreal-Ottawa, 31 January 2012.

84 Interview, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin in discussion with the author.

85 Asia Pacific Foundation, "Opportunity to Market Canadian Education in Pakistan," 21 December 2011, http://www.asiapacific.ca/news/opportunity-market-canadian-education-pakistan (accessed 22 January 2012).

86 Asia Pacific Foundation, "Study Permit Applications Approved to Applicants from Asia," http://www.asiapacific.ca/statistics/immigration/education/study-permits-issued-applicants-asia (accessed 1 February 2012).

87 Asia Pacific Foundation, "Asia Pacific Visitors to Canada," http://www.asiapacific.ca/statistics/immigration/tourism/asia-pacific-visitors-canada (accessed 1 February 2012).

88 Interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author; Massie and Roussel, "Preventing, Substituting, or Complementing the Use of Force? Development Assistance in Canadian Strategic Culture," 13.

89 Interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author.

90 Interview, Louis Delvoie in discussion with the author.

91 Interview, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin in discussion with the author; interview, David Collins in discussion with the author; interview, Doug Small in discussion with the author.

92 Dobell, "Canadian Relations with South Asia," 355.

93 Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 38.

94 Dernd Debusmann, "Pakistan and the Questions of Foreign Aid," *Reuters*, 13 May 2011, http://blogs.reuters.com/bernddebusmann/2011/05/13/pakistan-and-questions-over-foreign-aid (accessed 22 January 2012); Swaran Singh, "Sino-Pak Defence Co-operation: Joint Ventures and Weapons Procurement," *Peace Initiatives* 5, nos. 3–4 (May–December 1999), 12; Wren Elhai and Molly Kinder, "Pakistan Aid Facts," *Rethinking US Foreign Policy Assistance Blog*, 26 August 2010, http://blogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/2010/08/pakistan-aid-facts.php (accessed 22 January 2012).

95 John Meehan and David Webster, "From King to Kandahar: Canada, Multilateralism and Conflict in the Pacific, 1909–2009," in *Canada Among Nations 2008*, ed. Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 279.

96 Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 28–29.

97 Azmi, *Pakistan-Canada Relations 1947–1982*, 33.

98 Louis Delvoie, "Taming the South Asian Nuclear Tiger: Causes and Consequences, and Canadian Responses," in *A Big League Player?*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Martin Rudner, and Michael Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 233–52, 244–45.

99 CBC, "Baird Vows Support for Afghan Women at Bonn Summit," 5 December 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2011/12/05/pol-baird-bonn.html (accessed 22 January 2012).

100 Interview, Doug Small in discussion with the author.

101 Louis Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 45.

102 Saman Kelegama, *EU Trade Policy and Democracy Building in South Asia* (Colombo: Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, 2010), 7, 16–17.

103 Contrary to the views of these authors, see Delvoie, "Diplomacy at the Cold-Face," 47, 50; Louis Delvoie, "Taming the South Asian Nuclear Tiger," 247; Kanti Bajpai, "India and Canada: Moving Ahead," in *Canada Among Nations 2009–2010*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 161.