2013-10-02

# New Institutionalisms and the Resurgence of Traditional Authority in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Buganda Case Study

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New Institutionalisms and the Resurgence of Traditional Authority in Sub-Saharan Africa: the

Buganda Case Study


by


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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS


DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY, ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER , 2013

**ABSTRACT**

The last two decades have witnessed a 'resurgence' of pre-colonially rooted authorities and institutions in the politics of Sub-Saharan Africa. What were once thought to be irrelevant and unfavourable traditional institutions are now a principal dynamic in contemporary Africa's governance and development. What factors can be attributed to this traditional resurgence across the continent? Using data collected from fieldwork in Uganda, three causal factors were identified. The social entrenchment of the traditional institution, a collective sense of disillusionment with the central state and the formulation of new, contextually-based ideas played primary causal roles in the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. Three new institutionalist approaches – historical, sociological and discursive institutionalism – were employed in the identification, analysis and explanation of these causal factors. Therefore, this research also took on a methodological effort to reconcile the differences between often competing new institutionalist approaches and to demonstrate how they may be complimentary to each other.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

## DEDICATION

To all the marginalised and unsung communities,

states and peoples in Africa and beyond.

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# LIST OF SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS AND NOMENCLATURE

| Symbol | Definition |
|--------|-----------|
| KY | Kabaka Yekka or 'The King Alone' party |
| LC | Local Council administrative system |
| NRA | National Resistance Army |
| NRM | National Resistance Movement party |
| SAP's | Structural Adjustment Programs |
| UPC | Uganda People's Congress party |
| | |
| Abataka | Clan leaders of Buganda |
| Baganda | People of Buganda |
| Kabaka | King of Uganda |
| Katikiro | Head of government or 'prime minister' of the Buganda Kingdom |
| Luganda | Language of the Baganda |
| Lukiiko | Buganda's legislative body or 'parliament' |
| Muganda | Single Baganda |
| Ssabataka | 'King-in-waiting' |

*One who sees something good must narrate it.*

Ugandan proverb

# INTRODUCTION

The nature of sub-Saharan Africa's politics of governance and development is undergoing a fundamental change. The last two decades have witnessed a political 'resurgence' of pre-colonially rooted authorities and institutions; traditional and indigenous political structures that were once thought to be irrelevant and unfavourable to 'modern' notions of governance and development. The wake of independence coincided with the undermining, neglect or abolition of traditional authority as political discourses shifted towards nation-building and democratisation across the majority of the continent. For the next twenty-to-thirty years traditional authority remained in relative abeyance. However, since the early 1990's, these same traditional chieftaincies, clan structures and kingdoms have been revitalised as principal actors in local governance and development and, in many cases, have reclaimed a central position in the politics of contemporary African states. Traditional institutions have been constitutionally restored in Ghana,[1] South Africa[2] and Uganda[3] and have become *de facto* governance and development agents in countries such as Nigeria,[4] Somalia[5] and Namibia.[6] Research has uncovered traditional leaders' revitalised roles in administrative functions in Mozambique,[7] judicial processes in

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[1] Ray, Donald I., "Chief-State Relations in Ghana: divided sovereignty and legitimacy" in *Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Power in West African Societies: perspectives from legal anthropology*, eds. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E.A.B. and Zips, Warner (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1998).

[2] Ray, Quinlan, Sharma and Clarke, *Reinventing African Chieftaincy in the Age of AIDS, Gender, Governance and Development,* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011).

[3] Mayiga, Peter, *King on the Throne: the story of the restoration of the Kingdom of Buganda,* (Kampala: Prime Time Communication, 2009).

[4] Osaghae, Eghosa, *Structural Adjustment and Ethnicity in Nigeria*, Research report No 98, (Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1995).

[5] Simons, A., "Somalia: the structure of dissolution" in *The African State at a Critical Juncture,* ed. Villalon, L. and Huxtable, P. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

[6] Keulder, Christiaan, "Traditional Leaders" in *State, Society and Democracy: a reader in Namibian politics,* ed. Keulder, Christiaan (Windhoek, Namibia: Macmillan Education, 2000).

7 West, Harry G. and and Kloeck-Jensen, Scott "Betwixt and Between: 'traditional authority' and democratic decentralization in post-war Mozambique", African Affairs, 98 (1999); Buur, Lars and Kyed, Helene Maria,

Malawi,[8] public health initiatives in Ghana[9] and environmental protection in Zimbabwe.[10] Traditional authorities have been found to be a 'unique linkage' between the contemporary state and civil society[11] as they display a propensity for development,[12] their democratic compatibility[13] and conduciveness to decentralisation.[14] Why this traditional resurgence? Why is this occurring simultaneously across the continent? What factors can be attributed to the resurgence of traditional authority in sub-Saharan Africa?

**Conceptual Clarification: 'traditional authority' and the 'traditional resurgence'**

Before an inquiry into the traditional resurgence is presented, both 'traditional authority' and its 'resurgence' first need to be conceptualised.

Donald I. Ray provides the most concise yet comprehensive definition of 'traditional authority'. Ray conceptualises traditional authority as "those monarchs, other notables holding

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"Contested Sources of Authority: re-claiming state sovereignty by formalizing traditional authority in Mozambique", Development and Change, 37(4) (2006) and de Sousa Santos, Boaventura, "The Heterogenous State and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique", Law and Society Review, 40(1), (2006).

[8] Muriaas, Ragnhild, "Local Perspectives on the 'Neutrality' of Traditional Authorities in Malawi, South Africa and Uganda", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 47(1) (2009).

[9] Ray, Donald I. and Eizlini, Gaelle, "Chiefs as Development Agents: Ghanain pilot study" in *Reinventing African Chieftaincy in the Age of AIDS, Gender, Governance and Development,* ed. Ray, Donald and Reddy, P.S (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011) and Ray, Donald and Brown, Sherri A., "Building HIV/AIDS Competence in Ghana – Traditional Leadership and Shared Legitimacy: a grassroots community intervention best practices model" in Ray et al., *Reinventing African Chieftaincy.*

[10] Daneel, M.L.,"Environmental Reform: a new venture of Zimbabwe's traditional custodians of the land", *Journal of Legal Pluralism*, 37(36), (1996).

[11] Ray, Donald I. and van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E.A.B., "The New Relevance of Traditional Authorities in Africa. The conference; major themes; reflections on chieftaincy in Africa; future directions", *Journal of Legal Pluralism,* 37(38), (1996) and van Kessel, Ineke and Oomen, B.M., "One Chief, One Vote: the revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid South Africa", *African Affairs,* 96(385), (1997).

[12] Ray, et al., "Reinventing African Chieftaincy".

[13] Logan, Carolyn, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors and Hybrid Democrats: popular perspectives on the co-existence of democracy and traditional authority", *Journal of Modern African Studies,* 47(1) (2009) and Williams, J. Michael, "Leading from Behind: democratic consolidation and the chieftaincy in South Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies"*, 42(1) (2004).

[14] Murray, Christina, *South Africa's Troubled Royalty: traditional leaders after democracy,* (Leichhard: Federation Press, 2004) and Williams, "Leading from Behind".

offices, heads of extended families, and office holders of decentralised politics whose offices are rooted in the pre-colonial period".[15] [16] The term encompasses pre-colonially rooted traditional ethnic associations, familial structures, chieftaincies, clan structures and kingdoms. Therefore, traditional authority not only represents traditional leaders but also the traditional institutions which they are a part.

Unlike the concept of 'traditional authority', 'traditional resurgence' has not yet been fully conceptualised. The concept is best understood in its historical context. The recession and neglect of Africa's traditional authority occurred, at times, during the colonial era and, primarily, in the immediate post-colonial independence period.[17] Where traditional authority survived into the post-colonial period, in the majority of cases, it was either neglected, weakened or abolished. Africa's newly independent leaders sought to transcend pre-colonially rooted and/or ethnic identities in order to establish a central one around the nation.[18] Additionally, as it was in many cases, traditional leaders were perceived as co-conspirators with the colonialists and, therefore, viewed as unfavourable to post-colonial notions of self-determination and modernisation. The recession and neglect of traditional authority lasted until the early 1990's when it was

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[15]Ray and Eizlini, Chiefs as Development Agents, 36.

[16]If these authorities and institutions are a creation of the colonial or post-colonial state but still involve indigenous elements and peoples, they are termed 'neo-traditional' (Ray and Brown, 2011, 93).

[17]Depending on the nature of the colonialists policies, traditional authority either remained or receded. For example, Englebert (2002) notes the differences in 'colonial culture' between the British and the French towards traditional authority. The British used forms of indirect rule which 'preserved the existence and integrity' of some traditional authority while French forms of direct rule did not (56).

[18]Kizza, Immaculate, *Africa's Indigenous Institutions in Nation Building: Uganda,* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999).

[19] Logan, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors", 108 and Muriaas, "Local Perspectives on the 'Neutrality of Traditional Authority", 28.

[20]Englebert, Pierre, "Patterns and Theories of Traditional Resurgence in Tropical Africa", *Mondes en développement,* 118 (2002): 52.

'revitalised'[19] or 'reinvigorated',[20] either formally or informally re-instated and re-incorporated, in a variety of different ways, in local governance and development and/or involved in the politics of modern African states. It should be noted that this traditional resurgence is an on-going process. Traditional authority is continually 'adapting'[21] to, or 'evolving'[22] with, the current political context and, in many cases, is vying for greater authority and autonomy. For example, in Niger some chiefs are currently making attempts for formal incorporation into local governance[23] while the Baganda of Uganda are continually pushing for a federal relationship with the central government.[24]

There have been a number of approaches proposed to answer why this resurgence is occurring. Many have focused on the 'holes' left by weak states while others concentrate on its timing concurrence with other socio-political developments across the continent. Pierre Englebert concisely articulated four basic theoretical speculations.[25] The most common approach posits that the resurgence is a consequence of weak or failed states. This approach maintains that low state capacity and political legitimacy inspire a 'self-help' revitalisation of pre-existing local structures of governance and development. The second theoretical approach correlates the resurgence with democratisation. Democratic processes are viewed as needing to incorporate pre-existing local structures in efforts to decentralise authority and mobilise populations. Democracy is also viewed as an opportunity for socio-political groups to define or re-define their

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[21] Logan, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors".
[22] Ray et al., *Reinventing African Chieftaincy.*
[23] Lund, Christian, "Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa", *Development and Change*, 37(4) (2006).
[24] Mutibwa, Phares, *The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics*, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2008).
[25] Englebert, "Patterns and Theories of Traditional Resurgence".

political identities. Another theoretical approach focuses on the timing concurrence between the traditional resurgence and economic liberalisation. Local traditional leaders and structures are viewed as a source of 'cost recovery'; essentially filling the gap left by the retrenching state. The final theoretical speculation takes an international political economy approach, positing that weakened state sovereignty, in the context of globalisation, has paradoxically strengthened local structures. These speculations within the current literature will be further discussed in the second chapter of this paper.

Despite the quantity and quality of theoretical approaches, there remained to be undertaken an in-depth and empirically-based inquiry into the phenomenon. Therefore, it was necessary, for comparative purposes, to employ a qualitatively-based case study approach to the resurgence in order to identify and conceptualise the specific causal mechanisms involved. Prior academic focus on traditional authority has acknowledged that understanding the dynamics of this traditional resurgence may help to determine its limitations and potentials for contemporary African governance and development.[26]

In order to properly identify the causal factors involved in the traditional resurgence, a case study approach to the phenomenon was adopted. The resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom, located centrally in the Republic of Uganda, was chosen for both comparative and practical reasons. As it will be discussed in the third chapter of this paper, the Buganda Kingdom's resurgence follows similar patterns of traditional resurgence across sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, previous experience in the field by the researcher proved that the case-study provided a wealth of avenues to pursue the inquiry. After receiving ethics approval from the

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[26] Ray et al., *Reinventing African Chieftaincy*; Logan, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors" and Williams, "Leading from Behind".

University of Calgary, data was collected through in-depth, open-ended interviews with local research participants whom are particularly experienced with the phenomenon. The responses were then validated with primary and secondary literature resources.

The approaches used in the identification and analysis of causal factors were guided by the invaluable responses of the research participants. The research participants particularly emphasised the importance of history and the socio-political and institutional context in which the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom took place. Therefore, a historical institutionalist approach was employed to trace the processes and determining factors of the institution's formal re-instatement. However, the identification and analysis of specific causal factors necessitated the incorporation of other new institutionalist approaches. Both sociological institutionalism and ideational institutionalism were employed according to the analytical requirements of certain causal factors. Therefore, this research took on not only the inquiry into a political phenomenon, but also a methodological effort to reconcile the differences between often competing approaches in comparative politics and to demonstrate how they may act as complimentary to each other. This incorporation of new institutionalist approaches will be further discussed in the third chapter of this paper along with its significance and challenges in the final conclusions.

By utilising these methods, methodology and approaches, three causal factors were identified in the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. The first, and the most significant finding, is the social entrenchment of the political institution. The Buganda Kingdom was constructed and maintained as a socio-cultural institution as much as it is a political one. Sociological processes, including the clan culture and inter-generational socialisation and enculturation, framed a Baganda-specific 'logic of appropriateness' which maintained the inter-subjective connection between the social and political and framed the Baganda's interests pertaining to a re-

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instatement of their traditional kingdom. A historical institutionalist approach helped to identify this causal factor while sociological institutionalism helped in its understanding and explanation. The second causal factor found, a collective sense of disillusionment with the central state, also contributed to framing the Baganda's logic. The Baganda's disillusionment with the central state is related to both an existential, historically-based disillusionment of an 'imposed' and 'alien' institution and a perceived failure of the contemporary Ugandan state. Underdevelopment, dictatorial practices, corruption and patrimonialism are the main indicators of Uganda existing as a failed state, according to the research participants. Historical and sociological institutionalism were both employed to understand and explain this causal factor. Finally, tracing the historical course of the Buganda Kingdom identified the formulation of new, institutionally-structured and contextually-based *ideas* as a causal factor of the resurgence. A new political context turned into an opportunity for the Baganda to assert their interests in the political discourse of Uganda; an idea to create political capital to manifest such interests. The Ugandan government, on the other hand, had used the idea that the resurgence could secure political capital in a new, democratically-based institutional setting. It will be shown, through ideational institutionalism, that the Baganda gained influence in the discursive interaction with the Ugandan central government, resulting in the re-instatement of the traditional Buganda Kingdom.

The findings of this research project present a new way of approaching the traditional resurgence and open up new questions for further research. They challenge concepts common in the study of comparative politics and provide opportunities to engage with the current literature on African traditional authority, governance and development. Concerning the methodological synthesis of new institutionalist approaches, this analytical endeavor has hopefully demonstrated

a reconciliation, despite the challenges incurred, so as to provide the most accurate depiction of this specific socio-political reality.

## CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE RESURGENCE OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

The growing academic focus on traditional authority and institutions has inevitably led to a number of theoretical speculations regarding their current re-vitalisation. Intuitively, academics have attempted to characterise the relationship between African state weakness and the renewal or creation of forms of political identities and authorities, such as traditional ones, that are alternative to the central state. This premise is maintained in subsequent theoretical approaches which include analyses of different institutional changes that are perceived to have created the conditions conducive to the growth of alternative sites of political authority. Theoretical approaches focusing on democratisation and structural economic adjustment view their respective institutional analyses as creating 'space' for alternative identities or perpetuating state weaknesses where traditional leaders and institutions 'fill in the gaps'. Finally, an international political economy approach is considered where global forces are implicated as causal elements of the resurgence. These theoretical approaches provide useful insights into the dynamics of the resurgence, yet they also highlight the need for an in-depth inquiry into the phenomenon.

**The Weak State Theory**

The most commonly referenced theory of the traditional resurgence rests on the notion that the resurgence is a product of weak or 'failed states'.[27] Throughout the literature on traditional authority references are made to 'state capacity'[28] and/or 'political legitimacy'[29] in regards to

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[27] The literature regarding the traditional resurgence lacks a comprehensive conceptualization of 'state failure'. The limitations of this MA thesis preclude a definitive discussion or conceptualization of 'state failure'. Hopefully this can be dealt with in future Ph.D. and subsequent research. However, the preceding chapters of this paper deal with the concept of 'state failure' as characterized by the research participants.

[28] See, for example, Englebert, Pierre, "Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", *Political Research Quarterly*, 53(7) (2000).

state strength or weakness and their respective relationships to the traditional resurgence. The theory's underlying assumption, that alternative forms of collective identity and action are formed or revamped in the relative weakness or failure of the central state, is the underlying premise of subsequent theoretical approaches.

The weak state theory of traditional resurgence perceives the revitalisation of traditional institutions as a result of the central state's low capacity and/or political legitimacy. These state deficiencies are viewed as instigating an 'opportunistic disengagement' by 'outlying social groups'[30] whom, subsequently, form or revert to ethnic and/or cultural political affiliations. Herbst, for example, focuses on the geographic constraints that hinder the consolidation of state authority as well as the lack of service provisions sufficient for governance and development, resulting in the prevalence of ethnic or cultural identities in competition with that of the post-colonial state.[31] Reddy and Biyela also found that the Amakhosi (Zulu Royals) have been consolidating their authority and roles in local governance in the Kwa-Zulu Natal province of South Africa in response to insufficient state infrastructure and poor service delivery.[32] Lund also views the "incoherence and incapacity of the state" as encouraging "alternative sites of authority".[33] As it will be discussed in the concluding chapter, traditional leaders and institutions are found to have distinct sources of political legitimacy and, often, the political legitimacy of

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[29] See, for example, Wunsch, James S., "Refounding the African State and Local Self-Governance: the neglected foundation", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 38(3) (2000).

[30] Baker, Bruce, *Escape from the State: political disengagement and its consequences,* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000).

[31] Herbst, Jeffrey, *States and Power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control,* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[32] Reddy, P.S. and Biyela, B.B. "Rural Local Government and Development: a case study of Kwazulu-Natal: quo vadis?", in *Grassroots Governance? Chiefs in Africa and the Afro-Caribbean,* eds. Ray and Reddy (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2003).

[33] Lund, "Twilight Institutions", 689.

the central state is in question. Traditional authority, therefore, is perceived to offer a legitimate and capable alternative to governance and development. Despite this intuitive connection made between state weakness and the flourishing of traditional authority, further research has refuted the notion, perceiving a negative correlation between the two variables.

Englebert refuted the weak state theory of the traditional resurgence by arguing that it was "relatively strong states"[34] that are demonstrating the most compelling cases of the phenomenon. The relatively strong states of South African and Uganda, as put forth by Englebert, have undergone constitutional recognition and, in the case of South Africa, significant incorporation of traditional authority in local governance and development. These cases were then compared to 'relatively weak' African states –Angola, DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan- that have not experienced such a degree of traditional revitalization. State weakness *alone*, therefore, does not appear to be the determining causal mechanism of the resurgence.

The current academic focus on state strength and the traditional resurgence references 'state capacity' and 'political legitimacy' as indicators of state strength or weakness. No comprehensive discussion has been provided on the connotations of the concept of 'state strength', creating a problem for Engleberts' assertions of 'relatively' strong and weak African states, or how the concepts of 'state capacity', 'political legitimacy' and 'state strength' relate to one another in Africa's socio-political context. Ray, however, does provide a useful articulation of the *roots* or *bases* of political legitimacy for traditional authority and the post-colonial African state which will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

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[34] Englebert, "Patterns and Theories of Traditional Resurgence", 56.

The weak state theory provided the building blocks for subsequent theories of the traditional resurgence which have incorporated the analysis of state capacity and political legitimacy. However, the most phenomenal feature of the resurgence is its development across the continent during a common temporal period. The weak state theory neglects this feature; offering no explanations of the timing concurrence of the traditional resurgence and its development throughout the majority of the continent, regardless of its variations. It is, therefore, difficult to overlook historical contingencies and the widespread political trends that the continent was undergoing when traditional authority began its re-ascension. Two crucial institutional reforms were sweeping the continent as traditional authority was re-engaging in local governance and development. Specifically, the traditional resurgence shared a timing concurrence with the waves of democratization and economic restructuring across sub-Saharan Africa. Inevitably, two theoretical approaches have developed focusing on these specific processes.

**The Democratisation Theory**

Building upon the weak state theory, the democratisation theoretical approach incorporates the analysis of dramatic systematic and institutional changes that created the socio-political conditions which were conducive to collective identity construction or reconstruction. Maintaining the determinants of low state capacity and political legitimacy, this theoretical approach acknowledges the timing concurrence of the resurgence and identifies the process of democratisation as an additional variable. Furthermore, the process of 'democratic consolidation' is believed to be, paradoxically, consolidating traditional institutions in modern African governance and development.

Democratisation is perceived to be not only a systematic and institutional change, but also an inter-subjective development where opportunities to define or redefine collective identities become available. A transition to democracy 'opens up the public space'[35] where collective identities, alternative to the central state, are reified or created.[36] In the context of low state capacity and political legitimacy, new or pre-existing socio-political identity constructions are 'released' in democratic transitions and manifested through political affiliations and local forms of collective action.[37] Democratisation, then, revealed "the failure of the post-colonial African state to promote identity and facilitates efforts to return to traditional communities or to imagine new ones".[38]

Current research is adding some validity to this theoretical speculation through its focus on the role of traditional authority in, and its potential opportunities it may provide for, democratic governance in Africa. Ironically, what was once perceived as a threat to democracy is now being viewed as one of democracy's greatest assets across the continent. Research is uncovering how traditional clan leaders, chiefs and kings are 'reinventing themselves'[39] or 'evolving' along with the state[40] and are often viewed as necessary components of democratic consolidation in a context of low state capacity[41] or simply as an institution attempting to

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[35] Laakso, Liisa and Olukoshi, Adebayo, "The Crisis of the Post-Colonial Nation-State Project in Africa" in *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa,* eds. Olukoshi and Laakso (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1996).

[36] Ottaway, Marina, *Africa's New Leaders: democracy or state reconstruction?* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

[37] Laakso and Olukoshi, "The Crisis of the Post-Colonial Nation-State".

[38] Englebert "Patterns and Theories of Traditional Resurgence", 58.

[39] Ray et al., *Reinventing African Chieftaincy.*

[40] Beall, Jo, Mkhize, Sibongiseni and Vawda, Shahid, "Emergent Democracy and 'Resurgent' Tradition: institutions, chieftaincy and transition in Kwazulu-Natal", *Journal of Southern African Studie*s, 31(4) (2005) and Williams, "Leading from Behind".

[41] Buur and Kyed, "Contested Sources of Authority".

maintain its relevance in a changing political context.[42] Ray and van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal have shown that traditional leaders are acting as a unique linkage between civil society and the state.[43] Their argument is supported with evidence of chiefs providing effective and efficient opportunities for political participation while acting as spokespersons and intermediary representatives of their 'constituencies'.[44] Paradoxically, elected governments have come to rely on traditional authorities in the wake of increasing demands for services with limited resources.[45] Traditional leaders and structures have been utilised in decentralisation exercises,[46] as partners in election coordination[47] and as effective local level political mobilisation agents.[48] The central state is also perceived to rely on traditional authority exceeding mere practical terms. While traditional leaders rely on state recognition, African governments have come to rely on their local *legitimacy* for policy implementation and democratic procedures.[49]

The main argument of this approach, that democratisation has opened up the space for traditional institutions to flourish, provides unique insight into the effects of institutional changes on political identity formation. However, questions remain regarding the interpretation of democracy and the institutional changes it entails by local actors and communities. What does democracy really *mean* in their respective contexts? What are the specific requirements to be

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[42] Logan, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councilors".
[43] Ray and van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, "The New Relevance of Traditional Authorities in Africa".
[44] Williams, "Leading from Behind" and van Kessel and Oomen, "One Chief, One Vote".
[45] Logan, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors", Murray, *South Africa's Troubled Royalty,* de Sousa Santos, "The Heterogeneous State" and West and Kloeck-Jenson, "Betwixt and Between".
[46] Buur and Kyed, "Contested Sources of Authority" and Wunsch, "Refounding the African State".
[47] Oluwu, Bamidele, "Redesigning African Civil Service Reforms", *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 37(1) (1999) and Wunsch, "Refounding the African State".
[48] Oluwu, "Redesigning African Civil Service" and Wunsch, "Refounding the African State".
[49] van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal E, Adriaan B., "Chieftaincy in Africa: three facets of a hybrid rule" in *African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscap,*eds. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk (Hamburg, Lit Verlag, 1999), Englebert, "Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States" and Ray et al., *Reinventing African Chieftaincy.*

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considered 'democratic'? Is democracy simply procedural or does it entail a certain ethos? Quite often African countries claiming to be democratic are demonstrating strong anti-democratic behaviors.[50] Allegations of electoral irregularities, intimidation and assault of political opponents, massive corruption and patrimonialism are abounding in contemporary African 'democracies'. The assertion of this theoretical approach, therefore, becomes problematic and new insights into the localised concept of democracy and its relation to the traditional resurgence are therefore required.

**The Economic Adjustment Theory**

The second theoretical approach incorporating an analysis of widespread institutional changes in Africa, concurring with the temporal period of the traditional resurgence, focuses on structural economic adjustment as a causal mechanism. The economic adjustment theoretical approach of the traditional resurgence perceives alternative forms of political identities and authority resulting from low state capacity and political legitimacy. These state deficiencies, however, are believed to have been further perpetuated by the consequences of structural economic adjustments undertaken by many African states.

The adoption of structural adjustment programs (SAP's) by post-colonial African governments during the 1980's entailed large-scale structural and institutional changes. These adjustments included, for example, changes in the structural economic direction of states away from industry and towards a concentration on the exportation of primary commodities, the privatisation of public industries and a significant reduction in government spending on social

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[50] This point will be discussed in the following chapters.

programs and service provisions.[51] This 'retrenchment of the state' is viewed as the catalyst to the inter-subjective re-interpretation and/or reification of political identities. As capitalist processes subordinated the state to an inferior position, the state's political legitimacy and capacity to form a national ethos were further compromised.[52] Consequently, as local communities were 'fending for themselves', they were also defining or redefining who 'they' were. State identity became increasingly irrelevant in the wake of SAP's while local communities began to "develop alternative modes of identity, including traditional ones".[53] Osaghae and Vaughan, for example, witnessed an increase of ethnic associations in Nigeria following the country's adoption of SAP's.[54] Traditional ethnic and cultural communities were interpreted as being the centre for increasing forms of informal economic activities and alternative routes to local governance and development. The decrease in service provisions provided by the central state has witnessed local communities' increased involvement in provisions such as in education and health care delivery.[55] Local traditional leaders and institutions are viewed as a resulting source of 'cost recovery';[56] essentially filling the gap left by the retrenching state.

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[51] Abrahamsen, Rita, *Disciplining Democracy: development discourse and good governance in Africa,* (London: Zed Books, 2000): 1-24.

[52] Laakso, Liisa, "Changing Notions of the Nation-State and the African Experience: Montesquieu revisited" in *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa,* eds. Olukoshi and Laakso (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1996) and Englebert, "Patterns and Theories of Traditional Resurgence".

[53] Englebert, Pierre, "Born-again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies,* 40(3) (2002).

[54] Osaghae, Eghosa, *Structural Adjustment and Ethnicity in Nigeria,* (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1995) and Vaughan, Olufemi, *Nigerian Chiefs: traditional power in modern politics*, (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000).

[55] Donkoh, Wilhelmina J., "The Developmental and HIV/AIDS-Fighting Roles of Traditional Rulers: agency of festivals" in Ray et al., *Reinventing African Chieftaincy.*

[56] Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy.*

**The International Political Economy Theoretical Approach**

The final theoretical approach to the resurgence of traditional authority across sub-Saharan Africa employs a more multi-dynamic analysis. The international political economy approach includes the analyses of the democratisation and economic adjustment theories yet views these specific processes as Western-centric and imposed institutional changes that have threatened the very identities of post-colonial African states. Traditional authorities are believed to have resurged as a form of grass-roots defense against the negative repercussions of 'modernisation', as a form of political identity in an increasingly globalised context or as an intentionally driven phenomenon by international forces seeking to utilise pre-existing local structures during the processes of grand systematic and institutional changes.

As sub-Saharan Africa becomes increasingly globalised, the centrality of the African state is perceived to be under existential threat. In the context of low state capacity and political legitimacy, the economic and political conditionalities attached to the aid of international financial institutions and donors is viewed as weakening the sovereignty and integrity of the central state in Africa. Boaventure de Sousa Santos believes that traditional authorities have resurged as an expression of an "alternative modernity"[57] in the context of neoliberal globalisation. Regarding the combination of the weak African state, the "devastating consequences of structural adjustment" and political modernisation, de Sousa Santos argues that

> [...] the African nation-state has lost centrality and dominance by
> the emergence of powerful suprastate political processes. However,
> in an apparently paradoxical way, these same processes have led to
> the emergence of infrastate actors equally determined, albeit for very
> different reasons, to question the centrality of the nation-state. A case

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[57] de Sousa Santos, "The Heterogeneous State", 61.

> in point is the re-emergence of traditional authorities as a social and
> political actor [...][58]

de Sousa Santos, therefore, implicates the international political economy as weakening the

African state, creating the socio-political conditions for alternative centres of authority to

emerge.

A second route of the international political economy approach emphasises the

resurgence of traditional authorities as intended mechanisms of political and economic

modernisation by international political forces. Englebert highlights how the World Bank and

international donors began inquiring into traditional leaders and institutions as useful agents and

structures in the processes of political decentralisation and austerity programs.[59] A World Bank

research paper found that local traditional structures could be utilised during the modernisation

processes while viewing traditional authorities as being a source of 'stability' during rapid

institutional changes.[60]

**Moving Forward Towards an Empirical Inquiry into the Traditional Resurgence**

The theoretical approaches to the traditional resurgence provide useful insights into the dynamics

of institutional changes and political identity formation as well as both internal and external

elements of the phenomenon. However, each theoretical speculation frames the resurgence in a

functionalist manner; as supplementing the defunct functions of a weak state, regardless of the

additional processes identified by each approach. Most importantly, each approach remains mere

speculative and provide no in-depth or empirical account of the resurgence. An in-depth inquiry

into the phenomenon is therefore required in order to properly identify and conceptualize the

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[58] Ibid.
[59] Englebert, "Patterns and Theories of Traditional Resurgence, 60-61.
[60] Dia, Mamadou, *Africa's Management in the 1990's and Beyond: reconciling indigenous and transplanted* institutions, (Washington: World Bank, 1996).

causal mechanisms involved for future comparative studies on the resurgence of traditional

political institutions.

## CHAPTER 3: THE RESEARCH PROGRAM

*"We can place the objectifications of the most remote period and the most alien culture in understandable relationship to the familiar (that is, previously understood) context of our own surroundings."*

-Jürgen Habermas[61]

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The quote above by Jürgen Habermas reflects the ontological position of this research project. Understanding reality, the 'objective', is intrinsically linked to human subjectivity.[62] Concepts and categories within political science, therefore, are perceived to reflect the view of their creators and innovators. With this in mind, conceptualization and understanding concepts becomes a primary problem for political research. Understanding becomes more problematic when considering phenomena in a different context, such as in different polities and cultures with unique historical and socio-political conditions. As Habermas points out, our understandings of the concepts, ideas, institutions and behaviours, for example, of other polities and cultures are informed by our preconceptions. These preconceptions are formed and shaped within our own context. Accordingly, research must appreciate the 'unique' in every circumstance.

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[61] Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1: reason and the realisation of society,* (Bonston: Beacon Press, 1986): 294.
[62] della Porta, Donatella and Keating, Michael, "How Many Approaches in the Social Sciences? An epistemological introduction", in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: a pluralist perspective,* eds. della Porta and Keating, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Yanow, Dvora and Shwartz-Shea, Peregrine, *Interpretation and Method: empirical research methods and the interpretive turn,* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006).

This interpretive ontology is followed by an interpretivist epistemology which seeks to understand phenomena by engaging with subjective knowledges.[63] Analysis of phenomenon in a 'different' context entails understanding contextual subjective knowledges and the inter-relations between context and another's' inter-subjective interpretations. Social reality, in all contexts, is not simply 'out there' waiting to be discovered but is relational and subjective.[64] It is dynamic and continually in flux; susceptible to human volition and re-interpretations. Therefore, if we seek to understand a political phenomenon and its causal mechanisms, especially in a significantly different context, we must interact with local interpretations.

These ontological and epistemological positions are a result of prior experiences in the field by the researcher. Having spent several months in Africa on numerous occasions, the researcher found a divergence in the perceptions and meanings of various concepts often used in political science. 'Development', 'democracy' and 'traditional resurgence' are just a few concepts which demonstrated the differences in perceptions and meanings between the researcher and local interpretations. The need for an interpretivist ontology and epistemology is also buttressed by the current literature on African politics. Prior research has uncovered various disparities between common understandings and the 'realities' of political Africa.[65] Still, many academics make attempts to apply near 'meaningless' (from an African perspective) concepts, variables and co-variational analyses to political phenomena in Africa. In order to move past the

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[63] Della Porta and Keating, "How Many Approaches in the Social Sciences?"

[64] Hesse-Biber, Sharlene Nagy and Leavy, Patricia, *Emergent Methods in Social Research,* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2006).

[65] See, for example, Schaffer, Frederic C., *Democracy in Translation: understanding politics in an unfamiliar culture*, (New York: Cornell University, 1998).

use of insufficient conceptualizations and their resulting distorted reflections of reality, this

research project has been programmed for "extracting new ideas at close range".[66]

**Methodology**

In conjunction with these ontological and epistemological positions, this research project sought

to understand the *meanings* of causal factors, and their interrelations, involved in the traditional

resurgence using a qualitative or interpretivist methodological approach. Qualitative research

programs have been shown to be especially capable of capturing meanings and treating variables

as dynamic, historically contingent and inter-relational[67], leading to new or refined conceptual

innovations.[68] This has two implications for this research project. First, instead of attempting to

completely isolate key variables, the researcher will be analyzing their interrelations as a whole,

emphasizing the importance of history, context and complex multi-causality. Parsimony will

therefore be exchanged for analytical depth. Second, the researcher will allow individual

interpretations to guide the conceptualization of key variables with the hopes of discovering or

refining existing concepts as a contribution to academia focused on traditional authority and

African governance and development. This research program is considered to be part of a larger

research endeavor which can hopefully contribute to future qualitative and quantitative

investigations by "elucidating features of a larger class of similar phenomenon".[69]

In order to extract inter-subjective interpretations and to elucidate the importance of

context, the research question was approached using a single-N case study. A single case study

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[66] Collier, David, "Data, Field Work and Extracting New Ideas at Close Range", *APSA Organised Section in Comparative Politics,* 10(1) (1999).
[67] Mahoney, James, "Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics", *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(122) (2007).
[68] Collier, "Data, Field Work and Extracting New Ideas".
[69] Gerring, John, "What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?", *The American Political Science Review,* 98(2) (2004).

maintains the research's ontological coherence as they are considered as 'interdependent wholes' rather than containing individual variables.[70] Case studies allow for the exploration of context and the complexity of outcomes for comprehensive understandings while providing opportunities for exploring new causal mechanisms and their relations to each other.[71] Inquiring into real-world phenomenon with these provisions required selecting the case on the dependent variable.[72]

*The Buganda Case Study*

The Buganda Kingdom case study was chosen for both comparative and practical reasons. The temporal period of the Kingdom's abolition and its resurgence correlates with the general temporal period of the recession and re-ascension of traditional authority across Africa, making the case suitable for cross-case comparisons. The degree of the Buganda Kingdom's resurgence has also been noted as being "relatively extensive"[73] providing a near 'ideal case' to conduct the research. Through preliminary research and previous experience in the field, the researcher was aware that the Baganda are enthusiastic to speak of their traditional institutions and leaders and were more than cooperative to share their interpretations. Additionally, the history of the Buganda Kingdom and its current roles in governance and development, along with its relations to the central Ugandan state, have been extensively documented in local newspaper articles, books and academic journals.

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[70] della Porta and Keating, "How Many Approaches in the Social Sciences?"
[71] Gerring, "What is a Case Study".
[72] Thomas, George, "The Qualitative Foundations of Political Science Methodology", *Perspectives on Politics,* 3(4) (2005).
[73] Englebert, Pierre, "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40(3) (2002).

*Methods*

For the purpose of maximum validity in the research findings,[74] a dual-method approach to data collection was undertaken. The primary sources of data were collected through individual interviews with participants who were particularly knowledgeable and experienced with the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. Interviewees were found through social networking and by the recommendations made by prior participants within the Buganda Kingdom's administrative establishment. The response rate obtained was 100% as each participant I sought to include in the study agreed to participate. The number of participants totalled twelve including Baganda Members of Parliament, political science, history and linguistic professors at Makerere University, ministers within the Buganda Kingdom's institutional structure, employees of the Ministry of Tourism and Culture and Makerere University graduate students involved in pursuing the interests of the Kingdom.[75] Interviews were conducted as open-ended discussions, allowing participants to expand on their individual interpretations. Interviews began with the question 'In your view, what factors have contributed to the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom?' with subsequent probing questions into each individual answer. The recorded interviews were then transcribed, verbatim, and a serious of 'analytical codes' [76] were applied to similar responses. The research findings represent a conversion of individual interpretations into the aggregate level of analysis and a synthesis of conceptually-similar factors indicated by the participants.

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[74] Berg, Bruce L., *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences,* 4th Ed. (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 2001).

[75] The researcher is aware that the representativeness of this participant sample is limited due to the limited sampling of participants. Because of the limited nature of this research, and obstacles such as time constraints, the researcher chose to utilise participants he knew were willing and able to fully engage with the research question. Therefore, ordinary Baganda were not included in the interview sampling.

[76] Hesse-Biber and Leavy, *Emergent Methods in Social Research.*

Responses by the participants were then validated and expanded upon with the analysis of secondary sources. Local newspapers, books, information websites and prior research in academic journals were analytically coded along with the interview findings. These secondary sources were also used for the intricate details that respondents were unable to provide including specific dates, policies and programs and people involved in certain events. As it will be discussed below, research findings have been presented using a 'narrative strategy'; temporally ordered and sequentially unfolding events that the case study data presented.[77]

**The Approaches: synthesizing 'new institutionalisms'**

*"Indeed there should be that softening of these boundaries, given that the several approaches should be viewed more as complimentary rather than competitive explanations for political phenomenon".*

-Guy Peters[78]

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The approaches used in the analysis of the phenomenon and its causal factors were determined by the research participants themselves. Research participants particularly emphasized the importance of history and the socio-political context in which the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom took place. Considering the participants' responses and, essentially, an inquiry into an institutional change (the resurgence of a traditional institution) by the research question, a historical institutionalist approach had provided the strongest opportunity to understanding the traditional resurgence. However, research findings have also presented socio-

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[77] Mahoney, "Qualitative Methodology".

[78] Peters, Guy, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: the 'new institutionalism'*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Continuum, 2005):2.

cultural and ideational factors that were best understood and explained through sociological and

ideational institutionalism, respectively. Therefore, this research project also sought to bridge a

divide between three new institutionalisms according to the analytical requirements of the

phenomenon and its specific causal variables.

*Historical Institutionalism*

Historical institutionalism places the Buganda Kingdom's resurgence within a historical and

contextually complex perspective. History is not viewed as a "chain of independent events"[79] or

variables but as a complex and contingent path. The historical institutionalist approach will show

how the historical course of the Buganda Kingdom demonstrates an instance of institutional

'path dependence'. Paul Pierson outlines the key claims in the notion of path dependence:

> [...] specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from
> similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be
> possible; large consequences may result from relatively 'small' or
> contingent events; a particular course of action, once introduced,
> can be virtually impossible to reverse; and consequently, political
> development is often punctuated by critical moments or junctures
> that shape the basic contours of social life.[80]

Dynamic historical processes and interconnecting causal mechanisms can be traced and

characterised, respectively, by utilising this approach.[81] It helps to explain moments of

institutional persistence and stability and identify the critical juncture(s)[82] that ignited a

significant moment of institutional change or, in this case, resurgence. Institutions, both formal

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[79] Steinmo, Sven, "Historical Institutionalism", in *Approaches and Methodologies,* Eds. della Porta and Keating, 128.
[80] Pierson, Paul, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", *American Political Science Review*, 94(2) (2000): 251.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Immergut, Ellen M., "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism", *Politics & Society,* 26(1) (1998): 9.

and informal,[83] are believed to shape specific historical paths and trajectories by constraining or enabling certain options of collective behavior.[84] As the case study will demonstrate in the Buganda Kingdom's case, "initial policy choices, and the institutional commitments that grow out of them, are argued to determine subsequent decisions"[85] and outcomes.

As it will be shown in the following chapter, understanding the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom within its historical context is crucial. Unanimously, research participants drew out a historical path of the traditional institution and highlighted the important critical junctures which helped to extract causal mechanisms of the Kingdom's resurgence. The initial configurations of the socio-political institutions set it forth on a history of path dependence; a dynamic central to the institutions re-instatement. Ultimately, historical institutionalism helped to identify specific causal mechanisms while sociological institutionalism and ideational institutionalism helped to understand and explain them.

*Sociological Institutionalism*

By elucidating specific causal factors through historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism has helped to understand the socio-cultural dynamics of the resurgence which, in this case study, is essential. Particularly, research participants highlighted socio-cultural dynamics, such as the Baganda's clan culture and processes of inter-generational socialisation and enculturation, implicated in the Kingdom's re-instatement. Within Buganda society and culture is a specific 'logic of appropriateness' pertaining to their perceptions of the institution

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[83] Helmke, Gretchen and Levitsky, Steven, "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: a research agenda", *Perspectives on Politics,* 2(4) (2004).
[84] Ibid.
[85] Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science,* 19.

and their interests in its re-instatement. This 'logic of appropriateness' is also historically

contingent, providing a perfect realm to synthesise historical and sociological institutionalisms.

Sociological institutionalism places the resurgence within a culturally specific context.

Human beings can be viewed as being "fundamentally social beings" generally following a

'logic of appropriateness'; "social norms that govern everyday life and social interaction".[86] The

approach "shows how the institutions in which an individual lives, through socialisation and

learning, shape the very values and desires of that individual".[87] Culture, identified by Douglass

North as the "intergenerational transfer of norms, values and ideas",[88] is perceived to influence

collective behaviour and social outcomes.[89] Sociological institutionalists perceive culture and

institutions as overlapping, with culture creating "moral or cognitive templates for interpretation

and action".[90] The definition of institutions, generally defined by some historical institutionalists

simply as 'rules'[91] or a collection of "norms, rules, understandings and routines"[92] can,

therefore, accommodate the inclusion of culture. The concept of 'tradition' can also compliment

historical institutionalism "by showing how beliefs are transmitted, adapted and reinvented over

time".[93] A challenge comes from setting the parameters of culture as an institution and its

influence on specific outcomes, which Keating warns against using as a "catch-all devise".[94]

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[86] Steinmo, Sven, "Historical Institutionalism", 126.
[87] Ibid. 104.
[88] North, Douglass, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 50.
[89] Keating, Michael, "Culture and Social Science", in *Approaches and Methodologies,* Eds. della Porta and Keating.
[90] Hall, Peter and Taylor, Rosemary, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", *Political Studies,* 44(5) (1996).
[91] See, for example, Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism", 126.
[92] March, James and Olsen, Johan, *Rediscovering Institutions: the organizational basis of politics,* (New York: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1989).
[93] Keating, "Culture and Social Science", 116.
[94] Ibid.

*Ideational Institutionalism*

Ideational institutionalism places the resurgence within a discursive context. Ideational, 'discursive'[95] or 'constructivist'[96] institutionalism is an umbrella concept for an institutionalist approach that "takes into account the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse that serve to generate those ideas".[97] Ideas, according to this approach, are "central to change".[98] They are viewed as the "forces that help individuals formulate their preferences and are the currency for the discursive interactive processes that help produce policy change".[99] Actors are perceived to follow a 'logic of communication' as they "engage in the process of generating, deliberating and/or legitimising ideas about political action in an institutional context".[100] This approach can display the 'directions of discursive interaction'; essentially showing how the Baganda were able to consolidate their ideas and interests in Uganda's political discourse. Ideas are also helpful in this methodological endeavor to synthesise new institutionalist approaches as, according to Schmidt, "they show how ideas and discourse can advance knowledge in the social sciences across methodological approaches".[101]

The following chapters will show how the formulation of new ideas played a critically determining role in the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. These ideas were both institutionally-structured and contextually-based. Ultimately, through the creation of new ideas, the Baganda were able to secure more influence in their discursive interactions with the central

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[95] Schmidt, Vivien, "Reconciling Ideas and Institutions through Discursive Institutionalism", in *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research,* Eds. Béland, Daniel and Cox, Henry, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011).
[96] Hay, Colin, "Ideas and the Construction of Interests", in *Ideas and Politics,* Eds. Béland and Cox.
[97] Schmidt, Vivien, "Discursive Institutionalism: the explanatory power of ideas and discourse", *The Annual Review of Political Science,* 11 (2008): 47.
[98] Ibid. 53.
[99] Schmidt, "Reconciling Ideas and Institutions", 48.
[100] Ibid. 47.
[101] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism", 304.

government leading towards their Kingdom's re-instatement. These ideas were also contingent upon historical factors, especially the final historical critical juncture of the institution, and framed by the Baganda-specific 'logic of appropriateness'. This is the site in which the research is hopeful in synthesising these three new institutionalist approaches.

There are, of course, challenges and contradictions in synthesising these approaches. These will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this paper. This methodological endeavor is not meant to transcend the debates between institutionalist camps but to simply move forward and "declare peace and consider how these different approaches interrelate, how they complement one another [...] and what they contribute to our knowledge of political social reality".[102] As Hall and Taylor argue, "the time has come for greater interchange among them".[103]

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[102] Schmidt, "Reconciling Ideas and Institutions", 48.
[103] Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", 955.

## CHAPTER 4: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF UGANDA AND BUGANDA

A brief summary of Ugandan and Bugandan history and politics is provided for some contextual clarity. The following chapters will provide an in-depth historical account of the Buganda Kingdom as a socio-political institution and will outline the political relationship between the traditional institution and the Ugandan central government.

**Uganda**

The Republic of Uganda is a small, land locked country in east Africa.[104] After a seventy-four year long history under British colonialism, the country gained full independence in 1962 followed by decades of internal conflict and political instability. This conflict and instability has been characterised as being a result of disparities in political representation and development between ethnically-based regions.[105] The country consists of over ten major ethnic groups (of 2% of the population or higher) and a number of smaller ones with over forty different languages amongst them.[106] Northern Uganda, primarily inhabited by the Acholi and the Langi, has undergone a history of relative underdevelopment and political underrepresentation in Uganda's national politics compared to the country's southern and central regions. Many of Uganda's political and military conflicts have been based around this north-south divide.[107]

The first twenty-five years of Ugandan independence witnessed the removal of six presidents, none of which were through democratic means. The first Prime Minister, Milton

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[104] A current map of Uganda can be found in the Appendix.
[105] Kasozi, A.B.K., *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda,* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1994).
[106] Dagne, Ted, "Uganda: current conditions and the crisis in north Uganda", *Congressional Research Service Report*, (2010).
[107] Kasozi, *The Social Origins of Violence.*

Obote, a northern Ugandan, had dismissed the Kabaka[108] of Buganda and President of Uganda

Mutessa II, making himself both head of government and head of state.[109] A military coup led by

Gen. Idi Amin, from northwestern Uganda, in 1971 removed Obote from power. The subsequent

eight years of Amin's rule were marred with ethnically-based, government-driven violence and

devastating underdevelopment. Gen. Amin was overthrown in 1971 by Obote supporters

strengthened by Tanzanian military forces. Between 1979-1981 three Baganda presidents led

Uganda.[110] The first two, President Yusuf Kironde Lule and President Lukongwe Binaisa, were

deposed quickly for issues ranging from rampant corruption to centralising the decision-making

processes. The third Muganda President, Paulo Mwanga, led Uganda into its first general

elections since the country's independence. Obote, returning from exile in Tanzania after Amin's

defeat, was declared the winner of the 1980 elections. However, these elections were widely

believed to be "massively rigged",[111] resulting in a five-year guerilla war fought by the National

Resistance Army (NRA) under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni.

Since 1985 President Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM)

government have held power. Until 2005, the 'Movement system' was a 'no-party' system with

all candidates being constitutionally forced to run as NRM candidates or independents.[112] Often,

the term 'NRM' and 'government' are used interchangeably in Uganda. A referendum changed

this policy and today over ten political parties are represented in the Parliament of Uganda.[113]

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[108] 'Kabaka' is 'King' in Luganda, the language spoken by the Baganda. The 'Baganda' are the people of Buganda.
A 'Muganda' is a single Baganda.
[109] Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor,* 68.
[110] Ibid. 173-189.
[111] Interview: Faculty of History, Makerere University, Kampala, July 13, 2012.
[112] Carbone, Giovanni, *No-Party Democracy? Ugandan politics in comparative perspective,* (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2008).
[113] Uganda's parliament is a unicameral body.

Shortly after taking power, Museveni embarked on a large-scale decentralisation exercise, creating a hierarchical Local Council (LC) administrative structure from the LC I (village level) to the LC V (district level).[114] As it will be discussed in the following chapters, this administrative structure mirrored the Buganda Kingdom's original institutional structure.

Recently, President Museveni has been under strong criticism by his political opponents and international donors and trading partners. Rampant corruption at all levels of government, electoral irregularities witnessed by external observers, power centralisation and the perpetuation of ethnically-based political divides are examples of issues tied to Museveni's tenure as president.[115] In 2011, a series of 'Walk-to-Work' protests were started by Museveni's primary political opponent, Dr. Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change party, in response to the government's inability to lower commodity prices and counter corruption. These protests lasted months and were marred with allegations of excessive force by the security forces.[116]

**Buganda**

The Buganda Kingdom is located in central Uganda.[117] It contains the largest ethnic/cultural group of Uganda (approximately 17% of the country's population) and encompasses the largest territory compared to all of Uganda's other traditional kingdoms.[118] [119] Traditionally, the Kingdom is headed by the monarch (Kabaka). The Kingdom has historically been administered

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[114] Nsibambi, Apolo, *Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda,* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998).

[115] See, for example, Baragaba, Julius. "Donors put pressure on Museveni over poll reforms", *The East African,* Jun. 20-26, 2011, No. 868 and Mwenda, Andrew. "Uganda's anti-corruption rituals", *The Independent,* Aug. 10-16, 2012, Iss. 226.

[116] See, for example, Mafabi, David. "Museveni remark on walk-to-work is careless- Besigye", *The Daily Monitor*, July 18, 2011, No. 199.

[117] A current map of Buganda can be found in the Appendix.

[118] Mafeje, Archie, *Kingdoms of the Great Lakes Region: ethnography of African social formations,* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998).

[119]Other traditional kingdom's in Uganda include the Bunyoro, Busoga and Toro Kingdoms.

through a 'dual socio-political administrative system' with regional chiefs or clan leaders as administrative agents.[120] There are forty-six clans currently recognised by the Kabaka, all of whom are represented by their respective clan leaders in the Kingdom's 'Lukiiko', or 'parliament'.

The traditional Kingdom had re-emerged, albeit as a significantly different political institution, in the mid-1990's following decades after its abolition. As a traditional social and political institution, the Kingdom and its political actors have maintained local legitimacy rooted in the pre-colonial period. The era of colonialism significantly impacted the institution by strengthening some if its elements while incorporating it into the larger, colonial-enforced protectorate. Ugandan independence witnessed a series of political struggles, ultimately culminating in a military attack on the Kingdom and the constitutional abolition of all traditional authority across the country. The following chapters will provide an in-depth historical account of Buganda's political history and analyses of the processes leading to its resurgence.

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[120] This 'dual socio-political administrative system' will be discussed in the following chapters.

**CHAPTER 5: THE COURSE OF THE BUGANDA KINGDOM AS A SOCIAL AND**

**POLITICAL INSTITUTION: PATH**

**DEPENDENCE AND CRITICAL JUNCTURES**

In order to achieve as much of an understanding as possible of a political phenomenon in a culturally differentiated context, this research took a participant-guided approach. In their complex and multi-dynamic accounts of the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom, research participants explained the inter-connected factors and processes involved. The most emphasised dynamic by every participant was the traditional institutions' historical path; from its pre-colonial inception to the contemporary resurgence. The temporal periods and critical junctures identified in this chapter have not been arbitrarily designed but are products from the invaluable responses gathered from Baganda and non-Baganda participants involved in this research.

Research participants highlighted four historical junctures pertaining to the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. The first reaches far into the past of pre-colonial Buganda where the initial decisions regarding the configuration of the traditional institution set forth a history of institutional path dependence. Along the historical path of the institution are three critical moments, or junctures, of institutional change which had a lasting impact on the context of Buganda's resurgence. The colonial experience, the first critical juncture identified by participants, helped to maintain and strengthen core elements of the traditional institution. The second critical juncture, the processes in which the Kingdom was abolished, illuminates certain social dynamics created that would have a lasting effect on Buganda's resurgence. Finally, research participants emphasised the period immediately preceding the resurgence and the political factors and discursive elements involved in the traditional institutions' re-instatement.

As it will be specified in the next chapter, tracing the historical course of the Buganda Kingdom has helped to identify three causal factors of its political resurgence.

**Pre-Colonial Buganda and the Configuration of a Socio-political Institutional Structure**

*"At the time the colonialists came, after the mid-nineteenth century, they found the Kingdom was already in place and it had been for many hundreds of years. And the systems governing the Kingdom were there. All the cultural systems were there. All these were properly functioning under the leadership of the Kabaka of Buganda".*[121]

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The founding of the Buganda Kingdom and the establishment of its social and political institutional structure had far-reaching implications for its future. The decisions made in formatting the traditional institution set forth a historical path which helped to realise the Kingdom's resurgence in the modern era. Although elements of the institution were distorted through historical processes, the essence, or core dynamics, of the Kingdom remained throughout time. In particular, it was the dual socio-political institutional structure, facilitated at the time of its creation, of the Buganda Kingdom that set the traditional institution on a course of path dependence and social entrenchment.

The history of Buganda as a social and political institution dates as far back as the fourteenth century where the historical trajectory of the Kingdom, known only through oral traditions, began with the first Kabaka, Kintu.[122] Prior to Kintu's arrival, Buganda was an uncentralised collection of clans;[123] all roughly equal in social stature and military might and

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[121] Interview: Ministry for Youth and Employment of the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, August 14, 2012.

[122] Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor*.

[123] In this context, 'clans' are understood to be "a patrilineal or matrilineal line of people descending from a common ancestor" (Kizza, 1999).

governed by their respective clan leaders (Abataka).[124] Following his conquest of the territory of Buganda, Kintu and local clan leaders cooperated to establish what is commonly understood to be Buganda's 'constitution'. Though unwritten, this constitution established the "dual structure of Buganda's socio-political administrative system";[125] a structure which socially and culturally entrenched the traditional institution's political components in the everyday life of the Baganda.

The decisions made by Kabaka Kintu and the clan leaders during the construction of Buganda's constitution had established the basic functioning's of the Kingdom. The most significant dynamic of the institution's orientation is its complex dual socio-political administrative system which the constitution outlined. This 'dual system' established distinct yet intrinsically connected political and social administrative structures. Regarding the political component of this administrative system, the constitution established political offices headed by the Katikiro, who is commonly understood to be the equivalent to a prime minister, representing the Kabaka on political issues.[126] [127] Following the Katikiro in the political administrative structure was a hierarchical order of county chiefs (Ow'Essaza), sub-county chiefs (Ow'Eggombolola), parish chiefs (Ow'Omuluka) and village chiefs (Mutongole) who were granted authority over their respective constituencies. Chiefs were appointed by other chiefs above them in the hierarchical structure up to the county chief who was appointed directly by the Kabaka. A visual representation of this political structure is shown in figure 1. Most importantly,

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[124] Ibid.

[125] Kizza, *Africa's Indigenous Institutions.*

[126] Like many political arrangements, the Kabaka's role was similar to that of a 'Head of State' as he was considered "over and above politics"(Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Aug. 3, 2012).  The Kabaka, however, was the supreme political authority of the Kingdom with all decisions related to the functioning of the Kingdom and the appointments of all other authorities vested in him (Kizza, 1999)

[127] Other offices, including the equivalents to a 'Commander-in-Chief, and 'Admiral of the Navy, and an 'Overseer of the Royal Line', were also created.

this political administrative structure was "firmly anchored on the basic unit, the family

(enda)".[128] The family is considered to be part and parcel of the hierarchical political structure

with family elders acting as familial representatives. A group of families constituted a village, a

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┌─────────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐
│ Ethnic groups   │ ───▶ │ Kabaka       │
│ Head/Monarch    │      │ (Monarch)    │
└─────────────────┘      └──────────────┘
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| Katikiro (Prime Minister) | Musaji (Commander-in-Chief) | Gabunga (Admiral of the Navv) | Kimugwe (Overseer – Royal Line) |

| Ow' Essaza (County Chief) | Ow' Essaza (County Chief) | Ow' Essaza (County Chief) | Ow' Essaza (County Chief) | Ow' Essaza (County Chief) |

| Ow' Eggombolola (Sub-county Chief) | Ow' Eggombolola (Sub-county Chief) | Ow' Eggombolola (Sub-county Chief) | Ow' Eggombolola (Sub-county Chief) |

| Ow' Omuluka (Parish Chief) | Ow' Omuluka (Parish Chief) | Ow' Omuluka (Parish Chief) | Ow' Omuluka (Parish Chief) |

| Mutongole (Village Chief) | Mutongole (Village Chief) | Mutongole (Village Chief) | Mutongole (Village Chief) |

| Enda (family) | Enda (family) | Enda (family) | Enda (family) | Enda (family) | Enda (family) |

**Figure 1: Buganda's Dual Administrative System: Political Component - Offices[129]**

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[128] Ibid. 5.

[129] Kizza, *Africa's Indigenous Institutions,* 35.

group of villages constituted a parish and so on, up to the highest point of the hierarchical structure. This cemented the family as an integral part of the political structure and cemented the political structure as an integral part of being a Muganda, essentially entrenching the political in the everyday lives of the Baganda.

The social component of the dual administrative system is distinguished from the political one, yet the two are inextricably linked and mirror each other in structure. The social component evolved around a clan system set up to maintain individual pre-Buganda clan identities. The family is also set up as the basic unit of the clan system, essentially forming a large extended family. Clans were granted authority by the Buganda constitution to mediate disputes, to deal with matters of culture pertaining to their specific clan and second candidates to the Kabaka for appointees to various offices.[130] A hierarchical social order was constructed pertaining to the Kingdom's social structure with the family as the first building block of this social administrative system. Above a single family is a small collective of other close families (Lunyiriri) following sub-divisions (Mutuba and Siga) and clan leaders (Kika). A visual representation of this social structure is shown in figure 2.

Further entrenching the Buganda institution in the culture and identity of the Baganda was the lineage system set up for the Kabaka's clan. Clan membership of the Baganda is patrilineal as clan members are essentially part of a large extended family. Therefore, Baganda are expected to marry exogenously from their respective clans. This social norm helped to establish familial relations between the clans and provide equal opportunities for individual clans

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[130] "Background on Buganda". http://www.buganda.com/bugintro.htm (accessed 24 May 2012).

to become members of the Kabaka's royal clan. For instance, the son of the Kabaka was considered part of a specially constructed 'royal clan' that did not follow patrilineal descent. This meant that any clan could marry into the royal family and produce a future king.[131] As a



**Figure 2: Buganda's Dual Administrative System: Social Component - Units[132]**

Muganda Member of Parliament shared:

> There is no special clan in Buganda. Every Kabaka takes after his mother's clan. Every other clan has a chance of being on the throne. Once one is proclaimed Kabaka then automatically he belongs to his mother's clan [or special clan]. Now his son will belong to the clan of the woman he married and he will have to marry outside his own clan. So, every Muganda owns the institution.[133]

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[131] "Background on Buganda" (accessed 24 May 2012).

[132] Kizza, *Africa's Indigenous Institutions,* 36.

[133] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.

This complex, yet highly effective and efficient, institutional structure helped in developing the Buganda Kingdom as the economic and military hegemon in the East Africa region. A Muganda history professor stated that: "Before the contact with whites Uganda had different kingdoms at all levels of economic, political and social development. Buganda was the giant in the region".[134] The Kingdom developed a system of royal tax collection, an army and naval forces, elaborate infrastructure and "a comprehensive, efficient and impressive judicial system".[135]

The basic configuration of the Buganda Kingdom, set up in its constitution at its founding, linked the social and the political of society. Significantly, the primary link of the dual socio-political structure is the family. This enmeshed a Muganda with all Baganda and connected the Baganda with direct links to the top of both hierarchical structures: the Kabaka. The political, therefore, was created as personal. This holistic institutional structure became part of what it *means* to be a part of the Kingdom and set the institution on a historical path that attests to its social and cultural entrenchment. As the historical course of the Buganda Kingdom demonstrates, this initial configuration would be difficult to abandon, despite the critical junctures the institution would undergo.

**The First Critical Juncture: British colonialism and indirect rule**

*"Everything in Uganda started with Buganda. The Baganda welcomed the European explorers and eventually the 1900 Agreement came about. That is the foundation for the modern Uganda".[136]*

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[134] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.
[135] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, July 26, 2012.
[136] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.

In certain respects, Buganda's colonial experience resulted in both the weakening and strengthening of the Kingdom as a political institution. The Buganda Kingdom became subject to British colonial 'indirect rule', essentially replacing the Kabaka as the Kingdom's highest authority with British colonial administrators. Concurrently, the colonial experience expanded the Kingdom's territorial boundaries and allowed for, in relative terms, a significant degree of autonomy and privilege within the greater Uganda Protectorate. Most importantly, however, was the maintenance, and even strengthening, of Buganda's dual socio-political administrative structure throughout the colonial period.

Like many of Britain's colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, Buganda and the greater Uganda Protectorate were brought under a policy of 'indirect rule' following British conquest of the territory. Buganda's colonial period began with an 'agreement' between Kabaka Mutessa I and British colonial authorities which officially granted the imperial power the highest political authority of the Kingdom yet vested a significant degree of autonomy in the traditional institution.[137] According to Charles Mayiga, this was a calculated agreement by the Kabaka who was aware of British military supremacy and whom also had the 'foresight' to construct a political alliance with the colonialists in order to remain the political hegemon in the rest of the Protectorate.[138] Indirect rule, therefore, buttressed the relative hegemony of the Buganda Kingdom's social and political status in the region. However, as the next chapter will discuss, the British failed to secure a sense of political legitimacy over the Baganda, resulting in an

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[137] "Background on Buganda" (accessed 24 May 2012).
[138] Mayiga, Charles, *King on the Throne: the story of the restoration of the Kingdom of Buganda,* (Kampala: Prime Time Communications, 2009): 10.

existential disillusionment with the central state. This existential disillusionment would later contribute to framing the Baganda's interests in a political resurgence of the Kingdom following its abolition.

The British colonial policy of indirect rule allowed the Kingdom's administrative structure to continue albeit as a subject of the British Empire. British colonial administrators were 'impressed' with the organisational structure of the Kingdom and sought to maintain and utilise it throughout the rest of the Protectorate.[139] Baganda chiefs were transformed into colonial agents who were assigned the role of creating and supervising the Buganda style of administration in neighboring districts and kingdoms. The Baganda also co-operated with the British to suppress resistance from the rest of the Protectorate, specifically from the Bunyoro Kingdom, resulting in the annexation of half of Bunyoro's territory to Buganda.[140] This territorial expansion and co-operation with the British solidified Buganda's political and economic dominance within the greater Protectorate, manifesting the Kabaka's prior 'foresight'. As a 'reward' for assisting the British in establishing the Uganda Protectorate, the Buganda Kingdom and British colonial administrators signed the Buganda Agreement of 1900.[141]

The 1900 Agreement essentially cemented the British policy of indirect rule and Buganda's privileged status within the greater Protectorate. It officially maintained Buganda's relative degree of autonomy and granted the Kingdom private land estates to assist in its development.[142] Despite some changes to the political component of Buganda's administrative structure, including the conversion of the Kabaka's traditional gatherings into a regular council

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[139] Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor,* 9-12.
[140] "Background on Buganda" (accessed 24 May, 2012).
[141] Oloka-Onyango, J. "The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 15(2) (1997).
[142] Kizza, *Africa's Indigenous Institutions*, 63.

known as the Lukiiko,[143] the Kingdom's dual socio-political administrative structure remained intact and continued to be utilised by the British as indirect administration and imposed in the rest of Uganda throughout the colonial period.

The British policy of indirect rule and the decision to maintain and utilise the Buganda Kingdom's dual socio-political administrative structure throughout the rest of the Uganda Protectorate further entrenched the traditional institution as Uganda moved towards independence. Buganda's privileged and semi-autonomous status within the Protectorate made the Kingdom "almost a state within a state"[144] with far reaching implications for the future of the traditional institution and Uganda as an independent state. As independence neared, Buganda's institutional structure remained as socially and politically entrenched as it was constructed at its founding. However, the political strength of Buganda, relative to the rest of Uganda, set it on a course towards its next critical historical juncture which essentially dismantled the core political components of the traditional institution.

**The Second Critical Juncture: independence and the abolition of traditional institutions in Uganda**

*"The way the Buganda Kingdom was abolished was not popular. It was violent, it was unlawful, it was undemocratic. So it was a question of time before they [the Baganda monarchists] could regroup, re-energise and come back".[145]*

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[143] The Buganda Lukiiko is considered the parliament of Buganda. It's institutional structure resembles the British parliamentary structure with a cabinet, ministerial offices and representatives from each clan and special interest groups. All members of the Lukiiko, however, are unelected and subject to the Kabaka's recognition.
[144] Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor,* 5.
[145] Interview: Attorney-General's Office of the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 17, 2012.

The political events following the independence of Uganda represented a critical juncture for the Buganda Kingdom as a political institution. After initially securing its dual socio-political institutional structure in the immediate independence period, a political power struggle culminated into a constitutional abolition of all traditional political institutions in Uganda. The Buganda Kingdom not only lost its privileged status within the greater Uganda, but also its political component of its dual institutional structure. This historical juncture, therefore, dissolved the Buganda Kingdom, albeit until its resurgence, as a political institution. Furthermore, the manner in which the Kingdom was abolished greatly contributed to the Baganda's disillusionment with the central state; an inter-subjective interpretation that would later strengthen the interests of the Baganda and affect the political discourse leading towards the institutions resurgence.

The processes leading to the abolition of traditional institutions in Uganda trace back to the constitutional negotiations during the country's immediate pre-independence period. Before the British were to grant sovereignty to the state of Uganda, parliamentary consensus had to be reached regarding Uganda's Independence Constitution. Of the issues concerning the Independence Constitution, the question of Buganda's status within the greater Uganda was the most prominent and contentious issue.[146] Constitutional negotiations lasted seven years (1955-1962) resulting in Buganda gaining full federal status.[147] The federal relationship established between the Kingdom and the central government maintained Buganda's pre-colonial rooted

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[146] Mayiga, *King on the Throne,* 56-85.
[147] The other pre-colonial kingdoms of Uganda were granted a semi-federal status while non-monarchial regions were to be administered directly by the central government.

dual socio-political institutional structure and granted its administration with the same level of autonomy it had enjoyed in the colonial era.

This outcome of the constitutional negotiations was a result of a political alliance created between the Baganda monarchists and one of Uganda's leading political parties[148]. The Uganda People's Congress (UPC) party, led by Milton Obote, sought to secure Buganda's political support due to the historic political power the Baganda had wielded.[149] [150] The Kabaka Yekka, or 'the King Alone', (KY) party was the established Buganda political party; formed by Baganda elites in order to protect and advance the interests of the Kingdom. The UPC touted the interests of Buganda, presenting the perception of being a natural political ally for the Baganda.[151] The alliance between KY and UPC continued into independence, as their coalition formed a majority of seats in Uganda's first independent parliament in 1962. Milton Obote became the country's first Prime Minister while Kabaka Mutessa II assumed the largely ceremonial role of President. The results of Uganda's first independent parliamentary elections indicated a continuation of the historical path the Buganda Kingdom, as a socio-political institution, had followed. With Kabaka Mutessa II as President of Uganda, it was perceived that the Buganda institution would remain firmly established. However, political junctures began to indicate a crisis for the political institution.

Two years following Uganda's independence and the formation of the KY/UPC coalition government, Prime Minister Obote began to manoeuvre against the political power of the KY

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[148]Ibid.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Because the Buganda Kingdom contains the largest ethnic group, it was also perceived as containing the largest 'ethnic vote' in Uganda.

[151] Ibid.

party and the Buganda establishment as a whole.[152] Phares Mutibwa articulates Obote's reneging

of the KY/UPC alliance as a political pattern that has occurred throughout Uganda's history.

Mutibwa posits that

> [...] throughout Ugandan history – and therefore Uganda politics-
> all those who have come to power in Uganda [including the
> colonialists] have used the Buganda Kingdom as the springboard
> of their rise to power. Buganda has proven to be the main factor
> necessary in anyone's ambition to assume leadership [...] but as
> soon as the leader gets to the top of the wall and into the house, he
> kicks [Buganda] away.[153]

According to Mutibwa, Obote opportunistically exploited the Buganda Kingdom's political

power and interests to secure political authority but reneged on his alliance with the Baganda to

further his own political ambitions. As a history professor at Makerere University shared,

Obote's interests were focused on "centralising political authority around himself".[154]

The first instance of hostility between the UPC and the KY was a political move by Obote which

threatened the territorial integrity of the Buganda Kingdom.[155] In 1964 Obote introduced a

parliamentary bill calling for a referendum on the return of the counties of Buyaga and

Bugangazzi to the Bunyoro Kingdom; counties that were acquired by Buganda from the colonial

era. Despite Baganda President Mutessa II's refusal to sign the bill, the referendum commenced

and the two counties were transferred from Buganda to Bunyoro.[156] This act by Obote and the

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[152] Obote's central focus was to move away from ethnically-based or regional-based politics towards nation-building. The Baganda, on the other hand, sought to maintain their traditional, pre-colonial autonomy through federalism. As the historical course of the Buganda case study illustrates, these competing ideals have, so far, been irreconcilable. The questions surrounding ethnicity and nation-building in Africa are abound and beyond the scope of this thesis. They do, however, provide ample opportunity for future Ph.D. and subsequent research.
[153] Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor,* xii.
[154] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.
[155] Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor,* 52-84.
[156] The 1964 referendum results saw 82% of Buyaga and Bugangazzi voters supporting a return of their counties to the Bunyoro Kingdom (Adhola, "The referendum of the Lost Counties").

UPC created a strong rift between the Prime Minister and the Baganda for the rest of the Kingdom's political existence.

Following the loss of Buganda's acquired territory, the Baganda KY party initiated a political attack on Prime Minister Obote.[157] A KY Member of Parliament introduced a bill calling for an inquiry into allegations of Obote's involvement in smuggling resources out of Zaire while supporting rebels in the neighboring country. In response, Obote "illegally" suspended the Independence Constitution, dismissed the office of the President, vested all executive powers in himself and quickly created what is now known as the 'pigeon-hole' constitution.[158] These political developments culminated into what is now commonly referred to in Uganda as the '1966 Crisis'.

With the dismissal of Kabaka Mutessa II as President of Uganda and the new, autocratically constructed constitution, the Buganda Kingdom sought to separate from the rest of the country.[159] The Buganda Lukiiko passed a resolution demanding that the central government completely depart from the Kingdom's territory. Prime Minister Obote responded by placing the country under a state of emergency and ordered the military, under the command of Col. Idi Amin, to attack the Buganda establishment. The Ugandan army attacked Buganda's parliament and the Kabaka's palace, killing thousands of Baganda civilians in the process. Kabaka Mutessa II was able to escape and fled into exile in Britain, never to return to the Kingdom. The '1966 Crisis' was followed by the "imposition"[160] of Obote's Republican Constitution which officially abolished all the traditional kingdoms in Uganda.

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[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Interview: Attorney-General's Office for Local Government of the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 17, 2012.

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The political events of Uganda's independence culminated in the abolition of pre-colonial rooted political institutions across the country. The Buganda Kingdom lost the political authority it held in the pre-colonial period and its privileges it had maintained throughout the colonial era, with the Uganda state now as the centralised holder of political power. However, as it will be shown, the Buganda Kingdom, as a socio-political institution, had only incurred a juncture which effectively abolished only the political components of the institution. It also contributed to the Baganda's sense of disillusionment with the central state; a primary causal factor in the political resurgence of the Kingdom. The various social and cultural elements of the Buganda Kingdom remained intact leading towards the traditional institutions' resurgence as a political institution in Ugandan governance and politics.

**The Third Critical Juncture: the NRA guerilla war and the restoration of the Buganda Kingdom**

*"The 'Bush War' was fought in Buganda for a reason. The fact that this community, more than any other, had suffered the brunt of political tyranny and dictatorship and the people here were more willing and available to fight to overthrow those regimes".[161]*

*"Museveni allowed the restoration precisely because he wanted political capital out of them [the Baganda]".[162]*

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The restoration of traditional institutions in Uganda followed another critical juncture in the Buganda Kingdom's historical course. The guerilla war that removed President Obote from

[161] Interview: Ministry of Justice, Constitutional Affairs and Research for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 17, 2012.
[162] Interview: Faculty of History, Makerere University, Kampala, July 13, 2012.

power concurred with the realisation of a political alliance between the Baganda and the National Resistance Army (NRA) rebels. This political alliance lasted through the National Resistance Movement's (NRM) construction of a new constitution which, ultimately, re-formalised the recognition of traditional authorities and institutions. However, it was not merely the ousting of an anti-monarchial regime that resulted in Buganda's resurgence but also a growth of *ideas*, as opportunistic as they were, on both sides of the political equation between the Baganda and the NRM.

The twenty-seven years that the Buganda Kingdom endured political abolition were characterised by internal conflict and political instability across Uganda. As it was outlined in the previous chapter, the country had undergone a number of undemocratic leadership changes. The 1980 elections that brought Obote's second assumption to the presidency were widely regarded as being heavily manipulated by Obote and the UPC, igniting Museveni's guerilla war.

The NRA guerilla war was a significant process leading to the restoration of the Buganda Kingdom and the other traditional institutions across Uganda. What is commonly referred to as the 'Bush War' was waged predominately in the northern Buganda district of Luwero. Museveni and the NRA relied heavily on the local Baganda who supported the guerilla fighters to depose President Obote.[163] The Baganda provided food, shelter, communication channels and fighters for the resistance. Prominent Baganda royal family members joined the ranks of the NRA and Ssabataka[164] Mutebi himself toured the liberated areas of Buganda to provide moral support to the guerilla fighters.[165] The efforts of the NRA and Baganda alliance culminated in the 1986

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[163] Oloka-Onyango, "The Question of Buganda", 176-177.
[164] 'Ssabataka' is a 'King-in-waiting' or, in other words, a future Kabaka.
[165] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.

defeat of the central government and the capture of power by the NRM under Museveni as the new President of Uganda.

The first years of the NRM regime were marked by significant political and institutional changes in Uganda.[166] Despite the pressure by Buganda loyalists to restore the traditional kingdom, it was widely understood by the NRM and the Baganda that, before the restoration of the Kingdom could take place, the NRM had to re-establish governance in the country and construct and new constitution.[167] Significantly, the NRM began to construct an administrative system throughout the country that mirrored the political and social components of Buganda's dual administrative structure.[168] The establishment of Resistance Councils, now termed Local Councils (LC's), during and after the guerilla war was an exercise in decentralisation by Museveni. The hierarchical structure of the LC administrative system is indistinguishable from Buganda's political structure with many of the new offices and constituencies based on Buganda's previous establishment.[169] The basic element that distinguished the Local Council system from Buganda's institutional political structure was the authority it was based around. Buganda had yet to return as a political institution with the Kabaka, the primary symbol and epitome of the political Kingdom, awaiting his restoration to the throne.

Baganda elites and Ssabataka Mutebi began pressuring President Museveni for the Kabaka's restoration; creating the *idea* that, because of Buganda's support of the NRM Bush War, there was a tacit agreement between Museveni and the Baganda that the Kingdom would be

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[166] Museveni and his NRM party sought to establish a 'working democracy' within Uganda. A main focus of the NRM was to rid the country of regional or ethnically-based politics and decentralise political authority. This was attempted through the adoption of a 'no-party' system and the creation of the Local Council administrative structure.
[167] Mayiga, *King on the Throne,* 56-85.
[168] Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor,* 9-12.
[169] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.

restored with the NRM in power.[170] However, questions remained regarding the internal

mechanism of the traditional institution, what its relationship would be with the central

government and what, exactly, constituted the geographic parameters of the Kingdom.[171]

Simultaneously, the NRM government was debating the draft constitution in a Constituent

Assembly[172] with Museveni hoping to maintain a no-party system in Uganda and to secure his

tenure as president to help develop the country following years of internal strife. The Baganda,

on the other hand, were pushing for a return to Buganda's 1962 constitutional arrangement with

full constitutional recognition of the traditional institution and a return to a semi-autonomous

relationship with the central government through federalism. Museveni was able to capitalise on

the Baganda's ambitions in order to secure his political interests. As one Muganda law professor

stated:

> One year towards the elections in the Constituent Assembly
> the president decided to put in place a system to restore
> [the traditional institutions]. He wanted to pre-empt the debate
> because he wanted to make capital out of the restoration to get
> Baganda support. And indeed it happened. [173]

Without any debate or regard for the 1967 Constitution created by Obote, Museveni set a date for

the restoration of the Buganda Kingom with Mutebi as Kabaka. On July 13th, 1993 Mutebi was

crowned Kabaka of Buganda and the structure of Buganda's dual socio-political administrative

system was re-installed. In the 1995 Constitution, traditional leaders and institutions were

officially re-recognised albeit as solely 'cultural' institutions. Despite the emphasis in the

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[170] Interview: Department of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.
[171] Oloko-Onyango, "The Question of Buganda", 179.
[172] The Constituent Assembly consisted of representatives from every constituency in Uganda. The Baganda delegates represented a large portion of the Assembly and were pushing for a full restoration of the Kingdom and a return to a federal relationship with the central government.
[173] Interview: Faculty of History, Makerere University, Kampala, July 13, 2012.

constitution of traditional institutions existing as mere cultural entities, the Buganda Kingdom

had fully re-established its political institutional components, has continually endeavored in local

governance and development and remains a central dynamic, if not the most contentious, in the

politics of contemporary Uganda.

**Buganda Today**

The current situation between the Buganda Kingdom and the Ugandan central government is a

testament to the notion that the resurgence of traditional authority is an on-going process. As

noted above, the constitutional re-instatement of the traditional Kingdom was characterised by

Museveni as being merely 'cultural'. Although Museveni and the NRM continually emphasise

the Kingdom existing purely as a culturally entity, Buganda has practically established itself as a

"quasi-state institution"[174] with a full executive, legistative and administrative political

structures. The Kabaka set up a highly specialised ministry and bureaucracy, a modern-style

cabinet, re-instated the Katikkiro and appointed a full Lukiiko. Regular assemblies are held in the

Lukiiko to debate and discuss issues ranging from the Kingdom's development to their relations

with the central government. Because the Kingdom is constitutionally barred from collecting

taxes, all Baganda ministers are volunteers and questions of how to raise money for development

often dominate discussions in the Lukiiko. Eighteen traditional counties, once part of the initial

political configuration, were re-established along with the sub-county and parish units. The

Kabaka has since appointed international envoys and has established the Kingdom's own

corporate sector, including a trust company, Buganda Investments and Commercial Undertakings

Limited, a radio station, the Central Broadcasting Services, and a travel agency, the Royal Travel

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[174] Englebert, "Born-again Buganda", 347.

and Heritage Bureau.[175] The Buganda Kingdom, therefore, has fully re-established the political component of its original dual socio-political institutional structure.

The Buganda Kingdom's continual rise as a political institution goes far beyond the 'spirit and the letter' of its constitutional re-instatement. The institution's resurgence as a political entity has caused the relationship between Buganda and the central government to be primarily described as 'contentious'. The Kabaka of Buganda and his established local government persistently call for greater regional autonomy for the sake of local development. The NRM government, on the other hand, has continually made efforts to undermine the political power held by Buganda. The Baganda have been publicly calling for 'abyeffe', or 'our things'; a term used to describe the full assets of the Kingdom taken at the time of its abolition and a return to a full federal relationship with the central government. Additionally, the Kingdom is also acting as a whistleblower against government corruption while making critical public statements against Museveni and the NRM. In recent general and by-elections, the Baganda have been voting for the Democratic Party, which publicly supports Buganda's calls for federalism, and against any candidate who speaks out against the interests of the Kingdom.[176]

Uganda's central government has responded to Buganda's political ascension with efforts to undermine the Kingdom's political influence. President Museveni publicly denounces Buganda as a political institution and, in 2010, introduced and passed the 'Traditional Leaders Bill' which, by law, restricts any traditional leaders from engaging in politics.[177] Buganda's demand for a federal arrangement is continually denied and was instead offered a 'regional-tier'

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[175] Ibid.
[176] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.
[177] These restrictions include "rendering direct or indirect support to a political party or candidate, [...] making statements against Government policies or programs, [...] and making statements or comments on Bills or motions under consideration by Parliament" (*Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Bill*, 2010).

status whereby the leaders of the regional-tier would be elected. However, the election of a leader in Buganda undermines the tradition of the monarchial institution and was therefore rejected by the Kingdom. Other manoeuvres by the NRM have attempted to undermine the Kabaka's influence, including their blocking of the Kabaka's visit to a contested area of the Kingdom. This blocking of the Kabaka's movements resulted in the 2009 Buganda riots where at least twenty people were killed, the Kingdom's radio station was shut down and Buganda journalists were arrested for 'incitement'.

**The Historical Course**

By tracing the historical course of the Buganda Kingdom as a socio-political institution, a historical institutionalist approach to the resurgence of the traditional institution assisted in understanding the core dynamics and factors involved in the phenomenon. The approach has taken into account the initial decisions in configuring the institution and helped to establish an understanding of how these initial decisions are an essential factor in the re-instatement of the Kingdom's political components. The creation of the dual socio-political institutional structure socially and culturally entrenched the traditional Kingdom into the 'meaning' of Baganda identity. In other words, the inter-connectedness of the social and the political was constructed as being a part of what it means to be a Muganda. As it will be discussed in the next chapter, the initial configuration and, henceforth, social entrenchment of the traditional political institution is one of the primary concepts involved in its contemporary political resurgence.

Using history as an analytical tool also helps to outline the critical junctures relating to the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. Following the historical course of the Buganda Kingdom, as laid out by research participants, it is evident that the colonial experience not only maintained the institutional structure of the Kingdom but also strengthened it. The colonial

experience, therefore, is a primary historical factor involved in further entrenching the traditional institution. Another historical factor identified was the independence period and the political dynamics that culminated in the abolition of the Buganda Kingdom. The way in which the institution was abolished at this critical juncture helped to set the context for the next historical period in which it was re-installed. It had also helped to frame the Baganda's perceptions of the central government which played a large part in the return of the Kingdom. The military and political alliance between the Baganda and Uganda's current NRM regime acted as the final historical factor involved in the traditional Kingdom's resurgence.

The historical course of the Buganda Kingdom identified a primary causal factor involved in the political resurgence of the traditional institution; social entrenchment. Tracing the institution's historical course, as drawn out by research participants, also identified a collective disillusionment with the central state and the formation of new *ideas* as primary causal factors. Using a participant narrative-guided approach, the next chapter will explore, in-depth, the three conceptual causal factors involved in the political resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom and will identify core elements of each factor to help in their conceptualisations.

# CHAPTER 6: CAUSAL FACTORS OF THE BUGANDA RESURGENCE: SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT, DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE STATE AND NEW, INSTITUTIONALLY STRUCTURED IDEAS

By tracing the historical course of the Buganda Kingdom, three causal factors have been identified in the political resurgence of the traditional institution: the social entrenchment of its political components, a strong sense of disillusionment with the central state and the formulation of new, institutionally-structured ideas. The social entrenchment of the political institutional components is a product of the initial dual socio-political configuration of the Kingdom that was maintained in the perceptions of the Baganda through cultural norms and beliefs and the inter-generational socialisation and enculturation of these beliefs during the period of the institutions abolition. Essentially, Buganda cultural norms and beliefs formed a Buganda-specific 'logic of appropriateness' pertaining to the Kingdom which maintained a belief in the institution as intrinsically political and a collective interest in the Kingdoms re-instatement. This logic of appropriateness was further framed by the second causal factor: a sense of disillusionment with the central state. The combination of a historically-based, existential disillusionment with a colonial-imposed polity and the perceived failure of the post-colonial state helped to frame the Baganda's interests in re-instating the traditional kingdom. Finally, the formulation of new *ideas* at the third critical historical juncture of the institution initiated the process of institutional political resurgence of the Kingdom. These ideas were framed by the Baganda's socio-political logic of appropriateness and the specific political and institutional context of Uganda at that specific period of time.

**The First Causal Factor: social institutional entrenchment**

*"In certain respects the Buganda Kingdom never died. It was abolished, constitutionally, with the crisis in 1966, but the institutions remained and, more importantly, I think Buganda as such also remained. It remained alive in the people".[178]*

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Taking into account the perceptions of the Baganda, the term 'resurgence', regarding the re-instatement of the Buganda Kingdom, becomes somewhat misleading. Constructed as a socio-political institution, the Buganda Kingdom is more than just a political institutional structure; it is a part of *being* a Muganda and a part of being that has maintained throughout critical historical junctures. The institution encompasses familial relationships, community and clan relationships and, essentially, socio-political identities. It is a central dynamic of Buganda culture. With this centrality in the everyday life of the Baganda, a constitutional abolition of the political component of the Kingdom did not result in a complete abolition of the institution. Instead, the social components of Buganda's dual socio-political institutional structure remained as strong as it had been throughout Buganda history. As the social and political components of the institution were intrinsically linked through its dual socio-political institutional structure, the socio-cultural elements of the Kingdom maintained the perception of the institution as inherently political and framed a logic of appropriateness regarding the Baganda's interests in the Kingdom's re-instatement. The social entrenchment of the institutions political components, therefore, played a primary, if not the most significant, causal role in the political resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom.

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[178] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.

In this instance, the inquiry into an institutional change – the Kingdom's political resurgence- paradoxically required an inquiry into institutional continuity. According to the local perceptions provided by research participants, the social and political elements of the traditional institution remain inter-subjectively connected. Therefore, an inquiry into the continuity of the social elements of the institution helped to understand the resurgence of the political ones.

Taking into account the social and cultural significant of this causal factor, an inquiry into the socio-cultural dynamics required a sociological institutionalist approach. Research participants strongly emphasized the socio-cultural and inter-generational processes that framed both the inter-subjective connection between the social and political of the Buganda Kingdom's traditional structure and the interests of the Baganda regarding the re-instatement of the Kingdom. Sociological institutionalism helped to show how the socio-cultural institution shaped the perceptions, values and interests of the Baganda. According to Keating, the approach can be used to establish what roles the institution of culture had in establishing the *meaning* of the institution and is thus "a way of bringing culture back"[179] into institutional analysis. As it will be discussed, Buganda culture played a primary role in maintaining a traditionally political *meaning* of the Kingdom and framed the values and interests of the Baganda. In other words, social and cultural processes framed and maintained a Buganda-specific logic of appropriateness regarding their interests in re-instating the socio-political Kingdom.

With the incorporation of a sociological institutionalist approach, two conceptual components have been identified within the concept of 'social institutional entrenchment' that have framed the Baganda's logic of appropriateness and maintained that logic inter-

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[179] Keating, "Culture and Social Science", 104.

generationally through the period in which the Kingdom was abolished. The first conceptual component is socio-cultural and focuses on the cultural/clan norms, beliefs and values that have framed Baganda logic and interests. The second component is more individualised, focusing on the inter-generational processes of socialisation and enculturation. Together, these two socio-cultural components help to explain the social institutional entrenchment of the Kingdom's political components and the continuity of this perception through twenty-seven years of the institutions abolition.

*The Socio-Cultural Conceptual Component: local perspectives as a cultural and clan-based mosaic*

*"The strongest point is that Buganda gives you this identity. Before becoming Ugandan we are Baganda. From your family, the ancestors to the clan [...] And through that clan is where you have the clan head which is a direct link to the Kingdom".[180]*

*"The Kingdom derives its legitimacy from cultural norms. I mean, the Kabaka is your father. We believe that the clan leaders get their legitimacy from the Kabaka and the Kabakaship is a product of the clan system. The clans are a way of life for us".[181]*

*"The Kingdom has always been at the centre of our culture. Our leader is considered to be a natural, God-given leader. Belief in the monarchy to Baganda is more or less belief in a religion. It's our identity. The Kabaka is just the epitome of our culture".[182]*

*"The Kingdom is a part of their life. It's their guidance; a protector. It's God's making".[183]*

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[180] Interview: Faculty of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala August 22, 2012.
[181] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.
[182] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.
[183] Interview: Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Heritage, Kampala, June 21, 2012.

As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the clans of Buganda are "central to its culture".[184] They encompass traditional socio-political identities; what it means to be a Muganda within the greater Buganda Kingdom. Within the Kingdom's socio-political institutional structure, the clans tie individual Baganda with all levels of the institution, including the Kabaka. They also encompass culturally traditional roles, norms, beliefs, values and collective interests that frame the Baganda's logic of appropriateness and perceived interests. Essentially, Buganda's clans socially entrenched the Kingdom's political institutional components.

Within Buganda culture, the clans are, first and foremost, the primary socio-political institution of the Baganda. They are familial institutions that maintain the Baganda's social and political connections to Buganda's traditional monarchy. This personal connection to the Kingdom is established through the familial and social ties of the clan to the monarchy and the social and political roles each clan plays within the Kingdom. As a member of the Buganda Kingdom's executive shared: " A girl of my clan is considered my sister",[185] highlighting the familial and personal element of the clan. A Muganda Makerere University graduate student continued by stating: "We still have close kinship ties in Buganda. We have so many traditional ceremonies that are exclusively Buganda and these link you directly to your family, your bigger family; the clan".[186] As a familial institution, the clans of Buganda were the main source of connection between the social and the political of the Kingdom's dual socio-political institutional structure. "The clan also defines [a Muganda's] relationship to the Kabaka. Each clan has a role

[184] Interview: Faculty of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.
[185] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.
[186] Interview: Faculty of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.

it plays for the Kabaka".[187] Individual clans are traditionally assigned duties towards the

Kingship that define a Muganda's role in the Kingdom and frame a personal relationship to the

institution. For example, the Mbogo (Buffalo) clan is responsible for transporting the Kabaka

wherever he goes. Members of the Mbogo clan currently drive the Kabaka's caravans and act as

the carriers of his thrown as he parades through his Kingdom for social and political events.[188]

Additionally, the previous chapter discussed how each clan has an equal opportunity to produce

a Kabaka. This dynamic furthers the personal relationships that individual Baganda have with the

kingship. The political Kingdom, therefore, "[…] runs even through blood linkages. At one time

or another every clan will be able to produce a king. Everyone is a part of the Kingship".[189] The

initial configuration of the Buganda Kingdom's dual socio-political institutional structure

assigned the clans their socio-political significance which continued through the Kingdom's

political abolition. The socio-cultural entrenchment of the clans and their respective ties to the

Kingdom as a political institution led the Kingdom on a historical path towards its political

resurgence.

As the primary socio-political institution of the Baganda, the clans also encompass

culturally traditional norms, values and interests that frame the Baganda's logic of

appropriateness regarding their Kingdom. As one research participant stated, through the clan

"people know that a Muganda does not do this, a Muganda cannot go beyond these boundaries, a

Muganda speaks like this, a Muganda acts like this".[190] "The clan determines where you get

buried. The clan determines who can inherit your property. So it is a way of life. The legitimacy

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[187] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.
[188] This was witnessed by the researcher when members of the Mbogo clan were driving the Kabaka through a traditional market in central Kampala.
[189] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.
[190] Interview: Ministry for Youth and Employment for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, August 14, 2012.

of the clan is a given".[191] The norms, rules and values inherent in this cultural institution dictate a Muganda's perspective of the monarchy and, subsequently, the Baganda's interests in the Kingdom's political re-instatement. As demonstrated by the research participants, the clan encompasses collective socio-cultural norms and beliefs in the *meaning* of the Kingdom; a meaning that is as much political as it is social. This understanding can help establish an explanation of how the Baganda's perceptions and logic have maintained through the era of the institutions abolition, leading towards the second conceptual component.

*The Second Conceptual Component: inter-generational socialisation and enculturation*

*"I grew up as a young girl and I remember my grandmother would always tell me about how she was missing the King. I grew up in my mind that things would be better if the King was here".[192]*

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The social entrenchment of Buganda's dual socio-political institutional structure and the Baganda's logic of appropriateness pertaining to their traditional Kingdom was maintained through processes of inter-generational socialisation and enculturation. This, in large part, helps to explain the persistence of the traditional institutions' social entrenchment throughout the generations of the institution's abolition. The Baganda learn socio-cultural norms, rules, beliefs and values from Baganda of the previous generation, providing the framework of their contextualised logic of appropriateness. Additionally, the continuation of traditional socio-cultural practices also assisted in framing the inter-subjective interpretations of the new generations of Baganda.

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[191] Interview: Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Kampala, August 17, 2012.
[192] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.

While engaging with research participants, many narratives were given about the socialisation and enculturation of young Baganda by older generations. A part of this socialisation and enculturation entails teaching the young about the dual socio-political element of the traditional Kingdom. As a minster of the Buganda Kingdom shared: "The older folk who knew about what they had seen when the Kingdom was there would talk about it quietly to those of us who were younger".[193] As it will be discussed in the following section, the perceptions of the Kingdom were framed by older generations in relation to contemporary times where disillusionment with the central state is common. In other words, the older generations of Baganda referred to the period in which the Kingdom was fully instituted as 'better' than the period of the Kingdom's abolition. According to a Makerere University graduate student:

> During the period when we had no Kingship, physically, from
> 1966 to 1993, people still knew about Buganda because they are
> Baganda. They were studying it, they were being told by the elders.
> So even the youth know about the Kingship and how it is to serve
> and even the social, economic and political developments that had
> been obtained before the coming into a united Uganda.[194]

In regards to Buganda's continued struggle for the realisation of socio-political autonomy, a Muganda Member of Parliament stated that: "This battle was started by our great-grandfathers. It was carried on by our grandfathers. Our fathers fought for Buganda as a Kingdom. You are born into it".[195] As a result, "the young want to witness the past".[196]

The socialisation and enculturation of Baganda perspectives are also experienced outside of the immediate family through traditional cultural practices. Traditional gatherings and celebrations provided a venue for the Baganda to link the next generation to the Kingdom and

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[193] Interview: Ministry for Youth and Employment for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, August 14, 2012.
[194] Interview: Department of History, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.
[195] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.
[196] Interview: Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Heritage, Kampala, June 21, 2012.

perpetuate the perception that the social and political elements of the institution are a part of their identity while additionally framing the younger Baganda's interests in having the Kingdom politically re-instated. As one research participant shared:

> My clan, we always have an annual meeting. We spend the whole night being told about our clan; who our leader is, how our motto goes, who was our founder, what role do we play in the Buganda Kingdom. So, through such governing, it is almost done to strengthen and create more unity and get closer to our next-of-kins.[197]

He continued stating: "I have witnessed in the recent two Okwanjula's[198] that it is almost being politicised, making a pro-Buganda message. So, the Buganda cause is always at its peak".[199]

During the years of the Kingdom's abolition, the younger Baganda generations grew up with a sense that a part of their identity and the epitome of their culture had been taken away. Now "the youth are very, very vigilant. They have formed youth associations within the universities, even in many secondary schools".[200] A young Muganda student continued by stating that:

> These [youth associations] are at all levels; in academic institutions, in the villages. For example Nkobozombogo.[201] Currently it has gone to even primary schools. There is also a big group of youth who are so, so radical. 'Bangawa': the Buganda Workers Association. So, through such associations, the message is clear: sensitize people politically, create solidarity among others.[202]

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[197] Interview: Faculty of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22 ,2012.
[198] The 'Okwanjula' is a cultural practice of the Baganda whereby a large meeting between the families of a Muganda bride and groom gather for 'introductions' prior to a marriage.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Interview: Ministry for Youth and Employment for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, August 14, 2012.
[201] The Nkobozombogo Students Association is a post-secondary level association of Baganda who educate and advocate for the interests of their Kingdom.
[202] Interview: Department of History, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.

A sociological institutionalist approach to the social entrenchment of the Buganda Kingdom as a political entity has helped to explain how this entrenchment was maintained during the era which the institution was abolished. In fact, it helps to demonstrate that the Kingdom, as a socio-political institution, had never fully dissipated as its social elements, persisting through time, remained intrinsically linked to the political in the perceptions of the Baganda. The Kingdom as a political entity, therefore, was officially abolished yet unofficially remained within Buganda culture. This perception by the Baganda framed a logic of appropriateness in regards to their interests in having a full political resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. This logic of appropriateness was also framed by a second conceptual causal factor in the political resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom: a disillusionment with the central state.

**The Second Causal Factor: disillusionment with the central state**

Throughout the interviews and discussions with research participants, the Buganda Kingdom was often referred to as the preferred alternative to central state governance and development. The traditional institution was consistently spoken about in terms relative to the central state and the current NRM regime with the latter representing the adversarial conditions the Baganda, and Ugandans as a whole, have consistently faced since independence. Throughout the historical path of the Buganda Kingdom drawn by research participants were consistent references to strong collective sentiments of disillusionment or alienation from the central state. Therefore, a second conceptual causal factor, a sense of disillusionment with the central state, was identified in the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom that helped to frame Baganda interests in re-instating the traditional institution.

Two conceptual components of 'central state disillusionment' have been identified from discussions with research participants. Many participants emphasised an existential

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disillusionment with the central state within a historical context, referring to the colonial-imposed state, institutions and identity as alien and illegitimate. Therefore, there is a historically contingent disillusionment. The second conceptual component centres on the perceived failure of the post-colonial state. The failure of the post-colonial state, according to research participants, is characterised by underdevelopment, dictatorial behaviours by the state and rampant state corruption and patrimonialism.

*The First Conceptual Component: historical state disillusionment*

*"We're really talking about alien states. I mean, these entities are alien. They're creations of a colonial experiment; an experiment that is not working".*[203]

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Throughout the discussions with research participants were historical references to the imposition of the central state and its respective institutions. Unanimously, research participants displayed sentiments of disillusionment with 'alien' institutions that continue to be perceived as 'illegitimate', foreign constructions. Additionally, in the immediate independence period, the central state was responsible for the abolition of traditional institutions in Uganda. This abolition was a strong contribution to the Baganda's disillusionment with the central state.

A large part of the participants' historical disillusionment with the central state refers to the imposition of British colonialism and the subsequent perceptions of illegitimacy and alienation from the foreign-constructed state of Uganda and its respective governing institutions. In their "arbitrarily" constructed borders, the British colonialists grouped together numerous pre-existing societies and polities that had little to no commonalities amongst each other. In the case

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[203] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.

of Uganda, a number of pre-existing kingdoms and societies, each with their own respective

cultures, levels of development and political power, were nevertheless forcefully incorporated

together into a central state and administered by a foreign power. As a minister of the Buganda

Kingdom shared:

> This is just a Kingdom which was, by force, put under a big
> nation called Uganda. It was the creation of the colonialists
> as they struggled to build big real-estates for themselves. It
> was quite unfair what the colonialists did; bring people
> together who have nothing in common.[204]

The Baganda research participants unanimously shared the sentiment that Uganda continues to

be largely an 'illegitimate' creation by an 'alien' power. Each participant displayed sentiments of

'alienation' or 'disillusionment' with the central state as their political entity. Therefore, the

continued existence of such a state has helped to frame the Baganda's logic of appropriateness

pertaining to a full return of their traditional Kingdom which has maintained its legitimacy

among the Baganda. The imposition of the central state also entailed the imposition of British-

style institutions which continue to be perceived as 'alien' and illegitimately imposed. As a

Makerere University history professor stated: "At independence this nation of Uganda really

didn't exist […] and the democratic system, people didn't understand. Many of these institutions

were alien".[205]

The Baganda's historical disillusionment with the central state is also strongly informed

by the abolition of the Buganda Kingdom itself. The political manoeuvring against the Baganda,

the military attack on the Buganda establishment and the constitutional abolition of traditional

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[204] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.
[205] Interview: Attorney-General's Office of the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 17, 2012.

institutions, all under Milton Obote, were strongly perceived as illegitimate and dictatorial. As a member of the Buganda executive shared:

> The demise of the Kingdom in 1966 was a result of weak legal
> and political institutions. The Prime Minister, Milton Obote, was
> pursuing his own political ambitions when he decided to abolish
> the kingdoms. It wasn't the wish of the people. He [Obote] was
> looked at, especially in Buganda, as a dictator.[206]

This historically contingent, existential disillusionment with the central state may help to explain Uganda's lack of national identity, or national ethos, and the country's current adversarial conditions. For example, research participants emphasized the primacy of their traditional identities over a national one. As another member of the Buganda Lukiiko shared: "We don't have this nation called Uganda. If you look for Ugandans you will find none. People are either Baganda or Acholi or Banyankole but that is it. Your tribe is your identity".[207] A history professor at Makerere University reified this sentiment stating that:

> Uganda is not yet a nation but still just a geographic expression.
> There is no feeling. There is no soul. You cannot easily define
> Uganda. So the feelings, the norms, the values, what you'd call
> 'software issues' that create a nation, are not existing. We are just
> 'hardware'; a territorial boundary.[208]

The Baganda's existential disillusionment with the central state is a strong factor in the Baganda's logic of appropriateness pertaining to their Kingdom. According to research participants, it is also strongly related to the second conceptual component of state disillusionment.

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[206] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.
[207] Interview: Shadow Ministry for Local Government, Kampala, August 3, 2012.
[208] Interview: Faculty of History, Makerere University, Kampala, July 13, 2012.

*The Second Conceptual Component: the perceived failure of the post-colonial state*

*"A resurgence of cultural or traditional institutions [...] reflects a profound disillusion with what the central state has had to offer and for people finding much more solace, much more comfort, much more alignment in the traditional".[209]*

*"The best reason as to why I think Buganda is rising again is because the central government has almost failed to deliver in the social, political and economic spheres. People have been disappointed and once you have been disappointed you always seek for someone to lean on. That is why you see people now thinking in terms of their cultural groupings than as a nation. All the institutions of government have collapsed".[210]*

*"Everything is in shambles in this country".[211]*

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Previous theoretical speculations of the resurgence of traditional authority across sub-Saharan Africa attributed low state capacity as *the* or *a* causal factor of the phenomenon. Discussions with research participants in Buganda validated the speculation that state failure is, indeed, *a* contributing factor. However, this study highlights local perceptions of state failure in Uganda rather than on previously conceptualized notions. The research participants emphasized certain factors which they attribute to Uganda as a failed state and have, therefore, helped to provide some conceptual clarity on the issue in this specific instance.

With the help of research participants, three elements of their perceptions of Ugandan state failure have been identified. The first regards low state capacity or minimal state

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[209] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3 2012.
[210] Interview: Department of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.
[211] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.

development in the livelihoods of Buganda as a central component of state failure. The Baganda, for example, are disillusioned with the state's failure to alleviate poverty, provide sufficient service provisions or any other tangible incentive for Baganda to recognise central state legitimacy. A second component of the perceived failure of the central state centres on the coercive and dictatorial practices by the state. Undemocratic state behaviors perpetuate the sense of 'imposition' of alien institutions and are inconsistent with the democratic ethos that these alien institutions are attempting to impose. Finally, the third component of the Baganda's perceived failure of the central state is based on corruption and patrimonialism. Combined, these components of state failure, according to the Baganda, along with a historically-based disillusionment with the central state, reflect a profound deficiency of legitimacy for the central state relative to the legitimacy held by the Buganda Kingdom.

State Minimalism and Underdevelopment

*"The state has become so minimal in the sense that it has led to an alienation of the general population from the state and, as a consequence, a revision to these cultural/traditional institutions".[212]*

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One of the primary emphases made by the research participants in regards to their perceptions of the failure of the Ugandan state is the lack of development and "general poverty"[213] throughout the country. "Although the figures show that poverty rates are dropping, everywhere you look people are living in desperate ways/means".[214] As a young graduate student of history at

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[212] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.
[213] Interview: Ministry of Justice, Constitutional Affairs and Research for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 17, 2012.
[214] Ibid.

Makerere University shared: " I have been born of this regime, grown up in this regime and have seen how hard life has been; how people are struggling to survive".[215] In regards to the majority of Baganda who live in rural areas, he continued stating that: "People continue to be very, very poor. When you move into the villages, Buganda is not the way it used to be. Originally farming was the best economic activity [...] now agriculture has died out and that increased poverty in the villages".[216] The Baganda, and Ugandans in general, have a per capita income of $506, "among the lowest in the world".[217] Research has found that Ugandans poverty gap continues to widen and issues such as malnutrition have persisted throughout the NRM's reign.[218] [219]

A second dynamic of state minimalism highlighted by research participants in regards to state failure is the lack of service provisions by the state and the degenerating conditions of public services. One participant, a political science professor at Makerere University, generalised the situation as "the breakdown of hospitals with little medicine, poor roads, poor schools".[220] Currently, there are only 18 health workers per 10,000 Ugandans and they have been found to be "underpaid and unmotivated".[221] Another participant continued these sentiments of poor public services, particularly health care, stating that:

> Before Buganda had so many schools and all the schools
> were operating at a very high standard. Now the government
> has come up with what we call Universal Primary Education.

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[215] Interview: Department of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Kalabako, Faridah, "Gov't urged on basics to better per-capita income", *Daily Monitor*, Aug. 10, 2012, No. 122.
[218] Kulabako, Faridah. "Poverty gap widens further", *Daily Monitor*, Aug. 23, 2012, No. 136.
[219] For example, see Musobya, M. & Mulando, E., "Malnutrition hits Namutumba", *Daily Monitor*, Aug. 9, 2012, No. 121 and Aluma, Clement. "Arua hospital grapples with malnutrition", *Daily Monitor,* Aug. 9, 2012, No. 121.
[220] Interview: Faculty of History, Makerere University, Kampala, July 13, 2012.
[221] Nalugo, Mercy. "MP's move to declare resource crisis in health sector", *Daily Monitor*, Aug. 24, 2012, No. 136.

When you look at the products that come through UPE they
are almost half baked.[222]

Six years after the NRM took power, enrollment into primary schools fell to 47% and the

illiteracy rate rose to 55% from 46% ten years earlier.[223] Similar to their health care cohorts in

Uganda, teachers are currently found to be underpaid and undertrained.[224]

A Muganda law professor views this state minimalism as a product of liberal economic

restructuring enacted by the NRM regime after securing power. The participant shared:

We sold off everything, including the kitchen silver. Aside
from the military apparatus there is really nothing left of the
state. The strongest part of the Ugandan state is its coercive part.
We don't have any kind of public education to speak of, we don't
have any kind of healthcare system to speak of as public entities.
Before the privatization took place in 1986 they were all there.
Today all these public goods have been privatised.[225]

Immediately following his assumption of the presidency, Museveni engaged in massive

structural adjustment, including the sale of over 100 public enterprises at prices much lower than

their real values. This large-scale sale of public enterprises was largely unpopular and widely

blamed for minimizing Uganda's state capacity.[226] This interpretation provides some validity to

the 'economic adjustment theory' of the resurgence of traditional institutions which accredits

state retrenchment as the primary causal factor of the phenomenon. State economic

retrenchment, according to this research participant, plays a large role in the perceptions of

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[222] Interview: Department of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.
[223] "Celebrating 30 years of growing dependency", *The Monitor,* Oct. 8-16, 1992.
[224] Tulemwa, Moses. "Despite poor literacy rates, there's hope for Uganda's schools", *The Observer*, Aug. 20-21, 2012, Vol. 7 (176).
[225] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.
[226] Tebere, Richard. "This privatisation drive stinks badly", *The Monitor,* Jul. 31, 1992.

Buganda regarding Uganda as a failed state.[227] Further research may help to benefit an understanding of how economic restructuring has affected the perceptions of Baganda, or sub-Saharan Africans, towards their central state.

Often, research participants referred to the central state in relation to their traditional kingdom. Although the Buganda Kingdom is unable to officially collect taxes from its subjects and, hence, provide sufficient, tangible benefits, it still maintains the capacity to uphold its traditional and contemporary legitimacy. The central state, on the other hand, has not demonstrated the capacity and legitimacy to form a national ethos and shared identity. As a Muganda minister summed up:

> Buganda offers much more than Uganda does [...] people don't see
> any benefit from the central state. There is nothing tangible that
> Buganda can offer its people. Buganda, at least, is recognising you
> as a citizen. You're a member of a clan. There are intangible benefits
> that accrue from that. There's a sense of well-being, a sense of community.
> I'd rather take Buganda that is giving some psychological satisfaction than
> Uganda that is giving nothing at all.[228]

Dictatorial State Behaviors

*"In Uganda, today, we are talking about the abuse of human rights, violence in elections".[229]*

*"Here, in Uganda, there is no freedom at all".[230]*

*"We need to tame the power of the center".[231]*

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[227] As discussed in the second chapter, Rita Abrahamsen draws a strong correlation between the adoption of SAP's and prevailing underdevelopment in Africa. Abrahamsen argues that civil society acts as a form of 'cost recovery' (Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy*).
[228] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.
[229] Interview: Attorney-General's Office of the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 17, 2012.
[230] Interview: Faculty of Languages, Makerere University, Kampala, July 18, 2012.
[231] Interview: Faculty of History, Makerere University, Kampala, July 13, 2012.

Although Uganda is considered, nominally, a democratic state, the perceptions and experiences of the local research participants highlight coercive and undemocratic behaviors by the state. As a Muganda professor shared:"They are not truly democratic. In every election we've had, of course, violence, intimidation by the security forces, using state finances and facilities for campaigns. Every single election has been visited with claims of irregularities".[232] Preceding Uganda's 2006 elections, a number of European countries froze assistance to the country "citing concerns about the fairness of the political process".[233] Following Uganda's 2011 general elections, a European Union election observer mission report stated that "Uganda's electoral democracy was badly flawed and major reforms were needed".[234] Coercive and undemocratic behaviors further weaken the perceived legitimacy of the state, buttressing the sense of disillusionment and maintaining the sympathies for traditional structures. "In fact, there is an alienated relationship because the most prominent aspect the Ugandan citizen confronts or engages with the central state is the coercive one".[235] As a Muganda author explained:

> In many ways the post-colonial state is more violent and repressive of the people and their rights with the result that, not only in Uganda but in other parts of Africa, people lost trust. These post-colonial states lost legitimacy and basically survived through repressive means. So, with the loss of legitimacy, people have to look at options and traditional institutions.[236]

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[232] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.
[233] Butagira, Tabu. "UK sets new aid terms for Uganda", *Daily Monitor,* Mar. 19, 2009.
[234] Baragaba, Julius. "Donors put pressure on Museveni over poll reforms", *The East Africa,* Jun. 20-26, 2011, No. 868.
[235] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.
.[236] Interview: Ministry of Justice, Constitutional Affairs and Research for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 17, 2012.

Most stories in the local newspapers covering general and by-elections contained allegations of state-led violence and intimidation by the police and the Uganda People's Defense Forces.[237]

<u>Corruption and Patrimonialism</u>

*"I think you know what is going on in Uganda. There is so much corruption. Money is in the hands of just a few people. They're just siphoning off money from government in the billions of shillings. They bribe the people to give them votes. I think the people are fed up".[238]*

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A final element of the research participants' perceptions of Uganda as a failed state revolves around the corrupt and patrimonial practices of the current NRM regime. Participants emphasized the rampant corruption displayed daily in the national newspapers and focused on the power centralization by the president through patronage political appointments of members of his own ethnic region in Uganda. According to the research participants, state corruption and patrimonialism is a significant indicator of Uganda as a failed state.

The sentiments regarding corruption in Uganda by research participants was summed up by a Minister of the Buganda Kingdom. She strongly stated that: "All these people in government are thieves, let's face it. You should look at the assets they have. It's terrible. You can't look at a daily newspaper these days without reading a story on corruption".[239] Her statements were validated by newspapers, collected daily by the researcher, which consistently had headline stories regarding corruption at some level or some ministry in the current government. In fact, every daily newspaper, throughout the three months the research was being

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[237] For example, see "More violence feared today as Kasese votes", *The Observer,* Aug. 8-9, 2012, Vol. 7(171) and "Violence, arrests mar Bukoto South voting", *Daily Monitor,* Jul. 13, 2013, No. 194.
[238] Interview: Ministry of Youth and Employment for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, August 14, 2012.
[239] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.

conducted and beyond, had at least one story on government corruption.[240] Recently, it was

reported that "Uganda is almost collapsing under the weight of official corruption. The NRM has

not only failed to fight corruption, but has embarrassingly and unforgivably crafted itself as an

instrument of corruption".[241] As a result, a Muganda graduate student shared: "All the youth see

people in government as people who have detached themselves away from the people they are

leading. You look at the ministers in the central government, all corrupt".[242] Another research

participant concisely summed up the relation between central state corruption and the Buganda's

sense of disillusionment with the central state, saying:

> Now, with time, the National Resistance Movement, having been
> in power for almost 20 years and with the corruption and general
> confusion, people find solace in the institution because they think
> the Kabaka is more legitimate, more genuine. So now the people
> are disillusioned with the liberators.[243]

This element of disillusionment with the central state was also related to power

centralization and patrimonialism exercised by the current NRM regime. Corruption and

patrimonialism are perceived by the research participants as part of "Museveni's agenda to stay

in power for as long as he possibly can".[244] "If you look at most of the political leadership in the

current government, they are all from western Uganda where the president comes from. The

Military is from there. His political/social base is in Ankole".[245] In 2009, 73% of the country's

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[240] For example, see Arinaiture, Solomon. "Uganda leads East African states in bribery-report", *Daily Monitor,* Sept. 11, 2012; Arinaiture, Solomon. "Uganda falls further down corruption ladder", *Daily Monitor,* Sept. 11, 2012; Butagira, Tabu. "Calls grow for wider investigation at OPM", *Daily Monitor,* Aug. 8, 2012, No. 120 and Muhwezi, Wilber. "Kyegegwa targets corrupt staff", *The Observer,* Aug. 27-28, 2012, Vol. 7(179).
[241] Mwenda, Andrew. "Uganda's anti-corruption rituals", *The Independent,* Aug. 10-16, 2012, Iss. 226.
[242] Interview: Department of History, Archaeology and Organisational Studies, Makerere University, Kampala, August 22, 2012.
[243] Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.
[244] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012.
[245] Interview: Faculty of History, Makerere University, Kampala, July 13, 2012.

top army positions, 40% of cabinet posts and 43% of the top public sector jobs were held by western Ugandans.[246]

Underdevelopment, dictatorial state behaviors and state corruption and patrimonialism are the primary indicators of state failure in Uganda according to the research participants. Combined, they have resulted in a continued disillusionment with the central state that has helped shape the Baganda's logic in their interests for a full, political resurgence of their traditional Kingdom. They also represent *local* perspectives of state failure and open up new opportunities for further discussions and research of the concept which is beyond the scope of this paper.

As it has been shown, both the social institutional entrenchment of the traditional Kingdom and the Baganda's disillusionment with the central state have acted as primary causal mechanisms in the political resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. However, they do not answer the question as to *why* the political resurgence started occurring at its specific period of time. Institutional analysis of the Kingdom's resurgence has found a final causal factor of the phenomenon: the formation of new, institutionally-structured and contextually-based ideas.

**The Third Causal Factor: ideas**

The final causal factor implicated in the political resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom is the formulation of new, contextually-based and institutionally-structured ideas. At the fourth historical juncture of the Buganda Kingdom, both the Baganda and the Ugandan central government formed certain ideas that resulted in the re-instatement of the traditional institution at its specific period of time. These 'ideas' are representative of the perceived interests of both

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[246] Kigambo, G. and Kagumire, R. "Northern MP's anger shows national pain", *The Independent,* May 22-28, 2009, Iss. 61.

parties involved and were further constituted by the new historical and institutional context. The ideas of the Baganda are seen to be the product of socially and culturally entrenched interests and a new political context in which those interests could be consolidated in Uganda's political discourse. The ideas of the NRM under Museveni, on the other hand, were conditioned by a new, democratically-based institutional context that necessitated an obligation towards Baganda interests. Therefore, through an ideational institutionalist approach, it is evident that the Baganda, employing a 'logic of communication', were able to secure a flow of ideas in their discursive interaction with the central government.

As evident in the prior discussion of the social institutional entrenchment of the political components of the Buganda Kingdom, the collective interests of the Baganda in re-instating the traditional Kingdom were socially/culturally entrenched. The Baganda-specific 'logic of appropriateness' pertaining to their Kingdom was the primary informer to the formulation of a new, opportunistic idea to manifest their interests. However, a new political context provided the opportunity for these interests to come to fruition: the Buganda Kingdom's fourth historical juncture. According to research participants, the Baganda sought to aid Museveni in his guerilla war against Obote with the *idea* that, once Obote was overthrown, Museveni would 'repay' the Baganda by re-instating their Kingdom.[247] Sources differ as to whether this agreement between the Baganda and Museveni was implicit, explicit or if the agreement ever even existed. Despite this uncertainty, following Museveni's victory, the Baganda used this idea, publicly, to place enough political pressure on Museveni as to make the Kingdom's re-instatement a dominant issue in the country's political discourse. The idea of the Baganda to re-instate their traditional

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[247] Interview: Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, July 3, 2012 and Interview: Ministry of Information for the Buganda Kingdom, Kampala, July 26, 2012.

institution, therefore, was a result of socially and culturally entrenched interests and a new political context in which these interests could be realised.

The interests and ideas of the NRM under Museveni which resulted in the official re-instatement of the Buganda Kingdom were of obviously different origins. Museveni had publicly denied that there was an agreement with the Baganda of a re-instatement during the early stages of the war.[248] As it was discussed in the previous chapter, Museveni and the NRM had entered into debates over a new constitution for Uganda. These debates took place within a Constituent Assembly; a new, democratically-based institutional setting. In order for Museveni to secure the constitution he sought after, he needed to form a political alliance with the largest ethnic/regional population in the country: the Baganda. In order to secure an alliance with the Baganda, Museveni had to oblige the Baganda and grant them their Kingdom's re-instatement. Museveni's idea to revitalise the Buganda Kingdom in order to secure himself enough political support in the Constituent Assembly worked, according to the research participants. The Baganda, therefore, were able to secure their interests through a new political context.

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[248] See, for example, "Museveni-Buganda War Deal: who is telling the truth?" *The Independent,* September 29, 2009.

**CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES, QUESTIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS**

By using a synthesis of new institutionalist approaches, three distinct causal factors were implicated in the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom. They were identified within a complex combination of historical, sociological and discursive dynamics, necessitating the use of multiple approaches to analysis. The first causal factor – the social entrenchment of the institution – was identified through historical process tracing and understood with a sociological institutionalist approach. The initial configuration of the socio-political kingdom set it forth on a history of path dependence, manifested through its social entrenchment. Sociological processes, including the clan culture and inter-generational socialisation and enculturation, continued this path or entrenchment. A Baganda-specific 'logic of appropriateness' was maintained by this social entrenchment throughout the years of the Kingdom's abolition. The second causal factor – a collective disillusionment with the central state – also played an essential role in framing this logic. A historically-contingent, existential disillusionment with the Ugandan state combined with the interpretations of Uganda as a contemporary 'failed state', characterised by underdevelopment, dictatorial practices, corruption and patrimonialism, is implicated in helping to frame the Baganda's continued interests in a re-instatement of their traditional kingdom. These two causal factors created the momentum for a resurgence but it was not until the Kingdom's fourth historical juncture which ignited the resurgence. The third and final causal factor found – the formulation of new, contextually-based ideas – explains the particular timing of the resurgence of the Buganda Kingdom.

The findings of this research provide new opportunities to approaching traditional authority in sub-Saharan Africa and open up new questions for future qualitative and quantitative research. They also may act as complimentary findings for the current academic literature

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focused on contemporary African governance, development and traditional authority. There are, of course, potential challenges to the findings based upon the methodology/synthesis of new institutionalist approaches employed and the focus of analyses. Despite these challenges, the findings of this research provide potential for a renewed understanding of Africa's traditional authorities which may contribute to the academic discussion on their potential roles in Africa's governance and development.

**Challenges**

There are two fronts to this research that are susceptible to challenges. The first is inquiry-based, as the findings did not present causal factors which explain, in comparative terms, the concurrence of the resurgence across sub-Saharan Africa. The second is methodologically-based considering the current debates between the various new institutionalist approaches and the difficulties in reconciling the differences amongst them.

As noted in the methodological chapter of this study, parsimony was sacrificed for depth and explanation in the research findings. The first two causal factors – social entrenchment of the institution and a collective disillusionment with the central state – provide opportunities for conceptual, comparative application across case studies. Of course, these factors may vary across a large-N of cases but they provide a starting point for future inquiries and enhanced conceptualisations. It is specifically the third causal factor found, the formulation of new, institutionally and contextually-based *ideas*, which makes future cross-case work difficult. The conditions in which these ideas were formulated were historically contingent and completely conditioned by the specific context of the Baganda and Uganda as a whole. In hindsight, a stronger focus on these contingencies and conditions could have helped to find more comparatively applicable factors. For example, the new democratically-based institutional setting

in which these ideas were conditioned may provide some more clarity on the concurrence of the traditional resurgence. Has democracy or democratic processes played a causal role in the resurgence of traditional authority? If so, then how? However, problems arise from this question considering the findings of this research project. How could we explain the paradox between a sense of disillusionment with the central state, which was strongly informed by dictatorial, anti-democratic state practices, and the seemingly democratic conditions which helped formulate causal ideas? Would this explanation require a new conceptualisation of 'democracy'? For this reason the researcher believes that more work must be done regarding the relationship between the traditional resurgence and democracy/democratic processes. The ideational causal factor of Buganda's resurgence, however, does provide in-depth and explanatory value in this case study alone. It may provide a starting point for future comparative work on the conditions of discursive interaction regarding the resurgence of traditional authority.

The front in which this project is most susceptible to challenges is its methodological effort. A synthesis of new institutionalist approaches provides a number of problems that have been outlined in the new institutionalist literature. For example, Hall and Taylor discuss two essential issues between historical and sociological institutionalism, namely how they differentiate in 'specifying the relationship between institutions and behaviour' and 'their explanations of how institutions originate and change'.[249] Historical institutionalism is characterised as the 'most commodious' and attentive to power relations regarding these respective issues while sociological institutionalism focuses on existing institutions' effects on

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[249] Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", 950.

'underlying preferences' and 'future institutional templates'.[250] Hall and Taylor's discussion focuses on the distinct features of these two institutionalisms yet conclude that "each seems to be providing a partial account of the forces at work in a given situation" and that "some elements of each may be happening simultaneously".[251] Therefore, "we should not argue for the adoption of one approach over the other, but for greater interchange among them".[252]

Another challenge to synthesising new institutionalist approaches is exactly how to conceptualise 'institutions' considering that each approach has its own conceptual connotation. However, this problem does not only exist between institutionalist approaches but also within them.[253] In order to transcend this issue, we may focus on Steinmo's conceptualisation of institutions as simply "rules"[254] including formal ones, as focused on by Streeck and Thelen,[255] and informal ones that Hall[256] and Marcussen[257] emphasize and which Immergut[258] characterises as "obstacles to particular policy choices, but also ultimately structured the menu of choices available to different regimes".[259] With the inclusion of ideational or discursive institutionalism in this new institutionalist synthesis, we may have to take a more constructivist approach to describing institutions. As Schmidt describes, institutions

> are simultaneously constraining structures and enabling
> constructs internal to 'sentient' (thinking and speaking)

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[250] Ibid. 951-953.
[251] Ibid. 955.
[252] Ibid.
[253] For example, see Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism".
[254] Ibid. 123.
[255] Streeck, Wolfgang and Thelen, Kathleen, *Beyond Continuity: institutional change in advanced political economies,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[256] Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms".
[257] Marcussen, Martin, *Ideas and Elites: the social construction of economic and monetary union,* (Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2000).
[258] Immergut, Ellen, *Health Politics: interests and institutions in Western Europe,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[259] Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism", 124.

> agents whose 'background ideational abilities' explain
> how they create and maintain institutions at the same time
> their 'foreground discursive abilities' enable them to
> communicate critically about those institutions, to change
> (or maintain) them".[260]

If we are to take a more constructivist, ideational approach to institutions, we may have the opportunity to synthesize institutionalist approaches. Schmidt argues that ideational institutionalism is the most conducive to synthesis with other approaches as it "blurs the boundaries among all older institutionaisms [...] and shows how ideas and discourse can advance knowledge in the social sciences across methodological approaches".[261] If we are to move forward in analytical precision, we may have to accept that there are co-existing and mutually influential 'realms' of analysis (i.e. historical, sociological, ideational, rational). This project's new institutionalist synthesis has attempted to show just that; there are certain contextual, institutional and dynamic factors which require a specific type or types of analysis and that different approaches can, in fact, complement one another. If we could consider the analogy of the study of human beings in its various forms in the social sciences (i.e. sociology, political science, history, psychology) and how these approaches have informed one another, we may more precisely be able to understand and explain social and political phenomenon such as, for example, social institutional entrenchment and collective perceptions of the state.

**Questions and Contributions**

Despite the inquiry-based and methodologically-based challenges this research endeavor has incurred, the findings have opened up new questions as to how we conceptualise certain concepts

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[260] Schmidt, "Reconciling Ideas and Institutions", 48.
[261] Schmidt, Vivien, "Discursive Institutionalism: the explanatory power of ideas and discourse", *Annual Review of Political Science,* 11 (2008): 304.

to include different contextual factors, new opportunities to engage with existing literature on traditional authority and, most importantly, shed some led on causal factors that can be applied in future cross-case studies. Additionally, the research project and findings have attempted to show the invaluability of local interpretation and guidance towards finding specific causal factors and the necessary analytical approaches to understanding and explaining them.

In the discussions with research participants, certain concepts common in comparative politics were opened up and challenged by the local Baganda context and interpretations. Specifically, concepts such as 'failed states', 'democracy', 'political legitimacy' and, most important for the purpose of this study, 'institutions' were re-challenged by context and interpretation.

As it was outlined in the second chapter of this paper, one theoretical approach to the resurgence of traditional authority concentrates on state weakness or failure. Indeed, the findings of this project found that the perception of contemporary Uganda as a failed state has contributed to a collective disillusionment. How, then, do we define 'failed' or 'weak' states? According to Englebert Uganda is an example of a "relatively strong" state[262] yet the perceptions of local Baganda represent the contrary. In this case it is evident that 'relative' weakness or strength does not matter, but only the local perception of such. Not one local research participant characterised Uganda as a 'relatively' strong state. Instead, it was unanimously interpreted as weak or failed and characterised by underdevelopment, dictatorial practices, corruption and patrimonialism. These interpretations could be tied to sense of political legitimacy which leads into the next concept touched upon by the research findings.

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[262] Englebert, "Patterns and Theories of Traditional Resurgence".

The first two causal factors identified in this research –social institutional entrenchment and a collective disillusionment with the central state – could be integrated into the discussions of political legitimacy. Ray[263] provides the most comprehensive discussion on political legitimacy regarding traditional authority and the contemporary African state. According to Ray, traditional authorities maintain sources of political legitimacy that are distinct and "beyond the grasp of the post-colonial state".[264] Traditional leaders are argued to have retained special sources of legitimacy because "these institutions can be seen to embody their people's history, culture, laws and values, religion and even remnants of pre-colonial sovereignty".[265] The social entrenchment of the Buganda Kingdom and the Baganda's specific 'logic of appropriateness' may be a reflection of these legitimacy roots which Ray outlines. The post-colonial African state, on the other hand, claims its legitimacy from colonial legitimacy claims based on "(1) rights of the conqueror rather than the consent of the people, (2) assertions of cultural or racial superiority of the colonisers over the indigenous people and (3) the use of a constitutional and legal order based on or rooted in the imperial power" with the additional roots of "(1) the nationalist struggle for independence by the people, and (2) the expression of the democratic will of the people through elections".[266] It could be argued that the colonial legitimacy claims may have adversely affected the Baganda considering their historically-contingent, existential disillusionment with the central state. Similarly, the collective disillusionment with the Ugandan central state may represent the central state's relative lack of political legitimacy in

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[263] Ray, *Grassroots Governance?*
[264] Ibid. 5.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Ibid.

contemporary times. Therefore, the Buganda Kingdom can be said to have maintained more political legitimacy than that of the Ugandan state.

Finally, the findings of this research may revamp the way we view and treat the concept of 'institutions', particularly political ones. The Buganda Kingdom and its encompassed clan structures are quintessential examples of political institutions that are entrenched in the social and cultural everyday lives of the Baganda. In other words, the political institution is a part of their identity; inextricably linked to their traditional history, culture, values, beliefs and interests. Most importantly is the familial dynamic to the political institution. The Baganda are familially tied to all hierarchical levels of the political structure, including their leader: the Kabaka. This opens up questions of how we may define/conceptualise political institutions. Are there institutions that are more socially entrenched than others? Are some institutions more 'personally connected'? If so, what may be the differences in political outcomes? Would these institutions be more impervious to change? Finally, what might these findings have to say about our Canadian political institutions? This inquiry into the resurgence of traditional authority in sub-Saharan Africa will hopefully spark these and more questions as we engage with the prospects of Africa's future and the approaches and concepts we confront in comparative politics.

# APPENDIX: MAPS OF UGANDA AND BUGANDA

## Figure 3: Map of Uganda with Administrative Districts



*Source: Science Direct*

## Figure 4: Map of Buganda



*Source: Buganda.com*

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