Bhāviveka’s Jewel in the Hand Treatise: Elucidating a Path to Awakening Utilizing Formal Inference

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doctoral thesis

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Abstract

Madhyamaka soteriological theory can be summarized as a process of transforming cognition from conventional reality to ultimate reality. Hence, the diverse understandings of these two realities certainly influence different Mādhyamikans’ soteriology. Based on his unique theory of two realities, Bhāviveka elucidates a path to awakening utilizing formal inference in his *Jewel in the Hand Treatise*.

Bhāviveka defines conventional reality as that of worldly experience, including language, which is for those sentient beings who are not yet awakened even though such a reality is derived from their attachments produced from ignorance. Based on the theory that worldly experience is the result of the activation of intrinsic natures, Bhāviveka accepts that things have intrinsic natures at this level of reality. Moreover, Bhāviveka’s understanding of ultimate reality contains three connotations: 1) from an ontological perspective, “ultimate reality” means the ultimate object which is understood as the true nature of things; 2) from an epistemological perspective, ultimate reality is non-conceptual wisdom, which refers to how the Buddhist sages view reality; 3) the teachings in accord with non-arising is ultimate reality. According to the first and the second definitions, reality transcends worldly experience, languages and so on. From this level of reality, things possess no intrinsic nature.

In addition to the truth of things and non-conceptual wisdom, Bhāviveka suggested a secondary ultimate reality, i.e., the teachings in accord with non-arising to facilitate the interaction between the two realities. Therefore, a practitioner is able to transform their cognition from conventional to ultimate reality. Furthermore, Bhāviveka’s teaching of the secondary ultimate reality includes the knowledge of śūnyatā obtained from hearing,
thinking, and meditating. For Bhāviveka, the logical argument or a formal proof statement (prayogavākya) is a sufficient methodology to acquire the knowledge of hearing from which the other two types of knowledge can be acquired.

Although formal proof statements (prayogavākya) had been developed in Buddhism for a long time, they never became an important methodology for debate before Dignāga (480~540 CE). Because of his influence, formal proof statements became a formal methodology for debate and were accepted by different religious schools. According to Dignāga, a formal proof statement is established on the basis of two kinds of cognitions (pramāṇa): direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Based on Dignāga’s perspective, Bhāviveka incorporated formal proof statements into his soteriological theory. In order to make formal proof statements a qualified methodology, Bhāviveka included the concept of intrinsic nature in his interpretation of conventional reality. That is, the inclusion of an intrinsic nature involving direct perception and inference in conventional reality allows for a decisive conclusion by means of a valid formal proof statement. Therefore, a valid formal proof argument is able to secure the correct understanding of (secondary) ultimate reality which becomes the initial step for awakening.
Preface

Buddhism is usually considered a religion which emphasizes practice rather than logical inference. Even though logical inference was in fact mentioned and discussed very early in Buddhism, the question of how it concerns the path to awakening remained uncertain. Hence, some ancient scholars criticized logic as merely a debate methodology without any relevance for one’s liberation. In fact, few Buddhist texts discuss the relation between logic and the path to liberation. Bhāviveka (490~570 CE) is one scholar who had insight into such a relation. For him, logic was not only a methodology for debate, but also an initial step toward liberation. The purpose of my research is to show how Bhāviveka, based upon his unique interpretation of the two realities, constructs his soteriological theory and how his explanation constitutes a transitional process to liberation through the use of formal proof statements in his work Jewels in the hands.
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Other than my great supervisors, I also would like to give special thanks to Venerable Ru-li (Seng L. Chia) for providing sources and ideas for my research and Dr. Chris Daniels, Miss Christina Yanko and Miss Anna Burrowes for proof-reading and editing my dissertation.
Dedication

I would like to dedicate this work to my Master, Reverend Zhen Hua (真華). With his admonishment and encouragement, I was able to progress in both monastic and academic education.
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## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>Ams</td>
<td><em>Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣaśāstra</em></td>
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<td>BBh</td>
<td>Bodhisattvabhūmi of Asaṅga</td>
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<td>IBK</td>
<td>Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū/ <em>Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies</em></td>
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<td>KTR</td>
<td><em>Karatalaratna</em> of Bhāviveka</td>
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<td>Koṣa</td>
<td>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, edited by P. Pradhan</td>
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<td>MHK</td>
<td>Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā of Bhāviveka</td>
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<td>MMK</td>
<td>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna</td>
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<td>NYP</td>
<td>Nyāyapraveśaka of Śaṅkarasvāmin</td>
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<td>PPs</td>
<td>Prajñāpāramitā scriptures</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
<td>Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti</td>
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<td>SDV</td>
<td>Satyadvayavibhavīga of Jñānagarbha</td>
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<td>T</td>
<td>Taisho Shinshū Daizōkyō</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction: Logic and Soteriology in the *Jewel in the Hand*

Buddhism is usually considered a religion which emphasizes practice rather than logical inference. Even though logical inference was in fact mentioned and discussed very early in Buddhism, the question of how it concerns the path to awakening remained uncertain. Hence, some ancient scholars criticized logic as merely a debate methodology without any relevance for one’s liberation. In fact, few Buddhist texts discuss the relation between logic and the path to liberation. Bhāviveka (490–570 CE) is one scholar who had insight into such a relation. For him, logic was not only a methodology for debate, but also an initial step toward liberation.

The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate the relationship between logic and soteriology. First, I examine how Indian logic concerned itself with Buddhist soteriology by investigating Bhāviveka, the first Mādhyamikan to consider logic to be a necessary step in the path to liberation. Second, this dissertation provides an English translation of Bhāviveka’s work, *Karatalaratna* (大乘掌珍論/Jewel in the Hand) in which logical argument is an important methodology in obtaining liberation. Third, this dissertation presents a philosophical analysis of the translated text to show how Bhāviveka applies logical argument in his soteriological theory. The discussion focuses on how Bhāviveka’s metaphysical theory supports his logical argument and soteriological theory.

Although logical argument (*hetuka/ nyāya*) was discussed in some early Buddhist texts, it was not considered an important form of knowledge until Dignāga’s reformation. After the use of logical argument became more and more popular, the question which followed was whether logical argument is merely a methodology used in debate, or
whether it also plays an important role in the path to liberation. This is the question which this dissertation addresses.

Bhāviveka was a South Asian Buddhist monk who was influential in India around the sixth century. As modern scholars of Madhyamaka have known, he is the first Mādhyamikan to adopt formal proof statements (prayogavākya) to argue for the concept of śūnyatā. The application of formal proof statement distinguishes him from other Mādhyamika and had a great influence on later developments.¹ Although there are many divergent understandings of Madhyamaka doctrines, the fundamental disagreements are in regard to each scholar’s perspective toward the two realities and the manner of applying formal proof statements (prayoga). Some scholars claim that such divergences are philosophical and (or) methodological distinctions.² However, only a few people seem to be aware that these two differences are in fact soteriological distinctions.³ For Bhāviveka, the formal proof statement was not only a debate methodology but also an initial step towards liberation. The purpose of this dissertation is to show how Bhāviveka, based upon his unique interpretation of the two realities, constructs his soteriological theory and how his explanation constitutes a transitional process to liberation through the use of formal proof statements.

¹ Yamaguchi points out that Mādhyamika did not become a full-fledge school of thought until Bhāviveka wrote his MHK. “Indo daijō kyōgakushi ni okeru kyōsō hanjaku no tenkai” (The development of the sectarian classifications of Buddhism in the history of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thought), Ōtani Daigaku Gaguhō, Vol. 24 & 25 (1944), 28. Because Bhāviveka criticized Yogācāra, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra became two distinct schools. Because Bhāviveka criticized Buddhapālita and later was refuted by Candrakīrti, Mādhyamika was further sub-divided. S. Iida, Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism (Tokyo: the Hokuseido Press, 1980), 21.
³ Ibid., 77.
In my investigation into Bhāviveka’s soteriological theory, this dissertation relies primarily on one of Bhāviveka’s main works, the *Karatalaratna (大乘掌珍論/Jewel in the Hand, hereafter KTR). There are two reasons for using the KTR as the main source. First of all, the KTR itself outlines a relatively clear path toward liberation compared to the other major texts of Bhāviveka, the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (hereafter MHK) and Prajñāpradīpa (hereafter PrP), which are relatively extensive compared to KTR.

Bhāviveka’s unique method of religious practice, formal proof statements as an initial step to liberation, can be easily identified in the KTR. The KTR is also considered as a concise summary of Bhāviveka’s philosophical system presented in MHK. Therefore, the KTR is an important text to study Bhāviveka’s soteriological theory.

Second, the KTR is the only text of the three without either an original Sanskrit or Tibetan version, and thus, it has been largely ignored by Western scholars. Because the KTR was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang around 647 or 649 CE, eighty years after Bhāviveka’s death, the translation should not deviate too far from the original intent of the author. It is also widely accepted as Bhāviveka’s latest work of the three. Thus far, a French translation of the Chinese text by Poussin and a Sanskrit edition reconstructed

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4 The Sanskrit name is reconstructed from Chinese version by N. A. Sastri who in fact reconstructed the whole text into Sanskrit from Chinese in his work, Karatalaratna (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949), 33–104. However, according to Chinese version, it should be Mahāyāna-Karatalaratna because there is the term Mahāyāna addressed in front of the text. The original Chinese name is Dachengzhangzhenlun (大乘掌珍論) which can be translated as “The Mahāyāna treatise of Jewels in the Hands” in English.

5 These two texts will be briefly introduced in the next chapter.

6 That is something that I plan to prove in this dissertation.

from the Chinese by N. A. Sastri are available. However, to date, there is no complete English translation of the text. This dissertation will provide for the first time a full English translation of this text based on a Chinese version which will enlarge the potential academic audience for the study of Bhāviveka.

After a brief introduction, the second chapter will focus on the author of the text. The discussion contains biographical information, and will cover Bhāviveka’s influence in three different Buddhist contexts, including Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan Buddhism. Although there are many possible spellings, according to both Sanskrit and Tibetan sources, many scholars claim that ‘Bhāviveka’ is the most accurate spelling of the author’s name. Based on current scholarship and additional Chinese sources, this dissertation will further support this claim.

A large amount of Euro-North American scholarship has focused primarily on Bhāviveka’s thought and influence in either Indian or Tibetan Buddhism. In addition to these, this dissertation will extend the discussion to Bhāviveka’s influence on Chinese Buddhist thought. Some scholars have indicated that he has been influential in Indian Buddhist philosophy around the sixth century. Because of his critique on Yogācāra philosophy, the concept of “school” in Mahāyāna Buddhism began to emerge. For investigating Bhāviveka’s position in Indian Buddhism, the main source this dissertation will utilize is Chinese pilgrims’ records and later Mādhyamikans’ works. In re-analyzing those sources as well as modern scholars’ research, this dissertation suggests that during

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his time, Bhāviveka was considered to be the only legitimate successor of the Madhyamaka School.

In the context of Chinese Buddhism, it seems that three of Bhāviveka’s important works have been translated into Chinese although, nowadays, only KTR and PrP are available. Moreover, due to the lack of information regarding the later developments of Indian Madhyamaka Schools, Bhāviveka was represented as the successor of Nāgārjuna for Chinese Buddhist audiences. The unique philosophy of two realities, ‘‘truly empty and conventionally substantial’ (Zhen Kong Su You 真空俗有) from the *Karatalaratna was adopted by Chinese ancient scholars to represent Bhāviveka’s philosophy. His debate with the Yogācāra scholar Dharmapāla is well known in Chinese Buddhism. However, because the Chinese Madhyamaka School (Sanlunzong/三論宗) was on the wane, and because of Xuanzhuang’s (玄奘/602~664CE) dissemination of Yogācāra doctrine, most of the intellectual monks in the Tang Dynasty were all Yogācārins, and thus, Bhāviveka did not gain as much recognition as he did in India.

In Tibet, as some modern research indicates, Bhāviveka’s philosophy might have been introduced by Śāntarakṣita and many of his works were translated into Tibetan in the early period. Bhāviveka was very influential in the early development of Tibetan Madhyamaka around the eighth to tenth century. This influence survived for several hundred years in Tibet until Candrakīrti’s philosophy was noticed.

Chapter three is a brief introduction to the content of the *Karatalaratna (大乘掌珍論 Jewel in the Hand, hereafter KTR). As mentioned previously, this text is extremely important for the study of Bhāviveka because it is the only text among his works without
either original Sanskrit or Tibetan versions and it provides a relatively clear soteriological path compared with the other texts. The discussion in this chapter will cover the name of the text and the purpose of composing the text. This chapter will also introduce its structure and content. Moreover, the rhetorical methodology employed by Bhāviveka for debate with his opponents will be examined.

Subsequent chapters will discuss Bhāviveka’s philosophy and his soteriological theory according to what is presented in the *Karatalaratna and in his other works. Following Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka’s soteriological theory describes how to transfer one’s cognition from conventional to ultimate reality. Bhāviveka defines conventional reality as the reality of the worldly experience, including language, which is a reality for those sentient being who are not yet awakened, even though such a reality is derived from their attachments produced from ignorance. He reasons that although sentient beings are prone to mistakenly perceive things as they appear due to ignorance, things should have intrinsic natures at this level of reality.

Based on Bhāviveka’s understanding of ultimate reality, it can be briefly stated that the word ‘ultimate reality’ has three connotations: 1) from an ontological perspective, the term ‘the ultimate’ or ‘the object’ refers to the true nature of things; 2) from an epistemological perspective, the term ‘non-discriminating wisdom’ refers to how the Buddhist sages view reality; and 3) the teachings in accord with non-arising refers to ultimate reality. According to the first and the second definitions, reality is the transcendence of the worldly experience, language and so on. At this level of reality, things possess no intrinsic nature. Bhāviveka develops a third concept, secondary ultimate reality, which creates an important pivot between these two realities. The
secondary ultimate reality becomes an important feature of his soteriological theory. Before further discussing his soteriology, it is important to examine Bhāviveka’s definition of the two realities and the secondary ultimate reality. The examination and demonstration of Bhāviveka’s two realities will be in the fourth chapter.

The fifth chapter will examine Bhāviveka’s application of the formal proof statement (prayogavākya) in his soteriological theory. The teaching of the secondary ultimate reality according to the Prajñāpradīpa includes the knowledge of śūnyatā obtained from hearing (śrutamayī), thinking (cintāmayī), and meditating (bhāvanāmayī). In regard to these three types of knowledge, the formal proof statement according to the *Karatalaratna is a foundational methodology which allows one to acquire the knowledge of hearing and from which the other two types of knowledge can be achieved. Hence, the formal proof statement is the initial step for his secondary ultimate reality.

In order to validate the function of the formal proof argument, Bhāviveka must validate the function of valid cognition (pramāṇa) including direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa) because these two are the main elements of a formal proof argument. Based on Dignāga’s theory, Bhāviveka further develops his own epistemological theory: external objects are substantially existent because they consist of an aggregation of atoms. Since an external object is real in conventional reality, its particulars are able to cause direct perception (pratyakṣa), and its universal, i.e., a collection of particulars, is able to cause inference (anumāṇa). The basic definition for a universal is that it must possess a similar locus (āśraya) and lack a dissimilar locus. These two requirements of a universal can guarantee an accurate inference because a reference is the appearance of a universal in cognition. They become two of the three
requirements for a valid reason in a formal proof statement. Moreover, on the basis of this theory, language is able to refer to a certain thing by conceptualizing and designating its universal with the capture of its locus. Therefore, a formal proof statement, supported by the function of language and an accurate perception, is able to obtain an accurate result (i.e., inference) by providing a sound reasoning.

Therefore, Bhāviveka has to accept an intrinsic nature of dharmas in conventional reality to guarantee the decisive result of a formal proof statement and secure a possible path to achieve liberation. Based on his ontological system, the detail of a formal proof statement will be discussed and redefined with a principle in modern logical, Hypothetical Syllogism (HS).

The sixth chapter concludes that formal proof statements are not only a method for debate, but an initial step for the path towards liberation as revealed in the *Karatalaratna. Bhāviveka’s “teaching in accord with śūnyatā” includes the knowledge of śūnyatā obtained from hearing, thinking, and meditating. These three kinds of knowledge compose a hierarchical process towards liberation. Formal proof statements, therefore, are a sufficient methodology to acquire the knowledge of hearing which is the basis of the other two. Owing to Dignāga’s influence, formal proof statements have been established on the basis of the two kinds of valid cognitions (*pramāna), direct perception (*prayakṣa) and inference (*anumāna). In order to secure formal proof statements as a valid methodology, Bhāviveka accepted the concept of substance into his interpretation of conventional reality. That is, the acceptance of the theory that an intrinsic nature exists in conventional existence allows for a decisive result in terms of a valid formal proof
statement. Therefore, formal proof statements are both an initial step and a necessary methodology to obtain awakening.
Chapter Two: The Life and works of Bhāviveka

In the current chapter, I will focus on Bhāviveka’s life and works. The discussion includes Bhāviveka’s biographical information, his works, and his influence within three different Buddhist contexts, Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan Buddhism.

2.1 The Name

Although Bhāviveka is the author of the text *Karatalaratna, the spelling of his name is diverse in different sources. Shotaro Iida listed other possible spellings such as “Bhavya,” “Bhavyaka,” “Bhavyakāra,” “Bhavyaviveka,” “Bhāvivika,” and “Bhagavadviveka,” depending on different source, and concluded that three most accurate ones are “Bhāvaviveka,” “Bhavya,” and “Bhāviveka.”

The Japanese Madhyamaka scholar Yasunori Ejima also listed several spellings such as “Bhāvaviveka,” “Bhāvivikta,” “Bhāviveka,” “Bhavyavivikta,” “Bhavyaviveka,” and “Bhavya.” He points out that “Bhāvaviveka,” “Bhavya,” and “Bhāviveka” are the most common names for the traditional pre-modern scholars. Ejima concludes that ‘Bhāviveka’ is the most accurate spelling.

Up until now, the most common spelling used by modern scholars is “Bhāvaviveka.” The reason that this spelling is popularly used may be because it is found in the Prasannapadā. However, “Bhāvaviveka” only appears in the Sanskrit text and is not

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12 Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., — Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti (hereafter PsP) *Bibliotheca Buddhica* IV (St-Pétersbourg, 1903-1913), 36.
the only possible spelling in Sanskrit sources. Poussin’s edition of the Prasannapadā also uses Bhāviveka four times. The author of the Lakṣaṇaṭīkā, a commentary to the Prasannapadā, also uses the spelling. Hence, the spelling “Bhāvaviveka” is not exclusive in Sanskrit sources.

The term “Bhavya” is derived from Tibetan sources and, has not been found in any Sanskrit texts today. In the Tibetan translation of the Madhyakāḷamkāraṭīkā, two different spelling are used by the author: “sNang bral legs” which can be restored as “Bhāviveka” or “Bhāvivikta” and “sKal ldan” which is “Bhavya” in Sanskrit. Jñānagarbha, in his commentary of PrP (Prajñāpradīpa), uses “Legs ldan-byed” or “Legs ldan ’byed” for the author of PrP. Ejima indicates that “Legs ldan-byed” could be a typo and thus, “Legs ldan ’byed” is a more accurate spelling, which is “Bhavyaviveka” in its original Sanskrit. Moreover, Atīśa, in his various treatises and translations, also uses both “Bhavya” and “Bhavyaviveka” for the author of PPd and MHK.

In contrast to the divergence of Sanskrit and Tibetan, the Chinese translations of Bhāviveka’s name are very consistent in meaning. Most of the Chinese sources use 清辨 (qingbian), 清辯 (qingbian) or 分別明 (fenbieming). In regard to the Chinese word 清 (qing), although it possesses a dozen meanings, its basic meaning refers to ‘clear’, ‘manifest’ from which the meaning of ‘light’, the direct meaning of 明 (ming), is derived.

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15 Y. Ejima, “Bhāviveka/Bhavya/ Bhāviveka” 838-846. The following analysis is a summary of Ejima’s study.
16 C. Watanabe, Bhāviveka’s Madhyakāḷamkāraṭīkā, Tattvajñānaṣanā, verses 137-266: An English translation and explanation (The University of British Columbia, 1994) 8.
17 Most of the Chinese ancient scholars use either 清辨 or 清辯 (qingbian). 分別明 (fenbieming) only appears in Prabhākaramitra’s translation of Prajñāpradīpa.
Herein, the Chinese character 辨 (bian) means “distinction” or “distinguishing” as well as 分別 (fenbie). The word 辯 (bian) means ‘debate.’ Although these two words have slightly different meanings, according to classical Chinese grammar, the characters which possess the same pronunciation can be transposed.\(^{18}\) Hence, both 辨 (bian) and 辯 (bian) mean 分別 (fenbie) ‘distinction, discrimination, or investigation.’

According to the Datangxiyuji (大唐西域記), the transliteration of 清辯 or 清辨 (qingbian) is 婆毘吠伽 (pobifuja) which can be identified as Bhāviveka in Sanskrit according to Sanskrit-Chinese phonic analysis: 婆 bhā, 毘 vi 吠 ve and 伽 ka. The term ‘bhāviveka’ consists of two words bhā and viveka. The word bhā means ‘light’, ‘brightness’, splendour, etc.\(^{19}\) which corresponds to the Chinese word 清 (qing) or 明 (ming). Meanwhile, ‘viveka’ means “distinction”, or “discrimination”\(^{20}\) which also corresponds to the Chinese “辨”, “辯” (bian) or “分別” (fenbie.) Therefore, within the various spellings, Bhāviveka is the most possible spelling according to different sources. Hence, in the following, I will use Bhāviveka as a formal spelling for the author of the *Karatalaratna.*

\(^{18}\) T54, 834b.
\(^{19}\) M. Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (New York: Oxford University, 1988), 750.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., 987.
2.2 Birthplace:

According to Xuanzhuang’s (玄奘) *Datanxiyuji* (大唐西域記),\(^{21}\) Bhāviveka was from 領那羯磔迦國 (Dhānakataka, or Dhānyakaṭaka).\(^{22}\) The story of Bhāviveka in the 大唐西域記 (*datanxiyuji*) is summarised as follows:

The country of Dhānyakataka is six thousands Li (kilometre) in circuit, and its capital city is forty Li round. Not far away from the city of the south, there is a mountain crag in which the master Pobifuja (Bhāviveka) has stayed in the palace of Asuras, waiting to see Maitreya, the future Buddha. Bhāviveka went to Magadha and tried to debate with Dharmapāla. However, the master was refused by Dharmapāla. After that, the master came back to his own country. By thinking that except the future Buddha Maitreya, who can answer my questions, he decided to stay in the mountain, waiting for the future Buddha.\(^{23}\)

The description here, “the master came back to his own country” is the direct translation from the original Chinese, “論師既還本土.” From this hint, it can be derived that Bhāviveka was from the country of Dhānakataka.\(^{24}\) According to Samuel Beal, Dhānakataka is presently a western neighbor of the present Amarāvatī which is in central India and belongs to Andhra Pradesh province.\(^{25}\) However, in the ancient geographical system, it was probably considered to be in the south of the territory at that time.\(^{26}\)

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\(^{21}\) *Datanxiyuji* (大唐西域記/ the Great Tang Dynasty records of the western world) was a traveling record journal written by Xuanzang to record his journey to India. English translation see: S. Beal, *Si-Yu-Ki: Buddhist records of the western world* (London: Routledge, 2000).

\(^{22}\) There are many possible Sanskrit spelling for this Chinese term such as Dhamñakatak, Dhamyakatak, Dhānyakatak, Dhānyavātipura, Dhārnākaṭaka, Dharanikāṭa. Beal, 220–221. Also see Iida 25.

\(^{23}\) The translation of the whole passage can be seen in Beal 221–223. Iida also indicates that the last part of the passage is identical with the record in Tāranātha, 9–10.

\(^{24}\) Iida in his book *Reason and Emptiness*, says that *Ui’s Konsaisu bukkyō jiten* inform us that his birthplace was Dhānyakatak in south India. In fact, the reference for *Konsaisu bukkyō jiten* to make such a declaration is this passage. Somehow, Iida did not use this original passage as reference but used Konsaisu bukkyō jiten as reference instead (Iida 8).

\(^{25}\) Beal, 220–221, Iida 25, and Eckel 9.

\(^{26}\) According to 大唐西域記 (*Datanxiyuji*), Dhānyakatakata was identified as South-India at the time when the Chinese pilgrims traveled to India.
Falin’s (法琳/572~640 CE) Bianzhenglun (辯正論), another Chinese source regarding Bhāviveka which is previous to Datanxiyuji (大唐西域記), indicates that Bhāviveka was from a family in Magadha.\(^{27}\) In the Bianzhenglun (辯正論), Falin (法琳) claimed that he himself was a member of the Prabhākaramitra’s translation team translating the Prajñāpradīpa into Chinese in 629 CE, and he was in charge of writing down the translation as well as the preface. It is in the preface that Falin (法琳) claimed Bhāviveka’s Magadhan kṣatriya identity.\(^{28}\) Thus, he probably obtained this information from Prabhākaramitra. However, Falin’s (法琳) preface was not adopted as the official preface for the Prajñāpradīpa. The official preface was written by Huize (慧賾/580~636CE) who was another person in the team in charge of writing down the translation. However, in his preface, Huize (慧賾) did not mention anything about Bhāviveka’s birthplace.\(^{29}\) Hence, Falin’s (法琳)’s description about Bhāviveka’s birthplace is not without suspicion.

Tārānātha’s History of Buddhism in India says that Bhavya (legs-ldan) was born to an illustrious royal family of Malyara in south India.\(^{30}\) Sum-pa-mkhan-po indicates that Bhāviveka was born in a royal family of Malayagiri. According to the above sources and analysis, we may conclude that Bhāviveka was born into a royal family in Dhānakataka which now is a western neighbor of the present Amarāvatī.

\(^{27}\) T52, 513b. \\
^{28}\) Ibid. \\
^{29}\) T30, 50c. \\
^{30}\) Idia 8 & Tāranātha 130.
2.3 Date:

The date of Bhāviveka’s life is believed to be around 490~570 or 500~570 CE. Dating Bhāviveka’s lifetime is not difficult because his life or works involved many other Buddhist famous figures such as Dharmapāla, Buddhapālita, Dignāga and Sthiramati. Taking the historic records and epigraphics as basic sources, modern scholars have arrived at the above conclusion through the investigation of the relationships between Bhāviveka and these Buddhist famous figures. The following is a brief description.

According to Chinese pilgrims’ records, Dignāga, Dharmapāla, and Sthiramati were contemporary with Bhāviveka. Scholars used to believe that Sthiramati lived between 470~550 CE. In his research, “Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic”, Eric Frauwallner corrects this supposition and re-estimates the dates for those figures as following: Dignāga (480~540CE), Dharmapāla (530~561CE) and Sthiramati (510~570). On the basis of Frauwallner’s hypothesis, Yuichi Kajiyama further places Bhāviveka in between 500~570 CE by comparing the interaction among Dharmapāla, Sthiramati and Bhāviveka. First, Bhāviveka was a little older than Sthiramati. The evidence is that Bhāviveka, in his $PPr$, attacked Guṇamati who is one of Sthiramati’s teachers. Moreover, Sthiramati, in his $Dachengzhongguanlunshi$ (大乘中觀論釋/ the Commentary of Mahāyāna Mūlamadhyamakakārikā), cites passages from both Dignāga and Bhāviveka. Sthiramati was not only younger than Dignāga but must be even younger than Bhāviveka. Hence, Kajiyama concludes that Bhāviveka must be born around 500 CE.

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31 T54, 229b. Hirakawa 228.
Second, Kajiyama argues that Bhāviveka died around 570 CE. His reasons are: 1) Dharmapāla criticized Bhāviveka in his work. According to tradition, Dharmapāla should be over twenty years old when he could criticize a great master.\(^\text{34}\) That implies that Bhāviveka survived at least after 550 CE. 2) In the Dataniyuxi (大唐西域記), it says that Bhāviveka entered into the mountain crag (died) nine years after he was refused for debate by Dharmapāla who had already retired and stayed in Bodh Gayā.\(^\text{35}\) Dharmapāla retired from Nālandā at the age of twenty-nine (559 CE).\(^\text{36}\) Thus, Bhāviveka must have died around 569 or 570 CE. So far, Kajiyama’s conclusion seems to be accepted by many modern scholars such as Idia, Hirakawa, and Ames as a formal data for Bhāviveka.\(^\text{37}\) Hence, I will adopt Kajiyama’s conclusion in this dissertation.

2.4 Life and position of Bhāviveka in Buddhist cultural context

2.4.1 Bhāviveka in Indian context

Bhāviveka is definitely an influential figure in Indian Buddhist history. The Chinese pilgrim, I-zhing (義淨 635~713CE), lists a series of names of influential Buddhist figures in India in his travel record, the Nanhaijiguichuan (南海寄歸傳/ the Traveling Record of South-ocean). The record says:

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\(^{34}\) P. Hoornaert, “The Dharmapāla-Bhāviveka debate as presented in Dharmapāla’s Commentary to Catuhsataka XVI.23” Kanazawa University Repository for Academic resource 24 (2004), 119~149. Also T30, 246a~c.

\(^{35}\) It says that in order to see Maitreya, Bhāviveka recited incantation (mantra) for three years in front of the statue of Avalokītesvara Bodhisattva. After that, he recited another incantation for another three years. After these six years, Bhāviveka waited and practiced for three more years. Finally, the deity broke the crag and made a cave. The story ends up that Bhāviveka entered the cave to see Maitreya (T51, 930c).

\(^{36}\) Frauwallner 132~134.

\(^{37}\) Idia 7; William Ames 31; Hirakawa dates Bhāviveka as 490~570. See Akira Hirakawa, インド仏教史 (Indo Bukkyōshi/The History of Indian Buddhism) (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1995), 205.
There were such kind (of monks who helped Buddha to promote dharma) like Nāgārjuna, [Ārya-]deva, and Aśvaghoṣa far back in the past, Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka in median back in the past, and Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti...recently.  

I-zhing (義淨) went to India as a pilgrim via the sea route in 671CE and stayed in India and south Asia for twenty-five years. I-zhing (義淨) recorded those people in his travel diary and divided them into three periods of time. Moreover, since I-zhing (義淨) had traveled around India and south Asia for twenty-five years, the above information should not be understood as only I-zhing’s (義淨) personal opinion. Instead, it should be considered to be a general understanding during I-zhing’s visit to India.

From the above citation, there are several things worthy of more detailed discussion. First, although the chronological order of those figures above may have to be reconsidered according to modern research, especially putting Bhāviveka together in the same period as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, these people must have been so influential upon their contemporaries that I-zhing (義淨) had to mention it in his record. Second, it is surprising that in the list, we cannot find Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti who are considered to be the legitimate successor of Nāgārjuna in Tibetan traditions. Buddhapālita lived around 470~540 CE, and Candrakīrti was around 600 ~550 CE. That is to say, these two Mādhyamikans were elder and younger than Bhāviveka. If they were influential enough, why did I-zhing (義淨) not even mention them? Third, in this list, the figures listed in the middle period, only Bhāviveka belongs to Madhyamaka

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38斯乃遠則龍猛、提婆、馬鳴之類，中則世親、無著、僧賢、清辨之徒，近則陳那、護法、法稱、戒賢及師子月、安慧、德慧、慧護、德光、勝光之輩 (T54, 229b)。
School. Placing Bhāviveka together with these two Yogācāra founders may indicate that Bhāviveka was Nāgārjuna’s legitimate successor. Consistent with I-zhing (義淨), we cannot find any information about Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti in Xunzang’s (玄奘) 大唐西域記 (datanxiyuji) which records that Bhāviveka promotes Nāgārjuna’s teaching by stating, “the śāstra-master (Bhāviveka) … outwardly displayed himself by Sāṁkhya garb and inwardly, propagated the teaching of Nāgārjuna.”\textsuperscript{40} Hence, without the influence of the later sources from the Tibetan tradition,\textsuperscript{41} Bhāviveka in the Indian context was not only influential but also considered to be Nāgārjuna’s legitimate successor according to reports of Chinese pilgrims.

Bhāviveka’s influential position is not only illustrated in the Chinese sources but also in the later development of Madhyamaka from Tibetan sources. According to some modern Japanese scholars, in fact, most of the later Mādhyamikans belongs to Bhāviveka’s lineage.\textsuperscript{42}

The influential figures promote their Buddhist philosophies through their literary compositions and debates. As shown above, in the Datanxiyuji (大唐西域記). Xuanzhuang (玄奘) used the term śāstra-master (論師/vādī) to address Bhāviveka. As we can see, the Buddhist figures in the above list are all śāstra-masters. Since ancient times, there have been monks recognized as experts or in charge of different Buddhist sciences such as, suttantika, vinaya-dhara, and dhamma-kathika (dhamma-dhara).\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{40}“論師雅量弘遠，至德深邃，外示僧佉之服，內弘龍猛之學”(T 51, 930c)
\textsuperscript{41}See Bhāviveka in Tibetan context of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{42}Hirakawa, History 205~219. See Bhāviveka in Tibetan context of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{43}Hirakawa, History 94.
Those *dharma-kāthika* also became *dhamma-dhara* (those who hold/keep the teaching) who were in charge of passing down Buddhist teaching and examining the new teaching as it spreading out from different areas (on the basis of the old *sūtras* after the first Buddhist congregation.)*44* Consequently, from dharma-dhara, the *mātykā-dhara* or abhidharma-dhara developed. *45* Later, when abhidharma was used as a general term for all Buddhist commentaries, Abhidharma-dhara (those who promote *abhidharma*) became the most influential scholars in mainstream Buddhism.

When Mahāyāna scholars (or *śāstra-master*) began to compose commentaries on the newly appearing *sūtras*, i.e., Mahāyāna *sūtras*, they refused to use *abhidharma* as a general term for all Buddhist commentaries due to their disagreements with *abhidharma* philosophies, and that *abhidharma* had already become a specific genre. Instead of *abhidharma*, they preferred to use the term *śāstra* for their compositions. Those who compose *śāstras* to promote Buddhism are addressed as *śāstra-masters*. In their compositions, in order to impose their religious authority, they intensively challenged different scholars or schools in both Buddhism and non-Buddhism. Thus, debates with other philosophers are the essential parts of those *śāstras*. Through such debates in their compositions, the *śāstra-masters* promoted their philosophies and extended their influence on others.

As we can see, the figures in the I-zhing’s (義淨) list are all *śāstra-masters*, and they all left massive compositions in which they set up a primary, and many other minor

targets to challenge and debate with. For example, Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva as well as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, aimed at abhidharma scholars as their main object to challenge as well as other religious scholars as a second target. Saṃghabhadra was famous for his challenge to Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. It can be said that the more successful one was in debating with others the more influential they were.⁴⁶

Even though debate is a key point for a successful scholar, śāstra-masters individually faced different situations due to the fact that cultures and their different philosophies changed from time to time. Bhāviveka was one typical figure who promoted his own philosophy and extended his own influence through debate by composing śāstra. In order to determine how Bhāviveka impacted Buddhism, and thus other religions, it is necessary to know understand the environment in which Bhāviveka lived, and how he differed from Nāgārjuna.

In the time of Nāgārjuna (150~250CE), Mahāyāna was still in the early period of development,⁴⁷ and the sectarian (abhidharma) schools, especially Sarvāstivādin school, still dominated mainstream Buddhism. Hence, in his main work, the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*, Sarvāstivādin doctrine becomes the main target for Nāgārjuna’s criticism. That is to say, for Nāgārjuna, to establish a fundamental basis for Mahāyāna philosophy by challenging Sarvāstivādin School in the environment (or monasteries) surrounded and dominated by abhidharma philosophy was a top priority. As Walser indicates, Nāgārjuna refutes Sarvāstivādin doctrine without dismissing the abhidharma project as a whole.⁴⁸

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⁴⁶ Eckel, Bhāvaviveka 9~15.
⁴⁸ Ibid., 226.
Venerable Yin-shun further points out that the main focus of Nāgārjuna’s challenge was Kashmir Sarvāstivādins, especially, those who composed the *Abidamodabiposalun* (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra*).  

In contrast to Nāgārjuna, at the time of Bhāviveka, Mahāyāna Buddhism had developed and flourished for several centuries. Mahāyāna thoughts and doctrines clearly dominated certain areas of Buddhism. This can be revealed by the Chinese pilgrims’ travel notes. In regard to Mahāyāna Buddhism during the 5-6th century, there are three situations worthy of note. First, *abhidharma* Buddhism was still the mainstream Buddhism even though it was not as influential as before. Second, there were also different philosophies in Mahāyāna Buddhism. The most obvious difference as mentioned in the *Sāṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is the difference between the teachings of śūnyatā in the early *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures and the teaching of existence in other later sūtras.  

Third, a Hindu renaissance caused the resurgence of systematic Vedic philosophies in the Gupta empire (320~567CE). Although the monarchs’ attitude toward religion in the Gupta Empire was quite open, the main religion they extensively supported was the Vedic tradition. This attitude caused the restoration of the Vedic tradition. Due to this re-flourish of the Vedic tradition, Vedic philosophical schools were also quickly developing and flourishing. Of these, the six philosophical schools of Sāmkhya, Yoga, Mimāṁsā,  

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50 Walser 89.
Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, and Nyāya were the most famous. Although these six schools had developed for a long time before the Gupta Empire, their main philosophies were composed during this period.

Within such a complicated background, the main target for a later Madhyamaka philosopher to challenge, especially for Bhāviveka, is not only Sarvāstivāda but also extends to the Yogācāra School and even the Vedic-schools. This situation can be evidenced from both Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (hereafter MHK) and the *Karatalaratna. In both of these works, Bhāviveka even spends more effort on criticizing the Yogācāra School and those Vedic-schools than the abhidharma schools (this will be discussed in the following sections).

To challenge the various schools of both Buddhism and non-Buddhism, there are three problems that Bhāviveka had to directly deal with. They are: 1) the nihilistic critique on the teaching of śūnyatā, 2) the theory of svabhāva pervading in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, and 3) finding a valid debating system. Within those three, the idea of svabhāva is the central thesis which the other two are based on. In addition to Sarvāstivāda and some other abhidharma schools in Buddhism, the theory of svabhāva seems to be the fundamental theory shared with all six Vedic-schools. On the basis of this theory, the Sarvāstivāda accuses the Madhyamaka School of nihilism because its particular teaching of śūnyatā is to deny svabhāva. Moreover, in regard to the debate system, the formal proof statement (prayoga) which is established on the basis of the idea of svabhāva seems to be a valid and popular system to be adopted for debate among the schools.

54 In chapter 24 of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (hereafter MMK XXIV), Nāgārjuna’s opponents raised a series of arguments to challenge Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of śūnyatā.
different religions at that time. The conflict between śūnyatā and svabhāva became a dilemma for Bhāviveka.

In order to solve this dilemma and adjust to the contemporary environment, Bhāviveka established a unique account of two realities, according to Chinese scholars, called ‘truly empty and conventionally substantial’ (Zhen Kong Su You真空俗有). He attempted to remove the contradiction between śūnyatā and svabhāva by proposing that although in ultimate reality, all are śūnyatā, conventionally, everything has its own svabhāva. Relying on this unique theory, Bhāviveka, was, on the one hand, conventionally able to employ logic to argue for ultimate reality against other schools, and on the other hand, was able to retain the philosophy of the Madhyamaka tradition, i.e. everything is ultimately śūnyatā. Although this unique theory was very controversial and might not be accepted by other Mādhyamikans, it was the theory which enabled Bhāviveka to successfully debate against others and for him to become an influential figure in the history of Indian Buddhism.

As Yamaguchi points out, Mādhyamika did not become a full-fledge school of thought until Bhāviveka wrote his MHK. Once Bhāviveka criticized Yogācāra, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophies were distinguished and became two schools. Yamaguchi’s perspective is not merely a suggestion. In fact, in Chinese tradition, the debate between Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, a famous Yogācāra scholar, has been well

55 Enshō Kanakura. “ハイツカとヘ一ツカ” 印度哲學と佛教的諸問題 (Indo tetsugaku to Bukkyō no shomondai/The Problems of Indian Philosophy and Buddhism) (Tōkyō : Iwanami Shoten, 1951), 163.
56 Bhāviveka is the one who first used the phrase “Madhyamaka.”
57 Yamaguchi, “Indo daijō kyōgakushi ni okeru kyōsō hanjaku no tenkai” (The development of the sectarian classifications of Buddhism in the history of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thought), Ōtani Daigaku Gaguhō, Vol. 24 & 25 (1944), 28.
known for several centuries.\(^{58}\) The Chinese Yogācāra scholar, Huizhao (惠沼) from the Tang Dynasty, indicated that while Dharmapāla was being born one thousand and hundred years after the Buddha’s death, Bhāviveka also composed the *Karatalaratna. From then on, there is the debate over emptiness and existence in Mahāyāna.\(^{59}\) Therefore, it is not over-reacting to claim that Bhāviveka is the one who began the idea of ‘school’ in the Madhyamaka tradition.

2.4.2 Bhāviveka in the context of Chinese Buddhism

Bhāviveka was known as 清辯 (qingbian) or 分別明 (fenbieming) in Chinese. The first person who introduced Bhāviveka into China was Prabhākaramitra in 629 CE by introducing him as 分別明 (fenbieming) in the translation of the *Prajñāpradīpa. Later Xuanzang used the term 清辯 (qingbian) for Bhāviveka when he translated *Karatalaratna into Chinese around 647 or 649 CE. However, Xuanzang used the transliteration 婆毘吠伽 (pobifuja) to introduce Bhāviveka in *Datangxiyuji (大唐西域記). In addition, as mentioned above, 義淨 (I-zhing) used 清辯 (Qingbian). With ancient Chinese characters, when the pronunciations are the same, two different characters can substitute for each other. Thus, 清辨 and 清辯 are interchangeable.

The sources mentioned above, such as the *Prajñāpradīpa, *Karatalaratna, *Datangxiyuji (大唐西域記) and Nanhaijiguichuan (南海寄歸傳), are the main sources for

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\(^{58}\) P. Hoornaert, “The Dharmapāla-Bhāviveka debate as presented in Dharmapāla’s Commentary to *Catuhsataka XVI.23”, 119–122.

\(^{59}\) 成唯識論了義燈, “護法菩薩千一百年後方始出世, 造此論釋...。清辨菩薩亦同時出造掌珍論, 此時大乘方詮空有” (T43, 660a)。
the pre-modern traditional scholars in China to understand Bhāviveka and forms the basis for subsequent academic inquiry. As far as we know, the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Karatalaratna* are the only two texts among Bhāviveka’s compositions which have been translated into Chinese. However, there is evidence that some Chinese scholars knew another important text of Bhāviveka’s, the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*. No Chinese version has been found to date. The first person who mentioned the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* is Yuan-ce (圓測/613~696CE), one of Xuanzang’s disciples.

In his commentary on the *Saṃdhinirṇcana-sūtra*, he states:

Therefore, in the chapter of Entering into the True Ambrosia in *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* composed by Bhāviveka, it says that outside of the six consciousnesses, there is no ālayavijñāna because it is not subsumed by the six consciousnesses.”

Following this passage, later scholars such as Huizhao (惠炤/651~714CE), Huaiyuanlu (懷遠錄/around the tenth century CE), and Taixian (太賢/ around the eighth century) also mentioned this text in their works. Hence, some parts of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* must have been translated into Chinese and brought into China during the Tang Dynasty (唐朝). That is to say, in regards to Bhāviveka’s seminal works the ancient Chinese were able to access more than what is known in modern scholarship.

In the Chinese context, as compared to that of India or Tibet, there are three central differences in understanding with regards to Bhāviveka. First, all Chinese scholars considered Bhāviveka to be a legitimate successor of Nāgārjuna without knowing

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60 解深密經疏, “是故清辨菩薩所造，中觀心論入真甘露品云：離六識外，無別阿賴耶識，眼等六識所不攝故”(X21, 240b)

61 Huizhao (惠炤), 成唯識論了義燈 (T43, 733c); Huaiyuanlu (懷遠錄), 樞嚴經義疏釋要抄 (X11, 143a). Taixian (太賢), 成唯識論學記 (X50, 68c).
anything about Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. In China, as most scholars know, the Sanlunzong (三論宗/ the School of Three Treaties) is considered to be the Chinese Mādhyamika School. According to the Sanlunzhangyi (三論章義/ the Content of the Three Treaties), the Mādhyamika lineage from India to China is as follows:

Nāgārjuna →Āryadeva →Rāhula →Piṅgala → Bhāviveka

Sūryāsoma → Kumārajīva → early Chinese Mādhyamikans

The Chinese perspective of Indian Mādhyamika lineage can be understood from this lineage-diagram. After Rāhula, Piṅgala and then Bhāviveka were considered to be the legitimate successors of Nāgārjuna.

Kumārajīva was taken hostage and brought to China at around 410 C.E. and stayed in China for ten years. He translated many Mādhyamika texts which became the primary sources for the Sanlunzong. After Kumārajīva translated Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā together with Piṅgala’s commentary (中論釋) into Chinese, Piṅgala was naturally considered by Kumārajīva’s Chinese followers to be a legitimate successor of Nāgārjuna. Later, both Xuanzhuang’s Datānxiyuji (大唐西域記) and I-zhing’s Nanhaijiguichuan (南海寄歸傳) mention Bhāviveka as a Mādhyamikan, but not Buddhapālita or Candrakīrti. That was the reasons why the above Mādhyamika lineage-diagram was composed in this way. Moreover, I-zhing’s Nanhaijiguichuan (南海寄歸傳),

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62 So far, we cannot find any Chinese source mentioning Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti.
63 R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 163.
as mentioned above, was also a basic source for non-Mādhyamikans to think of Bhāviveka as the legitimate heir among his contemporaries.

Second, Chinese scholars focused on Bhāviveka’s philosophical approach instead of his methodology. Some modern scholars have singled out two of Bhāviveka’s approaches: one is philosophical and the other one is methodological. These two approaches also distinguish him from other Mādhyamikans. In his philosophical approach, Bhāviveka claims that from ultimate reality all things are empty (śūnyatā), but in the conventional reality all things exist. This idea is the main proposition Bhāviveka proposes in *Karatalaratna*. His methodological approach was the first to apply formal proof statements to argue for Madhyamaka doctrines.

In contrast to Tibetan scholars who categorize Mādhyamikans by means of their methodological approaches, Chinese scholars summarized Bhāviveka’s philosophy as ‘truly empty and conventionally substantial’ (*Zhen Kong Su You*真空俗有), and even classified his teachings as an independent school. For example, Xuanzang’s most influential disciple, Kuiji (窺基/632–682CE), in his commentary to the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*, divided Indian Buddhism into eight schools, and classified Bhāviveka as the seventh school by claiming:

The seventh school believes that from the ultimate reality all is śūnyatā. Bhāviveka and his followers consider this teaching to be the ultimate teaching. That is, all

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64 William. L. Ames thinks that the issue between Bhāviveka and Buddapālita only concerns the methodology and not other deep philosophical issue. In contrast with Ames, C. W. Huntington considers the issue to be more a philosophical issue. See the *Svātantrika and the Prasāṅgika Distinction* 8~9.

65 See the analysis in chapter four of this dissertation.
existences are substantial in the conventional reality but śūnyatā in the ultimate reality. 66

Another example is Cheng-guan (澄觀/737~838CE) who divided Indian Buddhism into ten schools and listed Bhāviveka as the eighth school in his commentary on the

Buddhāvatamsaka-mahāvatulya-sūtra:

The eighth one also called the school of extinction in both realities. Because ultimate existences are apart from features, they do not exist. Because the conventional existences arise by means of cause-conditions and such are like illusions, they are inexistent. For example, in the *Karatalaratna, it says, “Truly, composited existences are empty because they are produced by means of causality, for example illusions, and non-compositied existences which possess no reality do not occur like the flowers in the sky” 67

The following are other examples which show how those Chinese scholars present Bhāviveka’s philosophy in a concise manner: Kuiji (窺基) in his commentary of the

Avatamsakasūtra, “If we rely on Bhāviveka, (all) can be existent in conventional reality but all is empty in ultimate reality.” 68

Taixian (太賢) in his Chenweizhilun xueji (成唯識論學記/ the Record of Studying Chenweizhilun) states, “Bhāviveka and others interpreted in accordance with prajñāpāramitā teaching: the conditioned and unconditioned elements are existent in the conventional reality but empty in the ultimate reality.” 69

Huizhao (惠沼/651~714CE) in his commentary of Chenweizhilun (成唯識論了義燈/ the Lamp of Decisive Meaning of Chenweizhilun) states, “Bhāviveka says: [all is] empty in the

66 說無垢稱經疏,“七 勝義皆空宗：謂清辨等，明說空經，以為了義。說一切法，世俗可有，勝義皆空” (T38,1011a)
67 大方廣佛華嚴經疏,“第八亦名二諦雙絕宗：謂勝義離相故，非有。世俗緣生如幻故，是無。如掌
珍頌云：真相有為空，如幻，緣生故。無為無有實，不起似空華等” (T35,518c)
68 “若依清辨，世俗可有，勝義皆空”(T33, 40b.)
69 “清辨等，述般若言，有為無為，俗有真空”(X50, 27a).
ultimate but existent in the delusive conventional reality.” 70 Yuance (圓測/613–696CE) in his commentary on the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* states, “According to Bhāviveka and so on, on the basis of Nāgārjuna’s explanation of existence and emptiness, in terms of the conventional reality, [some things are] empty and [others are] not empty; [however,] in terms of the ultimate reality, there is nothing that is not empty.” 71 Hence, the idea “truly śūnyatā and conventionally substantial” could be considered as the most influential teaching that Bhāviveka left to those Chinese scholars.

The third point that I would like to investigate is how Chinese scholars viewed the debate between Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, specifically, their attitudes and the content of their discussions. There were two popular attitudes among those Chinese scholars toward the debate. The first group was those such as Kuiji (窺基), Dunlun (遁倫/around the eighth century), and Yanshou (延壽/904–975CE), who held Yogācāra as the legitimate teaching and accused Bhāviveka of misunderstanding śūnyatā. This detail will be discussed later in this chapter. Kuiji (窺基), Xuanzang’s most influential disciple and Dunlun (遁倫), the famous *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* (瑜伽師地論) annotator, were both Yogācāra scholars. Since they were Yogācāra scholars, it is quite logical for them to adopt a Yogācāra position within the debate.

However, not all Chinese Yogācāra scholars took a Yogācāra position to criticize Bhāviveka. Yuance (圓測), Xuanzang’s famous Korean disciple, considered Bhāviveka

70 “清辨云: 勝義空, 俗妄為有”(T43,766b.)
71 “若清辨等, 依龍猛宗, 說空有者, 依世俗諦, 有空不空, 依勝義無法不空”(X21, 279a.)
and Dharmapāla to be complementary rather than contradictory to each other. In his work, *Xinjingzuan* (心經鑽), Yuance (圓測) illustrates:

One thousand years after the Buddha’s *nirvāṇa*, there were two Bodhisattvas appearing in the world in the country of Dhānakataka (or Dhānyakaṭaka) in the south India. One was Bhāviveka and the other one was Dharmapāla. In order to help sentient beings to realize Buddhist dharma, their independent teachings of śūnyatā and existences complement each other to accomplish the Buddha’s intention. The Bodhisattva Bhāviveka held the teaching of śūnyatā against the teaching of substantial existence in order to remove (sentient beings’) attachment to substantial existence. The Bodhisattva Dharmapāla held the teaching of substantial existence against the teaching of śūnyatā in order to remove (sentient beings’) attachment to śūnyatā.  

In this passage, Yuance (圓測) considered that no matter what teachings those Bodhisattvas proposed, they were merely skilful means to help sentient beings to remove their attachment. Yuance (圓測) used the so-called *upāya* (skilful means) to eliminate the conflict between these two teachings. Yuance was not the only person looking at the debate from this perspective. Fazang (法藏/643~712CE), the famous monk from the Huayan School (華嚴宗), in his *Rulengchaixinxuanyi* (入楞伽心玄義), also supports this idea and insists that because the later scholars were endowed with little intelligence, they did not realize the teachings of emptiness and existence. Hence, Bhāviveka corrects the misunderstanding of existence which violates emptiness by revealing that all things are empty, and Dharmapāla corrects the misunderstanding of emptiness which destroys existence by revealing that some things are not empty.  

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72“佛滅沒已一千年後南印度界健至國中有二菩薩一時出世：一者清辨，二者護法。為令有情悟入佛法，立空有宗共成佛意。清辞性執空破有，護法性破空顯有。又清辞性破破空之有，令有不失。護法性破顯空之有，令空不失。故有情悟佛法，立空有宗共成佛意” (T33,544a).

73“後代論師為時澱慧薄，聞空謂斷因果，聞有謂隔真空。是清辨以破違空之有，令有不失顯空，方顯即空之有，因果不失。護法等以破顯空之有，令空不失顯有，方顯即有之空，真性不顯 (T39, 430c).
So far, I cannot find anyone who took a Madhyamaka position to criticize Dharmapāla. The reason may be that the Chinese Madhyamaka School, Sanlunzong (三論宗), had diminished after the death of Jizang (吉藏/549～623C.E), the authoritative scholar of Sanlunzong. Moreover, the Chinese Yogācāra School was founded and became more and more popular among Chinese intellectuals under the influence of Xuanzang after he came back to China in 643 CE.

Chinese scholars focused on the relations between the three natures of Yogācāra and two realities of Madhyamaka in their discussions surrounding the debates between Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla. More specifically, they focused on how the three natures of Yogācāra worked for Bhāviveka’s philosophic system, i.e., ‘truly empty and conventionally substantial’ (Zhen Kong Su You 真空俗有). The interaction between Bhāviveka and the three natures of Yogācāra will be further discussed in a subsequent chapter of this paper.

As the most popular citation that Chinese ancient scholars use from the *Karatalaratna* indicates, Bhāviveka’s philosophic system may be described as ‘truly empty and conventionally substantial.’ That is, on the level of ultimate reality, all is śūnyatā but on the level of the conventional, everything is existent. According to this system, those Chinese Yogācāra scholars alleged that on the level of conventional reality, Bhāviveka also recognized the existence of other dependence (paratantra) and perfect reality (parinispanna). Kuiji (窺基) claimed in his Chengweishilunshuji (成唯識論述記), “Bhāviveka, the featureless Mahāyāna from conventional reality, also asserts the existence of dependent nature (paratantra) and perfect nature (parinispanna), but all are
empty in true reality.” 74 Yuance (圓測) also considered that for Bhāviveka, the two natures (paratantra and parinispāṇa) could exist in conventional reality, but all is empty in ultimate reality.75 This idea can be considered a synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka.

Some people such as Yuance (圓測) might agree with the idea that dependent nature (paratantra) and perfect nature (parinispāṇa) only exist in convention reality. However, many Chinese Yogācāra scholars were unsatisfied with such a declaration. They thought that at least, the perfect reality (parinispāṇa) should not be empty in ultimate reality. That is because in Vasubandhu’s Trīṃśikāvijñāptibhāṣya, whose annotated-translation, the Chengweishilun (成唯識論), is the basic source of Chinese Yogācāra School, clearly states that parinispāṇa is the ultimate reality and the truth of all dharmas.76 Kuiji’s (窺基) interpretation of the Chengweishilun (成唯識論) states, “Chengweishilun says that in the ultimate reality, the mind and languages are extinct and hence, there is neither emptiness nor existences.”77 Hence, those Chinese Yogācārins thought that it should not be considered as empty even in ultimate reality. Anyone who considers everything to be empty in ultimate reality must be a nihilist or misunderstands...
śūnyatā. Moreover, instead of acknowledging eight consciousnesses and consciousness-only (viśiṣṭātma) in the conventional reality, Bhāviveka considered inner minds and external objects to all be substantially existent. This assertion is certainly not accepted by all Yogācāra scholars.

2.4.3 Bhāviveka in the context of Tibetan Buddhist thought

Modern Madhyamaka scholars are familiar with the terms Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. Bhāviveka has been classified as belonging to the so-called sub-school, Svātantrika Madhyamaka School, within the Tibetan Madhyamaka system. However, the terms Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika were Sanskritized by modern scholars from the original Tibetan Rang rgyud pa and Thal ’gyur ba which were invented by the eleventh century Tibetan scholar Pa tshab nyi ma grags. Although the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction was an unbreakable system in the later Tibetan Madhyamika wherein Candrakīrti was once resurrected to be a dominating figure, the later Tibetan sources did not describe the situation of the early Madhyamaka development before the tenth century. In fact, Bhāviveka was an influential figure in the early dissemination of Tibetan Madhyamika.

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78 Dunlun (遁倫/around eighth century) in his Yuceshidilunji (瑜伽師地論記) said “於大乘部中或有清辨菩薩等一類惡取空故。作如是言。由世俗故一切依他皆有。由第一義諦故一切依他皆無” (T42, 767c).
79 See Idia’s translation of the most famous Tibetan doxography (Grub mtha’), Grub mtha’ rin po che’i phreng ba (the doxography of the Precious Garland) by the eighteen century Tibetan scholar Dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po (Idia, 27). Also, see the translation of the Svātantrika chapter of Jang gay’s presentation of tenets in D. S. Lopez, Jr. A Study of Svātantrika (New York: Snow Lion, 1987), 254.
The assertion that Bhāviveka was well known in Tibetan Buddhism before the ninth century, but not Candrakīrti, can be proven by the textual translations during that period. According to the extant Indian and Tibetan sources, one of Bhāviveka’s important works, Prajñāpradīpa and its commentary Prajñāpradīpaṭīka by Avalokitavrata were translated into Tibetan and diffused by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu’i rgyal in the first dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism.\(^{82}\) Avalokitavrata was not the only commentator of Prajñāpradīpa. Guṇadatta also composed a commentary for Prajñāpradīpa which has been lost for centuries.\(^{83}\) Moreover, Bhāviveka’s main work, the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, and its auto-commentary, the Tarkajvala, are also mentioned in the Tibetan Tripitaka catalogue.\(^{84}\) Some texts with unknown authorships such as the Madhyammakārthasaṅgraha and Madhyamakaraṇa-pradīpa were considered the work of Bhāviveka.\(^{85}\) In contrast, most of Candrakīrti’s important works, except Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti, a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, were not translated until the


\(^{83}\) Yoshimura Shūki. インド大乗仏教思想研究 (Indo Daijō Bukkyō Shisō Kenkyū/ A Study of Thoughts in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism) (Kyōto: Hyakkaen, 1974), nos. 728 & 729.

\(^{84}\) Ibid.

\(^{85}\) Ejima Yasunori. 中観思想の展開: Bhāviveka 研究 (Chūgan shisō no tenkai : Bhāvaviveka kenkyū/The Development of Madhyamaka: the study on Bhāviveka) (Tōkyō: Shunjūsha, Shōwa, 1980), 34.
eleventh century.\textsuperscript{86} Therefore, it is fair to say that Bhāviveka rather than Candrakārti was
well known and influential in the early dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism.\textsuperscript{87}

So far, there is not enough evidence to tell how Bhāviveka’s philosophy was
initially introduced to Tibet. It was probably introduced by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla,
despite the fact that they disagree with Bhāviveka on the understanding of conventional
reality.\textsuperscript{88} As indicated by the pre-modern Tibetan source, the \textit{Presentation of Tenets}
(\textit{Grub mtha’ rnam par bzhag pa}) of Jang-gya (1717-1786 CE), Śāntarakṣita (725-790
CE) was the first Mādhyamikan to be invited by king Khri srong IDe brtsan (755-797 CE)
to Tibet to disseminate Buddhism.\textsuperscript{89} Later, Śāntarakṣita’s successor, Kamalaśīla
(740-796 CE), was invited to Tibet to debate with a northern Chan master. After
defeating the Chan master, Kamalaśīla remained in Tibet to disseminate Madhyamaka.\textsuperscript{90}
Jang-gya also indicates that at that time, very few scholars promoted the \textit{Yogācāra}
system in Tibet, and hence the most widespread Buddhist system in Tibet was \textit{Yogācāra-
mādhyamika} disseminated by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{87} Nagashima, 68.
\textsuperscript{88} See the following analysis.
\textsuperscript{89} D. S. Lopez, Jr. \textit{A Study of Svātantrika} (New York: Snow Lion, 1987), 259-260.
\textsuperscript{90} In regard to the debates and their results, Chinese and Tibetan sources have different description. For
detail, see David S. Ruegg. \textit{The Buddhist Philosophy of the Middle} (Boston: Wisdom Publication, 2010),
253-265.
\textsuperscript{91} Lopez, 259-260. As mentioned above, the term Svātantrika was not used at that time, and thus when the
later source uses this term, they only try to classify Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla into Bhāviveka’s branch.
The fact that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are commonly classified as Svātantrika-Yogācāra Mādhyamika by the later Tibetan source indicates that their connection with Bhāviveka was well recognized by Tibetan scholars. They are addressed as Svātantrika-Yogācāra Mādhyamika because they tried to synthesize Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophy on the basis of the Madhyamaka position. Moreover, there are two reasons why Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are identified as Svātantrika-mādhyamika. First of all, according to mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzung (1385~1438 CE), Śāntarakṣita in his work Madhyamakālaṁkāravṛtti as well as Kamalaśīla’s commentary Madhyamakāloka accept and apply formal proof argument (hetuvidyā). A formal criterion to identify Svātantrika-Mādhyamika for the later Tibetan sources is one’s attitude toward the application of formal proof arguments. Moreover, from a philosophical perspective, both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla accept Bhāviveka’s concordant ultimate-reality which is a different philosophy from Candrakīrti’s, the figure who represents prāsaṅgika-mādhyamika.

92 G. Tucci, “The debate of Bsam yas according to Tibetan source” Minor Buddhist Texts (2) (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1958). “The Mādhyamika who support the svasaṃvitti instead of the existences of the external objects are the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-mādhyamika such as Śāntirakṣita.” This is my Chinese-English translation. The Chinese version was translated by Chen Yu-jiao. 宗義寶鬘 (Zongyibaoman/ The Doctrinal System of the Precious Garland) (Taipei: Fa-er publisher, 1988), 96. Also, Iida, 30.

93 See S. Yamaguchi. 般若思想史 (Hannya shisōshi/ theHistory of Prajñā-thought) (Kyōto-shi: Hōzōkan, 1999), 170.

94 As Ames has indicated, the distinction is a methodological distinction rather than a philosophical distinction (G. B. J. Dreyfus & S. L. McClintock 8 ~9). Dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po in his Grub mtha rin po che’i phreng ba, clearly indentified Svātantrika-mādhyamika as: “Why is he called Svātantrika-mādhyamika? It is because he declares that by means of the correct hetuvidyā, composed of a formular of syllogism, one is able to remove the concept that things truly exist. He is called Svātantrika-mādhyamika” ( Iida, Reason 27)

95 Jundo Nagashima “The Distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika in the Late Madhyamaka: Atiśa and Bhvya Prāsaṅgika” in Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Sarībhāṣā (2004), 76.
According to Tibetan sources, after Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Bhāviveka’s influence at least remained till the ninth century. The Tibetan source *Ta ba’i khyad par* by Ye shes sde (the ninth century CE), the earliest Tibetan source mentioning the lineage of the Madhyamaka school, lists a series of Indian Mādhyamikans such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Bhāviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but not Candrakīrti. Moreover, instead of a *Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika* distinction, Ye shes sde classifies Madhyamaka as Sautrāntika and Yogācāra-Madhymaka.\(^{96}\) In the later source, those two schools are considered to be Svātantrika branches, i.e. Bhāviveka’s tradition.\(^{97}\) That is to say, even during the ninth century, Bhāviveka was considered to be a legitimate successor to Nāgārjuna by Tibetan scholars.

Bhāviveka’s system lost its dominant position in the Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition following King Lang darma’s religious persecution (reigned 838–842 CE). Candrakīrti was gradually revived at the beginning of the second Buddhist dissemination.\(^{98}\) According to Kevin Vose, Jayānanda was crucial to the revivification of Candrakīrti.\(^{99}\) First of all, Prajñākaramati was the first person to try to revive Candrakīrti by commenting on Śāntideva’s works with Candrakīrti’s philosophy before Atiśa.\(^{100}\) Atiśa, who is considered as the main figure in the Tibetan Buddhist restoration, frequently

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\(^{96}\) Nagashima, 66.

\(^{97}\) Iida, *Reason* 31.

\(^{98}\) The restoration of Buddhist in Tibet took place around the later period of the ninth century after the death of King King Lang darma. See John Powers. *Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Snow Lion, 1995), 136–137.


\(^{100}\) Ibid., 21–23.
promotes Candrakīrti’s position in his own works.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, Atiśa seems to have a negative attitude toward the usage of formal proof argument (\textit{prayoga}) in the search for ultimate reality.\textsuperscript{102} Although it is controversial to identify Atiśa as a Prāsaṅgika-mādhyamika,\textsuperscript{103} it should not be ignored that Candrakīrti is not less favoured than Bhāviveka by Atiśa.\textsuperscript{104}

After Atiśa, Jayanānda disseminated Candrakīrti’s philosophy by thoroughly commenting upon Candrakīrti’s works.\textsuperscript{105} He even used the term \textit{Svātantrika} to refer to Candrakīrti’s rival school.\textsuperscript{106} From then on, Candrakīrti increasingly got important. The revival of Candrakīrti caused a controversy among Tibetan Mādhyamikans in the eleventh ~ twelfth century. The controversy was mainly about whether the application of formal proof arguments is suitable in the argument for śūnyatā. Starting from a methodological argument, the controversy was later extended to the ontological theory and, even to the concept of the Buddha.\textsuperscript{107} The terms \textit{Svātantrika} and \textit{Prāsaṅgika} were created to address two rival systems of Madhyamaka. Finally, around the fourteenth


\textsuperscript{102} Nagashima 80.

\textsuperscript{103} In fact, Atiśa considers Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka to be in the same Madhyamaka lineage without emphasizing Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction. He even involved in translating Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahādvyāvatāra and his auto-commentary, Tarkajvālā, and supports some of Bhāviveka’s ideas. (Nagashima 80 & Mochizuki 102.) Atiśa in many of his works refers his direct master to Bodhibhadra who was influenced by Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣita. D. S. Ruegg. The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 109.


\textsuperscript{105} Kevin A. Vose 26.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 36.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 39.
century, Candrakīrti’s system replaced Bhāviveka and became the main stream of the Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition.

To sum up, Bhāviveka acted as a śāstra-master in India at his time. He progressively adopted formal proof statements as a debate methodology with his opponents both in Buddhism and non-Buddhism. As a result he became the most important figure in the establishment of Mahāyāna schools, and influenced the later development of Mādhyamika in India. Bhāviveka’s philosophy was introduced by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla into Tibet and remained as a main stream Madhyamaka in Tibet for almost three hundred years until the end of the ninth century. In China, although he was still considered to be the successor of Nāgārjuna, we cannot find much of his influence on Chinese Buddhism due to the fact that during Tang dynasty, the Chinese Madhyamaka School, Sanlunzong (三論宗) had lost its influence, and the situation even got worse after Xuanzang came back to China. Because of Xuanzang’s influence, Yogācāra became Chinese Buddhist intellectuals’ main focus of study.

3. The Works of Bhāviveka

Bhāviveka’s works were probably translated into classical Chinese and Tibetan from Sanskrit. Because there is a strong possibility that translation might be influenced by the translator’s preconceptions, it is important to resolve the issues of translation between Sanskrit and other languages such as Chinese, Tibetan, and even English before depicting a picture of Bhāviveka’s philosophy within the context of Madhyamaka thought.
Many works, both in Chinese and Tibetan, were ascribed to the sixth century Bhāviveka.\footnote{Iida, \textit{Reason} 12–19.} However, according to modern research findings, only three of them are confirmed to be composed by Bhāviveka. Hence, this chapter will not list all of those works which were ascribed to Bhāviveka. Instead, only these three texts will be introduced.

1) \textit{Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā} (hereafter \textit{MHK}) (further discussion can be found in his autocommentary, \textit{Tarkajvālā}, hereafter \textit{Tj})\footnote{Eckel, \textit{Bhāvaviveka} 213–298.}

2) \textit{Prajñāpradīpa}\footnote{In Prajñāpradīpa chapter 25, Bhāviveka’s critique of Yogācāra is missing in Chinese version. Eckel has translated the whole chapter into English from Tibetan in his work, “Bhāviveka’s Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of Prajñāpradīpa,” Miscellanea Buddhica (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1985), 45–75.}

3) \textit{Karatalaratna*}

The \textit{MHK} is understood to be the earliest of the three texts, because the other two works make references to this text. The \textit{MHK} is a text consisting of only verses and was most likely composed in Sanskrit by Bhāviveka and later translated into Tibetan.\footnote{In his \textit{Reason and Emptiness} (p. 12), Iida notes that Rāhula Sāriṅṭyāyana hand copied this text into Sanskrit from an incomplete manuscript found in the Zha-lu monastery in Tibet in 1936. In 1937, the original text was published in \textit{Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society} vol XXIII, part 1 (1937), 1–163.}

Tibetan Buddhists believe that Bhāviveka had composed an auto-commentary called the \textit{Tarkajvālā (Tj)} to interpret the verses of the \textit{MHK}. Only a Tibetan version of the \textit{Tj} has been found and it is confirmed that it was translated into Tibetan in the eleventh
century. But so far, only several chapters of this text have been translated into English.

The *Prajñāpradīpa* (hereafter *PrP*) is Bhāviveka’s commentary on Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter *MMK*). Both Chinese and Tibetan translations are available in the Chinese and Tibetan Tripiṭakas. The Tibetan version, translated at least three hundred years after the death of Bhāviveka, was done by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu’i rgyal in the early ninth century. In contrast, the Chinese version was translated by Prabhākaramitra in 629 CE, approximately sixty years after Bhāviveka’s death. It is worth noting that because Prabhākaramitra’s date of translation is closer to the time of the original text, it may be surmised that his translation does not deviate too much from the original. However, because most modern scholars are familiar with Xuanzang’s much more readable translation techniques, Prabhākaramitra’s translation has long been neglected. Thus far, only translations from the Tibetan source into English contributed by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu’i rgyal, are available to the modern scholars, but an

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113 Ibid., 77–78.
114 See Ames for spelling. Ibid., 53.
115 In fact, Indian and Tibetan scholars worked together to accomplish the translation. See Ibid., 53.
117 Ames, *Six Chapters* 54, “Kajiyama thought that this Chinese translation is bad, unreliable….” Kajiyama’s opinion needs to be reconsidered. Many Japanese scholars may be very comfortable to read either Xuanzang or Kumārajīva’s translations but not others. Moreover, Prabhākaramitra’s translation so far is the earliest version of Bhāviveka’s works. It is even more than 200 years earlier than Tibetan translation. Thus, it possesses a certain value for studying Bhāviveka.
118 Ibid., 77–78.
English translation from the Chinese sources is not yet available and thus largely unknown to Western scholars.

The *Dachengzhangzhenglun* 大乘掌珍論 (*Mahāyāna Karatalaratna/Jewel in the Hands*) is available only in Chinese and is probably Bhāviveka’s latest work of the three.\(^{119}\) It is a very short text. It is both a concise summary of Bhāviveka’s philosophical system and a concise edition of the *MHK*.\(^{120}\) Because the *KTR* was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang around 647 or 649 CE, eighty years after Bhāviveka’s death, the translation should not deviate too far from the original intent of the author. Thus far, a French translation of the Chinese text by Poussin, a Sanskrit edition reconstructed from the Chinese by N. A. Sastri, and Japanese version are available.\(^{121}\) These three versions are all translated from Chinese. So far, there is no English translation of the full text. Hence, this dissertation will provide for the first time a full study and English translation of this text.

According to Anyuan’s (安遠/？)\(^{122}\) *Sanlunzongzhangshu* 三論宗章疏, there once had been six Chinese commentaries of this text, including Jingmai (靖邁/627~649 CE), Wenbei (文備/around the eighth century), Taowen (道溫/?), Shentai (神泰/ around the

\(^{119}\) As what has been indicated in the previous section that the *KTR* uses the *MHK* as source of reference, Eijma agrees that the *KTR* was written after the *MHK*. Eijma Yasunori, 中観思想の展開 (*Chukan Shisō no Denkai/ The Development of the Idea of Madhyamaka*), 15~16. Z. C. Cao further indicates the *KTR* should be the latest composition of the three. Z. C. Cao. M.A. dissertation 5~6.

\(^{120}\) That is something that I plan to prove in this dissertation.


\(^{122}\) Anyuan (安遠) was an ancient Japanese scholar. He probably visited Chinese during the Tang Dynasty, and later, composed his *Sanlunzongzhangshu* 三論宗章疏.
seventh century), Taixian (太賢), and Yuanhsiao (元曉/617~? CE). Taixian (太賢) and Yuanhsiao (元曉) are from Korea and Taowen (道溫) lived in Song dynasty. Thus far, only half of one commentary (the bottom scroll) among these six is available in the Chinese Buddhist canon though the author of this half remains unknown. There are also many missing words in it.

Other than the MHK, the rest of Bhāviveka’s works are available in either Tibetan or Chinese translations. As a result, the sources for the study of Bhāviveka are very limited. Nevertheless, Bhāviveka’s concepts can be found in other sources such as Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (hereafter PSP, preserved in both Sanskrit and Tibetan) in which passages from Bhāviveka’s PrP are cited to illustrate many of Bhāviveka’s ideas. Thus, the PSP is an important auxiliary text for a comparative contextual study of Bhāviveka’s concepts. Moreover, most scholars who study Bhāviveka focus only on Tibetan sources. Given the fact that the Tibetan translations are much later than the Chinese translations, as explained earlier, it is advisable to pay closer attention to the Chinese translations. This dissertation will mainly rely on the Chinese source, in particularly, the Dachengzhangzhenlun (KTR), and other auxiliary sources in order to portray Bhāviveka’s religious practice—i.e., formal proof statements as an initial step to liberation.

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123 T55, 1138a.  
124 The half text can be found in X46, 713–728.
Chapter Three: The Text – *Karatalaratna (Dachengzhangzhenlun/大乘掌珍論/The Mahāyāna Treatise of the Jewel in the Hand) 125

This chapter is a brief introduction to the text *Karatalaratna (大乘掌珍論/Jewel in the Hand, hereafter KTR). As mentioned previously, this text is extremely important for the study of Bhāviveka because it is the only text among his works without either an original Sanskrit or Tibetan version, and the text provides a relatively clear logical path toward liberation as compared with the others. First, I will discuss the name of the text and the purpose of its composition. Next, this chapter will introduce its structure and content with a diagram. Finally, I will examine how this text illustrates Bhāviveka’s strategy in debating with his opponents.

3.1 Name and Purpose

The name *Karatalaratna is reconstructed from Chinese “Dachengzhangzhenlun” (大乘掌珍論). “Dacheng” (大乘) translates as Mahāyāna. “Zhang” (掌) means hand or palm. “Zhen” means “precious (things).” “Lun” simply means “treatise.” The title can be translated into English as The Mahāyāna Treatise of the Jewel in the Hand. As described in the previous chapter, it is one of Bhāviveka’s three important works and was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang around 647 or 649 CE.

In regard to the name of the text, Jewel in the Hand, there is a story in Tsa-ahan (雜阿含) which gives us an idea of what this refers to. In the story, the Buddha tells his

125 The Sanskrit name is reconstructed from the Chinese version by N. A. Sastri who in fact reconstructed the whole text into Sanskrit from Chinese in his work, Karatalaratna (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949), 33~104. However, according to the Chinese version, it should be Mahāyāna- Karatalaratna because the term Mahāyāna is addressed in front of the text.
disciples that although he has realized numerous things after his awakening, the most important things he has to teach are in his hand. Compared to other things, those in his hand are the most precious things. The passage from the early text provides us with a clue to the name of the text *Karatalaratna (Treasures in the Hand). In Buddhism, the most precious treasure is certainly the teaching that leads to awakening.\textsuperscript{126}

In this story, it is important to note the concept of “quintessence” and “hand.” As F. W. Thomas indicates in his article “The Hand Treatise,’ A Work of Aryadeva”, ‘hand’ is an idea well applied to a summary exposition.\textsuperscript{127} At the beginning of the text, Bhāviveka also illustrates that he composed this texts for two kinds of people:

For the people who have diligently reinforced the practice after entering the nature of things\textsuperscript{128} by means of the method of investigating extensive literature and are tired of the enormous work of the present of investigating the extensive literature, or for those who have not yet realise the nature of things and who are intelligent, I composed the *Jewel in Hands (*Karatalaratna) in order to enable people to easily realize true emptiness and quickly comprehend the true nature of things.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{126} “At that time, the Bhagavat, filling his own hand with leaves, asks those bhikṣus, “Are there more leaves in my hand than (in the forest) or does the forest hold more?” Those bhikṣus answer, “Bhagavān! The leaves in your hand are few, but the leaves in the forest are immeasurable. They are hundred-thousand times more than (the leaves in your hand). The two quantities cannot be compared, not even with simile.” (The Buddha says,) “Bhikṣus! After achieving awakening, those dharmanas I have realized and I have to preach for others are like the leaves in my hand. Why? That is because they are dharma-content beneficial, dharma-beneficial and holy-life beneficial. They are liberation, wisdoms, awakening, leading to the nirvāṇa. The leaves in the forest are like those that I will not teach to you after achieving awakening and realizing the dharma. Why? That is because they are not dharma-content beneficial, dharma-beneficial and holy-life beneficial. They are not liberation, not wisdoms, not awakening, and not the path to the nirvāṇa” (T2.08a/my own translation). Also see Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of ‘Siṁsapā Grove’ in Sāṁyutta Nikāya volumeII (2000), 1857~1858.


\textsuperscript{128} 入法性 (rufaxing) is directly translated as ‘entering the nature of existences’ in English. However, it is a metaphorical usage and means ‘realize the nature of existences.’

\textsuperscript{129} See my translation of the KTR I.1.2“或有依廣文義正決擇門入人法性數，復勤修勝進加行，於廣文義決擇現前甚大勳勞心生懈倦，或有雖復未入法性而是利根。為欲令彼易證真空速入法性故，略製此掌珍論。”(T30, 268b)
For those two types of people, Bhāviveka thinks that what they need is not an extensive exposition, but a concise text which can extract the quintessential idea of Buddhism. That is the reason for the composition of this text and the name *Karatalaratna (The Jewel in the Hand). Moreover, this text can also be considered as a concise “hand-book” of argument against Bhāviveka’s Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents.

If the *Karatalaratna is an extract from an extensive exposition, what is the extensive text to which it refers? A clue can be found in the relationship between this text and another important work of Bhāviveka, the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (hereafter MHK). Bhāviveka, when examining other schools in the *Karatalaratna, refers twice to the extensive discussions devoted to the topic in the Entering into the True Ambrosia (入真甘露). According to Chinese commentaries such as The Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (解深密經疏) and The Lamp for Illuminating the Meaning of the Treaties on the Establishment of Consciousness-only (成唯識論了義燈), Enter into the True Ambrosia is one of the chapters of Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā. Bhāviveka does not extensively debate certain topics to avoid overwhelming his target audience. In other words, if someone wants to know more detail about a certain debate, Bhāviveka will refer them to MHK. Hence, we may infer that when Bhāviveka composed this text, his intention was to extract the essential concepts from the MHK and provided a summary in an independent text.

130 Further discussion can be found in his auto-commentary, Tarkajvālā, hereafter Tj. Eckel, Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents, 213–298.
131 X21, 240b & T31,733b.
3.2 Structure and content

3.2.1 Introduction

Bhāviveka composed the *KTR*, using a thesis-style, to explain the process of the way to awakening. This includes the process from the wisdom obtained by hearing (*śrutamayī*), through the wisdom obtained from cognizing (*cintāmayī*) to the wisdom obtained from meditation (*bhāvanāmayī*), and finally the state of awakening, or the non-conceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*).

First, there is an introduction at the beginning of the text in which Bhāviveka gives a brief background to the work and his purpose for composing this text. In this introduction, he states that one has to generate the vow to obtain the unsurpassed awakening in order to benefit all sentient beings. After generating the vow, one has to rely on ultimate reality and conceive great compassion in order to observe the suffering of sentient beings. For this reason, one has to obtain non-conceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) in order to understand various kinds of people and further remove one’s own defilements. To obtain non-conceptual awareness, one has to employ *śrutamayī* (the wisdom arising from hearing) which is able to remove the self-nature of all perceived objects.\(^{132}\) Hence, *śrutamayī* can be considered to be the initial step on the way to awakening, which is also the primary topic that the *Karatalaratna* focuses upon. Bhāviveka spends eighty percent

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\(^{132}\) See my translation in the *KTR* I.1.2, “In order to attain awakening, one should examine, ‘Only by directly realizing the supermundane non-conceptual wisdom, can one realize the distinctions of various kinds of actions which are perceived by the faculty and have not been realized before. One is further able to break the net of the habituated and non-habituated defilements which are produced in the [mental] continua of self and others as well as the root causes of suffering. One is also able to generate the true vow for others and the determination to receive the precepts of the great beings. However, to directly realize super-mundane non-conceptual wisdom, one has to constantly apply the eye medicine\(^{132}\) of the unmistaken view of emptiness which is able to completely remove the eye-disease of false views. In order to accumulate the eye medicine of unmistaken view of emptiness, one should rely on the wisdom obtained from hearing (*śrutamayī*) which is able to remove the self-nature of all perceived objects.’” (T30,268b)
of the text discussing how to obtain śrutamayī in which Buddhist logical arguments are the central theme.

In his discussion of śrutamayī, Bhāviveka introduces his thesis with formal proof statements as the content of śrutamayī:

In reality, conditioned things are empty like illusions because they are produced by conditions, and unconditioned things are not real because they are not produced like sky-flowers.

Based on this thesis statement, Bhāviveka classifies the subject matter of the text into two main parts: conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. In these two parts, Bhāviveka grounds his explanation in Madhyamaka philosophy in order to criticize other Buddhist schools such as Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, and non-Buddhist schools including Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and others. He also provides a short conclusion at the end of each section, and a final conclusion at the end of the text. The details

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133 Herein, the true nature is the synonym of ultimate reality (paramārtha). See following explanation.
134 sanskrutdharma and asamskrutdharma can be translated “conditioned dharma” and “unconditioned dharma”. Edgerton, F. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. vo. II. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers), 1998, 543. In Chinese translation, 有為 (youwei) means “active”. Thus, it can be translated as “active dharma” and 無為 (wuwei) “inactive dharma”. However, sanskrta is a ppp. and is derived from sam + √skṭ that means “put together”, “constructed”, or “completely formed” etc. Therefore, herein, sanskrta is translated as “composite” and asamskrta “non-compounded”. See also, M. Monier Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary. (New York: Oxford University, 1988),1120.
136 空華 (konghua) “flowers in the sky” indicates that something does not have objective basis and is only created by eye diseases. It is different from illusions which do not appear as they really are. See the following explanation in the KTR. (See my translation the KTR III.1.3)
137 This division is also found in the third chapter of the MHK. The discussion of the conditioned dharma is in verses 24-129, and 129-136 is about unconditioned dharma. See C. Lindtner. Madhyamakahādayam of Bhavya (Chennai: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 2001), xxx.
concerning Bhāviveka’s employment of formal proof statements will be discussed in the next chapter.

3.2.2 Two-realities

After proposing his theme with a formal proof statement, Bhāviveka begins to elaborate his argument in detail. First of all, Bhāviveka gives a brief definition of the two-realities in which he clearly demonstrates that his argument for emptiness is from ultimate reality and not conventional reality:

The true meaning (paramārtha) itself is called ‘ultimate’; in other words, it is the ultimate reality (paramārtha). In terms of the ultimate reality, conditioned things are established as emptiness and not in terms of convention composed of various conditions.

According to the above passage, Bhāviveka simply defines ultimate reality as ‘the true meaning (object) itself.’ He then defines conventional reality as:

The things which ordinary people universally recognize are accepted by us as conventional existence. The causes and conditions which produce conventional direct perceptions are also recognized to exist.

In this passage, Bhāviveka recognizes two levels of conventional reality: the composite existences that ordinary people can perceive and experience at the primary level, and the elements that comprise the common existence of the primary level at the

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138 Bhāviveka’s understanding of paramārtha will be fully discussed in the chapter four.
139 真義自體說名真性，即「勝義諦」。就勝義諦立有為空，非就世俗眾緣合成。
141 This sentence tries to establish the conventional existences of elements (dharmas) such as five skandhas, twelve āyatanāṇi and eighteen dhātus. Those are all the cause and conditions to produce our sensual experiences.
second level. In order to fully understand Bhāviveka’s two realities, they should be investigated in comparison with Bhāviveka’s definition in his other works. After discussing Bhāviveka’s understanding of two realities, I will explore his explanation of how to transfer one’s cognition from conventional to ultimate reality. In the soteriological transformation, I will focus on discussing the concept of the secondary ultimate reality which involves the application of formal proof statements.

3.2.3 The Debates about Conditioned Dharma (saṃskṛtadharma)

Discussion of the emptiness of conditioned dharmas can be divided into two parts. The first part is the debates between Bhāviveka and those who insist on theories of self-nature of dharmas in both Buddhism and other Indian religions as well as on Bhāviveka’s rebuttals to the critiques of nihilism in Madhyamaka philosophy. Those debates can be classified into four sections to demonstrate: 1) Bhāviveka’s rebuttals to the critiques of destroying the conventional reality; 2) the conflict between self-nature and pratītyasamutpāda; 3) the theory of self nature; 4) the function of language and self-nature.

The second part is Bhāviveka’s critiques on dependent nature (paratantra) as it is taught in the Yogācāra School. The critiques can be separated into two parts in detail. First, Bhāviveka subsumes the theory of paratantra with his unique system of ‘ultimately śūnyatā and conventionally bhāva’ and thinks that paratantra can be accepted conventionally but not ultimately. After he accepts paratantra from the conventional perspective, Bhāviveka further reinterprets paratantra according to his own
understanding. That is, although he accepts *paratantra* conventionally, he does not accept the *Yogācāra* theory of consciousness-only conventionally.

3.2.4 The Debates about Unconditioned Dharmas (*asamskṛtadharma*)

The second part of the text includes discussions surrounding the emptiness of the unconditioned dharmas, the wisdom obtained from reflection (*cintāmayī*), the wisdom obtained from meditation (*bhāvanāmayī*), and finally the state of non-conceptual awareness (*nirvikalpajñāna*).

First, in regard to the concept of the unconditioned dharmas, Bhāviveka classifies it into two types: the unconditioned dharmas of Buddhism and the unconditioned dharmas in other religions. In Buddhism, Bhāviveka’s critiques focuses upon the three unconditioned dharmas of the Sarvāstivādin School and the perfect reality (*pariniṣpanna*) of the Yogācāra School. After criticizing Buddhist schools, Bhāviveka further extends his critiques on the unconditioned dharmas to the non-Buddhist schools of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and Jainism.

After the discussion of the *śrutamayī*, Bhāviveka provides further brief explanations of the other two wisdoms and the profound non-conceptual wisdom. For the wisdom obtained by reflection (*cintāmayī*), Bhāviveka places emphasis upon the frequency of cultivating the concept of emptiness obtained from the *śrutamayī*. For the wisdom achieved through meditation (*bhāvanāmayī*), meditation upon emptiness is the main focus. Finally, Bhāviveka articulates the profound non-conceptual wisdom and criticizes the concept of *bhūtatathatā* in the Yogācāra School. On the basis of such a soteriological process, Bhāviveka’s *KTR* advocates the importance of the wisdom obtained from
hearing (śrutamayī), which should be obtained through logical reasoning utilizing its formal proof statements.

The following outline provides the details of the text’s structure:

I. Introduction
   1. The reason to compose the work: śrutamayī is emphasized
   2. Thesis statement: a formal proof statement (prayoga)

II. The emptiness of conditioned dharma
   1. The establishment of formal proof statements
      1.1 The thesis
         1.1.1 The definition of conventional reality
         1.1.2 The definition of ultimate reality
         1.1.3 The exclusion of conventional delusion
      1.2 Example
      1.3 Reason
      1.4 The establishment of inference
   2. Response to objections\(^\text{142}\)
      2.1.1~15 Response to the critiques of nihilism
         Including the following debates:
         2.1.1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13 Response to the direct accusation of nihilism
         2.1.3 The conflict between self-nature and pratītyasamutpāda
         2.1.4, 14 The critiques of people who insisted self-nature
         2.1.9 Language and self-nature
      2.2 The critiques on paratantra in Yogācāra School:
         2.2.1 The Yogācārin interpretation of śūnyatā
         2.2.2 Response to Yogācārin interpretation
            2.2.2-1 Questioning Yogācārin interpretation
            2.2.2-2 Reinterpretation of paratantra
            2.2.2-3 paratantra as conventional reality
         2.3 Response to others
   3. Sub-conclusion
      3.1 The emptiness of all dharma
      3.2 The wisdom obtained from meditation
      3.3 The non-conceptual wisdom

\(^{142}\) See chapter 5.2.3 for the details about how Bhāviveka responds to these objections.
III. The emptiness of unconditioned dharma
1. The establishment of a formal proof statement
   1.1 Subject: definition of unconditioned dharma
   1.2 Reason
   1.3 Example
   1.4 The establishment of inference

2. Response to objections
   2.1 The unconditioned dharmas in Buddhist schools
      2.1.1~10 The three types of unconditioned dharmas in Sarvāstivāda
      2.1.9 The parinispanna of Yogācāra School
   2.2 The unconditioned dharmas in non-Buddhist schools
      2.2.1-2 Sāṃkhya
      2.2.2-2 Vaiśeṣika
      2.2.3 Jainism and others

IV. Conclusion
   1. Cintāmayī: frequent cultivation of śrutamayī is emphasized
   2. Bhāvanāmayī: meditating on emptiness is the central topic
   3. Avikalpajñāna
      3.1. The concept of profound non-conceptual wisdom
      3.2. The discussion of bhūtatathatā in Yogācāra School
3.3 Bhāviveka’s argument in the *Karatalaratna

In this section, I will further analyze Bhāviveka’s methodology and argument strategy in the *Karatalaratna. Generally speaking, a rhetorical analysis consists of analyzing a certain text by looking for its strategy and how it employs this strategy to convince its target audiences. To apply this principle to this text, we would critically look for its thesis, rhetorical purpose, audiences, and strategy. In regard to the thesis, from the perspective of ultimate reality, Bhāviveka tries to argue that all things are śūnyatā. Even though the argumentation of śūnyatā is a general position for Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna does not argue for śūnyatā merely from ultimate reality in MMK. In MMK XXIV.18, Nāgārjuna simply claims:

Whatever is pratītyasamutpāda that we call śūnyatā/
That (śūnyatā) being dependent designation is itself the middle-path//

Bhāviveka’s argumentation was also criticized by Candrakīrti. Candrakīrti thinks that conventional reality should be considered śūnyatā as well. Hence, although the teaching of śūnyatā is a general teaching of Madhyamaka, Bhāviveka’s argumentation from ultimate reality in the *Karatalaratna is still very unique. Moreover, for rhetorical

144 Nagao has written an article “From Mādhyamika to Yogācāra” in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra with regard to the translation of the word “upādāya.” Here, according to Nagao’s research, the word “some material” should be added behind “upādāya.” (Albany: State University of New York, 1991), 189~201. The following are some translations of other scholars: J. Singh: “That we call śūnyatā which is pratītyasamutpāda, prajñaptis upādāya, madhyamāpratipat.” Jaidev Singh, An Introduction to Madhyamaka Philosophy (Taipei: ShinWun Fong,1990),135. T. E. Wood: “We say that dependent co-origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is emptiness (śūnyatā). That (sa) is a conventional, dependent designation. That (sa) alone is the middle path.” Thomas E. Wood, Nāgārjunian Disputations : A Philosophical Journey through an Indian Looking-Glass (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications,1995), 296. D. J. Kalupahana: “We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is dependent upon convention. That itself is the middle path.” Kalupahana, Mālamadhyamakakārikā 339.
purposes, it can be clearly argued that Bhāviveka’s purpose is to persuade his audiences to accept his perspective. Thus, it is a rhetoric text that persuades with the use of logic.

In regard to the audiences (opponents), as mentioned above, the main targets for Bhāviveka are religious intellectuals including those from Abhidharma Schools, especially, Sarvāstivāda, Yogācāra School, and other religious schools. Bhāviveka employs different strategies to deal with those various opponents. First, although a formal proof statement is the general methodology to challenge all Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools in the *Karatalaratna, he specifically uses it against Vedic-schools. For example, most cases where Bhāviveka debates with Vedic-schools are about the validity of his formal proof statements.

Second, Bhāviveka is quite open to different abhidharma philosophies, even accepting some ideas of Sarvāstivādin philosophy in his account of conventional reality. According to Tibetan tradition, scholars think that Bhāviveka adopted Sautrāntika doctrine in regard to conventional reality.¹⁴⁶ That is why in Tibetan thought he is understood as Sautrāntika in regard to conventional view. In the *Karatalaratna, there is not much evidence to infer his adoption of Sautrāntika doctrine. One the contrary, what can be found is his extensive acceptance of different schools. However, in terms of ultimate reality, he argues against all of their teachings. Methodologically speaking, Bhāviveka used Mahāyāna sūtras to evidence his point of view against abhidharma philosophy in addition to formal proof arguments. For example, in the argument for substantial essence of analytical cessation (pratisamkhyānirodha), the Sarvāstivādins

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 209.
claimed that the Buddha did address the existence of analytical cessation

(*pratisāṃkhyaṇīrodha*) in *Āgama*. To deal with this, Bhāviveka first classified that
assertion in *Āgama* to be merely an expedient assertion, and cites some texts from the
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra as evidence that from ultimate perspective even *nirvāṇa* is
emptiness.¹⁴⁷

Third, with regard to the Yogācāra School, Bhāviveka’s strategy is to provide a
different interpretation of the doctrines and texts which the Yogācāra School relies on
from the conventional reality but deny them from the ultimate reality. For example, on
criticizing Yogācāra doctrine, Bhāviveka focuses on examining whether *paratantra* and
*parinispannya* are ultimately or conventionally existent. The theory of three natures is
considered to be the central philosophy of Yogācāra School. Since the concepts of the
three natures are found in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, anyone who claims to be a
Mahayanist should follow the three natures. Bhāviveka’s strategy is to interpret the three
natures according to the basic teaching of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *nirvāṇa* in *Āgama* from
the conventional reality but deny the three natures in terms of ultimate reality.

¹⁴⁷ See chapter 5.2.3 of this dissertation.
Chapter Four: Bhāviveka’s Two Realities

4.1 Introduction: two realities and liberation

Following Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka’s soteriological theory describes how to transfer a meditator’s cognition from conventional to ultimate reality. In order to enhance his theory, Bhāviveka utilizes something called the secondary ultimate reality, which creates an important pivot between these two realities. Before further discussion on the process of liberation, it is important to examine Bhāviveka’s definition of the two. This chapter will demonstrate Bhāviveka’s two realities by adopting his explanation in *KRT* as the main source, with auxiliary evidence from his other works, the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (his auto-commentary, *Tarkajvālā*) and *Prajñāpradīpa*. This chapter is comprised in three sections.

4.2 The Essence of Bhāviveka’s Two Realities

4.2.1 The Ultimate Reality and Śūnyatā

The Madhyamaka concept of practice can be summarized into a single prescriptive statement that it is a path regarding how to transfer someone’s cognition from conventional to the ultimate reality. This can be substantiated by the ninth to the tenth verses in Nāgārjuna’s *MMK*, XXIV.9-10:\(^{148}\)

\begin{verbatim}
  ye’nyor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyavor dvayoh /
  te tattvam na vijānanti gambhīram buddhaśāsane/
  vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate /
  paramārtham anāgamyayā nirvāṇam nādhigamyate//
\end{verbatim}\(^{149}\)

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\(^{148}\) Louis de la Vallue Poussin, ed., “Mūlamadhyamakakarikas de Nagarjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti” (hereafter *PsP*; *Bibliotheca Buddhica* (St-Pétersbourg, 1903-1913).  
\(^{149}\) *PsP* XXIV.8. p. 494, lines 4-5 and lines 12-13.
Those who do not understand the distinction between these two realities do not realize the profound truth embodied in the Buddha’s doctrine. Without relying on conventional [reality], an ultimate [reality] cannot be taught. Without understanding ultimate reality, nīrṇāṇa is not realized.

The above passage alludes to three soteriological steps. First, one has to know the difference between the two realities as taught in the doctrines of the Buddha. That is, one has to be able to identify what the conventional, and what the profound ultimate reality is. After identifying their differences, it is necessary to realize the importance of relying on the conventional reality to achieve ultimate reality, and further to obtain nīrṇāṇa. Therefore, this process towards liberation is accomplished in three sequential steps of understanding: conventional → ultimate → nīrṇāṇa. Before discussing further the process towards liberation, it is important to examine Bhāviveka’s definitions.

In discussing Bhāviveka’s concept of two realities, ancient Chinese scholars, as has been mentioned in the second chapter, have already indicated “truly emptiness and conventionally substantial” (zhen kong su you 真空俗有) as an indication of the key aspect of Bhāviveka’s thought. This chapter will follow this perspective to investigate Bhāviveka’s concepts. In the *Karatalaratna, after proposing his theme with formal proof statements, Bhāviveka begins to elaborate his formal proof statements in detail. First of all, Bhāviveka gives a brief definition of the two realities in which he clearly demonstrates that his argument for emptiness is derived from the perspective of ultimate reality and not conventional reality:

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150 The analysis of this verse in detail is discussed in section two of the previous chapter.
The true meaning itself is called ‘reality’; in other words, it is ultimate reality. (The thesis is) in terms of ultimate reality, the conditioned things are established as emptiness and not in terms of conventional reality.

According to the above passage, Bhāviveka simply defines ultimate reality as ‘the true meaning (object) itself.’ In order to have a full understanding of the concept of ‘the true meaning (object) itself,’ it should be compared with Bhāviveka’s other definition in chapter 24 of PrP wherein he explains ultimate reality as follows:

What is the so-called the ultimate-reality (paramārtha)? Response: Because the object (or meaning) is ultimate, it is called ‘ultimate-object.’ Moreover, it is the ‘highest non-conceptual wisdom,’ (nirvikalpaṃjñāna). Because it is the true meaning (paramārthasatya), it is called ‘ultimate-meaning.’ The [word] ‘true (meaning)’ means not any cause-conditions can be [its] defining-characteristics. When one dwells in the non-conceptual wisdom which adopts the truth as its perceived object, [this] is called the ultimate reality. The wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamayī), thinking (cintāmayī), and meditating (bhāvanāmayī) and by the teachings in accord with non-arising in order to remove the assertions that something arises etc. is called ‘ultimate reality.’

According to the above interpretation, it can be seen that Bhāviveka defines the term ‘paramārtha’ in three different ways: 1) it is the ultimate object or (meanings). That is to say, it is the objective existence (things as they are) wherein the subject-perceiving is not considered. It is considered to be equal to the concept of tathatā itself. 2) It is the highest

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151 勝義諦 (shengyidilparamārtha) is translated as ‘ultimate reality’ in English here.
152 真義自體說名真性, 即「勝義諦」。就勝義諦立有為空, 非就世俗(T30, 268c12).
153 Also D. Eckel has translated this chapter in his dissertation, A Question of Nihilism, unpublished (Harvard University, 1980), 192–264.
154 “第一義者云何？謂是第一而有義故，名第一義。又是最上無分別智，真實義故，名第一義。真實者：無他緣等為相。若住真實所緣境界無分別智者名第一義。為遮彼起等， 隨順所說無起等及聞、思、修慧, 皆是第一義”(T 30, 125a).
155 無分別智(wufenbiezhi) or 無分別慧(wufenbiehui/nirvikalpaṃjñāna) is translated as non-conceptual wisdom which is the direct insight into the truth of all existences in meditation.
(parama) non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna). Here, the term ‘artha’ refers to both non-conceptual wisdom and the true object. In this case, Bhāviveka claims that the wisdom (perceiving subject) and the objective-truth (tathatā) should not be separated, “the non-conceptual wisdom adopts the truth as its perceived object.” Moreover, Bhāviveka describes non-conceptual wisdom as 真實義 (zhenshiyi/true object or meaning). According to Candrakīrti’s PSP in which Candrakīrti mentions Bhāviveka’s definition of ultimate reality, the term 真實義 (zhenshiyi) is probably ‘paramārthasatya’ in Sanskrit. 156

3) The means of śrutamayī, cintāmayī, and bhāvanāmayi practiced to achieve the non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) are also classified into the category of ultimate-reality.

Some scholars analyze the passage in a similar way using the Tibetan version. 157 According to their analysis, Bhāviveka explicates the term ‘paramārtha’ in three different linguistic ways: 1) the ‘artha’ object is ‘parama’ ultimate. Bhāviveka states that paramārtha is understood as a karmadhāraya compound in which both object (artha) and ultimate (parama) refer to the object (vīṣaya) of perception but not to the mind that perceives the object. 2) He interprets the word paramārtha as a tatpuruṣa compound in which artha is an object and the ultimate (parama) refers to the subject, i.e. the non-conceptual wisdom. 3) He comprehends paramārtha as a bahuvrīhi compound that

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156 PSP 24.8
functions as an ‘adjective’ from which the meaning of ‘correspondence to the ultimate’ is derived. The only difference in the above analysis lies in the second definition, which according to the Chinese version, the term ‘parama’ should be an adjective to qualify ‘artha’, and the term ‘artha’ refers to both ultimate perceiving subject (paramārtha) and ultimate perceived object (tathātā). However, according to the Tibetan version, M. Nasu considers ‘parama’ to be the subject (non-conceptual wisdom) and ‘artha’ the object (truth).\(^{158}\) Kumagai Seiji refers ‘artha’ only to the subject (non-conceptual wisdom).\(^{159}\)

Based on the above analysis of the Chinese and Tibetan version of \textit{PrP}, it can be concluded that Bhāviveka’s understanding of the word ‘ultimate reality’ indicates three connotations: 1) from an ontological perspective, the term ‘the ultimate’ and ‘the object’ refers to the reality of things; 2) from an epistemological perspective, the term ‘non-conceptual wisdom’ refers to how the Buddhist sages view reality (the perceiving subject and the perceived object should not be separated);\(^{160}\) and 3) regarding the soteriological process, the teachings in accord with non-arising is the ultimate reality.\(^{161}\) In \textit{TJ}, Bhāviveka’s own commentary of the \textit{MHK} according to Tibetan tradition, there is a similar analysis.\(^{162}\)

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\(^{158}\) Nasu 46.
\(^{159}\) Kumagai Seiji 1188.
\(^{160}\) T30, 125b.
\(^{161}\) See, Iida, Reason 83 and Kumagai Seiji 1187–1188.
\(^{162}\) Nasu 46 and Kumagai Seiji 1187–1188.
Bhāviveka’s ultimate reality: \(^{163}\)

Ultimate reality

\[
\begin{aligned}
1) & \text{ tathatā} \\
2) & \text{nirvikalpajñāna and tathatā} \\
\rightarrow & \text{3) The teaching corresponding to the ultimate}
\end{aligned}
\]

By comparing the three definitions of ultimate reality in \textit{PrP} with that in \textit{KTR}, it can be shown that Bhāviveka’s description of ultimate reality in \textit{KTR} corresponds more with the second definition in \textit{PrP}. The reason is that in \textit{KTR} as well as the second definition in \textit{PrP}, Bhāviveka defines the concept of ultimate reality as the specific term ‘true meaning/truth’ (真實義/ zhenshiyi/ paramārthasatya). According to Bhāviveka, the truth, ultimate-reality and non-conceptual wisdom are the same thing. The non-conceptual wisdom which adopts the truth (tathātā) as its perceived object is ultimate reality. However, this is only a conventional description for ultimate-reality. From the ultimate perspective, both the ultimate and the non-conceptual wisdom are transcendent and cannot be demonstrated, and the thusness (tathātā) should not be considered as the perceived object of the non-conceptual wisdom.\(^{164}\) Here, it can be concluded that for Bhāviveka, the main definition of ultimate reality is non-conceptual wisdom.

To further elaborate the relationship between ultimate reality and non-conceptual wisdom, one has to investigate their connection with the main idea of the Madhyamakan

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\(^{163}\) This diagram can be found in Kumagai Seiji 1188.

\(^{164}\) This can be found in the \textit{KTR}. See my translation: “The operation of wisdom is non-conceptual and it operates without any trace of operation.” ‘Wisdom’ is the non-conceptual wisdom. Although it is apart from all concepts, the enlightened (non-conceptual) wisdom is superfluously and conventionally designated as wisdom.” (T30, 277b29) “If the tathatā can be seen, it should not be considered to be non-conceptual. Although from conventional perceptive, there is the view of equality which could be called a true view, [this view, from the ultimate reality,] is a view of inequality which should not be held to be a true view.” (T30, 277c10)
understanding of śūnyatā. In MMK, Nāgārjuna responds to his opponents’ accusation of śūnyatā as nihilism with three proposed perspectives. The three notions of śūnyatā in MMK XXIV.7 are as the following:

\[ \text{atra brūmah śūnyatāyāṁ na tvain vetsi prayojanaṁ / śūnyatāṁ śūnyatārthaṁ ca tata evāṁ vihanyase //} \]

Here, we say that you do not understand of [teaching] emptiness, emptiness itself, and the meaning of emptiness; in this way, you are thus frustrated. The three notions of śūnyatā are discussed in the above verse: the purpose of śūnyatā, the nature of śūnyatā and the meaning or object of śūnyatā. In PrP, Bhāviveka interprets the three notions of śūnyatā as: 1) The purpose of śūnyatā is to cease all fabrication (prapañca); 2) śūnyatā itself is understood as the state of transcendence of all discrimination and attachment, i.e. the non-conceptual wisdom. 3) In regard to śūnyatārtha, ‘artha’ is interpreted as object and hence, śūnyatārtha is the object of śūnyatā, i.e. the thusness (tathātā). According to the above description in the PrP, Bhāviveka separates the non-conceptual wisdom from the thusness (tathātā). Śūnyatā itself is the non-conceptual wisdom in which reality is cognized. On the other hand, the

\[ \text{165 PSP XXIV.7. p. 490, lines 6-7.} \]
\[ \text{166 M. Siderits and S. Katsura. Nagarjuna’s Middle way: the Mulamadhyamakakārikā (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2013), 271.} \]
\[ \text{167 This description is a description according to Tibetan version of PrP. See Ryūshin Uryūzu. \textquoteleft 中觀派の形成 (Chūganha no keisei/ The Establishment of Madhyamaka School)\textquoteright 中觀思想 (Chūgan shisō/ The Madhyamaka Thought) (Tōkyō: Shunjūsha, 1982), 147–148. Also see Eckel’s translation (1980), 192–264. The Chinese version is a little different from Tibetan. The Chinese version is, \textquoteright Śūnyatā is able to remove all attachment and fabrication (prapañca) and hence is called Śūnyatā. The meaning of śūnyatā is the wisdom that perceives śūnyatā, and is called the meaning of śūnyatā. You are willing to destroy the truth (tathātā). It is like the one who hit the space with one’s fist. \textquoteleft 空者能滅一切執著戲論,是故名空。空義者,謂緣空之智。名為空義。汝今欲得破壞真實相者。如人運拳以打虛空\textquoteright (T30, 124c). In Chinese version, śūnyatārtha refers to the perceiving wisdom and not the perceived truth.} \]
thusness is defined as śūnyatā-artha, the object perceived by śūnyatā, the non-conceptual wisdom.

In examining Bhāviveka’s interpretation of tathatā, it is clear that he defines tathatā as having no intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). In KTR, it reads:

Foolish mortals increase the net of various false views because (they) cannot realize the exact nature (tathatā) of the conditioned and unconditioned things in terms of ultimate reality and they delusively grasp the intrinsic natures of all things. … If one can realize the unmistak truth of the conditioned and unconditioned things in terms of ultimate reality, he/she is not attached to the substantial nature. 168

In the PrP reads:

The so-called conventional reality is: (truly) all things are non-arising and lacking of intrinsic nature, and the sentient beings delusively attach to them. This is reality in convention. The sages realize the lack of intrinsic nature of all things, śūnyatā. This is the ultimate reality for the sages and also called the reality. 169

Both of the above passages indicate that the lack of intrinsic nature is the reality serving as “an object perceived by the sages.” That is, the truth, which is essencelessness accurately perceived by non-conceptual wisdom, is ultimate reality. However, if it is mistakenly perceived by ordinary people as substantial existence, the wrong perception becomes conventional reality. This topic will be further discussed later in section 4.2.2.

According to the above analysis, śūnyatā is endowed with a dual meaning in Bhāviveka’s system: śūnyatā as non-conceptual wisdom and śūnyatā as objective reality, i.e. no intrinsic nature. As elaborated in PPs, śūnyatā possesses a dual meaning. Śūnyatā

168 “諸愚夫不正覺了勝義諦理有為無為無顛倒性。妄執諸法自性差別。増益種種邪見罣網。…若正覺知勝義諦理有為無為無顛倒性。爾時如世有智畫師。不執彼有真實自性” (T30, 268b).

169“世俗諦者。一切諸法無生性空。而眾生顛倒故妄生執著。於世間為實。諸賢聖…知一切法皆空無自性。於聖人是第一義諦。亦名為實” (T30, 125b).
(svabhāva śūnyatā/自性空/zixingkong) in the ultimate sense is a synonym for nirvāṇa which is the ultimate state of Buddhas and arhats and thus considered to be ultimate reality. In addition to representing ultimate reality, śūnyatā also refers (niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā) to the “unreal” or “no intrinsic nature,” and is often related to pratītyasamutpāda. Within these dual meanings of śūnyatā, while PPs focuses on the svabhāva śūnyatā as the central theme, Nāgārjuna, on the contrary, highlights the meaning of no-intrinsic-nature.

Bhāviveka adopts a two-fold understanding of śūnyatā, svabhāva and niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā, from the PPs and skilfully applies them to his interpretation of ultimate reality. From an epistemological perceptive, ultimate reality is non-conceptual wisdom, which is the so-called svabhāva śūnyatā in the PPs. Meanwhile, ontologically ultimate reality also refers to the truth of things which means no intrinsic nature and is the so-called niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā in the PPs. This is considered to be conventional reality in the PPs.

Although there are two perspectives of ultimate reality, overall, Bhāviveka’s main concern is on epistemological perception or non-conceptual wisdom. In terms of conventional language, these two ultimate realities can be classified into the perceiving wisdom and the perceived reality. Ultimately, however, they cannot be differentiated as subject-object. That is because when Bhāviveka utilizes non-conceptual wisdom to

170 The Japanese scholar, Hideo Masuda classified all different meanings of śūnyatā in the PPs into two kinds: absolute śūnyatā and relative śūnyatā. Absolute śūnyatā is beyond any denial such as the denial of self-nature, of names, and of distinctions. On the contrary, relative śūnyatā possesses the meaning of denial and is often related to pratītyasamutpāda. Masuda, Hideo. “佛教における“空”の検討:般若経・龍樹を主として” (Bukkyō ni okeru Kū no Kentō: Hannyakyō · Ryūju wo Shutoshite), 宗教研究 (Shūkyōkenkyū, 1986), 171.
171 Yin- Shun, 空之探究 (Kongzhitanju / Investigation of Openness) (Taipei: Zenwun, 1985), 147, 155~156.
illustrate ultimate reality, his use of the concept has already entailed the concept of the ultimate object, the lack of intrinsic nature. That is probably why “true meaning” (non-conceptual wisdom) is preferred over “ultimate object” by Bhāviveka when he composed a concise text like KRT. Hence, the central theme that Bhāviveka establishes in KRT, “in reality, conditioned things are empty” is to argue, “From the perception of the non-conceptual wisdom, all conditioned things lack of intrinsic nature.” He thinks that only in this way, one can achieve ultimate reality.

4.2.2 Conventional Reality and Svabhāva

With regard to conventional reality, ancient Chinese scholars suggest that Bhāviveka accepts substantial existence in conventional reality, which is called suyou (俗有/svabhāva) in Chinese. However, since the concise text KTR has been ignored by Western scholars, some scholars claimed that there is not enough evidence to prove this assertion in light of Bhāviveka’s other two texts, the MHK and PrP. In this section, I will argue for Bhāviveka’s claim of substantial existence in conventional reality with the evidence found in the KTR, and trace this claim further to the previous philosophies which he may have adopted.

First of all, two passages in chapter 24 of the PrP present Bhāviveka’s ideas of conventional reality as follows:

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172 M. D. Eckel in his article “The Satisfaction of No Analysis: On Tsong Kha pa’s Approach to Svētantrika-Madhyamaka” indicates that according to Tsong Kha pa, Bhāviveka’s account of conventional reality is ‘established with its own identity’. However, there is no Indian source to support this assertion. Also, Dreyfus, G. B. J. & McClintock 193.
Conventional reality is the worldly language such as the expression of the phenomena of arising, persisting, and extinguishing of color-form, the expression of Devadatta’s going and coming, the expression of Viśvamitra eating, Sumadatta meditating, Brahmadatta liberating and so forth. Those worldly expressions are called conventional reality.  

The so-called conventional reality is: [in reality] all things are non-arising and lack intrinsic nature, yet sentient beings delusively are attached to them. This is the reality in the conventional world.

The above passage indicates two conceptions of conventional reality: 1) worldly language, and 2) phenomena that lack intrinsic nature and are empty, yet are real for ignorant sentient beings who still have perverted views of the world (i.e. have not yet realized the truth of things). The first concept indicates a conventional usage without adding any positive or negative evaluation. The second concept is defined from an epistemological perspective and considers that reality is merely a delusion derived from people’s attachments, which are produced through ignorance.

In addition to the two definitions in the PrP, Bhāviveka also proposes a clear description of conventional reality later in the KTR as follows:

Here, the existents which ordinary people universally recognize I also accept as conventional reality. The causes and conditions which produce conventional direct perception are also recognized to exist. Because conditioned things such eyes, etc. are entailed in conventional reality, and people like cowherds,

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173 世諦者謂世俗言說，如說色等起住滅相，如說提婆達多去來，毘師奴蜜多喫食，須摩達多坐禪，梵摩達多解脫。如是等世俗言說，名為世諦 (T30, 125a)。
174 世俗諦者，一切諸法無生性空，而眾生顛倒故妄生執著，於世俗為實。 (T30, 125b)。
175 T30, 125a.
176 現量 (xianliang / pratyakṣa) means ‘direct perception.’ It is an immediate or direct perception approached by the five sense-organs such as eyes, etc. See Th. Stcherbatsky. *Buddhist Logic* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers), 1994, 12–13. S.R. Bhatt & A. Mehrotra have a more detail analysis on pratyakṣa in their book *Buddhist Epistemology* (Westport: Greenwood press, 2000), 25–48. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
177 This sentence tries to establish the conventional existences of elements (dhāraṇa) such as five skandha, twelve ayatanāni and eighteen dhātu. Those are all the cause and conditions to produce our sensual experiences.
commonly perceive conditioned things such as eyes etc. to be substantial existence, in order to avoid the contradiction with our own position that direct perception is commonly perceived, ‘reality’ is used to restrict the thesis.\textsuperscript{178}

In this passage, Bhāviveka suggests two levels of existence to be conventional reality. The first level is things that ordinary people universally recognize to be real. This focus is not the things themselves but ordinary perception, and hence, it is an epistemological perspective which is precisely the same perspective as the second definition of the \textit{PrP}. The second level of conventional reality is things or elements that cause the arising of our perceptions such as the five faculties, and so forth, as Bhāviveka singles out. Bhāviveka further claims that those elements are substantially existent, and are accepted as substantially existent by his own school. According to the above description, three concepts of conventional reality can be derived from the \textit{PrP} and \textit{KTR}. They are (1) worldly language, (2) the ordinary perceptions (in the \textit{KTR}) which are merely a delusion according to the \textit{PrP}, and (3) the elements which are able to cause the arising of direct perception.

To elaborate further with a linguistic analysis, the two Sanskrit terms \textit{saṃvṛti} and \textit{vyavahāra} are most often used to denote conventional reality. The term \textit{saṃvṛti} is derived from the root \textit{vr} meaning ‘cover’ and the prefix \textit{sam}, which means ‘totally.’ Taken literally, \textit{saṃvṛti} means ‘to totally cover’ or ‘to obscure.’\textsuperscript{179} The second definition of conventional reality in the \textit{PrP}, “all things are non-arising and lacking of intrinsic nature,

\textsuperscript{178} “此中世間同許有者自亦許為世俗有故，世俗現量生起因緣，亦許有故。眼等有為世俗諦攝，牧牛人等皆共了知眼等有為是實有故，勿違如是自宗所許現量共知。”(T30,268c08)

\textsuperscript{179} Kōsai Yasui 158. Candrākīrti explicitly defines the conventional reality in view of three categories: 1) the obscuration of the true nature of things due to ignorance (\textit{saṃvṛtisatya}), 2) reciprocal dependence, and 3) social conventions involving languages and translations. Herein, the first category is similar to Bhāviveka’s second definition in the \textit{PrP}. I. C. Harris, \textit{The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism} 113.
yet the sentient beings delusively attach to them,” corresponds to *saṃvṛti* because it indicates that sentient beings are totally deceived by their ignorance. The other term, *vyavahāra*, as mentioned in the previous section, possesses both linguistic convention and transactional convention, both of which can be found in the two texts.\(^{180}\) It seems clear that the first definition in the *PrP* is a linguistic translation, and the remainder can be subsumed in the meaning of transactional conventions.\(^{181}\)

The above description can be illustrated in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Texts</th>
<th>The meaning of conventional reality</th>
<th>epistemological definition</th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The <em>PrP</em></td>
<td>1. Worldly language</td>
<td>vyavahāra</td>
<td>vyavahāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Perceptions</td>
<td>Delusion</td>
<td>Saṃvṛti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>KTR</em></td>
<td>3. Element</td>
<td>Reality</td>
<td>vyavahāra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The epistemological definition can be considered to be the main perspective that Bhāviveka prefers to adopt for defining conventional reality, rather than by other means. That is because first, this type of definition is suggested in both of the two texts. Second, as mentioned above, Bhāviveka’s main definition for ultimate reality is an epistemological definition with which he must give a parallel definition for conventional reality to avoid inconsistency. Even though the epistemological definition has been

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\(^{181}\) “The conventional reality is the worldly language such as the expression of the…” (T30, 125a)
adopted by Bhāviveka in both texts as the main definition for conventional reality, the
two texts emphasize two different notions. While the PrP emphasizes the concept of
delusion or misconception, the KTR highlights the concept of ‘reality.’ When integrating
these two epistemological interpretations, Bhāviveka’s notion of conventional reality can
be illustrated as follows: all things are truly lacking of intrinsic nature, yet sentient
beings delusively perceive them to be intrinsic existence which, Bhāviveka insists, should
be universally accepted as conventional reality.

While defining conventional reality from an epistemological perspective, the notion
of pratyakṣa (現量 xianliang / direct perception), the fundamental concept of human
perception and Buddhist logic, should be singled out from the passage in the KTR. The
knowledge or knowing obtained by the six senses from the six objects is called
pramāṇa. 182 There could be different types of pramāṇa during the processes of
perceiving. 183 Immediate or direct perception approached by the five sense-organs is
implied by the term pratyakṣa 184 which is the most basic pramāṇa among the various
types. With his epistemological approach, Bhāviveka insists that since the unmistaken
pratyakṣa is universally accepted by all ordinary people, such as the cowherds and so
forth, it should be considered as conventional reality.

Bhāviveka further claims that not only pratyakṣa but also those causes and
conditions such as the six sense organs, which are able to produce pratyakṣa should also

182 This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
183 See M. Hattori. Dignāga, on Perception: Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga’s
Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan Versions (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968), 23–31. The chapter five of this dissertation will discusses this in more detail.
be considered reality in the conventional sense.\textsuperscript{185} In Buddhist traditions, it is commonly agreed that all pramāṇa necessarily involves the contact (sparśa) of an object (viṣaya, artha, etc.) with a sense faculty (indriya). Wherein, the six sense faculties, such as eyes, adopt the information gathered from the six objects, such as color-form (rūpa), to produce perceptions.\textsuperscript{186} If pratyakṣa is considered to be substantially existent, it is reasonable to say that those causes and conditions producing pratyakṣa should also be substantially existent. That is to say, in the epistemic processes, the perceptions, the sense faculties and their perceived objects, are all substantially existent conventionally.

To elaborate further, the Chinese term “shiyou” (實有), used to demonstrate Bhāviveka’s concept of conventional reality in this passage of the KTR, further indicates his understanding of what underlies conventional reality. In Xuanzang’s translation, the Chinese term “shiyou” (實有) is commonly used to describe the abhidharma concept of reality, and its parallel Sanskrit term is “dravyatas” which means “as a substance”, “as a thing”, “as an object”, “as an elementary substance.”\textsuperscript{187} Some abhidharma concepts of reality, especially that of the Sarvāstivādin School, refer to the substantial existence of the elements behind phenomena. For example, in the AMs, it says,

In regard to “existence”, some indicate two kinds: first, the “shiyou” (實有 / dravyata /substantial exist) is skandhas, dhātus and so on exist. Second, the convention is that men, women and so on exist.” …… The “shiyou” (實有 / dravyatas) which means “as a substance”, “as a thing”, “as an object”, “as an elementary substance.” Also see Monier Williams 501.

\textsuperscript{185} “The causes and conditions which produce the conventional direct perceptions are also recognized to exist” (T30,268c08)
\textsuperscript{186} John D. Dunne, \textit{Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy}, 23.
\textsuperscript{187} Hirakawa Akira, \textit{俱舍論索引 II (Kusharon Sakuin II/ The Index of Koa II)} (Tokyo: Daizo, 1977), 430, its Sanskrit is “dravyatas” which means “as a substance”, “as a thing”, “as an object”, “as an elementary substance.”
In other words, when Bhāviveka describes conventional reality in terms of *dravyatas*, he applies an abhidharma concept of intrinsic nature to conventional reality. In addition to the above passage of the *KTR*, the debate between Bhāviveka and abhidharma scholars provides more evidence for this assertion in the *KTR*. In the debate, the Abhidharma scholars claim that the eye-faculty (*cakṣur-indriya*) possesses an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) because it possesses activity (*sakārita*). An eye-faculty can produce eye-consciousness, and hence, it should possess a nature (*svabhāva*). Bhāviveka responds by stating:

If [the nature you] mention is the nature which is perceived by the uneducated knowledge of cowherds, in terms of conventional reality, eyes are established to possess a nature, and then you established what is already proved….. Everything such as eyes and so forth included within the worldly conventions has self-natures.

In this passage, Bhāviveka skilfully converts the understanding of ultimate reality in the Sarvāstivādin system into the conventional reality, and accepts the self-nature of things in the worldly sense. That is to say, Bhāviveka admits the self-nature of things in conventional reality.

Bhāviveka also attempts to apply the Sautrāntika theory to his theory of conventional reality. Even though Bhāviveka accepts the self-nature of things in conventional reality, this does not imply that Bhāviveka unconditionally accepts the Sarvāstivādin theory in the conventional sense. He, in fact, does not agree with the idea...

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188 "然諸有者，有說二種：一實物有，謂蘊、界等，二施設有，謂男、女等。” (*T* 27, 42a–b).
189 See my translation of the *KTR*.
190 This idea has been indicated by Chinese ancient scholars. See the section “Bhāviveka in the Chinese context” in the chapter two of this dissertation.
that the self-nature of things exists through the three divisions of time, the past, present, and future. In the *PrP*, he argues against this idea by saying:

The *Vibhāṣā* scholars say, “Although the time periods are different, the substance is not different. This should be understood.” …..Response (by Bhāviveka), “In terms of the ultimate reality, the present things should not be established. …The assertion that dharmas travel in the time periods is meaningless. …Moreover, in conventional reality, substance should not be established in past and future time periods.”

The Sarvāstivādin theory in this passage is also found in the *AMS* chapter 77. In that chapter, they argue that “reality exists in three divisions of time” (三世實有) and “dharma-substance eternally exists” (法體恒存). They insist that the substantial elements, dharmas unchangeably travel through three divisions of time and therefore, exist eternally. This passage is evidence to show that Bhāviveka does not accept the existence of substantial elements in the past and future time even in conventional reality.

The Sautrāntika proposes the idea of a seed (*bīja*) to explain the relationship between substantial elements and things in which the substantial elements exist only in the present time in the form of seeds (*bīja*), which possess potentials to activate and project into things. According to Sautrāntika, things are conventional reality while seeds

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191 “復次毘婆沙師言：世位雖別而體有不異，應如是知。…論者言：第一義中，現在物者，有亦不

成，汝喻非也。若謂有法經歷於世及諸位中者，是義不然。何以故？已遮起故。復次於去來中無

現在法，非現在故，如虛空花。又世諦中過去未來體亦不成。” (T30, 94c)

192 說位異者。彼謂諸法於世轉時。由位有異體有異。如運一籌。置一位名一。置十位名十。置

百位名百。雖歷位有異而籌體無異。如是諸法經三世位。雖得三名而體無別。此師所立世無雜亂。

以依作用立三世別。謂有為法未有作用名未來世。正有作用名現在世。作用已滅名過去世。

(T27,396a). See Dharmajoti, 148.

are considered ultimate reality because seeds exist substantially. There are passages in both the KTR and PrP showing that Bhāviveka does not refute the idea of seed and its activity on the level of conventional reality. The conflict between Bhāviveka and Sautrāntika is that while Sautrāntika considers seeds as ultimate reality, Bhāviveka only accepts them as conventional reality.

Bhāviveka does not really criticize the Sautrāntika School in the KTR, so far as we know, but instead states, “Here, the thing which can assemble seeds of the various activities or the accumulation of the various activities is called the mind.” A similar statement can be found in chapter seventeenth of the PrP where Bhāviveka uses a seed to explain the function of the mind, “Why is the mind (cita) called a seed (bīja)? Since it can generate the karmas of the body and speech, it is called a seed.” According to these two passages found in the KRT and PrP, what Bhāviveka tries to express is that the mind is able to cause the karma of the body and speech, and thereafter, assemble seeds. The “mind” mentioned by Bhāviveka must be the sixth consciousness because he does not accept ālayavijñāna. In sum, it can be safely said that Bhāviveka does not refute the seed theory as illustrating something in the conventional sense.

There is also evidence in the PrP showing that Bhāviveka only denies the existence of seeds in the sense of ultimate reality. In the PrP, Sautrāntika scholars intend to

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194 See the discussion in previous section.
195 “此中能集諸行種子，或為諸行種子所集，故名為心。”(T30,277b)
196 “云何名心為種子耶？謂能起身口業故，名為種子。”(T30, 99a)
197 Yuan-ce (圓測/613–696CE), one of Xuanzang’s representative disciple, his commentary on Saṃdhinirmocanasūtā, mentioned, “Therefore, in the chapter of Entering into the True Ambrosia in Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā composed by Bhāviveka, it says that outside of the six consciousnesses, there is no ālayavijñāna because it is not subsumed by the six consciousnesses.” 解深密經疏, “是故清辨菩薩所造，中觀心論入真甘露品云：離六識外，無別阿賴耶識，眼等六識所不攝故”(X21, 240b).
recognize seeds as a substance of ultimate reality, but Bhāviveka criticizes them with the assertion that seeds should be empty in ultimate reality. There are many passages where Bhāviveka argues this point, and the following citation from the PrP is one example:

The Sautrāntika says, “there are different features of dharmas (factors) rising such as the eye-consciousness. How do you know? That is because they activate. For example, buds will grow from seeds when their required conditions such as soil, water, temperature, and wind meet together. I use this answer to destroy your thesis.” The commentator [Bhāviveka] answers, “The previous verse says, ‘there is no activation in the conditions.’ What does the verse mean? [It means:] In ultimate reality, there is no arising. The activation does not have any substance. It should be denied that seeds and conditions meet together to produce the activation”. 198

A detailed interpretation of Sautrāntika’s argument in the passage can be found in the

Abidamosunzinilung (阿毘達磨順正理論/Abhidharmayāyānusāra):

A Drṣṭāntika claims that just as the theory of a seed [of a plant] causing its fruits, it should be known that the theory of karma causing its fruit is the same. Just as the seed, the [previous] fruit which caused its existence, has perished, is the main cause from which the different dharma [factors] such as root, shoot, stem, branch, leaf and so on arise in order after possessing enough conditions. Although the main body of the stream is not stable, it is inheriting and proceeding. At the last state, while encountering another condition, the seed can raise its own fruit. Similarly, karma is the main cause in the continuing stream after the vanishing of the previous fruit which raises the karma. From the next state, there are different features of dharmas [factors] rising in every state of the continuing stream. Although the main body of the stream is not stable, it is inheriting [its feature from the previous state] and proceeding. At the last state, while it possesses another condition, it can cause its own fruit. Hence, karma is not the direct causes of its fruit but the power of anyonya (mutual operation) is. 199

198 經部師言：有異法起，如眼識等。何以故，由有作故。譬如種子，地水火風，因緣和合，得有芽出。以此答故，汝先驗破。(答)論者言：如先偈說：「緣中無有作」。此義云何，第一義中，遮彼起故，彼作無體，種子等緣和合有作者，此不應爾 (T30, 55c)。

199 「譬喻宗說：如外種果感赴理成，如是應知業果感赴。謂如外種由遇別緣，為親傳因，感果已滅，由此後位，遂起根、芽、莖、枝、葉等諸異相法，體雖不住而相續轉。於最後位，復遇別緣，方能為因生於自果。如是諸業於相續中，為親傳因，感果已滅，由此於後自相續中，有分位別異相法起，體雖不住而相續轉。於最後位，復遇別緣，方能為因生於自果。……如是諸業，亦非親為因，令自果生，然由展轉力(T29,535a)。
Kumāralāta, who is also considered a Dārṣṭāntika because of his skill in using similes to illustrate theories, established the theory of bīja to explain the potential power of karma. The Dārṣṭāntika proposed the theory of bīja by giving up the ideal of substantial existence in the three divisions of time and by adopting the idea of substantial existence only in the present. Not only are the phenomena continuously changing, but also bīja, the potential activation behind the phenomena, is continuously transferring. Furthermore, the phenomena and the bīja are continuously and mutually transferring into each other. Hence, the theory of bīja apparently seems to deny the idea of substantial existence, to which the Sarvāstivādin School was committed, and to become a theory corresponding to the idea of impermanence. According to the Mādhyamika perspective, however, the theory of bīja could still not avoid the idea of substantial existence. The bīja, no matter how it may change, will eternally keep its self-nature before transferring into phenomena. For example, the bīja of eye-consciousness always maintains the self-nature [activation] and eventually transforms into the eye-consciousness. That is why Bhāviveka claims that from the standpoint of ultimate reality, the seed does not have a substance to activate. While denying the theory of seed, Bhāviveka specially uses “ultimately” to qualify his proposition. It appears that he accepts the notion of seeds in a worldly reality.

Based on the above analysis, we may conclude that Bhāviveka posits conventional reality from an epistemological viewpoint. According to Bhāviveka, although all things truly lack intrinsic nature (dravyata), sentient beings delusively perceive them to have such a nature and that is what should be universally accepted as conventional reality. The so-called intrinsic existence is elements (seeds) which are able to activate and construct
the phenomena when certain conditions are met. With such a theory, nihilism is prevented for Bhāviveka.

4.2.3 The Unique Feature of Bhāviveka’s Two Realities

4.2.3.1 The Remarkableness of Conventional reality

In order to highlight the unique feature of Bhāviveka’s two realities, in this section, I will compare his theory with the systems of two realities found in the PPs and of Nāgārjuna, and further look for the beginnings of Bhāviveka’s ideas.

The PPs set up two realities from two different perspectives. While the ultimate is established from an epistemological view, i.e., from the view of an awakened one (non-conceptual wisdom), the conventional reality is established from an ontological perspective, the things as they originally are — that is, things are dependently co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda) without any intrinsic nature. In the PPs, the Buddha teaches his disciples to examine all existence from the perspective of śūnyatā (svabhāva śūnyatā), i.e. ultimate reality. From this perspective, all existence is featureless, transcendent, and undifferentiated. There is only one reality, ultimate reality. However, in order to teach and benefit sentient beings, two realities are distinguished by the Buddha. According to such a distinction, some teachings, such as the expression of the transcendent realization of reality (svabhāva śūnyatā), refer to ultimate reality, and therefore, an epistemological perspective. In contrast, other teaching involving no-intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā) via pratītyasamutpāda refers to conventional reality, and hence, it is from an
ontological perspective. In such a doctrinal system, to achieve ultimate reality is to realize the nature of conventional reality since they are not differentiated.

The above description of the two realities in the *PPs* can be illustrated in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ultimately: One reality</th>
<th>Teaching: Two realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ultimate Reality:</td>
<td>Conventional Reality:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-conceptual wisdom</td>
<td><em>pratītyasamutpāda</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>svabhāva śūnyatā</em></td>
<td><em>Niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can achieve ultimate reality by realizing the truth of conventional reality

As indicated in the previous section, instead of emphasizing *svabhāva śūnyatā*, Nāgārjuna focuses on *niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā* to develop his philosophy of two realities. Inheriting the idea of ultimately there being only one reality from the *PPs*, Nāgārjuna also suggests that differentiation of two realities is merely a conventional distinction for teaching. That is, *niḥsvabhāva- śūnyatā* is considered ultimate reality (different from the *PPs*) and *pratītyasamutpāda* is conventional reality. However, according to verses in the
\textit{MMK}, XXIV.9-10, \textsuperscript{200} niḥsvabhāva- śūnyatā, ultimate reality is only a pivotal ground to transfer one’s cognition from the conventional world to ultimate liberation. Hence, the ultimate liberation, i.e. nirvāṇa, (the so-called svabhāva- śūnyatā in the \textit{PPs}) should be considered to be the real ultimate reality, and niḥsvabhāva- śūnyatā can be called convention-ultimate reality. Moreover, according to the \textit{PPs}, Nāgārjuna also thinks that the truth of the conventional reality is also ultimate reality, and hence, the undifferentiated relationship between the two realities is revealed.

A brief outline of the above description can be demonstrated in the following chart:

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (one) at (0,0) {Ultimate Reality: Non-conceptual wisdom \textit{Svabhāva śūnyatā}};
  \node (two) at (0,-1) {Ultimate Reality: \textit{Niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā}};
  \node (three) at (0,-2) {Conventional Reality: \textit{pratītyasamutpāda}};
  \node (four) at (1,0) {Epistemological view};
  \node (five) at (1,-1) {Ontological view};
  \draw[->] (one) -- (two);
  \draw[->] (two) -- (three);
  \draw[->] (one) -- (four);
  \draw[->] (two) -- (five);
  \draw[->] (three) -- (five);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{200} Louis de la Vallue Poussin, ed., “Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti” (hereafter \textit{PsP}) Bibliotheca Buddhica (St-Pétersbourg,1903-1913).

\textit{ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayor dvayoh /}
\textit{te tattvam na vijānanti gambhīram buddhāśāsanem/}
\textit{vyavahāram anāśritya pramārtho na desyate /}
\textit{paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇam nādhigamyate}
For Bhāviveka, the two realities are not merely concerned with types of teaching, they are instead distinguishable from two different points of view, and hence, have an epistemological distinction. The different perceptual perspectives toward the same object become two realities. That is to say, all things are truly lacking in intrinsic nature, and the awakened ones can perceive all things as they are with non-conceptual wisdom. Both accurate perception and things perceived accurately together are ultimate reality. On the contrary, sentient beings delusively perceive things to have intrinsic existence which is a type of reality in the conventional world. Teachings corresponding to ultimate reality are able to reverse the delusive mind and lead to ultimate reality, and hence, they are also considered as ultimate reality. This so-called “teachings corresponding to the ultimate” serves as a bridge to connect the two realities.

Their mutual relations described above can be demonstrated in the following chart:

The above three diagrams show that with regard to ultimate reality, these three systems of the two realities share a common view where the non-conceptual wisdom
(nirvikalpajñāna), i.e. the svabhāva śūnyatā, is the basic cognition of ultimate reality. However, they have some inconsistences concerning conventional reality. There is a slight difference between the PPs and Nāgārjuna concerning conventional reality. Nāgārjuna merely locates pratītyasamutpāda in conventional reality while the PPs sets both pratītyasamutpāda and niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā in it. However, their basic philosophies are not different. According to both Nāgārjuna and the PPs, conventional reality lacks intrinsic nature, and hence, there is truly no difference between the two realities. Meanwhile, Bhāviveka regards the lack of intrinsic nature as the ultimate point of view, while in conventional reality, things should be understood as having intrinsic natures. Therefore, the uniqueness of Bhāviveka’s idea of two realities lies in his particular conception of conventional reality.201

4.2.3.2 Bhāviveka’s Status of Śūnyatā in the Conventional Reality

Why does Bhāviveka have to posit intrinsic nature in conventional reality? As indicated in chapter two of this dissertation, because of the intensively changing environment during Bhāviveka’s time, there were problems in establishing a particular position of Mādhyamika School. These problems were: (1) the nihilist critique on the teaching of śūnyatā, and (2) finding a valid debating method to prove the Madhyamaka teaching. These challenges were strongly connected with and aimed at one philosophical consideration: the notion of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) which pervaded both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. In this section, I will focus on discussing the first notion

201 Tsong kha pa thinks that Bhāviveka’s unique concept becomes a criterion to distinguish Svātantrika from Prāsaṅgika. (Eckel, “the Satisfaction of No Analysis” 190)
concerning the accusation of nihilism, and discuss the second problem, a valid debating method, in the next chapter.

As was discussed in the previous section, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of śūnyatā in the *MMK XXIV* is accused of being nihilist by Sarvāstivādins. In response to this accusation, Nāgārjuna criticizes his opponents for misunderstanding śūnyatā by proposing the idea of two realities, and he, then, concludes his argument with the famous verse:

> Whatever is *pratītyasamutpāda* that we call śūnyatā /
> That (śūnyatā) being dependent designation is itself the middle-path/

In this verse, Nāgārjuna does not set any qualifier for his proposition. In other words, he does not limit perspectives to argue for his assertion of śūnyatā. Bhāviveka in the *KTR* states:

> In (ultimate) reality, conditioned things are śūnyatā like illusions because they are *pratītyasamutpāda* /

These two propositions are very similar in the way that both of them indicate that things are produced from *pratītyasamutpāda*, and hence, śūnyatā. The exception is that Bhāviveka inserts the qualifier ‘ultimately’ to modify Nāgārjuna’s proposition to make it only valid in terms of ultimate reality. That is to say, the proposition ‘everything is śūnyatā’ can only be established in ultimate reality but not in conventional reality.
Although he did not directly state as such, Bhāviveka seems not to have been satisfied with Nāgārjuna’s response to the accusation of nihilism. This dissatisfaction provoked Bhāviveka to modify Nāgārjuna’s argument for śūnyatā with the qualifier ‘ultimately.’ The evidence of this statement can be found in the KTR as well as in other works. In the KTR, Bhāviveka encounters the same accusation of nihilism as Nāgārjuna does in the MMK. For example, those who insist that everything is not empty accuse Bhāviveka’s doctrine of nihilism by stating:

If all conditioned things are established as emptiness, there will be no forms, etc. It is like using rabbit’s horns as a perceived object to produce direct experience. This is not reasonable at all. Thus, the various direct perceptions of the likeness of forms should not be produced. However, those [objects, i.e. forms] truly appear in each individual’s direct experience. Therefore, your thesis contradicts dharma-nature, makes the mistake of invalidating direct perception, and makes the mistake of invalidating common perceptions. That is, you insist that things which all cowherds, etc. can commonly perceive such as the substance of eyes, etc. are nothingness.

In this objection, the opponents use direct perception (pratyakṣa) that all ordinary people have to accuse Bhāviveka of nihilism. The logic of the accusation is as following:

![Diagram](attachment:diagram.png)

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205 See my translation of the KTR 2.1.1. (T30, 269a13)
In this logical inference, Bhāviveka’s opponents use common cognition that everyone sees or feels things to object to his proposition, and thereby, accuse him of nihilism. In response to this accusation, Bhāviveka simply explains:

If [you consider my assertion] to contradict the conventional direct perception of fools and so on, [my thesis] does not reject conventional existence. Hence, [my thesis] contradicts nothing.\(^{206}\)

Bhāviveka has already set the condition “ultimately” for his proposition to argue for śūnyatā. Hence, Bhāviveka is easily able to counter these accusations of nihilism with the simple response that he is arguing from ultimate reality and not the conventional. He accepts that things possess an intrinsic nature in conventional reality.

The same method is applied to refute his Buddhist opponents, the Sarvāstivādins, who argue from a philosophical perceptive in order to accuse him of nihilism because of his objection to intrinsic nature:

You have to accept there is a nature of an eye-faculty because (an eye-faculty) possesses activity.\(^{207}\) Those who do not possess natures do not have activities, such as the son of a barren woman. The eye-faculty has an activity because they produce eye-consciousness. Since the reason of activity has been stated, one must ascertain eyes to have natures.”\(^{208}\)

Again, to this objection, Bhāviveka replies:

If (the nature you) mention is the nature which is perceived by the uneducated knowledge of cowherds, in terms of conventional reality, eyes are established to possess a nature, and then you established what has been already proved….. Everything such as eyes and so forth included within the worldly conventions has self-natures.\(^{209}\)

\(^{206}\) Ibid. “若總相說如愚夫等一切世俗所生現量，今此不遮世俗有，故無容違害。”(T30, 269a28)

\(^{207}\) The Sanskrit for activity is sakāritra (Sastri, 43.8).

\(^{208}\) See my translation the KTR II.2.1.4 and the above discussion. (T30, 269b27)

\(^{209}\) Ibid.
All through the *KTR*, such accusations of nihilism are pervasive and could be considered the main objection to Bhāviveka’s position. Examples include: the *KTR* 2.1.5- a nihilistic accusation of example and reason; 2.1.7- a nihilistic accusation of reason; 2.1.8- a nihilistic accusation of the proposition; 2.1.9- 1) a nihilistic accusation of language which possesses function for communication, and 2) a nihilist accusation of the proposition.²¹⁰ Although each accusation is different in detail, Bhāviveka bases his rebuttals on the same principle that he is arguing from the perspective of ultimate reality rather than conventional reality.²¹¹

The accusations of nihilism in the *KTR*, as well as in the *PrP* and *MHK*, indicate that most of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, including the Yogācāra School, consider intrinsic nature to be the fundamental element in constructing the experienced world, including external objects and mental cognitions. Thus, for these schools, to deny intrinsic nature commits the fallacy of nihilism. According to the above analysis, Bhāviveka seems to assent to this philosophical approach and say that things which ordinary people universally recognize and causes which produce conventional direct perceptions are also accepted by his school as conventional reality.²¹² However,

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²¹⁰ The number is according to my English version. The text is arranged with numbers for the convenience of reading.
²¹¹ The *KTR* II. 2.1.9, “The (Buddha) speaks of the mind as a self in terms of the conventional reality, and in terms of the ultimate reality, no-self is established. The Buddha does not contradict its own words. The fault of my thesis (you indicate above) is just like this situation. The thesis mentions the existence of eyes, etc. in terms of conventional reality, and in terms of the ultimate reality, establishes all existences as emptiness. Thus, there is no fault in the thesis.” (T30, 270a29).
²¹² The *KTR* II. 1.1.1, “The existents which ordinary people universally recognize I also accept as conventional reality. The causes and conditions which produce the conventional direct perceptions are also recognized to exist.²¹² Because the conditioned things such eyes, etc. are subsumed in the conventional reality, and people like cowherds, etc. commonly perceive conditioned things such eyes etc. to be substantial existence, in order to avoid the contradiction with our own position that direct perception is commonly perceived, ‘reality’ is used to restrict the thesis.” (T30,268c)
Bhāviveka is still a Mādhyamikan and wants to maintain the basic Madhyamaka teaching of *niḥsvabhāva*. In order to solve this dilemma, Bhāviveka employs the concept of two realities, and proposes the idea of “ultimately empty, and conventionally existent.” In this way, he thinks that one can avoid all extremes and achieve the middle path:

In the present proposition, (the thesis) avoids eternalism regarding the conditioned things in terms of ultimate reality by negating intrinsic nature, and in the same manner, at other occasion (the conventional reality), (the thesis) avoids the view of nihilism by negating no-intrinsic nature. It avoids two extremes by negating both intrinsic nature and non-intrinsic nature. 213

Historically, Bhāviveka is not the first person to propose such an unique theory of two realities. In fact, a similar idea was conceived by some abhidharma scholars including Harivarma, the author of the famous Sautrāntika text *Satyasiddhiśāstra*. Harivarma synthesized various theories of two-realities in the AMS as well as in Mahāyāna Buddhism and established his own unique system of two-realities called the “two-level of two-realities.” According to SSH, Harivarma’s first level of two-realities is as follows:

Moreover, the Buddha preached two-reality: the true and conventional realities. The true reality is *rūpa* etc. and *nirvāṇa*. The conventional reality is conventional designation only and without any substance. For example, *rūpa* etc. as cause and conditions, the pottery is made, and five *skandha* as cause and conditions, the human being is composed. 214

According to his theory, in the first level of the two realities, worldly phenomena such as people, tree, things, etc are conventional reality, and the elements constructing these phenomena are the ultimate reality. In the second level, the elements constructing the

213 The KTR II. 2.1.10. (T30,270c).
214 又佛說二諦，真諦、俗諦。真諦謂色等法及泥洹，俗諦謂但假名，無有自體，如色等因緣成瓶，五陰因緣成人 (T32,327a)。
phenomena are the conventional reality and the realization of the emptiness of the elements is the ultimate reality. Harivarma established his second level of two-realities as follows:

The five skandha are not substantial, and they exist only conventionally. …the so called ultimate reality is that the rūpa is empty and not existent up to the consciousness is empty and not existent…. moreover, because realizing the truth of nirodha, it is called having obtained the path. Hence, it should be known that to realize the truth of nirodha is the ultimate reality and not the five skandha.\textsuperscript{215}

In this passage, Harivarma thought that the five skandhas are substantially existent and thus ultimate reality at the first level of two realities. However, at the second level, they are empty and only conventionally existent. The ultimate-ultimate reality is the nirodha of the four noble truths, and only with the realization of the nirodha, one is able to obtain the noble path. By means of this, one can be called ‘realizing ultimate reality.’

While comparing Bhāviveka’s two realities theory, it appears that Bhāviveka’s theory of two realities is a synthesis of Harivarma’s “two-level of two-reality.” By removing the hierarchical distinction between the worldly phenomena and elements, Bhāviveka considers the concepts of both realities in the Harivarma’s first level to be only conventional reality. That is, Bhāviveka’s conventional reality contains both realities of the first level and conventional reality of the second level in Harivarma’s theory.

\textsuperscript{215} 五陰實無，以世諦故有。...第一義者所謂色空無所有。乃至識空無所有。...又見滅諦故說名得道。故知滅是第一義有非諸陰也 (T32,333a).
The above description can be demonstrated into the following diagram. The left column is Harivarma’s two levels of two realities, and the right column is Bhāviveka’s system:

Harivarma’s two realities

- Conventional reality
- Ultimate reality

The 1st level

Bhāviveka’s two realities

- Conventional reality
- Ultimate reality

The 2nd level

- Humans, vases, etc.
- Elements such as rūpa etc.
- Realization of Emptiness of elements and nirodha

According to the *Satyasiddhiśāstra (hereafter SSs)*, the establishment of two levels of two realities is a skilful means for proceeding toward liberation. Harivarma, following what has been explicated in the *PPs*, insists that the two realities are an expedient means to lead people to *nirvāṇa*, and ultimately, there is only one reality. To achieve *nirvāṇa*, according to the *SSs*, there are three steps to go through. In the first step, one has to remove the conventional mind by realizing that conventional things such as vases etc.,

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216 "若第一諦中無此世諦，何用說耶？答曰：世間眾生受用世諦，...諸佛賢聖欲令世間離假名，故以世諦說。" (T32, 327a) “If there is no conventional reality in the ultimate reality, why did [the Buddha] spoke of [the conventional reality]? Answer: the sentient beings in the world are used to the conventional reality. Buddhas and other sages preach by means of the conventional reality in order to let these mortals depart from [the attachment] to the conventions.”

217 "滅三種心名為滅諦，謂假名心、法心、空心”(T32, 327a) “To remove three minds is called *nirodhāryasatya* which are the minds of convention, dharma and emptiness.”

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are conventional and not real, but that the elements and nirvāṇa are real. In the second step, one has to remove the dharma-mind by realizing that the dharma (element) is conventional and not real, and that nirodha is ultimate reality. In the final step, one has to give up the empty-mind which adopts nirodha as an object and thereby achieve nirvāṇa. Hence, for Harivarma, to regard the substantial elements to be the ultimate reality on the first level of the two realities is only an expedient means along a gradual process to liberation. The second level of the two realities is the central idea that Harivarma proposes, and is the typical model found in Bhāviveka’s two realities.

Moreover, in proposing his theory of two realities, Harivarma states that this theory is able to avoid committing the fallacy of nihilism. The SSs says, “To preach two realities is to avoid falling into the nihilism and eternalism….The karma and its retribution can be established.” This is precisely one of the remarkable features of Bhāviveka’s theory of two realities. In consideration of the philosophical similarities between these two, it is reasonable to suppose that Harivarma might have had influence on Bhāviveka’s theory of two realities.

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218 “真諦謂色等法及泥洹，俗諦謂但假名，無有自體，如色等因緣成瓶，五陰因緣成人” (T32, 327a). “The true reality is rūpa etc. and nirvāṇa. The conventional reality is conventional designation only and without any substance.”

219 “第一義者所謂色空無所有。乃至識空無所有。….又見滅諦故說名得道。故知滅是第一義” (T32,333a). “The so called ultimate reality is that the rūpa is empty and not existent up to the consciousness is empty and not existent…. moreover, because realizing the truth of niroda, it is called having obtained the path.”

220 “若緣泥洹是名空心。…此空心於何處滅？答曰：二處滅。一入無心定中滅，二入無餘泥洹斷相續時滅”(T32, 333c) The mind perceiving nirodha is called the empty mind. Where is [one] able to remove the empty mind? Answer: two places [can one] remove [the empty mind]. Either in the contemplation of mindless or in the nirvāṇa with nothing left wherein [the mental] continuity ceases can one remove [the empty mind].”

221 (T32, 317b)
According to Chinese sources, Harivarma lived around 250~350 CE, between the time of Āryadeva and Vasubandhu.\footnote{Hirakawa, The History of Indian Buddhism 181.} His biography states that Harivarma originally studied with the Sarvāstivāda School and later went to south Indian to stay in a Mahāsaṅghika monastery where he learned about Mahāyāna Buddhism. The biography goes on to say that he won debates with other non-Buddhist scholars, and was, therefore, respected by the king.\footnote{Harivarma biography is reserved in Sengyou’s (僧佑) Chusanchangjiji (出三藏記集) (T55, 78~79).} His main work, the *Satyāsiddhiśāstra, translated by Kumārajīva was influential in the Qi (齊) and Liang (梁) dynasties around the end of the fifth to the middle of sixth century.\footnote{The document regarding the translation and dissemination of *Satyāsiddhiśāstra is preserved in Chusanchangjiji (出三藏記集) (T55, 78a).} I suggest that Harivarma and his work must have been so popular in India at that time that Kumārajīva, who formally promoted Mahāyāna Buddhism and was kidnapped and brought to China in around 400 CE, was compelled to translate Harivarma’s works. Hence, Harivarma’s philosophy must have been influential in Indian Buddhism at that time. Although there are not enough sources to indicate a direct relationship between Harivarma and Bhāviveka, the philosophical similarity, at least, reveals that the concept of “conventionally, existent, and ultimately, empty” is not Bhāviveka’s exclusive idea. It is reasonable to infer that after Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, the idea of “conventionally, existent, and ultimately, empty” had been an effective method of explaining the two realities and responding to accusations of nihilism. This theory is later adopted and explicitly presented with formal proof statements by Bhāviveka.
4.3 Conclusion

Generally speaking, the perspective Bhāviveka employs to define the two realities is epistemological, where non-conceptual wisdom is ultimate reality while ordinary people’s delusion is conventional reality. That is, when the truth of no intrinsic nature is perceived as it is accurately by non-conceptual wisdom, it is ultimate reality. However, things mistakenly perceived by ordinary people to have substantial existence is a wrong perspective that is considered conventional reality.

Bhāviveka also skillfully arranges a dual meaning of śūnyatā in his system for the notion of the ultimate reality where the svabhāva śūnyatā, or non-conceptual wisdom, is ultimate reality, while niḥsvabhāva śūnyatā, or non-intrinsic nature, is the ultimate object (tathatā) perceived by non-conceptual wisdom. According to this notion of ultimate reality, the proposition that Bhāviveka states in KRT, “in reality, conditioned things are empty” (KTR 2.0.0) can be interpreted as follows, “From the perception of non-conceptual wisdom, all conditioned things lack intrinsic nature.” According to Bhāviveka, such a proposition is a teaching corresponding to ultimate reality, and thus can be considered as ultimate reality.

Although all things lack intrinsic nature in reality, sentient beings delusively perceive them to have intrinsic existence (dravya), which is universally accepted as conventional reality. That is, in conventional reality, things and their elements possess intrinsic natures. Therefore, the process of perceiving objects and obtaining knowledge becomes possible. Hence, it can be seen that it is an epistemological consideration that Bhāviveka emphasizes for conventional reality. Furthermore, in regard to the notion of intrinsic nature, instead of the Sarvāstivādin theory of “reality that exists in three
divisions of time” (三世實有), it appears that Bhāviveka favors the Sautrāntika’s theory of bīja (seed), which is able to activate and construct phenomena when certain conditions are met. Although there is not enough positive evidence to prove Bhāviveka’s direct adoption of bīja theory, the evidence shows that he does not reject it.

Bhāviveka’s unique interpretation of conventional reality becomes a remarkable feature distinguishing his doctrine of two realities from other scholars. Non-conceptual wisdom is consistently accepted as ultimate reality by the PPs, Nāgārjuna and Bhāviveka. Conventional reality, according to both Nāgārjuna and the PPs, lacks intrinsic nature, and therefore, there is truly no difference between it and ultimate reality. However, Bhāviveka regards the lack of intrinsic nature as the ultimate point of view and that in conventional reality, things should be understood as possessing intrinsic nature. This interpretation of conventional reality is extraordinary in the Madhyamaka tradition and is, therefore, a unique characteristic of Bhāviveka’s interpretation of two realities.

The accusation of nihilism is a common criticism to which almost all Mādhyamikans have to respond. In his own response, Bhāviveka modifies Nāgārjuna’s proposition, “all are śūnyatā because of pratītyasamutpāda” by inserting the qualifier ‘from the ultimate point of view.’ This modification of the proposition suggests that Bhāviveka disagrees with Nāgārjuna and is not satisfied with his response to the accusation. In this way, he skillfully avoids the nihilistic critique by acknowledging the function of conventional reality.

Finally, the concept of “conventionally, svabhāva, and ultimately, śūnyatā” is not exclusively Bhāviveka’s idea. In fact, it has been suggested by Harivarma, the author of the famous Sautrāntika text Satyasiddhiśāstra. For the convenience of ordinary practice,
Harivarma establishes two levels of two realities. The second level of the two realities is precisely the idea of “conventionally, svabhāva, and ultimately, śūnyatā.” In Harivarma’s theory, this combination of abhidharma and Mahāyāna philosophy has merit in that it can explicitly demonstrate the function of conventional reality without violating the Mahāyāna teaching of śūnyatā. Such a synthesis of abhidharma and Mahāyāna philosophy was inherited by Bhāviveka and became the essence of his own philosophy. On the basis of this, Bhāviveka further established his typical method of argumentation to formulate a soteriological system based on formal inference which I will examine in the following chapter.
Chapter Five: Formal proof statements and Bhāviveka’s soteriological theory

As I have suggested in the previous chapters, Bhāviveka utilizes formal proof statements (prayogavākya) for soteriological purposes in his works. The present chapter will examine Bhāviveka’s application of the formal proof statements in his soteriological theory. The teaching of the secondary ultimate reality according to the Prajñāpradīpa includes the knowledge of śūnyatā obtained from hearing (śrutamayī), thinking (cintāmayī), and meditating (bhāvanamayī). Formal proof statements, i.e. prayoga, according to the *Karatalaratna, are a foundational methodology which allows one to acquire the knowledge of hearing, and from which the other two types of knowledge can be achieved. In addition, a formal proof statement was also a valid methodology for debate accepted by different religious schools during Bhāviveka’s time. As mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, Bhāviveka strived to obtain a valid methodology for debate in order to establish a Madhyamaka position in the Indian religious environment.²²⁵ Hence, the formal proof statement, for Bhāviveka, serves not only as an initial step for his soteriology but also as a valid methodology allowing him to debate with other schools.

In order to validate the function of the formal proof argument, Bhāviveka had to assess the function of valid cognition (pramāṇa) including direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) both of which are strongly connected with a formal proof

²²⁵ Generally speaking, modern scholars think that Mādhyamika philosophers contribute more efforts in removing rivals’ misconceptions than establishing their own proposition. However, this concept toward Mādhyamika philosophy might be influenced by the Prāsaṅgika School. For Bhāviveka, the purpose of his debates with his rivals was to establish a Mādhyamika position. Malcolm D. Eckel “Bhavaviveka and the Early Madhyamika Theories of language” Philosophy East and West, Vol.28, No.3 (1978), 324 and 327.
argument.\textsuperscript{226} According to Buddhist tradition, the arising of a perception involves at least three basic elements, which are an external object (vīsaya) to be perceived, a faculty (indriya) to perceive, and a consciousness (vijñāna) to cognize. In abhidharma philosophy, those elements must have intrinsic natures to activate their own function in order to accomplish the process of perception. For this reason, Bhāviveka has to accept the intrinsic nature of dharmas in conventional reality, as indicated in the fourth chapter, to guarantee the valid function of language and perception, and from which the possible path to achieve liberation is secured.

In order to explain Bhāviveka’s philosophy, I will begin with a discussion of the so-called secondary ultimate. The secondary ultimate reality is one of the special characters that some scholars use to distinguish Bhāviveka’s system from other Mādhyamikans, such as Candrakīrti.\textsuperscript{227} The discussion focuses on Bhāviveka’s purpose of establishing the secondary ultimate reality and its connection to the obtainment of wisdom. Next, I will proceed to the investigation of the relationship between formal proof argument (prayogavākya) and wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamayī), particularly, exploring the possibility of obtaining śrutamayī through prayogavākya. Finally, my analysis will move to the connection between prayogavākya and svabhāva; that is, how the concept of svabhāva, for Bhāviveka, is able to secure the function of prayogavākya.

\textsuperscript{226} In his Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga divides inference (anumāna) into two types: inference for one’s own sake and inference for the sake of others. The first one is the apprehension of an object through an inferential mark (liṅga), and the latter one is the formal proof argument. The direct perception and the inference for one’s own sake are the basic elements for the formal proof argument. See M. Hattori, Dignaga on Perception: Being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga’s Pramanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan Versions (Harvard University Press: Oxford University Press, 1968), 12. See the further discussion in the next section.

\textsuperscript{227} Nagashima 73 and Nasu 47–49.
5.1 The secondary ultimate reality

As previously discussed, Bhāviveka proposes three notions of ultimate reality: 1) tathatā, 2) non-conceptual wisdom, and 3) the teaching in accordance with non-arising and the wisdom obtained through śrutamāyī, cintāmāyī, and bhāvanāmāyī.228 However, some scholars have suggested that Bhāviveka had established two categories of ultimate realities instead of one in his system.229 The first category indicates the true ultimate reality, that encompasses the first and second notions, which is the transcendence of the worldly experience, languages and so on. The second category refers to the teachings in accord with non-arising (śūnyatā), which is the vehicle to remove the obscuration caused by ignorance and to achieve the ‘true’ ultimate reality. Such a vehicle includes —cultivation (the practice) of the three wisdoms: listening to the Buddha’s teachings (śrutamāyī); reflection on the Buddha’s teachings (cintāmāyī); and the practice of meditation (bhāvanāmāyī). It is noteworthy that Bhāviveka’s second category of the ultimate reality, ‘the teachings in accord with non-arising’ or ‘vehicle’, is what distinguishes him from other Mādhyamikans and can be called the secondary ultimate reality.230 With Bhāviveka’s proposing of the secondary ultimate reality, the transition from conventional reality to the ultimate reality is feasible.

The secondary ultimate reality, according to Bhāviveka, serves as a pivot to transfer one’s cognition from conventional reality to ultimate reality. The Madhyamaka concept

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228 See chapter 4-2.
230 Nagashima 73 and Nasu 47–49.
of practice can be summarized into a single prescriptive statement. That is, a path regarding how to transfer one’s cognition from conventional to ultimate reality. In the transformation, Nāgārjuna in the MMK, based on the PPs, indicates that one has to rely on conventional reality to realize ultimate reality. Based on this notion, the interpretation of the two realities is a defining feature across all Mādhyamika soteriological theories. According to the MMK and DDs, Nāgārjuna tends to understand conventional reality from the perspective of vyavahāra, which only means ‘convention,’ and thus, in his system of two realities, pratītyasamutpāda is conventional reality, and śūnyatā is ultimate reality. According to this system, the proposition of “relying on conventional reality to achieve ultimate reality” means that as long as one fully realizes conventional reality, one is also able to realize ultimate reality because conventional and ultimate realities are indistinguishable.

Contrary to Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka considers conventional reality to be a delusion from the epistemological perspective, based on the meaning of saṃvṛti, ‘to cover totally’ or ‘to obscure.’ From this perceptive, conventional reality, according to Bhāviveka, is a sentient beings’ delusion because the truth is totally covered by ignorance (saṃvṛti). Applying this understanding of conventional reality to the soteriological transformation will result in a logical conflict as one cannot rely on a delusion to achieve awakening. The epistemological application to both realities breaks them into two separate and

\[231\] See the analysis in chapter 4-2.
\[232\] See the analysis in chapter 4-1-3.
\[233\] Ibid.
\[234\] Ibid.
\[235\] See chapter 4-2. Kōsai Yasui 1970, 158.
distinct worlds and leaves a gap.\textsuperscript{236} Ultimate reality is non-conceptual wisdom and is the awakened world where awakened ones dwell. In contrast, conventional reality is ordinary people’s delusion and is the common world we live in. There must be something to connect these two worlds. Otherwise, the Mādhyamika soteriological theory would fail to be established. For Bhāviveka, the secondary ultimate reality serves as a bridge to connect the gap between the two realities and establish the Mādhyamika soteriological theory.

In fact, the epistemological interpretation applied to both realities is not an interpretation exclusive to Bhāviveka. According to available sources, the first Mādhyamikan who adopts this interpretation is Piṅgala.\textsuperscript{237} His Zhonglun (中論/ the Commentary of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) translated in Chinese by Kumārajīva states:

\begin{quote}

The so-called conventional reality is that all things have empty natures, but the delusions produced by the mortals’ reversed (cognition) become the reality in the conventional world. Sages truly realize the reverse and thus, realize that all things are empty and non-arising. This is the reality [in the point of view of] those sages, and thus, is ultimate reality.\textsuperscript{238}

\end{quote}

The two realities described in this passage are very similar to the illustration in Bhāviveka’s PrP.\textsuperscript{239} Both passages indicate that reality lacks intrinsic nature. When it is mistakenly perceived by the common people, it is conventional reality, and conversely,

\begin{flushright}
237 In regard to Piṅgala, see Robinson 29–30.
238 “世俗諦者。一切法性空。而世間顛倒故生虛妄法。於世間是實。諸賢聖真知顛倒性。故知一切法皆空無生。於聖人是第一義諦名為實。”(T30, 32c)
239 PrP XXIV: “The so-called conventional reality is: (truly) all things are non-arising and lacking of intrinsic nature, and the sentient beings delusively attach to them. This is the reality in convention. The sages realize the no-intrinsic nature of all things, śānyatā. This is the ultimate reality for the sages and also called the reality.” “世俗諦者。一切諸法無生性空。而眾生顛倒故妄生執著。於世間為實。諸賢聖…知一切法皆空無自性。於聖人是第一義諦。亦名為實。”(T30, 125b)
\end{flushright}
when accurately perceived by awakened ones, it is ultimate reality. Not only have Mādhyamikans before Bhāviveka conceived this type of interpretation but Mādhyamikans after Bhāviveka, such as Candrakīrti, have also interpreted the two realities in this way. For Candrakīrti, the natures of the conventional and ultimate realities are totally opposite. Ultimate reality refers to the true nature of things which can be perceived only with transcendent wisdom, whereas, conventional reality refers to the obscuring of the true nature of things owing to ignorance. In summary, there are three key facts about Bhāviveka’s epistemological application 1) the epistemological interpretation of the conventional reality is what distinguish the later commentaries from Nāgārjuna, 2) the epistemological interpretation of two realities must have be widely accepted by Mādhyamikans at that time, and 3) Piṅgala lived around the fourth century CE, which means that this epistemological interpretation has been applied to Mādhyamika two realities as early as the fourth century.

The next question to be discussed is how the secondary ultimate reality is able to function. The secondary ultimate reality, the teachings in accord with non-arising and the three wisdoms, can accomplish the soteriological transformation using conventional language as the first step to conveying the teaching of śūnyatā (non-arising). This transformation can be accomplished because although the teaching of śūnyatā and the

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240 *PSP* XXIV.8. p. 494 line 1: paramaṇaś cāsav arthaś ceti paramārthaḥ / tad eva satyam paramārtha-satyam / “Since it is an object and it is ultimate, it is an ultimate object (paramārtha). Since that which is true, it is an ultimate truth (paramārthasatyā).”

241 He defines the conventional reality (saṃvṛtisatya) in view of three categories: 1) the obscuration of the true nature of things due to ignorance, 2) reciprocal dependence, and 3) social conventions involving languages and translations. I. C. Harries, *The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism* 113.

242 Robinson 29.
three wisdoms are not ultimate reality itself, they are in accordance with ultimate reality (the teaching of how to achieve ultimate reality). That is why that are called “[secondary] ultimate reality” or “in accord with ultimate reality,” and hence, they can be conveyed to practitioners through language. They are like an expedient stairway toward ultimate reality. Therefore, language serves for the first step in the transformation because it is able to convey the teaching of how to achieve ultimate reality.

However, the problem is that if conventional reality is a delusion caused by ignorance, how is language used in the delusive world able to convey any useful information? As indicated in MMK XXIV-10, one has to rely on conventional reality to achieve ultimate reality. Most scholars interpret the Sanskrit term vyavahāra (convention) as language. As discussed in chapter 4.3 of this dissertation, for Nāgārjuna, vyavahāra is not necessarily understood as language only, but can be interpreted as all transactional conventions. However, for Bhāviveka, language is the first step in the soteriological transformation. Bhāviveka proposes three notions for the idea of ‘convention’ (vyavahāra): (1) worldly language (especially for the verse MMK XXIV-10), (2) ordinary people’s perceptions (in the KTR) which are a delusion (saṃvṛti) according to the PrP, and (3) the elements which enable people’s direct perception in KTR.

Although ordinary people’s perceptions can be interpreted as delusion by following the


245 Without relying on convention, the ultimate [reality] is not manifested. Without understanding the ultimate reality, nirvāṇa is not realized.//XI vyavahāram anāśritya pramārtho na deśyate / paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamyate// PsP XXIV.8. p. 494 lines 12-13.
concept of ‘saṃvṛti’, it can also be understood as linguistic and transactional conventions which Bhāviveka considered to be ‘reality’ with an intrinsic nature in the KTR. In discussing the secondary ultimate reality and function of language in the soteriological transformation, the concept of ‘reality’ is highlighted by Bhāviveka in the KTR. From his perspective, language, because it possesses an intrinsic nature in the conventional sense, functions to convey information and indicate the misconception of the intrinsic nature.

In other words, in Bhāviveka’s philosophical system of conventional reality, while the term saṃvṛti is considered as delusion, the term vyavahāra, which contains language, human perceptions, and elements, is understood as reality. The above description can be depicted into the following chart:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Conventional reality} \\
\{ \text{saṃvṛti} \rightarrow \text{Delusion} \}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\{ \text{vyavahāra} \rightarrow \text{Reality} \}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
1: \text{language} \\
2: \text{Perceptions} \\
3: \text{elements}
\end{array}
\]

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[246] Tillemens indicates that saṃvṛtisaty should not be misunderstood as a purely conventional agreement but what is true for the world. Dreyfus, G. B. J. & McClintock, 114, note No.4.

[247] Eckel has indicated this point in his article “Bhavaviveka and the Early Madhyamika Theories of language”, 333. However, the evidence Eckel used is Tson-kha-pa’s works. This dissertation will cite passage from the KRT as evidence.
The statement below outlines the conflict, presented in KTR 2.1.9, between the lack of intrinsic nature and the function of language:248

If the premise of the argument is that all conditioned things do not have intrinsic natures in terms of their true nature, then, the language you use [to establish this premise] is also subsumed in the conditioned things and thus, must be unsubstantial like those conditioned things. If the expression you have used is not unsubstantial, the conditioned things must be not unsubstantial.

These expressions [you use to establish your premise] invalidate the premise you have established, and this logic error is called, “contradicting your own words”.249 For example the statement, “Everything which is said is false.” If ‘in terms of the reality, all conditioned things are inexistent’ is the thesis, then it will deprecate all things by considering them to be non-existent. This [premise] will be an erroneous conception.”

Bhāviveka’s opponents in this passage highlight a dilemma that challenges his proposition. The dilemma is that if everything does not have an intrinsic nature, then, language, one of the conditioned things used to establish the proposition, must have lack of intrinsic nature. If language lacks of intrinsic nature, it cannot activate its function, and therefore the proposition cannot be established through language. As indicated in chapter four of this dissertation, for most of the abhidharma schools and non-Buddhist schools, elements or things must have their own intrinsic nature in order to function. On the contrary, if language possesses an intrinsic nature to function, then, the proposition, ‘all

248 The KTR II 2.1.9, “所說真性有為空者，此立宗言其義末了。若就真性一切有為皆無有實，是立宗義，此所說言亦復破在有為中故，同諸有為亦應無實。若所說言非無實者，有為亦應皆非無實，此言破自所立義故，名違自言立宗過失，如立一切言說皆妄。若就真性一切有為都無所有，是立宗義，即誣一切皆無所有，如是所立便墮邪見” (T30, 270a20). The same refutation from the opponents can be found in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī. See Nāgārjuna, Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, E H. Johnston, and Arnold Kunst. The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), 96–97.

249 “違自言立宗過失” is svavacana-virodha in Sanskrit, and means the fault of contradicting one’s own proposition.
conditioned things lack intrinsic nature’ will be false. Through this dilemma, Bhāviveka’s opponents intend to invalidate his proposition.

Bhāviveka responds to this critique with a famous verse:

The self is the self protector. What other protector could there be? Through the proper training of the self, the wise reach heaven.\(^{250}\)

After presenting the verse, Bhāviveka explicates this verse according to different perspectives of the two realities. From the ultimate, everything has lack of intrinsic existence and thus, does not function. However, in conventional reality, things such as eye-faculty are certainly able to function.

This verse speaks of the mind as a self in terms of conventional reality, and in terms of ultimate reality, no-self is established. The verse does not contradict its own words. The fault of my thesis [that you indicate above] is just like this situation. The thesis mentions the existence of eyes, etc. in terms of conventional reality and in terms of the ultimate reality, establishes all existences as emptiness. Thus, there is no fault in the thesis.\(^{251}\)

Next, Bhāviveka uses an example to prove the function of language:

For example, someone says, “All living beings that were born must consequently die. The words that the Muni speaks are not false. [The Muni] himself having been born must consequently die because life and death are not separated.” The thesis he sets up can approve his own return to death. Because [his return to death] is established by the thesis, there is no contradiction in his own words.\(^{252}\)

The fault [you indicate] in my thesis is the same situation. In the proposition, “In terms of reality, conditioned things are empty because they arise through conditions,” the words which are used to establish the thesis are empty too, because they are produced by conditions. The words are not separate from conditions. The words that establish the thesis are able to prove that the words

\(^{250}\) The KTR II 2.1.9. Sastri (Sanskrit-English translation) 47, note 66. The Chinese-English translation is, “One definitely relies on oneself. Who say that (one should) rely on others? A wise one is skillful to cultivate (oneself) and thus is able to obtain the happiness of ascending to the heavens.” “我定依於我 誰言他是依 智者我善調 故得昇天樂”(T30, 270a20)

\(^{251}\) The KTR II 2.1.9 (T30, 270a29)

\(^{252}\) The KTR II 2.1.9 (T30, 270b03)
themselves are empty in nature. Because the emptiness of words is established by the thesis, there is no fault of invalidating my own thesis.\textsuperscript{253}

According to his opponents’ argument and the above passages, Bhāviveka’s response can be summarized as being that ultimately, language is empty. This does not imply that language is not able to convey ideas from the conventional perspective. That is, language itself does substantially exist in conventional reality and hence, is able to convey the idea of the empty nature of language in ultimate reality. From this, language certainly has the function to establish the proposition, “In terms of reality, conditioned things are empty because they arise through conditions,” without contradicting the proposition itself. In this way, Bhāviveka is able to solve the dilemma and establish the first step of the path towards soteriological transformation.\textsuperscript{254}

To sum up, later Mādhyamikans including Bhāviveka define the two realities from an epistemological perspective. Ultimate reality is things as they are and can only be perceived by awakened ones. In contrast, conventional reality is a delusion generated by ordinary people’s ignorance. With such a definition, the two realities are broken into two disconnected worlds, and hence, disable the soteriological transformation from conventional to ultimate reality. Being aware of this problem, Bhāviveka establishes the secondary ultimate reality, including the teachings in accord with ultimate reality and the three kinds of wisdom (śrutamayī, cintāmayī, and bhāvanāmayī), to connect the two realities. On the basis of MMK XXIV-10, Bhāviveka establishes language as the first step to accomplish soteriological transformation because it is able to convey the teaching in

\textsuperscript{253} The KTR II 2.1.9 (T30, 270b06)
\textsuperscript{254} The objects or meanings (ālambana) that language refers to will be further discussed in the next section.
accord with ultimate reality (non-arising or śūnyatā). The reason that language is able to convey information is due to Bhāviveka’s unique definition of conventional reality where language, as well as other conventional things, possesses intrinsic nature and can, therefore, activate functions. That is, language in conventional reality is able to convey the idea of “things are empty in ultimate reality” without contradicting itself.

5.2 Formal proof statements (prayogavākya) and wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamāyāpraṇā)

5.2.1 Obtaining śrutamāyāpraṇā through formal proof statements

As mentioned earlier, the teachings in accord with non-arising (conveyed by language), through which ultimate reality can be achieved, consist of the cultivation of the three wisdoms. According to the KTR, the initial step in obtaining wisdom through hearing, śrutamāyāpraṇā, requires logical reasoning, i.e. formal proof statements (prayoga). Bhāviveka further indicates that the purpose of composing the KTR is to propagate the knowledge of removing mistaken views and further obtaining non-conceptual wisdom. After emphasizing the importance of śrutamāyāpraṇā, the KTR provides formal proof statements to prove that the teaching of śūnyatā instigates śrutamāyāpraṇā. Hence, for Bhāviveka, a formal proof statement is an initial step to realize ultimate reality. The KTR states:

To obtain the transcendental non-conceptual wisdom, [...] one should rely on the wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamāyāpraṇā) which is able to remove the perception of intrinsic nature in all objects. Due to this reason, [...] I

Lindtner thinks that what is obtained through prayoga is cintāmāyā (Bhavya the Logician 34). However, according to KTR, what can be obtained through prayoga is śrutamāyā.

The KTR II 1.1.2, “然證出世無分別智……要藉能遣一切所緣自性聞慧。……為欲令彼易證真空速入法性故。略製此掌珍論” (T 30, 268b).
composed the *Treasure in Hands* (*Karatalaratna*) in order to [enable people to] easily realize true emptiness and quickly enter the true nature of things.

(The formal proof statement)

Truly, conditioned existence is empty, because it is causally produced. It is like an illusion. Unconditioned existence possesses no reality, because it is not produced. It is like the sky-flower.

In the above formal proof argument, there are two points worthy of investigate. The first point concerns the relationship between *prayoga* and *śrutamayīprajñā*, and the second is how a formal proof statement can logically achieve an accurate inference.

The Buddhist soteriological path can be briefly summarized as the process of obtaining three kinds of wisdoms, i.e. wisdom obtained from hearing (*śrutamayīprajñā*), wisdom obtained from reflection (*cintāmayīprajñā*), and wisdom obtained from meditation (*bhāvanamayīprajñā*). The relationship between formal proof arguments (*prayogavākya*) and wisdom obtained from hearing (*śrutamayīprajñā*) is controversial, and hence, worth an investigation. Christian Lindtner indicates that *śrutamayīprajñā* consists of knowing the scriptures, while *cintāmayīprajñā* consists of logical reflection based on *Āgama*. However, according to the above passage from the *KTR*, it is clear

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257 Herein, the word ‘truly’ is the synonym of the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*). The original Chinese 真性 (Zhenxing) should be directly translated as ‘true-nature’ in English. However, this could be confused with the concept of self-nature which is refuted by Bhāviveka in the text. Thus, here, this text employs Poussin’s French translation ‘vuritu’ (‘truth’ in English) for the Chinese 真性 (Zhenxing.) See De La Vallée Poussin, Louis, —Madhyamaka, II. L’auteur du Joyan dans la main. III. *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* (Bruxelles) 2 (1932-33), 70.

258 See the previous analysis.

259 緣生 (yuansheng) means ‘pratītyasamutpanna.’ The Sanskrit term pratītyasamutpāda which is in Pali, *patiçosamuppāda* and 緣起 in Chinese, is often translated as interdependent co-arising in English. It indicates the casual relationship of relevant existences, and hence, this term is simply translated as ‘causality.’ Therein, *pratītyasamutpāna* indicate the phenomena produced by means of *pratītyasamutpāda*, and thus, it can be translated into casual productions. See J. Macy, *Mutual Causality Buddhism and General Systems Theory* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 34.

260 Lindtner. *Bhavya the Logician* 34
that for Bhāviveka, logical reflection, especially logical analysis and arguments, belongs to the content of śrutamayīprajñā. This assertion may be influenced by the Yogācāra tradition, especially the Yogācārabhūmi which could be one of the earliest texts relating formal proof statements to śrutamayīprajñā.  

In the AMS, while in discussion of what śrutamayīprajñā is, someone understands it as merely accepting, knowing and promoting the scriptures. However, the authors of the AMS refer to such knowledge as merely upapatti-prajñā (wisdom endowed with birth) and define śrutamayīprajñā as the knowledge of the profound meaning in terms of the scriptures’ semantics. The cintāmayī prajñā consists of the knowledge of the profound meaning both in terms of semantics and beyond semantics, and bhāvanāmayī prajñā is the knowledge obtained only from the profound meanings behind language of scriptures. The AMS also defines śrutamayīprajñā as identifying particulars and universals of things. Following the AMS, the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and Abhidharmakośa inherited these definitions for the three wisdoms.

The Yogācārabhūmi (hereafter YBh) is the first text among Buddhist technical digests (śāstra) that relates the logical argument to śrutamayīprajñā. In the

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261 V. Eltschinger in his article, “Studies in Dharmakīrti’s Religious Philosophy: the Cintā-mayī prajñā” cites some passages from the Śrāvakabhūmi of Yogācārabhūmi to prove that the wisdom obtained through hetuvidyā is cintāmayī prajñā. Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010), 564. However, his evidence from Śrāvakabhūmi’ is controversial because the passage Eltschinger cites is a discussion over hearing and reflection of dharma and not specifically about cintāmayī prajñā and logic. The “śrutamayī-bhūmi” is the place where the Yogācārabhūmi specifically focus on the discussion on śrutamayīprajñā and hetuvidyā. See the following explanation.

T 27, 216c.

262 Ibid.

263 śrutamayī which indentifies particulars and universals of all things is also called abhidharma” (聞所成慧，分別諸法自相共相建立諸法自相共相，[…] 亦得名為阿毘達磨) (T27, 3a)
“śrutamāyīprajñā-bhūmi” of the YBh, the śrutamāyīprajñā is described as having five sciences. The third science is hetuvidya (logical reasoning):

What is [the level] of the wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamāyīprajñā-bhūmi)? In summary, through language, with intellections, [one] hears, receives, recites, and recalls the immeasurable differences in regards to the five sciences, and further accurately understands the meanings behind language. These are called [the level] of the wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamāyīprajñā-bhūmi.) What are the five sciences (pañcavidya)? They are inner science (adhyatmāvidyā), medical science (cikitsāvidyā), logical science (hetuvidya), linguistic science (śabdavidyā), and the science of fine arts and crafts (śilpavidyā). 265

The Śrutamāyībhūmi systematically expounds on hetuvidya in great detail. It can be considered to be one of the earliest treatises which do so in Buddhism. 266 In the scholastic explanation of hetuvidya, the types of hetuvidya and its component elements are noteworthy to highlight. The Śrutamāyī-bhūmi lists six types of hetuvidya, of which the author considers only the last two types to be accurate. The purpose of hetuvidya is to disseminate the correct teachings from which sentient beings are able to remove their doubt about Buddhism, and thereby, follow the path to liberation. 267 This is what Bhāviveka demonstrates in order to establish prayoga argument at the beginning of the KTR (the passage is cited above). 268
The Śrutamayī-bhūmi list eight elements of hetuvidya, which are thesis (pratijña), reason (hetu), example (drṣṭānta), similar locus (sapakṣa), dissimilar locus (vipakṣa), perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa), inference (anumāna-pramāṇa), and teachings (āptāgama-pramāṇa). The first three elements are the three members of prayoga formulated later by Dignāga. The similar locus (sapakṣa), and dissimilar locus (vipakṣa) are the conditions to qualify a valid example (see the following analysis). For Dignāga, direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are the only two means of valid cognition to compose a prayoga argument since Dignāga considered āgama-pramāṇa as merely one type of inference. The old prayoga formula contains application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana) as the last two members which have been removed in the Dignāga prayoga argument. That is, except for āgama-pramāṇa, the remaining elements among those eight are required to compose Dignāga’s new prayoga formula. The three-member-style of prayoga does not only appear in the śrutamayīprajñā-bhūmi but also in Asaṅga’s Shunzhonglun (順中論) and the

obtained from hearing (śrutamayīprajñā) as a stair, they still lack the supreme power of practice so that they cannot permanently remove the obstacles which should be removed. Hence, one should diligently cultivate the supreme power of the practice.” 如是遣除諸過難已，修觀行者正比量力悟入自他二宗所執無為性空。聞所成智階梯力已入性空，闕勝修力未能永斷所應除障，故復精勤習勝修力” (T30, 276a03).

269 “能成立法有八種者：一立宗，二辯因，三引喻，四同類，五異類，六現量，七比量，八正教 [量]。” (T30, 356c)
270 See the following discussion in 5.2.2.
271 See the following discussion in 5.2.2.
Abhidharmasamuccaya.\textsuperscript{272} The \textit{Shunzhonglun} is also the earliest Buddhist text which clearly demonstrates the three requirements of a valid reason.\textsuperscript{273}

According to the above analysis, it can be said that, for Bhāviveka, śrutamāyīprajñā is an accurate understanding of the profound meaning according to scriptures, and a formal proof statement is the methodology that guarantees an accurate understanding of the teaching, or śrutamāyīprajñā. The \textit{YBh} is the first text relating a formal proof statement (prayoga) to śrutamāyīprajñā, and thus, gives Bhāviveka’s soteriological theory a great degree of influence. Moreover, the formulation of a formal proof statement in “the level of the wisdom obtained from hearing” (the śrutamāyīprajñā-bhūmi) has conceived the basic idea of the new form of formal proof statements, which consists of three members instead of five. It is reasonable to say that Asaṅga and the form of formal proof statements in the Śrutamāyīprajñā-bhūmi gave the later Buddhist logicians such as Dignāga and Bhāviveka, a solid foundation to develop their logic formula.\textsuperscript{274}

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\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Shunzhong} (順中論) (T30, 41c~42a), \textit{Dashenabidamojilun} (大乘阿毘達摩集論/Abhidharma-samuccaya) (T31,671b).

\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Shunzhong} (順中論) (T30, 42a~c). Tsukamoto, Keishō, Yūkei Matsunaga, and Hirofumi Isoda. 梵語佛典の研究 III (Bongo butten no kenkyū/The Studies of Sanskrit Buddhism ScripturesIII) (Kyōto-shi: Heirakuji Shoten, 1990), 355.

\textsuperscript{274} While criticizing the Yogācāra theory of the three natures, the three-nature theory Bhāviveka cites is from \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}. Therefore, we believe that Bhāviveka must be very familiar with this text. See KTR (I) 2.2. Asaṅga in many of his works demonstrates Buddhist logic in different ways. See Akira, \textit{the History of Indian Buddhism}, 253. Nanqiang Yao. 因明學說史綱要(Yin Ming Xue Shuo Shi Gang Yao/The Summary of the History of Buddhist Logic) (Shanghai Shi: Shanghai san lian shu dian, 2000), 36~45.
5.2.2 A formal proof statement and svabhāva

The next point to consider is how a formal proof statement (prayoga) operates to obtain an accurate perception by means of the idea of svabhāva. For Bhāviveka, in order to avoid being criticized as a nihilist and to establish a valid argument, one has to accept that conventional things have their own intrinsic nature. In other words, the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) of conventional reality has to be real for a person who has not yet realized the true nature of things. Based on Bhāviveka’s metaphysical theory of conventional existences, things have intrinsic natures (svabhāva). Jñānagarbha, the later commentator and successor of Bhāviveka, in his Satyadvayavibhavīga (hereafter SDV) defends Bhāviveka’s analysis of ultimate reality (paramārtha) by claiming that ultimate (paramārtha) is indeed ultimate because it is in accord with certain knowledge achieved through logically reasoned cognition, which is said to be accurate. Jñānagarbha’s defence of Bhāviveka hints at the relationships between the function of a formal proof statement (prayoga), intrinsic nature, and the achievement of ultimate reality.

In support of Bhāviveka’s argument, we find that Dignāga is the source for Bhāviveka’s application of formal proof statements. Dignāga, on the basis of direct perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumāna), claims that a valid formal proof

275 See chapter 4-2.
276 Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India 69–70. Nasu, 48
277 So far, scholars consider that Dignāga is the source for Bhāviveka’s application of prayoga because there are numerous allusions to Dignāga’s Pramanasarasamuccaya in Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvalā and Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. C. Lindtner “Bhavya, the Logician” Visva Bharati Annals n.s.2 (1990), 45. However, as Yasunori Ejima indicates none of these two works can be sure to be composed by Bhāviveka. Ejima, 中観思想の展開: Bhāviveka 研究 (Chūgan shisō no tenkai: Bhāvaviveka kenkyū/Development of Mādhyamika Philosophy in India: the Study of Bhāviveka), 10. See the discussion of Bhāviveka’s works in chapter two of this dissertation.
statement should not be contradictory. Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (hereafter PRs), explains the reason why he only allows two kinds of valid cognition:

There are only two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) which are direct perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumāna). The teachings (āptāgama) and analogies (upamāna) are expediently established as cognition but not real cognition. Why are there only two cognitions? Answer: because perceived objects are only two kinds which are a particular (svalakṣaṇa) and a universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa).

The text continues to illustrate how the mind perceives external objects as:

The mind cognizing the external object by perceiving particulars is called direct perception because direct perception is projected [in mind] as an object with a particular. The mind conceptualizing the external object by perceiving a universal is called inference because inference is projected [in mind] as an object with a universal.

According to this citation, the reasons why only direct perception and inference are recognized are based on the idea that there are only two perceived objects: particulars (svalakṣaṇa) and universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). These two characteristics are exactly what Abhidharma literatures emphasize and analyze. Especially, the particular (svalakṣaṇa) in abhidharma scriptures is considered to be synonymous with svabhāva.

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279 This is my English translation from Chinese version of Pramāṇasamuccaya which was translated from Tibetan to Chinese by Fa-zun (法尊) in 1982. Fa-zun. 集量論略解 (Ji Liang Lun Lue Jie/ A translation and Summary of Pramāṇasamuccaya) (Peking: Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 1982.), 2. M. Hattori. Dignaga on Perception: Being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga’s Pramanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan Versions 24.

281 “To indentify particulars and universals of all things is also called abhidharma” (分別諸法自相共相建立諸法自相共相…亦得名為阿毘達磨) (T27, 03b).

Dignāga further defines direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) as a non-conceptualized perception. That is, the direct perception is the various particulars being reflected separately by the first five consciousnesses in the mind before they are conceptualized together as things with any expression by the sixth consciousness.²⁸³

In the same text, Dignāga further demonstrates four types of direct perception which are *indriya-pratyakṣa*, *mānas-pratyakṣa*, *svasamvedana-pratyakṣa*, and *yogi-pratyakṣa*. A prayoga argument involves the first two direct perceptions.²⁸⁴ The so called *indriya-pratyakṣa* refers to the basic cognitions of the external objects reflected in the five consciousnesses. That is, the five consciousnesses (equivalent to the five senses) directly perceive the five external particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), such as *rūpa*, etc., and cognize them as *rūpa*, etc. in mind without conceptualizing them.²⁸⁵ However, according to abhidharma theory, as well as Dignāga, while the five consciousnesses perceive the external objects, the simultaneous sixth consciousness²⁸⁶ must operate at the same time in order to accomplish cognition. The cognition reflected in this consciousness is called *mānas-pratyakṣa*.²⁸⁷ In the *Abhidharmakośa* (hereafter Kośa), the cognition of the five particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) through the five consciousnesses and the sixth-consciousness-operating-with- the-five-consciousness are called *svabhāva-vikalpa*.²⁸⁸ These two direct perceptions are the most basic perceptions in the whole epistemological process.

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²⁸³ M. Hattori. *Dignaga on Perception* 25.
²⁸⁶ According to 成唯識論 (*Chengweishilun* / Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness), the simultaneous sixth consciousness (五俱意識/*wujiyishu*) is the sixth consciousness associated with the five consciousnesses. (T31, 26a) See Wei Tat, *Ch‘en Wei-Shih Lun*, 351.
²⁸⁸ P. Pradhan. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 22. 阿毘達磨俱舍論 (T29, 8b).
Inference (anumāna) is the synthetic conceptualization of the five external particulars and can only be produced by the sixth consciousness.\textsuperscript{289} For example, while the five senses are perceiving an external object such as a flame, the five consciousnesses, together with the simultaneous sixth-consciousness, can only separately cognize the individual characteristics such as colour, sound, smell, and heat, and cannot further synthetically conceptualize them as a concept of a flame. In contrast, the sixth consciousness is able to conceptualize individual sensory information together into the concept of a flame through analysis, comparison, and inference based on previous memory. The concept of a flame becomes a universal in the mind at that moment, and is called inference or inferential perception (anumāna-pramāṇa).\textsuperscript{290}

Dignāga further divides anumāna into two kinds, an inference for one’s own sake (svārtha-anumāna) and an inference for the sake of others (parārtha-anumāna). These two inferences are not differentiated according to their natures but according to their different purposes. The inference for one’s own sake is to apprehend an object through an inferential mark (liṅga). The inference for the sake of others is a formal proof argument (prayoga), i.e. a logic inference through a statement of thesis (sādhya), reason (hetu) and example (dṛṣṭānta), and it is used for debate with others.\textsuperscript{291}

Dignāga’s theory of perception is elaborated further in the PRs, in which he explains that the five senses perceive the particulars (svalakṣaṇa) from any external object. However, the external things that the five senses factually perceive are the

\textsuperscript{289} Fa-zun. 集量論略解 (Ji Liang Lun Lue Jie /A translation and Summary of Pramāṇasamuccaya) 30. 
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{291} M. Hattori. Dignaga on Perception 12.
aggregation of the atoms and not the individual atom. According to the Abhidharmakośa, an individual atom possesses at least eight intrinsic natures including the four elements, and four āyatana. For example, when the eyes perceive a color-form from an external thing, what the mind factually perceives is rūpa-āyatana, an aggregation of rūpa atoms, and not an individual atom. However, it should be noted that this epistemological theory is not unique to Dignāga, but a common theory in abhidharma literature. In his Ālambanaparīkṣā, Dignāga distinguishes his theory from Sarvāstivādin epistemology by explaining that the aggregations of atoms are not the direct object of perception, but an object of cognition (ālambana), which creates its own appearance in cognition.

Based on Dignāga’s epistemological theory, Bhāviveka further expounds his theory of objects of cognition (ālambana) in more detail in MHK-V. In the text, Bhāviveka qualifies an object of cognition (ālambana) as:

[we] think that this [combination of atoms] is the object (ālambana), because it causes a cognition that has the image (ābhāsa) of that [combination], … MHK-V.36

The auto-commentary to this verse, i.e. Tj, further comments:

The atoms are real as the collections of eight things, but not real by its own self. … we think that a combination of similar atoms, such as a pot, is real (dravya) in a relative sense.

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292 Ibid., 3.
293 In Abhidharmakośa, it says that one single atom possesses at least eight things (could be more) which are the four mahābhūta, plus four āyatana which are color-form, smell, taste, and tangibility (T29, 18b).
294 Fa-zun 4.
295 Both Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika schools agree that only aggregations of atoms can be a perceived object.
296 This theory is shared by both Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika. See Akira Saito, “Bhāviveka’s Theory of Perception”, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 54 No. 3, March (2006) 1214.
297 Eckel, Bhāviveka 250.
This verse, together with its commentary, provides several hints for us to understand Bhāviveka’s epistemological theory. First, atoms, as the most basic element of material, are real only a collection of the eight things. That is, an atom is nothing but an aggregation of those eight things. Second, since the atoms are real, the external objects composed by atoms are also real. Third, the factual objects that the five senses perceive are not the aggregation of the atoms themselves but their appearance in cognition. An external object (ālambana) is understood as the cause that produces the appearance (ābhāsa). Furthermore, because this theory is closer to Sautrāntika epistemology than Sarvāstivāda, who considers the perceived objects of the five senses as the aggregation of atoms themselves, Bhāviveka is identified as Sautrāntika-mādhyamika.299

According to this theory, it follows that direct perception (pratyakṣa) is the appearance of the aggregation of atoms in cognition, and according to the statement in the KTR, Bhāviveka considers this appearance as real and substantially existent in the conventional sense. Not only appearance in cognition, but also all causal conditions which are able to produce perceptions (including the aggregation of atoms, the external

298 Ibid. In Abhidharmakośa, it says that one single atom at least possesses eight things (could be more) which are the four mahābhūta, plus color-form, smell, taste, and tangibility (See T29, 18b). However, the difference is that for Sarvāstivādin, the atom itself is real (See T29, 3b), but Bhāviveka only accepts it to be real only as a collection of the eight things.
300 Akira Saito, “Bhāviveka’s Theory of Perception”, 1214. However, Yin shun in his work mentions that according to Sautrāntika, a universal is not real because it is merely a conceptualization of the sixth consciousness based on particulars. In contrast, according to Sarvāstivāda, a universal is real and belongs to the perceived thing itself. See Yin shun, 唯識學探源 (Wei Shi Xue Tan Yuan/the Investigation of the Origin of the Teaching of Consciousness-only) (Taipei: Zheng wen, 1992), 204–206. If what Yin shun says is true, then, it is controversial to indentify Bhāviveka as Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika.
object, and the cognition) must, for Bhāviveka, be substantially existent from the conventional perspective.\textsuperscript{301}

Based on the above theory, Bhāviveka further develops his theory of inference (\textit{anumāna}) with the basic idea that universals, i.e., the perceived objects of inference, are real and possessed by external things. Bhāviveka’s theory of inference is well demonstrated from verses 61~65 in \textit{MHK}, V. When discussing the relationship between language and its reference, verse 61 illustrates:

A word refers to a thing that possesses a universal, because this [thing] causes a cognition in which there is an image of this [thing]. Since this [things] exists, it is reasonable for a word to refer to it.\textsuperscript{302}

First of all, Bhāviveka’s primary idea is that the external thing exists independently from the mind. Next, external things themselves possess the universals and are able to cause the cognition in which the universals of things appear. This is the difference between Bhāviveka and Dignāga. For Dignāga, the universal does not belong to external things, but merely a reconstruction of the mind according to the object.\textsuperscript{303} For Bhāviveka, the appearance of universals in cognition is inference. Finally, a word is able to refer to a thing because a word can only refer to conceptualized cognitions, i.e. inference, whose object, universals, are originally the properties of external things.

In verse 62, Bhāviveka further defines the meaning of a universal with two conditions:

\textsuperscript{301} See chapter 4-2. \textsuperscript{302} Eckel, \textit{Bhāviveka} 266. \textsuperscript{303} Hidenori Kitagawa. \textit{インド古典論理学の研究: 陳那の体系 (Indo Koten Ronrigaku No Kenkyū: Jinna (dignāga) No Taikei/ The Study of the Indian Classic Logic: Dignāga’s System)}, 11. Hirakawa, \textit{The History of Indian Buddhism} 265.
It is clear that a universal is empty of that which is dissimilar (vijātiyena śūnyatvam), because it is the cause of the occurrence of a similar cognition (tulyadhiśītihetu) and because it is the similarity (sāmānya) in similar things (tulyajātīya).304

According to this verse, a universal is defined as the similarity and the lack of dissimilarity. That is, according to the first definition, a universal is the property of the similarity itself, a collection of particulars. Anything which possesses that property is considered as a similar thing. For example, the universal of a cow is the similarity (sāmānya) of “cow” to a factual cow, i.e., a collection of particulars such as tail, hump, hoof, and horn. Anything which possesses this similarity is a cow (a similar thing/tulyajātīya). How can it be so? This is because the similarity of a cow can cause a similar cognition of a cow in one’s mind. As mentioned above, anything which is able to cause our perception must be real. Following the above illustration, the second definition of a universal is that the properties of similarity of a cow should not have any properties of similarity of a horse which is called dissimilarity (vijātiyena) of a cow.305 Since these two conditions of a universal are the intrinsic natures that a universal possesses, they later become two of the three requirements that can guarantee a valid reason in formal proof statements (prayoga).306

In verse 5.63, Bhāviveka demonstrates how a universal can be perceived by indicating the unbroken connection between a universal and a thing which possesses it:

A universal is not grasped unless its locus is grasped, because it is grasped when that locus is grasped, like a number. This is why a thing that possesses it can be

304 Eckel, Bhāviveka 267.
305 The above description is a description according to the auto-commentary of the verse. Eckel, Bhāviveka 268.
306 See the following discussion.
conceptualized and designated by words. [We] do not think that [a universal] is different [from the thing itself].

According to Tj, this verse means that a universal should not be separated from the things itself. For example, the “cowness,” the universal of a cow, cannot be separated from a real cow. A locus (āśraya) is a collection of particulars and is the basis of a universal.

For example, the locus of the universal of a cow, “cowness,” is the collection of tail, hump, hoof, and horn. When one tries to grasp “cowness”, what one really grasps is its locus. Hence, when the locus is grasped, a universal is grasped. The locus of a cow belongs to the thing itself, a cow. That is why a universal cannot be separated from things which possess locus. Based on this reason, a thing can be conceptualized and designated by words because a universal is conceptualized as inference which is the reference of a word.

According to the above discussion, Bhāviveka’s epistemology can be summarised as the following: external objects are substantially existent because they consist of an aggregation of atoms. Since an external object is real in conventional reality, its particulars are able to cause immediate perception (pratyakṣa), and its universal, or a collection of particulars, is able to cause inference (anumāna). The basic definition for a universal is that it must possess a similar locus (āśraya) and lack a dissimilar locus. These two requirements of a universal can guarantee an accurate inference because a

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307 Eckel, Bhāviveka 268.
308 According to Pramāṇasamuccaya (mentioned above), inference can be derived from both immediate perception and other inference. Here, it seems that Bhāviveka is describing how an inference can be derived from immediate perception. He thinks that universal is a collection of particulars. Each particular can only be grasped by the five consciousnesses, and only the sixth consciousness can perceive the universal by conceptualizing those perceptions together into a universal.
309 The description is a descriptions based on Tj. Eckel, Bhāviveka 268.
external reference is the appearance of a universal in the mental cognition. These two requirements of a universal become two of the three requirements for a valid reason in formal proof statements. Moreover, on the basis of this theory, language is able to refer to a certain thing by conceptualizing and designating its universal with the capture of its locus. Therefore, a formal proof statement, supported by the function of language and an accurate perception, is able to obtain an accurate result (i.e., inference) by providing a sound reason.

Based on his metaphysical theory that the causes and conditions in the epistemological process must exist substantially, the following section will discuss the formulation of a formal proof statement (prayoga) which Bhāviveka formally uses to establish the Mādhyamika proposition in the KTR.

In Buddhism, logic is called ‘hetuvidyā,’ which means ‘the science of reasons’. That is, an inferred thesis is established on the basis of valid reasons. Although the origin of Buddhist logic can be traced back to the Buddha’s life time, a formal logic formulation did not appear until the second century. Nāgārjuna’s *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra is the earliest Buddhist text which uses a formal logic formula, or a formal proof statement (prayoga), composed of five members (thesis, reason, example, connection, and conclusion) in debate.310 In the later texts such as the Yogācārabhūmi, the five members are reduced to three members, (thesis, reason, and example) although some other texts still keep the

310 The *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra (Fangbianxinlun  方便心論) only has Chinese version (T32,23b). Enshō Kanakura 163.
formulation of five members. After Dignāga, the formal proof statement composed of three members becomes a standard formula.\textsuperscript{311}

The three members of formal proof statements are a thesis (\textit{pratijñā}), reason (\textit{hetu}) and example (\textit{drṣṭānta}). A thesis has to include a subject (\textit{dharmin}) and a predicate (\textit{sādhyā})\textsuperscript{312} because the argument must guarantee the predicate to be a true statement regarding the subject. The example must be a common experience which is accepted by both sides of the debate in order to achieve a valid process of reasoning.\textsuperscript{313} For example, in the following \textit{prayoga}:

\begin{quote}
Thesis: the mountain is on fire  
Reason: because it has smoke  
Example: like a kitchen stove
\end{quote}

Thesis “the mountain is on fire” is what this formal proof statement intends to establish. In this thesis, “mountain” is the subject (\textit{dharmin}) and “fire” is the predicate (\textit{sādhyā}). “Smoke” is the reason that can connect “mountain” (\textit{dharmin}), and “fire” (\textit{sādhyā}). A kitchen stove is an example to support the reason. Hence, how to establish a valid reason becomes the crucial process in a \textit{prayoga} argument.

\textsuperscript{311} Hirakawa, \textit{The History of Indian Buddhism} 253.  
\textsuperscript{312} Ames, \textit{The Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika Distinction} 45.  
According to Śaṅkarasvāmin’s (600~? CE) Nyāyapraveśaka (hereafter NYP), a valid reason should fulfill three requirements: 1) the first requirement, paksadharmatva, is that the “inferring property” (smoke /sādhanadharma) has to be present in the subject (the mountain in the thesis); 2) the second requirement, sapakse sattavam, is that the “inferring property” (smoke) must be a property of whatever (such as a stove) possesses the inferred property (fire /sādhyadharma). That which possesses the inferred property (fire) is classified as the sapakṣa (the similar locus); 3) the third requirement, vipakṣe ’sattvam, is that the “inferring property” (smoke) should be absent from that which does not possess the “inferred property” (fire), and that which does not possess the “inferred property” is called vipakṣa (dissimilar locus).  

Any prayoga argument is a valid argument as long as it can fulfill the three requirements of the reason.

The above formal proof statement can be understood to contain the operation of two processes of the means of valid cognition – i.e., inference based on direct perception and logic inference (anumāna) based on other inferences. Take the following proposition for example:

\[ \text{p has/is r because of q, for example s.} \]

The connection between p and r is derived from the reason q, and thus, the phrase, “p has/is r because of q” is based on pure inference; but the relationship between “p and q” and “r and q” are based on inference derived from direct perceptions, — the inference for

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314 Eckel, Bhāviveka and his Buddhist Opponents, 55.
315 As mentioned above, an inference could be derived from immediate perceptions or other inferences. In order to distinguish these two inferences, the inference derived from other inference will be temporally called logic inference in this chapter.
one’s own sake. The three requirements of a valid reason prove the relation between p & q and the relation between q & r through inference derived from direct perception. The first requirement is to promise the truth of the statement ‘if p then q’ (p \(\rightarrow\) q) by means of an inference derived from direct perception (the inference for one’s own sake). The second and third requirements establish the promise that the statement ‘if q then r’ is true by means of inference derived from direct perception of the example of s (the inference for one’s own sake). Thus, the logical principle is like the Hypothetical Syllogism (HS) in modern logic:

\[
\begin{align*}
p \supset q & \quad \text{(inference for one’s own sake)} \\
q \supset r & \quad \text{(inference for one’s own sake)} \\
\therefore p \supset r & \quad \text{(logic inference/inference for the sake of others)}
\end{align*}
\]

Let’s take the proposition, “the mountain is on fire because we see smoke, like from a stove” as an example to demonstrate this logic formula. In the formula, ‘p’ represents “smoky mountain”, and ‘r’ represents ‘fire.’ ‘q’ represents ‘smoke’ and ‘s’ is ‘a stove.’ Then this prayoga can be demonstrated as a Hypothetical Syllogism, except that in modern logic the example ‘s’ is not used:

\[
\begin{align*}
P (\text{mountain}) & \supset q (\text{has smoke}) \quad (\text{all people can perceive smoke on the mountain}) \\
q (\text{smoke}) & \supset r (\text{fire}) \quad (\text{from our experience, smoke is one of universals of fire.} \\
\text{Therefore, 1) whatever has fire must have smoke, just like s = a kitchen stove, and hence, whenever there is smoke there must be fire. 2) On the contrary, whatever there is no smoke, there must be no fire.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[316\text{ D. Bonevac, Simple Logic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 305.}\]
P (mountain) ⊢ r (has fire) (an inference derived from the above two parts).

In the Hypothetical Syllogism, the first premise “P (mountain) ⊢ q (has smoke)” is equal to the first requirement of the reason of prayoga in which all people can see smoke on the mountain. The second premise “q (smoke) ⊢ r (fire)” contains the second and third requirement of the reason of prayoga, and involves the theory regarding a universal, the object of an inference. As mentioned, according to Bhāviveka, a universal belongs to a thing itself. All similar things must possess this universal and all dissimilar things lack of it. In this case, smoke is considered one universal of fire. That is, smoke belongs to fire. Hence, anything which has fire must have smoke, just like s, a kitchen stove, and reversely, whenever there is smoke, there must be fire. On the contrary, whenever there is no smoke, there must be no fire. Therefore, as long as smoke is present, there must be fire. That is, as long as the reason fulfills the requirements, it should be a valid argument and is able to promise an accurate inference.

In sum, on the basis of two means of valid cognition, as long as the reason fulfills the three requirements, one is able to obtain a decisive result through a formal proof statement. Because it functions as a tool to obtain a decisive result, for Bhāviveka, it can also be applied in the argument for Madhyamaka theory to infer śūnyatā.
5.2.3 The application of formal proof statements in the *KTR*

After a brief explanation of Bhāviveka’s metaphysical theory and its connection with formal proof statements, the current section will further examine how Bhāviveka applies formal proof statements to prove the teaching of śūnyatā in the *KTR*.

In the stanzas of the *KTR*, Bhāviveka proposes two formal proof statements to prove that all things are empty whether they are conditioned or unconditioned things:

I) In reality, conditioned things are empty like illusions because they are produced by conditions, and

II) unconditioned things are not real because they are not produced like sky-flowers.

According to Bhāviveka, all things can be divided into two opposite categories: conditioned and unconditioned things, which are discussed in detail by Bhāviveka in two chapters (top and bottom) in the *KTR*.

First, in the top chapter, Bhāviveka discusses and defends his arguments for the claim that all conditioned things are empty. His argument for this claim is presented as a formal proof statement, which can be illustrated in the following structure:

Thesis: In reality, conditioned things are empty

Reason: because they are produced by conditions

Example: like illusions

“In reality, conditioned things are empty” is the inference (thesis) that this formal proof statement tries to prove. In this formal proof statement, Bhāviveka first explains the
qualifier “in reality” by stating that “reality” means ultimate reality. By doing this, he is showing that his thesis is established in terms of ultimate reality. This qualifier is extremely important for Bhāviveka because it does not only concern Bhāviveka’s theory of two realities but also enables him to establish a valid formal proof statement and defend himself from an accusation of nihilism. As previously discussed, ultimate reality, for Bhāviveka, is both non-conceptual wisdom and things as they are. In other words, the thesis can also be rephrased as: from the perspective of non-conceptual wisdom, conditioned things are empty.

Next, in defining the subject of the thesis, Bhāviveka identifies the subject as the conditioned things that are produced by various conditions. In this context, conditioned things refer to the twelve sensory spheres except the portion of dharma media—space (kha), analytical cessation (pratisamkhyānirodha), non-analytical cessation (apratisamkhyānirodha) and thusness (tathātā).317 Continuing his argument, Bhāviveka states that the reason (the second member of a formal proof statement) for the thesis is that conditioned things are produced by conditions.318 By defining the reason as “produced by conditions” it indicates that the reason is qualified as the first of the three requirements for a valid reason in the construction of a formal proof statement. As mentioned in section 5.2.2, the first requirement (pakṣadharmanā) of a valid reason must consist of an inferring property (sādhanadharma) that is present in the subject. In the case of this formal proof statement, “produced by conditions” is the inferring property

317 See KTR 1.1.2. Those four are unconditioned things which will be discussed in the bottom chapter.
318 Ibid., 1.3.
that is present in the subject of the thesis, i.e., “conditioned things.” Therefore, “produced by conditions” fulfills the first requirement of a valid reason.

With regard to the third member of a formal proof statement, the example, Bhāviveka applies illusion as a similar or parallel example to support the reason for the thesis that conditioned things are empty. According to Bhāviveka, although various illusory things appear to substantially exist, they actually lack any intrinsic nature because they are produced by various conditions. These illusory things can be represented by men, women, goats, deers, and others.\(^{319}\) As a result, the example of an illusion applied here is able to fulfill the second requirement of a valid reason. Again, as discussed earlier in section 5.2.2, in order to fulfill the second requirement (\(sapakse sattavam\)), an inferring property must be a property of something that possesses the inferred property. Here, “produced by conditions” is the inferring property, and “empty” which means the lack of intrinsic nature, or no-substance, is the inferred property. In this formal proof statement, “illusion” is a proper similar example because it is able to demonstrate that any conditioned things such as houses, goats, deers, and etc. are produced by conditions due to the lack of intrinsic nature.

Moreover, in a standard formal proof statement, one has to provide a counter example that fulfills the third requirement (\(vipakṣe 'sattvam\)) of a valid reason. That is, the inferring property ("produced by conditions" in this case) must not appear in the counter example ("any conditioned things which possess substance" in this case). However, as Bhāviveka indicates, for this particular formal proof statement, since

\(^{319}\) Ibid., 1.2.
emptiness is the universal characteristic (sāmānyalakṣana) of all things, nothing can be the counter example to emptiness. Hypothetically, the counter example to emptiness is something that possesses an intrinsic substance. Since all conditioned things lack an intrinsic nature, a counter example cannot be found. Because no counter example can be provided, the third requirement is fulfilled.320

After establishing a formal proof statement for conditioned things to be empty, Bhāviveka starts to defend himself from various critiques. Defending himself from various critiques, Bhāviveka must not only prove that his thesis is accurate but also remove his opponents’ ignorance in order to obtain the wisdom obtained from hearing. That is, for Bhāviveka, the process of debate possesses a particular function to gradually remove a practitioner’s improper view and thus obtain wisdom. Bhāviveka states as such after his debate with those opponents:

Thus, having removed the various faults, a practitioner, by means of the correct inference, realizes the emptiness of unconditioned things which are attached by people in both our religion and other religions. Although practitioners have realized the emptiness through the power of the wisdom obtained from hearing as a stairway […].321

Although the sources of those critiques come from both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, most of the critiques in the top chapter of the KTR are from non-Buddhist schools, most of whom accuse him of nihilism. In the system of formal proof statements, there are many possible mistakes which can invalidate a formal proof statement. Śankaravāmin in his NYP categorises all possible mistakes (thirty-three in total) into

320 Ibid., 1.3.
321 The KTR IV.
three groups according to thesis, reason, and example. The following chart contains the thirty-three possible mistakes in establishing formal proof statements and their brief explanations.

I. There are nine possible mistakes in establishing a thesis:

1. Contradictory thesis:
   1) A thesis which contradicts a direct perception such as that sound cannot be heard.
   2) A thesis whose inference contradicts common experience such as that a pottery is permanent.
   3) A thesis which contradicts one’s own religious theory.
   4) A thesis which contradicts worldly experience.
   5) A thesis whose subject contradicts its inferred property such as that my mother is a barren woman.

2. Unacceptable thesis:
   1) A thesis whose inferred property cannot be understood and accepted by the opponents.
   2) A thesis whose subject cannot be understood and accepted by the opponents.
   3) A thesis which has both of the above two mistakes.
   4) A thesis which has been accepted by the opponents.

II. Fourteen possible mistakes in establishing a reason. Those mistakes can be further divided into three types.

1. Unacceptable reason:

\[\text{Śaṅkarasvāmin, the } *\text{Nyāyapraveśaka} (因明入正理論/\text{Yinmingruzhenglilun}) \text{ (T32, 11–12).}\]

\[\text{Ibid., 11.}\]
1) Both the proponent and opponent disagree with the idea that the inferring property (reason) is present in the subject of the thesis.

2) The opponent disagrees with that the inferring property (reason) is present in the subject of the thesis.

3) The inferring property (reason) cannot be sure to be present in the subject of the thesis.

4) The subject cannot be sure and thus cannot be accepted by the opponent. In this case, the inferring property (reason) cannot be sure to present in the subject.

2. Inconclusive reason:

1) The inferring property is present in both similar and dissimilar examples.

2) The inferring property is absent in both similar and dissimilar examples.

3) The inferring property is present in some similar example and in all dissimilar examples.

4) The inferring property is present in all similar examples and in some dissimilar examples.

5) The inferring property could be present in similar example or in dissimilar examples.

6) Both of the two contradictory theses can be established by fulfilling the three requirements of a valid reason.

3. Contradictory reasons:

1) The characteristic of the inferring property contradicts the inferred property.

2) The inferring property contradicts the meaning of the thesis.

3) The inferring property contradicts the subject.

4) The inferring property contradicts the meaning of the subject.

III. Ten possible mistakes in using examples:

1. Similar example:

1) The example and the reason belong to dissimilar locus.
2) The example and the inferred property belong to dissimilar locus.

3) The example possesses the above two mistakes.

4) The example cannot prove the connection of the thesis and the reason.

5) The example cannot prove what should be proved, and prove what should not be proved.

2. Dissimilar example:

   There are five possible mistakes in using dissimilar example, but since there is no dissimilar example in Bhāviveka’s formal proof statement, I will not demonstrate them here.

Almost all critiques focusing on Bhāviveka’s formal proof statements can be classified in the above categories. Those critiques will be illustrated below in detail according to the above categories.

In reference to Bhāviveka’s responses to the criticisms discussed in chapter three, Bhāviveka employs different strategies toward different opponents. To the Yogācāra School, Bhāviveka accepts dependent nature (paratantra) and the perfect nature (parinispanna) in conventional reality but ultimately denies them by citing the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures for support. To the Abhidharma schools, Bhāviveka accepts the intrinsic nature of things in conventional reality but denies them from the ultimate perspective. The Prajñāpāramitā scriptures are the main sources which Bhāviveka uses to argue against those Buddhist schools. To respond to the criticism of his formal proof statements, Bhāviveka sometimes defends himself by re-clarifying his thesis, reason and example according to different critiques. Other times, he will refer to those criticisms as
counterfeit mistakes. Counterfeit mistakes are actually not real mistakes, but they are considered as mistakes by his opponent.\textsuperscript{324}

There are seventeen criticisms in total in the \textit{KTR} in regard to formal proof statements for conditional things being empty, and many of them are from other religious opponents. They can be demonstrated as follows:

The number in the brackets shows the types of fallacies according to the thirty-three mistakes. For example, (I.1.1) is the fallacy that a thesis which contradicts a direct perception

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<td>1</td>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>Advocating that all are not empty</td>
<td>1. Without external objects, there is no direct perception, (I.1.1) 2. The thesis contradicts common knowledge. (I.1.2) *an accusation of nihilism.</td>
<td>1. The thesis is established from an ultimate perspective. 2. All religious theories contradict common knowledge.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1. Emptiness cannot be established as the subject of the thesis(I.2.2) 2. The inferring property is empty; hence, the reason cannot be established (II.1.2~3). *an accusation of nihilism.</td>
<td>1. Perceivable eyes and so on are conventionally able to be established as the subject and reason. A counterfeit mistake of thesis and reason.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>Nyayāyika</td>
<td>The thesis contradicts the reason. (II.3.2) That is because empty things should not be produced by conditions. *an accusation of nihilism.</td>
<td>The reason, “produced by conditions” and the example of illusion are accepted by both sides.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>Sarvāstivādin</td>
<td>The eye-faculty has intrinsic nature because it is functional.</td>
<td>1. Your thesis establishes what has been approved (I.2.4), conventionally.(I.2.4) 2. Ultimately, your formal proof statement does not have a similar example.\textsuperscript{325}</td>
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2.1.5 Others
The reason and example are all conditioned things. The subject, inferring property and example are the same type of things. Therefore, your thesis is not an inference.  
My thesis will be a mistake as you state if it claims that things are empty because they are inherently empty. However, my reason “produced by condition” is accepted by both sides. A counterfeit mistakes

2.1.6 The less knowledgeable one
The inferring property should be empty because it is conditioned. As a result, the reason cannot be established (II.1.2~3). *an accusation of nihilism.
If your criticism is logical, any reason will become invalid. Your claim is a counterfeit mistakes

2.1.7 Unknown
1. Empty things cannot be used as a reason. (II.1.2~3)  
2. The meaning of “empty” is not clear. (I.2.1)  
3. The example has no real content. (III.1.4)  
*an accusation of nihilism.
As long as the reason is accepted by both sides, it is a valid reason.

2.1.8 Nyāyāyika
Thesis: your reason and thesis cannot be established  
Reason: the inferring property and the subject are both empty.  
Example: sound produced by the son of a barren woman (II.2.6)  
*an accusation of nihilism.
Your reason is an inclusive reason because your example cannot prove your reason.

2.1.9 Others
If the language used to establish your thesis is empty, it cannot establish your thesis.  
*an accusation of nihilism.  
If the language is not empty, it denies your own thesis.
Ultimately, everything is empty, but conventionally, things have intrinsic nature. (This is Bhāviveka’s central philosophy by which he can answer all critiques.)

2.1.10 Others
Emptiness means nothing. That is, it is nihilism.  
*an accusation of nihilism.
The theory of emptiness rejects the concept of intrinsic nature, but never claims that emptiness is nothing. A counterfeit mistake of over inference.

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325 In ultimate reality, for Bhāviveka, things are not functional. Therefore, there is no similar example which can be provided from the ultimate perspective.
326 The opponents consider Bhāviveka’s inference as that A is A because of A, for example A.
327 A counterfeit mistake of over inference is that the opponents infer something that the thesis does not infer, and based on this over inference, argue against the thesis. In this case, the opponents subjectively consider Bhāviveka’s thesis as that all things are nothing.
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.1.11</td>
<td>Those who try to hide their own fault</td>
<td>Imagined postulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.1.12</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Is your reason established from ultimate or conventional reality? Either the former or the latter, it is faulty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.1.13</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1. If things are empty of intrinsic nature, there is no similar example, and thus, thesis cannot be established. *an accusation of nihilism. 2. If things are empty of other nature, you establish what has been established. (I.2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.1.14</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Your example is not valid because illusory things have substance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.1.15</td>
<td>Sānkhyās</td>
<td>Your reason is unacceptable when you claim that things are produced from their intrinsic nature.(I.I.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Yogācāra</td>
<td>Ultimately, imagined nature is empty but dependent nature does exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1. If language has substance, it invalidates your own thesis. 2. If language has no substance, it cannot establish your thesis. *an accusation of nihilism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above description, it appears that although all of Bhāviveka’s critics target his formal proof statement that all conditioned things are empty because they are produced by conditions, the actual motive of those critics is all about the accusation of nihilism. In other words, all of the schools mentioned above including both Buddhist and

\(^{328}\) A counterfeit mistake of discriminating reason is that the opponents try to invalid a valid reason by illogically discriminating a reason.
non-Buddhist advocate that things have substance. However, the problem for those schools is that they never explicitly clarify which point-of-view (whether from the perspective of ultimate or conventional reality) they are standing from to conclude that all things have substance. As a result, their critiques are ambiguous and obsolete as far as Bhāviveka is concerned.

Moreover, the accusations of nihilism can be classified into two types. The first type is the direct accusation of nihilism: “If things are empty, then…. (Such as No. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17.) The main reason of anti-nihilism is because they think that the three members of a formal proof statement cannot be established on the basis of nothingness. The second type is an indirect accusation which usually begins with the statement, “Things have substance because….Hence your thesis is wrong.” (No.4, 14, 15, 16) That is to say, if Bhāviveka’s opponent can provide a valid reason to prove that things have substance, Bhāviveka’s thesis will be invalidated. That is because if two contradictory theses can be established by fulfilling the three requirements of a valid reason, both of the two theses will be invalidated (see II.2.6, the thirty-three mistakes.)

At the beginning of Bhāviveka’s response to the first type of accusation, he has set the qualifier for his thesis before he starts his elaborate argument. The qualifier of his thesis is “in reality (真实性)”. His intent of setting a qualifier is to make explicit his point of view. That is, he only considers things to be empty from the perspective of ultimate reality. If he had not set the qualifier for his thesis, his thesis would have inevitably fallen into the fallacy of the thirty-three possible mistakes, and most importantly, it would have
contradicted empirical knowledge. For Bhāviveka, things, including language possess substance in conventional reality. Substantial things in conventional reality provide a solid ground for establishing formal proof statements, despite the fact that Bhāviveka’s own formal proof statement is to prove ultimate reality.

In regard to the second type of accusation, because Bhāviveka accepts things to have substance in conventional reality, if his opponents try to argue for things to have substance in conventional reality, it means they have a logical fault in that they are arguing a thesis that has already been accepted. Moreover, if his opponents intend to claim things to have substance from the ultimate perspective, as indicated by Bhāviveka, they have a difficulty in providing a good reason and example to support their thesis. That is because, for Bhāviveka, a conventional inferring property cannot infer the existence of an inferred property in ultimate reality.

In the bottom chapter of the KTR, Bhāviveka discusses and defends his formal proof statement for unconditioned things being empty. His statement for the emptiness of unconditioned things can be transformed into the following formal proof statement:

**Thesis:** In reality, unconditioned things are not real

**Reason:** because they are not produced

**Example:** like sky-flowers

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329 The *KTR* II 1.1.1 states, “The existents which ordinary people universally recognize I also accept as conventional reality. The causes and conditions which produce the conventional direct perceptions are also recognized to exist. Because conditioned things such eyes, etc. are subsumed in conventional reality, and people like cowherds, etc. commonly perceive conditioned things such eyes etc. to be real entities, in order to avoid the contradiction with our own position that direct perception is commonly perceived, ‘reality’ is used to restrict the thesis” (T30,268c08).
In this formal proof statement, the same qualifier “in reality” is applied again to restrict the thesis in terms of the ultimate perspective. The unconditioned things are space (kha), analytical cessation (pratisamkhyānirodha), non-analytical cessation (apratisamkhyānirodha) and thusness (tathatā). These four unconditioned things are only conventionally designated as things, but are unreal in ultimate reality. The statement “they are not produced” is established as a valid reason because it is accepted by both sides. Bhāviveka further explains, ‘unmade’, ‘uncreated’, and ‘indestructible’ can also be a valid reason because ‘unconditioned’ means ‘unproduced’ etc. This illustrates that the reason ‘unproduced’ can fulfill the first requirement of a valid reason.

The sky-flowers, which are also not produced, can be used as a similar example to support the reason. Bhāviveka states, “in terms of reality, space has no substance because it is not produced. Both the wise and foolish ones commonly know that those which are not produced do not have a true nature like the flower in the sky.” In Buddhism, the metaphor ‘flowers in the sky’ indicates that something does not have an objective basis and is only created by eye disease. It is different from illusions which mean that things do not appear as they really are. Bhāviveka tries to connect the inferred property “no intrinsic nature” with the inferring property “unproduced” to fulfill the second requirement of a valid reason. In other words, any unconditioned thing which has no intrinsic nature must not be produced. Bhāviveka considers this common sense.

Moreover, because there are no counter things, i.e. unconditioned things which possess

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330 There are only three unconditioned things which are space (kha), analytical cessation (pratisamkhyānirodha), and non-analytical cessation (apratisamkhyānirodha) according to Abhidharmakośa. In addition to those three, thusness (tathatā) is added in by Yogācāra School.
331 See the KTR III 1.4. (T30, 273c14)
332 Ibid.
intrinsic nature, no dissimilar example can be provided. The third requirement of a valid reason is fulfilled.

After establishing his formal proof statement, Bhāviveka defends himself from criticism. The main criticisms are fourteen in total, and they can be demonstrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KTR</th>
<th>opponents</th>
<th>criticism</th>
<th>response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>Vaibhāṣikas</td>
<td>The contemplation of infinite space (ākāśānantyāyatana) will not have a perceived object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>Both Buddhists and non Buddhists</td>
<td>Your thesis means that those which are produced are real.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>The example 'sky-flowers’ is not a valid example because the sky and flowers both have true nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>Vaibhāṣikas</td>
<td>Analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha) should be real according to the Buddha’s saying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1.5</td>
<td>Nyaiyāyika (or those who are not skillful in logic)</td>
<td>If unconditioned things do not exist, your thesis is not established. Your reason is not valid, and your example does not exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.1.6</td>
<td>Vaibhāṣikas</td>
<td>Analytical cessation is real.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.1.7</td>
<td>Sautrāntikas</td>
<td>You establish what we have established, “unconditioned things are not real”. (I.2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.1.8</td>
<td>Tāmraśāṭiyaka</td>
<td>The interval color-form between material matters is called space and established as conditioned things by our school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.1.9</td>
<td>Yogācāra</td>
<td>Thusness (tathātā) is real</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

333 In this case, the thesis only infers that things which are not produced are not real, but not that things that are produced are real. Hence, it is considered as a counterfeit mistake of over inference by Bhāviveka.

334 Sautrāntikas consider unconditioned things to be unreal even in conventional reality. Junshō Katō, 経量部の研究 (Kyōryōbu no kenkyū/The Study of Sautrāntika), 297–301.
| Page | 2.1.10 | Vaibhāṣikas | The sixteen noble attributes of the four noble truths such as suffering, etc are real because the practice of the path is able to remove all of the flame of defilements.  

The path of liberation is established according to conventional reality, and we conventionally accept what you have said. |
| 10 | 2.1.10 | Vaibhāṣikas | The sixteen noble attributes of the four noble truths such as suffering, etc are real because the practice of the path is able to remove all of the flame of defilements.  

The path of liberation is established according to conventional reality, and we conventionally accept what you have said. |
| 11 | 2.2.1-2 | Sāṃkhya | In our teaching, all things in the three realms are transformed (from the self-nature) like sky-flowers, and it does not mean ‘no sky-flowers.’ Since it (the sky-flower) is a similar example, it does not violate the thesis.  

If all things are sky-flowers, your thesis contradicts your own teaching.(I.1.3)  
If all things are not sky-flowers, there is no similar example. It contradicts your own thesis. (I.1.5) |
| 12 | 2.2.1-2 | Sāṃkhya | Thesis: Those worldly things have natures as their causes  
Reason: because they share the characteristics (of the natures). Those which share the same characteristic (of the nature) are considered to have natures as their causes,  
Example: for example, a slight piece of sandalwood.  
(If this formal proof statement can be established, it will spontaneously invalidate Bhāviveka’s thesis. II.2.6)  
1. From conventional reality, your thesis establishes what has been approved. (I.2.4)  
2. From ultimate reality, your reason is not accepted by both sides. (II.1.1) |
| 13 | 2.2.2-1 | Vaiśeṣikas | Thesis: the features such as breathing in and out, etc. must have inferred features  
Reason:  
1. From conventional reality, we accept the connection of inferring property and inferred  |

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335 In Sarvāstivādin doctrine, when practitioners practice four noble truths, there are four perceived objects in each noble truth which the practitioners should contemplate in order to achieve liberation. It is called शोदाशानित्यादि. They are impermanence, suffering, emptiness, no-self in the first noble truth, causes, origins, production, conditions in the second, cessation, pacification, excellence, renunciation in the third truth, and path, suitability, achievement, deliverance in the four truth. Louis de La Vallee Poussin, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 1110~1113. Also (T29, 137).

336 According to 金七十論 (a book written by Vasubandhu and translated by Zhen Di regarding the doctrine of Sāṅkhya), 種類 (zhong-lei) means the same characteristics of natures. In 金七十論, it says, “The self-nature exits substantially (in all phenomena). How can they been known? For example, for the pieces of sandalwood, no matter how many pieces of them, their nature of sandalwood is the same. The transformation is in the same situation. Although the Māha and so on (phenomena) are different, the natures of three guṇa are the same. Because of the same natures, they are known to exist originally. Therefore, the self-nature is known to exist.””(T54, 1248c).
because they are inferring features. Example: for example, seeing smoke.\(^{337}\)

property. Hence, you have established what has been approved.\(^{(I.2.4)}\)

2. From ultimate reality, if you try to use conventional inferring property to infer the ultimate existence, there is no similar example.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14</th>
<th>2.2.2-2</th>
<th>Vaiśeṣikas</th>
<th>The atom and the mind are established as unconditioned things by us. Hence, the reason, ‘because of non-arising’ that you use to establish your thesis is invalid according to your own principle.(^{338}) (^{(I.1.3)}) If you consider these two as conditioned things and establish your thesis by the reason of ‘produced by conditions’, the reason is invalid according to our principle(^{339}) (^{(II.1.2)})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If I consider atom and the mind as unconditioned things conventionally, my thesis will have the fault you indicate. However, they are both conditioned things in conventional reality.

According to the above demonstration, Bhāviveka clearly divides the debates of unconditioned thing into two parts: those from Buddhist schools (1~10), and those from other religious schools (11~14). Among Buddhist schools, the Vaibhāṣikas appear to be the main opponents. They are primarily concerned with the path to liberation (analytical cessation) because the path to liberation is exactly what the Buddha taught in the early Buddhist texts. For Bhāviveka, based on the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures and other

\(^{337}\) The Vaiśeṣikas here use a common logic to prove the connection between the inferred object and inferring subject and by means of this inference, to further improve the existence of the self nature (see the following paragraph). According to the commentary, in the example of seeing smoke, the smoke is an inferring property and the fire is the inferred property because the fire can be inferred by seeing smoke \(^{(X87, 557a)}\).

\(^{338}\) That is because Bhāviveka does not agreed that mind and atoms are considered to be unconditioned things.

\(^{339}\) For Vaiśeṣika, because atoms and mind (manas) are both ultimate existences, they should be unconditioned things \(^{(Kanāda, and Debasish Chakrabarty, 99)}\).
Mahāyāna texts, on the one hand, the path toward liberation substantially exists so that liberation can be conventionally achieved. On the other hand, from the perspective of ultimate reality, even nirvāṇa is not real, and the path is nothing but an expedient. The same strategy is also applied to arguing against Yogācāra’s idea of thusness (tathatā).

With regard to the challenge from other religious schools, the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣikas are the main opponents. Despite those schools having different opinions about what should be classified as unconditioned things, one of their main concerns is that unconditioned things should ultimately have intrinsic nature. Again, Bhāviveka responds to those criticisms according to his two realities system. That is, he accepts the intrinsic nature of unconditioned things in conventional reality, and denies it from the ultimate perspective. For those schools which claim the substantial existence of unconditioned things in ultimate reality, the most difficult evidence to support their thesis in the system of formal proof statement is to provide a similar example, as Bhāviveka indicates in the above criticism number 13. That is because the examples that those schools provide are conventional things such as smoke or a small piece of sandalwood, and logically, Bhāviveka considers a conventional inferring property not able to infer the ultimate things.

In sum, despite the fact that formal proof statements may be based on conventional reality, they function as a tool to obtain a decisive result. Hence, for Bhāviveka, when it is used to explicate the teaching of śūnyatā, it can remove one’s ignorance and help obtain śrutamayīprajñā which is considered to be the teachings in accord with non-arising, the secondary ultimate reality. In defending his formal proof statement for the
teaching of śūnyatā, he skillfully brings his two realities system into full play.

Conventionally, Bhāviveka accepts that things have intrinsic nature including language, and this attitude enables him to establish formal proof statements and respond to accusations of nihilism. However, in ultimate reality, as a Mādhyamikan, he still maintains the perspective that things are empty of intrinsic nature. Therefore, Bhāviveka believed that a formal proof argument is the first step in obtaining liberation and is a proper interpretation to Nāgārjuna’s soteriological process: convention → ultimate (secondary ultimate reality) → nirvāṇa (ultimate reality).
Chapter Six: Conclusion— Formal Proof Statements as an Initial Step to Liberation

The relationship between logical inference and Buddhist practice has been a controversial topic in Buddhist study. Even within the Madhyamaka School, which is often considered by scholars to be the school highlighting logical argument, the discussion around the connection between logic and practice is still contentious. For example, although Candrakīrti criticized formal proof statements as merely a methodology for debate without any relevance for one’s liberation, for Bhāviveka, it was not only a methodology for debate but also an initial step toward liberation.

The Dachengzhongzhenlun (KTR), and other auxiliary sources are used in this research in order to elucidate Bhāviveka’s religious practice—i.e., formal proof statements as an initial step to liberation. The KTR is essential for the academic study of Bhāviveka’s religious practice because the KTR is the only text without either an original Sanskrit or Tibetan version, and thus, has been ignored by western scholars. In addition, the text itself provides a relatively clear logical path toward liberation as compared with the other two texts.

The Madhyamaka concept of practice can be summarized into a single prescriptive statement: it is a path to transform a practitioner’s cognition from conventional reality to ultimate reality. This can be substantiated by the statement made from the ninth to the tenth verses in Nāgārjuna’s MMK, XXIV.9-10: first, one has to know the difference between the two realities as taught in the doctrines of the Buddha. That is, one has to be able to identify what is conventional reality and what is profound ultimate reality. After identifying their differences, it is necessary to realize the importance of relying on conventional reality to achieve ultimate reality and eventually to obtain nirvāṇa. In the
Madhyamaka School, the process towards liberation comprises three sequential steps: conventional → ultimate → nirvāṇa.

For Bhāviveka, conventional reality and ultimate reality are co-dependently related according to his three-fold explanation. In chapter 24 of the PrP, Bhāviveka defines conventional reality as: (1) worldly language, and (2) phenomena that lack intrinsic nature and are therefore empty, yet are real for ignorant sentient beings who still have perverted views of the world. In the KTR, Bhāviveka further claims that (3) things that the mortals mutually experience and accept as reality are conventional existence. In short, the reality of the worldly experience, including language, is conventional reality for those sentient beings who are not yet awakened, and is derived from their attachments produced from ignorance.

When defining ultimate reality, Bhāviveka, in chapter 24 of the PrP, explicates the term ‘paramārtha’ in three different ways by means of a linguistic analysis. He first clarifies that paramārtha (ultimate object) is understood as a karmadhyārya compound in which both parama (ultimate) and artha (object) refer to the perceived object (viśya) and not to the mind that perceives the object. Secondly, he clarifies that the word paramārtha indicates a tatpurūsa compound in which the ‘ultimate’ (parama) refers to the subject, i.e. the non-discriminating wisdom. The ‘object’ (artha) is an object which refers to things as they are. Finally, he clarifies that paramārtha is a bahuvrīhi compound that functions as an ‘adjective’ from which the meaning of ‘correspondence to the ultimate’ is derived. According to the above description, Bhāviveka’s understanding of the concept of ‘ultimate reality’ includes three connotations: 1) from an ontological perspective, the term ‘the ultimate’ or ‘the object’ refers to the true nature of things; 2) from an
epistemological perspective, the term ‘non-discriminating wisdom’ refers to how the Buddhist sages view reality; and 3) the teachings in accordance with non-arising is the ultimate reality.

From the above analysis, it is obvious that Bhāviveka had established two categories of ultimate realities instead of one in his system. The first category indicates the real ultimate reality (that encompasses his first and second definitions of the term ‘paramārtha’) which transcends worldly experience including languages. The second category (the secondary ultimate reality) refers to the ‘the teachings in accordance with non-arising” which is the vehicle to remove the obstruction caused by ignorance and to achieve the ‘real’ ultimate reality. Such a vehicle includes “cultivation” (i.e., the practice) of the three wisdoms: listening to the Buddha’s teachings (śrutamayī), cognizing Buddha’s teachings (cintāmayī), and the practice of meditation (bhāvanāmayī). It is noteworthy that Bhāviveka’s idea of the secondary ultimate reality ‘the teachings in accord with non-arising” or “vehicle,” is what distinguishes him from other Mādhyamikans. With Bhāviveka’s unique interpretations of ultimate reality, the transition from conventional reality to ultimate reality becomes feasible.

As mentioned earlier, the teaching in accordance with non-arising through which the real ultimate reality can be achieved consists of the cultivation of the three wisdoms: wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamayīprajñā), thinking (cintāmayīprajñā), and meditation (bhāvanāmayīprajñā). According to the KTR, the initial step in obtaining wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamayīprajñā) requires logical reasoning, i.e. formal proof statements. The KTR further indicates the purpose of its composition is to propagate wisdom obtained from hearing by removing the unrighteous view. After
explaining the importance of the wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamāṇiprajñā), the KTR provides two formal proof statements as a methodology to obtain wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamāṇiprajñā). Hence, for Bhāviveka, a formal proof statement is an initial step to bridge the two realities.

Based on Bhāviveka’s metaphysical theory of conventional reality, cognition is said to be without any contradiction once it is logically reasoned. For Bhāviveka, in order to avoid being criticized as nihilist, one has to accept that conventional phenomena have their own intrinsic natures. In other words, the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) of conventional reality has to be real for a person who has not yet realized the true nature of things. Bhāviveka, on the basis of two necessary cognitions: direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) claims that a valid formal proof statement should not be contradictory.

Based upon Dignāga’s theory of two necessary perceptions, Bhāviveka further develops his epistemological theory as follows: external objects are substantially existent because they consist of an aggregation of atoms. Since an external object is substantially existent in conventional reality, its particulars are able to cause direct perception (pratyakṣa), and its universal, i.e., a collection of particulars, is able to cause inference (anumāna). Bhāviveka further defines a universal as that which must possess a similar locus (āśraya) and lack a dissimilar locus. These two requirements of a universal can guarantee an accurate inference because a reference is the appearance of a universal in the cognition. These two requirements of a universal become two of the three requirements for a valid reason in the formal proof arguments. Moreover, on the basis of this theory, language is able to refer to a certain thing by conceptualizing and designating
its universal with the capture of its locus. Therefore, a formal proof statement, supported by the function of language and an accurate perception, is able to obtain an accurate result (inference) by providing a sound reason.

Bhāviveka skilfully applies this methodology, that a formal proof statement proved by a valid reason is able to infer a decisive result, to support the Madhyamaka theory that all things are empty. In order to support Madhyamaka theory, Bhāviveka provides two formal proof statements for conditioned and unconditioned things. His formal proof statements can be illustrated in the following standard structure. The first formal proof statement is as follows:

**Thesis:** In reality, conditioned things are empty  
**Reason:** because they are produced by conditions.  
**Example:** like an illusion

The second formal proof statements:

**Thesis:** In reality, unconditioned things are not real  
**Reason:** because they are not produced  
**Example:** like the sky-flowers

In his formal proof statements, Bhāviveka inserts ‘in reality’ (i.e., in ultimate reality) to clarify his position for the thesis. That is, he only considers things to be empty from an ultimate perspective. This qualifier is important because it presents Bhāviveka’s unique system of two realities, ‘ultimately things are empty but substantial conventionally.’ It also enables Bhāviveka to establish a valid formal proof statement. As mentioned above, for Bhāviveka, things must have intrinsic nature in conventional reality to secure the function of the two basic cognitions, on the basis of which formal proof statements are constructed. Third, this qualifier, according to Bhāviveka, prevents his thesis from
becoming nihilistic. That is because the assertion of things as empty in conventional reality contradicts common experience.

Moreover, according to Bhāviveka, his intention in composing the *KTR* was to remove sentient beings’ ignorance and obtain the wisdom obtained from hearing. To provide a thesis with formal proof statements is not sufficient to achieve this. The most crucial component is his responses to various criticisms from both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. Defending a thesis for Bhāviveka is not only to prove his thesis but also to remove his opponents’ wrong view in order to obtain wisdom obtained from hearing. That is, in the process of defending his formal proof statement he also provides a pathway to gradually remove one’s wrong view and obtaining wisdom.

In the debate, although opponents target their criticisms on different members of his formal proof statement, the main accusations are related to nihilism. According to his opponents, Bhāviveka’s thesis is a nihilistic assertion that all things are nothingness. Formal proof statements cannot be constructed on the basis of nothingness because formal proof statements have to contain a clear subject of the thesis, a valid reason, and a solid example. Therefore, from his opponents’ point of view, Bhāviveka’s assertion that things are empty precludes the construction of formal proof statements.

In response to those criticisms, Bhāviveka proposes the system of two realities to defend his thesis. That is, he only considers things to be empty from an ultimate perspective but not from a conventional perspective. In other words, he accepts things to have intrinsic nature in conventional reality. In contrast, although his opponents in the *KTR* consider things to have a substance, they never clearly explicate from what point of view, ultimate or conventional reality, they propose their theory. Because of this unclear
position, Bhāviveka is able to defeat his opponents on the basis of his theory of two realities. When his opponents try to directly accuse him of nihilism and invalid formal proof statements, Bhāviveka’s response is that he accepts things to have intrinsic natures in conventional reality, and hence, his thesis is able to avoid falling into nihilism. In addition to a direct accusation, some opponents try to establish a counter formal proof statement to prove that things have intrinsic nature. In response, Bhāviveka considers this type of criticism as having “the fault of establishing what has been approved” because once again, Bhāviveka accepts things to have intrinsic nature in conventional reality.

In conclusion, according to Nāgārjuna, the Madhyamaka soteriological process is the transformation of one’s cognition from conventional to ultimate reality. Bhāviveka, further developed this theory in more detail in his KTR. Bhāviveka considers ultimate reality to be both non-conceptual wisdom and the truth of things. On the contrary, conventional reality, according to Bhāviveka, is that things which do not have an intrinsic nature are mistakenly perceived to be substantial due to ignorance. To make the process feasible, Bhāviveka suggests a secondary ultimate reality, the teachings in accord with non-arising, to connect these two realities. The teaching in accord with non-arising includes the wisdom of śūnyatā obtained from hearing, thinking, and meditating. Wherein, a formal proof statement is a sufficient methodology to acquire the wisdom obtained from hearing. His formal proof statements are established on the basis of the two kinds of cognitions (pramāṇa) which should be substantial in conventional reality to secure a decisive inference. In order to make his formal proof statements a valid methodology, Bhāviveka accepts the intrinsic nature of things in conventional reality. Hence, when his formal proof statements are used to argue the teaching of śūnyatā, for
Bhāviveka, they can remove ignorance and help achieve wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamīyāprajñā.) Thus, Bhāviveka believed that a formal proof statement is the first step toward liberation.
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Chinese


Kajiyama, Yūichi 佛教中觀哲學(Fo Jiao Zhong Guan Zhe Xue). Gaoxiong Xian: Fojia guang chu ban she, 1978


Japanese


Inaba, Shōju. “チベット中世初期における般若中観論書の訳出(上)” (Chibetto Chūsei-shoki ni okeru Hanny-chūgan-ronjo no Yakushutsu (jō) /On the Translation of Treatises on Prajñāpāramitā and Mādhyamika Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages of Tibet[1], 佛教學セミナー (Otani Daigaku Bukkyōgaku Seminā) no.4. 1966.


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Appendix One: translation of the *Karatalaratna

大乘掌珍論卷上

*Mahāyāna Karatalaratna* (Up Section)

清辯菩薩造

Written by the Bodhisattva Bhāviveka

大唐三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

The Great Tang Tripiṭaka Dharma Master Xuanzang translated in the honour of the emperor

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340 The *KTR* was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang around 647 or 649 CE, eighty years after Bhāviveka’s death. The emperor of this time period is Tangtaizong (唐太宗/599–649) of Tang dynasty.
I. Introduction

1. The reason to compose the work

1.1. For benefiting all sentient beings

In order to generally benefit all sentient beings, one should aspire after a great vow for awakening. To commonly observe the mortal world, [those mortals] are disturbed by various false thoughts and thus, the mental disorders and windstorms continue. They are netted by the net of false views, caged by the cage of the cycle of life and death, and shot by the poison arrows of immense sorrows. Hence, whatever they do is separated from wisdom.

[T30, 268a29]普為饒益一切有情，正發無上菩提大願。等觀世間，常為種種不正尋伺紛擾、暴風亂心相續，邪見罥網之所罥網，生死樊籠之所樊籠，無量憂苦毒箭所射，諸有所行皆離明慧故。

[T30, 268b04]我依止如淨虛空絕諸戏論寂靜安樂勝義諦理，悲願纏心，不忍見彼眾苦所集。

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341 The Sanskrit term *samsāra* has two common Chinese translations which is 輪迴 (linhui), turning the wheel around and 生死 (shengsi), the cycle of life and death. Here, the latter one is used.

While relying on the principle of ultimate reality which is peaceful, blissful, and calmed of all fabrication and is like the clear sky, my mind is bound by compassion, I cannot bear seeing the accumulation of sentient beings’ sufferings.

[T30, 268b05] 為欲解脫自他相續煩惱固縛，住無退壞踰於金剛堅固輪圍增上意樂，誓處無邊生死大海。不憚其中所受無量眾苦災橫，發金剛喻不壞精進。

In order to liberate the strong attachment of defilements in one’s own and others’ [mental] continuums, and to dwell in the resolution satisfied and joyful which is irreversible like the diamond wheel, I vow to stay in the ocean of the endless cycle of life and death. Without fear of the immense suffering and catastrophes in [the world], I generate the non-destroyable effort which is like a diamond.

1.2. The wisdom obtained from hearing (śrutamayī)

[T30, 268b09] 為正開覺如是觀察：「要證出世無分別智，方能正知先所未了一切有情聚根勝解界行差別，及能破裂自他相續所起一切有習無習眾苦根本煩惱羅網，亦能為他起真誓願，堅固受持大士戒行。然證出世無分別智，要須積習能壞一切邪見眼瞼無倒觀空安膳那藥。如是積習無倒觀空安膳那藥，要藉能遣一切所緣自性聞慧」。
In order to attain awakening, one should examine, “Only by directly realizing the supermundane non-conceptual wisdom\textsuperscript{343} can one realize the distinctions of various kinds of actions which are perceived by the faculty and have not been realized before. One is further able to break the net of the habituated and non-habituated defilements which are produced in the [mental] continuums of self and others as well as the root causes of suffering. One is also able to generate the true vow for others and the determination to receive the precepts of the great beings.\textsuperscript{344} However, to directly realize super-mundane non-conceptual wisdom, one has to constantly apply the eye medicine\textsuperscript{345} of the unmistaken view of emptiness which is able to completely remove the eye-disease of false views. In order to accumulate the eye medicine of unmistaken view of emptiness, one should rely on the wisdom obtained from hearing (\textit{śrutamayī})\textsuperscript{346} which is able to remove the self-nature of all perceived objects.”

\textbf{T30, 268b16} 由是，或有依廣文義正決擇門已入法性數，復勤修勝進加行，於廣文義決擇現前甚大劬勞心生懈倦，或有雖復未入法性而是利根。為欲令彼易證真空速入法性故，略製此掌珍論。

\textsuperscript{343}無分別智\textit{(wufenbiezhī)} or 無分別慧\textit{(wufenbiehui/nirvikalpaprajñā)} is translated as “non-conceptual wisdom,” which is the direct insight into true nature of all existences in meditation.

\textsuperscript{344}大士\textit{(das hil mahāsattva)} is directly translated as ‘Great beings’ in English and is a synonym of Bodhisattva. See Kajiyama Y. “On the Meaning of the Words Bodhisattva Mahāsattva in \textit{Prajñāpāramitā} Literature” in Hercus, Luise A, and Jan W. Jong. \textit{Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. De Jong on His Sixtieth Birthday} (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publ, 1984).

\textsuperscript{345}安膳那\textit{(anshanna/āñjana)} is a kind of Indian eye medicine.

\textsuperscript{346}聞慧\textit{(wenhui)} is the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit \textit{śrutamayī–prajñā} which can be translated as the wisdom obtained from hearing. According to C. Lindtner, \textit{śrutamayī–prajñā} consists in knowing the scriptures, and the one which consists in logical reflection based on \textit{āgama} is \textit{cintāmayī}. ("Bhavya, the Logician" 30–31). However, in the present text, Bhāviveka thinks that \textit{śrutamayī} which consists in logical reflection based on \textit{Āgama} instead of \textit{cintāmayī}. In \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}, logical argument is also contained in \textit{śrutamayī}. That is, Bhāviveka may have been influenced by the Yogācāra tradition to understand \textit{śrutamayī}. 

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Due to this reason, for people who have diligently reinforced practice after realizing the nature of things\(^{347}\) by means of the method of investigating a great amount of literature and who are tired of the enormous work of the present of investigating the extensive literature, or for those who have not yet realized the nature of things and who are intelligent, I composed the *Jewel in Hands* (*Karatalaratna*) in order to enable people to easily realize true emptiness and quickly comprehend the true nature of things.

2. Thesis statement: formal proof statements

[T30, 268b21] 真性有為空 如幻緣生故 無為無有實 不起似空華

[I] In reality,\(^{348}\) conditioned things\(^{349}\) are empty like illusions because they are produced by conditions,\(^{350}\) and

[II] unconditioned things are not real because they are not produced like sky-flowers.\(^{351}\)

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\(^{347}\) 入法性 (*rufaxing*) is literally translated as ‘entering the nature of existences’ in English. However, it is a metaphorical usage and means ‘realize the nature of existences.’

\(^{348}\) Herein, the true nature is the synonym of ultimate reality (*paramārtha*). See the following explanation. *samskṛtadharma* and *asaṃskṛtadharma* can be translated “conditioned dhamma” and “unconditioned dharma”. Edgerton, F. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. vo. II. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers), 1998, 543. In Chinese translation, 有為 (youwei) means “active”. Thus, it can be translated as “active dharma” and 無為 (wuwei) “inactive dharma.”

There are many imagined postulations\textsuperscript{352} in regard to conjecturing and discriminating in both our own schools (i.e., Buddhist schools) and other schools (i.e., non-Buddhist schools). There are two cognizable objects: one is conditioned things and the other one is unconditioned things. Foolish mortals increase the net of various false views because they cannot realize the exact nature of the conditioned and unconditioned things in terms of ultimate reality and they delusively grasp the intrinsic natures of all things.

For example, an unintelligent painter in the world paints a horror figure of a demon\textsuperscript{353} or a woman. Because the eyes are trouble and the mind is confused, [the painter]...
mistakes the painting to be real. Due to such a mistaken attachment, the painter has either fears or passions for [the paintings]. [Those fools] make various imagining on those objects and increase the nets of the false views. If one can realize the unmistaken nature of the conditioned and unconditioned things in terms of ultimate reality, it is like an intelligent painter who is not attached to the truth nature of the [paintings] and thus, is different from [the previous painter]. With the net of the false view of the discriminating objects of the conditioned and unconditioned things, one wraps one’s own self like a silkworm in a cocoon. Because those [true natures] do not exist, one is able to accomplish the achievement of non-conceptual wisdom.

II. The empty of Conditioned dharma

1. The establishment of a formal proof statement

[T30, 268c06] 為顯斯義先辯「有為」: 以諸世間於此境上多起分別，故說是言：

「真性有為空，如幻，緣生故」。

In order to clarify that meaning, conditioned things should be expounded first. Since worldly [people] produce various conceptions on this object, the proposition has been stated as, “In reality, conditioned things are empty like illusions because they are produced by means of conditions.”

1.1 The thesis

1.1.1 The definition of conventional reality

354 This analogy is commonly used in Buddhist literatures such as *Laṅkāvatārasūtra (T16, 611a26), *Mahāratnakūṭasūtras (T11, 482c08), *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtras (T12, 373a19), and so on.
Herein, the existents which ordinary people universally recognize I also accept as conventional reality. The causes and conditions which produce conventional direct perceptions are also recognized to exist. Because conditioned things such eyes, etc. are subsumed in conventional reality, and people like cowherds, etc. commonly perceive conditioned things such eyes etc. to be real entities, in order to avoid the contradiction with our own position that direct perception is commonly perceived, ‘reality’ is used to restrict the thesis.

1.1.2 The definition of ultimate reality

真義自體說名真性，即「勝義諦」。就勝義諦立有為空，非就世俗。眾緣合成，有所造作故名「有為」，即十二處，唯除法處一分虛空、擇、非擇滅及真如性。

現量 (xianliang / pratyakṣa) means ‘direct perception’ which is an immediate or direct perception approached by the five sense-organs such as eyes, etc. See Th. Stcherbatsky. Buddhist Logic (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers), 1994, 12–13. S.R. Bhatt & A. Mehrotra have a more detail analysis on pratyakṣa in their book Buddhist Epistemology (Westport: Greenwood press, 2000), 25–48.

This sentence tries to establish the conventional existences of elements (dharmas) such as five skandhas, twelve āyatana and eighteen dhātus. Those are all the cause and conditions to produce our sensual experiences.

勝義諦(shengyidīparamārtha) is translated as ‘the ultimate reality’ in English here. See my dissertation chapter four in detail.
The true meaning itself is called ‘reality’; in other words, it is ultimate reality. [The thesis is] in terms of ultimate reality: conditioned things are established as emptiness and not in terms of conventional reality. Whatever is composed by various conditions and fabricated is called ‘conditioned things’ and refers to the twelve sensory spheres except the portion of dharma media including space, analytical cessation, non-analytical cessation, and thusness.

1.1.3 The exclusion of conventional delusion

[T30, 268c15] 此中，復除他宗所許虛妄顯現幻等有為，若立彼為空，立已成過故。若他遍計所執有為，就勝義諦實有自性，今立為空。且如眼處一種有為，就勝義諦辯其體空。空與無性虛妄顯現門之差別，是名立「宗」。

Here, the [discriminating condition] is further to exclude conditioned things which are created by delusions such as mirages and are accepted [as delusion] by other schools. If those [mirages, etc.] are established as emptiness, the thesis will commit a fault of what has already been accepted. While the conditioned things of imagined postulations are considered by others to have a true nature in terms of the ultimate reality, they are established [by us] here to be empty. In the following, conditioned things of the eyes-

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358 This sentence is to define the so-called ‘conditioned things.’ In Buddhism, the conditioned things are not simply referred to the experienced phenomena, instead they are referred to the elements which composite the phenomena. Hence, Poussin translated the term saṃskṛta as conditioned elements in English. Karl H. Potter. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies IX* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers), 1996, 385.
360 As indicated before, this mistake belongs to one of thirty-three mistakes. Tom J. F. Tillemans. *Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakirti and His Tibetan Successors* (Boston, Mass: Wisdom Publications, 1999), 57
media will be taken as an example to argue for its empty nature in terms of ultimate reality. There is a difference between empty and delusive appearance which possesses no intrinsic nature. That is our thesis.

1.2 Example

[T30, 268c20] 眾緣所起男女羊鹿諸幻事等，自性實無，顯現似有。所立能立法皆通有，為同法喻故說如幻。隨其所應假說所立能立法同。假說同故，不可一切同喻上法皆難令有。如說女面端嚴如月，不可難令一切月法皆面上有。隨結頌法說此「同喻」。如是次第由此半頌是略本處，故無有失。

The various illusory things such males, females, goats, deer, etc. produced by various conditions do not have a self-nature but manifest like they possess [a self-nature]. The formal proof presented with both the property to be proven and the reason\(^\text{361}\) is furnished with a parallel example ‘illusion’.\(^\text{362}\) According to what they correspond to, the property to be proven and the reason are conventionally designated to be similar.\(^\text{363}\) Because they are conventionally designated to be similar, one should not criticize that the target

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\(^{361}\) 所立法 (suolifa/sādhyadharma) means what to be established. Here, it refers to the thesis, “all conditioned things do not have a self-nature.” Hereafter, it will be translated as “the property to be proven” in English. 能立法 (nenglefa/ sādhanadharma) means what is able to prove. It refers to reasoning, “produced by causality” in the proposition. Only a valid reason can prove the valid thesis in Buddhist logic. Hereafter, this term will be translated as the reason in English.

\(^{362}\) There are two kinds of examples: parallel (similar) and counter (dissimilar) examples. The parallel example possesses the same situation with the thesis. On the contrary, the counter example possesses the opposite situation from the thesis. A parallel example is to support a valid reasoning. This sentence tries to establish the three branches of the Buddhist logic form, i.e., a thesis, reasoning, and an example.

\(^{363}\) Herein, the property to be proven is the thesis, and the reason is the example, ‘illusions.’
domain should possess the entire character of the source domain. For example, when [someone] speaks of the simile that the woman’s face is beautiful like the moon, others should not argue that the woman’s face should possess the entire characters of the moon. According to the rule of the ending of the verse, this ‘parallel example’ is brought out. In such an order, the half verse summarizes [the proposition]; hence, there are no faults.

1.3 Reason

[T30, 268c26]所立有法皆從緣生，為立此「因」說緣生故。因等眾緣共所生故，說名緣生，即緣所起緣所現(起)義。為遮異品，立異法喻，異品無故，遮義已成，是故不說。於辯釋時，假說異品建立比量，亦無有過。

In regard to the proposition that whatever thing is produced by means of conditions, in order to establish “the reason”, [I state], “being produced by conditions.” Because [all things] are produced by means of cause and conditions, it is called “produced by conditions.” That is, [all things] occur and manifest through conditions. In order to remove dissimilar existents, the counterexample should be established. Because there

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364 Lakoff and Johnson propose the idea that metaphorical language does not highlight all parts of the ‘tenor’, the original subject, which they refer to as the target domain. To explain, some parts of the target domain are not used in the ‘vehicle’, the words and concepts that are invoked by the word, to which they refer as the source domain(Lakoff and Johnson 10–13). In the following case, ‘the woman’s face is beautiful like the moon,’ ‘the face’ is the target domain, and ‘moon’ is the source domain used to construct the concept of the face. The part which needs to be highlighted from moon is the meaning of beauty, and the parts which are not to be included in the metaphor are the meanings of ‘round’ or others.

365 The old Buddhist logic is composed of five branches: the thesis, reasoning, example, combination and conclusion. However, in the late development, Buddhist logic only employs the previous three branches which are the thesis, reasoning, and examples (Hirakawa 251–256). This sentence means that in order to complete the logic form, the parallel example have to be brought out.

366 異品 (vipākṣa) means different kinds or counter existences, for example water and fire are different kinds.
are no dissimilar existents,\textsuperscript{367} the purpose of removing has been accomplished. Hence, a [counter example] is not stated. During a debate, there is also no fault if the dissimilar existents are temporarily used to establish the inferential valid cognition [or inference].\textsuperscript{368}

1.4 The establishment of inference (\textit{anumānampramāṇa})

\[ T30, 269a02 \] 云何此中建立比量？謂就「真性」眼處性空，眾緣生故。諸緣生者，皆就真性其自性空，牧牛女等所共了。如有威神呪術藥力，加彼草木塊礪等物，眾緣所現男女象馬宮殿園林水火等相，詭惑愚夫種種幻事，若彼自性少有實者，應非顛倒。故世尊言：「一切法性非眼所見，諸緣生法皆無自性。諸有智者，若知緣生即知法性，若知法性即知空性，若知空性即見智者」。又作是言：「諸緣生者皆是無生，由彼都無生自性故，若說緣生即說空性，知空性者即無放逸」\textsuperscript{369}。

Here, how to establish the inference? Answer: in terms of ‘reality’ (i.e., ultimate reality), the nature of the eyes-media is empty because it produced by conditions. Things which are produced by conditions have an empty self-nature in terms of ‘reality.’ This is a common knowledge shared with cowgirls and so forth. For example, after mighty incantations or magic powers have been performed on herbs, trees, and rocks, those conditions make various figures such as males, females, elephants, horses, palaces, gardens, water, fire, etc. manifest. The belief that the natures of those various illusions

\textsuperscript{367} That is because that all conditioned thing are produced by conditions without any exception.
\textsuperscript{368} 比量(biliang/anumānam-pramāṇa) which can be translated as ‘inferential valid cognition’ or ‘inference-perception’ means achieving result by inference or the knowledge obtained by inference. John D. Dunne. \textit{Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy} (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004), 25-28.
\textsuperscript{369} 無放逸(fangyil apramāda) means conscientiousness, mindful etc.
deceiving the fools are not real is not a mistake. Therefore, the Bhagavān says, “all
dharma-natures are not perceived by eyes. All dharmas produced by conditions possess
no self-nature. The wise knows the nature of things by knowing interdependent arising.
The one who knows the nature of thing knows emptiness. The one who knows emptiness
sees the wise-one (i.e., the Buddha).” He further says, “Those which are produced by
conditions are not occurring because they do not produce a self-nature. The proposition
of conditions is the proposition of emptiness. Those who know emptiness will not be
loose.”

2. Responding to criticism

2.1 Responding to nihilistic criticism

2.1.1 Responding to the criticism of destroying conventions

[T30, 269a13]【難】:此中一切不空論者，皆設難言：「若立一切有為皆空，
便無色等。如緣兔角現量370智生，理不成就。似色等緣諸現量覺亦應不生，然彼實
有各別內證。是故汝宗憎背法性，便有違害現量過失，及有違害共知過失。撥無一
切牧牛人等同所了知眼等體故」。

[Objection:] Here, those people who insist that all are not empty object, “If all
conditioned things are established as emptiness, there will be no forms, etc. It is like
using rabbit’s horns as a perceived object to produce direct experience. This is not
reasonable at all. Thus, the various direct perceptions of the likeness of forms should not

370 現量 (xinliang/ pratyakṣam pramāṇa) means “direct perception.”
be produced. However, those [objects, (i.e. forms)] truly appear in each individual’s direct experience. Therefore, your thesis contradicts dharma-nature, makes the mistake of invalidating direct perception, and makes the mistake of invalidating common perceptions. That is, you insist that things which all cowherds, etc. can commonly perceive such as the substance of eyes, etc. are nothingness.”

[T30, 269a18]【答】諸有智者，今當遣除朋黨執毒，住處中慧應共思議：我所立宗，為當違害自相續中所生現量？為當違害他相續中所生現量？若言違害自相續中所生現量。諸現量覺就勝義諦自性皆空，眾緣生故，如睡夢中諸現量覺非實現量。是故我宗且不違害自相續中所生現量。

[Answer:] those wise men now should eliminate the poison of the sectarian bias and think about [this] with the wisdom of the middle. Does the thesis I set up contradict direct perception produced in the continuity of one’s own self or contradict the direct perception produced in the continuity of others?371 In regard to the bias that [my thesis] contradicts the direct cognition produced by the continuity of one’s own self, [my answer is that] the self-natures of the various direct perceptions are empty in terms of ultimate reality because they are produced by conditions. For example, direct perceptions in dreams are not a real direct perception. Hence, my thesis does not contradict direct perception produced in the continuity of one’s own self.

371 相續 (xiangxu/prabandha) directly means continuity. However, herein, it means the continuity of one’s mind and body. Hence, the continuity of one’s own self simply means one’s own self, and the continuity of others means other people.
In regard to the assertion that [my thesis] contradicts the direct perception produced in the physical-mental continuum of others, [my answer is that] it will be reasonable to say that the extra appearances perceived by the one who has impure eyes, and unreal hair, fly, a moon perceived by the one who has a eye-disease, are illusory appearances and violate direct perception. Therefore, my thesis does not violate the direct perception produced in others’ physical-mental continuum.372

If [your assertion regarding the contradiction] is commonly referred to the conventional direct perception of fools and so on, [my thesis] does not reject conventional existence. Hence, (my thesis) violates nothing. Thus, it is not true for [you] to claim that [my thesis] violates common perception. If [you] claim that [my thesis] violates the common understanding of my own doctrine, it is unreasonable. That is

372 The MHK has the same description as the passage (MHK III.251~252). Malcolm D Eckel. To See the Buddha: A Philosopher’s Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness (San Francisco, Calif.: Harper San Francisco, 1992), 27.
because my own doctrine agrees with [my thesis]. Even if my thesis violated our
doctrine, it should be considered to violate our own school and should not be considered
to be a mistake of violating common cognition. If [you] claim that [my thesis] violates
the common understanding of others’ doctrines, it is unreasonable, too. That is because,
all theses are produced to refute the common understanding of others’ [doctrines].

[T30, 269b03] 若言違害牧牛人等共所了知，亦不應理。諸佛弟子立一切行皆剎
那滅，諸法無我亦無有情。諸勝論者：「實異色等有異實等」。諸數論者：「覺體
非思，已滅未生皆是實有」。如是等類，廣顯自宗所有道理，皆應說名違害共知。
然不應許，以於此中就勝義諦觀察諸法，非關牧牛人等共知。又立宗中以勝義諦簡
別所立，故定無容如說違害，由此亦無違自宗過。

If [you] claim that [my thesis] contradicts the common cognition of cowherds and so
on, again, it is not reasonable. All Buddhists stand for the thesis that all formations are
momentary, and all things are selfless and there are no living beings. The Vaiśeṣikas
claim, “All different true color-forms possess different substances.” \(^\text{373}\) The Sāṅkhyaś
claim, “The intellect itself is not mental phenomena and substantially existent before its
occurring and extinction.” \(^\text{374}\) [According to your objection,] those [theories] and so forth
which promote the doctrines of their own sects should be considered to contradict

\(^\text{373}\) According to vaiśeṣika’s theory, color-form (rūpa) being a physical composition belongs to the second
category (guna-padārta) of the seven categories (sapta-padārta). Different color-forms are composed of
different substances (dravya) such as earth, water, light, air and void which are classified in the first
194–195.

\(^\text{374}\) According to Sāṅkhyaś, Bodhi which is a composition of both material and spiritual substance is the
common cognition. However, we should not consider [their theories to contradict the common cognition] because they all examine things in terms of ultimate reality. Thus, it (the issue) does not concern with the common cognition of cowherds.

Moreover, in the establishment of my thesis, ‘ultimate reality’ has been used as a discriminating condition to apply to the thesis we have established. Therefore, the contradictions you speak of are absurd. Likewise, there is not a contradiction our thesis.

2.1.2. Responding to certain opponents

[T30, 269b13]【難】有餘復言：「性空論者，就勝義諦，眼等處空，便有「有法」不成宗過，亦有所依不成因過」。

【答】此不應理。牧牛人等共所了知，極成眼等總為宗故，即說彼法以為因故。此「似有法」不成宗過，亦「似所依」不成因過。

【Objection:] Moreover, others say, “the proponents of emptiness, in terms of ultimate reality, establish that eyes-media, etc. are empty. This has the fault of the thesis having an un-established subject as well the fault of having an inferential reason with an un-established locus.”

【Answer:] This is not reasonable. Because cowherds can commonly know that the eyes-media being used as example to accomplish [our thesis] have been established [by us] to be the thesis, and thus, [the eyes-media are] the reasoning. [The mistake you
indicate is both a counterfeit mistake of an invalid subject and a counterfeit mistake of an invalid reason.

2.1.3. Responding to the conflict between svabhāva and pratītyasamutpāda

[T30, 269b18]【難】有諸不善正理論者，作是難言：「若就『真性眼等皆空，眾緣生故』，眼等既空云何緣生？若緣生者云何體空？如是宗因更相違故，便成與宗相違過失」。

【難】此若矯舉立宗過失方便，顯因無同法喻，或不成過。如說：「聲是常，一切無常故」，此方便顯非一切故，不明了因有不成過。以聲攝在一切中，故亦無同喻，如何是常而非一切，此不應理。緣生故，因及如幻喻皆共知，故因喻並成。是故汝難終不能令智者意悅。

[Objection:] The contemptible Nyaiyāyika make this criticism, \[375\] “If in terms of true nature, eyes, etc. are all empty because they are produced by conditions, then how can the eyes, if they are empty, be produced by conditions? If they are produced by conditions, how can their nature be empty? Because the thesis and the reason are contradictory to each other, there is the fault of contradicting your own proposition.”

[Answer :] If this is [your formal reasoning] to indicate and correct the fault of our thesis in order to show that our reason does not have a similar example or cannot be

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\[375\] The Chinese term “不善正理論者” can have two interpretations. The first one is ‘Some contemptible Nyaiyāyika.’ The second one is ‘Someone who is not rational.’ “正理論者” can be a Chinese translation for Nyaiyāyika. However, in abhidharma literature, the Sarvāstivādins also address themselves ‘正理論者’ which means the rational one in this case. According to Bhāvāya’s retort which focuses on rebuking for the assertion that the words (sound) are permanent, the opponents should be someone from Mīmāṃsā School. Thus, ‘Someone who is not rational may be a better translation for this Chinese term here. Sastri in his reconstruction adopts the first interpretation ‘Nyaiyāyika’ (Sastri 8).
established, [your thesis has the same problem.] For example, [you] claim, “sound is eternal because all existences other [than sound] are impermanent.” This is to show that [sound] is not included in all other existence. The unclear reason cannot be adopted as a reason. Because sound should be included in all existences, it does not have a parallel example. How can anything be both permanent and not included in all existence? This is not reasonable. [In my thesis.] since ‘arising through conditions,’ the reasoning and the example of illusion are things that are generally understood. Therefore, the reasoning and example are both established. In this case, your criticism cannot satisfy intelligent people.

2.1.4 Responding to the proponents who advocate self-nature

[T30, 269b27]【難】有性論者復作是言：「汝應信受眼根有性，有所作故。諸無性者非有所作，如石女兒。眼有所作，謂生眼識。如所說因有勢用故，眼定有性」。

[Objection:] The proponents of [the idea] of self-nature, moreover, state the following objection, “You have to accept there is a nature of an eyes-faculty because [an eyes-faculty] possesses activity.376 Things that do not possess natures do not have activities, such as the son of a barren woman. The eyes-faculty has an activity because they produce eye-consciousness. Since the reason of activity has been stated, one must ascertain eyes to have natures.”377

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376 The Sanskrit for activity is sakārita (Sastri, 43.8)
377 According to the description, the opponents here could be Sarvāstivādins. See chapter 3-2 of my dissertation.
[T30, 269c01]【答】此若就彼非學所成，牧牛等慧所知自性，依世俗說，成立眼等有為有性，便立已成。若就勝義，無同法喻，唯遮異品所愛義成，不應道理。如計音聲常住論者說：「聲是常，所聞性故；瓶等無常，非所聞性。聲既所聞，是故性常」。又依世間共知同喻，「有所作故」成相違因，能立眼等皆是世俗言說所攝自性有故。

[Answer:] if [the nature you] mention is the nature which is perceived by the uneducated knowledge of cowherds, in terms of conventional reality, eyes are established to possess a nature, and then you established what is already proved. If it is established according to ultimate reality, there are no similar examples. You only establish the intended object through negation of heterogeneous instances. This does not make sense. For example, those who support the permanence of sound say, “sound is permanent because it has the nature of being heard. A vase and so forth is impermanent because it has no nature of being heard. Since sound is heard, its nature is permanent.” According to the parallel examples that can be known conventionally, [their] reason, ‘because of possessing activity’ is a mutually contradictory cause. Therefore, everything such as eyes and so forth included within worldly conventions has self-natures.

2.1.5 Responding to criticism of reason and example

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378 The logic of this argument could be as following: according to those who support the permanence of sound, a vase, even it possesses a function, is not permanent because it cannot be. Thus, ‘possessing functions’ is a mutually contradictory reason because someone uses to support a self-nature, on the contrary, others use to support impermanence.
【難】餘復難言：「有為空者，若因、若喻皆攝在中，種類同故闕比量過」。

【答】今此頌中總說量果，於觀察時及立量時，眼等一一別立為宗，故無此過。總立一切有為為空，亦無此過。緣生故，因二宗皆許，非不成故。若說眼空，其性空故，此所說因可有是過。亦非無喻，幻等有故。若立所說喻中，幻等以為宗者，便有重立，已成過故。

[Objection:] Others again object, “The reason and the example are all included in the thesis, ‘conditioned things are empty.’ Because they are in the same category, [the thesis] has the fault of the lack of inference.”

[Answer :] this verse speaks in a general manner of the cognition as the effect. Within the observation and establishing formal proof statements, eyes and so on, each one will individually be established as their own thesis. Hence, there is no such a fault. There is also no any fault to establish the main thesis that all conditioned things are empty. The reason ‘produced by conditions’ is accepted by both sides; thus, it is not invalid. If [I said], “eyes are empty because their natures are empty,” such a reason possesses a fault. [My thesis] does not lack an example. Illusions are [examples]. If the example, illusions, was established as thesis, I would have the fault of establishing what has been proved.

2.1.6 Responding to criticism on reason

379 The two sides mean the proponents and the opponents of a certain thesis.
【難】有少智者作是難言：「若立一切有為性空，「因」有為故，其性亦空，是則此「因」有不成過」。

【答】此似不成，非真不成。如佛弟子立一切行皆無有我，由「有因」故。
有難：此因諸行中攝，亦無我，故有不成過。又數論者立諸顯事以苦、樂、癡、為其自性，與思別故。有難：「此因顯事中攝，亦以樂等為其性故，有不成過」。又勝論者立聲無常，所作性故。有難：「此因用聲為體，亦無常故，有不成過」。如是等類諸敵論者，雖廣勤求立論者過，如所說理畢竟無能破壞他論。若有此理，何處誰能建立比量破我所樂所說道理。

[Objection:] Someone with less knowledge objects, “For the thesis that all conditioned things are empty in their natures, since the ‘reasoning’ is also a composite existence, its nature is also empty. Thus, the reason has the fault of being unestablished.”

[Answer:] [According to your rejection.] my ‘reasoning’ seems to be invalid but in reality, it is not unestablished. For example, the disciples of the Buddha set up the thesis that there is no self in all formations because there are causes. Someone can criticize, “because the causes are contained in all formations, and hence do not have self-natures, it has the fallacy of unestablished [reason].”

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380 This sentence means that because the reasoning is also empty, it cannot have the function to support the thesis.
The Sāṃkhyas set up the thesis that the three *guṇas* i.e. *rajas*, *sattva*, and *tamas* are the nature of all things because they are different from mental phenomena.\(^{381}\) Someone objects, “The reason ‘mental phenomena’ is also included in the things and uses *sattva*, etc. as its nature. Thus, there is the fallacy of an unestablished [reason].”

Moreover, the Vaiśeṣikas set up the thesis that sounds are impermanent because it is produced. Someone objects, “The ‘reason’ employs sounds as its substance and is impermanent, too. It has the fallacy of unestablished [reason].

Although the opponents of these various theses like the above seek the faults of these philosophers, according to what has been stated above, they consequently cannot invalidate others’ theories. If their reasoning [to oppose others’ theses] is valid, where can one establish an influence to invalidate the theory that I desire to state?\(^{382}\)

2.1.7 Responding to nihilistic argument of the reason

\(^{381}\) Radhakrishan, *Indian Philosophy* 262–265.  
\(^{382}\) That is because any reasoning people provide will be self invalid according to the argument proposed by those who have little wisdom.
[Objection:] Again, someone objects, “If ‘because of arising by condition,’ [is the reasoning], the ‘reasoning’ cannot support what should be established because of its empty nature, for example, the sound made by the son of a barren woman. This reason has a problem of self-invalidation. If [you] say that [the reasoning] is recognized by the opponent sects as a valid reasoning, it is also not logical. That is because in terms of the opponent sects, [the reasoning,] ‘because of the empty-nature’ does not have a clear object.\(^{383}\) If ‘non-object’ could be adopted as reasoning, the reasoning would be invalid because there is no non-existence.\(^{384}\) If the object manifested by illusions could be the reasoning, [it will be invalid because] the sound of the son of a barren woman does not exist. This example has nothing to support. Moreover, the sound made by a magic manifestation has the problem of instabilities because it can accomplish infinite matters of pleasures for sentient beings. It is not that a reason can be established as reasoning only with the opponents’ promise. Either the establishment [reasoning] or the established [thesis] cannot be accomplished. It is like the invalid reasoning in other sects because it is destroyed by contradicting inference. Hence, a big mistake always follows.

\(^{383}\) 義 (yī/ artha): An object or meaning.

\(^{384}\) This sentence means that non-existence cannot be considered to be a type of existences, and hence, it cannot be a reason to support a thesis.
【T30, 270a07】【答】如立慧等非心相應，行蘊攝故，如名身等。立虛空等皆非是常，德所依故。猶如地等立我非思，非顯事故，猶如最勝。立應信二宗共許，方名為因。由此道理，如所說過無容得有。

[Answer :] for example, [in Buddhism] knowledge\(^{385}\) is classified into the category of factors disassociated from thought because it is subsumed in the factor of formation like the name-form.\(^{386}\) [In the Vaiśeṣika school], space is impermanent because it is dependent upon gunas. For example, [in the Saṅkhya school], the self is established on the basis of earth, etc. but not on thought, because thought which is ultimately existent is not an experiential thing. Such kinds of arguments invalidate all theses [they desire to propose] because mistakes always follow. Hence, the reason which must be accepted by both parties [of a debate] can be called reasoning. According to this logic, [my thesis] does not have the fault that you accused.

2.1.8 Responding to criticism on the proposition

[T30, 270a13】【難】有餘不善正理論者，為顯宗過，復作是言：「若自性空，所立、能立皆不成就，如石女兒所發音聲。能立攝在有為中故同彼所立，其性亦空。以俱空故，所立能立並不成就」。

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\(^{385}\) 非心相應 (feixinxiangying/cittaviprayuktasamskāra) means the factor disassociated from thought. 慧 (huī/prajñā) in the Buddhist systems of classifications of existence such as Abhidharmaśāstra and Pañcaskandhaprakara is classified into the category of mental factors (caittasikā). However, herein, it is classified into the category of cittaviprayuktasamskāra (factors disassociated from thought). This sentence should be re-examined.

\(^{386}\) 名身(mingshen/nāmakaya) is one of the cittaviprayuktasamskāra and means name-form.
【答】彼遣所立，能立法體，即是遣於有法自顯立宗過。彼因自他互不成故，
不決定故，喻有過故。如次前說亦不應理。雖設異端終不能掩自宗過失。

[Objection:] Some others who are not skilful in logical argument, in order to show
the fault of our thesis, further state the following criticism, “If all self-natures are empty,
the property to be proved (sādhya) and the reason (sādhana) cannot be established, for
example, like the sound produced from the son of a barren woman. Because the reason is
subsumed within conditioned things, [its nature] which is the same as the property to be
proved is also empty. Because the property and the reason are both empty, they are not
established.”

[Answer:] The accusation of things in [our] thesis and reason focuses on the self-
nature of things in order to show the fault of our thesis. Their reason [against us] is not
accepted by both parties and inconclusive. Their example is invalid. Those accusations,
just like what have been explained before, do not make sense. Although they propose
these accusations [against us], they cannot conceal the mistakes of their own thesis.

2.1.9 Responding to the critique on the function of language

(T30, 270a20)【難】有餘復設別異方便掩自宗過，作如是言：「所說真性有為
空者，此立宗言其義未了。若就真性一切有為皆無有實，是立宗義，此所說言亦復
攝在有為中故，同諸有為亦應無實。若所說言非無實者，有為亦應皆非無實，此言
破自所立義故，名違自言立宗過失，如立一切言說皆妄。若就真性一切有為都無所
有，是立宗義，即諸一切皆無所有，如是所立便墮邪見」。
[Objection:] Others set up other arguments to conceal the faults of their theses, and say thus, “The meaning of the thesis, i.e., the so-called emptiness of conditioned things in terms of the true nature has not been fully explained. If ‘all conditioned things are empty in terms of the true nature’ is the thesis, the statement you use [to establish your thesis] is also subsumed within the conditioned things and thus, must be unsubstantial like those conditioned things. If the expression you have used is not unsubstantial, the conditioned things must be not unsubstantial. These expressions [you use to establish your thesis] invalidate the thesis you have established, and this fault of thesis is called, “contradicting your own words.”387 For example, the establishment of the thesis, “Everything which is said is false.” If ‘in terms of the reality, all conditioned things are inexistent’ is the thesis, then it will deprecate all things by considering them to be inexistent. That will become a false view.”

[T30, 270a20]【答】此中如說：

我定依於我 誰言他是依 智者我善調 故得昇天樂

[answer:] Here, for example, it is said:

387 “違自言立宗過失” (Svavacanavirodha) is, as mentioned before, the mistake of that the thesis contradicts one’s own assertion.
One definitely relies on oneself. Who says that [one should] rely upon others?

A wise one is skillful to cultivate [oneself] and thus is able to obtain the happiness of ascending to the heavens.\footnote{Sastri English translation is, “the self is the self protector. What other protector could there be? Through the proper training of the self, the wise reach heaven” (Sastri 47, note 66).}

[T30, 270a29] 彼就世俗說心為我，就勝義諦立為非我，無違自言。立宗過失此亦如是，此是就世俗性說有眼等，就勝義諦立彼皆空，故無過失。復如有說：「一切生法皆歸於死，牟尼所言定無虛妄，自身既生亦應歸死，不相離故」。彼所立宗雖能證自亦歸於死，是所許故，無違自言。立宗過失此亦如是，說就真性有為皆空，眾緣生故。所立宗言既眾緣生亦應性空，不相離故。此立宗言雖能證自言說性空，是所許故，無有自破所立義失。如梵志言：「世尊!一切我皆不忍」。佛言：「梵志忍此事不」。此中梵志固忍此事，而言一切我皆不忍，彼言違自所許事故，可有違害自所言過，非一切處皆有此失。

This verse speaks of the mind as a self in terms of conventional reality, and in terms of ultimate reality, no-self is established. The verse does not contradict its own words. The fault of my thesis [that you indicate above] is just like this situation. The thesis mentions the existence of eyes, etc. in terms of conventional reality and in terms of ultimate reality, establishes all things as emptiness. Thus, there is no fault in the thesis.

For example, someone says, “All living beings that are born must consequently die. The words that the Muni speaks are not false. [The Muni] himself having been born must
consequently die because life and death are not separated.” [Here.] the thesis he sets up can approve his own return to death. Because [his return to death] is established by the thesis, there is no contradiction in his own words. The fault [you indicate] in my thesis is like the same situation. In the proposition, “In terms of reality, conditioned things are empty because they arise through conditions,” the words which are used to establish the thesis are empty as well because they are produced by conditions. The words are not separate from conditions. The words that establish the thesis are able to prove that the words themselves are empty in nature. Because [the emptiness of words] is established by the thesis, there is no fault of invalidating my own thesis.

[Likewise,] a Brahman says, “Bhagavān! I do not recognize any theses.” The Buddha says, “Brahman! Do you accept your own thesis or not?” Herein, the Brahman accepts his own thesis and says, “I do not recognize any theses.” Because his words contradict his own thesis, he has the fault of invalidating his own words. The fault does not happen in all such causes.389

[T30, 270b13]世尊餘處說：「一切行皆無有我」。又餘處說：「諸行無常有生滅法」。若不爾者，既說諸行無我無常，佛亦應有如所說過。然無彼失，如遮諸行我性常性。此立宗言，亦許同彼「無我」常故。此亦如是，說「有為空」所立宗言亦許性空，此則順成自所許義。是故汝說，此言破自所立義故，此因不成。又如數論立諸顯事樂等為性，雖有難言：「顯事若以樂等為性，所立宗言亦應用彼樂等為

389 This is a very famous story from the Āgama and cited again and again by the later texts (T2,449a).
性。所立宗言若非彼性，顯事亦應非彼為性」。然所立宗無如是過。如立有為無常
無我，亦無如彼所說宗失。此亦如是無所說過，意所許故。

On some occasions, the Bhagavān says, “All formations are selfless,” and on other
occasions he says, “All formations are impermanent but have properties of arising and
cessation.” If it was not like the explanation above, the Buddha should have the same
fault when he says, “all phenomena are no-self and impermanent.” However, he does not
have such fault because [the thesis] negates both the natures of self and permanence of
formations.

The thesis intends [the principle] of ‘no-self” to be permanent. The same situation
happens in my thesis. The words ‘the emptiness of conditioned things’ of the thesis also
promises an empty-nature. This corresponds to the meaning we have promised.
Therefore, the reason with which you accuse that our words invalidate our own thesis
cannot be established.

Moreover, [another] example is that Sāṅkhya considers sattva, etc. the nature of all
phenomena. Someone may object, “If sattva, etc. is the intrinsic nature of all phenomena,
the expression to establish their thesis should also have sattva, etc. to be its nature. If
those [sattva, etc.] are not the nature of the words of the thesis, they should not be the
nature of all phenomena.”390 However, there is no such fault in the thesis.

390 According to the philosophy of Sāṅkhya, all phenomena are composed of three substances which are Sattva, rajas, and tamas. Radhakrishan, Indian Philosophy 262–265.
Just like (in the Buddha’s teaching), the thesis which establishes no-self and impermanence of conditioned things does not have the fault those opponents indicate. This thesis does not have such a fault because it has been established.

(T30, 270b25)【難】又彼論者不救所立，而返難言：「若就真性有為無實，所說有為無實之言，亦應無實」。【答】此難不能免自宗過，妄說他宗同彼有失。如世癡賊既被推徵，不能自雪，而立道理誣誣他言：「汝亦是賊」。此非審察所出言詞。

【難】又彼所言：「若就真性一切有為都無所有是立宗義，即謗一切皆無所有，如是所立墮邪見者」。【答】此中宗義如前廣說，謂空無性虛妄顯現門之差別，非一切種皆謗為無，故汝不應作如是難。

[Objection:]Furthermore, those theorists, instead of saving their own thesis, object, “If in terms of reality, conditioned things are unreal, the language that demonstrates the non-reality of conditioned things should be unreal as well.”

[Answer:] This reproach cannot cover the fault of your own thesis by misleadingly indicating the fault of others’ theses. It is like that a fool thief who has been caught cannot prove his guiltlessness, but accuses others, “You are a thief, too” instead. This is not a speech through a careful consideration.

[Objection:]They further state, “If the proposition that in terms of reality, all conditioned things are inexisten is the thesis, it will deprecate all things by considering them to be inexisten. That will become a false view.”
[Answer:] Here, the meaning of my thesis has been fully demonstrated before. That is, there is a difference between empty, the lack of intrinsic nature, and false appearances. Not all existences are considered to be inexistent. You should not make such an objection.

2.1.10 Responding to theorists who are clever and arrogant

[T30, 270c06]【難】復有餘師懷聰叡慢作是難言：「若諸有為就勝義諦猶如幻等空無自性，即是非有，執非有故便為無見」。

[Objection:] Moreover, some other theorists who are clever and arrogant state the following objection, “If all conditioned things, in terms of ultimate reality, are like illusions which are empty and possess no self-nature, this means that they are inexistent. The attachment to inexistence becomes the view of non-existence.”

[T30, 270c08]【答】彼欲覆障自宗過難，矯設謗言，寧俱有過。勿空論者，所立量成謗勝義諦，過失大故。此「非有」言，是遮詮義，汝執此言表彰為勝。我說此言遮止為勝，此「非有」言，唯遮有性，功能斯盡無有勢力更詮餘義。如世間說：「非白絹」言，不可即執此言詮黑，與能說者作立宗過。「非白絹」言，唯遮白絹，功能斯盡更無餘力詮表黑絹、赤絹、黃絹。今此論中就勝義諦於有為境避常見邊，且遮有性，如是餘處避斷見邊，遮於無性，雙遮二邊遮有無性。為避所餘妄執過失，乃至一切心之所行悉皆遮止。所行若滅，心正隨滅。又於餘處說阿難陀，若執有性
[Answer:] They are willing to conceal the fault of their own thesis by establishing this reproach. [The thesis and the reproach] both possess faults. The thesis established by the theorists of non-emptiness slanders ultimate reality and hence, possesses a great fault. The empty my thesis brings out is to highlight the side of negation, and the ‘inexistence’ is only used to negate ‘substance.’ Beyond this function, there is no other function to demonstrate other meanings. For example, when one conventionally says, “Not white silk fabric!”, [others] should not interpret this proposition to express black silk fabric and by means of this interpretation even indicate the speaker’s fault of his proposition. The [function] of the words, ‘Not white silk fabric’ is only to negate white silk fabric, and beyond this function, there is no other faculty to express black, red, or yellow silk fabric.

In the present proposition, [the thesis] avoids eternalism regarding conditioned things in terms of ultimate reality by negating intrinsic nature, and in the same manner, regarding [conventional reality], [the thesis] avoids the view of nihilism by negating no-intrinsic nature. It avoids two extremes by negating both intrinsic nature and no intrinsic nature. In order to avoid the faults of other delusional attachments, all objects that a mind functions on have to be negated.391 When the objects [the mind works on] cease, the mind itself immediately ceases.

391 The Chinese term ‘一切心之所行’ is savacittagocara in Sanskrit which means the object on which the mind works.
[The Buddha] on one occasion told Ānanda that attachment to a nature would fall to eternalism, and the attachment to non-nature would fall to nihilism. On another occasion, [the Buddha] told Kāśyapa that existence was one extreme, and inexistence was another. According to the Ágama and those reasons which have been stated, the thesis I establish does not have the fault of view of nihilism, which is defiled by excrement.

2.1.11. Responding to the people who cannot endure a mass of faults their thesis

[T30, 270c24]【難】有不忍見自宗道理過難所集，為欲隱映，復作是言：「性空論者雖常欣求無分別慧，而恒分別一切有為、無為空性。即是成立遍計所執虛妄分別，失自樂宗」。【答】如是亦遮，故無此過。

[Objection:] The people who cannot endure a mass of faults assembling at their thesis, in order to cover up [their mistake], again, make the following statement, “Although the theorists of emptiness frequently seek non-conceptual wisdom, they always discriminate the empty nature of composite and unconditioned things. Because that [discrimination] becomes an imagining postulation with attachment, they destroy the thesis they intend. [Answer:] this argument has been rebutted, and hence, [my thesis] has no such fault.

392 In Tsaahan (雜阿含) no.193, The Buddha states, “Ānanda! The assertion of the existence of self falls in the eternalism, and the assertion of the inexistence of self falls in nihilism. The Buddha’s teaching is free from those two extreme and corresponds to the middle path.” (T2, 444c)
393 The ordinary people depend on two kinds of bases — i.e. they are attached to what is to be contacted as existing or non-existing. Because they are attached to what is to be contacted, [there results the views of] existence (eternalism) or non-existence (nihilism) (T2, 85c).
2.1.12. Responding to some other opponents

[T30, 270c27]【難】有餘復言：「所說空因，若就世俗？或就勝義？於自、於他因義不成」。

【答】二宗共許不顯差別，總相法門明正理者許為因，故汝所立難，似不成過，非真不成。如勝論者立聲無常，所作性故。聲常論者說彼過言：「分別因義，咽喉等作，或杖等作，如是分別因義不成」。如數論者立能聞等五有情根，非所造色，是根性故，猶如意根、眼等五根。造色論者說彼過言：「根性故因，若大造性，或樂等性。於自於他如是分別因義不成」。彼二種說，似不成過，非真不成，故不應理。此亦如是。

[Objection:] Others further argue, “Is the reasoning of emptiness you argue for from the perspective of the ultimate or the conventional existences? The reasoning cannot be valid both from your own side and the opponents’.”

[Answer:] The [reason] that are accepted by both sides are not different from each other and accepted as subject that is characterized as an unparticularized generality by the one who knows logic.\(^{394}\) Hence, our thesis you object seems to have the fault of being unestablished, but it is not really unestablished. For example, the Vaiśeṣikas set up the thesis that sounds are impermanent because they are produced.\(^{395}\) The proponents of eternal sound indicate their fault by saying, “[They] discriminate the reasoning [for their thesis] by asserting that [sounds] are produced by a throat or sticks, etc. Thus, the

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\(^{394}\) The Chinese term “明正理者” directly means ‘the one who understand the logic instead of the school of Nyaiyāyika.

explanation for the reasoning is not successful.”\textsuperscript{396} The Sāṃkhya considers that the five sentient faculties such as the ability of smelling, etc. are not composed of color-forms because they are the basic faculties like the mental faculty.\textsuperscript{397} The opponents argue, “The reason that those faculties can be the reason is because they are basic faculties like the five great elements or \textit{sattva}, etc. Such reasoning cannot be established for both their own and opponents’ sides.” Those two theses do not seem to be successfully established, but they are not really unsuccessfully established. The present situation is like this.

2.1.13. Responding to the critique of the example

\textsuperscript{[T30, 271a09]}【難】復有餘師，以聰明慢貪自宗愛眯亂慧目，不能觀察善說珍寶自論鄙穢得失差別，妄顯所立譬喻過言：「呪術藥力加被華果塊塼等物，令其種種象馬兔等色相顯現。我宗不許彼自性空。同喻便闕，所立無故。若言如幻象馬等相，無有他實象馬等性，說名為空，眼等亦爾，無他性故，立為空者，便有宗過，立已成故」。

[Objection:] Other theorists, because their minds are confused by arrogant intelligence and the cupidity of their own thesis, are not able to figure out the distinction between the treasure of skillful speech and the filthiness of their own theory, and delusively indicate the fault of the example of our proposition, “the various forms such as elephants, horses, rabbits, etc. which are transformed and manifested from matters such as flowers, fruits, rocks and so on by magic mantra and medications are not considered to

\textsuperscript{396} Since both sides (the Vaiśeṣikas and their opponents) accept the same reason (sound are composed), for each of them, there is no any reason to indicate the other’s fault.

\textsuperscript{397} According to the Sāṅkhya, the five organs of perception (jīna-\textit{indriya}) such as the functions as sight, hearing, etc. are not composed of physical elements. Radhakrishan, \textit{Indian Philosophy} 270–271.
be empty in nature by our school.\[398\] Hence, the example is missed because there is nothing to be established. If [you] rebut that because the illusory elephants, horses and so on do not possess the natures of those real elephants, horses etc., they should be considered to be empty. Eyes, etc. are in the same manner.\[399\] If those which do not possess other natures are considered to be empty, the thesis has a fault. As soon as the thesis is established, [the fault] is accomplished.”

[Answer:] This reproach is not true. Those figures of elephants, horses and so on are produced by various conditions, i.e. the flowers, fruits, rocks transformed by mantra and medicines. Because those elephants, horses and so on are empty in nature, they can be used as examples. The meaning [of the example] is successfully established.

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\[398\] That is because flowers and fruits are existent.
\[399\] This argument means that although eyes-source does not possess others’ nature, it possesses its own self-nature. Hence, it should not be considered to be empty.
\[400\] The contrast between the conventional things and the magical appearances can be found in the verse 77 of MHK. P. Hoornaert. “An Annotated Translation of Madhyamakahāṛdayakārikā/Tarkajvālā V.69-84” Kanazawa Daigaku Bungakubu ronshū. Kōdō kagaku, tetsugaku hen No.22 (2002), 128.
If you further object, “Even though these elephants and horses, etc. produced by magic do not possess the nature of those real elephants and horses, etc., it is wrong to infer that the nature of these [real elephants etc.] are empty because the nature of those [magic elephants etc.] are empty. Don’t [you see] that if something appears as a certain figure, the nature of this certain figure must exist. The example will be the flowers and fruit that you accept.”

If thus, the forms [such as elephants, horses, etc.] produced by magic should possess the nature of those real elephants and horses. In fact, they do not possess them. Therefore, it should be known that those forms such as elephants, horses, etc. produced by magic are empty in nature. Thus, the examples we mention are really existent. There is no fault of proving what has already been established since our thesis is that conditioned things such as eyes etc. are empty in terms of their intrinsic natures.

2.1.14 Responding to someone who insists upon a different idea from śūnyatā

[T30, 271a27]【難】復有諸餘異空慧者，別顯喻過：「雖諸幻士非實士，故說名為空。然彼幻士自性不空，有虛妄現士相體故。由此道理，如先所立句義不成立，喻不成故」。

【答】今應詰彼：「此虛妄現幻士相體從緣生不」？彼作是答：「此從緣生」。若爾，何故復名虛妄？以如所顯現不如是有故。豈非眼等亦從緣生，如所顯現不如是有。同喻成故，性空義成。汝應信受。
Moreover, some others who possess the knowledge different from śūnyatā manifest the fault of the example from a different point, “Even though those illusory people are not real people, and hence, they are considered to be empty, the nature of those illusory people are not empty. That is because there are the figures of those illusory people manifesting. According to this reason, the thesis you set up is invalid because the example is not valid.

[Answer:] Now, we should question them, “Are those figures of the illusory people produced from conditions or not?” The opponents answer, “Yes, they are produced from conditions.” The author responds “If so, what is delusion? [Delusion is that] something does not exist as what it appears. Don’t [you see] that eyes, etc. are produced from conditions and do not exist as they appear. The example is valid, and thus, the thesis of non-nature is valid. You have to accept.”

[T30, 271b05]【難】彼作是言：「不應信受，以諸幻士非如實士。堪審觀察待彼實士，此虛妄故說名為空。非汝等立離前所說眼等有為別有眼等，堪審觀察待彼說此眼等性空，可令信受」。

[Objection:] They answer, “We should not accept because those illusory people are not real people. Through a careful analysis, relative the real people, these [illusory people] are considered to be empty because they are illusory. In your case, you did not establish other eyes, etc. separated from the conditioned things of eyes. If you did so, through a careful analysis, relative to those [composite existence of eyes], these [eyes] are considered to be empty in nature. In such a situation, it can be accepted.”
【答】雖然此所說眼等別有眼等，然有如是性空緣生，所立能
立二法成就。但由此喻足能證成所喻義故。汝今分別法喻別故，便成「分別相似過」
類，顯敵論者自慧輕微。如勝論者說：「聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等」。不應難
言：「瓶等泥團輪等所成，可燒可見棒所擊破，可是無常，聲既不爾，應非無常。
此亦分別法喻別故，亦成「分別相似過」類。故應信受眼等性空，性空不離緣生因
故。又如「相現即有自性」，先已破故，此亦應爾。故汝等言，不能解雪自宗過難。

[Answer:] Although there is no other eyes, etc. which separate from the eyes we
mention, those things are produced by conditions with an empty nature. Due to this
reason, the sādhya (property to be proved) and the reason are both established. By means
of this example, it is enough to prove the meaning of the example. If you now
differentiate qualities of the subject from the example, it leads to the fault of
differentiating similarity.\(^{401}\) That will reveal the little knowledge of the opponents. For
example, the Vaiśeṣikas insist that sound is impermanent because it is composed, like a
pot. Those opponents should not object, “A vase is made by a mass of mud, wheels, etc.
Because it can be burned, seen, broken by a striking of a stick and so on, it is
impermanent. Sound is different from that and hence, is not impermanent. This is the
differentiation qualities of subject from example. It also leads to a fallacy of the
differentiating the similarity. Therefore, you should accept the empty nature of eyes, etc.

\(^{401}\text{In The Reinterpretation of Nyāyapraveśa (因明人正理論疏抄), 「分別相似過」 (the fault of
differentiating similarity) is one of the fourteen faults in which the opponents mistakenly discriminate the
reasoning and attack a thesis. In this case, all existences, (i.e., eyes, etc.) and illusory existence are in the
same category in terms of produced by causality. However, the opponents attack the thesis by
differentiating them (X53, 855).}
because empty of intrinsic nature is not separate from the basic reason of dependent arising. Furthermore, the idea that figures which appear must have natures has been negated previously. Here, it would be the same situation. Therefore, what you say cannot save the fault of your own school.

2.1.15 Responding to Sāṃkhyas

[T30, 271b20]【難】有數論師作如是難：「我立大等諸轉變聚是所顯性。『緣生故』，『因』有不成過。一切皆有一切體故，諸根遍在一切處故，彼幻士中亦有此體。立此性空，無同法喻」。

[Objection:] Some Sāṅkhya make such objection, “We establish that the congregation of transformers such as Mahat, etc. is something to be manifested.402 ‘Because of causal production’ cannot be established as the reasoning. All existences possess all natures (prakṛti). Every substance (prakṛti) pervades in all existences. Those illusory people also have this nature (prakṛti). If this is considered to be empty in nature, there is no parallel example.”403

[T30, 271b23]【答】此中且依色覺觀察。謂諸色覺非緣所顯，隨彼別緣有轉異故。如隨泥團輪杖陶師心欲樂等差別眾緣，有瓶盆等，或大或小。如是眼等眾緣差

402 In Sāṃkhyya philosophy, all phenomena are composed of the twenty-five substances. Herein, puruṣa (spiritual self) and prakṛti (self-nature) are the even more fundamental substances which can transform themselves (parināma) into other elements. Thus, these two elements pervade in all existences. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy 266–276.

403 Since nothing is not pervaded by prakṛti even an illusion, there is no parallel example for the thesis of empty-nature.
[Answer:] Here, the senses of colors-forms (rupa) will be taken as an example to observe [your theory]. The senses of color-forms are not simple reflected by perceived objects. [The senses] are different according to different conditions. For example, according to the different conditions such as the mass of mud, wheels, sticks, potters’ willingness, etc., there are different pots such as big or small sizes. Thus, according to the different conditions such as eyes and etc., the senses of color-forms change differently. According to the sensitivity of eye-sense and also the different color of objects such as blue etc., the sense of the likeness of blue appears differently. The manifested matters to be perceived, in the conventional world, do not change according to those conditions, for example, various matters such as a loop, or a bracelet manifested by a lamp, medicine beans, and sun. The sense of color-forms is different [from that]. Just as the observation of the sense of colors, eyes etc. are the same. This meaning is really a conventionally universal understanding. Hence, there is no any fault of not being established in the reason.

[T30, 271c03]又汝所言一切皆有一切體等，為據顯事？為據隱用？若據顯事執一切有一切體者，如於瓶處有瓶顯事，於盆等處亦應遍有，此瓶顯事遍有體故。如是一瓶即應遍滿無量百千踰膳那處。於瓶等處亦應具有盆等顯事。非瓶顯事被隱映故，盆等顯事，亦被隱映，形量大故。形量大者應為轉大形量隱映，瓶等顯事盆等
Moreover, relying on manifested matters or non-manifested matters, do you mean, “All matters possess all natures”? If in terms of manifested matters, you hold that all matters possess all natures, the manifested matter of a vase does not only exist in a vase but also pervades in a sink bowl because the manifested matter of a vase pervades all matters. Thus, a vase should pervade countless hundred thousands yojana places. In a vase, there should be the manifested matter of a sink bowl. Not only the manifested matter of a vase has been reflected but also the manifested matter of a sink bowl has been reflected due to its big figure. A big matter should be transformed into a big reflection. Because both the manifested matters of a vase and a sink bowl have been reflected, they should not be obtained in anytime and anyplace. Therefore, it is not logical for your school to hold the idea that all matters possess all natures in terms of manifested matters.

If you hold that all matters possess all natures in terms of non-manifested matters, such an attachment has to be examined through an extensive observation in order to know
its accuracy. It should not be extensively observed because it may cause the problem of wasting too much writing. Your doctrine also agreed that real people show the emptiness of matter in which illusory people appear. Thus, my example does not have a fault, and the meaning of empty-nature we set up is valid. You Sāṅkhya depend on no basis [to criticize my thesis]. It is not that every substance pervades in all existences because each one must have a cause, i.e., the basis that a substance can rely upon. Thus, the theory that the substance (prakṛti) is the cause to produce sattva, rajas, tamas, mahat and other elements should be extensively expounded. Due to the destruction of the assertion that every sense-faculty pervades in all sense-objects, there is no the substance of sense-faculties in illusory people. It is not that the thesis of emptiness does not have a parallel example. Therefore, you are deceived by demons to make such an assertion which has become an illusory discrimination.

2.2 The critiques on paratantra in Yogācāra School

2.2.1 The Yogācārin interpretation of śūnyatā

[T30, 271c22]【難】相應論師有作是說：「汝就真性立有為空，緣生故者。若此義言：『諸有為法從眾緣生，非自然有，就生無性立彼為空』。是則述成相應師義，符會正理」。

[Objection:] According to Yogācāra-theorists, there is an assertion, “You consider conditioned things to be empty in terms of the reality because [they] are produced from conditions. If this statement means, ‘All conditioned things are produced from conditions and not automatically produced. Hence, they are considered to be empty in the sense that
[they] do not have intrinsic nature with regard their origination,”

[Your statement corresponds with the Yogācāra assertion and conforms to the right doctrine.”

[T30, 271c25] 又如是說：「由彼故空，彼實是無，依此故空，此實是有。如是空性是天人師如實所說」。此教意言：「遍計所執依他起上自性本無，非彼性故。以非如能詮有所詮性，亦非如所詮有能詮性故。依他起自性有上，遍計所執自性本無。『由彼故空』即妄計事，彼自性無。『依此故空』，即緣生事，此自性有。此若無者，則為斷滅。

They further say, “That on the basis of which there is emptiness is exactly inexistent. This on the basis of which there is emptiness is really existent. Such emptiness is what the teacher of gods and men [the Buddha] exactly taught.”

This teaching intends to state that on the basis of dependent nature, the imagined nature (parikalpita) is inexistent because [the dependent nature] does not have [the imagined] own nature. That is because it is not like that on the basis of what can expound, there are things which can be expounded, and it is also not like that on the basis

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404 生無性 (shengwuxing/utpattiṇihsvabhāvata) is translated as that (they) do not have intrinsic nature with regard their origination in English. It is one of the three non-nature doctrine of Yogācāra. In order to interpret the doctrine of śūnyatā in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra as well as avoiding nihilism, Yogācāra-theorists proposed the teaching of three natures and three non-natures. Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra (the chapter of all dharma characteristics) (T16, 693a–b).

405 The sentence, “On the basis of that, (there is) emptiness. That is exactly inexistent. On the basis of this, there is emptiness. This is in fact existent” is originally from Yogācārabhūmi 36 (T30, 488c). Its Sanskrit is, “yena hi śūnyaṃ tad asadbhāvāt. yac ca śūnyaṃ tad sadbhāvāc.” The Sanskrit-English translation is, “That by means of which there is an empty is inexistent, and that which is empty is existent.” Also see J. D. Willis. On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga’s Bodhisattvabhumi: Translated with an Introduction, Commentary, and Notes, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, First Indian Edition,1982), 115.

406 依他起 (yitaqi/paratantra) is translated as dependent nature in English and is the second nature of the three natures.

407 The sentence means, “The dependent nature does not have the same nature as the imagined.” Paul Hoornaert, “because the dependent nature does not have that [imagined] nature” (81).
of what can be expounded, there are words which are able to expound. On the basis of the
dependent nature, the imagined nature is originally inexistent. The so-called ‘that on the
basis of which, there is emptiness’ is the illusively discriminated things, and they do not
have a self-nature. The so-called, ‘On the basis of this, there is emptiness’ is things
originating from conditions, and they have self natures. If [the dependent nature] does not
exist, it will become nihilism. 408

[T30, 272a03]於何事上說誰為空？此緣生事即說名為依他起性，依此得有色、
受、想等自性差別假立性轉。此若無者，假法亦無，便成無見。不應與言，不應共
住。自墮惡趣亦令他墮。如是成立遍計所執，自性為空，及依他起自性為有。契當
正理。若此義言：『依他起性亦無所有，故立為空』，汝便墮落如上所說過失深坑，
亦復成就誹謗世尊聖教過失」。

On what basis, what is considered to be empty? Things originating from conditions
are called the other-dependence nature, and on the basis of this, the distinct natures of
color-forms, feelings, thinking and so forth are conventionally established to operate. If
this [other-dependent nature] is considered to be inexistent, the conventional existences
are inexistent. It becomes the view of nihilism. We should not talk to and dwell with [the

408 The same passage can be found in MHK and Tj V.4. Paul hoornaert. “An Annotation of
Madhyamakahrdayakarika/Tarkajvala V.1-7” Kanazawa University Repository for Academic Resource
19 (1999), 133, 140.
one who asserts such nihilism.] The one will descend into a lower realm and cause other
to descend [into a lower realm.] 409

According to the [above] explanation, it can be established that the nature of
imagined postulations is empty, and the nature of other-dependence is existent. It
corresponds with the right principle. If this means, ‘Because the dependent nature is also
nothingness, the emptiness is established,’ you fall into the deep pit of faults expounded
above, and also commit a fault of slandering the Buddha’s holy teachings.

2.2.2 Responding to Yogācārin interpretation

2.2.2-1 Questioning the Yogācārin interpretation

[T30, 272a10]【答】此中尚與發趣餘乘及諸外道，欣求善說離憍嫉者，廣興諍
論，何況同趣一乘諸師。論時至故，少共決擇此事，廣如《入真甘露》已具分別，
故不重辯，怖廣文者不欣樂故。

[Answer:]Herein, [I] even extensively debate with those who generate the vow in
other vehicles and other religions in order to obtain the good teaching and be free from
stinginess and jealousness, let alone with those in the same vehicle. Because it is time to
debate, and [the debate] should be discussed in short. The extensive argument has been

409 The same description of this statement can be found in verses 82 and 83ab in MHK. “If things have no
inherent nature, conventional designations also will not exist. He [who propound this] is a nihilist to
whom one should not talk and with whom one should not dwell together”(82) “Not only is such a
[nihilist] himself destined for an unhappy existence, but he also leads others to misery”(83as). Hoornaert,
“Tarkajvālā V.69-84” 131. The original content is from BBH 46 (T30, 488c).
given in the chapter of *Enter into the True Ambrosia* (of *Heart of the Middle Way*).\(^{410}\) I will not repeat [them all] because those who are afraid of extensive writings will be unhappy.

[T30, 272a14]言有為法從眾緣生非自然有，就生無性說彼為空，此有何義？若此義言：「眼等有為依他起上，不從因生，常無滅壞，眼等自性畢竟無故，說名為空」，便立已成，同類數論勝論等宗，皆共許故。

然說眼等非所作空，自性空故，應言無生無性故空，不應說言就生無性說彼為空。若彼起時，就勝義諦有自性生，云何說為生無自性。若實無生，此體無故，不應說有唯識實性，若爾則有違自宗過。若依他起自然生，性空無有，故說之為空，是則還有立已成過。既許依他眾緣而生，實不空故，應不名空。我則不爾，云何述成相應師義。

What do [you] mean [when you] say that because conditioned things are produced from conditions and do not automatically occur, they are considered to be empty in terms of the lack of intrinsic nature with regard to their origination? If you intend to say, “The conditioned things such as eyes, on the basis of other-dependence (*paratantra*) do not occur from causes, and thus, they are permanent and imperishable. Eyes, etc. are called emptiness because their self-nature does not exist.” You establish what is identical with the schools of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and so on because they all accept this assertion?

\(^{410}\) According to Chinese commentaries such as《解深密經疏》(*The Commentary of Sanidhiśīnirmocana-sūtra*) (X21, 240b), 《成唯識論了義燈》(*The Light to Understanding the Accomplishment of Yogācāra*) (T.733b), 《入真甘露》(*Enter into the True Ambrosia*), and 《心要甘露》(*Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*) is one of the chapter of the *Heart of the Middle Way*.
However, eyes, etc. are not caused to be empty instead they are empty in their own nature. You should say that they are empty because of non-origination and lack of intrinsic nature, and should not say that in the sense of lack of intrinsic nature with regard to their origination, they (eyes etc.) are considered to be empty.

Suppose that when they occur, they occur from intrinsic-nature in the ultimate sense, how can they be called ‘lack of intrinsic nature with regard to their origination’? If they are truly non-originated, [you] should not insist the existent of the true nature of consciousness because of lack of substance. If thus, there is a fault of negating your own thesis.

If because [things] are automatically originating on the basis of other-dependence, they are empty and non-existent, they are considered to be empty, this [assertion] still commits a fault of establishing what is proved. If you insist that all things depend on other conditions (i.e., dependent nature), they are not really empty. They should not be called emptiness. It is different from ours. How can my assertion correspond with Yogācāra-theorists’ assertion?

2.2.2-2 Reinterpretation of paratantra

[T30, 272a26] 又如所說：「由彼故空，彼實是無；依此故空，此實有等」。若因緣力所生眼等一切，世間共許實有，是諸愚夫覺慧所行，世俗似有自性顯現。以

411 In Vasubandhu’s Trīśikā-vijñāpatimātratā-siddhi, in expounding the perfect-nature, it describes it as, “The ultimate reality of all dharma is tatathatā which is always in accord with its own nature, i.e. vijñānamatra- bhūtatathatā (T31,61a). Hence, 唯識實性 (weizhishixing/ vijñāpatimātratā- bhūtatathatā) is the perfect-nature (pariniṣpanna) which means the ultimate reality.
Furthermore, in regard to their statement, “That on the basis of which [there is] emptiness is exactly inexistent. This on the basis of which there is emptiness is really existent”, [the meaning is as the following:] things such as eyes and so forth that originate from conditions are conventionally considered to be real. They are the objects (gocara) perceived by common people’s cognitions and appear as if they have the intrinsic-nature in the conventional reality. If we examine them with the superior wisdom from the ultimate reality, they are the same as the illusory people and possess no true nature. Hence, it is said, “That on the basis of which [there is] emptiness is exactly inexistent.” That is to avoid falling into the fault of eternalism.412

[T30, 272b02] 如為棄捨墮常邊過，說彼為無，亦為棄捨墮斷邊過，說此為有。謂因緣力所生眼等，世俗諦攝，自性是有，不同空華全無有物，但就真性立之為空，是故說言：「依此故空此實是有」。如是空性是天人師如實所說。若就此義說依他起自性是有，則為善說。如是自性我亦許故，隨順世間言說所攝福德智慧二資糧故，世俗假立所依有故，假法亦有。

Just in the same manner as the above assertion that ‘that’ is considered to be inexistent in order to avoid falling into the fault of eternalism, ‘this’ is considered to be existent in order to avoid falling into the fault of nihilism. That is to say, things such as

eyes and so forth produced from conditions are subsumed in conventional reality and hence, their intrinsic natures do exist. Unlike flowers in the sky which are completely non-existent, they are only established as emptiness in terms of [ultimate] reality. Therefore, it is said, “This on the basis of which there is emptiness is really existent.” Such emptiness is exactly what the teacher of gods and men spoke. If the other-dependence nature is stated to have an intrinsic nature in terms of this sense, it is a right teaching. Because of such a self-nature is agreed by us, the accumulations of fortunes and virtues subsumed by the conventional designation, and that things on which the conventions rely do exist, the conventional things also exist. ④

2.2.2-3 Paratantra as the conventional reality

[T30, 272b10] 然復說言:「此若無者，假法亦無，便成無見，不應與語」。如是等過皆不成就。又若建立依他起性世俗故有，便立已成。若立此性勝義諦有，無同法喻。如已遮遣執定有性，亦當遮遣執定無性。是故不應謗言增益損減所說依他起性。

However, they further say, “If this is considered to be inexistent, the conventional existences are inexistent. It becomes nihilism. We should not talk to [those who assert such nihilism.]” Such a fault [they indicate] is not true. If the nature of other-dependence is established as existence in terms of conventional [reality], you establish what is already proved. If it is established as existence in terms of ultimate [reality], there is no parallel

④ See Sastri, 59 (footnote 121).
example.\textsuperscript{414} Just like that the attachment of decisive nature has been removed, the attachment of decisive non-nature should be removed, too. Hence, [you] should not accuse us of increasing or decreasing other-dependence.

[T30, 272b15]若言：「我宗立有幻等離言實性，同喻無故」，非能立者離言實性道理不成，故無有過。若爾外道所執離言實性，我等誰能遞破。彼亦說有實性，我等非慧非言之所行故。

If [they] say, “[Even though] ‘the ineffable true nature separating from language’ of illusions established by our doctrine does not have a parallel example, it does not mean that the principle of the true-nature separating from language, i.e., the establishment is invalid.\textsuperscript{415} Hence, it does not have the fault.” [Answer:] If so, who is able to destroy the attachment of the true-nature separating from language proposed by other religious sects? That is because those [religious sects] also propose the true-nature which is not the object perceived by our intellect and language.

[T30, 272b19]若眾緣力所生一切依他起性就勝義諦有自性者，幻士應有實士自性。若有他性亦不應理，牛上不應有驢性故。作、非作性，實有實無，有性無性二俱攝受。如此所立無同法喻，或立已成二過所染，故不應理。

\textsuperscript{414} Parallel texts is the verse 71 in the \textit{MHK}, “if [this is argued] with reference to the conventional [truth], [the error of] proving what is already proven will occur. If [it is argued] with reference to the ultimate [truth], then there is no example and the reason is contradictory. P. Hoornaert, “Tarkajvālā V.69-84” 122. \textsuperscript{415} According to \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi} of \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}, 離言實性 (liyanshixing/ nirabhilāpya-svabhāva) which is translated as ‘the true-nature separating from language’ is the ultimate nature which is different from the conventional nature expressed by language (30,488c).
If other-dependence by means of which all existences produced by conditions possessed a self-nature in terms of ultimate reality, the illusory people should have the self-nature of real people. If they are supposed to possessed other-nature, it would not be logical, too. That is because a cow should not have the nature of a donkey. The establishment of that nature of function and non-function, true and untrue existences, and nature and no-nature are both subsumed by [dependent nature] does not have a similar example; or it will be defiled by two faults after it has been established. Hence, it is not logical.

Moreover, conditioned things produced by conditions are considered to have a nature in terms of ultimate reality because they are composed. Because the reasoning [they are composed] approves the emptiness of the nature and removes the existence of the nature, the thesis you establish contradicts inference. What have been produced by conditions is commonly known as existences with a nature conventionally. If those [natures] are decisively considered to be ultimate existent, one should use this logic to destroy that thesis. They also should not accept this thesis because it is not logical to have two kinds of discriminations in terms of one ultimate reality.
又如所說：「非如能詮有所詮性，非如所詮有能詮性」，諸敵論者於此無疑，故遮止言，立已成過。又如所說故：「依他起自性有上，遍計所執自性本無」。此亦他論，於是無疑，故遮止言，立已成過。

In regard to what you say, “It is not like that on the basis of what can expound, that which is expounded exists, and it is also not like that on the basis of that which is expounded, that which can expound exists”, those opponents [other religious schools] do not have any doubt about this. Hence, this saying has to be removed. It has a fault to establish [this thesis]. Furthermore, in regard to what has been said, “On the basis of the nature of other-dependence, the self-nature of the imagined postulations does not exist”, this thesis also belongs to the [opponents’] thesis. They do not have any critique on this thesis. Hence, this saying has to be removed. It has a fault to establish [this thesis].

若言：「由執能詮所詮遍計所執自性有力生諸煩惱故須遮止」，此亦不然。諸禽獸等不了能詮所詮相應，亦於境界不如理執生煩惱故，具有種種堪能意樂，亦有種種微妙聖言。遍計所執自性空教，唯益少分不遍一切故，我不獨立之為空，且止傍論應辯正論。如是如前所說道理，已具成立眼自性空。

If they assert, “Because the nature of the imagined postulations which bases on the attachment of what is able to expound and what is expounded has the capacity to produce various defilements, it should be removed”, this is not acceptable. Those animals which cannot understand the correspondence between what is able to expound and what is expounded also produce defilement due to the unreasonable attachment to
the perceived objects. Because of that, they possess various capacities and pleasures, and also have various subtle sacred speeches. The teaching of the empty of the imagined nature only benefits a small part [of people] and does not pervade all. Thus, I do not establish it only as emptiness. The subordinated topic should be stopped. The main topic should be debated. Thus, just as the reasons which have been explained, the empty self-nature of eyes has been established.

2.2.3. Responding to some theorists

[T30, 272c12]【難】復有餘師作如是難：「此能遮破有自性言，若是實有，失所立宗，「因」成不定。若非實有，即無自性，不成能破」。

[Objection:] Some other scholars object, “If the language which is able remove self-nature is really existent, you lose your thesis. That is because the reasoning becomes undecided. If is not really existent, it has no self-nature. It is not able to destroy [self-nature. ]

[T30, 272c14]【答】此亦不然。如世尊說：「梵志當知，一切所說『實非實言』，我皆說為非實非妄」。由此聖教及諸已說、當說道理，就勝義諦，實與不實皆不建立。是故無有如所說過。

[Answer:] This is not true. For example, the Bhagavān has said, “Brahmin! You should know that all that have been pronounced, ‘truth or untruth’ I declared that they are neither true nor false.” According to such a noble teaching and the reasons which have been expounded and will be expounded, in terms of ultimate reality, the true and untrue both cannot be established. Therefore, there is no such fault like what you say.
Moreover, to respond to what you mean and the reason you say that because the negated does not exist, the negating does not exist as well. It is false that the negated can exist when the negating does not exist. Only because the negated does not have a self-nature, the negating does not exist, too. The only virtue of the negation is to show that the negated is without intrinsic nature. It is not able to destroy the intrinsic nature of the negated. For example, it is said, “A Bodhisattva does not make things empty through emptiness. All things are themselves empty of intrinsic nature, and so on.”416

Again, for example, when the perceiver perceives the object, it should not be said that because the perceived object such as a pitcher, a cloth and so on does not exist, the perceiver does not exist. It also should not be said that the nature of the perceived object which did not exist before appears now.

Moreover, the pairs such as the negating and that which is negated, proof and refutation, and the mistaken and the unmistaken we establish are all conventionally existent. If you reject that which is proved and proof, you violate your own thesis. The expression which is able to negate is not able to prove because [the expression] does not have a true nature, just like the sound made by the son of a barren woman. If you allow that [the expression] is able to prove the inference, I do, too. That is because it is conventionally existent which has been explained above. Let this extensive argument end because those who dislike the extensive lengths are unable to retain it.

Therefore, the inferential perception mentioned above does not have those obstacles. Hence, the established thesis, “The eyes are empty in nature in terms of the true nature” should be logically valid. Furthermore, regarding the so-established reasoning, “because of produced by conditions” is a brief example used to remove the so-called self-nature of eyes. There are other reasons [which can be the reasoning] such as ‘destructible’, ‘difference because of conditions’, ‘producible’, and ‘wrong and right views occur
occasionally.’ On the basis of those reasons, according to what [those reasons] should respond to and treat with, [those unrighteous views] should be destroyed.

[T30, 273a06]【難】復有說言：「眼實有性，彼相因果皆現有故，非實性空現有相等，現見眼等，相等現有。是故眼等非實性空」。

【答】此就勝義無同喻故，有性不成；若就世俗共知實性，便立已成。又依同喻因成相違，同喻唯有世俗性故。

[Objection:] Moreover, someone says, “Eyes really have a nature because their figures, causes and effects are all existent. Those which are empty in nature cannot manifest the existences of figures and so on. The eyes and figures immediately perceived are presenting right now. Therefore, eyes, etc. are not empty in their true nature.”

[Answer:] If this thesis is based on ultimate reality, because it does not have parallel example, the nature cannot be established. If it is based on the true nature commonly known in conventional reality, you establish what is already proved. Furthermore, the parallel example is contradictory to the reasoning because a parallel example only has a conventional nature.

3. Sub-conclusion

3.1 The emptiness of all dharma

3.1.1 The emptiness of the twelve āyatana
Just as the eyes-media are empty in nature in terms of true nature, in the same manner, the faculties such as ears, nose, tongue, body, mind, and perceived objects such as color, sound, smell, taste, touching, and cognitions are also empty in nature. The one who practices meditation should thus realize the empty nature.

3.1.2 The emptiness of all other dharmas

Moreover, in terms of true nature, those such as aggregations, elements, conditions, mindfulness, thorough abandoning, supernatural powers, faculties, powers, branches of enlightenment, perfections, concentrations, mnemonic formula, various knowledge, ten mightiness, fearlessness, exclusive dharma, omniscience etc. should be generally and individually considered to be empty in nature. The one who practices meditation should thus realize the empty nature.

3.1.3 The emptiness of the assertions in other religions

Moreover, in terms of true nature, those such as aggregations, elements, conditions, mindfulness, thorough abandoning, supernatural powers, faculties, powers, branches of enlightenment, perfections, concentrations, mnemonic formula, various knowledge, ten mightiness, fearlessness, exclusive dharma, omniscience etc. should be generally and individually considered to be empty in nature. The one who practices meditation should thus realize the empty nature.
Also, the imagined postulations of other religions such as greatness, self-attachment, subtle elements, fundamental element, qualities, truth, virtues, actions etc. are all subsumed in the twelve-source because their characteristics belong to [the twelve-source]. The one who practices meditation should thus realize the empty nature.

3.2 The wisdom obtained from meditation (Bhāvanāmayī)

[T30, 273a22] 如是雖由思擇力故，悟人性空，闕修習力，譬如眾鳥翅羽初生未能作用，故復精勤習修習力。如眩瞖者，餌能遣除眩瞖藥故，眼得清淨，離諸麁大髮蚊蠅等明見境界。

Thus, even though some realize the emptiness according to the strength of reflection, they still lack the strength of the wisdom obtained from meditation. For example, the wings of a just born bird are not able to function. Hence, they have to diligently cultivate the strength of practice. For example, those who have eye-disease, because they take eye-medicines, will purify their eyes and obtain the state of clear vision which is free from rough hairs, mosquitoes and flies.

3.3 The non-conceptual wisdom

[T30, 273a25] 如是勤習修習力故，除遣執取有為相垢疑惑邪智。修真觀行初現前時，不由他緣受妙喜樂，不取一切有為相故。不取一切施物、施者及受者故，不取一切施者、受者及施果故，二種三輪皆得清淨，乃能正勤攝受無量福智資糧二種重擔。終不貪求現、非現果，亦不愛樂現事當果。親近供養所愛有德種種天神。亦不妄執德為作者、我為作者、大自在天、極微性等。常修大捨。
Thus, because of diligently cultivating the strength of practice, one is able to remove the indecisive and wrong knowledge which attach to the figures of conditioned things. As long as the cultivation of the true meditation presents, one receives subtle joys and happiness without relying on other conditions because of attaching to no figures. Without any attachment to all donatives, donators, and donatories as well as without attachment to givers, receivers and the reward of giving, with the purification of the two kinds of three spheres, one is able to diligently collect the two-fold countless accumulation of merits and wisdom. One never seeks for present and non-present rewards and never desires the reward caused by the current events. When serving and offering [things to] the beloved deities, [one should] not mistakenly consider virtue as the doer, self as doer or attach to the lord of gods, atoms and so on. One always practices great giving.

[T30, 273b05] 如是等事皆由已說當說正理證得，一切有為無為、所破能破法性空故。如世尊言：「菩薩不應安住諸事行於布施，都無所住應行布施，乃至廣說」。

418 又世尊言：「若諸菩薩有情想轉，不應說名真實菩薩」。419 又世尊言：「無有

417 The first three-spheres (trimandala-parisuddhi) are gifts, givers, and recipients, and the second three-spheres are givers, recipients and the reward of giving.
418 The idea of “A bodhisattva should not attach to various things to perform donation” can be found everywhere in Prajñāpāramitā scriptures. The best example is the Vajracchedikā where the Buddha expounds that one should perform all deeds without any attachment. See F. M. Müller. In Buddhist Mahāyāna Sūtras (SEB, vol.49, 1894), 111~144.
419 The idea of “The bodhisattva who holds the concept of sentient beings in mind should not be called a real bodhisattva” can be found in Prajñāpāramitā scriptures. The followings are some references (T7, 825b) and (T7, 1017a).
Those things have been approved by means of the valid reasons which have been expounded or will be expounded because all conditioned and unconditioned things, and the negated and the negating are empty in their dharma-nature. For example, the Bhagavān has said, “A bodhisattva should not be attached to various things when giving. [A bodhisattva] should perform giving without any attachment. . . .” The Bhagavān further said, “The bodhisattva who holds the concept of sentient beings in mind should not be called a real bodhisattva.” The Bhagavān further said, “There is nothing that one can call a vow for the bodhisattva-vehicle. Bodhisattvas do not even diligently practice noble actions to desire parinirvāṇa, let alone have a desire for the cycle of birth-death in the three realms.

[T30, 273b12] 如是正修一切有為性空觀已, 復應正觀若自性空即無有生, 若無有生即無過去未來現在, 於其三世無有障礙, 正觀三世皆清淨相。依前所說無顛倒理, 三輪清淨趣大菩提。如有問言：「曼殊室利! 云何菩薩趣大菩提？」答言：

「梵志!應如菩提」。復問：「云何為菩提？」答曰：「梵志! 此非過去, 亦非未來及以現在」。421是故菩薩應觀三世皆清淨相, 三輪清淨趣大菩提。

420 The idea of this citation can be found in Vajracchedikā. F. M. Müller, In Buddhist Mahāyāna Sūtras 111–144.

421 The entire conversation can be found in Da Po Ro Jing (大般若經) No.574 translated by Xuan zang (玄奘) (T7, 964).
After having cultivated the view of the empty nature of conditioned things, [a Bodhisattva] should further observe that the empty nature means non-occurring, and due to non-occurring, there is no past, present, and future. [A Bodhisattva] will not be obstructed by the three divisions of time through properly observing the pure characteristics of all three divisions of time. [A Bodhisattva] according to the non-reversed reasons mentioned above will achieve the great awakening to the purity of the three spheres. For example, someone asks, “Mañjuśrī! How can a Bodhisattva achieve the great awakening?” [Mañjuśrī] responds, “Brahmin! Be correspondent with awakening.” Someone further asks, “What is called awakening?” [Mañjuśrī] responds, “Brahmin! There is no past, present, and future.” Therefore, a Bodhisattva should observe that the three divisions of time are all pure characteristics and achieve the great awakening with the purification of three spheres.
大乘掌珍論卷下

*Mahāyāna Karatalaratna Śastra* (Bottom Section)

清辯菩薩造

Written by the Bodhisattva Bhāviveka

大長三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

Translated by the Great Tang Tripiṭaka Dharma Master Xuanzang in honour of the emperor
III. The emptiness of unconditioned dharma

1. The establishment of a formal proof statement

(T30, 273b23) 如是已說修觀行者總相悟入有為性空, 而未悟入無為性空。若不開示無由悟入。若不悟入無分別慧，能趣人行終不得成。為開示故復說是言：「無為無有實，不起似空花」。

In this way, it has been generally stated that the yogi should realize the empty nature of conditioned things. However, the empty nature of unconditioned things has not been introduced. Without an explanation, there is no access for realization. Without realization of non-conceptual wisdom, the capacity for achieving [awakening] cannot be obtained. In order to explain, I have further stated, “Unconditioned things do not have any essences and, hence, are not arising like the flower in the sky.

1.1 Subject: definition of unconditioned dharma

[T30, 273c03] 此中簡別立宗言詞即上真性，須簡別意，如前應知。就真性故立無為空，非就世俗。非有為故名無為，翻對有為是無為義，即是虛空、擇、非擇滅及真如性。謂前所除法處一分。

422 The Chinese term “實有”(shiyou) or “實物有”(shiwuyou) means “real or substantial existence”. According to Hirakawa Akira, 俱舍論索引 II (Kusharon SakuinII/ The Index of Kośa II) (Tokyo: Daizo, 1977), 430, in Xuan Zang’s Chinese translation, its Sanskrit is “dravyatas” which means “as a substance”, “as a thing”, “as an object”, “as an elementary substance.” Also see Monier Williams 501. This term is connected with the concept of svabhāva by Sarvāstivādin. Here, ‘無有實’ (wu shi/ no essences) exactly has the same meaning of emptiness which is to deny the concept of self-nature.

423 In MHK, there is the similar argument. Eckel Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents, 294. 不起(bu qig) directly means ‘non-arising.’ That is because the sky-flowers are merely a delusive creation of an ill-eyes, and they do not even exist conventionally. That is different from mirage. The sky-flowers are a simile to explain that the non-composite dharmas do not even arise.
Herein, the expression for a distinguishing condition of the thesis is ‘in reality’ mentioned above. It should be known like the previous chapter that the thesis has to be distinguished. Conditioned things are established as emptiness in term of true nature and not [in terms of] conventional reality. Unconditioned things are called ‘non-composite’ because they are not conditioned things. Unconditioned things are the opposite of conditioned things and include space, analytical cessation, non-analytical cessation and \textit{tathatā}.\footnote{In different Buddhist texts, the classifications of dharmas are different. In \textit{Abhidharmakośa}, there are only three unconditioned dharmas which are space, analytical cessation, and non-analytical cessation. Poussin trans., \textit{Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam} 59. \textit{Mahāyānapaścaskandhaprakaraṇa} has four which are exactly same as what this text lists, i.e. space, analytical cessation, non-analytical cessation and \textit{tathatā} (T31, 850a). However, in \textit{百法明門論} (the Demonstration to the Gate by One Hundred Dharma), there are six non-composite dharmas: space, analytical cessation, non-analytical cessation, \textit{āniñjya}, \textit{saṁjñāvedayitanirodh}, and \textit{tathatā} (T31, 855c). These three texts were all composed by Vasubandhu.} This is to single out a portion of the dharma-source of [the twelve-sources] mentioned above.

\textbf{[T30, 273c06]}先顯悟入虛空性空，易開示故。唯就空無有質礙物，世間共立名虛空故，由此為門悟入所餘無為空性。即此世間所知虛空，就真性故空無有實，是名立宗。

The realization of the empty nature of space will be indicated first because it is easy to explain. The space which is not occupied by any material matters is conventionally and universally established as so-called ‘space.’ In this manner, it serves as a doorway for realization of the empty natures of other conditioned things. The space conventionally perceived is empty without any substance in terms of true nature. This is the establishment of the thesis.
1.2 Reason

[T30, 273c10] According to this establishment, in terms of the true nature, there is no true space because both proponents and opponents accept that it is 'non-arising' or 'conventionally established as non-arising things.' This is called 'the reason.'

1.3 Example

[T30, 273c12] Because flowers in the sky have no essence and are not arising, it is established as a parallel example. There is no need to remove the different kinds, and hence, there is no counter example. It should be known as [discussed] above.

1.4 The establishment of inference

[T30, 273c14] In this chapter, the establishment of inference is discussed. It states: 'In terms of the true nature, space has no essence and is not arising. Both parties agree that it is a non-arising thing. This is called 'the reason.'

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Here, how to establish the inference? Answer, “In terms of reality, space has no substance because it is not arising. Both the wise and foolish ones commonly know that those which do not arise do not have a true nature like the flower in the sky. The established reason ‘non-arising’ is just a listed example. There are other reasons such as ‘unmade’, ‘uncreated’, ‘non-destroyable’ and so on. Those reasons are able to negate the so-called nature of unconditioned things. Therefore, according to how they respond, they are all considered to be reasons. For example, one says, ‘You should guard the curd from the crows.’ The purpose is to guard [the curd] from damage by [animals] including cats, rats, etc.

2. Respond to Objections

2.1 The unconditioned dharma in Buddhist schools

2.1.1 Respond to Vaibhāṣikas

[T30, 273c21]【問】毘婆沙師咸作是難：「若所立宗無為無實, 是無有義。『空處等至』即無所緣, 云何得有。然無障礙是虛空相」。

[Objections]: The Vaibhāṣikas object, “If the thesis, ‘unconditioned things do not have any essences’ that you have established means ‘nothingness’, the ‘contemplation of

infinite space’ will not have a perceived object.\textsuperscript{426} How can this contemplation exist? However, the unobstructed is the characteristic of space.”\textsuperscript{427}

[T30, 273c23]【答】此若方便立比量言：「空處等至實有所緣，或境實有是等至故，或是等至所緣境故如餘等至，或如彼緣」。其餘等至及彼所緣，是有為故，已辯性空則無同喻。此就勝義辯虛空相。若就世俗所立，虛空亦非實有，以不起故，猶如空花。由此比量，彼所建立實有不成。又即由此我所說因，汝言等至所緣境故，因有決定相違過失。是故我先所立義成無障難故。

[Answer]: If this is a means to establish the inferential argument, “The contemplation of infinite space really has a perceived object, or the real object is [the essence of] the contemplation, or because of such a perceived object, there is such a contemplation like other contemplations or their perceived objects,” it does not have any parallel examples which has been argued for its empty nature [above] because other contemplations and their perceived objects are conditioned things. [The current argumentation] is to argue the characteristic of space from ultimate reality. From the conventional establishment, space is not real existence as well because it does not occur like the flower in the sky. According to this inference, the substantial existence they establish is not valid. Moreover, due to the same reason I just mentioned, the reason you propose, “because of

\textsuperscript{426} 空處等至 ākāśānāntyāyatana (contemplation of infinite space) is one of the of the four formless contemplations. The practitioners take the space as their perceived object to practice this contemplation.

\textsuperscript{427} This is the definition that the Sarvāstivādin gave to space. In Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, it says, “Space has for its nature not hindering matter which, in fact, takes place freely in space; and also of not being hindered by matter, for space is not displaced by matter.” Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (California: Asian Humanities Press, 1988), 59.
such a perceived object, there is such contemplation” definitely has the fault of contradiction. Hence, the thesis I establish has no obstacle.

2.1.2 Respond to the criticism of a similar locus

[T30, 274a03] 【問】自部他部有作是言：『若『就真性虛空無實，以不起故』，此言義准『起者皆實』。若言：『起者亦無有實』，是則此因不遍同品，因性不成』。

[Objection:] In both our school and other schools, someone argues, “The meaning of the assertion ‘in terms of reality, space is not real because it is not arisen’ promises that wherever arises must be real. If [you] assert that what arises is also not real, the reason does not pervade in a similar locus.” Therefore, the reason is not established.

428 In fact, there are two different concepts for space for Sarvastivadin: space (nabhas) and space (ākāśa). The space which the eye-consciousness can perceive is nabhas and belongs to the category of form (rupa). Contrary to nabha, ākāśa is an unconditioned dharma. (T 29, 2b). The perceived object of the contemplation of infinite space is nabha but not ākāśa. It is certainly unreasonable to use the perceived object of the contemplation of infinite space to establish the existence of ākāśa.

429 In the Buddhist logic, a valid reason must satisfy three requirements which are called three characteristics of reason. 1) the “inferring property” (sādhanadharma) has to be present in the subject of the syllogism, 2) it has to be present in another subject that possesses the inferred property (sādhyanadharma), 3) and it has to be absent in any subject that does not possess the inferred property. A “subject that possesses the inferred property” is called a sapakṣa or “similar locus.” M.D. Eckel, Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2008), 54.
【答】此是「義准相似過類」似不成過。此審定言：「諸不起者皆無有實」，非審定言：「諸無實者悉皆不起」。雖復勤勇無間所發，不遍同品亦許為因，故此無過。

[Answer:] This is the fault of mistakenly interpreting a thesis. 431 [My] Expression is to confirm, “Everything which is not produced is unreal” but not to confirm, “Everything which is not real does not arise.” Things produced immediately with human effort, though it does not pervade all similar locus, can still be a valid reason. 432 Hence, there is no fault in my thesis.

2.1.3 Respond to the criticism of example

[T30, 274a10]【問】有餘難言：「虛空有性，世共知故。花亦有性，噓鉢羅等世現見故。空、花二種雖不相應，非無自性。故空花喻所立不成」。

[Objection:] Someone objects, “Space has a nature because all people conventionally know that. A flower has a nature, for example, the blue lotus which cannot be seen in the

430 The Chinese term 勤勇無間所發 (prayatnānantarīyakatva) means “produced with human effort” according to Śaṅkarasvāmin’s Nyāyapraveśaka. (T 32, 11b~12a) For example, a pot and thunder are both produced. A pot is produced by human effort but not thunder.

431 The fault of mistakenly interpreting a thesis is the seventh fault of the fourteen faults in Buddhist logic. It means that opponents accuse a thesis by mistakenly interpreting the thesis. Here, Bhāviveka tries to say that his proposition should not be twisted.

432 This is an exception that a valid reason can be established. Commonly, a valid reason should be able to be applied to all similar loci. However, the reason of human effort cannot be applied to all similar loci. For example, a pot and thunders are similar locus because they are both produced and hence impermanent. Even though the reason of human effort can only be applied to a pot and not to thunders, it is still considered to be a valid reason. (see Śaṅkarasvāmin’s Nyāyapraveśaka, T 32, 11b).
Although these two kinds, i.e., space and a flower are not relevant, that does not mean that they do not have a self-nature. Hence, the example of a flower in the sky is not valid.

[T30, 274a12] 【答】此難不然，此空花喻就第六轉依士訓釋。空之花故說名空花。此既非有故，「喻」非無。由此道理修觀行者應正悟入虛空性空。於擇滅等三種無為性空道理亦當悟入。

[Answer:] This critique is not reasonable. The example of the compound *kha-puspam* (sky-flower) should be interpreted according to the sixth rule of *tat-puruṣa*. The flower in the sky (*khasya puspam*) is called sky-flower. Because [the sky-flower] does not exist, this example is not inexistential. According to this reasoning, a practitioner should realize the empty nature of the space as well as realize the empty nature of the other three non-conditioned things, i.e., analytical cessation and so forth.

2.1.4 Respond to the criticism of Vaibhāṣikas

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433呖鉢羅 (Yupoluo), according to most of the Chinese explanation, is referred to some kind of lotus, which will turn into blue color in a cold weather, and hence, it is called blue lotus. See, 俱舍論疏, “呖鉢羅者此云青蓮華。寒轉增故身色變青如青蓮華(T41, 616b). 俱舍論記, “此云青蓮華。巖寒逼切身變拆裂如青蓮華”(T41, 187a). “呖鉢羅花: 上溫骨反唐云青蓮花其花青色葉細細長香氣遠聞人間難有 無熱惱大龍池中亦或名優鉢羅聲傳皆一也” (T54, 324b).

434In Sanskrit grammar, there are six ways to interpret a compound. The first one is called *tat-puruṣa* which is the text indicates here. The Chinese term “依士訓” (*Yi shi xun*) is the translation of *tat-puruṣa*. In the interpretation of *tat-puruṣa*, the pre-word is the cause for the post-word which is the subject, and there are possible six cases for the subject. The sixth cause is the locative. That means that in the compound sky-flowers, the sky should be in locative case, and the compound should be interpreted as the flowers in the sky.
【問】毘婆沙師不忍遮破擇滅無為，復作是難：「佛說擇滅對治有為故名出離。若謗言無，汝等便有違宗過失。又世尊說：『喜貪俱行諸受盡滅，名為涅槃寂靜微妙』。云何言無？

[Objection:] The Vaibhāṣikas cannot support the refutation of the unconditioned [dharma] of analytical cessation, and object, “The Buddha taught analytical cessation to counteract conditioned things. It is called renunciation [of the world]. If it is slandered to be inexistent, you commit the fault of conflicting with our teaching. Moreover, the Bhagavan said, ‘the eradication of craving accompanied by joyful desire is called \textit{nirvāṇa}, peaceful and subtle.’ How can you say it is not so?”

[T30, 274a20] 【答】此中世尊欲令所化於有為境勤修厭離，於無為境隨順欣樂故，就世俗說有擇滅、出離、涅槃、寂靜、微妙。如佛說有化生有情，說有無為涅槃亦爾。許此有故，無違宗過。但就真性遮破擇滅。故世尊言：「諸有尋求涅槃有性，我說癡人外道弟子，乃至廣說」。又言：「如來不見生死及以涅槃，言涅槃者如來假立，此中都無涅槃自性，乃至廣說」。

[Answer:] Herein, the Bhagavān, in order to make the cultivated [sentient beings] to diligently practice the renouncement from the conditioned objects and desire the
unconditioned objects, taught the analytical cessation, renouncement, *nirvāṇa*, calm, and subtlety in term of conventional reality. For example, the Buddha said there are sentient beings born by transformed (*aupapādaka*) and with the same manner, [the Buddha said] there is unconditioned *nirvāṇa*. To agree with its existence does not conflict with our teaching. The [unconditioned dharma of] analytical cessation is refuted from reality. For example, the Bhagavān said, “Those who seek the nature of the unconditioned *nirvāṇa* are considered by me to be the fool disciples of other religions, and so forth.” He also said, “The *tathāgata* does not see *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. The so-called *nirvāṇa* is conventional designated by the *tathāgata*. There is no the self-nature of *nirvāṇa* at all, and so forth.”

[T30, 274a23] 亦無誹謗聖諦過失。以就世俗說有愛苦畢竟不生、出離、涅槃、寂靜、微妙，無顛倒故。非就勝義說有愛苦畢竟不生本性寂滅名為滅諦。由此聖教及所說理，就真性故說無擇滅無此過失。

[My thesis] also does have the fault of denigrating the noble truths. That is because in terms of conventional reality, it is expressed that there are the ultimate non-arising of joy and suffering, [and there are] renouncement, *nirvāṇa*, calm, and subtlety. It is non-reversal. It is not demonstrated from the ultimate reality that there is the ultimate non-

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437 The textual citations that Bhāviveka uses to retort are from Mahāyānasūtra, especially, *prājñapāramitāsūtras*. In *Mahāprājñāpāramitāsūtra*, it says, “Bhagavān! Those who practice the profound *prājñāpāramitā* neither detest the faults of the *samsāra* nor desire for the merits of *nirvāṇa*. Why? Those who practice this teaching do not even see *samsāra* so that they do detest. They also do not even see *nirvāṇa* so that they will not desire.” (世尊！修學甚深般若波羅蜜多，不為厭離生死過失，不為欣樂涅槃功德。所以者何？修此法者不見生死，況有厭離！不見涅槃，況有欣樂！) 大般若波羅蜜多經 (T7, 965a).
arising of joy and suffering, and the quiescence by nature is called “truth of cessation.”

According to the noble teaching and the principle expressed by it, in terms of ultimate reality, there is not any fault to assert that there is no analytical cessation.

2.1.5 Respond to Nyaiyāyika’s criticism of nihilism

[Objection:] Someone who is not skilful in logical argument objects thus, “In regard to the thesis you establish, because ‘the non-conditioned things are not real,’ non-conditioned things do not exist, the [thesis] you establish cannot be established and the reason you rely on also cannot be valid. Because a sky-flower does not exist, the example is invalid. The thesis, reason, and example all have faults.”

[Answer:] This objection is false. With setting force as ‘there is nothing,’ one sets up a vacuity. From wisdom, one points out that there is no affliction that arises, and sets up cessation. From the lack of connections, one says that there is no arising, and sets up non-cessation. On there being no existence of everything engaged in, one sets up true existence. With setting force allowing for provisional vacuity, etc., one does not show the difference. One jointly sets up the existence. Differences are left, not being common knowledge, one sets up the thesis. Thus, for things arising, one sets up the reason. Because of this, there is no establishment of the thesis, reason. Therefore, there is no reason for the thesis failing to be established.

438 Truth of cessation is a English translation of the term 無為 (miegādi/nirodha-āryasatya). It is the third noble truth of the four noble truths in early Buddhist teaching. According to this explanation, Bhāviveka thinks that the four noble truths are not an ultimate reality but merely conventional expressions.
[Answer:] This critique is not reasonable. Only the lack of material matters is established as space by the force of conception. Only the non-arising of the defilements is established as analytical cessation through analysis of wisdom. Only the non-arising of anything is established as non-analytical cessation due to the lack of various conditions. Only the non-attachment to all things is established as true thusness. Because space and so forth are conventionally expressed by the conventional strength of conception, there is not any difference between [you and me] in regard to the inferring property which is commonly established by our consensus. My proposition which is different [from yours] and cannot be understood by you is to negate your disagreement and thus, established as thesis. The non-occurring of those [non-conditioned things] which are commonly known are established as the reasoning. Hence, there is no any fault in both the thesis and reasoning. Although the so-called sky-flower does not have any substance, it possesses same the nature, i.e. no-substance as the content of the non-arising existence.

According to Yogācāryabhūmi, in Xuan Zang’s translation, the various Chinese terms such as 施設, 假名, 假立, 假名施設 and so on are the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit prajñapti which could be translated as, convention, designation, or conventional designation. See: Jaidev Singh, An Introduction to Madhyamaka Philosophy (Taipei: ShinWun Fong,1990), 135. Thomas E. Wood, Nāgārjunian Disputations: A Philosophical Journey through an Indian Looking-Glass (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications,1995), 296. D. J. Kalupahana, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1996), 339.

According to the commentary, the thesis, “the non-composite existences are not substantial” cannot be understood by others who consider the non-composite existences to be substantial. This is called difference. Since the author uses his thesis to negate others’ theory, this is called “negating your disagreement.” (論主依勝義諦「無為無實」，外人依勝義諦「無為是實」。然我無實之理，非汝外人之所共知，故言差別。我今立無實之言，遮遣汝有實之語。故言遮遣非所共知立為宗法也) (X87, 545a).

According to the commentary, the author means that the sky-flower does not have any object substance, i.e., it never occurs because it is only produced by an eye-disease. Non-composite dharma which is not occurring has the non-nature as its nature. From the perceptive of non-occurring, the sky-flower can function as an example to support both reason and thesis. “此空華雖無實體。而是因法所依之有法同喻。何以故。以無有實體性。與無為同故。由是能成所成立義”(X87, 545b).
means of this, the establishment and the established are accomplished. Therefore, there is no fault of lack of subject matter [for the example].

2.1.6 Objection of Vaibhāšikā’ analytical cessation

[T30, 274b16]【問】毘婆沙師復作是說：「此亦不然，擇滅實有，道所緣故，違煩惱故。非無實法可有是事」。

[Objection:] The Vaibhāṣikās further state, “This [negation of analytical cessation] is not reasonable. The analytical cessation exists substantially because it is the perceived object of the path and opposes the defilements. Not any unreal existence can have those functions.”

[T30, 274b17]【答】此言唯有遮異品故。如遮虛空實有性故，此已具破不應重執。

[Answer:] This proposition can only remove the different locus of examples. [It can be] negated like the negation of the substantial existence of space. This argument has been rejected before and, it should not be apprehended in this way again.

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442 According to the Commentary of Karatalaratna, in the Vaibhāṣikās’ proposition, the reason such as the violation of the defilement that the Vaibhāṣikās propose to support their thesis does not really support their thesis (i.e., The selective extinction exists substantially) because there is no any parallel example, but it removes other substantial existence such as space instead because the reason violates the second requirement of the three. That is, according to this proposition, any substantial existence must be violated to defilement. However, it is not true because some substantial existence such as space does not violate any defilement (X87, 545b).

443 The author means that first, there is no parallel example, and second, it cannot be accepted to used being a perceived object to prove its realistic existence because if it was a perceived object, it could not be a non-composite existence.
2.1.7 Response to Sautrāntika criticism about space

[T30, 274b20] 還部諸師咸作是說：「立虛空等皆非實有，如是比量，立已成過」。

[Objection:] The Sautrāntikans say, “In regard to the [thesis] that space and so forth do not exist substantially; this inferential perception commits a fault as soon as it has been established.”

[T30, 274b21] 若此義言：『有礙色等無性為體』，非立已成，辯彼無故。所立宗言：「無為無實」，此言正遣執實有性，亦復傍遣執實無性。

[Answer]: If your thesis means, “the nature of [space] is the nature of the lack of material matters,” it is spontaneously valid. That is because you argue for its non-existence. The expression of my thesis, ‘unconditioned things have no substance’ primarily removes the attachment of substance and secondarily, removes the attachment of true non-substance.

2.1.8 Respond to Tāmraśāṭiyikas objection of the emptiness of space

444 Sautrāntikas claim that the three non-composite existences do not have any substance. In Abhidharmakośa, it says, “The Sautrāntikas affirm that three types of unconditioned things are not real. Three dharmas that it refers to are not distinct and real entities like color, sensation, etc.” Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, 280. Also(T29, 34).

445 According to the commentary of Karatalaratna, this sentence is showing the difference between Bhāviveka and Sautrāntikas. For Bhāviveka, the non-composite existences do not have substances only from the ultimate reality but according to the conventional reality, they are existent substantially. While affirming the unsubstantial existence of the non-composite existences, Sautrāntikans do not have such distinction (X87, 548b).
【問】銅錠部師復作是說：「諸間隙色說名虛空，我宗立彼是有為故。汝遣無為立已成過」。

[Objection:] The Tāmraśāṭīyikas say, “The interval color-form between material matters is called space and established as conditioned things by our school. You consider it to be non-conditioned things and criticize. Hence, you have a fault.

【答】有為自性如前已遣，故亦不然。

[Answer:] The self-nature of conditioned things has been removed as above, and hence your argument is not reasonable.

毘婆沙師與犢子部，所執多同，應如彼破。

Vaibhāṣikas and Vātsīputrīyās hold the same ideas. Thus, they can be rejected by the same argument.

2.1.9 The critiques on parinispanna of Yogācāra

【問】相應論師有作是說：「於勝義上更無勝義，『真如』即是諸法勝義，故就勝義說真如空，此言稱理。而言真如非實有者，此不稱理。云何出世無分別智及此後得清淨世智緣無為境。是應正理」。
[Objection:] The Yogācāra-theorists make such an assertion, “Beyond the ultimate reality, there is no other ultimate reality. Tathatā is the ultimate reality of all things.” Hence, in terms of ultimate reality, Tathatā is considered to be empty. This assertion is reasonable. The assertion that Tathatā does not truly exist is not reasonable. [If your thesis is true,] how can the supermundane non-conceptual wisdom and the subsequently attained pure mundane wisdom have nothingness as their object? Therefore, [our assertion] should be reasonable.”

[T30, 274c03] 【答】實不應理。如說此智緣無為境，不應正理；如是此智緣有為境，亦不應理。非執真如實有應理，此實有性難成立故。緣真如智非真出世無分別智，有所緣故及有為故。如此緣智。

[Answer:] [Your assertion] is really unreasonable. Neither the assertion that this wisdom has nothing as its object nor the assertion that this wisdom has something as its object is reasonable. It is not that the assertion that Tathatā is substantial is reasonable because this substantial nature is very difficult to prove. The wisdom that has the Tathatā as its object is not the real supermundane non-conceptual wisdom because [it] has had an object and because [it] has been conditioned, just like any other knowledge which can perceive [is not the supermundane non-conceptual wisdom].

446 In Trīṃśikāvijñānti, the 25th verse has the same affirmation. It says, “In all existence the ultimate reality which is Tathātā...” (dharmānāṁ paramārthaśca sa yatastathatāpi). Tao-hui Huo (霍韜晦). Sthiramati’s Commentary on Trīṃśikāvijñānti-bhāṣya: A Chinese Translation with Notes and Interpretation (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1978), 203.
447 The discussion that the reality should not be treated as an object can be found in MHK 5.9. See Eckel, Bhāviveka 286~7.
[T30, 274c07] 是故經言：「曼殊室利！慧眼何見？答言：『慧眼都無所見』」。
又說：「『云何名勝義諦？』答言：『此中智尚不行，況諸名字』」。又說：
「『梵志！如來菩提非能現觀』」。又契經言：「曼殊室利！云何見諦？答言：
『此中無法可見憶持』」。此等諸契經者，不應許此無分別智是能現觀及緣真如。

Therefore, the sūtra says, “‘Mañjuśrī! What do wisdom-eyes see?’ Answer: ‘they see
nothing,’” and says, “‘what is ultimate reality?’ Answer, ‘Herein, even knowledge does
not operate, let alone those names,’” and further says, “Brahmin! The enlightenment of
the Tathāgata cannot be observed directly.” Moreover, the sūtra says, “‘Mañjuśrī! What
does it mean to realize reality?’ Answer, ‘Herein, there is nothing to be realized.’” Those
sūtras do not allow non-conceptual wisdom to be the one which can directly take Tathatā
as an object to perceive.

[T30, 274c12] 又彼真如非真勝義，是所緣故，猶如色等。

Moreover, that Tathatā is not the true ultimate reality because it is an object of
perception like color and so forth.

[T30, 274c14] 又汝所說「於勝義上更無勝義」如是等言，若於此上空無此，故
說名為空。諸衣綢上更無衣綢，牧羊人等亦共了知，彼亦應名見真理者。

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448 This citation is from 大寶積經 (Dabaojijing/*Ratnakūṭasūtra), “Ultimate reality is not something on
which the mind can work, let alone can be interpreted by language.” (勝義諦者，所謂若於是處尚非心
行，況復文字而能陳說. T11, 300c). Also, Braarvig, Jens. Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra: Vol.2 (Oslo: Solum
Forlag, 1993), 73.
In regard to your statement, ‘there is no other ultimate reality upon ultimate reality and so forth’,[if you mean that] because there is emptiness of this upon this, it is called emptiness, [the statement] that upon the cloth of silk fabric, there is no other cloth of silk fabric has been commonly understood by shepherds, and hence, those shepherds should be called the one who has realized the truth.

[T30, 274c17] 又為對治諸惡見故說如是空，於勝義上更有勝義，此類惡見曾未有故，不應遮彼說如是空。

Furthermore, in order to refute various wrong views, emptiness has been taught. Wrong views such as, ‘there is another ultimate reality upon the ultimate reality’ have never been found. Hence, emptiness is not taught to refute a view like that.

[T30, 274c19] 又彼真如非實有性，違如前說比量理故，如說如來不見生死及以涅槃。

Again, that thusness (bhūtatathatā) does not have a true nature because it violates the inferential perception mentioned above. For example, it is mentioned [in the sūtra] that the tathāgata does not see birth-death and nirvāṇa.

[T30, 274c20] 已正了知非有顛倒所起煩惱，本性畢竟無生自性。如是正知本性畢竟，非是正知非不正知。
[One] has realized that the nature of the defilement produced by the misunderstanding of the non-existence ultimate does arise. Thus, the ultimate realization of the nature [of the defilement] is neither realization nor non-realization.

[T30, 274c23] 由此聖教應知，真如唯是一切分別永滅，非實有性，非離非有。實性真如轉依為相，法身成就。由得觀空真對治道，一切分別遍計所執種子所依異熟識中分別等種無餘永斷。因緣無故畢竟不生。本性無生本性常住。是名如來轉依法身。如契經說：「曼殊室利! 言如來者即是畢竟本無生句，常無生法是名如來，乃至廣說」。

According to this noble teaching, it should be known that Tathatā is merely the permanent cessation of all discriminations and does not really have a nature. It is neither non-existent nor existent. The reality of Tathatā has transformation of the basis as its feature.\(^{449}\) The dharma-body has been obtained. Relying on the true path which is able to remove (defilement) by realizing emptiness, the seeds of the discrimination in the consciousness of transforming maturation (vipākavijñāna) which is basis of the seeds of imagined postulations of the all discriminations have been removed permanently without any left. Because of the lack of causes and conditions, [those seeds] never occur thoroughly. The original nature of the [Tathatā] is non-occurring and permanently stable. It is called the dharma-body of the transformation of the dependence of tathāgata. For

\(^{449}\) The concept of “the feature of the true Tathatā is the transformation of the dependence” can be found in Trīṃśikāvijñānapītī from 25th verse to 29verse. Tao-hui Huo, 46–47. Herein, 轉依 (transformation of the basis) which is āśrayasya parāvṛttis in Sanskrit means that ālayavijñāna as the basis has been transformed into dharmakāya. In detail see: L. Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna: on the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy (Tokyo: the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), 197–207.
example, the sūtra says, “Mañjuśrī! The word tathāgata is a designation of the thoroughly and originally non-produced. The dharma of the eternally unproduced is called tathāgata, and so on.”

[T30, 275a01] 若言：「真如雖離言說而是實有」，即外道我名想差別說為真如。如彼真如雖是實有，而就勝義有非有等分別不成。我亦如是，彼亦計我，雖是實有周遍常住作者受者，而離分別。以非語言所行處故，分別覺慧所不緣故，名離分別。彼教中說：「言說不行心意不證，故名為我。我相既爾」。

If you say, “Tathatā, though it separates from language, is a real thing,” it means that the ‘self’ in other religions, though the terms are different, is considered to be Tathatā. In regard to your [idea] of Tathatā, though it exists essentially, in terms of ultimate reality, it cannot be classified into either existence or inexistence. The self is in the same manner. [Other religious believers] also consider that although the self is essential existence, pervading, permanent, a doer, and a receiver, it is separated from discrimination. Because it is not the object that a language is able to operate on and not perceived by knowledge, it is called ‘separating from discrimination’. In their doctrines, it says, “Because language cannot work on it and the mind cannot perceive it, it is called ‘self’.”
【難】而復說言：「緣真如智能得解脫，非緣我智」。【答】此有何別，並無言說，有實性故。唯執朋黨，說如是言。故我不能信受如是似我真如實有非有。且止廣諍，諸有厭怖廣文義者難受持故，入真甘露已具分別。

[Objection:] They further respond, “It is able to achieve liberation to perceive the knowledge of Tathatā and not self.”

[Answer]: What is the difference [between Tathatā and self?] [You assert,] “They are both separated from language and substantial.” Only the one who attaches to a clique will say those words. Hence, I cannot accept this Tathatā which is similar to the self. They essentially exist but do not exist in language. It is time to stop the extensive debate because those who hate the extensive literatures have difficulty to accept and keep it. The argument has been clarified in the chapter of Enter into the True Ambrosia (of Heart of the Middle Way).\(^{451}\)

2.1.10 Respond to Sarvāstivādin soteriological path

[T30, 275a12]【難】復有同類乘、劣乘者作如是言：「十二處攝有為、無為定有自性，以有苦等十六聖行觀四聖諦。精勤修習見修二道，能滅見修所斷一切三界所攝煩惱熾火及令三界眾苦息故」。

[Objection:] There are other practitioners in the same vehicle and the [opponents from the] small vehicle making such an assertion, “The conditioned and unconditioned

\(^{451}\) See top section of the translation: 2.2.2-1.
things subsumed in the twelve source-medias must have a self-nature because there are sixteen noble attributes of the four noble truths such as suffering, etc.\textsuperscript{452} The diligent practice of the two paths of vision and cultivation is able to remove all of the flame of defilements which are subsumed in the three realms and could be eliminated by the [two paths of] vision and cultivation, and is able to make the various sufferings in the three realms stop.”

[T30, 275a16]【答】若不開示諸法性空，誰當能捨如是過失，誰復能修如是功德。「三乘雖有資糧根性勝解差別，現觀聖道應無差別」。如是一切我皆信受。為欲斷除煩惱障故，依世俗理，彼道差別。若離證入法無我性，不能永斷所知障故，大師應成少分解脫。「為不說言解脫解脫無差別耶」？實有此說，皆同解脫煩惱障故，作如是言，非一切種。譬如毛孔與其太虛空，性雖同非無差別。若不爾者，應不能發勝果作用如意神通，所證應非真實究竟。且止傍論應辯正論。

[Answer]: If [the Buddha] did not teach the emptiness of all dharmas, who could renounce those faults and who could practice those virtues? (The opponents respond.) “Although there are differences of accumulations, natures, and intelligence among [the practitioners] of the three vehicles, the insight into the noble path should not be different.” I believe in all of what you have said. However, in order to remove the

\textsuperscript{452} In Sarvāstivādin doctrine, when practitioners practice the four noble truths, there are four perceived objects in each noble truth which the practitioners should contemplate in order to achieve liberation. It is called \textit{ṣoḍaśāṇityādi}. They are impermanence, suffering, emptiness, no-self in the first noble truth, causes, origins, production, conditions in the second, cessation, pacification, excellence, renunciation in the third truth, and path, suitability, achievement, deliverance in the four truth. Louis de La Vallee Poussin, \textit{Abhidharmakosabahāṣya}, 1110–1113. Also (T29, 137).
defilement as obstacle, in terms of the conventional principle, there are different paths. [In fact] the one who is apart from achieving the feature of no-self of dharma should never remove the obstacle of knowledge, and hence, the great master (i.e., the Buddha) could have only achieved a small part of liberation. [The opponents respond,] “Haven’t you ever heard [the scripture] which says that [a Buddha’s] liberations and [an Arhat’s] liberations are never different?” There are exactly such words [in the scriptures.]

However, this assertion is talking about the liberation from the obstacle caused by defilement but not the liberation from all kinds of obstacles. For example, the space of a pore and the space of the universe, though they share with the same nature, are indistinct. If it was not so, [the Buddha] would not be able to generate the ubiquitous supernatural power which is the function of the surpassing fruit. His achievement is not truly ultimate. It is the time to stop the sub-argument and go back to the main argument.

2.2 The Objection to unconditioned dharma in non-Buddhist schools

[T30, 275a27] 修觀行者，如已悟入自宗所計虛空等空，亦當悟入他宗所計自性、士夫、極微、自在、時、方、命等諸句義空。

The practitioners of meditation who have realized the emptiness of non-conditioned things such as space, etc. in our religion should also realize the emptiness of those

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\(^{453}\) According to the early Buddhist texts such as Āg, Sarvāstivādin thought that the liberations between a Buddha and arhats are not different. In Māhāvibhāṣika, it says, “How do you understand the sūtra which says that there is no difference between the Buddha’s liberation and other arhats’ liberation” (又契經說當云何通？如說：如來解脫與餘阿羅漢等解脫無異。) (T27, 161c).
categories such as self-nature, person, atom, sovereign, time, space, life of other religions.\footnote{The theories of 自性 prakṛti (self-nature) and 士夫 purusah (person) belong to Sāṃkhya School, and 極微 anu, 自在 īśvara, 時 kāla, 方 dik, and 命 jīvita belong to Vaiśeṣika School.}

2.2.1-1 The Objection to Sāṃkhya philosophy

[T30, 275b01]【問】此中自性士夫論者作是難言：「我宗三界一切皆似空花轉變，非無空花。由彼是有同喻，不成違所立故」。

[Objection:] Herein, the theorists of the Self-nature and Person make such an objection, “In our teaching, all existences in the three realms are transformed [from the self-nature] like sky-flowers, and it does not mean ‘no sky-flowers.’ Since [the sky-flower] is a similar example, it does not violate the established.

【答】今應詰問：「汝言：『三界一切皆似空花轉變』，如是三界為是空花為非空花」？若言：「三界皆是空花」，違害自宗及共知故不應道理。若言：「三界非是空花」，是則為無同喻成就，失汝本宗。

[Answer:] now we should interrogate, “You say that all in the three realms are transformed like sky-flowers. Are such existences in the three realms sky-flowers or not sky-flowers?” If the answer is that those in the three realms are sky-flowers, it is not reasonable because it violates your own doctrine and common perception. If the answer is that those in the three realms are not sky-flowers, it will cause no parallel example and thus, you fail your own principle.
若言：「不失！『空花無』聲所說，三界有性故」者，且應審察。汝為謂我說「空花無」為同法喻，為說「空花」為同法喻。若汝謂我說「空花無」為同法喻，是惡審察，我說「空花」為同法喻故。若說「空花」為同法喻，即非三界，不應說言：「三界有故彼亦是有」。此言顯汝自慧輕微。又遮詮言，遮止為勝。遮所遮已，功能即盡，無能更表所遮差別。如是難辭前已具釋，故非智者心所信受。

The [opponents] respond, “We do not fail because the ‘no sky-flowers’ which is expressed by the speech has a [self] nature [like others] in the three realms,” this response should be examined. Do you mean that the ‘no sky-flowers’ I said is a parallel example or the ‘sky-flowers’ I said is a parallel example? If you mean that I said ‘no sky-flowers are a parallel,’ it is a terrible understanding because what I have said is ‘a sky-flower is a parallel example.’ If the sky-flower is considered to be a parallel example, it does not belong to the three realms, and thus, [you] should not say, ‘because others in the three realms have a self-nature, it should have a self-nature, too.” Such a speech shows your little intelligence.

Moreover, the speech which is exclusive in negating is superior in negating. After it negates what it should negate, it has exhausted its functions and does not have any capacity to distinguish what it has negated. Such kind of objections has been fully explained in the above. Hence, it cannot be accepted by the intellectuals’ mind.

2.2.1-2 The objection to Sāṃkhya: Puruṣa
【難】諸數論師復作是說：「我雖不能親現成立最勝士夫，然就共知諸變異聚方便成立，彼體實有。謂諸顯事，有性為因，有種類故。諸有種類一切皆見有性為因，如檀片等。顯事既是有種類故，有性為因。

[Objection:] The Sāṃkhya state, “Although we cannot directly establish the supreme person (puruṣa),\(^{455}\) by means of the assembly of transformation\(^{456}\) which is commonly known, it is expediently established. Its existence is substantial. Those phenomena have natures as their causes because they share the characteristics [of the natures]. Those which share the same characteristic [of the nature] are considered to have natures as their causes, for example, a slight piece of sandalwood.\(^{457}\) Because those phenomena are contained in the categories, they have natures as their causes.

[T30, 275b20] 如是顯事有能受者，所受用故。諸所受用一切皆見有能受者，如婆羅門所受飲食。顯事既是所受用故，有能受者。前說比量便為敵量之所違害」。

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\(^{455}\) For those Sāṃkhyaś, the *supreme person* is a metaphysical existence and not something which can be directly perceived by our sense-organs. That is why it cannot be directly proved. The Sanskrit puruṣa can be translated as supreme person or pure consciousness. See W. Chikafumi, “A translation of the Madhyamakahādayakārikā with the Tarkajvāla III. 137-146” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* v. 21.1(1998), 130 & 148 footnote 28. Because this translation is based on Chinese version and the Chinese term 士夫 (Sifu) means person, instead of consciousness, the word person is adopted to translate puruṣa.

\(^{456}\) 变異(bian-yi/ transformation): According to Sāṅkhya, all phenomena are transformed (變異/parināma) from the primary self-nature (prakṛti).

\(^{457}\) According to 金七十論(a book written by Vāsumandu and translated by Zhen Di regarding the doctrine of Sāṅkhya), herein, 種類 (zhong-lei) means the same characteristics of natures. In 金七十論, it says, “The self-nature exits substantially (in all phenomena). How can they be known? For example, for the pieces of sandalwood, no matter how many pieces of them, their nature of sandalwood is the same. The transformation is in the same situation. Although the Māha and so on (phenomena) are different, the natures of three guṇa are the same. Because of the same natures, they are known to exist originally. Therefore, the self-nature is known to exist. (自性實有，云何得知？…同性故者。譬如破檀木，其片雖復多，檀性終是一。變異亦如是，大等雖不同，三德性是一。以此一性故，知其皆有本，故知有自性。) T54, 1248c.
Such phenomena have someone as their consumers because they can be consumed. All which can be consumed should have their consumers to be seen. For example, those food and drinks which are consumed by the Brāhmaṇas. If those phenomena are something to be consumed, there should be a consumer. Your previous thesis is damaged by the opponents’ reasoning.

[T30, 275b23]【答】此就世俗，若以總相立諸顯事有性為因，不辯差別，便立已成。若立顯事樂等為因，即無同喻。因亦不成，樂等種類非共許故。若以比量成立因言：「四蘊皆是苦樂癡性，是蘊性故，如受蘊」者，此所說癡，非受蘊攝，同喻不成。

[Answer:] In terms of the conventional reality, if it is universally established that the various phenomena have natures as their causes, it is not necessary to distinguish the difference because you established what is already proved. If sattva, etc. are established to be the causes of all phenomena, there is no any parallel example. The causes cannot be valid because sattva, etc. are not commonly accepted. If you try to use inference to establish [sattva, etc.] as the causes by asserting, “The natures of the four aggregations are suffering, happiness and ignorance because they are the nature of the aggregations, for example, the aggregation of feeling.” [My rebuttal is that] the so-called

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458 Herein, the Sāṅkhyaś try to use the existence of the three guna to prove the substantial existence of all phenomena, and then, further use the existence of phenomena to establish the existence of the supreme-person.
459 That is “the thesis that unconditioned things do not substantially exist is destroyed by the thesis that unconditioned things exist substantially.”
460 Bhāviveka accepts that all phenomena have their own natures in conventional reality. However, for Sāṅkhyaś, the three gunas are ultimate reality. That is why Bhāviveka has to deny them.
ignorance is not subsumed in the aggregation of feeling and hence, there is no parallel example.

[T30, 275b28] 又汝士夫多體相遍，有積聚義，即是蘊義，由此士夫因成不定。又汝樂等各別無能一一立宗。是蘊性故，因義不成。

Moreover, your [supreme] person which are multiple and pervading has the meaning of accumulation which means aggregates. Due to this reason, the cause of the supreme person is not determined. Furthermore, your sattva, etc. cannot function individually. Hence, the nature of the aggregations cannot be established as the causes.

[T30, 275c02] 若就勝義有實檀片，有性為因，非共許故，同喻不成。又就世俗，若以總相立諸顯事有能受者，不辯差別，便立已成。世所共知，受者有故。若立顯事有實受者常住周遍，思為自性，同喻不成。如是體相諸婆羅門非共許故。若就勝義，同喻不成，受者飲食皆實有性，非共許故。前說比量，無有敵量能為違害。

In terms of ultimate reality, the assertion that there are essential sandalwoods which have true natures as their causes is not commonly accepted because the parallel example is not available.

Moreover, in terms of conventional reality, if things are universally considered to have receivers, it is not necessary to distinguish the difference because you established what is already proved. That is because it is conventionally accepted that there should be a receiver. If you established that those phenomena have a intrinsic receiver which is
permanent, pervading, and having the thought as its self-nature, no parallel example can be established. That is because such a feature of [the person] is not even commonly accepted by the Brāhmaṇas. In terms of ultimate reality, the parallel example cannot be established because the substantial existences of the enjoyers and food are not universally accepted. There is not any opponents’ argument that can damage my previous thesis.

2.2.2-1 The objection to Vaiśeṣika (1)

[T30, 275c10] 【問】諸勝論師復作是說：「諸入出息、閉目開目、令意行動、根變等相，定有所相，是能相故。如見煙等」。

[Objection:] The Vaiśeṣikas claim, “The features such as breathing in and out, closing and opening eyes, making the mind function and the transforming of the faculties must have inferred features because they are inferring features, for example, like seeing smoke.”

[T30, 275c12] 【答】此就世俗，若以總相立彼諸相定有所相，不辯差別便立已成。世俗共知我非無故。若立彼相有所相我，常住周遍，樂等所依，便無同喻，違所立故。若就勝義亦有如是喻不成過。時、方、空等由此道理亦應遮破。

461 The Vaiśeṣikas here use a common logic to prove the connection between the inferred object and inferring subject and by means of this inference, to further prove the existence of self (see the following paragraph). According to the commentary, in the example of seeing smoke, the smoke is an inferring property and the fire is the inferred property because the fire can be inferred by seeing smoke (X87, 557a).
In terms of conventional reality, when those various features are universally established to have inferred features, it is not necessary to distinguish the difference because you established what is already proved. That is because the ‘self’ is not inexistent according to common understanding in conventional reality. However, if that inferring feature is established to have an inferred feature of self which is permanent, pervading, and the basis of happiness, etc., there is no parallel because this establishment violates your thesis. If it is established in terms of ultimate reality, it still has a fault of the invalid parallel example. In regard to [their concepts of] time, ether, and space, etc., they should be refuted according to the same reasons.

2.2.2-2 The objection to Vaiśeṣika (2)

[T30, 275c17]【問】諸勝論師復作是難：「極微與意，我立無為。成立空因「不起故」者，自不成因。若謂此二是有為攝，成立空因「緣生故」者，他不成因。應成少分悟入空性」。

[Objection:] The Vaiśeṣikas further object, “The atom and the mind are established as non-conditioned things by us. Hence, the reason, ‘because of non-arising’ that you use to establish their emptiness is invalid according to your own principle. If you consider

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462 Again, for Bhāviveka, the logical connection between an inferred object and an inferring subject is conventionally accepted because such a syllogistic argument is Bhāviveka’s main methodology.

463 The author means that the logic of the connection between inferred and inferring subjects can only prove the existence of the conventional person but not the primary self.

464 In Vaiśeṣika, time(kāla), ether(ākāśa) and space (dik) all belong to the dravya padārtha in which the nine essences are the basic element the universe. See Kanāḍa, and Debasis Chakrabarty. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra of Kanāḍa (New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, 2003), 97–99.

465 That is because Bhāviveka does not agreed with that mind and atoms are considered to be non-composite existences.
that these two are subsumed within conditioned things and establish their emptiness by the reason of causality, the reason is invalid according to others’ principle.”

[In such case], there is less opportunity to realize the emptiness.

[T30, 275c20]【答】若意、極微世俗亦許是無為者，可有此難。然所立「意」且非無為，智生因故，猶如色等。如是句義「同異性故」、「念生因故」，此等餘因如應當說。又諸極微亦非無為，能成因故，猶如縷等。如是其餘有合、離、數、同、異等因，隨應當說。

[Answer:] If mind and atoms are accepted as unconditioned things in conventional reality, there could be such a problem. However, [the concept] of mind you establish is not a unconditioned thing. That is because it is the cause of the arising of the knowledge like color-form, etc. The category [to which the mind belongs] is the cause of the features of universality and uniqueness, and the cause of thinking. There are other reasons which should be demonstrated on a proper occasion. [Hence, the mind should not be non-conditioned things.] Moreover, those atoms are also not unconditioned things because they are causes [for others], for example a thread. They are also the causes for

466 For Vaiśeṣika, because atoms and mind (manas) are both ultimate existences, they should be non-composite existences (Kaṇḍa, and Debasish Chakrabarty, 99).
467 The Chinese term 句義 (gou yi) is padārtha in Sanskrit. It can be translated as ‘category’ in English. Vaiśeṣikas divided all the phenomena of the universe into six categories (Ibid.).
468 A thread is the cause of a cloth because a cloth is composited of the assemblage of a great number of threads. It is just like that a experience matter is composited of a great deal of atoms.
other features such as combination, separateness, numbers, universality and uniqueness, etc. which should be demonstrated on a proper occasion.  

[T30, 275c25]  

or二極微所成麁物非常為因，是所成故，猶如瓶等。如是其餘是所作故，可滅壞故，是有因故，此等諸因，隨應當說。由此道理他所妄執意與極微皆自性空，是故無有如所說過。  

Furthermore, the complexes which are composed of two kinds of atoms have impermanence as their causes.  

That is because they are composed, for example, like a vase. Other reasons are the following: they are made, they can be damaged, and they have causes. Those reasons should be demonstrated on proper occasions. According to these reasons, the mind and the atoms that are delusively conceived are empty of their intrinsic natures. Therefore, my thesis does not have the fault that you say.

2.2.3 Jainism and others

[T30, 276a01] 如上所說遮破數論勝論句義種種道理。無衣等論所執句義。亦隨所應當立為空。  

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469 The atoms can be assembled together and separated. They have numbers. Some have the same characteristics and some are different. Therefore, atoms are not non-composite existences.  

470 This sentence means that the atoms which are the causes of the complex stuffs are also impermanent. Hence, the atoms cannot be non-composite.
By means of the above various reasons used to destroy the categories of the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas, the categories that the naked practitioners (Jaina) attach should be established to be empty according to how they have responded.\footnote{According to the commentary, 無衣 (wuyi) which directly means ‘without clothes’ is referred to 裸形外道 (Guanxingwaidao), i.e., the naked practitioner of other religions. In Buddhism, this term is usually referred to Jainism. In the Buddha’s life time, the leader of Jainism was called 尼乾子 (Jñātiputra) which means the son of Jainism. Hermann Jacobi, Jaina Sūtra (Evinity Publishing Inc, 2009), 79~87, 217~270. Jñātiputra performed a very stream asceticism in which he even cultivated nakedly practice. Hence, from then on, the naked practitioners have been designated on this school in Buddhist texts. See 成唯識論述記卷一 (T43,265~266).}

IV. Conclusion

1. The wisdom obtained from thinking (cintāmayī)

[T30, 276a03] 如是遣除諸過難已，修觀行者正比量力悟入自他二宗所執無為性空。雖聞所成智階梯力已入性空，闕勝修力未能永斷所應除障，故復精勤習勝修力。

Thus, having removed the various faults, a practitioner, by means of the correct inference, realizes the emptiness of unconditioned things which are attached by people in both our religion and other religions. Although practitioners have realized emptiness through the power of the wisdom obtained from hearing as a stairway, they still lack the supreme power of practice so that they cannot permanently remove the obstacles which should be removed. Hence, one should diligently cultivate the supreme power of practice.
若於此中隨有一種為無為相有間無間復現行時，即應如理觀彼性空遣除彼相，令不顯現悟入諸法。離自性故，其性本空。由性空故相不成實，則是無相。由無相故無所願求，則是無願。由離相垢故成遠離。

Here, when any of the features of conditioned and unconditioned things appears again frequently or continually, a practitioner, according to the principle, should observe their empty nature to remove those features and make them never appear again in order to realize all of the dharmas. [The principle for observing is as the following:] because of being free from the self-nature, their original nature is empty. Because of their empty nature, their signs are not real. Hence, they are signless. Because of being signless, one does not wish for anything. Therefore, they are wishless. Because of being free from the defilement of signs, it becomes isolated.

Moreover, because of being isolated from self-nature, the perceived defilement does not consequently occur. It becomes tranquil. Because the self-nature does not arise, it is unborn. Because of being unborn, there is no impermanence, no suffering, and no selflessness. Moreover, because of being unborn, there are no signs. Because of

472 Emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness are called three contemplations or three accesses to liberation.
signlessness, one is able to see all dharmas and realize the non-duality through the practice of one sign of being signless.

[T30, 276a15] 由此行相勤習勝修，增長如是勝修力故，遣除麁相令不顯現。由此令無所行行相，謂取有為無為行相，如眩瞖者離麁瞖眼得清淨，不見先來所取諸相。

One diligently cultivates distinctive meditation according to this understanding. Because of the increase of the strength of the distinctive meditation, one is able to remove the gross sign and make it no longer appear. By means of this, one makes no cultivation on the performance which means performance on the conditioned and unconditioned things. For example, those who have eye-disease are free from rough-ill eyes and re-obtain healthy eyes. They will not see the various things which they previously conceived.

[T30, 276a18] 雖於此中已得無住，然由空等分別現行，有功用心猶相續住，未得無動了知空等分別現行障礙出世無分別慧。為欲棄捨，勇猛正勤如是觀察：「就勝義故，空性境上空等分別亦非實有，從緣生故，猶如幻等」。如是勤修復能除遣空等分別。除遣彼故，空不空等二邊遠離，不更以其空等行相觀察諸法。

Although here, one has obtained non-attachment (literally means “non-dwelling ”), the conception of emptiness is still occurring and hence, the mind of effort is still
continuously reoccurring. The appearance of conception of the absence of the immoveable realization of emptiness obscures the supermundane non-conceptual wisdom. In order to remove [this conception], one should diligently observe as follows, “From ultimate reality, the conception of emptiness upon the emptiness as a perceived object is also not intrinsically existent because it also arises from conditions like an illusion.” Such a diligent practice is able to remove the conception of emptiness etc. Because of having removed it, one is free from both extremes of emptiness and non-emptiness and never uses the conception of emptiness to observe things again.

[T30, 276a25] 如說：「般若波羅蜜多正現行時, 於其色上不觀為常、不為無常,不觀為樂、亦不為苦, 不觀為我、亦非無我，不觀寂靜、非不寂靜，不觀為空、亦非不空。不觀為相、亦非無相, 不觀為願、亦非無願, 不觀遠離、非不遠離」。

For example, (the sūtra) says, “When prajñāpāramitā is in operation, one does not see color-forms as either permanent or impermanent, either happy or suffering, either self or no-self, either tranquil or not tranquil, either empty or not empty, either with signs or

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473 According to the *Commentary*, even though the view of signlessness is able to destroy the attachment to things, the mind which conceptualizes the signlessness of things becomes an obstacle to the emptiness. This mind is called the mind of effort “有功用心” (X87, 560a).

474 This sentence is to explain that one cannot be attached to emptiness because it is only a conventional expedience for cultivation. In Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter 24, it says, “Whatever is *pratītyasamutpāda* that we call śūnyatā. That (śūnyatā) being dependent designation is itself the middle-path.” By comparing with Nāgārjuna’s sentence, it can be found that Bhāviveka adds ‘In terms of ultimate reality’ as a condition to define śūnyatā. This can show the difference between Bhāviveka and Nāgārjuna.
without signs, either to be wished for or not to be wished for and either isolated or not isolated.\textsuperscript{475}

[T30, 276b01] 如是於其受想行識、一切色聲香為觸法、所有眼耳鼻舌身意、布施持戒忍辱精進靜慮般若波羅蜜多、念住、正斷、神足、根、力、覺支、道支、靜慮、無色等至、神通、十力、無畏、諸無礙解、不共佛法、諸三摩地、陀羅尼門、一切智上，不觀為常亦非無常。乃至廣說。

Thus, regarding such things as feeling, conception, karmic formation, consciousness; all forms, sound, smell, taste, touch; all sense-organs such as eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, mind; all the giving, morality, patience, diligence, concentration, \textit{prajñāpāramitā}; mindfulness, efforts, supernatural powers, faculties, powers, branches of awakening, branches of path, concentrations, formless realm attainment, super-sensory power, ten mightiness, fearlessness, various analytical knowledge, exclusive dharmas, various \textit{Samādhi}, the practice of \textit{dhāraṇī} and omniscience, etc., one should not observe them to be either permanent or impermanent and so forth.

2. The wisdom obtained from meditation (\textit{bhāvanāmayī})

[T30, 276b07] 既能如是遠離二邊，即能生長處中妙行。此離二邊處中道理，由如上說二種比量有為無為色類無故，說名無色。由無色故，亦無有等諸分別故，

\textsuperscript{475} This description can be found everywhere in \textit{Da Pin Po Ruo} (大品般若/ the \textit{Pañcavimatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra}) (T5, 405b; 7, 67a, 127b).
無有少法可相表示。言彼既然，此亦如是，故名無示。由無性故所依能依皆不成就，無有住持，故名無住。

When one can be free from those two extremes, the subtle practice of dwelling in the middle [path] is able to be produced. This principle of middle path being free from two extremes is called no form according to the above explanation that there are not any kinds of form in both conditioned and unconditioned things by the two inferences. Because there is neither form and nor various conceptions, there is no anything which could be indicated by signs. Inasmuch as that is considered to be so, this is in the same manner. Therefore, [the principle of middle path] is called no attachment. Because of no-nature, both the basis to be relied on and things to rely cannot be accomplished. Since there is no basis to dwell on, [the principle of middle path] is called no attachment.

[T30, 276b12] 若有為相或無為相，若所分別非所分別，若能分別非能分別，如是等相覺慧不行，故名無現。遠離一切有相無相，此境界識皆不生故，名無了別。由無色故，無形質故，方維幖幟皆無有故，名無幖幟。

No matter the conditioned or unconditioned signs, things that can be conceptualized or cannot be conceptualized, and things that are able to conceptualize or unable to conceptualize, because the awakening wisdom does not operate on those features, [the principle of middle path] is called no manifestation. [The principle of middle path] is called no perception because it is free from all of signs and non-signs and any

476 The two inferences are the two formal proof statements that this text establishes.
consciousness of objects does not occur. Because there is no color-forms, no material matters, no marks of directions, it is called no marks.\textsuperscript{477}

[T30, 276b17] 如世尊告迦葉波言：「常為一邊無常第二，此二中間無色無示無住無現無所了別無有幖幟，是則名為處中妙行。如實觀察一切法性，廣說乃至有為一邊無為第二，乃至廣說」。又如佛告迦葉波言：「明與無明皆無有二，無二差別。此中正智是則名為處中妙行」。

For example, the Bhagavan told Kāśyapa, “Permanence is one extreme and impermanence is another. Between these two, there are no form, no indication, no dwelling, no manifestation, no conception and no marks, and hence, it is called subtle practice of middle path. One should truly observe all dharma-natures according to this and even extensively according to that conditioned things are one extreme and non-conditioned things are another; and extensive observation.”\textsuperscript{478}

It is also like what the Buddha told Kāśyapa, “Knowledge and ignorance are not two and they are not different like a dichotomy. Herein, the proper knowledge is called subtle practice of the dwelling in the middle.”\textsuperscript{479}

[T30, 276b23] 既能如是遠離二邊，於能安住無二想上所起分別無二之想，亦能了知障礙出世無分別慧，寂靜安住。如所說因速能永斷，永斷彼故，即無如是如是

\textsuperscript{477} The six signless descriptions such as no form, no indication, no dwelling, no manifestation, no conception and no marks are used to describe the principle of middle path.

\textsuperscript{478} This citation is from Kāśyapaparivarta. Baron A. von Staël-Holstein. The Kāśyapaparivarta: A Mahāyāna Sūtra of the Ratnakūṭa Class (Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan, 1926), 87.

\textsuperscript{479} Ibid. 93.
Having isolated from the two extremes, if one is able to realize that the conception of the non-dual concept which is created from the attachment of the non-dual concept obscures the supermundane non-conceptual wisdom, one dwells in tranquility. If the cause expounded above can be quickly and eternally removed, there will not be those various conceptions and thus, oral and mental conception will cease. [Hence, one] realizes the reality of all dharma which is unmovable, without appearance, without signs and isolated from all fabrications. One immovably realizes the truth of the subtle wisdom from the perceived objects and continuously dwells [in the truth of subtle wisdom.]

Although one diligently cultivates the unmistaken view of emptiness, one is reluctant to obtain emptiness. This is called surpassing meditation.

[T30, 276c01] 如世尊言：「雖修靜慮然不依色而修靜慮；如是不依受想行識而修靜慮；不依眼耳鼻舌身意而修靜慮；不依色聲香味觸法而修靜慮；不依於身分別安住而修靜慮；不依於心分別安住而修靜慮；不依於地水火風而修靜慮。

It is just like the Bhagavan said, “Although practitioners practice meditation, they do not rely on form to practice meditation, and likewise, they do not rely up feeling, recognition, formations, and consciousness. In the same manner, they do not rely on eyes, ears, noses, tongues, bodies, minds to practice meditation; they do not rely on colors, sounds, scents, tastes, touches, perceptions to practice meditation; They do not rely on the conception of the body to practice meditation; They do not rely on the conception of the
mind to practice meditation; They do not rely on earth, water, fire and wind to practice meditation.

[T30, 276c06] 不依於空日月星宿而修靜慮; 不依帝釋梵王世主而修靜慮; 不依欲界色無色界而修靜慮; 不依此世及以他世而修靜慮; 不高不下證住無動而修靜慮; 不依我見而修靜慮。

They do not rely on sky, sun, moon and constellations to practice meditation. They do not rely on Śakra, Lokeśvara and Brahmā to practice meditation. They do not rely on the desire realm, the form realm, and formless realm to practice meditation. They do not rely on this lifetime and other lifetimes to practice meditation. They do not rely on no highness, no lowness, achievement, and the unmoved to practice meditation. They do not rely the view of self to practice meditation.

[T30, 276c10] 如是不依有情命者養育士夫補特伽羅及以意生摩納婆見而修靜慮; 不依斷常有無有見而修靜慮; 不為漏盡而修靜慮; 不為趣入正性離生而修靜慮; 不為證果而修靜慮; 不為畢竟無所造作而修靜慮; 雖為修習無倒空觀而修靜慮，然於空性不為作證而修靜慮」。

In the same manner, they do not rely on sentient beings, jīvaḥ, nurturers, puruṣah, pudgalah, manujava, māṇavaka to practice meditation. They do rely on the views of nihilism, eternalism, existence, non-existence to practice meditation. They do not practice meditation for the purpose of the exhaustion of the defilement. They do not practice meditation for purpose of achieving samyaktva-niyāma. They do not practice meditation
for realizing results. They do not practice for the purpose of ultimately non-acting.

Although they practice meditation for the non-erroneous view of emptiness, they do not practice meditation for obtaining emptiness.”

3. The supermundane non-conceptual wisdom (avikalpa-pājñāna)

[T30, 276c17] 相應論者有定執言：「一切所取能取分別悉皆遠離，是出世間無分別智。即於其中起堅實想精勤修習」。

【難】The Yogācārins decisively assert, “Being free from all objects and subject is the supermundane non-conceptual wisdom. According to this, one generates the firm believe and diligently practices.”

[T30, 276c19]【答】有餘於此正審察言：「如是智生，雖無如上所說分別，而隨無相境相起故，自性分別所隨逐故，是有為故，如餘現量有分別覺，不成出世無分別智」。

Someone, having critically examined this assertion, objects, “When such wisdom is generated, it does not have the conception explained above. However, because it arises according to the signless object, it is followed by the conception of self-nature, and it is

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480 I cannot find the exact text.
481 In Tīrthākāśāvijñāpī, the verses 28th and the upper half of 29th say, “When the knowledge does not exactly obtain any perceived object, (one is) dwelling in the consciousness-only because while (what is) to be seized does not exist, there is no seizing. (yatā tvālambanāṁ jñānaṁ naivopalabhat tadā/ sthitām vijñaptimātratve grāhyāḥbhāve tadagrāhāt/ ) Without both mind and obtainment, it is the knowledge beyond the world (acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānamlokokattaraṁ ca tat/ ). Tao-hui Huo, 205, 206
conditioned like other direct perceptions which are accompanied by conceptuality, it
cannot be the supermundane non-conceptual wisdom beyond the world.”

[T30, 276c22] 又彼所計離相離言真如勝義是所緣故，如餘所緣不成勝義。即由
此因俱非最勝。如契經言：「云何此中名勝義諦？謂於其中智亦不行」。又如問言
曼殊室利言：「慧眼者當何所觀？」答言：「若有少所觀者即非慧眼」。由此慧眼
無分別故不觀有為，亦復不能觀於無為。以諸無為非此慧眼所應行故，由此理教彼
亦應斷於此定執。

Moreover, because the signless and unspeakable Tathatā, i.e. ultimate reality, they
claim is a perceived object like other perceived objects, it cannot be the ultimate. Due to
this reason, it is not the most supreme. For example, in the sūtra, it says, “herein, how is
it called ultimate reality? Answer: in it, even the wisdom does not operate.” Furthermore,
for example, the Buddha asked Mañjuśrī, “What do the eyes of wisdom see?” He
answered, “If they can see anything, they are not the eyes of wisdom.” 482 Because these
eyes of wisdom do not discriminate anything, they do not observe conditioned things and
they also do not observe non-conditioned things. That is because those unconditioned
things are not the objects that the eyes of wisdom should observe. Due to this doctrine,
they should remove such a firm assertion.

[T30, 276c29] 復審察言：「就勝義諦，如是出世無分別智亦非實有，從緣生故，
猶如幻士」。於有所有妨難過失，如理覲見當正遣除。若智能斷如是定執，此亦如

482 The original text is from 大寶積經 (Dabaojijing/Ratnakūtasūtra) (T11, 663c).
彼有過失故，不復精勤審察開示。如是等執既滅除已，於所應知無相境性亦無行解，因緣闕故，餘智不生由無行解。是故說名真實行解。

Having further examined, it can be said, “In terms of ultimate reality, such an supermundane non-conceptual wisdom is not real because it is also produced from conditions like illusory people.” In regard to all the objects and faults, one should have insight into them in accord with this principle and remove them. If this wisdom is able to remove such a firm attachment, this [wisdom] has the same fault as the attachment. There is no need to expound this in detail.

Having removed these firm attachments, there are no practices and understandings upon this signless object which should be known because of the lack of conditions. Other knowledge does not occur due to non-practices and understandings. Therefore, it is called the true practices and understandings.

[T30, 277a07] 如世尊言：「云何名為真實行解？謂於諸法都無行解，是則名為真實行解」。又如經言：「如來菩提都無現觀」。又如問言曼殊室利：「諸見諦者當何所見？」答言：「無有少法可見。所以者何？凡有所見皆是虛妄，若無所見乃名見諦」。

For example, the Bhagavān said, “What is called true practice and understanding?” Answer, “There is not any practice and understanding upon any dharma.” Moreover, as the sūtra states, “The Tathāgata does not have any direct insight into awakening.” Also, [the Buddha] asked Mañjuśrī, “What do those who see the truth see?” Answer, “They do
not can see even a single dharma. Whatever they see is illusions. If there is nothing they can see, it is called insight into the truth.”

[T30, 277a12] 又如問言：「云何精勤應修現觀？」答言：「若知無有少法思惟分別，如是精勤應修現觀」。復問：「云何已證現觀？」答言：「若能觀一切法皆平等性」。復問：「有能見一切法平等性耶？」答言：「無能見平等性。若有所見是則應成不平等見」。

Moreover, for example, it is asked, “How should one diligently cultivate direct insight?” Answer, “If one knows that there is not any dharma which can be thought and discriminated, in accord with this, one diligently cultivates direct insight.” It is further asked, “What does it mean that one has achieved direct insights?” Answer, “If one is able to have an insight into the equal nature of all dharmas, [it means that one has achieved direct insight].” Again, it is asked, “Can one have an insight into the equal nature of all dharmas?” Answer, “The one [who has already had insight into the equality of all dharmas] cannot see the equal nature because if there is something which can be seen, it would become the view of inequality.”

[T30, 277a17] 真實行解見諦現觀皆同一義，修觀行者，爾時心意識智不行，說名正行無分別慧。若能如是行無所行，則得如來應正等覺真實授記。

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483 I cannot find the exact text.
484 I cannot find the exact text.
True practice and understanding, insight into reality, and direct insight have the same meaning. Practitioners of meditation are considered to be engaged in the non-conceptual wisdom when the mind, mentality, consciousness, and wisdom do not operate. If [those practitioners] can thus practice the non-practice, they will receive the true prediction from the *tathāgata*, *i.e.* *arhat*, or perfect Buddha.

[T30, 277a20] 如契經言：「世尊!菩薩云何修行於其無上正等菩提得諸如來應正等覺真實授記？梵志! 菩薩若於是時不行於生不行於滅，不行於善不行不善，不行世間不行出世，不行有漏，不行無漏，不行有罪不行無罪，不行有為不行無為，不行相應及不相應，不行於斷及以不斷，不行生死及以涅槃。

For example, in the *sūtra*, it says, “Bhagavān! How do bodhisattvas practice in order to receive the prediction to the perfection of the unsurpassed awakening from the *tathāgata*, *i.e.* *arhat*, or the perfect Buddha? Brahmin! When the bodhisattvas do not practice in accord with either arising or extinction; they do not practice in accord with either wholesome or unwholesome; they do not practice in accord with either mundaneness or supermundaneness; they do not practice in accord with either contamination or non-contamination; they do not practice in accord with either guiltiness or guiltlessness; they do not practice in accord with either conditioned or unconditioned things; they do not practice in accord with either *yoga* or *ayoga*; they do not practice in accord with either removing or non-removing; they do not practice in accord with either *samsāra* or *nirvāṇa*.

485 I cannot find the exact text.
They do not practice in accord with seeing, hearing, awareness, and knowing. They do not practice in accord with either sīla or vinaya. They do not practice in accord with either patience or diligence. They do not practice in accord with either meditations or contemplations. They do not practice in accord with either wisdom or understandings. They do not practice in accord with either wisdom or realization. Bodhisattvas who thus practice non-practice will receive a true prediction for unsurpassed awakening from the tathāgata, arhat, and perfect Buddha.

Such an operation of wisdom is called noble silence. For example, in the sūtra, it says, “In regard with the thirty-seven branches of Awakening, the demonstration in accord with what the Buddha has said is called dharma-preaching. One further achieves dharma by the body neither observes the existence of dharma without the body nor observes the existence of body without dharma. This observation is called the observation of neither dualism nor non-dualism. While observing, one does not see through the
knowledge of the direct perception by observation. Because of non-observing, it is called noble silence.

[T30, 277b09] 由是理教審觀察時，一切有為無為自性，無有能為若心若慧若有分別若無分別境界自性。如是知已，明慧日光能除一切愚癡黑闇。

While observing in accord with this principle and doctrine, all self-natures of composite and unconditioned things can never be the self-nature of objects perceived by mind, wisdom, conceptualization or non-conceptualization. Having known this, the sunlight of bright wisdom is able to remove all the darkness of ignorance.

諸心慧境現 智者由不取 慧行無分別 無所行而行

When the various objects of the mind and wisdom appear, a wise one does not grasp because wisdom operates in accord with non-conceptual practice by means of non-practice.486

[T30, 277b14] 此中能集諸行種子，或為諸行種子所集，故名為心。能持勝德或由彼持令不流散，故名為慧。心慧所行名心慧境。境地所行是名差別。心境即是有為無為所有諸相。慧境即是有為無為所有空性。如契經言：「無相分別慧終不轉」。

Here, the one which can accumulate the seeds of all actions or in which the seeds of all actions assemble is called mind. That which holds the supreme virtues or prevents

486 The following is the explanation of this verse.
virtues from being lost is called wisdom. Those [objects] upon which the mind and
wisdom operate are called the sphere of mind and wisdom. Those objects or grounds are
different according to what operate on them. The objects of the mind are the various
features of conditioned and non-conditioned things. The object of wisdom is the
emptiness of conditioned and non-conditioned things. For example, the sūtra says, “The
non-conceptual wisdom never operates.”

[T30, 277b19] 「現」謂顯現，即似心慧所行境界性相現義。「諸」謂地等，隨
其一類或總或別，如是眼等及以色等，隨其一類或總或別。如是色受想行與識，隨
其一類或總或別。如是念住及以正斷神足根力覺支道支、波羅蜜多、一切神通、十
力無畏不共佛法、諸三摩地陀羅尼門、預流一來及以不還、若阿羅漢所有道果，隨
其一類或總或別，廣說乃至一切智智。

The term ‘appear’ means manifestation, i.e. the manifestation of the features of the
likeness of the objects on which the mind and wisdom operate. The term ‘various’ means
the universal or particular of any kind of the elements such as earth, etc. In the same
manner as the elements, it means the universality or individuality of any kind of the
sense-sources such as eyes, color-forms, etc. In the same manner, it means the
universality or individuality of any kind of the form, feeling, conception, formation
factors, and consciousness. In the same manner, it means the universality or individuality
of any kind of mindfulness, right exertion, supernatural powers, faculties, powers,
branches of awakening, branches of path, pāramitā, all magic powers, ten mightiness,
fearlessness, exclusive dharmas, various samādhi, the door ways of dhāraṇī, from the
results of stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, arhat and extensive all the way even to the wisdom of omniscience.

[T30, 277b26] 於一切法能正了知無顛倒性，故名智者。「由」者謂說捨相因緣。言「不取者」無執無見，即是覺慧不計度義。由不取因為何所證。

Those who can correctly understand the non-erroneous nature of all dharmas is called a wise one. “Because” is to explain the reason of detachment. The so-called “non-grasping” means no attachment and non-seeing, i.e. the non-conceptualization of the awakened wisdom. If there is no grasping, what is there to realize?

[T30, 277b29]「慧行無分別，無所行而行」：「慧」者即是無分別智，雖復永離一切分別，覺慧増益假名為智。以無影像無相無言，境界起相、自性分別亦無有，故名無分別。雖無住者而就異位假名建立。如言：「燈滅阿羅漢滅」。「覺慧增益」依俗言說，於此相續名無分別。如分別智名有分別。

“The operation of wisdom is non-conceptual and it operates without any trace of operation.” ‘Wisdom’ is non-conceptual wisdom. Although it is apart from all concepts, the awakened [non-conceptual] wisdom is superfluously and conventionally designated as wisdom. Due to the [reason] of no reflection, no signs and no languages, there are no signs which occurred from perceived objects and the conception of self-nature. Therefore, it is called non-conception.
Although it has no-dwelling, it is conventionally designated to be established according the different positions, for example, it is said, “the extinction of a lamp is the extinction for an arhat.” The increasing enlightened-wisdom’ is called non-discrimination when it is conventionally designated on this continuity. For example, the discriminating knowledge is called ‘discriminative.’

[T30, 277c06] 此中意取智無生行說名為行，由此智行自他法性一切種相非所見故，不名能見。即非能見說名真見，如所證故。非非所見作所見相，或有分別或無分別，真見得成。

The meaning of the [operation] in [the verse] is called operation because the knowledge operates on the object of non-arising. While this knowledge is operating, because the dharma-nature of the self and others, and the feature of all kinds are not seen, it cannot be called the viewer. Because it cannot see, it is called the true seeing, just like the [reality] it achieved.  

When those which are not non-viewable are taken as the perceived objects, no matter they are either conceptual or non-conceptual, true seeing is accomplished.

[T30, 277c10] 真如若是所見性者，不應說為非可見性。雖依世俗有平等見說名真見。不應執此不平等見，說名真見。諸可見者皆非真實，起解因故，如陽焰水一

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487 According to the Commentary, this example means that while the arhat or the light is blown out, there is no existence or non-existence. It is merely conventionally designated as extinction (X87, 559a).
488 Here, it means that the perceiver cannot see anything just like the perceived which cannot be seen. That is to say, on one hand, the truth knowledge perceives nothing, and on the other hand, the reality is not perceived.
切可見皆非真實。真如若是可見性者，可見相取不成真見。若非可見，不應說言證
見真如。見非可見豈名平等。

If the *tathatā* can be seen, it should not be considered to be non-viewable. Although
from the conventional perceptive, there is the view of equality which could be called a
true view, [this very view, from ultimate reality,] is a view of inequality which should not
be held to be a true view. Those which can be seen are not real because their causes
can be analyzed, for example, the water of a mirage. All those which can be seen are not
real. If the *tathatā* can be seen, because it is taken as a perceived object, it is not a true
seeing. If [the *tathatā*] cannot be seen, one should not say ‘seeing the *tathatā*.’ To see
what cannot be seen cannot be called a view of equality.

[T30, 277c16] 又智有為真如無為，性不平等，若見應成不平等見。

Moreover, knowledge is conditioned and the *tathatā* is non-conditioned. Their
natures are not equal. If [the knowledge can see the *tathatā*], this will become an unequal
seeing.

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489 According to the *Commentary*, ‘this very view, from the ultimate reality’ has to be added in otherwise
the whole sentence will not make sense (X87, 566a).

490 In his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, Dignāga proposes a theory that the so-called perceived-object as condition is
the carried object produced by the perceiving consciousness according to the subjective perceived object.
However, according to Yogācāra, the non-discriminating knowledge and *tathatā* are both subjectively
existence. Thus, the problem is, while the non-discriminating knowledge is perceiving *tathatā*, is the
perceived object *tathatā* itself or produced by the non-discriminating knowledge. If it is the *tathatā*
itself, then, Dignāga’s theory will be problematic. If it is the later one, then, the non-discriminating
knowledge is not perceiving the reality (non-discriminating knowledge is supposed to be the true
knowledge which should direct perceives the reality). *The Bibliography of Xuan Zang* (T50, 245). Here,
Bhāviveka uses the same model of argument to attack Yogācāra’s theory at his time.
Furthermore, all of those dharma-natures cannot be seen as well as those which can see because they both have non-production as their self-nature. Because the non-seeing is conventionally designated as seeing, it is not unequal. Also, when [the direct-insight], in one moment, realizes all dharma, there is not any direct-insight at all. That is called the true direct-insight.

One should not object [by saying], “just as reflection cannot see itself, the wisdom cannot realize true nature of wisdom.” They both are not seen. Because the object and nature are not distinguished, they are realized at the same time. In terms of ultimate reality, the original nature of the knowledge of the image of the object is non-arising. Therefore, there is no direct-insight and no attainment.

如契經言：「汝不應以現觀證得觀於如來體是無為，出過一切眼所行故。如是梵志！如來安坐菩提座時，證一切法皆無所得，永斷一切虛妄顛倒所起煩惱」。如是等經悉皆隨順。
For example, the *sūtra* says, “You should not observe the *tathāgata* by means of direct-insight and obtainment because his nature is unconditioned and transcendental of all what the eyes can see. In this way, Brahmin! When the *tathāgataḥ* sat on the bodhi-seat, he realized that there is no any obtainment of all dharma and thus, he eternally removed all defilements produced by illusions and the mistakes.”

Those texts such as this should be followed.

Stop the minor argument and go back to the main discussion. ‘Activity’ means moving around. No activity means non-moving. The ‘non-moving’ is used to explain the meaning of non-arising and non-conceptual wisdom. Because it moves without any sign of moving, the non-moving is called moving. This is only a summary. It is like the result accomplished by the proper endeavor previously explained.

The practitioners of meditation, because the activity of wisdom is non-conceptual, do not practice in accord with practice, and practice is non-practicing. They separate from

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491 I cannot find the original text.
the mind which contemplates on a perceived object and do not dwell on any dharmas like the sky. They give up all conceptualizations, are calm like that they have insight into all dharma-natures by entering into the nirodhasamāpatti.\footnote{The Chinese term 淡泊 (dan bo) in the Māhaprajñāpāramītsūtra translated by Xung Zang is used to describe the nature of the all dharma. Here, the same term is used to describe the Buddha’s dharma-body. Hence, the term in Xung Zang’s translation appears to be a term to describe the ultimate reality. (佛告善現！若菩薩摩訶薩修行般若波羅蜜多時, 如實知一切從緣所生法, 不生不滅、不斷不常、不一不異、不來不去，絕諸戲論本性淡泊) T6, 988b & T 7,389b.}

\begin{quote}
[T30. 278a06] 諸佛法身不可思議、不可了別。無二、無藏、無相、無見，不可表示。無生、無滅、無有起盡。淡泊寂然無有差別。無相、無影、離諸瑕穢。超過一切覺慧語言境界道路。
\end{quote}

The dharma-bodies of all Buddhas are inconceivable and, they cannot be conceptualized. They are non-dichotomous, non-hidden, featureless, invisible, and non-manifest. They are unproduced, non-extinguished, and there is no arising and ceasing of them. They are calm and they have no distinction from each other. They do not have a sign or reflecting images, and are separated from all defilements. They transcend all paths of the operated object of languages of awakened wisdom.\footnote{Nirodhasamāpatti or saṃjñāvedayitanirodha is a very specially contemplation which is usually listed as the highest one in the nine steps of contemplation (navānupravāhārasamāpatti). In Sarvāstivādin, it is considered to be merely a mundane contemplation like the other eight. However, in Vāsumandhu’s Śatadharma, it is classified as non-composite dharma. Moreover, many Buddhist texts such as 成唯識論 (T31, 37c), 成實論 (T32, 344c) and so on all consider it as a contemplation which can only achieved after removing all defilements. Also see Paul J. Griffiths, On Being Mindless Buddhist Meditation And The Mind-Body Problem (Open Court Publishing Company, 1986), 220.}

\footnote{Since the Chinese meaning is not very clear and the commentary does not have any comment on it, this sentence is translated according to Japanese translation.}
[T30, 278a10] 雖如是觀而無所見，不見而見即不見。如是妙見所攝受故，能正增長無量福聚，能感無邊微妙樂果，清淨一味能滅他苦。如藥樹王饒益一切正所求願。

Although [the practitioners] see, they see nothing. Seeing nothing is to see and seeing is to see nothing. Having been subsumed by the subtle seeing, [the practitioners] are able to increase the immeasurable accumulation of merits and cause for the result of unlimited joy. The same kind of purity is able to remove others’ sufferings as well. For example, the king of the medicine-trees can benefit all and fulfills proper wishes.

[T30, 278a13] 如是正觀如來法身，不見諸法有無相，故名為正見。以息一切遍計分別名正思惟。由證諸法，離諸戲論，一切語言悉皆靜息，名為正語。由一切法非所作性，不造彼因身語意業，名為正業。以一切法皆是無增無減，法性所有增減皆永不生，名為正命。以一切法皆無發起，無有造作，勇猛方便名正精進。以於諸法畢竟不證境性有無，無有憶念、無所思惟，名為正念。以一切種不取諸法，無所依住，名為正定。如是正觀能修如此八支聖道。此義廣如菩薩藏中處處宣說。

Thus, while properly observing the tathāgata’s dharma-body, (practitioners) do not see any signs or non-signs of all dharmas. That is called the proper view. Because of realizing all dharmas, one separates from all meaningless speech and all languages cease. That is called the proper speech. Because all dharmas are not creatable, one does not create the causes for the karmas of the body, speech, and mind. That is called the proper action. Because all dharmas are neither increasing nor decreasing, all of the increase and
decrease of the dharma-natures are continually not arising. That is called the proper livelihood. Because all dharmas are not arising and not creating, this becomes the means for the proper effort. That is called the proper efforts. Because all dharmas are not ultimately achievable by the existence or inexistence of perceived objects and, thus, there is not any mindfulness, that is called proper mindfulness. Because in all kinds of existences, there is no attachment to dharmas and there is nothing to depend upon, that is called proper concentration. The one who properly sees in this manner is able to cultivate the eight-fold noble path. This doctrine is extensively expounded everywhere in the Bodhisattvapiṭaka. 495

[T30, 278a25] 如是正觀非但能修八支聖道，亦能圓滿略說六種波羅蜜多。雖無加行而有是事。其義云何？謂能棄捨一切種相，及能棄捨一切煩惱，是名為施波羅蜜多。能息一切所緣作意，修無所得，是名為戒波羅蜜多。於諸所緣能不忍受，是名為忍波羅蜜多。無取無捨離一切行，是名精進波羅蜜多。一切作意皆不現行都無所住，是名靜慮波羅蜜多。於一切法不起戲論遠離二相，是名般若波羅蜜多。此義廣如梵問經等處處宣說。

Proper seeing is not only able to cultivate the noble eight-fold path but also able to consummate the six perfections. With intensified effort, [the accomplishment of the six

495 The so-called bodhisattvapiṭaka can have both narrow and broader definitions. The specific definition is referred to the bodhisattvapiṭaka of Dharmaguptā and Mahāsāṅghikā. In Dharmaguptā, the jātaka stories are classified as bodhisattvapiṭaka. In Mahāsāṅghikā, in addition to jātaka, there are some texts called vaipulya in the bodhisattvapiṭaka. Moreover, there are some Māhayāna sūtras being called the sūtra of bodhisattvapiṭaka. Yin Shun, the Origin and Development of Early Māhayāna Buddhism (Taipei: Zheng-weh,1981), 550 &588. The broadest definition is referred to all Māhayāna sūtras. Here, it is more reasonable to refer the term to all Māhayāna sūtras.
perfections] is still possible. How can it be possible? It means that the renouncement of all things and defilements is called the perfection of giving. One is able to cease all thoughts on the perceived objects and cultivate without expecting anything. It is called the perfection of morality. No longer enduring the perceptions of any object is called the perfection of endurance. No grasping, no renouncing, and being apart from all actions is called the perfection of diligence. When all mindfulness no longer appears and does not dwell on anything, that is called the perfection of meditation. With regard to all dharmas, when fabrications no longer occur and the signs of duality are removed, that is called prajñāpāramitā. This doctrine is extensively expounded everywhere in the Brahmaparipṛcchāsūtra.

[T30, 278b06] 如是妙住有無量門，無量經中世尊廣說，有大義利多所饒益。諸有智者，應如實知離諸放逸當勤修學。

In this way, the subtle dwelling has immeasurable doorways which the Bhagavān extensively expounded in the Apramāṇasūtra (or in immeasurable sūtras). It has a great advantage to benefit many [people.] Those who have wisdom should thus know how to keep away from various delinquencys and diligently practice.

大乘掌珍論卷下

The bottom section of the Mahāyāna *Karatalaratna