Nationalist Violence and Terrorism: the Cases of Northern Ireland and Wales Compared

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Nationalist Violence and Terrorism:
The Cases of Northern Ireland and Wales Compared

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between nationalism and violence, asking the question: why are some stateless nationalist movements largely nonviolent while others produce violence and terrorism against a state or other ethnonational groups in pursuit of their goals? To answer this, I compare the cases of Northern Ireland and Wales in the 1960s-1980s, when both countries experienced waves of nationalist violence but with Northern Ireland’s violence far surpassing that of Wales in its intensity, frequency and casualties produced and with Welsh nationalist violence finding little support from the broader population. I first examine the development of nationalist identity in each country and then utilize Jeffrey Ross’s model of structural causes of terrorism to compare the violence in each case. I find that several structural factors including strength of nationalist identity were present to a far greater degree in Northern Ireland than in Wales.
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Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

This thesis asks the question: why are some stateless nationalist movements largely nonviolent while others produce violence and terrorism against a state or other ethnonational groups in pursuit of their goals? Another way to phrase this is to ask whether nationalist movements are inherently violent or if the existence of a nationalist ideology necessarily leads to violence. To explore this question, this thesis will examine the cases of Northern Ireland and Wales, focusing on the 1960s-1980s when both countries experienced nationalist agitation and unrest that, in the former case, frequently manifested itself violently and, in the latter case, produced only small-scale incidents of violence that received little support from the larger nationalist population. The next chapter, which outlines the methodology of this thesis, considers the justification for this research question in further detail as well as the rationale for the two cases compared. This chapter, however, reviews the relevant literature on both nationalism and terrorism. Because the two fields of study are largely self-contained and are fraught with their own inter-paradigm debates, the final section of this literature review also considers the arguments of scholars who concern themselves with nationalist violence. However, as the methodology of the following chapter explains, this thesis will attempt to use existing theories on nationalism and nationalist ideology to complement theories exploring the causes of terrorism and political violence and thus bridge the gap between the two fields of study.

1.2 Defining the “Nation” and “Nationalism”

Walker Connor, one of the most prominent postwar academics on nationalism studies, notes that academics were caught off-guard by the resurgence of nationalism in the second half of the twentieth century. Conventional postwar thought had viewed it as an anachronism, a kind of parochial fanaticism that had culminated in the excesses of fascism and the Holocaust and that had come to be dismissed in Western Europe as a supranational identity came to the fore and seen as irrelevant in Eastern Europe in the face of centralizing, bureaucratic communist regimes. The biggest reason for this is the scholarly tendency “to equate nationalism with a feeling of loyalty to the state rather than with loyalty to the nation” (1978: 378). Before the post-Cold War onset of scholarly fascination with globalization and its erosion of state sovereignty, at least, the
common view appeared to be that the state was the dominant actor in global politics, and the institution which reigned supreme in retaining the loyalty of its inhabitants. Not only did resurgent nationalism put the lie to this assumption, it also highlighted the conceptual ambiguities that have been partly responsible for such misunderstandings. As he puts it: “it would be more difficult to name four words more essential to global politics than are state, nation, nation-state, and nationalism. But despite their centrality, all four terms are shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, inconsistent, and often totally erroneous usage” (378).

Partly to blame for this confusion is the difficulty of defining what exactly the “nation” is, without which one cannot begin to define “nationalism”. Yet there is no consensus on which characteristics are universal to all nations, or even whether nations exist at all save in the minds of those convinced that they belong to them. What is certain is that the “essence” of any nation is “a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all other peoples in a most vital way” (Connor, 1978: 379). Yet beyond this sense of commonality or belonging, it is difficult to pin the nation down to any particular definition. For example, territory, religion or language can all form the basis of some “national” identity or may have little to no role at all. The working class of a given country may feel a “psychological bond” or solidarity, especially in its relations with the ruling or bourgeois classes, and yet few would likely argue that the working class constitutes a nation.

Ultimately, Connor argues, what matters is not whether a nation exists but whether people believe it exists; in other words, the nation is self-defined. Factual data uncovered by anthropologists, linguists or geneticists might discredit dearly-held myths of common descent, but these data are irrelevant as the members of a given nation will remain untroubled by evidence undermining their beliefs. What is more important is the feeling of belonging to a distinct social group with a singular and ancient origin and, often, a common blood lineage – the latter of which being why nation was, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often conflated with race. Etymological shifts over the centuries have meant that nation has changed in meaning from breed or race, stemming from the Latin past participle, nasci, “to be born”, to “blood group” in the middle ages, and finally to referring to the citizenry or inhabitants of a given country or state, regardless of their ethnic origins, in more recent centuries (1978: 381).

This leads to another conceptual problem – differentiating between the nation and the
ethnic group. Some of the difficulty in this, as Smith (2010) discusses, lies in the tension between “objective” and “subjective” factors that figure into definitions of the nation. Definitions may stress “objective” criteria such as language, religion, shared history and common myths or more subjective criteria such as perceptions of commonality or the will to see a nation as existing, as seen in Benedict Anderson's famous definition of the nation as “an imagined political community” (10-11). Such criteria can also feature in definitions of both the state and the ethnic group, yet the state is “a set of autonomous institutions...possessing a legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory” (12). The ethnic community, or *ethnie*, as Smith refers to it, is much more easily confused with the nation, and indeed sometimes is in the literature. He deals with this confusion by defining the *ethnie* as “a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” and the nation as “a named human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members” (13). Nations possess territory; they are not simply linked with a historic homeland as *ethnies* are; *ethnies* also do not need any public culture, only a common cultural element such as language or religion. These are ideal types, of course – one often speaks of diaspora nations such as the Jews and Armenians which did not occupy their homelands for centuries but which are clearly more than just an *ethnie*. There are also “polyethnic nations” such as the Swiss which comprise separate *ethnies* but which can claim a shared public culture, founding myths and a bounded homeland (15).

1.3 Two competing paradigms of nationalism studies

Despite having a working definition of the nation, we are still faced with a literature rife with disputes over the nature of nationalism and over the origins of nations. Broadly speaking, we can define the two opposing ends of the spectrum of the debate as “primordialism” and “constructivism”. The former refers to the idea that nations have deep-seated, even organic or biological roots, that their origins can be traced back to prehistory or even that the kinship of a nation's members can be traced back to a common ancestry. The latter refers to the idea that nations are social constructs, often fabricated by elites for purposes of manipulation; at the very least, constructivism highlights the modernity of the language surrounding nations and the way
in which disparate groups can be brought together under created myths and histories. Few scholars adhere rigidly to either extreme, and most fall somewhere along the spectrum, but the primordialist/constructivist dichotomy serves as a useful guide to conceptualizing interparadigm debates.

One variety of primordialism stresses the *sociobiological origins* of nations. Although such a conceptualization fell out of vogue in the twentieth century following the excesses of racialized nationalism during the two world wars, it has gained some currency in more recent decades. Smith cites Pierre van den Berghe as “its chief exponent” (2009: 8). Van den Berghe, while acknowledging the more subjective elements of race and ethnicity, cautions against reducing membership to such categories to class affiliation and other flexible and more modern social identities (1978: 401). As he explains, “the most basic question asked by sociobiology is: why are animals social, that is, why do they cooperate?” (402). While there are certainly mutual benefits to cooperation, sociobiology stresses the importance of *kin selection* in maximizing *inclusive fitness*. The latter term refers to the way in which an animal prefers kin over non-kin in order to promote the reproduction of shared genes. Human society is distinct in that reciprocity and coercion coexist with kin selection as constituent elements, with the first two becoming more important in relation to the third as society becomes larger and more complex (403). While acknowledging that such an argument is reductionist and biologically determinist, he argues that this view is not a return to Social Darwinism or racist theories, but merely an assertion that human behaviour is the product of adaptive evolution involving “the complex interplay of genotypical, ecological and cultural factors” (403). His central argument is that race and ethnicity are extensions of “the idiom of kinship”, while class relations are related to reciprocity. Thus, he argues, there are two broad types of human collectivities: Type I groups which tend to be defined by common descent and are endogamous and include racial, caste and ethnic groups, and Type II groups, “joined in the defence of common interests” and encompassing trade unions, political parties, professional bodies and the like. Such groups can overlap, but their ideal types take their basis of solidarity in kinship and shared interests respectively. He points out that, until the last few thousand years, Type I groups “were synonymous with human societies”, comprised of small inbred “tribes” of a few hundred people regarding themselves as a “people” sharing common descent, which van den Berghe refers to as “superfamilies”. Even as such societies grew to
populations in the tens of thousands, reference to unilineal descent provided some basis for their existence, and even as they extended through migration, conquest and interbreeding with neighbouring societies, they maintained the myth of common descent. It is somewhat missing the point, he argues, to highlight the fictive nature of shared ancestry; this kinship “was real often enough to become the basis of these powerful sentiments we call nationalism, tribalism, racism, and ethnocentrism” (404). The fact that these sentiments remain strong even in modern industrial society and in the face of competition from Type II groups is telling. Smith raises concerns with this account. “The most obvious” difficulty, he writes, “is the problem of generalizing from the level of individual reproductive behaviour to that of collective, and political, action”. It is also somewhat awkward to explain large-scale sociopolitical developments through individual or kin behaviour (2010: 56).

Another variety of primordialism, associated most commonly with Clifford Geertz, argues that ethnic groups and nations spring from “cultural givens” of social existence (Smith, 2010: 56). Geertz argues that, despite the advance of the sovereign state, “peoples' sense of self remains bound up in the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition” (1963: 2). Thus, many states are susceptible to “serious disaffection based on primordial attachments”; primordial attachments are those that stem from the “assumed 'givens’” of social existence, regardless of their basis for being taken as natural. While the strength of such primordial bonds may vary from person to person and from society to society, “for virtually every person, in every society...some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural – some would say spiritual – affinity than from social interaction”. It is for this reason that he argues: “the reasons why a unilingual state is stable and a multilingual state unstable are quite obvious. A state is built on fellow feeling...a feeling of corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel they are kith and kin”. This fellow feeling “is the foundation of a stable and democratic state”, and the lack of fellow feeling among members of a state leads to conflict between primordial and civil sentiments and thus gives rise to problems of tribalism, communalism and conflicting loyalties (3). Smith notes the qualified nature of Geertz's argument, as he speaks of “assumed 'givens” of social existence”; thus, even primordialism allows for the importance of culture, while stressing that “we, as individuals and members of our collectivities, feel and believe in the primordiality of our ethnies and our nations – their
naturalness, longevity and power” (2010: 57). However, primordialism is still inadequate, as it does not probe the question of why so many people share a sense of primordiality. Answering this “requires a rational, empirical analysis of ethnic attachments, not an assertion of the a priori nature and emotional content of such ties” (58).

The constructivist paradigm, on the other hand, views nations as “invented traditions” and “imagined communities”, to quote Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson respectively. For Hobsbawm, nationalism is an ideology that exists for the purpose of creating nation-states: “nations only exist as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one”, or as Smith puts it, “nations are made by nationalists” (Smith, 1998: 121). Hobsbawm dismisses the “proto-national” bonds of “supra-local” regional, religious or ethnic communities as not constituting ancestors of modern nationalism, as they have had “no necessary relation with the unit of territorial political organization which is a crucial criterion of what we understand as a 'nation' today” (122). Hobsbawm distinguishes two types of nationalism: the first is the mass, civic and democratic political nationalism “modelled on the kind of citizen nation created by the French Revolution” which predominated in the nineteenth century and operated under the “threshold principle” that only nations capable of supporting a large capitalist market economy could claim sovereignty as sovereign states. The second emerged after 1870 and featured smaller groups asserting their right to separate from large empires on the basis of ethno-linguistic ties. These ties were products of the rise of new classes, large-scale migrations of peoples, the growing centralization of state powers combined with the democratization of politics (121-22). Thus, Hobsbawm takes an essentially Marxist view of nationalism, linking it to the rise of capitalism and the actions of elites concerned with creating a standardized vernacular and identity and viewing such nationalism as producing right-leaning populations concerned with stamping out “foreign” influences. Nationalism “is a substitute for lost dreams” and cannot serve as a dominant principle of state formation in today's world (123-24).

Smith raises several issues with this account. For one, Hobsbawm says little about the spread of nationalist ideas in the decades before the French Revolution, as it had little to do with the processes of state-making and market-establishing; in doing so Hobsbawm ignores many of the social and cultural aspects of nationalism. Smith also questions whether one can so easily
distinguish between two kinds of nationalism; upon closer inspection most “civic” and “political” nationalisms turn out to be “ethnic” and “linguistic”, even the French nationalism during the Revolution (1998: 125-26). Hobsbawm also conflates ethnicity with language or actual descent and “fails to consider the importance of myths, memories, traditions and symbols of sociocultural groupings – including shared memories of historical events, however selective or idealized, and shared myths and symbols of (presumed) ancestry”; in fact, he dismisses them as fabricated or irrelevant as they would otherwise undermine his insistence on the ultra-modernity of nations and nationalism (127). Smith notes Hobsbawm's concept of “proto-national” bonds renders peoples as passive, historyless and acted upon by elites. For example, it overlooks how the medieval political and ethno-linguistic ties of the Holy Roman Empire provided a basis for modern German nationalism or the way in which the ancient and medieval Jewish ideals of the homeland and holy land, passed down through the generations in the diaspora, informed Zionist ideology.

Another major constructivist view is that of Benedict Anderson, who argues that nations are “imagined communities” because its members will never meet most of their fellow-members, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991: 6). Of course, all communities larger than small villages are “imagined” according to these criteria, but it is the style in which they are imagined that matters. The nation is imagined as limited, because it has boundaries beyond which lie other nations. It is imagined as sovereign because it emerged as a concept in an age of revolution and enlightenment which challenged the legitimacy of the “divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm”. It is imagined as a community, because “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (7). Nations take their basis in historical “print-communities”, reading publics of vernacular languages who expanded with the growth of early modern print culture and the use of centralized languages of state, which “lent a sense of fixity and stability to particular languages within territorially discrete areas” (Smith, 2010: 86). Broader changes that facilitated the rise of nations included the decline of far-flung religious communities and great empires; more importantly, the “universal quest for immortality” provided the intergenerational fraternity which has made it possible for so many to sacrifice themselves for the well-being of this imagined community (87). Smith notes that although Anderson recognizes the linguistic basis of an imagined political community, he fails to explain
nationalism as “a type of collective conduct, based on the collective will of a moral community and the shared emotions of a putatively ancestral community”; we need to understand why nationalism has wide appeal rather than simply explaining it through the “cognitive lens of its intellectual and artistic purveyors” and as something imposed upon a passive population (89-90).

Given the many issues raised by Smith regarding the competing paradigms of both primordialism/perennialism and constructivism/modernism, we now turn to Smith's approach of “ethnosymbolism”, which will provide the conceptual framework for the comparison of this thesis' two cases. “Ethno-symbolists,” he writes, “consider the cultural elements of symbol, memory, value, ritual and tradition to be crucial to an analysis of ethnicity, nations and nationalisms” (Smith, 2009: 25). These elements ensure “a degree of common consciousness”, allow each community to differentiate itself from nearby communities and help “ensure a sense of continuity with past generations of the community” (25). Thus, it is important to look beyond the structural conditions that help give rise to nations and nationalism and try to understand the appeal of different symbols, myths, values, memories and so forth. Ethnosymbolists also view networks of ethnic ties “as the single most important factor in the rise and persistence of nations and nationalisms” (26-27). Smith uses the term ethnie, French for ethnic community, to distinguish a form more complex than a simple ethnic category, which is imposed by outsiders based on cultural markers such as language or religion regardless of whether such a “group” identifies itself as such. An ethnie, in his words, is “a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata” (27). A significant degree of ethnic homogeneity is often found at the core of many political nations and forms the basis for its institutions and the emergence of a strong state.

Ethnosymbolists highlight the historicity of nations, arguing that modernist views favour modern Western understandings of the nation as a “territorialized and autonomous legal-political community” rather than recognizing non-Western and premodern varieties of the nation. Nations can emerge slowly, over centuries, on the basis of many of the same ties as an ethnie as well as possessed territory and public culture, and thus, as concerns methodology, are ideal for historical analysis. While modernists see the spread of nationalist ideologies as the product of elitist projects and national myth-making or “invented traditions”, ethnosymbolists contend that only
those elements which have some prior resonance among the larger population “will be able to furnish the concept of the proposed nation's political culture” (31). In line with such themes of historicity, it is important to note that nationalist histories and narratives are subject to constant reinterpretation and challenges from those within the national community; for example, religious and racially-tinged Hindu nationalism has repeatedly challenged the secular and socialist narrative of India's Congress Party. Nations are thus “zones of conflict” and debates about national identity actually help to raise the level of national consciousness by forcing parties to explore the significance of national history (33-35). Debates often occur when periods of crisis and change force rediscovery and re-evaluation of the past to strengthen the sense of national identity and destiny (36). What becomes apparent in the ethnosymbolist approach is that any study of a nation and its accompanying nationalism needs to take a long-run historical view of the nation.

I choose Smith as the basis for comparing the two nations in this thesis for several reasons. First, Smith highlights the importance of symbols, myths, customs and traditions in understanding why nations inspire the loyalty that they do. The modernist view that nations are elitist projects imposed upon a people to solidify support for a capital-serving state implies that the masses have little agency and denies the significance of premodern history. Conversely, primordialist approaches that highlight kin selection and biology fail to underline why these supposed primordial connections should continue to hold relevance in the modern world where thousands or millions of individuals with no familial links still forge common identities. Because this thesis emphasizes the importance of historical processes in producing nationalist violence and terrorism, an approach that examines how nations form and are continuously reshaped over centuries is particularly useful.

1.4 Literature on Terrorism and Political Violence

Similar to the definitional difficulties that plague nationalism studies, little consensus exists as to what exactly terrorism is. Hoffman notes that almost any violent – or even sometimes non-violent – action can be casually regarded as terrorism. Yet when even the actions of organized criminals and lone-wolf killers classify as terrorism, in the sense that their actions “terrorize” us, the term loses much of its academic relevance. Terrorism, he reminds us, “is fundamentally and inherently political”, which is to say that acts of terror – or the mere threat of
them – are used in the pursuit of political goals (2006: 2-3). While the term originally had a more positive connotation when it was first popularized during the French Revolution when terrorism was used by the newly-established state to intimidate counterrevolutionaries, its usage has since shifted to refer mainly to violent antigovernment activity and thus is often used as a pejorative label to discredit its perpetrators. The pejorative nature of the term “terrorism”, in fact, is one of the main reasons for the difficulty of defining the term, as it makes any definition inherently subjective. Additionally, while earlier perpetrators of terrorist acts such as nineteenth-century anarchists may have embraced the terrorist label, in recent decades most have tended “toward ever more convoluted semantic obfuscations to sidestep terrorism's pejorative overtones” (21). Names of terrorist organizations include words such as “freedom”, “liberation”, “popular” and “resistance”, and members of such organizations will usually deny that they are terrorists and posit themselves as defenders and liberators of an oppressed group against a perceived illegitimate government or unjust socioeconomic system – such targets constitute the “real” terrorists. Third World national liberation movements fighting colonial powers or harsh regimes could be labelled terrorists, for example, as they threatened an unjust status quo; as one Mauritanian ambassador put it, “all liberation movements are described as terrorists by those who have reduced them to slavery” (24).

However, while what one views as terrorism may depend on whether one sympathizes with the politics of the perpetrators, and while national armed forces have caused far more death and destruction than any terrorist group, Hoffman points out that there are accepted norms of behaviour regarding conduct in war, legitimized by numerous international conventions – and terrorists do, he notes, “deliberately portray themselves in the terminology of military jargon” (Hoffman, 2006: 26), as combatants who must resort to clandestine acts of violence to counter the overwhelming firepower of the state. International law grants civilian noncombatants immunity from attack, prohibits taking civilians as hostages, outlaws reprisals against both civilians and POWs, and upholds the inviolability of diplomats (26-27). Terrorists frequently violate all these rules.

Continuing on this track, Hoffman suggests that a further clue to understanding terrorism lies in distinguishing it from guerrilla warfare and insurgency, with which it is often confused or treated as synonymous of. After all, guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists often employ similar
tactics such as assassination, bombings and hostage-taking with similar purposes of intimidation or coercion, and generally do not wear any uniforms or insignia to distinguish themselves from noncombatants; they also all fit into the general category of “irregulars”. Yet “guerrilla” refers to a large group of armed individuals who act as a military unit who engage with military forces and may even seize and hold territory. Insurgents are similar, although they will often incorporate propaganda and psychological warfare to mobilize popular support. Terrorists do not act as armed military units, do not seize or hold territory, avoid engaging enemy military forces, do not have the numbers or logistical capability to organize mass political mobilization and cannot exercise direct control over a populace. Of course, these categories are ideal types and many established terrorist groups can also be considered guerrillas due to their size and tactics (2006: 35). This would suggest, I argue, that terrorism is as much a tactic as anything.

In keeping with the political narrative of terrorism, it is important to note that if terrorism is a tactic, then it cannot be entirely irrational – at least not in the minds of the perpetrators – as it would then fail to serve the advancement of any political agenda. To this end, Freedman notes that the use of terror is ultimately for the purpose of creating an environment of fear, uncertainty and instability in order to influence the political behaviour of a target group (2007: 314). He contends that other scholars have only acknowledged terrorism’s strategic nature – with little in-depth analysis – to highlight its “purposive” rather than “pathological” character. The definitional problems with terrorism noted in the preceding paragraphs, he writes, “stem in part from the strategic role that definitions can play”, chief among them the pejorative connotations of the term “terrorism” and the potential to delegitimize the political claims of various groups through its application (315). Freedman argues that terrorism ultimately entails a battle of narratives in that terrorists carry out the anarchist tradition of “the propaganda of the deed”, using spectacular acts of violence to awaken revolutionary feeling among the masses and highlight the current status quo. Radical propaganda is much harder to suppress in an age of global communication and “it is now likely,” he writes, “that any dramatic, violent deed, no matter how anonymous the perpetrators, will stimulate immense speculation and controversy around the identity of the perpetrators and their motives”, with “the effect of the deeds” depending “on the ability to influence this commentary” (316-17). Likewise, counterterrorist strategy involves highlighting the futility of actions of terrorism. In this fashion, the strategies of both terrorists and the state are
interdependent, in that the actions undertaken by one actor are calculated to influence the future choices of the other. “Thus”, he writes, “the quality of A's strategy depends in the end on the quality of B's” (318-319). For example, overreaction to a terrorist incident on the part of the state may provide the group with moral credibility.

Terrorism is not simply a strategy, however. As Schmid writes, terrorism acts as a form of psychological warfare, given that, as Lenin once said, the purpose of terrorism is to produce terror – at least, Schmid qualifies, among those who identify with victims of terrorism and who may believe that they could be the next targets. Yet it is more than that: it is a medium of communication in itself, especially as mass media coverage of a terrorist incident inevitably publicizes the message of the terrorist group. In fact, he argues, the sensation-seeking nature of the media encourages terrorist actions, as “news value” is determined by factors such as drama, conflict, negativity, immediacy and photograph-ability. Thus, the media not only transmits the terrorist's message, “they also publicize the terrorist's cause free of charge which makes their strategy very cost-effective” (2005: 142). This enables terrorists to influence the public conversation through careful selection of targets and timing of attacks. I would go one step further and argue that terrorism is not only a form of psychological warfare, it is also a form of “propaganda warfare” in that, as both Freedman and Schmid highlight, it is ultimately about contesting the discourse – and the hegemony of this discourse – of the state.

While we have now established some idea – or at least highlighted some arguments – of what terrorism is and to what ends its use can serve according to the literature, the equally important question of what actually causes terrorism remains. A variety of theories and disputes has arisen over the decades, perhaps due to the tendency of scholars to focus on case studies of particular countries, regions, terrorist groups and individual terrorists, with less attention paid to the larger picture (Ross, 1993: 317). Ross highlights three prominent categories of causes of oppositional political terrorism that have emerged from years of individual case studies and the mutual borrowing of concepts and theories between scholars: structural, psychological and rational choice (317). Structural theories look for the causes of terrorism in the political, cultural, social and economic structure of societies, psychological theories try to understand why individuals join terrorist organizations, while rational choice theories try to explain participation in terrorist organizations as a result of cost-benefit calculations (317). Ross constructs a model of
structural causes of terrorism on the basis that it is much easier to operationalize and measure structural variables than it is for psychological or rational choice ones (318). His model proposes three permissive and seven precipitant causes; the former, he writes, are at the core of the latter. The least important permissive cause is geographical location: urban locations allow terrorists greater access to recruits, logistical advantages and closer proximity to targets; from this he hypothesizes that “the higher the population of a city, the greater the amount of terrorism” (320-21). Second, the type of political system acts as a permissive cause, as most terrorism occurs in democracies, likely because there is greater legitimation of the right to dissent, protection of civil liberties, and a system encouraging “the proliferation of narrow-based social issues”; thus, “the greater the degree of democracy, the higher the toleration for terrorism” (321-22). Third and most important, a society's level of modernization affects the availability of sophisticated weapons and technology, prevalence of mass media for disseminating terrorist messages, the education level – and likelihood of being receptive to terrorist causes – of the general populace, the prevalence of critical and vulnerable infrastructure such as transportation networks, and the likelihood that such a society is democratic; thus, “the greater the amount of modernization, the higher the social, cultural and historical facilitation” of terrorism (322). Related to these permissive causes are precipitant causes; these are, from least to most important: social, cultural and historical facilitation, organizational split and development, presence of other forms of unrest, support, counterterrorist organization failure, availability of weapons and explosives, and grievances (320). A few of these are self-explanatory, but social, cultural and historical facilitation refers to the “shared attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, customs, habits, myths, and traditions that permit the development of nationalism, fanaticism, violence and terrorism in a subgroup of a population” (322). The presence of other forms of unrest can act as a catalyst for terrorism by motivating terrorists and increasing the legitimacy of violent actions (323). Organizational split refers to the fact that most terrorist groups come into existence as the result of a split between moderate and more extreme wings of a political organization (322). Grievances, which can be divided into further subcategories such as economic, religious and legal grievances, constitute the most important variable here. As Ross writes, “grievances unheeded can lead to the development of a social movement, interest group, political party, or in extreme cases an individual, cell, group or organization that engages in terrorist actions”;
similarly, intensification of grievances and lack of success in mitigating them can lead to splits between moderates and extremists in political organizations, while grievances can also lead to others offering their support to those who engage in terrorism (325-26). The main point of this model is to highlight the interaction between different structural factors and how this interaction increases the likelihood of terrorism occurring; in general, he writes, “the permissive causes structure the type and amount of precursors to a group's choice of terrorism, which is facilitated by interdependent precipitant causes” (326). Ross concludes that his is but a “first-generation model”, imperfect in its existing form but establishing a foundation for more refined models as different case studies are used to test it.

Predating Ross's argument and drawing upon similar ideas is Crenshaw's influential article on the causes of terrorism in which she uses case study comparison “to distinguish a common pattern of causation from the historically unique” and “outline an approach to the analysis of terrorism” (1981: 379). Crenshaw distinguishes between preconditions, which “set the stage for terrorism for the long run”, and precipitants, “specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism” (381). Her argument's preconditions are similar to those of Ross, including modernization, urbanization, social facilitation such as beliefs and attitudes condoning terrorism, and, most importantly, “a government's inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism” (382). Precipitants include the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup such as an ethnic minority – specifically grievances based on perceived injustice for which the government can be blamed; lack of opportunity for political participation; and some precipitant event such as government use of force to quell dissent. Of the second, Crenshaw notes that “terrorism is essentially the result of elite disaffection” in that “it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider constituency who may have not been consulted about, and do not necessarily approve of, the terrorists' aims or methods” (384). She suggests that terrorism might occur where “mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide”, as the majority of the populace is not discontented enough to rise up against the regime and so a small minority feels compelled to use radical means to overthrow the government, which leads her to the paradoxical conclusion that terrorism may actually be a sign of a stable society (384). Crenshaw argues that terrorism is a product of rational choice for groups who want to draw attention to a cause, demoralize the government, attract public support
and provoke regime violence to gain public sympathy. Terrorism is attractive as an inexpensive and simple alternative to contesting the regime through other means and is seized upon as an option when conditions are felt to be ripe (388-389). Equally important as strategic variables are psychological ones: “terrorists are only a small minority of people with similar personal backgrounds, experiencing the same conditions, who might thus be expected to reach identical conclusions based on logical reasoning about the utility of terrorism as a technique of political influence” (389).

As Newman notes, speaking of “root causes” in the language of authors such as Crenshaw and Ross can be problematic. If terrorism “is considered the dependent variable, then root causes form the background independent variables” and precipitant factors “form intervening variables”. This is controversial because “it suggests that root causes are an essential part of the equation” and carries the risk of making explanations appear prescriptive for dealing with terrorism (2006: 751). Root cause explanations, especially those focus on poverty and other “grievances”, are imperfect because terrorism can emerge in stable, democratic and developed states as well as in poorer regions. “The concept of root causes”, he writes, “does not imply direct cause and effect” as “most societies where these root causes exist do not give rise to terrorism” (755). Thus, root causes are only important insofar as they can be found to be a common feature of societies where terrorism does emerge.

Along these lines, Newman demonstrates issues with testing root causes through different methodologies. First, he takes a large sample analysis of terrorist incidents carried out in 79 countries between 1996 and 2003 and comparing the frequency of terrorist incidents to indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality, as well as indicators of political rights, civil liberties, population density, urbanization, and age of population. He finds no clear correlation between these indicators and frequency of terrorist incidents except for one indicator: population density, something that is associated with terrorism, shows a negative relation with frequency of terrorist incidents (2006: 756-60). Another approach that he considers is to focus on the terrorist organizations themselves and determine their nature and aims of each group, the background of the terrorist leadership as well as that of its supporters and operatives, and the social base of each organization. This helps in allowing one to distinguish between different types of terrorism. For example, many
European-based “Marxian” organizations “display less evidence of root cause factors” and “emerge in societies that do not display markedly high levels of deprivation or inequality” (762); nor are these societies characterized by the demographic factors commonly linked with terrorism. However, ideologically similar groups in developing parts of the world such as Latin America do reflect root cause factors, drawing upon dispossessed communities for support in societies with high levels of poverty, inequality and human rights abuses. European-based nationalist groups “do not exist in environments of acute deprivation of inequality” but emerge out of a situation of “perceived inequality and humiliation” (763). In the developing world, again, ethnonationalist groups reflect the root causes argument, with the addition of a “clash of values” in which groups “perceive that they are engaged in a struggle against an incompatible value system” (763). Thus, he concludes, the “root causes” argument is not entirely satisfactory. However, it should be noted that all of the broad types of groups discussed here draw upon a sense of perceived inequality or injustice, a point that he does not follow. While the levels of inequality or deprivation in European countries are not comparable to those in the developing world, the fact that individuals may feel a sense of injustice relative to the overall conditions in their own society might be more important as a motivating factor than the level of absolute deprivation.

When a sub-sample is analyzed, Newman writes, the findings can be different. The deadliest organizations are clustered in societies with lower HDI rankings and poor records of human rights and civil liberties. They also emerge in societies with higher proportions of young people, although no correlation between deadliness and either urbanization or population density is present (2006: 765-66). Finally, when adopting Palestine as a single case study for testing the root causes argument, Newman finds an “interrelationship among permissive background conditions, direct grievances, catalytic variables, and terrorism itself” (769). Thus, he concludes that we cannot make generalized conclusions from large-scale quantitative analyses and are better served by qualitative analysis, while also arguing that root causes are more relevant in understanding terrorism in developing countries rather than developed countries (769-70).

Piazza notes that research on terrorism from different authors has produced a diversity of often-conflicted findings regarding links between socioeconomic factors and terrorism. Some empirical research demonstrates that perpetrators of terrorism are no more likely than the
average person to come from a lower socioeconomic background and that economically-deprived people are no more likely to support terrorism than better-off people, while other studies indicate that countries with higher levels of economic inequality experience higher levels of terrorism than more egalitarian ones. Similarly, some research suggests that economically-developed OECD countries are less likely to experience terrorism while other research finds the opposite (2011: 339-40). Piazza highlights economic discrimination against minorities as a potentially-overlooked factor in much of this literature, despite the fact that literature in the fields of criminology and sociology has demonstrated the importance of experience of ethnic, racial or class discrimination as a predictor of future aggressive behaviour and violent crime (340). He relates this to the theory of relative deprivation, that shared experience of collective or social status disadvantages help to produce and strengthen cohesive minority group identities; this alienation and sense of otherness from the majority and the state when combined with opportunities to mobilize can lead to political violence aimed at redressing grievances. Terrorist groups serve as a potential vehicle to “channel minority group grievance into violent action” (341), a hypothesis that he supports with data from the Minorities at Risk project.

Although research such as that cited above highlights the potential theoretical issues with Ross’s model, I nonetheless chose to use his model for several reasons. The first is the practicality of its operationalization: structural variables are easily measured by examining the material conditions in a given case such as availability of weapons and explosives and the presence of legitimate grievances. Second, as with Smith’s theory of ethnosymbolism, Ross’s model underlines the importance of the processes which lead to outcomes – in this case, terrorist violence. Merely analyzing a decision by individuals or groups to commit acts of terrorism as a matter of rational choice – that is, weighing the potential rewards and risks of committing these actions – diminishes the importance of history, culture and structural factors in producing an environment that would encourage actors to turn to terrorism. Third, although Newman, as highlighted above, illustrates some of the difficulties presented by “root causes” arguments, his qualitative analysis of Palestine demonstrates linkages between permissive conditions, grievances, and terrorism, while European nationalist groups emerged out of situations of perceived inequality rather than acute levels of deprivation or inequality. Similarly, Piazza finds that economic discrimination against minorities is an overlooked factor in terrorist violence.
Thus, the overall thrust of Ross’s model has support in the literature. I intend to test it in order to assess the relevance of its proposed variables in explaining terrorism.

1.5 Nationalism and Violence: Literature

Dandeker argues that there are two reasons for the connection often made by academics between nationalism and violence. One concerns the nature of the formation of national communities and how it is tied to “the political framework provided by the modern state and its monopolization of legitimate violence within a given territory” (1998: 21-22). The history of the modern nation-state system since the Early Modern Period has been marked by violence. The creation of the Netherlands from the Habsburg Empire, the birth of the United States, the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the nineteenth century and the disintegration of Austrian, Turkish, British, French, Belgian and Soviet empires in the twentieth century all saw new nation-states appear and eventual recognition by the UN General Assembly “that empires were no longer acceptable political entities” (25); that is, international law came to recognize the supremacy of the nation-state. Warfare helped create national communities in medieval and early modern Europe “by sustaining geopolitical pluralism” through divisions created by feudalism, non-kinship personal bonds and various invading groups of conquest while also stimulating technological and tactical innovations in military organization and innovation in the apparatuses of the state. Constant European warfare made political leaders dependent on money lenders, bankers and armaments manufacturers, spurring the rise of independent capitalist classes and the modern state system and enabling Western powers to achieve global supremacy, leading to the spread of the nation-state system. As Dandeker writes: “the upshot of all this was that war created nations, nations created states, and states created further wars. In turn, these stimulated the modernization of the state as a power container in which national communities could be consolidated” (27).

The second reason has to do with the conceptual connection between nationalism and political autonomy. Dandeker highlights Anthony Smith's distinction between an *ethnie*, or ethnic group, and a nation: the former can be associated with a given historical territory, but a nation possesses or seeks to possess a territory. Some ethnic groups are content to live in a given nation-state, while one that is not may either be an aspiring nation seeking to separate its associated territory from the state in possession or may seek to join a related nation already in existence in
another territory. Thus, “it is precisely because national identity is bound up with territory and political autonomy that national conflicts are fundamentally associated with the risk of violence: control of the instruments of coercion and regulation over territory...are at issue” (1998: 26).

Malešević challenges conventional views of nationalism as “intrinsically” violent, categorizing such “causality assuming” perspectives as intentionalism, naturalism and formativism. The first focuses on the role of powerful individuals in driving acts of apparently-nationalist violence such as the Holocaust or ethnic cleansing against Bosniaks but suffers from overlooking the complex sociological and historical processes facilitating the rise of such nationalist leaders (2013: 14-15). Naturalism tends to view ethnic violence such as that which occurred in the Balkans during the 1990s as the product of “ancient hatreds” and that nationalist fervour and violence are a natural expression of Darwinist competition. Not only is such a perspective biologically and culturally determinist, but it both ignores the prolonged political mobilization that generates national solidarity and the fact that most of human history has been relatively peaceful and that most conflicts have been of small-scale and occurring between elites and their armies as opposed to occurring between entire societies. Were nationalism and violence both natural and inextricably linked, “this planet would experience many more genocides, revolutions and wars than it actually has” (16). Formativism, which holds sway among most mainstream social scientists, considers nationalism a byproduct of violent social action and confrontation and the result of a “security dilemma” in which self-interested states fall into competition with one another (17). For Malešević, it is the increased bureaucratization of society and the spread of mass ideologies imparted on networks of microsolidarity – that is, extended families, communities and other kinship groups – that has facilitated the rise of nationalist ideology and enabled both states and revolutionary groups to mobilize followers to commit themselves to violence for the sake of the nation (22-32). Thus, both nationalism and organized violence are products of historical processes and should not be thought of as inherent to human nature.

One factor that is easy to overlook in an analysis of terrorism is that there are different types of terrorism – and for the purposes of this study, nationalist terrorism is the focus here. What distinguishes it, Sánchez-Cuenca writes, “from revolutionary, fascist, or religious terrorism is the political claim. Nationalist terrorists ask always for independence or greater autonomy for
some territory”, causing them to “engage in a war of attrition with the State” (2007: 289). Because this is a war of attrition, nationalist terrorists are more likely to cause the state to eventually yield with each casualty-causing attack that they can successfully pull off. However, in his comparison of attacks carried out by the Basque terrorist group ETA in Spain and the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, he notes that neither group was indiscriminate in their choice of targets. The goal, he argues, was not simply to “maximize the pain on the enemy”, as indiscriminate attacks on public places could kill too many “non-legitimate” targets; both groups even denied responsibility for particular bomb attacks in public places that killed large numbers of civilians. The reason for this self-restraint, he argues, is that “terrorist organizations can survive as long as they do not completely alienate their existing and potential supporters” (300). He defines three degrees of support for terrorism: “(1) those who disagree with the armed struggle and the killing of innocent victims but vaguely sympathize with the organization's goals; (2) those who vote for the party associated with the terrorist organization or participate in the social movements that develop around the organization; and (3) those who help the organization in various ways (by providing information, housing, money, etc.) or engage in lesser acts of violence” (300-1). Group (3) is the least likely to cease supporting terrorists due to excessive casualties, and their material and moral support is important for maintaining and expanding the organization. Ultimately, however, the organization needs to win the support or, at the very least, the “non-rejection” of groups (1) and (2) in order to claim legitimacy and to avoid being marginalized in the political environment. Thus, he argues, when these two groups are more moderate than the terrorists, there is a trade-off between the organization's offensive capacity and popular support; that is, the organization is forced to limit its tactics in its war of attrition, leading to the armed struggle being less threatening to the state (301). Utilizing data from both cases, he concludes that popular support for both the ETA and the IRA peaked during periods when their tactics were moderate and demonstrating a willingness to compromise, and lower during periods of extreme violence.

Laitin highlights four mechanisms leading national and ethnic groups to violence against their state or against other ethnic and national groups: irredentism, secession, sons-of-the-soil, and communalism. The first three are mainly concerned with challenging the status quo “with a view that all nations merit their own states” (2007: 2) and the third of these concerns indigenous
populations living in impoverished dry zones of the periphery of overpopulated core zones – mainly in the global South – resisting the encroachment of the dominant nationality group. As such, it is the first two mechanisms that are mainly of interest for the purposes of this study. Irredentism refers to when a “nation has a state of its own but seeks to redeem territory occupied by fellow nationals living in a modern state”. For example, Nazi Germany laid claim to the German-populated but Czechoslovakia-ruled Sudetenland. Secession is what happens when a nation is smaller than the state and its “self-appointed representatives seek to have a state of their own”. The Irish seeking separation from Britain and the Basques seeking separation from Spain are probably the best-known Western European examples. More dangerous is a combination of irredentism and secession – that is, a combination of national minorities, nationalizing states and external national homelands. This figured in the Sudetenland issue as well as Serbia's inciting of ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia following the collapse of Yugoslavia (3-5). However, the fourth factor, communalism, could also hold relevance here; while there were no real organized pogroms on civilians in the case of Northern Ireland, there was certainly what we might term “communal warfare”. Laitin cites several possible explanations for such localized violence, including competition for jobs and divide-and-rule politics by either former colonial overlords or current politicians (7-9).

Interestingly, Laitin contests the conventional wisdom among social scientists that nationalism is inherently dangerous, arguing that the available data show that the probability of violence given ethnic difference is actually very low. Many societies are quite heterogeneous and experience little conflict; even in the case of Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, there has been almost no communal violence in religiously heterogeneous cities and rural areas (2007: 11). As he writes, “the historical and contemporary evidence showing links between nationalism and violence is impressive”. Quantitative data, on the other hand, “undermine confidence in theories purporting to show that national aspirations, differences, or demographics are systematically associated with communal violence or civil war” (22-23). One reason for this is selection bias: scholars are far more likely to focus to on violent cases such as the Basque nationalist movement than on low violence cases such as Catalonia. This “reflects a bias in the literature on nationalism, one that overemphasizes explanations for violence at the expense of explanations for peace” (23). Another issue is that of “listening too earnestly to the accounts of combatants”: 21
journalists flock to zones where ethnic war has broken out and ask combatants to explain the fighting. Leaders of a rebellion need to get support for their insurgencies, and the best way to do this is to appeal to historical grievances and link the insurgency to a nationalist cause. Yet while appealing to such grievances can help sustain an insurgency, this does not mean that such grievances are the cause of the insurgency, especially as grievances are commonly felt in nonviolent cases of nationalism as well. He argues, “ex ante measures of grievance levels are not good predictors of the transformation of latent grievances into manifest ones”. What is more important to explaining violence is to determine the factors that transform “latent grievances into violent action” (25).

1.6 Conclusion

While there is slight overlap between the fields of nationalism studies and terrorism studies as highlighted by the presence of researchers concerned with nationalist violence, the two fields remain self-contained and too riven by inter-paradigmatic and definitional disputes to have a direct relationship with one another. However, any research that examines cases of terrorism that at least appear to have been fuelled by nationalist ideology is incomplete without examining the nature of this nationalist identity. Smith's critique of both primordialists/perennialists and modernists/constructivists highlights the suitability of his own approach of ethnosymbolism in exploring the development of nationalist identity, and Ross's model of structural causes of terrorism provides us with a means of examining the variables that led to the outbreak of violence in the cases selected for study here. Having established both working definitions for the nation and terrorism, we have a solid theoretical ground for proceeding to outlining the methodology of the core of this thesis.
Chapter Two: **Methodology**

2.1 **Research question and cases considered**

According to George and Bennett, the selection of research objectives is closely linked with the task of identification of an important research problem or “puzzle”. This problem “should be embedded in a well-informed assessment that identifies problems in the current state of knowledge, acknowledges contradictory theories, and notes inadequacies in the evidence for existing theories”. Thus, the proposed research needs to appear to make some significant contribution to the field (2005: 74).

This thesis addresses the following question: why does nationalism appear to produce terrorist violence in some cases and not others? That is to say, does the development and spread of nationalism necessarily lead to nationalist violence? Answering this is important for several reasons. First, nationalism has been subject to periodic, highly-critical reappraisals, usually in the aftermath of some bloody upheaval such as the Second World War or the breakup of Yugoslavia. In such instances nationalism has come to be identified with racist extremism and was viewed as an inherently negative force, thus making it imperative to discover whether nationalism can act as a positive force or whether it must inevitably take on a life of its own until it spirals into violence. Second, it is possible that nationalism might not be a necessary precondition of violence in cases where it *appears* to be a significant factor: that is, the existence of a nationalist ideology may only matter insofar as it gives a marginalized group an identity around which to rally; the actual content of the nationalist ideology may not promote the development of violence. Third, nationalism exists in many forms, and it is therefore important to determine, in cases where nationalism does indeed appear to be a factor in the development of political violence and terrorism, what is unique about the nationalisms in such cases. Fourth, even in cases where it appears that nationalism-driven violence does occur, there are different types of violence. For example, a case in which a majority, politically-dominant group carries out pogroms and ethnic cleansing against minorities who are blamed for economic difficulties is clearly different from a case in a marginalized group carries out acts of sabotage against the state with the goal of gaining greater autonomy or even independence. It is the second of these two theoretical examples that concern me in this thesis.

To answer this question, I examine and compare the cases of Northern Ireland and Wales
in the second half of the twentieth century. Both areas saw instances of nationalist-motivated violence informed by grievances linked to historical domination by an English-dominated state, yet the violence in Northern Ireland was far greater, both in terms of casualties and the reaction it provoked from the state. The “violence” in Wales consisted mainly of sabotage of water pipelines in the 1960s and arson against English-owned holiday homes in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The violence in Northern Ireland, on the other hand, was sectarian, territorial and long-lasting. Thus, it would appear that Northern Ireland was a case of nationalism serving as a causal mechanism of political violence and terrorism, while Wales was a case in which either nationalism was not “developed” enough to produce sustained violent campaigns or the existence of nationalism was not sufficient to produce such campaigns, begging the question of what other factors were different in the Welsh case.

I compare these two cases for several reasons. First, simply examining only one case of nationalist violence has its drawbacks in that it involves selection bias, as highlighted in the discussion involving Laitin in the previous chapter: scholars are much more likely to study violent cases such as Northern Ireland than they are less violent cases. Thus, it is imperative to determine whether we can generalize from one case by comparing it to others. Second, the historical circumstances of the two cases are as close as any two could probably be: both regions existed as medieval frontiers of the English-speaking world and were conquered by force and politicking by the English crown. Indeed, Wales bears greater similarity to Ireland than Scotland does to either, as Scotland entered the Union on a much more equal footing in 1707. In order for a comparative case study to have any validity, the cases considered should have as much in common as possible in order to isolate the variables that are different with the intention of identifying causal mechanisms. Third, despite these similar historical circumstances, the outcomes in the two regions have had little in common: Welsh nationalism has been relatively peaceful, while Irish nationalism has been marked by violence since the mid-nineteenth century, and arguably even earlier if we include the 1798 uprising, which was not Catholic in origin but still inspired by notions of an independent Irish nation. Thus, it is crucial to identify the distinguishing variables between the two cases in order to better understand the relationship between nationalism and violence.
2.2 Conceptual framework

This thesis attempts to synthesize both the literature on nationalism and literature on terrorism and political violence, as discussed in the previous chapter. It takes as its starting point Anthony Smith's ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism to truly understand the symbolic and historical dimensions of the Welsh and Irish nations, and then moves on to examine Ross's model of structural causes of terrorism. Because his model eschews examination of psychological variables as it is easier to operationalize and measure structural variables, I intend to demonstrate that nonetheless such a model is insufficient if it does not account for the importance of identity formation and ideology as permissive factors. Thus, literature on nationalism can play a complementary role in understanding terrorism in a nationalist context.

The previous chapter gave an overview of ethnosymbolism as an approach to understanding nationalism. I draw upon Smith’s model as it entails tracing the historical development of a nation and exploring how and why its various myths, symbols and customs come to resonate among a large population and fuel a nationalist identity. As concerns methodology, Smith writes, “the main theoretical task of an ethnosymbolic analysis is to provide a cultural history of the nation as a type of historical culture community” [original emphasis] (2009: 39). He thus maps out the methodological process:

“Starting from the ethnic bases formed by the interplay of kinship ties, cultures and political action, a cultural history of the nation would first seek to trace the social and symbolic processes in its formation, before going on to distinguish various types of national community and the different routes of nation formation, as well as their successive periodization. It would then explore the role of various kinds of nationalism, as an ideological movement, in the mobilization of populations and the shaping of distinct nations, as well as the part played by nationalist intellectuals and professionals in this process. Finally, this would lead to an investigation of the forces for persistence and change of nations, particularly in the modern world. Such an enquiry would need to analyze the fundamental cultural and religious resources of the nation, as well as the conflicts between elites who propose different ethno-historical narratives and who seek to realize often opposed projects of national regeneration and 'national destiny' on behalf of 'the people’” (40).

Thus, in order to consider the role played by national identity in the Irish and Welsh cases, it is necessary to understand the historical processes of identity formation and how these processes may have differed in the respective cases. For example, regarding the last sentence in the above quote, there may have been greater conflict over ethno-historical narratives in the Welsh case than in the Irish, producing a fragmented or contradictory identity unable to provide a sufficient
base for mobilization against an outside oppressor. As highlighted in the previous chapter, Smith argues that national ideologies and myths, even if the project of nationalist elites, only succeed in contributing to a national political culture if they have some sort of prior resonance among the larger population (31). Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, it is not enough to analyze the relationship between nationalism and terrorism only in the context of the mid-to-late twentieth century or in the context of the nationalist revivals of the Western world in the 1960s and 1970s; we must explore the historical roots of these nationalisms to better understand what role history played in determining the openness of Irish and Welsh nationalists to violent strategies. There are three general steps to exploring the cultural history of a nation, as implied above. The first step examines the *ethnogenesis* (45) of a nation – that is, it traces the processes by which the “ethnic core” of a nation takes shape. Second, an ethnosymbolist approach examines the processes of nation formation – such as acts of self-defining as a nation through both symbolic and geographic boundaries (49) – that result from this ethnogenesis. Finally, this approach examines how intellectuals and other elites have influenced the modern form taken by the nation in question (58).

After examining the historical and symbolic dynamics of Irish and Welsh identity, I move on to exploring the causes of terrorism in both Northern Ireland and Wales. Schmid notes the difficulty of discussing “causes” of any kind of conflict, be it war or terrorism. Causality “is in reality never perceptible” as it is merely “a construct of scientists that certain factors in reality have been of influence for the presence of a particular phenomenon” (2005: 129). However, we cannot begin to understand the relationship between these factors without utilizing theories, which involves constructing “a system of abstract statements, verified by a body of research findings, on social phenomena”, which allows one to test the existence of a “causal working of factors” (129). Thus, one must consider the variables that constitute the building blocks of the theory – “those changing factors and varying influences which produce an effect when one observes or measures a phenomenon” (129). For the purposes of this thesis, the occurrence of terrorism in Northern Ireland and Wales is the dependent variable while those factors whose presence can be both measured and correlated with the occurrence of terrorism act as the independent variables. We might expect certain independent variables to be present to a far greater extent in Northern Ireland, given the intensity and frequency of terrorism campaigns.
there compared to Wales. Therefore, a theory of terrorism presenting logical variables which can be measured is desirable.

To this end, I consider Ross's model of structural causes of terrorism. As detailed in the previous chapter, his model considers three permissive and seven precipitant causes, with the former laying the basis for the latter. I thus consider the three permissive causes of level of urbanization, political system type and level of modernization in both cases, before moving on to examine the precipitant causes of social, cultural and historical facilitation, organizational split and development, presence of other forms of unrest, support, counterterrorist organization failure, availability of weapons and explosives, and grievances (Ross, 1993: 320-22). Ross's model has the advantage of clearly highlighting key variables that can be readily measured through examination of the case in question, and in distinguishing between broader “permissive cause” variables which lay the societal basis for terrorism and the more immediate “precipitant cause” variables which act as sparks to ignite conflict.

Although Ross is not a particularly prominent figure in the literature on terrorism, his model represents an elaboration upon the earlier work of Martha Crenshaw in its redefining of precipitant causes from specific events to a range of immediate factors whose presence precedes the occurrence of terrorism. Crenshaw highlights the presence of a dissatisfied minority with grievances and a lack of opportunity for political participation, in combination with an immediate precipitating event such as state violence against the aggrieved group as precipitant conditions (1981: 383-85). Ross, on the other hand, offers additional factors such as access to weapons, public support and organizational split which speak to the material conditions that must be in place for potential terrorists to organize and carry out attacks. Thus, he offers a more complete model for comparing cases of terrorism, especially when these additional factors may be key to explaining the difference in outcomes between Northern Ireland and Wales. One of the goals of this thesis, therefore, is testing whether Ross's model of structural causes of terrorism is a viable one. Additionally, the use of either Ross or Crenshaw is not completely without precedent: Piazza, whose research demonstrates a relationship between socioeconomic discrimination against minorities and the prevalence of terrorism as discussed in the previous chapter, grounds the theoretical justification of his work in both Ross and Crenshaw, as both argue “that group grievances of marginalized subnational communities is the crucial root cause
of terrorism” (2011: 341).

The importance of nationalist identity formation and ideology comes into play in exploring its role as a permissive cause in Ross's model. At first glance, this additional element might seem redundant as it is already implied by the precipitant cause of social, cultural and historical facilitation, which he defines as the “shared attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, customs, habits, and traditions that permit the development of nationalism, fanaticism, violence and terrorism in a subgroup of a population [my emphasis]” (1993: 322). Nonetheless, as Ross describes permissive causes, “which are endemic to all societies”, as “deeper systemic conditions that prestructure and facilitate the presence of the precipitants” (320), it seems apparent that, when specifically discussing nationalist terrorism, strength of nationalist identity and ideology is as important as level of urbanization, political system type and level of modernization. Of course, nationalist identity and ideology can be affected by the latter three variables, but the relationship can also work the other way: a shared national identity can provide a basis for rallying to promote greater levels of democracy or a more modernized state. Thus, it is not sufficient to discuss social facilitation alongside other precipitants such as availability of weapons and explosives when it is clear that this social facilitation is historically rooted and systemic.

2.3 Chapter Outline and Hypothesis

With chapters 1 and 2 dealing with the literature review and methodology respectively, the next few chapters address the cases themselves. Chapter 3 gives a historical overview of the two cases, first highlighting the premodern history of both Ireland and Wales in order to situate them both in a larger British context and to show broad similarities in the relationship of the two countries with the English crown. I then consider in depth the recent history of each case in turn, addressing the development of nationalist sentiment in each country in the nineteenth and especially twentieth centuries, before moving on to the period in question, the 1960s-1980s, when violence was relatively high in both cases. In this chapter, I use Smith's ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism to determine the significance of nationalist identity formation as a possible permissive factor in the development of terrorism. Chapter 4 forms the heart of the analysis in this thesis, examining the causes and drivers of nationalist violence and terrorism. Here I test Ross's model of structural causes of terrorism, examining the existence or non-existence of permissive and precipitant causes in both cases. Chapter 5 explores the conclusions
I hypothesize that identity conflict led to the development of a fragmented nationalist identity in the Welsh case, limiting the attractiveness of militant nationalism for most Welsh. In contrast, the historical processes in the Irish case led to the emergence of a stronger identity which effectively challenged the pan-British but Anglocentric narrative of the ruling powers. Thus, the permissive factors in the Northern Irish case had a greater presence than in the Welsh case and allowed for greater facilitation of terrorism and political violence. Second, I hypothesize that both the permissive and precipitant factors in Ross's model in general had a stronger presence in the Northern Irish case, increasing the propensity of that national community's members to support or use violence. Third, British repression in Northern Ireland acted as a significant precipitant variable and acted as one of the biggest initiators of violent resistance, while lack of comparable repression in Wales gave less impetus to the use of terrorism. Fourth, I hypothesize that the IRA was more successful in gaining the support or at least tolerance of broad swathes of society than any comparable Welsh movement. Despite the greater lethality of IRA attacks, the organization was able to demonstrate its legitimacy as a front for the nationalist movement and benefit from support for Sinn Féin, the political party with which it was closely associated. In contrast, the differences in demographics and composition between Plaid Cymru and the assorted Welsh militant movements made it difficult for organizations such as Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru to gain legitimacy as representatives of the mainstream nationalist movement.
Chapter Three: Exploring the Development of Nationalist Ideology

3.1 Overview of Irish and Welsh premodern history

The following section, because of space limitation and the purposes of this thesis, does not explore every significant event or development in Irish and Welsh history. While I do describe the early settlement of Ireland and Wales and discuss general political trends and changes, what is more important is the role such factors played in forming the modern Irish and Welsh societies and their corresponding national identities and how these histories have been interpreted and reconstructed by both nationalist historians and the broader public. For example, I do not distract myself discussing whether or not the existence of King Arthur has any basis in historical evidence; what matters here is the importance of Arthur as a national hero in the Welsh popular imagination. Equally important is the role of real or perceived historical injustices perpetrated by the English in informing the grievances of modern nationalists. As mentioned in the previous chapter, I use this historical overview to situate both Ireland and Wales in a broader context vis-à-vis their respective relationships with England and show the overall similarities between the two cases while also demonstrating the differences in the development of national identity. Thus, I explore whether the strength of these respective identities can shed light on the importance of nationalist identity as a permissive factor in the development of terrorism.

3.1.1 Ireland

While Ireland first saw human settlement nine thousand years ago before rising sea levels submerged the land bridges between it and Britain, and was settled by succeeding waves of Stone Age peoples over the ensuing millennia, Irish history as we know it began with the Celts. It seems likely that the existing Beaker culture of Ireland absorbed Celtic culture rather than being completely wiped out by it. In any case, not only did many of the artifacts of Irish Celtic culture survive up to the modern day, but the Gaelic language is, along with the Euskara tongue of the Basques, one of “the oldest living vernaculars in the West”; because “oral tradition was a strong element in this culture”, Ranelagh argues that “a continuous Irish historical consciousness [has] endured” (2012: 7-9). The Gaels possessed a sophisticated society, bringing to Ireland an Iron Age culture and building massive stone forts; Ireland remained for centuries a land divided among Gaelic tribes and encompassing a social hierarchy of aristocrats, freemen and slaves; the
first group included kings, warriors, judges (*brehon*), druids, poets and historians (11, 15). The Irish Sea protected Gaelic society from both Roman imperialism and the marauding European tribes of the early Middle Ages, thereby ensuring its long-term survival; this was especially clear in the survival of the Brehon Laws well into the Anglo-Norman age (17-21). Also surviving from this period are the Gaelic sagas, which “provided a romantic vision of early Ireland which came to lie at the heart of the Gaelic revival in the last years of the nineteenth century, when scholars translated and publicized them, providing heroic inspiration for modern Irish nationalism” (22).

Although Christianity in Ireland predated the coming of Patrick by a few decades, it was he who consolidated its hold on the island. He was born in Roman Britain and spent six years in captivity in Ireland after being captured by raiders; after escaping he had a vision that led him to return to Ireland as a missionary and baptize thousands of people and ordain clerics. The coming of the Church brought episcopal government to Ireland whereby bishops held jurisdiction over their diocese, and autonomous monasteries quickly spread and became economically and culturally important, especially as Ireland had no real towns or villages at this time (Kinealy, 2004: 18-21). Irish monks later evangelized abroad themselves, helping establish Christianity in Scotland and England. Patrick became one of Ireland's first national figures, the traditional day of his death, March 17th, becoming Ireland's national day and legends accumulating around him, such as his supposed banishing of the snakes from Ireland (Ranelagh, 2012: 29-30).

Much of Irish history following the eighth century is a story of invasion, pillage, and interference in Irish affairs, first by the Vikings and then by the English. Turmoil marks the period prior to this as well, as the Ui Neill and Eoganachta high kingdoms struggled for supremacy and domination over the smaller kingdoms and tribes, causing many kings and chiefs to actually ally with the Viking invaders (Ranelagh, 2012: 32). The Vikings founded Ireland's first city, Dublin, which became one of the largest slave-trading centres in Europe, gave Ireland its name, and eventually came to accept Christianity, settle, intermarry and trade with the Irish (35). Brian Boru managed to become the high king in the south and defeat the Danish Vikings, founding a dynasty that ruled much of Ireland for 150 years; he has often been compared to Alfred the Great in this regard (35-36). Irish culture not only survived but in some ways was strengthened in the aftermath of the Viking period; cultural revival in the eleventh century increased the use of the Irish language, with many translations of Latin texts and written
recordings of Gaelic poems and sagas, leading to Ireland becoming the first European country to develop a native literature and have its own standardized written grammar (Kinealy, 2004: 39).

The English presence in Ireland was longer-lasting and far greater in its long-term impact. Canterbury had claimed episcopal authority over Ireland since the sixth century. The Irish Church had long rejected papal authority, but this changed in the twelfth century when the Roman church brought Roman episcopal authority to Ireland. While the primacy went to Armagh rather than Canterbury, the Lordship of Ireland went to the king of England, although some controversy exists over whether the papal bill authorizing the latter was in fact an English forgery (Ranelagh, 2012: 38-40). Rivalries between two Irish kings led to the English offering support to one, Diarmuid MacMurrough, leading to a complicated unfolding of events which resulted in the English invading and occupying three-quarters of the country (45). English elites replaced many of the Irish, including in the Irish Church, which remained loyal to the English Crown for centuries, and English common law replaced the Brehon Law (45). The Anglo-Irish remained a minority in the country and dependent upon the political disorganization of native kings and chiefs. Thus, the tendency was to adopt Irish customs and marry locals, and many Anglo-Irish contributed to Gaelic literature and culture. Even the area around Dublin known as the Pale, directly controlled by the English Crown and populated by many English settlers, became steadily Gaelicized, despite the Crown's forbidding of intermarriage and adoption of the Irish language and customs by the Anglo-Irish (46-48). English rule thus remained tenuous and the Anglo-Irish became just another group of local chiefs vying for power.

Thus, the Anglo-Irish saw the Wars of the Roses of the fifteenth century as problematic for Irish independence. What was primarily a series of dynastic civil wars between the houses of Lancaster and York over the English throne naturally affected Anglo-Irish families whose political connections stretched across the sea to England, and many supported the Yorkist cause even after the ascension of the House of Tudor, especially as Richard, Duke of York, successfully favoured and earned the loyalty of locals during his time as Lieutenant in Ireland. Henry VII appointed loyal men as deputies over Ireland and had a parliament pass measures known as Poynings' Law, which declared that an Irish Parliament could only meet with the King's permission and only pass laws previously approved by the King and his English Council (Ranelagh, 2012: 50-53). Henry VIII, however, faced rebellion in the 1530s at the same time that
he broke with the Roman church; this “was to become the traditional pattern of Irish dissidence and subversive nationalism. England's difficulty was henceforth seen as Ireland's opportunity” (54). A long-term effect of the Reformation in England was that the survival of Catholicism in Ireland – largely due to the lack of a strong middle class and the small number of towns, both factors being important for the rise of Protestantism elsewhere (57) – became yet another element which distinguished the identity of the Irish from that of the English (54-55).

Henry's lieutenant in Ireland, the Earl of Surrey, suggested using plantations with English colonists to displace disloyal Irish and thus subdue Ireland. This led to native resistance and necessitated a constant military presence in the country; Anglo-Irish lords also rebelled during the reign of Elizabeth, many of them joining up with Gaelic chiefs outside the Pale. She responded to such rebellions ruthlessly and confiscated the lands of rebels for use as plantations by English colonists, including 300,000 acres of land in Munster (Kinealy, 2004: 77). The advance of the Tudor state into Ulster and accompanying anglicization brought about rebellion from the Gaelic chief Hugh O'Neill. The Nine Years War was one of the bloodiest conflicts in the country's history and led to the disarming and, in some cases, expulsion from Ireland of the defeated chiefs, with the Plantation of Ulster being established in the confiscated lands. Thus, the Tudor age brought about the displacement or suppression of the old Gaelic and “Old English” social hierarchy and the imposition of English legal and administrative structures; the conquest “reinforced an emerging English pattern of state formation by centralization, administrative uniformity, and cultural imperialism” while also causing “great bitterness and long-term alienation from royal government of the Gaelic and Old English communities” (Ellis, 1998: 356, 358).

Much of the 20th century conflict between unionist and nationalist, Protestant and Catholic, Ulster and the rest of the country can be traced back to the plantation. Once “a stronghold of Gaelic, Catholic Ireland”, the plantation “was a way of ensuring that the deposed Gaelic world could not return” (Kinealy, 2004: 82). Legislation aided in this endeavour; for example, all persons in Ireland were declared to no longer be subject of their chiefs but of the king only (82). The new settlers were uniformly Protestant, either Anglican or, if they were Lowland Scots, Presbyterian; native Irish who had supported the Crown during the war were given small land under strict conditions, while the claims of minor Gaelic lords were ignored
Informal segregation existed between settler and native, with the latter confined to poorer-quality land; the English, Scottish and Welsh colonist population in Ireland far outnumbered that of North America in the early seventeenth century, accounting for one-tenth of the population of Ireland (Lenihan, 2008: 48-50, 54). As Crawford writes, the effects of the Reformation and colonization meant that native Catholic Irish came to construct an Irishness “based on opposition to the ruling settler elite and on their 'Celtic', or 'Gaelic' origins as the true possessors of the nation” (2011: 55).

Other grounds for future discord within Ireland were laid during the seventeenth century, as Crown-Parliament conflict in England had spillover effects. Fear of an invasion by anti-Catholic forces of the Long Parliament led to rebellion by native Irish and royalists – the former accepted the right of the Crown to rule Ireland (Ranelagh, 2012: 68). The 1641 rebellion resulted in a massacre in Ulster of some 12,000 Scottish and English planters; despite this being “the consequence of indiscipline and private vengeance” and “not of policy”, myths that over 300,000 people had been slaughtered and that the rebellion was directed to “the wholesale extermination of Ulster Protestants” circulated and continue to resonate today in Northern Ireland (69). The Long Parliament and Oliver Cromwell used such massacres as ground for seizing over 2.5 million acres of land for plantation and inflicting similar massacres upon rebel garrisons; the difference between Cromwell's massacres and the earlier one of the rebels is that Cromwell's was entirely premeditated and motivated by Puritan hatred of Catholics (71-72). Thus, Cromwell's ruthlessness lived on in the Irish popular memory as evidence of the violence and oppressive power of Protestant England (73). While many of the new settlers became Irish themselves and displaced Irish drifted east to work on plantations, the north remained strongly anti-Catholic (75).

The overthrow of the Catholic Stuarts in England and the coming of the Protestant House of Hanover, which itself shared lineage to the Stuarts but differed in its religious allegiance, to the throne – amid a larger Protestant-Catholic conflict in England and beyond – brought about the consolidation of power by the Protestant or Anglican Ascendancy class. These large Anglican landowners dominated the Irish Parliament and enacted what became known as the Penal Laws – anti-Catholic legislation that, among other things, prohibited Catholic ownership of weapons, inheritance of land from Protestants and participation in parliamentary elections. Such laws
existed to prevent any Catholic Irish challenge to Ascendancy Control and effectively served as an attempt to subdue and suppress the Irish nation (Ranelagh, 2012: 77-79). Presbyterians also faced discrimination, and those who did not immigrate to America or return to Britain came to identify with Catholics: many early Irish nationalists were Presbyterian (80).

Lenihan writes of how sixteenth and seventeenth-century clerics and literati “invented Irishness”, many stressing the mixed nature of the population and the “shared womb” of the two nations (2008: 65). Records from the time suggest increased popular use of the term Éireannach (Irishman or Irishwoman) rather than the ethnic marker Gael, while scholars such as Geoffrey Keating reworked Gaelic/Irish myths for wider audiences and amateur poets celebrated a new national consciousness (65-67). The eighteenth century, especially the latter half, saw not only a growing sense of “Irishness” but also agrarian unrest and even armed uprising. Gaelic poets developed the aisling, or vision poem, which generally presented visions of a beautiful maiden symbolizing Ireland and lamenting its oppressed state, while nationalistic and romantic themes pervaded the works of other poems (Ranelagh, 2012: 88). Peasant societies such as the Munster Whiteboys and the Oakboys sprang up throughout the countryside, terrorizing landlords with murder and crop-burning in response to the enclosure of common lands and increases in rent and rate demands. While the uncoordinated and fragmented nature of such uprisings prevented them from being truly national movements, they challenged the legitimacy of the Ascendancy class and occurred on the eve of the American and French revolutions (90). The grievances and arguments of American colonists and French revolutionaries, as well as the rebellious actions that they inspired, spoke to aggrieved Irish proto-nationalists and intellectuals, many of whom were displeased that the autonomy gained by the Ascendancy-dominated Irish Parliament in 1783 did not lead to gains for Catholics and Dissenters (91-92).

Such developments led to the Irish Rebellion of 1798, one of the most violent in Ireland's history. Unlike much of more recent Irish nationalist violence, it sprang from decidedly non-sectarian origins: the Society of United Irishmen, formed in 1791 by Anglicans who sought parliamentary reform and the expansion of rights to Catholics and Presbyterians, launched the rebellion with the intent of severing English rule. The United Irishmen even succeeded in securing support from revolutionary France, leading to an aborted landing of French troops in 1796. Government spies infiltrated United Irish groups across the countryside and the
government moved to arrest the leadership, spurring the rebellion that such manoeuvres were intended to prevent. Both sides committed atrocities in the fighting that followed, but the government crushed the rebellion quickly and the Catholic Church was quick to denounce it; the Act of Union that followed in 1800 weakened the Anglican Ascendancy and tamed the Presbyterians to a degree. Yet one legacy of the rebellion remains: the United Irish colour, green, was adopted by later Irish nationalists, and the grave of its leader, Wolfe Tone, is to this day the site of pilgrimages by nationalists; a key difference, however, is that later nationalists would identify Irishness with Catholicism (Ranelagh, 2012: 92-98).

The rebellion, combined with Ireland's increasing economic and strategic importance during the age of upheaval and Napoleonic wars, influenced the British government to push for union with Ireland. The Acts of Union 1800-1801 ended the Irish Parliament, although many Ascendancy parliamentarians found similar power in Westminster. One long-term effect of this was that many Irish landlords tended to be absent from their estates, away in London, which meant that “Irish discontents could be squarely placed at Westminster's door, thus inflaming Irish separatism”, allowing the union to “be blamed for all Ireland's problems (Ranelagh, 2012: 104). While the Union faced resistance before it was even passed, largely from the Ascendancy class and Protestants in Ulster who feared job competition with Catholics, the Act passed with little immediate consequence for most Irish people, especially as it did not lead to Catholic emancipation due to the intransigence of George III (101, 102, 106). The Act of Union thus acts as a convenient turning point from premodern to modern Irish history.

3.1.2 Wales

As with the Irish case, Welsh history begins with the emergence of a Celtic culture. Contrary to older theories of a sudden, large-scale “invasion” of Celtic-speaking peoples after 700 BCE displacing indigenous Britons, historians now believe native societies gradually adapted and assimilated the culture of Celtic-speaking peoples who themselves arrived in England and Wales only gradually and in a process lasting centuries (Jenkins, 2007: 18). Unlike Ireland, however, Wales experienced Roman invasion and occupation, although native resistance was fierce, lasted decades and produced anti-Roman leaders such as Caratacus and Boudica who were remembered as early Welsh/Britannic heroes. Aside from the material effects on roads, urbanization and changes to the agricultural economy, the most lasting consequence of Roman
civilization was the spread of Christianity to Britain, though it remained for some time a religion of the urban, upper classes – in the fourth century possibly all the Welsh *civitas* capitals had bishops – and was slow to spread to the countryside (Davies, 2007: 35-36).

It was in the post-Roman period, however, that something distinctly identifiable as Wales emerged and in which heroic myths such as the Arthurian legend have their origins. Whether a figure named Arthur truly existed and fought against the Anglo-Saxons is less important here than the excitement his legend stirred in later Welsh who elevated him to the role of a national hero: “only in the glow of hindsight did his name come to mean something to the Welsh” (Jenkins, 2007: 34-36). The construction by Mercians of the massive defensive earthwork known as Offa's Dyke to ward off Welsh raiders served to physically demarcate the frontier between the Anglo-Saxon east and the Celtic west, and thus was “an acknowledgement of the otherness of Wales” and came “to exercise a profound effect on its people's sense of identity” (37). While early medieval Wales was fragmented into competing petty kingdoms and subject to frequent Viking attacks, a few rulers were able to bring some measure of unity to the region, namely Hywel the Good, who unified nearly the whole of Wales while maintaining peaceful relations with the English and created a national code of laws, helping create the sense of the Welsh as a unified people (41). In this period Christianity spread through Wales and produced many Welsh saints, whose hagiographies were written centuries after their deaths and elevated them to early heroes of the Welsh church, keen to establish its independence from Canterbury (50); indeed, in early centuries, Christianity served as a way for the Welsh to distinguish themselves as distinct from and culturally superior to the pagan Anglo-Saxons (55). The Welsh language also emerged from Brythonic in the early medieval ages; a vernacular culture that included heroic poetry appeared in the sixth century. Few written pieces survive, although early Welsh literary culture was mostly oral (56-58).

After the Norman conquest of England in 1066, it was the Welsh March that came to define the *otherness* of Wales and distinguish it from the non-Welsh world. The *Marchia Wallie*, ruled by Anglo-Norman barons who were nominally subjects of the King of England but enjoyed independence from the Common Law (Davies, 2007: 106-107), largely corresponds with the those eastern and southern counties which were the most heavily anglicized by the twentieth century – and least receptive to appeals for protection and promotion of the Welsh language. The
Marcher Lords ruled over Welsh territories, erecting castles and indulging in private warfare, while also bringing Norman, English, Breton and Flemish colonists who did not assimilate readily to the native Welsh culture (110-11). Because there were few large existing towns in Wales given transportation difficulties and the agriculturally-based economy and because many towns were planted by colonists, a belief emerged that the Welsh were an inherently rural people and could not flourish in an urban environment (111-12).

An early example of national myth-making from the middle ages was the *Historia Regum Britanniae* (History of the Kings of Britain) by Geoffrey of Monmouth, who explored the story of Britain under Brythonic rule, tracing the origin of ancient Britons to Troy and Rome and devoting much of his book to the golden age of King Arthur. Yet despite the appealing message that the whole of Britain had once belonged to the Britons, he argued that the Britons had lost their right to rule through their sins and so the inheritance of Britain had passed to others. Thus, while the *Historia* has been seen as a work of nationalistic history, Davies argues that it actually sought to promote “the hegemony of London” and ease “the way for those Welshmen who hoped to find a place for themselves within that hegemony” (2007: 120). As Jenkins notes, however, Geoffrey assured his readers that Welsh prophecies “referred to the restitution of lost rule, of freedom from captivity and of the expulsion of heavy-handed foreigners”; Arthur would someday awaken and set the Welsh free (2007: 84).

Although the Treaty of Montgomery in 1267 won Wales recognition as a principality and the shrewd Llywelyn ap Gruffudd as its prince, this triumph was short-lived, as Edward I succeeded to the English throne a few years later, crushed Llywelyn and annexed Wales. Although the Welsh territories were not legally incorporated into the Kingdom of England until the Laws in Wales Acts of 1535 and 1542, Edward's conquest meant the effective end of Welsh independence. The century that followed was a particularly dark one in Welsh history, as Wales suffered both the bubonic plague, which may have reduced the population by a third in Wales as well as in the rest of Europe while also ravaging the socioeconomic order (Jenkins, 2007: 98-100), and entrenchment of English rule which denied economic and political opportunity to even the native aristocracy and crushed outbreaks of popular dissent (102-7). Thus, Wales by 1400 was ripe for rebellion when Owain Glyndŵr was proclaimed Prince of Wales and countless Welsh followed him into an armed uprising against English rule.
Whole books have been written on the subject of Glyndŵr and his decade-long, and ultimately unsuccessful, rebellion, and he figures so prominently in the Welsh pantheon of heroes that he deserves particular attention here. Descended from Welsh noble houses on both sides, he was a cultivated, charismatic and eloquent man who championed Welsh independence and who was able to garner support from all parts of Welsh society – from landowners to ecclesiastics to labourers – by speaking to long-held grievances of a dispossessed, disenfranchised, conquered people (Jenkins, 2007: 111-12). Support for him was much weaker in the urbanized, anglicized parts of southeast Wales and along the borders and far greater in the northern and western regions (113); as will be seen, the strength of nationalist ideology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was also split along the same regional lines. Nevertheless, the appeal of Glyndŵr lied very much in his use of language that could be almost described as proto-nationalist: he “spoke in national terms, he convened national parliaments” and he imagined an independent Welsh state with boundaries beyond Offa's Dyke, universities and an independent Welsh church with its own archbishop (116). Although the English Crown eventually triumphed and no further major uprisings occurred, admirers and worshippers believed “he had simply joined the ranks of the slumbering heroes who awaited a second opportunity to liberate the Welsh people” (117). While scholarly interpretations of Glyndŵr changed over the centuries, especially in England, the Welsh social memory of him was entirely enthusiastic and prone to mythmaking, especially in the age of romantic nationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the age of the Young Wales movement in the late nineteenth century, he became the hero of the nationalist movement; “his movement had given a glimpse of a truly independent and united Wales,” writes Davies, and “as with all mythic figures, his appeal was contemporary because it was apparently timeless” (1995: 332).

Welsh recovered economically in the century that followed, and with the ascent to power of the Welsh-origin House of Tudor, it appeared that Wales might have its grievances addressed. Yet Henry VII failed to live up to the hopes of the Welsh, and Henry VIII showed little interest in the country. Welsh elites, frustrated with lawlessness in the Marches, helped bring about the Laws in Wales Acts of 1536 and 1543, which eliminated the Marches, divided Wales into thirteen shires, annexed the Welsh legal system to England and made English the language of government, effectively serving as an “Act of Union” (Jenkins, 2007: 129-30, 144-45). As
Thomas writes, the fact that the Acts denied office to those who lacked mastery of English encouraged those who wished to advance their social and political position in Tudor/Elizabethan England to adopt the language, which paved the way for English to completely displace Welsh as the language of commerce, government and education in the following centuries. However, because towns served as the focal points of trade and government, these developments also contributed to the growth of a linguistic and cultural divide between urban and rural Wales (1994: 94-95).

The story of the following centuries was the gradual penetration of the English state and economy, although the English language had little success penetrating beyond the coastal cities. Union with England helped facilitate the rise of the Welsh gentry, who were rewarded for serving the interests of the crown and saw their best interests in assimilating to the English culture and language, ensuring that Wales did not experience rebellion as did Ireland; in the early modern period, “as the Irish became more fractious, the Welsh became more benign” (Jenkins, 2007: 147), to the point of proving staunchly royalist during the English civil wars and reacting with horror to the beheading of Charles I (149-50). Union with England, demographic growth within Wales and the emergence of a transatlantic economy also led to exoduses of countless Welsh who were attracted to the larger labour markets in cities such as London, served the empire as soldiers and sailors or sought to make a better living in the Americas (137-38). Welsh woodlands were cleared to make room for cattle and sheep to service the English market while English capital developed Welsh mining industries for the profit of English investors (139-42). Culturally, the largest shift was the centuries-long process by which Wales became a Protestant nation, which was certainly helped by the Act of 1563 ordering the translation of the Scriptures into Welsh, which helped the reception of the new faith; in Ireland, on the other hand, Protestantism “was propagated in English and inevitably smacked of colonialism” (154). According to Thomas, “by granting a religious role to the Welsh language, while withholding a secular role for it, the state created what was to be an effective language barrier between the gentry and the peasantry” over the next few centuries (1994: 97-98). Wales was not to be dominated by the Anglican Church, however, as Protestant dissent was to lead to the rise of Nonconformist denominations from the seventeenth century onward. Most of the population remained illiterate until the eighteenth century, however, when the arrival of the first printing press in Wales and the efforts of one
particular clergyman to promote the reading of the Bible in the vernacular strengthened both literacy and the Welsh language (Jenkins, 200: 160-61). The press also enabled a revitalization of Welsh literary culture, providing “a host of new opportunities for poets, almanackers, ballad-mongers and playwrights” (169). Romanticism and primitivism became popular in late eighteenth-century Wales as new literary and antiquarian societies emerged, Welsh writers rediscovered their language's literary past, and Welsh “nationalists” began to refer to themselves as “Ancient Britons” (171-72). Therefore, as with Ireland, Wales prior to the modern era was the product of two clashing worlds, Celtic and English, but unlike Ireland was unlikely to see its best interests as divergent from those of England.

3.2 Nationalist (re)awakenings in the 19th and 20th centuries

3.2.1 Ireland

With the birth of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1801, Ireland entered a new era, one that saw new upheavals and growth in nationalist sentiment. Despite dramatic changes at the administrative level, Ireland remained a country ruled by an Anglican landed elite, with Catholic emancipation granted only in 1829, and it continued to be treated as a colony (Kinealy, 2004: 147). The British government, did, however, address social issues in Ireland, although the legacy of such efforts is a complex one. Statutory state funding of education provided new national schools that reached a multi-denominational audience, but nationalists viewed the use of only English as a teaching medium as a way of contributing to the decline of Irish culture and language (148). The Poor Law, based on the English model of workhouses designed to provide relief to paupers, found its way to Ireland, but there was no legal right to relief; such divergences from the English system were based in part “on a belief that Irish people were lazy and would take advantage of any state system of welfare provision” (149). Even largely modest attempts at land reform largely fell apart in the face of vehement opposition from landlords (149).

Polarization between Catholics and Protestants also grew in the nineteenth century. Presbyterianism emerged as a powerful political force, changing “from being an inclusive, progressive and radical influence on Irish politics to a conservative and militant force that increasingly defined itself by its opposition to Catholicism and nationalism” (Kinealy, 2004: 151). Although many Protestants initially opposed the Union, as Ulster industrialized it benefitted economically from its position in the United Kingdom. The sectarian Orange Order
emerged as a conservative and intensely anti-Catholic alternative to the United Irishmen, and came to support Unionism and resist, sometimes violently, any advance made by Catholics, becoming infamous for their annual parades, often through Catholic areas. The Order came to incorporate Presbyterians as well as Anglicans, and also came to infiltrate the army, police force and judiciary (151-53). Conversely, the first half of the nineteenth century saw the Catholic church consolidate its power over the “native” Irish population as it successfully wrestled with the state for control over education of Catholics and became a powerful arbiter in Irish affairs, so much that “being a Catholic occupied the minds and hearts of Irish people” (Crawford, 2011: 57).

Two clear strains of Irish nationalism, which found themselves in increasingly hostile competition with one another, emerged in the early nineteenth century, setting the tone for the future: popular constitutionalism on the one hand and “revolutionary conspiracy” on the other (Ranelagh, 2012: 113). Representing the former was Daniel O'Connell, a lawyer-turned-politician who campaigned for Catholic emancipation as well as repeal of the Union. While relatively flexible in the pursuit of such goals and abhorring armed revolution, he was a skilled “rabble-rouser” who mobilized the peasantry with the support of the Irish Catholic Church. Although the Emancipation Act of 1829 raised the franchise qualification and thus removed from the electoral register many of the minor freeholders who had supported O'Connell, the campaign strengthened the link between Catholicism and nationalism and laid the groundwork for future mass campaigns that rejected revolutionary means (109-10). The campaign also caused sectarian rioting in northern Ireland, setting an “ominous” tone for Irish nationalism (109, 112). O'Connell was unsuccessful in his campaign for repeal of the Union: the British government was willing to grant concessions to Catholics to avoid civil war but drew the line at threats to the Union (115).

The other, more revolutionary strain of nationalism manifested itself from the 1840s onward throughout the century in the Young Irelanders and the Fenians. The former took influence from Giuseppe Mazzini's nationalist revolutionary society Young Italy and aimed to “establish internal union and external independence” (Ranelagh, 2012: 117). They published a widely-circulating nationalist weekly, The Nation, and although they sided with O'Connell in favour of repeal, they found his willingness to comprise with establishment politicians distasteful and came to advocate revolution. The famine of 1845-1849 further radicalized some leading
members and led them to argue that the unequal nature of land ownership lay at the heart of the famine. The government arrested much of the leadership, especially after its attempted rebellion in 1848 (117-20). The Fenian movement actually consisted of two related groups, the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood and the Fenian Brotherhood, and felt that only armed revolution could bring about independence. The Fenian Brotherhood was based in the United States and conducted several raids into Canada before the US government cracked down on them. The IRB had a much longer and influential history reaching into the twentieth century; in the nineteenth, however, it experienced the arrest and even execution of some of its members as well as excommunication from the church. The trial and execution of three IRB members for the shooting of a Manchester police guard “reduced Irish faith in British justice and helped to encourage romanticization of Fenianism and to nourish the IRB myth”; annual commemorations of the “Manchester Martyrs” still take place (138).

Although constitutional nationalism remained dominant in the nineteenth century, especially given the tolerance of it by the political and religious establishment, general antipathy toward the British state rose with the famine of 1845-1849. Nationalists were quick to blame the widespread death, starvation and mass emigration on both the unequal distribution of land ownership and the laissez-faire approach taken by the government toward Ireland. Over a million died and a million more migrated, mainly to the United States, with the result that the Gaelic language declined drastically in speakers and embittered emigrants and their descendants in America became a significant source of financial and political support for all future Irish national movements (Ranelagh, 2012: 132-33). The dislocations of the Great Famine “consolidated the stereotype of the oppressive [Protestant] landlord” (Crawford, 2011: 56) and paved the way for the British state removing some of its support for the ruling Protestant class, as discussed in the next paragraph. Although such developments spurred the development of nationalist – and anti-English – sentiment, the identification of Irishness with Catholicism was problematic as the Church enjoyed a cozy relationship with the British government and thus only pressed for social reform and never outright independence; it considered rebellion justifiable only under the harshest conditions and only when no alternatives existed, and so was hostile to revolutionary movements (140-42). Thus, the Church condemned the Fenians, the 1916 Easter Rising, and the IRA in 1920 and 1922 (140).
Whatever the resistance of the establishment to more militant forms of nationalism, the Home Rule movement saw elements within the establishment, notably William Gladstone, attempt to make concessions to demands for autonomy, although such concessions were often motivated by a desire to “pacify” Ireland and tame its revolutionary elements. For example, Gladstone also disestablished the Church of Ireland and brought about a degree of land reform, both of which “strengthened the appeal of constitutional political action in Ireland at a time when violent action was again threatening” (Ranelagh, 2012: 146-47). Interestingly, the successor party to the Home Rule League, the Irish Parliamentary Party, was led by a Protestant landlord, Charles Stewart Parnell, who was also president of the National Land League, which agitated for land reform and gained mass political support. The League's campaign for redistribution became known as the Land War; tactics included boycotts, rent strikes and, in some cases, violence against landlords, prompting crackdowns from the Gladstone government. Although Parnell was able to tame the League's violence, the 1882 murder of two senior politicians in Dublin's Phoenix Park by a breakaway group of the IRB renewed fears of Fenianism. However, the Irish Party returned eighty-six MPs in the 1885 general election, surpassing the Liberal Party in Ireland, greatly increasing Catholic representation and making a strong case for home rule (153-58).

Thus, the legacy of this period was mixed: the more “moderate” or non-violent nationalists saw great success in engaging with the political system, but there was also a considerable degree of radical and sometimes violent political agitation. Furthermore, the line between the two nationalisms was a hazy one, as demonstrated by Parnell's connections with both strains and the importance of the threat of violence and chaos in pushing Gladstone to appease nationalists in an attempt to “pacify” Ireland.

In any case, both of Gladstone's attempted Home Rule Bills were defeated in Parliament in the face of powerful unionist and Conservative opposition, riots in Belfast, scandals surrounding Parnell's personal life, and infighting within the Irish Party. In fact, the Home Rule issue made sectarian tensions in the north of Ireland more volatile than ever and caused a revitalization of the anti-Catholic and staunchly loyalist Orange Order, spurred on by the Conservative Party (Ranelagh, 2012: 164-65). Protestant-dominated Ulster had been the only real beneficiary of industrialization during the nineteenth century, with factory production oriented toward the British market, and Protestants feared that Home Rule would mean
domination by Catholics. The renewed “Orangeism” of this period contrasts with the Gaelic cultural renaissance seen in the rest of Ireland which encompassed both Protestantism and Catholicism, best embodied by the Gaelic League. The League was founded by a unionist Protestant, a supporter of the Irish Party and a Catholic priest-scholar yet dedicated itself to the “de-Anglicization” of Ireland, publishing Irish-language textbooks and pushing for the revival of the language, but it became politicized under IRB influence. Although the League was more successful in teaching people “to dance reels well” rather than learn “to speak Irish well”, many of its members would participate in the 1916 rising and be instrumental the Irish Free State's educational policies “designed to inculcate a new Catholic, 'Gaelic' and nationalist construction of national identity” (Crawford, 2011: 57). The turn of the century saw a wave of Irish literary giants rising to prominence, writers such Yeats, Joyce, Shaw and Wilde who, although they mainly wrote in English and were neither uniformly Catholic nor nationalist, nonetheless were influenced by Gaelic myths, songs and literature and whose works were often celebrated by nationalists (Ranelagh, 2012: 175-77).

A more radical alternative to the Irish Party, and a nationalist contrast to the unionist political associations that emerged near the end of the century, was Sinn Féin, which found itself internally divided between moderate elements who were content to work with the Irish Party and radical elements which sought to defeat the party and push public opinion toward violent revolutionary action (Ranelagh, 2012: 182). Civil war threatened as unionists swore an oath in 1912 to fight against Home Rule and established a quasi-army, the Ulster Volunteer Force, creating discord in the Conservative Party and the military about the possibility of moving against a unionist force (185-86). In part as a reaction to this, Irish nationalists formed the Irish Volunteers; meanwhile, Dublin saw outbursts of strikes and trade union activity linked strongly to Irish nationalism (188).

Such developments made for a potentially explosive situation as the First World War loomed. Britain's war effort saw many nationalists and unionists alike put aside their differences and sign up to fight in Europe, demonstrating that “Irishmen were voting with their feet (and lives) in favour of constitutional cooperation with Britain” (Ranelagh, 2012: 197), but it also created opportunity for rebellion. The Easter Rising of 1916, in which members of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army seized parts of Dublin and proclaimed an independent
Irish republic, was crushed after six days and was initially seen by most Irish as treason, especially in light of the war, but the government's harsh reaction, including the execution of the rising's leaders, caused a shift in public opinion and created martyrs for the cause of Irish freedom (208-9). It also made the government anxious to implement the Third Home Rule Act, passed in 1914 but never coming into force due to the war. Sinn Féin, incorrectly credited – or blamed – for the Easter Rising, benefitted from the change in public opinion, taking in a majority of Irish seats and proclaiming itself Dáil Éireann, the parliament of Ireland. Thus, this period was marked by “an uneasy alliance between constitutional and revolutionary nationalists”, masterminded by Michael Collins, who operated within Sinn Féin, the IRB and the Irish Volunteers, increasingly known as the Irish Republican Army (218-19). The constitutionally-minded Dáil found itself pulled into the campaign of violence against the British government carried out by the IRA from January 1919 onward, eventually supporting the movement fully in order to avoid “the danger of having two sources of authority competing for the loyalty of nationalists” (220). The details of the Irish War of Independence are too complicated to explore here, but two points are worth noting. First, the brutality of various government forces, especially the Royal Irish Constabulary and the “Black and Tans” unit – most famously associated with the 1920 Bloody Sunday incident – appalled many Irish and strengthened the cause for a free republic. Second, the campaign of violence carried out by the IRA, which included sabotage, assassination and intimidation of RIC men – themselves viewed as traitors given their largely Irish Catholic background – paved the way for the terrorism of the later IRA groups during the Troubles.

Ultimately, a truce halted the violence long enough for the British government and representatives of the “Irish Republic” to negotiate the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which provided for the establishment of an Irish Free State and provided Northern Ireland with the option to remain with the union. The Treaty's limited terms, which stipulated that Ireland would become a Dominion of the British Empire and owe allegiance to the crown, caused deep splits within the nationalist cause: while some leaders figures such as Collins regarded it as a significant and pragmatic step forward, most of the IRA viewed it as a betrayal of the republican cause (Ranelagh, 2012: 235). This created a situation where the new provisional government and the Dáil rejected each other's authority, while the IRA rejected even the Dáil's authority and the
provisional government began recruiting a national army to replace or even combat the IRA. Tensions rose, sparking a civil war between the National Army and the IRA that saw the former ruthlessly crack down on the latter, executing dozens by firing squad and imprisoning thousands suspected of involvement with the IRA; the IRA declared a unilateral ceasefire, but the repression embittered generations of republicans to follow (240-42).

Such conflict among the Irish demands some comment on the complex relationship between nationalism and republicanism. As Craith writes, early twentieth century nationalists made little distinction between the injustice of the Irish partition and general discrimination against Catholics. Republicanism, while concerned with issues of inequality, made reunification its primary focus, even though there was no realistic notion of how a united, Catholic Ireland could be achieved at the time of the Free State's establishment. This lack of intellectual clarity meant that, “until the 1960s, there was little critical exploration of how Irish independence could be achieved” (2003: 29-30).

Irish history from 1921 onward – and especially following the Irish Republic's gaining of full legislative independence from Britain and ending of dominion status within the empire in 1931 – is marked by increasing polarization between north and south, Protestant and Catholic, and discord within the new entity of Northern Ireland, and it is these tensions that are of interest here. Despite warnings that failure by either Irish government to respect the rights of their respective minorities could have disastrous consequences, Northern Ireland's first prime minister, Sir James Craig, spoke of a “Protestant parliament for a Protestant people” (Bew, 2002: 7), ignoring the needs of a third of the North's population. Gerrymandering of local electoral districts to favour unionists and the abolition of proportional representation ensured that unionists enjoyed political dominance even in areas such as Derry where nationalists heavily outnumbered them (Ranelagh, 2012: 305). Political and economic discrimination against Catholics ensured that they faced high levels of unemployment and poor housing conditions (307). Nevertheless, Northern Ireland's economy benefitted from its links with Britain and even its poor remained generally better off than those in the south, and the development of the British welfare state improved conditions further. The most important consequence of this was that it led to the expansion of access to higher education for poorer – and predominantly Catholic – students in a time when civil rights movements were beginning to take hold throughout the
Western world; the first generation to come to maturity through this system, Ranelagh notes, “provided the impetus for the civil rights movement culminating in the strife that tore the province apart” (309). As this strife, better known as The Troubles, is a subject of analysis in the next chapter, this historical overview returns now to Wales.

3.2.2 Wales

Industrialization from the late eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth rapidly changed Wales, and the population exploded from half a million in 1780 to over 2 million by 1901 due to high birth rates and migration from rural areas to urban areas. Economic growth, especially in mining, and new modes of transportation such as the railway helped facilitate these processes (Jenkins, 2007: 174-75). This industrialization and urbanization was of monumental importance for Welsh history: “the tragic story of Ireland in the wake of the Famine of 1845-9 is a stark reminder of how the fate of the Welsh might have been very different had Wales remained a predominantly rural society” (178). Few towns at the beginning of the nineteenth century had more than 5,000 people; by its end, Cardiff – itself formerly a small market town – and Rhondda had well over 100,000 (183). However, the need to expand the workforce in the industrializing southeast contributed to the decline of the Welsh language there, as even migrants from the Welsh-dominant west and north were forced to use English in the workplace. As the labour pool from the Welsh heartland dried up, immigration from outside Wales, mainly from southeast England, increased, further weakening the presence of the Welsh language and entrenched English as the language of commerce and education (Thomas, 1994, 101-2).

Religion played a significant role in the strengthening of Welsh national identity in the nineteenth century as the majority of worshippers turned to Nonconformity while the Church of England shrunk in popularity. Dissatisfaction with a church dominated by English speakers that could not properly respond to the needs of Welsh worshippers boosted the rise of Nonconformity. Nonconformist preachers roamed the countryside, converting thousands. Chapels sprouted up, prayer meetings, bible classes, eisteddfodau – festivals of literature, music and performance – and hymn-singing festivals became part of daily life (Jenkins 2007, 204-8).

A prominent theme of Welsh identity politics in the nineteenth century is the tension between national pride and a sense of Britishness that extended to embracing the idea of a colonizing, civilizing, globe-spanning empire. In 1847, the publication of a commissioned report
decrying the state of education in Wales – a report largely based on information gathered from monoglot English-speaking Anglican clergymen – and blaming this on the “loose” morals, primitive culture, Nonconformist religion and alien language of the Welsh brought great humiliation to Wales, and this “Treachery of the Blue Books” only deepened the wounds by recommending full-scale anglicization and modernization (Jenkins, 2007: 213-14). The outrage gave even greater impetus to an already awakening Welsh nationalism; from the late eighteenth century on, cultural elites and artists had seized upon romantic notions of ancient Celts – of bards, druids and poets – being crushed by barbaric Anglo-Norman invaders. After several extensions of the vote, working class Welsh voters almost unanimously voted for Liberal candidates; from this rise of the Liberal party came the Young Wales movement which sought to gain home rule for Wales but failed to gain traction in the anglicized, industrialized south (222-24). During this period, most MPs – as well as the general public – still “identified Britain as a country of three nations, not four”, and this was reflected by administrative procedures in the House of Commons; locals bills relating to Scotland or Ireland were referred to a committee of MPs from either region, while Welsh bills went to committees representing either the west or northwest of England. This did not stop Welsh Liberal MPs from agitating in favour of Welsh issues and even the goal of disestablishment (Cragoe, 2004: 252-57).

The twentieth century saw the number of Welsh speakers decline drastically as modernity, two world wars, in-migration from England and the penetration of mass media and the automobile took their toll; by 1951, only 29 percent of the population were Welsh speakers (Jenkins, 2007: 262). The Welsh tongue became a source of embarrassment for many, especially those in the anglicized south, who viewed English as the means to “getting on” in the world. Nationalist figures such as Sinclair Lewis warned of a future where the language would become extinct, and the Welsh Language Society was formed in 1962 to reverse the trend, engaging in non-violent civil disobedience, which included disrupting court proceedings and vandalizing English-only road signs (262-63). As Johnes writes about the decline of the language, “once it is remembered that for many Welsh speakers the language lacked any ideological meaning, their willingness to stop speaking it is quite understandable” and those who did speak it did so only because it was their first language “and not out of a conscious effort to preserve it or recognize Welsh culture (2012: 184). Polls suggest that only a tiny minority of Welsh believed the decline
of the language to be a serious problem; most, even among the rural working class, actually preferred to use English in official business affairs and were confused by literary elites who insisted on the primacy of Welsh and coined neologisms to replace English words (184-85).

The declining status of the language – only to be reversed near the end of the twentieth century due to nationalist campaigns and government initiatives – reflected the ambivalence of those who lived in Wales toward Welsh identity. Johnes notes that many in the south, especially in Monmouthshire, saw themselves as English, while, paradoxically, regional divisions meant that northerners and southerners regarded each other suspiciously and as less authentically Welsh than themselves (2012: 188-89). Complicating matters was the fact that many people were monoglot English migrants or descendants of English migrants. The Welsh openly celebrated the coronation of Elizabeth II and publicly mourned the passing of Winston Churchill, despite the latter's deployment of troops to the Rhondda after the 1910 Tonypandy riots, as Welshness and Britishness were mutually complementary identities for most people (198-99).

Yet manifestations of dissent flared up periodically despite the generally muted nature of Welsh nationalism. An early precedent was established in 1936 when several Plaid Cymru members, including Saunders Lewis, set fire to an RAF bombing school in Wales. When plans to flood the village of Capel Celyn to build a reservoir for the Tryweryn river serving Liverpool came to light in the 1950s – in the midst of similar projects elsewhere in the UK – nationalist activists, among them the nationalist party Plaid Cymru, protested, claiming that these plans were part of the “gradual murder of the Welsh national personality by various forces from beyond the Dyke” (Johnes, 2012: 212-13). The entire village marched in Liverpool asking for sympathy for their plight, but many Welsh were apathetic; indeed, Plaid Cymru had to persuade the villagers to protest in Liverpool, as the newer modernized homes being offered as compensation were a clear material improvement (214-15). Plaid Cymru itself never did well in Wales, only winning its first seat in 1966, but concessions were made by Westminster to those seeking some measure of devolution with the establishment of a Welsh Office, Cardiff’s ascension to the capital of Wales, and the declaration of the Red Dragon as the official national flag (219). Frustration with the general state of affairs led some nationalists, occasionally with the blessing of Plaid Cymru, to pursue direct action, such as vandalizing an electricity transformer at the Tryweryn construction site (220). The Welsh Language Society, mostly
comprised of student activists, engaged in acts of civil disobedience such as sit-ins and refusing to license vehicles until it was possible to do so in Welsh. Such efforts resulted in the 1967 Welsh Language Act, giving Welsh equal validity with English, although its implementation left much to be desired (226-28). The Free Wales Army claimed responsibility for bombings actually perpetrated by the Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru – which will be discussed in the following chapter – but its inflated claims of its size and its readiness to wage guerrilla war in defence of Wales underlined just how deeply passionate many nationalists were over issues of language and independence (233).

3.3 Ethnosymbolic analysis of national identity formation

As highlighted in the previous two chapters, Smith's approach of ethnosymbolism can be useful in analyzing the nation as a “historical culture community” (2009). It should be apparent from the above historical overview that the Irish and Welsh nations were neither products of modernity nor were they necessarily perennially existing. The following paragraphs reflect on the social and symbolic processes leading to the formation of the respective nations and the extent to which these processes were successful in producing strong national identities.

Smith, arguing that nationalism succeeds earlier nations, notes that we can “account for the formation of nations” by searching for the “‘ethnic core' of the nation” and tracing “its social and political origins, in the belief that nations are characterized by a degree of cultural unity and distinctiveness” (2009: 45). While many cultural communities share these traits, what distinguishes the processes of ethnogenesis includes: the conferring of a collective proper name “highlighting the unity of its parts” and “widely accepted by the members of the population”, collective self-definition through boundary delineation as “a consequence of differentiation and exclusion of neighbours”, the emergence of myths of common ancestry – regardless of whether the nation in question has mixed ethnic origins or was even partly produced by such mixed origins – and symbolic cultivation of the “wide range of ethnic memories, symbols, values, myths and traditions” which “promote a distinctive self-image and reinforce a sense of common ethnicity” (46-48).

Determining the ethnogenesis of an Irish nation is a complicated task, as implied by the historical overview above. Ireland has seen settlement over the millennia from various Stone Age peoples to English and Scottish colonists, but its ethnic core is undoubtedly Celtic. The survival
of the Gaelic language, one of the oldest vernaculars in the West, as well as the survival of oral traditions such as the Gaelic sagas demonstrate the existence of a base upon which later nationalists could construct a national identity. While other nations, especially landlocked ones, have had fluid, historically-shifting boundaries, Ireland has always been defined by the Irish Sea, allowing its people to distinguish themselves by differentiation from outsiders. The presence of English-speaking colonists and their descendants throughout the centuries, especially in the north, complicates matters, especially as many saw themselves as being as rightfully Irish as Gaelic-speaking Catholics. Yet the fact that so many Irish republicans were upset with the partition of Ireland and desired complete unification suggests that Irishness is as much a geographical concept as a linguistic, religious or cultural one, and that it entails a process of othering that distinguishes between those born to the land and those from the outside who threaten its freedom. Gaelic society, with its chiefs, brehons, druids and poets, survived almost untouched until the coming of Christianity, which gave a unifying sense of Irishness to the disparate patchwork of kingdoms as well as an early founding figure, Saint Patrick. This unity was further strengthened by legendary figures such as Brian Boru who staved off the Vikings and brought the various kingdoms together.

In the case of Wales, it is clear that, while it has seen settlement by indigenous Britons, Celtic peoples, Romans, Anglo-Normans and others, its ethnic core is thoroughly Celtic as it was in the post-Roman period when the Welsh language emerged and when these Brythonic peoples came to define themselves as different from the Anglo-Saxon newcomers through the boundary delineation of Offa's Dyke. Myths of common ancestry emerged in the “heroic age” of Arthur and the early spread of Christianity to the region helped the inhabitants of the region distinguish themselves from the pagan Anglo-Saxons. Even though “Wales” as a territorial entity did not come into existence during this early period, the Celtic peoples in the western part of Britain could look back to legends of earlier British heroes – who were not necessarily from the same region of Britain but who represented pre-Anglo-Saxon, Celtic Britain nonetheless – such as Caratacus and Boudica, leading to the cultivation of ethnic memories, symbols and myths.

While these processes of ethnogenesis are important in laying the groundwork for the emergence of a nation, they are not sufficient in themselves. Smith notes that the most important of the processes of nation formation is territorialization. He writes: “nations are, by definition,
territorialized communities, that is, communities the majority of whose members have come to reside in an historic territory or homeland and to feel a strong attachment to it” (2009: 49). Historical memories become “closely linked to the intimate landscapes of the homeland”, thus making the community naturalized to the environment and fusing a people into a particular ethnoscape (50). Shared customs and standardized laws, while hardly unique to nations, “provide powerful means for creating unity and a sense of solidarity among large numbers of people” (50). This does not necessarily require a state to create these laws and customs, as religion can also provide a basis for their incorporation. A distinct public culture comprised of public rituals and ceremonies, public symbols such as anthems and public codes of dress, gesture and so forth are also essential in the development of a national community (51). Vernacular mobilization is important in the cases of “smaller, ethnic populations”, “especially those with a high degree of self-awareness as relatively compact communities of belonging” (55).

We can see various processes of Irish nation formation unfolding rather haphazardly in the medieval ages. On one hand, the continuous settlement of Ireland by Danes and Anglo-Normans combined with the fragmentation between different kingdoms, many of which were willing to ally themselves with “outsiders”, suggests that the Irish nation did not emerge as a territorialized community in this period. Yet even the Old English gentry began to identify themselves as Irish after a few centuries, adopting the Gaelic tongue and intermarrying and identifying their interests as Irish and disliking interference from the British Crown; there is something to be said for the way in which Celtic culture was able to first supplant prior prehistoric cultures and then absorb Viking and even English cultures. Cultural revival after the eleventh century, especially the development of a native literature, strengthened this basis for national development, and the fact that Gaelic was so widely written and spoken, even by those of English descent, indicates that vernacular mobilization and a sense of self-awareness have been present throughout Irish history. Celebrations of Saint Patrick's feast day dates back to the middle ages, and church-life was well-organized compared to many European countries, indicating that Ireland had an emerging distinct public culture, although Saint Patrick's Day only became Ireland's official national holiday in 1903 after lobbying from the Gaelic League and other nationalist organizations (Walker, 1996: 79).

Much of medieval Welsh history involves processes of territorialization, from the
construction of Offa's Dyke to the establishment of the Welsh March. This created a sense of Welsh “otherness” vis-à-vis the Anglo-Normans, reinforced by the different laws and language of Wales and a heavily rural landscape which promoted the idea of the Welsh as an agricultural people. What may have lessened their effect on the development of a widely-embraced Welsh identity was the fragmented nature of such processes: the Welsh Marches extended beyond the border and included much of the south and centre of the country, ensuring that even in the Middle Ages there were anglicised, urbanized pockets throughout, which themselves saw immigration from continental Europe as well as England. Regarding shared customs and standardized laws, the laws set by Hywel the Good created a Welsh legal system distinct from the Anglo-Norman one, giving medieval Wales a sense of cultural unity, while the bardic tradition celebrated in the eisteddfodau is just one example of a distinctly Celtic public culture that would later be revitalized by romantic nationalists. The Historia Regum Britanniae provided Wales a proud though heavily-mythologized history, but actual vernacular mobilization was a process that happened much later in Welsh history and only half-heartedly at that – as seen above, most Welsh elites and members of the middle class came to favour English as a language of moving up in the world. While nationalist intellectuals and artists from the late eighteenth century onward did their best to bring back or create new Welsh cultural traditions and warned of the impending death of the language, most ordinary Welsh continued to speak the language in daily life without any nationalistic attachments to it and responded with bemusement to the appeals of nationalists.

As per Smith, having traced these social and symbolic processes of nation formation in the Irish and Welsh cases, my ethnosymbolic analysis moves on to “explore the role of various kinds of nationalism, as an ideological movement, in the mobilization of populations and the shaping of distinct nations, as well as the part played by nationalist intellectuals and professionals in this process” (2009: 40). As he states, nationalism is not “to be equated with the rise of nations” (61) – in other words, nationalism does not come first and give birth to the nation, but is “an active movement inspired by an ideology and symbolism of the nation” (61). All nationalisms share ideas of desire for autonomy and unity, of a feeling of distinct identity and belonging to a homeland (63). Smith sees nationalism as a kind of “political archaeology” in which nationalist intellectuals “rediscover, select and reinterpret the past or pasts of a given
community, reshape its conception of its present state and so help to regenerate the community” (65). His use of the re-prefix here is telling: nationalists do not so much create the nation as many modernists believe but reshape it in order to make it relevant and provide unity and a basis for autonomy for the present-day community. Revivalist nationalists, chief among them the romantics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sought not only to regenerate the national community but to discover “authenticity” and “national character” through ideological devotion to national identity, recalling great events from the national past, “returning to nature” by romanticizing the “homeland”, and through propagating cults of heroes embodying “the innate virtue and 'true essence' of the nation” (67-69). Yet – and here is where modernist claims about nations being created by elites and imposed upon the masses become truly problematic – Smith argues that “intellectuals remain ineffective as cultural entrepreneurs unless supported by the state and its agencies or by segments of 'the people'” (70). The former case makes it likely that the nationalism and its goals will be compromised by state elites and established political parties; the second makes it possible to build mass support for nationalist goals. This required nationalists to appeal to the people through folk memories, myths, symbols, customs and traditions, even if many of these were local and required creative manipulation to have resonance among the larger group. Of course, determining who exactly constituted “the people” was problematic in itself due to the often heterogeneous nature of the populations residing in the territory in question – each region might have its own dialect and customs. Therefore, nationalist selection “had to respond to the needs, values, memories, symbols and traditions of different segments of the designate population” (72). Because of these above factors, we can consider nationalism to be a “religion of the people” of sorts, regardless of whether the particular nationalism in question is secular in character or founded upon religious ideals – the distinguishing point is that this secular, civic religion “elevates the people and citizens as the chief object of worship and ties them to the land of their ancestors and the shrines and landscapes of their saints and heroes” (77).

We can see such processes at work from the late eighteenth century onward in Ireland and causing interpretations to change as to what exactly constituted “Irishness”. As detailed above, agrarian unrest in the eighteenth century set a precedent for later uprisings and revolutions, and the 1798 rebellion was carried out largely by Protestants who desired Ireland's independence. As
Walker notes, in this period the Protestants, particularly the members of the Ascendancy, were identified as Irish; it was only with the coming of Daniel O'Connell that the Catholics began to be regarded as the “real Irish” because they were the majority, and thus Catholicism and Irishness became the same (1996: 111). Later Protestant nationalists such as Charles Stewart Parnell continued to advocate for a broad interpretation of the Irish nation, one that encompassed all who were born on Irish soil regardless of whether they were Protestant or Catholic or spoke English or Gaelic; even many unionists prior to the crisis over the third Home Rule bill regarded themselves as more Irish than British and only later began to strongly identify themselves as belonging to Ulster foremost (115). Thus, the romantic nationalism that emerged especially in the nineteenth century involved reinterpretations of Ireland's history to highlight its Gaelic and Catholic past. Such changes were cemented by Ulster's industrialization encouraging conservativism from Protestants and the union and the famine of 1847-1849 making it easier for nationalists to link the potential freedom of the Irish nation with ownership of Irish soil. The legacies of both constitutional nationalists such as Daniel O'Connor and the radical nationalists such as the Manchester Martyrs foreshadows the complex relationship in the twentieth century between mainstream Irish nationalists and the IRA, while the appeal of Gaelic athletic and cultural associations in the late nineteenth century speaks to the historical roots of the Irish nation. At the same time, however, this fixation on the Irish past has long tended to focus on the negatives; for example, Daly writes that the fascination of Irish-Americans with the Great Famine speaks to the notion that the Irish are “a nation of victims, a causal explanation for mass Irish emigration and a symbol of national unity” (1996: 71). Walker chronicles many instances in which twentieth-century nationalists spoke of Irish history as entailing centuries of slavery and oppression and blaming the past for all of modern Ireland's problems (1996). Thus, in all this we can see the processes outlined by Smith playing out, as nationalists – or more precisely, a particular strain of nationalists – reshaped Irishness to signify Catholicism, Gaelic ancestry and historical ties to Irish soil; this provided the basis upon which nationalists, especially republicans, made demands for autonomy and rejected the claims of unionists to be part of Irish soil.

We can also see nationalism developing as a kind of “political archaeology” in Wales with the “rediscovery” of the bardic tradition and the eisteddfod, and with the framing of early
Welsh history as a case of ancient Celtic poets, bards and druids being pushed back and subdued by Anglo-Norman barbarians. Perhaps nowhere were such explorations and reinterpretations of the past more prominent than in the realm of literary history: romantics took great artistic liberties in their celebration of the Welsh past, drawing upon the same myths that were propagated by Geoffrey of Monmouth centuries before (Davies, 2007: 294). *The Myvyrian Archaiology*, published at the beginning of the nineteenth century, compiled a swath of medieval Welsh literature, although it was filled with forgeries by the contemporary poet Iolo Morganwg; while criticized in more recent times for its inauthenticity, the *Archaiology* “became a keystone in the nineteenth century Welsh national revival” (Constantine, 2008: 126). Nineteenth and twentieth-century intellectuals such as Saunders Lewis lamented the loss of the Welsh language and called for a revival of Welsh culture to precede self-government; Lewis frequently compared the supposed unity of medieval Wales to its weakened, fragmented and anglicized modern self (O'Leary, 2009: 10-11). Yet in order to appeal to younger generations of Welsh in his 1962 BBC lecture “The Fate of the Language”, Lewis felt compelled to avoid talking so much about the past and instead focused on ensuring a prosperous future for the Welsh nation through political action, including civil disobedience (11-12). Focusing too much on the medieval past, although such an approach may seem natural for a Welsh academic accustomed to taking a long historical view, would have ensured that his views held little relevance for the majority of Welsh.

### 3.4 Conclusions

In the previous chapter, I hypothesized that the historical processes in the Irish case led to the emergence of a strong national identity which challenged the Anglocentric narrative of the ruling powers, while identity conflict in the Welsh case created a more fragmented identity that limited the attractiveness of militant nationalism. The reality appears to have been more complex. Welsh history is every bit as rich and proud as Ireland's, replete with mythical heroes and sagas, native literature and traditions stretching back to the middle ages and beyond. Furthermore, while Wales certainly saw fragmentation emerge between the poor, Welsh-speaking and rural north and the Anglicized and more economically advanced south, similar fragmentation emerged between the Gaelic-speaking, Catholic parts of Ireland and the Anglicized and Protestant areas in the north. Yet, perhaps owing to Ireland's isolation from Britain and its large population compared to Wales, Ireland assimilated newcomers and their descendants rather
successfully, while the same cannot be said for Wales. Ireland experienced rebellion with alarming frequency over the centuries, creating precedents for future revolutionary action in the name of a free and independent Ireland; as highlighted earlier in the chapter, “as the Irish became more fractious, the Welsh became more benign”. In part this was due to Wales' early incorporation into the English legal system under the Tudors and the Crown's success in giving the native gentry a stake in maintenance of the status quo. In contrast, a small number of Anglican landlords came to own much of the land in Ireland and were clearly an alien force, while enduring poverty, harsh treatment of Catholics and the nightmarish experience of the Great Famine gave the Irish historical grievances that were not necessarily felt by most Welsh. This is evidenced by the limited attractiveness of nationalist ideology in Wales: those in the rural, predominantly Welsh-speaking north were bemused by the appeals of the tiny minority of elitist Welsh intellectuals, while many in the south were embarrassed by the Welsh language and viewed English as the language of the future. In contrast, Irish nationalists were able to appeal to broad swathes of Irish society, especially concerning issues of land reform and Catholic emancipation.

Of course, there is a degree of simplification in this comparison, and the historical similarities between the two cases are perhaps more striking than the differences. An observer ignorant of Irish and Welsh history beyond the middle ages would be hard-pressed to say which case would ultimately lead to armed revolution and constitutional change in modern times leading to the emergence of an independent state. Nevertheless, the historical processes highlighted above, including repeated acts of repression against the Irish as well as an established pattern of armed rebellion against the English-dominated state – clearly perceived as an outside force to a far greater degree than it was in Wales – created a historical memory that created a strong national identity and justified both unarmed and armed resistance in the name of Irish freedom. These processes did not unfold in a similar fashion in Wales. However, without an analysis of the other structural causes of the political violence and terrorism at play in the 1960s and 1970s in both countries, we cannot yet say to what extent this difference in national identity was decisive in the difference in outcomes.
Chapter Four: Analyzing the Causes and Drivers of Nationalist Violence

4.1 Introduction

This chapter builds upon the themes and history elaborated upon in the previous chapter to explore the development of nationalist violence in both Northern Ireland and Wales. The first section provides an overview of both cases during the period concerned, roughly the 1960s to the 1980s, tracing the path to violence and the rise and decline of various extremist organizations. The second section uses these cases to test Ross’s model of structural causes of terrorism, hypothesizing that both the permissive and precipitant variables had a stronger presence in the Northern Irish case than in Wales.

4.2 Political violence and terrorism from the 1960s-1980s

4.2.1 Ireland: the IRA and The Troubles

The Troubles in Northern Ireland, as they unfolded in the 1960s and 1970s and coming to a supposed end with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, constitute an incredibly complex narrative, and due to space limitations only a basic sketch is provided here, although the following sections of the chapter explore many significant details. What distinguishes the violence in the Northern Irish case from that in the Welsh case is its sectarian nature: while the vilification of the IRA has made it easy to single it out as the main perpetrator of terrorism, it is important to remember that it was not the only party to the conflict and that many of its actions were in response to violence from unionists and much of its public support lay in the fact that many Catholics saw it as their only form of protection from unionist and government forces.

Thus, the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1966 by unionist militants marks a good starting point for The Troubles, as their attacks on Catholics in a time of civil rights activism heralded an intensified era of sectarian conflict. When a civil rights march in 1968 through Derry entered a Protestant part of the city, the Royal Ulster Constabulary responded with indiscriminate violence against marchers, leading to growing support for further marches, one of which resulted in ambushes by Protestant and RUC attackers and fifty marchers being injured. Other sectarian incidents occurred, and the Northern Irish government oscillated between blaming the violence on Catholic marchers – and thus angering them – and considering concessions to Catholics, which angered unionists. The “Battle of the Bogside” in 1969, where
the annual march of the Protestant and unionist Apprentice Boys in Derry led to serious fighting and rioting between nationalists and the RUC and days of protests and riots throughout Northern Ireland, forced the British government's hand: the British army was deployed to restore order under Operation Banner (Kinealy, 2004: 249-52).

The Labour government, now focusing its attention on a long-neglected region of the UK, committed itself to reforms in Northern Ireland, “especially regarding electoral boundaries, housing allocation and hiring practices in public employment” (Kinealy, 2004: 255). Such intentions brought about little real change, and despite efforts to reform policing, Northern Ireland's police force remained predominantly Protestant (256), and, in any case, the unionist-leaning Conservative party took power in 1970. The burgeoning crisis also reinvigorated the more radical nationalist elements, as both Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA – both relegated to the sidelines in the face of the civil rights movement and riots – “split into two political wings, Sinn Féin and the Workers' Party, and their respective military wings, the Provisional and the Official IRA” (256). While the Officials were predominantly peaceful, the Provisional IRA endorsed the use of force to end British occupation, involving itself in street fighting in 1970 and positioning itself as the defender of the people in the absence of fair and impartial policing, thus earning itself new recruits (257). Despite the temporary and limited peace imposed by the presence of British troops, the situation deteriorated in 1971 and 1972 as the Provisional IRA began carrying out killings of British soldiers and bombings of commercial targets, while the government began interning thousands of people, almost all Catholic, and allegedly abused and even tortured detainees (258-59). Internment as well as the use of rubber bullets, house searches, roadblocks and frequent stop and searches only increased protests, street violence, sectarian killings and IRA recruitment, while unionist paramilitaries saw increased recruitment, the formation of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and ambivalent support from the Democratic Unionist Party and its religious fundamentalist leader, Ian Paisley. Increasingly, the middle ground disappeared from Northern Irish politics, and when a 1972 civil rights march in Derry against internment resulted in the army firing on the marchers and killing fourteen unarmed civilians in the incident known as “Bloody Sunday”, the conflict entered a new phase in which the IRA took its campaign directly to Britain and Westminster imposed direct rule on the province (260-64).
The 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, produced by representatives from the British and Irish governments and mainstream unionist and nationalist parties, attempted to provide a power-sharing arrangement between Catholics and Protestants while also creating a Council of Ireland intending to bring the Republic into Northern Ireland's affairs, especially regarding border issues. Republicans opposed Sunningdale, seeking the full removal of the United Kingdom from Ireland, while militant unionists opposed the idea of sharing power with nationalists. Civil disorder and chaos, including a general strike by the Ulster Workers' Council and bombs set off by the UVF in Dublin and Monaghan, killing thirty-two people, spelled the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement (Kinealy, 2004: 264-66).

IRA violence, including political killings, increased steadily throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s as the IRA adopted a new “Long War” strategy involving smaller cells carrying out a war of attrition with the British Army aimed at making the Six Counties ungovernable, with the Provisional IRA extending its bombing campaign outside Northern Ireland and a new republican group, the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), and its military wing, the Irish National Liberation Army, appearing in 1975. Much of this was driven by repeated failures in the political process and an increased sense “that political power flowed out of the barrel of a gun” (Cochrane, 2013: 96). Provisional IRA strategies ranged from physical attacks involving car bombings to allying itself with national movements around the world such as the Palestine Liberation Organization in order to both finance its struggle and gain international legitimacy to combat the British narrative (111). Major victims of the Provisional IRA included the British ambassador to Ireland and Lord Mountbatten, the great-uncle of Prince Charles. The next decade saw IRA bombs kill ten soldiers in a London barracks in 1982, the bombing of a hotel in Brighton where the Conservative cabinet was staying in 1984, killing five, and a bombing on Remembrance Sunday in 1988 that killed eleven and wounded sixty-three in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, the British government found its popularity sinking to new lows after withdrawing Special Category Status from convicted republican prisoners, which led to the 1981 Hunger Strike, which in turn galvanized Irish nationalists following the deaths of MP Bobby Sands and several others and pushed Sinn Féin to enter parliamentary politics and to become a successful political party in its own right. One Sinn Féin member summarized the use of electoral politics as a complementary force to IRA campaigning as taking power in Ireland.
“with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in the other” (116). Violence continued sporadically until the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 signalled the official end of the Troubles, which created a new Northern Ireland Assembly and allowed that Northern Ireland would remain a part of the United Kingdom until a majority of people in the north and in Irish Republic voted otherwise, although there have been a few isolated incidents of violence in the years since.

4.2.2 Wales: sabotage and arson

In contrast to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the political violence and terrorism seen in Wales from the 1960s onward were both non-sectarian in nature and so comparatively tame – consisting mainly of acts of sabotage and arson – that the academic literature on it is almost non-existent. Indeed, Humphries is justified in terming these acts of violence “Wales's forgotten 'war'”, as even many Welsh viewed groups such as Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru and the Free Wales Army with such embarrassment that they have been effectively written “out of history” (2008: 7). This, of course, makes the case all the more interesting, given the growing but fragmented nationalist identity in Wales, and begs the question of whether academics prioritize exploring why some cases are particularly violent to such an extent that they neglect to examine why other cases are not.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, tensions over the construction of the Tryweryn dam produced acts of sabotage, starting with vandalism of an electricity transformer in 1962 by two Plaid Cymru members with the prior knowledge and approval of party leader Gwynfor Evans and culminating in bombings of a transformer and transmission tower the following year by members of MAC. Protestors at the official opening of the reservoir in 1965 outnumbered the guests, and among them were members of the Free Wales Army. Of the two groups, the FWA was the far less serious threat in terms of its actual capabilities, but it boasted of having 7,000 members – when it only had around twenty – and claimed responsibility for many of the explosions carried out by MAC in the 1960s, while it in fact failed to detonate the one bomb it ever laid (Johnes, 2012: 233).

The real force capable of disrupting the status quo in Wales was Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. Responsible for previous sabotage attempts at Tryweryn, in 1966 it successfully bombed the Clywedog dam construction site, causing £30,000 worth of damage and delaying construction by six months (Humphries, 2008: 4-5). The context of the bombing was similar to
that surrounding Tryweryn – in both cases, Welsh valleys were being flooded to provide water to English cities. Driven underground after Tryweryn, MAC resurfaced to sabotage the Clywedog dam while reorganizing itself into a network of tightly controlled cells (65-66). MAC continued its sabotage campaign throughout the late 1960s, with notable actions including the bombing of a tax office in Chester and the Welsh Office in Cardiff. The three main members of the FWA were jailed in 1969, and, following a failing bombing campaign centred on the investiture of the Prince of Wales in the same year, police were able to round up several members of MAC; with the ten-year jailing of its de facto leader John Jenkins, MAC was effectively eliminated as an organization.

The actions of MAC and the FWA created difficulties for Plaid Cymru, which was blamed by opposition parties for the sabotage campaigns and which was sympathetic to the objectives of nationalist extremists, if not their methods. Although Saunders Lewis declared any form of resistance to the building of dams as “wholly just”, most of the party felt that extremists would alienate popular support, and Gwynfor Evans expelled FWA members and condemned the “vicious and degrading cult of violence” (Johnes, 2012: 234). Plaid's devotion to the ballot box alienated militant nationalists, and even Huw Edwards, an influential Welsh politician and trade union leader who also corresponded with powerful establishment figures, remarked, “the weakness of Plaid is that it attempts to imitate the popular parties rather than going into the wilderness for the nation's soul” (Humphries, 2008: 70).

A different campaign of violence in Wales took place from 1979 to 1992 as arsonists attacked English-owned holiday homes in rural areas. Several groups claimed responsibility, although Meibion Glyndŵr (Sons of Glyndŵr) has been most commonly associated with the actions. The campaign eventually expanded to include attacks on estate agents suspected of selling second homes and Conservative Party offices and eventually also included letter bombs (Johnes, 2012: 386). To this day it is unclear who the arsonists were and the only person convicted for letter-bombing was only nine years old when the arson campaign began. Due to the geographic reach – with simultaneous fires breaking out 150 miles apart in December 1979 – and duration of the campaign as well as the wide variety of incendiary devices employed, it is likely that Meibion Glyndŵr was a network of different cells or organizations rather than two or three individuals (Humphries, 2008: 160).
4.3 Ross's model of structural causes of terrorism

4.3.1 Permissive causes

4.3.1.1 Geographical location

Ross: “the higher the population of a city, the greater the amount of terrorism”; “the higher the percentage of a country's population that is urbanized, the greater the amount of terrorism that the country should experience”; “the larger the population, the greater the opportunity for support, the greater the availability of weapons and explosives, and the greater the presence of grievances”; “the larger the city, the higher the probability that there will be other forms of unrest” (Ross, 1993: 321).

Ross argues that urban areas are more likely than rural areas to facilitate terrorism, as they give advantages including logistic superiority such as close proximity to targets, availability of weapons and explosives, greater anonymity and a larger audience. Cities also offer a greater base of both potential recruits and supporters. Thus, an urbanized environment should permit the existence of precipitant causes such as availability of weapons and explosives, support and other forms of unrest (1993: 320-21).

The Troubles in Northern Ireland, as well as the preceding civil rights marches and surging sectarian tensions, were primarily a feature of cities such as Derry and Belfast, where entire neighbourhoods were divided against one another by adherence to Catholicism and Protestantism, nationalism and unionism. Living in the presence of so many unionists, unionist-dominated policing forces and, later, the British Army both fed the grievances of Catholics and offered close proximity to targets for the IRA, which also drew support from Catholic communities by serving as its only real source of protection from Protestants and a hostile constabulary. Much violence and IRA activity, however, did take place in rural areas, especially along the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland across which weapons could be smuggled.

By contrast, Wales during the period of the sabotage and arson campaigns was a country split between an Anglicized, relatively urban south with cities such as Cardiff and Swansea concentrated along the coast and a rural, Welsh-speaking north and west. The sabotage campaign
of the 1960s was a reaction to projects such as the Tryweryn dam which only affected a few villagers – who themselves were handsomely compensated by the government for the troubles (Johnes, 2012: 214-15) – as well as the incremental erosion of the Welsh way of life by an English-speaking modernity. Likewise, the arson campaign of 1979-1992 was a rural reaction to the influx of English homebuyers and its effect on hitherto-undisturbed Welsh villages (Roger, 1994: web).

4.3.1.2 Political system type

Ross: “the greater the degree of democracy, the higher the toleration for terrorism”; “the greater the amount of democracy, the higher the support for terrorism”; “the greater the level of democracy, the higher the presence of other forms of unrest”; “the greater the amount of democracy, the higher the probability of counterterrorist organization failure”; “the greater the level of democracy, the higher the availability of weapons and explosives” (Ross, 1993: 322).

Existing research, according to Ross, demonstrates that oppositional terrorism “flourishes primarily in prosperous democracies”, while it is less common in less developed states and minimal in authoritarian and totalitarian countries (1993: 321). This is mainly due to the guarantee of civil liberties and the ability to express dissent that is characteristic of democracies as well as the tendency of democracies to encourage “the proliferation of narrow-based social issues”. There is also greater access to media for promoting political messages, greater freedom of movement, and a police force that is generally law-abiding. These factors rarely exist in other political systems. At the same time, Ross notes, dissenters in democracies have access to legitimate and recognized avenues for expressing discontent or to seek redress, so potential terrorists must explore alternative political actions before engaging in violent actions (322).

However, more recent research (Li, 2005; Findley and Young, 2011; Chenoweth, 2013) offers a different perspective, namely that wealthy democracies which offer few restrictions on citizens and respect the rule of law generally suffer less terrorism, both domestic and transnational in origin, while emerging, weaker democracies that suffer from social disparities or restrictions on rights are more vulnerable.

In any case, of all the variables discussed in this chapter, political system type is probably the least relevant to the discussion, as both Northern Ireland and Wales were part of the United Kingdom and thus were constituent units of a democratic nation-state. However, until 1972
Northern Ireland remained under the direct control of the Stormont government, which was dominated by Protestants and which, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, had engaged in various forms of discrimination against Catholics; this, of course, fed the grievances of Catholics and gave them reason to support the IRA. It may seem ironic, then, given Ross's hypothesis, that a relatively fragmented democracy such as Northern Ireland should face terrorism, yet it is worth reexamining the state of this democracy. While gerrymandering of local electoral districts to favour unionists, the abolition of proportional representation, and discriminatory distribution of housing and employment all weakened Catholics politically, the postwar period saw an expansion of the welfare state which benefited even Catholics, and improved access to higher education created huge numbers of students who were influenced by the civil rights movements and revolutionary fervour experienced in other western countries during the 1960s. This factor, combined with the sectarian divide in Northern Ireland's society, paved the way for the various forms of unrest that would eventually include political violence (Ranelagh, 2012: 305-7).

Unlike Northern Ireland, Wales during this period remained under the direct control of Westminster at a time when nationalists were agitating for devolution, recognition of the Welsh language and the advancement of the official position of Wales in government. From the 1950s onward, there were increasing signs of government sensitivity to Wales, such as financial support for the publishing of Welsh-language school books, support for the National Eisteddfod, the establishment of Cardiff as the official capital of Wales, the declaration of the Red Dragon as the official national flag and the creation of the Welsh Office to execute government policy in Wales (Johnes 2012, 219). If anything, such developments may have appeared to radical nationalists to be piecemeal concessions meant to stave off the establishment of a truly sovereign Wales by either soothing over Welsh discontent over developments such as Tryweryn or by strengthening governmental control over Wales through the Welsh office.

Thus, Ross’s rationale for the second permissive variable in his model does not hold up well to the evidence presented by the Northern Irish and Welsh cases. The evidence above appears to validate the arguments of more recent research that weaker democracies are more conducive to the growth of terrorism than stronger ones. Northern Ireland, in particular, was a highly imperfect democracy in which one group enjoyed a greater degree of rights than the other,
which in turn fuelled grievances. While Ross does have a point that democracies offer greater leeway for dissenting views than non-democracies, it might be suitable to refine this variable as, for example, level of perceived inequality in a democracy, with a proposed hypothesis: the greater the amount of perceived inequality or social disparity in a democracy, the greater the amount of grievances, the higher the presence of other forms of unrest, the higher the toleration for terrorism and the higher the support for terrorism.

4.3.1.3 Level of modernization

Ross: “the more modern the nation-state, the higher the probability that there will be more cities”; “the more modern the society, the higher the probability it will be democratic or there will be pressures for democratic institutions”; “the greater the amount of modernization, the higher the number of grievances”; “the greater the amount of modernization, the higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation” (Ross, 1993: 322).

Modernized societies, Ross argues, are the most important of the permissive factors. Several factors associated with such societies are “a variety, better, more sophisticated, vulnerable targets, destructive weapons and technology, mass media, populations with increased literacy, conflicts with traditional ways of life, and networks of transportation” (1993: 322). Modernization relates to the two previous permissive causes in that it produces urbanization and tends to exist prior to the establishment of democratic political systems. Thus, modernization also lays the groundwork for the precipitant causes discussed below.

Comparatively, Northern Ireland was the more advanced of the two countries, benefitting from strong trade links with Britain which produced greater urbanization and a relatively well-developed welfare state in which even poor Catholics remained better off than their brethren in the Irish Republic (Ranelagh, 2012: 307-9). Wales remained uneven in its development, with economic development, urbanization and modernization concentrated in the coastal south where the influence of the English world was the strongest and rural Wales with its agriculture-based economy suffering economic, cultural and linguistic decline (Thomas, 1994: 101-2; Johnes, 2012: 188-89). Lack of modernization was not conducive to the existence of the other causes discussed below, and the fact that rural decline was a central issue in the Welsh case rather than, say, sectarian divide in urban areas as in Northern Wales, did not strengthen the case for terrorism emerging when factors such as proximity to targets, access to media, availability of
weapons and supplies, and the critical mass of people required to provide plentiful recruits and supporters are considered. Again, this permissive variable is problematic as Wales was not necessarily less advanced than Northern Ireland, only less urbanized outside its southern regions. It is difficult to say whether the United Kingdom “modernized” before it became democratic, as the history of the UK – and England before it – is one of slow processes of democratization, many of which occurred well before the Industrial Revolution. Again, the benefits of both industry and democracy were spread very unevenly in either Northern Ireland or Wales, which is a better clue to explaining the grievances experienced in either case than the general level of modernization.

4.3.2 Precipitant causes

4.3.2.1 Social, cultural and historical facilitation

Ross: “the longer an identifiable subgroup exists within a dominant majority, the greater its tendency to develop grievances”; “the higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation, the greater the propensity of members of that community to use terrorism”; “the higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation, the greater the support of terrorism”; “the higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation, the greater the tendency for its members to split from a more moderate organization” (Ross, 1993: 323).

This variable may be the broadest in scope and most difficult to measure of all the possible precipitant causes, as it “consists of shared attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, customs, habits, myths, and traditions that permit the development of nationalism, fanaticism, violence and terrorism in a subgroup of a population” (Ross, 1993: 322). This facilitation succeeds in numerous manners such as inspiring individuals, encouraging imitation, creating the perception that the risk of carrying out terrorist actions is small, exposing groups to information and ideologies that can conceivably justify the use of violence and reduce factionalization and defections in order to strengthen unity and resolve toward goals (322). How this facilitation is actually carried out is even more multifaceted. Terrorist leaders, intellectual and cultural elites and journalists are all major sources, and alternative and mass media, higher education and dissemination of intellectual knowledge and cultural values can all serve as crucial transmitters. This facilitation may draw upon social, cultural and historical precedents to symbolize the continuity of an organization's struggle and increase its solidarity while also creating support for
it and causing problems for counterterrorism efforts (322-23).

The biggest factor in terms of social, cultural and historical facilitation in the Irish case is the historical precedent established by past Irish rebellions and especially the violent republicanism of the early twentieth century. The IRA had existed in one form or another since 1913 with the formation of the Irish Volunteers, and had experienced splits after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and in 1969 at the outset of the Troubles, but such splits were between those who wished to moderate or change the IRA's focus – for example, the Marxist-leaning members of the Official IRA viewed sectarian violence among the working class as serving the interests of the ruling classes – and those who staunchly adhered to republican values and contested the Anglo-Irish Treaty during the civil war or carried out the extensive armed campaign against the British presence for thirty years during the Troubles. Bosi, through interviews of former PIRA members, finds that IRA volunteers who joined before the 1969 split were mainly raised in families “steeped in republican tradition” (2012: 360). Family networks were important for mobilization, as many new volunteers were introduced into the organization by family members after being raised with republican ideals; deciding to join the PIRA was a gradual process that marked a “continuation of an earlier involvement with the Republican armed-struggle strategy to drive the British out of Ireland”. Bosi contends that these motives were rooted in a “counterhegemonic consciousness” that glorified the republican struggle to free Ireland from British imperialism (360-61).

To elaborate even further along the lines of the previous paragraph, Irish nationalism has a long history of armed rebellion against the British state as well as fomenting general unrest. While some rebellions and instances of unrest such as the 1798 uprising were decidedly non-sectarian in nature – or even mainly carried out by non-Catholics – by the middle of the nineteenth century Catholicism and Protestantism had become linked firmly with nationalism and unionism, respectively, as illustrated in the previous chapter. The Fenian movement, although having historical roots in the United Irishmen, was more immediately a byproduct of the growing nationalist movement linked with O'Connell, and laid the groundwork for all future revolutionary, republican and specifically Catholic strains of Irish nationalism. Early nationalist heroes such as the Manchester Martyrs, as noted in the previous chapter, “reduced Irish faith in British justice and helped to encourage romanticization of Fenianism and to nourish the Irish
Republican Brotherhood myth” (Ranelagh, 2012: 138).

The presence of social, cultural and historical facilitation is much weaker in the Welsh case. While Irish Catholics could draw upon a long history of revolution and rebellion, Wales had been in a largely pacified state since the crushing of Owain Glyndŵr's rebellion in the fifteenth century, and the only remotely violent manifestation of nationalist anger in the modern era prior to 1960s was the 1936 arson attack against an RAF bombing school in Wales by several members of Plaid Cymru. As discussed in the previous chapter, nineteenth and early twentieth-century Welsh identity was torn between national pride rooted in Nonconformity and Celtic history and mythology on the one hand and, on the other hand, a strong sense of Britishness that could at times produce embarrassment of one's cultural roots and a desire to become more “English”. The latter also explains much of the public and media disapproval of both the sabotage and arson campaigns, exemplified in the £30,000 offer from the Western Mail to “flush out these cowards” and restore “the name of Wales as a land of peace and goodwill” (Johnes, 2012: 386).

On the other hand, the sabotage incidents of the 1960s took place against a backdrop of rising nationalist feeling and dissatisfaction with the status quo. Saunders Lewis' 1962 radio lecture on the impending doom of the Welsh language and his statement that successfully reversing this linguistic decline could “only come about through revolutionary methods” and making it “impossible to conduct local authority or central government business without the Welsh language” (Johnes, 2012: 221) reflected a more general sentiment that extra-parliamentary action was not only a viable option, it was increasingly appearing to be the only option. Plaid Cymru itself flirted with the idea of nonviolent resistance to the construction of the Tryweryn dam, although it ultimately rejected such a path. Gwynfor Evans remained wedded to constitutional party politics as the key to bringing about devolution of selected powers to Wales and protection of Welsh language and culture, and in 1966 Evans won a byelection, sending the party its first-ever MP to Westminster and occasioning great celebrations among the Welsh populace (222-23). The party's official disapproval – and especially that of the pacifist Evans – of sabotage campaigns appears to have reflected the moderate nature of Welsh nationalism at the time and explain the muted support for groups such as MAC and the FWA. At the same time, the determination of Plaid Cymru to work within the parameters of parliamentary politics could only
have frustrated those who saw conventional politics as illegitimate and dominated by interests antithetical to those of Wales. Such tensions were bound to produce some extremists who felt the need to resort to extra-parliamentary measures to achieve nationalist goals but who were bound to be labelled as hooligans whose contributions were not constructive.

Although this likely had little impact on popular support, the name Meibion Glyndŵr (Sons of Glyndŵr) is an interesting example of historical or cultural – more appropriately, mythological – facilitation. While it is unclear whether the arsonists were one organization or several loosely affiliated organizations, cells or even individuals – and it may have been a combination of one or two main groups and possible copycat individuals – the fact that these arsonists should cite one of the most cherished Welsh heroes – one prophesied to someday return and liberate Wales – demonstrates that they saw themselves as carrying on a struggle that had raged for centuries. As Roger puts it,

“this tendency to telescope together into a single identity distinct exploits by distinct individuals is not a new process in the construction of a mythology concerning a particular folk-hero. Indeed, the social and political significance of the phenomenon derives, not from the identity and characteristics of the individuals involved, but, rather from the conditions which generate this myth-building and allow the ascription of folk-hero status”.

Roger refers here to Hobsbawm's theory of social banditry in which bandits who are regarded by the state as criminal enjoy a degree of moral or practical support from the economically and politically marginalized for their campaign of banditry against the landowners and its supporting state machinery – even being regarded as champions of the oppressed. Robin Hood is the classic “noble robber”, a “righter of wrongs not just of serfs against feudal landholders, but also of the indigenous Anglo-Saxons against the Norman newcomers”. The arson campaign took place against a backdrop of cultural and economic decline in rural Wales in which the Welsh language weakened through both the spread of English and rural depopulation brought about by a modernized agricultural economy; the influx of English “aliens” into the heartland of Welsh language and culture inflated property prices and undermined the social infrastructure of Welsh villages as the wealthier English purchased local businesses and threatened to anglicize communities. This upsetting of both material wellbeing and the “delicate network of historically accumulated associations” through domination by another linguistic group, combined with the apparent hopelessness of a constitutional solution, created ripe conditions for social banditry (1994, web). When examined through such a lens, it would be more surprising if cultural and
economic decline combined with an influx of aliens from a dominating culture did not lead to incidents of vandalism or arson from a frustrated underclass.

4.3.2.2 Organizational split and development

Ross: “the more terrorist organizations split, the higher the probability that one or more of them will advocate and use terrorism”; “the higher the number of political and terrorist organizations that split, the greater the probability that one or more will support terrorism” (Ross, 1993: 323).

Compared to the other causes explored in this section, it is with the variable of organizational split and development where we find the clearest evidence of its existence in the Irish case. Ross notes that most terrorist groups come into existence as a result of a split “between the moderate and the more extreme wings of an already-existing organization” and that splits within terrorism organizations can lead to the emergence of even more extreme organizations that are committed to demonstrating to their “presumed or actual constituency” just how serious they are about fulfilling their goals by carrying out acts of terrorism (1993: 323).

First, both Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, split into Sinn Féin and the Workers' Party and the Provisional and Official IRA respectively. While the Officials tended to be relatively moderate and committed to class-based socialist politics and officially called off their campaign against the British Army and the RUC after 1972, the Provisionals became increasingly radical and violent with time. The original members of the IRA who seceded to form the PIRA did so because of the organization's “marginalization” of the military approach, its failure to protect nationalist neighbourhoods from communal violence and due to antagonism toward conventional politics and a belief in the necessity of armed struggle to drive out the British (Bosi, 2012: 356-57).

Based on the accounts of former volunteers with the Provisional IRA, Bosi argues that those members who had been previously been involved in other political activities were compelled to join the organization after resolving that armed struggle was the only approach that could bring about change. Similarly, those who had been involved with the Republican movement and joined the PIRA after its split with the Official IRA did so because “they perceived it to be more able to continue the traditional struggle of fighting to free Ireland from British imperialism” (2012: 349-50). He writes that, “in its early years, much PIRA recruitment
rested on the armed group's course of action rather than on a coherent persuasive argument’’; all of his respondents cited an overwhelming need to take action stemming from either family tradition in the Republican movement or transformative events combined with a perceived need “to reclaim a sense of dignity, honour, and pride for themselves and for their community” (350-51).

In the case of Wales, there is no clear case of organizational split because there were barely any “terrorist” organizations in the first place. It is arguable, however, that Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru and the Free Wales Army arose in the first place partly out of disillusion with the impotence of Plaid Cymru and mainstream nationalists in the face of Welsh linguistic and cultural decline and the appropriation of Wales' water resources. While Plaid Cymru had flirted with the idea of sabotage to stop the Tryweryn project, it ultimately rejected such ideas under the leadership of Gwynfor Evans in favour of nonviolence. Yet Humphries notes that “the failure of the democratic process to stop the dam, and Gwynfor Evans' refusal to condone direct action as the only means left, came close to splitting Plaid Cymru when disaffected members formed an action group threatening sabotage” (19). While this came to nothing, Owen Williams and others who formed MAC were driven by the same disenchantment.

4.3.2.3 Presence of other forms of unrest

Ross: “the greater the presence of other forms of unrest, the higher the likelihood that grievances by subgroups will be identified and acted on”; “the greater the presence of other forms of unrest, the higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation among groups expressing grievances”; “the higher the amount of other forms of political unrest, the greater the likelihood there will be counterterrorist organization failure” (Ross, 1993: 323-24).

Ross (1993) views both violent and nonviolent forms of unrest such as “war, revolution, guerrilla warfare, strikes, protests, demonstrations, riots or other group terrorist actions” as catalysts for terrorism in that they can “motivate terrorist organizations, provide learning opportunities, increase the legitimacy of violent actions, and heighten a sense of grievance” (1993: 323).

Northern Ireland saw a new era of unrest unfold with the civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s and the sectarian violence and rioting that followed. While it is apparent that there was a great deal of overlap among the nationalist groups involved with the Troubles – as seen in the
relationship between Sinn Féin and the IRA – the IRA itself had acquired a reputation for inactivity and tentativeness during the civil riots marches and riots and had become a marginalized part of the nationalist movement. Frustration with this situation was a crucial element in pushing dissident members of the organization to split off and form the Provisional IRA, as indicated in the above section. The PIRA provided protection to Catholic areas and garnered support from nationalists who viewed the violence of Protestants against civil rights protesters as indicative that Catholics needed to defend themselves with equal force (Kinealy, 2004: 257). Indeed, Bosi finds that those who joined the PIRA at a young age and without previous involvement with nationalism did so because they experienced state repression or sectarian attacks and wished to defend or avenge their communities; larger political reasons such as republicanism usually only became a justification as a result of socialization into the organization as well as time spent in prison. Thus, many joined the PIRA simply “because of what was happening on the ground”; that is, the intensifying unrest compelled a new generation toward armed activism (2012: 350).

As discussed above and in the previous chapter, many Welsh in the 1950s and 1960s experienced anxiety over the decline of the Welsh language and reacted negatively to plans to flood the village of Capel Celyn. The Welsh Language Society formed in 1962 and engaged in a campaign of civil disobedience that included disrupting court proceedings, vandalizing English-only road signs, participating in sit-ins and refusing to license vehicles until it was possible to do so in Welsh (Jenkins, 2007: 262-63; Johnes, 2012: 226), while Plaid Cymru and nationalist activists protested the Tryweryn plans, deriding them as part of the “gradual murder of the Welsh national personality by various forces from beyond the Dyke”, with the entire village of Capel Celyn marching in Liverpool with the backing of Plaid Cymru (212-15). Such manifestations of dissent were limited to these few incidences, and were generally met with apathy from the broader Welsh population. Thus, those who engaged in sabotage campaigns could look to these incidences of dissent as establishing a precedent for more extreme action, but the fact that Wales did not experience the kind of civil rights marches, riots and sectarian violence experienced by Northern Ireland – and the presence of such conflict itself is tied to socio-historical circumstances – weakened the grounds for a situation in which more violent tactics might be viewed as necessary.
4.3.2.4 Support

Ross: “the higher the amount of support, the greater the amount of counterterrorist failures”; “the higher the amount of support, the greater the availability of weapons and explosives” (Ross, 1993: 324).

Support for terrorism can come in many forms, including “finances, training, intelligence, false documents, donations or sales of weapons and explosives, provisions of sanctuary or safe housing, propaganda campaigns, ideological justification, public opinion, legal services, and a constant supply of recruits” (Ross, 1993: 324). Such support can come from other members of the aggrieved population, states, other terrorist organizations, organized crime groups, and members of a diaspora, to name a few (324). Support also leads to the availability of weapons and explosives, the failure of counterterrorist organizations and grievances; thus, these precipitant causes are related to one another.

One of the most crucial sources of support, and one that is also detailed in the discussion of availability of weapons and explosives below, was the Irish-American community. One such source was the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), a pro-republican support organization established after the 1969 riots, which was alleged to have raised funds for IRA arms importation while also supporting the families of volunteers; in the 1970s, NORAID's “contributions comprised around two-thirds of expenditure on prisoners' dependents, with around £170,000 left – along with other contributions – to spend on arms annually” (Oppenheimer, 2009: 154). US-based Irish republican George Harrison supplied guns for the 1950s border campaign and in 1970 set up a network of US arms smugglers who supplied the Provisional IRA throughout the Troubles. The guns provided, including the compact AR-15 rifle, were used to kill 285 British Army personnel and Northern Ireland police officers between 1970 and 1974 (155). The FBI broke up the Harrison network in 1981, and was quick to crack down on shipments of firearms, anti-aircraft weaponry and explosives in the 1980s and 1990s. It should be noted that much of this support came long after the outbreak of PIRA terrorism and thus says little about the importance of this variable as an original precipitant of terrorism.

It should be noted that both the Welsh sabotage and arson campaigns were primarily phenomena of rural, Welsh-speaking Wales and not the urbanized, Anglicized parts of the country. This stands in direct contrast to the Troubles, where conflict occurred in cities such as
Derry and was concentrated in Catholic zones such as Falls Road. As discussed by Ross and as noted in the section above on geographical location, cities are more likely than rural environments to facilitate terrorism, as they not only provide logistical advantages and proximity to targets, but they also provide greater availability of material and technological support from sympathizers as well as various sources for recruits such as slums or universities (1993: 320-21). Thus, rural environments typically lack concentration of supportive elements. Greater support from those living in Cardiff and other southern cities, especially from the educated middle-classes, might have bolstered the sabotage campaign, even if such support simply entailed sympathizing with the ideals of MAC and other groups to such an extent that it forced Westminster to reconsider Tryweryn and other examples of its attitude toward Wales.

Lack of support from Plaid Cymru and other mainstream nationalists as well as prominent newspapers such as the Western Mail certainly did not help MAC, although it did push extremists dissatisfied with the status quo of parliamentary politics toward the organization. Gwynfor Evans, who won Plaid Cymru its first seat in 1966, was staunchly pacifist and rejected sabotage and bombing tactics, but MAC did have at least the implicit moral support of Saunders Lewis, who saw any form of resistance to the Tryweryn project as just, as well as that of the influential trade unionist and Labour Party-turned Plaid Cymru member Huw T. Edwards, who stood bail for Owen Williams after he was arrested for blowing up the transformer at the dam construction site and decried Plaid's weakness in remaining fixed upon parliamentary politics as a means for bringing about Welsh self-government (Humphries, 2012: 70). More important from a material perspective was the support of activists in northwest Wales, especially in the period before the investiture of Prince Charles, when John Jenkins, a former non-commissioned officer who effectively took over the leadership of MAC, spent six months compiling a list of people and resources and organizing the organization into cells. Prominent supporters cited by Humphries as having made significant contributions to MAC include language rights campaigner and Plaid Cymru member Trefor Beasley as a secret “quartermaster” who assisted insurgents active in south Wales without the knowledge of his own wife, herself a respected civil rights campaigner; poet, Plaid Cymru member and editor of its weekly newspaper Harri Webb had links to Breton nationalists and provided advice; and millionaire and co-founder of the Welsh Republican Movement political party Trefor Morgan funded Owain Williams' defence on an
explosives charge, while the WRM newspaper supported militant nationalism and at least one of its editors supported MAC and the FWA while also campaigning for the early release of John Jenkins from prison following his arrest and sentencing in relation to the investiture plot (67-69). Thus, there were certainly supporters of the bombing campaigns, but to nowhere near the extent seen in Northern Ireland, where whole communities rallied around the Provisional IRA and overseas supporters attempted to smuggle weapons into the country.

When taking either case as a whole – that is, when looking beyond the initial outbreaks of violence and considering what forces were instrumental in sustaining that violence over a period of years or decades, Sánchez-Cuenca’s analysis of degrees of support for terrorism is helpful. He notes that that nationalist terrorist groups exercise self-restraint and discrimination in their choice of targets, avoiding or denying responsibility for attacks that kill large numbers of civilians or “non-legitimate” targets; this is necessary so that organizations do not alienate existing or potential supporters. As highlighted in the literature review, he defines three degrees of support: “(1) those who disagree with the armed struggle and the killing of innocent victims but vaguely sympathize with the organization's goals; (2) those who vote for the party associated with the terrorist organization or participate in the social movements that develop around the organization; and (3) those who help the organization in various ways (by providing information, housing, money, etc.) or engage in lesser acts of violence” (2007: 300-1). Group 3 is the most crucial for material and moral support and is the least likely to cease supporting the organization over excessive casualties, but the organization needs support or at least tolerance from groups 1 and 2 to claim legitimacy and avoid being marginalized in the political environment. If groups 1 and 2 are more moderate than the terrorists, then the terrorist organization is forced to limit its offensive capacity to maintain and bolster public support, thus potentially compromising its effectiveness against the state (301).

His analysis of data in the cases of the IRA and the Basque ETA suggests that popular support for these organizations peaked when these organizations moderated their actions and showed willingness to compromise and fell during periods of extreme violence. For example, the IRA denied responsibility for the two Birmingham pub bombings of 1974, which killed 19 and injured 182, or the 1987 Enniskillen bombing that killed 11 Protestant civilians; the PIRA’s first chief of staff even stated that, “no resistance movement in history has ever succeeded in fighting
a struggle for national freedom without some accidental casualties, but the Republican interest in retaining popular support clearly lay in causing as few as possible” (Sànchez-Cuenca, 2007: 300). Along these lines, Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, saw its electoral support grow during periods where violence was lower and in which it engaged in the peace process (302). Likewise, the groups in Wales never intended to hurt anyone, both for moral and pragmatic reasons, and drew what little support that they had by targeting infrastructure, holiday homes and other physical manifestations of the English absorption of Wales.

4.3.2.5 Counterterrorist organizational failure

Ross: “the greater the number of antiterrorist organizational failures, the higher the amount of terrorism”; “the greater the number of counterterrorist organization failures, the higher the probability that some of these organizations will facilitate the availability of weapons and explosives to terrorist groups”; “the more the amount of antiterrorist organization failures, the greater the amount of support for terrorist organizations” (Ross, 1993: 324-25).

Counterterrorist organization refers to all actors engaged in detecting, preventing, combating and controlling terrorism: the police, military, intelligence services, prisons, private security services and the government itself (Ross, 1993: 324). Failure by counterterrorist organizations to “develop an organization to monitor terrorist events and groups”, “obtain sufficient resources”, “deter terrorists by not increasing the risks for terrorists and people who might join or support them”, “maintain the semblance of democracy by increasing authoritarianism”, “detect terrorists”, “pre-empt terrorists by making it impossible for them to act” and “make organizational changes” all contribute to undermining attempts to control terrorism (324). Such failures can enable terrorist groups to obtain weapons and explosives, increase oppositional grievances and encourage popular support of terrorist organizations (325).

The fourth point, failure to “maintain the semblance of democracy by increasing authoritarianism”, is especially pertinent in Northern Ireland's case. Punch chronicles the British security community's role in outraging the nationalist community and provoking resistance. Such actions that contributed to worsening the situation included: the British Army's proclaiming of a non-statutory curfew in the Falls area of Belfast in 1970; the introduction of internment without trial, which mainly targeted republicans and many who had no active involvement with the IRA, and which not only had little success in weakening the IRA but actually “led to a flood of
recruits, money and weapons”; the Bloody Sunday incident; and Operation Motorman, when 30,000 troops entered the no-go areas of Derry and Belfast in 1972, conducting mass house searches and arresting 337 people (2012: 66). The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922 provided sweeping powers to the Northern Irish government, allowing for arrests without warrant, internment without trial and unlimited search powers (74). He also addresses accusations of deviation within the security community, including the possibility of “shoot to kill” policies, arguing that while the evidence of a deliberate [his emphasis] conspiracy to kill suspected insurgents is questionable, it seems likely that the security community as an institution, due to a lack of checks and balances and the difficult circumstances of the Troubles, irreversibly fell onto a “slippery slope” in which practices antithetical to the beliefs of democratic societies became rationalized for “national security” reasons. (84-86).

A prime early example of the British army alienating the Catholic population during the Troubles was the Falls Road Curfew of July 3-5, 1970, when troops entered the area with armoured personnel carriers to recover paramilitary weapons following riots in June. After removing an arms cache, the soldiers were confronted by angry Catholic crowds, some of whom threw stones. Not only did the troops quickly resort to excessive use of CS gas to control the crowds and engage in gun battles with both Provisional and Official IRA members, they also imposed a curfew zone of around fifty streets for thirty-four hours. House-to-house searches for weapons resulted in a multitude of accusations of misbehaviour by troops, with acts such as smashing windows, tearing up floorboards, destroying furniture, threatening and assaulting residents and looting of houses and shops. Several people were killed or injured during these days, some simply shot for being outside of their homes during the curfew. Contemporary observers noted that the situation in Northern Ireland had become more dangerous as a result of the curfew, as the Army had initially been welcomed by the Catholic community as a peacekeeping force but had now alienated it (Hennessey, 2007: 38-45).

Even more provocative to an already-enraged Catholic community was the imposition of internment without trial in 1971 during Operation Demetrius. The impetus for using such a tactic came largely from Faulkner's unionist government, while the British originally suggested interning loyalist militants, calling in weapons held by rifle clubs and banning parades in order to avoid the appearance of specifically targeting Catholics and republicans. Irish Taoiseach Jack
Lynch warned that “if you round up 1,000 people and intern 20 because they are bad, you immediately make bad people of the other 980” (Hennessey, 2007: 123). Regardless, Faulkner had his way, with the main justifications being that internment would demonstrate his determination to suppress violence, that removing known dangerous individuals might lessen tensions and that internment would allow for substantial collection of information to aid in combating the IRA (127). Dawn raids on August 9th led to the arrests of hundreds and almost immediately sparked violence in Belfast – including arson, riots, shootings and bombings – that lasted for weeks. The SDLP launched a campaign of civil disobedience on the 16th to antagonize for an end to internment and to “demonstrate clearly that a large section of this community has withdrawn its consent from the system of government” (146). While the SDLP provided a non-violent alternative to nationalists opposed to the IRA, the quote above illustrates how the Stormont government had all but destroyed what little legitimacy it had among the Catholic community through its heavy-handed and discriminatory responses to the ongoing crisis, and suggests that the IRA provided the only tangible protection to this community in the wake of the army’s actions and the failures of the Protestant-dominated police force.

Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes argue that the British Army's decades of experience in policing remote colonies and combating localized insurgencies heavily influenced its approach to Northern Ireland, and as a result, its tactics aided the emergence of the Provisional IRA. Tactics perfected in Kenya, Palestine, Borneo, Cyprus and Aden were inappropriate to a Western, urbanized liberal democracy, as dealing with poorly-armed insurgents in the countryside did not prepare the Army for urban policing and crowd control (1997: 3). Yet the authors note that the Army generally coordinated its counter-insurgency campaigns with civilian authorities and came, by the 1950s, to recognize that military means were insufficient to coping with modern insurgencies and that a “minimum force” strategy aimed at “winning hearts and minds” was necessary (4). Such a coordinated political-military strategy was difficult in Northern Ireland due to the issue of whether Westminster or Stormont would retain control of the army: the former doing so could undermine the legitimacy of the latter's sovereignty, but Stormont was also seen as illegitimate by much of the Catholic community, especially given the failures of the Protestant-dominated police force (9-10). Due to this last factor, the Army was given responsibility for riot control until policing could be reformed and tensions cooled. Although the
Army enjoyed a “honeymoon period” in which the Catholic community welcomed it as a neutral peacekeeper, the British military presence on Irish soil gave the newly-emergent Provisional IRA a ready symbol of British dominance which could be used to garner support for the organization. The emergence of PIRA put an end to the ongoing “normalization” processes, as the Army was the only force capable of combating it and thus would need to adapt to the situation. Yet, as the authors note, “here was the crunch, the methods needed to defeat the IRA were bound to alienate the Catholic community which had initially welcomed the Army” (11-12). Falls Road, internment and Bloody Sunday all reflect the accuracy of this statement.

In contrast to the plentiful examples of counterterrorist organizational failure in Northern Ireland, relatively little controversy surrounded the reaction of the police forces in Wales to the actions of MAC, the FWA or Meibion Glyndŵr. Owen Williams and his accomplice John Albert Jones were arrested without incident a week following the Tryweryn bombing, with evidence including a manifesto, maps, notes on the movements of police cars, and a diagram of an explosive device being seized (Humphries, 2008: 37-38). The judge displayed some sympathy for the grievances of Williams during the ensuing court case, but Williams was sentenced to twelve months in prison following media outrage at hints of leniency (40-42). Likewise, the bombing campaign of the late 1960s leading up to the investiture of the Prince of Wales resulted in the arrests and sentencing of John Jenkins and an accomplice as well as arrests of three FWA members. Although police were able to trace many explosions back to Jenkins, several cases have remained unsolved, including the explosion at Clywedog Dam in 1966 and the sabotage attempts at the tax office and the Welsh Office in Cardiff. Partly, this was due to Jenkins’ organizing of MAC into self-contained cells which had no clue as to the identity of any other (142-43). Nevertheless, and perhaps in part due to MAC’s cell-based organization and Jenkins’ leadership role, the arrests and convictions effectively spilled the end of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru and its bombing campaign. When it came to the arson campaign of Meibion Glyndŵr, however, the police response was a bit more problematic: in response to the discovery of explosive devices at the Conservative Party’s headquarters in Cardiff in 1980, police arrested forty people in a series of dawn raids two days later, and, despite a letter purportedly from the arsonists disclaiming responsibility for the attack, police engaged in Operation Fire, a roundup of dozens of known nationalists across northern Wales. One detective chief inspector of the time...
states that there was no evidence against any person questioned, that intelligence was badly flawed, and that there was no cooperation by the public in regard to the burning of holiday homes, as most people, even if they did not support the campaign, were sympathetic to the arsonists as they believed their own Welsh communities to be dying. Not only was no evidence unearthed about the arsonists, the harsh treatment and questioning of detainees and indiscriminate searches and seizures of property, combined with police failure to make the proper applications for arrest warrants in many cases, led to widespread condemnation from civil liberties groups, political parties, trade unionists and academics (165-69).

Nevertheless, when compared to the actions of the British security community during the Troubles, the apparent transgressions of police forces in Wales seem relatively mild. Events such as the Lower Falls curfew and Operation Demetrius alienated the Catholic community to such an extent that it made the IRA seem the only viable force for protection and thus likely created an influx of recruits and supporters. In contrast, Wales were never close to being the powder-keg that Northern Ireland was, and police actions did not appear to give rise to any further violence or spur recruitment into organizations that never had more than a few dozen members.

4.3.2.6 Availability of weapons and explosives

Ross: “the higher the availability of weapons and explosives in a country, the greater the amount of terrorism”; “the higher the availability of weapons and explosives, the greater the likelihood of counterterrorist organization failure” (Ross, 1993: 325).

Weapons, explosives and other materials can be obtained through purchases, gifts, theft or construction. In some cases, terrorists can purchase weapons legally in their own country, while they can also take advantage of countries with liberal gun laws such as the United States to procure an overseas support. If lacking money obtained from criminal activities to purchase weapons, terrorists may rely on common sources of support for financing. Materials for the construction of bombs such as gasoline and dynamite are relatively easy to steal or secure, and much information about bomb construction is publicly available. As Ross notes, “availability of weapons and explosives most directly leads to support of such activities; no one wants to back a powerless organization” (1993: 325).

Oppenheimer dedicates an entire book to describing how the IRA managed to amass such an impressive arsenal – reportedly enough to arm two battalions as of the time of
decommissioning in 2001. Generally speaking, there were three main methods by which the PIRA built up its supply of weapons and explosives: by smuggling them into the country with the help of overseas sympathizers, especially in the United States, by procuring them through raids of British Army weapons stores and, lastly, by constructing them from available materials. Weapons from the United States included various assault rifles and machine guns mainly stolen from US army depots and smuggled through the “Harrison network”, which was busted in an FBI sting operation in 1981, putting an end to eighty percent of the IRA's supply of guns (2009: 153). Muammar Gaddafi supplied rifles, machine guns and, most importantly, Semtex from Libya in the early 1970s and late 1980s; the early support was part of Libya's strategy to support insurgencies against imperial powers in both Europe and in the Middle East and North Africa, while the later support came in a time of hostile relations between Libya and the US and the UK (163). During the 1950s border campaign, the IRA procured weapons through arms raids, although this prompted the British Army to tighten security, and there is no mention of arms raids being a significant source of supplies for the Provisional IRA. Perhaps most impressively, the PIRA built up a large inventory of what we would now call improvised explosive devices (IEDs), often made from household items or items from the construction industry; in 1972 alone, the organization carried out 1,300 bombings (8).

The Welsh saboteurs of the 1960s mainly relied on improvised explosives, which were simple enough to acquire. For example, Owain Williams and two accomplices were able to steal “enough detonators and fuse wires to start a war” from a quarry close to his parents' farm in 1962 (Humphries, 2008: 25), while one of the primary timing devices used by the saboteurs, a Venner switch, was commonly used in streetlights and provided by a sympathetic draughtsman (28, 71). While some firearms were in the possession of the FWA, who themselves never constituted a serious threat, simple explosive and incendiary devices were the weapon of choice of the saboteurs and later arsonists, and were readily accessible.

4.3.2.7 Grievances

Ross: “the greater the number of grievances, the higher the amount of terrorism”; “the higher the number of grievances, the greater the support of terrorism”; “the higher the amount of grievances, the higher the number of organizational splits and development” (Ross, 1993: 326).
Ross views grievances both actual and perceived as the most important variable. Economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious and social grievances as well as grievances such as police brutality can be directed at individuals, groups, subgroups, classes, races and ethnicities and spur the development of social movements, political parties and even individuals or organizations who engage in terrorist actions. Even in nonviolent organizations, “the intensification of grievances or lack of success in obtaining the group's objectives may lead to organizational splits, and the development of different organizational levels that engage in support of terrorism”. Lastly, he notes that the presence of other forms of unrest, social, cultural and historical facilitation and organizational split and development – three of the variables discussed above – “heighten the intensity of already felt grievances” (1993: 325-26).

White demonstrates the importance of this variable in the Troubles: both his quantitative analysis of the development of IRA violence and interviews with IRA supporters show that state repression, specifically, was instrumental in pushing nonviolent nationalists toward supporting the organization. Interestingly, at the macrolevel, he finds that higher levels of economic deprivation and increased unemployment were not related to increased violence, but violence did increase in months following incidents in which security forces shot civilians and especially after the introduction of internment (1989: 1288-89). Personal accounts from former members of Sinn Féin and the IRA clearly demonstrate this transition from nonviolent protest to support of violence as repression increased: one supporter states that his decision to turn to violence was not a simple, immediate one following the outbreak of the Troubles but a result of prolonged reflection upon several years' worth of sectarian violence and incidents such as Bloody Sunday and the deaths of Bobby Sands and Francis Hughes. The former incident pushed him to join Sinn Féin, and the latter pushed him to the IRA as a “natural progression”; state repression led him to question the moral legitimacy of the state and seek options to prevent the repression of his people. To quote White, “repression made him more open to 'belief amplification' regarding the efficacy of violence. His perceived options were limited, his awareness was raised, political violence became legitimate, and the cost of inactivity was great” (1290-93). White's interviews with other republicans reveal similar motivators, primarily community loyalty, state repression and non-economic injustices. Interestingly, he notes that supporters of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which provided a moderate, constitutional alternative to the republican
movement for nationalists, were generally older, university-educated and held middle-class occupations during this period. Thus, not only was the cost of participating in violence higher for them, they were also less likely to experience state repression – especially as the working class faced the brunt of daily harassment from British troops and tactics such as internment – and view violence as a necessary or effective course of action. This is evidenced in the way in which his republican interviewees viewed violence as a rational and necessary response to state repression while his SDLP interviewees viewed it as emotional and irrational (1295-97).

As discussed in the section above on social, cultural and historical facilitation, rural Wales experienced economic and cultural decline throughout the twentieth century, and tensions came to a head in the 1960s and 1970s with the flooding of Capel Celyn and the area near the Clywedog Reservoir to provide water to England and the influx of English newcomers who purchased holiday homes, pushing up property prices and undermining the “Welshness” of rural villages. Even the Western Mail, which Humphries describes as “an apologist for Wales's imperial masters”, joined countrywide opposition to the Tryweryn project, describing Liverpool Corporation's “attitude to Wales and its water resources as 'cavalier’” and arguing that locals had a “proper and natural claim to a say in the development of their own countryside” (2008: 13-14). Humphries highlights the economic disparities between England and Wales, noting that while much of England had seen considerable economic development in the past two centuries, much of Wales had remained underdeveloped or exploited for its resources – and the closure of many mining pits in the 1960s heightened this sense that Wales was little more than an imperial asset, its language, customs and socioeconomic structure of little interest to the metropolitan centre. In his view, Tryweryn was simply “the catalyst, exacerbated by the contempt and arrogance with which Welsh protest was usually treated” (15-16).

4.4 Conclusion

Ross’s model highlights the political, cultural, social and economic structure of societies as instrumental to understanding the causes of terrorism; this model has the merit of being easier to operationalize than psychological or rational choice models, as one can more confidently measure structural variables. By examining both permissive and precipitant causes in this chapter, it is clear that there was a far greater presence of structural variables conducive to the growth of terrorism in the case of Northern Ireland than in Wales. Northern Ireland was more
urbanized and modernized than Wales, although it was, on the surface at least, of the same political system type. The republican tradition, dating back to at least the eighteenth century, and the cultural memory of uprisings and civil war played into the social, cultural, and historical facilitation of violence in Northern Ireland, whereas little such facilitation existed in Wales. Organizational split within the IRA and Sinn Féin produced a more radicalized and violent nationalist threat to the British Army, while the “terrorist” groups in Wales were too small and lacking in support from elements within Plaid Cymru to experience comparable radicalization. Northern Ireland experienced a far greater degree of unrest before and during the Troubles than did Wales during the period in question, although there were certainly manifestations of dissent from groups such as Plaid Cymru and the Welsh Language Society; what was especially significant in Northern Ireland was the Catholic population’s disenchanted with the timidity of the IRA during the civil rights demonstrations and sectarian clashes of the 1960s and the effect that this disenchanted had on creating fierce debate and eventual organizational split within the IRA and Sinn Féin. Support for the IRA was far-reaching, even including arms shipments from the Irish-American community, while support in Wales for MAC and FWA was insignificant, although there was considerable sympathy in the countryside for the arson campaign, although nothing that appeared to make much of a material difference. Critically, the conduct of the security community in Northern Ireland contained so many egregious transgressions that it only increased the IRA’s supporters and recruit base, while there were few outstanding incidences of counterterrorist failure in Wales. Along these lines, the IRA was able to secure weapons and explosives from multiple sources, both domestic and overseas, while also constructing its own explosives. MAC relied on simpler explosives and sought mainly to sabotage, never to kill, so a steady supply of weapons and explosives was never as critical in the Welsh case. Finally, while both countries had developed their share of grievances due to their historical domination by England, the degree to which these grievances were felt was far stronger in Ireland, where Catholics experienced everyday discrimination from the Protestant-dominated state while also being well-aware that a free Irish republic existed just across the border. This, combined with the historical memory of civil wars and revolutions and flagrant misconduct by the British Army after the outset of the Troubles, ensured that grievances pushed many Catholics in the direction of supporting violence and ensured radicalization of both the
IRA and Sinn Féin. The grievances experienced in Wales, including the decline of the Welsh language and culture, the diverting of Welsh water resources and the English “invasion” of the countryside were not significant enough to push most Welsh people in the direction of supporting violence. Thus, when the model is considered as a whole, one can see that conditions in Northern Ireland were ripe for the growth of violence and far less so in Wales.
Chapter Five: Conclusion

The objective of this thesis was to evaluate whether or not the strong presence of a nationalist identity necessarily leads to the development of nationalist violence – and specifically terrorist violence by an aggrieved nationalist minority against either the majority group or the state itself. As discussed in the methodology chapter, historical events such as the world wars and the breakup of Yugoslavia have given nationalism a violent connotation, but closer examination of structural factors in a given case calls into question to what degree nationalism contributes to violence. It may, in fact, be the case that nationalism simply gives a marginalized or aggrieved group an identity around which to rally; whether or not the ideology is specifically nationalist may be beside the point. To address this question, I examined the cases of Northern Ireland and Wales in the second half of the twentieth century, where both countries had significant nationalist movements that emerged out of similar historical circumstances vis-à-vis England but which saw vastly different outcomes in terms of nationalist violence. The methodology of this thesis combined Anthony Smith's ethnosymbolist approach to studying nationalism and Jeffrey Ross' model of structural causes of terrorism; it incorporated development and strength of nationalist identity as a key variable with the rationale that precipitant factors such as availability of weapons or grievances are insufficient to explaining outbreaks of violence without considering the historical roots of the conflict. Thus, I consider strength of nationalist identity as an additional – and the most important – permissive cause alongside level of urbanization, political system type, and level of modernization, as any study of nationalist terrorism must consider the historical development of a national identity in order to understand its impact on precipitants such as social, cultural, and historical facilitation or grievances.

The historical overview chapter situated both Irish and Welsh national identities in their respective historical contexts, with Smith's approach of ethnosymbolism serving to analyze each nation as a “historical cultural community”. Thus, the chapter traced their roots to ancient but relatively sophisticated Celtic societies whose languages and traditions significantly influenced – or evolved into – those of the Irish and Welsh peoples who came into their own during the middle ages; these processes of ethnogenesis included boundary delineation of identity based on either the Irish Sea or Offa's Dyke, as well as cultivation of myths and traditions such as the brehon laws and heroes and founding figures such as Saint Patrick or King Arthur – whether
such historical figures existed or not ignores the more important lasting impact that their legends had on the historical memory of their respective nations. Further processes of territorialization took place during the middle ages as shared customs, laws, traditions and language helped both the Irish and Welsh identify themselves as distinct from the English, even in the midst of their own petty struggles between local chiefs; however, while the Anglo-Irish readily adopted Irish culture as their own in the pre-plantation era, pockets of relatively-urbanized Englishness survived throughout the centuries with stubborn resistance to Welsh influences, and the incorporation of Wales into the English legal system under the Tudors further weakened the Celtic underpinnings of Welsh society. Smith discusses how nationalism is a kind of “political archaeology” in which nationalist intellectuals rediscover and interpret the past to reshape the popular conception of the present community and thus give it a renewed sense of purpose and destiny. However, these elements of the national “character” cannot be simply created and imposed top-down; they must appeal to the masses through relevant folk memories, symbols, customs and traditions, even if they must be reshaped from localized sources to encompass a broader, heterogeneous population living within a “national” territory. Such processes were evident in Ireland, where nineteenth-century romantic nationalism highlighted Ireland's Catholic and Gaelic past and identified Protestantism and Englishness with the slavery and exploitation of the “true” Irish. Similarly, nineteenth century Wales “rediscovered” its bardic tradition and redefined its history as a case of Celtic druids and poets being overwhelmed by Anglo-Norman barbarians, while nineteenth-century nationalists such as Sinclair Lewis linked Anglicization and the decline of the Welsh language with Wales's slow fragmentation from its supposedly more united and homogenous medieval self.

As stated in the methodology chapter, my first hypothesis was that historical processes led to a weaker and more fragmented national identity in the Welsh case compared to the Irish case, which limited the attractiveness of militant nationalism for most Welsh. The historical overview chapter, however, demonstrated that Welsh history is every bit as rich with myths, legends, heroes, native literature and traditions as Irish history, and that both countries featured fragmentation between Celtic and Anglicized segments. Yet Ireland was more successful in assimilating newcomers and even Protestant, English-speaking descendants of plantation settlers adopted elements of the native culture and figured prominently among the nationalists of the
eighteenth century. However, the alien presence of elite Anglicans who came to own much of the country's land and dominate the government – as well as an agricultural economy based on exploitation – gave the Irish strongly-felt grievances. Similarly, Ireland's history of repeated armed rebellions set a historical precedent for nationalist violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Catholics in Northern Ireland during the 1960s could draw upon both this legacy and the grievances produced by contemporary, unionist-dominated society. Wales, on the other hand, was less successful in assimilating newcomers, especially as Tudor England was quick to incorporate Wales into the English legal system and give the local Welsh gentry a stake in the status quo; that is to say, while rural Wales remained as Celtic as ever throughout the centuries, this Celtic culture struggled to maintain its relevance in urban areas which were host to immigration from England and continental Europe and whose social, legal and linguistic aspects had more in common with those east of the Marches than in Caernarfon or Merioneth. Nineteenth-century Wales saw considerable industrialization in the south which drew both rural Welsh and English migrants to the already considerably-anglicized towns and cities of the region and which helped to reinforce the notion that speaking and acting “English” was the path to upward mobility and modernity while rural Wales remained stuck in the dark ages. Nationalist intellectuals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who themselves were ironically a product of urban Wales and England and the university world and did not speak the Welsh of the countryside, struggled to make their romanticized conception of an idyllic Wales resonate with the rural people. This, combined with the weaker historical precedent for armed rebellion, lessened the appeal of violence against the state in the name of Welsh freedom. Thus, this first hypothesis about the relative strength of Irish national identity and weakness of Welsh national identity is confirmed: a strong Irish identity, drawing upon Catholicism, the Celtic past and a history of armed rebellion, was able to successfully challenge the Anglocentric narrative of the dominant forces in Northern Ireland and allow greater facilitation of terrorism and political violence in pursuit of nationalist goals, while similar factors did not exist in Wales.

My second hypothesis was that both the permissive and precipitant factors in Ross' model of structural causes of terrorism had a stronger presence in the Northern Irish case, leading to a greater propensity among the Catholic population to support or use violence than was the case for the Welsh population in Wales. The previous chapter compared Northern Ireland and Wales
on each of these variables and found that there was in fact a greater presence of them in Northern Ireland. In terms of permissive causes, Northern Ireland was more urbanized and modernized while possessing a similar political system to that in Wales – and, as discussed above in my incorporation of an additional variable to the model, had a much stronger national identity. This last permissive cause had a strong influence on the first precipitant – social, cultural and historical facilitation. Ireland had a strong republican tradition dating back to the eighteenth century and centuries of rebellion against the English crown, providing a sense of legitimacy to the actions of the Provisional IRA and its supporters. Organizational split within the IRA and Sinn Féin radicalized nationalists, which was partly fed by the high degree of civil unrest in Northern Ireland during this time period. Support for the Provisional IRA existed both within and beyond Northern Ireland's borders, which helped it in its efforts to secure weapons and explosives. The misconduct of the security community, including the British Army only added to the long-standing grievances of Catholics in Northern Ireland. The presence of such precipitant causes in Wales was far weaker, thus suggesting that Ross' model is a useful one for linking structural variables to outcomes in terrorism.

My third hypothesis, which also relates to Ross' model, was that British repression in Northern Ireland acted as a significant precipitant variable and was one of the biggest initiators of violent resistance while lack of comparable repression in Wales gave less impetus to the use of terrorism. Given the overwhelming and aggressive response of both the Northern Irish state and the British Army to the Troubles, the relatively measured response of authorities to unrest in Wales likely succeeded in casting actors such as MAC and the FWA as fringe radicals who were better left ignored by mainstream Welsh society. The entry of the Army to the Irish scene and such actions as the Falls Road Curfew and internment without trial and incidents such as Bloody Sunday signified a slippery slope by which antidemocratic practices became rationalized in the name of national security. Moreover, there was another element which was not comparably present in Wales: a government nominally autonomous from Westminster but being completely dominated by English loyalists who gerrymandered local electoral districts in their favour and filled the ranks of the police forces while openly discriminating against those who did not belong to their social group. That is to say, well before the outbreak of the Troubles, there existed significant repression of Catholics as well as sectarian tensions, which threatened to eventually
produce violence. In contrast, while Wales prior to the 1960s and during the controversy surrounding Tryweryn and holiday homes was not without its socioeconomic disparities, there is little indication of direct and thorough repression of Welsh speakers; the natural pressures created by the growth of the English-speaking population was insufficient to cause much beyond agitation for protection of the Welsh language. The police were quick to arrest the main suspects in the Tryweryn bombing and the bombing campaign surrounding the investiture of the Prince of Wales, although their response to the arson campaign of Meibion Glyndŵr involved dawn raids and detainment of known nationalists and sparked outrage. Yet even such relatively aggressive police action in Wales failed to convince the Welsh populace that their safety and well-being could only be ensured by a revolutionary or republican organization, while in Northern Ireland a strong sense pervaded that only a force such as the IRA could protect the Catholic community in light of the actions of the unionist-dominated police force and the British Army.

My fourth and final hypothesis was that the IRA was more successful than any comparable Welsh movement in gaining the support or at least tolerance of broad swathes of society. In other words, it demonstrated its legitimacy as a vanguard of the nationalist movement and the broader “nation” that it claimed to represent, while the differences in composition and goals between Plaid Cymru or the broader Welsh population and organizations such as Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru made it difficult for the latter to be taken seriously. Earning popular legitimacy was the key to creating a base of recruits, weapons and equipment suppliers, safe houses, financiers and other forms of support. As discussed above and in the previous chapter, the IRA was successful in both drawing upon Ireland's long republican tradition and in casting itself as the only legitimate source of protection for the Catholic community in Northern Ireland in the face of repression from local police forces and the British Army. This translated to a constant inflow of recruits, especially following high-profile incidents of repression as well as a steady supply of weapons and money from overseas supporters. Movements such as MAC and the FWA did not have a similar tradition upon which to draw, nor could they claim to represent more than a handful of rural Welsh who were themselves highly sceptical of the need for armed insurrection. The key to the longevity of MAC and Meibion Glyndŵr lied in the ability of both groups to exist as a loose network of insular cells across rural areas wherever sympathizers might reside; in the case of MAC, the survival of this cell structure depended on the organizational
skills of its de facto John Jenkins, whose arrest and imprisonment effectively ended MAC as a potential threat. Crucially, MAC was unable to win the support of Plaid Cymru, the mainstream Welsh nationalist party, while the IRA and Sinn Féin, and, after the organizational split of 1970, the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin were firmly entrenched as military and political wings of the same broader nationalist movement, respectively.

Thus, my findings largely conform to my hypotheses. Taken together, these hypotheses suggest that the violence in Northern Ireland was a product of historical and structural factors which had a far weaker presence in Wales. This, of course, draws attention to my original question of whether there is an inherent relationship between nationalism and violence. The answer is somewhat complicated: while it is clear that the processes of national identity formation produced a stronger national identity in Northern Ireland than in Wales, it was the combination of structural factors – of which nationalism is but one – that ultimately led to sustained nationalist violence which had a relatively high level of support – both material and implicit – from the broader national population. The presence of a strongly-felt national identity is in itself insufficient – other, more immediate material conditions such as ongoing unrest, instances of government and police repression and general grievances serve as the actual ignitors of conflict. In this sense, the importance of national identity in a case of nationalist violence lies in its function as a facilitator of violence – the nation provides an identity around which an aggrieved group can rally. Yet is also more than that: the nation has a lineage far greater in historical scope than, say, the industrial working class, and as such is a powerful force for legitimizing violence against an outside threat and is difficult to divide and conquer compared to the example of a working class. As Smith's framework of ethnosymbolism shows us, whether or not the story and mythology of a given nation has one hundred percent basis in historical fact is beside the point; it is the various traditions, myths and memorialized historical events which shape meaning for a nation and give it a sense of purpose as well as a sense of what constitutes an outside threat to its existence. The potential implications of this thesis suggest that a more complete understanding of the nature of the nation will aid terrorism researchers in differentiating between specific types of terrorism.
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