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America's Alleged Intelligence Failure in the Prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Study of Analytic Factors

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America's Alleged Intelligence Failure in the Prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom:

A Study of Analytic Factors

by

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ABSTRACT

In the prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), notables in the G. W. Bush administration declared Iraq to be an existential threat as it had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and connections to transnational terrorist groups. After the 2003 invasion of that state, coalition forces engaged in a search effort that found no significant evidence of WMD. Investigatory committees subsequently judged Iraq had no WMD or terrorist group connections. This situation is broadly regarded as a failure by America's intelligence community (IC). The initial hypotheses driving the research for this dissertation focused on four sets of factors: (1) a lack of fresh and accurate data; (2) a series of analytical and intellectual pathologies in the intelligence analysis process; (3) a dependence on scientific, technology-driven methods of data collection and analysis; and (4) a serendipitous denial and deception (D & D) campaign mounted by Iraq's government. However, the research undertaken did not support this initial line of argument. Instead, it suggested that the working-level members of the IC in the broad sense, correctly analyzed the Iraqi situation. The intelligence failure thus arose from other factors. These initial results pointed to factors in organizational and bureaucratic politics especially at the upper levels of the IC, in its relationship to senior levels of the G. W. Bush administration, and to channels for the assessment and movement of information that bypassed the established intelligence apparatus. Drawing on a detailed examination of the analyses and handling of claims regarding Iraqi WMD and its connections with terrorist groups, combined with considerations drawn from organizational and bureaucratic theories, the dissertation concludes (a) that there was no intelligence failure at the non-executive levels of the IC, but (b) there were distortions or suppressions of situationally-correct intelligence analytic products at the executive levels of the IC to support the policy preferences of certain G. W. Bush administration elites. In contrast to

this, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department not only was outstandingly accurate in its assessments of the Iraqi situation but also, bolstered by its executive team, was able to resist downward-facing pressures to generate policy-palatable analytic products.



Dissertation Approval Form

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction, Thesis Question, and Research Hypothesis

After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the attitudes of America's elites and ordinary citizens were significantly, if not irreversibly altered. Americans no longer felt secure within the bastion of their insular continent. Often citing the Pearl Harbor disaster as a paradigm, America's elites focused on preventative war in order to preclude repeat performances of the 9/11 disasters. Notables in the G. W. Bush administration publicly stated Iraq was in violation of United Nations (U. N.) resolutions that prohibited its possession, use, and production of WMD. The IC produced President's Daily Briefings (PDB) and National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) in late 2002 that apparently aligned with this posture. Shortly after the initial assault phase of OIF, the G. W. Bush administration ordered a comprehensive search for Iraqi WMD. This task was the responsibility of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). Under the signature of Charles Duelfer, in 2005 the ISG produced a report that found no substantial evidence of functional Iraqi WMD.¹ Bearing these facts in mind, it takes no great effort of judgement to infer that the IC ostensibly produced defective intelligence products in the prelude to OIF.

With this widely shared conclusion in mind, this dissertation shall answer the following question: **What caused the IC's alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF?** The dissertation shall examine the following theoretical constructs: (1) intelligence analysis; (2) bureaucracy; (3) careerism; and (4) organizational dynamics. The main thrust of this research

will be to ascertain if any of these constructs or other issues may have contributed to the production of defective intelligence products pertaining to Iraq's WMD and its connections to transnational terrorist groups.

The research hypothesis for this dissertation initially postulated that America's alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF resulted from a confluence of the following factors: (1) a dearth of temporally fresh and accurate data with respect to Iraq's WMD program and Saddam Hussein's connection to transnational terrorist organizations; (2) perceptual and analytic pathologies within the IC; (3) an opportunistic denial and deception (D & D) campaign generated by Saddam Hussein's intelligence infrastructure, the foundational concepts of which senior Iraqi specialists absorbed while receiving training in the former U.S.S.R.; and (4) America's dependence on scientific, technology-driven methods of data collection along with a denigration of intuitive, contextual, and acumen-based intelligence analytic methods. However, after extensive interviews with retired and serving professionals in the IC, it became apparent that these theoretical constructs had in fact no correlation to the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. These interviews pointed to instances of careerism, internecine bureaucratic strife, and other pathologies subsumed in the overall theory of organizational dynamics that could have led to the intelligence failure.

Previous Studies Related to the Thesis Question

Various commentators have spoken to the erroneous assessment of Iraqi WMD and Saddam Hussein's connection to transnational terrorist groups in the prelude to OIF. Most of these efforts have been investigative reporting endeavors that have answered the questions of *who*, *what*, and *where* but are deficient in answering the critical queries of *why* and *how*. Some of these works appear in the section of this dissertation, *Perceptions of Iraq's Connections to*

Transnational Terrorism and WMD. Additionally, Thomas Fingar, Lloyd C. Gardner, Roger Z. George with James B. Bruce, Richards Heuer, Robert Jervis, Rob and Judith M. Johnston, Paul R. Pillar, and Gregory Treverton have generally commented on erroneous analytic products based upon intelligence failure theory, and perceptual / cognitive bias theory. Moreover, Amy B. Zegart asserted most American intelligence failures resulted from the systemic structural faults mentioned in her commentary on the interagency problematique. In another perspective that deals with intelligence failure, David Brooks, Jeffry R. Cooper, Kenneth R. Hammond, and Milo Jones with Philippe Silberzahn asserted that America's IC suffered failures caused by scientism.²

Organization of the Research

The fundamental argument of this dissertation is as follows: the prelude to OIF saw the entry into the American government, especially under the G. W. Bush administration, of a suite of neoconservative actors with strong intellectual, social, and political ties not only to each other, but also to the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and its leader, Ahmad Chalabi. This group of actors held dominant political positions within the G. W. Bush administration, and had broadly shared mindsets not only regarding Iraq but also concerning the IC. Those mindsets and that position of dominance strongly affected how information regarding Iraq's WMD arsenal and its connections to transnational terror groups entered, and in some cases, bypassed the IC. Additionally, these factors affected how that information was handled, and how it was assessed especially at the upper management and executive levels of the IC. Major causal factors contributing to the alleged intelligence failure, generally were not found in the working levels of the IC, but rather in bureaucratic and organizational politics and the interplay of other elements originating in the management practices of the IC and in its political relationship with senior figures in the G. W. Bush Administration.

The research effort supporting this study is organized along the following lines of inquiry: (1) a condensed contextual discussion of the organizations, persons, and events contributing to the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF; (2) a workup of theoretical constructs subsumed in the overall theme of organizational dynamics such as intelligence analytic politicization, bureaucracy, careerism, a typology of bureaucrats and their practices, organizational citizenship behavior, social exchange theory, and leader-member exchange theory; (3) a comparison and analysis of the contextual discussions and theoretical constructs; (4) an analysis of the alignment between the aforementioned contextual discussion and theoretical constructs; (5) conclusions drawn from the comparisons and analyses; and (6) recommendations for further research. The upcoming paragraphs shall discuss the details of the research organization.

In order to provide the reader a concise intellectual foundation from which to compare upcoming sections of this work, *Chapter II, Contextual Considerations* of this study shall deal with the events and relationships pertinent to the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. This chapter shall present the following: (1) the foundations of the neoconservative *weltanschauung* and its intellectual founders; (2) the concepts put forward by second-generation neoconservative intellectuals; (3) a brief history of the neoconservative agenda; (4) the relationship between the President, the Vice President, and the IC; (5) the relationship between the IC management cadre and its employees; (6) perceptions of Iraq's connections to transnational terrorism and WMD; (7) Colin Powell's dissenting perspective; (8) the ambiguous intelligence environment after ODS; (9) the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's relationship with Ahmad Chalabi and the INC; and (10) the imbroglio of the October 2002 NIE. Following the elucidation of these events, constructs and relationships, this chapter shall discuss

the context of the IC, the origins of the CIA and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the INR's accurate analytic products, and information technology problems in the prelude to OIF.

Chapter III, Dubious Data Enters the Intelligence Community shall deal with faulty data feeds that entered at various points into the IC. Among these feeds are the following: Sabah Khalifa Khodada al-Lami's statements; Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri's assertions; Khidhir Hamza's story; the Niger yellowcake affair; and the aluminum tubes imbroglio. This chapter shall show a connection between these data feeds and the machinations of Ahmad Chalabi, the INC, and that organization's pseudo-intelligence production group. Additionally, this chapter shall show the entry points of this pseudo-intelligence into the IC; both in its formal institutions and the *ad-hoc* entities inaugurated by President G. W. Bush's group of neoconservative elites and their immediate supporters. Moreover, this chapter shall discuss how these pseudo-intelligence packages affected Secretary of State Colin Powell's now infamous address before the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, this section shall examine the interactions of these pseudo-intelligence packages with some of the organizations in the IC.

Chapter IV, Theoretical Considerations, shall assess the constructs that serve as yardsticks from which to compare the contextual elements outlined in the previous chapter. Among these theoretical constructs are the following: intelligence analysis and intelligence failure; the praxis and theory of intelligence; the objective of intelligence; how intelligence analyses are produced; the intelligence cycle; intelligence politicization; the difficulties and remedies of intelligence analysis; bureaucracy, bureaucrats, and careerism; a typology of bureaucrats; careerism and governmental employment factors; whistleblowing; political factors

in the workplace; organizational citizenship behavior (OCB); leader-member exchange (LMX); organizational politics; and pro-social behaviors and the relativism of ethics.

Chapter V, Discussion and Conclusions shall compare, contrast, and analyze the data from *Chapter II, Contextual Considerations*, *Chapter III, Dubious Data Enters the Intelligence Community*, and *Chapter IV, Theoretical Considerations* with a view of answering the critical questions of *how* and *why* the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF occurred. This chapter shall also outline gaps in current data sets pertaining to the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF, along with opportunities for elucidating missing data, generating further analyses, and providing better answers in the future to the critical questions surrounding the alleged intelligence failure.

Contribution

This dissertation exploits previously untapped sources such as interviews with members of the IC, notable members of the Iraqi WMD development community, practitioners from other intelligence agencies, or those lightly used by other commentators. Further, a study that qualitatively analyzes the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF based on the comparison of contextual evidence with theories of intelligence analytic politicization, bureaucracy, careerism, OCB, and LMX is missing from academic and analytic tradecraft literature suites. This study fills that gap.

Research Method and Sources

This study is based on information gleaned from declassified IC publications, academic commentaries, media sources, and primary government documents. Additionally, it drew on data gathered from interviews and survey questions acquired *via* professional contacts and personal

referrals from intelligence trade and fraternal organizations. This research also used little-known information suites such as Congressional Research Service³ documents and obscure, declassified military and government sources. During the course of this project, former and serving practitioners from all branches of the IC agreed to answer questions of a non-classified nature pertinent to the data gathering and analytic functions performed in the prelude to OIF with a focus on potential factors that may have contributed to the alleged intelligence failure. All sources used in this study reside in the domain of open-source intelligence (OSI).

Overview of Interviews and Surveys

From December 2014 to December 2016, the investigator interviewed two hundred thirty-seven anonymous respondents for this research project. Sixteen anonymous respondents were disqualified because of answers that suggested political and / or personal vendettas. Additionally, the investigator interviewed twenty-six publicly identifiable respondents, none of whom were disqualified because of the above-mentioned criteria. None of the respondents participating in this study were given a detailed preview of the questions before the interviews occurred. All public respondents communicated their answers to the investigator via voice over internet protocol (VOIP) telephone calls and / or e-mail, with two also agreeing to personal interviews. Five public respondents answered questions posed by the researcher in public forums. All anonymous respondents communicated their responses to the investigator via encrypted VOIP telephone calls, while seven also communicated via encrypted e-mail. All anonymous respondents participated in the investigator's survey *via* encrypted email. In addition to encrypted VOIP telephone calls, six anonymous respondents granted the investigator a personal interview. Because of the highly compartmented and secretive nature of the IC, many respondents were incapable of supplying answers to some questions. As explained in the

Bureaucracy section of this work, no official knows everything about all occurrences in any large bureaucracy. This situation is not a cause for the disqualification of a respondent; however, responses were only included in this dissertation if they presented substantive and triangulated answers to the questions posed by the investigator. All qualified anonymous respondents made commentaries about workplace and cultural issues in their respective agencies. No respondents requested to be removed from this study. The investigator has never had any financial or supervisory relationship with any of the respondents in this study.

Respondent Identification, Approach, Recruitment, and Consent

The investigator identified potential respondents by multiple methods. The first method consisted of identification by way of harvesting names from: (1) academia, (2) the media, (3) professional and trade associations, (4) government, and (5) other organizations. This method provided a primary list of twenty potential respondents, who upon initial contact and agreement to proceed with the interview process, generated secondary contacts that the researcher could recruit to participate in the study. The researcher then asked these secondary contacts for further potential respondents' contact information. This method was one of the facets in the 'snowball effect.' The other facet in the 'snowball effect' resulted from previously recruited respondents on their own initiative requesting their colleagues in the IC to contact the researcher for starting an interview dialogue. The outcome generated by the overall 'snowball effect' was an additional six public and two hundred thirty seven anonymous respondents. In order to help with source verification, the investigator asked the 'walk-in' respondents for the name of the person who referred them. Upon receiving this information, the investigator asked for a one-week hiatus in order to send a signed Combined Research Ethics Board (CREB) informed consent document for their perusal. In that period, the investigator additionally confirmed that the 'walk-in' respondent

was actually referred by a previous participant in the research study. If the person named by the ‘walk-in’ respondent did not confirm this information, the investigator was prepared to terminate communications with the ‘walk-in’ respondent. However, all ‘walk-in’ respondents were verified by their respective referrers. Notably, members of the IC and government contacted the researcher even after the formal closure of the data collection phase of this research project. In alignment with CREB guidelines, the data sets offered by these persons were not included in this study.

Upon initial contact with potential respondents, the investigator sent a recruiting letter to these individuals. In the following week after sending the recruiting letters, the investigator made contact with potential respondents and sent copies of the CREB informed consent documents for their perusal. Respondents willing to be publicly identified in the study signed the appropriate informed consent document and returned it to the researcher by way of email, fax, or postal delivery. Respondents willing to participate but requiring anonymity received a copy of the appropriate CREB informed consent document with the researcher’s signature and date affixed to that document. Communications with public respondents occurred via face-to-face interviews, e-mail, and VoIP telephony. Communications with anonymous respondents occurred *via* face-to-face interviews, encrypted e-mail, and encrypted VoIP telephony. Under no circumstances did the researcher communicate with anonymous respondents *via* non-secure methods.

Most of the interviewees worked in the line employee echelons of the IC, providing an upward-facing intelligence practitioner’s perspective in the prelude to OIF. This formed the majority of the data collected in this research project. Most IC executives’ commentaries arose from publicly accessible sources, while some notable executives such as Tyler Drumheller, Thomas Fingar, W. Patrick Lang, Mark Lowenthal, William D. Murray, and Greg Thielmann

directly contributed to this research program. Some other IC executives agreed to participate in this study on the condition that their names and organizational data remained confidential. The commentaries of Drumheller, Fingar, Lowenthal, Lang, Murray, Thielmann, and the anonymized executives provided perspectives with a high degree of confirmatory triangulation to those provided by the IC's line employees participating in this project.

The investigator based all consultations on reflexive interviewing techniques. The reflexive interviewer utilizes these methods to elucidate interviewees' subjective perceptions and narratives of the events in which they participated or had specific knowledge. Practitioners of this technique query their interviewees about the same subject at different times in an interview and over the course of multiple interviews using dissimilar phraseology so as not to irritate that individual's intellectual sensibilities. It may require multiple interviews for the practitioner to arrive at an answer that he or she believes to be a true representation of the scenarios under examination. Reflexive interviewing allows a patient investigator to ascertain within different organizational subunits and across bureaucratic boundaries the perspectives of multiple interviewees with respect to the scenarios under investigation. The investigator used this approach in the gleaning of information from all respondents, both anonymous and public.⁴

During the course of this research project, one hundred eighty-seven out of two-hundred-twenty one anonymous respondents provided three or more interviews, while the remainder provided two. All publicly identifiable respondents in this research project provided three or more consultations. Interviews consisted of an initial consultation in which the investigator discussed the purposes of the research project with the respondent. During this initial interview, the investigator gave the interviewees instructions on how to verify his identity and candidate status at the institution supporting this doctoral dissertation. Additionally, the investigator

restated the fact that he and his dissertation committee possessed no security clearance, and therefore were not entitled to read, hold, or otherwise interact with classified materials. After an approximate one week hiatus, the investigator resumed contact with the respondent in order to make initial queries about the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF based upon the respondent's general feelings and impressions about the IC, his or her agency, and its relationship with the top officials in the executive branch of the G. W. Bush administration.

In alignment with reflexive interviewing principles, the investigator did not use tightly scripted questioning routines. The dialogue presented by the interviewee provided direction for the phraseology used by the investigator; if the interviewee appeared to be uncomfortable or hesitant about discussing a certain line of inquiry the investigator maintained the use of indirect phraseology. If the interviewee's dialogue gave the impression that he or she was confident and ready to talk about specifics, then the investigator's phraseology and approach followed those cues. The investigator used the interviewee's dialogue and demeanor as an ongoing feedback mechanism to modify dynamically his lines of inquiry. Interviews typically lasted for fifteen to forty-five minutes. During the interview, the investigator took shorthand notes to chronicle the interviewee's responses to the research queries. Near the end of this interview, the investigator asked the interviewee for the names of any other members of the IC whom they felt would agree to participate in this research project. Many interviewees provided these names and contact details. Some interviewees mentioned that they would need to think about other individuals who might choose to participate in the research project. The investigator then asked all of the interviewees if they would be comfortable with follow-up interviews. All interviewees indicated that follow-up consultations would be acceptable. At the close of this interview, the investigator thanked the interviewee for his or her input into this research project.

During follow-up interviews, the investigator asked all of the respondents if they believed there was a generalized intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. If the respondents assessed that there was a failure, the interviewer asked the respondents to give an overall assessment of the potential causes and loci of that failure. Approximately eighty-seven percent of the anonymous respondents assessed the professional intelligence environment in the prelude to OIF exhibited a high degree of analytic accuracy and reliability with respect to Iraq's WMD arsenal and its involvement with transnational terror groups. Approximately thirteen percent of the anonymous interviewees declined comment on this line of inquiry. Notably, all of the IC's named respondents in this study agreed with the above assertion about analytic accuracy and reliability.⁵ The above-mentioned group of anonymous respondents also mentioned that the failure in the prelude to OIF did not occur in the data collection, information production, and intelligence analysis generation functions of the IC; instead, it occurred at the top executive levels of the IC and that of elected officials and their immediate political subordinates in the G. W. Bush administration. These anonymous respondents also suggested that workplace pathologies might have been a significant contributing factor in the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF, again asserting that the loci of that failure resided in the areas of the elected executive politicians and political appointees. No respondents mentioned analytic deficiencies in the prelude to OIF. In fact, all IC respondents mentioned that the working-level analysts in their organization rigorously followed either or both Sherman Kent's Socratic analytic methodology or Richards J. Heuer and Randolph Pherson's structured analytic frameworks in the prelude to OIF. The commentaries of the public respondents triangulated with those of their anonymized associates in the low ninetieth percentile, with the approximate ten percent shortfall being caused by some public respondents' disinclination to comment on these elements.⁶

Subsequent interviews occurred with respondents with a view to posing questions that were more specific; these interviews dealt with the details of where the interviewee thought the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF occurred. Some individuals indicated that they were not privy to that information in a specific sense; most of this group suggested that they were incapable of offering further information pertinent to these lines of inquiry. Some individuals in this group gave pointers to others who would have access to this sort of information; they also noted, why in an organizational sense, the individuals to whom they referred would have access to that information. This next group of individuals served as interview recruiting objectives for further inquiry. In *all cases*, interviewees' commentaries were subjected to scrutiny *via* triangulation methods against data sets provided by academic analysts, other members of the IC, and officials who made comments in the media and contributed to publicly accessible documents.

In addition to the extemporaneous interviews that formed the backbone of this research work, during 2016 the investigator asked via encrypted e-mail all two hundred twenty-one qualified, anonymized respondents to complete a small suite of survey questions pertaining to the state of intelligence analysis in the U. S. bearing certain milestones in mind: (1) the Iran-Iraq war; (2) Operation Desert Storm; (3) the 1998 Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA) technology initiative; (4) the 9/11 attacks; and (5) any other milestone they assessed to be of significance to American analytic tradecraft. The participants were Anon001 to Anon 220, and Anon234. Respondents Anon221 to Anon233 and Anon235 to Anon237 did not participate in the survey as the researcher had previously disqualified them due to the suspicion of agendas causing tainted answers. Please see *Information Verification and Crosschecking Processes* for a short description of the respondent disqualification process. The investigator than asked the

qualified respondents to score their analytic methods relative to these milestones using integers on a scale from one to ten, with one representing analysis based upon intuition, acumen, and nuance; five representing a balance between intuition and scientific analysis; and ten representing analysis based upon 'hard data' and scientific examination. This spectrum of answers was based on the theoretical underpinnings of Kenneth R. Hammond's cognitive continuum.⁷ The two hundred twenty-one qualified, anonymized respondents offered the following numerically averaged answers to the survey questions: (1) the Iran-Iraq war gave a numerical result of 3.8; (2) Operation Desert Storm gave a numerical result of 4.1; (3) the 1998 ARDA technology initiative gave a numerical result of 4.8; and (5) the 9/11 attacks gave a numerical result of 5.1. Category (5) gave a numerical result of 4.9. These numerical results showed a gradual ramp-up from analytical methods based on intuition, acumen, and nuance to those based on hard scientific and numerical methods. However, these results did not show any clearly defined tipping point that indicated hard scientific techniques dominating the analytic methods of the IC in the prelude to OIF. Based on these results, the investigator rejected the initial hypothesis that the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF was caused by scientism.

Dealing with Respondents and their Data

As many of the respondents in this research project are former or serving officials in the IC, the investigator took rigorous steps to ensure the confidentiality of these persons. The author chronicled the anonymized verbal responses to research queries *via* hand written notes. No audio or video recordings were collected during the course of this project. The dissertation used extemporaneous commentaries from anonymized respondents only in paraphrased form. The investigator scrubbed *all responses* of sensitive organizational data, personnel names, dates, and operational details in order to protect the confidentiality of anonymous respondents used in this

dissertation. In making reports of anonymous respondents' answers, the investigator only used raw numbers to indicate tallies and / or percentages from various agencies in the IC. Anonymous respondents' pseudonyms were not recorded with an agency affiliation or position in his or her agency. Therefore, even in the raw data there is no correlation between anonymous respondents' pseudonyms and their agency connections. Voice and data communications with anonymous respondents were executed over channels that employed state of the art, military-grade encryption techniques.

Public respondents were advised that their names and organizational details would appear in this dissertation and other publications available for unrestricted perusal. Hand written notes of all participants' responses were transcribed into flat-text files on a private, encrypted computer system residing in a secure, undisclosed location. After the computer transcription, the investigator destroyed all hand written notes. Raw data sets associated with confidential respondents were destroyed at the conclusion of this research project. Prior to the solicitation of respondents' commentaries, all participants were advised that the investigator, his supervisor, supervisory committee, and dissertation review committee members hold no security clearance and therefore are not legally entitled to hold, view, read, disseminate, or otherwise interact with classified materials. The researcher neither solicited nor collected classified materials during the course of the investigation supporting this dissertation.

Information Verification and Crosschecking Processes

Interviewees' responses possibly could be subject to hidden agendas or other pretexts such as self-aggrandizement, organizational or personal image protection, or *ad-hominem* attacks on professional or political rivals. Preliminary screening questions were posed to all respondents to ascertain if these hidden agendas existed and when found to do so; the researcher removed

these respondents' narratives from this study. These screening questions were indirect queries about job satisfaction, career progression, and other scenarios that may indicate tainted answers to research questions. Anon221 to Anon233 and Anon235 to Anon237 were removed from this study based on the above-mentioned criteria. Moreover, interviewees' responses may well have indicated that the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF occurred due to reasons other than those itemized in the initial research hypotheses. If this was the case, the investigator was prepared to examine other theoretical constructs that would align with a revised assessment of the interviewees' responses.

All respondents' data streams were subjected to intensive crosschecking *via* triangulation techniques. Four types of triangulation methods became dominant in the social sciences: (1) data triangulation which involved the use of multiple data sources within an individual study; (2) investigator triangulation which is the use of multiple investigators to study a particular issue in question; (3) theoretical / hypothetical triangulation which involved the use of multiple theories / hypotheses to guide the analyses of a particular study, and (4) methodological triangulation which is the use of multiple methods to conduct a research investigation.⁸ The researcher employed data, theoretical / hypothetical, and methodological triangulation methods in order to enhance the reliability, validity, and robustness of the data supporting the conclusions generated in this study. These triangulation methods were applied in an intra-organizational and where possible, inter-organizational fashion. Information sets acquired from respondents who were previously acquainted with the investigator were subjected to the same triangulation methods as the information supplied by others heretofore unknown to the researcher.

The investigator also solicited general comments from Iraqi, Jordanian, French, German, and Israeli personnel who were pertinent to the situation under examination by this study.

However, the researcher discarded the commentaries of certain Iraqi and Jordanian intelligence officials during the preliminary phases of the research project. These commentaries asserted that Iraq had an active WMD program in the prelude to OIF, and that it was engaged in a D & D campaign associated with that program. All public and anonymous respondents in the IC contradicted the assertions of these people.⁹ Public refutations of these assertions also occurred in the Amorim Reports, the Duelfer Report and the later publications of David Kay that are discussed in this work. Moreover, the author also interviewed some key members of the Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi WMD research and development community with the view of ascertaining the status of these programs in the prelude to OIF. These individuals commented that Iraq had no active WMD program in the prelude to OIF,¹⁰ thus triangulating with a high level of correlation to the comments made by public and anonymous respondents from the IC. These factors led to the investigator re-vectoring his research hypotheses to that of organizational pathologies being the key factors in the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF.

It must be noted that the data provided by interviewees' commentaries and survey answers were self-reporting mechanisms in which the participants conveyed their perceptions of themselves, the organizations in which they worked, and the IC in general; therefore, these responses should be viewed as initial indicators rather than definitive answers. As this study was based upon OSI, interviews that supplied non-classified information, the media, and peer-reviewed academic sources, there exists a possibility that the research work and its resultant conclusions were based on incomplete information suites. A practicable remedy to this situation will appear when additional classified information suites that are pertinent to this dissertation are made public *via* Freedom of Information and Privacy Act releases.

This study deals with multiple agencies, organizations, sub-organizations, personal biographies, and technological minutiae that are highly detailed, intertwined, and nearly Byzantine in their complexity. In order to reduce the length of the main text of this study, the author shall outline these details in various appendices appearing at the end of this dissertation. Please see the *Table of Contents* at the beginning of this dissertation for the location of these appendices.

CHAPTER II

CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

This chapter shall deal with contextual information that highlights the foundations of the neoconservative *weltanschauung*; the relationship between the President, Vice President, and the IC; the relationship between the IC's management cadre and its employees; perceptions of Iraqi WMD and connections to transnational terrorism; and other issues that may have contributed to the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. This portion of the study will demonstrate a confluence of factors such as neoconservative intellectual positions and worldviews emanating from high profile academic commentators, members of government and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and issue clusters / networks that may have contributed to this alleged intelligence failure.¹¹ When some individuals who originated from neoconservative issue clusters / networks (NICN) attained political power in the G. W. Bush administration, they formed an iron triangle that among other goals attempted to press the IC to generate products that agreed with their pro-war stance. Other elements explored by this chapter include: (1) the long-standing friction between America's governmental decision-makers and its IC; (2) an ever-increasing distrust of the IC by neoconservative notables; (3) the practice of using sources outside of the IC for the purposes of supporting and justifying government executives' decisions; (4) the neoconservatives' long-standing desire to depose Saddam Hussein and his sons from power; and (5) a fortuitous confluence of goals and information feeds that supported the INC and the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's political predilections. When combined, these

factors generated a perfect storm of bad data, duplicitous publicity, and downward facing political pressure that may have caused the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. Other issues explored by this chapter include discussions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, the IC including the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the INR, and CIA; and information technology problems in the prelude to OIF. This chapter and the next shall serve as part of the evidentiary foundation for the comparisons and conclusions produced later in this study.

The Foundations of the Neoconservative *Weltanschauung*

This section shall explore the intellectual foundations of the issue clusters / networks that supported the neoconservatives' platform with respect to the United States' global position and how it should deal with its perceived adversaries. America's traditional conservative political faction fell into disorder partly because of the Richard M. Nixon-Watergate debacle. Subsequently, the Republican Party's public approval collapsed, resulting in the GOP struggling to maintain its power base in both Congress and the White House. After this political disaster, certain intellectuals in American academia began to formulate and espouse a new conservative platform. These intellectuals, their students, and adherents formed issue clusters / networks in order to discuss and promote their political agendas and policy preferences. This section of the study shall outline the assertions and hypotheses espoused by various intellectuals and political commentators that helped form the nascent neoconservative political nexus. Among these intellectuals, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Bernard Lewis, and Richard Pipes formed the primary cerebral foundation of America's NICNs.

Alberta and Roberta Wohlstetter

Albert Wohlstetter was a noted American conservative scholar with deep connections to the RAND Corporation and several presidential administrations. From 1964 to 1980, he taught Political Science at the University of Chicago and served on the dissertation committees of Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad. Wohlstetter also influenced and assisted other future neoconservative notables such as Richard Perle. Wohlstetter's intellectual positions were significant factors in the formation of America's new conservatism; they posited that America's position on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was too soft, and that the IC was not effective in its prosecution of covert operations and the delivery of high-quality intelligence analytic products. Moreover, Albert Wohlstetter asserted that the IC had systematically underestimated the military strength of the Soviet Union, thereby exposing the United States to significant risk.¹² Responding to these assertions, in May 1976 President Gerald Ford directed his Foreign Advisory Board (PFAB) to instruct the CIA's Director, G. H. W. Bush to institute a 'Team B' competitive intelligence organization. Led by the eminent scholar, Richard Pipes, and staffed with leading conservatives, this organization postulated that the Soviet Union had developed, produced, and stockpiled nuclear weapons of a blast capability heretofore unseen, thereby outstripping the arsenal of the United States, resulting in a perceived gross upset to the balance of power. Eventually the conclusions from this team turned out to be inaccurate; these findings however, caused enough of a furor that the Ronald Reagan administration embarked on a massive military spending program. A notable facet of this program was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or 'Star Wars'). This notion of distrusting the IC and the use of a 'Team B' competitive intelligence organization would have a telling effect on the G. W. Bush administration's stance in the prelude to OIF. Another pillar supporting neoconservative thought was Roberta Wohlstetter's classic book on intelligence failure, *Pearl*

Harbor: Warning and Decision. This work exhaustively dealt with the Pearl Harbor sneak attacks in the run-up to World War II. Many of the hawkish minds in the NICNs eagerly received her incisive commentary about signal-to-noise ratio problems, interagency ineffectiveness, and bungling in the IC. Notably, in his second appointment as Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Donald Rumsfeld required all of his senior staffers to read this book.¹³ Rumsfeld's reading requirements demonstrated his disrespect for America's IC and a predilection to use alternate intelligence methods, such as 'Team B' panels.

Albert Wohlstetter's students and associates helped form the foundations of upcoming NICNs that would gain momentum, and over the course of time attract wealthy financial supporters and like-minded politicians. Eventually, individuals originating from these NICNs would gain political power, and with the help of sympathetic elected officials in the G. W. Bush administration, would form an iron triangle that pushed for the prosecution of war with Iraq.

Bernard Lewis

Bernard Lewis is a Princeton University professor emeritus who specializes in Middle Eastern and Muslim culture. After his 1986 retirement from Princeton, Lewis served as a faculty member of Cornell University until late 1990. At one time in his storied and lengthy career, Lewis was a member of the British Army's Intelligence Corps and then served as a Foreign Office staffer. In the 1970s, Lewis became a critic of the U.S.S.R. and a vocal supporter of Israel. He offered many explanations as to the troubles within the Muslim world, cataloging these assertions in a high impact work, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice*. This book put forward Lewis's conception of Arab-Jewish relations in the Middle East and the risk these affairs presented to global stability. Moreover, Lewis asserted that European colonial powers and America were not the source of the problems seen in the Muslim

world. Essentially, Lewis stated that the socio-religio-cultural matrix in the Muslim world was the source of these issues. In short, Lewis posited that the problems in the Muslim world were self-generated. Professor Lewis in 1970 greatly impressed a young staffer in Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson’s office, a figure of future importance named Richard Perle. During the administration of G. H. W. Bush, Lewis forged a strong and enduring relationship with then SECDEF Dick Cheney that would continue into the prelude to OIF and beyond. His influence on Dick Cheney’s line of thinking retained significance during Cheney’s tenure as VP in the administration of G. W. Bush. Lewis remained a member of the NICNs that pushed for America’s more aggressive stance in the Middle East and ultimately promoting war with Iraq.¹⁴

In 1998, Lewis signed a letter authored by the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf addressed to President W. J. Clinton that advocated a comprehensive political and military strategy to unseat Saddam Hussein from power and eradicate the Iraqi *Ba’ath* Party. Other signatories of this letter included Richard Perle, John Bolton, Donald Rumsfeld, Frank Gaffney, Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith, and Zalmay Khalilzad. This group was one of the NICNs that lobbied for war with Iraq. In the latter part of September 2001, Richard Perle the head of the Defense Policy Board led closed advisory sessions to analyze the possibilities of military action against Iraq. Perle invited Lewis to attend these meetings along with Ahmad Chalabi of the INC. In these meetings, Lewis supported the notion of militarily mediated regime change in Iraq, the ouster of Saddam Hussein and America’s continued support of Ahmad Chalabi and the INC. After these sessions, Lewis served as a consultant on the Defense Policy Board, where he continued to make assertions about Muslim rage, jealousy, and resentment. Professor Lewis often espoused opinions that urged America to have assertive and sometimes militarily aggressive relations with the Muslim world.

Ian Buruma asserted that Lewis' writings and assertions had a significant impact on the thinking of Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and other future G. W. Bush administration notables. In an especially pithy assessment of his influence, Jacob Weisberg asserted that Professor Lewis was the most significant intellectual force who supported the G. W. Bush administration's policy preference to invade Iraq. David P. Goldman in a review of Lewis' memoir *Notes on a Century: Reflection of a Middle East Historian*, said that Lewis in a seemingly odd fashion, retrospectively asserted that he advised the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle to consider caution in the decision to invade Iraq.¹⁵

This work asserts that Bernard Lewis served as a primary intellectual foundation for the NICNs that contained Richard Perle, John Bolton, Donald Rumsfeld, Frank Gaffney, Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith, and Zalmay Khalilzad. As will be demonstrated in upcoming sections of this dissertation, the NICNs containing these individuals would gain political power during the presidency of G. W. Bush, thus morphing into a powerful iron triangle that strenuously advocated for the invasion of Iraq.

Richard Pipes

Richard Pipes was another important personage who contributed to the intellectual foundations of the NICNs that supported America's aggressive political / military stance toward the Arab world and specifically Iraq. Dr. Pipes is a noted American scholar who taught at Harvard University from 1958 until 1996. Pipes' academic focus was the history of Russia, communism, and Cold War studies. In the early 1970s, Richard Perle recruited Pipes to serve as a policy consultant to Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson; in that role, he was a significant anti-Soviet commentator. Also in the 1970s Pipes was a member of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a significant conservative issue cluster / network of that era. Among other

appointments, Pipes headed the famous ‘Team B’ competitive intelligence analysis organization during the presidency of Gerald Ford. In a 1986 retrospective article, Pipes elucidated the intelligence failure that the ‘Team B’ exercise was mandated to correct. In that article he mentioned that the IC committed analytic errors that caused underestimates of Soviet nuclear and conventional military strength, resulting in a strategic exposure for the United States and its NATO allies. His primary focus while heading ‘Team B’ was the Strategic Objectives Panel. His distrust of the American IC was palpable, and this intellectual position made its way throughout the neoconservative agenda promulgated by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the Hudson Institute Center for Middle East Policy, the Heritage Foundation, all of which featured members who were associated with other NICNs supporting America’s war with Iraq. He served in multiple advisory positions to National Security Councils (NSC) in several presidential administrations, and notably served as a mentor to several neoconservative personages in the prelude to OIF. In many public forums Pipes has asserted that radical Islam is a current threat rivaling that of twentieth century communism. He further asserted that although radical Islam does not have the huge WMD capacities of the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C., it does have as its main weapon irrational fanaticism. He went on to say that America and the western alliance must stand up to the agents of radical Islam, not fall victim to irrational fears, and be prepared for a decades long conflict against the *jihadis*. Pipes openly promoted the notion of OIF, based on Iraq being an existential threat to the security of the United States. Notably, he was ambivalent on the notions put forward by other neoconservatives such as nation building and making the world safe for democracy.¹⁶ This dissertation asserts that Pipes and his associates in various NICNs helped support the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle’s policy preference to invade Iraq.

Second-Generation Neoconservative Intellectuals

Among the second-generation neoconservative intellectuals were a soon to be famous doctoral candidate of Albert Wohlstetter, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and academic associates of Richard Pipes, such as Douglas J. Feith and Laurie Mylroie. Other notables in this group of intellectuals were Abram Shulsky and Zalmay Khalilzad. By way of a former Director of the CIA, R. James Woolsey, Wolfowitz and Mylroie would come to have a significant intellectual impact upon the NICNs after the 9/11 disasters. Feith would assume prominence in these neoconservative assemblages by way of his association with Richard Perle, Richard Pipes, Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld. These individuals initially participated in issue clusters / networks that promoted a more assertive and ultimately aggressive stance levelled at America's adversaries. Wolfowitz, Perle, Feith, Shulsky, and Khalilzad later rose to political power in the G. W. Bush administration; they were notable members of the iron triangle that promoted America's invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power.

Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Wolfowitz is the son of a Cornell University professor of statistical theory, Jacob Wolfowitz. He entered Cornell University in 1961 and graduated in 1965 with a baccalaureate in mathematics. However, Wolfowitz did not pursue mathematics as a profession; he instead chose to study Political Science in the hope of assisting the avoidance of a global nuclear holocaust. In 1972, Wolfowitz earned a Ph. D. in Political Science at the University of Chicago that dealt with nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. During his academic career at the University of Chicago, Wolfowitz attended some courses taught by Leo Strauss. His doctoral dissertation supervisor was the noted mathematician *cum* political theorist Albert Wohlstetter. Notably, Wohlstetter had become Wolfowitz's mentor, and in the summer of 1969 Wohlstetter arranged

for Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and others to join the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, a notable issue cluster / network that promoted a more assertive American defense stance. From 1970 to 1972, Wolfowitz was a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Yale University, and one of his students was a future notable member of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle in the G. W. Bush administration, I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby.¹⁷

In the 1970s, Wolfowitz entered government service where he and Richard Perle acted as aides to Democratic Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson. It is during this service that Wolfowitz and Perle’s political views coalesced; Jackson’s peculiar amalgam of support for social welfare programs, civil rights, and labor unions along with increased military spending and hardline stance against the Soviet Union significantly influenced them. In 1972, Wolfowitz’s door of opportunity for political advancement opened a little more widely when President Richard Nixon, under pressure from Senator Jackson dismissed the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and replaced him with Fred Iklé. When Iklé assumed this position, he assembled a new team in which Paul Wolfowitz was a member. Performing duties similar to those he did for the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, Wolfowitz did research work, drafted papers, and helped with the production of speaking points for Iklé. During the administration of Gerald Ford, more opportunities appeared for Wolfowitz when Henry Kissinger’s policy of *détente* with the Soviet Union lost political favor. This situation resulted in the Director of Central Intelligence, G. H. W. Bush receiving orders to form a committee of anti-communist experts headed by Richard Pipes. This committee came to be known as ‘Team B,’ and one of its junior members was Paul Wolfowitz. ‘Team B’ assessed the CIA to be too soft in its analysis of the military capabilities of the U.S.S.R., and recommended a much-hardened American stance toward the Soviets.¹⁸

In 1977, during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, Wolfowitz moved to the DoD where he assumed the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASECDEF) for Regional Programs serving under SECDEF Harold Brown. In 1980, Wolfowitz left government service and became a visiting professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. Upon the 1980 election of President Ronald Reagan, the new National Security Advisor, Richard V. Allen, under the advice of John Lehman, offered Wolfowitz the position of Director of Policy Planning at the State Department. In his new position, Wolfowitz diverged from the Reagan administration's official policy of tacit support for Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government. This stance led Wolfowitz into a position of conflict with Secretary of State Alexander Haig. On June 25, 1982, George P. Shultz replaced Haig as Secretary of State; this change facilitated Wolfowitz's promotion to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. From 1989 to 1993, during the administration of G. H. W. Bush, Wolfowitz served under SECDEF Dick Cheney as Undersecretary of Defense (USECDEF) for Policy. Wolfowitz played a pivotal role in the civilian oversight of military strategy and raised approximately sixty billion dollars in allied financial support for Operation Desert Storm (ODS). In a February 25, 1998 testimony before a congressional committee, Wolfowitz in a seemingly prescient fashion asserted that America's best opportunity to depose Saddam Hussein evaporated one month after the close of ODS. In essence, Wolfowitz's career developed to such an extent that he was no longer a line level civil servant; he became a member of the Senior Executive Service, and thus moved closer to the policymaking elites inside the Washington, D.C. Beltway. This situation later allowed Wolfowitz to help morph the NICNs to which he was amicable into a powerful iron triangle.¹⁹

After the end of ODS, Wolfowitz and his assistant I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby wrote the 1992 *Defense Planning Guide* which came to be known as the Wolfowitz Doctrine. This positioning paper although not officially accepted by the DoD, leaked to the press. Embarrassingly, it proposed a highly aggressive American foreign policy with respect to the Middle East that promoted interference in the internal political affairs of that region. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell publicly rejected the Wolfowitz Doctrine. However, after the publication of the Wolfowitz Doctrine then SECDEF Dick Cheney produced a slightly revised version of that document with the stances pertaining to preemption and unilateralism couched in softer terminology. After the 1992 election of President W. J. Clinton, Wolfowitz left government service. From 1994 to 2001, he served as Professor of International Relations and Dean of SAIS at Johns Hopkins University. During his tenure at that institution, he also advised Bob Dole on foreign policy during his 1996 presidential bid, managed by another notable neoconservative, Donald Rumsfeld. Wolfowitz’s positions on intelligence analyses became clear in a 1995 interview with the noted CIA intelligence theorist Jack Davis. In that interview, Wolfowitz stated that both analysts and policymakers must transcend hard evidence and rely upon assumptions. Moreover, Wolfowitz asserted that intelligence analysts claiming a position of unassailable objectivity and attributing an automatic bias to the policymaker offended him. He went on to say policymakers want to succeed and cannot do so without the use of high-quality assumptions. Wolfowitz further asserted that the policymaker has to be the analyst of last resort (apex analyst) in making assessments for the President and other leaders. In short, Wolfowitz posited intelligence production should be driven by the policy process and the closer the relationship between intelligence and policy the better for both systems. His focus on the use of assumptions in the intelligence analytic process would come to have significant implications

in the prelude to OIF. Also while working at Johns Hopkins University, Wolfowitz became involved with a notable NICN, the PNAC, signing both its June 3, 1997 *Statement of Principles* and its January 26, 1998 *Letter to the Honorable William J. Clinton, President of the United States*. In February 1998, Wolfowitz testified before a congressional hearing stating that the Clinton administration lacked a sense of purpose to deal with Saddam Hussein.²⁰ As will be discussed later in this work, during the G. W. Bush administration, the iron triangle in which Wolfowitz was a senior member cajoled and sometimes coerced the IC into the production of policy-palatable intelligence analytic products.

In 2001, President G. W. Bush nominated Wolfowitz to the post of Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSECDEF), serving under his old friend and political patron, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Wolfowitz became a vocal proponent of war with *al-Qaeda* and Iraq. It is at this point that Wolfowitz moved from being a member of pro-war NICNs into being one of the leaders of a powerful iron triangle that strove to initiate OIF. Secretary of State Colin Powell resisted Wolfowitz's notions; however, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld held war planning meetings from which Powell and his staff were excluded; thus signifying Powell was not a member of the pro-war iron triangle. Prior to the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, Wolfowitz publicly went on record saying that Iraq's possession of WMD was the prime reason for the inception of the war.²¹ Wolfowitz would continue on this line of thought, helping institute the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), entities that later sections of this work shall demonstrate were involved in the production of pseudo-intelligence that aligned with the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's policy preferences.

This section of the study has shown that Paul Wolfowitz had a long-standing relationship with the early founders of neoconservative thought and upcoming notables in the G. W. Bush administration. Additionally, this section has shown that Wolfowitz was an active participant in the NICNs that promoted a more assertive American stance with respect to the Middle East; in the G. W. Bush administration, he became a senior member of the iron triangle that advocated for war with Iraq. Once in that iron triangle, Wolfowitz worked to marginalize those who disagreed with that group's policy preferences, notably Secretary of State Colin Powell and his allies in the State Department. This segment has also shown that Wolfowitz held an intellectual position unfriendly to that of the classical social scientific method of intelligence analysis as espoused by Sherman Kent. This and other methods of analysis shall be discussed in *Chapter IV, Theoretical Considerations*.

Richard Perle

Richard Perle is a notable protégé of Albert Wohlstetter who assisted like-minded people to attain senior positions in the G. W. Bush administration. His efforts helped various neoconservative personages gain political appointments and / or employment in the federal civil service; thus populating the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle with a group of forceful ideologues who strongly promoted America's upcoming war with Iraq. Before his university education, Perle attended Hollywood High School in Los Angeles, where he met and befriended Joan Wohlstetter, the daughter of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter. He earned a baccalaureate in International Politics from the University of Southern California, and was involved in student exchange programs in Denmark and at the London School of Economics. Perle also earned a master's degree in Political Science from Princeton University. His formal relationship with the federal government started with Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson, a conservative Democrat from

Washington State. Notably, Jackson resisted the left-wing tendencies of the Democratic presidential hopeful, George McGovern. To counteract the increasingly left-leaning inclinations in the Democratic Party, Jackson assembled a cadre of bright young intellectuals to serve as staffers in his office. Among these cognoscenti were future neoconservative notables such as Douglas Feith, Elliot Abrams, Abram Shulsky, and Paul Wolfowitz.²²

Perle and Wolfowitz's work in Senator Jackson's office related to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The convivial relationship between Perle and Wolfowitz would continue into the administration of President G. W. Bush. While in Jackson's employ, Perle received a classified report leaked by CIA analyst David Sullivan, who presumably released this report in the hopes of causing the United States to take a more resolute stand against the U.S.S.R. The CIA's Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner attempted to dismiss Sullivan for this offense. Before Turner could complete the proceedings for his removal, Sullivan resigned his CIA position in 1978. Notably, Senator Jackson later hired Sullivan to work alongside Perle in his office. Perle and Sullivan would come to be close associates; often writing papers speaking of the dangers presented to America by the U.S.S.R. Perle experienced another interesting incident regarding his handling of classified information. During his service as a staffer with Senator Jackson, FBI counterintelligence agents ascertained that Perle had disseminated classified information to Israel. In late 1969 and early 1970, Perle reputedly gained access to this information *via* a senior Richard Nixon administration advisor on Soviet affairs, Helmut Sonnenfeldt. In the summer of 1970, Albert Wohlstetter placed Perle and Paul Wolfowitz in staff positions with the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, a conservative issue cluster / network founded by Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze.²³

Perle used his position with Senator Jackson to help Wolfowitz gain employment with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the early 1970s. In the mid-1970s, Senator Jackson and Richard Perle openly attacked as ineffective the policy stance of Henry Kissinger. These attacks gained increased support when in 1974 Donald Rumsfeld became President Gerald Ford's Chief of Staff. Rumsfeld then employed as his aide the Washington newcomer, Dick Cheney. The saga of Richard Perle continued with his involvement with the CPD. The CPD's incarnation of that era was led by Eugene Rostow. It had an iconic membership list such as William Casey, the Director of the CIA; Secretary of State Paul Nitze, Donald Brennan, Norman Podhoretz and his wife Midge Decter; the leader of 'Team B,' Richard Pipes; Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, Richard Nixon's DSECDEF, David Packard; the National Security Advisor to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, General Andrew Goodpaster; the billionaire Richard Mellon Scaife, and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. The CPD was an issue cluster / network whose goal was to motivate Congress and the President to significantly increase defense spending and harden America's stance with respect to its international adversaries. Notably, Perle also served as a junior member of the Gerald Ford administration's 'Team B' panel. When Ronald Reagan was elected to the presidency, Perle served on Reagan's transition team; in that position, he managed to place many of his ideological compatriots into positions of importance in the areas of national security and the DoD. Perle then served as Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASECDEF) for International Security Policy in the Ronald Reagan administration. In this position, he hired Douglas Feith in 1982 as Special Counsel. Perle quickly promoted Feith to the position of DASECDEF for Negotiations Policy.²⁴

In 1983, Richard Perle contracted an academician, Michael Ledeen to act as a senior terrorism consultant. His immediate supervisor, Noel Koch, noted that Ledeen had access to

classified materials available only to those personnel with top secret / sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI) security clearances; a level that Ledeen did not have. In 1984, Koch instructed his staff to stop giving Ledeen access to classified materials. Shortly after Koch's orders, Ledeen stopped reporting to work in his office. Later in 1984, Ledeen obtained a contract for the provision of consulting services to the NSC. Notably in 1985, Albert Wohlstetter introduced Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz to Ahmad Chalabi. Perle continued to serve as ASECDEF until April 1987. He also served as an unpaid member of the Defense Policy Board even after his resignation from the DoD. In the G. H. W. Bush administration Perle was a member of an issue cluster / network led by Morton Abramowitz, the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Most of the members of this group were either centrists or slightly left-leaning policy specialists. Richard Perle and James Schlesinger who were among the few conservative members of this group quickly resigned their positions in that organization.²⁵

Perle was and still is quite active in promoting his notion of pro-Israeli American foreign policy. One of the best examples of this stance was a paper written for the Arab-American Institute, *A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm*. Perle was the lead author of this paper, but it featured a veritable 'who's who' of important neoconservative pundits; among them were: Meyrav Wurmser, the future director of the Hudson Institute Center for Middle East Policy; David Wurmser the future chief advisor for Middle East Policy for VP Dick Cheney; Douglas J. Feith, one of the leading members of the shadow intelligence organizations instituted by SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld; and other lesser-known neoconservatives. This paper promoted a highly aggressive American foreign policy for the Middle East that offered expanded support for Israel and its policy of Zionist migration to the Jewish homeland. The authors of this paper formed part of the core of an NICN that would become the G. W. Bush administration's pro-war

iron triangle. Another one of Perle's policy tenets was that the United States should embark on a crusade to democratize, using force when necessary, the Middle East. Perle's influence continued to grow; he became chairman of the Defense Policy Board in the administration of President G. W. Bush. Perle, along with Douglas Feith and David and Meyrav Wurmser became instrumental in moving the G. W. Bush administration's National Security Council toward a policy of war with Iraq. Perle's lack of respect for the CIA became especially apparent when in the late spring of 2002 he asserted the agency's analyses of Iraq were not worth the paper upon which they were printed.²⁶

This section of the study has shown that Richard Perle was a central figure in pro-war NICNs, and more importantly, the advancement of his allies from those organizations into the Washington, D.C. halls of power. This dissertation asserts that Perle was one of the primary enablers of the transformation of pro-war NICNs into a powerful iron triangle that steered the G. W. Bush administration's position on Iraq from comparatively moderate channels of coercive diplomacy to that of outright military conflict.

Abram Shulsky

Abram Shulsky is an important personage in this study as his intellectual positions and academic writings helped legitimize the workings of DSECDEF Paul Wolfowitz's shadow intelligence infrastructure, which consisted of the PCTEG, OSP, and Near East – South Asia Desk (NESA). Furthermore, Shulsky's philosophy of intelligence analysis would come to have a significant impact on the NSC, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, DSECDEF Paul Wolfowitz, VP Dick Cheney, and ultimately President G. W. Bush.

Shulsky earned an undergraduate degree in mathematics at Cornell University and did graduate work at the University of Chicago, earning his M. A. and Ph. D. in Political Science

under the supervision of Leo Strauss. During his student years at the University of Chicago, he became a lifelong friend of Paul Wolfowitz. Shulsky is a high profile neoconservative scholar with connections to the RAND Corporation, the Hudson Institute Center for Middle East Policy, and various United States government agencies. He started his political career as a specialist aide to Senators Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. His work for Jackson and Moynihan supported the mandate of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. In the early 1980s, Shulsky served in the DoD under ASECDEF Richard Perle during the administration of President Ronald Reagan. It is during his association with Jackson, Wolfowitz, and Perle that Shulsky joined the NICNs that promoted an interventionist and militarily assertive American foreign policy. After he finished his work in the DoD, Shulsky then joined the RAND Corporation as a subject matter expert dealing with military and intelligence affairs. Shulsky later served as Director of the OSP for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USECDEFP) Douglas Feith. It is at that point that Shulsky became a member of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle that vigorously promoted the policy of America invading Iraq and deposing Saddam Hussein from power.

Notably, Shulsky was and still is highly critical of Sherman Kent’s social scientific method of intelligence analysis; he supported the military model of intelligence that aligns with and supports policy goals. Based on Leo Strauss’ concepts, Shulsky’s methodology placed analytic independence in a position of secondary importance to that of supporting decision-makers’ policy goals. This position stemmed from the Straussian concept of “truth is not salutary, but dangerous, and even destructive to society – any society.”²⁷ Robert Pippin asserted that Leo Strauss believed, “Good statesmen have powers of judgement [and] must rely on an inner circle. The person who whispers in the ear of the king is more important than the king.”²⁸

Encapsulating the Straussian position, Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt in their short work *Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence* incisively criticized the shortcomings they asserted were present in Sherman Kent's social scientific method of intelligence analysis and its position of analytic independence. Schmitt and Shulsky asserted that analysts must be receptive to the notion that critical information is either misleading or absent, and consequently, effective analysis must rely on assumptions of the intentions of the adversaries rather than on details or uncertain information.²⁹ In another work, Shulsky and Schmitt asserted, "[I]ntelligence can never forget that the attainment of truth involves a struggle with a human enemy who is fighting back – or that truth is not the goal, but only a means toward victory."³⁰ Shulsky's lifelong friendship with Paul Wolfowitz would assume great importance in the prelude to OIF; he joined the iron triangle in the G. W. Bush administration that promoted America's war with Iraq. While working in this iron triangle and under Wolfowitz's direction, Shulsky applied his considerable writing talents to enhance the credibility and palatability of the pseudo-intelligence products emanating from the PCTEG, NESAs, and OSP. Additionally, Shulsky and Schmitt's positions on analytic independence, truth, and policy dependency would come to be the *de rigeur* standards for the PCTEG, NESAs, OSP, and the NSC.³¹

This section of the study has shown that Abram Shulsky had a long-standing relationship with the early founders of neoconservative thought and upcoming notables in the G. W. Bush administration. In fact, Shulsky was an early member of the NICNs that promoted an interventionist and militarily assertive American foreign policy stance. *Via* the machinations of Richard Perle and the support of Paul Wolfowitz, Shulsky gained employment with the DoD during the G. W. Bush administration; in which he joined the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle that promoted America's war with Iraq. This segment has also shown that Shulsky had a

position hostile to the classical social scientific method of intelligence analysis as espoused by Sherman Kent. Shulsky's position that intelligence does not necessarily have to support the search for truth, but instead is a tool for military victory would come to have significant repercussions in the operations of the NESAs, PCTEG, and OSP in the prelude to OIF. These and other methods of intelligence analysis shall be discussed in *Chapter IV, Theoretical Considerations*.

Zalmay Khalilzad

Zalmay Khalilzad is an important personage in this study as he was one of the neoconservative thinkers who migrated into government and attained positions of significant political power in the course of time that led up to the prelude to OIF. As the influential leader of the G. W. Bush DoD transition team, Khalilzad was instrumental in the placing of important neoconservatives into positions of power in that department. These placements allowed Richard Perle, Abram Shulsky, and other individuals to consolidate the NICN's agendas in the DoD. Additionally, Khalilzad's resistance to Sherman Kent's classical principles of intelligence analysis would become an important factor reinforcing the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's position for war with Iraq.

In 1965, Albert Wohlstetter assembled a group of intellectual acolytes to carry forward his notions of foreign relations that he developed while working at the RAND Corporation. Zalmay Khalilzad later became a member of this issue cluster / network. Wohlstetter did not support Sherman Kent's notions of traditional intelligence analysis; instead, he grounded his opinions on analysis in his mathematical and positivist underpinnings. These foundations consisted of statistical analysis, probability theory, game theory, and systems analysis. One of these notable intellectual disciples assembled by Wohlstetter was Zalmay Khalilzad. When Dick

Cheney became SECDEF on March 20, 1989, he had the option of reorganizing the DoD and replacing some of his subordinates. He decided to keep Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad in their posts. Wolfowitz, Libby, and Khalilzad then drafted the DoD’s *1992 Defense Planning Guide* (the Wolfowitz Doctrine) that outlined America’s position as the global hegemon, and more importantly, dominating Middle Eastern oil resources for its own advantage. President G. H. W. Bush rejected the *1992 Defense Planning Guide*, but notably, SECDEF Dick Cheney supported it in a modified form.³² Later revisions of the document would feature changes from confrontational language into that supportive of alliances and the United Nations being cornerstones of American foreign policy. This posture would radically reverse itself when in the G. W. Bush administration, the NICNs that originated with Albert Wohlstetter became a powerful iron triangle.

After the late summer 1996 visit of Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, some NICN members mounted a concerted effort to lobby the United States government to engage in a preventative war against Iraq. William Kristol and Robert Kagan wrote op-eds in periodicals such as *The Weekly Standard* and *Foreign Policy* promoting this stance. Charles Krauthammer and A. M. Rosenthal use their syndicated columns in newspapers in a similar fashion. Zalmay Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz wrote analogous articles for the *Washington Post*, while David Wurmser contributed his writing skills to this campaign in the *Wall Street Journal* and published a book *Tyranny’s Ally*. Zalmay Khalilzad, in October 1996 published articles in the *Washington Post* that advocated the United States engage with the *Taliban* to unite Afghanistan, restore peace to the region, thus generating a stable environment in which private industry could build an economically beneficial gas pipeline in that state.³³

These NICNs again made their presence known; for on January 26, 1998, the Project for the New American Century published the now infamous *Statement of Principles* advocating President W. J. Clinton undertake an aggressive foreign policy that included war with Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. One of the signatories of the *Statement of Principles* was the future American envoy to Iraq in the G. W. Bush administration, Zalmay Khalilzad. In mid-February 1998, another NICN, the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf (CPSG) authored a letter to President W. J. Clinton advocating that he use the United States military to help Iraqi opposition groups overthrow Saddam Hussein, his sons, and the *Ba'ath* Party. Former United States Representative Stephen Solarz and a former ASECDEF, Richard Perle led the CPSG. The cosigners of the letter to the President were nearly the same group of individuals who wrote the PNAC's *Statement of Principles*. The cosigners of this letter to the President were Elliot Abrams, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, Stephen Bryen, Douglas Feith, Frank Gaffney, Fred Iklé, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, William Kristol, Michael Ledeen, Bernard Lewis, Peter Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, Gary Schmitt, Max Singer, Caspar Weinberger, Paul Wolfowitz, David Wurmser, and Dov Zakheim. According to retired Colonel W. Patrick Lang of the Defense Intelligence Agency Human Intelligence Service (DIA-HS), the CPSG advocated the following policy options: American support for Ahmad Chalabi and the INC as replacements for Saddam Hussein and the *Ba'ath* Party; funding of the INC with seized Iraqi assets; designating Kurdistan and southern Iraq as no-fly zones controlled by the INC; establishing large United States forward operating bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to facilitate an invasion of Iraq; and capturing Saddam Hussein then putting him on trial before an international tribunal for crimes against humanity.³⁴

The PNAC continued its lobbying efforts for a more aggressive American foreign policy; in September 2000, it published a document *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century* that advocated for a militarily and economically mediated global *Pax Americana*. Targeted at the leadership of the G. W. Bush administration, this document promoted the establishment of worldwide United States military and economic hegemony that precluded the rise of any significant rival. It also advocated American control of the Persian Gulf and the natural resources surrounding that area irrespective of Saddam Hussein's status in Iraq.³⁵

During the W. J. Clinton administration, Zalmay Khalilzad was outside of government; he worked for the energy conglomerate, Union Oil Company of California (UnoCal). While in the employ of UnoCal, Khalilzad lobbied for the Afghan *Taliban* to provide pipeline concessions to that company. He also performed the risk analysis for this pipeline. All the while, Khalilzad maintained his connection to the neoconservative power nexus. This connection resulted in a good outcome for Khalilzad, as he became the leader of the G. W. Bush administration's DoD transition team. Among the hopefuls for acquiring high office in the DoD were Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, and Abram Shulsky. Abrams joined the NSC; Khalilzad, Feith, and Shulsky joined the DoD and Perle became leader of the influential Defense Policy Board.³⁶ President G. W. Bush then appointed Khalilzad as his Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia, and Other Regional Issues. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, President G. W. Bush appointed Khalilzad as Special Envoy to Afghanistan. In November 2003, Khalilzad became United States Ambassador to Afghanistan.

This section of the study has demonstrated that Zalmay Khalilzad was instrumental in the staffing of President G. W. Bush's DoD with noted neoconservative hawks. These individuals,

like Khalilzad were prominent members of various NICNs that promoted the notion of America's military-mediated removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Notably, Khalilzad helped Richard Perle and Abram Shulsky maintain and expand their influence within the DoD, thereby strengthening various NICNs' agendas and goals within that department.

William J. Luti

William J. Luti was a career officer in the Navy. He earned a bachelor's degree at the Citadel, a master's degree from the Naval War College, and a master's degree in Law and Diplomacy followed by a Ph. D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. In the late 1990s, Luti involved himself in right wing politics, serving as an aide to then House Speaker Newt Gingrich. After leaving that posting, he served in several command assignments in the Navy. When G. W. Bush assumed the presidency in 2001, he went to work for VP Dick Cheney as his Special Advisor for National Security Affairs. A few months later, Luti retired from active duty in the Navy. Shortly thereafter, he joined Douglas J. Feith's team in the DoD, thus becoming a member of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. Luti was deeply involved in senior leadership roles in the OSP, NESA, and PCTEG. All three of these groups heavily relied on the pseudo-intelligence generated by Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi resistance organization, the INC. Luti was especially notable in the prelude to OIF as he cooperated with Abram Shulsky, Douglas J. Feith, and Paul Wolfowitz in the enforcement of the intellectual homogeneity of the OSP, NESA, and PCTEG. In this exercise, Luti, Feith, Shulsky, and Wolfowitz were instrumental in the recruiting, retaining, and promotion of personnel in those agencies who supported the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's policy agendas. Moreover, Luti, Feith, Shulsky, and Wolfowitz dismissed or transferred members of their organizations who did not share, or at least outwardly support the policy preferences of the iron

triangle. An example of this type of relationship resided in Luti's dismissal of Bruce Hardcastle, an expert DIA official responsible for the analysis of Middle Eastern Affairs.³⁷

Douglas J. Feith

Douglas J. Feith earned his baccalaureate at Harvard University in 1975. In his undergraduate career, Feith had the occasion to take several courses from the noted conservative scholar, Richard Pipes. At that time, Feith began his long-term involvement with various conservative issue clusters / networks. He then continued his education at Georgetown University earning a Doctor of Jurisprudence in 1978. He also served in the first Ronald Reagan administration's National Security Council as a Middle East Specialist. From 1982-1984 he served as Special Counsel to ASECDEF Richard Perle. Feith also served from 1984-1986 as DASECDEF for Negotiations Policy. In these positions, Feith advocated the United States opt out of treaties, strive towards unipolar hegemony, and back out of agreements such as the Comprehensive Test Ban, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the ABM Treaty, and the International Criminal Court. In 1996, Feith joined an NICN, the Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy toward 2000. Other members of this group were notable neoconservatives such as Richard N. Perle, James Colbert of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Charles Fairbanks of Johns Hopkins University's SAIS, Rob Loewenberg of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Jonathan Torop of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, David Wurmser of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, and Meyrav Wurmser of the Middle East Media Research Institute. In 1996, the Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy toward 2000 published *A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm* that advocated increase support for Israel and a significantly hardened and forceful American stance with respect to Arab states and the Muslim world in general. During the G. W. Bush

administration, Douglas Feith served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USECDEFP); thus becoming an important member of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. In that role he was responsible for the formulation of defense planning guidance and forces policy, DoD relations with foreign countries, and the DoD's role in governmental interagency policymaking. In the few weeks after the 9/11 disasters, Feith helped establish the PCTEG. He also supervised Abram Shulsky, the head of the OSP. SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld in September 2002 created the OSP out of the DoD's Northern Gulf Affairs Office. In June 2003, the OSP reverted to its original designation, the Northern Gulf Affairs Office.³⁸

Laurie A. Mylroie

Laurie A. Mylroie holds a Ph. D. from Harvard University in Political Science, specializing in security and Arab studies. Mylroie's doctoral supervisor was a noted expert on Arab and Muslim culture, Nadav Safran, then director of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies. Safran had a deep connection to Israel; he had fought as a lieutenant in that country's 1948 war. Interestingly, Safran had significant connections to the CIA.³⁹ Notably, during her doctoral candidacy at Harvard, Mylroie had the occasion to interact with a noted scholar whose thoughts and writings were one of the intellectual mainstays of the American neoconservative movement, Richard Pipes. She also interacted with a Princeton University scholar who focused on the Arab-Muslim world, Bernard Lewis. These relationships would have a telling impact upon Mylroie's *weltanschauung*. At that time, Mylroie became a supporter of some of the policy agendas put forward by various NICNs. Additionally, Mylroie attended American University in Cairo, Egypt in order to enhance her knowledge of the Arabic, Farsi, Baluchi, and Dari languages. Mylroie later served as an assistant professor at Harvard University and the Naval War College. She worked extensively under Army Human Terrain Systems (HTS) contracts

assessing cultural, political, and security issues in the Muslim world. During some of these remote postings, she had visited Iraq, conferred with Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon, and interacted with several of Saddam Hussein's senior officials. Throughout her many travels in the Middle East, Mylroie ascertained a connection between the Iraqi *Mukhabarat*, *Istikhabarat*, and various insurgent groups in Baluchistan. Based upon further research, Mylroie asserted that some of the perpetrators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and other terror attacks leveled against the United States were actually Baluchis trained by the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* at a base near Salman Pak. In the W. J. Clinton administration, then CIA director R. James Woolsey retained Mylroie's consulting services. Throughout the course of those engagements, Mylroie produced a series of documents that connected the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* and *Istikhabarat* with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and other terror incidents. Mylroie asserted that Iraq's *Mukhabarat* had stolen Kuwaiti birth, passport, and other identity records during the occupation of Kuwait, thereby allowing *Mukhabarat* / *Istikhabarat*-trained *al-Qaeda* personnel easy access to the United States. Woolsey supported and promoted Mylroie's assertions during his tenure as Director of the CIA. Woolsey's support for Mylroie's work continued after his leaving government service, and extended into the G. W. Bush administration via his consulting engagements with the NSC.⁴⁰

Further extending her influence in various NICNs, in 2000, with the help of Paul and Clare Wolfowitz and the American Enterprise Institute Press, Mylroie published a book, *Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War against America* that supported and expanded the notion of Iraq's direct involvement in an ongoing covert war against the United States.⁴¹ Using sworn testimonies from federal criminal courts and the cooperation of leading FBI investigators and Department of Justice (DoJ) prosecutors, Mylroie presented a compelling case that the Iraqi

Mukhabarat manufactured false identities for *al-Qaeda* operatives of Baluchi origin who perpetrated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. *Via* the efforts of R. James Woolsey, and notables in the American Enterprise Institute, Mylroie's work made its way into the hands of DSECDEF Paul Wolfowitz, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, VP Dick Cheney, and ultimately the remainder of the NSC. On approximately September 14, 2001 Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz discussed Mylroie's assertions, thereby reinforcing the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's conventional wisdom that Iraq was interconnected with transnational terrorism threats to the United States and that Saddam Hussein intended to reconstitute his WMD arsenal that the American-led Coalition nearly destroyed during ODS. Interestingly, although Mylroie was a significant supporter of various NICN policy positions, she never gained employment in the G. W. Bush administration; therefore, she was not a member of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle.⁴²

A Brief History of the Neoconservatives

Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld enjoyed a long and convivial relationship in American public life. During his service as the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity in the Richard M. Nixon administration, Donald Rumsfeld hired Dick Cheney as an aide. Cheney and Rumsfeld's political styles immediately meshed. Impressed by some of Cheney's conservative talking points, Rumsfeld introduced the young Cheney to a large retinue of American conservative pundits and decision-makers. After serving as Rumsfeld's aide, Cheney held positions such as White House Staff Assistant, Assistant Director of the Cost of Living Council, and Deputy Assistant to the President. In the last position, Cheney suggested several policy positions in memoranda to Donald Rumsfeld. These positions would have a significant impact on Cheney's career progression, for in the Gerald Ford administration, Cheney became

Assistant to the President and Rumsfeld's White House Deputy Chief of Staff. Once Rumsfeld was named SECDEF, Cheney succeeded him to become White House Chief of Staff. Cheney's negative view of the American IC appeared in his peripheral participation in the May 1976 'Team B' intelligence exercise during the Ford administration. His distaste for the IC again appeared during the Iran-Contra hearings of 1985 – 1987. During the hearings in which he was a congressional participant, Cheney enlisted David Addington as one of his aides. This individual was a neoconservative ideologue whose intellectual position was markedly similar to that of Cheney. The CIA's failure to predict Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its failure to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union also reinforced Cheney's jaundiced view of the IC. Moreover, Cheney was well aware of the CIA's failures to predict and stop the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1996 attack on the American military quarters at the Khobar Towers in al-Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and the 1998 U. S. Embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.⁴³ Over the course of time, Cheney and Rumsfeld formed a nexus of political power and policy perspectives that exhibited very little, if any respect for the IC.

The NICNs' disaffection with the IC developed further, for in 1998, Donald Rumsfeld headed a commission that analyzed America's missile defenses. In 1999 and 2000, Rumsfeld again headed a congressional commission that dealt with similar issues; its notable members were future elites of the G. W. Bush administration such as Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Hadley, and Richard Perle. Their ultimate goal was the revitalization of Ronald Reagan's then-defunct Strategic Defense Initiative. Based upon its own information sources, this commission asserted that the IC had misjudged the capabilities of America's enemies and warned of missile attacks from North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. The Rumsfeld Commissions were examples of a competitive 'Team B' intelligence exercise instigated and implemented by an

NICN. Notably, another Rumsfeld-led ‘Team B’ competitive intelligence infrastructure would rise to importance in the administration of G. W. Bush. This infrastructure, which was part of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle, consisted of the OSP, PCTEG, and NESAs.

In 2001 Richard Clarke, then Counterterrorism Director in the G. W. Bush White House asserted that an invasion of Iraq while fighting a war in Afghanistan was inopportune. On September 12, 2001, President G. W. Bush ordered Clarke’s group to find any possible connections between Saddam Hussein and *al-Qaeda*. Clarke responded that his group and the IC in general could not find these connections. Within weeks of President G. W. Bush’s request, Richard Clarke’s group published a report *Survey of Intelligence Information on any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks*. Citing that report, the 9/11 Commission stated “Clarke’s [report] found no compelling case that Iraq had planned or perpetrated the attacks. There was no evidence whatsoever that Saddam Hussein had cooperated with Osama bin-Laden on WMD.”⁴⁴ Clarke’s work, however did note an unvetted Czech intelligence report that Mohamed Atta (the operational ringleader of the 9/11 attacks) had met with an Iraqi *Mukhabarat* agent in Prague sometime in April 2001. The document also mentioned unvetted information originating in Poland that the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* had forewarning of the 9/11 attacks. Clarke stated that President G. W. Bush never saw his group’s report. The report seemed to have no substantive effect on President G. W. Bush’s perception of Iraqi complicity with the 9/11 attacks; as in NSC meetings on September 17 and 28, 2001, the President stated, “I believe Iraq was involved, but I’m not going to strike them now. I don’t have the evidence at this point... and if we catch [Saddam Hussein] being involved, [we] will act.”⁴⁵

Colin Powell agreed with Richard Clarke’s position that stated a war with Iraq was unpropitious. Both Clarke and Powell opposed the aggressive stance espoused by the iron

triangle members VP Cheney, SECDEF Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and USECDEF Feith. From the onset of NSC deliberations, Condoleezza Rice favored constraining Iraq's WMD aspirations by way of deterrence, somewhat like the stance she had traditionally espoused in relation to the Soviet Union. Irrespective of this position, Rice knew that regime change in Iraq was America's formal position since the passage of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act.⁴⁶ Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Perle had strenuously supported this bill and promoted its passage through Congress. Sponsored by Trent Lott and other Republicans, the Iraq Liberation Act passed Congress on October 7, 1998. Notably, Ahmad Chalabi and Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute helped Trent Lott and his Republican allies draft the wording of this bill. In this case, this NICN had a measureable impact on American foreign policy.

Paul Wolfowitz originally was cautious about regime change in Iraq; he wrote a 1997 essay that stated a conquest of Iraq during ODS would have imposed an immense liability on the United States in that America would have been forced to take responsibility for the resultant government. Upon seeing Saddam Hussein's post-ODS crimes against the Kurds in the north and the *Shi'ites* in the south, Wolfowitz then modified his position and vigorously supported a policy of regime change in Iraq. On September 12, 2001, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld recalled from overseas business Douglas Feith, members of his newly formed PCTEG, and the head of the NESA, William J. Luti. During his journey to the Middle East, Luti came to the realization that Afghanistan was not the only theatre in which America had to fight *al-Qaeda*. On September 20 Feith, Luti, and their staffers drafted a memorandum addressed to SECDEF Rumsfeld espousing a policy that America's post-9/11 response should not be limited to Afghanistan but expanded to other areas in Southwest Asia and potentially other locales around the globe.⁴⁷ Shortly after these events, SECDEF Rumsfeld formally instituted the OSP; thereby initiating another 'Team B'

competitive intelligence enterprise in the executive branch of government. This initiative would become a linchpin in the events that occurred during the prelude to OIF. With these events, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle caused significant changes in the foreign policy as previously promulgated by the W. J. Clinton administration.

Although many commentators and media pundits describe the political appointment and hiring practices inside the Washington, D.C. Beltway as incestuous, it is important to note that the intellectual undercurrents forming the nexus of the NICNs originated in academia and initially spread throughout the federal government by way of fortuitous staffing factors. Once Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz gained employment in the federal civil service, they encountered high profile politicians and political appointees (such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld) who largely shared their views on American foreign relations policy, military strength, Israel, and its Muslim neighbors in the Middle East. By way of skillful maneuvering, Perle, Wolfowitz, and their ideological allies increasingly gained political traction and professional network connections that helped place them near the nexus of decision-making in the prelude to OIF. It is during the first G. W. Bush administration that the NICNs gained political power and influence, thereby morphing into an iron triangle that could affect changes in U. S. government policy. Supported by their political patrons such as VP Cheney and SECDEF Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Perle, and their confidantes hired ideologically similar (although not necessarily identical) individuals to manage and staff pseudo-intelligence generating groups such as the OSP, PCTEG, and NESAs during the prelude to OIF. This sort of staffing behavior is not unusual in the transition from a previous presidential administration to a new one, but it is important to note who took part in this instance and how their behaviors affected the pseudo-intelligence generating organizations in the federal government as well as its formal intelligence

bureaus. The individuals examined in this section provided significant credibility to the policy preferences of VP Cheney, SECDEF Rumsfeld, and DSECDEF Wolfowitz; thus reinforcing the downward facing political pressures exerted on the IC by their iron triangle.

The Relationship between the President, Vice President, and the IC

This section of the study shall examine the structural relationship between the President, Vice President, and the IC with the view of elucidating the *de jure* and *de facto* power interactions that existed between these entities in the prelude to OIF. Additionally, this section of the study shall also deal with the hierarchy of the agencies in the IC during that period. As a part of this examination, this section shall offer insights into the relationship between the Vice President and the IC. Moreover, this section shall examine how that relationship started as an informal agreement and later became an official function of the Vice President. Additionally, this section shall focus on the CIA's Inspector General (CIA-IG) and that official's relationship to the President, the Vice President, Congress, and employees of the CIA. The ultimate goal of this section is to ascertain if any of these interactions could have possibly opened avenues of opportunity for the manipulation of data, information, or intelligence by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and its retinue of supporters.

The Intelligence Hierarchy in the Prelude to OIF

In the prelude to OIF, the CIA was the *de jure* lead agency and central accumulator for all intelligence analytic products sent to the OPOTUS, the OVP, the NSC, and Congress. During the prelude to OIF, George Tenet was the Director of the CIA and Director of Central Intelligence and hence, the CIA's analytic organization, the DI was the final arbiter of all intelligence analytic product reaching America's decision-makers. The chief analyst at the CIA during this time was

the Deputy Director of Intelligence, (DDI) Judith A. ‘Jami’ Miscik. All President’s Daily Briefings, Special Briefings, and other intelligence products came under the purview of her organization. Since the post-9/11 enactment of the USA Patriot Act, all agencies in the IC are legally mandated to share data, information, and intelligence to entities and agencies with appropriate security clearances and a documented need to know. Hence, from a *de jure* perspective, the DI and the DDI should have had access to all data, information, and intelligence pertinent to the Iraq situation. It is in the DI where the final production work on finished, intelligence occurred, and where most of the responsibility lies for any defects and shortcomings in the intelligence analytic products delivered to America’s governmental elites.⁴⁸

The President, Vice President, and the IC

From the historical perspective, the President and the IC have enjoyed a special relationship; it served at the pleasure of the President and was under his explicit control. The IC answered to the President alone, thus assuring that presidential secrets remained so. This relationship also meant that nothing of significant import occurred in the IC without the knowledge and approval of the President. Irrespective of this historical relationship, President G. W. Bush however recognized that he had very limited foreign affairs expertise and thus relied upon VP Cheney’s previous academic and governmental experience in these areas. Unofficially, all national security related items destined for the President had to pass through the Office of the Vice President (OVP) and receive its preliminary approval before arriving on G. W. Bush’s desk. In essence, VP Cheney served as the United States *de facto* chief executive decision-maker for security issues and foreign affairs in the prelude to OIF. According to a close associate of the VP named David Addington, Cheney attended all presentations of the PDBs and was a voracious consumer of intelligence products, often asking for raw data feeds from which to perform his

own analyses. He also said that VP Cheney attended all White House meetings with the CIA and the NSC. Thusly, in the prelude to OIF, Dick Cheney had assumed responsibilities and powers far in excess of previous Vice Presidents. Some commentators likened his position to that of a prime minister or a co-president.⁴⁹ The situation as described in this paragraph would come to have a significant impact on the relationship between the Office of the President (OPOTUS), the OVP, the NSC, and the CIA in the period examined by this study. This situation is of interest because VP Cheney was one of the major figures steering the policy direction of the pro-war iron triangle in the prelude to OIF.

Similar in outlook to VP Cheney and SECDEF Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith was decidedly against appeasement and negotiation; he saw British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's actions in the prelude to World War II as a paradigm of what to avoid in the Iraq scenario. In alignment with this archetype, Feith, Abram Shulsky, and William Luti's work focused on the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's agenda, and they expelled from the OSP, PCTEG, and NESAs anyone who openly disagreed with this schema. Among those expelled were long serving subject matter experts such as Larry Hanauer, Marybeth McDevitt, Joseph McMillan, and James Russell. Hanauer, who was noted for his fair and balanced approach to Middle Eastern affairs, was replaced by David Schenker, a well-known member of a pro-war NICN, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). The abuse of the IC did not stop with OSP, PCTEG, and NESAs personnel, as Luti's liaison with the DIA, Bruce Hardcastle, was subjected to abusive behavior because his analyses openly differed from the positions of the iron triangle. Hardcastle was a Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) in the DIA; the office to which he reported was responsible for intelligence related to global geographical domains. Notably, his specialty was the Near East, South Asia, and Counterterrorism. The DIOs and the DIA in general had

significant doubts about the status of Iraq's WMD program and Saddam Hussein's connection to transnational terrorist groups. Hardcastle was in the unfortunate position of presenting these doubts to William J. Luti, Shulsky, Luti, and Feith so disagreed with Hardcastle's analyses that not only did they terminate his relationship with the OSP, PCTEG, and NESAs, they abolished his parent organization from the DIA.⁵⁰ Hardcastle's treatment by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle was so severe that he left the DIA. He later gained employment with the British IC.

VP Cheney ensured *via* his *de facto* national security control mandate that intelligence delivered to the OPOTUS, NSC, and Congress was in alignment with the iron triangle's pro-war stance, thus moving President G. W. Bush towards the decision to initiate OIF. The strained relationship between VP Cheney and the IC became especially evident just after the commencement of OIF's invasion phase. Ending the *de facto* nature of the VP's national security powers, Presidential Executive Order 13292 of March 28, 2003 formalized the transfer of these powers to the VP. Cheney used his new *de jure* powers to declare all proceedings emanating from the OVP to be of a classified nature and thus closed from IC, congressional, and public scrutiny. VP Cheney, under the auspices of this executive order directed his staff to monitor all the emails and internal memoranda of the NSC.⁵¹ This situation helped intensify the impact of the overwrought environment encountered by George Tenet, the CIA, and the IC in general.

Perceptions of Iraq's Connections to Transnational Terrorism and WMD

This section of the study shall examine American perceptions of Iraq's connections to transnational terrorism and its possession of WMD with a view of elucidating how these insights may have affected the IC's analytic products during the prelude to OIF. Terry Anderson, Arnaud De Borchgrave, and other notable commentators asserted that declarations made by government leaders, intellectuals, and other American elites suggested the 9/11 attacks generated an

attitudinal change of such a magnitude that OIF was virtually a predestined upshot of those disasters.⁵² Public respondents from the IC made similar assertions.⁵³ Remarkably, one hundred seventy-one out of two hundred twenty one anonymized respondents from the IC shared these views. Notably, an NICN lobbied for the invasion of Iraq during the administration of President W. J. Clinton. Future VP Cheney, future SECDEF Rumsfeld, and other upcoming G. W. Bush administration elites worked in this organization, The Project for the New American Century. Shortly after its founding by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, this NICN published its *Statement of Principles*, which described the United States as:

[A] preeminent world power that faced a challenge to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests... [T]he United States should challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values and preserve and extend an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.⁵⁴

The signatories of the *Statement of Principles* formed a veritable ‘who’s who’ of elite neoconservatives. The signatories include Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Elliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Iklé, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Harry S. Rowen, Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weigle, and Paul Wolfowitz. Other individuals who later joined the PNAC included John R. Bolton, Devon Gaffney Cross, Bruce P. Jackson, and Gary Schmitt. Some of the PNAC’s notables would come to occupy senior leadership positions in the G. W. Bush administration, thereby forming the pro-war iron triangle in the prelude to OIF. (Please see *Appendix C - Key Organizations & Personnel* for some biographical details of these individuals.)

Apparently, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was the central agenda of various NICNs, even before G. W. Bush assumed the presidency.⁵⁵ However, opinions within the Washington, D.

C., Beltway were heterogeneous, for in April 2001, Paul Wolfowitz and the White House's counterterrorism expert Richard Clarke engaged in a heated dispute during an NSC meeting. In that clash, Clarke asserted that America's emphasis should be on Osama bin-Laden and *al-Qaeda*, while Wolfowitz insisted that America's primary focus should be on the threat of Iraqi state-sponsored terrorism. On September 13, 2001, the CIA's director in the Clinton administration, R. James Woolsey stated in an op-ed in *The New Republic* that the IC should examine the possibility that the 9/11 attacks "were sponsored, supported, and ... even ordered by Saddam Hussein."⁵⁶ In this op-ed Woolsey further argued that Ramzi Yousef, the planner of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was in fact an Iraqi covert agent who travelled to the U. S. by way of a passport stolen from a Kuwaiti citizen of the same name who had died during Iraq's occupation of that country. Notably, on September 21, 2001 Michael Morell delivered a President's Daily Briefing to G. W. Bush and his immediate retinue of officials. The CIA's DI, under the overall supervision and approval of Judith A. 'Jami' Miscik, generated this report. This briefing contained several facts that were at odds with the public statements made by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. In short, this report said Saddam Hussein had no connections to transnational terrorism, and viewed *al-Qaeda* as an existential threat to Iraq, the *Ba'ath* party, and his leadership of that country. The report did mention that the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* positioned agents within various terrorist organizations with the goal of acquiring intelligence. Moreover, the report said there was no link between the Iraqi government and the 9/11 attacks, and that there was very little evidence of an extant Iraqi WMD program.⁵⁷

On October 12, 2001, James E. Hoagland parroted Woolsey's comments in a *Washington Post* editorial; he mentioned that the FBI was negligent in its duties as it allowed an *al-Qaeda* member involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing named Abdul Rahman Yasin to

leave the United States for safe haven in Baghdad. According to Hoagland's commentaries, the FBI asserted that Yasin played an insignificant role in the 1993 bombings and consequently released him on his own recognizance. On May 23, 2002, Leslie Stahl located Yasin in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison; for some odd reason, Iraqi authorities granted her permission to interview him. Incarcerated for almost eight years, Yasin talked with Stahl about his relationship with Mohammed Salameh and Ramzi Yousef and his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Notably, in 1994 and then October 2001, Saddam Hussein's government attempted to negotiate Yasin's return to the United States. On both occasions, the United States government refused to accept Yasin's return. Even after the start of OIF this perception would not dissipate, for in September 2003, VP Cheney still attempted to use Yasin as a connector between the Saddam Hussein regime and *al-Qaeda*. Speaking with Tim Russert of NBC News, he mentioned that one of the bombers was an Iraqi [Abdul Rahman Yasin] who returned Iraq after the [World Trade Center] attack of 1993. Cheney went on to say, "After American forces gained access to intelligence files in OIF we ascertained that this individual received mission financing from the Iraqi government in addition to safe haven after the fact." ⁵⁸

The perceived connection of Saddam Hussein to *al-Qaeda* intensified even further after the November 11, 2001 capture of a senior member of Osama bin-Laden's staff. Pakistani officials apprehended Ibn al-Shayk al-Libi, a Libyan *jihadi* who supervised *al-Qaeda*'s paramilitary training camp near Khalden, Afghanistan. Notably, Ibn al-Shayk al-Libi is a *nom de guerre*; Ali Mohamed Abdul Aziz al-Fakheri is the birth name of this individual. When transferred to the custody of United States covert operators in January 2002, these officials transferred al-Libi to a 'black site' outside of Cairo. Under the supervision of CIA interrogators and Egyptian intelligence (*Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Harbiyya wa al-Istitla*) officials, al-Libi

experienced extraordinary rendition, under which he reputedly released valuable data that connected *al-Qaeda* to the Iraqi government. Moreover, al-Libi apparently surrendered important data that led to the capture of a senior *al-Qaeda* member, Abu Zubaydah, allegedly one of the architects of the 9/11 attacks. Pakistani security forces then captured Abu Zubaydah in March 2002. American officials negotiated with the government of Pakistan to release Abu Zubaydah into the custody of United States personnel. Under the supervision of José Rodriguez, CIA officials transported Abu Zubaydah to the Nakhon Phanom ‘black site’ in Thailand. Upon extraordinary rendition, Zubaydah eventually surrendered the location of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and some of his close associates. Additionally, al-Libi recounted to Egyptian and American officials that *al-Qaeda* requested the Iraqi government help them with the development, manufacture, and use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). To this end, al-Libi asserted that *al-Qaeda* sent an emissary, Abu Adula al-Iraqi in 1997 to visit Iraq with the mission of obtaining CBW, its manufacturing feedstock, and training in the use of these weapons.⁵⁹

Members of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle viewed the al-Libi statements as proof positive of Saddam Hussein’s close relationship with WMD proliferation, *al-Qaeda*, and other non-state terror organizations. However, before the iron triangle’s use of the al-Libi statements, in February 2002 the DIA-HS reported that al-Libi was an unreliable source as polygraph tests indicated that he was deceptive. As the situation unraveled, in early 2004, al-Libi retracted his statements after interrogators confronted him with statements from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed that affirmed *al-Qaeda* had no significant operational ties to the Iraqi government. Notably, in a January 2004 intelligence analytic document, CIA officials reported al-Libi’s recantations to the NSC.⁶⁰

The Bush administration's bellicose attitude towards Iraq again appeared in the January 2002 State of the Union Address, in which the President asserted that Saddam Hussein was a major player in the world's 'Axis of Evil' and insisted that it was the United States duty to constrain these entities by whatever means necessary. In apparent alignment with these statements, President G. W. Bush in March 2002 redeployed the Army Fifth Special Forces Group from Afghanistan to clandestine activities inside northern Iraq. Just following that military re-deployment, VP Cheney attended a Republican Party supporters' luncheon in which he said that there was no question of whether the United States was going to invade Iraq; the only question was when the invasion would occur. In apparent support of Bush and Cheney's position, SECDEF Rumsfeld made comments that Saddam Hussein was similar to Adolf Hitler; he was a monster preparing to use horrible weapons in support of his personal aims and policies. Rumsfeld went on to say it would be a tremendous mistake if the United States waited for Saddam Hussein to use his arsenal against America's friends in the Middle East. Harkening back to the early days of the Third Reich, Rumsfeld asserted that an early preemption of Saddam Hussein's political and military aims would save millions of lives and dollars, just like what would have occurred if the Allies had stopped Adolf Hitler in the early stages of his career. Rumsfeld succinctly stated the American perception of Iraq's WMD at a DoD press conference held in Brussels in mid-2002 by saying: "The absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. It is ...saying the same thing in a different way. Simply because you do not have evidence that something does exist does not mean that you have evidence that it doesn't."⁶¹

In June 2002, pressure on the IC to produce policy palatable intelligence analytic products became more intense, with VP Cheney and his aide, Lewis 'Scooter' Libby making repeated visits to the CIA. The tenor of these visits was contentious, with Cheney and Libby

repeatedly questioning analysts and managers why their analytic product did not agree with that produced by the INC, OSP, PCTEG, and other sources. Although Cheney never overtly stated he wanted intelligence analytic product modified into assessments that agreed with his *weltanschauung*, his repeated and incisive rapid-fire questions along with ‘Scooter’ Libby’s prosecutorial demeanor sent a chill through the ranks of the CIA’s analytic cadre and their managers. Analysts commented to the media that Cheney’s questions served to underscore his firm conviction that Iraq was an immediate threat to the United States.⁶²

On August 15, 2002, Christina Shelton of the DIA presented *Assessing the Relationship Between Iraq and al-Qaeda*, a summary of the Iraq-terrorism situation. This report focused on the notion that the majority of America’s transnational terrorist threats were probably state-sponsored. On that day, Shelton a twenty-year veteran analyst of the DIA, briefed George Tenet, the NSC, and OVP on her group’s findings. The briefing stated that the covert nature of the relationship between Iraq and *al-Qaeda* made it difficult to know its full extent. Speaking further to this situation, Shelton asserted that the security measures instituted by both entities precluded a full understanding of their relationship. Shelton mentioned that the body of reporting was mostly based on CIA accounts from 1990-2002. These accounts were grounded on a variety of sources that reflected a pattern of Iraq’s support for *al-Qaeda* including high-level contacts between Iraqi senior officials and their counterparts from *al-Qaeda*.⁶³ Shelton’s PowerPoint presentation supporting this briefing mentioned potential admonitions specific to the IC’s dealing with intelligence pertinent to Iraq’s connections to transnational terrorist organizations. This presentation highlighted the following assumptions and questions:

- (1) The IC does not normally require juridical evidence to support a finding;
- (2) there was a consistent underestimation of the importance that would be attached to Iraq and *al-Qaeda* hiding a relationship;
- (3) the assumption that secularists and Islamists will not cooperate even when they have common interests;
- (4) what is the probability that there are

contacts between a Iraq and *al-Qaeda*; (5) what is the probability that there is cooperation regarding support functions such as finances, expertise, training, and logistics; (6) what is the probability that Iraq and *al-Qaeda* actually coordinate on decisions or operations; (7) what is the probability that if a relationship existed, Iraq and *al-Qaeda* could conceal its depth and characteristics from the United States.⁶⁴

After highlighting these assumptions and questions, Shelton's PowerPoint presentation summarized the following contacts between Iraq and *al-Qaeda* from 1990-2002:

(8) In 1990, Osama bin-Laden had emissaries meet in Jordan with Iraqi government officials; (9) in 1993, the National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi helped Osama bin-Laden develop a relationship with Iraq and according to CIA reports, with an Iraqi defector later confirming this information; (10) in that meeting there was an understanding reached between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin-Laden that amounted to a nonaggression pact with an agreement to cooperate on unspecified activities, and [there would be] no *al-Qaeda* attacks against the Iraqi government because Osama bin-Laden forbade his Iraqi dissidents to attack Iraq; (11) in 1994-1998, the Deputy Director of the *Mukhabarat*, Farouk Hijazi met at least twice with Osama bin-Laden; (12) in 1996, Farouk Hijazi met with Osama bin-Laden in an unspecified location and shortly thereafter bin-Laden returned to another unspecified location from Qatar; (13) in 1996, the director of the *Mukhabarat*, Mani abd al-Rashid al-Tikriti met privately with Osama bin-Laden at one of his farms in the Sudan a few weeks after the Khobar Towers attack, using an Iraqi delegation travelling to Khartoum as cover for this visit; (14) in 1995-1996, Osama bin-Laden requested Iraqi assistance with bomb making; (15) in late 1998, Farouk Hijazi met with Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan; (16) in 1998, Ayman al-Zawahiri was in Baghdad and met with the Iraqi Vice President; (17) in that same year, al-Zawahiri met with two *Mukhabarat* officers in Afghanistan; (18) in 1998-1999, there was a flurry of reported meetings following *al-Qaeda's* successful East Africa attacks, and there were discussions of the provision of safe haven following the attacks, with Iraq reportedly promising *al-Qaeda* training; (19) in 1999, *al-Qaeda* established an operational training camp in northern Iraq, with reports of Iraq training terrorist at Salman Pak; (20) in 1999, Iraqi *Mukhabarat* officials met with Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan and [they] made additional contacts through Iraq's Embassy in Pakistan; (21) in April 2001, the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* Chief in Prague Czechoslovakia, [Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir] al-Ani met with Mohamed Atta; (22) in 2002, a large number of *al-Qaeda* personnel were reported operating in northern Iraq; and (23) in 2002, Ayman al-Zawahiri was located in Baghdad.⁶⁵

The PowerPoint presentation continued to state that there was a basis for cooperation between Iraq and *al-Qaeda*, founded on the notion of *the enemy of my enemy is my friend*. The motives were shared objectives and animus towards the United States. Continuing with this theme, the presentation asserted that for Saddam Hussein the [First] Gulf War never ended. The presentation also stated that unlike most rogue states and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations,

attacking Israel was not the primary focus of either Iraq or *al-Qaeda*. One of the important notions put forward by this presentation was the existence of a *quid pro quo* arrangement between Iraq and *al-Qaeda* in which Iraq would receive a willing surrogate to attack the U. S., and in exchange for that surrogacy, *al-Qaeda* would receive critical support from Saddam Hussein.⁶⁶ The report outlined key objectives of both parties:

(24) Iraq's objectives were an operational surrogate with which to continue its war with the U. S., a means to subvert and intimidate its enemies, a deniable mechanism to threaten the U. S. and others, and fireproofing [Iraq] against extremism; (25) *al-Qaeda*'s objectives were the acquisition of expertise, training, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, financing and procurement services, documentation and facilitation services, and a safe haven of last resort.⁶⁷

Shelton's PowerPoint presentation asserted that the Iraqis were assisting *al-Qaeda* in the establishment of microbiological laboratories in Afghanistan. It went on to say Iraq cheated on the oil for food program, and that the CIA estimated Iraq had earned three hundred twenty-five million dollars by March 2000, much of which *could* be used to finance terrorist organizations. In summary, the presentation asserted that Iraq gained advantage from this relationship as it benefitted from intertwined foreign companies linked to *al-Qaeda* that helped it circumvent United Nations sanctions. One of these scenarios involved a senior bin-Laden related business official named Salah al-Tamimi who conducted a large amount of business with Iraq in defiance of these sanctions. This individual was the director of Osama bin-Laden's tannery operations in Khartoum, Sudan. Another business contact used for this purpose was Osama bin-Laden's al-Hijra Company that worked with a Netherlands-based company that did clandestine operations for facilitating Iraqi weapons procurement. The presentation also mentioned that the Iraqi government provided least one hundred thousand dollars to terrorist groups in northern Iraq (such as *Ansar al-Islam*) that had very close links to *al-Qaeda*. Furthermore, the presentation mentioned Abdul Rahman Yasin, a fugitive from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing who

fled to Iraq in 1993. It also mentioned that Iraq had provided logistical support to a large number of terrorist organizations over the past several decades, including the Abu Nidal organization, *al-Fatah*, and the Japanese Red Army. Furthermore, the report mentioned Iraq's connections to a Malaysia-based Iraqi national named Ahmed Shikmat Shakir who facilitated the arrival of the 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mindhar for an operational meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.⁶⁸ On June 30, 2007, Shelton in a *Washington Post* article mentioned that on October 7, 2002 George Tenet sent a letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that stated the following points in acceptance of the intelligence summaries contained in her PowerPoint presentation:

We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and *al-Qaeda* going back a decade and of the presence in Iraq of *al-Qaeda* members, including some that have been in Baghdad. [There is] credible information indicating that Iraq and *al-Qaeda* have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression and that *al-Qaeda* leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with *al-Qaeda*, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action.⁶⁹

Referring to Tenet's best-selling book, *At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Shelton mentioned in a *Washington Post* article that Tenet said there was no evidence of Iraq's having authority, direction, and control of *al-Qaeda* operations. Shelton went on to mention that Tenet was at the center of the political thicket because he placed himself on both sides of the issues by supplying intelligence that firmly asserted Iraq and *al-Qaeda*'s relationship while simultaneously inferring that only concerns of such linkages existed.⁷⁰

In September 2002, the DIA released a report, *Iraq – Key WMD Facilities: An Operational Support Study* outlining that agency's position on Iraqi WMD. This report stated that the great bulk of Iraq's CW agents, precursors, munitions and production equipment were destroyed in the period from the end of ODS to ODF. This destruction resulted from UNSCOM

and United States military actions. Nonetheless, the DIA believed that Iraq retained production equipment, expertise, and chemical precursors that could reconstitute a CW program in the absence of an international inspection regime. The report also highlighted that there was no reliable intelligence that clearly indicated Iraq was producing or stockpiling CW, and if it had or would reestablish its CW agent production facilities. The statement went on to say Iraq could develop elements of its chemical industry to attain self-sufficiency in the production of precursors required for CW agent production. Also in September 2002, the DIA also published another report, *Iraqi Interest in Smallpox as a Biological (BW) Agent* that offered the same tenor in its wording as its CW report. In October 2002, the CIA published a paper *Saddam's Timelines for Using WMD* that stated Iraq had some lethal and incapacitating biological agents and was using fixed facilities to quickly produce and weaponize agents such as anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin toxin. An extensive 2004 CIA postmortem report, *Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community* found that in 2002 the agency's reports had become more one-sided in their support for the notions that Iraq had connections to transnational terrorist groups and was actively rebuilding its WMD arsenal. This report mentioned that the President's Daily Briefings lacked caveats about ambiguous and limited information that were present in other analytic products. This report pointed to the politicized analyses emanating from the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC).⁷¹

The OPOTUS also utilized wide-ranging efforts to promote the Iraq war agenda. These efforts came to prominence when Andrew H. Card instituted the White House Iraq Group (WHIG) in early August 2002. This assemblage started its weekly meetings in the White House Situation Room at approximately the same time Douglas Feith instituted the workings of the OSP in the Pentagon. WHIG consisted of Karl Rove, Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, Lewis

‘Scooter’ Libby, Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin, Jim Wilkinson, and Nicholas Calio. Karl Rove worked with WHIG to persuade Congress and the American people to support a preventative war against Iraq and to depose Saddam Hussein. In August 2002, VP Cheney made dramatic speeches about Iraq’s nuclear weapons; reportedly written by Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby and John Hannah. In September 2002, the White House leaked to the *New York Times* a story about Iraq’s purchase of aluminum tubes, ostensibly to be used in centrifuge techniques for the production of fissile uranium.⁷² Shortly after that leak, President G. W. Bush warned, “the smoking gun ... could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”⁷³ That commentary was the work of Karl Rove and WHIG. Rove, although untrained in national security matters, enjoyed a TS/SCI security clearance due to his position as political advisor to the President. Notably, Rove had regular access to sensitive classified information with respect to Iraqi WMD. On December 12, 2002, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet asserted to President Bush that Iraq’s possession of WMD was a ‘slam-dunk’ case. In 2006, VP Dick Cheney also referred to Tenet’s ‘slam-dunk’ comment in an interview with NBC’s Tim Russert on the *Meet the Press* television show.⁷⁴

VP Cheney had promoted the notion of a preventative war against Iraq on multiple occasions. One of the best examples of Cheney’s war promotion efforts occurred in an August 26, 2002 speech before the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Nashville, Tennessee. In this address Cheney said,

Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has WMD... There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. Saddam is a mortal threat to the United States based upon first-hand testimony from defectors including Saddam Hussein’s own son-in-law.⁷⁵

This study, however, shall demonstrate that Cheney’s assertions about defectors’ testimonies relied upon fabrications, coached statements, and a concerted denial and deception

campaign originating from elements of the INC. Indeed, the major G. W. Bush administration claims regarding Iraq's WMD programs were for the most part, based on or affected by INC activities, as will be demonstrated in the next section of this study.

As this dissertation shall show, the mindsets extant in the notables of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle would have a telling impact on analytic products generated in the prelude to OIF. One of the more notable examples of this situation was that of George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence. Tenet publicly and privately agreed with Cheney's position that stated WMD equipped terrorists had to be stopped at any cost, and he made this mission the CIA's top priority. Tenet selected Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a long serving CIA veteran to spearhead this campaign. Moreover, in a fashion similar to Cheney, Tenet strenuously asserted that the CIA was too risk-averse in dealing with Iraq's WMD and its ties to transnational terrorist organizations.⁷⁶ Specifically, Tenet's convictions migrated into a CIA organization that focused on Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal; the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center. Analytic deliberations in that organization effectively ceased in December 2002 when its director, Alan Foley told his staff, "If the president wants to go to war, our job is to find the intelligence to allow him to do so."⁷⁷ Certain CIA personnel alleged visits by VP Dick Cheney and his chief of staff, Lewis 'Scooter' Libby pressured them into generating intelligence to suit the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's perception of the Iraqi WMD program. Preconceived notions in certain management-level elements of the CIA were so strong that analysts suffered significant pressures forcing them to generate their analytic product in alignment with those of the iron triangle. Some of these individuals resisted those pressures and suffered negative career consequences including dismissal from the agency. A few of these individuals mounted legal actions against the agency asserting unlawful dismissal.⁷⁸ Essentially,

after ODS, debate about Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal subsided, and after 9/11, this debate all but disappeared. After that momentous event, elements of the IC had crossed an intellectual point of no return in which no sensible community member would risk conceptualizing that Iraq would not be WMD equipped.⁷⁹ Mark M. Lowenthal commented on the conventional wisdom regarding Iraq's WMD arsenal by saying,

Everybody *implicitly believed* that Saddam Hussein had WMD — no one could argue with the extrapolatory evidence previously presented by UNSCOM / IAEA [after ODS]... We viewed this conventional wisdom to be nearly insurmountable... We knew we were going to war irrespective of any analyses in the NIEs we produced.⁸⁰

Notably, the mindset expressed in the statements of America's elites extended into the general population. A CNN / USA Today / Gallup public opinion poll stated that ninety-nine percent of survey respondents said Iraq had WMD and was trying to develop them, while ninety-two percent said that Saddam Hussein was supporting terrorist groups that had plans to attack the United States.⁸¹ Coupled with the statements of America's elites, this survey pointed to the fact that the United States was emotionally poised for a preemptive war against Iraq, irrespective of intelligence analytic products to the contrary.

Colin Powell's Dissenting Perspective

Notwithstanding the Bush administration's overall hawkish mindsets, in late August 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell advocated an open debate within the United States and the international community with respect to Iraq's WMD and its links to transnational terrorist groups. Powell also wanted United Nations inspectors to re-enter Iraq to ascertain the true nature of the situation in that country. Notably, most members of the State Department (except John R. Bolton and his allies) and INR supported Powell's position with respect to Iraq.⁸² In an apparently serendipitous acquiescence to Powell's position, on September 16, 2002, Saddam

Hussein made clear that he was prepared to allow United Nations inspectors unconditional and unfettered access to Iraq's weapons-related sites. The Iraqi leader announced his intentions by way of memoranda delivered by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri to the United Nations and public statements by his Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz. In October 2002, the Iraqis declared that they would cooperate with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.⁸³ These modifications to Iraq's foreign policy seemingly failed to penetrate the ambiguous intelligence environment that originated after Operation Desert Storm. The next section of this study shall examine that intelligence situation.

The Ambiguous Intelligence Environment after ODS

By early 2002, Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal and his connection to transnational terrorist groups had become the overarching focus of President G. W. Bush's inner circle within the NSC. This scrutiny was not novel; after the close of ODS, the international community forced Saddam Hussein's government to submit to intrusive inspections of its military and WMD facilities by United Nations personnel. This arrangement formed a *quid pro quo* with the international community as outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687.⁸⁴ The cease-fire agreement following ODS granted Iraq conditional immunity from international retaliation in exchange for its accurate accounting and destruction of any proscribed WMD it possessed. David A. Kay worked the UNSCOM inspections and starting in June 1991, his team found residual calutrons hidden adjacent to a military base outside of Baghdad. Kay's team of inspectors located documents in a Baghdad office complex that housed the organization responsible for WMD research, production, and deployment. These documents outlined in detail Iraqi denial and deception campaigns used against United Nations inspectors.⁸⁵ Kay spoke of the historical state of the Iraqi WMD arsenal thusly:

Rolf Ekéus, chairman of UNSCOM, informed the Security Council on July 31, 1991, that inspectors had already found four times more chemical weapons than Baghdad had declared... By October 1991, inspectors [found] ...almost 10 times the number initially declared... Iraq's initial declaration of April 19, 1991, avowed that it had no proscribed nuclear materials, but this was amended on April 27 to acknowledge that it did have... 27.6 pounds of HEU [high-enriched uranium] and 22 pounds of LEU [low-enriched uranium]. Iraq... had...in 1981 embarked on a clandestine uranium enrichment program... At the time of the invasion of Kuwait, it had begun the start-up for industrial-scale enrichment... Over twenty thousand people [worked] in this ...nuclear weapons program.⁸⁶

Not restricting himself to comments about Iraq's nuclear weapons, Kay went on to say that a modest chemical and biological weapons program was well within the technical and industrial scope of many midsize countries such as Iraq. In another commentary, Kay further said inspectors operating in Iraq after ODS found a military-industrial complex researching and producing a wide range of WMD. He added that the Iraqi nuclear program was worth approximately ten billion dollars in U. S. funds. Kay went on to say that that the time of ODS, Iraq was only eighteen to twenty-four months away from a first-generation nuclear device and approximately three to four years away from battlefield-deliverable nuclear weapons.⁸⁷

UNSCOM and the IAEA's discoveries set an evidentiary precedent that seemed to demonstrate Saddam Hussein was determined to reconstitute his WMD programs. Moreover, these revelations ostensibly showed Saddam Hussein and his followers would resort to any denial and deception gambit in order to protect the progress and integrity of those programs.⁸⁸

Another subgrouping of mixed intelligence emanated from Scott Ritter, who served as an UNSCOM inspector. He openly admitted that he also worked as a clandestine CIA operative, and in that function, supplied a great deal of data to the United States pertaining to Iraq's WMD arsenal. Ritter arranged for CIA aerial photoreconnaissance analysts to examine the data generated by U-2 spy aircraft overflights of Iraq. Not only did Ritter use American intelligence assets to analyze the data feeds coming from UNSCOM's surveillance infrastructure, he also

used his contacts with Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate (*Agaf HaModi'in* or *Aman*) to fill the gaps in this task spectrum. From his practical experience in Iraq, Ritter appreciated that Saddam Hussein's forces had adapted old Soviet SCUD missile technologies to manufacture their own variant of that launch vehicle. He believed the Iraqis had buried these missiles in clandestine desert cache sites where they would remain until reactivation on Saddam Hussein's orders. Ritter then requested Operation Cabbage Patch in which American and British helicopter overflights used ground-penetrating radar to locate clandestine SCUD missile cache sites. Over its duration, Operation Cabbage Patch found nothing. Later, Ritter said one of his reports which dealt with the hypothetical existence of concealed Iraqi WMD was perverted by the IC into an official intelligence document that supported the actual existence of concealed WMD.⁸⁹

Notably, UNSCOM's inspectors did have some problems with their on-site monitoring technologies; they used battery-powered cameras that recorded their data streams onto similarly powered miniature video tape recorders. This situation required UNSCOM's technicians to change tapes and renew batteries periodically on their surveillance devices installed in the monitored sites. The United States replaced these devices with AC powered / battery backed-up monitoring equipment that wirelessly transmitted its results to an encrypted radio-frequency network. The United States Special Collection Service (SCS) designed, built, installed, maintained, and operated this infrastructure. This new arrangement allowed the United States to dovetail upon UNSCOM's monitoring, surveillance, and reconnaissance of Iraqi WMD and overall voice and data communications traffic.⁹⁰ The work of Ritter, his teammates, and the SCS-operated audio and video recording infrastructure demonstrated that America's IC enjoyed effective data collection mechanisms after ODS.

In August 1995, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel al-Majid and his family defected from Iraq. At the time of his defection, Kamel, was in charge of Iraq's WMD, and consequently had intimate knowledge of development programs, research and storage sites, and operational capabilities. Kamel exposed a document cache residing at a secret location outside of Baghdad codenamed the 'Chicken Farm,' which bared Iraq's undisclosed WMD infrastructure. Rolf Ekéus of UNSCOM used Hussein Kamel al-Majid's defection as a bludgeon to force Saddam Hussein to uncover his previously undisclosed WMD assets. Using this advantage and his considerable negotiating skills, Ekéus uncovered a massive Iraqi denial and deception campaign immediately after the defection of Kamel. In this exposé, Ekéus reported that Iraq had a huge, clandestine weapons-grade uranium enrichment program, and production facilities for feedstocks used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons.⁹¹

Notwithstanding Ekéus' comments, the IAEA and UNSCOM had generated a relatively complete picture of Iraq's WMD infrastructure that depicted a disarmed state. However, this picture left serious doubts about undocumented and undiscovered WMD facilities in Iraq. Scott Ritter agreed publicly with this assessment, but said the United Nations knowledge of Iraq's VX nerve agent research and development facilities, its short-range ballistic missile development, and BW programs were precariously incomplete. Moreover, he said the efforts of United Nations agencies ostensibly demonstrated Saddam Hussein's desire to reconstitute his WMD infrastructure and to obfuscate it from inspectors. Rolf Ekéus stated in 1997 that his judgment was that any further development of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program was inextricably linked to the importation of fissile material. When Richard Butler replaced Rolf Ekéus as head of UNSCOM in 1997, he noted that not only did UNSCOM use aircraft based surveillance, it also

used SIGINT technologies to monitor Iraqi radio and land-line based data and voice transmissions. According to Butler, along with aerial photoreconnaissance, and ground-penetrating radars, SIGINT technologies gave UNSCOM a very good picture of the state and extent of Iraq's WMD arsenal. Notably, the resultant data streams from these technologies migrated from UNSCOM into the hands of the CIA and NSA's technical analysis teams.⁹²

David Albright and Khidhir Hamza asserted in 1998 that Iraq would face difficulties in the development and production of nuclear weapons. Albright and Hamza also said that approximately three to seven years were required for Iraq to build the cascaded Zippe centrifuge infrastructure necessary to generate ten kilograms of HEU. They also maintained that Iraq faced problems in the development of Zippe centrifuge equipment necessary for the production of fissile materials. Additionally, they asserted that the damage suffered by Iraq during ODS and the IAEA / UNSCOM programs severely degraded that nation's nuclear weapons efforts. Continuing on this line of thought, Hamza and Albright maintained that all of Iraq's pre-ODS nuclear facilities had been destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. In late 1998, Saddam Hussein forced UNSCOM's personnel out of Iraq. Immediately thereafter, the United States and the U. K. started an intensive aerial bombing campaign, Operation Desert Fox (ODF). Remarkably, ODF fortuitously destroyed Saddam Hussein's sole remaining clandestine calutron, leaving Iraq denuded of uranium enrichment facilities and domestically generated fissile material. After the forced expulsion of UNSCOM personnel, Scott Ritter admitted that the intelligence flow pertaining to Iraqi WMD came to a drastic halt. Apparently, after ODF the United States sole recourse for data collection in Iraq was *via* remote SIGINT techniques and overhead surveillance methods such as spy satellites and reconnaissance aircraft overflights.⁹³ In contrast to Ritter's assertions, an upcoming section of this dissertation shall demonstrate that a

legendary member of the CIA mounted a ‘last ditch’ project to penetrate Saddam Hussein’s inner circle of decision-makers. This effort provided data streams that indicated Iraq was indeed denuded of WMD.

In 1999, Celso Amorim generated a series of reports for the United Nations that dealt with the status of Iraq’s WMD arsenal. These documents, otherwise known as the *Amorim Reports*, discussed the results of the IAEA and UNSCOM’s weapons inspections of Iraq since 1991. The *Amorim Reports* asserted that the IAEA and UNSCOM had been successful in the detection and destruction of many of Saddam Hussein’s proscribed weapons and their related development programs. It did however, note many difficulties in the ongoing detection of these programs. Moreover, the report noted that the Iraqis had failed to account for fifty warheads out of two hundred ten, seven Iraqi-made SCUD-type missiles, and other rocketry-related technologies they claimed to have destroyed. The *Amorim Reports* also asserted that the Iraqi chemical weapons program had for the most part been destroyed, but UNSCOM was not satisfied with Iraqi declarations about the production and stockpiling of nerve agent VX. The report also highlighted that Saddam Hussein’s government did not account for chemical weapons they used in the 1980s, or for approximately five hundred fifty artillery shells filled with mustard gas that they claimed to have lost after ODS. UNSCOM’s inspectors asserted by way of the *Amorim Reports* that Iraq’s BW program had been kept secret until Hussein Kamel’s defection in 1995. Nonetheless, UNSCOM’s inspectors gained significant insight into this program and supervised the destruction of al-Hakam, Iraq’s main BW research, development, and production site. Notwithstanding its findings, UNSCOM still had significant reservations about Iraq’s BW program because of Saddam Hussein’s previous obfuscation efforts, and more importantly, the ease of which BW agents could be produced by a nation such as Iraq that was endowed with

significant scientific and technological expertise. Additionally, UNSCOM's inspectors asserted *via the Amorim Reports* that there was no indication Iraq had nuclear weapons or any significant amount of fissile material, nor did Saddam Hussein's regime retain any facilities capable of enriching uranium into its weapons-grade isotope.⁹⁴

However, in 1999, David Kay of UNSCOM propounded a dissenting opinion, he stated that Iraq had the scientific and technological talent to design and build a cascaded Zippe centrifuge infrastructure needed to enrich uranium and efficiently produce fissile material. He also asserted that the Iraqis' only constraints were that of time and access to uranium ore. Kay feared that Iraq's close alignment with the former Soviet Union and Russian Federation would allow them access to clandestine sources of uranium ore, fissile uranium, or plutonium feedstocks. Therefore, Kay said if the Iraqis overcame these obstacles; it would only take them a few months to construct a first-generation nuclear weapon. Dissenting opinions from United Nations personnel continued to emerge; notable among these were the statements of Richard Butler, the chairman of UNSCOM. Butler said in July 1999 that he suspected Iraq had exerted tremendous efforts to reconstitute its WMD program. Continuing with this line of assertions, he mentioned that since there was no one on the ground to inspect and evaluate Iraq's WMD sites, it was reasonable to assume that Saddam Hussein's overarching desire to become a nuclear-armed power propelled that nation to reconstitute its R & D programs and its arsenal of these weapons. Notwithstanding David Kay and Richard Butler's pessimistic statements, in 2000, Hans Blix, based on surveillance satellite data and SIGINT feeds, stated that he estimated Iraq had no uranium enrichment program.⁹⁵

After the conclusion of the post-ODF inspection hiatus, on November 25, 2002 UNMOVIC's arms inspectors arrived in Iraq. Mindful of the CIA's connection with the United

Nations inspectors, Hans Blix assigned a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officer Jim Corcoran to an intelligence leadership post in UNMOVIC. Based on his understanding of the 'Five Eyes Agreement,' Blix knew very well that Corcoran would forward all information pertaining to Iraq's WMD arsenal to the IC. During United Nations inspections in late 2002 and early 2003, Blix's staff found 13,000 finished rocket tubes manufactured from 7075-T6 aluminum alloy, the exact same tubes assessed by Joe Turner of WINPAC to be Zippe centrifuge tubes used in the uranium enrichment process. However, Blix told the media that his inspectors did not find any 'smoking guns.' Notably in December of 2002, United Nations inspectors visited the Tuwaitha complex, Iraq's primary nuclear weapons research and development facility. During these visits, the inspectors found no evidence of the reconstitution of Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program, despite American satellite reconnaissance data to the contrary. In fact, United Nations inspectors found no definitive evidence of Iraqi WMD. As an adjunct to UNMOVIC's inspection regime, Hans Blix requested intelligence from the United States to locate Iraqi WMD sites. In a curious turn of events, the United States was not forthcoming with this intelligence, often citing United Nations inspectors as security risks who could reveal Iraqi sites queued up for American bombing raids.⁹⁶

In the days just before the January 27, 2003 deadline as stated in United Nations Resolution 1441, IAEA and UNMOVIC's inspectors discovered that the Iraqis had violated sanctions by smuggling rocket engines into their country. Inspectors took this fact as evidence that Iraqis were developing missiles with a range in excess of the proscribed limit of one hundred fifty kilometers. During a snap inspection of the Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Compound, UNMOVIC inspectors found twelve gas warheads, notably without any chemical weapons residues. At approximately the same time, UNMOVIC's inspectors raided the private home of a

prominent Iraqi nuclear scientist. During that raid, the inspectors found approximately three thousand documents pertaining to experimental high-energy laser isotopic refinement technology and ballistic missile laser guidance systems. Hans Blix mentioned these documents were not proof positive that Iraq had a reconstituted WMD program; this information suggested but failed to prove Saddam Hussein had not totally abandoned these enterprises.⁹⁷

As a culmination of their inspection work, on January 27, 2003 Hans Blix of UNMOVIC and Mohammed El-Baradei of the IAEA presented their report to the United Nations Security Council. Blix stated that it was too early in the inspection process to ascertain if Iraq had reconstituted its WMD program. He went on to say the Iraqis had left unanswered several important questions pertinent to their WMD stockpiles and their R & D programs. Moreover, Blix said that the Iraqis supplied only four hundred of approximately three thousand six hundred names of their scientists, engineers, and technicians who worked on WMD and other proscribed weapon systems. El-Baradei mentioned that his IAEA inspectors had found no evidence of a nuclear weapons program.⁹⁸

The commentaries and reports from the IAEA, UNSCOM, and UNMOVIC were inconsistent; some stated that Iraq's arsenal had been sufficiently degraded so as to become combat ineffective, while others stated the possibility that there were yet undiscovered and undeclared WMD caches in that country. Moreover, some reports stated that Iraq was still a threat to the world because Saddam Hussein had the overarching desire to become a WMD-equipped power and still had indigenous engineering, scientific, and technological skills to design, produce, and deploy these weapons systems. These inconsistent statements by United Nations personnel and other public figures allowed sufficient intellectual and political slack so that American decision-makers and senior members of its IC could extrapolate with what they

assumed to be reasonable assuredness that Iraq had reconstituted its WMD program or at least had significant intent to do so. This smorgasbord of inconsistent intelligence reports from the United Nations helped allow the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle to select whatever information feed they felt would best suit their pre-existing political aims. Notably, ‘cherry-picking’ of information would come to be a significant factor in the politicization of intelligence in the prelude to OIF.

A Note on Uranium Enrichment Technologies

As nuclear weapons and related technologies were some of the major talking points presented by the G. W. Bush administration to support America’s war with Iraq, it is useful for the reader to understand how naturally occurring uranium ore is refined, purified, and isotopically separated into its fissile, weapons-grade state. The upcoming paragraphs shall present that discussion.

Uranium, when refined from its natural ore contains about ninety-nine percent of the U^{238} isotope. This isotope does not support nuclear fission and its only military uses are armor piercing projectiles and armor plating. The U^{235} isotope, which is fissionable and when enriched to a high enough percentage is fissile, represents approximately one percent by weight of naturally occurring uranium ore. In order to produce a nuclear weapon, large amounts of uranium metal refined from its natural ore must come under isotopic separation. U^{235} when collected in sufficient amounts to achieve critical mass is suitable for use in atomic fission weapons such as implosion and gun type devices. Moreover, a critical mass of U^{235} is useful as an initiator charge for thermonuclear weapons.

Many paths for uranium isotopic separation existed in the prelude to OIF, chief among them was the method developed by the United States during the World War II Manhattan

Project. This method used electromagnetic separators called calutrons. These contrivances are huge devices that require massive support infrastructures and enormous amounts of electric power. However, calutron-based enrichment was not the only production method for fissile uranium used during the Cold War. Another uranium isotopic enrichment method used during that period was gaseous diffusion. In this process, purpose-built machinery forced super-heated uranium hexafluoride molecules through semi-permeable membranes thereby accomplishing the separation of U^{235} from U^{238} isotopes. Gaseous diffusion accounted for approximately forty percent of the world's production of highly enriched, fissile uranium isotopes. An alternative class of methods for the production of HEU is that of ultracentrifugation. These techniques use components called gas centrifuges and a later enhancement called Zippe centrifuges. Engineers and physicists developed these processes in order to improve upon the inefficient, high cost methods of isotopic separation such as calutrons and gaseous diffusion. Most isotopic enrichment centrifuges use metal tubes rotating at extremely high speeds to separate uranium isotopes based upon their density. Notably, these rotating cylinders operate at very high centrifugal forces. These operating parameters require the cylinders' machining and finishing to extremely tight tolerances to ensure a very high level of static and dynamic balance coefficients. The aluminum tubes in the Iraqi WMD scenario were in such a state; they exhibited balance factors to the nearest milligram and finish tolerances normally associated with aerospace components. These features helped lead to the conventional wisdom in certain sectors of the IC that Iraq was building a large-scale uranium isotopic separation program based upon Zippe centrifuges.⁹⁹ Iraq's purported use of aluminum tubes in a Zippe centrifuge program shall be discussed in *Chapter III, Dubious Data Enters the IC*.

The U. S. Government's Relationship with Ahmad Chalabi and the INC

President G. H. W. Bush formally acquainted the United States government to Ahmad Chalabi and the INC by way of a CIA front company located in London, England, the Rendon Group U. K. (TRG-UK). Using a multi-million-dollar covert budget supplied by the CIA, TRG-UK embarked on a massive media blitz to publicize Saddam Hussein's human rights violations, war crimes, and WMD activities. Not limiting itself to publicity operations, TRG-UK also organized an opposition movement with a view of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. TRG-UK, using CIA covert funding and logistical resources, supported the INC's efforts inside Iraq to topple the Saddam Hussein government *via a coup d'état*. In 1994-1995 Robert B. Baer, a CIA covert operative met with Chalabi several times in the Kurd-controlled region of northern Iraq. Baer asserted that Chalabi had very strong ties to the CIA and the White House and could literally talk to agency executives and the OPOTUS whenever he chose.¹⁰⁰ In short, Ahmad Chalabi and the INC had enjoyed an 'inside track' with conservative elites such as President G. H. W. Bush, and SECDEF Dick Cheney since ODS. Therefore, when one takes into consideration Chalabi's political acumen and adept lobbying efforts, it is not surprising that he and his organization maintained advantageous contacts with American neoconservative elites from the end of ODS to the prelude of OIF.

Notwithstanding the INC's sporadic relationship with the CIA and State Department *via* the interface provided by the Rendon Group, the DoD served as the main and enduring entry point into the federal government for Ahmad Chalabi and the INC. Three organizations within the DoD facilitated this relationship; they were the PCTEG, NESAs, and the OSP. William J. Luti's special assistant, Navy Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein handled the duties of interviewing Arabic speaking assets; he was a linchpin in the production of the material emanating from these three organizations. Other policy-compliant appointees who worked for

Luti, Shulsky, and Feith included Michael Rubin, a Middle East specialist previously with the AEI; David Schenker, previously with the WINEP; Michael Makovsky; David Makovsky, a senior WINEP fellow and former executive editor of the pro-*Likud* Jerusalem Post; and Chris Lehman, the brother of John Lehman, a prominent neoconservative who served as Secretary of the Navy under Ronald Reagan. Based upon ‘cherry-picked’ data inputs from the INC, United Nations, and other sources, the pseudo-intelligence produced by the PCTEG, NESAs, and the OSP did not use the normal analytic checks and balances used by the CIA, DIA, INR, and other intelligence organizations of the United States. In short, Feith, Luti, Shulsky, and other personnel from the PCTEG, NESAs, and the OSP gathered uncorroborated data from the INC that asserted Iraq had links to *al-Qaeda* and also had reconstituted its WMD program. These individuals converted the INC’s material into talking points for SECDEF Rumsfeld, VP Cheney, and other G. W. Bush administration notables. Greg Thielmann, a noted INR analyst asserted the PCTEG, NESAs, and the OSP were highly unusual entities; these organizations had at their disposal the United States largest intelligence agency, the DIA, but for reasons incomprehensible to him, these three groups ignored the majority of the DIA’s analytic products. He went on to say these organizations only used the DIA’s analytic products that supported the neoconservatives’ pro-war stance.¹⁰¹

Some INC memoranda identified John Hanna, a senior aide in the OVP as one of the recipients of that organization’s information feeds. A former aide to Newt Gingrich, retired Navy Captain William J. Luti, was the leader of Feith’s NESAs and another direct recipient of the INC’s pseudo-intelligence. Notably, Luti was also a top aide to SECDEF Dick Cheney during the administration of G. H. W. Bush. He also served as a senior aide to VP Dick Cheney in 2001 before he transferred to the DoD. Allen Keiswetter of the State Department asserted that both

Hannah and Luti attended meetings that dealt with the INC, Chalabi, and the promotion of their information feeds. In August 2002, Colonel William B. Bruner of the NESA and OSP released a stream of pseudo-intelligence based upon unvetted information delivered to the DoD by Ahmad Chalabi and the INC. In October 2002 comments to the media, Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA executive asserted a great deal of this product appeared in presidential and vice presidential speeches despite that fact that it was uncorroborated, and not subject to the checks and balances of standardized analytic techniques. These products moved their way into the highest levels of decision-making in the G. W. Bush administration; as Shulsky, Bruner and others finished these products, they appeared in the desks of Luti, USECDEFP Feith, DSECDEF Wolfowitz, USECDEFI Stephen Cambone, SECDEF Rumsfeld, VP Cheney, and President G. W. Bush.¹⁰² The commentaries of Ahmad Chalabi's retinue of Iraqi dissidents helped reinforce the intellectual platform of American neoconservatives. Fortuitously for the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle, this platform also received intellectual and political maneuvering space from the inconsistent statements put forward by United Nations weapons inspectors operating in Iraq and intelligence sources.

During her tour of duty in the NESA, Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski saw further irregularities in the movement of pseudo-intelligence to and from Douglas Feith's organizations. In October 2002, she noticed significant similarities between Abram Shulsky's documents and President G. W. Bush's Cincinnati, Ohio speech in which he spoke of a smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. Shortly after that speech, Kwiatkowski chatted with Major John Trigilio, who was at that time William J. Luti's assistant in the NESA. Trigilio told Kwiatkowski that Bush's speech 'toed the party line;' he said it stemmed from intelligence to which very few people in the IC enjoyed access. Kwiatkowski deduced that the speech

originated from the pseudo-intelligence generated by the close relationship between the PCTEG, OSP, NESAs, and the INC. Trigilio's commentary is especially significant; in fact, the DoD had intelligence feeds that it did not disclose to other members of the IC. These classified feeds, upon their release to the public, showed the DoD had good reason to believe that Chalabi's INC *at best* based its pseudo-intelligence upon innuendos, assumptions, and guesswork.¹⁰³

The INC's relationship with the federal government was not always smooth. In fact, the State Department was one of the early objectors to Ahmad Chalabi and the INC's obfuscatory practices and lack of financial accounting procedures. Allen Keiswetter, the State Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Near Eastern Division ordered the INC program transferred out of the State Department. Auditors in the State Department found the INC had spent almost five hundred thousand dollars on a propaganda program that featured very poor substantiating documentation. In late 2000, the State Department ceased funding the INC's operations. Just after the inauguration of G. W. Bush, VP Cheney spearheaded the effort to restore federal government funding to Ahmed Chalabi and the INC. In May 2002, the State Department again removed the INC's funding which notably had reached almost three hundred-fifty thousand dollars per month. Richard Armitage, who was then Secretary of State Powell's deputy, led the initiative to disqualify the INC for further funding. This situation would not endure, as SECDEF Rumsfeld later ordered a reinstatement of INC funding under the management of the DoD.¹⁰⁴

With VP Cheney's approval, SECDEF Rumsfeld directed the DoD to assume funding responsibilities for Ahmad Chalabi and the INC in early September 2002. This funding amounted to approximately three hundred-fifty thousand dollars per month that the DIA administered from a secret account that supported HUMINT collector operations. However, this funding arrangement came with obligations; the most significant of these requirements was that

the INC and the DIA enter into a secrecy agreement that prohibited the INC from releasing any of its data, information, or analyses without the expressed permission of the DoD. This agreement also stated that the DIA be the sole INC intelligence conduit to the OSP, with SECDEF Rumsfeld ultimately acting as the single dissemination control point for INC intelligence products. Under no circumstances would the DoD allow the INC to deliver its intelligence products by any other method. Irrespective of the directions given the DIA by Cheney and Rumsfeld, most of the agency's regular members did not trust Ahmad Chalabi or his pseudo-intelligence providers in the INC. These individuals recommended polygraph sessions when verifying INC HUMINT assets provided to United States. However, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and its immediate subordinates chose to ignore this recommendation.¹⁰⁵

Dick Cheney's Adversarial Relationship with the IC

Dick Cheney and his group of supporters exhibited a well-known disdain for the IC, its methods and results. One of the foundations of his antagonistic relationship with the IC is exemplified by the fact that Cheney approved the recruitment and staffing of many notable individuals who worked for or had other professional relationships with the neoconservative Senators Henry M. 'Scoop' Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Members of various NICNs such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Abram Shulsky, and Zalmay Khalilzad carried forward and reinforced the agenda that decried the IC's poor operational and analytic record during the Cold War and America's conflict with transnational terror groups. Moreover, Cheney based his perspective on the fact that he viewed the IC as a consummate failure in its mandate to anticipate and prevent the 9/11 attacks, and because he thought it did not have a complete grasp of Iraq's pre-ODS WMD programs. Cheney mentioned the IC's history of intelligence failures and

repeatedly stated that the INC was the only group delivering high-quality intelligence pertaining to Iraq. Cheney made multiple comments that the CIA had no HUMINT assets in Iraq after the expulsion of UNSCOM's inspectors. Therefore, Cheney viewed Ahmad Chalabi and the INC as the most reliable source of HUMINT with respect to Iraq in the prelude to OIF.¹⁰⁶

VP Cheney's use of Richard Haver is exemplary of his disdain for the IC. Cheney and Haver had a long-standing professional relationship that extended back to the G. H. W. Bush administration. Haver was a former operator in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), whom SECDEF Dick Cheney appointed as his Special Assistant for Intelligence at the DoD. Later in his career, Haver became a senior member of the CIA's investigatory team tasked to assess Aldrich Ames' damage to that agency; he was especially scathing in his criticism of the CIA for allowing Ames to operate for ten years as a Soviet double agent before his arrest in 1994. In the G. W. Bush administration, Haver became SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld's Special Assistant for Intelligence, the same job he previously had with SECDEF Dick Cheney. Haver was instrumental in the promotion of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's version of a 'Team B' campaign against the IC. Like his benefactor Cheney, Haver believed that the CIA, especially during the W. J. Clinton administration was feckless and far too risk-averse to be an effective contributor to American security. He said the CIA was not truly clandestine and its operational signature was easily identified because of a lax approach to tradecraft that routinely betrayed its sources and methods. VP Cheney actively promoted Haver to become the Director of the CIA and Director of Central Intelligence upon G. W. Bush's election to the presidency. However, President G. W. Bush decided to keep George Tenet in that position. Tenet was well aware of Cheney's hostility to him and his promotion of Haver to fill his position.¹⁰⁷ The Richard Haver scenario shall appear in *Chapter V, Discussion and Conclusions* as one of the

downward facing workplace pressures that could have contributed to the politicization of the CIA's executive cadre in the prelude to OIF.

As stated earlier in this work, VP Cheney historically had a strained relationship with the IC; he specifically viewed George Tenet and the CIA with a jaundiced eye. Another interesting example of this relationship appeared when under the approval of the OPOTUS and OVP, the CIA's Inspector General, John L. Helgerson initiated an investigation into the agency's accountability for the intelligence failure that allegedly allowed the 9/11 attacks to occur. Supported by the advice of VP Cheney, President G. W. Bush had nominated Helgerson to the position of CIA-IG in February 2002. Although having Helgerson's nomination approved by the Senate, only President G. W. Bush had the power to remove the CIA-IG from office. In a few short weeks after his nomination, Helgerson received an official request from Congress to initiate his investigation. Bolstered by the encouragement of the OPOTUS and OVP, Helgerson's staff immediately began interviewing CIA personnel, in some cases using polygraph examinations, interrogating their friends and family members, combing through raw data feeds, field operations notebooks, and analytic documents, along with computer and communications logs.¹⁰⁸

The intrusive nature of the CIA-IG's investigation caused the agency's rumor mill to run rampantly with reports of a 'witch hunt' operating at the behest of VP Cheney, 'Scooter' Libby and their close associates in the NSC. The impact of the investigation and its rumors was great; many individuals who formerly offered dissenting opinions on Iraqi WMD and Saddam Hussein's connections to transnational terrorist groups made abrupt positional reversals into alignment with the statements made by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle.¹⁰⁹ In fact, almost seventy percent of the anonymous respondents in this study who worked for the CIA in the prelude to OIF said this 'witch hunt' caused them to work in an environment best described

as a climate of fear, loathing, and coerced compliance with the policy preferences of their superiors. Completed in late 2004, the results of the CIA-IG's investigation were held secret in the Office of the Inspector General until June 2005, with a redacted public release on March 19, 2015. The investigation pointed to misdeeds by approximately fifty CIA personnel; among them were Cofer Black, Ben Bonk, Henry Crumpton, James Pavitt, and George Tenet. Other individuals implicated in the report were the directors of the Counter Terror Center and the bin-Laden Issue Station (Alec Station). In early July 2005, some of these individuals filed formal responses to the CIA-IG's allegations levied against them.¹¹⁰ The CIA-IG's report recommended formal Accountability Board hearings for these individuals. After its release in June 2005, the CIA's new director, Porter Goss contemplated pursuing the Accountability Board hearings and punitive sanctions recommended in the CIA-IG's report, but instead declined to do so and issued a blanket, agency-wide pardon for all individuals mentioned in that document.¹¹¹ However, Goss' actions in 2005-2006 were too late to be of any consequence to the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. The CIA-IG examination scenario shall appear in *Chapter V, Discussion and Conclusions* as one of the downward facing workplace pressures that could have contributed to the politicization of the CIA's executive cadre in the prelude to OIF.

Apparently, the impact of the CIA-IG's investigation was not enough to satisfy Dick Cheney and his immediate group, as the VP continued not to trust the efficacy, accuracy, and timeliness of any intelligence analyses emanating from Tenet's organization. This continuing lack of trust appeared when VP Cheney and his chief of staff Lewis 'Scooter' Libby made multiple visits to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. In these visits Libby behaved like a prosecuting attorney; he confronted analysts with rapid-fire questions often asserting that their analyses were inaccurate, untimely, and unhelpful. Reinforcing Cheney's perspective, Rumsfeld,

Wolfowitz, Feith, and other members of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle dealt with members of the IC in a contemptuous and haughty fashion. Once the CIA delivered its analytic product to VP Cheney, Libby rebuffed them and again confronted them with more rapid-fire questions that insinuated their incompetence, untimeliness, and unresponsiveness to executive requirements. The cycle of Cheney and Libby's repeated rebuffing of the CIA's analytic product became a significant feature of the iron triangle's dealings with the IC during the prelude to OIF. This snubbing of analytic product again appeared when VP Cheney recommended that President G. W. Bush change the analytical standard when dealing with WMD equipped rogue nations and terrorist groups. In that recommendation, Cheney asserted that the G. W. Bush administration lower the threshold of evidentiary acceptability when proving possession of WMD, and raise it when asserting the non-presence of those weapons systems. He also stated the G. W. Bush administration had to be much more aggressive in dealing with these threats than the W. J. Clinton administration was. Essentially, VP Cheney used his position as the President's information gatekeeper to steer G. W. Bush's decisions in a direction friendly to the VP's worldview.¹¹² Jami Miscik, the CIA's DDI asserted that Cheney and Libby's rebuffing of CIA analytic products exerted tremendous pressure on the analysts to conform to the preconceived notions of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle.¹¹³ Speaking to these types of situations, Robert Hutchings the former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council said:

When policy officials come back repeatedly to push the same kinds of judgments, and push the intelligence community to confirm a particular set of judgments, it does have the effect of politicizing intelligence, because the so-called 'correct answer' becomes all too clear... I think every judgment ought to be challenged and questioned. But... when it goes beyond that, to a search for ...clearly defined, preformed set of judgments, then it turns into politicization, and... even when it is successfully resisted... it creates a climate of intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging.¹¹⁴

The complexities inherent in the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's manipulation of intelligence analytic products was reinforced by the statements of a senior NIC analyst for Middle East Affairs and signatory of the October 2002 NIE, Paul Pillar. He asserted,

Reports that conform to policy preferences have an easier time making it through the gauntlet of coordination and approval than ones that do not... [Managers] want to avoid the unpleasantness of laying unwelcome analyses on a policymaker's desk.¹¹⁵

In short, the actions of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and its staff constituted subtle and sometimes overt attempts to modify the analytic output of the IC into alignment with their policy preferences. In *Chapter V, Discussion and Conclusions*, the author shall analyze, compare, and contrast these actions and policies against the theoretical constructs put forward in *Chapter IV, Theoretical Considerations*.

The Imbroglia of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate

In September 2002, Senators Dick Durbin and Bob Graham asked CIA Director George Tenet for a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to inform Congress on the state of Iraq's WMD arsenal and other related issues. Tenet assigned this task to its usual working group; the National Intelligence Council, staffed by senior members of the IC called National Intelligence Officers (NIO). The NIOs worked around the clock to prepare this document for presentation to Congress in October 2002. Many members of the National Intelligence Council and their support staff remained in their offices for days at a time, receiving changes of clothing from their families and subsisting on junk food, coffee, and caffeinated soft drinks. George Tenet delivered this document to Congress just in time for its vote to authorize the use of military force against Iraq. This NIE was very similar to a September 2002 DIA document *Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Program*. Both documents referred to Iraq attempting to acquire yellowcake uranium ore from Niger. Nevertheless, the INR's assessment was different from that of the CIA. The INR's

analyses asserted that Iraq's quest for centrifuge parts and yellowcake uranium ore in Africa was not supported by current data garnered from American collectors. Strangely, the INR's dissenting analyses appeared in the back text of the National Intelligence Estimate; they did not appear in the executive summary of that document.¹¹⁶ Analysts at the State Department's INR put forward dissenting opinions that rejected the notions that Iraq had a reconstituted WMD program. The dissenting opinion reads as follows:

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research believes that Saddam [Hussein] continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapons-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment... INR is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon... In INR's view, Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U. S. DoE who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others [such as CIA's WINPAC] to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets.¹¹⁷

Contrary to popular opinion, the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002 was not instrumental in the United States initiation of OIF. In actuality, the PDBs and other special intelligence reports given to the President by CIA briefing personnel were key factors in the United States initiation of OIF. Senior CIA briefers such as Michael Morell gave PDBs and Special Briefings to the President and the Vice President. These briefings are highly confidential, and their specifics are generally unknown to the majority of the IC except for Morrell, Jami Miscik, John McLaughlin, and George Tenet. Notably, three senior analysts confirmed with the author of this dissertation that only twelve members of Congress had read and understood the full text of the October 2002 NIE. These analysts maintained that the October 2002 NIE had a

minimal, if any impact on Congress' decision to authorize the use of military force against Iraq. Paul R. Pillar, the NIO for Near East and South Asia, and one of the primary signatories of the October 2002 NIE, asserted that intelligence analysis was not a key factor in the crafting of security decisions and was often misused to publicly justify executive decisions already made. Pillar further postulated that politicization significantly affected the quality of the IC's analytic products. However, there were dissenting opinions at the CIA; some analysts and operators were in agreement with the INR's assessment of the alleged Nigerian yellowcake contract. CIA's upper-level management quashed these dissenting opinions in order to present a unified agency analytic response to these issues. The October 2002 NIE was a highly flawed document, pointing to the fact that the intelligence analytic process did not align itself well with the information provided by the IC's collector agents. This document was wrong on most accounts; an especially glaring example of these errors was the statement that said if Saddam Hussein acquired sufficient HEU Iraq could make a nuclear weapon within a year.¹¹⁸

On October 2, 2002, Senators Bob Graham and Dick Durbin requested a declassified version of the classified NIE. Graham and Durbin wanted the American public to understand better the importance of the Iraq issue. The declassified document appeared a few weeks later, replete with polished graphics, satellite images of weapons sites and maps that delineated targeting distances for alleged Iraqi ballistic missiles. In actuality, the key judgments section of the declassified NIE appeared to be much more strongly worded than the corresponding section of the classified NIE. Senator Graham said, "It was a terrifying case for war. The problem was that it did not accurately represent the classified NIE."¹¹⁹ The backwash from the October 2002 NIE continued to escalate, for on January 10, 2003, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley summoned the DDI, Jami Miscik to attend a meeting later that afternoon in which she

would present the latest CIA intelligence report pertaining to Saddam Hussein's connections with *al-Qaeda*. Miscik realized that the OPOTUS, OVP, and NSC were operating based on their own independent sources of pseudo-intelligence, and that these entities simply wanted the CIA's DI to validate those products in order to make it more palatable for public and congressional consumption. Disagreeing with Alan Foley and WINPAC's assessments of Iraq, Miscik reached her level of tolerance for the tainting of intelligence analytic product with policy preferences. Several individuals whose workspaces resided on the seventh floor of the CIA's headquarters building stated that Miscik expressed grave apprehensions about the public statements made by the President and notable members of the NSC. She went so far as to say that the information suites underlying these statements were nothing more than rubbish. Miscik then visited Tenet in his office and heatedly threatened to resign. Tenet then placed a telephone call to Stephen Hadley and cancelled the meeting with Miscik. Tenet, who promoted Miscik to DDI, did not want her to resign; he instead recused her from further analytic products pertaining to Iraq. Consequently, no further Iraq-related analytic product emanating from the DI would appear under Miscik's signature. As mentioned previously, the CIA's DO mounted information collection operations under the aegis of Charlie Allen and Tyler Drumheller; these efforts arrived at conclusions that triangulated to a high degree with those of Miscik and the INR. Moreover, the DO discredited the commentaries from the INC, 'Curveball,' and other assertions made by the PCTEG, NESAs, and OSP. Notwithstanding these results, in the view of VP Cheney, the NSC had the requisite proof it needed in order to initiate military action against Iraq.¹²⁰ The October 2002 NIE would come to have a telling impact on Colin Powell's address before the United Nations Security Council.

Interestingly, while the civilian IC's working-level operators and analysts were generating reports and analytic products that disagreed with the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's perspective on Iraq, SECDEF Rumsfeld's own DoD intelligence organizations were producing similar results. On September 5, 2002, the DoD's Chief of Joint Intelligence (J-2), Major General Glen D. Shaffer produced a report that assessed Iraq had been making some progress in WMD programs. This report made its way to SECDEF Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers on September 9, 2002. Notably, Shaffer's J-2 organization stated this assessment relied heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than hard evidence. Further to that statement, J-2 assessed that the evidentiary basis was particularly sparse for Iraqi nuclear programs. Moreover, it also mentioned that Iraqi security measures had negated America's view into most of Iraq's WMD program. In its presentation, J-2 stated that it did not know with any precision how much it knew about Iraq's WMD programs. The presentation further stated that Iraq had the internal expertise needed to build nuclear weapons, with many of the processes still being in place to build such arms. In subsequent pages, J-2 assessed Iraq possessed a viable weapon design capability, yet the DoD did not know the status of its uranium enrichment capabilities and had no notion whether its Zippe centrifuge program was operational or not. J-2 admitted in this presentation that its knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was based in the ninetieth percentile on analysis of imprecise data.¹²¹

On the question of biological weapons, J-2 assessed that Iraq had the knowledge needed to build these munitions without the use of external expertise, and it did have all the processes required to produce these ordnances. Nonetheless, J-2 admitted that it could not confirm the identity of any Iraqi facilities involved in the production of biological weapons. J-2 assessed that it had ninety percent incomplete intelligence on how and where the Iraqis could produce

biological munitions. On the issue of chemical weapons, J-2 assessed Iraq had the knowledge needed to build these arms without the use of external expertise, but it did not know if all the processes required to produce these weapons were in place. J-2 further assessed that Iraq had previously demonstrated the capability to produce various mustard and nerve agents, but lacked the precursors for sustained agent production. Additionally, J-2 could confirm the identity of facilities producing feedstock chemicals for the production of these weapons, but it could not confirm the location of any Iraqi sites producing the final chemical agents. Furthermore, J-2 admitted that its intelligence about Iraqi chemical agents and production facilities was at best, only sixty to seventy percent complete.¹²²

Assessing the Iraqi ballistic missile scenario, J-2 asserted that Iraq had the knowledge to design these missiles without the use of external experts, and that it had many of the processes in place to build these delivery systems. Moreover, J-2 asserted that Iraq could only produce short-range ballistic missiles and that its intelligence on the Iraqi ballistic missile program was half-complete, but only twenty-five percent complete for staging and storage sites. In essence, Shaffer's J-2 assessed that the DoD's intelligence store with respect to Iraq's WMD programs was incomplete, inaccurate and based on a foundation of assumptions, inferences, and guesswork.¹²³

Glen D. Shaffer's document package made its way to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers and SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld and seemed to move no further. Lawrence Wilkerson, the Chief of Staff for Secretary of State Colin Powell, never mentioned to the author of this study that he and Powell had seen this document in the course of their duties. In short, Powell made his presentation before the United Nations Security Council based upon foundations of incomplete intelligence and without the benefit of access to previously obfuscated

DoD analytic products. Karen Kwiatkowski, who worked in coordination with OSP and PCTEG personnel, said that she saw similar documents stating the same type of intelligence analyses in the course of her duties, but this information remained inside the boundaries of USECDEF Douglas Feith's organizations. Moreover, Greg Thielmann and Thomas Fingar asserted that they never saw this documentation package, and had they seen it, the October 2002 NIE could have been different from the version the NIC presented to Congress.¹²⁴

Working without the benefit of the intelligence analyses provided by Glen D. Shaffer's organization, Colin Powell fortuitously directed his team to discard most of the pseudo-intelligence from the INC and Ahmad Chalabi. A concerted and heated debate occurred between Powell's team and the CIA with respect to the controversial assessment of Iraq using the aluminum tubes in Zippe centrifuges. Alan Foley and Joe Turner of WINPAC asserted that the aluminum tubes were destined for Iraq's Zippe centrifuge project; curiously, Powell ignored the dissenting opinions of the INR and accepted the CIA's position. The CIA also asserted that Iraq's connection to mobile BW labs was substantiated by the testimony of 'Curveball,' Major Mohammed al-Harith, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, and Abu Zeinab al-Qurairy. Tenet and his executive-level subordinates conveniently chose to withhold the fact from Powell that these individuals had direct connections to Ahmad Chalabi and the INC, for whom Powell had an intense distrust. Powell also noticed undated Iraqi communications intercepts that the NSA had translated into American Standard English. These intercepts pointed to the fact that two of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard commanders were talking about destroying evidence of Iraq's CW program in order to hide it from United Nations inspectors. Powell did not notice that the overhead aircraft and satellite photos of CW and BW sites were so indistinct that they were unsuitable for proof of Iraq's involvement in these proscribed weapons programs. However,

Powell still was uncomfortable with the evidence provided to him by the CIA; so great was his discomfort that he demanded George Tenet stand behind him during his speech to the United Nations Security Council. Powell told Tenet that his presentation was as much Tenet's as it was his.¹²⁵

A day before Powell's presentation before the United Nations Security Council, Tyler Drumheller had an opportunity to review its supporting material. Drumheller was extremely uncomfortable with WINPAC's assertions about the aluminum tubes, the OSP's 'pseudo-intelligence' about mobile BW labs, the yellowcake controversy, and other items he considered 'flights of fancy.' He contacted John McLaughlin and expressed his concerns with these analyses. Tenet then chatted with Drumheller and acknowledged these concerns but did not say he would take any action on the suspect intelligence. Contemporaneously, a CIA reporting analyst operating in Joseph Wippl's organization assessed that 'Curveball' was a fabricator and his assertions should not reside in any sort of presentation about Iraqi BW programs. On or about February 5, Drumheller checked with his support staff to ensure that his suggested deletions to Powell's presentation had been forwarded to George Tenet and ultimately to Colin Powell. Unbeknownst to Lawrence Wilkerson, 'Scooter' Libby made a last-minute attempt to reinstate the Prague-Mohamed Atta-*Mukhabarat* scenario in Powell's speech.¹²⁶

Drumheller was not alone in his assessment of the intelligence concerning Iraq and its status with respect to WMD and transnational terrorist organizations. His immediate subordinate, William D. Murray was the CIA's Paris Chief of Station and the agency's handler of Iraq's Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri and his Palestinian intermediary. In his typically colorful manner, Murray commented that the 'Curveball' testimony was garbage, and he added that WINPAC's analyses shared the same quality. Lawrence Wilkerson mentioned that none of Drumheller and

Murray's commentaries reached his staff or Powell before his speech. However, this situation does not liberate Powell from responsibility for his presentation before the United Nations Security Council. Months before Powell's speech, Greg Thielmann, a senior State Department officer in charge of analyzing Iraq's WMD had alerted Powell to the fact that the aluminum tubes were most likely not intended for use in Zippe centrifuges. About six months before the speech, INR had given Powell an accurate assessment of Iraq's WMD program that stated it was not reconstituted. On January 31, 2003, the INR sent Powell memos asserting approximately thirty-eight allegations in his speech were based on shaky evidence. Powell discarded most, but not all of the thirty-eight allegations. Hans Blix noted that most the allegations in Powell's speech mainly were based upon assumptions, as opposed to inspections, HUMINT, or overhead surveillance data streams. Blix went on to say that IAEA and United Nations inspectors found no overarching evidence of Iraq's complicity in proscribed activities.¹²⁷

The Origins and Cultures of the IC

The evidence and commentaries presented in the previous sections of this study suggest that the working-level analysts and operators in the IC had assessed correctly Iraq's WMD program and its involvement with transnational terror groups. Once these analyses reached certain levels of the executive cadre in the IC, politicization occurred, save for an outstanding exception: State Department's INR. This situation leads to an important question: what made INR so radically different from all of its sister agencies in the IC such that it successfully resisted top-down pressures to mold its analyses into alignment with the political predilections of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle? The historical foundations of the CIA and the INR shall serve as baselines from which to explore possible organizational and cultural differences

between these organizations that may have contributed to their divergent analytic perspectives and outcomes in the prelude to OIF.

Until the signing by President G. W. Bush of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the IC featured approximately sixteen sister agencies operating under separate budgetary control areas, with differing mandates, control schema, institutional cultures, and styles of management. The greatest division in the IC exists between agencies with a civilian mandate and those operating under the aegis of the DoD. The civilian agencies vary from law enforcement-oriented entities such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) to those agencies mandated to collect and analyze intelligence such as the CIA, the DoE Intelligence Group, and the State Department's INR. In the prelude to OIF, the CIA *nominally* acted as the central clearinghouse for the intelligence products generated by its sister agencies. The Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, who was also the Director of the CIA, provided this function. Acting under the aegis of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (ODCI), the CIA and the NIC generated President's Daily Briefings, Special Briefings, and National Intelligence Estimates for use by the President, the National Security Council, and Congress. The ODCI had *nominal* control of all of the sixteen intelligence agencies in the IC, but most notably did not exert budgetary authority over those entities. Without being able to institute organizational sanctions *via* budget cuts, staff reductions, and resource / financial realignments, the ODCI in practice only exerted consultative powers. Hence, *national* standards of data collection, information production, and intelligence analysis were conspicuously absent in the prelude to OIF. In fact, in

the highly competitive and duplicative environment of the American IC, the ODCI appeared to be a figurehead institution, and to some extent, was ineffectual.¹²⁸

As in any hierarchically organized entity, strains and stresses occur between employees, their peers, and superiors in their chain of command. These conditions can result from human emotions such as greed, jealousy, insecurity, or other pathologies. In any organization, workers generally wish to ensure their continued employment, career advancement, and enhancements to their professional status. With these notions in mind, the researcher posed *ad-hoc* questions to two hundred twenty one anonymized respondents in the American IC that queried the relationships they had with their peers, managers, and bureau executives. One hundred four out of two hundred twenty one of the qualified, anonymized respondents indicated that there was some sort of strain in the relationships with their peers and superiors in their chains of command. Of these one hundred four respondents, approximately sixty seven percent of those who worked in the CIA reported these characterizations, while approximately sixteen percent of those who worked in the INR had similar responses. Respondents in this group who worked in the DoD and the DoE's intelligence bureaus offered levels of responses similar to their comrades in the INR. These responses point to some sort of difficulties extant in the CIA's work environment. The conceptual foundations of these workplace pathologies shall be examined in *Chapter IV, Theoretical Considerations*. Also in the course of the background research performed for this study, the author had occasion to interview the CIA's Politicization Ombudsman for the DI, Barry L. Stevenson. In the course of that interview, Stevenson mentioned that to the best of his recollection there were approximately eight politicization complaints lodged with his office during the prelude to OIF. Stevenson also mentioned that he could not discuss the details of these complaints due to his lifelong nondisclosure agreement with the CIA. Further responding to

these questions, Stevenson suggested that the author of this study file a Freedom of Information and Privacy Act release request with the CIA to gain access to those details.¹²⁹

The Origins and Cultures of the CIA and INR

In the few years before America's entry into World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt relied on informal modes of data collection for producing intelligence products. These methods often involved the use of close associates to collect data from both foreign adversaries and allies alike. Confidants such as Harry Hopkins, W. Averell Harriman, and William J. Donovan often provided these data collection services. Notably, Donovan was a graduate of Columbia Law School, where he was a classmate of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Also noteworthy was the fact that Donovan had earned the Medal of Honor in World War I. In 1940, Roosevelt sent Donovan to Europe to ascertain the robustness of Britain and again in 1941 to gather information on the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. It is during these data gathering excursions that Donovan had extensive contact with William S. Stephenson, the British Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS or MI-6) official normally posted to Washington, D.C. These data gathering expeditions allowed Donovan and Stephenson to discuss Great Britain's extensive practice of secret intelligence and analysis, thus allowing Donovan to form an intellectual model of how America's intelligence service should be designed and operated. Upon returning to America, Donovan lobbied for the creation of America's first centralized intelligence institution. In July 1941, Roosevelt appointed Donovan as the Coordinator of Information (COI) to collect data and produce intelligence relevant to America's national security. Donovan used his experience in World War I and his contacts with British intelligence agencies to create the Division of Special Information (DSI) residing in the Library of Congress. Subsequently, Donovan called upon Archibald MacLeish, then Librarian of Congress and his associate,

William L. Langer, to recruit other scholars for the purpose of intelligence research and analysis. This organization formed the underpinnings of America's *de jure* centralized practice of data collection and intelligence analysis. Nonetheless, after the Pearl Harbor disaster, the Roosevelt administration deemed that intelligence analysis support was insufficient to meet the national security needs of the United States. Hence, in June 1942, under the aegis of the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States government re-designated the COI / DSI as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the command of Donovan.¹³⁰

The OSS assumed the duties of the DSI in addition to carrying out clandestine operations against the Axis powers. It consisted of three separate bureaus: Research and Analysis, Secret Intelligence, and Special Operations. As a military officer and a noted man of action, Donovan favored Secret Intelligence and Special Operations over the Research and Analysis Bureau. The other two bureaus of the OSS mainly consisted of military professionals who did not hold the bespectacled academics in the Research and Analysis Bureau with a high degree of respect. They disparagingly referred to the Research and Analysis Bureau as the 'Bad Eyes Brigade.' This example of intra-bureau friction would become significant when President Truman split the OSS into the INR and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The OSS was primarily a military institution featuring a top-downwards style of management whose commanders used authoritarian methods when dealing with subordinates. This militarily mediated cultural matrix would have a telling effect on its daughter establishment (CIA) in the prelude to OIF: that agency's executive team would not tolerate dissenting opinions or alternate hypotheses in its analytic products generated for America's decision-makers. Hence, most analytic products appearing under the official banner of the CIA featured a unitary agency position.¹³¹

Even as early as 1943, Donovan proffered official requests within the military hierarchy to gain support for a civilian, centralized intelligence bureau. Most ranking military officers were hostile towards Donovan's proposals as they viewed his projected bureau to be a diminution of the intelligence agencies residing in their particular service branches. During the later days of World War II, Donovan formally proposed a centralized intelligence bureau in a document, *The Basis for a Permanent U. S. Foreign Intelligence Service*. Sidestepping his military chain of command, Donovan directly delivered this document to President Franklin D. Roosevelt on November 18, 1944. However, this proposal immediately met significant resistance from the FBI, the armed services, the State Department, and the press. The internecine fighting concerning the proposed bureau was palpable; it caused Donovan to make multiple proposals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Cabinet, and the President. Notwithstanding the OSS commander's considerable efforts, Roosevelt did not move on his recommendations, and upon his death, Donovan had to restart his lobbying exertions with the new President, Harry Truman. Adding to the political resistance to Donovan's proposed agency, Walter Trohan on February 9, 1945 published an article, *Donovan Proposes Superspy System for Postwar New Deal* in the *Washington Times Herald*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the *New York Daily News*. These newspaper articles contained the full text of Donovan's proposal, *The Basis for a Permanent U. S. Foreign Intelligence Service*. Trohan publicly trumpeted that Donovan's proposed agency would be an American *Gestapo* and consequently, contrary to the notions of Americanism. These pressures on the OSS were not ephemeral occurrences; they would continue throughout the life of that organization and would extend into the environment that molded the institutional culture of its daughter bureau, the CIA. As will be demonstrated in upcoming paragraphs, this culture could be seen as that of bureaucratic defense, in which the CIA protected its budget,

headcount, and in some cases its overall survival. In October 1945, President Truman disbanded the OSS and moved its Special Operations Bureau to the War Department while the Research and Analysis Bureau went to the State Department, where it formed the foundation of the INR. Along with its analysts, the university-like culture of the OSS' Research and Analytical Bureau migrated to the INR. Moreover, President Truman appointed the State Department to serve as the lead agency for all federal departments that dealt with national security intelligence analysis. The collegial perspective of the OSS' Research and Analytical Bureau would become a hallmark of the INR's *modus operandi*. In fact, this operational predilection would become quite prevalent in the prelude to OIF, as the institutional culture of the INR would not only support, but also encourage Socratic debate, alternate hypotheses, and dissenting opinions with respect to Iraq's WMD and its connection to transnational terrorist groups.¹³²

Shortly after the close of World War II, President Truman became increasingly dissatisfied with the condition of America's data collection, information production, and intelligence analysis. Wishing to avoid a repeat of the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure, Truman issued an executive order on January 22, 1946 to establish the National Intelligence Authority, Central Intelligence Group, and Intelligence Advisory Board. In that month, Donovan received the Distinguished Service Medal in recognition of his wartime accomplishments; he subsequently left the Army and returned to his private law practice in New York. Truman had hoped the Central Intelligence Group would be his answer to the problem of managing disparate and bureaucratically bickering intelligence agencies. Truman initially instituted the Central Intelligence Group as a clearinghouse without strong central authority or wide-ranging budgetary control. Nonetheless, within six months of its establishment, its director Hoyt S. Vandenberg petitioned for his agency's enhanced power, autonomy, and centralized control of the IC.

Truman then sponsored the National Security Act of 1947 that founded the CIA. The institution of the CIA was not without resistance: some commentators and government officials, especially J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI stated that this institution was no more than an American *Gestapo*. The exhortations and political maneuvering of J. Edgar Hoover, his bureau subordinates, and Washington, D.C. allies would have a telling effect on the nascent centralized civilian intelligence infrastructure proposed by William J. Donovan. This sort of external pressure would have a profound effect on the former OSS personnel who formed the majority of the CIA's staff: that organization would come to develop a closed, introspective culture. Moreover, the military indoctrination and authoritarian *modus operandi* of the former OSS members who moved to the CIA would significantly contribute to an institutional culture centered on the production of analytic products that reflected unitary agency opinions.¹³³

The resistance to the creation of the CIA was only the opening salvo in a battle that would continue throughout the history of the agency. It continued with a formal investigatory effort, *The Eberstadt Study*, spearheaded by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. In November 1948, this work made several recommendations to President Truman with respect to a centralized civilian intelligence service. It said the organizations established by the National Security Act of 1947 were not working well and recommended increased cooperation between the CIA, the State Department, the armed forces, and their respective customers. The report further recommended that the CIA establish a top-level evaluation board of highly experienced personnel whose duties would be exclusively limited to intelligence evaluation. Finally, the report stated that the CIA must be the central organization for the national intelligence system.¹³⁴ This set the stage for the CIA being the final arbiter of intelligence analytic product offered to the President, the Vice

President, the National Security Council, and Congress. These products would appear in the form of President's Daily Briefings, Special Briefings, National Intelligence Estimates, and the like.

The external pressures placed on the CIA did not end with *The Eberstadt Study*. In fact, as time progressed, these pressures intensified; executive and congressional opponents of the CIA inflicted many denunciations on that agency. A small sampling of these are: (1) the failure to predict the Soviet Union's development and test of a nuclear weapon; (2) the failure to predict North Korea's invasion of its southern neighbor, and the People's Republic of China entering into that conflict; (3) the failure to successfully prosecute the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba; (4) the failure to depose or assassinate Cuba's dictator, Fidel Castro; (5) the illegal actions within the United States as examined by the Church Committee; (6) the failure to predict the Iranian revolution; (7) the failure to predict Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; (8) the failure to uncover the Soviet mole operating in its midst, Aldrich Ames; and (9) the failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.¹³⁵ These failures and the resultant waves of negative opinion within certain circles of the government's elites reinforced the CIA's defensive and introspective nature; over the course of time, the agency's practice of sharing data, information, and intelligence even with security and compartmentalization cleared individuals fell to the wayside.

The INR's Accurate Analytic Products

In the prelude to OIF, the State Department's INR generated many classified intelligence analytic products that dissented with the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's conventional wisdom concerning Iraq's reconstituted WMD program and its involvement with transnational terrorist groups. Although these reports are not open for public perusal, Simon Dodge, Greg Thielmann, Wayne White, and others who wished to remain anonymous asserted that the INR did not support the assessments that Iraq had a fully reconstituted WMD program or

that it had functional ties to transnational terror groups responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, the 9/11 disasters, and other attacks against the United States and its allies. One of the INR's notable dissenting opinions on Iraqi WMD appeared in the October 2002 NIE; however, the NIC moved these opinions to the twelfth and thirteenth pages of the classified version of that document. These findings did not appear in the executive summary, the section most likely to be read by legislators and their staff members.¹³⁶

Based on information gleaned from conversations with several notables in the IC, the researcher ascertained that the INR featured institutional, managerial, and analytic cultures that differed from its sister agencies. These differences include foci on subject matter expertise, country and area expertise, intellectual maturity of analysts, customer-focused standard operating procedures (SOP) and other issues. Specifically, the INR's analysts generally enter the bureau with a minimum of 12 years' previous experience in analysis, civil service, or in Foreign Service appointments. Moreover, the majority of the INR's analysts hold doctorates in disciplines deemed critical for the generation of high-quality issue-area specific analytic products. In discussions with some notable intelligence practitioners, another factor appeared in the hiring practices of the IC: save for the INR, the IC generally eschewed the hiring of candidates holding doctorates into their analytic cadre. After the ascendance of Robert Gates to the position of DCI, hiring practices focused on the acquisition of junior analyst candidates holding baccalaureate degrees with the goal of turning them into analytic generalists. The IC's management cadre considered holders of doctorates to be far too specialized to fit into the strategic vision of Robert Gates and his subsequent DCIs. IC managers thought these individuals could not fit into the broad-spectrum demands of the post-Gates analytic era. In short, the managers and directors in

the IC outside of the INR saw analysts who held doctorates as individuals who were difficult to re-mold into intellectually compliant generalists.¹³⁷

Even though under pressure by politicized management cadres, various analysts in its sister agencies agreed with the INR's positions. More often than not, the internal cultures of these sister agencies caused these analysts' opinions to be overwhelmed by bureaucratic wrangling and internal SOPs that demanded unitary agency opinions. Notably, the CIA's employees are encouraged to maintain the *status quo* and are mandated to satisfy numerical quotas based on quantity metrics. Essentially, the internal cultures of the INR's sister agencies were not conducive to dissenting opinions and Socratic debate. Along this line, Greg Thielmann offered some special insights into the culture of the INR. During the prelude to OIF, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John R. Bolton, attempted to politicize the INR's analytic products into alignment with the predilections of certain Bush administration elites. The then-serving Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Carl Ford, Jr., resisted Bolton's politicization attempts in the INR's analytic offices. According to Thomas Fingar and parallel to Greg Thielmann's line of thought, the INR's culture of excellence and focus on Socratic debate led it to be a 'career magnet' for other analysts in the IC. Consequently, the INR could 'cherry pick' the rest of the IC for its cadre of analysts. Fingar noted that it was a common occurrence for analysts in its sister agencies to take a cut in pay and grade in exchange for the perceived privilege of working in the INR.¹³⁸

In the words of Thielmann and Fingar, another key component of the INR's analytic successes resided in its institutionally engendered balance of foci between current and strategic intelligence analyses. Stemming from its standing culture that emanated from its intellectual roots in the Library of Congress, this equilibrium helped mitigate the ever-present predilection of

analysts' managers to focus on short-term 'hot issues' at the expense of strategic intelligence analyses. Fingar was especially incisive about the differences between the INR's institutional culture and that of its sister agencies. For example, until 2005 the average 'time on account' for an INR analyst was over fifteen years, while the remainder of the IC's average was less than three years. This speaks to the overarching maturity and subject matter expertise of the INR's analysts. With analysts managing wide portfolios, the INR's culture of deep expertise required these specialists to work on issue areas with a long-duration, strategic perspective. Fingar mentioned one of the greatest problems in the IC was the rapid churning of entry-level and mid-level analysts to various issue and country-specific areas, thereby blunting their expertise and transforming them into analytic generalists. Fingar summed up the situation by saying "The INR's sister agencies in the IC move their people around to such an extent that they have very little residency in their present job; they know more about their previous job than their present one. This is a grievous institutional problem."¹³⁹

Drawing on his experience as Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, Fingar noted another unique quality of the INR: it features a career advancement program that is very close to a meritocracy. Fingar mentioned that the INR's career advancement program is practically an anomaly in the United States government, as it is based mainly on expertise and quality of work, as opposed to the seniority-based systems present in its sister agencies of the IC. This feature allows the INR to maintain top-level expertise in the analytic professions: analysts can enjoy financial and career advancement without moving into management cadres. Reinforcing this position, Fingar asserted that keeping expert personnel inside the analytic ranks is essential to the provision of high-quality intelligence to governmental decision-makers. He further asserted that the INR views expert-level analysts as the *ne plus ultra* of the bureau. INR's

analysts had ‘on the ground’ experience as most came from embassies, working on country desks, and interacting with foreign decision-makers on a daily basis. These individuals more often than not came from other agencies in the IC; consequently, they knew the good analysts and operators in the IC, and, when necessary, reached out to their interagency peers. Stressing this point, Fingar noted that this interagency connectivity was a cultural norm for the INR. This sort of interagency communications historically has enhanced the INR’s capabilities to produce high-quality intelligence analytic products.¹⁴⁰

Fingar and Thielmann also discussed one of the INR’s strengths that are not readily apparent to external commentators. Even though the INR is a small bureau, the State Department is very large, with embassies and consulates operating in almost all nations of the world. Therefore, the INR can draw on these resources to gather information, open source intelligence, and other data to strengthen its analytic capabilities and products. The norm for the INR is to interact with anybody who could be a potential source for data or information, such as scholars, the media, noted personalities, business people, other government agencies, and the IC in general. In an interesting witticism, Fingar asserted that the State Department’s ‘champagne and *hors d’oeuvres* method’ of overt data collection often trumped that of covert operations such as the CIA’s espionage. This is not the norm for the other members of the IC: in these agencies, there were significant institutional and cultural barriers to operate in a fashion similar to the INR. Fingar summed up his assertions by saying that State Department’s INR is designed to support diplomacy; it does not perform paramilitary operations, counterterrorism, interdiction, and espionage. Consequently, these differences significantly contributed to the INR’s unique institutional and analytic culture.¹⁴¹

Based upon his position as Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, Thomas Fingar was in the unique position to add pertinent commentary about the CIA, its institutional, managerial, and analytic cultures. According to him, the dominant ethos, rulemaking, and SOPs of the CIA originated from the clandestine side of intelligence work. INR has a vastly different culture than that of the CIA; it is more like a university environment that handles classified and open source information. The INR's culture emanated from the days of Donovan's COI and DSI residing in the Library of Congress; the INR can trace this professional ethos to the heritage of Archibald MacLeish, then Librarian of Congress. Many of the INR's analysts originate from similar positions in the Library of Congress or the Congressional Research Service. In contrast to the INR environment, agency rules constrained CIA analysts and operators' interactions with their peers in its sister agencies of the IC.¹⁴²

At the end of the Cold War, most of the IC's agencies did not know what the next great problem would be. Their focal point of analysis, the Warsaw Pact was defunct. The INR had always been flexible because the State Department dealt with all nations on the planet: it was not exclusively focused on the Soviet Bloc. The INR's sister agencies in the IC focused on the ability to do generalized analytic work as opposed to being subject matter experts in specific areas of inquiry. The INR did not do this. The end of the Cold War resulted in dramatic drops in the levels of subject matter expertise in the INR's sister agencies. This situation did not occur in the INR. Fingar's conceptualization of the INR's institutional culture is summed up in the following phrase, "As opposed to the perception of being correct, exhaustive analytic rigor is a prime concern at the INR. The perception of correctness more often than not leads analysts down an erroneous path."¹⁴³ Fingar's commentary is especially interesting as it points to an

organization whose overall ethos is based on an inquisitive *weltanschauung* that emphasizes the generation of policy-relevant, yet policy-independent analytic products.

Thielmann and Fingar also asserted that the INR is a prime example of a learning organization. They stated that Sherman Kent's principles of social scientific, acumen-based intelligence analysis are alive and well at the INR, but not so much in its sister agencies. In the absence of deep subject matter expertise, parts of the IC, especially the CIA, periodically encountered analytic problems. Proceeding with this line of thought, Thielmann and Fingar warned that analysis by rote without subject matter expertise is problematic. Residing in the State Department forces the INR's analysts to be acutely aware of the policy implications of their analytic product. The INR's analysts routinely talk with their customers: they are not isolated from their customer base like analysts in the rest of the IC. In closing, Fingar and Thielmann noted that approximately thirty percent of the INR's analysts are former Foreign Service Officers: this situation helps them understand the context and implications of the intelligence analytic products they generate.¹⁴⁴

Information Technology Problems in the Prelude to OIF

In the late 1990s, the IC became increasingly dependent on information technology to collect, sort, and index data, produce information, and analyze that information into intelligence products. Ever since the inception of the Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA) Initiative, technology-mediated intelligence production consumed the majority of congressional budgetary allocations for the IC. The ARDA Initiative featured a flagship project called *Novel Intelligence from Massive Data* (NIMD); this project formed the underpinnings of the NSA's mass surveillance infrastructure. NIMD featured a broad-spectrum approach to data collection; its philosophical foundation was to cast a wide net and collect all data irrespective of its

relevance to national security concerns. Once captured and stored, the software algorithms of NIMD would automatically sort, index, and collate the data, turn it into information, and purportedly generate high-quality intelligence analytic products with almost no human intervention.¹⁴⁵

However, ARDA's technological focus was not without problems; for example, America's premier TECHINT agency, the NSA suffered several information technology blackouts during the directorship of General Michael V. Hayden. These blackouts prompted Hayden to initiate his famous "100 Days of Change" in order to reestablish a customer-facing focus in the NSA's mission and non-mission oriented information technology systems. Hayden's drastic initiative caused the purge of many senior professional practitioners, managers, and directors in order to make the NSA's huge fleet of information technology platforms, operating systems, and application programs behave in a synergistic fashion that would purportedly produce comprehensible results for intelligence analysts and consumers alike. Hayden's initiative was not altogether successful as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (*JWICS*) and *InteLink* failed in their mission to deliver data, information, and lucid analytic products to executive and analytic consumers during the prelude to OIF.¹⁴⁶

A senior NIO and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mark Lowenthal asserted that information technology problems affected the quality of the October 2002 NIE and other analytic products. In these assertions, he stated that 'burn notices' from analysts in various sections of the IC went unnoticed due to computer-based information overload and user interface factors. Drawing an analogy to a subway car passing multiple advertisement billboards, Lowenthal stated that these 'burn notices' were ignored because their format was not distinctive enough to catch the attention of the NIC's analysts. Other analysts in the IC essentially agreed with Lowenthal's

assertions. Analysts in the CIA, NSA, and the State Department's INR asserted that the information retrieval and cataloguing functions on *JWICS / InteLink* were especially difficult to use for those not conversant with computer technology. As these analysts were subject matter experts in constrained areas, such as WMD counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and political constructs, they openly admitted that their technological expertise did not extend into the area of information technology, specifically that of doing keyword in context / keyword out of context (KWIC / KWOC) searches and relational database-enabled information retrieval. In short, the clumsiness of the *JWICS / InteLink* enabled applications' user interfaces did not allow analysts to delve easily into the huge assemblages of data collected by America's mass surveillance and reconnaissance programs. William B. Binney, a long serving NSA specialist in cryptomathematics and computer systems, said this situation was akin to the intelligence analyst finding a gold-colored needle in an incredibly huge haystack. He publicly asserted in many forums that this type of situation was a major problem in America's production of high-quality intelligence before the 9/11 disasters and in the prelude to OIF. Mark Lowenthal and Greg Thielmann went on to say that the warnings relating to the 'Curveball' testimony, the Niger yellow cake scenario, and the aluminum centrifuge tube reports may well have run uncorrected because 'burn notices' went unrecognized because of these technological problems. In fact, one government commission asserted that the CIA's reticence to put some of its finished intelligence on *JWICS* or *InteLink* as one of the problems in the pre-OIF intelligence environment.¹⁴⁷

Although not information technology professionals, Fingar, and his immediate subordinates recognized the severity of the *JWICS / InteLink* problem and recommended its solution by way of an *Intellipedia* system. This system used a *Wikipedia*-style user interface in which 'burn notices' and other high priority action items were placed within easy reach of

compartment security-cleared IC professionals. This project had been languishing in the prelude to OIF; had it been in place, intelligence analysts would have had an easy-to-use, common interface for the accumulation of raw data, information, and subsidiary intelligence analytic products for the generation of President's Daily Briefs, Special Intelligence Reports, and National Intelligence Estimates. With appropriate levels of analysts' security clearance and compartmentalization authorizations, *Intellipedia* allows universal access to all feeds, sources, and 'burn notices.' However, Fingar's *Intellipedia* did not appear until 2006, too late to be of any consequence to the intelligence situation in the prelude to OIF.¹⁴⁸ Although information technology-mediated problems were extant in the prelude to OIF, this study asserts that the main issue was that of politicization at the executive level in certain agencies residing in the IC.

Summary

This chapter has elucidated a confluence of intellectual positions, personages, and other factors that generated an environment conducive to the reception of dubious data feeds emanating from various sources. Additionally, this chapter has explicated the structure of the IC and the cultural and structural differences between the CIA and the INR. This section suggests that the combination of the above factors generated an environment that was favorable to the in-house production of faulty intelligence products by the OSP, PCTEG, and NESA in the prelude to OIF. Supporting the intellectual and ideological predispositions of the G. W. Bush administration's neoconservative elites, these factors helped generate a subsequent milieu conducive to the generation of talking points and information suites supportive of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's position to attack Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and his sons from power. This and the upcoming chapter shall serve as the empirical data suite from which to contrast and compare the theoretical constructs discussed later in this study.

CHAPTER III

DUBIOUS DATA ENTERS THE IC

This chapter shall deal with questionable data that entered the IC, the generators of this data, along with the organizations and personnel that received, processed, and redistributed these assemblages. When one aligns these feeds with the receptive environment provided by the elements discussed in the previous chapter, it becomes apparent that a combination of intellectual predilections, worldviews, and institutional peculiarities generated an environment that may have resulted in the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. This section shall demonstrate that policy-compliant personnel in the NESAs, PCTEG, and OSP served as entry points and distribution conduits for these data streams that eventually found their way into the publicity campaigns, talking points, and policies of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle.

The INC's Pseudo-Intelligence Supports the Iron Triangle's Policies

The INC's suites of pseudo-intelligence moved to the OVP, NSC, and OPOTUS via Douglas Feith's direct subordinates in the DoD, such as those individuals working in the PCTEG, NESAs, and OSP. In the PCTEG, neoconservative staffers such as David Wurmser and Michael Maloof filtered these packages in order to ensure compliance with the policy objectives set out by VP Cheney and SECDEF Rumsfeld. Conversations within the PCTEG and OSP indicated their leaders viewed the CIA as a rival unit, with poor performance and intelligence analytic products that were flawed at best. Richard Clarke, a former White House

counterterrorism expert said the PCTEG and OSP were acting as intelligence analytic entities, notably without a legal mandate to do so. He further asserted that these entities were not really performing proper intelligence analysis as they had already decided on a conclusion, and they were simply searching for evidence to support it. The NESAs, also under the control of Douglas Feith, blurred its boundaries with the PCTEG and OSP. Within the NESAs was an Air Force Colonel, William B. Bruner, who was reputedly Ahmed Chalabi's handler. Notably, Bruner was a former military aide to House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Bruner often appeared with Chalabi during the summer of 2002, escorting him to the NESAs's offices on the Pentagon's fourth floor. Remarkably, Chalabi was a foreign national with no security clearance. Consequently, he should have been barred from facilities dealing with classified materials. In the production of its pseudo-intelligence product, the NESAs used inputs from NICNs such as the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the Middle East Media Research Institute.¹⁴⁹ The staff of the PCTEG, NESAs, and OSP formed the underpinnings of the iron triangle led by Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz.

Iraq's Aluminum Tubes and Zippe Centrifuges

In early 2000, the Military Industrialization Commission of Iraq released a request for bids for approximately sixty thousand high-strength 7075-T6 alloy aluminum tubes with an outside diameter of eighty-one millimeters. A contract trader named Ahmed al-Barak located at al-Khellany Square in Baghdad placed a bid with a Jordanian company in Amman called the Atlantic Trading and Communications Corporation (AT&CC). An expatriate Iraqi who was the director of AT&CC, Bashir Ibrahim received the bid and gained approval from al-Barak to proceed with the enterprise. Ibrahim awarded the production contract to the International Aluminum Supply Company, an Australian subsidiary of *Kam Kiu* Aluminum Products Group of

Taishan, Guangdong, in the People's Republic of China. Garry Cordukes, the managing director of International Aluminum Supply, suspected that this order was in violation of United Nations sanctions and alerted the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). After a short time, ASIS *via* its liaison officers forwarded its concerns to the IC. Under surveillance by the Americans and Australians, in late May 2001, approximately two thousand of these finely machined aluminum tubes left the Kam Kiu facility in Southern China in transit to Hong Kong. Then the aluminum tube consignment left Hong Kong for AT&CC in June 2001. All the while, elements of ASIS and the IC were watching the progress of the shipments. Eventually the consignment reached Jordanian territory. In July 2001, officials from the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID or *Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah*) and the CIA intercepted the shipment. When the aluminum tubes reached Jordan, certain INC-friendly individuals in the GID transmitted these results to their compatriots operating in Washington, DC. These individuals presented this information to Douglas Feith's operating groups in the DoD. Upon receiving this information, members of Feith's groups promoted this unvetted information into intelligence products without subjecting it to any of the procedures used in traditional or structured intelligence analysis. In September 2002, the White House publicly asserted that these tubes served as evidence for a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons program. However, after the initial assault phase of OIF, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) examined these tubes and assessed them to be over-engineered componentry for use in the production of eighty-one millimeter military rockets. In a later report, the ISG stated that there was no evidence to support the notion of a program to design, develop, or produce eighty-one millimeter gas centrifuges or Zippe centrifuges used in uranium isotopic separation procedures. The DoE asserted that the aluminum tubes were for tactical rocket motor casings, and some CIA analysts eventually adopted this assertion.¹⁵⁰

Wayne White, a senior INR official working on Iraq-related issues, asserted that the United States had captured a shipment containing aluminum tubes bound for Iraq: he further posited that in the subsequent analysis of these tubes, American specialists found they were unsuitable for use in Zippe centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. On September 8, 2002, Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller published an article in the *New York Times* that stated in the past fourteen months Iraq attempted to purchase thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes that American officials believed were intended as components for centrifuges to produce weapons grade uranium. Gordon and Miller asserted that the size, finish, and precision of the tubes prompted the American IC to assert that these tubes were intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapons development program.¹⁵¹ On September 11, 2002, the NSC directed the CIA to provide clear language about the aluminum tubes; the agency complied with the NSC's request by issuing the following statement:

Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And we also know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient of the process. The regime was caught trying to purchase [five hundred] metric tons of this material. It takes about [ten] tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon.¹⁵²

In the first week of September 2002, Paul Wolfowitz invited Ahmad Chalabi's American agent in Washington, D. C., Francis Brooke, and the expatriate Iraqi nuclear weapons scientist, Dr. Khidhir Hamza to a confidential meeting in his Pentagon office. Wolfowitz wanted clarification on the dual use controversy that centered on Iraq's aluminum tube purchase. All the while Hamza's book, *Saddam's Bombmaker: The Daring Escape of the Man Who Built Iraq's Secret Weapon*, was enjoying public acceptance and notoriety, partly because of the INC and Brooke's promotion campaigns. Interestingly, on August 30, 2002, Hamza testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; in that testimony, he declared that Iraq had approximately

ten tons of uranium, and one ton of partially enriched uranium, which was enough to produce the HEU needed for three first-generation nuclear devices. Hamza went on to say Iraq could accomplish this feat in three years. Hamza's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2002 firmly cemented the notion in the G. W. Bush administration's elite cadre that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his post-OSIRAK nuclear weapons program. Notably, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi was the leader of Iraq's pre-1991 crash program for the development of Zippe centrifuges to replace the expensive and inefficient calutrons previously used in that state. Obeidi openly stated in his book *The Bomb in My Garden: The Secret of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind* that Iraq had an active uranium enrichment program based upon ultracentrifugation technologies. He further asserted that the program halted after the post-ODS sanctions imposed upon Iraq by the United Nations. Writing further, Obeidi mentioned that he had the plans for the Iraqi variant of the Zippe centrifuge in a fifty-five gallon oil drum buried in the garden next to his home. Debunking Hamza's assertions, Obeidi mentioned that Hamza was not a uranium enrichment specialist, nor was he involved in his program in any fashion. General Amir al-Saadi, who was one Iraq's most senior weapons scientists and its liaison with UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, asserted on his April 12, 2002 surrender to American forces that Saddam Hussein had no extant WMD. Saba Abdul Noor, another arms designer, and professor at Baghdad Technology University said that after the close of ODS, logistics, resources, and development skill sets were too dispersed and too disorganized to revive any Iraqi WMD project. At a similar time, Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, a top Iraqi BW scientist and member of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council mentioned that Iraq's BW program was in a shambles after ODF.¹⁵³

Other Iraqi WMD specialists had similar data to offer. Among these was Hussein al-Shahristani, a respected expert in the area of neutron activation theory who had received his

training in this area at the University of Toronto. Al-Shahristani unfortunately had told Saddam Hussein that his nuclear program had fundamental deficiencies, and for his honesty suffered torture at the hands of the *Mukhabarat*. Along with his Canadian wife, al-Shahristani and his family luckily managed an escape to Iran during the chaos that ran rampant during ODS. From Iran, al-Shahristani then communicated his assessment of Iraq's nuclear weapons capabilities to the CIA's DO by way of relatives living in Europe. Eventually al-Shahristani made his way to Canada and subsequently joined the Iraqi opposition movement headquartered in London, U. K. He later re-entered Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein and rose to an elevated status in Iraqi partisan politics.¹⁵⁴

Interestingly, the conventional wisdom of an operational Iraqi centrifugal uranium enrichment program would not cease; personnel inside WINPAC vigorously promoted the aluminum tube-Zippe centrifuge argument. An analyst in WINPAC named Joe Turner asserted that the aluminum tubes were single-use items, specifically designed for use in uranium enrichment Zippe centrifuges. The Goodyear Atomic Corporation was the first employer of Turner, a mechanical engineering graduate from the University of Kentucky. In 1997, Turner worked at the Oak Ridge Labs Y-12 National Security Complex and later joined WINPAC in 1999. Alan Foley, the director of WINPAC vigorously supported Turner's assertions and distributed them to Robert Joseph and various members of the OSP and NSC. Turner's line of reasoning claimed that the alloy of the aluminum tubes, 7075-T6 was ideally suited to withstand the stresses imposed on them by Zippe centrifuges. Using this logic, Turner asserted that these tubes were proscribed products. However, senior and much more experienced scientists at the DoE put forward a dissenting opinion. Houston Wood III, a University of Virginia professor and DoE expert on centrifuge-based uranium enrichment, concluded that that the aluminum tubes

were too thick and heavy to work in Zippe centrifuges. Wood additionally asserted the aluminum tubes in question would be very prone to leakage and catastrophic failure had the Iraqis used them in centrifuge-based uranium enrichment programs.¹⁵⁵

Other senior experts at the DoE such as Drs. Rhys M. Williams, Jon A. Kreykes, Duane F. Starr, and Edward von Halle emphatically agreed with Wood's position. The detailed analyses provided by this group of subject matter experts resided in an eight-page report, *Iraq's Gas Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway*. Moreover, DoE's analysts working in concert with colleagues in the Army ascertained that these tubes featured the proper dimensions for use in Iraq's Nasser eighty-one millimeter tactical rocket system. DoE's analysts also asserted that in 1996, the IAEA's inspectors discovered and examined thousands of 7075-T6 alloy aluminum tubes similar in overall finish and dimensions to those in Joe Turner's analytic reports. Notably, Iraq's Nasser fabrication plant had built eighty-one millimeter tactical rockets using these exact same tubes.¹⁵⁶

Curiously, in 2002 Wood and Williams' analyses met an unanticipated bureaucratic roadblock in the form of Thomas S. Ryder, then acting director of the DoE's Office of Intelligence. Ryder asserted his department still believed that Iraq was rebuilding a nuclear arsenal. Ryder was a human resources manager with no intelligence analytic expertise, but notably had close ties to the neoconservative Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham. Notably Ryder was in office for approximately six months as an administrative specialist, not a technical subject matter expert. Ryder's obstructions of the DoE's analytic product relied on inaccurate data that asserted pre-ODS Iraqi technical specialists were presently working in a Baghdad magnet production facility for centrifuges, and that an Iraqi front company was attempting to purchase on the black market proscribed balancing machines for use in such a program. Analysts

at the DoE asserted that there was no substantial evidence indicating that the magnets were intended for use in a centrifuge program, and they added there was no corroborating evidence that Iraq had received proscribed balancing machines. Ryder's positions obstructed the product of his most expert analysts, thus temporarily pushing the DoE into alignment with WINPAC's assessment of the Iraqi nuclear weapons issue. An interesting factor did arise with respect to Ryder's institutional roadblocks of Wood and Williams' analyses when Colin Powell and Carl Ford Jr., convinced Spencer Abraham to remove these impediments and allow Wood's analyses into the INR's subsequent reports.¹⁵⁷

In September 2002, the DIA produced a report, *Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program* that assessed the specifications of the aluminum tubes aligned with Iraqi vintage-1990 Zippe centrifuge designs. Shortly thereafter this report, the CIA's WINPAC produced their analysis of the same subject in a report *Iraq's Hunt for Aluminum Tubes: Evidence of a Renewed Uranium Enrichment Program*. This assessment stated that the aluminum tubes matched the specifications for tubes used in Zippe centrifuge rotor designs. Curiously, this report also included addenda that summarized a report from the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) that asserted the tubes *were not intended* for use in a rocket program. These and other top-level reports pertaining to the aluminum tubes arrived on the desk of VP Cheney on March 12, 2002 when he was travelling on official business in the Middle East. None of these reports mentioned that there were strong dissenting opinions from the analysts at the DoE, the INR, or individual dissenters. Curiously, multiple opinions arrived on decision-makers desks affirming Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes and reconstitute their nuclear program. All of the reports were based on the same information sources, but were interpreted as generated by

independent, correlated, and triangulated sources. None of these reports included any substantive mention of dissenting opinions.¹⁵⁸

The Iraqi Aerial Drone Controversy

One of the more remarkable assertions of the NIE of October 2002 was the fact that Iraq was allegedly developing pilotless aerial drones, otherwise known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). These vehicles could be used to distribute chemical and biological weapons over a wide range, thereby threatening Saddam Hussein's neighbors, and with sufficient technological development, could extend their reach to Israel and perhaps Europe. In order to enhance that technology, Iraq allegedly attempted a black market acquisition of global positioning system (GPS)-enabled waypoint reference and trip routing software. This intelligence was purportedly supported by observations of an Iraqi pre-ODS project to retrofit French Mirage and Soviet MiG fighter aircraft into vehicles for the dispersion of CBW agents. In the mid-1990s, UNSCOM's inspectors found some small scale UAVs at the Salman Pak facility. The Iraqis also used some modified Czechoslovakian jet training aircraft as test CBW dispersant vehicles. Based upon early Iraqi efforts to obfuscate their pre-ODS CBW dispersant program, some American analysts erroneously assumed that the smaller UAVs were intended to carry these agents. Analysts at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base / National Air Intelligence Center disagreed with this assessment. These analysts asserted that the fleet of small scale UAVs was in alignment with aerial reconnaissance missions, not chemical-biological (CB) agent dispersion sorties. The Air Force's assessment with respect to the UAVs did appear in the October 2002 NIE. The INR however did support the Air Force's assessment. Notably, the Air Force, Army, and DIA stated that the GPS enabled waypoint reference and trip-routing software did not necessarily indicate Iraqi intent to target the United States, but most probably indicated the intent to acquire generic

mapping capabilities. A few weeks before the initiation of OIF, the CIA backtracked on its position on Iraqi UAVs targeting the United States by way of a classified memo to the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Porter Goss.¹⁵⁹

Iraqi Missile Programs

After ODS, Iraq embarked on a weapons disposal and destruction program. During this program, the Iraqis disregarded their obligations to report their proscribed weapon systems to the relevant United Nations agencies. Iraq admitted these actions to UNSCOM's inspectors, but those actions created a situation in which the status of the proscribed weapon systems was impossible to verify. However, UNSCOM's wide-ranging snap inspections did manage to verify that Iraq had qualitatively disarmed itself. In his December 1992 report to the United Nations Security Council, the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Rolf Ekéus asserted, "All Iraqi ballistic missiles and items related to their production and development, identified as requiring destruction... have been destroyed."¹⁶⁰ In UNSCOM's 1993 inspection report, one of the monitoring teams asserted that the Iraqis had no indigenous capability to mass produce missiles, and had very little capability to produce prototype missiles. The report went on to say there was a dearth of missile design and testing experience, and when coupled with the shortage of indigenous scientific, engineering, and technical expertise there would be a delay of several years before the Iraqis could domestically produce a prototype solid fuel unguided missile system in preparation for mass production.¹⁶¹

Ahmad Chalabi's Machinations

This section of the study shall outline the intrigues of Ahmad Chalabi that affected America's elites and its IC executive cadre. These intrigues included the production of pseudo-

intelligence about Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium ore from foreign sources; replace its destroyed calutron-based uranium enrichment facilities with Zippe centrifuges; build in-situ and mobile BW weapons development and production infrastructures; construct a UAV fleet for the dispersal of biological and chemical warfare (BCW) agents; clandestinely design, construct, and deploy ballistic missiles; and finance, train, reinforce, and equip transnational terrorist groups. Moreover, this section shall show a deep connection between Chalabi and American neoconservative elites by way of the American Enterprise Institute and other NICNs. By outlining Chalabi's statements and actions, the section will show a connection with the neoconservative mindset that helped form an intellectual ecology featuring cognitive dissonance,¹⁶² thereby facilitating the rejection of the analyses of the non-executive majority of the IC that stated Iraq had no reconstituted WMD programs or connections with transnational terrorist organizations.

Ahmad Chalabi was a member of an affluent *Shi'ite* banking family that had extricated itself from Iraq when the *Ba'ath* Party violently seized power. Chalabi's overarching desire was to return to Iraq, depose Saddam Hussein, and eventually lead the government in that country. However, certain members of the United States diplomatic corps considered Chalabi to be a fraudster who exhibited delusions of political grandeur. Chalabi was a multimillionaire who made his fortune in banking and had deep connections to the United States neoconservative elites. He studied mathematics at MIT, and then received his Ph. D. in mathematical knot theory at the University of Chicago. While attending that university, he had occasion to meet Albert Wohlstetter, a strategic theorist, and the person many commentators consider the father of American neoconservative thought. Notably, Albert Wohlstetter was the Ph. D. dissertation supervisor for a well-known neoconservative, Paul Wolfowitz. Wohlstetter also served as a

mentor for Richard Perle; he arranged for Wolfowitz and Perle to work for the early NICN, Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy. Another notable member of this group was a classmate of Perle's, Edward N. Luttwak. Moreover, the connection between Chalabi, Perle, and Wolfowitz would rise to importance in the prelude to OIF.¹⁶³ The next few paragraphs shall outline Ahmad Chalabi's efforts to obtain United States funding and support for his program to unseat Saddam Hussein from power, dissolve the Iraqi *Ba'ath* Party, and form a provisional government in that state.

The informal relationship of Ahmad Chalabi with the United States government began in a circuitous and indirect fashion. A noteworthy factor in this connection occurred in early August 1990. After Iraq's successful invasion of Kuwait, an issue cluster / network by the name of Citizens for a Free Kuwait, with financial support from the Kuwaiti royal family hired the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton to lobby for an American intervention in that war. The ruler of Kuwait, Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah reputedly paid one million seven hundred thousand dollars to Hill & Knowlton to design and manage a publicity campaign that would entice the United States and its allies into a war with Iraq. Concomitantly with that effort, Hill & Knowlton contracted the services of a CIA 'front enterprise' named the Rendon Group.¹⁶⁴ Hill & Knowlton along with the Rendon Group would come to have an enduring and deep connection with Ahmad Chalabi and his resistance organization, the Iraqi National Congress.

In late 1990, Ahmad Chalabi formed a friendship with Professor Bernard Lewis who then introduced him to his colleagues and intellectual acolytes in the administration of President G. W. Bush. It is *via* these contacts that Chalabi amplified his profile within the United States government, thereby allowing him to fortify his lobbying efforts and import the INC's pseudo-intelligence products into the policy choices of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle.

Chalabi also managed to meet General Wayne Downing, the leader of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His meeting with Downing would have an interesting after-effect, a joint CIA-JSOC strategy called the Downing Plan that was designed to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi *Ba'ath* party by way of a *coup d'état*.¹⁶⁵

Notably, in 1991, Ahmad Chalabi asked the United States Congress to release frozen Iraqi monies residing in a Federal Reserve account.¹⁶⁶ In that year, he approached a Lebanese lawyer, Chibli Mallat to help him in his quest to access these funds *via* the founding of the predecessor to the INC, the International Committee for a Free Iraq. Chibli Mallat's association with Chalabi would continue, for on March 16, 1994 he set up a British nonprofit organization called the Iraq Trust. Chalabi would be secretary of that company along with directors Jalal Talabani and Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, who was another one of the founders of the INC and a major figurehead in *Shi'a* Islam. Other directors would be Mallat and the journalist Edward Mortimer, a long-standing Chalabi supporter who would later work for the United Nations. Irrespective of Mallat's legal expertise and Chalabi's lobbying efforts, the Iraq Trust sat idle waiting for funding.¹⁶⁷

In the early 1990s, a veteran State Department official, Frank Ricciardone contracted a top-tier Washington, D. C. firm to help with the INC's payment reception problem. Since the W. J. Clinton administration, Ricciardone had been tasked with the coordination of American support to various Iraqi opposition groups. He used the firm Burson-Marsteller (BM) for these purposes; its INC team leader was London-based Gavin Grant. BM moved these duties to its subsidiary firm Black, Kelly, Scruggs, and Healey (BKSH). BKSH had a long history of representing major defense contractors, governments, and Fortune 100 corporations. Charles Black, the director of BKSH said it received an initial payment of three hundred thousand dollars

to promote the agenda of the INC. The primary official at BKSH who handled the INC account was K. Riva Levinson. She had formerly worked for Charles Black when BKSH was Black, Manafort, Stone, and Kelly (BMSK). That account netted BMSK approximately sixty thousand dollars per year. BKSH had a connection to Dick Cheney, Jeffrey Weiss, and his wife Juleanna Glover-Weiss. The connection was so strong that Juleanna Glover-Weiss would later work for Dick Cheney during his terms as Vice President.¹⁶⁸

The earliest documented instance of Chalabi's formal connection to the United States government occurred in May 1991 when President G. H. W. Bush authorized the CIA to allocate approximately one hundred million dollars to undermine Saddam Hussein's government. The IC made initial contact with Chalabi in the spring of 1991 *via* a telephone conversation to his flat in an upscale London neighborhood called Mayfair located near Mount Street Gardens. This contact came in the form of a conversation with Whitley Bruner, a senior CIA official formerly operating in Baghdad. Bruner arranged a personal interview at Chalabi's residence on May 11, 1991 to discuss potential American support for his cause. At the time of the meeting between Bruner and Chalabi, the management of the CIA's Iraqi Task Force created the Iraqi Opposition Branch. This management cadre placed Whitley Bruner in charge of the Iraqi Opposition Branch. After several meetings, Bruner managed to get Chalabi's preliminary agreement to lead a resistance organization whose main operational goals were the deposing of Saddam Hussein and his sons from power, and the elimination of the Iraqi *Ba'ath* Party. Subsequent meetings with the CIA's representative Linda Flohr arrived at financial and logistical support details for Chalabi's resistance organization. Using the Rendon Group, United Kingdom, a subsidiary of the Rendon Group, the CIA channeled cash to the INC and Chalabi. The Rendon Group focused on public relations duties in order to construct an image that promoted the egregious nature of

Saddam Hussein's human rights violations, his WMD arsenal, and connections to transnational terrorist groups. The Rendon Group's contract with the CIA also extended into the area of covert military action: it worked with Iraqi opposition groups to subvert Saddam Hussein and the *Ba'ath* Party. David Mack, a specialist in near eastern affairs who worked under then Secretary of State James Baker III acted as Chalabi's handler during his initial visits to the United States. It is during these visits that Paul Wolfowitz first expressed interest in dealing with Ahmad Chalabi.¹⁶⁹

In the early 1990s, Chalabi established a CIA-funded Iraqi exile group based in Kurdistan that eventually attempted a *coup d'état* against Saddam Hussein in 1995. This venture fizzled, and the *Mukhabarat* discovered most of Chalabi's covert assets in Iraq; many participants in the *coup d'état* suffered summary execution at the hands of Saddam Hussein's henchmen. In January 1992, Ahmad Chalabi founded the Iraqi Broadcasting Company (IBC) and used it for spreading anti-*Ba'ath* propaganda and as a financial funnel to support his political aims. IBC's managing director was Ali Sarraf who had formerly worked for Chalabi in the failed Petra Bank. IBC not only provided propaganda radio services targeted at Iraq, but also laundered CIA funds and redirected them to the INC. Also in 1992, Mohamad al-Zobaidy joined the INC; he would become Chalabi's chief generator of pseudo-intelligence and his senior officer in charge of organizational security.¹⁷⁰

By early 1996, Chalabi had realigned the INC into an anti-CIA, pro-Israeli group that positioned itself with America's neoconservatives and the American Enterprise Institute. Chalabi's efforts to depose Saddam Hussein attracted the support of prominent neoconservatives like Newt Gingrich, Trent Lott, Jesse Helms, Dick Cheney, and members of the American Enterprise Institute such as Paul and Clare Wolfowitz. In December 1996, Chalabi met with the

recently retired Linda Flohr and the former CIA official, Duane Clarridge. In this meeting, Clarridge floated the idea that he could replace CIA funding by way of an ‘oil for cash’ deal with various Taiwanese business and governmental interests. This deal would depend upon the INC’s successful toppling of Saddam Hussein and their subsequent control over Iraqi oil production. Although ultimately a failure, in one of the meetings scheduled to strategize this plan, Clarridge introduced Chalabi to General Wayne Downing. Clarridge and Downing devised the *Alternate Strategy for Iraq* (Downing Plan) that involved the use of commando units trained in Kurdistan. Downing was to present his plan to Congress and ask for an appropriation of four hundred million dollars in the first year. However, Chalabi’s politically motivated ‘charm offensive’ was not universally successful with American elites. General Anthony Zinni, the leader of the United States Central Command was an opponent of the Downing Plan; he said it was a template for another Bay of Pigs disaster. He viewed these stratagems as an attempt to involve the United States in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Chalabi made repeated personal retorts against Zinni’s commentary. Colonel W. Patrick Lang, the DIA’s senior Iraq expert disagreed with the Downing Plan. Lang’s opinion stated the Downing Plan depended upon a fragmented Iraqi state and Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus being ineffectual. Lang went on to say Wayne Downing and Duane Clarridge poorly researched the situation as Iraq’s intelligence agencies were among the best in the Middle East. Calling it a ‘Bay of Goats,’ Lang, in a fashion similar to Zinni equated the Downing Plan to the John F. Kennedy administration’s Bay of Pigs fiasco. Martin Indyk, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, remained skeptical about any U. S. military support for an Iraqi opposition group; he said that policy option was unwise and irresponsible.¹⁷¹

In 1997, Chalabi spoke to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in Washington, D. C.; in that address, he stated that an Iraqi government after the ouster of Saddam Hussein would institute friendly relations with Israel. In 1998, Chalabi asserted to a reporter from the *Jerusalem Post* that an INC government in Iraq would restore an oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa that had been cut since 1947. By way of January 1998 clandestine meetings in his London flat with Scott Ritter, Chalabi, and his chief of security, Aras Kareem Habib (a.k.a. Ahmed Allawi) became privy to gaps in United Nations intelligence about Iraq's WMD arsenal. According to Ritter, Chalabi fabricated pseudo-intelligence, thus filling those gaps and using a constructed matrix, indicted the government of Saddam Hussein in the eyes of America's decision-makers. Using this disinformation matrix, on September 18, 2001 Chalabi addressed a special meeting of the Defense Policy Board, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld's civilian advisory group, then chaired by Richard Perle. At that meeting, Bernard Lewis, a former Princeton professor and renowned Middle East expert asserted that the United States should support the efforts of Chalabi and the INC to depose Saddam Hussein.¹⁷²

Even as the Iraq Trust parked in an idle state because of monetary shortfalls, Chalabi redoubled his efforts to secure funding from the Americans. Notably, in 1996, Francis Brooke became Chalabi's unregistered lobbyist in Washington, D. C. In 1997 and 1998, his efforts at gaining access to frozen Iraqi assets residing in a Federal Reserve account gained traction with certain neoconservatives. Chalabi's ministrations appeared in an open letter of February 19, 1998 to President W. J. Clinton that dealt with the Iraqi situation. John Bolton, William Kristol, Bernard Lewis, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Elliot Abrams, and Peter Rodman signed this letter. The letter urged Clinton to recognize a provisional government based on the principles of the INC and to release frozen

Iraqi funds in the United States and Great Britain to the control of his provisional government. This letter appeared under the aegis of an NICN, the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf and was available on the website of the Project for the New American Century. Chalabi also lent his considerable political influence to assist in the October 7, 1998 passing of the Iraq Liberation Act. In that year, Chalabi also proposed that the United States provide air cover, logistics, and training support for his Iraqi insurgent army with which he planned to overthrow Saddam Hussein.¹⁷³

The INC's attempts to gain and maintain United States funding were not always successful. In fact, vigorous debate often accompanied Chalabi's support requests. Warren Marik was one of the CIA's few supporters of Chalabi. He had met Chalabi during a 1993 London restaurant consultation with Linda Flohr. Later, in 1995 CIA managers forbade Marik talking to Chalabi. In 1997, Marik resigned from the CIA. In February of that year, Marik contacted Chalabi in Washington, D. C. and became a vocal critic of the CIA's alleged betrayal of Chalabi. In March 1998, Ahmad Chalabi appeared before a Senate hearing named *Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown*. In that hearing, Chalabi railed against State Department policies that he viewed as racist, and he vociferously denigrated events he saw as exemplars of ham-handed CIA interference in the political affairs of Iraq. In his testimony, Chalabi emphasized Saddam Hussein's egregious human rights violations, his history of international military aggression, and the well-documented record of his development, stockpiling, deployment, and use of WMD. Zalmay Khalilzad and R. James Woolsey also offered testimony in support of Chalabi's positions. Richard N. Haass, a former State Department official who had met Chalabi before the formation of the INC, offered an intensely dissenting opinion. Haass asserted that the INC was a sham that was in no form or fashion representative of the Iraqi people. He further testified that

the INC was simply a small pressure group that consisted of Ahmad Chalabi, Francis Brooke, Zaab Sethna, Arras Kareem Habib, Nabil Musawi, and Mohamad al-Zobaidy.¹⁷⁴

In 1998, Chalabi recruited Danielle Pletka to serve on his staff. Pletka had served from 1992-2002 as Chief of Staff for the Senate Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; she believed the State Department and the CIA had ingrained biases that predicated them to work in cooperation with Middle Eastern dictators such as Saddam Hussein. Pletka later went on to become the chief spokesperson for the American Enterprise Institute. She was also the wife of Steven Rademaker, a high-level aide serving in the House International Relations Committee. Upon his graduation from law school Rademaker worked in the Ronald Reagan administration's State Department, under the leadership of Elliot Abrams. He also supported the Nicaraguan *Contras* in concert with Duane Clarridge and Oliver North. Rademaker was already friendly towards Chalabi, whom he had previously met at a Republican Party Policy Committee meeting. Rademaker helped write the initial draft copy of the Iraq Liberation Act in concert with Ahmad Chalabi. Stephen Rademaker lobbied Randy Scheunemann, a senior aide to the Senate majority leader Trent Lott. Scheunemann then discussed the proposed legislation with Senator Lott who then introduced the Iraq Liberation Act to the Senate floor on September 29, 1998. Democratic Senator Bob Kerry, the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee strongly supported the Iraq Liberation Act. Nonetheless, public opinion was not universally aligned with the law, as in an especially acerbic editorial, the *New York Times* asserted that the Iraq Liberation Act would be a waste of American blood and treasure and that the INC represented almost no one. On October 5, the Iraq Liberation Act passed the House of Representatives, and on October 7, the legislation passed the Senate with a unanimous vote. President W. J. Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act on October 30, 1998. Not surprisingly, Ahmad Chalabi stated the law was for the

most part, in alignment with his political expectations. After the 1998 passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, the State Department was very slow in dispersing monetary support to the INC. In order to speed up this disbursement, Chalabi started the Iraq Liberation Act Committee, a lobbying effort modelled after another NICN, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Francis Brooke spearheaded the institution of the Iraq Liberation Act Committee, which notably listed its ownership as Levantine Holdings based in the Cayman Islands. The board of directors for this committee consisted of Mahdi al-Bassam, Entifadh Qanbar, and Maha Yousif.¹⁷⁵

An important factor contributing to the impediment in the INC's acquisition of United States government funding was that the INC was not a legally incorporated entity; hence, it had no mechanism for accepting electronic funds transfers or checks from the State Department. To remedy the situation, the INC set up a subsidiary entity legally incorporated in the United States called the Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF). The former director of the CIA during the W. J. Clinton administration, R. James Woolsey had his legal firm Shea & Gardner file the incorporation papers for the INCSF. Shea & Gardner received taxpayer funds to keep the INCSF operating within the strictures of the United States Code. Eight months after the incorporation of the INCSF, Woolsey abruptly stepped away from that business relationship citing the potentially negative optics of a conflict of interest. At the behest of the State Department, the INCSF included some of Chalabi's rivals such as Ayad Allawi, Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein, the presumptive heir to the Iraqi royal throne; Latif Rashid of Jalal Talabani's party, and Hoshyar Zibari who emanated from Massoud Barzani's political organization. In March 2000, the INCSF received its first payment instalment from the State Department. In October

2000, just before the election that would place G. W. Bush in the White House, the Clinton administration released four million dollars to the INC.¹⁷⁶

In the early months of the G. W. Bush administration, the INC was still experiencing roadblocks that prevented it collecting all of the funds allocated to it by the Iraq Liberation Act. Francis Brooke of the INC complained to American media personalities that certain W. J. Clinton administration holdovers were blocking access to the funds to which the INC was legally entitled. Reaching a tipping point in his frustration level with the State Department, Ahmad Chalabi published a May 2001 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, *We Can Topple Saddam*. In this article, Chalabi warned of Saddam Hussein's history of WMD development, deployment, and use. Chalabi mentioned that the INC could topple Saddam Hussein and turn Iraq into a democratic and peace-loving country that would not represent a substantial threat to United States, its allies, or the Middle East in general.¹⁷⁷

Operating under the directives of Clark Kent Ervin, the State Department's Inspector General, in early June 2001, accountants executed to snap audit of the financial records residing in the INC's Washington, D. C. office on Pennsylvania Avenue. In the analysis of these records, the auditors found cost overruns, a lack of audit trails, and significant evidence of waste, fraud, and abuse. For those readers with interest in a summary of this situation, please see the document produced by the United States General Accounting Office, *State Department – Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation*. Officials at the State Department insisted that the INC hire an accountant; they suggested Margaret 'Peg' Bartel, who had extensive experience in managing overseas projects. Bartel eventually became one of Chalabi's important American assets; she would help him in his dealings with the State Department and assist him in acquiring funding from other sources. Notably, Bartel and Francis Brooke formed a

Virginia-based corporation, Boxwood, Inc., located at 900 Duke Street, in Alexandria. The purpose of Boxwood, Inc. was to manage the financial allocations that the United States Government made to the INC. In June 2001, Chalabi attended the annual American Enterprise Institute retreat in Beaver Creek Colorado. Mrs. Lynne Cheney, the wife of the new VP Dick Cheney, hosted this retreat. It was at this conference that Chalabi gained an audience with VP Cheney. Notably Chalabi had an existing friendly relationship with Cheney's Middle East advisor, John Hannah. A former member of an NICN, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Hannah was an enthusiastic supporter of Chalabi and his policy preferences.¹⁷⁸

In the week following the 9/11 disasters, Chalabi's allies started promoting his assertions. One of his more important allies was the former director of the W. J. Clinton administration's CIA, R. James Woolsey. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Woolsey wrote an op-ed in conjunction with Mansoor Ijaz, a Pakistani-American who was a noted participant in various counterterrorism forums. This op-ed, *Revenge Is a Dish Best Served Cold* appeared in the *Los Angeles Times*. In that work, Woolsey and Ijaz stated that Osama bin-Laden and *al-Qaeda* should not be America's exclusive intelligence and military focal point. They went on to say that the IC should seriously consider that the 9/11 attacks resulted from state sponsorship, most likely Iraq. Shortly after the publication of his *Los Angeles Times* op-ed, Woolsey appeared on various television outlets saying that Iraq was the prime suspect behind the 9/11 attacks and was probably responsible for the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center. In the few weeks following the 9/11 disasters, General Wayne Downing, the former commander of the United States JSOC assumed a new post as the National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. He hired Linda Flohr in an advisory post within the NSC; she was the

retired CIA agent who had been one of the Rendon Group's first contacts with Ahmad Chalabi in London. At the time of this study, Flohr still works for the Rendon Group.¹⁷⁹

On September 14, 2001, the American Enterprise Institute held a news conference that discussed the notions put forward by Ahmad Chalabi and R. James Woolsey. In this event, notables from the American Enterprise Institute such as Michael Ledeen, David Wurmser, and Laurie Mylroie publicly supported the notions put forward by Ahmad Chalabi, Woolsey, the INC, and its retinue of pseudo-intelligence generating followers. On September 18, 2001, Chalabi was invited to the E-Ring on the third floor of the Pentagon to give a lecture to the Defense Policy Board about the existential threat to the United States posed by Saddam Hussein and his *Ba'ath* government. Another invited guest, Professor Bernard Lewis of Princeton University, gave a glowing recommendation of Chalabi's political intentions. A noted member of the board, Kenneth Adelman was not impressed by Chalabi's presentation. Richard Perle, one of Chalabi's most strident supporters was chairman of the board, and his opinions overruled those of Adelman.¹⁸⁰

A short time after this Defense Policy Board meeting, G. W. Bush administration officials instructed Chalabi and the INC to collect intelligence from Iraqi defectors that pertained to Saddam Hussein's WMD and his relationships with transnational terrorist groups. From that point forward, Chalabi frequented the Pentagon facilities of the OSP and PCTEG in the prelude to OIF, often meeting with William J. Luti and Douglas Feith. Chalabi made clear his opinions on Iraq's WMD arsenal and Saddam Hussein's deep involvement with transnational terrorist groups during his movements in the open cubicle sections of the OSP and PCTEG. In order to generate the data streams used in Chalabi's presentations, the INC recruited sources from Iraqi exile communities residing in Amman, Damascus, and various locations in Turkey. One of

Ahmad Chalabi's close confidants, Mohammed al-Zubaidi coached these Iraqi defectors in the production of the INC's data feeds.¹⁸¹

On September 27, 2001, R. James Woolsey made a telephone call to the head of the DIA, Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson to confer about Saddam Hussein's airplane hijacking school at Salman Pak.¹⁸² Notably, on September 30, 2001 the DIA produced a Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary *DITSUM No. 044-02, Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps* that stated "Salman Pak was purportedly used to train non-Iraqis in hijacking operations while underwater demolition training took place at Lake Tharthar."¹⁸³ Notwithstanding the INC's efforts, the intercessions of Woolsey, and the DIA's reports, the CIA's Iraq Operations Group in the DO published an analytical report that offered a different perspective; it stated no *al-Qaeda* associated detainee since September 11, 2001 had said they trained at Salman Pak.¹⁸⁴

In a July 31, 2002 interview on CNN's *Newsnight* program, Aaron Brown interviewed the American Enterprise Institute scholar, Laurie Mylroie. In that primetime interview, Mylroie explained the intellectual position of the American Enterprise Institute with respect to Iraq's involvement with the 9/11 disasters and the seeds of America's failure in dealing with transnational terrorist groups. This explanation dovetailed closely with R. James Woolsey's notions that Iraq was the dominant, if not exclusive source of training, funding, and support for the 1993 World Trade Center attacks, and the 9/11 disasters. Driving further on this point of debate, Mylroie rested the blame for these disasters on the shoulders of President W. J. Clinton because he viewed transnational terrorist threats as a law enforcement issue as opposed to military and intelligence problems.¹⁸⁵

Ever since the passage of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, Ahmad Chalabi was eager to receive the ninety-seven million dollars earmarked in that bill for the support of the Free Iraqi

Forces. In the summer of 2002, two individuals from the G. W. Bush administration managed the ninety-seven million dollar support budget afforded to the INC by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. The first individual was a retired Army Colonel named Chris Straub who formerly worked for Senator Bob Kerry and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. His position involved the administration of the monies that would train and equip the Iraqi opposition forces, publicly known as the Free Iraqi Forces. To do this work, Straub resided in the OSP, run by William J. Luti. Alongside Straub worked Colonel William B. Bruner. General David Barno, the commander of the United States Army Training Center at Fort Jackson, South Carolina managed the practical aspect of equipping and training the Free Iraqi Forces under the codename *Task Force Warrior*. Barno realized that the training and equipping of the Free Iraqi Forces based upon American heavy maneuver division doctrine would be next to impossible. Instead, he would train the Free Iraqi Forces to act as military support units acting as translators, topographical orienteers, and cross-cultural interfaces between the local population and American troops. Barno established a facility at Taszar Air Base, in Hungary to train the Free Iraqi Forces' recruits. Notably, according to an agreement drawn up with the INC, Barno and his staff were expressly forbidden from recruiting personnel to fill the ranks of the Free Iraqi Forces. That job was the domain of Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress. In the OSP, Chris Straub coordinated with the INC's recruiters and forwarded the names of those individuals to Barno's training organization. Surprisingly, only seventy-four Iraqis appeared to receive military training. According to a ranking INC official, Hamad Shoraidah, the INC at the last minute decided to issue orders sending military recruits to Barno's training camp.¹⁸⁶

In the late summer and early fall of 2002, another parcel of pseudo-intelligence appeared *via* the efforts of the INC's propagandists. One such package was unique in that it involved one

of Saddam Hussein's romantic relationships. Parisoula Maria Lampsos was a Greek woman carrying Iraqi passport papers who claimed to be Saddam Hussein's mistress. In an ABC September 8, 2002 interview, Lampsos asserted Saddam Hussein had provided significant funding to Osama bin-Laden in 1996. By early October 2002, the DIA found that Lampsos' assertions might have been credible but were contaminated by instances of coached fabrications. Officials in the CIA determined that Lampsos' assertions were not substantiated by triangulation with information provided by other vetted sources. Therefore, the agency declined to use Lampsos' representations in any of its analytic products. Notwithstanding the reports from the CIA and DIA, Douglas Feith's PCTEG and OSP used Lampsos' assertions in the production of their pseudo-intelligence products.¹⁸⁷

In the fall of 2002, the OPOTUS founded the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (CLI); a quasi-governmental organization that dealt with public relations issues related to diplomatic, financial, and potential military measures levied against Iraq. The point of request for the founding of the CLI resided in the office of Stephen Hadley, then Deputy National Security Advisor. Bruce Jackson, a former lobbyist for the Lockheed Martin Corporation, and purported expert in democratic transitions served as the executive leader of the CLI. At the onset of his position, Jackson consulted with people such as Elliot Abrams, Frank Miller, and Dan Fried to ascertain if there was any overarching reason for the NSC to push for war with Iraq. Jackson later surmised that human rights abuses would be the most viable premise for gaining support from the American people for the prosecution of a war against Iraq. In these publicity efforts, Jackson recruited supporters such as Newt Gingrich, Steven Solarz, Bob Carey, Joe Lieberman, John McCain, Christopher Hitchens, Robert Kagan, Richard Perle, R. James Woolsey, and Ahmad Chalabi. Jackson then recruited the person responsible for the management of day-to-day

operations for the CLI. This individual was Randy Scheunemann, a former member of the staff of Senator Trent Lott and one of the more vociferous supporters of the INC on Capitol Hill. One of the more notable public relations coups executed by the CLI was that of its publicizing of a statement made by ‘The Vilnius Ten,’ in support of the Bush administration’s stance for war with Iraq. Representatives of the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in February 2003 penned this statement in support of the Bush administration’s position to make war on Iraq.¹⁸⁸

Also in the fall of 2002, Chalabi succeeded in obtaining the transfer of his Information Collection Program from the supervision of the State Department to that of the DoD. Aras Kareem Habib of the INC managed this program. Notably, State Department officials viewed this program as netting poor results with very few, if any financial audit controls in place. It is important to note that Ahmad Chalabi and the INC were never transparent to United States government-mandated financial audits. This situation resulted from the fact that the INC often used the age-old *Hawala* method of funds transfer, the same instrument that the United States government assessed to be a mechanism for terrorist financing. Nevertheless, on the same day that Colin Powell gave his ill-fated speech before the United Nations General Assembly, the State Department signed an agreement to give the INC even more funding. The money amounted to an additional seven million dollars; the deal went forward irrespective of the protests emanating from State Department officials such as Richard Armitage, Sherri Kraham, and Yael Lampert.¹⁸⁹

Extending over many years, Ahmad Chalabi spent significant amounts of money and effort cultivating relationships with American decision-makers, during which time he developed very close ties with future American elites such as Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith,

and William J. Luti. Irrespective of his failed political intrigues and *coups d'état*, Chalabi was expert at plying his efforts that targeted the American political environment. In summary, during the 1990s, the INC received its funding from the CIA, and then in 2000 and 2001 its funding originated with the State Department. In the latter half of 2001, its funding base moved from the State Department to the DoD. In 2002-2003, some of the INC's funding again came from a reluctant State Department. All the while, the DIA was extremely suspicious of Ahmad Chalabi, Entifadh Qanbar, and other INC underlings. Both CIA and DIA-HS personnel asserted that the INC was penetrated by Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (*Vezeerat-e Ettela'at Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran*) agents and in some cases, members of the *Quds* Force and *Pasdaran*. Notably, the Israeli IC shared this same opinion of the INC.¹⁹⁰ Ahmad Chalabi and the INC aligned themselves with various NICNs in order to influence American policy on Iraq in a direction that favored their goals. Once the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz group attained political power in the G. W. Bush administration, it became an iron triangle; it used Chalabi's INC and various NICNs to forward its political agenda that included the invasion of Iraq and the deposition of Saddam Hussein and his sons from political power.

The next sections of this study shall discuss some of the more significant examples of Ahmad Chalabi and the INC's pseudo-intelligence feeds that helped reinforce the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's conventional wisdom about Iraqi WMD and Saddam Hussein's connections to transnational terrorist groups.

Sabah Khalifa Khodada al-Lami and Iraq's Support of al-Qaeda

An alleged Iraqi member of the *Fedayeen Saddam*, Sabah Khalifa Khodada al-Lami had immigrated to the United States in May 2001 *via* special assistance from R. James Woolsey, the W. J. Clinton administration's Director of the CIA. In 2001, the media repeated Khodada al-

Lami's assertions that the 9/11 attacks were planned and executed by personnel trained at Salman Pak by the *Mukhabarat* and the Iraqi Army.¹⁹¹ These assertions became a dominant theme in the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's press for war with Iraq.

Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri's Statements

In November 2001, an alleged Iraqi engineer, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, arrived in Kurdistan with his family. In his desperation, he took advantage of a long-standing friendship with the leader of the INC's office in Washington D.C., Entifadh Qanbar. Because of that relationship, INC agents quickly transported him, his family, and a document cache to Damascus, Syria. Mohammed al-Zubaidi then quickly ordered his INC agents to transport him to Thailand. Once in Pattaya, Thailand, Zaab Sethna of the INC coached al-Haideri on the presentation he would make to representatives of the IC. Using the pseudonym, Jamal al-Ghuraiiry, al-Haideri mentioned that he and an Iraqi official named Sabah Khalifa Khodada al-Lami had explicit knowledge of Iraq training members of foreign terrorist organizations at a base named Salman Pak. Al-Haideri further mentioned that the Salman Pak base trained terrorists in methods they would use to attack United States assets. Al-Haideri then mentioned that al-Lami had immigrated to Texas in 2001. Moreover, al-Haideri mentioned that the *Mukhabarat* was in charge of a special facility inside of the Salman Pak base that, under the supervision of an expatriate German microbiologist researched and produced proscribed biological weapons (BW). Interestingly, in 1992, a member of a UNSCOM team reported that Iraq was working on mobile BW facilities in order to avoid detection by United Nations inspectors. On December 17, 2001, agents of the IC interrogated al-Haideri in Pattaya, Thailand. During that interrogation, a CIA polygrapher determined that al-Haideri was deceptive. Notwithstanding the CIA and DIA's assessment of al-Haideri, his pseudo-intelligence made its way to the OSP, thereby arriving in

the offices of VP Cheney and SECDEF Rumsfeld.¹⁹² From that point onward, al-Haideri's pseudo-intelligence would appear in various addresses and presentations made by G. W. Bush administration elites.

Khidhir Hamza and Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program

Another one of Chalabi's pseudo-intelligence sources was Khidhir Hamza, an Iraqi nuclear physicist who received his training at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. During that period of schooling in America, he had come to know Ahmad Chalabi, becoming his close friend. Hamza asserted that throughout the course of his career, he was involved in the procurement of proscribed technology, uranium ore, and HEU for Iraq's nuclear program. He also asserted in many forums that he was intimately involved with the design of nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment technologies. In 1994, he became disaffected with Saddam Hussein's authoritarian regime and covertly crossed the border into Kurdistan in August of that year. Once across the border, he became reacquainted with Chalabi near Erbil. Under the advisement of Chalabi, Hamza then negotiated with a CIA representative. The CIA refused to offer protection for Hamza and his family. Instead, they offered considerable sums of money for him to become a CIA covert asset in Iraq. Hamza found this offer unacceptable and later with the assistance of Robert B. Baer and Rick Francona, he and his family exfiltrated across the frontier into Turkey. In 2000, Khidhir Hamza wrote a best-selling book, *Saddam's Bombmaker: The Daring Escape of the Man Who Built Iraq's Secret Weapon*, in which he outlined in frightening detail the progress of Iraq's nuclear weapons development program. Hamza's book was widely read by the pro-war faction in the United States government, although many operators and analysts in the IC disputed his assertions. One of Hamza's key claims was that Iraq was trying to replace its old, calutron-based method of fissile uranium production with a newer and much more efficient

technique based on the Zippe centrifuge. Notably, two key players in Iraq's nuclear weapons program, Drs. Imad Khadduri and Jafar Dhia Jafar have asserted to the author of this study that Hamza was a theoretical nuclear physicist who was in no way involved with the design of Zippe centrifuges, reactors, or nuclear weapons. Khadduri further asserted that Hamza's statements *might* have been part of a *quid pro quo* arrangement with Chalabi and the INC in exchange for his extraction from Iraq and receiving United States residency status.¹⁹³

Allegations about Iraq's BW Program

On February 11, 2002, former CIA director R. James Woolsey contacted Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Linton Wells. In that conversation, Woolsey mentioned that INC agents had contacted a former Iraqi *Mukhabarat* officer, a defector whom the IC later identified as Major Mohammed Harith al-Assef. This individual claimed he was responsible for Iraq's mobile BW labs and production facilities. He also made claims that he had some technical knowledge of Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons programs. Notably, Harith al-Assef had contacted Mohamed al-Zobaidy's INC agents at the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, Jordan in December 2001. He later contacted another INC principal in London, Aras Kareem Habib. Wells ordered the DIA-HS to arrange initial contact with Harith al-Assef by way of the INC's office in London. Upon interrogating Harith at the U. S. Embassy in Amman, nagging doubts began to appear about his allegations concerning Iraqi WMD. Notably, Harith al-Assef passed his initial examination at the hands of the DIA-HS' polygraphers. Although the DIA-HS agents first thought Harith al-Assef story was truthful, they began to suspect it was a well-coached fabrication. Under intense interrogation by DIA-HS agents, the truth slowly began to emerge; Harith al-Assef was not a scientist or engineer, hence he possessed none of the technical expertise necessary to support his allegations. These and other inconsistencies in the information

put forward by Harith al-Assef increased; the DIA-HS agents then deemed him to be deceptive and a potential fabricator. In May 2002, these agents issued a ‘burn notice’ that stated he was not to be believed. Curiously, this ‘burn notice’ and many others never traversed the IC’s computer systems; it was never used in the NIE of October 2002. Consequently, the gist of the statements of Harith appeared in both the NIE of October 2002 and President G. W. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address. The claims contained in the statements of Harith al-Assef when coupled with satellite photos that allegedly showed mobile BW labs in Iraq appeared in Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 presentation before the United Nations. Remarkably, Charles Duelfer of the CIA asserted there was no reason to reject Harith al-Assef’s commentary; he insisted Iraq’s WMD program had only accelerated since Saddam Hussein expelled UNSCOM from Iraq in 1998.¹⁹⁴

The assertions of another individual codenamed ‘Curveball’ apparently reinforced Harith al-Assef’s claims about Iraq’s mobile BW labs. In 1999, the German *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) encountered a young Iraqi engineer who was trying to defect to Germany. ‘Curveball’ (a.k.a. Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi), arrived in Munich in that year seeking refugee immigrant status. He told the BND that Iraq’s Military-Industrial Commission hired him immediately upon graduation from Baghdad University in 1994. Reputedly, the *Mukhabarat* tasked him to work at the Chemical Engineering and Design Center, and like Harith al-Assef, he asserted that he worked with Doctor Rihab Taha, a.k.a. ‘Dr. Germ,’ to build *in situ* and mobile BW labs and production facilities. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, later asserted that WINPAC’s briefers said ‘Curveball’ had worked in mobile labs and had sustained injuries in an accident in these facilities. Lothar Schumann, of the BND’s Pullach office, kept the DIA-HS officers in that city abreast of the developments in the

interviews with ‘Curveball,’ and provided the first summaries of these meetings to U. S. officials in early 2000. During this time, the constitutionally constrained BND refused to subject ‘Curveball’ to a full polygraph examination. In 2001, Germany granted ‘Curveball’ political asylum and his cooperation with the BND rapidly degenerated. In the wake of the 9/11 disasters and the anthrax attacks, the CIA’s WINPAC reassessed the information ‘Curveball’ had provided to the BND and upgraded its risk assessment of Iraq’s BW program. In October 2001, WINPAC assessed that Iraq was continuing to produce in mobile production labs at least three BW agents in quantities exceeding the production levels from the pre-ODS era.¹⁹⁵

In late 2001, the CIA’s DO initiated a contentious disagreement with WINPAC’s assessment of the ‘Curveball’ scenario. Members of Tyler Drumheller’s group in the DO assessed that Aris Kareem Habib, an INC senior intelligence operator arranged for the initial ‘Curveball’ encounter with Germany’s BND. Contrary to Drumheller and his group’s assessments, Lawrence K. Gershwin, a member of the NIC supported the allegations of ‘Curveball.’ On December 20, 2001, Judith Miller published a story in the *New York Times* about an Iraqi defector codenamed ‘Curveball’ who had first-hand knowledge of secret BW sites in Iraq. In his claims, ‘Curveball’ described Iraqi tests of live BW agents on Kurdish and *Shi’ite* prisoners. Irrespective of the media’s representations and WINPAC’s assessments, Tyler Drumheller, William D. Murray, Joseph Wippl, and Margaret H. Henoch assessed ‘Curveball’ to be deceptive. Upon speaking with DIA-HS operators in Munich, Germany, they realized that the intelligence garnered from ‘Curveball’ was suspect, and they advised the CIA’s top executives to exclude any ‘Curveball’-related information from the agency’s intelligence analytic product. Drumheller, Murray, Wippl, and Henoch requested the BND allow the CIA and DIA direct access to ‘Curveball’ for conducting a full polygraph examination. The initial response of the

German authorities was to decline the polygraph session request. Faced with this situation, Joseph Wippl used his long-standing convivial relationship with senior German government officials to facilitate a temporary transferal of ‘Curveball’ to the United States Consulate in Munich. In that facility, DIA and CIA polygraphers interrogated ‘Curveball.’ Upon completion of that examination, the polygraphers adjudicated ‘Curveball’ to be deceptive. On further triangulation with vetted sources, and further analyses of his claims, DIA and CIA officials assessed ‘Curveball’ to be a fabricator. Irrespective of the assessments of Tyler Drumheller’s group, and the CIA and DIA polygraphers’ adjudications of the ‘Curveball’ interrogations, in early 2003, Alan Foley, Director of WINPAC asked two of his senior analysts to leave his department after they expressed significant reservations about the credibility of ‘Curveball.’ These individuals insisted that ‘Curveball’ was not in Iraq at the time of the 1998 Djerf al Nadaf industrial disaster, of which he said he was a direct participant. These two analysts also exposed the fact that ‘Curveball’ was not an employee in a government job that gave him access to the BW program.¹⁹⁶

The INC’s Assertions about Iraq’s Links to Terrorists

If the reader refers to *Laurie Mylroie’s Research*, her assertions become obvious regarding Saddam Hussein’s involvement with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 attacks. Mylroie performed extensive Iraq-focused contract work for the United States government starting from a time before the Iran-Iraq war. She based her articles and books upon this work and sources originating in the law enforcement and judicial communities. Upon extensive discussions with Mylroie, it became apparent there was a strong intellectual undercurrent within the G. W. Bush administration’s neoconservative elites that supported her lines of inquiry and resultant analyses. Moreover, Mylroie’s assertions were often the focus of

discussions in the offices of the NESAs, PCTEG, and the OSP. Notably, Mylroie's research work and declarations did not escape the notice of Ahmad Chalabi, Aras Kareem Habib, Mohamad al-Zobaidy, and other members of the INC.¹⁹⁷ As the next few paragraphs shall elucidate, facets of Mylroie's work appeared in the presentations made by Ahmad Chalabi, his associates, and advocates.

Not limiting itself to the 'Curveball' assertions, Chalabi's INC provided other dubious information feeds that wormed their way into the United States national consciousness *via* the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle, media outlets, and various NICNs. The INC promoted a story that Mohamed Atta, one of the primary actors in the 9/11 attacks had met on April 8, 2001 with an Iraqi *Mukhabarat* agent in Prague. William Safire, a senior *New York Times* columnist was one of the more notable media supporters of the Mohamed Atta-*Mukhabarat* collusion theory. Before discussing this story, it is important for the reader to note that the PDB on September 21, 2001 reinforced the IC's assessments that found no connection between Iraq, *al-Qaeda* and the 9/11 attacks. The PDB asserted that the only credible contacts between *al-Qaeda* and Iraqi officials involved the *Mukhabarat's* attempts to monitor that group. Additionally the PDB did acknowledge that Saddam Hussein offered various forms of support to the Abu Nidal terrorist group and significant levels of financial backing to Palestinian terrorist organizations. Curiously, the OPOTUS and OVP refused to release that briefing, even to TS/SCI-cleared congressional intelligence committees.¹⁹⁸

In early 2001, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle leaked an unvetted intelligence report that asserted Iraq was involved with an *al-Qaeda* strategy to attack the United States, in a fashion similar to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Coupled with this leak was an alleged confirmatory report of an Iraqi diplomat who had been under surveillance by Czech

security forces because of suspicions that he was involved in planning the terror bombing of the Radio Free Europe (RFE) headquarters in Prague. The reason behind the alleged attempt to bomb the RFE headquarters in Prague was that since 1998 it was broadcasting anti-Ba'athist propaganda on the short-wave radio bands in an attempt to foment a rebellion in Iraq. The Czech government ordered the diplomat, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani to return to Iraq. The informer who had made the confirmatory report to Czech security services on April 8, 2001 asserted that al-Ani repeatedly met with Mohamed Atta. During a November 2001 visit to Washington D. C., the Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman and Interior Minister Stanislav Gross told Secretary of State Colin Powell that Atta had visited Prague to meet with a suspected Iraqi *Mukhabarat* agent, the diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. The CIA disseminated this information to appropriate agencies and officials within the United States government. Shortly after that, various press outlets published stories that Atta had lengthy conversations with an Iraqi official in Prague.¹⁹⁹

Acting on fears that the Iraqi diplomat was attempting to recruit a terrorist to mount an explosive attack on RFE headquarters in Prague, the Czech government's Deputy Foreign Minister, Hynek Kmonicek ordered al-Ani to leave the country on April 18, 2001. On October 13, 2001 the Foreign Minister and Coordinator of Intelligence for the Czech Republic, Jan Kavan met Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington, D. C.; that briefing session asserted Mohamed Atta may have met with an Iraqi *Mukhabarat* agent in Prague on April 8, 2001.²⁰⁰ An example of this faulty information resided in VP Cheney's December 9, 2001 commentary on the NBC *Meet the Press* television show. Cheney said:

It's pretty well confirmed that [Mohamed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack. Now, what the purpose of that was, what transpired between

them, we simply don't know at this point, but that's clearly an avenue that we want to pursue.²⁰¹

After learning of his country's advice to Powell, the Czech President, Vaclav Havel, surreptitiously used 'back channels' to advise the OPOTUS that the communiqué regarding the al-Ani — Atta meetings was unsubstantiated, unreliable, and should not be used in any decisions. Instead of releasing this information, the OPOTUS strangely remained silent while other members of the G. W. Bush administration used the original version of the al-Ani — Atta pseudo-intelligence in public presentations to support their stance for the initiation of OIF. In early August, Paul Wolfowitz along with a small retinue of his officials met with the FBI's Deputy Director of Counterterrorism to discuss the al-Ani — Atta meetings in Prague. Wolfowitz insisted that the FBI support the notion that these meetings actually occurred and could possibly link *al-Qaeda* to the Saddam Hussein regime. This story retained its credibility until officially discredited by the 9/11 Commission and Senate Select Intelligence Committee's publishing of their reports. Czech and German intelligence officials asserted there was a Mohammed Atta (note spelling) in Prague at the time of question, but this individual was a Pakistani businessperson. The hijacker Mohamed Atta (note spelling) was in Prague on June 2 of the year in question but promptly boarded a plane for the United States on the following day.²⁰²

VP Cheney was not the only G. W. Bush administration official to promote the notion of a direct connection between *al-Qaeda* and the Iraqi government. Another one of the leaders of the iron triangle, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld made public statements to this effect. In a September 26, 2002 press briefing, Rumsfeld said:

Since we began after September 11, we do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of *al-Qaeda* members, including some [who] have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of senior-level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical and biological agent training. And when I say contacts, I mean between Iraq and *al-Qaeda*. The reports of these contacts have been increasing since 1998. We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and *al-Qaeda* have discussed safe

haven opportunities, [and] reciprocal nonaggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible evidence that *al-Qaeda* leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who can help them acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We do have — I believe it's one report indicating that Iraq provided unspecified training relating to chemical and / or biological matter for *al-Qaeda* members. There is, I'm told, also some other information of varying degrees of reliability that supports the conclusion of their cooperation.²⁰³

Members of the media joined the chorus of individuals pointing to Iraq's intimate involvement with non-state terror groups. Chris Hedges, a *New York Times* correspondent operating in that newspaper's Paris bureau cited two former officers in the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* who reportedly asserted their organization was training *jihadi* radicals at Salman Pak in techniques to be used in terror attacks against the United States. According to Hedges, these *Mukhabarat* officials allegedly asserted that this training program had been in existence since 1995.²⁰⁴

The Habbush Data Feed

In early 2002, Rob Richer had just assumed his duties as chief of the CIA's Near East Division in the DO. In December of that year, Richer convened a meeting at the CIA station in London in which he harangued the agency's Middle Eastern Chiefs of Station and gave them directions that allegedly originated in the OPOTUS. Richer insisted that the CIA had failed in its Middle Eastern duties, as it had no reliable assets in that area, specifically Iraq. Rob Richer convened to task the heads of the Iraq Operations Group (IOG), an entity subsidiary to his Near East Division. The IOG's mandate was to extract information from Iraqis and to cultivate clandestine assets within Saddam Hussein's inner circle of power. One member of this group was John Maguire, a CIA operative who had worked on clandestine operations in Iraq for many years. Another member of the IOG met daily with Ian McCredie, the head of MI-6 in Washington, D. C. They also discussed covert operations in Iraq such as the assassination of

Iraqi elites, plans for a *coup d'état*, and convincing Saddam Hussein to enter into substantive negotiations with the U. K. and the United States.²⁰⁵

In a subsequent IOG meeting, Richer introduced Michael Shipster, the Middle East Chief of Intelligence for MI-6. During the course of that meeting, Shipster admitted to Richer that he had a clandestine asset in the highest echelons of the Iraqi government; the chief of the *Mukhabarat*, General Tahir Jallil Habbush al-Tikriti. Shipster had appraised the head of MI-6, Sir Richard Dearlove of this situation, who in turn advised George Tenet. Dearlove and Tenet approved a joint CIA - MI-6 operation to extract secret information from Habbush. Rob Richer contacted Saad Khayr, head of the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, *Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah*, to arrange weekly meetings with Habbush in Amman, Jordan. Mohammad Dahabi subsequently executed Khayr's orders to arrange the meetings starting in January, 2003. Habbush repeatedly told Richer and Shipster that he needed protection and safe passage to a foreign country in the event of the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. In some of the meetings, Habbush mentioned that Iraq had no viable WMD research and development programs or facilities. Moreover, Habbush also mentioned that in 1991 Saddam Hussein had ordered destroyed his chemical weapons stockpile and that his nuclear program had ended in that year. Additionally, Habbush purportedly asserted that the Iraqi leader did not intend to restart any WMD program. The comments made by Habbush concerning the destruction of the al-Hakam biological weapons facility in 1996 seemed especially credible, as this research program was run by the agency that he commanded, the *Mukhabarat*. Habbush continued with his trips to Amman until the first few days of February 2003. Notably, Habbush could not provide verifiable evidence that Iraq had no WMD. A summary report of Habbush's information, written by Michael Shipster's MI-6 staff was hand delivered by Sir Richard Dearlove to George Tenet in the

closing days of February 2003. After a short time, George Tenet and his DI briefer, Michael Morrel presented this report to the OPOTUS, where it caused a great deal of consternation for the President, the VP, and the NSC. The OPOTUS then buried the Habbush report and instructed MI-6 that they were no longer interested in maintaining communications with the Iraqi general. On March 19, 2003, America's massive air assault on Baghdad began. On the day before, with the help of *in situ* agents Habbush managed to make his escape by way of land egress through Iraq's al-Anbar province into Jordan. In October 2003, Rob Richer then arranged for the CIA to pay Habbush five million dollars in consideration for the services he rendered to the agency.²⁰⁶

The Habbush Memorandum Controversy

The interaction of the CIA with Habbush did not end with the provision of data to the agency via MI-6 channels and his subsequent escape to Jordan. In *The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism*, Ron Suskind asserted that he had several interviews with Sir Richard Dearlove, Rob Richer, Nigel Inkster, Michael Shipster, Alvin B. 'Buzzy' Krongrad, and other intelligence officials connected with the Habbush affair. In an interview of late October 2003, Rob Richer allegedly told Suskind of a White House D & D campaign that involved the use of Habbush. In that campaign, members of the OPOTUS arrived at a plan whereby CIA personnel would interact with Habbush in Jordan, and concoct a memorandum. Backdated to July, 2001, in his own handwriting and on official *Mukhabarat* letterhead, Habbush would write that there was a link between Saddam Hussein and *al-Qaeda*. The letter also would show other incriminating facts such as Iraq attempting to set up uranium yellowcake purchases and shipments with Niger using the assistance of *al-Qaeda* operatives. Once the memorandum was completed, CIA clandestine assets would take the document to Baghdad and arrange to leak it to the media. According to Suskind, George Tenet gave this assignment to Rob Richer, and he

grudgingly accepted it. In further commentary, Suskind stated that Richer assigned this task to a subgroup in the Iraq Operations Group headed by John Maguire. Suskind further asserted that in September, 2003 the *Habbush Memorandum* appeared in the possession of the new leader of the Iraqi Interim Government, Ayad Allawi. According to Suskind, one of Allawi's staff members reputedly passed a copy of the *Habbush Memorandum* to Con Coughlin of London's *Daily Telegraph*, who published a high impact story on December 14, 2003, *Terrorist behind September 11 Strike Was Trained by Saddam* containing paraphrased revelations from that document.²⁰⁷

In 2008, Rob Richer and John Maguire publicly denied any involvement with the *Habbush Memorandum* or any of the events surrounding it. Both Richer and Maguire mentioned they had no knowledge of the origin of the alleged memorandum, or how it circulated in Iraq. White House Deputy Press Secretary Tony Fratto and former CIA Director George Tenet agreed with the comments made by Richer and Maguire. In 2009, Representative John Conyers Jr., Chairman of the House Committee on Judiciary Majority Staff produced the report *Reining in the Imperial Presidency: Lessons and Recommendations Relating to the Presidency of George W. Bush* that assessed the overstepping of presidential authority and prerogative in the administration of G. W. Bush. In that four hundred eighty seven-page report, approximately one-half page of text dealt with Ron Suskind's assertions about the *Habbush Memorandum* in his book *The Way of the World: The Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism*. Mentioning George Tenet, Rob Richer, John Maguire, Buzzy Krongard, John Hannah, and Scooter Libby, the report found no information that confirmed the existence of the forgery. Moreover, the report said whoever may have ordered and authored the alleged forgery and was involved in leaking it through foreign intelligence channels remains unidentified.²⁰⁸

The Niger Yellowcake Affair and Iraq's Nuclear Weapons

Not limiting his organization's efforts to representations made by alleged expatriate insiders from Saddam Hussein's government, Chalabi repeatedly promoted the notion of Iraq attempting to obtain uranium yellowcake from Niger. Capitalizing on his close relationship with members of a prominent NICN, the American Enterprise Institute, Chalabi had a ready-made pipeline for his suite of assertions to make their way into the highest decision-making echelons of the G. W. Bush administration. The INC's statements about Iraq obtaining Nigerien yellowcake appeared in the pseudo-intelligence analytic products emanating from William B. Bruner, Abram Shulsky, and other members of Douglas Feith's OSP. These contentions made their way from SECDEF Rumsfeld to the OVP and eventually the NSC. During the initial phases of its promulgation, this example of the OSP's pseudo-intelligence analytic products operated in a 'blue sky' environment; at that time there seemed to be no other contradictory analytic product to act as its foil. This situation was an artifact of the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the resultant diminution of the proxy wars in Africa, permitting the W. J. Clinton administration to downgrade its HUMINT collector activities on that continent. These conditions resulted in a dearth of high-quality intelligence with respect to Africa. When America in 2002 increased its interest in Niger, it had very few, if any intelligence assets in that country.²⁰⁹

Niger produced uranium yellowcake in various mines, the most significant of which were Somair and Cominak, located deep in the Sahara Desert. The Government of Niger exerted administrative authority over the production of yellowcake, but routine operational control of these mines resided with a French conglomerate, COGEMA. This firm informally contracted the French intelligence agency, *Direction General de la Sécurité d'Exterieur* (DGSE) to handle its security functions for these facilities.²¹⁰ This relationship with the DGSE would help the CIA's

DO expose the INC's fraudulent assertions of a Nigerien / Iraqi yellowcake contractual arrangement.

In February 1999, an Iraqi diplomatic and trade delegation visited Niger. The United States Embassy in Niger reported this fact to the State Department's headquarters in Washington, D. C. In late March and early April of that year, the CIA received unvetted data indicating that delegations from Somalia, Libya, Iraq, and Iran visited Niamey, the capital of Niger with the goal of obtaining uranium yellowcake. In mid-summer of that year, the Nigerien Prime Minister Ibrahim Mayaki met with an Iraqi delegation led by Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf. In early 2001, Antonio Nucera, an agent of *Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare* (SISMI) approached an Italian freelance information broker named Rocco Martino in an attempt to organize an unofficial operation. Nucera introduced Martino to Laura Montini, a covert SISMI agent planted in the Nigerien Embassy in Rome. In early January 2001, this embassy suffered a break-in, during the course of which the perpetrators stole official letterheads, envelopes, and state seals. In the early summer of 2001, Martino and his partners assembled a document cache that suggested Iraq had contracted with Niger to purchase uranium yellowcake. On October 15, 2001, SISMI presented its initial reports about an alleged Iraqi / Nigerien yellowcake contract to Jeffrey W. Castelli, the CIA's Chief of Station in Rome. Castelli then discussed the reports with a comrade in the CIA's Milan office, Robert Selden Lady. Later that month, a report reached the DIA-HS that stated Iraq was attempting to purchase yellowcake from that country. This report purportedly came from British MI-6, and subsequently appeared in a September 2002 white paper originating from that agency. Interestingly, the primary source of the MI-6 intelligence was one of Mohamad al-Zobaidy's INC operatives in Amman, Jordan. In December 2001, Michael Leeden arranged a clandestine meeting with Nicoló Pollari of the SISMI, officials from

the United States DoD such as Larry Franklin, Harold Rhode, agents of the INC, and a noted Iranian intelligence agent and arms broker, Manucher Ghorbanifer.²¹¹

The Iraqi-Nigerien yellowcake acquisition deal would come to have nine lives; it simply would not extinguish itself despite the efforts of the CIA's DO and the State Department's INR. In early February, 2002 Tyler Drumheller's group in the CIA received copies of Martino's documents, notably containing both grammatical and spelling errors. On February 5, 2002, Italy's SISMI delivered to the CIA more data that claimed Iraq and Niger had entered into a yellowcake deal. This data asserted that the Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawi, traveled to Niger in 1999 to arrange a yellowcake procurement contract. To this day, Iraqi officials deny this excursion ever happened.²¹² This contract purportedly bound Niger to supply Iraq with 500 tons of uranium yellowcake per year. In February as well, the DIA sent its analytic product to the OVP, stating that this volume of uranium yellowcake was a serious risk to U. S. and world security, because if properly processed, that amount of refined uranium ore could produce enough fissile material to make approximately fifty first-generation nuclear bombs. On February 12, 2002, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) forwarded an analysis paper to VP Cheney, *Niamey Signed an Agreement to sell 500 Tons of Yellowcake a Year to Baghdad*, which asserted that Iraq was probably searching for external sources of uranium ore for its nuclear weapons program. Drumheller's group in the CIA at first surmised that the Italian SISMI initially generated these reports, while the DIA could not verify the base data responsible for these intelligence analytic products. Senior analysts such as Greg Thielmann, Simon Dodge, and Wayne White at the INR considered the data feeds from SISMI to be unreliable. Carl Ford, Jr., the head of the INR supported these analyses and stated to certain administration notables that all the so-called intelligence concerning Iraq and Niger emanated

from the same, non-triangulated source. On February 14, 2002, certain members of CIA's WINPAC asserted that Rocco Martino's document cache was short of verifiable details, insisting that these documents were highly suspect in nature and therefore should not exist in any actionable intelligence analytic product. Alan Foley, the Director of WINPAC, stridently contested these analyses. Tyler Drumheller's group compared the feeds from the SISMI to information originating from other members of the IC and allied intelligence agencies. His group arrived at the conclusion that there was no confirmatory information from other sources about a Nigerien yellowcake agreement and that Iraq had no post-processing facilities for such material.²¹³

Drumheller and the members of his group were not the only people within the CIA who assessed the pseudo-intelligence of Ahmad Chalabi and the INC to be worthless. An individual of legendary repute in the CIA's DO who shared that assessment was Charles 'Charlie' E. Allen. In the spring of 2002, the CIA's Assistant Director for Collection, Charlie Allen started an initiative to remedy the lack of reliable HUMINT in Iraq. Assessing that actionable HUMINT from Iraq had disappeared after 1998, Allen designed an operation whereby his agents would make contact with expatriate relatives of scientists and engineers in the Iraqi WMD program and convince them to act as CIA assets in the collection of information about their relatives' work in that country. Allen used such sources as Saad Tawfiq, who was privy to some of the most closely held secrets of Iraq's nuclear weapons programs. In order to recruit Tawfiq as a clandestine asset, Allen's group contacted his sister Sawsan Alhaddad, a Cleveland Clinic anesthesiologist who had left Baghdad in 1978 for life in the United States. Alhaddad then agreed to recruit her brother, Saad Tawfiq as a CIA asset. Tawfiq worked as an electrical engineer for Jafar Dhia Jafar, one of Saddam Hussein's senior nuclear scientists who were crucial to Iraq's development

of calutron-based uranium enrichment. On a 2002 visit to Baghdad, Sawsan Alhaddad managed to speak to Tawfiq. In the course of various conversations, Tawfiq said the last remnants of Iraq's nuclear weapons program disappeared by the end of ODF. Alhaddad returned to the United States in mid-September 2002 and quickly made contact with the CIA in Washington, D.C. She reported her findings to Allen's CIA agents in an extensive debriefing session. Some thirty expatriate Iraqis had returned to Baghdad to gather intelligence for the CIA, and all of this information aligned with the reports provided by Sawsan Alhaddad. These reports rose up the chain of command in the CIA and strangely disappeared. In the few weeks just prior to OIF, CIA's top executives terminated Allen's intelligence gathering operation. WINPAC's management rejected Allen's reports, and these assessments never made their way into PDBs or NIEs.²¹⁴

Following the example of Charlie Allen's efforts to penetrate the elite sphere of silence in Saddam Hussein's government, in August and September 2002, Tyler Drumheller's group tried to recruit credible assets inside Iraq. In September, these efforts bore fruit as the French DGSE arranged for a proxy meeting between the CIA and a representative of Iraq's foreign minister, Naji Sabri. Through this representative, Sabri offered valuable information pertaining to Iraq's WMD program. Sabri asserted that Iraq had no workable biological weapons and only had some primitive remnants of chemical weapons under the control of tribal leaders in a few provinces. Sabri did note however, that Saddam Hussein was intensely interested in nuclear weapons, but Iraq had no fissile material. He also added that Iraq had no workable enrichment facilities, and would need a minimum of two years development time to construct and deploy a nuclear weapon after it had attained sufficient stocks of fissile material. Drumheller asserted that Sabri's intelligence confirmed there was no WMD threat to U. S. troops, and also solidified his group's

suspicious about the unreliable nature of ‘Curveball’ and the Iraqi-Nigerien yellowcake deal. Drumheller also mentioned Sabri’s commentaries about Saddam Hussein’s alleged connections to *al-Qaeda*. In these commentaries, Sabri asserted that Hussein considered Osama bin-Laden and his organization to be long-standing enemies of Iraq. William D. Murray, a former member of Tyler Drumheller’s group, who was then CIA’s Paris Chief of Station, received similar revelations from members of the CIA’s Iraq Operations Group. Drumheller’s staffers constructed a limited distribution report that they gave to George Tenet. Drumheller’s superior, the DDO, James L. Pavitt, and his associate director, Hugh Turner, requested that his group arrange a face-to-face meeting with Sabri in late September. Waiting almost a month, Pavitt advised Drumheller that Tenet said there was no longer any interest in Sabri’s commentaries. In July 2006, George Tenet asserted that Drumheller had mischaracterized Sabri’s information.²¹⁵

Nevertheless, the Nigerien yellowcake story did not stop at that juncture, as a few members of the CIA’s DI asserted the SISMI information feeds were unsubstantiated and should not be included in its intelligence analytic product. Moreover, the INR’s analysts asserted that COGEMA in Niger was unlikely to have conspired with Iraq to divert yellowcake to that country. Additionally, the same analysts indicated that President Mamadou Tandja of Niger was very unlikely to risk the loss of United States foreign aid by allowing a clandestine yellowcake transaction with Iraq to occur. Nonetheless, the DIA issued a September 2002 report, *Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Program*, that did not contain any of the dissenting opinions, caveats, and warnings that existed in the INR’s analysis. The DIA report however asserted that Iraq had been vigorously trying to procure yellowcake, but that it could not confirm Iraq’s successes in any of these efforts. VP Cheney then asked for the CIA’s version of the Niger situation. This started Joseph Wilson’s investigatory journey to that state.²¹⁶

Joseph Wilson enjoyed a series of fruitful political contacts in West Africa since the early 1970s, during which time he had served as a junior diplomat in Niger. In 1997, Wilson served as a senior director of the Africa Desk in the W. J. Clinton administration's National Security Council. Unbeknownst to many members of the United States government, Wilson had worked for the CIA multiple times; during his career, he had visited many West African states and collected information about their yellowcake mining, production, and sales enterprises. Because of Wilson's multiple trips to Africa, he had generated a large range of professional and governmental contacts from which he could garner important information about uranium ore mining, refinement, and sales. In February 2002, the CIA set the wheels in motion for Joseph Wilson to re-visit Niger with the goal of collecting information on that country's alleged yellowcake sales contracts with Iraq.

Wilson had a convivial relationship with the former Nigerien Prime Minister, Ibrahim Mayaki, who was in office at the time when the yellowcake procurement deal with Iraq allegedly occurred. Wilson also was familiar with Mai Manga, the Nigerien Minister of Energy and Mines who served during the mandate of Ibrahim Mayaki. He also served as Deputy U. S. Ambassador to Iraq in the prelude to ODS, and thus was one of America's diplomatic officials who possessed a very strong sense of whether Saddam Hussein was or was not attempting to acquire yellowcake from Niger in order to reconstitute his nuclear weapons program. Wilson arrived in Niamey on February 26, 2002. The U. S. Ambassador to Niger, Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick was somewhat surprised when Wilson appeared at the embassy. She had thought that her previous reports forwarded to the INR's analysts had discredited the alleged Niger-Iraq yellowcake contracts. Moreover, Owens-Kirkpatrick had previously arranged for General Carlton Fulford to visit Niger and interview President Tandja and Foreign Minister Aichatou Mindaoudou with the view of

ascertaining if the country's uranium consortium had any agreements with Iraqi officials to supply yellowcake. At that meeting, the President and the Nigerien Foreign Minister assured Fulford that Niger's goal was to keep its uranium ore off the black market. In a seemingly prescient fashion, the INR on March 1, 2002 published an intelligence assessment by Douglas Rohn, *Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq Is Unlikely*. Rohn's document elicited multiple reasons to doubt the veracity of the Nigerien Iraqi yellowcake deal, the most important of which was Niger's heavy dependence upon American foreign aid. Rohn mentioned the Nigeriens would be highly resistant to any sort of action that would jeopardize the continuance of aid from Washington. Notably, the INR did admit that it failed to provide the assessment directly to VP Cheney by way of special delivery.²¹⁷

On March 5, 2002, Joseph Wilson arrived in Washington from his Nigerien fact-finding mission. Wilson met with the CIA's DO debriefing staff to file his report on the status of the alleged yellowcake contract between Niger and Iraq. Based upon Joseph Wilson's findings, on March 8, the CIA produced a report that made its way to the OVP. These reports highlighted the fact that the Nigerien Prime Minister and Minister of Mines had no knowledge of any contracts signed between their country and any rogue states for the supply of yellowcake. The Nigerien Minister of Mines further asserted that he would have been aware of any such contractual arrangements. It is noteworthy that Wilson's report only made its way through the CIA *via* routine channels: agency executives failed to flag the report as an urgent action item. Moreover, the CIA's briefer, Michael Morell did not explicitly inform VP Cheney about Wilson's report.²¹⁸

Irrespective of Joseph Wilson's report, the Nigerien yellowcake imbroglio would not expire. In mid-March 2002, the CIA received another report from Italy's SISMI restating the notion that the Nigerien government had in fact contracted with Iraq to supply it with

approximately five hundred tons of uranium yellowcake *per annum*. In May of that year, Paul R. Pillar's group in the CIA's DI prepared a briefing for the NSC that stated a foreign government had arranged to acquire five hundred tons of uranium yellowcake from Niger. In September 2002, the DIA published a report, *Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Program* that clearly stated Iraq had tried to procure various forms of uranium ore, including yellowcake and various uranium phosphate minerals from sources such as Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. The assessment did qualify its statements by saying that the DIA could not confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring any type of uranium ore from the above sources. Nuclear weapons analysts at the DoE noted that the alleged Nigerien yellowcake would have given Saddam Hussein a significant advantage in the production of low yield nuclear weapons, and if true, this would indicate that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. These analysts also indicated that there was no clear chain of evidence that indicated any shipments of Nigerien yellowcake to Iraq.²¹⁹

In response to the nebulous intelligence environment associated with the alleged Niger-Iraq yellowcake deal, Tyler Drumheller, the CIA's Chief of European Operations became suspicious of the sources and methods supporting that milieu. Drumheller had received an initial analysis from Jeffrey W. Castelli, the CIA Chief of Station in Rome who asserted the papers surrounding the Niger-Iraq yellowcake deal were fraudulent. Drumheller instructed his Paris Chief of Station, William D. Murray to make contact with his associate in the French DGSE to investigate further the allegations about Iraqi-Nigerien complicity in an alleged yellowcake contract. Murray managed to convince Alain Chouet of the DGSE to send some agents to Niger to investigate the situation. Chouet's agents returned from Niger with no evidence that supported any yellowcake deal between that country and Iraq. Chouet noted that the allegations about a

uranium yellowcake deal between Iraq and Niger were strangely similar to those made by an Italian freelance information broker, Rocco Martino who had tried to sell similar documents to the DGSE in 2001. At that time, analysts at the DGSE assessed Martino's allegations to be fabrications and his documentation forgeries. *Via* secure methods, Chouet's DGSE team sent notification to this effect to William D. Murray, who then forwarded the DGSE's assessment of the situation to Drumheller.²²⁰

Drumheller and his support staff then prepared formal assessments of the Nigerien yellowcake situation and forwarded them to the DDO, James L. Pavitt, and DCI George Tenet. Drumheller's reports asserted that reliable intelligence sources pointed to the fact that Rocco Martino in partnership with Antonio Nucera had forged the documents that purportedly supported a uranium yellowcake deal between Niger and Iraq. Nucera reportedly had supplied copies of legitimate Nigerien papers to Martino for the purposes of forging the yellowcake sales memoranda. Drumheller's commentary further asserted that on January 2, 2001, Martino, Nucera, Zakaria Yaou Maiga, and an unnamed female accomplice codenamed '*La Signora*' broke into Niger's Rome Embassy and stole official letterheads, envelopes, and an embassy stamp. Coupled with other items, the Martino group forged the documents that depicted a memorandum of understanding between Niger and Iraq, approving the yellowcake sale in compliance with Article 20 of Ordinance 74-13 dated 5 July 2000. According to Drumheller, Martino purportedly forwarded the forged documents to the DGSE in exchange for a large yet undisclosed sum of money. DGSE analysts subsequently scrutinized the documents and assessed them to be forgeries.²²¹

Drumheller's reports also stated that the head of Italy's SISMI, General Nicoló Pollari, asserted his agency played no part in the production of the forged documents. Pollari did openly

admit that ‘*La Signora*,’ Martino, and Nucera, acting in an independent and non-authorized fashion, were involved in the forged documents escapade. The connection to these documents spread to the Pentagon’s OSP by way of Michael Ledeen, who was in Rome at the time that this plot occurred. Complicity between Martino, Larry Franklin, and Michael Ledeen formed a ‘back channel’ from which to propagate the information contained in the fraudulent Nigerien documents back to the OSP, and eventually the OVP. Drumheller’s reports asserted that the allegations of a Nigerien yellowcake deal were fabrications potentially generated by Rocco Martino and his accomplices. Drumheller then waited for a change in the G. W. Bush administration’s public commentary on the Nigerien yellowcake scenario: he ascertained no such modifications in these remarks, thus leading to his increased level of frustration with the quality of intelligence analytic product generated by the CIA’s DI.²²²

Oddly, the Nigerien / Iraqi yellowcake scenario did not end with the reports produced by Tyler Drumheller’s group. The CIA faxed a memo to the White House on October 6, 2002 stating that two of the Nigerien uranium ore mines flooded and were incapable of producing yellowcake, and that a third Nigerien mining facility was under the full control of French authorities. On October 7, 2002, and at the approximate time of President G. W. Bush’s speech in Cincinnati, twenty-two pages of documents outlining the Nigerian yellowcake contract arrived at the desk of Elisabetta Burba, a reporter for the Italian newspaper *Panorama*. Burba received these documents from Rocco Martino, with whom she previously had dealt on several occasions. Martino required a ten thousand dollar payment from Burba in exchange for photocopies of the alleged Niger / Iraq yellowcake contracts. On October 9, Burba delivered the document cache to the U. S. Embassy in Rome. Once in the embassy, Jeffery W. Castelli, the CIA’s Rome Chief of Station took action: he sent the documents to Drumheller who then forwarded them to the CIA’s

Counter Proliferation Division. On October 16, staff in the U. S. Embassy in Rome sent these photocopies to the INR for analysis. INR analysts Greg Thielmann, Wayne White, Douglas Rohn, and Simon Dodge immediately questioned the validity of the documents by asserting that the official Nigerien seal on the papers appeared to be crude forgeries. In an October 16 meeting, INR personnel formally forwarded their preliminary assessments to representatives of the CIA. Curiously, upon later examination by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee none of these CIA representatives admitted any recollection of receiving these documents.²²³

In November 2002, the chief executive officer of COGEMA in Niger told the U. S. Ambassador, Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick that his consortium had not diverted to Iraq any of the uranium yellowcake produced in its mines. On December 7, Iraq produced an approximate twelve thousand-page document package that denied having any WMD programs whatsoever. Then, on December 17, WINPAC produced an analysis of Iraq's document package, asserting that Iraq was in default of its agreement to cease and desist all of its WMD programs by failing to explain its procurement contracts for highly machined, high-strength aluminum tubes and its attempts to obtain uranium yellowcake from Niger. Subsequently, on January 16, 2003, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee asserted that the CIA received the Nigerien documents, with two of their analysts agreeing with the INR's assessments that the papers were crude forgeries. On January 28, 2003, President G. W. Bush declared in the State of the Union address that Iraq sought significant quantities ore uranium from Africa, but he avoided mention of Niger by asserting that this information came from the British government.²²⁴

The uranium yellowcake entanglement reached a feverish pitch when on March 3, 2003, Jacques Baute, the director of the Nuclear Verification Office for the IAEA said his organization investigated the Nigerien documents and found them to be forgeries. Baute said the documents

“did not substantiate any assessment that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger.”²²⁵

Subsequently on March 4, 2003, the DGSE told the CIA the Nigerien information was faulty and was based on forged documents.²²⁶ On March 7, 2003, the Director General of the IAEA, Mohammed El-Baradei, publicly asserted the Nigerien documents were forgeries. During an NBC News *Meet the Press* episode On March 16, 2003, VP Cheney publicly disagreed with the IAEA’s findings by saying, “I think if you look at the track record of the IAEA on this kind of issue, especially where Iraq is concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what... Saddam Hussein was doing.”²²⁷ Shortly after that speech, the United States launched its ‘Shock and Awe’ air assault against Iraq. On April 5, 2003, the National Intelligence Council published a Sense of the Community Memorandum, *Niger, No Recent Uranium Sales to Iraq*.

This memorandum stated the following:

We judge it highly unlikely that Niamey has sold uranium yellowcake to Baghdad in recent years. The IC agrees with the IAEA assessment that the key documents purported showing recent Iraq — Niger sales are a fabrication. We judge that other reports from 2002 — one alleging warehousing of yellowcake for shipment to Iraq, a second alleging a 1999 visit by an Iraqi delegation to Niamey — do not constitute credible evidence of a recent or impending sale.²²⁸

Finally completing its retraction, the IC further stated its position on the yellowcake procurement scenario. On June 17, 2003, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, Jami Miscik sent a memo to George Tenet that explicitly debunked the Niger-Iraq yellowcake procurement agreement. This classified memo, *In Response to Your Questions for Our Current Assessment and Additional Details on Iraq's Alleged Pursuits of Uranium from Abroad*, stated that the IC’s earlier allegations supporting this procurement agreement were based on false documents, and there was no evidence to support claims that Iraq purchased any uranium ore from foreign sources. In the first week of April 2003 Stanley M. Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs for the CIA sent a memo to Congress explaining the Nigerien yellowcake and aluminum

tubes scenarios. The memo arrived at the desk of Jenny Mayfield in the OVP, with further instructions for routing to Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby and John Hannah. Additionally, this memo moved to Tim Sample, the Staff Director of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. This document outlined the CIA’s assessments of Iraq’s WMD capabilities, feedstock and equipment acquisition efforts.²²⁹ In fact, this memo acknowledged the assessment errors mentioned earlier in this study.

Colin Powell’s Dilemma

As the intelligence analytic furor expanded in the IC, President G. W. Bush, VP Cheney, and SECDEF Rumsfeld requested Secretary of State Colin Powell make a presentation before the United Nations Security Council stating America’s case for war against Iraq. Powell initially did not respond to the Iraqi’s reporting compliance of January 27, 2003, instead focusing on Iraq’s lack of cooperation and his understanding that the Iraqis wanted to reconstitute their WMD programs. Powell had long been an advocate of continued and enhanced United Nations inspections of Iraq’s WMD arsenal. He spent many hours of concerted effort lobbying for United Nations Resolution 1441. In late January 2003, the NSC sent its last request to the CIA for a definitive statement on Iraq’s WMD arsenal. Robert Walpole, the CIA’s Chief Nuclear Programs Analyst, and a signatory of the October 2002 NIE, asserted that the NSC considered the case for Iraq having nuclear weapons to be ambiguous. Shortly thereafter, ‘Scooter’ Libby delivered a high-impact presentation that emphasized Iraqi denial and deception operations designed to obfuscate United Nations inspection efforts to uncover WMD stores in that country. In that meeting, members of the NSC received a presentation that asserted funds garnered from Iraq’s illicit oil sales were used to purchase black-market WMD. With pseudo-intelligence in hand, President G. W. Bush with the advice of Karl Rove requested that Colin Powell make a televised

presentation before the United Nations Security Council stating America's case for invading Iraq. In his landmark address, Powell mentioned the probability of Iraqi WMD, proscribed systems, and other dangerous capabilities. Powell asserted that the Iraqis had shifted WMD assets to secret locations before inspectors' visits thereby violating previous United Nations resolutions. Notably, Hans Blix later denied that United Nations inspectors had reported the Iraqi scenarios as described in Powell's speech.²³⁰

Notwithstanding Blix's comments, senior officials in the Bush administration continued to press home the notion that Iraq was an existential threat to the security of the United States and its allies. The Bush administration continued to promote this line of thinking despite the fact that the CIA's DO had solid evidence that 'Curveball' was a fabricator, the aluminum tubes were used for tactical rocket bodies, there were no mobile BW labs, and the UAVs were simply used for aerial survey work. Before President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address, Joseph Wippl, the CIA's Chief of Station in Berlin received an update from the BND with respect to 'Curveball.' Wippl reported to Drumheller that the BND considered 'Curveball' to be a fabricator; he issued a high-priority 'burn notice' to the IC. Notably, in early October Drumheller met with a BND official in a Washington, D. C. restaurant. The BND officer went on to say that 'Curveball' was unreliable. Drumheller personally brought this information to the DDO, James Pavitt, who then suggested he present this report directly to Alan Foley, the head of WINPAC. The meeting between Drumheller and Foley was extremely heated and contentious. The day before President Bush's January 28, 2003, State of the Union Address, Wippl's report about the status of 'Curveball' went directly to the office of George Tenet. Drumheller and Wippl's reports then disappeared into the upper echelons of the G. W. Bush administration. At approximately the

same time, Air Force intelligence reports negating the G. W. Bush administration's claims of weaponized Iraqi UAVs became public.²³¹

On January 29, Lawrence Wilkerson and other members of Colin Powell's staff went to the CIA's headquarters. Their assignment was to transform 'Scooter' Libby's pseudo-intelligence into something in which Powell had a modicum of confidence. John Hanna, William Tobey, and some members of the State Department accompanied them. Powell had read the October NIE, but had not performed detailed research on the intelligence foundations of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's case for war. Lawrence Wilkerson noted that due to Powell's immense public reputation, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz stressed that he could afford to lose some popularity points by presenting a strong case for war with Iraq. John Hanna produced documents for Powell to review and use in his speech before the United Nations. These documents were not professional intelligence analytic products; in reality, they were nothing more than a collection of op-eds. In essence, the documents were just a reiteration of talking points provided by Douglas Feith, 'Scooter' Libby, and the OVP. Powell's team reviewed many documents and found them to be deficient; they decided to use the October 2002 NIE as a basis for his speech, as it seemed to be the lesser of two evils. Powell emphatically stated that he could not use the material that allegedly linked Saddam Hussein to Mohamed Atta; the connection that said Atta met with an Iraqi *Mukhabarat* agent in Prague. He decided that he could not present solid evidence of a linkage between Saddam Hussein and transnational terrorist groups, but he would simply state there was a loose association between the Iraqi leader and various terrorist entities. However, Powell decided to use information from a document that asserted Ibn al-Shaikh al-Libi had trained *al-Qaeda* members in the deployment and use of CBW. Interestingly, United States forces captured Ibn al-Shaikh al-Libi in Afghanistan and in early 2002, transferred

him from Bagram Air Force Base to a CIA 'black site' in Egypt where he experienced extraordinary rendition. In February 2002, the DIA-HS issued a report that asserted Ibn al-Shaikh al-Libi was a fabricator. Notably in March 2004, the CIA withdrew the questionable intelligence that Iraq and trained *al-Qaeda* in CBW. Another notable postscript to the Colin Powell narrative came from Michael Morell, Jami Miscik's immediate subordinate in the CIA's DI. In a May 11, 2015 interview with correspondent Charlie Rose on the CBS Morning News, Morell made a very important apology to Powell by saying, "I thought it important to do so because here is a man with an incredible reputation: well-deserved over a long period of time, and he went out there and made this case, and we [in the CIA] were wrong."²³²

Summary

This chapter has elucidated questionable data feeds that entered the IC, NSC, PCTEG, OSP, and NESA. Among these feeds were Iraq's aluminum tubes and Zippe centrifuges, its aerial drone, ballistic missile, and NBCW programs, along with Saddam Hussein's connections to transnational terrorist organizations. These questionable data feeds resulted from the INC's pseudo-intelligence generating program that based its products on the statements made by alleged defectors from Iraq's military, scientific, and intelligence agencies. This chapter also dealt with data feeds generated by cooperative efforts between Great Britain's MI-6 and the CIA, along with some fraudulent data feeds generated by questionable information brokers residing in Italy. For the most part, these feeds fortuitously reinforced the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's intellectual and ideological predispositions that supported an American invasion of Iraq. At times, these data feeds featured mutually inconsistent aspects that tended the cloud the waters of intelligence analysis production, thereby giving the elites in the G. W. Bush administration sufficient political maneuvering room to assist them in making a case for war with

Iraq. In short, as members of various NICNs joined the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle in the G. W. Bush administration, they ‘cherry picked’ various data feeds for information sets that agreed with their ideological and political dispositions and preconceived notions about Iraq’s WMD arsenal and its complicity with transnational terrorist organizations. This and the preceding section shall serve as the empirical foundation for which to compare, contrast, and analyze the theoretical constructs examined in the upcoming chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The previous chapters have discussed the milieu delineating the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. Based on the data presented in these chapters, the root cause for this failure could align with three theoretical groupings: poor intelligence analytic tradecraft, features of bureaucracy, and behavioral pathologies. This chapter shall present some various pertinent theoretical constructs in order to align, and when necessary, contrast them with the considerations discussed in the previous chapters. This section shall deal with theoretical aspects of intelligence such as intelligence analysis and intelligence failure, the praxis of intelligence, the intelligence cycle, the politicization of intelligence analysis, and the difficulties of intelligence analysis and their remedies. Next, this chapter shall examine the overall categories of bureaucracy, bureaucrats, and careerism. In this examination, the following theoretical sub-constructs shall be scrutinized: a typology of bureaucrats, careerism, bureaucratic self-interest, issue clusters / networks, and iron triangles, governmental employment factors and careerism, whistleblowing, workplace political factors, organizational citizenship and compulsory citizenship behaviors, leader-member exchange, perceptions of organizational politics, along with prosocial behaviors, and the relativism of ethics. The researcher shall then use the information provided by this chapter to contrast, compare, and analyze in *Chapter V, Discussions and Conclusions*, the information provided by *Chapter II, Contextual Considerations* and *Chapter III, Dubious Data Enters the IC*.

Intelligence Analysis and Intelligence Failure

In order to ascertain if an intelligence failure did or did not occur in the prelude to OIF, it is necessary to examine briefly the theories of intelligence analysis and intelligence failure. To initiate this examination, one must first define intelligence in the context of this research.

Jennifer Sims asserted that, “Intelligence is information collected, organized, or analyzed on behalf of actors or decision makers.”²³³ From the perspective of state governance, intelligence is an activity that is designed to understand or influence foreign entities. Another facet of intelligence is that it helps leaders accomplish their national security goals. Intelligence provides advance warning with the opportunity to move events more closely into alignment with decision-makers’ goals.²³⁴ Michael Turner asserted, “Intelligence is policy-relevant information, collected through open and clandestine means and subjected to analysis, for the purposes of educating, enlightening, or helping ...decision makers in formulating and implementing national security and foreign policy.”²³⁵ In short, the purpose of intelligence analytic products is to give decision-makers an accurate depiction of the capabilities and intentions of individuals and groups that are significant to the national security interests of any polity. Particularly with respect to intentions, Michael A. Turner said:

Intentions, on the other hand, involve the will and plans of political leaders to carry out specific actions. Since this kind of information involves intellectual processes and private deliberation among government leaders, it is often subject to repeated change, concealment, and manipulation. Collecting information about intentions requires ...capabilities that rely less on quantification and measurement, and more on contacts, intuition ...and the ability to ferret out deception and other types of subterfuge... For a government to be without a clue about the enemy’s intentions — let alone its capabilities is very dangerous...²³⁶

In addition to having the above-mentioned qualities, intelligence products must be analytically neutral and untainted by the policy preferences of executive decision-makers. When intelligence falls short of these qualities, goals and purposes, the result is an intelligence failure.

Once data is collected, analysts subject it to a multi-iterative process in which they sort and index the acquired data, transforming it into information. Taking into account evidentiary facts, intangibles, innuendos, intuition, and contextual factors, these individuals then follow an analytic process to produce intelligence. The intelligence analytic process is not sterile: it is a socio-cognitive activity. Even though modern-day intelligence production uses technological aids, it still utilizes the human brain as the ultimate generator of its product. Moreover, the generation of intelligence involves the interaction of multiple individuals within groups, agencies, and across group or agency boundaries. This interaction is a socially mediated process that operates *via* relationships between those who assign analytic tasks and generate analytic products. Long gone are the days in which a single, apex analyst poring over sets of data produces high quality intelligence for decision-makers: the current paradigm has analysts collaborating with their peers and drawing on the expertise and insights of data collectors and subject matter experts. Succinctly stated, most analysts work in groups that have deep and wide interconnections with other members of the intelligence, academic, and governmental communities.²³⁷

The Praxis of Intelligence

The praxis of intelligence is as old as statecraft and warfare: it deals with discerning the intentions and capabilities of adversaries, allies, and neutral parties. Dealing with evidentiary facts, prevarications, innuendos, half-truths, and estimates, some commentators often misconstrue intelligence to be fortune telling and a predictor of future events. Notably, the United States was the last major power to enter into the formalized practice of intelligence analysis. Its practice of intelligence began with the efforts of George Washington and Benjamin Franklin. Many American presidents have commissioned *ad-hoc* intelligence enterprises often associated with the extreme emergencies of war. Most of these enterprises spiraled down after

the end of hostilities; hence, in the American experience, the praxis of intelligence has become intertwined with the use of military force.²³⁸

After the close of World War II, President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS, inaugurated some interim intelligence organizations, and then in 1947 under the auspices of the National Security Act, instituted the Central Intelligence Agency. During the Cold War, the IC grew at a phenomenal rate. This expansion was necessary because of the perceived threat of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, Red China, and nuclear war. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the perceived termination of the Cold War, the IC floundered; its long experience of dealing with a bipolar world did not align well with the new realities of a multi-polar global power structure. This situation-capabilities mismatch was exemplified by the IC's inability to predict and prevent the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, the attacks on United States interests and facilities in the Middle East and Africa, and the 9/11 disasters. After these events, the IC radically shifted its resources away from state-oriented foreign threats to that of sub-state actors, such as transnational terrorist organizations.

One of the more noted commentators on intelligence analysis theory, Klaus Knorr, in 1964 stated that there were neither normative nor descriptive theories of intelligence analysis, thus leading to a situation in which there were no criteria for judging whether intelligence analysis was done badly or well. Yet without a theory of intelligence analysis, practitioners are unable to attain intellectual parsimony. Richard K. Betts asserted that the dearth of intelligence analysis theory is culturally rooted: it stems from the fact that many intelligence practitioners believe theory is boring or puerile.²³⁹ These statements tend to leave the reader unsure as to the purpose of intelligence. As a consequence of this situation, this study shall supply a succinct commentary that deals with the objective of the praxis of intelligence.

Collectors and analysts often describe the objective of intelligence analysis as the generation of parsimonious statements that clearly delineate the capabilities and intentions of the individuals and groups under examination. Intelligence analysis must deal with major inputs such as intelligence personnel, organizational scope, the nature of information, the modes of analysis and production, and demands made by consumers. In short, intelligence collection and analysis arrives at a concise situational scrutiny that informs decision-makers in the establishment of policy options. Yet, contrary to popular belief, intelligence analysis and collection should not under any circumstances form policy; that function is the exclusive purview of executive decision-makers. Moreover, intelligence should not be produced to align with the policy preferences of executive decision-makers.²⁴⁰

The praxis of intelligence allows decision-makers to maximize their power, which is the ability to modify their target's behavior to do something that they otherwise would not do. Moreover, intelligence is not practiced for its own sake; on the contrary, executive decision-makers need high-quality intelligence in order to make their application of power more effective and efficient. In essence, intelligence analytic products assist executives' decision-making duties; it is best described as a decision support tool. The purpose of intelligence becomes increasingly valuable when one considers what a decision-maker does in his or her professional life. Decision-makers are continually confronted with the following generalized questions: what is occurring, what is its significance, and what must be done? Executives who have well-developed levels of decision-making capabilities are constantly repeating iterations of these questions until they find a satisfactory answer to the last question: what must be done. Unlike Napoleon Bonaparte's notable position as Imperial France's apex intelligence analyst, the great majority of current decision-makers are unable to base their decisions upon personal experience and

knowledge. Therefore, present executive decision-makers must delegate data collection and intelligence analytic production to various organizations, such as the CIA or DIA, which collect data, sort and index it, produce information and analyze it into intelligence products.

Notwithstanding this differentiation, decision-makers and intelligence agencies need the same sort of skills, information base, and wisdom in order to perform their functions effectively and efficiently. High quality intelligence analytic products reduce decision-makers' uncertainties about their adversaries and anxieties about their country's vulnerabilities. In short, high-quality analytic products give executive decision-makers foreknowledge; that is, a suite of triangulated information that is of extremely high importance to those who wish to seize the initiative in international affairs.²⁴¹

How Are Intelligence Analyses Produced?

A naïve view of the intelligence production process is that executive decision-makers set requirements and the IC obediently fulfils those necessities. In a perfect world, this simplistic view would be sufficient, but in today's world of ever-increasing complexities, this perspective is quite deficient. The reality of the situation is that intelligence priority setting is not the exclusive purview of executive decision-makers. These priorities are a large and heavy burden shared by senior analysts, subject matter experts, and other members of agencies external to the IC in conjunction with the executive decision-making cadre. However, the main job of the IC is to ensure that its analytic products are relevant to pressing policy issues. In the latter half of the twentieth century, technological advancements changed the global strategic environment to a significant extent. This change manifested itself in the following ways: (1) ever-increasing levels of national power; (2) increased speed of the application of national power; (3) increasing speed and mass of data collection; (4) faster and more efficient methods of data reduction, indexing,

information production, and intelligence analyses; and (5) faster rates of delivery of analytic products to decision-makers. In short, the overall praxis of intelligence has changed with the passage of time: with the advent of the information age, a paradigmatic shift occurred from simplistic modes of data collection to that of mass collection, sorting, indexing, explanation, and exhaustive analysis.²⁴² The above changes were significant factors in the praxis of intelligence during the prelude to OIF.

The Intelligence Cycle

The classical intelligence cycle has six phases: (1) planning and direction, (2) collection, (3) processing, (4) production, (5) analysis, and (6) dissemination. This cycle is not a linear setting in which one phase inextricably leads to the next. On the contrary, each step in the cycle is multi-iterative with producers and consumers interacting with each other *via* feedback loops. The intelligence cycle is not smooth, and is certainly not without faults and defects. It is subject to the vagaries of the human condition, such as prevarication, self-aggrandizement, bickering, vendettas, corruption, and bureaucratic infighting. In the first section of the intelligence cycle planning and direction occurs. This stage encompasses the setting of requirements for which type of data sets are needed and what intelligence agency shall collect those data sets. Even at this early stage of the intelligence cycle, human and bureaucratic factors come into play: agency directors, deputy directors, and managers of departments must guard against the issues that are evident in any human-mediated enterprise. These issues may simply arise from differences in perspective, education, ethnocentrism, philosophical bias, and *weltanschauung*. Structured analytic techniques, institutional SOPs, and professional ethics *should* prevent such defects from tainting the intelligence production process. These techniques are part of the planning process,

insuring that a healthy modicum of repeatability and defensibility underpins the analyses produced by a particular intelligence organization.²⁴³

The collection phase of the intelligence cycle attracts significant attention from the media and the entertainment industry, as it primarily employs operations that capture the public's imagination such as espionage, paramilitary endeavors, mass surveillance, and high technology collection techniques. The IC uses many data acquisition mechanisms for the generation of these types of intelligence such as human intelligence collector operations (HUMINT) and various technological modes of collection (TECHINT). There has been a budgetary tension between HUMINT and TECHINT in the United States with TECHINT now consuming approximately ninety percent of the American intelligence budget. Nonetheless, HUMINT collector operations have demonstrated some outstanding precedents: the Western alliance gained significant intelligence from a Soviet intelligence officer named Oleg Penkovsky, while the Soviet bloc achieved such notable successes such as the theft of American nuclear weapons secrets and the penetration of the British Secret Intelligence Service by Guy Burgess, Don McLean, and Harold 'Kim' Philby. Contrary to media-fueled public perceptions, open source intelligence (OSINT) provides more than eighty percent of all intelligence collected by the United States. This originates from sources such as libraries, publicly available industrial reports, the media, and overt collection efforts performed by Foreign Service Officers in the State Department.²⁴⁴ However, one must guard against the ever-present predilection to view information as intelligence. In fact, this error will cause a surfeit of seemingly useful information that actually will hinder the production of high-quality intelligence. William B. Binney, a former senior NSA intelligence officer stated his position on the information overload problem present in America's IC:

“This ...was for the most part caused by America’s predilection to ...mass surveillance technologies. By casting a wide net that catches all sorts of data ...overload occurs; the situation is so severe that even the most powerful information technology infrastructure cannot overcome it. Data and information overload more often than not, causes a dearth of high quality intelligence analytic products.”²⁴⁵

In short, data is not information and information is not intelligence. The rigorous analysis of information garnered from data feeds is an absolute prerequisite for the generation of high-quality intelligence. As will be discussed in upcoming sections of this study, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle’s erroneous acceptance of unvetted information as intelligence produced disastrous results for America’s decision-making outcomes in the prelude to OIF.

Intelligence Analytic Politicization

The information presented in *Chapter II, Contextual Considerations* suggests that analytic politicization and a concomitant intelligence failure occurred in the prelude to OIF. As a point of comparison, this chapter shall discuss the theoretical factors delineating intelligence analytic politicization. Intelligence analytic products serve political ends: the entities who request the collection of data and the production of analyses are decision-makers with political agendas and goals. This environment is rife with opportunities that could allow policymakers’ influence to affect intelligence analyses.²⁴⁶ However, this statement begs the question, what is intelligence politicization? Jack Davis, a noted CIA intelligence expert and author of copious works on analytic tradecraft stated that politicization is:

[T]he distortion of analysis by setting aside or otherwise failing to meet the standards of objectivity in setting forth information and judgments, in order to support a worldview or policy preference. ...[it] is a debasement of professionalism... Debasement of professional norms has happened in the past when analysts and their managers have given into bullying from a policy official or have deliberately distorted the analytic process at their own initiative. Politicization also takes place when analysts and managers... let their own policy biases skew the marshaling of evidence and judgments.²⁴⁷

Harry Howe Ransom further defined analytic politicization by saying ... “[I]ntelligence estimates are influenced by embedded policy positions... [I]ntelligence agencies are subjected to overt or subtle pressures resulting in [policy palatable] intelligence.”²⁴⁸ Ransom further mentioned that politicization of intelligence occurs when the interests of America’s plural society are in conflict over the government’s foreign policy means and ends. He went on to assert that intelligence politicization occurs because of the competitive and inherently conflictual nature of that political environment.²⁴⁹ Robert Jervis added weight to Ransom’s assertions by stating that intelligence politicization may seem unusual, but is in reality, quite common.²⁵⁰ Robert Gates mentioned that analytic politicization is not the exclusive purview of policymakers: it can also emanate from analysts, managers, and executives in the IC.²⁵¹

In order to understand analytic politicization, one must examine the relationship between intelligence analysis producers and the policymaking consumers. When one looks at that relationship, hierarchies and power structures emerge. The IC, from the *de jure* perspective is subservient to its political masters: in the American example, the President, VP, and NSC. Mark Lowenthal described the relationship between elites and the IC by saying, “Policymakers can exist and function without the intelligence community, but the opposite is not true.”²⁵² Sherman Kent mentioned that a dichotomy of focus exists between policymakers and analysts, with policymakers demanding short-term current intelligence analytic products, while analysts prefer to deliver strategic analyses. This dichotomy, leads to friction between policymakers and analysts.²⁵³ In essence, the intelligence analysts’ scholarly pursuit of objective truth is at odds with the time-sensitive nature of policymaker’s demands.²⁵⁴ Robert M. Gates, a former Director of the CIA spoke to the crux of this situation by saying, “If we ignore policymaker interests, then our products become irrelevant in the formulation of our government’s foreign policy.”²⁵⁵ This is

not to say that the relationship between the IC and its political masters is necessarily adversarial, on the contrary, both parties have a stake in the maintenance of ongoing good relations. These interests emanate from the fact that non-expert policymakers need the IC to inform them about critical issues so they can make judgments that enhance and protect national interests and security. The IC however, requires guidance from decision-makers so that its analytic product is policy relevant, not just a theoretical treatise that resides in the realm of curiosity research.²⁵⁶ This study asserts that requests for mission-oriented research emanating from the policymaking cadre form the initiating mechanism that generates intelligence analytic products. Policy guidance provides the mission orientation for this research effort. The crux of this question lies in the demarcation between policy guidance and policy compliance in the production of intelligence analytic products. As an examiner of intelligence politicization, one *should* ask the following question; when do policy relevance and guidance degenerate into political pressure that compels the IC to make policy palatable analytic products?

One perspective on the relationship of intelligence analytic products to policy is that of isolation. This viewpoint asserts that those working in the IC must be sequestered from elites and their pressures in order to prevent the pollution of analyses by policymakers' preferences. The impact of isolation on intelligence analysis is a double-edged sword: too much isolation causes analytic products to become policy irrelevant, while too little isolation runs the risk of causing these products to be sycophantic documents complying with decision-makers' preferences.²⁵⁷ Members of the IC have debated the notions of intelligence analytic independence since the days of William J. Donovan's institution of the COI in the Library of Congress. This debate became especially heated after the founding of the CIA via the 1947 National Security Act. Sherman Kent and Willmoore Kendall espoused two opposing viewpoints: Kent supported the notion of

analytic independence, while Kendall supported a position that included heightened policy relevance, and a close relationship between decision-makers and the IC's analytic cadre. In essence, Kent wanted institutional independence for analysts in order to provide the levels of objectivity normally associated with scholarly pursuits. Moreover, Kent asserted that to maintain policy relevance, analysts must accept nonintrusive guidance from policymakers. His approach was a balanced one, with a slight bias towards policy-maker proximity. He expressed this dictum by saying, "Of the two dangers, that of intelligence being too far from the users and that of being too close, the greater danger is the one of being too far."²⁵⁸ Kendall repeatedly asserted that Kent's concepts would make the IC too bureaucratic in orientation, distant from policymakers and often irrelevant to the United States position on the world's stage. In short, Kendall wanted intelligence analysts much more closely slanted towards policymakers with a concomitant removal of Kent's 'Chinese Wall' that separated these two entities.²⁵⁹ Stephen Marrin summarized this situation by stating:

[I]ntelligence agencies that are proximal to decision-makers produce analyses that are useful for decision-making but have the potential for distortion due to the incorporation of policy biases and preferences. Agencies that are distant from policymakers tend to produce analyses containing little distortion, but [are] of little use in improving policymaker judgment.²⁶⁰

Michael I. Handel asserted that an objective intelligence environment populated by detached experts who present the analytic truth of any situation to decision-makers is a fanciful and illusory construct.²⁶¹ Arthur Hulnick noted that proponents of the proximity model recommended intelligence and policy should be closely intertwined, while the traditionalists supported Sherman Kent's notions of an IC insulated from the caprices of the policy-making cadre.²⁶² Long-serving intelligence professionals such as Tyler Drumheller, Tom Fingar, William Murray, W. Patrick Lang, Mark Lowenthal, Mike Pheneger, and Greg Thielmann asserted that politicization could also occur through the normal mechanisms one might ascertain

in the American bureaucracy. These mechanisms include budgetary controls, headcount restrictions, intensification or denigration of organizational prestige, and access to the OPOTUS, OVP, and NSC. When implemented subtly and skillfully, these factors could present a powerful, yet implicit *quid pro quo* to IC executives and senior employees to ‘toe the line’ by generating policy-palatable analytic product that closely aligns with governmental elites’ expectations.²⁶³ Another mechanism that allows policymakers to accomplish analytic politicization is that of the appointment of a policy compliant DCI.²⁶⁴ This mechanism will use the policy compliant DCI as a proxy for the policymakers’ wishes: it utilizes workplace pathologies present in a hierarchically organized intelligence agency to coerce analysts into compliance with policymakers’ preferences. This sort of politicization does not necessarily need to occur at the executive levels of the IC, as exemplified by the appointment of both policy compliant analysts, managers, and executives in the CIA during the prelude to OIF.²⁶⁵

Notwithstanding the ability of an intelligence agency to produce high-quality actionable analytic products, another issue remains – acceptance of the analyses by the policymaking cadres in government.²⁶⁶ Richard K. Betts asserted that even when the IC properly identifies warning signs and generates analytic products, they still have to convince the political decision-makers of the policy relevance of their work. Betts further went on to say that many policymakers believe in their own superior abilities to analyze information and turn it into intelligence, and like all human beings, suffer from the pathology of not readily accepting data streams that are not aligned with their *weltanschauungen*. In short, policymakers could exhibit cognitive dissonance. Robert Jervis in his landmark work *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* summarized the theoretical foundations of these conditions and their practical ramifications.

Philip E. Tetlock and Charles B. McGuire Jr., in their work *Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy* also arrived at results comparable to those of Jervis.²⁶⁷

Notably, most policymakers are unskilled in the praxis of intelligence analysis, and because of their high workload and demanding schedules have little time to receive training in that discipline.²⁶⁸ In some cases, policymakers tend to distort by way of their own beliefs the intelligence analyses they receive from the IC.²⁶⁹ The American IC presents a unique opportunity for policymakers to shape intelligence analyses. The multiplicity of agencies and overlapping mandates in the IC allows agencies with differing perspectives to produce competitive analyses on the same policy question. These analyses may or may not agree with each other and the perceptions of the policymaking elites. When some competitive analyses agree with the elites' position and others offer dissenting opinions, policymakers could 'cherry pick' the analyses that agree with their political predispositions.²⁷⁰ Moreover, many policymakers harbor distorted perceptions about what the IC can or cannot do. Some policymakers believe that the IC can accurately predict future events, and when these predictions fail to materialize, are profoundly disappointed by the perceived quality shortfall in the analytic products. When this occurs, these leaders revert to trusting their own innate perceptions instead of accepting the analyses provided by the IC.²⁷¹ In short, these executives attempt to act as Napoleon-like apex intelligence analysts; these behaviors often result in disastrous policy outcomes.

Even though the IC and political decision-makers have significant stakes in maintaining good ongoing relationships, interactions with the IC sometimes degenerate into suspicion, hostility and generalized friction.²⁷² Sometimes this relationship becomes strained to such an extent that policymakers view the analytic product generated by the IC to be irrelevant and useless in the decision-making context in which they find themselves embroiled. This scenario is

especially interesting, for in the prelude to OIF the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and their retinue of followers viewed the IC as soft, sloppy, and producing nearly useless analytic product in the context of helping the NSC navigate its foreign policy options. Previous sections of this study have mentioned that the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and their cadre of supporters had a worldview with respect to the Middle East and Islamist terrorists that differed with the analyses put forward by the working levels of America's IC. In effect, these decision-makers exhibited cognitive dissonance in which they were predisposed to disagree with any intelligence analyses emanating from the IC irrespective of quality, timeliness, and policy relevance.

The Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle was of the opinion that intelligence should follow the military approach as espoused by Abram Shulsky. However, when leaders make wide-ranging, high-impact public statements about their policy preferences, they wish to use the analytic product emanating from the IC as a buttress to support these positions. In order to maintain public credibility leaders are indisposed to reverse their policy preferences, especially when subjected to intense public scrutiny.²⁷³ Harold P. Ford, a senior intelligence practitioner stated, "Intelligence... receives a cool reception when its messages are uncongenial and do not ...support ...policies being advocated at the time."²⁷⁴ An example of cognitive dissonance, this situation places the IC in a very stressful position, as the leaders expect analytic products to support their public positions, thereby leading to subtle or overt efforts to politicize the IC.²⁷⁵ This study asserts that the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle exhibited cognitive dissonance with the analyses generated by the majority of America's IC. This dissonance was mainly rooted in the intellectual precepts of (1) Abram Shulsky, (2) Paul Wolfowitz and Gary Schmitt, and (3) Albert Wohlstetter.

The Difficulties of Intelligence Analysis and Their Remedies

The production of high-quality intelligence analytic products is subject to several problems. Thomas Fingar, a respected academic commentator and executive veteran of the American IC stated that, “Analytic problems result from institutional issues and psychological pathologies.”²⁷⁶ Richard K. Betts, Fingar, Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Pythian asked if the analytic tradecraft of the American IC has sufficient competencies and capabilities to satisfy the task demanded of it by its political masters. They said analytic tradecraft must improve to develop accuracy and pertinence to policy issues. Sherman Kent stated that even though the professional intelligence analyst has the best professional training, the highest intellectual integrity, and the very large amount of worldly wisdom, mental biases occur that can significantly denigrate the quality of analytic product.²⁷⁷ Consequently, organizations like the CIA, DIA, and INR employ analytic procedures to mitigate these problems. The most important of these include Sherman Kent’s social scientific practices and Richard J. Heuer and Randolph H. Pherson’s structured intelligence analysis frameworks.

Heuer, Pherson, Kent, Thomas J. Shreve, and James J. Dowd developed theoretical constructs for the teaching of analytic tradecraft to IC employees. In this vein, Kent advocated the use of words of estimative probability in the American IC’s analytic products. Coupled with this, he championed the use of Socratic debate and the use of competing hypotheses in the production of intelligence analytic products. Shreve and Dowd supported the practice of case studies as a pedagogical tool for intelligence analysis. Heuer focused on perceptual anomalies, cognitive defects, and other psychological issues that could influence the generation of timely and accurate analytic products. Heuer and Pherson advocated the use of structured analytic techniques and software packages to mitigate the impact of these pathologies on the generation of analytic products. The objective of Sherman Kent’s classical intelligence analysis regimens

and the more modern structured analytic framework is to ensure that mental and perceptual biases do not taint the production of intelligence analytic products. Several important scholars who have contributed to the praxis of intelligence analysis have commented on the importance of avoiding mental biases in the generation of intelligence analytic products. Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuer, Pherson, and Peter M. Todd are notable examples of these academicians.²⁷⁸ Some of these pathologies are cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias, common knowledge effect, groupthink, group polarization, overconfidence, and pressures toward uniformity. Along this line, David T. Moore posited a series of core competencies in the practice of intelligence analysis. Using four levels of intelligence analysis, descriptive, explanatory, interpretive, and estimative, he stated,

Analysis is the process by which evidence and inference is transformed into intelligence... Analysts ...interpret evidence inserted into a context and configure it according to requirements of policymakers. [Only] analysts create intelligence.²⁷⁹

Moore's commentary is especially incisive when the reader considers that most of the members of the PCTEG, NESAS, and OSP were not formally trained, professional intelligence analysts. In short, most of the products emanating from these organizations were nothing more than information feeds that the managers of these groups misrepresented to be professionally generated products that were subjected to the rigors of intelligence analytic regimens.

Thomas Fingar and Greg Thielmann emphasized the notions that intelligence analytic products must originate from triangulated sources, and based on rigorous and exhaustive analysis, exhibit an overarching sensitivity to pressing policy questions. Gregory Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard proposed that a suite of best practices should involve a new paradigm in internal communications and information sharing between analysts. They stated that this new paradigm should operate at cross-purposes to the old standard evident in the IC: that of data compartmentalization and restricted access based on the need to know. Moreover, Treverton and

Gabbard asserted that the IC must be more transparent to its customers with respect to what it can or cannot supply. Cynthia M. Grabo stated that warnings of surprise attacks do not reside exclusively in the domain of rigorous data acquisition and manipulation but exist in the area of probability assessments.²⁸⁰ Grabo highlighted a classic problem by saying, “Successful warning does not flow from a majority consensus; it results from exhaustive research efforts.”²⁸¹ Like Alexander George,²⁸² Grabo insisted that minority opinions must be respected and given appropriate resources from executives to prevent their overwhelming by their majoritarian counterparts. She stated, “Often, the independent view of an individual warning analyst proves to be more accurate than any amount of consensus or examination of other’s views.”²⁸³ Along this line of thought, a former long-term CIA employee, Melissa Boyle Mahle spoke to the weaknesses in the CIA’s culture by saying former CIA Director Robert Gates promised the extensive use of competitive team techniques to avoid analytic failures. Nonetheless, Gates and subsequent directors failed miserably in that respect. Mahle added to this perspective by saying that the use of competitive teams and the avoidance of unitary agency opinions would have generated better analyses in the prelude to OIF.²⁸⁴ Mahle’s perspective is especially interesting when one considers the scenario of WINPAC and its director, Alan Foley. The researcher shall examine that situation in an upcoming section of this study.

Bureaucracy, Bureaucrats, and Careerism

Via extemporaneous commentaries by analytic and collector professionals in the American IC, it became evident that intelligence collection and analytic procedures worked well, save for a few specific cases. In the instances where these procedures deteriorated, it became apparent from interviewees’ responses that careerism and the fear of negative career impacts were a significant factor in the IC’s offices that produced defective intelligence analyses in the

prelude to OIF. With these factors in mind, this section shall discuss bureaucracy, careerism, and other associated theories that may have a correlation with the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF.

Bureaucracy

Bureaucracies are as old as most forms of governance. The earliest political leaders responded to the complexities of their responsibilities by delegating duties, authorities, and accountabilities to loyal retainers. As the size and convoluted nature of governments increased, hierarchically oriented organizations emerged. Within any government, there resides some sort of organization that executes the orders and mandates of its elites. As government is a political entity, governance, administration, and politics intertwine into a matrix that is complex and often enigmatic. Bureaucratic organizations are part of this matrix, and governmental officialdoms are replete with the problems, advantages, and interrelations that are evident in any polity. In short, bureaucracy is a suite of administrative and governance functions supplied by one or more organizations. Inside of a bureaucracy reside its subordinate organizations, the bureaus. A bureau is a system of purposefully coordinated activities of two or more persons created to achieve specific goals. Bureaucracy can be defined further as governance managed by appointed officials.²⁸⁵ According to Anthony Downs, an organization is a bureau if:

- (1) It is large and where its elite members know less than half of the other members;
- (2) the majority of its members are full-time workers who depend upon their employment in the bureau for most of their income;
- (3) the initial hiring of personnel, and their promotion and retention within the bureau are based partly upon some type of performance assessment rather than ascribed characteristics; and
- (4) the major portion of its output is not evaluated in any markets external to the organization by means of voluntary *quid pro quo* transactions.²⁸⁶

Downs attributed other internal characteristics to bureaus: a hierarchical structure of formal authority; formal communications networks; extensive systems of formal rules; formal

impersonality of operations; and intense personal loyalty and involvement among officials, particularly in the highest ranks of the hierarchy. According to Max Weber, other traits of bureaus include the extensive use of rules, complex administrative tasks, secrecy, and employment of specially trained personnel.²⁸⁷ Over the course of time, the meaning of bureaucracy further evolved into a concept representing a class of appointed officials or the positions they occupy. Another notion that comes into play in this discussion is that of an administrative apparatus: a machine that simply implements the edicts and directives of the state's elites. However, public bureaucracies perform both partisan and nonpartisan political functions along with their nominative duties. Bureaus exist in an environment of power: they exercise power and in turn are affected by it. One of the major influences on bureaus is the power of those organizations or persons who have legal authority over the bureau. In the United States, the IC has several of these authorities, such as the President, the Vice President, the National Security Council, and Congress. Rivals, be they individuals or other organizations can also distress a bureau. According to Downs, bureaus arise by way of four different mechanisms. The first of these mechanisms works *via* a concept first propounded by Max Weber: the routinization of charisma. In this process, a charismatic leader gathers devoted individuals into a group that perpetuates the leader's ideals and principles. As time passes, charismatic leadership then moves towards organizational authority. This movement to authority also causes a change in the perspective of the subordinate staff: these individuals shift their standpoints towards that of safeguarding their positions within the organization. Interestingly, organizations that are born out of the routinization of charisma and enthusiastic endorsement of policies can evolve into entities governed by conformity and enforced by fear or repression. Describing this evolutionary situation, the Weber-Michels model asserts that any association, with the passage of time will

increase its conservatism and move its goals towards organizational maintenance and enhancement.²⁸⁸

The evolution of organizations within America's IC is especially interesting when one considers the charismatic personality of the founder of the OSS, William J. 'Wild Bill' Donovan. *Via* the force of his personality and seemingly unending lobbying efforts, he influenced President Franklin D. Roosevelt to institute America's first centralized intelligence bureau, the OSS. Donovan's heroic military record from World War I, his convivial contacts within the British intelligence system, his training as an attorney at law, and his extensive business contacts enabled his success in the founding of the OSS. The personal charisma of Donovan had a lasting impact on the OSS, and its daughter organization the CIA, but as subsequent paragraphs of this study shall show, the routinization of his charisma degenerated into an environment dominated by organizational authority, conformity, and obedience enforced by fear and repression.

The second mechanism for bureau creation is simply functional: a bureau apparently arises in order to provide a specific function or set of functions to government or society. In the third mechanism, a bureau arises because it splits from an existing entity. The fourth mechanism sees an entrepreneurial group of individuals promoting a specific policy or agenda: the force of that promotion causes the generation of a bureau to support that program. Once instituted, a bureau must struggle for its existence. In the case of governmental bureaus, these entities must prove to their political masters that the services they provide justify their budgetary and resource appropriations. In short, governmental bureaus exist at the pleasure of their political masters, be they congressional committees, or elites in the executive branch of government. As a bureau matures, its leaders tend to shift the organization's goals from carrying out its titular functions to

those ensuring its survival and growth. Moreover, members of these organizations are highly resistant to the cessation of activities that reward them.²⁸⁹

Bureaus also conform to Robert Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' that states, "Who says organization, says oligarchy."²⁹⁰ This law posits that all organizations irrespective of any democratic underpinnings tend towards oligarchic practices; that is, the governance of the many by the few. Consequently, income, authority, and prestige concentrate at the top level of a bureau's hierarchy. Officials occupying the top level in any bureau enjoy information that pertains to the general operations of the organization, as opposed to officials on the lower echelons of the bureau who have more specialized knowledge about the operations in their mandated area. However, no official knows everything about all occurrences in any large bureaucracy. Because of the hierarchical power structure of these entities, bureaus often adopt the characteristics of their leadership cadre. In essence, if the leadership cadre is of a particular type, then in the general sense, the rest of the bureau will adopt those characteristics irrespective of the features of the subordinate employees.²⁹¹ Simply put, executive power diffuses downward, forcing subordinate employees to 'toe the line,' with dissenters often suffering negative career consequences. The oligarchic nature of bureaus is especially interesting when one considers the situation of the line employees within the CIA's WINPAC and their relations with that organization's director, Alan Foley. The foundations of these relations shall be examined in the subsequent sections of this study that deal with the theories of leader-member exchange and organizational citizenship behavior.

Organizations arise because there is a perceived need to achieve a mandated goal or suite of goals. In complex organizations such as bureaucracies, the achievement of these objectives requires the coordination of multiple persons who have different perspectives, training, and skill

sets. Implicitly speaking, these people to some extent must surrender part of their differences in order to achieve the organization's objectives. In most cases, this situation does occur, but in some critical instances, this state of affairs fails to materialize. When the synchronization of personal differences fails to occur, a bureau must rely on a hierarchy of authority to enforce compliance with organizational goals. The failure of persons or subunits within an organization to align themselves with mandated goals is caused by two pathologies: conflicts of interest and technological limitations. These abnormalities generate incoherent behavior patterns that may act at cross-purposes to organizational objectives. Conflicts of interest arise from differences in the explicit goals that bureaucratic officials pursue and from their differences in reality perception. The officials in question are identifiable social actors with objectives in various decision-making scenarios that conflict with the objectives of their parent organizations. Individuals have differences in their perceptions of reality due to cultural context, training, and methodologies derived from their overall milieu. In any organization, there exists an overarching *ex ante* uncertainty that to some extent enables disagreement between rational individuals who have similar goals, reasonably equal perception, and access to the same data sets. In order to ensure compliance with its goals, an organization must entrust conflict resolution authority to certain members of that entity, use an internal conflict resolution mechanism, or employ a set of behavioral rules to which all members must adhere.²⁹²

The use of formalized rules is one of the major features of any bureaucracy. These rules are an effective way of coordinating complex tasks. Official rules also help bureaus coordinate their relationships with people and entities external to that bureau. Rules tend to emphasize the position and role rather than the person, giving the image, if not the substance of impartiality. With this depersonalization, authority essentially rests with the system, not the individual.

Depersonalization simply refers to a change in perception: it is not equivalent to dehumanization. Depersonalization is roughly equivalent to social categorization: it is a change in an individual's perception that one resides in a group and follows the in-group prototype. These prototypes "describe and prescribe perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and behavior."²⁹³ Social categorization generates conformity and normative behavior and also reinforces group and intergroup behaviors. However, people tend to resist depersonalization; they sometimes transgress their institutional boundaries and participate in activities as independent, unitary entities. Formalized rules systems frequently exhibit great difficulty in compensating for these personal propensities. Peter M. Blau asserted that only where employees identify with organizational goals and adapt their behavior to the changing context of these goals would there be efficient and effective bureaucratic administration.²⁹⁴ A good example of the resistance to depersonalization appeared in the protestations offered by the CIA's DDO, 'Jami' Miscik; she refused to follow the in-group prototype of the CIA's executives that supported the politicization of analytic products.

Formalized rule systems often exhibit impacts that transcend organizational boundaries. This situation sometimes occurs when officers occupying a particular stratum in their hierarchy will often use their formal authority to establish some personal significance that will stay with them as they traverse their present engagement or enter into a new one. In large organizations, some non-conformities from the formalized rule system sometimes become institutionalized as 'unwritten laws' and informal associations become culturally established. Institutionalization removes such unorthodoxies from the realm of personality differences, transforming them into a persistent structural aspect of formal organizations. These institutionalized rules and modes of informal cooperation are attempts by participants in a formal organization to control the group relations that support the environment of organizational decisions. Reactive informal structures

within a bureau have the potential to divert its members' foci and actions from achieving the formal goals of that institution. These informal structures may target career goals by way of manipulating conditions of power, position, and personal income within a bureau.

Notwithstanding this situation, formal rule sets are constrained: they cannot with any surety deal with all sorts of situations that could occur within a bureau. Therefore, bureaus often rely on informal operating procedures to help deal with these unanticipated situations.²⁹⁵ The above-mentioned concepts are important to the intelligence environment in the prelude to OIF: management enforcement of some 'unwritten laws' may well have caused the generation of faulty analytic products.

A Typology of Bureaucrats

Inside bureaus reside bureaucrats: a class composed of purportedly politically neutral public administrators. A bureaucrat is a person who is employed on a full-time basis by a large organization, and derives the majority of his or her income from that employment. Moreover, that employment is governed by the bureau's policies that nominally depend upon employee performance as compared to some agreed-upon metrics espoused by that organization's leadership cadre. Notably, the definition of a bureaucrat also includes the fact that the bureaucrat is not periodically elected to office by any constituency outside the organization, nor is his or her ongoing employment directly tied to the continuing office of some elected official. Additionally a bureaucrat's output cannot be evaluated *via quid pro quo* methods in any marketplace.²⁹⁶

Among the more interesting aspects of Anthony Downs' theoretical assemblage is a typology of officials working in bureaus. The first type of these officials is the self-interested bureaucrat. Downs describes this group as motivated almost entirely by goals that offer personal benefits. In this group reside two subgroups: the climbers, and the conservers. Climbers are

career adventurers, individuals who look for any sort of advantage they can use to advance their power, prestige, or income. Downs further describes the climber as a bureaucratic dilettante with an arrogant and dismissive attitude towards organizational or professional loyalty. Notably, several agency officials asserted that the numbers of ‘climbers’ in the CIA has increased with the passage of time. The conservers are archetypal bureaucrats who are satisfied with their present positions, and they neither seek nor want any change to their present employment milieu. Rapidly growing bureaus do not attract conservers; in fact, these organizations may repel conservers because rapid growth engenders uncertainty, an uncomfortably dynamic organizational structure, and high workloads. As they grow older, many officials in a bureaucracy tend to transform themselves into conservers. This effect is especially pronounced if these individuals do not reside in a cadre that is slotted for career promotions.²⁹⁷

The second type of Downs’ bureaucrat is the altruistic employee, described as a ‘mixed motive official.’ This individual combines self-interest with altruistic fidelity to greater values. Downs views this category as a continuum with two poles, zealots and statesmen. Zealots exhibit very narrow policy, organizational, or functional perspectives while statesmen exhibit loyalty to society in general. At the midpoint reside advocates, individuals who exhibit a balanced approach between narrow perspectives and societal loyalty. It is important to stress the fact that the differences between zealots and statesmen are not demarcated in a sharply delineated fashion. These differences are ‘fuzzy sets’ of behaviors and attitudes that reside on a continuum of possibilities. This continuum depends upon the institutional culture and ideology in which the bureaucrats under examination reside and operate.²⁹⁸

Statesmen for the most part focus on the national interest as a guiding principle in their professional lives. These individuals sacrifice career goals, bureaucratic loyalties, and

institutional foci on the altar of the national good. Statesmen are rare in bureaucracies because the culture of these organizations tends to overwhelm statesmanlike perspectives: they suffer from a distinct disadvantage when engaging in the internecine battles for budgetary allocations, resources, and agency prestige. In short, the nature of bureaucracy acts as a Darwinian selector against statesmanlike perspectives and behavior. Zealots exhibit very narrow professional and bureaucratic foci. When these narrow foci and altruism combine, they result in a high degree of personal commitment to specific issues and standards. These individuals may often deal with issues in a myopic fashion and may be antagonistic to anyone outside of their small bureaucratic group. This antagonism not only extends to bureaus external to their own but also to other subunits within their parent agency. More often than not, zealots exhibit such a high degree of altruism that they show very little regard for self-interest and career considerations. Advocates exhibit loyalty to a broader subset of functions or organizations than zealots do. Unlike zealots, advocates are loyal to their agency but are not completely consumed by that mindset. Due to their broader intellectual spectrum and loyalty to a larger organizational unit, advocates are better equipped to recognize and deal with policy nuances and their inherent contradictions than their bureaucratic brethren. Another characteristic of advocates is intellectual flexibility with respect to policy decisions and recommendations. These individuals are more likely to compromise for the sake of the greater good than are zealots. Along with this intellectual flexibility, advocates are more likely than zealots are to acclimate to changing policy goals of the elected leadership cadre. Notwithstanding these considerations, advocates residing in bureaus tend to define the national interest in terms of their parent bureau's interests; these interests often stem from the culture of that organization.²⁹⁹

Careerism

During the course of extemporaneous interviews, one hundred eighty six out of two hundred twenty one anonymous respondents in this research project asserted that the intelligence environment in the prelude to OIF suffered from the impact of indirect, subtle, yet noticeable pressures to modify their situationally correct intelligence analytic products into variants that agreed with the conventional wisdom espoused by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. Thirty-nine out of two hundred twenty one of these respondents additionally mentioned that they were the targets of overt demands from their superiors to produce intelligence analyses in alignment with the policy preferences of that iron triangle. These career intelligence professionals also responded that they sensed the continuation or advancement of their careers periodically could have depended upon compliance with the iron triangle's political positions.³⁰⁰ Moreover, out of the above-mentioned one hundred eighty six anonymous respondents, one hundred sixty five individuals also asserted that their work environment was politicized; their career continuance and advancement often depended upon issues outside of the formal governmental rubric of job performance metrics. The comments provided in the interviews indicate the possible influence of politicization, careerism, and other bureaucratic pathologies on certain members of the IC during the prelude to OIF. Several commentators have asserted that careerism and fears of negative career consequences are an overarching factor in the United States civil service including the IC. These fears may have led to 'convenient sins of omission' in the production of intelligence analyses during the prelude to OIF.³⁰¹ Consequently, this dissertation asserts that career factors were a significant element in the alleged intelligence failure during the prelude to OIF. Therefore, this section shall discuss the theoretical construct of careerism and its sub-constructs in order to form a base from which to compare the actions of key American intelligence professionals in the prelude to OIF.

An interesting conceptual argument asserts that only careerists, those bureaucrats with long-term positional aspirations could be politically neutral. In contrast to these individuals, there are transient holders of office, those individuals deemed by most commentators to be political appointees and therefore not long-term bureaucrats. These ephemeral appointees relocate themselves to and from governmental positions with very little distress, often using their experience as a springboard to enhanced positions and compensation packages within the private sector. The important point to consider is that careerist bureaucrats have much more to gain or lose than their transient appointee colleagues. Hence, the supposedly nonpolitical bureaucrats have extremely strong incentives to engage in the practice of internecine careerist politics, whereas their transient colleagues have political interests that are comparatively more personal and partisan. Bureaucrats' ability to perform their political and administrative functions depends upon key variables such as tenure, income, and interdependence with their coworkers and superiors in the bureaucracy. The relationship between ephemeral political appointees with command authority over careerist bureaucrats is a factor of significant importance in the discussion section of this work. Along with the political nature of any bureaucracy, these constructs lead to the discussion of an important concept, careerism.

As early as 1950, academic commentators presented critiques of employees who pursued their own objectives at the expense of their employers and communities. Some of these commentators referred to these employees as careerists. Other commentators stated that careerists' dominant mode of social interaction is antagonistic cooperation, a *modus operandi* in which a façade of teamwork concealed a shameless struggle for bureaucratic survival and / or advancement. In this obfuscated tussle, careerist employees sometimes misrepresent their capabilities, objectives, and expectations in order to gain advantage within their institutional

hierarchy, often exhibiting *chameleon-like behavior traits*. These traits often appear as outward facing sycophancy that conceals the careerist's ulterior motives. This suite of behavior patterns exhibits a disregard for social / organizational norms and the rights of others. The acceptance and use of this *deceptive modus operandi* for personal advancement is one of the hallmarks of the careerist perspective. In fact, successful careerists are expert at the obfuscation of their true objectives; they often publicly represent themselves as team players who support organizational goals, cultures, and rule sets. When successful at these obfuscatory efforts, careerists can shield themselves from negative consequences meted out by their superiors. Notably, Melvin Goodman and John Gentry mentioned sycophancy was a hallmark of careerists in the CIA. Approximately fifty one percent of the qualified, anonymized CIA respondents in this research program mentioned that sycophantic careerism existed in their agency. Approximately eight percent of the qualified, anonymized INR respondents in this research program made similar assessment of their bureau. The qualified, anonymized respondents from other agencies in the IC offered results similar to that of their INR colleagues. Because of commitments made to the anonymous respondents in this research project, the investigator is unable to identify and cite the pseudonyms linked to the agency associations of these individuals.³⁰²

Careerism frequently manifests itself in an employee's generalized desire to advance through their institutional power hierarchy *via* job change and frequent promotions. Careerists often choose mentors who could potentially open the institutional pathways of promotion whereas non-careerists pursue mentors who could help them enhance their professional expertise and performance. In a further development of this concept, some commentators asserted that careerist employees were sacrificing competence on the altar of enhancing their image of performance. Various studies have asserted that fast-track advancement-oriented careerists

develop work habits focused on short-term tactical successes and the image of successful engagements while foregoing efforts to attain professional excellence. Careerist attitudes can have long-term negative consequences as attention to strategic goals and tactical details are likely to suffer: careerists ignore them in favor of image-based constructs that may well assist their otherwise unwarranted rise in the institutional hierarchy. Careerist employees are sensitive to the aspects of their job that could block their advancement in upcoming years irrespective of favorable current conditions; psychologists refer to this state as anticipatory dissatisfaction. Studies have found that careerist professionals spend much less time than their non-careerist peers do on professional activities, but rather focus their efforts on workplace politics and influence-based pursuits.³⁰³ For the purposes of this study, the author refers to careerism as an employee's propensity to achieve their career objectives *via* activities other than those based on meritorious job performance.

Bureaucratic Self-Interest

Bureaucratic self-interest is another factor of importance in the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. Robert K. Yin defined bureaucratic self-interest as the actions and policies of bureaus and bureaucrats that do not lead to demonstrable improvements in the services these entities deliver to their customers. Yin also mentioned that bureaucratic self-interest arises from the unwritten rules of organizational survival and competition in public bureaucracies. Going further, Yin mentioned that the individual bureaucrat often acts in a rational problem-solving manner in order to protect and promote his or her self-interests. Yin sums up his statements by saying that the main goal of the bureaucrat is to survive organizational changes, and the most reliable way of surviving is to encourage his or her organizational growth in terms of personal power and status. William E. Odom, a former Director of the NSA spoke to

the issue of bureaucratic self-interest in the IC by stating, “Parochial bureaucratic self-interest in [the IC] will ...undermine both overall efficiency and the ability of organizations to make the best use of limited aggregate resources.”³⁰⁴ John A. Gentry, another senior IC official asserted that Sherman Kent’s principles of analytic independence and service to the nation are dying out in the CIA; they are being replaced by a culture of self-service and bureaucratic self-interest that no longer supports analytic objectivity. Riveting this issue further, in a telephone consultation with the researcher Gentry mentioned that since the advent of Robert Gates as CIA director, the agency had become increasingly politically astute, generating analyses that were policy compliant products; these efforts were not objective analyses of the data and information streams examined by the DI.³⁰⁵

Issue Clusters / Networks, and Iron Triangles

Notably, during the period from the R. M. Nixon to the W. J. Clinton administrations, politicians, civil servants, academics, and prominent members of the public formed issue clusters / networks in order to promote their conservative and neoconservative political agendas and policy preferences. Upon the election of G. W. Bush to the presidency, certain members of these issue clusters / networks ascended to positions of political power thereby allowing them to coalesce with certain associates into an iron triangle. Rebecca K. C. Hersman added significant insights into the notion of issue clusters by stating:

Issue clusters ...are the informal groupings of similarly minded policymakers from NGOs [and] ...government. These clusters are the key factors in the understanding of the day-to-day, obfuscated reality of ...policy decisions.³⁰⁶

Other academicians supplied their own descriptive classification to policy groupings. Among them, J. Leiper Freeman and Douglass Cater coined the terminology iron triangle. Hugo Heclo defined iron triangles as small enclaves of participants who have succeeded in becoming

powerfully autonomous, thereby gaining the ability to influence or make government policy. Francis E. Rourke asserted that iron triangles were coalitions of executive agencies, interest groups, congressional committees and other powerful entities that have historically dominated certain sectors of policy making. Other commentators such as Gordon Adams, Morton Halperin, and H. W. Shuman have asserted that iron triangles are significant features of American governance.³⁰⁷ Ali Farazmand spoke of iron triangles in America's government by stating that:

In a typical iron triangle, informal allegiances form among interest groups administrative / bureaucratic elites, legislative committee members and other political elites. It functions outside the formal structure and process of the bureaucracy and government... [It] dominate[s] the policy process, thereby producing a narrow-minded vision and a lack of transparency and accountability in the transaction of public business.³⁰⁸

This dissertation asserts that from the time of Paul Wolfowitz, Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith, Abram Shulsky, and Richard Perle's employment with Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson, the neoconservative movement has operated *via* issue clusters / networks. Members of these groups, once in positions of political power in the G. W. Bush administration morphed these consortia into an iron triangle that attempted to steer the IC's analytic production process to generate products that complied with its policy preferences.

Governmental Employment Factors and Careerism

The capacity of employees to perform their functions depends on several factors, such as tenure, income, and interdependence with other members of government. Simply explained, tenure is the assurance of long-term employment, income security, and monetary advancement. Factors in the workplace such as politics, leadership, institutional, and management cultures can significantly influence an employee's adherence to careerist precepts. Until the early 1900s, most United States federal employees entered government and maintained their positions by way of

political patronage. These employees' patrons expected them to engage in partisan political activities such as election campaigning and financial contributions. Under this system, federal government workers did not enjoy tenure: they were at the omnipresent risk of job dismissal upon the electoral defeat of their political benefactors. The gradual and incremental shift from federal service patronage-based appointments began with the Pendleton Act of 1883. In response to public accusations of political corruption, this law authorized the merit-based hiring of a small portion of the federal workforce. Over the course of time, the impact of the Pendleton Act expanded: by the 1980s, there were only about 5000 political appointees within the federal civil service, amounting to less than one percent of total civilian federal government employment.³⁰⁹

During the period examined by this study, the great majority of federal government employees were hired and assessed based on a meritocratic process. Moreover, various statutes in the United States Code expressly forbid these employees from using their federal government positions as platforms in partisan political ventures. Once beyond their initial probationary period, the federal government grants these employees tenure, and it is extremely difficult and costly for their superiors to dismiss them from their positions. Moreover, the federal government's civil service rules give more weight to employee seniority than merit. However, most 'classified employees' in the IC find themselves in a different situation from ordinary federal government workers: they are not protected by job tenure, and have neither unions nor collective bargaining privileges. 'Classified employees' in the IC are those individuals who collect or deal with classified materials or engage in clandestine and / or paramilitary operations. These individuals serve at the pleasure of the President, and at the pleasure of their superiors in their parent agency's chain of command.³¹⁰ Serving at the pleasure of an employee's superiors makes his or her employment status very tenuous. The lack of unionization or other protective

associations can make job termination simple, perhaps even capricious, for an employee's superiors.

Whistleblowing

Via a nationally distributed sample of American workers, certain research has demonstrated that thirty percent of the sample population observed some type of workplace misconduct, and sixty-two percent of those individuals reported the misconduct to appropriate authorities. Of those whistleblowers, only sixteen percent reported workplace wrongdoings to external authorities. This research indicated that when confronted with organizational misbehavior, a significant number of workers remain silent observers. Other explorations indicate that management considers whistleblowing as organizational misbehavior, for which employees often suffer significant retribution from their line management or executives.³¹¹

Research has defined active whistleblowing, in that it must involve,

The unauthorized disclosure of information that an employee reasonably believes is evidence of the contravention of any law, rule, or regulation, code of practice, or professional statement, or that involves mismanagement, corruption, abuse of authority, or danger to public or worker health and safety.³¹²

In short, whistleblowing is a highly risky proposition for most employees. Staff members in the IC who deal with classified materials and actions have often found whistleblowing to generate significant negative career consequences including criminal prosecutions levied against them by their parent organizations. Even though their whistleblowing actions may be of a legitimate nature, it may be reasonable to surmise that some sort of unwritten workplace political factors may have come into play that construct a 'code of silence' encumbering the actions of IC employees.³¹³

Workplace Political Factors

Some research asserts workplace political factors may cause an individual to seek power, recognition, and status at the expense of professional excellence within a perceived environment of unfairness. Long-term government employees gain competence from deep levels of experience but also because they have an interest in maintaining their positions, income levels, and career advancements. These individuals may tend to use their offices and the products they produce to ensure career security and advancement. Conversely, transitory employees in government tend to have perspectives of two minds: they are likely to maintain their orientations acquired in previous positions. These individuals are inclined to eschew the dominant suite of bureaucratic philosophies and interests and instead maintain alignment with their deeply ingrained personal ethos, with very little incentive to become involved with long-term bureaucratic politics. Transient bureaucrats, because of a lack of experience in their present governmental position often exhibit lower levels of expertise than their long-duration employed comrades do.³¹⁴

There are two types of careerist officials: those individuals who receive their positions assisted by political patronage and those who gain their position and promotions based upon the tenets of meritocracy. In traditional absolutist states, rulers, based upon their power and caprice, could appoint whomever they chose to whatever post they deemed appropriate. As long as these individuals displayed high degrees of loyalty to the ruler and exhibited a modicum of expertise their positional tenure might endure. Conversely, in a meritocracy, employment, promotion, and salary increments are established upon standardized metrics and procedures based upon the individual's alignment with performance expectations generated by their organization. Notably, in the historical sense, most careerists entered government outside of the meritocracy: appointed to their career, they owed their advancement to political patronage factors. However, when a

bureaucratic system is grounded on meritocratic principles, public officials gain expertise in areas that allow them to fulfil more effectively their objectives but also to compete for the interests of their bureaucratic subunits. The American civil service meritocracy features a system of expertise that translates into high degrees of support for programs in which bureaucrats gain tenure. This bureaucratic system strongly motivates its members to engage in nonpartisan political activities in which they are primarily involved to protect their positions, career advancements, and income. Given that bureaucrats' positions, incomes, and career advancements are governed by non-bureaucratic entities such as elected officials, bureaucrats are strongly motivated to fulfil their duties as mandated by their political masters. This is a key factor in the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF, as individuals in the IC tended to disengage from public dissention with their political masters; they kept their 'heads down' so as to limit their exposure to arbitrary and capricious punitive measures meted out by superiors in their chains of command. In short, even though some bureaucrats in the IC privately dissented with the pseudo-intelligence generated by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and their retainers, these bureaucrats remained *outwardly* policy-compliant in order to escape being disciplined by their supervisors and agency executives.

In simple bureaucracies, officials are mandated to perform a delineated suite of functions, but with increasing role specialization their interdependence increases. Tasks spanning the length and breadth of an organization reside inside staff agencies that interlock *via* program-based line functions. A merit-based bureaucratic system, which depends on individual specialists is tightly dependent upon complementary and interdependent roles, tasks, and mandates. Self-interest leads a bureaucrat to be most responsive to those individuals who would decide the bureaucrat's employment status. Anthony Downs asserts that bureaucrats appointed to positions outside of

their immediate bureaucratic organization have an overarching loyalty to those persons who appointed them to that position. If the person appointing the bureaucrat to that position is outside of the bureaucratic constituency of the appointee, then loyalties become clouded, in many cases, residing outside of the organization in which the bureaucrat is employed.³¹⁵

Organizational Citizenship and Compulsory Citizenship Behaviors

The United States Government and its IC consist of organizations in two great domains, the military and civilian. Notwithstanding this division, all of these establishments are subject to organizational dynamics. Within these dynamics resides the conduct of its members: organizational citizenship. Subsumed within the conceptual framework of organizational citizenship is pro-social behavior: comportments including the assistance of others, volunteering, punctuality, and innovation. These pro-social behavior patterns have two distinct categories: altruistic comportments that do not benefit the actor *per se*, and generalized organizational compliance mechanisms. Commentators describe altruistic behavior patterns as a ‘good soldier’ or ‘good citizen’ syndrome that aims at doing things correctly for the sake of the organization. These behaviors are not correlated to the organization’s formal reward system, and there may or may not be any institutional punishment for an individual’s failure to engage in these conducts.³¹⁶ Other commentators suggest a yardstick with which to gauge the prosocial aspects of organizational citizenship behavior. These include: “Represents organization favorably, defends [the] organization against outside threats and employee criticism, does not waste time, does not waste [the] organization’s resources, and shares ideas for new projects.”³¹⁷ Other commentators suggest that OCB consists of the willingness of persons to contribute their energy to the organization; this energy has been described as cooperative, spontaneous, and protective actions to promote and protect the organizational image. Actions within the rubric of OCB may

be performed by a member with a view to promoting the goals of the organization, a subgroup, or an individual.³¹⁸

OCB is based on covenants, the characteristics of which are mutual trust, open-ended commitment and shared values. Covenants require specific behaviors to maintain the relationship between people and organizations; however, they are not specified in advance, they are implicit agreements rather than explicit bargains. A covenant is an existential pledge; it is a relationship that binds people to their organizations, and organizations to their members.³¹⁹ Commenting on pro-social behavior, Dennis Organ and Mary Konofsky stated, “OCB derives practical importance from the premise that it represents contributions... which presumably enhance organizational effectiveness.”³²⁰ Organ further posited the basis of OCB as “behavior ...that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization”³²¹ OCB enhances the effectiveness of an organization’s social machinery. OCB can actually reduce the effectiveness of the good soldier’s job performance while engaging in prosocial behavior. Prosocial OCB therefore has the potential to enhance or impede organizational effectiveness. OCB can be seen as a compensatory mechanism: it is repayment to an organization.³²² Interestingly, OCB-mediated practitioners may not necessarily be concerned with justice or ethics in their methods or targeted outcomes.

Members of organizations reside in two generalized categories: those who exhibit behavior patterns in which they perform the least amount of work necessary to maintain organizational membership, and those individuals who go ‘above and beyond the call of duty,’ thereby exceeding the expectations of their peers and superiors. Those who go ‘above and beyond the call of duty’ exhibit the ‘good soldier syndrome.’ This syndrome revolves around the notion of employees performing duties to enhance the work environment, the organizational

modus operandi, and objectives even when their superiors offer no formal rewards in exchange for these actions. ‘Good soldierly behaviors’ are intended to benefit someone or something other than the actor. Some commentators assert that the presence of ‘good soldierly behavior’ will probably stimulate an improved social or work setting, augmenting performance and the products of an organization. One of the earliest commentators on OCB defines it as, “Individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization.”³²³ Other studies of OCB assert that it is an employee’s positive behavior pattern deserving encouragement by leaders in the organization. Some research points to the fact that the ‘good soldier syndrome’ is simply OCB. However, the ‘good soldier syndrome’ is a double-edged sword that can produce constructive or damaging behavior patterns.³²⁴ These patterns can work to the benefit of the organization itself at the expense of societal benefit. This is an important fact to consider when one realizes that ‘going the extra mile’ in support of a dishonorable objective can produce damaging results of momentous consequences.

Still other studies have indicated that even the widespread practice of OCB is not enough to ensure the viability and success of a particular organization. Simply stated, in order to enhance the opportunity for organizational success, members of an organization must challenge the present state of affairs and embrace forward facing change. This is the regime of change-oriented OCB. Within it resides two factors; helping and voice. Helping is an affiliative / promotive behavior, and voice is a challenging / promotive behavior that expresses constructive challenges designed to improve the situation in question rather than simply criticizing it. Voice makes constructive suggestions for change to SOPs even when other members may disagree with these suggestions.³²⁵

Change-oriented OCB relates to taking charge of one's environment. This involves individuals taking the initiative with respect to changing how they perform their jobs within the organizational context. Other commentators refer to this behavior as take revision: this is a practice in which individuals take action to correct a faulty procedure or other scenario. Change oriented OCB is a major factor in public organizations. Along with OCB resides public-sector motivation (PSM) and psychological contracts with public-sector organizations. PSM and OCB are distinct yet complementary concepts. OCB deals with the informal and innovative aspect of behavior, while PSM involves formal and non-innovative contributions to the work environment. OCB can provide better productivity, increased efficiency, effectiveness, and lower levels of stress among organizational employees. A dearth of OCB, change-oriented OCB, and PSM in the public sector can negatively influence public services and can engender a generalized dissatisfaction with governmental institutions along with an overall view that government is illegitimate and unable to fulfil its mandate.³²⁶

Compulsory Citizenship Behavior (CCB) often coexists with OCB. Although outwardly appearing to be OCB, CCB is a suite of extra-role duties and behaviors compulsorily mandated for employees by their managers or coworkers. CCB is a prevalent practice in modern organizations that carries sometimes severe, yet informal sanctions levied on those who refuse to comply with these duties and behaviors. From the employees' perspective, CCB is coercive, and nonspontaneous, and often exerts a negative influence on in-role and extra-role OCB. Moreover, CCB often results from abusive and / or exploitative supervision or excessive workplace pressures that often coerce an employee into the performance of duties and the execution of behavior patterns outside of his or her normal job scope. Some researchers suggest that these abusive supervisory behaviors could be tyrannical, bullying, undermining, or abusive in

nature.³²⁷ Abusive supervision refers to “subordinates’ perceptions of supervisory displays of hostile and non-verbal behaviors, excluding physical contact.”³²⁸ When levels of CCB in an organization are high, employees experience feelings of exploitation or abuse. Notably, what managers may define as OCB employees may define as CCB.³²⁹ CCB is interesting in the context of the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF as it dovetails closely to the duties informally mandated by managers onto various analysts in WINPAC. Although these duties were outside of the normal work syllabus of the IC’s analysts, managerial and coworker pressures may well have contributed to the generation of politically palatable yet inaccurate intelligence analysis with respect to Iraqi WMD and Saddam Hussein’s connections to transnational terrorist groups. Notably, CCB to some extent involves implicit and informal *quid pro quo* relationships between leaders and members of organizations that are studied under the heading of leader-member exchanges.

Leader-Member Exchange

The public expects governmental leaders to enhance organizational capabilities, protect the citizenry, and maintain budgetary control while improving the services their establishments deliver. Moreover, the public assumes these individuals will use expert management skills and program functions to attain these goals. In order to meet these expectations, leaders use management techniques to shape the objectives, beliefs, and actions of their subordinates. These techniques reside in two domains: transformational and transactional. The transactional leadership method depends upon *in situ* formalized rules of compliance, goal accomplishment, and explicit *quid pro quo* rewards. This type of leadership depends upon the assessment of subordinates’ in-role activities: it uses clearly defined and auditable SOPs, rules, governance mechanisms, and expected results. Transformational leaders use nonmaterial incentives such as

appeals to patriotism, ethics, morality, religion, and inspiration to modify organizational culture in alignment with their expectations. In short, this type of leader attempts to replace the ethics and values of their followers with their own. Both management techniques are dependent upon leader-member exchanges. Leader-member exchange (LMX) has evolved from an imprecisely defined and vague notion to an accurately described, yet abstract concept, that of a general tendency to behave in relationally supportive ways.³³⁰

Social exchange theory subsumes LMX relationships, asserting that human relationships are primarily based on a cost-benefit analysis of social interactions. The unifying factor between social exchange theory and OCB is supervisory behavior that builds trust with subordinates. These behaviors engender perceptions of fairness in the minds of underlings thereby leading to satisfying workplace relationships that may well lead to extra-role OCB.³³¹ These relationship behaviors and fairness perceptions lead to exchange ideology, “the strength of an employee’s belief that work efforts should depend on treatment by the organization.”³³² This states that an individual expects reciprocity in social relations. Following this line of reasoning, careerists sometimes can limit their job performance when they view organizational actions against them to be unfair.³³³ In essence, those individuals who embrace a strong instance of exchange ideology will exhibit diligent work efforts only if treated well, and those with a weak instance will support the organization irrespective of treatment.

Public management researchers have used social exchange theory and LMX as benchmarks from which to analyze complex management-employee problems in government agencies, especially those under public and congressional scrutiny. The bulk of this research operates under the argument that improvement in manager-employee relationships is a core factor for the enhancement of organizational performance and outcomes in any agency. These

enhancements may occur because leaders reap benefits such as increased status, loyalty, and reputation while subordinates gain tangible benefits such as pay raises, promotions, and desirable postings. LMX transactions are not however limited to tangible benefits: they can include intangible factors such as esteem, popularity, and support. Research points to the fact that employees who enjoy high-quality LMX relationships exhibit behavior ‘above and beyond the call of duty,’ as opposed to employees who suffer under the yoke of low-quality LMX relationships tend to remain mired in mindsets that predicate the execution of duties aligned with their contractual obligations. Managerial fairness, honesty, and workplace justice forge a matrix from which OCB or ‘good soldierly behavior’ may emerge.³³⁴ Awareness of management and organizational fairness is often correlated with employees’ perceptions of organizational politics.

Perceptions of Organizational Politics

Research has shown that organizational politics is pervasive within both public and private sectors. Employees’ understandings of workplace fairness are correlated to their perceptions of organizational politics (POP). The events that define organizational politics occur as a natural course of an organization’s socio-cultural milieu. In short, cultural influences exhibit a significant impact on political behavior both inside and outside organizations. Research suggests a correlation between procedural justice, POP, and management fairness. The organizational political climate correlates to job attitudes: a bad climate causes reduction in voluntary obligation to and identification with the organization and an increase of employees’ overall dissatisfaction with the workplace. Research has shown that employees’ perceptions of a highly politicized workplace have significant negative ramifications for employee satisfaction, job performance, and organizational commitment. Moreover, employees’ perception of a highly politicized environment may cause them physically or psychologically to leave the organization

in question: if they physically stay in the organization they may disengage from organizational goals or psychologically withdraw from the culture of that organization. Another ramification of POP is that of employees' neglectful behavior; actions and attitudes of employees that are injurious to their organization. Examples of this sort of behavior are sub-optimal work performance, workplace gossip, and blowback political maneuvering aimed at superiors and peers perceived to be adversaries.³³⁵ This sort of conduct also includes activities such as internecine fighting, complaining, finding fault with other individuals or groups, and arguing. These actions constitute, in part, counterproductive workplace behavior (CWB). From the perspective of the employer, any intentional behavior by an organization's members contrary to the legitimate interests of that organization constitutes CWB. Researchers in the mid-1980s discovered CWB in a federal government agency and suggested that this behavior suite served as a coping mechanism for governmental personnel who perceived that they were abused by a highly politicized environment. Notably, these employees were not willing to resign their positions. Certain investigations have ascertained that the correlation between negative job attitudes and an employee's perception of a politicized workplace is stronger for subordinate employees than those of higher rank in an organization.³³⁶

Pro-Social Behaviors and the Relativism of Ethics

Pro-social behavior patterns follow a suite of ethics that places personal aggrandizement, gain, and security in a position secondary to that of higher order considerations, such as the security of the citizenry and the nation as a whole. Often equated to some form of ethics, pro-social behaviors enhance the effectiveness of an organization's social machinery. Notably, ethics are not always viewed as objective: some commentators assert ethics as constructs imbued with relativism. This suggests that an action or position may be viewed as ethical if the individual or

group to whom he or she belongs views those actions or positions as ethical. However, personal ethics and group ethics sometimes may be incompatible: the weight of group forces may well overwhelm personal ethics. The organization and its members are social systems, consisting of many wide and varying behavior patterns. Daniel Katz asserted any organization that depends upon its formalized, rule-based systems of behavior is very fragile, suggesting that vibrant and effective organizations must rely on OCB. Ethical rules are not categorical: in some difficult situations, they require practitioners to make significant exceptions to them.³³⁷ This situation often presents an enigma to practitioners in the IC. Examples of this sort of situation are the production of politically palatable yet inaccurate intelligence or a subordinate's performance of unethical actions at the behest of their superiors.

When supervisors evaluate subordinates' ethics, they often consider factors such as the promotion of organizational standards, advancement of organizational goals, and ultimately organizational survival. Supervisors often differentiate between organizational ethics and the personal ethics of their subordinates. In short, supervisors and their positional power strongly influence and mold the ethics of their subordinates. Notably, certain studies have ascertained that internal organizational pressures are significant predictors of subordinates' unethical behavior. Organizational loyalty behaviors, at first examination, are highly desirable but do not necessarily offer any enhancements in effectiveness or efficiency.³³⁸ Ethical and unethical behavior patterns are differentiated by ambiguity, the "point where the accepted rules no longer serve and the decision-maker is faced with the responsibility for weighing values and reaching a judgment in the situation which is not quite the same as any he has faced before."³³⁹ This is an exemplar of an environment in which the individual is forced to depend upon personal values to steer his or her actions. In short, when faced with a dearth of organizational rules concerning decisions,

subordinates often depend upon the ethics of supervisors, indoctrination, and institutional ethical culture in order to navigate their ways through a sea of ambiguity.³⁴⁰ This dissertation asserts that some, but not all analysts in the IC were confronted with a sea of ethical ambiguity in the prelude to OIF.

Summary

This chapter has discussed theoretical assemblages that may align with the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF: substandard intelligence analytic tradecraft and defects in bureaucracy. This section of the study has examined sub-sections of these groups with the view of aligning these theoretical constructs with elements discussed in *Chapter II, Contextual Considerations* and *Chapter III, Dubious Data Enters the IC*. These potential alignments shall be contrasted, compared, and analyzed in *Chapter V, Discussions and Conclusions*.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This section of the study shall contrast, compare, and analyze the concepts set out in *Chapter II, Contextual Considerations, Chapter III, Dubious Data Enters the IC, and Chapter IV, Theoretical Considerations* with the view of providing answers to the following questions: (1) were there intelligence failure(s) in the prelude to OIF; (2) where were the intelligence failure(s) located; (3) what caused the intelligence failure(s); and (4) why did the intelligence failure(s) occur?

Comments on the Author's Initial Hypotheses

At the onset of this study, the researcher hypothesized that cognitive or analytic pathologies contributed to the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. One of the initial pathologies examined by this work resided within the realm of Kenneth R. Hammond's cognitive continuum coupled with the theoretical construct called scientism. Hammond's work analyzed the way in which human beings deal with their environment, hence, commentators sometime refer to this corpus of knowledge as ecological psychology. This discipline attempts to ascertain how a person or group of persons deals with a question or precept. The cognitive continuum endeavors to pinpoint this mechanism on a band that ranges between intuition and the methods of hard science. In the midpoint of this continuum resides Hammond's quasi-rationality, an intellectual 'sweet spot' in which the positivistic notions of hard science are counterbalanced by

intuitive, acumen-based functions. As discussed in *Research Method and Sources*, the researcher asked all anonymous respondents to describe their analytic methodological milestones on a scale from one to ten, with one representing analysis based upon intuition, acumen, and nuance; five representing a balance between intuition and scientific analysis; and ten representing analysis based upon hard data and scientific method-based examination. The historical milestones were: (1) the Iran-Iraq war; (2) Operation Desert Storm; (3) the 1998 ARDA technology initiative; (4) the 9/11 attacks; and (5) any other landmark assessed to be of significance to American analytic tradecraft. It must be noted that this exercise was a self-reporting mechanism in which the participants conveyed their perceptions of themselves and the organizations in which they worked; therefore, these questions and responses should be viewed as initial indicators rather than definitive answers.

As noted in *Research Method and Sources*, the responses pointed to an incremental shift towards the methods of hard science in the practice of intelligence analysis, but showed no tipping point that indicated a definitive transition to scientism. In short, the data still hovered close to Hammond's region of quasi-rationality. Thus, the examination based on Hammond's cognitive continuum tested for the presence of scientism in the IC's analytic methods, and found it absent. Moreover, when the researcher queried publicly identifiable IC members, their responses indicated that professional discipline in the IC mandated analysts to use either Sherman Kent's social scientific methods of intelligence analysis or structured intelligence analytic techniques. These individuals said that when used according to the IC's SOPs, these methods of intelligence analysis significantly mitigated intellectual biases and the contamination of analytic processes by scientism.³⁴¹

The researcher also hypothesized that another probable factor relating to the alleged intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF was that of an opportunistic Iraqi D & D campaign. In the preliminary examination phases of this study, former Iraqi intelligence officers indicated by way of telephone interviews that Saddam Hussein had embarked on such a campaign in order to deceive his immediate neighbors with respect to his possession, deployment, and intent to use WMD. Part of this hypothesis was that the Iraqi D & D campaign had somehow contaminated the data streams moving into the IC, thereby causing the generation of defective intelligence analytic products. During the course of interviews with anonymized and public IC respondents, it became apparent that American analysts detected the Iraqi D & D campaign and recognized it for what it was: an operation designed to keep Iraq's proximal rivals at bay *via* the threat of a WMD attack. All anonymized and public respondents from America's IC indicated that Iraq's D & D campaign played no significant part in the production of analytic products in the prelude to OIF.³⁴²

Additionally, the investigator hypothesized that Iraq covertly maintained an active, clandestine WMD development and production program in the prelude to OIF. Publicly accessible documents such as the Amorim Report, the Duelfer Report, reports from the IAEA, UNSCOM, and UNMOVIC disagreed with this hypothesis. Interviews with public respondents from the IC and their anonymized comrades also asserted that there was no active WMD program in Iraq during the prelude to OIF. Public respondents from the Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi WMD community also supported this assertion.³⁴³

Issue Clusters / Networks, Iron Triangles, and pre-OIF Intelligence Failure

This study has shown that issue clusters / networks were an important feature in the promotion of conservative and neoconservative political agendas. Starting from such entities as

the CPD, notable conservatives gathered to discuss and promote their vision of American foreign policy directions. This became especially pronounced when Albert Wohlstetter initiated a then unnamed NICN that had members who would ultimately exhibit significant levels of political power in the G. W. Bush administration. These individuals, such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Abram Shulsky, and Elliot Abrams, *via* the ministrations of Albert Wohlstetter joined the CPD; it is in this organization that these people gained introductions to powerful conservative politicians in the United States federal government.

As Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz entered the federal government's civil service, they climbed their respective career ladders and assumed positions of increasing responsibility and political power. During this time, Perle, Wolfowitz, Abrams, Shulsky, and other neoconservative notables attracted the notice of ascendant Republican politicians such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. As the neoconservative intellectuals intermingled with various politicians, this consortium started to morph from its origins as an issue cluster / network; once G. W. Bush assumed the presidency the transformation began to coalesce. It is at this time that this NICN became an iron triangle; it was an archetypal power nexus that operated outside the formally mandated mechanisms of governance. When President G. W. Bush informally repositioned his foreign policy making duties to VP Dick Cheney, the iron triangle gained immense foreign policy-making power; it exhibited executive potency and influence far in excess of what one might expect from such a small group. Led by notables such as VP Dick Cheney, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, and DSECDEF Paul Wolfowitz, this iron triangle vociferously and strenuously promoted the policy option of America fighting a war with Iraq.

The Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle did not restrict itself to backroom political pursuits; it embroiled itself in the intelligence process by way of the institution and operation of

groups such as the PCTEG, OSP, and NESAs that were responsible for the acquisition and acceptance of faulty data streams, their conversion into pseudo-intelligence products used in executive level promotional events, and influencing the analytic product produced by the IC. In short, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle worked towards the goal of manipulating the IC to produce policy-palatable analytic product in the prelude to OIF. This process is intelligence politicization. This study asserts that the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle attempted to politicize intelligence analytic products *via* the mechanisms of flawed management-employee relations in the IC.

Managers in the IC

As stated earlier in this chapter, the initial hypotheses guiding this study seemed not to bear fruit. Interviews with working members of America's IC pointed to the fact that certain members of the executive cadre in the IC exhibited politicization, often urging their subordinates to produce intelligence analyses that agreed with the conventional wisdom as espoused by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and its supporters. Thus, management-employee relations in the IC were an important factor. The researcher shall analyze these factors *via* some specific examples of management-employee relations and intelligence politicization in the prelude to OIF.

Management-Employee Relations in the IC

In this study, some of the researcher's unprompted and *ad-hoc* questions to members of the IC presented unexpected responses. Without first mentioning specific workplace pathologies to the participants, the questions posed to two hundred twenty one anonymized respondents in the American IC touched upon the relationships they had with their managers and bureau

executives. One hundred nineteen of two hundred twenty one anonymized respondents indicated that there was some sort of problem in their relationships with the superior members of their chain of command. When prompted to explain these worksite relationship issues, these one hundred nineteen respondents noted that their work environment was characterized by a lack of trust in their managers or executives. These individuals reported that they felt as if they were expendable assets serving as ladder rungs from which their superiors could advance their careers. Of these one hundred nineteen respondents, approximately sixty seven percent of those who worked in the CIA reported these characterizations, while approximately sixteen percent of those who worked in the State Department's INR reported these issues. Respondents who worked in the DoD and the DoE's intelligence bureaus offered responses similar to their comrades in the INR. As with other reports of this type, the investigator recorded only raw numbers for the calculation of percentages on an agency basis. As previously mentioned in this dissertation, the investigator recorded no data that could link respondents' pseudonyms to their agency affiliations. Therefore, these percentages cannot be cited with anonymous respondents' pseudonyms. These responses suggest some possible management-employee issues extant in the CIA's work environment. Coupled with the WINPAC environment, the John R. Bolton – INR situation, the Richard Haver scenario, and John L. Helgerson's investigation of CIA personnel, these results suggest that CCB, OCB, LMX, POP, and workplace bullying factors contributed to the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF.

Previous sections of this study have stated that 'classified employees' in the IC have a tenuous grip on their positions within that hierarchy. Without the protection of legally mandated job tenure, unionization, or the benefit of other professional associations that could negotiate on their behalf, the threat of negative career consequences or outright job termination hovers above

the heads of these employees. Describing the tenuous employment situation of ‘classified employees’ in the IC, Richard Helms a former DCI asserted that he was “the easiest man in Washington to fire as he had no political, military, or industrial base.”³⁴⁴ This situation could cause many of the IC’s employees to resort to self-protective tactics and strategies, thereby reallocating significant amounts of their personal capabilities from job-related duties to those of career survival and / or enhancement. In fact, one hundred sixty-four out of two hundred twenty one respondents in this study asserted that they have ascertained or been party to negative career consequences associated with the IC’s employment environment. These responses indicated a correlation to workplace bullying factors and coercion present in the IC during the prelude to OIF. These statements are significant: such qualms may have caused some instances of intelligence politicization in the prelude to OIF. These claims, however, are contrary to the Robb-Silberman Commission that assessed there was no evidence of politicization in the production of the October 2002 NIE, yet which also stated there was no doubt that analysts existed in an environment driven by *intense policymaker interest in Iraq*.³⁴⁵ With these factors in mind, the upcoming paragraphs shall discuss some specific instances of management-employee relations in the IC during that period that could have contributed to the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF.

Management-Employee Relations in WINPAC

One of the more notable examples of problematic management-employee interactions was that of Alan Foley, a long-term CIA member who spent most of his career in the DI. In May 2001, George Tenet instituted WINPAC with a staff of approximately five hundred analysts, scientists, and other personnel from the remnants of Foley’s Arms Control Intelligence Staff, the old Nonproliferation Centre, and the Weapons Intelligence Staff in the Office of Transnational

Issues. During the course of his CIA career, Foley served alongside Melvin A. Goodman in the DI. Both Goodman and Foley interacted closely and worked on nuclear weapons related issues. During the course of their employment, Goodman assessed Foley to be a careerist, an individual who Goodman evaluated to have exhibited behavior traits primarily aimed at career advancement. In conversations with Goodman, Foley asserted he would do whatever was necessary to ensure his rapid career advancement within the CIA's chain of command, including the politicization of intelligence.³⁴⁶ Goodman specifically cited an example of this behavior in *Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA*, stating that in December 2002, Foley, then director of WINPAC told his staff, "If the president wants to go to war, our job is to find the intelligence to allow him to do so."³⁴⁷ Speaking further to the situation in WINPAC, Goodman went on to say that:

[D]uring the run-up to the Iraq War certain senior [CIA] officials such as ...Alan Foley provided the Bush administration with the case for going to war. In that exercise [he] failed to make sure that ...analyses reflected the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process. ...Foley forgot that [the] main mission was to 'tell truth to power' and not to corroborate the opinions of the policy community's principals.³⁴⁸

Another noted national security commentator, Joseph Cirincione, drawing on parts of the Robb-Silberman report of March 2005, asserted that Foley removed from WINPAC two senior analysts who refused to modify their dissenting opinions about Iraq's WMD into alignment with the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's policy preferences.³⁴⁹ Foley's workplace bullying tactics cultivated an environment inside of WINPAC that was laden with CCB; in that group, employees were compelled to engage in actions that were outside of the normal analytic performance standards as set out by the CIA's Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis. Additionally, Foley *via* his 'back channel' with Robert G. Joseph approved Bush's infamous 'sixteen words' used in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union message.³⁵⁰ The 'sixteen words' appeared to be an eerie duplicate of the text presented in a September 24, 2002 British dossier

that cited various intelligence sources supporting the notions Iraq was developing a nuclear bomb and possessed other banned weapon systems. These words were “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”³⁵¹ In short, Foley closely resembled the characteristics of Anthony Downs’ archetypal self-interested bureaucrat, an individual who is “motivated ...by goals that benefit themselves rather than their bureaus or society as a whole.”³⁵² The important dynamic to scrutinize is how or why the top-level executive echelons within the CIA allowed Foley’s actions to occur.

The working relationship between Alan Foley, WINPAC, Jami Miscik, John McLaughlin, and George Tenet was intricate and convoluted. Nominally, Foley directly reported to Miscik, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence; Miscik reported to John McLaughlin, the Deputy Director of the CIA, and then to George Tenet, who served as Director of the CIA and Director of Central Intelligence. Interestingly, the CIA’s chain of command rules mandated that all intelligence analytic products emanating from that organization must do so with the explicit approval of the Deputy Director of Intelligence, in that case Jami Miscik. Therefore, one might reasonably assume that Miscik would have control over the intelligence analytic product generated by Foley’s organization, WINPAC. This link in the chain of evidence becomes extremely complicated when one realizes that Foley and some of his subordinates in WINPAC had a ‘back channel’ that they could use bi-directionally to communicate policy-palatable intelligence analytic products to the National Security Council and the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. That line of communication existed because of a friendship between Foley and Robert G. Joseph, the NSC’s Chief Counterproliferation Specialist. From time to time, Foley and Joseph enjoyed an unrestricted and unaudited communication channel between their two offices. Foley also admitted during a *Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Session on the*

Nomination of John R. Bolton to be Permanent U. S. Representative to the United Nations that he had enjoyed continuing ‘back channel’ communications with Bolton *via* Frederick Fleitz. The WINPAC situation does not stop with the CIA’s connections to senior members of other agencies in the IC. On July 10, 2002, John Bolton met with the director of the CIA’s National Intelligence Council, Stuart Cohen. He later testified that he had met with Foley on the same day. Foley mentioned that he talked to Frederick Fleitz and John Bolton at least once a week in the prelude to OIF. In his testimony before the United States Senate, under oath Foley admitted that Frederick Fleitz acted as his ‘back channel’ between John Bolton’s office and WINPAC.³⁵³

The politicized intelligence situation reached a high point in late 2002, when Jami Miscik declared to George Tenet that she would resign her CIA position in protest over WINPAC’s bad intelligence that found its way into the hands of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle for use as pro-war talking points. Miscik had enjoyed a long and convivial relationship with Tenet under whom she had served as Executive Assistant from 1996 to 1997. In July 1997, Tenet became Director of the CIA; he promoted Miscik to the position of Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation Center. In January 1999, Tenet again promoted Miscik; she assumed the position of Director of Transnational Issues. In 2002, Tenet again promoted Miscik; she became the agency’s first female leader of the Directorate of Intelligence. In short, Miscik was a long-term protégé of George Tenet; he had received kudos from Presidents W. J. Clinton, G. W. Bush, and Congress for his promotions of Miscik.

In response to Miscik’s protestations and threat of resignation, Tenet recused her from all subsequent intelligence analytic products emanating from WINPAC. This decision short-circuited agency rules, allowing WINPAC’s politicized intelligence product to continue its propagation from the CIA under the auspices of John McLaughlin and George Tenet absent the

expressed approval of Jami Miscik. Interestingly, no publicly available records or respondents' commentaries indicated that the CIA's Inspector General of that time, John L. Helgerson did anything to examine and correct this obvious breach of agency regulations. Tenet's refusal to accept Miscik's resignation can be viewed as an exercise in bureaucratic and personal damage control. A resignation at that level of seniority in the CIA would have attracted the attention of the NSC, President G. W. Bush, and Congress. Moreover, in the partisan political arena, Miscik's resignation could have been portrayed as a cultural and gender-based devolution in which the CIA's upper executive cadre had reverted to its roots as a male-dominated 'old boys club.' Notably, dissenting personnel of lesser rank in the CIA, such as those serving in WINPAC suffered punishments meted out by their supervisors and agency executives. In short, bureaucratic and partisan political interests precluded Tenet's acceptance of Jami Miscik's resignation.³⁵⁴

John R. Bolton's Attempted Politicization of INR

In addition to his 'back channel' connection with Alan Foley, John Bolton attempted to override the expert analytic output of Christian Westermann and other analysts in the INR. Like Alan Foley in WINPAC, John Bolton attempted to use his executive position within the State Department to compel the INR's analysts into generating analytic products that were compliant to the policy preferences of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. From the theoretical standpoint, Bolton's actions appear to be workplace bullying with the goal of forcing subordinates into CCB that was misaligned with their mandated duties to generate policy-neutral analytic products. Simply put, Bolton attempted to politicize the analytic output of the INR. Not only did Bolton's actions extend from his operational unit into one in which he did not reside, his

antics represented a blatant attempt to change not only the SOPs of the INR, but its long-standing institutional culture of analytic independence.

Carl Ford Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research resisted John Bolton's attempts at intelligence politicization. His defense of the INR's analysts was so strenuous that he took his complaints to Secretary of State Colin Powell and had Bolton temporarily banned from the bureau's premises. Noting the climate of fear Bolton generated in the bureau's analytic cadre, Ford requested Powell to address the INR's staff and urge them to continue producing balanced and unbiased analytic product. In Senate hearings reviewing the nomination of Bolton to be the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ford characterized Bolton as a quintessential 'kiss up, kick down' type of leader who engaged in abusive behavior directed towards those people he viewed as his subordinates, and more importantly, was intolerant of dissenting analytic opinions. The Bolton-Ford conflict is immensely interesting because Carl Ford, Jr. is a staunch conservative, a friend and former employee of Dick Cheney and hawkish in his political views. Irrespective of his philosophical underpinnings and political predilections, Ford was resolute in his belief that intelligence must remain free from politicization, and regardless of political and career consequences, should 'speak truth to power.' In short, Carl Ford, Jr. supported Sherman Kent's notions of intelligence analytic product being blind to policy makers' political predilections. Ford doggedly protected such individuals as Christian Westermann, Wayne White, Simon Dodge, Greg Thielmann, and others against downward-facing politicization pressures emanating from John Bolton and his comrades in the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle.³⁵⁵ Carl Ford, Jr. was an exemplar of downward-facing pro-social OCB: he expected no compensatory rewards for his actions that defended the analytic integrity of the INR.

Thomas Ryder's Attempted Politicization of the DoE

Thomas Ryder was a long-serving human resources specialist who by way of a political appointment ascended to the position of Acting Director of Intelligence for the DoE. He had filled the position left vacant by Lawrence Sanchez who served in that role during the W. J. Clinton administration. Notably, Ryder did not stay in his acting role: a former CIA official, John Russack later filled the position of Director of Intelligence for the DoE. After leaving the DoE, Ryder went on to other roles in the Senior Executive Service in the G. W. Bush administration. As mentioned previously in this study, Ryder initially succeeded in his attempts to override the expert analytic products of his department's scientific and engineering staff. This is especially interesting in that Ryder attempted to overrule the analysis of a group of well-recognized and published experts in the field of uranium enrichment; Drs. Houston Wood III, Rhys M. Williams, Jon A. Kreykes, Duane F. Starr, and Edward von Halle.

Even though in his own right Houston Wood was an internationally renowned expert on uranium centrifugation enrichment, he decided to 'go the extra mile' in the analysis of the aluminum tube imbroglio. Following 'good soldierly behavior' patterns, Wood exhibited pro-social OCB by actually contacting the aging Gernot Zippe, the inventor of the centrifuge technology in question, for additional consultative information pertaining to the suspect aluminum tubes. Zippe confirmed Wood and his colleagues' analyses that the aluminum tubes were quite unsuitable for use in uranium enrichment *via* gaseous centrifugation; without prompting, Zippe asserted these tubes would have leaked and / or disintegrated had they been subjected to the extreme forces encountered in his centrifuges.³⁵⁶

As per the DoE's policy, Wood's team presented this suite of information to Thomas Ryder for transmission up the IC's reporting chain and ultimately into the CIA and WINPAC. Wood's team extensively briefed Ryder on their findings with respect to the Iraqi aluminum tube

scenario; they offered detailed analyses about Zippe centrifuges, how they worked, the forces they generated, their inherent design parameters and limitations, and the engineering constraints behind the materials used in their construction. In short, Ryder received a very thorough, high-level presentation about Zippe centrifuges in the briefing supplied by Houston Wood and his colleagues, making it clear that the aluminum tubes sent from the People's Republic of China to Iraq were unsuitable for use in Zippe centrifuges and were, with a high degree of certainty intended for use as the fuselages of tactical battlefield rockets. During his meetings with Alan Foley, Joe Turner, and other WINPAC staff, Ryder refused to support the expert analytic product of Wood and his colleagues. Notwithstanding his briefings by the DoE's centrifugation experts, Ryder supported the claims of Foley and Turner and allowed WINPAC's analyses to move up the IC's chain of command in a seemingly unopposed fashion.³⁵⁷

Ryder's actions are extremely interesting from the perspective of bureaucratic politics; he had a well-known political relationship with his immediate superior, the Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham. This relationship becomes even more interesting when one realizes that Abraham had deep connections to the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle; he was beholden to VP Cheney (the head of the G. W. Bush transition team) for his appointment as Secretary of Energy. As a result of that relationship and VP Cheney's handling of all national security matters, Cheney was directly involved in the approval of Ryder's appointment as the DoE's acting intelligence chief. This situation suggests a relationship between the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and Ryder's attempted suppression of the analytic products emanating from the subject matter experts in the DoE. When one realizes that Ryder was an administrative specialist and not a technical subject matter expert, it becomes incredulous that he would have the knowledge required to make scientific and engineering value judgments on the

analytic output of Dr. Houston Wood and his team of world-renowned uranium enrichment experts. In short, Ryder's overriding of the output of Wood and his team must have resulted from other areas; specifically that of bureaucratic self-interest. Although nothing appears in respondents' commentaries or in publicly accessible sources, one could surmise that there was some sort of career progression relationship between Ryder's actions and the policy preferences of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. Considering his politicization attempts and that relationship, Ryder appears to fit the mold of Anthony Downs' self-interested bureaucrat.

Donald Rumsfeld's Politicization of the DoD

As mentioned previously in this study, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld obfuscated the analytic output of General Glen D. Shaffer, his departmental chief of intelligence (J2). Shaffer's documents summarized all of the accumulated data feeds and analytic products generated by the DoD's service intelligence branches and the DIA. This package included a PowerPoint file and transmission / reception memos from General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld. Shaffer's documents summarized that the DoD and its intelligence assets assessed that most of its data feeds were based upon guesswork, inference, and innuendo. Some of the assertions in these data feeds were only thirty to forty-five percent based on facts. This PowerPoint presentation appeared on the desk of SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld by way of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This documentation package was affixed with a stamp saying *SECDEF HAS SEEN SEP 09 2002*, clearly indicating that Rumsfeld had acknowledged seeing it on that date. As mentioned earlier in this study, interviews with non-DoD IC notables indicated they had never seen this suite of documentation.

This information leads to a very interesting state of affairs when one considers the post-9/11 disaster situation. Presidential commissions and congressional committees had assessed that

one of the major failings in the IC was that its agencies did not effectively share data, information, and intelligence across bureaucratic boundaries; these agencies were ‘stove-piped.’ In order to protect against sneak attacks scenarios such as the 9/11 disasters, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, which was signed and enacted by President G. W. Bush on October 26, 2001.³⁵⁸ Among others, sections 202, 203, 314, 344, and 403 of this law clearly provided the legal mandate and authority to share investigative and intelligence information across agency boundaries. In short, after October 26, 2001, interagency intelligence and investigative ‘stove-piping’ should have stopped in the United States government. However, the reasons for Myers and Rumsfeld not distributing the findings of Shaffer to the rest of the IC and Secretary Powell are, at the time of this study unknown.

The above situation leads to an intellectual conundrum in which one must decide whether Myers or Rumsfeld were incompetent and unknowledgeable about the wording and intent of the USA Patriot Act or if some other suite of issues was at play in their decision to withhold Shaffer’s information package from the non-DoD portions of the IC. Although it is impossible to analyze Myers or Rumsfeld with respect to their withholding of Shaffer’s information from the non-DoD sections of the IC, it is a reasonable assumption for any person of normal cognitive capability to conclude that some sort of mindset came into play during this scenario. This assumption suggests that Myers and Rumsfeld felt that the situation in which they found themselves embroiled located them into a position above the wording and intent of the USA Patriot Act.

Another point to consider is the authoritarian and disciplined nature of the command hierarchy in the DoD. Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) contains proscriptions that prevent the unauthorized sharing of data, information, or intelligence outside

of one's chain of command except when one is legally mandated with the authority to do so.³⁵⁹ Title 18, Part I, Chapter 93, Section 1905 of the U. S. Code provides similar restrictions for civilians who have access to classified information.³⁶⁰ This arrangement of authority predicates that information flows move upwards until they meet an individual in the hierarchy with command authority to allow the information to move horizontally; that is, to other groups within the DoD or to external organizations. Due to the authoritarian and highly controlled nature of this situation, subordinate members of J-2 were legally prohibited from moving the information in Shaffer's document package outside of the DoD: the only persons legally allowed to do so were Myers and his civilian commander, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld.

When one considers that Rumsfeld and Myers were financially independent individuals in the sunset phases of their respective careers, the motives of sycophantic careerism and the desire for accelerated professional progression must fall to the wayside. The simplest explanation for their actions is that Rumsfeld and Myers were true believers in the neoconservative pro-war mantra and they exhibited cognitive dissonance; they refused to accept as true any evidence or analyses that disagreed with their *weltanschauung*.

Colin Powell – The Paradox of the Archetypical Good Soldier

Colin Powell enjoyed a long and storied career in the Army and after his retirement from military service, in governmental posts. As previously mentioned in this study, Secretary of State Powell resisted John R. Bolton's efforts to politicize intelligence in the INR, temporarily banning Bolton from the analytic facilities in the Foggy Bottom Office Complex. Furthermore, Powell convened several meetings with the INR's staff in which he asserted that he would never condone downward-facing pressure that forced them to produce analytic product that agreed with the political predilections of governmental elites. In these actions, Powell exhibited downward-

facing pro-social OCB: he 'went the extra mile' in his duties to ensure that his organization maintained its integrity, performance, and reputation for analytic excellence. Notwithstanding his defense of the INR's analytic integrity with respect to the Iraq situation, Powell eventually acquiesced to the G. W. Bush administration's desire to invade that state, as exemplified by his powerful presentation before the United Nations Security Council in which he stated that Iraq had an ongoing WMD program. In September 2004, he testified before Congress that his United Nations presentation was based on faulty intelligence. Later in 2004, Powell acknowledged that it was highly unlikely Iraq had any deployable WMD. Shortly after his congressional testimony, Powell resigned his position as Secretary of State. In the author's telephone interviews with Lawrence Wilkerson, it became apparent that Powell and Wilkerson never saw Major General Shaffer's PowerPoint presentation that demonstrated the DoD's dearth of high-quality intelligence with respect to Iraq's WMD programs.³⁶¹

It is evident that Colin Powell was no stranger to the political environment within the Washington, D. C. Beltway: he enjoyed continuing contacts and convivial relations with several senior decision-makers in both the Republican and Democratic parties. In short, Colin Powell was neither a political neophyte nor a dullard. Powell had misgivings about the Iraq War and was not completely on side with the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's predisposition to invade that country and topple Saddam Hussein and his sons from power. The question that arises from Powell and his positions is why he made his presentation before the United Nations Security Council. The answer to that question resides in Powell's military career, indoctrination, and ethical underpinnings with respect to loyalty to his chain of command.

All officers schooled in the Anglo-American military tradition are indoctrinated to have their primary loyalty towards the superiors in their chain of command and the mission objectives

issued to them by their superiors. Although loyalty to and care of their subordinates is important, the *mission must come first*. This situation is complicated further by the precept that all members of the United States military are mandated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to disobey in a respectful fashion any order that a person of reasonable cognitive capabilities and judgement would assess to be unlawful.³⁶² This UCMJ concept is based on the *Nuremberg Principle IV* that arose from the Allies' post-World War II military tribunals that prosecuted Nazi German war criminals. In these military tribunals, the defendants mounted their defense based upon the concept that they were only obeying orders from a superior command authority. In most cases, the Allied military tribunals rejected these defense motions, found the defendants guilty, and imposed suitable punishments against them.

In short, Powell's long-standing military career and his enduring indoctrination in the Army's *mission must come first* principle short-circuited his judgment: reluctantly, he obediently gave his presentation to the United Nations Security Council in alignment with President G. W. Bush's requests. Notably, Powell did try to separate the wheat from the chaff in the approximate one week of analytic work afforded to him and his staff by President G. W. Bush. Led by Lawrence Wilkerson, this rapid intelligence work-up resulted in a presentation that contained wording of a much weaker nature than that recommended by VP Dick Cheney and his chief of staff, Lewis 'Scooter' Libby. Powell's behavior before the United Nations Security Council and his protection of the INR's analytic staff from the politicization efforts of John R. Bolton demonstrated the double-edged nature of OCB: 'good soldierly behaviors' are subject to relativism and can produce a variety of outcomes depending upon the context from which they originate.

A Countervailing Argument

The reader may be tempted to align the behavior patterns of various IC employees to those of foreign-controlled agents (moles) operating in that community. In this alignment, the reader may hypothesize that these moles were in some way not subject to an employment environment that featured the possibility of capricious and arbitrary actions levied against them by their superiors, thus negating some of the assertions about the IC made in this study. Some of the more notable examples of moles were Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Jonathan Pollard. The question is thus; if it is so easy for superiors to bully or fire IC employees, then why or how did Ames, Hanssen, and Pollard escape these fates? The answer lies in the fact that IC employees sometimes express dissent with their superiors' opinions in an *overt fashion*, while moles commit their acts of espionage *veiled by subterfuge*. In order to attain their objectives, moles rely on professional intelligence tradecraft techniques in addition to the bureaucratic obfuscation methods routinely used by sycophantic employees. Moles are a breed apart from the typical IC employee; in most cases, they receive training from their controllers' formalized syllabus on how to avoid detection and thrive in a complex bureaucracy.³⁶³

Notably, both Ames and Hanssen were recruited and handled by one of the Soviet Union's most adept KGB officers, Victor Cherkashin, who was the *resident* in that state's Washington, D. C., embassy. In *Spy Handler: A Memoir of a KGB Officer: The True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames*, Cherkashin mentioned how he trained his foreign assets in espionage tradecraft techniques and bureaucratic obfuscation methods. Cherkashin noted successful covert agents practice perception management methods; moles must manage how co-workers and supervisors perceive them. Cherkashin's narratives are quite interesting in relation to the cases of Ames and Hanssen; perhaps these moles' pre-existing bureaucratic skills and tradecraft expertise along with the enhancements supplied by

Cherkashin's training were significant enabling factors in their decades-long history of successful criminal undertakings levelled against the IC.³⁶⁴ The case of Jonathan Pollard is interesting because his short career of espionage was enabled by the dereliction of duty by flag rank and senior officers in the United States Navy and the Defense Investigative Service. In *Capturing Jonathan Pollard: How One of the Most Notorious Spies in American History Was Brought to Justice*, Ronald J. Olive explained how Pollard's impolitic behavior and lack of espionage tradecraft skills led to his undoing. Olive also pointed out that Pollard during his short career in the ONI did not have the time to become adept at sycophantic careerist tactics; he was a neophyte who seemed unable to acquire and use these crucial skills. Moreover, Olive outlined how Pollard's Israeli handler was not a professional intelligence agent; this person did not have the espionage tradecraft skills or the well-developed bureaucratic survival talents to train Pollard in these disciplines. In short, Pollard's successful criminal enterprise did not occur because of a professionally permissive employment environment.³⁶⁵

The techniques of bureaucratic politics and sycophantic careerism are different from that of espionage. Irrespective of their differences, these skill sets are complementary functions in the mole's toolkit. Sycophantic careerists *usually* employ legal, yet unethical methods to promote their bureaucratic survival and professional advancement, while moles employ illegal espionage tradecraft techniques that are derived from formal training regimens. Tyler Drumheller, W. Patrick Lang, Melissa Boyle Mahle, William D. Murray, and Michael Pheneger said that moles manipulate their targets' emotions so their dupes believe them to be friendly, confidence-worthy, nonthreatening persons. These HUMINT experts further asserted that the first step in being a successful mole is to fit into the bureaucratic environment in which they are operating.³⁶⁶ The cases of Ames and Hanssen do not indicate a permissive employment environment that precludes

an employee's capricious and arbitrary dismissal by his or her superiors. The case of Pollard indicates an environment where the Defense Investigative Service and Pollard's chain of command were derelict in their duties to protect the operational security of the environment for which they were responsible. Therefore, this work asserts these cases do not indicate employment environments that were absent of management's capability to levy arbitrary and capricious retributions against dissenting employees.

Conclusions

This study drew upon interviews with IC and government officials, sources in academia, the media, and primary government documents with a view to ascertaining if there was an intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. In the initial phase of the study, the author hypothesized that an intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF may have occurred because of analytic pathologies such as scientism or intellectual biases. Survey results from two hundred twenty one anonymized respondents from the IC indicated that scientism was not a factor in the intelligence environment before OIF. Moreover, interviews with anonymized and publicly quotable persons from the IC strenuously asserted that classical intelligence analytic techniques and structured methods of intelligence analysis were firmly entrenched in the IC during the prelude to OIF. These methodologies all but negated the opportunities for scientism and intellectual biases taking hold in the analytic process. Moreover, one hundred eighty six out of two hundred twenty one anonymized respondents indicated that they knew of subtle, yet discernible attempts by executives to modify intelligence products into alignment with the political predispositions and conventional wisdom espoused by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. Additionally, thirty-nine out of two hundred twenty one anonymized respondents in this study mentioned that they were the targets of overt requests from their superiors to modify

their intelligence analyses into alignment with the policy preferences of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle.

In *Chapter II, Contextual Considerations* this study outlined the development and members of the various NICNs that originated in the realm of academia. These *ad hoc* organizations featured future neoconservative notables such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliot Abrams, and other individuals who would rise to power in the G. W. Bush administration. Moreover, the study has shown a confluence between these early academic neoconservatives and their powerful counterparts in both the Democratic and Republican parties. These political notables were Democratic Senators Henry M. ‘Scoop’ Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan along with future powerful Republicans such as Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. From the early 1970s, various NICNs were instituted with the financial support of rich businesspersons such as Nina Rosenwald and Richard Mellon Scaife. With the financing of these billionaires, the NICNs gained political and intellectual resources that were willing to write op-eds, books, articles, positioning papers and generate webpages. These facilities managed to attract the attention of other academics, politicians, civil servants, consultants, and political opportunists; this situation further increased the momentum of the NICNs and their ability to affect change in American policy options.

During the administration of President W. J. Clinton, members of various NICNs took an especially aggressive stance; they lobbied the president by way of letters, media op-eds, and webpages to become more assertive in his protection of Israel and to adopt an economically and militarily interventionist policy in the Middle East. This stance was especially notable in the Project for the New American Century; members of this NICN were a veritable ‘who’s who’ of people destined to become powerful personages in the administration of President G. W. Bush.

Upon the election of the Bush / Cheney ticket in 2000, the NICNs coalesced; important members of these groups were appointed to positions of political power in that administration. Under the auspices of VP Dick Cheney and his transition team, individuals such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Abram Shulsky, Richard Perle, and other members of various NICNs gained the power to modify American foreign policy with respect to the Middle East and specifically Iraq.

After the 9/11 disasters, American sensitivity to Arab / Muslim terror attacks was at a feverish pitch; VP Dick Cheney advised President G. W. Bush to add significant resources to the national security infrastructure and to allow him to take charge of all national security related issues. It is after that point that the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle came into existence; it expressed its desire within a few weeks after the 9/11 disasters to hunt down and eliminate radical Islamic terrorists and to connect the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq with *al Qaeda*. Additionally this iron triangle drew upon old, 'cherry-picked' intelligence estimates that agreed with its preconceived notions that stated Saddam Hussein was directly connected with the 9/11 attacks, and was in league with *al Qaeda*. These estimates also indicated that Iraq had an active WMD development program and was in possession of a WMD arsenal that was banned by international conventions and treaties.

In short, extemporaneous comments from practitioners in the IC indicated that there was no intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF, save for a few areas where a small cadre of executives politicized into alignment with the predilections of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle the situationally correct analytic product of their staff members. *Chapter II, Contextual Considerations* suggests that there was politicization at the executive levels of the CIA, DoD, and the DoE in the prelude to OIF. The DoD's Chief of Joint Intelligence, Major

General Glen D. Shaffer generated a PowerPoint document that explained the analytic positions of the DoD's service intelligence bureaus and the DIA. As noted previously in the study, this document stated the agencies under the DoD's command umbrella did not have high quality intelligence about the status of Iraq's WMD arsenal in the prelude to OIF. Once this document package reached the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers and SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld it move no further; it stayed within the DoD and was not transmitted to other critical decision-makers such as Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence. When considering the data generated by this study, it is impossible to understand fully why Myers and Rumsfeld chose to obfuscate Shaffer's analysis package from other members of the IC. Notably, after the release of Shaffer's analysis package, neither Myers nor Rumsfeld made any public comments pertaining to this situation.

One executive in the State Department, John R. Bolton, attempted to politicize the situationally correct intelligence analytic product of the INR. Carl Ford, Jr. dealt with Bolton's politicization attempts; he maintained the professional standing and reputation of the INR and the integrity of its analytic product. With the support of Secretary of State Colin Powell, the INR's dissenting opinions appeared in the October 2002 NIE. Powell and Ford's performance of their duties maintained the integrity of the bureau they led. Their behaviors extended beyond the INR when Powell and Ford 'went the extra mile' in their duties by way of convincing Spencer Abraham, the Secretary of Energy to release the dissenting opinions of his department's subject matter experts with respect to the aluminum tubes analyses. Overriding Thomas Ryder's attempted politicization of the DoE's subject matter experts, Powell and Ford managed to obtain access to these dissenting analyses and used them to reinforce the INR's overall position that

appeared in the classified NIE of October 2002. Notably, Carl Ford, Jr. was a conservative sharing some political beliefs with Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. Colin Powell was a self-described moderate Republican. Irrespective of Powell and Ford's political beliefs, they were public servants who followed Anthony Downs' notion of bureaucrat-advocates who served a higher cause and relegated career progression to a position of significantly reduced priority when compared to the national good. Powell and Ford's actions aligned with downward-facing OCB that caused a positive impact on the organization they led.

Notably, Powell did demonstrate the other aspect of OCB: his deeply ingrained predilection to 'good soldierly behavior' and indoctrination to support his commander-in-chief irrespective of the consequences disposed him to make his now infamous presentation before the United Nations Security Council. Although Powell and Wilkerson significantly weakened the position of the presentation relative to that sought by VP Cheney and his chief of staff 'Scooter' Libby, Powell nonetheless made his presentation before the United Nations Security Council that asserted Iraq had WMD programs and was itself an existential threat to the United States and its allies. It must be noted that had Powell and Wilkerson seen General Shaffer's PowerPoint slides about Iraq's WMD situation, the presentation before the Security Council might not have occurred.³⁶⁷ Powell's actions, although well meaning, demonstrate the fact that OCB can lead to disastrous outcomes, in this case, the ill-fated Iraq War. In short, Powell's actions in the prelude to OIF demonstrate that OCB and its outcomes are contextually contingent.

In the CIA's DO, individuals such as Charles Allen, Jeffrey Castelli, Tyler Drumheller, Margaret H. Henoch, Robert S. Lady, William D. Murray, and Joseph Wippl collected and collated data that indicated Iraq had no connection to transnational terrorist groups and had no battlefield deployable WMD in the prelude to OIF. This suite of data and its resultant

preliminary analyses moved up the CIA's chain of command through Charles Allen, Tyler Drumheller, and the DDO, James Pavitt, eventually reaching the desks of George Tenet and his deputy John McLaughlin. This suite disagreed with the politicized analytic products generated by WINPAC and its director, Allen Foley. All the while, the DDI, Jami Miscik became increasingly distressed about the faulty intelligence emanating from WINPAC to Robert Joseph and the NSC. In fact, Miscik tendered her resignation in protest to this situation. Apparently, Miscik had reached the limit of her tolerance for bad organizational behavior. She exhibited good soldierly behavior in that she was willing to sacrifice her career for the benefit of her organization and nation. George Tenet refused to accept her resignation: he recused Miscik from signing any intelligence emanating further from WINPAC. Tenet's refusal to accept Miscik's resignation aligns well with the notions of bureaucratic self-interest and professional survival. Furthermore, his actions correlate to an implicit lack of resistance to the politicized intelligence emanating from WINPAC.

The Director of CIA's WINPAC, Alan Foley displayed careerist behaviors by way of the politicized instructions he imposed upon the analysts under his supervision. Anonymous respondents and two notable public commentators asserted that Foley was a careerist who would not accept dissenting opinions from the analysts he managed. One of these commentators noted that Foley removed two analysts from WINPAC because they refused to modify their analytic product to align with the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle's political predilections with respect to Iraq. Another commentator asserted that one of these analysts had sued the CIA for unlawful dismissal because of Foley's actions. When one compares Foley's actions to the typology of bureaucrats, it becomes clear that Foley was a self-interested bureaucrat whose behavior aligned with the 'climber' archetype as propounded by Anthony Downs.

These examples and findings, along with comments made by public and anonymous respondents, academic commentators, media notables, and others indicate that there was a problem in the top layers of the IC. Notably, in the CIA the chain of evidence ends with John McLaughlin and George Tenet. The important question to consider is why highly dedicated and patriotic IC executives would allow politicization to occur. In order to answer this question, one must note that an employee enters the IC under an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to defend it from enemies both foreign and domestic. Additionally, the IC subjects recruits, employees, and contractors to psychological scrutiny and testing upon entry and at random instances during their careers. This testing can range from mild to intense interrogation, polygraph examinations, full financial audits, covert counterintelligence surveillance and investigations, and other invasive methods. The majority of the IC's officials are mixed motive individuals: they display a combination of self-interested motives and overall altruism. The selection and indoctrination processes in America's IC emphasize loyalty to the state and self-sacrifice to the attainment of national goals.³⁶⁸ Intellectual, emotional, and ethical defects aside, other factors may have come into play that instigated Tenet and McLaughlin's tacit acceptance of WINPAC's defective intelligence product. The data supporting this study suggest that career and employment factors were a major element in Tenet and McLaughlin's relationship with WINPAC's faulty intelligence product.

This assertion is best explained by the fact that all 'classified employees' in the IC have no job tenure, collective bargaining rights, unions, or professional associations to protect them against unwarranted and unreasonable actions inflicted on them by superior personnel in their chain of command. In short, anyone superior in the chain of command of a 'classified employee' can mete out negative career consequences or outright termination, even on the flimsiest of

pretexts. Consequently, these IC employees have no other options but to depend upon the ethics, OCB, and forbearance of their superiors. Regarding this situation, Mark M. Lowenthal has asserted that analysts' managers and executives must protect their subordinates from the effects of top-down politicization. As previously stated in this study, employees in the IC serve at the pleasure of the president, and this situation has the potential to lead to the merging of policy and intelligence. Moreover, at its worst state, policy could inform intelligence as opposed to intelligence informing policy.³⁶⁹ Irrespective of the fact that McLaughlin and Tenet were long-term career civil servants, they were subject to the same organizational and employment-related pressures that affected their peers and subordinates. William D. Murray, a former senior officer in the CIA's DO summed up the situation by saying:

Government should take concrete steps to offer substantive protection to IC executives and employees against politicization pressures and career threats pointed towards them by elected officials, political appointees, and superiors in their chains of command.³⁷⁰

The anti-IC position like that of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and their associates existed well before the 9/11 attacks. One of the more notable examples of this position was that of President Richard M. Nixon; he so distrusted the IC that he instituted the Office of Net Assessment in the DoD to provide policy-compliant intelligence analytic products. This position expanded in the Washington, D. C. Beltway; another notable example was that of the 'Team B' exercise during the Gerald Ford administration. Notably, the Office of Net Assessment was a major, but not well-known contributor in the 'Team B' exercise.³⁷¹ In this committee, some future neoconservative notables had their first practical experiences with the distrust of the IC, analytic politicization, and other bureaucratic pathologies. Some of the players in this group were Dick Cheney, Andrew Marshall, Richard Perle, Richard Pipes, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. As these individuals' careers progressed, their distrust of the IC amplified; it became especially palpable in the W. J. Clinton administration and became public *via* them being

signatories to several documents authored by the PNAC and other NICNs. Moreover, Cheney and Rumsfeld's 'take no prisoners' style of bureaucratic politics grew during the formative years of the NICNs; these individuals and their acolytes became some of the most feared political in-fighters who operated in the Washington, D. C. Beltway.³⁷² W. Patrick Lang asserted that the political power and vindictive leadership styles of Cheney and Rumsfeld made the professional lives of governmental dissenters miserable; most of these workers reverted to sycophantic tactics because they feared the loss of their jobs.³⁷³

Before the 9/11 disasters, VP Dick Cheney's support of Richard Haver to replace George Tenet as the Director of the CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence at the inception of the G. W. Bush administration is an exemplar of the downward-facing political forces experienced by the senior executive cadre in the IC. Even though President G. W. Bush maintained his support for the continuance of George Tenet in his offices, VP Cheney's vigorous campaign to replace Tenet was quite easy to ascertain for all those in the NSC, the Cabinet, and the members of the Senior Executive Service who led the IC. Haver's position as an external inquisitor of the CIA after the Aldrich Ames affair was well known in not only the rank and file of the agency, but the senior executive cadres of the IC as well. Haver's reputation as the leader of this anti-CIA 'witch hunt' ran rampantly through the agency's rumor mill. Even though Tenet successfully maintained his position, he was well aware that he was treading on very thin political ice. Tenet knew that personnel such as VP Cheney, SECDEF Rumsfeld, and their political allies were looking for any available opportunity to remove him from office.

The Cheney-Haver-Tenet scenario is not the only exemplar of downward facing political and workplace pressure faced by the IC's senior executive cadre. The reader should understand that after the 9/11 attacks the IC was under a microscope; senior elected officials and political

appointees in the executive branch of government were champing at the bit to engage in disruptive and possibly vindictive rounds of IC reorganizations. The 9/11 disasters placed huge political and workplace pressures on George Tenet, James Pavitt, Cofer Black, Ben Bonk, Henry Crumpton, and approximately 50 other anonymized CIA officials. As previously stated in this study, shortly after the 9/11 disasters the CIA's Inspector General, John L. Helgerson initiated an investigation of the above mentioned individuals for misfeasance, malfeasance, and dereliction of duty in their alleged failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. These individuals were subjected to humiliating and invasive techniques such as repeated polygraph examinations, seizures of documents and field notes, questioning of colleagues, friends, family members, and exhaustive financial audits. All these procedures were initiated because these individuals were suspected of not being sufficiently aggressive in their prosecution of counterterrorist operations. Although officially ordered by Congress, the investigation was prompted and supported by VP Cheney with the view of removing senior Clinton administration holdovers from the CIA's leadership cadre.³⁷⁴ The underlying reasons for this investigation align well with the mindset underpinning the original 'Team B' exercise in the Gerald Ford administration and its descendant worldview that migrated into the Washington, D. C. halls of power with the election of G. W. Bush and Dick Cheney. This 'witch hunt' was simply another facet of the 'Team B' mindset, a grouping of concepts that stated the IC and especially the CIA were too soft in their approach to combatting America's foes, sloppy in operational tradecraft, and a blight on national security.

The situations of Colin Powell and Carl Ford differ in a few distinct areas from that of John McLaughlin, George Tenet, and other IC officers. Powell was a figure of immense public reputation. This factor gave Powell a large amount of political capital that allowed him to disagree in any form he chose with his Cabinet peers, VP Cheney, and President G. W. Bush. Up

to the time of his ill-fated speech in front of the United Nations Security Council, Powell was nearly unassailable in the eyes of the American public. This situation gave Powell the wherewithal to protect the INR against politicization. Powell's downward-facing pro-social OCB and the support of his subordinates enabled him to backstop Carl Ford's efforts to negate the politicization antics of John Bolton and Frederick Fleitz. Notably, during the prelude to OIF, Ford was already entitled to a full federal government pension, thus insulating him to some degree from the actions of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and their immediate retinue of political appointees.

Examples of Politicization

In the prelude to OIF, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle attempted to produce and disseminate pseudo-intelligence by way of the agencies its leaders directly controlled; these included the DIA, the armed services intelligence branches, the NESAs, and newly-minted groups such as the PCTEG and OSP. This iron triangle used its political powers to ensure that personnel in these organizations followed the dominant policy position that stated Iraq was an existential threat to the United States because of its ongoing WMD program and Saddam Hussein's connection to transnational terror groups. When certain individuals in these organizations refused to conform to this position, the leaders of this iron triangle and / or their politically appointed deputies transitioned these persons into positions of reduced authority in which they could not exert a negative impact on the iron triangle's policy preferences. In some cases, these individuals were forced into early retirement from the civil service. Justin Raimondo's commentary about this situation is chilling; in it he asserted that a senior member of the iron triangle named Harold Rhode stated "anyone who speaks contrary to the 'party line' pays with his or her career."³⁷⁵

In addition to inflicting downward-facing political pressure on the DoD's intelligence organizations, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle attempted to coerce various civilian intelligence bureaus into the production of analytic products that agreed with its policy preferences. Among the organizations finding themselves in that situation were the CIA, INR, and the DoE. All of these organizations attempted to resist the downward facing political pressures imposed on them by the iron triangle; these organizations did so with varying degrees of success. Notably, the INR was quite successful in its resistance to the pressures imposed on them by the iron triangle; this organization via the efforts of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford, and Thomas Fingar succeeded in producing highly accurate, dissenting opinions that found their way into the NIE of October 2002 and other analytic products. Even though the DoE's world-renowned subject matter experts on nuclear enrichment wrote dissenting evaluations on the issue of the aluminum tubes, that department's Acting Director for Intelligence Thomas Ryder overrode these opinions and supported the highly politicized analytic product emanating from WINPAC. It is interesting to note that the Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham was a staunch neoconservative and a long-term friend of VP Dick Cheney and SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld. Abraham was responsible for the appointment of Ryder to his post and at first, supported Ryder's overriding of his department's subject matter experts' analyses. Only when confronted with the powerful arguments of Colin Powell and Carl Ford did Spencer Abraham relent; he then allowed the analyses of his subject matter experts to be transmitted to the INR for inclusion in their overall suite of dissenting opinions that found their way into the NIE of October 2002.

The CIA presents an especially interesting case in its relationship with the politicization of intelligence in the prelude to OIF. As the CIA was nominally the central accumulator of all

intelligence during that period, it is deserving of special attention. Notable members of the CIA's DO such as Charles Allen, Jeffrey W. Castelli, Tyler Drumheller, Margaret H. Henoch, Robert Selden Lady, William D. Murray, and Joseph Wippl by use of HUMINT tradecraft techniques and the cooperation of allied intelligence agencies produced data streams that indicated Iraq had no active WMD program or battlefield deployable WMD in the prelude to OIF. Drumheller's group also collected data that refuted the notion that Saddam Hussein was a supporter of transnational terror groups. As the directors of separate departments in the DO, Drumheller and Allen, using separate assets and data feeds arrived at the same conclusions. Drumheller, by way of his DDO James Pavitt forwarded his conclusions to the Director of the CIA George Tenet and his Deputy Director John McLaughlin for consideration. Allen performed a similar function with no intervening officers separating him from Tenet and McLaughlin. These evaluations mysteriously disappeared into the top executive level of the CIA during the prelude to OIF. Notably, Drumheller, Henoch, Lady, Murray, Wippl, and other members of the DO took early retirement packages in 2005. No data exists in the academic literature, primary documents, or the media as to whether these retirements were voluntary or coerced; nor were any of the respondents participating in this study willing to comment on this issue. It is indeed baffling that all of these dissenting officials would choose to take early retirement in relatively close temporal proximity to one another. This situation is made even more perplexing when one considers that these officers took retirement packages well before the date of the maximum accrual of their pension benefits.

The CIA's DI was a hotspot in the production of politicized analytic products in the prelude to OIF. Without the approval of his supervisor Jamie Miscik, Alan Foley, the Director of WINPAC sidestepped agency rules, and according to one of his long time CIA coworkers

Melvin Goodman, actively politicized the intelligence analytic process in order to make products that agreed with the policy preferences of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. Miscik vociferously objected to the lack of defensibility and objectivity in the analytic products generated by WINPAC; she repeatedly exclaimed on the seventh floor of the CIA's headquarters that these products were not worth the paper upon which they were written. Miscik was also disturbed by the fact that Alan Foley was circumventing analytic document control / delivery rules by sending them *via* a 'back channel' to Robert Joseph in the NSC. This situation came to a head when Miscik directly exclaimed to George Tenet she would resign her deputy directorship and leave the CIA. Irrespective of Miscik's protests, the politicized intelligence kept flowing from WINPAC to the NSC; the inside circle of elites in the G. W. Bush administration used this material as a justification for war with Iraq. Similar to the dissenters in Tyler Drumheller's group, in 2005 Miscik chose to take an early retirement package from the CIA. Also like Drumheller's dissenters, she left her executive position in the agency well before the date when her pension benefits reached their maximum accrual levels. Another interesting fact about Miscik is that she remained outside of the IC until August 29, 2014, when she became Chair of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. Notably, this date was in the administration of President Barack Obama, during which time the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle was no longer in power. Miscik continues to serve in that position at the date of the writing of this dissertation.

The above scenarios could leave the reader asking how these problems in the IC could occur. The next few paragraphs will supply answers to this question based upon the detailed contextual evidence and theoretical constructs previously discussed in this dissertation.

Organizational Pathologies that Enabled Politicization

The events discussed in *Contextual Considerations* and summarized in the previous paragraphs indicate that the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle subjected the IC to downward facing pressure; it coerced the IC to modify its analytic products into alignment with that group's policy preferences. Bearing in mind the comments made about the employment situation inside the Washington, D. C. Beltway, it becomes apparent that two organizational pathologies enabled this situation to occur. The first pathology involves the notion of Anthony Downs' careerist 'climber,' an individual whose overarching focus is that of climbing the institutional hierarchy in which he or she is employed; simply put, career advancement with its attendant increases in monetary compensation and prestige are the primary goals of this type of individual. Using the 'carrot and stick' analogy, this scenario represents the carrot in which the 'climber' is rewarded by powerful superiors for his or her loyalty and (at least) the outward appearance of compliance to policy preferences. The second pathology is the other side of the 'carrot and stick' analogy; using the stick as a tool of enforcement, powerful politicians, executives, and managers in the government hierarchy *via* negative career consequences, compel their subordinates to comply with the superiors' policy preferences. Examples of the targets of this sort of coercive executive behavior were Larry Hanauer, Bruce Hardcastle, Marybeth McDevitt, Joseph McMillan, James Russell, and two senior analysts in WINPAC. The Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle did not restrict its coercive actions to the line employees of the IC; in fact, they levelled their sanctions against IC executives, perhaps *via* the effects of a poisoned work environment that forced them into early retirement from their government positions. Some examples of these people were Jeffrey Castelli, Tyler Drumheller, William D. Murray, Joseph Wippl, and notably Jami Miscik.

Analytic Politicization: A Larger Conspiracy?

A question remains that asks the following: was the analytic politicization efforts of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle indicative of a larger conspiracy? When the reader considers the evolution of various issue clusters / networks into a number of small NICNs and the coalescing of these groups into the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle along with the commentaries given by many participants in the data gathering phase of this dissertation, it becomes apparent that the notion of a widespread, generalized conspiracy to promote and prosecute the war with Iraq is untenable. The data collected from this work's respondents and the constructs discussed in *Theoretical Considerations* support the notion that the environment for 'classified employees' in the federal government makes them highly susceptible to the 'carrot and stick' scenarios mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Simply put, in the prelude to OIF 'classified employees' residing in most of the IC were forced to resort to sycophantic careerist tactics in order to maintain their employment, and in the case of Anthony Downs' careerist 'climbers' to help accelerate their career advancement plans. Those 'classified employees' of the IC who *openly dissented* with the policy preferences of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle, be they at the line level or senior management / executive strata, suffered career consequences that varied from outright dismissal to operating inside of an employment climate so poisoned that they were forced to take early retirement as a relief to its hostile working conditions. The important factor to realize when considering the situation is that the leaders of the iron triangle and their immediate subordinates wielded almost unrestrained power over the 'classified employee' cadres of the IC. This leads to an employment environment that is not only permissive of, but has the overarching propensity to practice the politicization of intelligence analytic products. These assertions align well with Michael Handel's commentary that stated analytic politicization is the norm within the IC.

The State Department's INR was an exception to the politicization commentary made by Michael Handel; notably this situation was not caused by any *de jure* protections offered to their 'classified employees.' On the contrary, the lack of politicization in the INR was reinforced by its long-standing culture of dissenting opinions, Socratic debate, and other collegial features it inherited from its foundations in the Library of Congress. Additionally, in the prelude to OIF the INR's analysts were fortunate to have an executive team that protected their analytic independence. This team, made up of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford, Jr., and Thomas Fingar resisted the politicization attempts of John R. Bolton and other acolytes of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. The protection of INR's analytic independence came from the downward facing OCB and professional ethics of Powell, Ford, and Fingar. Notably, Colin Powell's immense popularity gave him enough political power to resist the politicization attempts of the iron triangle and its acolytes. Had Powell been coerced to resign his position as Secretary of State during the prelude to OIF, this action would have caused significant political damage to the G. W. Bush's administration, and specifically the iron triangle. Based upon the data collected from interviews, academic commentaries, the media, and public statements from members of government the author of this dissertation agrees with Michael Handel's commentary that politicization is the norm in the IC. What makes the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF so remarkable is that analytic politicization was one of the significant factors that helped enable the passage of the authorization to use military force against Iraq.

Neocons: In Ideological Lockstep or Dancing the *Potomac Two Step*?

The data provided from interviews, academic commentaries, the media, and primary government documents indicated a strong correlation between the actions of certain members of

the neoconservative movement and the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. This leads to another interesting question as to the intellectual and policy-based homogeneity of the neoconservative elites in the G. W. Bush administration. Many, if not all of the people involved in the intelligence failure during the prelude to OIF were members of or associated with NICNs that promoted a more assertive and pugnacious American foreign policy coupled with increasing support for Israel and the Zionist movement. Among these NICNs were the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Heritage Foundation, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), the Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI), the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the Hudson Institute Center for Middle East Policy, and the Project for the New American Century (PNAC).

Many of these NICNs can trace their lineage to disenchanting members of the Democratic Party who found the 'New Left' movement of the 1960s to be misaligned with their *weltanschauung* and policy preferences. Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter spearheaded the academic side of the early NICNs while Senators Henry M. 'Scoop' Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan led their partisan political aspect. Notably, Jackson and Moynihan were right of center members of the Democratic Party; they shared paradoxical political views in that they supported increased defense spending and assertive / forceful strategic positioning with respect to America's enemies along with support for trade unions, minimum-wage laws, and other social policies not normally associated with conservative politicians. That being said, the Jackson-Moynihan camp in the Democratic Party was not in alignment with the major policy platforms of the Democratic National Committee and subsequently that faction had to look for financial and political support from other sources. The majority of the funding for the NICNs originated from

wealthy businesspersons who espoused support for the security of Israel and the Zionist movement. Some of the notable, ongoing supporters of these NICNs were Nina Rosenwald, the heiress to the Sears - Roebuck fortune, and Richard Mellon Scaife, the heir to the Mellon family's financial empire. In the decade before the start of OIF, it is estimated that Scaife contributed approximately three hundred forty million dollars to various NICNs and other conservative pressure groups. *Via* her Stonegate and Gatestone Institutes, Rosenwald made multi-million dollar contributions to the same NICNs that enjoyed Scaife's largess.³⁷⁶

The aforementioned NICNs responded to the demands of the wealthy ideologues who supplied their funding; they wrote positioning papers, published webpages, and generated media op-eds in alignment with their supporters' viewpoints. Former and present Washington, D. C. insiders such as John Kelly, W. Patrick Lang, and William S. Lind opined that the NICNs acted as 'consulting pens for hire;' these groups generated works of a pseudo-academic nature that were driven by motives to acquire more funding from an ever-increasing base of wealthy donors.³⁷⁷ Irrespective of the political ideology of the authors, the NICNs generated what their donors paid them to produce. Once the Bush / Cheney ticket emerged victorious in the 2000 election, the NICNs rapidly coalesced and morphed into an iron triangle. Spearheaded by VP Dick Cheney, the Bush transition team nominated various NICN-associated individuals for cabinet level posts and appointed other policy-compliant individuals to positions of lesser authority. The majority of these appointments were based upon the appointees' comments, writings, and assessments they produced earlier in their careers. Individuals such as Douglas Feith, William J. Luti, Abram Shulsky, Harold Rhode, Michael Maloof, Elliot Abrams, and others were members of this group.

Although the notion of ideological and policy homogeneity within the NICNs is an interesting concept to explore; commonsense rationality points to the fact that very few individuals within any group have identical *weltanschauungen*, policy preferences, or systems of ethics and morals. The important notion to consider when analyzing this concept is that the G. W. Bush transition team recruited individuals from the NICNs that in their estimation most closely aligned themselves with the policy preferences and other intellectual underpinnings of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. Once these individuals were in office, they had immense administrative power over their subordinates; as mentioned earlier in this dissertation, their subordinates served at the pleasure of their superiors and the President; they could be dismissed at any time, even on the flimsiest of pretexts. More importantly, this appointment dictum was not universally adopted; as explained in upcoming paragraphs, the Bush transition team appointed some individuals who did not have a fully neoconservative pedigree.

The policy-compliant political appointees who served under the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle used their political and administrative powers to enforce the obedience of their subordinates; as mentioned earlier in this dissertation, some individuals who produced dissenting analytic products were moved into less sensitive positions, dismissed from government service, or forced into early retirement. What the iron triangle required was at the least, the outward image of policy compliance from its subordinate appointees and line employees. This sort of compliance resulted in their continued employment and / or protection of their federal government retirement benefits. Enthusiastic compliance with the iron triangle's policy preferences in some cases resulted in the employee's promotion with attendant increases in salaries, benefits, status, and pension allocations. Some of the people who enjoyed these career enhancements were William B. Bruner, William J. Luti, John Trigilio, and some other members

of the NESAs, OSP, and PCTEG. The individuals who successfully cultivated the image of policy compliance along with their enthusiastically compliant peers danced the *Potomac Two Step*; they capitalized on the pathologies in the bureaucratic environment and survived to work another day. In short, the homogeneity of *weltanschauung*, policy preferences, and moral underpinnings was a moot point in the inner circle of the G. W. Bush administration; the effective use of the ‘carrot and stick method’ by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and its immediate political appointees produced the desired result – a matrix of pseudo-intelligence, talking points, and policies that supported the underlying preferences of that group with respect to the Iraq War.

Nonetheless, the G. W. Bush transition team did appoint or retain some personages to Cabinet level and other positions who did not comply with the policy preferences of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. Notable among these were Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford, Jr., and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Notably, Colin Powell was not a member of the NICNs previously mentioned in this work; he was a moderate Republican nominated to be Secretary of State because of his widespread popularity and his support constituency that resided outside of the neoconservative sphere. In short, the Bush transition team assessed the nomination of Powell would be a good political strategy; as Secretary of State, Powell could broaden the G. W. Bush administration’s popular support base. Carl Ford, Jr., was also a notable exception to the neoconservative / ideological lockstep assertion. Even though he espoused conservative political views and was a longtime friend of VP Cheney, Ford did not support the notion that ideology and presuppositions should take precedence over accurate intelligence analytic products. Not having maintained a membership in either the Democratic or the Republican parties, Ford is neutral in the partisan political sense. Ford’s professional history is interesting as he had a long-

standing career as an expert intelligence analyst. Irrespective of his nomination by President G. W. Bush and close friendship with VP Cheney, Ford and Powell formed a powerful nexus of resistance to the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle; they consistently voiced dissenting opinions concerning faulty intelligence analytic products in the prelude to OIF. One of the results of their dissenting opinions was that Secretary of State Colin Powell and his allies were sidelined from Iraq War planning sessions by the iron triangle. Perhaps President G. W. Bush assessed the dismissal of Colin Powell and Carl Ford, Jr., would inflict too much political damage to allow the iron triangle to move forward with that stratagem.

Condoleezza Rice was another political appointee who did not have a fully neoconservative pedigree; notably she became acquainted with the Bush family by serving as President G. H. W. Bush's Special Assistant and Advisor on American Foreign Policy. In that role, her academic expertise as a Sovietologist impressed the President, leading to an ongoing friendship with his family and notably, G. W. Bush. Interestingly, Rice was an early acolyte of Henry Kissinger's neo-Bismarckian theories that espoused a version of *realpolitik*-mediated tacit negotiation with Saddam Hussein as a viable policy alternative to war. Although Rice was an initial supporter of America's invasion with Iraq, she had a rocky relationship with VP Cheney and SECDEF Rumsfeld. As an infrequent dissenter in the G. W. Bush administration, Rice like Powell and Ford was sidelined from important decisions by the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. In *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*, Rice enumerated in detail her clashes with VP Cheney and SECDEF Rumsfeld; these battles occurred during the prelude to OIF until her stepping down from government. Her disagreements with the iron triangle ranged from the validity of the intelligence that contributed to the decision to initiate OIF, to military force levels in Iraq, and the handling of detainees in that conflict.³⁷⁸

An incoming administration's purging of previous political appointees and executive-level civil servants is a common practice in America's partisan political environment. This is exemplified by the fact that each new administration fields a transition team; the expressed purpose of this assemblage is to populate the Cabinet and the civil service's executive ranks with appointees who are amicable to the incoming administration and perhaps offer it some political benefits. In essence, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle used its political powers to suppress dissenting opinions whenever they could, but partisan political constraints did not permit them to do so in all instances. Succinctly explained, the iron triangle worked in a fashion that is typical of all incoming administrations; it acted in concert with the Bush transition team to ensure that dissent was excised from its political appointees and the top executive cadre within the federal government's civil service. The interesting fact about the Bush transition team is that it was populated by ideologues and political opportunists who originated from the NICNs that were tightly aligned with American interventionist policy in the Middle East. What is novel about this particular scenario is that members of the aforementioned NICNs morphed into a powerful iron triangle that was able to exercise political power to such an extent that it caused an intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. Perhaps the dissenting opinions presented by some members of the G. W. Bush administration caused the iron triangle to intensify its efforts to politicize the IC's analytic products. Based on the information summarized in this section, the researcher asserts that the notion of all members of the Bush administration's elite cadre being in ideological lockstep is groundless.

A Summary of Analytic Politicization in the Prelude to OIF

Irrespective of current intelligence analytic products that offered dissenting opinions, in the prelude to OIF the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle relied on the conventional

wisdom that Iraq had an ongoing WMD development program, battlefield deployable WMD, and connections to transnational terror groups. This conventional wisdom was reinforced by several sources; the first was that of data and information feeds collected before ODS, during that conflict, and during post-hostilities inspections by various United Nations organizations; the second was that of politically motivated, duplicitous data feeds produced by the INC and its leader Ahmad Chalabi; the third was a peculiar combination of self-reinforcing op-eds, documents, and public presentations by various NICNs that supported the notion of America going to war with Iraq; and the fourth source was that of data and information feeds supplied by policy-compliant government employees and bureaus. This iron triangle apparently chose to ignore all data and information feeds that produced analytic products containing assessments to the contrary. Succinctly stated, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and its followers were biased; they interpreted data feeds in ways that were consistent with their desires and beliefs. The iron triangle then used its *de jure* powers in the American bureaucracy to coerce the IC *via* subtle and overt methods into the production of intelligence analytic products in alignment with those biased views. This situation was an example of intelligence politicization *writ large*.

During the prelude to OIF, two major mechanisms enabled intelligence analytic politicization: (1) the power of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and its ability to use ‘carrot and stick’ tactics against government officials, and more specifically the IC, and (2) bureaucratic pathologies resident in the IC. In the first case, the iron triangle capitalized on the G. W. Bush transition team’s policy to populate the senior civilian appointee cadre with either sycophantic careerists or those persons who were true believers in the ideology propounded by the pro-war NICNs. This behavior was exemplified by the appointment or hiring of senior individuals such as Abram Shulsky, Douglas Feith, William J. Luti, and William B. Bruner into

positions from which they could produce politicized pseudo-intelligence based on stale, ‘cherry picked’ data and / or the duplicitous feeds supplied by Ahmad Chalabi and the INC. The second case revolved around the fact that certain IC executives permitted analytic politicization to occur. In these cases, IC executives refused to follow the analytic principles taught in the CIA’s Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis or at the National Defense University Intelligence Analysis School. Good examples of this case reside in the scenarios of Alan Foley and WINPAC, Thomas Ryder in the DoE, and SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld in the DoD. In these and other cases, analytic independence from decision makers’ policy preferences went by the wayside. The reader could ask the question of how these pathologies could happen; the answer resides in the fact that ‘classified employees’ in the IC serve at the pleasure of the President and the superiors in their chain of command. In such an environment ‘classified employees,’ be they executives, managers, or line workers are at the ever-present a risk of bullying by their superiors, political appointees, or elected officials. When they fail to comply with their superiors’ wishes, these workers could be subjected to negative career consequences that may result in job termination, impeded career progression, or coercion into early retirement. In this situation, most but not all of these employees meekly acceded to the politicization mandates that emanated from the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle. With these conditions in place, policy informed intelligence instead of intelligence informing policy.

When one examines the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF, it is advantageous to examine that failure from the perspective of the praxis of intelligence analysis. This particular praxis, which is the blending of the theoretical and practical aspects of analyzing information and turning it into high-quality intelligence analytic products, involves the practitioner’s recognition that all humans, irrespective of mental capacity and / or education levels, are subject to

emotional and intellectual biases. As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, Sherman Kent's social scientific / Socratic method and the structured analytic methods of Richards J. Heuer and Randolph Pherson are constructed to force their practitioner to examine, recognize, and compensate for intellectual and emotional biases. This is an important factor to consider because the leaders and senior members of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle were not professional intelligence practitioners trained in any of these analytic disciplines. For example, Paul Wolfowitz stated that policymakers' assumptions are much more important than using analytic methods. Moreover, one of his most senior employees, Abram Shulsky also made comments to this effect; he even amplified these comments by stating that intelligence analysis products must be extremely proximal to the policy preferences of elected executive decision-makers. Wolfowitz and Shulsky's positions are antithetical to the above-mentioned analytic methods and the syllabi used to train America's cadre of professional intelligence analysts. These syllabi have been developed over many decades by expert analysts; these individuals serve as professors of intelligence tradecraft in the Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis at the CIA and the DIA's School of Intelligence Analysis. Notable individuals who served in these positions were Sherman Kent, Jack Davis, Cynthia M. Grabo, Mark Lowenthal, Tom Fingar, and others mentioned in this dissertation. The fact that VP Cheney, SECDEF Rumsfeld, and DSECDEF Wolfowitz never had any formal training in the praxis of intelligence analysis left them exposed to emotional and intellectual biases when they examined incoming data streams. When a data stream examiner is afflicted by these biases and does not recognize them, and more importantly does nothing to compensate for them in their analyses, then inaccurate, indefensible, and inconsistent intelligence analytic products will often come to fruition. This situation is risk-laden when the data stream examiner is an executive decision maker who can exert significant

influence over the ultimate generation of national security policy. When executive decision makers who are ignorant in the praxis of intelligence analysis try to emulate Napoleon Bonaparte's practice of being a nation's apex intelligence analyst, gross policy failures are highly likely to occur. This dissertation asserts that the leaders and senior members of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle acted as if they were America's apex intelligence analysts; they were ignorant of the praxis of intelligence analysis, and unfortunately for the nation, bad policies resulted from their faulty analyses.

Based on the data in *Chapter II Contextual Considerations* it becomes apparent that Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz exhibited significant intellectual and emotional biases with respect to the Middle East, and more specifically, Iraq's WMD arsenal and its involvement with transnational terrorist groups. It is important to understand that all three of these individuals were privy to secret intelligence during their tenure in government before the W. J. Clinton administration. It is during this period that they formed the majority of their cognitive corpus with respect to Iraq and the Middle East. Based on Saddam Hussein's actions in the Iran-Iraq War, and his egregious treatment of rebellious Kurds in the north and dissident *Shi'ites* in the south, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz formed a very strong and enduring *weltanschauung* that stated Saddam Hussein and his government had the overarching desire to design, develop, stockpile, and ultimately use WMD. It is important to note that this *weltanschauung* was based on secret intelligence that was old, stale, and unsupported in the immediate prelude to OIF. Notably this *weltanschauung* was so solid that it became an enduring intellectual bias in the policy preferences of VP Cheney, SECDEF Rumsfeld, and DSECDEF Wolfowitz. This situation produced an environment that was fertile ground for the generation of inaccurate, faulted, and politicized intelligence products

This scenario becomes even more interesting when one considers VP Cheney led the G. W. Bush transition team; in that position he had the ear of the President with respect to the nomination of presumptive Cabinet members, other appointees who needed congressional approval, and senior members of the national security / advisory apparatus. This is not a novel process when a new administration takes over from a partisan political rival; however it is important when this process strives to attain a modicum of policy homogeneity and compliance in its cadre of presumptive appointees. When one examines the membership of the NICNs that existed before and during the prelude to OIF, it becomes apparent that VP Dick Cheney and the other members of the G. W. Bush transition team nominated their group of presumptive appointees from the membership ranks of these organizations. In short, the ideologues who originated from these NICNs enjoyed a preferential track for appointment to positions of significant political power in the G. W. Bush administration. This process led to the population of the Cabinet, the NSA, and other functional elements of the national security apparatus with ideologues / zealots who had a long history of espousing American economic, political, and military interference in the affairs of the nations in the Middle East. Moreover, many of these individuals made public ministrations via websites, media op-eds and interviews that stated they were highly committed to America's invasion of Iraq and the institution of an American-modelled 'empire of democracy' in that geographical region. Many of these individuals such as Michael Maloof, Abram Shulsky, David Wurmser, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz were members of this group. Not only did this group exert significant influence within the Washington, D. C. Beltway, it did enjoy extensive *de jure* powers over the groups and agencies its members led. SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, for example enjoyed command authority over the largest and best funded group of agencies in America's IC, namely the DIA, the armed services'

intelligence corps, the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO, to name a few. Paul Wolfowitz's influence and power over the DoD intelligence agencies was especially pronounced; as SECDEF Rumsfeld's deputy he had the delegated authority to directly interfere in the intelligence collection and analysis processes of the department he helped lead. When one notes Wolfowitz's antithetical position with respect to policy independent intelligence analysis it becomes evident that his position of power and authority represented a significant risk to the intelligence analytic process. Not only did Wolfowitz's *de jure* authority over the traditional intelligence agencies within the DoD exemplify this risk, his leadership over the NESAs, PCTEG, and OSP amplified this risk because of these organizations' importation of fraudulent data streams generated by Ahmad Chalabi and the INC. Under Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith's aegis, the NESAs, PCTEG, and OSP turned these fraudulent data streams into pseudo-intelligence analytic products that were used as talking points and lobbying tools in support of the iron triangle's efforts to initiate a war with Iraq. Additionally, these pseudo-intelligence products were used by VP Cheney and Scooter Libby to bludgeon the CIA's executive leadership cadre, and more notably the leadership of WINPAC into compliance with the policy preferences of the iron triangle. Notably, the iron triangle also attempted to bludgeon the INR and the DoE's intelligence branch, but with significantly less success than that which it experienced with WINPAC and the top executive levels of the CIA.

The above paragraphs assert that the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle was *not completely successful* in its efforts to attain policy compliance and ideological homogeneity in the NSC, the Cabinet, and the top levels of the IC. Significant dissenters existed, notable among these were Secretary of State Colin Powell, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford, Jr., certain members of the Department of State and the CIA, Major General

Glen Shaffer of the DoD, and most notably the DDI in the CIA, Jamie Miscik. Some of these individuals ascended to their positions because their appointment had the potential to garner the G. W. Bush administration partisan political advantage, while some others were career military officers, and others were long serving members of the IC and / or civil service. What is interesting about these individuals' careers is that they openly dissented with the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle; this dissension often caused a poisoned work environment in which some of these individuals suffered restricted career advancement horizons, harassment, and bullying that may have resulted in their job termination or early retirement.

Conclusions and Closing Remarks

In summary, the negative aspects of OCB, CCB, POP, careerism, and the destructive nature of unconstrained manager-employee relations in the American IC were significant factors contributing to the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF. These failures occurred because of the politicization efforts of the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and its cadre of policy-compliant political appointees and employees. These efforts exacted significant downward facing pressures upon the IC; sometimes these efforts successfully coerced analysts and their managers into the production of policy palatable intelligence analytic products. Therefore, intelligence failures occurred in the prelude to OIF; there loci resided in the senior executive cadres of the CIA, the DoD, and the DoE.

Perhaps the Director of National Intelligence should follow the notions that carried over from William J. Donovan's Division of Special Information that resided in the Library of Congress. Archibald MacLeish, then Librarian of Congress instituted and fostered a collegial environment of data collection, information production, and intelligence analysis that encouraged Socratic debate, divergent perspectives, and dissenting opinions. These notions informally

moved from the OSS when Harry Truman dissolved it and subsequently created the INR within the State Department. Nonetheless, these cultural notions were never formally encoded into the rules and regulations of the INR, depending instead upon the downward-facing pro-social OCB of the Secretary of State and the leaders of the INR. If the analytic independence legacy of Archibald MacLeish were to be formally encoded into the statutes governing the IC, then tragedies such as Operation Iraqi Freedom may well be avoided in the future.

Recommendations for Further Research

During the course of the research work supporting this study, it became apparent that several problems occurred within the IC during the prelude to OIF. Opportunities for further research exist in the area of the contrast, comparison, and analysis of the workplace environments of the CIA with that of the BND. In Germany, the BND and *Bundeswehr* enjoy a workplace environment in that all of their members are unionized, and enjoy collective bargaining rights, job tenure, and *de jure* protections from the egregious actions of overzealous politicians, managers, and executive staff members. This situation is extremely interesting in that the BND was the primary agency that reported 'Curveball' and his testimony to be of a suspect nature. In fact, it was the cooperation offered by the BND's staff in Pullach that helped Joseph Wippl's CIA personnel to complete successfully their examination of the 'Curveball' scenario. Survey work with BND agents could provide an interesting insight to whether their workplace environment helped enable them to make assessments that were not in alignment with the conventional wisdom about Iraq's WMD program. This survey could provide key understandings into the relationship between analytic independence and the quality of intelligence analytic products. If this research shows that the BND's workplace environment significantly enhanced that organization's ability to provide highly accurate and timely intelligence analyses, then this

exploration could provide significant foundational data to help the United States improve the analytic performance of its IC.

Notably in the CIA, politicization occurred at the executive level of that organization. Nonetheless, no records occur in the CIA's publicly accessible documents that *explicitly* show its DI Politicization Ombudsman found the *specific* problems relating to the faulty intelligence products emanating from WINPAC. In fact, Barry L. Stevenson, the CIA's Ombudsman for Politicization told the researcher that his office dealt with eight complaints of politicization in the prelude to OIF. He also mentioned that due to his lifelong nondisclosure agreement with the CIA, he could not discuss the details of these investigations.³⁷⁹ On July 10, 2003, Representatives Porter Goss and Jane Harman sent a request to Barry L. Stevenson that demanded information about the "number of politicization complaints his office received, the complainant's number of years of experience as an intelligence analyst, what they were primarily responsible for, and what the nature of the complaint was."³⁸⁰ Stevenson replied about these issues in document OCA 2003-1427, with all four pages redacted from public perusal.³⁸¹ However, the redaction only reveals that the CIA's censors would not release the details of the politicization complaints handled by Stevenson's office in the prelude to OIF.

When discussing institutional and cultural issues with personnel from the IC, it became apparent that there were significant problems with respect to leader-member relationships within that community. Specifically, members' rights of redress of grievance with respect to management abuses, position tenure, collective bargaining rights, and other significant issues have come to the forefront during the course of this research. When discussing some of these issues with the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, Thomas Fingar, it became apparent that the new leadership cadre within the ODNI is taking actions to remedy them. The

author intends to collect further information by way of Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests. Once the researcher has acquired these information suites, he will generate scholarly documents for publication in learned journals dealing with these issues, suggesting possible remedies. Perhaps scholars in the CIA's Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis and its Center for the Study of Intelligence may embark on an exhaustive examination of these problems from the perspectives of analytic tradecraft, institutional dynamics, and leader-member exchange theories. Ignoring these problems would be a disservice to the American people.

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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

1998 U. S. Embassy bombings — Occurred on August 7, 1998 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. Over 200 people lost their lives in these coordinated bombings. The IC attributed these bombings to Egyptian Islamic Jihad and *al-Qaeda*.

7075-T6 — Is a type of aluminum alloy with a specific mixture of subcomponents and heat treating that is ideally suited for use in rocket motor casings and Zippe centrifuges.

9/11 — Are the September 11, 2001 attacks lodged against the United States by the terrorist group *al-Qaeda*.

Abu Ghraib — Is a.k.a. the Baghdad Central Prison. This facility was Saddam Hussein's prison and torture site. Abu Ghraib is located approximately 30 km west of Baghdad.

Abu Nidal — Is a *nom de guerre* for Sabri Khalil al-Banna. Abu Nidal was a member of Yasser Arafat's *Fatah*, a Palestinian militant anti-Israel organization. He formed the spin-off organization called *Fatah- Revolutionary Council* that was much more violent than its parent organization.

Accountability Board (CIA) — Is a group of CIA officials convened by the Director of the CIA to assess the behavior of officials under investigation with a special focus on waste, fraud, abuse, corruption, and dereliction of duty. If the officials under investigation are found to be guilty of the above offences, the Accountability Board decides whether they should be subject to disciplinary action ranging from reprimand, termination, or referral to the Department of Justice for the pressing of criminal charges.

ACDA — Is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act established this agency as an independent United States government entity on September 26, 1961. The ACDA's mission was to strengthen national security by way of disarmament policy, strategies, and agreements. In 1997, the administration of President W. J. Clinton integrated the ACDA with the State Department. The ACDA then served under the leadership of the Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs.

AEI — Is the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. This organization is also known as the American Enterprise Institute. The AEI resides in Washington, D.C. and is a conservative issue cluster / network. This organization promoted the notions of social and economic conservatism along with an expansive, worldwide American hegemony.

Agaf HaModi'in — Is Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate, a.k.a. *Aman*. Sections of this organization assisted Scott Ritter in the analysis of data collected on Iraqi WMD.

AIPAC — The American Israel Public Affairs Committee is a registered lobbying group that represents pro-Israel positions to the Congress and executive branch of the United States government.

A.K.A. — Is the acronym for 'also known as'.

Alec Station — a.k.a. the bin-Laden Issue Station. This unit was a sub-organization of the CIA tasked with the tracking of Osama bin-Laden, *al-Qaeda*, their associates and sympathizers. Created in January 1996, the bin-Laden Issue Station was operational until 2005. This unit was a specialized hybrid organization that combined HUMINT, TECHINT, and analysis into an organization that provided 'one-stop shopping' for intelligence pertaining to its targets. David Cohen, the CIA's DDO recruited an analyst who had run the Counterterrorism Center's Islamic Extremist Branch to run this new unit. This senior analyst was Michael Scheuer, and the code name 'Alec Station' was derived from the first name of his son. Originally starting with only twelve professional staff members, such as CIA analysts Alfredo Frances Bikowsky and a former FBI agent Daniel Coleman, headcount levels reached approximately fifty employees by September 11, 2001. Some other notable members of this group were Michael A. Casey, Tom Wilshire, Doug Miller, Richard Blee, Mark Rossini, Charles Frahm, Margaret Gillespie, and Jennifer Lynne Matthews.

Amorim Report(s) — Was a series of reports generated by United Nations inspectors under the signature of Celso Amorim. These reports dealt with Iraqi disarmament, and the assessment of current and future monitoring and verification issues.

ARDA — Is the Advanced Research Development Activity, headed by Ted Senator. Notable individuals in the initiative are John Farrell, and Ricard Brackney of ARDA, Lisa Yanguas, and Paul Esposito of the NSA, John C. Davis of Mitretek, Robert H. Anderson of RAND, and Tom Haigh of Adventium Labs. ARDA's mandate was to stimulate the development of NIMD and global mass surveillance technologies. After its initial offerings, ARDA moved from public visibility into the covert areas of the NSA. During the prelude to OIF, the NSA closed the ARDA website. However, the reader can find historical versions of that website at <https://web.archive.org>. Once on that website, the reader should enter the following search term: ARDA. Another interesting search term for perusal is NIMD. These searches will point to archived websites that show the scientific and engineering underpinnings of the NSA's worldwide mass surveillance programs.

ASECDEF — Is the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

ASIS — Is the Australian Secret Intelligence Service.

AT&CC — Is the Atlantic Trading and Communications Corporation, a Jordanian business involved in the aluminum tubes imbroglio.

Axis of Evil — Is the terminology famously used by President G. W. Bush in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address. This phrase refers to governments he accused of helping terrorism and seeking or having access to WMD. At that time, President G. W. Bush's focus was on Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

Ba'ath Party — Is the Arab Socialist *Ba'ath* Party, which means Renaissance or Resurrection. This party originated in Syria, and split into two branches, one in its parent country and the other in Iraq. These branches of the *Ba'ath* Party eventually became inimical to one another. Saddam Hussein and his sons eventually controlled the *Ba'ath* Party of Iraq.

BATF — Is the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.

BCW — Are biological and chemical weapons, classes of WMD.

BIS — Is the Bezpečnostní Informační Služba, the primary intelligence agency of the Czech Republic.

BKSH — Is Black, Kelly, Scruggs, and Healy. BKSH was a Washington, D.C., based publicity and governmental lobbying firm. This business entity came into being *via* the merger of two Washington, D.C. firms, Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly and Good & Liebengood. This firm is a subsidiary of Burson-Marsteller.

Black site — Is the IC's euphemism for a clandestine detention and torture facility.

BMSK — Black, Manafort, Stone, and Kelly is a Washington D.C., based public regulations and governmental lobbying firm. This company was one of the major consultancies supporting Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign in 1980. It would also enjoy extensive connections to President G. H. W. Bush and President W. J. Clinton.

BND — Is the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*, the Federal Intelligence Agency of Germany. The BND is roughly equivalent in function to the Central Intelligence Agency, although unlike its American counterpart, the German constitution allows it to carry out operations within that state. This organization directly reports to the Chancellor of Germany. The BND can trace its origins to a German World War II Major General, Reinhard Gehlen. This individual headed the *Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost* of the German General Staff. After VE day, Gehlen and some of his former comrades began to work for the United States occupation government collecting information pertaining to Communist activities in Europe. In a facetious fashion, many American intelligence specialists called this group the Gehlen Organization or 'The G-Org.' Gehlen recruited individuals from his former organization along with notables from the SS, *Gestapo*, and *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD). The OSS and later the CIA supplied financial and logistical support for the Gehlen Organization. In April 1956, the Gehlen Organization ceased operations; most of its personnel and assets moved to a new bureau, the BND.

Bojinka Plot — Generated by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, this plot intended to assassinate Pope John Paul II and blow up eleven airplanes in transit from Asia to the United States. The planned execution date of this plot was January 1995.

Bundeswehr — Founded on November 12, 1955, the *Bundeswehr* is the unified Armed Forces of Germany. Notably the name *Bundeswehr* was the intellectual invention of a former Nazi *Wehrmacht* general officer, Hasso von Manteuffel.

Bundeswehrverband — Established in 1956, the *Bundeswehrverband* is the union representing the members of the *Bundeswehr* and the German IC. This union deals not only with relations between employees and with their superiors in the chain of command, but also with the relations between these employees and German parliamentarians.

Burn notice — Is an IC vernacular term for a warning notification that a source is suspect and therefore should be placed on a low credibility level.

Burson-Marsteller — Is a large American public relations firm with deep connections to G. H. W. Bush, G. W. Bush, the Vulcans, and the federal government. Notably, Ahmad Chalabi used this firm to enhance the public image of the INC and himself in the prelude to OIF.

BW — Are biological weapons, a class of WMD.

Calutrons — Are huge electromagnetic devices used for the refinement of fissile uranium isotopes from naturally occurring uranium. Ernest O. Lawrence invented the calutron while working at the Clinton Engineer Works in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Calutrons produced the U₂₃₅ isotope used in America's World War II atomic bomb that it dropped on Hiroshima.

Carrot and stick method — Is a colloquialism that originates from organizational theory. Used in the context of large organizations such as governments, this colloquialism indicates a reward and punishment scenario in which an entity in a position of superior power cajoles or coerces a subordinate entity into compliance with its orders. The carrot is the reward and the stick is the punishment.

CBW — Are chemical and biological weapons, a class of WMD.

CB — Please see CBW.

CCB — Is compulsory citizenship behavior.

Central Intelligence Group — Was the direct progenitor of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Group appeared on January 24, 1946, with Rear Admiral Sidney Souers as its first director.

Chicken Farm — Is a farm purportedly owned by Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel, the son-in-law of Saddam Hussein and head of Iraq's WMD program. Rolf Ekéus, then head of

UNSCOM discovered at the Chicken Farm approximately 150 boxes containing documents that outlined Saddam Hussein's biological warfare program.

Chinese Wall — Is a vernacular term that describes an information barrier between organizations or groups designed to prevent exchanges or communications that could generate conflicts of interest.

CIA — Is the Central Intelligence Agency.

CIA-IG — Is the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the prelude to OIF, John L. Helgeson held that post.

Citizens for a Free Kuwait — Was a publicity agency operated by the Kuwaiti government. The goal of this entity was to persuade the United States government to take military action against Iraq.

CLI — Was the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. Founded in 2002, this committee consisted of a group of noted scholars, media personalities, government members, and military personnel that advocated the deposition of Saddam Hussein *via* a United States invasion of Iraq.

CNN — Is the Cable News Network.

COGEMA — Is the *Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires*, a French conglomerate that originated from the French Atomic Energy Commission. COGEMA was active in all stages of the uranium fuel cycle. Notably, this corporation was responsible for operating the uranium yellowcake mines in Niger. In 2001, COGEMA merged with other industrial concerns to form the large energy corporation named Areva NC. This corporation primarily mines uranium reserves in Niger and Canada.

Cognitive dissonance — Is a theory put forward by Leon Festinger that describes how humans strive for internal and intellectual consistency. His theory states that an individual who experiences inconsistency (dissonance) becomes uncomfortable and is motivated to take actions to reduce this dissonance. When an individual has deeply held beliefs that are underpinned by a strong reinforcing *weltanschauung*, that person may take extraordinary steps to defend those beliefs when encountering information of a contradictory nature.

COI — Was the Coordinator of Information of the United States, William J. Donovan.

Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy — Was an issue cluster / network active in the late 1960s that lobbied Congress to continue and enhance its support for the new anti-ballistic missile system. Founded by Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, this group promoted the positions of Senator Henry M. Jackson, who was the leading supporter of the anti-ballistic missile system in Congress. Albert Wohlstetter recruited some of his leading graduate students to work in this institution; among them were Paul Wolfowitz and Peter Wilson. He also placed Richard Perle in this group.

Contras — Is an umbrella name given to the right-wing rebel groups that fought against the *Sandinista Junta* Reconstruction Government in Nicaragua. This group was active from 1979 to the early 1990s. The largest member the *Contras* was the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, which by 1987 absorbed all of the other right-wing resistance groups operating within that country. In 1985, via the Third Boland Amendment, Congress cut off all funding and aid to the *Contras*. Irrespective of this fact, certain elements of the Ronald Reagan administration continued providing clandestine funding and aid to the Nicaraguan *Contras*, resulting in the Iran-*Contra* scandal. Some of the notable players in the scandal were Duane Clarridge of the CIA and Colonel Oliver North.

Copper Green — Was a DoD operation that featured coercive interrogation of suspected terrorists. Formed under the direct approval of SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld during the United States invasion of Afghanistan, this operation was supervised by USECDEFI Stephen Cambone. Operation Copper Green was first outlined in Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer's book *Operation Dark Heart*.

CoS — Is a Chief of Station in the Central Intelligence Agency.

CPD — Is the Committee on the Present Danger. The self-stated mandate of this group was to educate Americans and their governmental leaders about the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union, its military buildup and belligerent attitude. This group was founded in the years following World War II with a view of countermanding the rapid drawdown of American military strength mandated by President Harry S. Truman and the Democrats in Congress. This group was started by Tracy S. Voorhees, William Marbury, and R. Ammi Cutter. This trio then recruited the President of Harvard University, James B. Conant to serve as group chairman. The CPD first made public its concerns in December 1950. This group rapidly recruited notables into its membership such as Vannevar Bush, the President of the Carnegie Institution; Robert Patterson, the former Secretary of War; and Robert Sherwood, Franklin Roosevelt's speechwriter. Notably, this group did not exclusively depend upon public funding as it had a confidential financial support contract with George C. Marshall, then Secretary of Defense. The CPD made many public statements that America should maintain its conventional military strength irrespective of its desire to enjoy a peace dividend after World War II, and not solely rely on a nuclear weapons-based deterrent to Soviet aggression. The CPD's mantra of 'peace through strength' is very similar to that espoused by the AEI, PNAC, and other neoconservative issue cluster / networks. The CPD dissolved and reconstituted itself several times during the Cold War; it rose again in July 2004. The CPD's most recent incarnation features prominent members from the AEI, PNAC, the Hudson Institute Center for Middle East Policy, and other NICNs.

Critical mass — Is the weight of a fissionable or fissile radionuclide required for a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction.

CRS — Is the Congressional Research Service.

CSIS — Is the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

DARPA — Is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

DASECDEF — Is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

D & D — Is the acronym for denial and deception.

DCI — Is the Director of Central Intelligence.

DDI — Is the Deputy Director of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency. During the prelude to OIF, Judith A. ‘Jami’ Miscik was the DDI. Miscik left the CIA in 2005 under duress from then CIA Director Porter Goss. She then entered private industry where she currently holds a position of President and Vice Chairman of the Board of Kissinger Associates, Inc. In December 2009, President Barack Obama appointed Miscik as a senior member of his Intelligence Advisory Board.

DDO — Is the Deputy Director of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. During the prelude to OIF, James L. Pavitt was the DDO. Pavitt resigned from his CIA post on June 4, 2004. Pavitt is now a senior advisor at the Scowcroft Group, a private policy-consulting firm led by General Brent Scowcroft.

DEA — Is the Drug Enforcement Administration.

DGSE — Is the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure*, the French external security agency. The DGSE is roughly equivalent in function to the Central Intelligence Agency. Alain Chouet of the DGSE helped ascertain the true situation of the Nigerien yellowcake imbroglio.

DIA — Is the Defense Intelligence Agency.

DIA-HS — Is the Defense Intelligence Agency Human Intelligence Service. Other than the Central Intelligence Agency, the DIA-HS is the only United States government agency permitted to do clandestine foreign espionage operations.

DI — Is the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence. It is an organization provides intelligence analysis services for the Central Intelligence Agency. The Directorate of Intelligence also produces President’s Daily Briefings, special briefings, and other analytic reports.

DIS — Is the Defense Investigative Service. This entity is the DoD’s centralized agency responsible for personnel background checks and the issuance of security clearances. Although mandated to be the DoD’s centralized security clearance investigatory group, various DOD entities such as the NSA, NRO, and the armed services and intelligence agencies maintain their own internal security clearance investigatory groups.

DITSUM — Is the Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary. This document is a compilation of information and analyses on terrorism threats and developments that could affect DoD personnel, facilities, and interests. Contents include brief terrorism notes, regional terrorism developments,

and in-depth special analyses. DITSUMs also include monthly terrorism reviews by combatant commands. These documents are produced Monday through Friday and are distributed to security-cleared federal government and military personnel by way of *JWICS* and *InteLink*.

Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah — Is the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate.

Djerf al Nadaf — Is a dilapidated agro-industrial area approximately ten miles southeast of Baghdad. ‘Curveball’ maintained that he had been working at that facility during a 1997 incident in which twelve technicians purportedly died of exposure to bio-weapons agents.

DNI — Is the Director of National Intelligence.

DoD — Is the Department of Defense.

DoE — Is the Department of Energy.

DoJ — Is the Department of Justice.

DoS — Is the Department of State.

DoTr — Is the Department of the Treasury.

DO — Is the Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Operations. The DO is an organization that provides clandestine intelligence collection services for the Central Intelligence Agency. The leader of the DO is the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO).

DPB — Is the Defense Policy Board, a.k.a. Defense Policy Advisory Committee. The DPB is a federal governmental advisory committee that supports the SECDEF. Richard Perle served as the chairman of the DPB during the prelude to OIF.

DSECDEF — Is the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

DSI — Is the Division of Special Information. William J. Donovan created this entity in the Library of Congress. The DSI provided unclassified, scholarly information to Donovan’s staff with the goal of generating high quality intelligence for the United States government.

DST — Is the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Science and Technology.

DUSECDEF — Is the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense.

Extraordinary rendition— Is a United States government euphemism for torture.

FBI — Is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI operates under the aegis of the United States Department of Justice.

Fedayeen Saddam — Was a permanent Iraqi popular force tasked with a number of state security functions and irregular war fighting responsibilities. Saddam Hussein formed the *Fedayeen Saddam* in October 1994 in response to the *Shi'ite* and Kurdish uprisings of March 1991. The *Fedayeen Saddam* was noted for its fanatical loyalty to Saddam Hussein.

Fission weapon — Is a type of nuclear armament that uses as its primary explosive the splitting of heavy atomic nuclei such as U^{235} or Plutonium.

Five Eyes Agreement — Refers to the U. K. — U.S.A. Intelligence Pact. In this agreement, the U.S.A., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand mutually share highly detailed intelligence products.

Gallup — Is an American research company that primarily performs public opinion polls. Founded by George Gallup in 1935, his family sold the company after his death in 1984 to Selection Research, Inc. This firm retained the name Gallup to maintain brand visibility with the American public and decision-makers. To this day, the surveys conducted by Selection Research Inc. are still named Gallup Polls.

Gaseous diffusion — Is a technique invented in Great Britain to produce fissionable and fissile U^{235} from the naturally occurring isotopic mix in uranium metal. This technique forces uranium hexafluoride gas (UF_6) through multiple stages of semi-permeable membranes to affect this isotopic separation. This technique transferred from the U. K. to the United States when the British Tube Alloys Project migrated to the American Manhattan Project.

Gas centrifuge — Is a technique used to produce fissionable and fissile U^{235} from the naturally occurring isotopic mix in uranium metal. This technique rotates uranium hexafluoride gas (UF_6) at high centrifugal forces to affect this isotopic separation. A variant of this technique is the Zippe centrifuge.

Gestapo — Is the *Geheime Staatspolizei*, or the Secret State Police. This organization was the official secret police of Nazi Germany and German-occupied areas.

GID — Is the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate or *Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah*.

GOP — Is the Grand Old Party, a colloquialism for the Republican Party of the United States.

G-Org — Is the Gehlen Organization (a.k.a. the 'Org'). The G-Org consisted of a group of former Nazi German intelligence specialists. After the close of World War II hostilities in Europe, Reinhard Gehlen founded the G-Org under the aegis of the OSS with the mandate of providing intelligence services targeting the Soviet Union and its occupied territories. Many members of the IC asserted that G-Org was rife with Communist sympathizers and moles. This opinion continued when G-Org morphed into the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*. This mindset caused a great deal of suspicion and lack of cooperation between American and German intelligence agencies.

GPS — Is the Global Positioning System. The GPS although widely used for commercial transport functions, was originally designed for target location, waypoint reference, direction finding, and friend / foe analysis functions used by the United States military. The United States military also uses GPS as a direction finding mechanism for precision aimed weapons.

al-Hakam — a.k.a. al-Hakum. Located approximately 70 km southwest of Baghdad, this facility was Iraq's most significant biological weapons (BW) research and development and production facility. Al-Hakam produced significant quantities of botulinum toxin and anthrax from 1989 — 1996.

Hawala — Is an informal monetary transfer system based upon personal honor and a large network of money brokers. The system primarily operates in the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian subcontinent. *Hawala* operates outside of traditional banking, financial channels, and remittance systems. For the most part, it is not regulated by governmental authorities and is seen by the United States and its allies as a major funding channel for the financing of terrorist activities.

HEU — Is highly enriched uranium, also known as fissile uranium. HEU contains the U^{235} isotope, that when present in sufficient purity and quantities (about eighty-five percent) can support a rapidly cascading chain reaction that results in a nuclear explosion. Low enriched uranium (LEU) contains the U^{235} isotope in lower proportions than HEU. LEU supports non-catastrophic chain reactions present in commercial nuclear reactors.

Hill & Knowlton — Is an international public relations corporation headquartered in New York City. Hill & Knowlton was founded in Cleveland, Ohio in 1927 by John W. Hill. This corporation received significant public criticism because it generated Kuwaiti propaganda that helped mold public opinion that led to America's 1991 decision to prosecute a war with Iraq.

HTS — Is the Army Human Terrain System. It operated under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and used professional practitioners from the social scientific disciplines to provide military commanders timely and accurate information and analyses concerning the local population in the zones their troops were deployed.

Hudson Institute — Is a conservative issue cluster / network founded in 1961 in Croton-on-Hudson, New York. Founded in 1961 by former RAND employees Herman Kahn and Max Singer along with a high-profile New York lawyer Oscar Ruebhausen, the Hudson Institute served as a platform for the dissemination of conservative strategic thought. The initial research projects promulgated by the Hudson Institute mainly centered on the writings of Herman Kahn that dealt with nuclear war. Notable intellectual contributors to the Hudson Institute were Henry Kissinger and Daniel Bell. William J. Luti and I. Lewis Libby occupy senior leadership positions with this institution.

HUMINT — Is an acronym for human intelligence.

IAEA — Is the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA is an international bureau that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear technology and works toward the prohibition of its use for

military purposes. It was established on July 27, 1957 in Vienna, Austria as an independent organization that works through the United Nations by way of its own international treaty, the IAEA Statute. Although nominally an independent organization, it reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

IASPS — Is the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. This entity is an issue cluster / network based in Israel with offices in Washington, D.C. IASPS has significant connections with the American neoconservative movement.

IBC — Please see Iraqi Broadcasting Company.

IC — Is the Intelligence Community of the United States.

Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Harbiyya wa al-Istidla — Is the Egyptian Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance Administration. This organization operated a ‘black site’ near Cairo in close cooperation with the IC. This site was a key location in the extraordinary rendition of illegal enemy combatants captured in the G. W. Bush administration's Global War on Terror.

INA — Is the Iraqi National Accord. This entity is an Iraqi political party founded in 1991 by Iyad Allawi and Salah Omar al-Ani. The INA was founded as an opposition group to the Saddam Hussein government. This entity enjoyed funding and support from Saudi Arabia, the U. K., and the United States. The INA is not simply a political entity as it instrumented irregular warfare attacks in Iraq between 1992 and 1995. The INA’s major political strategy was to organize a military *coup d’état* against Saddam Hussein and his sons. The attempted *coup d’état* was foiled by the Iraqi *Mukhabarat*, and approximately one hundred thirty INA members lost their lives at the hands of the Iraqi government.

INC — Is the Iraqi National Congress. This entity was founded after ODF to coordinate the command, control, and intelligence activities of various groups that were in opposition to the government of Saddam Hussein. John Rendon of the Rendon Group purportedly coined the term Iraqi National Congress. Led by the political entrepreneur Ahmad Chalabi, the INC exerted considerable influence in the halls of American power.

INCSF — Please see Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation.

INR — Is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, a subordinate entity within the State Department.

INS — Is the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

InteLink — Is a private intranet of hosts, servers, and workstations whose purpose is to deliver data, information, and intelligence to authorized IC users. *InteLink* is authorized to handle information up to and including the secret classification level.

Intelligence Advisory Board — Please see President’s Intelligence Advisory Board

Intellipedia — Is an intelligence sharing system championed by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, C. Thomas Fingar. Using a *Wikipedia*-style front-end, *Intellipedia* resides on three separate networks. The *JWICS* networks support *Intellipedia-TS* for top-secret /compartmented information / sensitive information, while *SIPRNet* supports *Intellipedia-S* for secret information, and *InteLink-U* supports *Intellipedia-U* for unclassified / for official use only information.

International Aluminum Supply Company — Is an Australian metal supply company involved in the aluminum tubes imbroglio.

International Committee for a Free Iraq — Formed in London in the spring of 1991, this entity came to public view by way of a presentation before the U. K. House of Commons on June 21, 1991. This group consisted of approximately fifty Iraqis and some non-Iraqi members. It operated as an international consultancy and not as a politico / military resistance group.

IOG — Is the Iraq Operations Group. An entity subsumed in the CIA's DO that was responsible for clandestine intelligence and paramilitary activities related to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government.

Iran-Contra Scandal — Was a scandal that erupted in the late 1980s when Congress ascertained that members of the government had violated laws prohibiting governmental support of the Nicaraguan *Contras*. Notably, several prominent members of the future G. W. Bush administration were implicated with culpability in this scandal.

Iraq Liberation Act — Was a law signed by President W. J. Clinton on October 31, 1998. The act stated that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the Iraqi government headed by Saddam Hussein. In October 2002, President G. W. Bush, VP Cheney, SECDEF Rumsfeld, and other elite members of the United States government cited this act as justification for the invasion of Iraq.

Iraq Liberation Act Committee — Was a political lobby group set up by Francis Brooke and Ahmad Chalabi of the INC in order to promote the congressional passage and presidential signing of the Iraq Liberation Act. This committee was legally controlled by Levantine Holdings, Inc., of the Cayman Islands. The Board of Directors of this group included Mahdi al-Bassam, Entifadh Qanbar, and Maha Yousif.

Iraq Trust — Was an entity instituted by Ahmad Chalabi after western governments had frozen approximately \$1.6 billion in Iraqi assets when that state invaded Kuwait. Chalabi hoped that the Iraqi Trust would be an institutional vehicle that would allow him and his followers to gain access to those funds. Chalabi's attorney friend, Chibli Mallat created the Iraqi Trust on March 16, 1994 in order to accomplish this goal.

Iraqi Broadcasting Company — Was a media broadcasting company founded by Ahmad Chalabi in January 1992 as a profit-making entity. Although it was a propaganda arm for the INC, the primary purpose of this company was to serve as a financial channel to redirect CIA funding to Ahmad Chalabi.

Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation — This entity was established in 1999 to provide an organization that could legally receive Department of State funding. From March 2000 to 2003, the Department of State funded several INCSF projects such as television and radio broadcasting.

Iraqi Opposition Branch — Was a subunit of the CIA's Iraqi Task Force created in late 1991 to organize and marshal the disparate groups that voiced opposition to Saddam Hussein and his government.

Iraqi Task Force — a.k.a. Iraq Task Force. The Iraqi Task Force was a CIA group in the DO mandated to deal with intelligence collection, espionage, and paramilitary activities related to Iraq.

IRTPA — Is the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This act resulted from America's massive intelligence failure in the prelude to the 9/11 attacks. In the aftermath of these attacks, the government elites' overarching perception of the IC was that it was disjointed, unable to share information across agency borders and subject to institutional infighting that resulted from strongly defended bureaucratic fiefdoms. Among other actions, the IRTPA instituted the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that had resource allocation and budget control capabilities over all of the agencies in the IC.

ISG — Is the Iraq Survey Group. This entity was a fact-finding mission commissioned by the Multinational Force after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The mandate of this group was to search for purported WMD in Iraq. The results of the search were summarized in a document called the *Duelfer Report* that found no significant stockpiles of WMD that could form a military threat.

ISI — Is the Directorate General for Inter-Services Intelligence, a.k.a. Inter-Services Intelligence. The ISI is the lead intelligence agency of the Government of Pakistan.

Istikhabarat — Full name *Mudiriyyat al-Istikhabarat al-'Askariyya al-'Amma*. This agency was Iraq's military intelligence service during the leadership of Saddam Hussein.

J-2 — Is a military acronym that stands for the Joint Intelligence Directorate of the DoD.

Jerusalem Post — Is a newspaper published in Jerusalem, Israel. Founded in 1932 as the *Palestine Post* the name changed in 1952 to the *Jerusalem Post*. This newspaper carries news, analyses, and opinions pertinent to Israel and its relations with its neighbors.

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs — This entity is a Washington, D.C. based pro-Israel issue cluster / network that focuses on issues pertinent to international security. Notably, it acts as an unregistered pro-Israel lobby group in Washington, D.C.

JSOC — Is the Joint Special Operations Command, an umbrella organization reporting to the SECDEF. JSOC is responsible for all special operations of the United States armed services.

JWICS — Is the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System, a private intranet of hosts, servers, and workstations whose purpose is to deliver data, information and intelligence to authorized IC users. *JWICS* handles the most sensitive of information up to and including a classification level of Top Secret / Sensitive / Compartmented Information.

Kam Kiu Aluminum Products Group — Is a Chinese metal producing conglomerate that is part owner in the International Aluminum Supply Company. These companies were involved in the aluminum tubes affair.

Khalden — Is a training base in Afghanistan used by *al-Qaeda* and the *Taliban*. Ibn al-Shayk al-Libi supervised the operations in this camp. American forces captured him late in 2001.

al-Khellany Square — Is a landmark in the commercial area of Baghdad, Iraq.

Khobar Towers — Is a housing facility located in al-Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, close to the King Abdul-Aziz Air Base. This facility housed Coalition forces assigned to Operation Southern Watch. This operation enforced the no-fly zones in southern Iraq. On June 25, 1996, a large truck bomb detonated next to building number one hundred thirty-one that housed members of the United States Air Force's 4404th Wing. The attack killed nineteen United States servicemen and wounded approximately five hundred other foreign nationals. The IC asserted that *Hezbollah al-Hejaz* organized and implemented the bomb attack. William Perry, who was the SECDEF at the time of the attack, asserted that *al-Qaeda* was responsible for this incident.

KWIC — Is Keyword in Context, a data / information search and correlation tool.

KWOC — Is Keyword out of Context, a data / information search and correlation tool.

Laser isotopic refinement — Is a method for the separation of isotopes by laser excitation. Drs. Michael Goldsworthy and Horst Struve invented this process in Australia; it was based on earlier methods of laser enrichment such as atomic vapor laser isotope separation and molecular laser isotope separation. Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar's nuclear weapons group in Iraq attempted to develop this method, but never succeeded in elevating it into production status.

Levantine Holdings — Was an anonymized holding corporation based in the Cayman Islands. Reputedly owned by Ahmad Chalabi, it was designed as a financial front entity in order to funnel CIA and Department of State monies into the hands of the INC and its directors. Chibli Mallat allegedly assisted Chalabi in the incorporation of this shell entity. Levantine Holdings held a mailing address at 2544 28th St. NW, Washington, D.C., 20008-2744.

LMX — Is an acronym for Leader Member Exchange.

LoC — Is the Library of Congress.

Luftwaffe — Is the German Air Force.

MAD — Is mutually assured destruction, a condition caused by the all-out exchange of nuclear weapons in a war between global superpowers such as the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy — a.k.a. Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy. Founded in the late 1960s by Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, this group lobbied Congress to support the anti-ballistic missile system. Albert Wohlstetter recruited a number of graduate students to work in this group such as two of his students at the University of Chicago, Paul Wolfowitz, and Peter Wilson. Wohlstetter also recruited to work in this group a graduate student from Princeton University, Richard Perle.

Manhattan Project — Was the United States World War II project that developed nuclear (fission) bombs.

MEMRI — Is the Middle East Media Research Institute. It is a purportedly not-for-profit and politically neutral press monitoring and analysis organization based in Washington, D. C. Many critics assert that this organization casts Arabs and Muslims in a negative perspective. This group was cofounded in 1998 by Yigal Carmon, a former Israeli military intelligence officer, and the Israeli born political scientist Meyrav Wurmser, the wife of the noted neoconservative David Wurmser. Notably, Carmon is a close friend of Douglas Feith.

MI-6 — Is Great Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, a.k.a. SIS. The mandate of MI-6 is roughly equivalent to that of the CIA.

MiG — IS the Mikoyan and Gurevich Design Bureau. Founded by Artem Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich, MiG originated in the Soviet Union. The bureau started producing military aircraft in 1940. It now operates under the name of the Russian Aircraft Corporation - MiG.

Military Industrialization Commission of Iraq — Was a division of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense primarily tasked with the procurement, test, and acceptance of various military systems. This commission had multiple branches and foreign companies; the United Nations implicated it in the procurement of prescribed materials and feedstock for WMD.

Mukhabarat — Full name *Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-Amma*. This bureau was Iraq's civilian intelligence agency.

Mustard gas — Otherwise known as sulfur mustard, this gas is a cytotoxic chemical warfare agent that forms blisters on exposed tissue and the lungs. This agent was originally developed in 1916 for use by the Imperial German Army in World War I. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 controls these agents. Iraq made heavy use of these weapons in the Iran-Iraq War and in the suppression of internal rebellions.

Nakhon Phanom — Is a Royal Thai Air Force Base in the northeast corner of Thailand adjacent to Laos. This base was used by American forces in the Vietnam conflict for special operations, radio listening posts, and heavy bomber sorties. This base served as a 'black site' for CIA detention and interrogation operations during President G. W. Bush's Global War on Terror.

Nasser 81 rocket — Was an Iraqi forty-eight tube multiple launch rocket system based upon the Italian Medusa 81 design. State Department INR ascertained that the aluminum tubes Iraq bought were intended for the construction of these rockets as opposed to Zippe centrifuges.

National Air Intelligence Center — Is located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio. This center handles the interpretation of data collected by the United States Air Force and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.

National Intelligence Authority — Is otherwise known as the NIA. This entity was made up of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and President Harry Truman's chief military advisor, William Leahy. The NIA monitored the Central Intelligence Group, which Harry Truman created in 1946 to replace the Office of Strategic Services.

National Intelligence Council — Please see NIC.

NESA — Is the Near East and South Asia desk in the DoD. In the Pentagon, NESA personnel worked adjacent to those serving in the PCTEG and OSP.

NFOIO — Is the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office located in Suitland, Maryland. A branch of the ONI, the NFOIO was established in 1957. Initially tasked with naval SIGINT, the NFOIO expanded its mandate to provide real-time actionable intelligence about the disposition of enemy forces during World War II. Further expanding its duties during the Cold War, the NFOIO provided customized operational intelligence to support the Navy, other governmental executive decision-makers, and authorized members of the IC.

NGA — Is the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

NGIC — Is the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center.

NIC — Is the National Intelligence Council. Founded by order of President Jimmy Carter, the National Intelligence Council is an organization charged with the production of National Intelligence Estimates and other specialized intelligence documents for Congress, the NSC, and the President. During the prelude to OIF, the NIC directly reported to the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet. The NIC's offices reside on the seventh floor of the old CIA headquarters building in Langley, Virginia.

NICN — Is a neoconservative issue cluster / network. The NICN of interest to this dissertation started with Albert Wohlstetter and some of his noted students and associates. This NICN morphed into a powerful iron triangle during the presidency of G. W. Bush. This iron triangle strenuously promoted the notion that Iraq was an existential threat to American security and that preventative war with that state was a necessary policy choice.

NIF — Is the National Islamic Front, an Islamist organization led by Hassan al-Turabi. This organization exerted significant influence over the Sudanese government from 1979 to the late 1990s. The NIF is anti-western and anti-American in its political predispositions and is seen by many in America's IC as a supporter of terrorism.

NIMD — Is Novel Intelligence from Massive Data, a.k.a. ‘data mining.’ Ted Senator, who worked at the NSA, spearheaded the ARDA initiative that formed the core of that agency’s worldwide mass surveillance program. NIMD was and still is the core data reduction / correlation operation within the PRISM / Traffic Thief / Trailblazer functions revealed in the Edward Snowden revelations about the NSA’s global surveillance infrastructure.

NIE — Is National Intelligence Estimate. These documents are authoritative intelligence assessments generated by the National Intelligence Council under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (now the Director of National Intelligence). These assessments are highly classified analytic products that are only made available to persons with appropriate security clearances.

NIO — Is a National Intelligence Officer, a member of the National Intelligence Council. NIOs are senior resources drawn from the IC, academia, and the private sector. They purportedly act as a chamber of sober second thought that deals with intelligence issues of extreme national importance.

NMJIC — Is the National Military Joint Intelligence Center.

NSA — Is the National Security Agency.

NSC — Is the National Security Council.

OCB — Is organizational citizenship behavior.

ODCI — Is the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

ODF — Is Operation Desert Fox.

ODNI — Is the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

ODS — Is Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 Gulf War.

OIC — Is the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.

OIF — Is Operation Iraqi Freedom. The invasion phase of OIF started on March 20, 2003 and concluded on May 1 of that year.

ONI — Is the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Operation Cabbage Patch — Was the codename for the UNSCOM 61 inspection mission in Iraq. This operation occurred in September -- October 1993. The goal of this mission was to find hidden Iraqi ballistic missiles. Cabbage Patch used helicopter mounted, ground penetrating and synthetic aperture radar sets to detect these missiles. Scott Ritter designed this mission and

christened it after a soubriquet used for a Soviet site where KGB and GRU officers trained Iraqis to hide ballistic missiles.

OPOTUS — Is the Office of the President of the United States.

OSECDEF — Is the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSIRAK — In the 1970s Iraq successfully negotiated with France to purchase and build a light water nuclear reactor at the al-Tuwaita Nuclear Center near Baghdad. The French supplied approximately twenty-eight pounds of ninety-three percent U²³⁵ for use in this reactor that was named *OSIRAK*. Operating under the Codename Operation Opera, on June 7, 1981 the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed the *OSIRAK* reactor complex.

OSI — Is open source intelligence. OSI is collected from publicly available sources such as the media, public statements by government officials, academic commentators, peer reviewed journals and the like. It is the opposite of secret / covert intelligence.

OSP — Is the Office of Special Plans. This bureau operated in the DoD from September 2002 to June 2003. Created by Paul Wolfowitz and led by Douglas Feith, the OSP's mandate was to provide unvetted information to the Vulcans pertaining to Iraq. This information appeared as public talking points in speeches made by various G. W. Bush administration elites.

OSS — Was the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS was America's first formal, centralized intelligence bureau. It operated during World War II.

OVP — Is the Office of the Vice President of the United States.

Patriot Act — Is a.k.a. U.S.A. Patriot Act or "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001." President G. W. Bush signed the U.S.A. Patriot Act into law on October 26, 2001. This act resulted from the perspective that the lack of information sharing within the IC helped enable the 9/11 attacks. The Patriot Act allowed law enforcement and intelligence agencies warrantless access to financial records, telephone conversations, emails, and other information sources.

PCTEG — Was the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. Created by Douglas J. Feith days after the 9/11 attack, this group disbanded in February 2004. Operating out of the third floor the Pentagon, Michael Maloof, David Wurmser, and a few others operated under the supervision of Stephen A. Cambone. This group fell under examination by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence based upon allegations that this bureau exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq in order to justify OIF.

PDB — Is the President's Daily Briefing, otherwise known as the President's Daily Brief. This is a top-secret document produced by the Director of Central Intelligence (now Director of National Intelligence). This document is given daily to the President at 07:45 hours. This document covers top priority intelligence that is garnered from the member agencies of the IC.

Petra Bank — Was founded in 1977 by Ahmad Chalabi, the future leader of the INC. Petra Bank had partners that included wealthy families from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Two years after its founding Petra Bank was the second largest bank in Jordan. The bank attributed its success to its nimbleness in executing foreign exchange transactions. Petra Bank lent approximately \$30 million U. S. funds to Prince Hassan of Jordan. Chalabi became close friends with the prince, thus allowing him to open bank branches in surprising locations such as the Israeli-occupied West Bank and even Iraq. In the late 1980s, Jordan's Central Bank Governor, Mohammed Saeed Nabulsi ordered all of Jordan's banks to deposit approximately thirty percent of the foreign exchange holdings with the central bank of that kingdom. Petra Bank could not comply with this order. Two weeks later, Petra Bank was under investigation by Jordanian authorities, and shortly thereafter Chalabi fled the country. The investigation headed by Nabulsi exposed massive fraud within Petra Bank.

PFAB — Is the President's Foreign Advisory Board otherwise known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

PFIAB — Is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Created on September 13, 1993 by Presidential Executive Order number 12863, the PFIAB assesses the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis, and estimates and of counterintelligence another intelligence activities. Reporting directly to the President, the PFIAB advises him concerning the objectives, conduct, management, and coordination of the various activities of the agencies of the IC.

PNAC — Was the Project for the New American Century. Established in 1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, the PNAC is a Washington, D.C. based issue cluster / network that focused on United States foreign policy. The New Citizenship Project (NCP) was instrumental in the founding of the PNAC. The NCP was a close affiliate of the Project for the Republican Future, a conservative Republican can issue cluster / network founded by Bill Kristol. The NCP and the PNAC were headquartered at 1150 17th Street Northwest Washington, D.C. that was also the headquarters of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). The publicly stated goal of the PNAC was to promote American global leadership, and the Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity. Twenty-five people signed the PNAC's founding *Statement of Principles*, among them were soon to be elites within the G. W. Bush administration, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.

Potomac Two Step — Is a colloquial term that refers to a federal government appointee or employee avoiding association with issues that may cause damage to his / her reputation or career progress. It is often used to denote the practice of cynical careerism. This term became part of the popular culture inside the Washington, D.C. Beltway. Interestingly, this term did not originate in that location; it was penned by Tom Clancy in his motion picture *Clear and Present Danger*.

POTUS — Is the President of the United States.

PMO — Is the Paramilitary Operations Directorate of United States Central Intelligence Agency.

POP — Is the perception of organizational politics.

President's Intelligence Advisory Board — a.k.a. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). President Dwight D. Eisenhower initiated this body in January 1956, naming it the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). John F. Kennedy renamed this entity the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This entity serves at the pleasure of the President who can change its mandate and staffing at any time. Among other duties, this board examines violations of the laws and directives governing clandestine intelligence activities. Under G. W. Bush the board members were Brent Scowcroft, Chairman; Pete Wilson; Cresencio S. Arcos; Jim Barksdale; Robert Addison Day; Stephen Friedman; Alfred Lerner; Ray Lee Hunt; Rita Hauser; David E. Jeremiah; Arnold Cantor; James C. Langdon, Jr.; Elisabeth Pate-Cornell; John Harrison Streicker; and Philip Zelikow.

PSM — Is public-sector motivation.

PUK — Is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, a political organization founded on May 22, 1975 by Jalal Talabani and a small group of Kurdish activists. Resisting Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi *Ba'ath* Party, the PUK advocated the self-determination of the Kurdish people in Kurdistan and Iraq.

Radar, ground penetrating — A geophysical tool that uses radar to image subsurface features. It uses electromagnetic radiation in the microwave band and detects the reflected signals from subsurface structures. In the hands of a trained operator and analyst, ground-penetrating radar can detect subsurface objects, changes in material properties, voids, and hidden items such as fighter airplanes, military weapons, and WMD production facilities. This technology was extensively used by the United States and its coalition partners in ODS, OIF and the intervening years.

R&D — Research and development.

RAND Corporation — Emanating from his experiences in World War II, the commander of the Army Air Force, General H. H. Arnold asserted that the nation needed a group to perform forward-looking research on science and technology. In May 1946, the federal government initiated Project RAND (Research and Development) under the control of the Douglas Aircraft Company. In February 1948, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the conversion of RAND from a subsidiary of the Douglas Aircraft Company into an independent, nonprofit research establishment. To this day, RAND provides research functions essential to the security interests of the United States and its allies.

Rezident — Is a Russian term for a senior spy operating from an embassy or consulate in a foreign state. A *rezident* is roughly equivalent to a CIA chief of station.

Rezidentura — Is a Russian term for an espionage agency based in a consulate or embassy.

RFE — Radio Free Europe is a government-funded broadcasting system that provides news, information, analysis, and propaganda to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the

Middle East. It broadcasts on both the FM and shortwave bands, and targets countries where the free flow of information is either banned by government authorities or not fully developed. It was originally headquartered in the Munich Germany, from 1949 to 1995. In 1995, RFE headquarters moved to Prague, in the Czech Republic.

Rumsfeld Commission(s) — Was the *Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*. Authorized by Congress as an independent commission, this group started work in January 1998 and issued a final report on July 15 of that year. The report noted that there was a growing ballistic missile threat to the United States, and highlighted the inability and ineptitude of the IC to keep American decision-makers informed on these critical issues. Donald Rumsfeld headed another group, the *Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization* that produced a report on January 11, 2001 citing weaknesses in American space defenses and intelligence capabilities to support them.

RW — Are radiological weapons, a type of WMD.

Salman Pak — Is a city in Iraq approximately 20 km south-southeast of Baghdad. In this city resides the Salman Pak Facility, a military installation that was the primary center for Saddam Hussein's biological and chemical warfare research, development, and deployment programs. This facility also housed sites run by the *Mukhabarat* and *Istikhabarat* for the purpose of training personnel in the arts and sciences of irregular warfare and special operations.

Scientism — Is a *weltanschauung* propounded by individuals such as Francis Crick, Richard Dawkins, Stephen Hawking, Carl Sagan, and Edward O. Wilson that states there is no area of the human condition to which science cannot be successfully applied. This mindset in essence focuses on the scientific method being the arbiter of solutions for all problems encountered in the realm of human existence.

SCS — The Special Collection Service is a joint NSA-CIA organization that specializes in surveillance and reconnaissance efforts targeted against foreign communication infrastructures.

SCUD — Is a series of tactical ballistic missiles developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The SCUD was based on the design of the Nazi German V-2 ballistic missile. Iraq used domestically manufactured variants of these missiles during their Iran-Iraq war and Operation Desert Storm.

SDI — Was President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, a.k.a. 'Star Wars'. President Reagan publicly announced the existence of SDI on March 23, 1983. SDI focused on the interception and destruction of enemy ballistic missiles, thereby freeing the United States from the constraints imposed on it by the strategic concept of mutually assured destruction.

SECDEF — Is the Secretary of Defense.

Shi'ite — Is an adherent to the *Shi'a* sect of Islam.

SIGINT — Is the acronym for signals intelligence.

SISMI — Is the *Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare*, the Military Intelligence and Security Service of Italy.

SIS — Is Great Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, a.k.a. MI-6.

Snowball Effect — Is defined as a procedure or scenario that starts from an initial state of limited importance and grows upon itself, becoming larger and more important over the course of time. In this research project, a limited number of respondents grew to an amount that was unanticipated at the beginning of this investigation.

Socratic debate — Is a form of cooperative argumentative dialog between individuals that is based on the asking and answering of questions in order to stimulate critical thinking for the purpose of exposing ideas and underlying preconceived notions. As a dialectical method, Socratic debate involves discussion in which a perspective is defended and questioned. This method performs hypothesis elimination; it eliminates defective hypotheses and generates improved counterparts by identifying and eliminating the hypotheses that lead to contradictions.

SOP — Is an acronym for standard operating procedure.

Special Republican Guard — Was a military division created in the Iraqi military in 1992. Controlled by elite members of the Iraqi *Mukhabarat*, the Special Republican Guard was mandated with protecting President Saddam Hussein, his immediate family, presidential sites, the city of Baghdad, and quelling any threat to his power. The Special Republican Guard was more lavishly equipped and better paid than the Republican Guard or the mainstream units of the Iraqi Army. Drawn from tribal units with proven loyalty to Saddam Hussein, the Special Republican Guard was noted for its fanatic loyalty and extremely harsh treatment of its victims.

Star Wars — Please see SDI.

TDY — Is a military acronym for temporary duty assignment.

'Team B' — Was a competitive intelligence analysis exercise mandated by President Gerald Ford and overseen by the Director of Central Intelligence G. H. W. Bush. 'Team B' resulted from a 1974 publication produced by Albert Wohlstetter that accused the CIA of being too soft on the Soviet Union and chronically underestimating their military and intelligence capabilities. 'Team B' parroted Wohlstetter's assessment. This report was made public by way of a press leak shortly before Jimmy Carter's 1976 election to the presidency. Notable future neoconservatives such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld were peripherally involved with the 'Team B' exercise.

TECHINT — Is technological intelligence.

Thermonuclear (fusion) weapon — This weapon uses energy from a primary fission weapon to heat and compress tritium (a radioactive isotope of hydrogen) into such a state that it fuses and becomes helium. These weapons were invented by Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam assisted

by the computational and mathematical expertise of John von Neumann. These weapons are significantly more powerful than fission weapons.

TRADOC — Is the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

TRG-U.K. — Is a subsidiary of the Rendon Group operating in the United Kingdom.

TS/SCI — Is an acronym that stands for top-secret, sensitive, compartmented intelligence. Top-secret intelligence is that which unauthorized disclosure could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States. Sensitive, compartmented intelligence is a level above top-secret, in which only authorized owners of a compartmented parcel of intelligence may access it.

Tuwaitha Complex — Was the main Iraqi nuclear research and production center. Located outside of Baghdad, this center housed facilities for the refinement of uranium yellowcake ore, isotopic separation, nuclear research, and nuclear weapons development.

U-2 — Is an American high altitude single seat, single engine reconnaissance aircraft manufactured by Lockheed-Martin. This aircraft operated extensively in surveillance and reconnaissance missions targeted against the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and Middle Eastern states.

U²³⁵ isotope — Is the fissionable and fissile isotope of uranium.

U²³⁸ isotope — Is the isotope of uranium that does not participate in fission processes.

UAV — Is an unmanned aerial vehicle; in common parlance, a drone. UAVs may operate either under remote control, or with a certain degree of autonomy.

UCMJ — Is the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. Signed into law by President Harry S. Truman on May 31, 1951, the UCMJ applies uniform rules of justice to all branches of the United States' armed services.

Ukhaider ammunition storage compound — Was an ammunition dump located near the Fortress of al-Ukhaider, approximately 50 km south of Karbala, Iraq.

Ultracentrifugation — Is a technique used to separate compounds, elements, and other entities based upon the application of high degrees of centrifugal force. In the case of nuclear physics, ultracentrifugation and its enhanced variants such as Zippe centrifugation are used to separate the isotopes of radionuclides.

United Nations Resolution 1441 — Is a resolution unanimously passed by the United Nations Security Council on November 8, 2002. This resolution offered the Iraqi government and Saddam Hussein a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations that had been set out in previous United Nations resolutions such as 660, 661, 678, 686, 687, 688, 707, 715, 986, and 1284. This resolution stated that Iraq was in material breach of the cease-fire terms in

Resolution 687, as it had attempted to construct prohibited armaments, missiles, and refused to compensate Kuwait for the damaged it suffered during Iraq's invasion.

U. N. — Is the United Nations.

UNMOVIC — Was the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission. Created via the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999, UNMOVIC lasted until June 2007. UNMOVIC replaced the former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) with the goal of disarming Iraq of its WMD and to operate an ongoing system of monitoring and verification to ensure Iraqi compliance with its United Nations obligations not to acquire weapons deemed prohibited by the Security Council.

UNSCOM — Was the United Nations Special Commission. Created with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 in April 1991, UNSCOM oversaw Iraq's compliance with the destruction of its WMD and missile systems. From 1991 – 1997 its director was Rolf Ekeus, and from 1997 – 1999 its director was Richard Butler. In December 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1284, replacing UNSCOM with UNMOVIC.

Uraninite — Is Uranium dioxide (UO₂), the primary mineral source for metallic uranium. Yellowcake is the high-grade version of uraninite that is used in the production of fissionable (low enriched) and fissile (high enriched, weapons grade) uranium. Other secondary sources for uranium such as tobernite contain uranium bound to other metals and a number of phosphate groups

Uranium hexafluoride — Is a fluorine salt of uranium metal that is used in the enrichment process to generate U²³⁵ for nuclear power generation and nuclear weapons.

USECDEF — Is the Undersecretary of Defense.

USECDEFPP — Is the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

USECDEFI — Is the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence

USA Today — Is a nationally distributed tabloid newspaper targeted at American readers.

U.S.S.R. — Was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a.k.a the Soviet Union.

U. S. S. Cole incident — On October 12, 2000 a suicide speedboat laden with explosives detonated adjacent to the *U. S. S. Cole*, a United States guided missile destroyer moored in the harbor of Aden, in Yemen. The explosion killed seventeen and injured thirty-nine American sailors. The IC attributed this attack to *al-Qaeda*. In 2007, a federal judge found the attack to be the responsibility of the Sudanese government.

Vilnius Ten — Was a group of countries consisting of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia that penned a February 6, 2003 letter supporting the upcoming United States invasion of Iraq.

VP — Is The Vice President of the United States.

Vulcans — Condoleezza Rice coined the appellation Vulcans to stand for the group of neoconservative elites who supported a hardened stance towards the United States' enemies. This nickname was derived from a huge statue of the Roman demigod of Vulcan that stood in Condoleezza Rice's hometown, Birmingham, Alabama. Most members of the G. W. Bush administration's NSC were participants in this group. Some of the more notable members of the Vulcans were Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Stephen Hadley, Richard Perle, Dov S. Zakheim, Robert Zoellick, Paul Wolfowitz, and Lewis 'Scooter' Libby. In this work, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle was a powerful subgroup of the Vulcans that set the policy direction for that group.

VX — Is the Nerve agent (O-ethyl S-[2-(diisopropylamino)ethyl] methylphosphonothioate). VX is a highly toxic chemical with no known uses except chemical warfare. It is the most potent unitary nerve agent ever manufactured. Its LD₅₀ (a dose in which fifty percent of the test population dies) is approximately eight mg. United Nations Resolution 687 classifies VX as a weapon of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 prohibits the production and stockpiling of that agent in amounts exceeding one hundred grams per year.

Washington Institute for Near East Policy — Otherwise known as WINEP. This entity was founded in 1985 with the help of Martin Indyk, an Australian-trained academic and former Deputy Director of Research for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Indyk positioned WINEP as friendly to Israel but doing intellectually fair, balanced, and credible research on the Middle East. This entity helped inform the policy directions of the G. H. W. Bush administration with respect to the Arab – Israeli peace process. Indyk served in a variety of U. S. diplomatic postings, such as Ambassador to Israel, Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian relations, and Senior Director of Near East / South Asia affairs in the NSC.

Wehrmacht — Was the Nazi German Defense Forces, roughly equivalent in structure and mandate to the DoD.

WHIG — Was the White House Iraq Group, otherwise known as the White House Information Group. This entity was a subgroup of the White House mandated to inform the public about the purpose of OIF. Set up in August 2002 by White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and led by Karl Rove, the mandate of this entity was to coordinate all of the executive branch elements in the prelude to OIF. Members of WHIG included Karl Rove, Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin, Andrew Card, Dan Bartlett, James R. Wilkinson, Nicholas E. Calio, Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, I. Lewis 'Scooter' Libby, Michael Gerson, Ari Fleischer, and selected members of the Rendon Group. Most commentators view WHIG to be nothing more than a propaganda coordination committee.

WINEP — Please see Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

WINPAC — Was the Central Intelligence Agency's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center. WINPAC is a subordinate organization subsumed in the Central

Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence. Alan Foley was the Director of WINPAC during the prelude to OIF.

Wikipedia — Is a freely accessible Internet encyclopedia that allows its users to post and edit almost any article. The *Wikipedia* user interface served as a model for Thomas Fingar's *Intellipedia*.

WMD — Are weapons of mass destruction. This group includes nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.

Yellowcake — Please see Uraninite.

Zippe Centrifuge — This machine is a variant of the uranium enrichment technique based upon ultracentrifugation of uranium hexafluoride gas. In the west, this technique is named after one of its developers, Gernot Zippe. Dr. Zippe served in the Nazi German *Wehrmacht* during World War II. After the close of hostilities in World War II, Soviet forces captured Zippe and transported him to a nuclear weapons research facility in the U.S.S.R. It is during Soviet captivity that Zippe along with other German and Austrian scientists and engineers invented their groundbreaking method for the production of HEU. In 1956, the Soviet Union allowed Zippe to return to the west. Based upon his memory, Zippe managed to re-create this ultracentrifugation technology at the University of Virginia.

APPENDIX B
KEY PERSONNEL

This appendix will present short biographies of selected individuals of relevance to the intelligence failure in the prelude to OIF.

Aboul-Enein, Youssef — Was a Navy Lieutenant Commander who served as the Special Assistant to William J. Luti. Aboul-Enein translated incoming Arabic documents and recordings forwarded to the PCTEG and OSP from Ahmad Chalabi and other INC sources. Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski asserted that Aboul-Enein also perused Arab language media to find articles that would incriminate Saddam Hussein as being involved in terrorism and WMD plots. Once translated, talking points from these articles would find their way into speeches presented by Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz. According to Kwiatkowski, these data sets were never subjected to the standardized suites of analytic techniques normally used in the DoD. Notably, both Aboul-Enein and William J. Luti had previously served as military aides in the offices of Congressman Newt Gingrich.

Abraham, E. Spencer — Served as the tenth United States Secretary of Energy under the administration of President G. W. Bush. He served in that position from 2001 – 2005. In 2006, Abraham became Non-Executive Chairman of the Board of Areva, Inc., the American subsidiary of the French nuclear conglomerate Areva. Notably, Areva is the new name for COGEMA, the firm that operated the uranium ore mines at the center of the Nigerien yellowcake imbroglio. Moreover, as Secretary of Energy, Spencer was involved in the aluminum tubes situation. Spencer was a member of the Federalist Society, a critical credential for anyone hoping to receive cabinet appointment support from Dick Cheney. Abraham was a key Cheney ally in the production of the National Energy Plan.

Abramowitz, Morton — Served in the Department of Labor as a labor economist from 1957 to 1958. In 1959, he joined the State Department as a program analyst. He rose through the ranks in the State Department and served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research from 1985-1989. Abramowitz also served in various ambassadorial positions. In 1991, he became president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Abrams, Elliott — Was a founding member of the PNAC. Notably, Abrams was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. He was married to Rachel Decter, the daughter of neoconservative activists Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter. He began his government service during the 1970s as Assistant Counsel to the Senate Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations and as Special Counsel to Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson. He also served as Chief of Staff to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. During the Ronald Reagan administration, Abram served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, then as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and then as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Abrams was significantly involved in the Iran-*Contra* scandal. In November 1986, Attorney General Meese announced that profits from secret US-authorized arms sales to the Khomeini regime in Iran were illegally diverted to the Nicaraguan *Contras*. As Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Abrams, had carried out the program, assisted by another contributor, Michael Ledeen, who was then serving as an adviser to Oliver North on the National Security Council. Abrams was convicted in October 1991 of perjury because of the false testimony he made under oath to Congress regarding the Iran *Contra* Affair. He later received a pardon from President G. H. W. Bush for this offence. After the election of G. H. W. Bush as President, Abrams worked for the Ethics and Public Policy Center. Early neoconservatives such as Richard Perle and former U. N. Ambassador Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick significantly influenced Abrams in his political views. In the G. W. Bush administration, Abrams first served as Deputy National Security Adviser for Global Democracy Strategy to the President. He also served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs since December 2002. He assisted Stephen J. Hadley in promoting democracy and human rights. He also worked as director of the NSC’s Directorate of Democracy, Human Rights, and International Organization Affairs and its Directorate of Near East and North African Affairs. Abrams also worked in a liaison role with Condoleezza Rice and Hadley.

Acheson, Dean — Was a noted public official and member of the Democratic Party. He served as Undersecretary of the Treasury in 1933. In 1939-40, he led a committee to study the operation of bureaus in the federal government. In 1941, he became Assistant Secretary of State and implemented many policies that aided Great Britain, such as the Lend-Lease Program. He was instrumental in the designing of the American-British-Dutch oil embargo that cut off ninety percent of Japanese oil supplies and escalated the crisis with Japan in 1941. In 1944, Acheson attended the Bretton Woods conference as the lead delegate from the State Department. In 1945, President Harry Truman nominated Acheson to be his Assistant Secretary of State. In late 1945 and early 1946, Acheson was one of the individuals who advocated compromise with the U.S.S.R.

Addington, David — Was legal counsel for the House Intelligence Committee. Addington was instrumental in the writing of Representative Dick Cheney’s minority view that dissented with the Boland Act, a law that restricted President Reagan’s ability to fund and support the Nicaraguan *Contras*. Cheney enlisted Addington in his ill-fated 1994 presidential bid. Addington served alongside I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby as Cheney’s aide in the first G. W. Bush presidential campaign. He later served as VP Cheney’s legal counsel and a member of the Heritage Foundation. With the approval of VP Cheney, Addington vetted appointees to the Federal Appellate Courts, the DoJ, and the Supreme Court of the United States during the administration of G. W. Bush. Most, if not all of the successful nominees were members of the Federalist Society, an ultra-conservative legal organization that favored rigidly conservative constitutional legal interpretations along with expansive presidential powers and prerogatives.

Addington served as a cornerstone in VP Cheney's efforts to regain presidential authority that he considered misappropriated by Congress.

Adelman, Kenneth 'Ken' — Began his government career in 1969 at the Department of Commerce and then served in the Office of Economic Opportunity. In the 1970s, Adelman joined the conservative issue cluster / network the Committee on the Present Danger. From 1975 to 1977, Adelman was an assistant to SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld and was later a member of the Defense Policy Board. He served as Deputy United States Ambassador to the United Nations for two and one-half years under the supervision of Jean Kirkpatrick. After that, he served as the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for almost five years during the Reagan administration. Adelman served as an advisor to President Ronald Reagan during the U.S.A - U.S.S.R. summit meetings. A Signatory of the PNAC's letter to President Clinton, Adelman was a vocal supporter of the Iraq invasion of 2003. The support appeared in his columns for the *Washington Post*, in February 2002, *Cakewalk in Iraq*, and April 2003, *Cakewalk Revisited*. He repeatedly asserted that Iraqi WMD were likely to be near Tikrit and Baghdad.

al-Ani, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir — Was an Iraqi diplomat based in Prague, Czech Republic. The Czech Intelligence Agency, BIS allegedly saw al-Ani meeting in early April 2001 with a young Arab man in Prague. Czech government officials feared that al-Ani was actually a covert *Mukhabarat* agent attempting to recruit an asset who would sabotage Radio Free Europe headquarters in that city. The Czech government expelled him on April 18, 2001. After the 9/11 attacks sources reported that Mohamed Atta had visited Prague in 2001, and coupled with the reports from BIS, certain individuals in the IC asserted the al-Ani had met with Atta for the purpose of coordinating the 9/11 attacks.

Albright, David — Is a former nuclear arms inspector who now heads the Institute for Science and Security in Washington, D.C. Albright wrote many reports depicting Iraq's desires for and capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. He cooperated with Khidir Hamza in the writing of several documents that delineated Saddam Hussein's post-ODS reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Notably, Albright sided against the G. W. Bush administration's posture in the aluminum tubes imbroglio. He became a highly vocal critic of the faulty intelligence emanating from the White House, the OVP, and the DoD with respect to Iraq's possession of WMD and relationship with transnational terrorist groups.

Alhaddad, Sawsan — Is an expatriate anesthesiologist who left Baghdad in 1978 for life in the United States. She is sister to the Iraqi WMD specialist, Saad Tawfiq. Alhaddad, under the direction of the CIA's Charlie Allen, recruited Tawfiq and other Iraqi WMD specialists as CIA assets. These assets reported to Charlie Allen's group that Iraq had no battlefield deployable WMD or functional production facilities in the prelude to OIF.

Allawi, Ahmed — Is a pseudonym used by Aras Kareem Habib.

Allawi, Ayad — Is an Iraqi politician of *Shi'a* Muslim heritage, and a former a member of the *Ba'ath* party. Allawi notably helped form the Iraqi National Accord. In an apparent power dispute with Saddam Hussein, Allawi resigned from the *Ba'ath* party in 1975 and moved to the

U. K. in order to pursue a medical education. He is married to Ahmad Chalabi's sister. In the prelude to OIF, the Iraqi National Accord provided data about alleged Iraqi WMD to Great Britain's MI-6 and the CIA.

Allen, Charles E. 'Charlie'— Was the CIA's Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection. His group managed to turn the expatriate Iraqi Sawsan Alhaddad into a CIA asset. Alhaddad recruited her brother and other Iraqi WMD specialists as CIA assets, thereby providing data in the prelude to OIF that indicated Saddam Hussein had no workable WMD or associated delivery systems.

Allen, Richard V. — Worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies from 1962-1966. He then served as a senior staffer at the Hoover Institution from 1966-1968, leaving that position to become Foreign Policy Coordinator to President Richard M. Nixon. He then served as President Ronald Reagan's Chief Foreign Policy Advisor from 1977-1980. Reagan then appointed him as his first National Security Advisor. After the completion of his government career, Allen served as a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and as a member of the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center Advisory Council, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Policy Board, the American Alternative Foundation, and the United States National Security Advisory Group. Allen was also a member of the PNAC.

Ames, Aldrich 'Rick' — Was a 31-year veteran of the CIA's counterintelligence unit. In 1994, a federal court found Ames guilty of treason. The court proved Ames acted as a double agent on behalf of the Soviet Union. He is now serving a life sentence in a federal 'super-max' prison without the possibility for parole. His career of espionage continues to be a major embarrassment to the CIA. Notably, the Ames case caused the counterintelligence unit of the CIA to be overseen by the FBI, thus exacerbating a long-standing instance of inter-agency enmity and friction.

Ammash, Huda Salih Mahdi — Was appointed to Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council in 2001. Dr. Ammash help rebuild the country's biological weapons program after ODS. She surrendered to Coalition forces on May 9, 2003 and was taken into custody along with Dr. Rihab Taha. Both Ammash and Taha were released by Coalition forces in December 2005.

Amorim, Celso — Following Iraq's late 1998 decision to halt unilaterally all UNSCOM disarmament work, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 1194 and 1205. In 1999, three panels chaired by Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, convened to examine options that would force Iraq into full implementation of its disarmament obligations. These panels produced detailed reports commonly known as the Amorim Reports.

Armitage, Richard L. — Graduated from the United States Naval Academy and served in the Navy during the Vietnam War. In 1978, Armitage returned to the United States and embarked on a civilian political career working as an aide to Republican Senator Bob Dole. In 1980, he became a foreign policy advisor to President Ronald Reagan. From 1981 to 1983, he became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. In June 1983, Armitage was promoted to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. In 1989, he left that post to serve as a special presidential negotiator dealing with the retention of

military bases in the Philippines and water issues in the Middle East. In 1998, Armitage signed the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton that urged him to target Saddam Hussein and his sons with a view of removing them from power. During the 2000 presidential election campaign, he served as foreign policy advisor to G. W. Bush. On March 23, 2001, the Senate confirmed him as Deputy Secretary of State. He served in that position until February 23, 2005. Armitage and his immediate supervisor, Secretary of State Colin Powell were considered by some commentators to be moderates within the G. W. Bush administration.

Armstrong, Fulton T. — Is an officer in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. Armstrong began his government career in 1980 as a Legislative Assistant and Press Secretary to U. S. Representative Jim Leach. In 1984-95, he served as an analyst, case officer, and manager specializing in Latin America in both the intelligence and policy communities. During the prelude to OIF, he also served in the National Intelligence Council as an NIO for Latin America.

al-Assef, Mohammed Harith — Was an alleged Iraqi *Mukhabarat* officer who defected to the INC. He promoted the notion that Iraq was in possession of mobile BW production laboratories. Conferring with INC intelligence collectors in Amman Jordan, in December 2001, he asserted that he had contractual evidence of Iraqi front companies attempting to acquire equipment and feedstock used in the production of BW. Officials of the DIA-HS stated that al-Assef was deceptive in his assertions.

Atta, Mohamad Mohamad el-Amir — Was one of the pilot / hijackers who perished in the 9/11 attacks. He crashed American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Czech officials mistakenly asserted that Atta had visited Prague on April 8, 2001 to meet with an Iraqi *Mukhabarat* official. Members of the G. W. Bush administration used this assertion as part of their publicity campaign to justify the invasion of Iraq.

Aziz, Tariq — Has the birth name Mikhail Yuhanna. Notably Aziz is an ethnic Assyrian and a member of the Chaldean Catholic Church. He served as Iraqi Foreign Minister from 1983-1991 and Deputy Prime Minister from 1979-2003. He was a close confidant and advisor of President Saddam Hussein. His relationship with Saddam Hussein started during the formative years of the Arab Socialist *Ba'ath* Party. He was a vocal critic of American intrusions into the sovereign state of Iraq and mentioned that America's goals were based upon the acquisition of secure oil resources and the support of Israeli foreign policy. Although sentenced to death in 2010, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani commuted his sentence to life in prison without the chance of parole. The Iraqi government imprisoned him in a detention facility near the city an-Nasiriya until his death by heart attack on June 5, 2015.

Baer, Robert B. — Is a retired CIA covert operations officer with over 20 years' operational experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Muslim states. As deputy chief of the CIA's Iraq Operations Group, he managed covert operations in Iraq from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. The mission of Baer's operations was to organize and arm local groups in opposition to Saddam Hussein and his *Ba'ath* party. Baer also served as one of the CIA's handlers of Ahmad Chalabi. Baer and Rick Francona headed an operation to free one of Saddam Hussein's senior nuclear weapons specialists, Khidhir Hamza from Iraq. Mr. Baer has published several

books that outlined his exploits in the CIA clandestine services. He and his wife Dayna serve as national security consultants and commentators for Turner Broadcasting-CNN.

Baker, James A. III — Was an American public official with a long career in domestic and foreign politics. He assisted in the formation of United States policy that dealt with Iraq and other Middle Eastern matters. During the presidential administration of G. H. W. Bush, Baker served as Secretary of State from 1989-1992. From 1992-1993 he was Bush's White House Chief of Staff. Baker was instrumental in the construction of a large international coalition that attacked Iraq and removed its armed forces from Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm.

El-Baradei, Mohammed M. — Served as the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1997-2009. El-Baradei provided leadership to the IAEA that pushed that organization towards the goal of aggressive monitoring and de-weaponization of nuclear stockpiles on a global basis. His organization was instrumental in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities after the close of hostilities in ODS. Notably, El-Baradei had an ongoing conflictual relationship with the United States Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John R. Bolton.

al-Barak, Ahmed — Was a Baghdad-based Iraqi businessperson involved in the aluminum tubes imbroglio.

Barno, David — Was a career soldier in the United States Army. In January 2003, General Barno deployed to Hungary as the commanding general of Task Force Warrior, the purpose of which was to train the Free Iraqi Forces in support of OIF. The policy underpinnings of this mission were masterminded by Chris Straub in the OSP. Notably, Task Force Warrior failed due to a shortage of Iraqi volunteers.

Bartel, Margaret 'Peg' — Was an accountant initially appointed by the State Department to oversee and audit Ahmad Chalabi and the INC's financial dealings. Bartel later became a direct employee of Ahmad Chalabi and helped him gain new sources of funding and maintain existing lines of financial support from the United States government and other sources.

Bartlett, Dan — Had early connections to Karl Rove & Company. He succeeded Karen Hughes in June 2002 as President G. W. Bush's counsellor. Bartlett was also in charge of overall communications for the OPOTUS. He focused on making the news cycle successful for the President at every opportunity. Bartlett was in the presence of President G. W. Bush at Brooker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida when the 9/11 attacks occurred. He helped write President G. W. Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address and mold its focus on the threat Iraq posed to America and its interests.

Barzani, Massoud — Is of *Sunni*-Kurdish heritage. Barzani was the leader of an anti-Saddam Hussein resistance group called the Kurdish Democratic Party. His local rival was the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani. Barzani was a political rival and sometimes acted as an ally of convenience with Ahmad Chalabi. He supported a broad-based secular government in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

al-Bassam, Mahdi — Is the son of one of Ahmad Chalabi's older sisters, Thamina. He is a Texas-based physician and member of the INC who served on the Board of Directors of the Iraq Liberation Act Committee. Al-Bassam frequently writes for the *National Review* and other conservative publications. His political writings promoted the ouster of Saddam Hussein and his sons from power in Iraq.

Bauer, Gary— Is a noted conservative Republican. While attending law school at Georgetown University he worked as Assistant Director of Opposition Research at the Republican National Committee from 1969 to 1973. Upon his graduation from law school, he took a position as the Director of Government Relations for the Direct Mail Marketing Association from 1973 to 1980. He then served as Deputy Undersecretary for Planning and Budget in the United States Department of Education from 1982 to 1987. Bauer then served in that department as an Advisor on Domestic Policy from 1987 to 1988. He then served as the President of the Family Research Council from 1988 to 1999. Notably, Bauer was one of the signatories of the *Statement of Principles* of the PNAC and a signatory of its letter to President W. J. Clinton. He also serves on the board of the Emergency Committee for Israel.

Baute, Jacques — Was an eminent French nuclear scientist and Director of the Nuclear Verification Office for the IAEA. He was involved in the debunking of the Iraq-Niger yellowcake procurement deal.

Bell, Jeffrey — Is a long-standing social conservative and a contributor to many neoconservative groups such as the *Weekly Standard*, the Manhattan Institute, the American Conservative Union, the ethics and Public Policy Center, the Foundation for Community and Faith Centered Enterprise, and the Council for National Policy. Bell is a Vietnam combat veteran and an early supporter of Ronald Reagan and his economic policies. He twice ran unsuccessfully for the United States Senate from New Jersey. Notably, Bell was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Bennett, William J. — Is a noted neoconservative and signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. Bennett served as Secretary of Education in the Ronald Reagan administration, the Director of National Drug Control Policy, and the co-director of Empower America.

Binney, William B. — Was a former cryptanalyst with the NSA. He is a vocal critic of the NSA's broad-spectrum mass surveillance activities, and more specifically of the NSA's *Trailblazer* program as exposed in the Edward Snowden revelations.

Black, Charles — Was a leading Republican political strategist who served as a senior advisor to Presidents Ronald Reagan and G. H. W. Bush. He was the key partner in Black, Kelly, Scruggs, and Healy, a lobbying and public relations firm that acted on behalf of many important individuals, notably Ahmad Chalabi and the INC.

Black, Joseph Cofer — Was a long serving CIA officer in the Directorate of Operations. In the initial part of his CIA career, Black mainly served in Zambia, South Africa, Zaire, and Angola. After these tours of duty, Black returned to the CIA station in London, England. After a

short assignment there, he redeployed to Khartoum in the Sudan where he served as Chief of Station until 1995. While in the Sudan, his group was primarily tasked with collection of HUMINT on terrorist organizations, specifically *al-Qaeda*. It is during this tour of duty that *al-Qaeda's* leadership cadre targeted Black for assassination. In 1995, Black assumed the position of Task Force Chief in the Near East and South Asian Division. From June 1998 – June 1999, he served as Deputy Chief of the Latin American Division. In 1999, George Tenet appointed Black as Director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC). He also served as George Tenet's Special Assistant for Counterterrorism and as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism. During the 9/11 attacks, Black was the head of the CTC. Black was one of the named defendants in the CIA Inspector General's investigations of misfeasance, malfeasance, and dereliction of duty in the agency's failure to detect and prevent the 9/11 attacks.

Blix, Hans — Was a Swedish diplomat who served as Sweden's Minister for Foreign Affairs (1978-1979). Blix later assumed the leadership of the IAEA. He also served as head of UNMOVIC from March 2000– June 2003.

Bolton, John R. — Is a notable neoconservative who also was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. Bolton was Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in the G. W. Bush Administration. He was also the former Executive Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute. Bolton was noted for his long-standing lack of respect for the United Nations and other international institutions, often stating that they were impediments to America's foreign policy goals. Notably, he unsuccessfully attempted to politicize the analytic products of the INR in the prelude to OIF.

Bonk, Benjamin 'Ben' — Was the Director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center from 1999 – 2002. Bonk was named as a defendant in the CIA-IG's examination into agency dereliction of duty charges related to the 9/11 attacks.

Bork, Ellen — Holds a law degree from Georgetown University Law Center. In the 1980s, she served in the Department of State and Department of Education. She was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. Bork served as Deputy Director of PNAC. From 1996 – 1998, Bork was the senior professional staff member for Asia and the Pacific in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. From 1998 – 1999, she served as counsel to Martin Lee, chairman of the Hong Kong Democratic Party, and from 2001 – 2002, she was a fellow at German Marshal's Funds Trans-Atlantic Center in Brussels.

Brennan, Donald — Was a member of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). Formed in the 1950s and re-instituted in 1976, the CPD lobbied the President and Congress for increased defense budgets, a hawkish foreign policy, and an arms build-up to counter the perceived overmatch presented by the Soviet Union. The CPD's members included future members of the AEI and PNAC.

Brooke, Francis J. — Was deeply involved with the Rendon Group since the early 1990s. Brooke served as Ahmad Chalabi's agent in Washington, D. C., and London, U. K. In 1996, he became an unregistered lobbyist for the INC in Washington, D. C. Brooke was also the

principal founder and director of the Iraq Liberation Action Committee, a political issue cluster / network that advocated the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his sons.

Brown, Arthur — Was the NIO East Asia during the prelude to OIF.

Brown, Harold — Served in the J. F. Kennedy and L. B. Johnson administrations as Director of Defense Research and Secretary of the Air Force. He served as President Jimmy Carter's SECDEF from 1977 – 1981. Brown advocated détente with the Soviet Union. He supported the continuance of America's nuclear triad: land based nuclear missiles, nuclear bomber aircraft, and sea-launched submarine-based nuclear missiles. Brown was notable for his centrist approach to Middle Eastern issues that focused on negotiations rather than military confrontations.

Bruner, Whitley — Was a senior CIA agent in London, U. K., in the Directorate of Operations. Bruner was the CIA operative who made first contact with Ahmad Chalabi in London. Often using the alias Bill Ryder, Bruner dealt with Iraqi exile affairs. Bruner now works with Diligence, LLC, a private intelligence consultancy in the Washington, D. C. Beltway.

Bruner, William B. — Was a contemporary of Karen Kwiatkowski. Bruner was an Air Force Colonel who worked in the PCTEG, NESAs, and OSP. Bruner was the direct interface between these organizations, Ahmad Chalabi, and the INC. He first encountered William J. Luti when both individuals worked in the office of then Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich. Bruner retired from the Air Force, and now works for the Lawrence Livermore Research Laboratories in California.

Bryen, Stephen D. — Is a long standing Washington, D. C. insider. Bryen enjoys significant contacts in the defense industry and government decision-making cadres. He is closely connected with Richard Perle under whom he worked when Perle was Ronald Reagan's Assistant Secretary of Defense. Bryen is closely aligned with various hardline pro-Israel groups like the Center for Security Policy and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. Along with Michael Ledeen, Bryen helped found the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in the 1970s. Bryen is closely associated with Richard Perle, Richard Allen, Frank Gaffney, Douglas Feith, Robert Kagan, Paul Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser *via* the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Burba, Elisabetta — Was a reporter for the Italian newspaper *Panorama*. She served as a key link to the Italian information broker, Rocco Martino. This connection allowed CIA and INR personnel access to the forged Nigerien yellowcake documents.

Butler, Richard — Was a long-serving Australian diplomat. Butler headed UNSCOM after Rolf Ekéus. He assumed that position in 1997.

Calio, Nicholas E. — Was a prominent Republican who had a long-standing convivial relationship with the Bush family. He served as President G. H. W. Bush's Assistant for Legislative Affairs, in which he lobbied members of Congress to draft and pass legislation

favorable to the President's political goals. He also worked in an identical position under President G. W. Bush.

Cambone, Stephen A. — As G. W. Bush assumed the presidency, Cambone served on a panel studying nuclear weapons issues sponsored by the National Institute for Public Policy. Other members included Stephen Hadley, William Schneider, Jr., and Robert G. Joseph. He then served as a Special Assistant to the SECDEF and DSECDEF from January 2001 — July 2001. On July 19, 2001, he was confirmed by the Senate as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Cannistraro, Vincent — Was a former CIA Chief of Counterterrorism. Cannistraro was a vocal critic of Ahmad Chalabi and the INC.

Card, Andrew H. — Was a Republican politician who enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the Bush family. He served as Secretary of Transportation under President G. H. W. Bush. He later served under the administration of President G. W. Bush as White House Chief of Staff.

Carmon, Yigal — Is a former Colonel in the Israeli Defense Force, and served in Israeli military intelligence from 1968-1988. He helped found MEMRI in 1998, and has close associations with many neoconservative elites.

Casey, William — Served as the Director of the Secret Intelligence Branch of the OSS in Europe. After his World War II service, Casey returned to private law practice. From 1971 — 1973 he served as the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. He then served as Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs from 1973 — 1974 and chairperson of the Export-Import Bank of the United States from 1974 — 1976. He was cofounder of the Manhattan Institute in 1978. Casey was a campaign manager for Ronald Reagan's 1980 bid for the presidency. President Reagan nominated Casey to the post of the Director of Central Intelligence in which he served from 1981 — 1987. During his tenure in this position, Casey obtained expanded intelligence community funding and resources to levels greater than those seen before the Jimmy Carter administration. He also lobbied President Reagan to remove restrictions on CIA actions in the pursuit of American policy goals. Casey was a strong supporter of the CIA's intervention in the Nicaraguan civil war.

Castelli, Jeffrey W. — Was the CIA's Chief of Station in Rome. He helped debunk the Iraq-Niger yellowcake deal.

Chalabi, Ahmad — Please see the body text of this document for biographical details of this person.

Chavez, Linda — Is an ultra-conservative political activist, and media commentator. She was President G. W. Bush's first nominee for Secretary of Labor; however, the public revelations of her use of undocumented foreign labor caused her to decline that nomination. Chavez was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Cheney, Elizabeth — During the prelude to OIF, she was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs. Elizabeth Cheney is the daughter of former Vice President Dick Cheney.

Cheney, Lynne — Is the wife of former Vice President Dick Cheney.

Cheney Richard ‘Dick’ B. — Cheney served multiple terms as a member of Congress from Wyoming. During the presidency of G. H. W. Bush, Cheney served as SECDEF. He served as VP during the presidencies of G. W. Bush. Notably, Cheney was a signatory of the PNAC’s letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Chouet, Alain — Was a high-ranking official in France’s DGSE during the prelude to OIF. Chouet provided help with the Nigerien yellowcake imbroglio to the CIA’s Paris Chief of Station, William D. Murray.

Clarridge, Duane ‘Dewey’ — Was a noted member of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations who was involved in the Iran-*Contra* scandal. After his retirement, Clarridge operated a variety of private intelligence consulting firms from his home outside of San Diego, California. In 1996, he and Linda Flohr acted as liaisons between the CIA, Ahmad Chalabi, and various Iraqi rebel factions. He also worked in conjunction with Wayne Downing and the INC to plan a *coup d’état* to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the *Ba’ath* Party.

Clarke, Richard A. — Served in the State Department under President Ronald Reagan. A long-serving consultant on terrorism, security, drugs, and arms, Clarke acted as a presidential counsellor to G. H. W. Bush and W. J. Clinton. He served as the NSC’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator from 1995 — 2001. Under G. W. Bush, Clarke had similar responsibilities, but the Vulcans did not afford him cabinet-level privileges. Clarke was very critical of the G. W. Bush administration’s pre-9/11 counterterrorism measures and was opposed to the decision to invade Iraq.

Cohen, Elliot A. — Is a professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Cohen is a significant supporter of neoconservative-oriented foreign policy campaigns. During the G. W. Bush administration, he was an advisor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and served on the Defense Policy Board during SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure in that office. Cohen is a close associate of the Vulcans. He was a notable signatory of the PNAC’s letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Cohen, Stuart A. — Was an intelligence officer with 30 years of service in the CIA. Cohen was acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council when it published the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.

Corcoran, James ‘Jim’ — Worked for Hans Blix as an inspector in the assessment of Iraqi WMD. Blix knew of his CSIS background and that Corcoran would communicate his data findings to the IC. Corcoran later became the Deputy Director of Operations for CSIS.

Cordukes, Garry — Served as director of the Australian company, International Aluminum Supply. Cordukes alerted the Australian Secret Intelligence Service that he suspected prohibited aluminum tubes were being purchased by a proxy of the Iraqi government for reconstituting a uranium enrichment program. This alert started a chain of events that resulted in the aluminum tubes imbroglio.

Cross, Devon Gaffney — Is a neoconservative activist who is noted for her pro-Israel rhetoric and support of U. S. military interventions in the Middle East. Ms. Cross served in Richard Perle's Defense Policy Board during the G. W. Bush presidencies. She was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

'Curveball' — Codename for Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, one of the individuals promoted by the INC as being a credible witness to Iraq's reconstitution of a BW program.

Dahabi, Mohammad — Was the head of the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate during the prelude to OIF.

Decter, Midge — Is a noted journalist and author. Along with Donald Rumsfeld, Decter was the chair of the Committee for the Free World, a neoconservative issue cluster / network. Decter and her husband Norman Podhoretz were among the original promoters of the American neoconservative movement. She was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Dearlove, Sir Richard — Was the head of British MI-6 during the prelude to OIF.

Dobriansky, Paula — Is a long-serving executive member of the State Department. From 2001 to 2009, Dobriansky served as Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs. Dobriansky was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Dodge, Simon — Was a senior analyst in the INR. Dodge was instrumental in the writing of the INR's dissenting opinions that appeared in the October 2002 NIE.

Donnelly, Thomas — Is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He has published many articles and op-eds that promote the neoconservative political agenda. Donnelly was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Donovan, William 'Wild Bill' J. — A high profile Republican, World War I hero, prosperous New York lawyer, and close confidant of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, Donovan was the founder of the OSS. Donovan was a bitter political rival of J. Edgar Hoover. Donovan's enduring turf war with Hoover helped build a culture of mutual mistrust, competition, and a lack of cooperation between the OSS and the FBI. This culture would transfer over to the CIA when it was institutionalized by the National Security Act of 1947.

Downing, Wayne — A career soldier, Downing retired as commander of JSOC. He came out of retirement in 2001 to mount a campaign to destroy terrorist organizations and those who support them. Reporting to then National Security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, Downing held the title of National Director and Deputy National

Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. He was a notable player in the prelude to OIF as he and members of the CIA's Iraq Operations Group hatched a plan to depose via a *coup d'état* Saddam Hussein and his sons.

Drumheller, Tyler S. — Was the CIA's Director of European and Middle Eastern Operations during the prelude to OIF. His group assessed as fabrications most of the intelligence asserting Iraq had WMD and connections to terrorist groups.

Duelfer, Charles — Worked at the White House Office of Management and Budget from 1977 — 1983 where he was responsible for the DoD's strategic nuclear forces and space programs. Duelfer joined the Politico-Military Bureau of the State Department in 1983 and was responsible for regional activities including the conflicts in Chad, Libya, and Grenada and ongoing strategic verification of space and strategic defense issues. In 1984, he became Deputy Director of the Office of International Security Policy responsible for European, African, and Latin American regions. He was also Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Multilateral Defense Matters. From 1990 — 1992, he supervised defense trade matters as the Director of the Center for Defense Trade and Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs. From January — March 1991, he directed the State Department's task force in support of ODS. Duelfer was the Deputy Executive Chairman and then Acting Chairman of UNSCOM from 1993 until its termination in 2000. Duelfer also served as the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Iraqi WMD. He led the Iraq Survey Group that investigated the scope of Iraq's WMD programs. The Iraq Survey Group published its report in October 2004, also known as the Duelfer Report.

Duhamel, Alain O. — Served in the French DGSE during the prelude to OIF. Duhamel specialized in security and intelligence issues in France's former African colonial assets.

Durbin, Dick — Served as a Democratic member of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Durbin and Senator Bob Graham in September 2002 asked the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate so that Congress could be fully informed on the Iraq situation.

Eberstadt, Nicholas — Is a well-known neoconservative scholar. He is a political economist and holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute. He has supplied consulting services to many government agencies. Eberstadt was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Ekéus, Rolf — Was a Swedish diplomat who served in multiple roles in the prevention of the spread of WMD. From 1991 — 1997 he was the director of UNSCOM. Ekéus has had a long-standing conflictual relationship with the United States government in that he resisted American attempts to use United Nations resources to act as intelligence assets. Ekéus has held the position that Iraq was free of WMD after ODS.

al-Fakheri, Ali Mohamed Abdul Aziz (a.k.a. Ibn al-Shayk al-Libi) — Was a Libyan national captured in Afghanistan in November 2001. He experienced extraordinary rendition at the hands of American and Egyptian interrogators. In these interrogations, al-Fakheri asserted

that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* had direct connections with Osama bin-Laden and other leaders of *al-Qaeda*. Notably, CIA and DIA analysts asserted that this information was a fabrication. This information was used by the Vulcans to justify America's invasion of Iraq.

Feith, Douglas J. — Please see the body text of this document for more information on this person.

Fiers, Alan — Served as the CIA's Chief of the Central American Task Force from 1984 — 1988. Fiers was closely involved with Oliver North's efforts to sidestep the legal strictures of the Boland Act that prevented America's aid to the Nicaraguan *Contras*.

Fingar, C. Thomas 'Tom' — Is a professor at Stanford University. Fingar also served in various positions in the U. S. government. Notably he served as Acting Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the INR from 2000 — 2001, and 2003 — 2004. In that position, he acted as principal intelligence counselor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. Fingar was one of the cornerstones of the INR's dissenting opinions that appeared in the October 2002 NIE. Fingar is now serving as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis.

Fleitz, Frederick — Joined the CIA during the directorship of William Casey and served in the DI specializing in the analysis of military, political, and WMD proliferation. Fleitz's intelligence politicization role in the prelude to OIF became apparent during the public release of the congressional hearings dealing with the nomination of John R. Bolton to be Ambassador to the United Nations.

Flohr, Linda — Is a former agent in the CIA's Directorate of Operations. Her notable assignments included the Counterterrorism Center, the Panamanian invasion, and other Latin American projects. After retirement in 1994, Flohr gained employment with the Rendon Group, where she still works as a program manager to the date of the writing of this dissertation. While in the employ of the Rendon Group U. K. Branch, Flohr made continuing contact with Ahmad Chalabi and senior members of the INC. Flohr later gained a consulting contract with the NSC, working for the head of counter-terrorism, General Wayne Downing.

Foley, Alan — Was the Director of CIA's WINPAC and was nominally subordinate to the DDO, Jami Miscik. He was a close friend of Frederick Fleitz and Robert G. Joseph. Foley was deeply involved in the CIA's production of faulty intelligence analytic products in the prelude to OIF.

Forbes, Malcolm Stevenson 'Steve' — Is a prominent Republican, captain of industry, and noted publisher. Forbes at one time had presidential aspirations. He has deep connections with President Ronald Reagan's conservative wing of the Republican Party. Forbes was one of the signatories of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Ford, Carl Jr. — Was Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research during the prelude to OIF. Ford is staunchly conservative in his political outlook, and a close friend of VP Dick Cheney, yet is not a registered member of any political party. He served two tours of duty in the Vietnam War as a military intelligence officer. He was then employed in the DIA as a

China Strategic Intelligence Officer; after that engagement, he joined the CIA as a China Military Analyst. Ford also worked as a professional staff member / subject matter expert with the Committee on Foreign Relations and as a National Intelligence Officer with the National Intelligence Council. In short, Ford had a long history as an expert intelligence analyst. In 1989, Ford transitioned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in that organization he first served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs and concurrently as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia. After ODS, Ford became Deputy Assistant for the Middle East and South Asia while still maintaining his Principal Deputy position. He maintained these positions until the W. J. Clinton transition team nominated his replacement. Ford then entered private industry as an independent security consultant until May 2001 when he was nominated by President G. W. Bush to be the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. As the leader of INR, Ford resisted the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz iron triangle and John R. Bolton's efforts to politicize the intelligence analytic products emanating from the INR.

Francona, Richard ‘Rick’— Was an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel seconded to the CIA’s Iraq Operations Group. Francona with Robert B. Baer extracted Khidhir Hamza and his family from Iraq. He was one of Ahmad Chalabi’s handlers in the prelude to OIF. He met with Chalabi in early October 1995 at an undisclosed location in Kurdistan. Francona ascertained that Chalabi was not providing the services the CIA was paying him to deliver.

Franke, Rend Rahim — Was a Chalabi supporter and an INC lobbyist in Washington, D.C.

Franklin, Lawrence ‘Larry’ — A former DIA analyst, Franklin became a DoD aide who helped Ahmad Chalabi and his retinue of Washington, D. C., agents gain introductions to and audiences with various Pentagon decision-makers. Franklin was a close friend of Harold Rhode and Michael Ledeen. By April 2004, the FBI was investigating Franklin for the disclosure of classified information to members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

Fried, Daniel ‘Dan’ — Was a long serving member of the State Department's Foreign Service. He served as a staff member on the National Security Council from 1993 — 1997. Ambassador Fried was Principal Deputy Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for New Independent States from May 2000 until January 2001. During the G. W. Bush administrations, Ambassador Fried was instrumental in the design and implementation of United States policy to advance security in various geographical areas of interest.

Friedberg, Aaron L. — Is a well-known academic who espouses hawkish political views. Friedberg served from 2003 — 2005 in the OVP as Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning. He was one of the signatories of the PNAC's Statement of Principles and its letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Fukuyama, Francis — Is a well-known right-wing academic who is known for his book *The End of History and the Last Man*. Fukuyama argued that the global spread of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism might be the final point in human sociocultural evolution and the ultimate form of human politics. He was a signatory of the PNAC’s letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Fulford, Carlton W. Jr. — Was a Marine Corps General in charge of Africa Command. Fulford had extensive ties to African governmental and industrial elites. He was a close friend of the U. S. Ambassador to Niger, Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick. Fulford enjoyed convivial relationships with both civilian and military leaders in Niger.

Gaffney, Frank J., Jr. — Gaffney started his government career in the 1970s working as an aide to Senator Henry M. Jackson under the supervision of Richard N. Perle. From 1983 to 1987, Gaffney was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, again serving under Perle. Gaffney became Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in April 1987. He is the former chairperson of the High-Level Group at NATO, and a senior advisor at Americans for Victory over Terrorism. In 1988, Gaffney established the Center for Security Policy (CSP), a pro-Israel issue cluster / network based in Washington, D.C. Many political commentators have asserted that this group has been a major promoter of Islamophobic propaganda in the United States. Gaffney promoted the notions that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing. He was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President Clinton.

Gedmin, Jeffrey — Is a conservative scholar who served for six years as director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin. From 1996 to 2001, he was a resident scholar and Executive Director of the American Enterprise Institute's New Atlantic Initiative. Gedmin was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President Clinton

Gentry, John A. — Was for twelve years an intelligence analyst at the CIA, where he worked on economic issues associated with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries; for two of those years he was a senior analyst on the staff of the National Intelligence Office for Warning. He is a retired U.S. Army Reserve officer, with most assignments in special operations and intelligence areas. On active duty, he was the executive officer of a Special Forces operational detachment. As a reservist, he spent much of 1996 as a civil affairs officer in Bosnia. Dr. Gentry formerly taught at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, and at the National Intelligence University. He now teaches International Relations and Security Studies at Georgetown University. His research interests are intelligence and security studies.

Gerecht, Reuel Marc — Is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Initiative at the PNAC. He was a former Middle Eastern specialist in the CIA. He frequently writes about national security and intelligence issues under the pseudonym of Edward Shirley. Gerecht was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Gershwin, Lawrence 'Larry' K. — Holds a Ph. D. in physics awarded by the University of California, Berkeley in 1969. He held multiple positions in various issue cluster / networks including the RAND Corporation until 1979. From 1979 to 1981, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation where he analyzed strategic forces, arms control, and net assessments. In October 1981, Gershwin joined the CIA as a National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs where he served until June 1994. From that time, he served as a National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology. During the

prelude to OIF, he was one of the NIOs that supported the pseudo-intelligence stating that Saddam Hussain had connections to transnational terrorist groups, and Iraq was reconstituting its WMD program.

Gerson, Mark — Is the Project Director of the PNAC. Gerson is the CEO of Gerson-Lehman Group. He is a graduate of Williams College and Yale Law School. Gerson is a frequent contributor to news and commentary programming on CBS, NBC, and C-SPAN. Gerson serves on the boards of the Manhattan Institute, Student Sponsor Partnership, and the Yale Chai Society and *Imentor*. He was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Ghorbanifer, Manucher — Prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Ghorbanifar served as a senior agent in the Shah's SAVAK intelligence service. After the revolution, he escaped Iran and started his career as a private intelligence broker and arms dealer. He had deep connections with the Saudi arms dealer, Adnan Khashoggi. Ghorbanifer and Khashoggi were intimately involved in the Iran-*Contra* arm scandal. He has known connections to Larry Franklin, Harold Rhode, Douglas Feith and Stephen Hadley. He often acted as an intermediary between Douglas Feith's OSP, PCTEG, NESA, and the INC.

al-Ghurairy, Jamal — Is a pseudonym used by Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri.

Gingrich, Newt — Is a staunchly conservative Republican who represented Georgia's Sixth Congressional District from 1979 until his resignation from politics in 1999. He also served as Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1995 to 1999. In 2012, he suspended his retirement from politics in an unsuccessful bid for the Republican presidential nomination. Notably, Gingrich employed as aides William J. Luti and William B. Bruner.

Goldfarb, Michael — Is a noted American conservative commentator. Goldfarb was a contributing editor for *The Weekly Standard*, and a researcher at the PNAC. He was an advisor to VP Dick Cheney's political issue cluster / network Keep America Safe. Goldfarb was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Goodman, Melvin A. — Is a former career CIA analyst, educator, and expert witness in congressional hearings probing the IC. Goodman interacted with WINPAC Director Alan Foley and Lawrence K. Gershwin on multiple occasions during his lengthy CIA career. Dr. Goodman is a lecturer in Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and intelligence analysis at National Defense University and the Joint Intelligence College.

Goodpaster, Andrew — Was a career Army officer who attained the rank of four-star general. Goodpaster served in a multiplicity of senior advisory positions to various presidential administrations. He held a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States Military Academy at West Point, a Master of Science in Engineering at Princeton University, and a Ph.D. in International Affairs from Princeton. He served as a fellow at the Eisenhower Institute, and the Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington, D. C., and was one of the founders of the Committee on the Present Danger. Serving in that committee, he was an advocate for a strong defense establishment, and warned of the Soviet Union's increasing military threat to the United States.

Goss, Porter — Was a former CIA agent who retired from the agency because of medical problems. Goss then entered the business community where he amassed a small fortune. He then entered politics in Florida and in 1988 became a member of the House of Representatives on behalf of that state. While in Congress, he generally followed Republican voting lines and had an extremely conservative record in debate and the passing of legislation. He was chairperson of the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee from 1997 until 2005. During his congressional career, he continually supported increased funding and strong support for the IC. On September 22, 2004, President G. W. Bush appointed him Director of the CIA, and he served in that position until his resignation on May 5, 2006. Notably, Goss refused prosecution of the approximately 50 CIA employees mentioned in the CIA Inspector General's assessment of dereliction of duty in the prelude to the 9/11 disasters.

Grabo, Cynthia M. — Was a significant contributor to the DoD's analytic efforts during the Cold War. She was an analysis instructor at various DoD intelligence schools during her lengthy career. She was the daughter of Carl Henry Grabo, who was a professor of English at the University of Chicago. C. H. Grabo co-wrote several novels with a significant early contributor to American code breaking — Herbert O. Yardley

Graham, Bob — Was an American politician and member of the Democratic Party. He served as Governor of Florida from 1979 — 1987 and was a United States Senator representing Florida from 1987 — 2005. He was one of the requesters of the NIE of October 2002. Notably, Graham believed that the intelligence supporting America's war with Iraq was faulty.

Gross, Stanislav — Was the Czech Interior Minister in the prelude to OIF

Haass, Richard N. — Was a long serving senior federal government employee. From 1979 — 1980, he served in the DoD, and held various positions in the State Department from 1981 — 1985. From 1989 — 1993 Haass was Special Assistant to President G. H. W. Bush, and National Security Council Senior Director for Northeast and South Asian Affairs. From February 6, 2001 — June 20, 2003 Haass served as Director of Policy Planning in the G. W. Bush administration; in that position, he was extremely critical of the notions that stated Saddam Hussein had connections to transnational terrorist groups and that Iraq was reconstituting its WMD arsenal.

Habib, Aras Kareem — Was provided to Ahmad Chalabi as an aide by Mustafa Barzani. He was a senior officer in the Free Iraqi Fighters. Chalabi made him responsible for issues such as security, intelligence, and finance. Habib rapidly became one of Chalabi's closest confidants and was a key figure in the production of INC pseudo-intelligence that made its way into the IC. Habib had close ties to Iran. In 2004, the United States ascertained that Habib was acting as a covert Iranian intelligence asset, sending sensitive information to that state.

al-Haideri, Adnan Ihsan Saeed — a.k.a. Jamal al-Ghurairy. He was an alleged member of the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* who provided information that Iraq was supporting, training and equipping transnational terrorist organizations. He also purported that Iraq had WMD. The INC used him as a provider of pseudo-intelligence to the Vulcans.

Haig, Alexander — Was a career Army officer who served as White House Chief of Staff under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Haig also served as Secretary of State in the administration of President Ronald Reagan.

Halle, Edward von — Was an internationally renowned expert in the theory of isotope separation. His Ph. D. dissertation at the University of Tennessee was on the subject of separation of isotopes by thermal diffusion, and his later contributions covered isotope separation by gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, and laser methods. He spent most of his career in the Operations Analysis and Planning Division at Oak Ridge Facility K-25, where he earned a great deal of respect as an expert on uranium enrichment methods. Dr. von Halle was one of the DoE's subject matter experts that disagreed with the opinions espoused by Joe Turner and Alan Foley of WINPAC.

Hamdoon, Nizar — Was Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations from 1984 – 1988. He also served as Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister from 1988 – 1992, and as Under Secretary to the Foreign Ministry from 1999 – 2001.

Hamza, Khidhir — Was a prominent scientist in Iraq's nuclear weapons development program. Hamza defected to the United States in 1994. CIA operatives Rick Francona and Robert Baer extracted Hamza and his family from *Ba'ath*-controlled northern Iraq into Kurdistan. Dr. Hamza now resides in the United States and is a member of the Arms Control Association.

Hanauer, Larry — Was a long serving career official within NESAs who was removed from that organization in early 2002 by Abram Shulsky due to incompatible analytic and political perspectives. Hanauer worked the Israel-Syrian-Lebanon sub-desk until he was replaced by David Schenker from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Hannah, John — Is a long-standing Washington, D. C. insider. He served as a senior member of Secretary of State James Baker's policy planning staff in the administration of President G. H. W. Bush. Hannah also served as Senior Advisor to Secretary of State Warren Christopher during the W. J. Clinton administration. During the administration of President G. W. Bush, Hannah served as VP Dick Cheney's Deputy National Security Advisor for the Middle East.

Hardcastle, Bruce — During the prelude to OIF, Hardcastle was the most senior Middle East / North Africa all-source military intelligence analyst in the DoD. He served as the DIA's liaison to William J. Luti in the prelude to OIF. He presented intelligence analyses to Luti that disagreed with the Vulcans' assessment on Iraq's involvement with transnational terror groups and possession of WMD. Due to his dissenting opinions, SECDEF Rumsfeld and DSECDEF Wolfowitz removed him from his position and eliminated his parent organization in the DIA.

al-Harith, Mohammed — Was an alleged Major in the *Mukhabarat* who made claims that Iraq had mobile BW production facilities mounted on seven Renault trucks. The INC used his claims to reinforce its position to support an American invasion of Iraq.

Harman, Jane — Was a Democratic member of the House of Representatives, from California. During the prelude to OIF, Harman served as the minority leader of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The majority leader of that committee was the soon to be Director of the CIA, Porter Goss. She and Goss demanded that the CIA's Politicization Ombudsman, Barry L. Stevenson produce a listing of all politicization complaints lodged with his office during the prelude to OIF.

Hassan, Prince of Jordan — Otherwise known as Prince Hassan bin Talal. He is a member of the Hashemite royal family of Jordan. He is the third son of Queen Zein al-Sharaf and King Talal, brother of the late King Hussein and uncle of the current King Abdullah II.

Havel, Vaclav — Was the Czech president during the prelude to OIF.

Haver, Richard — Was a former career naval intelligence officer and close friend of VP Dick Cheney. Cheney promoted the notion of Haver replacing George Tenet as the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the CIA, at the beginning of the G. W. Bush presidency. Notably, President G. W. Bush resisted VP Cheney's position with respect to Haver replacing Tenet.

Hawkins, Gerald — Is a former member of Army military intelligence corps and the Special Collection Service.

Hayden, Michael V. — Is a former Air Force intelligence officer who was the Director of the NSA from 1999 – 2005. Hayden oversaw a radical change in the NSA's business and mission-related computing systems in his now-famous *100 Days of Change*. Hayden was responsible for implementing the NSA's mass surveillance programs such as *Trailblazer*, as exposed in the Edward Snowden revelations. He later became the Director of the CIA, and in that position, he vigorously resisted the release of the CIA-IG's documents related to the investigation of senior agency personnel for dereliction of duty in the prelude to the 9/11 disasters.

Helgerson, John L. — Was the CIA Inspector General during the prelude to OIF. As a result of the 9/11 attacks, Helgerson initiated an investigation of the CIA's actions in the prelude to 9/11. The CIA-IG released several reports that cited problems in the agency during that time period. The review placed blame on many agency individuals, up to George Tenet, J. Cofer Black, Ben Bonk, and James Pavitt. Moreover, Helgerson's review recommended disciplinary actions and punishments. When Helgerson's office finished its report in 2005, the newly installed Director of the CIA, Porter Goss considered the institution of disciplinary review boards with a view of punishing the culpable individuals. Instead of doing this, Goss offered a blanket pardon for all persons mentioned in Helgerson's review.

Helms, Jesse — Was a conservative Senator from North Carolina who served from January 3, 1973 – January 3, 2003. He was a Democrat from 1942 – 1970, and then transferred his allegiance to the Republican Party from 1970 – 2008. He helped organize and support the

conservative resurgence of the late 1970s. He was also a major factor in Ronald Reagan's successful campaigns for the presidency.

Henoch, Margaret H. — Was Tyler Drumheller's senior reporting agent in the CIA's DO. Henoch is now retired from the CIA and is an outspoken critic of the G. W. Bush administration's position to invade Iraq.

Hijazi, Faruq — Was the Deputy Director of the Iraqi *Mukhabarat*.

Hitchens, Christopher — Was a noted essayist and political commentator who often criticized public figures such as Mother Teresa, President W. J. Clinton, and Henry Kissinger. He was a publicly avowed atheist who lived in the U.K. until 1981, and after that date, maintained residency in the United States. He became a naturalized American citizen in 2007.

Hoover, J. Edgar — Was the first Director of the FBI. He served in that capacity from March 23, 1935 — May 2, 1972. Hoover had a long-standing rivalry with William J. Donovan and was a vocal opponent of the OSS and the CIA.

Hughes, Karen — Enjoyed a long and convivial relationship with G. W. Bush. She served as first director of his Texas gubernatorial campaign. Hughes then served as one of President G. W. Bush's key public relations counsellors from 2001 to late 2002.

Houdek, Robert — Was the NIO for Africa during the prelude to OIF.

Huntington, Samuel — Was a noted political scientist, academic and senior advisor to several presidential administrations. He spent most of his professional life at Harvard University. During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, Huntington served as the White House Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council. Huntington is conservative in his political beliefs, writings, and public commentaries. He became famous for his 1993 work, *The Clash of Civilizations* that espoused a new world order that would emerge after the end of the Cold War. In his theoretical writings, he asserted that future wars would not be fought between sovereign states, but between cultures. Huntington viewed Islamic extremism as a significant threat to the Western world.

al-Hussein, Sharif Ali bin — Was an expatriate Iraqi of royal ancestry who helped provide significant financing to Ahmad Chalabi and the INC. He was a wealthy banker who based his financial empire in London, U. K. Al-Hussein was first cousin to the last Hashemite king of Iraq, Faysal II. Hence, al-Hussein claimed to be the legitimate heir to the Iraqi throne, and headed the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy. He returned to Iraq on June 10, 2003, but neither he nor any of his followers assumed positions of power in the provisional government.

Hutchings, Robert — Was the former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

Ibrahim, Bashir — Was an Iraqi businessperson involved in the aluminum tubes imbroglio. He owned the Atlantic Trading and Communications Corporation, based in Amman,

Jordan; a company that won the Iraqi government's tender to supply aluminum tubes for tactical artillery rocket fuselages.

Ijaz, Mansoor — Was a Pakistani-American who was a noted participant in various counterterrorism forums. Ijaz was a close confidant of R. James Woolsey.

Irvin, Clark K. — In the prelude to OIF, Irvin served as the Inspector General of the State Department. On January 10, 2003, he served as the acting Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, and on December 26, 2003 became the formal Inspector General that department.

Inkster, Nigel — Was a British MI-6 officer during the prelude to OIF.

al-Iraqi, Abu Adula — Was an *al-Qaeda* member allegedly sent multiple times from 1997— 2000 as an emissary to enlist the aid of Saddam Hussein's government in the procurement of WMD.

Jackson, Bruce P. — Is one of the founders and president of the Project on Transformational Democracies. From 1979 — 1990, Jackson served in the Army as a military intelligence officer. From 1986 — 1990, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in a variety of policy positions pertaining to nuclear forces and arms control. Upon leaving the Department of Defense in 1990, Jackson joined Lehman Brothers, where he was a strategist in the firm's operations. Between 1993 and 2000, Jackson was Vice President for Strategy and Planning at Lockheed Martin Corporation. During 1995 and 1996, Jackson was National Cochairman of the Dole for President Finance Committee. In 1996, he was a delegate to the Republican National Convention where he served on the Platform Committee and the Platform Subcommittee for National Security and Foreign Policy. Jackson was one of the signatories of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. During the 2000 presidential campaign, he was a delegate committed to G. W. Bush and chaired the Foreign Policy Subcommittee for the Republican Platform Committee. Jackson is the President of the U. S. Committee on NATO. During 2002 — 2003, he served as the Chairman of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.

Jackson, Henry 'Scoop' — Was a long serving Democratic Senator from Washington state. Liberal in his social positions, Jackson curiously espoused strong support for the military-industrial complex and served as a governmental supporter for young academics who embraced views similar to his. He helped start the governmental careers of Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and other notable neoconservatives.

Jafar, Dhia Jafar — Is a *Shi'ite* Iraqi nuclear physicist, and former Vice Chairman of the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission. He also served as chief of Iraq's nuclear program. Earning a baccalaureate and master's degrees in physics from the University of Birmingham, he then completed a doctorate at the University of Manchester. He subsequently returned to Iraq and started work on Saddam Hussein's new nuclear program. Jafar was instrumental in the design, construction, and operation of the OSIRAK nuclear reactor. Jafar has repeatedly asserted that all of Iraq's WMD were destroyed after Operation Desert Storm. He also maintained that

irrespective of Saddam Hussein's desire to restart Iraq's WMD programs, the country did not have sufficient resources to do so.

al-Janabi, Rafid Ahmed Alwan — a.k.a. ‘Curveball’. This individual is an Iraqi who defected in 1999 to Germany claiming that he had worked as an engineer in a facility that manufactured mobile BW production laboratories. The CIA, DIA, and BND ultimately assessed that this individual’s claims were deceptive.

Joseph, Robert G. — Was the head of the NSC Counterproliferation Office. Joseph was a close friend of the CIA agent Frederick Fleitz and John R. Bolton.

Kagan, Donald — Is an historian at Yale University. He is the father of Robert Kagan, and is closely involved with the PNAC. Donald Kagan was a signatory of the PNAC’s letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Kagan, Robert — Along with William Kristol, was the cofounder of PNAC. Kagan is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International peace, a contributing editor at the *Weekly Standard*, a columnist for the *Washington Post*, and the author of various books. In 1981, he was assistant editor at *The Public Interest*. From 1985 — 1988 Kagan was a Deputy for Policy in the State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, serving under Elliot Abrams. From 1984 — 1985, he was a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff and speechwriter to Secretary of State George P. Schultz. In 1983, he served as a foreign policy advisor to Congressman Jack Kemp and as Special Assistant to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency. Kagan is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and is an Alexander Hamilton Fellow in American diplomatic history at American University. Kagan is married to Victoria Nuland, a Foreign Service officer in the Department of State. Robert Kagan was a signatory of the PNAC’s letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Kahn, Herman — Was a prominent American strategic theorist who at one time worked for RAND. He was one of the main contributors to American nuclear strategy during the Cold War. Kahn was one of the founding members of the Hudson Institute.

Kavan, Jan — Was the Foreign Minister and Coordinator of Intelligence for the Czech Republic

Kerry, Joseph Robert ‘Bob’ — Was an American politician of the Democratic Party who served as Governor of Nebraska from 1983 – 1987, and as a United States Senator from that state from 1989 – 2001.

Khadduri, Imad — Was a leading member of Iraq’s nuclear weapons development team for almost thirty years. He holds an M.Sc. in physics from the University of Michigan and a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from the University of Birmingham. Dr. Khadduri now resides in Dubai, United Arab Emirates and operates a nuclear electric power generation consultancy. He has repeatedly stated in public forms and various publications that Iraq’s WMD arsenal was not operational after Operation Desert Storm.

Khalilzad, Zalmay M. — Please see the body text of this dissertation for biographical details.

Khayr, Saad — During the prelude to OIF, Khayr was the leader of the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, a.k.a. *Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah*.

Kay, David A. — Is a highly respected WMD analyst. He enjoyed a long and distinguished career in that area starting with a project funded by the State Department. In 1983, Hans Blix hired him as a senior nuclear consultant with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. In that position, Blix tasked Kay to rewrite the IAEA nuclear safeguards program. When the United Nations instituted the Special Commission (UNSCOM), it asked the IAEA to uncover and destroy nuclear weapons and associated materials in post Operation Desert Storm Iraq. He left the IAEA in 1992 to pursue other interests. In 2004, Kay changed his position on Iraqi WMD, admitting that the United States had made a mistake.

Keiswetter, Allen L. — Was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near Eastern Division in the prelude to OIF.

Kendall, Willmoore — Was an American political theorist, professor of Political Philosophy, writer, and theorist of intelligence analysis. Kendall served in the OSS in World War II, and transitioned to the CIA in 1947. Kendall had an ongoing debate with Sherman Kent with respect to analytic independence; Kendall supported policy relevance as the main goal of intelligence analysis, while Kent supported the notion of policy independence.

Kent, Sherman — Is considered the grandfather of American intelligence analytic praxis. The CIA School of Intelligence Analysis carries his name. Kent espoused the notion that intelligence analytic product should never be tainted by compliance to the policy preferences of governmental elites. His method of intelligence analysis is based on Socratic debate.

Kelly, John F. — Is a retired four star Marine Corps general. He is currently serving as the Secretary of Homeland Security in the D. J. Trump administration. Kelly is one of the early adopters of Colonel John R. Boyd's maneuver warfare concepts. In his Marine Corps for career, Kelly had the occasion to interact with many Washington, D.C. consulting firms. In many public forums, Kelly has been critical of the ethics of these firms.

Kirkpatrick, Jeanne J. — Was an anti-Communist, conservative Republican who served in the National Security Council during the Ronald Reagan administration. She also served on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Defense Policy Review Board, and chaired the Secretary of Defense Commission on Failsafe and Risk Reduction of the Nuclear Command and Control System. She served as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations for one term. Kirkpatrick resigned that position in April 1985. She was a strong supporter of Israel, and along with Empower America codirectors, William Bennett and Jack Kemp called on Congress to declare war against the entire fundamentalist Islamist terrorist network. In early 2003, President G. W. Bush sent Kirkpatrick as an envoy to various Arab states in order to enlist their support for the American invasion of Iraq. Ms. Kirkpatrick was an active

contributor to the PNAC, the AEI, other conservative issue cluster / networks, and political issue cluster / networks. She was a notable signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Kissinger, Henry — Is an American diplomat and political theorist. Kissinger served as National Security advisor and later as Secretary of State in the administrations of President Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford. For his efforts to negotiate a cease-fire in the Vietnam War, Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Kissinger is a proponent of *Realpolitik* and supported the notion of détente when dealing with the Soviet Union. He presently heads Kissinger and Associates, a New York-based economic and political consultancy that employs the former DDI in the prelude to OIF, Jami Miscik.

Kmonicek, Hynek — Was the Czech government's Deputy Foreign Minister

Koch, Noel — In 1983, Koch was a senior DoD official who supervised Michael Ledeen who was acting as a consultant on terrorism related issues. ASECDEF Richard Perle had arranged the consultancy contract for Ledeen. Koch and Ledeen traveled in that year to Italy in DoD business, and during that excursion, Koch ascertained that the DoD-HS considered Ledeen to be an agent of foreign influence acting on behalf of Israel. Koch ordered all of his personnel to deny Ledeen access to any classified materials. Koch later reported Ledeen to the FBI's counterintelligence unit for further investigation.

Kolt, George — Was the NIO for Science and Technology.

Krauthammer, Charles — Is a psychiatrist, columnist, author, and activist. In 1978, Krauthammer arrived in Washington, D.C. to supervise psychiatric research and planning for the administration of President Jimmy Carter. At that time, he started to write articles about politics, frequently contributing to *The New Republic*. He is a vocal conservative, often appearing on the Fox News Network *Special Report with Bret Baier*. Krauthammer was also a weekly contributor to the PBS News program *Inside Washington* from 1980 until it terminated in December 2013. He was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. Krauthammer supported the Iraq war based on the notion of preemption; he viewed Saddam Hussein as very likely to acquire WMD.

Kraham, Sherri — Served in the Department of State, most notably as an Iraq Desk Officer from 1998 to 2001. She supported efforts to strengthen the Iraqi opposition and to enable conflict resolution between the main Kurdish parties under the aegis of the 1998 Washington Agreement. Ms. Kraham worked on plans and programs in preparation for post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

Kreykes, Jon A. — Was the head of the DoE's Oak Ridge National Security Advanced Technology Group. He wrote opinions that asserted the aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq were unsuitable for use in Zippe centrifuges.

Kristol, William — Was the Chairman and cofounder of the PNAC. Prior to coming to Washington, Kristol served on the faculty of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government (1983 — 1985) and the Department of Political Science at the University of

Pennsylvania (1979 — 1983). From 1985 — 1988, he served as Chief of Staff and Counsellor to Secretary of Education William Bennett. Kristol then served as Chief of Staff to Vice President Dan Quayle during the G. H. W. Bush administration. Mr. Kristol regularly appears on the *Fox News Channel*, and serves on the boards of the Manhattan Institute, the John M. Ashbrook Center for Public affairs, and the Shalem Foundation. Kristol led the Project for the Republican Future, where he helped shape the strategy that produced the 1994 Republican congressional victory. Kristol is also the founder and editor of *The Weekly Standard*. He was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Kubba, Laith — A member of a prominent Iraqi *Shi'ite* family, Kubba was one of the early members of the INC.

Kwiatkowski, Karen — Was an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel who served in the NESAs and OSP of Douglas Feith. Kwiatkowski observed most of the pseudo-intelligence emanating from Feith's organizations. She also saw most of the data arriving from the INC and Ahmad Chalabi. Kwiatkowski personally escorted on several occasions groups of Israelis, including several generals, from the first floor reception area to Douglas Feith's office in the Pentagon. Now retired from the military, Kwiatkowski earned a Ph. D. in Political Studies and today teaches at several universities in Virginia.

Lady, Robert Selden — Was a CIA operative residing in the agency's Milan office. Lady was a close associate of Jeffrey Castelli.

al-Lami, Sabah Khalifa Khodada — Was an alleged defector from the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* who talked about a secret camp, Salman Pak where Islamic extremists received training in the practice of sabotage, hijacking, and assassination. He was one of the INC's sources of pseudo-intelligence.

Lampert, Yael — Was a senior State Department official who objected to the lack of transparency present in the INC's financial management and reporting processes.

Lampsos, Parisoula Maria — Was one of Saddam Hussein's mistresses. She made public statements that she had knowledge of Iraq's WMD arsenal and connections to transnational terrorist groups. The IC discounted her commentaries as deceptive.

Landry, John — Was the NIO for Conventional Military Issues.

Langer, William L. — Was at one time, Chairman of the History Department at Harvard University. He was on leave during World War II and acted as the head of the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS. William Donovan had a close relationship with Langer and came to depend on the quality and timeliness of his analytic products. Later, Langer served as Special Assistant for Intelligence Analysis for the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. In 1950, Langer organized the Office of National Estimates in the newly established CIA. After the completion of this work, he returned academia. In 1961 — 1977, he returned to the IC and served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Lang, W. Patrick — Was a member of the U. S. Army Special Forces whose career focus was intelligence, the Middle East, *jihadi* terror groups, and the relationship between the United States, Iraq, and Iran. He is fluent in Arabic, Farsi, French, and Vietnamese. During the course of his military career, Lang served as a Middle Eastern security consultant to several presidential administrations and as an instructor in HUMINT collector operations and Arabic language skills at the United States Military Academy and the United States Military Intelligence School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Notably, Colonel Lang was one of the founders of the Defense Intelligence Agency HUMINT Service. He also served on the Defense Policy Board in the W. J. Clinton administration, and was a member of the Senior Executive Service overseeing the DIA's HUMINT Service.

Ledeen, Michael — Is a close friend of Karl Rove. He is a fellow of the AEI. Ledeen was directly intertwined with the Iran-Contra affair. Repeatedly espousing bellicose opinions with respect to Iraq, Ledeen frequented the offices of the OSP, NESA, and the PCTEG.

Lehman, John — Is a Republican, and a close conservative ally of former President Ronald Reagan. He served as Secretary of the Navy from 1981 – 1987. He developed a strategic theory to counteract the threat of Soviet incursion into Western Europe by way of attacking the comparatively weakly defended Soviet Far East in the Pacific. This concept came to be known as the Lehman Doctrine. Lehman was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President William J. Clinton.

Levinson, Riva K. — Was the BKSH account prime for the INC.

Lewis, Bernard — Please see the body text of this document for more information.

Libby, Irve Lewis 'Scooter' — Was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. He was a noted member of the Vulcans, and was an active promoter of the Iraq war. During the G. W. Bush administration, Libby was Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, Chief of Staff to the Vice President, and Assistant to the President of the United States.

al-Libi, Ibn al-Shayk — birth name Ali Mohamed Abdul Aziz al-Fakheri, was a Libyan national captured in Afghanistan in November 2001, after United States forces and their allies toppled the *Taliban*. He suffered extraordinary rendition at the hands of American and Egyptian forces. The information he provided under duress was cited by President G. W. Bush as strong evidence supporting a connection between Saddam Hussein and *al-Qaeda*. Some members of the CIA and DIA-HS questioned the veracity of al-Libi's statements, saying that they were deceptive.

Lieberman, Joe — Is an American politician and former Democratic Senator from Connecticut. He is now an independent with no formal political party affiliation. He was a strong supporter of the Iraq War.

Lind, William S. — Served in many post in the U. S. government ranging from consulting positions in the DoD to research support associates for various centers. Lind is the

author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook and the Fourth Generation Warfare Handbook. He is an early adopter of John R. Boyd's strategic concepts. Lind has spent many years in the Washington D.C., Beltway consulting environment and has made many public comments about the lack of professional ethics exhibited by many consulting firms that contract with the federal government.

Lott, Trent — Is a former United States Senator from Mississippi. Lott is a member of the Republican Party and was one of the first Republican members of Congress elected during the decline of the Democratic party in the southern states.

Lowenkron, Barry F. — Was the NIO for Europe.

Lowenthal, Mark — Was Assistant Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the prelude to OIF. Lowenthal was instrumental in the drafting of the October 2002 NIE that dealt with estimates of Iraqi WMD.

Luce, Clare Boothe — Served as a Connecticut member of the U. S. House of Representatives, Ambassador to Brazil, and then to Italy. Luce is a strong conservative and vocal anti-Communist. She was a member of the Committee for the Present Danger, a political issue cluster / network that supported increased defense appropriations and a more vigorous stance against America's enemies.

Luti, William J. — Please see the body text of this study for details about this individual.

Mahle, Melissa Boyle — Is a former CIA agent who was based in Amman, Jordan. Ms. Mahle is a vocal critic of politicization in the CIA. She now works as a consultant for the entertainment industry to ensure that espionage films are situationally correct. Ms. Mahle also gives mentoring lectures at the International Spy Museum in Washington, D. C.

Maiga, Zakaria Yaou — Was a senior-level employee of the Nigerien embassy in Rome. Maiga had access to door keys, safe combinations, and security alarm codes. He was implicated in the embassy break-in associated with the Nigerien yellowcake imbroglio.

Mack, David — Was a specialist in near eastern affairs who worked under then Secretary of State James Baker III. He acted as Ahmad Chalabi's handler during his initial visits to the United States.

MacLeish, Archibald — Was a noted American lawyer and poet who was appointed the Librarian of Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Along with William Langer, MacLeish was instrumental in the development of the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS. During World War II, MacLeish also served as the Director of the War Department's Office of Facts and Figures and was the Assistant Director of the Office of War Information. He also served for a year as the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and then for another year served as the United States representative at the creation of UNESCO. He then retired from public life and returned to academia. He and Langer were instrumental in recruiting of notable

German-speaking historians for the OSS such as Leonard Krieger, Gordon Craig, H. Stuart Hughes, Franklin Ford, Paul Alexander, Felix Gilbert, Annemarie Holborn, Inga Neumann, Eugene Anderson, and Carl Schorske. MacLeish and Langer are credited with the institution of the tradition of using Socratic debate in the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS.

Maguire, John R. — Was a CIA operative implicated by Ron Suskind as a participant in the *Habbush Memorandum* escapade.

al-Majid, Hussein Kamel — Was the son-in-law and second cousin of Saddam Hussein. He rose through the ranks of the Iraqi military to become Commander of the Republican Guard in 1982. He later became the Minister of Industries, in which position he led the Military Industrialization Commission and the production of various weapons systems from 1987. He married one of Saddam Hussein's daughters, Raghad Saddam and carried on his life in Iraq until 1995. On August 7, 1995, he, his wife, and family defected from Iraq and arrived in Jordan. The Jordanian government granted asylum to Kamel, his wife, brother and his brother's wife. During his exile in Jordan, Kamel cooperated with Rolf Ekéus of UNSCOM, the CIA, and MI-6. Kamel's commentaries reaffirmed the notions that Iraq had an active BW program before Operation Desert Storm. His revelations further elucidated the fact that all of Iraq's WMD programs were destroyed in Operation Desert Storm or shortly thereafter.

Makovsky, David — Is a high-profile neoconservative who worked in the OSP. He was formerly the executive editor of the pro-*Likud* party *Jerusalem Post* newspaper. He is currently a senior fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Makovsky, Michael — Is a neoconservative who worked in the OSP. He is currently the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, a neoconservative issue cluster / network that promotes hardline American policies in the Middle East and seeks to enhance cooperation between Israeli and American security officials. He is the younger brother of David Makovsky.

Mallat, Chibli — Is a Lebanese lawyer who was a close confidant of Ahmad Chalabi. Mallat performed critical legal services for the INC.

Maloof, Michael — Is a high-profile neoconservative who worked in the PCTEG and the OSP. In these roles, he and David Wurmser were instrumental in concocting pseudo-intelligence that was based upon unvented reports provided by the INC that stated Saddam Hussein had an active WMD arsenal and connections to transnational terrorist groups.

Manga, Mai — Was the Nigerien Minister of Energy and Mines.

Marik, Warren J. — Was a CIA case officer who was among one of the first members of that agency to make contact with Ahmad Chalabi. He was an unabashed supporter of Chalabi and the INC.

Martino, Rocco — Is an Italian freelance information broker who was involved in the Nigerien yellowcake imbroglio.

Matalin, Mary — Was a long-standing friend of the Bush family. She served as campaign director for G. H. W. Bush, and later as a public relations counsellor to President G. W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney.

Mayaki, Ibrahim — Was the Nigerien Prime Minister.

Mayfield, Jenny — Was a member of the OVP staff in the prelude to OIF.

McCredie, Ian Forbes — During the prelude to OIF, McCredie was the head of the MI-6 office in Washington D. C.

McDevitt, Marybeth — Was a long service career official within NESAs who was removed from that organization in early 2002 by Abram Shulsky due to incompatible political views. McDevitt worked as the NESAs Country Director for Egypt.

McGovern, Raymond ‘Ray’ — Was a senior analyst in the CIA for twenty-seven years. During that career, he helped prepare National Intelligence Estimates and President's Daily Briefings. McGovern is an outspoken critic of the Iraq War and politicization in the CIA.

McLaughlin, John E. — Served as the CIA's Deputy Director during the prelude to OIF. Serving under Director George Tenet, McLaughlin was second in command of the agency during that timeframe.

McMillan, Joseph — Was a long service career official within NESAs who was removed from that organization in early 2002 by Abram Shulsky due to incompatible political views. After his ouster, McMillan moved to the NESAs Center at National Defense University.

Miller, Frank — Was the Senior White House Director for Defense. He reported to then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.

Mindaoudou, Aichatou — Was the Nigerien Foreign Minister.

Miscik, Judith ‘Jami’ A. — Was the Deputy Director of Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency during the prelude to OIF. George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, appointed Miscik to that post. Miscik was the first female to occupy a post at the deputy director level in the history of that agency. She was a key figure in the resistance to analytic politicization in the prelude to OIF.

Mohammed, Khalid Shaikh — Was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. CIA and Pakistani ISI operators captured him on March 1, 2003 in the city of Rawalpindi.

Monaghan, Karen — Was the acting NIO for Economics and Global Issues.

Montini, Laura — Was a covert Italian SISMI agent planted in the Nigerien Embassy in Rome. She was implicated in the break-in at that embassy and its cascade effects in the yellowcake imbroglio.

Morell, Michael — Was President G. W. Bush's intelligence briefer from the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. His immediate superior was Jami Miscik.

Mortimer, Edward — Was a noted journalist; he also served as one of the directors of the International Committee for a Free Iraq

Moskowitz, Stanley M. — Was the Director of Congressional Affairs for the CIA.

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick — Was a Democratic Senator from New York state; first elected in 1976, he was reelected in 1982, 1988, and 1994. Moynihan declined to run for reelection and 2000. He was an early neoconservative icon and on many issues was a political ally of Senator Henry M. 'Scoop' Jackson. He was one of the strategists who helped craft John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson's *War on Poverty*. Moynihan supported most, but not all increases to defense funding.

Muravchik, Joshua — Originally started out with left-wing political leanings, but converted to the mantra of neo-conservatism when he acted as an aide to Senators Daniel Patrick Monahan and Henry M Jackson in the late 1970s. He was a resident scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 1985 and the American Enterprise Institute from 1987 — 2008. Muravchik was one of the signatories of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Murray, William D. — In the prelude to OIF, Murray was the CIA's Chief of Station in Paris.

Musawi, Nabeel — Was the INC's chief diplomat. He publicly promoted the notion that Saddam Hussein's agents were intimately involved in the 9/11 attacks.

Mylroie, Laurie A. — Please see the body text of this study for more details about Dr. Mylroie.

Myers, Richard B. — Was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the prelude to OIF.

Nabulsi, Mohammed Saeed — Was a Jordanian banker, economist, and politician. He served as Governor of the Central Bank of Jordan from 1973 — 1985, and from 1989 — 1995. During his governorship, his group investigated the fraud at Ahmad Chalabi's Petra Bank.

Noor, Saba Abdul — Was a prominent Iraqi arms designer who stated that Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal was nonoperational after ODS.

North, Oliver — Was a Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel who served as a staff member in the National Security Council during the Iran-*Contra* Affair. He was noted for designing the

section of the Iran-*Contra* escapade that diverted the proceeds of arms sales to Iran to help support the Nicaraguan *Contras*.

Nitze, Paul H. — One of the principal authors of NSC-68, Nitze was a leading thinker and Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 1949 — 1953. Nitze served as the main representative for strategic issues and Chairman for Policy Studies of the Committee on the Present Danger. The self-stated mandate of this group was to educate Americans and their governmental leaders about the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union, its military buildup and belligerent attitude.

Nucera, Antonio — Was SISMI's Deputy Director for Technology Transfers and Counter Proliferation for the Middle East and Africa.

Obeidi, Mahdi — Was a senior designer in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. He made multiple statements to United States intelligence operatives that Iraq's nuclear weapons program was essentially defunct after Operation Desert Storm

Owens-Kirkpatrick, Barbro — Was the U. S. Ambassador to Niger.

Pavitt, James L. — Was the Deputy Director of Operations in the CIA. Some of Pavitt's subordinates were Tyler Drumheller, William D. Murray, Margaret H. Henoeh, Joseph Wippl, and Jeffrey Castelli.

Perle, Richard N. — Please see the body text of this work for details on this individual.

Pheneger, Michael — Was a career Army officer and intelligence specialist. Pheneger taught intelligence analysis courses at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Pheneger is an outspoken commentator on American intelligence failures and ethics.

Pillar, Paul R. — Was the NIO for Near East and South Asia, and a signatory of the October 2002 NIE. Pillar has become an outspoken critic of the Iraq war and the intelligence failures in the prelude to OIF.

Pipes, Daniel — Is the son of Richard Pipes, and was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. Dr. Pipes leads the Middle East Forum, which is a neoconservative issue cluster / network.

Pipes, Richard — Please see the body text of this document for further information.

Pletka, Danielle — Is the wife of Steven Rademaker. She was involved in the drafting of the Iraq Liberation Act. From 1992 – 2002 she served on the staff of the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations – Near East and South Asia. Ms. Pletka worked with Ahmad Chalabi from the late 1990s. She has repeatedly espoused opinions that the IC is predisposed to cooperate with Middle Eastern dictators. A strident neoconservative, Ms. Pletka has enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the AEI.

Podhoretz, Norman — Is an American neoconservative theorist and writer for various magazines. From 1981 — 1987 Podhoretz was an advisor to the United States Information Agency, and from 1995 — 2003 was a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute Center for Middle East Policy. Podhoretz was one of the notable signatories of the PNAC's *Statement of Principles* and that group's letter to President W. J. Clinton. He was one of the more vocal supporters of the war in Iraq.

Pollack, Kenneth M. — Is a vocal supporter of the war in Iraq. From 1988 – 1995, he served as a CIA analyst working on Iraqi and Iranian military issues. He then served a year as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs with the NSC. In 1999, he rejoined the NSC as Director for Persian Gulf Affairs. He has also served as a professor at National Defense University.

Pollari, Nicoló — Was the leader of Italy's SISMI.

Powell, Colin, L. — Was a career Army officer with over 35 years of active duty service. Powell's military field career ranged from two combat tours of duty in the Vietnam War to a tour of duty as a battalion commander in South Korea. Following these deployments, he attended the National War College from 1975 — 1976. He was then promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and led the Second Brigade of the One Hundred First Airborne Division. In the administration of President Jimmy Carter, Powell was Military Assistant to the DSECDEF and the Secretary of Energy. Then he rose to the rank of Major General. He then assisted Frank Carlucci in the DoD during the transition from the Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan administration. He then served as the senior military aid to SECDEF Caspar Weinberger. In that role, he designed the overall strategy for the invasion of Grenada and the bombing of Libya. In 1987, Powell was promoted to the position of National Security Advisor, a post that he held for the duration of the Reagan administrations. In that position, he coordinated advisors who supported Ronald Reagan's summit meetings with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Powell was summoned to testify before Congress during the Iran-*Contra* scandals, but was not implicated in any wrongdoings. In 1989, President G. H. W. Bush appointed Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In that position, Powell designed the overall strategy for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He promulgated the now famous Powell Doctrine, which stated that the United States should only fight wars with the absolute support of the American people and their government, and should use insurmountable and overwhelming force in the prosecution of those wars. Powell retired from active service in 1993, and from that time, was active in various NGOs and governmental outreach projects. In 2000, President G. W. Bush appointed Colin Powell as Secretary of State, and the Senate unanimously approved him for that position. Secretary of State Powell did participate in making the case for war with Iraq. Nonetheless, as time passed he expressed increasingly serious misgivings about that conflict. During his tenure as Secretary of State, Powell had a rocky and conflictual relationship with SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld and VP Dick Cheney.

Qanbar, Entifadh — Was a long-term member of the INC and close confidant of Ahmad Chalabi. Qanbar served as the INC's chief liaison to the United States government and was the overall manager of that organization's Washington, D. C. office. Qanbar directly

interfaced with John Hanna and William J. Luti for transferring the INC's pseudo-intelligence into the PCTEG, OSP, and NESA.

Quayle, James Danforth 'Dan' — Represented Indiana in the U. S. House of Representatives from January 3, 1977 – January 3, 1981, and in the Senate from January 3, 1981 – January 3, 1989. He served as Vice President of the United States in the administration of George H. W. Bush from January 20, 1989 – January 20, 1993. Quayle was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. Quayle did seek the Republican presidential nomination in 2000, but withdrew from the race and supported G. W. Bush.

al-Qurairy, Abu Zeinab — Was one of the INC's suppliers of pseudo-intelligence to the G. W. Bush administration. Al-Qurairy represented himself as a former Lieutenant General in the Iraqi *Mukhabarat*. He told the media of Iraq's training of terrorists at Salman Pak in airline hijacking methods and other techniques of irregular warfare. He also said that the Salman Pak facility housed a BW installation that was headed by a German expatriate. These commentaries inferred a connection between Saddam Hussein, the *Mukhabarat*, the 9/11 attacks, and the anthrax attacks suffered by the United States. Subsequent investigations revealed that al-Qurairy and his commentaries were contrived fabrications designed by the INC to influence United States decision-makers to support an invasion of Iraq and the deposing of Saddam Hussein and his sons from power.

Rademaker, Steven — Holds a baccalaureate and master's degrees in foreign affairs and a *juris doctoris*. Rademaker served as a law clerk to James Hall Buckley from 1984 – 1986 and was in private practice until 1987. From 1987 – 1989, Rademaker served as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. From 1989 – 1982, he held a position as Associate Counsel to the President in the Office of Counsel to the President and as Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security Council. He held various positions in the United States House of Representatives; from 1993 – 1995 as Minority Chief Counsel, from 1995 – 2001 as Chief Counsel, from 2001 – 2002 as Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel. In 2002, Rademaker served as Chief Counsel to the House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security. In that position, Rademaker was instrumental in drafting the legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security. Also in that year, he became Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. Rademaker was one of the individuals responsible for drafting the PNAC's *Statement of Principles* and letter to President W. J. Clinton. He is the husband of another noted neoconservative, Daniella Pletka.

Rashid, Latif — Is an Iraqi Kurd, born in Sulaymaniyah. He was an active member of the PUK under the leadership of Jalal Talabani. He holds a Ph.D. in civil engineering. In 1992 Rashid became Vice President and Executive Member of the INC, and in 1998 he ascended to the six-member leadership cadre of that group. Rashid has been a long-standing opponent of Saddam Hussein, his sons, and the Iraqi *Ba'ath* party. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Rashid ascended to various leadership positions in the Iraqi government.

Ravich, Samantha — Was the National Security Advisor for Terrorism to VP Cheney.

Rendon, John W. — Is the owner of the Rendon Group. Rendon started his political support career during George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign. He then served as the Executive and Political Director of the Democratic National Committee and managed the 1980 Democratic convention. He also worked as Director of Scheduling and Advance for President Carter's reelection bid. The Rendon Group started work for the CIA in the early 1990s; it was instrumental in the initial United States government funding for Ahmad Chalabi and the INC. The Rendon Group also worked on a sixty day contract for the DoD's Office of Strategic Influence. Among other arrangements, the DoD contracted the Rendon Group to make its public case for war with Iraq.

Rhode, Harold — Rhode holds a Ph. D. from Columbia University in Islamic history. He is a Middle Eastern specialist who worked for the DoD for almost thirty years. He was originally attached to Andrew Marshall's Office of Net Assessment in the DoD. He advised the Office of the Secretary of Defense on many Middle Eastern issues during his career in the Office of Net Assessment. During the prelude to OIF, Rhode worked in the OSP.

Ricciardone, Frank — Was a career member of the State Department serving in a variety of ambassadorial postings. From 1997 — 2001 he served in the State Department's 9/11 Task Force on the Coalition against Terrorism and as the Secretary of State's Special Coordinator for the Transition of Iraq. He also served in the INR and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Ricciardone was one of the early whistleblowers who warned of fiscal and management irregularities within the INC.

Rice, Condoleezza — Was a Stanford University professor who specialized in Russian history. She was also the doctoral dissertation supervisor of Amy B. Zegart, a noted intelligence commentator. In 1984, Rice became an informal campaign advisor to Gary Hart during his unsuccessful bid for the presidency. During that time, she came to know Brent Scowcroft, President George H. W. Bush's National Security Advisor. Scowcroft offered her a position as a staff member on the NSC. Rice's influence in the G. H. W. Bush administration grew; she became the president's special assistant serving as his expert on Soviet and East European affairs. In 1991, Rice grew tired of the environment inside the Washington, D.C. Beltway; she resigned and returned to her teaching position at Stanford. Irrespective of her exit from public service, Rice maintained her friendly relations with the Bush family, and came to know George W. Bush, who hired her as one of his foreign policy advisers in his bid to attain the presidency in 2000. Upon his ascension to the presidency, Bush named Rice as his National Security Advisor.

Richer, Robert 'Rob' — Served as chief of the Near East Division in the CIA's Directorate of Operations. Ron Suskind in his book, *The Way of the World* implicated Richer and some of his subordinates in the *Habbush Memorandum* escapade. Richer has denied in many public forums his or his subordinates involvement with the *Habbush Memorandum*. After serving in the CIA for 35 years, Richer retired in September 2005. After his retirement, Richer worked for Blackwater USA as Vice President for Intelligence. In 2007, Richer created Total Intelligence Solutions with Cofer Black and other former intelligence professionals.

Ritter, Scott — Is a former United States Marine Corps intelligence officer who served as an UNSCOM inspector. Ritter was also a covert CIA agent who worked in concert with Israeli

intelligence agencies. Ritter became a vocal critic of the G. W. Bush administration's Iraq war stance.

Roberts, Pat — Served in the House of Representatives from 1981 – 1997. In 1997, he became a United States Senator from Kansas. He served as chairperson of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and was responsible for that committee's investigation into the intelligence failures leading up to the United States invasion of Iraq.

Rockefeller IV, John D. 'Jay' — Served as a United States Senator from West Virginia from 1985 — 2015. He is a great-grandson of John D. Rockefeller, the tycoon who started the Standard Oil Company. He is the only member of the traditionally Republican Rockefeller family who served in the United States government as a Democrat. Rockefeller was a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that investigated misfeasance, malfeasance, and dereliction of duty in the IC during the periods before and during OIF. Rockefeller became a strident critic of the Iraq war.

Rodman, Peter W. — Served in various federal government positions ranging from a National Security Council staff member to that of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. His career stretched from 1969 — 2008. Rodman was one of the signatories of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Rodriguez, José A., Jr. — Is a former Director of the National Clandestine Service of the CIA. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Rodriguez became the Director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center. In that position, he promoted the use of extraordinary rendition against suspected members of *al-Qaeda* and associated terrorist organizations.

Rohn, Douglas — Was a long serving senior analyst in the INR. Rohn was a member of a group of INR analysts who expressed doubts about the allegations of Iraq arranging a uranium yellowcake contract with Niger.

Rosen, Stephen P. — Is a Harvard University Professor of National Security and Military Affairs. Rosen is a longtime friend of neoconservative pundits Bill Kristol and Allen Keyes. Rosen has been active as a policy contributor to the Republican Party in areas of national security and military affairs. He was one of the notable signatories of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Rove, Karl — Was a close confidant of G. W. Bush. He was the political campaign architect for Bush's Texas gubernatorial campaigns of 1994 and 1998, and Bush's successful presidential campaigns of 2000 and 2004. Rove served as Senior Advisor and Deputy Chief of Staff to President G. W. Bush, along with appointments as head of the Office of Public Liaison and the White House Office of Strategic Initiatives.

Rowen, Harry S. — Was a national security expert, economist, and academic. Rowen had deep connections to the RAND Corporation serving both as a consultant and as president of that organization. From 1981 — 1983, he was chairperson of the National Intelligence Council. In 1989 — 1991, he served as a DSECDEF for International Security affairs in the DoD, under

SECDEF Dick Cheney. From 2001 — 2004, Rowen served as a key member of SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld's Policy Advisory Board. Notably, Rowen was one of the signatories of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Rubin, Michael — Is a resident scholar at the AEI. He holds a Ph.D. in History from Yale University. From 2002 — 2004, Rubin served as Country Director for Iran and Iraq in the OSECDEF. In that position, Rubin also supplied support services to the OSP. Notably, he served with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after the initial assault phase of OIF.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. — Is a noted politician and businessperson. Rumsfeld graduated in 1954 from Princeton University earning a baccalaureate in Political Science. He then served in the Navy for three years and entered public life by winning a position as an Illinois congressional representative in the United States House of Representatives . Notably, he was one of the leading cosponsors of the Freedom of Information Act. In 1969, he accepted an offer from President Richard Nixon to lead the Office of Economic Opportunity. It is during his tenure as leader of the Office of Economic Opportunity that Rumsfeld hired Frank Carlucci and the young Dick Cheney to serve under him. Nixon also appointed him as special counsellor giving him Cabinet level status. He also led the Economic Stabilization Program before his appointment to the position of Ambassador to NATO. In 1974, he was recalled to Washington, D.C., and became President Gerald Ford's Chief of Staff. Notably, he successfully lobbied President Ford to veto an expansion of the Freedom of Information Act; a veto that was eventually overridden by Congress. When Nixon resigned as President in August 1974, Rumsfeld returned to Washington to serve as the transition lead for the new President Gerald Ford. When Ford assumed his new duties as President, he appointed Rumsfeld as White House Chief of Staff, a position in which he served from 1974 – 1975. In October 1975, President Ford named Rumsfeld as his SECDEF and George H. W. Bush as the Director of Central intelligence. As the leader of the DoD, Rumsfeld supervised the transition from a conscript based Army to an all-volunteer force. He also lobbied the President to stop the decline in defense spending and to reinvigorate American nuclear and conventional forces. He supported the 'Team B' exercise that stated the United States was at risk of a Soviet nuclear and conventional military overmatch. Notably in November 1983, President Ronald Reagan appointed Rumsfeld as Special Envoy to the Middle East. During his tenure in that position he travelled to Baghdad on December 20, 1983 and met Saddam Hussein in a 90-minute negotiation session. He also held a variety of short-term advisory posts in the executive branch of the United States government. From 1977 – 2000 Rumsfeld resided for the most part in the private sector. One of his notable industrial accomplishments was as CEO, President, and Chairman of the Board of the G. D. Searle & Company, a global pharmaceutical firm. He also served as chairperson and CEO of General instrument Corporation from 1990 – 1993. He also served from 1997 – 2001 as Chairman of Gilead Sciences Inc., the developer and marketer of *Tamiflu*. Based on the recommendation of VP Dick Cheney, President G. W. Bush nominated Rumsfeld as SECDEF. In January 2001, he was sworn in as SECDEF in the G. W. Bush administration. After the 9/11 attacks, Rumsfeld led the military strategic planning and execution of the United States invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Notably, Rumsfeld pushed for small force based offensives in both of these conflicts. His tenure as SECDEF was noted by conflictual relationships with flag-rank officers in the United States military.

Russack, John — Replaced Thomas Ryder as the Director of Intelligence in the DoE. Prior to his DoE service, Russack held several positions at the CIA, including Deputy Chief of External Operations and Cover Division for Counterintelligence, Deputy Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection; Military Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation Center; and Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

Russell, James — Was a long service career official within NESAs who was removed from that organization in early 2002 by Abram Shulsky due to incompatible political views. Russell was the country director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.

Ryder, Thomas S. — Was acting Director of the DoE's Office of Intelligence during the prelude to OIF. Ryder did not support the expert analyses of his scientific and engineering staff regarding the aluminum tubes — Zippe centrifuge scenario. Instead, he supported the notions put forward by Joe Turner and Alan Foley of WINPAC that mistakenly asserted the aluminum tubes were ordered from the PRC in order to build a uranium enrichment infrastructure based upon Zippe centrifuges. After the close of this scenario, Ryder exited the Department of Energy and went on to other federal government positions.

al-Saadi, Amir Hamudi Hasan — Was the organizational mastermind behind Saddam Hussein's weapons program. He also served as the Iraqi president's liaison with the U.N. in the prelude to OIF. He surrendered to American forces on April 12, 2003 and was detained at the Camp Cropper facility for high-value detainees. All throughout the time of his interface with the U. N. inspectors and during interrogation by IC personnel, al-Saadi maintained that Iraq's WMD arsenal was in a state of disarray since its destruction in ODS.

al-Sabah, Jaber al-Ahmed — Was the Emir of Kuwait during the prelude to OIF.

Sabri, Naji — Was Iraq's Foreign Minister during the prelude to OIF. Sabri served as a covert asset for the CIA, allowing the CIA's DO agents to ascertain that Iraq had no deployable WMD assets in the prelude to OIF.

Safran, Nadav — Was Laurie Mylroie's Ph. D. supervisor. Notably, Safran had clandestine connections to the CIA.

al-Sahhaf, Mohammed Saeed — Gained notoriety during OIF as Saddam's Minister of Public Information. Because of that role, he received the moniker of 'Baghdad Bob' from American media pundits. He also served in Iraq's diplomatic corps and was instrumental in maintaining relations with African states such as Niger.

Salameh, Mohammed — Is a convicted perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He is currently serving a sentence of 240 years at the federal super max prison in Florence, Colorado.

Sample, Tim — Was the Staff Director of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Sanchez, Lawrence H. — Was a CIA intelligence officer since 1984. Sanchez served as the Executive Assistant to the CIA's Executive Director and as an Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. He served four years in the CIA's Nonproliferation Center and a one-year tour of duty as a Deputy Team Chief for Intermediate Nuclear Forces Inspections in the former Soviet Union and three years as an imagery analyst. On October 5, 1998, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson selected Lawrence H. Sanchez to be the Director of the Office of Intelligence at the DoE. While in his position at the Department of Energy, Sanchez retained his position with the CIA. In the spring of 2002, Sanchez left the DoE for a CIA liaison position in the New York City Police Department's Joint Terrorism Task Force. Thomas S. Ryder replaced Sanchez as the Acting Director of the Office of Intelligence at the DoE.

Sarraaf, Ali — Formerly worked for Ahmad Chalabi in the Petra Bank. In that position, he was in charge of foreign exchange transactions and overseas accounts. Jordanian authorities arrested Sarraaf upon the collapse of the Petra Bank. Sarraaf later served as managing director of the Iraqi Broadcasting Company (IBC). This company not only provided propaganda radio services that targeted Iraq, but also laundered CIA funds and redirected them to the INC. He later became the INC's financial director.

Scaife, Richard Mellon — Was a billionaire businessperson and heir to the Mellon family fortune in banking, oil, and aluminum. For over four decades, Scaife was well known for his financial support of conservative policy issue cluster / networks.

Schenker, David — Formerly of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), Schenker was assigned to NESAs / OSP when other career professionals with balanced perspectives on Arab / Israel affairs and Iraq were fired by Abram Shulsky. Specifically, Schenker replaced Larry Hanauer.

Scheunemann, Randy — Is a Washington, D. C. lobbyist, public servant and activist. From 1986 — 1993, Scheunemann served on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the House Republican Policy Committee. During 1996, Scheunemann was a senior advisor to Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole and served on the 1996 Republican platform committee. He was a noted signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. Scheunemann served as national security adviser to Senate Republican and Majority Leaders Bob Dole and Trent Lott from 1993 — 1999. He has also served as the PNAC's Project Director. From 1999 — 2000, Scheunemann served as defense and foreign policy coordinator for the McCain 2000 presidential campaign. In 2001, Scheunemann served as a consultant to the OSECDEF. Scheunemann was involved in Senate deliberations concerning the use of American military power in Somalia, the Korean Peninsula, Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia. He also served as coordinator for Senate Republican Policy on United Nations reform, Congressional-executive war powers, NATO enlargement, global climate change, economic sanctions, ballistic missile defense, and technology transfers to China. Scheunemann serves on the Board of Directors of the U. S. Committee on NATO, the Project on Transitional Democracies, and the International Republican Institute. In 2002, he founded the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. He served as president and executive director of that group until early 2003.

Schmitt, Gary — Is the Executive Director of the PNAC. In the early 1980s, Dr. Schmitt was a member of the professional staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and from 1982 — 1984, served as the committee’s minority staff director. In 1984, he was appointed by President Reagan to the post of Executive Director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He served in that position until 1988. Since then, he has held visiting fellowships at the *National Interest*, the *Foreign Policy Journal*, and the Brookings Institution. He served as coordinator for the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence Working Group on Intelligence Reform. He also worked as a consultant to the DoD. Dr. Schmitt is an adjunct professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He was a signatory of PNAC’s letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Senator, Ted— Was a senior official at DARPA who championed the ARDA Initiative. He focused on the following technology-mediated projects: Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery; Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology; and Novel Intelligence from Massive Data. These projects formed the core of the NSA’s mass surveillance program as exposed by the Edward Snowden revelations.

al-Shahristani, Hussain — Was an Iraqi nuclear specialist who received his training at the Imperial College of London and the University of Toronto. His specialty was in the design, construction, and management of nuclear reactors. He refused to build nuclear weapons for Saddam Hussein and because of this position, he was held in the Abu Ghraib prison for approximately 11 years. Saddam Hussein later sentenced him to death and then commuted his sentenced to life imprisonment. He escaped imprisonment during an ODS bombing raid, and exfiltrated himself and his family to Iran. He became a member of the anti-Saddam Hussein movement from his home in Iran. Al-Shahristani returned to Iraq in 2004, became active in partisan politics, and served in many high-level government positions.

Schumann, Lothar — Was a senior BND official in charge of the team that handled ‘Curveball.’ Schumann cooperated with Joseph Wippl of the CIA to allow the polygraph examination of ‘Curveball’ at American consular facilities located in Munich, Germany. Schumann’s efforts helped German and American intelligence specialists to assess the ‘Curveball’ suite of statements to be deceptive.

Sethna, Zaab — Was a Rendon Group U. K. staffer who later joined the INC. He became one of Chalabi’s most loyal followers. He is now managing partner at Northern Gulf Partners, an Iraq-based venture capital and private equity firm. He received his baccalaureate degree at Georgetown University, and a Master’s degree in International Affairs at Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs.

Shaffer, Glen D. — Was a Major General in charge of the DoD’s Joint Intelligence Operations (J-2). His group produced a series of high-level documents asserting the DoD’s understanding of Iraq’s WMD arsenal was limited.

Shelton, Christina — Was a senior DIA analyst on a temporary support assignment to the PCTEG. She publicly commented on George Tenet’s equivocation in the prelude to OIF.

Shipster, Michael D. — Was a British diplomat who led MI-6 in the Middle East during the prelude to OIF. He allegedly held meetings in Amman, Jordan with General Tahir Jallil Habbush al-Tikriti, who led the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* during the prelude to OIF.

Shoraidah, Hamad — Was an INC official who formerly served as an Iraqi Republican Guard officer. Shoraidah emigrated to Norway and then the United States. During the prelude to OIF, he was a prominent, yet unregistered INC lobbyist operating in the United States.

Shulsky, Abram — Please see the body text of this work for details on this individual.

Signora, La — Codename ('The Lady') for an Italian SISMI agent who assisted with the break-in perpetrated on the Nigerien embassy in Rome.

Singer, Max — Was a founder with Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute in 1961 and its president until 1973. He continues to serve as a senior fellow and trustee emeritus of the Hudson Institute. From 1974 — 1976, he was managing director of the World Institute in Jerusalem, and from 1977 — 1978, he was director of the Institute for Jewish Policy Planning and Research of the Synagogue Council of America. Subsequently he worked for his own consulting firm, The Potomac Organization. Singer was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton urging the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Solarz, Steven — Was a Democratic member of the United States House of Representatives. He had strong neoconservative political leanings, and was instrumental in the writing of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton urging the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut — Was a foreign policy expert and a long serving staff member in the NSC. He was a close friend and confidante of Henry Kissinger.

Stahl, Leslie — Was a CBS News correspondent.

Starr, Duane F. — Served in the DoE's Oak Ridge National Laboratories as a senior subject matter expert on nuclear proliferation threats. Dr. Starr was one of the DoE's subject matter experts who wrote analyses dissenting with those of Alan Foley and Joe Turner of WINPAC regarding the aluminum tube imbroglio.

Stevenson, Barry L. — Was the Politicization Ombudsman in the CIA's DI during the prelude to OIF.

Straub, Chris — Was a retired Army officer and former Republican staffer for the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. In the prelude to OIF, Straub worked in the OSP.

Strauss, Leo — Was a professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Some notables in the neoconservative power nexus such as Paul Wolfowitz interacted with Strauss during their student years while at that university.

Sullivan, David — Was a CIA analyst who was forced to resign his position because he supplied highly classified transcripts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to Richard Perle, an aide of Senator Henry M. Jackson. Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Director of the CIA attempted to fire Sullivan for this misdeed. Notably, after Sullivan's resignation, Jackson hired him to act as his staff intelligence consultant.

Taha, Rihab — a.k.a. 'Dr. Germ,' was the chief of the Iraqi BW program in the prelude to OIF.

Talabani, Jalal — Is an Iraqi politician of Kurdish extraction. Although Talabani opposed Saddam Hussein and his government, he was a political rival of Ahmad Chalabi and the INC.

Tandja, Mamadou — Served as the President of Niger from December 22, 1999 – February 18, 2010.

Tawfiq, Saad — Was a senior Iraqi nuclear specialist who worked on calutrons and when time permitted, performed some ancillary development work on the Zippe centrifuge project. Tawfiq was the brother of the American resident Iraqi CIA asset, Dr. Sawsan Alhaddad, who in turn recruited him to be a CIA asset. In the prelude to OIF, he reported to Charlie Allen's group at the CIA that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was incapable of making or deploying battle-ready weapons.

Tenet, George — Was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director of Central Intelligence from July 1997 to July 2004. As Director of Central Intelligence, Tenet was responsible for all analytic products generated by the IC during his tenure.

Tester, John — Is a United States Senator from Montana, and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence .

Thielmann, Greg — Was a senior analyst in the State Department's INR. Thielmann was instrumental in the writing of the INR's dissenting opinions that appeared in the October 2002 NIE.

Trigilio, John — Was a DIA official on TDY with the OSP. In that position, Trigilio worked for William J. Luti and was associated with the pseudo-intelligence emanating from that organization.

al-Tikriti, Mani abd al-Rashid — Was the director of the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* until June 30, 1997.

al-Tikriti, Tahir Jallil Habbush — Was the head of the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* in the final years of Saddam Hussein's regime. He assumed that position in 1999.

Tobey, William — Worked with Robert G. Joseph in the NSC's Counter Proliferation Office.

al-Turabi, Hassan — Was the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF)

Turner, Hugh — Was the Associate Director of the CIA's DO. Turner was subordinate to James L. Pavitt.

Turner, Joseph 'Joe' — Was a nuclear weapons analyst in the CIA's WINPAC during the prelude to OIF. Turner was a vociferous supporter of the assertion that aluminum tubes acquired from the PRC were intended for use in Iraq's reconstituted uranium enrichment program. His assertions were eventually disproved by senior nuclear enrichment specialists in the DoE.

Turner, Stansfield — Was a career Navy officer. He was Director of the CIA from 1977 — 1981. Admiral Turner was a vocal advocate of intelligence ethics and supported the ascendancy of TECHINT in the CIA's ongoing operations.

al-Ulum, Muhammad Bahr — Was one of the founders of the INC and a major figurehead in *Shi'a* Islam.

Vandenberg, Hoyt S. — Was a career Air Force officer. Vandenberg completed his military career as Director of Intelligence in the War Department General Staff. In June 1946, he became Director of Central Intelligence; in that position, he lobbied President Harry S. Truman for the creation of a strong and centralized civilian intelligence agency.

Vickers, Robert — Was the NIO for Warning during the prelude to OIF.

Walpole, Robert D. — Was the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, and a signatory of the October 2002 NIE.

Weber, Vin — Is a Washington, D. C. lobbyist and former Republican member of the House of Representatives from Minnesota. He was closely aligned with Newt Gingrich, and was considered a rising star in the Republican Party. Weber left Congress in 1992, when he was implicated in a financial scandal. He was one of the notable signatories of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Weigle, George — Is an ethicist, political commentator, and signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Weiss, Jeffrey — Was a Black, Manafort, Stone, and Kelly lobbyist who worked on projects for notables in the Republican Party.

Weiss, Juleanna Glover — Worked for Bill Kristol, VP Dan Quayle, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, and Senator Jesse Helms. In the prelude to OIF, she worked both as a senior staffer in the OPOTUS and as VP Dick Cheney's Press Secretary.

Wells, Linton — Was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense during the W. J. Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations. Dr. Wells' portfolio was command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I).

White, Wayne — Was a senior State Department INR official who was instrumental in the writing of that organization's dissenting opinions appearing in the NIE of October 2002. White was a notable critic of the CIA's poor analytic product appearing in that document.

Wilkinson, Jim — Served in the OPOTUS as Deputy Communications Director, and as an aide to then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Wilkinson was a critical player in the pro-war announcements emanating from the OPOTUS. When Rice was appointed Secretary of State, Wilkinson moved to the State Department, again serving as her aide.

Wilkerson, Lawrence — Army Colonel Wilkerson served as General Colin Powell's aide-de-camp since early 1989. He then served as Secretary of State Colin Powell's Chief of Staff during the prelude to OIF.

Williams, Rhys M. — Was a senior member of the DoE's scientific staff. Williams stayed in the DoE and went on to the position of Deputy Director of Nonproliferation, Verification Research and Development at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Williams help write the DoE's dissenting opinion about the aluminum tubes – Zippe centrifuge scenario.

Wilson, Joseph — Please see the body text of this study for more details.

Wilson, Thomas R. — Was the Director of the DIA from July 1999 – July 2002.

Wippl, Joseph — Was CIA Chief of Station in both Berlin and Pullach. Wippl was instrumental in keeping the lines of cooperation open between the IC and the German BND. He was also one the CIA's officials who provided early assessments that debunked the 'Curveball' affair and other assertions that Iraq had an extant WMD program and connections to transnational terror organizations.

Wohlstetter, Albert — Please see the body text of this study for more details.

Wohlstetter, Joan — Is the daughter of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter. Joan Wohlstetter attended high school in Los Angeles where she was a close friend of Richard Perle. She introduced Richard Perle to her parents thereby starting a relationship that culminated with Perle becoming an intellectual protégé of her father Albert.

Wohlstetter, Roberta — Please see the body text of this study for more details.

Wolfowitz, Clare — Was the wife of Paul Wolfowitz. She was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton.

Wolfowitz, Paul D. — Was a signatory of PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton. Please see the body text of this study for more details on this individual.

Wood, Houston III — Was one of the primary founders of the DoE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory Centrifuge Physics Department. Wood is also an applied physics and nuclear engineering professor at the University of Virginia and a world-renowned subject matter expert not only on generalized uranium enrichment techniques but also on one of its variants called gaseous centrifugation. Wood designed and built America's first gaseous centrifuges while working at the DoE.

Woolsey, R. James — Served as director of the CIA from February 1993 — January 1995. He was a member of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in Richard M. Nixon's second presidential term. Other notable members of this group are Senator Henry M. 'Scoop' Jackson, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Midge Decter, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Jean Kirkpatrick, and Ben Wattenberg. This group urged President Richard M. Nixon to abandon the concept of détente, and adopt a tough confrontational approach toward the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In the late summer of 1989, Woolsey made first unofficial contact with Ahmad Chalabi. In 1997, Woolsey served on a committee with Harvard Professor Joseph Nye that asserted the United States was unprepared to defend itself against a terrorist attack using NBCW. Woolsey was a signatory of the 1998 PNAC letter to President W. J. Clinton. Woolsey was active in public affairs in the prelude to OIF, and has repeatedly asserted that Iraq was responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 disasters. Woolsey was one of the earlier supporters of a United States invasion of Iraq.

Wurmser, David — Was the director of Middle East Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Shortly after the 9/11 disasters, Douglas J. Feith and Harold Rhode recruited Wurmser to be a DoD consultant. In 1996, Wurmser in cooperation with Feith, Richard Perle, and his wife Meyrav Wurmser wrote a paper for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called *A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm* that advocated Israel contain, destabilize, and rollback various states in the Levant. The paper also promoted the policy of overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, pressing Jordan to restore the Hashemite Dynasty to the Iraqi throne, and launching military attacks against Lebanon and Syria. In 1997 Wurmser wrote an op-ed in the *Wall Street Journal* called *Iraq Needs a Revolution*, and in 1998 cosigned a letter with Richard Perle calling for full U. S. support for the Iraqi National Congress in its efforts to mount an insurgency with a view of deposing Saddam Hussein. While working at the AEI, Wurmser wrote an expanded version of his Israeli strategy paper called *Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein*, advocating an alliance between the INC and Jordan in order to redraw the map of the Middle East. This book cited intellectual foundations provided by Ahmad Chalabi, Richard Perle, and Douglas J. Feith. In the prelude to OIF, Feith hired Wurmser as the leader of the PCTEG.

Wurmser, Meyrav — Is a former senior fellow at the Hudson Institute Center for Middle East Policy, and was the cofounder of the Middle East Media Research Institute with Yigal Carmon. She is married to David Wurmser. In 1996, Ms. Wurmser helped write *A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm*. Both Meyrav and David Wurmser signed the PNAC's letter addressed to President W. J. Clinton.

Yasin, Abdul Rahman — Is an American-born individual of Iraqi descent. Yasin was one of the bomb-makers involved in the 1993 World Trade Center attacks. He was never apprehended by U. S. authorities. Yasin has lived in Iraq since late 1993. The Iraqi authorities held him in Abu Ghraib prison since 1994. His last public appearance was on a CBS News interview with Leslie Stahl on May 23, 2002. After that appearance, his whereabouts became unknown.

Yousef, Ramzi — Was one of the main perpetrators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the bombing of Philippine Airlines flight 434, and a co-conspirator of the Bojinka Plot. In 1995, the Pakistani ISI and U. S. Diplomatic Security Service arrested him in an Islamabad guesthouse. His maternal uncle is Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the other conspirators in the Bojinka Plot and the architect of the 9/11 attacks. He is serving two consecutive life sentences in the federal supermax prison in Florence, Colorado.

Yousif, Maha — Is a prominent dentist residing in the United States. He was a member of the INC.

Zakheim, Dov — Was the DoD Comptroller under President G. W. Bush. He was a noted signatory of the PNAC's letter to president W. J. Clinton.

Zegart, Amy B. — Was an assistant to Dr. Condoleezza Rice in the G. W. Bush cabinet. Previously, Zegart was a graduate student under the supervision of Rice.

Zeman, Milos — Was the Czech Prime Minister during the prelude to OIF.

al-Zahawie, Wissam — Was Iraq's ambassador to the Vatican. He retired from Iraq's Foreign Service before OIF. He now lives comfortably in Amman, Jordan and writes political commentaries pertaining to Iraq, the United States, and the Middle East.

al-Zawahiri, Ayman Mohammed Rabie — Is the current leader of *al-Qaeda*. In 1986, he first met Osama bin-Laden during a visit to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Al-Zawahiri was a high-ranking official in Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and promoted its morphing into *al-Qaeda*. He was second in command of *al-Qaeda*, assuming leadership over that organization when United States Navy Seals killed bin-Laden in his Abbottabad, Pakistan stronghold.

Zibari, Hoshyar — Is a Kurd originally from Aqrah, in the Nineveh governorate of Iraq. In the 1990s, he was a prominent representative for the Kurdish Democratic Party.

Zinni, Anthony — A career Marine Corps officer, Zinni served as Combatant Commander of Central Command from 1997 — 2000. He designed the overall strategy for ODF. Testifying before Congress on March 15, 2000 Zinni mentioned that Iraq was a threat to peace because of its continuing attempts to acquire WMD and its record of disobedience of the post-Operation Desert Storm cease-fire agreements. In that testimony, he advocated for a new disarmament regime to be imposed on Iraq. Zinni served as United States Special Envoy for Middle East Peace from November 7, 2001 — March 2003.

al-Zobaidy, Mohamad — Is also known as Mohammed al-Zubaidi.

Zoellick, Robert — Served in various positions in the State Department from 1995 — 1992. After he left government service, Zoellick served as the Executive Vice President of Fannie Mae from 1993 — 1997. Notably, Zoellick was a signatory of the PNAC's letter to President W. J. Clinton that advocated military action against Iraq. In the 2000 presidential campaign, Zoellick served as foreign policy advisor to G. W. Bush and the Vulcans.

al-Zubaidi, Mohammed — Was a close confidant of Ahmad Chalabi. He also was the INC's chief of security and intelligence operations. Al-Zobaidy joined the INC in 1992. He was one of the INC's chief propagandists. He concocted stories that asserted Saddam Hussein's security apparatus was responsible for the training, funding, and logistical support of the 9/11 attacks. He was also responsible for the recruitment of alleged Iraqi government resources willing to provide incriminating data to members of the OSP, NESA, and PCTEG. He operated a data gathering network from offices located in Damascus, Syria and Amman, Jordan. This network used Iraqi expatriates who lived in Jordan and other areas as 'intelligence sources' from whom the INC could advance its political goals. These sources were promised assistance in gaining refugee status in the U. S., U. K., and Western Europe in exchange for their cooperation.

Zubaydah, Abu — Is a Saudi Arabian citizen also known as Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn. He is currently detained by United States authorities in the Guantánamo Bay facility. Pakistani officials arrested Zubaydah in March 2002 and then transferred him to the custody of the CIA. Zubaydah served in the *mujahedeen* in the Afghan civil war, and has connections to *al-Qaeda* and other transnational Islamist terror groups.

Zumwalt, Elmo — Was a long serving naval officer who served in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam conflict. He served as Chief of Naval operations starting in April 1970. He retired from the Navy in July 1974. Zumwalt was a strong supporter of a vigorous American foreign policy with respect to its foreign adversaries. He also supported the notions put forward by the PNAC and other neoconservative issue cluster / networks.

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND RECRUITING SCRIPTS

Initial Interview Question Template

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Personal Referral Recruiting Script Template

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APPENDIX D

RESEARCH ETHICS DOCUMENTS

Certification of Institutional Ethics Review

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Certification of Institutional Ethics Review Extension

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Research Ethics Informed Consent Document for Confidential Respondents

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Research Ethics Informed Consent Document for Public Respondents

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Tri-Council Policy Certificate of Completion

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**Tri-Council Policy Certificate of Completion: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving
Humans**

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