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The Roots of Democratic Participation: The Historical Legacies of the Polish Partitions

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The Roots of Democratic Participation:

The Historical Legacies of the Polish Partitions

by

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A THESIS

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Abstract

This thesis examines the historical legacies of Poland's partitioned past as an explanation for contemporary regional differentiation in citizens' democratic participation. Specifically, it considers the historical experience of the Poles prior to 1919 and their response to the occupying powers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia following the partition of the state between 1772 and 1795. In doing so, it focuses on two mechanisms: the birth of modern cultural nationalism and peasant political integration. It argues that the way these variables developed under the authority of the occupying powers accounts for a) the quality of contemporary democratic participation, and b) the persistence of political values over time. The Polish example illustrates the larger implications of the preconditions driving citizen participation and how these affect the quality of democratic development.

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To the memory of Dr. Gretchen MacMillan

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Introduction

More than two decades after the introduction of democracy in Poland, it can be observed that there are regional distinctions with respect to citizens' participation in the democratic process. From the first semi-free elections in 1989 until the most recent parliamentary elections in 2011, electoral evidence has shown Poland to be divided along regional lines. The electoral geography of voter turnout in the most recent sejm (the lower house of the parliament) elections reveals southeastern Poland to have the highest participation, followed by the northwestern provinces. Central and eastern Poland have areas of high participation as well as large pockets of some of the lowest turnout in the country. Low turnout can also be observed in areas along the western border (Figure 0.1). Citizens' political preferences also seem to be regionally determined: southeastern Poland emerged as the stronghold of the nationalist, Catholic right, while liberal ideologies and programs are favoured in the north and west (Figure 0.2. and 0.3).

After 45 years of ideological repression, prohibiting the expression of varied political and social interests and with no long-term history of democratic participation, the presence of distinct and stable regional patterns of citizens' participation is an unexpected outcome of post 1989 democratic politics. Moreover, Poland's first decade as an emergent democracy was characterized by dramatic changes of the political landscape. This is all the more interesting because Poland is considered to have an extremely homogeneous cultural landscape. The vast majority of the Polish population identifies with the Polish ethnic identity and exclusively uses the Polish language. Poland is also mainly Roman Catholic. In 2011, 87 percent of the population identified with the Roman Catholic Latin rite.¹ In light of this, the question that this thesis asks is: What accounts for the regional differences with respect to citizen's political participation? Subsequently, how do these traditions endure over time?

This thesis proposes that patterns of regional differences in the levels of citizen's political participation are less likely to be defined by modern administrative divisions, than by their historical experiences in the partitions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Following the partition of the state between 1772 and 1795, Poland was subject to the

¹ Central Statistical Office, "Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 2012," (Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 2012), 134.

occupying powers of Prussia, Russia, and Austria until 1918. These historical regions left behind long lasting patterns of political and social behaviour, which despite communism have survived to manifest themselves in discernible regional variations of citizens' connection to public life such as their relationship with politics and political institutions. To support this hypothesis, this thesis will compare the different historical experiences of Poles prior to 1918 and their response to the foreign administrations of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. This paper will argue that the roots of regional differences within Poland can be found in the administrative structures of the occupying powers, specifically their effect on Polish cultural-religious development as an expression of modern nationalism and peasant integration into political life. The way that these mechanisms developed under each of the foreign administrations accounts for the quality of contemporary democratic participation and the persistence of political values over time.

The "Polish question" fits into the larger debate regarding the role of citizen participation and its effect on democratic quality within a liberal democratic system. Specifically, it aims to contribute to our understanding of what preconditions might affect the quality of democracy. If a robust democracy is an outcome of citizen participation, what factors influence how citizens participate in democracy?

There are two theoretical approaches informing this debate: institutionalism and behaviouralism. Institutionalism takes as its main premise that institutions shape political behaviour.² Institutions provide the framework, that is, "the rules of the game" that structure the interaction of individuals (North 1990). In doing so, institutions both constrain and enable the kinds of political choices available to individuals by shaping "norms, beliefs, and actions" and thereby influence political outcomes. In addition, history matters, and it matters most with respect to institutions. Institutional choices made in the formative stage of institutional development, or policy initiation, set the direction of future

²Institutions have been central to questions about political life since antiquity and can be found in the political philosophy of Aristotle. In recent decades, 'new institutionalism' or 'neo-institutionalism' has sought to advance theoretically and empirically in order to provide a better understanding of the centrality of institutions in-political life. New institutionalism can be distinguished to have a variety of different analytical approaches, however, they agree in the core assumptions that institutions shape political life and that a nation's history matters. For a detailed discussion of Institutional Theory within the discipline of political science see, Guy B. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The "New Institutionalism"* (New York: Continuum, 1999). For a discussion of three variations of new institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism see, Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* 44 (1996): 936-957.

development.³ Subsequent institutional evolution is therefore constrained by past trajectories. As Putnam notes, “Individuals may “choose” their institutions, but they do not choose them under circumstances of their own making, and their choices in turn influence the rules within which their successors choose” (Putnam 1993: 8). These historically derived trajectories can therefore serve as the foundation for political legacies. As a result, current political contexts need to be considered in light of past history.

By contrast behaviouralism challenges the centrality of institutions and places emphasis on individuals as the only relevant political actors, arguing that individuals and their behaviours determine how individuals participate in politics.⁴ In other words, behaviouralism reverses the causal direction, stating that politics and political institutions are an outcome of the behaviour of individuals (and groups of individuals). As such, the focus of analysis is on the individual “whether as a voter, as a holder of opinions, or as a member of the political elite” (Peters 1999: 14). The application of this approach can be found in the study of political cultures. Almond and Verba’s landmark study, of the *Civic Culture*, aims to explain variations in political systems by examining the political norms and attitudes of the polity, or what the authors refer to as the “civic culture”.⁵ In Almond and Verba’s study, culture is seen as the main mechanism that governs behaviour towards the political system. However, the roots of cultural explanations are traced by the authors to institutional history, which points to the impact of political institutions on the development of political culture. The behaviouralist framework of this study is grounded on the premise that while institutional history shapes political culture, it is political culture that determines the individuals’ connection to political institutions.

This debate is central to our understanding of the different interpretations of citizen participation. To the extent that institutionalism gives priority to institutions as determinants of political behaviour, and behaviouralism gives priority to individuals’

³ The argument is central to historical institutionalism, however the importance of history in institutional development can also be observed in rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and economic institutionalism, particularly in the work of Douglass North (1990). The general emphasis in both “old” and “new” institutionalism is that history matters to contemporary institutional and therefore political analysis.

⁴ Behaviouralism as a political science approach developed with the intent to improve theory development and methodological testing. It differs from the institutionalist approach in that it rejects institutions as the focus of political analysis and examines individuals and their behaviours in relation to the political system.

⁵ See, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company (Inc.), 1965).

behaviours as determinates of institutions, the two are fundamentally different. However, both approaches have a shared focus on historical trajectories and these trajectories shape both the institutional and the cultural reality that affects political behaviour. As such, this thesis takes the perspective that the focus of analysis needs to be placed on the institutional histories that forged the direction of development. This approach will demonstrate that whether it is institutions or political cultures that shape individual behaviour, both are relevant only because institutional histories have set meaningful boundaries around them in the first place. This study seeks to contribute to this debate by examining the institutional determinants of political legacies in Poland and their effect on regional patterns of political participation.

Poland provides a good case study in regard to this debate due to its unique historical situation caused by the partitions of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. For over a century, Poland had been subject to the different institutional structures of Prussia (later on Germany), Russia and Austria. It is the prevailing institutions and structures of these states, exerting different influence on the cultural, political and economic spheres and general framework of daily life, that shaped mass society's relationship with politics. As a result of the partitions, three distinct historical regions can be identified in contemporary Poland, each roughly corresponding to the former partition zones. A fourth region can also be identified on account of border changes following WWII. The partitions of Poland provide a natural experiment of institutional legacies in which three different formal institutional frameworks are applied to the former political entity of Poland and alter the existing structures of interaction. It is these influences that have left lasting legacies that today account for citizens' participatory behaviours.

The examination of Poland within the context of the institutional-behavioural debate helps shed light on what preconditions might affect the quality of democracy, and ultimately, the larger question of "What makes democracies work?" For a young democracy like Poland, this is of key significance to future democratic development. For a country that it is in its Third Republic, reconciling historical legacies with future objectives will be key.

The objective of this thesis is to provide a framework for assessing the effects of the partition period on contemporary patterns of democratic political participation. By

addressing the institutional role in the shaping of Polish nationalism and peasant political integration this paper does not intend to disregard the role of individual political actors. Rather, the main objective is to focus the discussion on the mechanisms that are linked to the development of participatory behaviour as it occurred in each of the partitioned regions. By bringing the focus to these mechanisms it is possible to identify varying trajectories of change as they occurred in each of the partitions resulting in different patterns of regional participation. The historical legacy of the partitions does not explain everything, but it is an often over looked factor that explains more than previously assumed.

This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter One presents the puzzle of Polish regional differences in regards to political participation in contemporary democratic Poland. It also reviews the relevant literature that tries to explain this problem and presents the analytical framework and methodology used in this paper. Chapters Two and Three examine the possible causal mechanism behind the observed participatory patterns of regional differences, providing a controlled comparison between Poland's historic regions. Chapter Four considers the implications of these findings for understanding political participation in contemporary democratic Poland.

Figure 0.1 Voter turnout according to electoral districts, 9 October 2011 sejm elections







Figure 0.2 Political parties with best results according to electoral districts, 9 October 2011 sejm elections



Source: National Electoral Commission

Figure 0.3 Political parties with best results broken down by counties and cities with county rights, 9 October 2011 sejm elections



Source: National Electoral Commission

Chapter One: The Polish Puzzle

Mapping Voter Turnout and Partisanship in Poland between 1989-2011

In 1989 Poland emerged as a sovereign state and transitioned to a democratic regime. More than two decades later regional patterns of voter turnout and voter preferences in Poland are both readily identifiable and stable. This regional diversity in voting is unexpected given the country's most recent history. WWII and its artificial homogenization of society, as well as the post war change of frontiers and various resettlement and expulsion programs have left Poland with a relatively uniform ethnic landscape.⁶ Today, the vast majority of Poland's 38.5 million inhabitants identify themselves to be of Polish ethnicity and speak the Polish language.⁷ Poland is also predominantly Roman Catholic, with approximately 87 percent of the population belonging to the Roman Catholic Church.⁸ Adding to these structural changes are 45 years of communist rule; the end of this era was assumed to have 'wiped the slate clean', resulting in an absence of legitimate political authority as well as political norms and behaviours of the old regime. The introduction of democratic elections resulted in its own kind of chaos as first time participants in the democratic process were faced with a multitude of political options, party fragmentation, and changing coalitions. Yet, in the 22 years of Poland's short democratic history, stable patterns of differentiation have come to light both across time and space. Polish citizens have not only been able to identify ideological and economic preferences, but electoral returns also show that political sympathies have a corresponding regional geography that has largely remained unchanged since 1991.

In light of this apparent paradox, this thesis asks: What accounts for the regional differences with respect to citizen's political participation, and how have these traditions endured over time? This chapter starts by providing a brief overview of the problem to be examined; that is, the structure of Polish politics and the corresponding geographical regional patterns of partisanship and turnout in Polish elections between 1989-2011.

⁶ Prior to WWII, Poland had been ethnically and religiously diverse. The methodical destruction of Poland's Jewish population during the Holocaust left the country ethnically Polish.

⁷ Based on official census estimates, approximately 96 percent of Poland's population consider themselves to be of Polish national-ethnic identity. The largest groups of national-ethnic minority are: Silesian, German, Ukrainian, Kashubian, Romany, Russian, Ruthenian, and Lithuanian. See, Central Statistical Office, "Demographic Yearbook of Poland, 2012" (Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 2012). 173-174.

⁸ See, Central Statistical Office, "Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 2012" (Warsaw: Central Statistical Office 2012), 134.

Voting Preferences and Turnout

Since the first semi-free elections in 1989, the Polish political landscape has displayed a decidedly divided character. Given that there were only two options for which to vote -the existing communist regime and the Solidarity opposition- the 1989 election was less a parliamentary contest than a “referendum” demonstrating society’s disapproval of communist rule and as a result, anti-communist sentiments were the main force behind the decisive Solidarity win (Tworzecki 1996: 89). Despite the high support for Solidarity throughout Poland, observable regional variations in voting patterns emerged. Southeastern Poland was identified as the stronghold of Solidarity, while the western and northeast provinces (with the exception of Gdańsk and Wrocław provinces) provided the electoral base for the communist “National List” (Heyns and Białecki 1991; Jasiewicz and Żukowski 1992; Tworzecki 1996; Raciborski 1997) (see Appendix A – “Solidarity”).

Voter turnout seemed to also have a similar geographic character. Turnout was highest in the provinces of: Piła, Leszno, Kalisz (present day Wielkopolska province) followed by the areas of southeastern Poland: Bielsko-Biała, Nowy Sącz, Tarnów, Rzeszów, Krosno and Przemyśl, and Zamość (present day Małopolska and Podkarpackie provinces) (see Appendix A – “electoral turnout”).⁹ Turnout was lowest in the east and central Poland as well as the western provinces.

The development of parliamentary democracy in Poland in the 1990s provided citizens with more political options allowing for diversification of voting preferences along regional lines. The large number of political parties provided for a wider representation of interests. By that same account, in the initial years of the 1990s the political scene was vastly fragmented and unstable.¹⁰ Despite this, two distinct political groupings became evident, those with roots in the Solidarity opposition movement,¹¹ and those rooted in the

⁹ From 1975 to 1998 Poland was divided into 49 provinces, also called voivodeships (*województwa*), first level administrative units. As of 1 January 1999, Poland has 16 provinces.

¹⁰ This is in part due to the rules of the Polish electoral system, which allowed any party that received at least 1% of the popular vote to hold seats in parliament.

¹¹ The parties included: Democratic Union (*Unia Demokratyczna*, UD, 1990), later the Freedom Union (*Unia Wolności*, UW, 1994), Liberal Democratic Congress (*Kongress Liberalno – Demokratyczny*, KLD), Center Citizen’s Alliance, (*Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum*, POC), Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity (*Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”*, NSZZ “*Solidarność*”), Confederation of Independent Poland, (*Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*, KPN).

former regime¹² (Tworzecki 1996: 97; Jasiewicz 1993). Towards the end of the decade a number of political parties identifying with either of these groupings became organized into two electoral alliances: Solidarity Electoral Action (*Akcja Wyborcza 'Solidarność'*, AWS)¹³ and the Alliance of the Democratic Left (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*, SLD).¹⁴ The AWS represented the anti-communist 'Right', while the SLD, represented successors of the communist 'Left', gaining much of its support from former party supporters as well those enduring the hardships of economic transition.¹⁵

Adding to this picture of the political scene is the consistent presence of agrarian parties such as Peasants' Accord (*Porozumienie Ludowe*, PL), Polish Peasants' Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, PSL),¹⁶ Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (*Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polski*, SRP) and religious conservative parties such as the Catholic Electoral Action (*Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka*, WAK). These parties did not necessarily fit into the anti-communist vs. post-communist (left vs. right) dichotomy, although they aligned with one or the other, depending on their own interests of economic and national or traditional conservatism. The liberal-democratic interests, also referred to as the urban/elitarian option (Bański 2012), on the other hand, were represented by the Democratic Union (*Unia Demokratyczna*, UD), later the Freedom Union (*Unia Wolności*, UW), the Liberal-Democratic Congress (*Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny*, KLD) and the Union of Realistic Politics (*Unia Polityki Realnej*, UPR). While these parties had their roots in Solidarity, they represented a liberal, market-oriented option rather than focusing on the anti-communist and nationalistic message of their former Solidarity counterparts.

¹² Social Democratic Party of Poland (*Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – SdRP*), and the Democratic Left Alliance, SLD.

¹³ The AWS was a coalition formed in 1996-2001, consisting of: Christian-National Union (*Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe*, ZChN), Peasants Agreement (*Porozumienie Ludowe*, PL), Confederation of Independent Poland, (*Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*, KPN), Nonpartisan Block for Support of Reforms (*Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform*, BBWR), Conservative People's Party (*Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe*, SKL), and the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity (*Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy "Solidarność"* NSZZ "Solidarność").

¹⁴ The SLD coalition formed in 1990 and was led by the SdRP, the successor of the communist Polish United Workers Party.

¹⁵ In Polish politics the terms "Right" and "Left" are used in reference to a party's origin in either the Solidarity opposition or the communist party. Throughout this thesis the terms will be used in this way.

¹⁶ Polish People's Party or Polish Peasant's Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL*) is a populist agrarian party, which tends to shift both right and left on the political spectrum, depending on its interests. The roots of this political party can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century. See, Olga Narkiewicz, *The Green Flag: Polish Populist Politics, 1867-1970* (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976).

A similar division of political representation can be observed in the presidential candidates of the 1990s. Lech Wałęsa, the Solidarity leader, was a clear representation of the anti-communist sentiments of the ‘Right’, while Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz of the SLD represented the post-communist “Left”. The two other leading incumbents were Tadeusz Mazowiecki, also of the former Solidarity movement and Stanisław Tymiński running as an independent. Tworzecki (1996: 93) has described the 1990 elections as “differentiated on the basis of feelings towards the communist regime”. Wałęsa was the favorite and ultimately won the very first direct presidential election in Poland on 9 December 1990. Lech Wałęsa and Alexander Kwaśniewski, the leader of the SdRP, dominated the presidential elections of 1995, making the anti-communist versus post-communist sentiments the key axis of electoral competition.¹⁷ Ultimately, Wałęsa won a second term in office during this election.

Studies of electoral support in the parliamentary and presidential elections of the 1990s have indicated that voter support seems to follow the regional patterns that first became evident in 1989. Provinces distinguished by high support for Solidarity in 1989 favoured parties and candidates that reflected the Solidarity (anti-communist) traditions and built on its symbols of nationalism and Catholicism. Political parties such as the Citizens’ Center Alliance (POC), and Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) in 1991 and Solidarity Electoral Action in 1993 and 1997 and presidential candidates like Wałęsa (1991,1995) received much of their support from the Solidarity stronghold of southeastern Poland, as well as significant support from central-eastern Poland, which is considered to have a similar socially traditional and conservative population (see, Appendices B-F – “right-of-center”).¹⁸ In contrast, provinces that gave support, or at least did not oppose the National List in 1989, have been observed to support the communist successor parties, such as the SLD in the parliamentary elections of 1991,1993, 1997, and presidential candidates Cimoszewicz (1990), and Kwaśniewski (1995).¹⁹ Most of their support came from the

¹⁷ Other candidates included Pawlak (PSL), Zielinski (UP), Kuroń (UW, formerly the UD and KLD), Olszewski (national right), and Gronkiewicz-Waltz.

¹⁸ Tworzecki, in his book *Parties and Politics in Post -1989 Poland* (1996), indicates that the “correlation between a province’s average Solidarity vote in 1989 and voting for Wałęsa in 1990 was .69; the correlation between voting for the Communist “National List” in the 1989 election and voting for Wałęsa in 1990 was .77.” See. Tworzecki, *Parties and Politics in Post-1989 Poland*, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), 108, figure 3.6.

¹⁹Curiously, these areas also gave support to the Tymiński (1990) anomaly.

northern and western provinces (see, Appendices B-F –“left-of-center”). The SLD also did well in the city of Łódź, as well as Poland’s eastern provinces, where concentrations of Belorussian and Ukrainian minorities reside (Kowalski 2000).

In addition to the left-right distinction, there is what many researchers have identified as the rural-urban or peasant-liberal divide. In the parliamentary elections of 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997, agrarian parties such as PSL and PL gained much of their support in the rural regions of central and eastern Poland. As did the presidential candidate Waldemar Pawlak of the PSL in the 1995 elections (see, Appendices B-F –“peasants”). The Catholic party WAK also did well in rural east-central Poland. The party’s religious traditionalism and conservative profile made it an appealing option in agrarian districts (Tworzecki 1996: 92). On the other hand, parties such as the Democratic Union (UD), the Freedom Union, the Liberal-Democratic Congress, and the Union of Realistic Politics, and presidential candidates Mazowiecki (1990) and Jacek Kurón (1995) from the UW received most of their votes from urban Poland. Support for these candidates was strongest in major cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, Gdańsk, Poznań, Wrocław, and Szczecin as well as provinces where small-scale private agriculture is absent (see, Appendices B-F –“liberal”).

An interesting outcome of the 1990 election was Mazowiecki’s candidacy. While Mazowiecki lost in the first round of voting, and Wałęsa was ultimately elected as president, the map of Mazowiecki’s electoral support has been described as “almost a photographic negative of the map showing Wałęsa’s support” (Tworzecki 1996: 92). The provinces on the left of the map expressing their support for Mazowiecki while the provinces on the right giving their support to Wałęsa (see Appendix B).

Despite the vast array of political options, the post-Solidarity versus the post-communist conflict came to define Polish politics of the 1990s. As Jasiewicz (2009: 497) points out:

The choice of whom to vote for were defined much more by the past (pre-1989) credentials of political actors and past experiences of the voters than by the present policy issues. The former were well defined and easily understood; the latter were foggy and poorly articulated.

What is more interesting, however, is the easily discernible and stable pattern of regional support that emerged. Southern, eastern and central Poland provided support for the right, while the western and northern areas supported the left, adding a layer of complexity to this

picture is the urban-rural distinction, as observed by Tworzecki (1996: 93). This second distinction points to the geographic distribution of votes between western urbanized regions and rural agrarian Poland.

Yet another layer is added when voter turnout is considered. The geographical pattern of turnout shows some slight changes in subsequent elections since 1989 but continues to be regionally differentiated with the provinces in northwestern Poland (Poznań, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk) and in southeastern Poland (Kraków, Rzeszów, Bielsko-Biała, Nowy Sącz) showing the highest turnout. The lowest turnout is characteristic of central and eastern Poland, with the exceptions of Warsaw and Łódź, as well as the western provinces along the German and Czech borders, and the northern provinces (Elbląg, Olsztyn, and Suwałki), with the exception of Wrocław (see, Appendices B-F –“electoral turnout”).

During the early 2000s the political support swung in favor of the left with Kwaśniewski (SLD) winning the presidential election in 2000,²⁰ and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Labour Union (UP) coalition, winning parliament in 2001. The left's return to power (by a landslide victory of 41.04 percent) indicates change and can be explained on the one hand by the fractured state of the Solidarity coalition (Poland 2001). On the other hand, it suggests that as time passed, voter preferences became more about economics than the politics of the recent past (Bański et al., 2012). For some voters there was a perception of whether they (self) identified as “winners” or “losers” of the transition period, which accounted for their choice. Poland's accession to the European Union, for some, contributed to this concern. In the 2001 elections, agrarian parties also rose in popularity, with the two largest parties, Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) and Self-Defense, winning a combined total of 19.18 percent of the vote (Poland 2001).

Regionally, central and eastern Poland continued to give backing to the agrarian option while the successor left advanced its hold in western and northern Poland (Bański et al. 2012). Despite the strong shift towards the left throughout the country, southeastern Poland continued to be a stronghold for the post-Solidarity right, represented by the AWS.

²⁰ A visual representation of the electoral maps for the Presidential Election of 2000 was not available from the National Electoral Commission.

In other words, electoral data shows that at the regional level patterns of support have remained consistent (see, Appendix G).

From 2005 onward the two leading parties have been the Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS) and the Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*, PO) as well as their respective candidates for president, Lech Kaczyński (2005) and Jarosław Kaczyński of PiS (2010), and Donald Tusk (2005) and Bronisław Komorowski (2010) of PO. While both PO and PiS have their roots in the Solidarity movement and are committed to Poland's independence and democratic success, there are key differences between the two. PO derives from the liberal or elitarian faction of the post-Solidarity grouping. It is a liberal party that supports free market economic policies, and close ties with the European Union. On social issues it takes a conservative position. The party is respectful of the Catholic Church, but encourages a separation in the relationship between church and state. PiS have roots in the AWS and Christian Democratic Center Agreement. It is a national conservative party that advocates a social market economy, and is cautious of the European Union. Unlike PO, PiS is more closely associated with the Catholic Church. It is also known for its commitment to anti-corruption and decommunization.

2005 marks a considerable change in the Polish political scene. The presence of the SLD and left-wing parties (i.e. the Labour Union) has not necessarily disappeared, but has certainly been reduced to marginal proportions owing to various corruption and scandal allegations following the left's four-year rule (see, Appendix H – “left-of-center”). Conversely, the agrarian Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) continues to demonstrate a stable presence (see, Appendix H – “peasants”).²¹ Since it was first introduced to the political scene in 1990, the PSL has consistently been represented in parliament.

The parliamentary and presidential elections between 2005 and 2011 reveal regional patterns of support for PO and PiS as well as their presidential candidates.²² The provinces along the western and northern border of Poland, lend their support to Civic Platform, Tusk and Komorowski (see, Appendices H-L – “liberal”). The southeastern corner of Poland,

²¹ Agrarian party, Self-Defense has been represented in parliament since 2001; in 2007 it lost representation and has not regained it since.

²² The electoral maps for the first decade of elections were sourced from Kowalski (2000), as primary data was not available. The second decade of electoral data (2001-2011) was sourced from the Polish National Electoral Commission. While the electoral data was obtained from two different sources, both illustrate the same outcomes of regional differentiation in electoral turnout and preferences.

along with the eastern border and central Poland are the support base of Law and Justice and the Kaczyńskis' (see, Appendices H-L – “right-of-center”). The only exceptions to PiS support in these provinces are major cities and small areas where ethnic Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian populations can be found (Jasiewicz 2009: 498). Jasiewicz (2009: 498) has termed this division as that of “liberal Poland (*Polska liberalna*) and Poland of social solidarism (*Polska solidarna*)”. Bański et al., (2012) have stated that this prominence of PO and PiS represents a shift from the left vs. right political conflict to one of center vs. right.²³

An interesting pattern of continuity can be observed here given that the same areas that voted for PO, Tusk and Komorowski also supported the post-communist party SLD during the 1990s and the National List in the 1989 election (Jasiewicz 2009: 498). The areas that voted for PiS and the Kaczyńskis', on the other hand, gave strong preference to the post-Solidarity factions (POC, KPN and AWS), and Wałęsa during the 1990 and 1995 elections, and were a Solidarity stronghold in 1989. While initially this has been called a paradox (Jasiewicz 2009: 498), subsequent research conducted by Bański et al., (2012) has shown that the shift of the political scene since 2005 has had an impact on the Polish countryside. PiS have strengthened the support of the right in the traditionally agrarian regions of east and central Poland, even taking support way from agrarian parties. As a consequence, PO has attracted “moderate right –wing voters”, dissatisfied with PiS, gaining much support in the rural areas of western Poland.

The electoral map of support distribution for PO and PiS also resembles the 1990 presidential contest and the distribution of support for Wałęsa and Mazowiecki. Significantly, to the point that the map is split in two, the provinces on the left half of the map express a preference for PO and are the same provinces that supported Mazowiecki, while the provinces on the right half, expressing a preference for PiS are the same provinces that supported Wałęsa.

²³ New parties have also entered the political scene: Palikot's Movement (*Ruch Palikota*, RP) a libertarian, anti-clerical party founded in 2010 that gained representation in the parliament in 2011. It is a splinter from PO; Poland Comes First (*Polska Jest Najważniejsza*, PJN) was founded in 2010 and is a splinter group of PiS; Congress of the New Right (*Kongres Nowa Prawica*, KNP), a conservative liberal and eurosceptic party founded in 2011 by Janusz Korwin-Kikke; United Poland (*Solidarna Polska*, SP), a far right, Catholic nationalist party founded in 2012. It is also a splinter spin-off from PiS.

Although PO and PiS have attracted many voters from other parties, patterns of continuity can still be found for both the left and agrarian options. While the political left has lost much of its representation, parties representing this option continue to maintain pockets of support in northern, mid-northern and western provinces as well as the Świętokrzyskie province in central Poland (see, Appendices H-L – “left-of-center”).²⁴ Agrarian parties also maintain support in central and eastern Poland, albeit reduced (see, Appendices H-L – “peasant”). Finally, in the eastern and southeastern provinces where traditional social values, such as religiosity are strong, voter support is given to Christian conservative parties, which in the 2001 and 2005 election have been represented by the League of Polish Families (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*, LPR).

Patterns of voter turnout in the 2000s very much resemble those of the 1990s. Turnout is always higher in major cities than in rural areas. Regionally, southeast Poland maintains the highest voter turnout, followed by the provinces of Pomorze and Wielkopolska. Lowest turnout continues to be in the western provinces, with the exception of Dolny Śląsk province. Turnout levels in the central and eastern provinces however have increased during the last decade of elections. While this area still shows pockets of low turnout (such as the Świętokrzyskie province), in general a gradual increase can be observed making this area more on par with the rest of the country (see Appendices H-L – “electoral turnout”).

To summarize, the political patterns in the 2000s show that the general political conflict has shifted away from issues largely concerning the post-Solidarity vs. post-communist split. The shift towards “liberal” vs. “right-wing” conservative issues represented by the two right-of-center parties is not necessarily a new one, however. It can be considered to have its roots, much like PO and PiS, in the original split of Solidarity in 1990.

Despite the political shifts and new parties entering the political scene, regional patterns of electoral support have remained stable. Southeastern Poland, along with east and central Poland, once a stronghold for post-Solidarity party support has become the support base of right-wing, socially conservative and nationalist PiS. The western and

²⁴ In 2007 the SLD formed a coalition with SDPL, PD and UP.

northern provinces, along with major cities, which once supported the left, offer support to center-right, liberal conservative PO.

The patterns of regional differences in participation are evident from the first elections in 1989 until the present day. While in 1989 the two choices permitted –Solidarity or “Old Regime” were not enough to build a solid case with respect to the regional differences that emerged, twenty some years later, these patterns continue to persist. This suggests that there is something at work informing citizens’ decisions and that these decisions have been reasonably stable over space and time.

Explanations of Regional Differentiation in Poland

Regional differentiation in voting behaviour has not gone unnoticed in Poland. A generation of scholarship beginning in 1989 has tried to make sense of this problem using a variety of different analytic and theoretical frameworks. More recently, researchers have applied different analytical tools in order to better understand the relationship between geography and political behaviour. This section will outline the most prevalent approaches and how researchers have applied them to the Polish problem of regional variation in voting behaviour. Subsequently, this study is going to build on previous work and extend it by looking at older traditions.

Communist Legacies (Post-Communist Transition)

Post-1989 scholarship has explained the post-communist transformation process as a function of the anti-democratic cultural, social, and institutional structures of the communist regime (Jowitt 1992, Hall 1996). According to this perspective, the legacy of communist rule challenges the possibility of building viable democracies in Eastern Europe (Jowitt 1992).²⁵ This approach influenced much of the early research on democracies in the region. As some countries progressed towards democratic consolidation and economic transition and others did not, nuances appeared in the literature. Numerous variations on the “communist legacies” arguments were put forth, citing economics, social structure, culture, modes of extraction, differences in communist and pre-communist party systems, etc., as explanations for the differences between post-communist trajectories (Kolarska-Bobińska,

²⁵ Jowitt argued that Poland might be the only exception in the region on account of the Solidarity movement, demonstrating the presence of a liberal mass society and counter-elite. Ken Jowitt (1992) provides an excellent introduction to comparative analysis of post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe.

1990; Kitchelt, 1992, 1995; Rupnik 1994, Ekiert and Kubik 1999, Wiatr 1999; Howard 2003).

Research on Poland followed this same pattern. Once the scholarship on post-communist transitions shed its initial pessimism, the trajectory of Poland's post-communist transition showed finer distinctions. Particular attention was given to the legacy of communism on the party system. Various authors have argued that Poland's party system is based on "us versus them" divisions that emerged in the 1980s, dividing the defenders of the old regime against those who opposed it (Jasiewicz 1993). Others have focused on the dynamics of the transition process itself, pointing to the division of Polish society into winners and losers of the dual economic and democratic change (Powers and Cox, 1997).

Political scientists and sociologists of the immediate post-communist era have also noticed key divisions of the political space. Mirosława Grabowska (1991, 2004) has argued that the political divisions indicate an on-going left-right cleavage that has divided society into supporters of the former system and those who were against it. For Grabowska, the left-right cleavage is based on economic, political and spiritual criteria (1991). Gebethner (1995), Wiatr (1999), Jasiewicz (1993), and Grzymała-Busse (2002), among others, have put forth similar arguments.

The problem with the concept of communist legacy that informs this approach is that all the emphasis is placed on the recent past. The usefulness of this approach is therefore limited to explanations of the initial post-communist years, whether it be regarding the formation of new institutions, post-communist party systems or even voting behaviour. This approach can explain neither the speed nor the direction of change once new "genuine multi-party democracy had begun to function" (Tworzecki 1996: 20). In this manner, it obscures the significance of the changes that are taking place.

By the same account, the conventional wisdom guiding this approach stated that given the illegitimacy of the former regime, the end of communism represented a "tabula rasa", erasing all previous "politically relevant norms, beliefs, and behaviors" (Tworzecki 1996: 17). This is problematic and raises questions such as how popular participation (mass

mobilization) developed after communism ended,²⁶ or how religion and traditional values survived the communist period to inform voting behaviour in the post-communist era. This paper puts forth the perspective that the historical legacy of communism should be given due attention; however, it is only one layer of European and Polish history. The literature and explanations of the communist legacies approach are self-limiting and it is necessary to consider other explanations.

Electoral Geography

Electoral geography addresses the territorial dimensions of electoral behaviour (Rykiel 2011) and has accompanied much of the research on voting behaviour in Poland.²⁷ These investigations of Polish electoral geography vary on the spatial scale (national level, ethnic minorities, urban versus rural), in their basic unit of measurement (province or county), and the types of elections they consider (presidential, parliamentary, referenda, senate, etc.) (Rykiel 2011: 20). They also vary in their methodology, employing a variety of approaches ranging from descriptive/cartographic, historical/quasi-sociological, statistical and spatial structural (Rykiel 2011: 21).²⁸

One of the key questions explored by electoral geography is that of cleavages and regional differentiation. Geographical empirical analysis has demonstrated that the right and left, as well as urban-rural dimensions of electoral competition have a distinct regional character. Indeed, since the first semi-free elections of 1989, the map of electoral results and turnout has been observed to resemble old historical patterns of the partitions of Poland.²⁹ In light of such empirical evidence, the relevant literatures have hypothesized a clear link between Poland's present day electoral geography and its partitioned past of the nineteenth century along with post WWII border changes. While some of the earlier work

²⁶ For example, why protests and demonstrations in Poland took place between 1989-1993, or what accounts for the "coloured revolutions" in the former Soviet Union in the 2000s. See, Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, *Rebellious Civil society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1999).

²⁷ The field of political cartography was pioneered by geographers Siegfried, Goguel, Kereil and Sauer.

²⁸ For an excellent overview of literature on Polish electoral geography see: Zbigniew Rykiel, "Polish electoral geography and its methods," *Social Space Scientific Journal*. N. 1. (2011): 17-48.

²⁹ The work most commonly cited as the first to point out old historical patterns in the 1989 elections is that of Andrzej Florczyk and Tomasz Żukowski, "Nowa geografia polityczna Polski" [The New Political Geography of Poland] in *Wyniki badań – Wyniki wyborów 4 czerwca 1989*, ed. Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Piotr Łukasiewicz, and Zbigniew W. Rykowski (Warszawa: Ośrodek Badań Społecznych, 1990). Unfortunately, this book was not available to me.

has been descriptive, a number of later works have taken a historical approach in order to explain the problem (Zarycki 1994, 1999, 2002; Rykiel 1995; Kowalski 2000; Raciborski 1997, among others).³⁰

As a result of the large number of works, interesting explanations have been put forth to interpret the connection between contemporary outcomes of electoral behaviour and old historical boundaries. It seems that while numerous authors would agree that regional patterns of Polish electoral geography are easily identifiable, the interpretation of the connection between modern political participation and preferences and old historical boundaries remains difficult, leading to several interpretations of the legacy of the partitions. A number of these interpretations have been grounded in the logic of previously established frameworks of analysis, such as the Lipset and Rokkan perspective or that of political cultures.

The Lipset-Rokkan Model

Given the resemblance of contemporary electoral turnout and partisanship to former historical boundaries, some scholars of Polish electoral geography and party system formation have turned to methods grounded in the historical logic of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967).

The Lipset and Rokkan model asserts that party divisions and voting behaviour in Western European democracies are linked to social divisions that are an outgrowth of two key historical events in the course of European nation building. These are the “National Revolution” and the “Industrial Revolution”. Each country’s experience of these “critical junctures” was shaped, in turn, by the pre-existing conditions under which they happened, (Reformation and Counter Reformation). The outcome of each juncture thus resulted in a set of cleavages. The National Revolution resulted in the *center/periphery* and *religious/secular* cleavages in Western Europe. The center/periphery cleavages represent the conflict between the nation-state and the peripheral opponents, such as ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups. The religious/secular cleavage represents the conflict arising from the state objective to dominate the church. The Industrial Revolution produced the

³⁰ For a more complete list of authors who have considered history as an explanatory variable of the geographic differentiation in Polish political participation see, Rykiel, “Polish electoral geography and its methods,” 17-49.

land/industry cleavage (also referred to as the *rural/urban* divide) as a result of the conflict between the interests of the landed elites and rising bourgeois, and between the “the workers and the owners of the means of production”.

A key component of the Lipset-Rokkan model is the “freezing hypothesis”. The hypothesis states that the national response of a given nation to the above mentioned critical junctures tend to freeze into durable patterns of cleavage structures that can be observed in the formation of political party systems of given countries. From this perspective, contemporary party systems and patterns of voter behaviour have been determined prior to the development of party systems.

The Lipset-Rokkan model was originally developed to explain differences in the political patterns of Western European democratic systems (based on cleavage structures). Since the 1990s, it has been applied in numerous studies examining the post-communist context of Central and Eastern Europe (Sitter 2001; Suraszka 1991, 1996; Tool 2003, 2007; Tworzecki 1996; Zarycki 2000, 2002; Zarycki and Nowak 2002; Zielinski 2002). Some studies have applied this model “using purely contemporary data” (Tool 2007). Other studies highlight the theoretical advantage of long-term historical analysis, and use the Lipset and Rokkan approach to explain regional differentiation of electoral support based on historical context. Toole (2007) most closely replicates the Lipset and Rokkan analysis by testing for the existence of the four cleavages identified by the authors, based on the comparison of socio-historical conditions to outcomes in “modern” political competition.³¹ His findings suggest “...that social division originating decades and even centuries before the advent of communist rule have helped to structure the array of party types found in the post-communist politics of East Central Europe” (Toole 2007: 564). In the case of Poland, for example, the roots in the Catholic Church have produced parties that defend those interests. While Toole concludes that the Lipset-Rokkan model is only partially able to predict the cleavages that come to influence contemporary political competition, he acknowledges that the influence of historical roots in electoral politics should not be underestimated. Toole proposes that a broader interpretation of the model would provide more insight.

³¹ Tool uses the term “modern” in reference to the pre-communist interwar years as well as the post-communist democratic period, when political competition was permitted in East and Central Europe.

Tworzecki (1996) and Zarycki (2000, 2002) have broadened the application of the Lipset and Rokkan model by reinterpreting it in terms of geographic conditions in application to the two political cleavages in Poland, the left-right values and the economic interests.³² Both explain these divisions of the political scene using the center-periphery concept, by identifying Poland as a periphery of Russia, Prussia and Austria during the historical period of the partitions. While Tworzecki uses the center-periphery concept loosely,³³ Zarycki outlines his reasoning, stating that the center-periphery conflict prevented Poland, given its weak state and later partitioned status, from experiencing both the national and industrial revolutions, therefore preventing the development of the classic (in the Lipset-Rokkan sense) church-state and employers-employees cleavages (Zarycki 2000: 868). According to Zarycki, Poland needs to be considered from the “international perspective” (Zarycki 2000: 857), that is, the peripheral status of Poland needs to be taken as constant in relations to the changing geopolitics of the “foreign centers” in order to explain the changing structure of the Polish political landscape.

The basis of both authors’ arguments, therefore, is that historical experiences matter. For instance, Tworzecki (1996: 212) states that “the divergent historical experiences of the eastern and western parts of Poland...” account for the contemporary structure of electoral politics. Similarly, Zarycki (2000: 857) states that Poland’s peripheral status since the eighteenth century affected “the changes in the structure of the Polish political scene in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”. By tracing contemporary electoral preferences to historical junctures in Polish history (identified as the partitions of Poland), both Tworzecki and Zarycki are able to demonstrate that Poland’s historical regions continue to influence political behaviour.

Their research indicates that, despite the apparent volatility of the post-communist political scene, there are geographical patterns of continuity that characterize the democratic practices of Polish society. As Tworzecki points out, there is a “measure of

³² Tworzecki (1996) and Zarycki (2000, 2002) both interpret the Lipset-Rokkan concept of center-periphery from the perspective of geography, that is, regional differences, which manifest in the post communist electoral structure. This interpretation of contemporary electoral structures is seen as an outcome of the center-periphery cleavage that resulted from the conflicting attitudes (social divisions) of Poles towards the partitioning powers during the time of partition of the nineteenth century. The key difference between Tworzecki’s research and that of Zarycki is that the former examines the contemporary developments of the political scene, while the latter focuses on explaining contemporary developments as an outcome of the past.

³³ Tworzecki sees Poland as the periphery of the partitioning powers.

continuity, a link to the past, and a kind of skeletal structure upon which democratic differentiation of society into voting blocs and, indeed, into regionally based parties, could develop further” (Tworzecki 1994: 113). For Tworzecki, however, the historically grounded explanatory power of basic social cleavage presented by Lipset and Rokkan ends here. According to the author, further explanations of contemporary political developments require focus both on the individual, that is, their opinions and values and on institutional actors, who are “translators” of existing social structures into cleavages. Tworzecki therefore supplements the Lipset-Rokkan perspective with arguments grounded in both the political culture and institutionalist arguments.³⁴

The strength of Tworzecki’s work can be found in his excellent analysis of Polish political parties between 1989 and 1995. The limitation is that it points to the importance of Poland’s historical past as evidenced by Polish electoral geography and its effect on the structure of the political scene, but does not explain how identified social factors, for instance the population’s religiosity, have been maintained over time for political cleavages to be constructed from them in the twentieth century.

Zarycki takes a more historical approach. Taking Poland as a periphery of the partitioning powers during the partition period, and later as a Soviet periphery, he examines the country’s subsequent political development. Zarycki’s reinterpretation of the Lipset-Rokkan center-periphery model serves as an effective way of linking current political cleavages to their historical origins. One strength of the author’s argument lies in the attention brought to geopolitical factors, which have been marginalized in previous research. A second strength is the author’s description of the disputes between the prevailing attitudes found in Polish politics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These attitudes, which can be observed among Polish political elites, according to Zarycki, were an outcome of the unbalanced relationship caused by Poland’s dependant status. Zarycki’s argument, by focusing on elite attitudes as an outcome of Poland’s partitioned and peripheral status, provides a new and fuller understanding of Polish political development.

Based on this model of analysis Zarycki argues that the regions which experienced the strongest domination by the central culture, (the Prussian and Russian partition zones),

³⁴ See, Hubert Tworzecki, "Demographic and Issue Cleavages," in *Parties and Politics in Post-1989 Poland*, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), 141-188.

became areas where the role of the Roman Catholic Church became central to the development of Polish peripheral national culture. Zarycki states, a “very strong connection between national and religious identity” can be observed in these areas (Zarycki 2000: 860). This outcome reflects the link between the high levels of religiosity and strong support for the political right (“traditionalist/anti-communist) option (Zarycki 2000). The rural-urban split, Zarycki attributes to the structures of land ownership and the rise of the intelligentsia during the partition period. Representing the rural element are the peasants, whose political interests are formed according to the partition era land ownership structures as per the land reforms implemented by the central powers and later by communist reform policies. The urban side is represented by the intelligentsia, seen as an outcome of the peripheral nature of each partitioned region. As a result, the development of Polish national culture is largely attributed to the intelligentsia. During the communist period, the intelligentsia gradually acquired the role of anti-communist opposition.

The Lipset-Rokkan model has obvious value in its ability to frame the historical roots of political conflicts. Lipset-Rokkan are correct to argue for the long-term historical cleavages but focus too narrowly on the center-periphery conflict and neglect to give the same level of attention to other cleavages. Zarycki’s necessity to modify the Lipset-Rokkan model, for example, points to the model’s limitations. Much like in Tworzecki’s work, the Lipset-Rokkan model is best used as an indicator of the lineage from which contemporary political conflict is constructed.³⁵ This paper agrees that such a framework is a most useful starting point, however it criticizes the emphasis placed on the premise of center-periphery, specifically in application to the Polish case. The premise of periphery, as emphasized by Zarycki, and used to establish Poland’s dependent position, obscures the agency of Polish society to cope with the dominant ‘centers’, (for example the rise of various insurrections in the nineteenth century and political movements in the twentieth century). It also ignores Poland’s role as dominant center in relation to the peripheral status of Belorussia, Lithuania and Ukraine. I argue that the mechanisms that drive peripheries to fight against the ‘centers’ need to be more closely examined. The development of these mechanisms needs

³⁵ Indeed both Zarycki and Tworzecki seem to be aware of the model’s limitations particularly in application to the Central and Eastern European context, but also acknowledge the model’s value in recognizing the historical roots of political conflicts. Zarycki’s 2000 paper does an excellent job of pointing out what the model cannot explain.

to be understood not only as an outcome of outside pressure but also as a factor of regional development.

Political Culture

While the Lipset and Rokkan perspective has been identified as a good starting point for examining the roots of social cleavages, and their role in shaping voting behaviour, the application of this approach to the contemporary Polish context (among other contexts as well) has proven to be limiting, leading researchers to modify, supplement or replace this approach with other theoretical tools.

To overcome some of the limitations of structural explanations some researchers have turned their focus to individuals, their values, attitudes and opinions in relation to politics and political institutions. When values, attitudes and opinions are collectively shared, they are understood to form a “political culture”.³⁶ A key contribution to this perspective is Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture* (1963). In this study, Almond and Verba conduct a cross-national comparison of the political cultures of five countries in order to explain variations in their respective political systems. According to the authors’ historical explanatory framework, variation can be accounted for by a nation’s institutional history, which shapes political culture, while culture in turn determines how subsequent institutional structures work (Lubecki 2000: 38). The explanatory variable is therefore culture, as opposed to structure, which influences the individual behaviours that drive “democratic stability” (Almond and Verba, 1963), or in more general terms institutional development. From this perspective, the causal direction between political culture and political structure is reversed, leading to the view that variations in citizens’ political behaviours account for the differences between political systems, states or even regions. Almond and Verba’s concept of culturally driven political orientations has been applied by researchers of the post-communist context (Tworzecki 1996: 29).³⁷ Tworzecki, for example, used political cultures in conjunction to the Lipset-Rokkan model in order to

³⁶ The most notable examples of the cultural perspective in democratic political analysis are Alexis de Tocqueville’s, *Democracy in America* and Max Weber’s, *The Protestant Ethic*. The modern development of this perspective is represented by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, as well as Ronald Inglehart in his “Renaissance of Political Culture.” Some have classified Robert Putnam and his book, *Making Democracy Work*, as representative of this perspective as well.

³⁷ There seems to be a degree of overlap between political culture and post-communist legacy frameworks in application to the post-communist period.

explain how opinions and values affect party support in the post-communist Polish context.³⁸

Jacek Lubecki (2000) offers a cultural perspective to the puzzle of Poland's regional differentiation. Based on Robert Putnam's framework of analysis, which the author interprets as cultural in approach, Lubecki traces the civic traditions in Poland, seeking to explain the "civic" status, that is, the level of political engagement, of the historical region of Galicia, and the "un-civic" status of the western and northern territories.³⁹ Lubecki's findings suggest that cultural factors, as opposed to structural factors, determine the 'civic' and 'un-civic' patterns of regional political behaviour (Lubecki 2000: 7). According to Lubecki, "Modern civic culture can be traced to the traditions of sustained political mobilization by movements representing independent agency of economically subordinate social groups. Conversely, areas of "democratic deficit".... are also regions where political mobilization of subordinate classes was historically weak" (Lubecki 2000: 7). Lubecki's thesis that "the role of popular political mobilization in influencing patterns of democratic governance" (Lubecki 2000: 7) is valid, but what he does not acknowledge is the role of the institutions in creating the context in which the rise of popular political mobilization was able to take place. The strength of Lubecki's research is that it highlights the specific mechanisms (i.e. political mobilization) of historical conditioning that have lasted over time and can contribute to an explanation of contemporary outcomes.

Within the culture driven framework, the myth of the "Habsburg Hypothesis" has also been raised in regards to the question of geographical boundaries. The Habsburg hypothesis asserts that given the unique experience of Habsburg liberalism,⁴⁰ areas previously belonging to this empire will produce democratic outcomes (Rupnik 1994, 1997; Bialasiewicz 1997; Raciborski 1997). Building on the Habsburg hypothesis and political cultural assumptions, Andrew J. Drummond and Jacek Lubecki (2010) conduct a cross-national comparison of voting behaviour between 1989-2001 of the former Habsburg

³⁸ See, Tworzecki, "Demographic and Issue Cleavage," 141-188.

³⁹ Lubecki's thesis is a comparative study of regional political cultures in Poland and Italy. Using Putnam's framework of analysis and original data, Lubecki recreates Putnam's work on civic engagement in Italy and builds upon it. He applies a similar framework of analysis for the case of Poland.

⁴⁰ The term "liberalism" in reference to Habsburg Austria is used in a loose manner to convey that the empire was "tolerant" or "progressive". For definitions of "liberalism" as connected to nationalism see, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso Press, 1991), or Hagan Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998).

region of Galicia. The region, which today is split between Poland and Ukraine, was reconstructed at the level of Polish provincial administrative districts and Ukrainian *oblasti*, to test exactly why these areas are more civic. The authors argue that, Galicia's historical legacies continue to influence present-day political behaviour in both Poland and Ukraine because of the presence of the Greek and Roman Catholic Church. According to the authors, high rates of church attendance in the region have established the church as a "vehicle of cultural persistence" (Drummond and Lubecki 2010: 1311).⁴¹

While Drummond and Lubecki provide a much-needed examination of the complex mechanism that might be propagating the legacies of past Galician culture, the authors admit that the study was inconclusive. According to Drummond and Lubecki (2010: 1336):

The data we have analyzed here cannot, in fact, distinguish whether Galicians sought out the Church as an institution to re-gather their politically liberal efforts when the state became hostile to their interests, or whether in gathering in the Church, Galicians learned additional civic skills that bolstered an already participatory culture.

Based on the authors' conclusions further investigation is required. While the authors suggest gathering survey data of present-day churchgoers (i.e. Verba et al 1995), this thesis suggests that it may be necessary to look closer at the history of Polish regional development in order to establish which mechanisms are the most important, how they became so important, and when did they acquire their ability to influence public life. It also suggests that it is necessary to consider how various mechanism interact with one another to influence patterns of political behaviour.

The literature review shows that a number of frameworks have been applied in an effort to explain regional differentiation in Poland's electoral politics and voting behaviour. In recent years, researchers have applied different analytical tools to better understand this relationship. Despite these efforts, gaps still remain. This is evidenced by the attention given to Poland's three historical regions. There is considerable agreement that there are

⁴¹ A similar study was conducted by Steven Roper and Florin Fesnic (2003). Based on the Habsburg hypothesis, Roper and Fesnic carry out a cross-national comparison of post-communist Romania and Ukraine to establish the determining factors of post-communist voting behaviour. Their study provides a comparison of the historical Austro-Hungarian regions of Romania (Transylvania) and Ukraine (Galicia, Transcarpatia and Bukovian). The authors argue that historical legacies are the most significant determining factor of voting behaviour in the former Austro-Hungarian regions of Ukraine and Romania, even when controlling for socio-economic and ethnic variables.

differences between the regions and that they continue to be defined by their past boundaries. However, the literature is unclear as to the explanation of historical regional differences and the historical legacy of the partitions. Moreover, few of these works provide a clear and systematic analysis of the causal mechanisms stemming from Poland's partitioned past that would explain present day regional outcomes. Subsequently, this study is going to build on previous work but also extend it by looking at older traditions. In the next section, a framework of analysis will be presented, offering a different way to look at the problem.

The Legacy of Institutional Histories

To explain regional differentiation of citizens' democratic participation in Poland, I employ the following framework of analysis: institutional histories cause regional differences affecting democratic behaviour.

Institutional histories → regional differences → democratic behaviour

This theory endeavors to explain how different institutional traditions can leave behind political outcomes that shape future political behavior within a given region. Based on this framework of analysis the argument put forth by this thesis is that the institutional histories of partitioned Poland have left behind legacies that to this day manifest in the regional distinctiveness of citizens' democratic participation.

As indicated by the literature review, numerous studies have cited that the partitions of Poland were a historically significant period that had a profound effect on Poland's subsequent political development. In spite of this, the literature does not provide a consistent framework of analysis allowing for the comparison of the partitioned areas and the identification of causal mechanisms stemming from these partitions. As a result there is little agreement regarding the meaning and legacy of the partitions. The purpose of this next section is to outline a framework of analysis that will help make sense of institutional historical legacies. This paper will focus on the institutions as the historical determinants of the regional differences leading to variations in political behaviour in Poland.

Institutions

This paper follows the institutionalist argument that defines institutions as the organized constraints that structure human behaviour (North 1990). Institutions, that is, the formal system of governance and its laws, are understood as the main means of “affecting the behaviour of citizens” (Peters 1999: 6-7). In this manner institutions set the parameters of political choices available to individuals, shaping their norms, beliefs and actions, and as a result, shape political outcomes. Institutions also have distinct historical roots. Inherited patterns of historical development set the direction of future development (Peters 1999: 10). From this perspective, history matters in regards to the trajectory of subsequent institutional development. It provides the context or circumstances that influence individual behaviour (Putnam 1993: 8). These basic tenets of ‘old’ institutionalism have been reasserted by ‘new’ institutionalism indicating the value of the older analytical approach (See: March and Olson 1989; Putnam 1993; North 1990).

This paper asserts causal priority to institutions as the determinants of social outcomes. Contrasts between different units of analysis (i.e. states) are therefore an outcome of the constraints placed on societies by their respective institutions and the histories that have shaped them. According to this institutionalist framework, these contrasts will persist even after the initial conditions that have caused them have disappeared.

The aim of this paper, however, is not limited to understanding institutional influence on citizen behaviour. It is also necessary to examine historical turning points in regards to the relationship between institutions and society.⁴² The question that arises is how to explain institutional change? Given the salient role of history, what is “Most important is to understand how history smoothes some paths and closes others off” (Putnam 1993: 181) In this regard, the concept of ‘critical junctures’ is very important (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Collier and Collier 1991). Critical junctures, in general terms, refer to changes that are taking place at specific historical moments, that alter the direction of development and result in long-term consequences. More specifically, Collier and Collier

⁴² Collier and Collier (1991) conduct a similar study in their examination of critical transitions in regards to the relationship between the state and the organized labour movement in Latin America. See, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991).

(1991: 29) define critical juncture “as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinctive ways in different countries (or other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies”. For Collier and Collier (among others), these “historical turning points” (Putnam 1993: 179) are a critical aspect of political development.

The concept of critical junctures is most useful in application to the Polish case because it provides a means by which to make sense of distinct regional differences. In other words, the partition period of Poland was a critical juncture. The distinctive ways in which this critical juncture took place in each of the partitioned territories accounts for the differences between the historical regions. Subject to the distinct institutional constraints of the partitioning powers, key mechanisms such as modern national identity and peasant integration into political life took divergent trajectories. The mechanism of modern national identity addresses the transition from elite national identity, based on political rights, to mass cultural national identity, defined by a unified cultural community. In the case of Poland, the Roman Catholic faith was a key factor towards the development of unified national identity and nationalism. The mechanism of peasant political integration is distinct from, yet related to, the development of a sense of nation that includes the whole population. The political integration of peasants into political life is also the integration of peasants into Polish national politics. In the context of the partitions, the development of rural political interests is also a matter of national consciousness of the rural masses. The legacy of how these mechanisms were shaped, today, manifest in the distinct regional variations of citizens’ political behaviour.

Partitions of Poland

This framework of analysis is applied to the case of Poland where political development has been shaped by foreign institutions as much if not more than by its own. In 1717, Poland became a Russian protectorate and control over its internal affairs of state was vastly reduced.⁴³ In 1772 and 1773 Poland suffered the first and second partitions,

⁴³ The year 1717 marks the beginning of the Russian Empire’s growing influence over the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was the outcome of the “Silent Sejm” (*sejm niemy*) of 30 January 1717. The sejm was convened to address the conflict between King Augustus of the Saxon House of Wettin, elected to the Polish throne in 1697, and his opponents (the Polish nobility) who rejected the Saxon king’s rule. The conflict had brought the Commonwealth to the brink of civil war, as number of rebellions (The Confederations of Warsaw

losing large amounts of its territory and population. In 1795 the Polish Republic was lost in the third partition and would not reemerge as an independent state until 1918.

Between 1795 and 1918 Poland resurfaced in one limited capacity or another, but always within the framework of foreign powers. From 1807-1815 it was the Kingdom of Warsaw, under Napoleon's France. The Grand Duchy of Poznań (1815-1849) and the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (1772-1918) were the imperial provinces of Prussia and Austria, respectively. The Kingdom of Poland, also known as Congress Poland or the Congress Kingdom (1815-1864), was established by the Congress of Vienna, but joined to Russia by personal union. Although the Congress Kingdom was promised autonomy it remained a puppet state of the Russian Empire. The Republic of Kraków or *Rzeczpospolita Krakowska* (1815-1846), established by the same treaty, was made a Free City by the partitioning states. It had the legal status of an autonomous state, yet it remained a protectorate of the three partitioning powers. Both the Republic of Kraków and the Congress Kingdom were abolished following the Polish uprisings of 1846 and 1863, respectively.⁴⁴

As a consequence of the partitions, between 1795 and 1918, Poland was subject to the governing institutions of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, each with distinct political traditions, levels of economic development, as well as culture, language, and (excepting Austria) religion. The examination of Polish development within the institutional context of three separate states and their historical legacies is therefore a complex task. Perhaps the most appropriate starting point then is to situate the territory of the former Polish-Lithuanian Republic within the borders of the partitioning states.

The pre-partition Polish-Lithuanian Republic⁴⁵ is described by historian Piotr S. Wandycz (1974: 3) as “stretching from the Baltic to the Carpathian Mountains and across

and the General Confederation of Tarnogród) took place against the king. The conflict was ended by Russian intervention in the form of the Silent Sejm, which limited Polish financial and military resources and made Poland a Russian protectorate. For a more detailed discussion see, Norman Davies, “Wettin: The Saxon Era (1679-1763),” in *God's Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. I.*, Norman Davies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 371-385.

⁴⁴ For a good account of Polish history between 1795 to 2000 see, Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. II.*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

⁴⁵ The shared history of Poland and Lithuania spans four centuries. The Union of Krewo, 1385-1386 refers to the prenuptial negotiations and eventual marriage between Jadwiga, Queen of Poland and Jagello, Grand Duke of Lithuania, upon which a personal union between the two states was established. In 1569 the Union of Lublin merged Poland-Lithuania into a single state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, also known as the *Rzeczpospolita Polska*, or the Latin, *Respublica*. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth came to an end by

the northern European plain from the borders of Prussia to the Dnieper River...”. In the course of the three partitions, Poland was divided into three parts according to the “*system copartageant*” (Wandycz 1974: 11).

The Austrian territorial gains in the first partition included much of Lesser Poland (*Małopolska*) and parts of Greater Poland (*Wielkopolska*) (Wandycz 1974: 11). The area was incorporated as a province of Austria and called the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomera (Davies 2005b: 102). In the third partition⁴⁶ the province was extended northward, its borders following the Pilica and Bug Rivers (Wandycz 1974: 11). ‘New (or West) Galicia’, as the district was called, was ethnically Polish territory, while the earlier acquisition had been both Polish and Ruthenian (Ukrainian) ethnically. New Galicia was annexed in 1809 to the Duchy of Warsaw. Upon the Duchy’s demise (1815), a large portion of the area was restored to Austria by the Congress of Vienna. The city of Kraków was the only exception; established as a Free City (1815-1846) it was not recovered by Austria until 1846. From 1846 the Empire’s boundaries remained unchanged until 1918.

Prussian acquisition of Polish territory was subject to the frequent fluctuation of borders. In the first partition, Prussia gained Royal Prussia (renamed West Prussia), along with Ermland (*Warmia*), a portion of Greater Poland, and parts of Kuyavia (*Kujawy*) (Wandycz 1974: 14). In the second and third partitions Prussia took Danzig (Gdańsk),⁴⁷ most of Greater Poland and Mazovia (*Mazowsze*) which became the province of South Prussia; it also gained a portion of Lesser Poland, including the city Częstochowa, which became New Silesia, and finally, a portion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania west of the Niemen River, which formed the province of New East Prussia (Davies 2005b: 83; Wandycz 1974: 14). The territory annexed by Prussia was largely ethnically Polish (Ibid). In 1807 Prussia lost much of what it had gained due to Napoleon’s victory against Prussia at Jena and Auerstadt in October of 1806. The territories were carved up once again, according to the Treaties of Tilsit. South Prussia was annexed to form the Duchy of

the partitions. Throughout this paper pre-partitioned Poland will be referred to as the Republic or the Commonwealth.

⁴⁶ Austria did not participate in the second partition of Poland.

⁴⁷ The Polish-German city of Danzig (Gdańsk), while located in Royal Prussia, remained a Free City until 1793 when it became part of the province of West Prussia. Between 1807-1814 Danzig was established as a partially independent city by Napoleon Bonaparte as a result of the French Empire’s triumph over the Fourth Coalition. Napoleon’s defeat in 1814 returned Danzig to Prussia and in 1815 it was again incorporated into the Prussian Kingdom as the capital of West Prussia. For a more detailed discussion see, Piotr Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland* (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1974), 14-17.

Warsaw,⁴⁸ Danzig was made a Free City, and a portion of New East Prussia, (Białystok district) was lost to Russia (Davies 2005b: 218). These arrangements lasted until the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). The Congress of Vienna divided the Duchy into three parts: Prussian gains included the newly formed Grand Duchy of Poznań along with Danzig; Austria (as mentioned above) regained most of New Galicia; the new and independent Congress Kingdom was joined with Russia by personal union (Davies 2005b: 224).

Russia claimed the largest share of the former Commonwealth, both in terms of land and population. It extended its territory to the Niemen and Bug Rivers, claiming the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukraine, and with them the ethnically Lithuanian, Belorussian, Ukrainian as well as Polish population (Wandycz 1974: 17; Davies 2005b: 61). This territory came to be known as Russia's 'Western Region' (Davies 2005b: 60).⁴⁹ In 1815, by assuming the crown of the Congress Kingdom, Russia extended its territory westward, past the River Warta, and north to the River Niemen. In 1864 the Congress Kingdom of Poland was officially added to the Russian Empire's acquisitions and renamed Vistulaland.

Based on the above overview, it can be observed that the boundaries of partitioned Poland remained generally stable between 1815 and 1918. The end of World War II brought about the shift of Poland's borders westward. The new territorial gains were in part meant to balance the loss of territory in the east. Poland's new western frontier became the Oder-Neisse line, gaining Poland the cities of Gdańsk (formerly Danzig), Wrocław (formerly Breslau), and Szczecin (formerly Stettin) (Davies 2005b: 374). The Polish eastern border was drawn according to the Curzon Line and confirmed at Yalta (Leslie 1980: 1).⁵⁰ To the north and south Poland's borders were marked by the natural frontiers of the Baltic Sea and the Carpathian mountains.

⁴⁸ The Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815) was formed as a French client state according to the Treaties of Tilsit, following Prussian defeat by Napoleon I at Jena and Auerstadt (1806). By the same treaty, Danzig became a Free City again. For a detailed account of the Duchy of Warsaw see, Norman Davies, "Varsovie: The Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815)," in *God's Playground, Vol., II*, 216-224.

⁴⁹ According to Davies, this area was later divided into administrative unites or *gubernias*. These were the *gubernias* of Kovno, Vitebsk, Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Mohylev, Kiev, and Podolia. Two years after the annexation of Congress Poland, ten new *gubernias* of the newly named Vistulaland were added. These were the *gubernias* of Warsaw, Kalisz, Płock, Piotrków, Radom, Kielce, Lublin, Siedlce, Łomża, and Suwałki. See, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol.,II*, 61.

⁵⁰ Also see, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol. II.*, 367-400.


These historical divisions have led to the existence of four distinct territories in modern Poland. Figure 1.1 illustrates a detailed attempt to place Poland's present-day *powiats* (second level administrative districts)⁵¹ according to these four historical regions. As the relevant literature has pointed out, since the onset of democratic transition, patterns of voter turnout and participation in Poland seem to follow the historical regional division of the country. Their outlines follow either the historical divisions of partitioned Poland between 1815-1918, or replicate the Polish-German frontier prior to the 1945 "recovery"⁵² of German territory west of the Oder and Neisse Rivers.

The strong contemporary regional contrasts can therefore be linked to the partition period. This period provides the "historical commonality" (Collier and Collier 1991: 7) of the Polish regions. During the partition period each region was subject the different administrative structures of the partitioning states, resulting in fundamental differences in each regions political development. The significance of this period is particularly germane to Polish political development because it took place at a time of modern nation-building and liberalization in Europe that were connected to "claims for national cultural and political emancipation" (Hlousek 2009: 7). The fundamental political differences between the partitioning powers affected how these changes occurred in each of the partitioned regions of Poland, accounting for their divergent paths. To understand these paths it is necessary to discuss the mechanisms of modern cultural nationalism and rural society's political integration and to address their institutional historical persistence. The legacy of how these mechanisms were shaped can provide insight into present day patterns of participatory mobilization and political preferences.

⁵¹ *Powiats* (second level administrative units) were used as a means of reconstructing the historic regions of Poland because they more effectively reflect historical boundaries. Modern provinces or *voivodeships* (first level administrative units) are too large and in some cases can span more than one historical region, prohibiting an accurate reconstruction of historical boundaries. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that even using a smaller unit of analysis, the reconstruction of historic regions remains an approximation.

⁵² The term "Regained" or "Recovered Territories" is commonly used in reference to the former German territory acquired by Poland after WWII and according to the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. The westward and northward expansion of Poland was to compensate for the Polish territorial losses to Russia in the east. The reasoning for the term "Recovered", however, was derived from the historical claim that these lands once belonged to the medieval Polish Piast ruler s, but over time had been lost to German colonization. Given the term's communist origins and associated propaganda rationalizing Polish claim to this land, the more neutral "Western and Northern Territories" has also come into common use. On the subject of modern Polish frontiers see, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol. II.*, 367-398; Leslie, *The History of Poland since 1863*, 285-287.

Figure 1.1 Poland according to historical boundaries



Modern Nationalism

Nationalism has many definitions. The definition adopted in this paper is borrowed from John Breuilly, who defines nationalism as referring to a shared doctrine that “there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; [and] the nation must be as independent as possible” (Breuilly 1994: 2). Using this definition this paper aims to examine the contexts that gave rise to Polish nationalism. My analysis of Polish nationalism centers on the change from an elite based nationalism to a mass movement that includes the whole population. The main argument states that nationalism as a mass movement was shaped in accordance to the different institutional structures of the partitioning powers. Shifts in the institutional policies, from absolutist political control towards state repression of cultural freedoms, such as language and religion, gradually transformed elite nationalism to mass nationalism by building on existing ethnic-cultural identity. National cultural identity is therefore an outcome of nationalist development and not the cause of it. Where state repression of cultural freedoms was strong, nation and national identity became linked with

and conceived of in cultural and religious terms. Where state repression was weak, nation and national identity remained linked with traditional culture.

Peasant Political Integration

The definition of political integration used in this paper is one put forth by Suzanne Berger. According to Berger political integration consists of three phases in the relationship between rural society and national political life. The first step is the politicization of society. This involves society perceiving links between the problems of the private sphere and national politics and political structures, thus leading to the emergence of political issues. The second step is political organization, which involves the organization of political life around a common set of political issues. The third step is substantive agreement, a common view on the resolution of political issues (Berger 1972: 37-38). According to this definition, the process of political integration encompasses but also moves beyond political emancipation, understood as the extension of political rights and economic reforms regarding land tenure. This paper seeks to understand how this process occurred in partitioned Poland. The analysis of peasant integration centers on the development of peasant class interests and how these interests are linked to Polish nationalism.

Where state intervention in agrarian reforms occurred earliest the process of peasant politicization was able to begin. Where state intervention in agrarian reform was delayed, the politicization of peasant interests was also slow to develop. Additionally, the direction of political integration was also influenced by the state structures, which either facilitated or hindered the alignment of peasant interests with other segments of Polish society. Where peasant interests aligned with those of the nation, they developed in conjunction with national objectives. Where peasants' interests did not develop in common with the rest of the nation, a regional class character developed.

While this is not the full list of possible mechanisms, this paper takes the position that they are the most critical variables contributing to the explanation of contemporary political behaviour. Moreover, these variables did not develop in isolation from one another. Because both national identity formation and political integration of the rural society occurred in the same period, in some regions one variable may have been more predominant than the other. On account of this, each of Poland's historical regions has its

own political character that continues to be relevant to this day. A summary of the framework and the key mechanisms is provided below in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Summary of the key mechanisms

<i>Critical Juncture</i>		Partition of 1772/1795-1918	Partitions of 1772/1795-1918	Partition of 1772/1795-1918	Post WWII
<i>Territory</i>		Austrian Galicia	Prussian Territory	Russia Territory	Western and Northern Lands
<i>Key Mechanisms:</i>	Modern nationalism	Developed among intelligentsia and nobility	Developed among nobility, intelligentsia and mass level	Developed among nobility, intelligentsia and urban society	-
	Peasant political integration	Early	Early	Late	-
<i>Outcome –contemporary patterns of democratic participation</i>	Voter turnout	High	High - Moderate	Low	Low
	Voter preferences	Right	Left; Center Right	Right	Left; Center Right

Methodology

Taking the institutions of the partitioning powers as independent variables, this paper examines how state policies affected Polish subjects in each of the partitioned areas. This paper focuses on two key (intervening) mechanisms: 1) modern cultural nationalism, and 2) peasant political integration. Each mechanism is a political outcome on account of state policies resulting from the critical juncture of the partitions. A systematic comparison across the partitions will show that each political outcome is present in differing degrees. The legacy of these variables becomes the force that shapes the regional patterns of democratic participation (dependent variable) in Poland. Table 1.1 above summarizes these two variables as the political outcomes of state policies that have come to shape the patterns of democratic participation in each of Poland's historical regions.

To illustrate the persistence of regional patterns over time and geographic space, I draw on secondary data for turnout and partisanship. Data from the National Electoral Commission is used to compile an image of the most recent decade of democratic participation. *Powiats* (second level administrative units) are used to reconstruct Poland's historical regions (see Figure 1.1 above). By reconstructing the former historical regions of Poland and comparing their levels of turnout and partisanship, it is possible to gain a general sense of which regions have higher levels of political and civic engagement as well as more stable partisanship profiles. Data aggregated at the *powiat* level is then used to determine the average level of electoral turnout per historical region for the entire second decade (Table 1.2). While the difference between historical regions does not seem to be significantly, a larger contrast becomes evident when this is compared to the first decade of Polish elections based on previous research (Table 1.3). The comparison of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show that distinctions between the historical regions had been more pronounced but have over time closed the gap.

Table 1.2 Rank order of Polish historical regions according to the average rate of voter turnout in sejm and presidential elections (2000-2011)

Rank order	Historical region	Average rate of turnout in historical regions (2000-2011) (%)
1	Galicia	51.84
2	Prussian Partition	51.37
3	Russian Partition	49.49
4	Recovered Territories	46.84

See Appendix M for details.

Table 1.3 Rank order of Polish historical regions according to the average rate of civic electoral participation (1990-1997)

Rank order	Historical region	Average rate of turnout in historical regions (1990-1997) (%)
1	Galicia	46.39
2	Prussian Partition	38.25
3	Russian Partition	35.72
4	Recovered Territories	35.61

Source: Lubecki (2000).

The reconstruction of Poland's historical regions allows for some general conclusions about each of the areas under Austrian, Prussian, and Russian rule. But more importantly, a controlled comparison can be made in the subsequent chapters of the possible mechanisms that seem to influence participatory patterns. The remainder of this thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapters Two and Three provide a comparative historical analysis of modern nationalism and peasant integration into national political life across Poland's historical regions. Chapter Four considers the continuity of historical legacies in present day democratic participation in Poland.

Chapter Two: The Rise of Modern Polish Nationalism

Introduction

The period starting with the third partition of Poland on 3 January 1795, when the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was removed from the map of Europe until the reinstatement of Polish independence on 11 November 1918, marks when a sense of modern national awareness developed among the Poles (Prazmowska 2010: 4; Davies 2005b: 9). It arose in opposition to the state legislation of the partitioning powers of Austria, Prussia and Russia and was tested in those circumstances. The varying forms of officialdom experienced by the Poles during this period thus shaped the character of Polish nationalist expression. Social patterns that emerged as a result of this experience contribute to the explanation of contemporary Poland's regional character.

This chapter aims to provide a comparative examination of the development and rise of modern cultural nationalism within each of the partition zones. The analysis centers on the change from an elite based nationalism to a mass movement that included the non-noble strata of Polish society. It argues that modern Polish nationalism, as a mass movement, developed in response to the different institutional structures of the partitioning states. Specifically, it was a response to the shift in institutional policies towards key aspects of Polish ethnic-cultural identity such as religion and language that contributed to the mass awakening of Polish national consciousness and determined the development of modern Polish nationalism.⁵³ This relationship between the Polish subjects and their governing states not only structured the nationalist aspirations within each of the partition zones but subsequently set the parameters of future patterns of participation to this day.

To illustrate this argument, this chapter will first define nationalism and describe the evolution of its meaning during the partitions. Second, this chapter will discuss the development of Polish nationalism as a mass movement by applying Susan Berger's structure for assessing the phases of political integration. Through this discussion, it seeks to show that on account of mass nationalism, modern Polish national identity is also regional in character; areas where state repression against the Roman Catholic Church was

⁵³ While language is an important component of cultural identity and therefore modern national development, it will not be examined in this paper. Rather, focus will be given to religion as a key factor in modern national identity formation and Polish nationalism. Today, it is religiosity, rather than language, that can be said to affect political preferences in Poland.

strongest, the concept of nation and national identity became associated with cultural and religious terms. Weak state repression against the Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, contributed to a weak sense of rural national identity that remained grounded in the traditional culture.

Nationalism

The history of the partitions of Poland is the history of modern Polish nationalism, where in the absence of the Polish state, the idea of the Polish nation gained utmost significance. Nationalism, as defined in this paper, refers to political movements, which seek or use state power and substantiate their aims based on specific national claims (Breuilly 1994: 2). National claims, as John Breuilly explains, are based on the shared doctrine that “there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; [and] the nation must be as independent as possible” (Breuilly 1994: 2). In this sense, as Breuilly explains, nationalism is political in its aims and politics is about the power to control the state (Breuilly 1994: 1); to achieve these objectives of national interest, nationalism awakens and exploits sentiments that attract support for the purpose of political action (Breuilly 1994: 421). Modern Polish nationalism grew, first and foremost, in opposition to the respective partitioning states. It began as a political movement to restore the historic Kingdom of Poland and was initially limited to the ranks of the nationalist Polish nobility — the *szlachta*.⁵⁴ In this sense, it was not modern at all (Breuilly 1994: 117). It was the noble nationalism of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where the Polish ‘nation’ and Polish ‘nationality’ was defined by loyalty to the state (Davies 2005b: 9). Its meaning was strictly political, in that it had little to do with language, religion, or ethnicity; rather it was reserved for the nobility who had civil and political rights in the country (Davies 2005b: 9). The nobility, with their formal privileges, ownership of private property, as well as through the influence of their provincial diets, held control of the state, rendering the monarchy elective and subject to noble support (Ertman 1997: 265; Davies 2005a: 163-166). The nobility, in this capacity,

⁵⁴ The term *szlachta* is a complicated one. I use the definition put forth by historian, Norman Davies who states that the term *szlachta* refers to the entire noble estate on account of political and legal privileges as well as traditions and obligations rather than socio-economic criteria. Thus defined, the *szlachta* includes great magnates, middling and lesser nobility, as well as farmers who plowed their own fields. According to Davies, the term *szlachta* can be translated as ‘Nobility’, *szlachcic* as ‘nobleman’, and *stan szlachecki* as ‘the noble estate.’ For more detail on the term see, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol. I.*, 160.

held a status that was unparalleled in the rest of Europe.⁵⁵ The aim of noble nationalism was to gain back the political authority that had been lost or diminished by the partitions. The ‘nationalist’ movement for the restoration of Poland was therefore indifferent to ethnic or linguistic nationality. Indeed, such criteria would have been counter-intuitive to the restoration of the old Republic, which was comprised of inhabitants of various ethnic and linguistic groups (Breuilly 1994: 117). Furthermore, the movement for the restoration of Poland was primarily led by the lesser or middling nobility. This group was most affected by the legal changes over control of the land, while the great magnates hoped to gain Austrian and Prussian titles and generally collaborated with the partitioning powers to maintain privilege (Breuilly 1994: 115)

By the 1830s the movement managed to gain momentum and extend the national idea to the exiles and urban intelligentsia (Breuilly 1994: 117). However, the national idea would remain limited to the ranks of this minority group, which shared the goal of regaining Poland’s independence but failed to agree on a program that would enlist popular support. The more radical faction of the nobility sought to widen the social basis of the movement by extending political and economic rights to the rural society thereby integrating the lower strata into the national fold. The larger, more conservative faction of the nobility, on the other hand, saw such an extension of privilege as a conflict of interests. The marginalized social groups, specifically the peasant masses, sought to distance themselves from the national movement for the resurrection of the old noble Republic. The social gulf between peasants and noble landlords created by centuries of serfdom was a dividing factor influencing sentiments towards the concept of ‘Polish nation’.

The end of the Commonwealth and the onset of partitions did, however, change the meaning of ‘nation’. As noted by the historian Davies (2005b: 9), “The word ‘nation’ shed its former political connotation and increasingly assumed its modern cultural and ethnic overtones”. In the absence of the state, the idea of Polish nation became fundamentally linked with the church as a source of national inspiration (Davies 2005b: 14). Polish nationalism drew on these key sentiments for the purpose of political action. This shift was

⁵⁵ According to Thomas Ertman, only the nobility of Hungary could compare in terms of its capacity for state control. For an interesting discussion of Polish and Hungarian nobility and their role in state formation see, Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 264-305.

brought on by the change in the policies of the partitioning powers. While restoration nationalism was conditioned by the refusal of the partitioning authorities to re-establish Poland's independence, subsequent policies drastically reduced any remaining measures of autonomy. This outcome was most prevalent in Prussia and Russia, where limits on political aims soon translated to repression in the social and cultural spheres. Moving forward Polish nationalism would come to be shaped by the unique context of the different partitioning states. In the context of the partitions, specific attention needs to be given to the pressures of foreign administrations and their influence on key criteria such as the Roman Catholic Church and the Catholic faith.

A key factor in the development of modern Polish nationalism during the partition period was the Roman Catholic Church. Under the old Republic, the church did not maintain "a monopoly in the religious affairs" (Davies 2005b: 14).⁵⁶ As the official religion of the state it did however maintain certain privileges beyond those as caretaker of religious life that allowed it to exercise a considerable degree of power. These privileges included the possession of estates and large landholdings, tax abilities and judicial powers, as well as a near monopoly over education (Alvis 2005). According to church historian, Robert E. Alvis, in the absence of centralized state authority and administrative structures, the church and clergy filled "a central and exclusive element in the life of the state" (Alvis 2005: 22-23). In this context, church and the nobility shared a mutually beneficial relationship. Most significantly, the positions in the Catholic hierarchy were limited to those of noble upbringing, while the clergy was often from less privileged society (Alvis 2005: 23).

The first and second partitions of Poland made evident the political nature that the church would later take on. The reform efforts surrounding the Constitution of 3 May 1791, which sought to centralize power with the Polish king, effectively reducing the power of the nobility reverberated through the Roman Catholic Church. The reforms found supporters among the clergy while many of the ecclesiastical hierarchy sided with the conservatives, joining the opposition in the *Targowica* Confederation (Alvis 2005: 23).⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Although religious tolerance varied over time, the Commonwealth was characterized by a coexistence of Christian denominations (Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Protestant), Jews, and Muslim Tatars.

⁵⁷ The act of the *Targowica* Confederation (1772) condemned the Constitution of 3 May 1791 and called on Russia for assistance. The Confederation led to the Russo-Polish War of 1791-1792 and ultimately to the Second Partition of 1793. For more details on the *Targowica* Confederation see, Emanuel Rostworoski, "The Struggle for the Independence and for the Reform of the Commonwealth (1788-1794)," in *History of Poland*,

The relationship between the conservative nature of the Catholic Church and its officials and the reform sympathetic clergy on the one hand, and the connection between faith and nation on the other, would take different shape in the context of the three partition zones. The partitions brought the interests of traditional religious authority in line with the nationalist cause as both came to stand in opposition to the given partitioning state. As the concept of nation became linked with religious Catholic terms, it contributed to the inspiration of a national Polish consciousness beyond the established political class. The details of how nationalist and religious Catholic interests broadened the concept of nationalism to integrate rural society into *national* politics thus need to be examined within the established context of the partitioning states.

The church represented the vehicle of change whereby the concept of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ ceased to represent the nobility and came to reflect the first step in non-noble society’s eventual integration into national politics. This development took place within the institutional framework of the partitioning states where the political conflict of Polish national independence took place. The developing definition of Polish nationalism increasingly began to encompass religion (and the Roman Catholic Church) as key variables of Polishness. Both the partitioning states and the activists of the Polish cause, each adopted this perspective, appropriating it for their own objectives. It has become common to lump these variables together and apply them to all of partitioned Poland as a whole in order to “highlight the imagined quality of the nation” (Porter 2000: 8). However, it is also necessary to isolate how ideas of Polish community were constructed, imposed, and enforced (Porter 2000: 8) in each of the partitioned areas.

To examine the development of modern Polish nationalism in consideration of the specific administrative structures of the partitioning powers, this chapter will use Susan Berger’s three phases of political integration: politicization of society, political organization and substantive agreement. The reason for this approach is that nationalism, as a mass movement, can be linked to the political integration of rural society. Participation in national political life is first and foremost based on a sense of belonging to a national community. The main objective behind the analysis of modern Polish nationalism’s

ed. Zuzanna Srefaniak (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN - Polish Scientific Publishers, 1979), 320-322.

development is to gain a better understanding of the relationship between Polish society, specifically at the regional level, and the Polish state.

Galicia

The Austrian partition – the Kingdom Galicia and Lodomeria –consisted of territory belonging to the old Polish Republic and ceded to Habsburg Austria in the partitions of 1772 and 1795. A distinction can be made between the ethnically Polish western Galicia and the ethnically mixed character of eastern Galicia, comprised mainly of Ruthenian (later Ukrainian) as well as Polish and Jewish populations.⁵⁸ In 1846, Kraków lost its status as a Free City and was also brought under Austrian jurisdiction. The political and cultural regime of the absolutist empire began much like that of Prussia and Russia, but as absolutism gave way to decentralization towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Austria Empire provided unique circumstances for the development of Polish nationalism in the region. While Poles in both the Russian and Prussian partitions were struggling for linguistic and religious rights, the Austrian Empire, under Franz-Joseph I (1848-1916), allowed unparalleled political and cultural liberties in the areas of Galician self-government and minority rights. Concessions granted to Galicia in these areas strengthened national Polish identity among the nobility while delaying the awakening of national consciousness among the remainder of the populations, specifically the peasant masses. In short, Austrian policies towards the Polish question can be summed up in one approach: divide and conquer (Wandycz 1982: 91). For the peasants of Galicia, the general sense of a Polish cultural heritage therefore developed in isolation from that of the nobility.

The Church

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Habsburg Austria, much like Prussia and Russia, actively intervened in matters of church and religion. The fundamental difference was that the Habsburg monarchy was religiously tolerant, and the Polish

⁵⁸ In addition to the dominant Polish and Ruthenian ethnicities a sizable Jewish population could be found in Galicia. On the subject of Jewish nationalism in Galicia see, Leila P. Everett, “The Rise of Jewish National Politics in Galicia 1905-1907,” in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism Essays on Austrian Galicia*, eds. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 149-177. Also see, Jolanta Pekacz, “Galician Society as a Cultural Public, 171-1914,” *The Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 23. No. 2 (Winter 1998): 29-31.

population in Galicia was never subject to the national and religious persecution experienced in the Prussian and Russian partitions (Wandycz 1974).⁵⁹ In fact, Austria being a Catholic state, Catholicism was encouraged, and established Polish Catholic traditions, such as the Marian cult, were allowed to continue.⁶⁰

Religious tolerance was part of the all-encompassing state reforms, introduced as early as 1781 by Emperor Joseph II, were designed to transform the Habsburg Empire into a modernized, centrally governed and enlightened state. These reforms also limited the power of the church and ecclesiastical matters came under state control. The Roman Catholic Church was denied access to Rome. The clergy lost its privileges. Papal and Episcopal decrees first had to pass imperial censorship. Hundreds of monasteries were dissolved and their property annexed by the state. Schools and theology seminaries were removed from under the aegis of the church and converted into secular colleges under the auspices of the state (Davies 2005b: 153).

Monarchial centralizing reforms aroused resistance from the church-nobility alliance, as both church officials and the nobility feared the loss of their positions of privilege on account of the emperor's intervention (Rudnytsky 1982: 7). The alliance between state, the nobility and church was restored relatively quickly, however, and lasted until the fall of the Empire in 1914. The reasoning behind this alliance can be found in the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy itself, which as Ciucuria writes, "was based on two pillars –the centrist bureaucracy and the estate of gentry/nobility" (Ciucuria 1985: 250). In other words, the imperial political structure was based on the balance of power between the imperial center and the territories over which it ruled.⁶¹ Imperial power was preserved by,

⁵⁹ Emperor Joseph II (1780-90) state policies towards the church and religion (among other areas) aimed to modernize his empire and introduce a measure of religious 'equality'. The Patent of Toleration, introduced in 1781, was perhaps the most notable of reforms, granting religious freedom to non-Catholic religions. The reform granted civil rights to Lutherans, Calvinists, and Greek Orthodox, and in 1782 extended religious rights to the Jewish population. These rights were applied to the newly acquired territories of Galicia after the partitions. Although, as Wandycz points out, religious freedom does not necessarily ensure freedom from subjugation to the state, particularly in the case of Galician Jews. See, Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, 14.

⁶⁰ Although Polish Catholic traditions were permitted, the proper veneration had to be observed; Polish subjects no longer prayed to 'the Virgin Mary, Queen of Poland' but to 'the Virgin Mary, Queen of Galicia' See, Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, 14. Also, Davies *God's Playground, Vol. II.*, 104.

⁶¹ Imperial power was grounded in the preservation of the empire's interests. From this perspective, control over Galicia provided a source of raw materials for Austria's industrially more advanced regions; it was also a source of conscripts for the army. For Galicia's economic status under Austrian rule see, Piotr Wandycz,

“subordinating societies with autonomous institutions and regional elites...into politically subordinate civil societies” (Wank 1993 following Motyl).⁶² While the political sovereignty of the nobility was taken away or reduced, this group was allowed to maintain its privileged position as the highest of the curia. In return the nobles maintained a cooperative alliance with the state. The privileged position of the nobility and its alliance with the church hierarchy contributed to a social distance between the upper strata and the rural masses. Among the general population the clerical-nobility alliance contributed to a general anticlerical sentiment in the region, which would manifest towards the end of the nineteenth century.

Church, Religion and Society

Anticlerical does not, however, mean anti-religion. The Roman Catholic Church had over time won over rural society, and during the partitions Polish Catholics held on to their faith. Galicia’s religious tolerance meant that rural subjects could practice freely thus attracting their loyalty to the Austrian crown. The absence of religious oppression meant that in Galicia, religion did not serve as a common denominator between the upper and lower strata.

Before peasants had a sense of “nation” or “nationalism,” they identified with the Catholic Church, their immediate communities and with “peasantness” itself (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 8). As historian Keely Stauter-Halsted explains, membership in the parish church shaped peasants’ identity from baptisms and weddings to their funeral rites. In addition to religious rites and requisite Sunday Mass, rural society gathered to celebrate religious feast days, saints’ days, and holy pilgrimages. Parish membership and taking part in church-organized activities was an obligatory aspect of village life. Although it was not the sole form of social interaction, it was the foundation of nineteenth century Galician village life (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 47).⁶³

“Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 71-74.

⁶² For a discussion on the Habsburg Empire’s feudal and dynastic concepts with respect to the question of national political units see, Wank, “The Nationalities Question in the Habsburg Monarchy: Reflections on the Historical Record” (Lancaster: Franklin and Marshall College, 1993), Working paper.

⁶³ For a detailed account how peasant life was organized by religious practices see, Keely Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 47-48.

Religious practices, more so than any real ethnic differences, also differentiated the Poles (Roman Catholic) from their Ruthenian (Greek Catholic), German (Lutheran) and Jewish village neighbors (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 47). This distinction was perhaps more relevant in central and eastern Galicia where the population was mixed, as opposed to western Galicia which had a Polish-speaking majority. As Ivan L. Rudnytsky points out, the association of the Polish speaking population with Roman Catholicism and the Rusyn speaking population with Greek Catholics (Uniate) is generally accurate with few exceptions.⁶⁴ Although ethnic blending (between Poles and Ruthenians) was prevalent, religious practices reinforced commonalities and highlighted differences among the religious groups. These distinctions helped Polish peasants construct a sense of self and community that would contribute to the nascent concept of Polish nationality.⁶⁵

Roman Catholic religious identity formed a large component of how Polish rural society in Galicia approached public life in the first half of the nineteenth century. It shaped the attitudes and values adopted by the individual as well as those of the religious community within the often-heterogeneous village society. Perceptions regarding the “otherness” of non-Roman Catholics and non-believers certainly existed, however the concept of a “Polish nation” was virtually unknown. Rural society’s religious practice of Roman Catholicism, while shared in common with the Polish *szlachta* and reflecting the church institution, were in reality far removed from both nobility and church hierarchy. Just how far removed this “Polish” element of Galician society was from the “nation” and the “national cause” can be clearly demonstrated by the 1846 Peasant Rising (*Jacquerie*) when the peasant serfs in western Galicia rose up against the “Polish” nobles who were seeking to resurrect the old Polish Republic (details of the event are presented in Chapter Three). The event shows not only the social distance between the landed nobility and rural society,

⁶⁴ The first exception according to Rudnytsky, were the Polonized nobles and intelligentsia originally of Rus’ ancestry. Many were educated Greek Catholics who culturally and politically identified themselves as Polish - *gente Rutheni, natione Poloni*. The second exception was the larger, mostly peasant, population of the *latynnyky* (Latins) meaning people of the Latin rite, who overtime had adopted both the language and customs of their Ukrainian village neighbors. These middle groups ended up choosing sides in the national struggle. See, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Ukrainians in Galicia Under Austrian Rule,” in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 39.

⁶⁵ For other factors contributing to the conception of peasant identity prior to emancipation in Galicia see, Keely Stauter-Halsted, “The Roots of Peasant Civil Society: Pre-modern Politics in the Galician Village” in *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland 1848-1914*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 47-48.

but also just how foreign was the concept of Polish national identity in pre-emancipation Galician society.

The Church and National Identity

Habsburg policies of centralized royal absolutism took a dramatic turn beginning in 1848. The revolutionary movements of 1848, the breakdown of neo-absolutism, defeat in the Austro-Prussian War and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 were all contributing factors towards Austrian decentralization of power (Wank 1993). A constitutional system with representative institutions was introduced by the new Emperor, Franz-Joseph I, and consolidated by the “December Constitution” of 1867 (Ciucuria 1985: 250). These events and constitutional laws significantly helped nationalist development in Galicia.

Two critical events contributing towards the development of modern national identity were the emancipation of the peasants in 1848 and the granting of autonomy to Galicia in 1867. Peasant emancipation had little immediate effect on peasant national identity, more over on participation in the national movement, a reality that is illustrated in a letter by the Polish magnate and supporter of the Polish movement for independence, Zdisław Zamoyski:

Our peasant, despite the fact that he was born on Polish soil, that he only speaks Polish, is incapable of grasping the concept that he is a Pole. What is still worse, among the peasants the name “Pole” and the word “enemy” are one and the same. The Pole for him is the lord whom he despises –who has power and legal jurisdiction over him –for whom he owed feudal obligations.⁶⁶

Zdisław Zamoyski, 1848.

Zamoyski’s letter speaks to the gap that existed between rural society and the nobility. This gap represented not only the social distance between the two strata, but also how far removed the peasants were from self-identifying as Poles.

The peasants’ new status, however, did provide opportunity for national awareness and organization, an opportunity that would be taken up by the local clergy. The Roman Catholic clergy, more familiar and sympathetic to the plight of the peasants were more willing to take up the cause of rural society. Following peasant emancipation numerous

⁶⁶ “Letter from Zdislaw Zamoyski (June 25, 1848) as reprinted in Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*, 63, originally from Kieniewicz, *Pomiedzy Stadionem a Goslarem: Sprawa wloscianska w Galicji 2 1848 r.* (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1980), 72-74.

parish priests supported peasant interests towards overcoming inequalities lingering from serfdom and fostering a sense of national consciousness among their congregations (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 151). Much of this work was done by organizing agricultural circles and reading rooms to promote access to information, the set up of various credit co-operations and village stores, as well as through the introduction of peasant newspapers. These efforts were directed as much towards helping the rural population acquire social equality as towards encouraging peasant mobilization behind the national cause. From this perspective, the work of the clergy contributed towards the development of peasant political interests regarding their own condition (a topic addressed in the next chapter) by linking it with participation in public life. In other words, the efforts organized around the improvement of the peasant condition sought to give peasants a voice in the larger national community (Kieniewicz 1969).⁶⁷ The role of the clergy in peasants' political awakening is therefore inherently linked to peasant national consciousness. When social and economic interests are no longer seen as an outcome of local forces but have become perceived as the result of relations with the governing body they become political issues (Berger 1972: 36). According to Berger (1979), the development of political issues indicates a perceived connection between the individual (or group) and the national political system. Galician peasants' identification with the realm of national politics speaks not only to the emerging political attitudes, but also the development of national engagement. Although this does not indicate a lessening of the gap between "peasant" and "landlord", it does provide the modest beginnings of a decrease in the gap between the concept of "peasant" and "Pole".

In 1867, Galicia was granted autonomy; a situation providing Galician Poles with more rights than could be enjoyed by their counterparts in the Prussian and Russian partitions. Galicia' liberal status was the result of Austria's diminishing role as great power. Faced with internal divisions caused by demands of ethnic minorities and increasingly under German influence, Vienna chose to build alliances with the strongest minority groups in the regions, the Poles and the Hungarians (Davies 2005b: 109-110; Kieniewicz 1969: 206). Galician autonomy reinforced the sense of peasants' social isolation from the Polish

⁶⁷ Of key importance is the work of Father Stojałowski, who tried to engage peasants into participating in public life. According to Kieniewicz, Father Stojałowski, respected the conservative-clerical rules, but later adopted a decisively anti-conservative approach and championed the cause of the peasants. For more on the role of Father Stojałowski see, Stefan Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 208-209.

conservatives that now managed the province between 1867-1918.⁶⁸ As a result Polish peasants' attitudes and values continued to be informed by their position of social inequality stemming from economic disparity, and public life increasingly became organized around this issue. Perhaps paradoxically, seeking rural reforms in Galicia made the issue of "nation" and "nationality", which had been a persistent concern of the nobility, a key aspect of rural society's agenda. As Stauter-Halsted states (2004: 187):

This rural reform agenda, promoting close linkages between building the fatherland and improving cultural and economic conditions in the countryside, became the key manifestation of peasant nationalism and was positioned at the very crux of the social contract between peasants and the nation they sought to join.

This second aspect of political integration is underscored by the peasants' "commitment to the welfare of the "nation" " (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 216). This is signaled by the 1889 elections when after twelve years of non-representation, peasants gained three seats in the Galician sejm (Kieniewicz 1969: 214-215).⁶⁹

Anticlericalism

The role of the Catholic Church in the Galician context is a most interesting one. The parish clergy, while instrumental to the politicization of peasant interests and awakening peasant national awareness, was paradoxically also responsible for the rise of anticlericalism in Galicia. As peasants became more engaged in public life and organized politically to participate in the province's representative institutions, the Galician Sejm and the Reichstag, the church officials took a position against the movement. The Catholic Church in its conservative nature, sought to protect the recent politicization of peasant national identity and emerging social movement. As Stauter-Halsted explains (2004: 153),

⁶⁸ For example, since the control of Galicia passed into Polish hands, the number of peasant deputies in the sejm greatly decreased. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 206-207.

⁶⁹ Peasant participation in ceremonies and celebrations commemorating significant historical events, such as the bicentennial of Jan Sobieski's victory at Vienna in 1883, centennial of the 3 May Constitution in 1895, and the Kościuszko Rising in 1894 can also be seen as sharing in the common political goal of Poland nationalism. For how popular images of Polish history have been appropriated into peasant national sentiment See, Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*, 208-215. From the other perspective, the inclusion of Polish peasants in commemorative events by the Polish administration also represents a key point of commonality regarding Polish nationalism. For example, to celebrate the 1894 centennial of the Kościuszko Uprising, a panoramic image of the battle of Raclawice was set up in Lvov (Lviv), depicting the attack by the peasant scythmen against Russian soldiers. The panoramic image was show in recognition of peasant patriotism. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 215.

“Once peasants began to establish political organizations to promote their own needs, clerical leadership was compromised. Ecclesiastical authorities believed that the peasantry could not both govern itself and also accept the traditional social hierarchy”. Numerous steps were taken by both state and church authorities to ensure the traditional social order. Censorship was imposed over the information available to the Galician village. For example, in 1884 an imperial and church ban was issued prohibiting the publication and readership of prominent peasant newspapers, such as the *Wieniec i Pszczółka* for their anticlerical outlook and school curricular content was subject to restrictions (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 156).⁷⁰

In Galicia the concept of national identity has strong traditional roots. It stems from rural society’s understanding of self and community as it developed in the traditional village structures of the region. For Polish peasants in Galicia, the main sources of identity formation were non-religious elements such as village life and peasantness itself, but above all, Roman Catholicism influenced both peasant identity and social relationships. Peasant emancipation provided the opportunity for rural society to enter political life and the Catholic clergy were influential in this process. The formation of rural national identity in Galicia was structured according to the customary structures of rural life, in particular religious life. As peasant national consciousness developed traditional concepts of peasant identity remained inherent to its development. Even as peasants came to see themselves as part of the larger Polish nation, their concept of Polish identity was understood as separate, or distinct, from that of the Polish *szlachta* (the nobility and other village outsiders) as well as the Catholic Church hierarchy. Rural national identity therefore can be seen to have evolved in reaction to rather than in conjunction with the Polish and church authorities that governed the province of Galicia, particularly after Galicia gained autonomy. This course of development was made possible by the structure of Habsburg rule, which became increasingly liberalized during the course of the partitions thus granting greater authority to the Polish higher curia, separating them from the peasant masses. As a result at the end of

⁷⁰ According to Keely Stauter-Halsted, the 1894 ban of *Wieniec i Pszczółka* was implemented in twenty-three of Galicia’s districts. Imperial police confiscated the papers while the church threatened both readers and Father Sojałowski with excommunication. Most significantly, the village priests were directed to withhold absolution from petitioners who were subscribers of the paper. See, Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*, 156-157.

the partition period, Galicia can be summarized as traditionally devout and anti-clerical in its character.

Prussian Partition

The Prussian partition represents the former western territories of the abolished Polish Republic. Between 1807-1918, Prussian Poland generally meant the provinces of Poznań and West Prussia. In official usage the term “Prussian Poland” also refers to the Grand Duchy of Poznań (*Księstwo Poznańskie*), which from 1815-1848 was granted limited autonomy (Davies 2005b: 83). Precisely because of the Grand Duchy’s autonomous status, it became the center of the nationalist movement in the region owing largely to its large Polish population. The character of the Polish lands acquired by Prussia was mixed in terms of language, denomination and stratification thanks the long history of Prussian and German interaction with the former Polish Republic.⁷¹

The Prussian position towards its Polish inhabitants, its *Polenpolitik*, was shaped by Prussia’s transition from traditional (authoritarian and centralizing) to modern nation state. Within the environment of the changing Prussian institutional framework and state objectives, the problem of territorial integration of Polish lands became the political problem of the Polish national question. In reaction to Prussification and Germanization efforts, the Polish struggle for religious and linguistic rights became a strong determinant of national consciousness. The struggle for religious and linguistic cultural liberties resulted in the rise of a Catholic and nationalistic political identity that unified all the Polish social strata. Furthermore, the struggle for national identity did not turn to violent insurrection, as was the case in the Russian partition, but largely developed within the structural framework

⁷¹ Given a long historical interaction the character of the former western and northern provinces of the old Polish Republic were linguistic and denomination mixed. Accompanying these distinctions was the presence of social-stratification; in addition to the Polish *szlachta* and the peasants, there existed a Polish bourgeoisie, German and Jewish burghers, as well as German landowners (Junkers). Also worth mention is the mixed ethnic character of Upper Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia. These territories, formally within the political borders of Prussia prior to the partitions, represent areas where either Polish-speaking settlement or Slavic populations “speaking a tongue closely related to Polish” could be found. Given their long history under German rule, the Slav population of these areas did not identify as Poles but rather as ‘Polish-speaking Prussians’. Although these provinces were relatively passive in regards to nationalist development throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century they would become more relevant post WWII. See, Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 7-16.

of the Prussian system. These factors of the Prussian context would come to determine how national goals and later the region's political character would come to be defined.

The Church

Much like in Habsburg Austria, under the Prussian authorities the Catholic Church and its clergy had to submit to regularization by the Protestant Consistory (Davies 2005b: 153), which looked after all religious matters in Prussia. As in Galicia, church property was subordinated by the state over time, while rent and agricultural revenues from church lands were reduced by half (Alvis 2005: 78). Controls over church real estate progressively pushed the church into a position of financial dependence (Ibid). Matters of legal jurisdiction and punitive authority, church taxes and fees, as well as control over religious publications were all subject to the control of the state (Ibid). In 1821 the papal bull *De salute animarum* was passed regarding matters of the Catholic Church in Prussia. The papal bull granted the church a large measure of independence in exchange for Prussian influence in the appointment of bishops (Trzeciakowski 1967: 619). The arrangement enabled the implementation of policy in Prussia's eastern provinces that were advantageous to state (political) interests. Under the Prussian system, the Catholic Church lost the position of privilege and influence that it had enjoyed in the Polish Republic, its role now limited to matters concerning religion and sacramental life. According to Alvis, the policies were intended to lessen the power of the Catholic Church and the authority of its clergy while working to preserving "instrumental value" of church influence in the Catholic community (Alvis 2005: 78, also Hagan 1980: 58). In sum, restrictions on the Catholic Church were to help integrate the Polish provinces and their Polish inhabitants more firmly to the Prussian state.

Catholicism at this time was not synonymous with "nationality"; that term was reserved for the ranks of the *szlachta* who remained loyal to the idea of Polish restoration or at least Polish legal autonomy within Prussia. However, as repressive Prussian policies further pushed the state of the Catholic Church into decline, a number of the clergy began to support or participate in acts of anti-establishment rebellion. By the 1820s, among a new generation of the lower clergy, the defense of the Catholic religion was linked with Polish identity (Alvis 2005: 82). Still, a number of the church hierarchy gave their commitment and loyalty to Prussia on account of personal conservative orientations. For some, like

Ignacy Raczyński, first the bishop of Poznań (1793-1807) and later the archbishop of Gniezno (1807-1818), the position of the Catholic Church was best maintained by preserving the status quo.⁷² This approach was in accordance with the conservative higher nobility but also very much mirrors the steps taken by the Catholic hierarchy in Galicia and the Russian partition.

Shifts in official Prussian policy towards the Poles took place in the 1830s and 1840s. The first factor responsible for the shift was the November Uprising of 1830-31 in the Russian partition. The rising Polish nationalist movement in the Poznań area was of concern to the Prussian Government who feared the threat of a Polish uprising in Prussia. (Frauendienst 1960: 180; Hagan 1980: 86).⁷³ The second factor was the emergent liberal movement in Prussia and the movement's adoption of the concept of nationality in its political objectives (Frauendienst 1960: 184). Inspired by the French Revolution and French democratic concepts of the nation, German liberalism, in its early stages, often sided with the Poles in regards to the Polish question. The concept of nationality, giving preference to language, religions, culture, and homeland, for example, engendered demands for ethnic sovereignty (Frauendienst 1960: 185), and served as the basis for the Revolution of 1848 (Spring of Nations). As a result of these events official Prussian *Polenpolitik* became more hostile towards the Polish element in the territory, citing the nobility and clergy as instigators of the rebellious sentiments (Hagan 1980: 86; Frauendienst 1960: 180). Further restrictive measures were taken against the Catholic Church while official state policy prohibited the "restoration of the Polish state" on the grounds that it would "undermine Prussia as a great power" (Hagan 1980: 86).

Despite the regulatory measures imposed on the Catholic Church and its clergy, the initial process of territorial integration of Polish lands permitted freedom of religion. As Davies points out, "religious conformity was not an essential criterion for social or political advancement" (Davies 2005b: 86). According to Prussian officialdom, nationality was a question of loyalty to the Prussian state and religion did not conflict with Polish acquisition

⁷² For more on Ignacy Raczyński see, Alvis, *Religion and the Rise of Nationalism: A Profile of an East-Central European City* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 80-81.

⁷³ While the November Uprising of 1830 was directed against the Russian Empire, Poles from both Prussia and Austria joined the uprising. Hagan places the number of participants from the Grand Duchy of Poznań at "1,600 Polish Civilians and 1,400 Poles in Prussian military service" of the 625,000 of the Duchy's population. Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 86.

of Prussian character. In this context, Slavs and Germans, Catholics and Protestants, and Jews could coexist as loyal Prussian citizens.

The introduction of the *Kulturkampf* or the “Cultural Struggle” (1871-1878) by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck dramatically changed the relationship between the Polish population, church and the state. Officially the *Kulturkampf* was implemented to strengthen and centralize the newly unified German Empire, against the tendencies of regionalism and Catholicism (Wandycz 1974: 228). In the mainly Polish and Catholic areas, it became the struggle between Protestant and Catholic identities. As a result, the *Kulturkampf* influenced a definition of Polish nation based on religious terms. Traditional religious authorities, typically against nationalism (as was the case in Galicia and the Russian partition), came to side with the Polish nationalist movement and opposed the state, setting the course of Polish nationalist development in the region.

Church, Religion and Society

In the first half of the nineteenth century, for the Polish-speaking population, what mattered was identification with social station, village and religious denomination and later language. These boundaries of “social belonging” were just as important for the rural population as for city dwellers.⁷⁴ Much like in Galicia, religious practice shaped both the private life and the social interaction of the population. In large cities, like Poznań, the Catholic Church also did its best to instill a sense of geopolitical affiliation between Catholicism and Poland. According to Alvis, “Since at least the sixteenth century, Catholics were inculcated with the belief that their state served as the gatekeeper of Christendom (Alvis 2005: 29).⁷⁵ Perceived in this manner, Catholicism can be understood as a powerful defining attribute of individual identity.

Religious observation was also the main defining attribute of the population. Like in Galicia, the identification of Poles as Roman Catholics and Germans as Protestants is a fairly accurate one. The exception was that a high percentage of German-speaking Catholics and some Polish-speaking Protestants also existed. This outcome was owing to

⁷⁴ For examples of personal identification in the Poznań and area see, Alvis, *Religion and the Rise of Nationalism*, 19- 20.

⁷⁵ Towards this end, historic examples were presented such as the Mongolian invasions of Poland during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Swedish “Deluge” of 1655, and the defense of the Commonwealth by Jan Sobieski and his Polish army against the Ottomans in the battles of 1673, and later as King. See, Alvis, *Religion and the Rise of Nationalism*, 29.

the long history of German colonization movements, religious conversions on account of the effects of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the assimilation of both German settlers and nobles into the local Slavic context, as well as waves of German migration into the areas that previously formed the northern and western territories of the former Polish Republic.⁷⁶ Unlike in Galicia, where the majority of the population, Catholic or Ruthenian, were of the same social station, Catholics and Protestants often occupied different socioeconomic status. In this regard, prevalent religious practices were associated with economic benefits that contributed to a sense of differentiation between religious communities. The economic distinction between religious groups would later in the century contribute to the nascent development of Polish and German nationality. In the first half of the nineteenth century, despite the central role of religion in general and Catholicism specifically as a source of self and community identification, these sentiments did not yet convey a sense of nation in the modern sense among the rural or urban poor populations. The point is illustrated by Polish society's lack of resistance against the partitions and later towards the passive acceptance of the new regime (Alvis 2005: 41). This outcome could very well have been motivated by the early abolition of serfdom in Prussia (Frauendienst 1996:178). By the time of the revolutions of 1848, however, a shift in peasant perspective can be observed when in the Grand Duchy of Poznań the peasants joined the Poznań Uprising and fought alongside the *szlachta* (Kieniewicz 1948: 102). The 1848 events in Poznań strongly contrast with those in Galicia only two years earlier. In Galicia, where the peasants were mistrustful of the landlords and loyal to the emperor, the concept of Polish national identity was still far removed. In Poznań, the combination of German administration and patriotic urging of the Catholic clergy, among other factors (Kieniewicz 1948: 101-102), helped close the gap between villagers and the *szlachta*, setting the stage for the formation of a unified national community.

The Church and National Identity

The transformation of Prussia into a nation-state in the form of the German Empire in 1871 had the most dramatic effect on the relationship between the Roman Catholic

⁷⁶ For a summary for shared history between the German and Polish border see, Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 1-9. About Protestants in Poznan, including Protestant heritage in Poznan see, Alvis, *Religion and the Rise of Nationalism*, 31.

Church and Polish national development. Already in 1848 following the revolutionary movements and the subsequent triumph of monarchy, Prussian policies had sought to diminish the influence of Catholicism. The implementation of the *Kulturkampf* campaign between 1871-1878 by Bismarck was intended to suppress the political influence of the Catholic Center Party and strengthen the German unified state. Socially, it was intended “to secularize the German school system in order to utilize it for strengthening German national consciousness” (Kieniewicz and Wereszycki 1979: 456). In the Polish provinces, however, the *Kulturkampf* took on a particularity anti-Polish quality.

While the policies of the *Kulturkampf* represented a conflict between the Catholic Church and the state, they had a profound effect on the Polish-Catholic element, hitting the former territories of the old Republic the hardest. From the perspective of state authorities, matters of the Catholic Church were too closely aligned with the Polish question. First, the continued influence of Polish clergy and therefore Polish educational and religious instruction prevented the political assimilation of the Poles in Prussia (Blanke 1981: 20). Second, the Catholic Church served as a politicizing influence on Poles in the German province of Upper Silesia, as well as among the Kasubians in northern West Prussia (Blanke 1981: 32). The reframing of the nationalizing agenda in religious, particularly in Catholic terms, thus had specific implications for the politicization of Polish society, and most notably the peasants.

Anti-clerical legislation directly affected the large majority of the Polish Catholic population. The shortage of priests due to arrests or the lack of candidates deemed acceptable by the state left many churches without priests and schools without teachers. For communities defined by their Catholic identity, the virtual standstill of parish life was taken as an attack against the Catholic people. The aggressive legislation against the Polish Catholic clergy served to alienate the previously passive villagers and townspeople, causing them to rally behind the clergy. The effects of anti-clerical legislation on traditional aspects of peasant life came to link private social interests with the political system. In this context the practice of the Catholic faith became a matter of political concern. As Trzeciakowski

points out, “The majority of the Catholic population sided with the persecuted clergy, the attitude of the Polish Catholics being particularly consistent” (Trzeciakowski 1967: 625).⁷⁷

The *Kulturkampf* resulted in the widespread awakening of national consciousness that gave political content to Polish Catholic identity. While the *Kulturkampf* was abandoned in 1878 and anticlerical measures were gradually removed, the Polish national question still remained an issue of concern. In Prussia's view the end of *Kulturkampf* did not mean the end of Germanization of the Polish element in Prussia. Rather, the Catholic Church was to be used in order to implement anti-Polish measures by imposing the use of German in religious rites, using the pulpit to criticize the Polish national movement, the Polish language was banned and education was secularized.

The *Kulturkampf* gave a particular character to Polish national identity of this region. First, the government imposed cultural struggle did not fail to impress upon the Poles and, specifically, the common towns people and the peasants, that it was an attack on their nationality (Hagan 1980: 145). In response to heavy-handed state oppression, Polish society came to identify and organize around the concept of Polish national identity. The link between Catholicism and Polish national identity created an opportunity for common cause with the conservative Polish nobility. The conservatives in turn, adopted the view of “antiliberal social conservatism stressing the traditional religiosity of Polish society” (Hagan 1980: 145). They advocated the principle of conservative “loyalism”, not unlike that of Galicia, which sought to come to terms and work within the context of government policies. Realizing that Polish independence was out of the question, they hoped to mimic the conservatives of Galicia in order to gain some measure of cultural concessions. The Polish cause in Prussia, however, differed from that of Galicia. In Galicia, where the population was given more cultural autonomy and the traditional way of life was not necessarily threatened, identity-based political mobilization was late to develop; rather the focus remained on differences between the social strata leading to a class-based political mobilization instead.

⁷⁷ Examples include riots in 1874 in the city of Pelplin, the bishop's seat of Chełmno, on account of the charges against Bishop Marwitz. In the a variety of towns of the Poznań, West Prussia and Silesia areas, a range of protests took place in reaction to the appointment of the so-called “May priests” (clergy who met the government requirement of the “May Laws” of 1873) by the government. In response to these events, Catholic Poles began to organize at mass meetings in defense of the Church and “Polishness”. See, Lech Trzeciakowski, “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church in Prussian Poland 1871-1914,” *Slavic Review* 26 (1967): 618-637.

Second, the solidarity between the clergy and parishioners in the Prussian ruled territories transformed the region into a stronghold of clerical nationalism. As Hagan sums up, “The clergy’s opposition acquired the glow of national heroism. The church’s national leadership, cast in some doubt by the Ultramontanism of the preceding years, was fully restored” (1980: 145). The commitment of the lower clergy and later the church hierarchy to the struggle against the government resulted in the formation of Catholic and nationalistic political identity of the Prussian partition. This provides a stark contrast to the outcomes in anticlerical and traditional culture of Galicia where Catholicism was appropriated as a symbol of national identity that derived from the traditional structures and identities of rural society. In the Prussian partition it was politicized in reaction to state policies.

In the territories of the Prussian partition the concept of Polish national identity and nationalism was shaped by the policies of Prussification and Germanization. Both town and rural society’s understanding of national identity and the onset of nationalism developed in the context of strong Prussian institutional structures that from the beginning of the partition sought to endow Polish society with a “Prussian Character”. As state objectives and frameworks evolved so did official attitudes towards Prussia’s Polish inhabitants. During the process of German unification, as state objectives and frameworks evolved, adopting more nationalist thinking, so did official attitudes towards Prussia’s Polish inhabitants. Where at the start of the nineteenth century Catholic identity did not conflict with Prussian citizenship, by the 1870s, it had become a key-dividing factor between people of German and Polish nationality. Bismarck’s policies served to estrange the Polish inhabitants from Prussia and accept the political leadership of the Catholic clergy and the Polish gentry. The formation of mass national identity therefore moved from generally passive acceptance of the Prussian regime towards closer identification with the Polish Catholic nation. Polish reaction to Prussia’s repressive policies inspired identity-based political mobilization and transformed the region into a stronghold of Catholic nationalism.

Russian Partition

The Russian partition of Poland included most of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, right-bank Ukraine and most of the territory east of the Bug River; this area

came to be called the “Western Provinces” (Wandycz 1974: 17; Davies 2005b: 60-61).⁷⁸ In 1815, the Kingdom of Poland was added to the Russian possessions, expanding its territory westward. In 1864, the Kingdom of Poland was officially absorbed by the Empire and renamed Vistulalana.

The Western Provinces of the Russian partition, given their history within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were heterogeneous in character, with the Polish element strongest in the cities. The Congress Kingdom, in contrast, was predominately linguistically and ethnically Polish, and above all Catholic (Davies 2005b: 61; Weeks 1996: 72).⁷⁹ For this reason, when speaking of the “Polish Provinces”, it is often meant the Kingdom of Poland, more commonly referred to as the Congress Kingdom or *Kongresówka*. Established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Congress Kingdom was granted limited autonomy in that it maintained a constitution that permitted the existence of both the sejm (the parliament), an independent Polish administration and granted freedom of person, religion, press, and property.⁸⁰ The Kingdom was also permitted cultural autonomy and maintained its own army (Wandycz 1984: 75). The crown of the Congress Kingdom, however, rested with the Russian tsar, who was represented by the appointed figure of the Viceroy (*namiestnik*). According to the Treaty of Vienna and the general guarantees granted by the Russian tsar, the Congress Kingdom granted the Poles greater freedom than any of the other partitioning powers at any point through the course of the partitions.

Official Russian policy, however, rested on the three principles of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and “nationality”, which formed the stronghold of Russian ideology until the fall of imperial rule (Davies 2005b: 61). These basic tenets of Russianness quickly came to clash with Polish existence under Russian authority not to mention Polish objectives of national resurrection. The limited autonomy of the Congress Kingdom created favorable circumstances for Polish nationalism to be closely linked with the insurrectionary efforts

⁷⁸ For more precise geographical boundaries see, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol. II.*, 85.

⁷⁹ According to Weeks, on account of the ethnographic as well as religious makeup of the Western Provinces and the Kingdom of Poland, different government policies were implemented in their administration. Given the population of the former was mainly Belorussian and Ruthenian but more importantly Orthodox, and therefore considered closer to Russian, official policies sought the complete integration of these areas with Greater Russia. The latter, undeniably Polish in composition and therefore distinct from Russia, was to submit to Russian subordination. These policies were pursued at least in theory if not in actual practice. See, Theodore Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996).

⁸⁰ It should be noted that many of these constitutional liberties remained a dead letter.

for the restoration of Poland. As a result of the 1830 and 1863 insurrections, the limited freedoms granted in 1815 were progressively revoked and eventually abandoned. Polish subjects had to contend with an active campaign of forced Russification. The Russification campaign, particularly post 1863, moved the 'Polish Question' from the parliament, that is the domain of the *szlachta* and intelligentsia, to the realm of private life, the domain of the common people. Attacks on church and language made the national question relevant to the segments of the Polish population, which had previously been excluded from the national discussion. However, the disaffection caused by the Russification campaign against Polish language and religion, and the severely limited opportunities for participation in public life, prevented rural society's political mobilization, whether class or identity based, making this region the most politically passive of the three former partition zones.

The Church

Russian state power over the former Polish territories, much like in the two other partitions, altered the relationship between church and government. The three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) increased the Catholic population in Russia. Despite guarantees of religious freedom by Catherine the Great, the Catholic Church soon came under the domination of the state. On the one hand, and much like in the other two partitions, Russian authorities wished to subordinate the Catholic Church by reducing Vatican influence and controlling church resources. With this objective censorship was imposed over the publication of Papal decrees, clergy privileges were revoked, their estates annexed and their dioceses reorganized (Davies 2005b: 64). From 1801 the Catholic Church was to be administered by a supervisory body of the Sacred College in St. Petersburg, which took over clerical appointments (Davies 2005b: 154). These measures allowed Russian authorities to appoint leaders (bishops) of the Roman Catholic Church who were loyal to the imperial throne or corrupt and willing to work to discredit Catholicism.⁸¹

On the other hand, for the Russian Empire, state and Orthodoxy were inextricably

⁸¹ As Davies points out, already in the final period of the Republic, the majority of Catholic bishops were in the employ of the Russian Empress. In the subsequently imposed conditions of the partitions, church hierarchy who chose to defy the ruling powers were deprived of their position and influence, their seats left vacant or assigned to civilian administrators. Under these circumstances most chose the path of compliance. For more details see, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol. II.*, 161.

linked.⁸² As historian Theodore R. Weeks points out, "...to the end of the imperial period, religion remained possibly the single most important determining factor for the imperial government's definition of the Russian nation" (Weeks 1996: 8).⁸³ In this context, while the Polish question was politically motivated, the religious divide between Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy provided the foundation for the formation of national identity according to strong religious sentiments. As a result, throughout the course of the partitions official Russian perceptions identified Poles as Catholics, a view so tainted with distrust for Catholicism that it engendered opposition.

The Polish insurrections of 1830 and 1863 only served to affirm Russian objectives to not only suppress the Polish political elements but also defend Russian and Orthodox principles by restricting Catholic influence (Wandycz 1974: 196). In sum, Russia sought to weaken the political strength of the Polish nationality as expressed by the *szlachta*, the intelligentsia, and the Catholic clergy. Catholic institutions and the clergy in particular were a perceived danger to Russian rule; their access to the rural masses could facilitate national integration. The November Insurrection of 1830 was crushed by Tsar Nicholas I and restricted Polish autonomy in the Congress Kingdom. Among the many restrictions were measures taken specifically against the Catholic Church; these included the closing of a significant number of convents and monasteries; communication with Rome was circumscribed; sermons and publications first had to pass government censorship (Davies 2005b: 154).

The January Insurrection of 1863 brought yet stricter measures of Russification on the Polish population. For the Catholic Church this meant the Catholic orders were closed; all church and monastery properties were confiscated; priests were stripped of their rights, exiled, confined to monasteries, or, if implicated in the insurrection, killed. The administration of the Catholic Church was put in the hands of the Ministry of Interior and Catholic priests were no longer in charge of religious education (Davies 2005b: 154; Weeks

⁸² For the a discussion on the divide between Russian Orthodox Identity and Catholicism, from a perspective sympathetic to Russia see, Barbara Skinner, "The Irreparable Church Schism: Russian Orthodox Identity and Its Historical Encounter with Catholicism," in *Polish Encounters, Russian Identity*, ed. David L. Ransel, and Shallcross Bożena (2005), 20.

⁸³ Davies argues that it is necessary to make a distinction between the "Principle of Orthodoxy", as a state ideology and the "genuine principles and practices of the Orthodox Church." See, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol. II.*, 64).

1996: 99). Furthermore, Russian equation of “Pole” with “Catholic” profoundly influenced policies towards Catholic Belorussians and Lithuanians as well as Uniate Ruthenians (Ukrainians).⁸⁴ To minimize Catholic influence in the Western Province, measures were introduced such as the conduction of the Catholic liturgy in the Russian language, as was the case in Vilna in 1870 (Davies 2005b: 154). As Davies aptly observes, “The most that can be said about religious toleration in Russia is that no attempt was ever launched to close the Roman Catholic churches wholesale” (Davies 2005b: 154).

Following 1863, Russification measures aimed to end the autonomous existence of institutions like the Roman Catholic Church in an effort to weaken Polish cultural influence and bond the Polish provinces to the Russian Empire were implemented (Weeks 1996: 96). Oppressive policies intensified during the reign of Alexander III (1881-1894), relaxed under Nicholas II (1894-1917), but did not end until the fall of Russian imperial power.

Church, Religion and Society

In the course of the three partitions Russia acquired a large Catholic population. Among the peasants Catholicism and traditional devotionism structured social order and in this respect did not differentiate much from that of the other two partitions. Religious practices differentiated the Roman Catholic Poles from their Greek Orthodox (Uniate) Belorussian and Ruthenian as well as Jewish neighbours. Catholicism however was a religion that Poles shared with the majority of the Lithuanians and a portion of the Belorussians. This distinction was more important in the Western Provinces where the population was more heterogeneous, and the Catholics were often the magnates and *szlachta* landowners.

While the Russian authorities equated “Polish” with “Catholic”, this apparently did not mean the Polish rural society. This was reserved for the *szlachta* and the intelligentsia,

⁸⁴ The association of religious and ethnic categories in reference to Belorussians, Lithuanians as well as Belorussians and Ruthenian Uniates, particularly in the post 1863 context of the Russian partition, deserves greater attention than can be given in this paper. In general terms, it can be summarized as on the one hand, Russian efforts to free their Slav brethren from the Latin rite and bring them back to the Orthodox faith. On the other hand, it is more politically motivated, where the Belorussians and Lithuanian ethnicities by virtue of sharing that Catholic faith with the Poles, were seen as Polish allies against Russia. To deal with this problem Russian authorities eventually closed the Uniate Church and forced conversions to Russian Orthodoxy. For more details see, Skinner, “The Irreparable Church Schism: Russian Orthodox Identity and Its Historical Encounter with Catholicism,” 20. Also, Theodore Weeks, “Religion, Nationality, or Politics: Catholicism in the Russian Empire 1863-1985,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2 (2009): 52-59. For a brief summary on Russian measures taken against the Uniates, see, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol. II.*, 154-155.

the political element of Polish nationality. According to Weeks, official records of provincial viceroy's (governors) generally regarded Polish peasants "as loyal to the tsar despite their devotion to the Catholic Church" (Weeks 1996: 57). The events of the 1830 Insurrection, while they did not necessarily confirm peasant allegiance to the tsar, certainly pointed to the gap between the nationalist ambitions of the Polish upper strata and the peasant masses. The November Insurrection did not prompt the peasants to fight on the side of the Polish nationals. Burdened by labour services and conscriptions, some peasants rose against the manor, refusing to perform labour services, others deserted from the army, but most were indifferent to the movement all together (Kieniewicz and Wereszycki 1979). The 1830 Insurrection was not religiously motivated showing that at this time the connection between religion and nationality did not yet exist in explicit terms. Following the 1830 Insurrection, the relationship between church, religion and Polish society would fundamentally change.

The Church and National Identity

The problem of the Catholic Church in the Russian partition and its relationship with Polish society and nationality is less straightforward than in the previously addressed cases. Subject to a repressive regime and forced to struggle for fundamental rights such as the use of the Polish language and the Catholic religion, much like for the Poles in Prussia, national identity came to be conceived of in cultural and religious terms. Yet, like in Galicia, unanimity in faith did not always mean unanimity in objectives; as a result the politicization of nationality occurred at different times for different segments of the Polish society.

The repressions directed towards Poles and the Catholic Church following the 1830 November Insurrection resulted in a new conception of "nation". The rhetoric of nationalism came to be connected with the language of the church. Within this rhetorical framework of "national messianism", Poland became the "Christ of Nations" and the restoration of Polish independence "a divine imperative" (Porter 2000: 49).⁸⁵ This rhetoric defined the patriotism of the period, albeit among a small literate segment of Polish society. It defined Poland by its spiritual existence in absence of its physical one and gave hope for

⁸⁵ For the Polish Romantic movement and its main actors, see, Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate*. Also, Kieniewicz and Wereszycki, "Poland Under Foreign Rule 1975-1918," 422-430.

Polish national resurrection. The concept did not define a unified national community on the basis of language, religion or ethnicity, but rather meant to be inclusive of all who inhabited the historic territory of the old republic and exclusive of its oppressors, the partitioning powers (Porter 2000: 37). However, the connection between religion and the Polish national question helped politicize a concept of nation that made a strong connection between Polish culture and Catholicism. In sum, the Polish question was also the Catholic question as attitudes and values defined by Catholic identity became affected by the Russian political structure.

For a growing segment of Polish society (particularly the urban population in Warsaw) during the post 1830 period, awareness of the connection between Catholic identity and Polish national identity in relation to Russian official policies was increasingly strong. The actions of the urban population became increasingly antagonistic towards the political authority given the conscious demonstration of national sentiments in the open. By 1860 and 1861, patriotic demonstrations such as religious hymn singing took place in both Warsaw and Vilna.⁸⁶ In Warsaw, commemorating the anniversary of the November Insurrection, people sang both the Polish prayer for the nation, *Boże coś Polskę* (God save Poland) as well as the national anthem (*Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła* – Poland is not yet lost) while marching through the streets (Kieniewicz and Wereszycki 1979: 435). The appropriation of Catholic symbols in these political acts demonstrated both the growing politicization of nationality, as well as the increasing identification of Catholic faith with freedom and nation. Yet, while this was an important step towards the politicization of the conception of nation, as Kieniewicz points out, it did not necessarily represent unanimous social objectives between the social strata given that the majority of the population, the peasants, were largely excluded (Kieniewicz 1967: 134).⁸⁷ Comparing to Galicia in the same period, however, where the Austrian government remained distant and its policies were administered by the Polish *szlachta*, social attitudes were more likely to reflect grievances against the landlords' or even the Catholic Church but did not necessarily

⁸⁶ The largest manifestation of dissension took place on 27 February of 1861, when one hundred thousand people attended the funeral of five anti-establishment conspirators who had been killed instigating a clash between the Russian troops and the crowd in Warsaw. See, Stefan Kieniewicz, "Polish Society and the Insurrection of 1863," *Past and Present* 37 (1967): 133-134.

⁸⁷ For a detailed account of the 1863 January Insurrection and the events leading up to it see, Stefan Kieniewicz, "Polish Society and the Insurrection of 1863, 130-148.

express a political opinion much less a unified concept of national community and Polish independence.

The idea of equating Polish with Catholic, however, was perhaps more firmly entrenched in the minds of the Russian authorities than Polish nationalists. Following the 1863 January Insurrection Russian repression against the Roman Catholic Church increased in an effort to break the Polonizing effect of Catholicism. At the same time peasants were granted full emancipation, in an effort to keep this social strata loyal to the Russian throne. While the collapse of the 1863 Insurrection and the repressions that followed led many politically aware Poles to retreat into apathy, peasant emancipation provided the opportunity for the growth of national awareness.

Identification of peasant identity with Polish national identity developed late in the Russian partitions. When it finally came about, it was based on the traditional understanding of peasant society's concept of self and community more reminiscent of events in Galicia. This is accounted for by late emancipation, which delayed the development of peasants' interests along national lines in favor of peasant expectations for the improvement of their condition by the tsar (Kieniewicz 1967: 132). When peasant emancipation did occur, the severe restrictions regarding any form of social organization again limited peasant access and integration to national development. Unlike in the Prussian partition, where social organization could function within the limits of the law, in the Russian partition restrictions would not be seriously challenged until the revolution of 1905.⁸⁸ In these circumstances, the Catholic Church and its clergy remained the only relevant source of national development (Kieniewicz 1969: 185).

Chapter Summary

This chapter has considered how modern Polish cultural nationalism developed in each of the three partitions. It looked at how the Polish nationalism of the former Polish Republic, defined by political rights of the *szlachta*, transitioned to a mass based cultural nationalism in response to the different institutional structures of the partitioning states. The general conclusion is that the Polish national identity and Polish nation is best explained by how the nascent Polish culture, defined by traditional Catholic identity, came to confront

⁸⁸ For details of the first signs of peasant nationalist aims in the Russian partition see, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 228-229.

the different state regimes of the partitioning powers. As the partitioning powers extended authority over traditional institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church, their authority became increasingly intrusive on aspects of traditional life and concepts of identity. However, this intrusion took on different forms in the three areas of Polish partitioned lands. Where state repression was weak, or where institutions such as the church chose to collaborate with the authorities, Polish national identity and nationalism remained grounded in traditional culture, as was the case in Galicia. Where state repression was strong, national identity and nationalism became associated with religious terms, as took place in the Prussian partition. As a result this region experienced identity based political mobilization that transformed it into a stronghold of Catholic nationalism. Likewise, the repressive policies of the Russian partitions politicized Polish national identity as linked with Catholicism, however, subsequent Russification efforts and late peasant emancipation resulted in the regions lack of mass-based political mobilization either class or identity based.

Chapter Three: Politics of the Peasants

Introduction

Connected to the politics of nationalism are the changes in rural society that gradually led to the integration of peasants into national political life. Understanding these changes means tracing the process of agrarian reform consisting of personal freedom, compulsory labour and rights to land. The resolution of these issues, however, took place within the context of partitioned Poland and was subject to the policies of the partitioning states of Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The timing and implementation of agrarian reform policies fundamentally influenced the development of political interests and subsequent integration of the peasant society into political life, affecting the overall awakening of a national consciousness.

This chapter examines the effects of agrarian reforms in each of Poland's partitioned areas and how they affected peasant integration into political life. The first section provides a short review of the peasant political condition as it was under the former Commonwealth and presents Berger's definition of political integration. Next I look at the process of agrarian reforms under the three occupying powers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and provide an analysis of the social situation leading to the politicization and organization of peasants and their eventual integration into political and national life.

Peasant Condition and Political Integration

In the course of the three partitions 1772, 1793, and 1795 the partitioning powers, in their acquisition of Poland, gained an economy primarily based on agriculture along with an overwhelmingly rural population. The characteristic image of the rural sector at the turn of the nineteenth century was one of political passivity. Rural society was illiterate, lacking political interests and mobilization, and in general, separate from other social groups, mainly the *szlachta*.⁸⁹ The main reason for this is that political power under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was in the hands of the crown, church and nobility. The rural society was subject to the manorial system where the land belonged to the landlord (king, bishop or abbot), or the landed noble estate (*szlachta*) but was cultivated by the (peasant) serfs, who owed compulsory labour (*folwark-pańszczyzna*). Under this system the peasant

⁸⁹ Although it should be noted not all landowners were nobility, and not all nobility owned land. See, Davies, *God's Playground, Vol. II.*, 168.

was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the landowner: “The peasant living on the gentleman’s land was his subject; he was attached to the land, governed by the laws of the domain, obliged to work on the manorial farms” (Kieniewicz: 1969: 4).⁹⁰ In contrast, members of the noble estate, by virtue of political rights granted by the sovereign, represented the Polish nation and held citizenship. The partitions of Poland resulted in the nationalization of crown and church land and the loss of legal privileges for the Polish nobility, making both the landowners and their serfs subject to the new governing states. By examining the politics surrounding agrarian reform under the new governments of the partitioning powers, it is possible to observe the process of integration of rural society into political life and eventually Polish national life.

To examine the topic of peasant integration into political life, I use the definition of political integration given by Suzanne Berger (1972). According to Berger’s definition, political integration is a three-stage process that alters the relationship between rural society and national politics. The first stage is politicization, whereby individuals and communities come to recognize connections between local issues and problems of the private sphere as an outcome of national politics and political structures. In other words, it is the “creation of political issues” (Berger 1972: 36). In the second stage political issues are nationalized as the politics of peasant and other segments of society begin to align, and society begins to organize conflicts and institutions around them. The third stage is the development of substantive agreement in the nation on what the common political problems are but also towards a shared resolution of these issues.

By identifying the phases of peasant political integration, the intent of this chapter is to trace the patterns of political interests and organization that developed in each of the partition regions following agrarian reforms. Examining this process will help shed some light on how the bulk of Polish society was integrated into national politics. On account of the differentiated process of peasant integration into political life under the different administrative structures, each partitioned area had its own regional political character. It can generally be observed that early state intervention in agrarian reforms facilitated the first phase of peasant political integration. Where state intervention was late, the

⁹⁰ Throughout Commonwealth Poland there was some variation regarding the strong and weak land rights that peasants had. This would have to some degree influenced their perceptions of what they were entitled to during the period of agrarian reforms.

politicization of peasant interests was also delayed. Furthermore, state structures influence the direction of political integration by either inhibiting or facilitating the alignment of peasant political interests with those of other segments of society. Where peasant interests align with national objectives, such as national independence or cultural freedoms, a regional class character does not develop (as in the case of Polish peasants in the Prussian partition). Where peasant interests do not develop in common with national objectives, a regional class character is the norm (as in the case of Galicia and the Congress Kingdom in the Russian partition).

Galicia

The political background of peasant integration into political life in Galicia is connected to agricultural reforms. This process occurred relatively early in Galicia and under more culturally favorable circumstances than in the Prussian and Russian partitions. When peasants began to think and act politically, they did so according to their socioeconomic situation rather than national lines. As a result peasants' political attitudes, perceptions and goals, as well as mobilization, were organized along class lines leading to a disjuncture between peasant interests and national politics. Even when peasants began to incorporate national ideas, they were suffused with traditional concepts of village life. The process of rural reforms and their effect on peasant political integration provides a possible piece of the puzzle that adds to the overall picture of Galicia's unique regional characteristics as highly mobilized and oriented towards peasant interests.

Agrarian Reform

In its acquisition of Galicia, Austria gained an overwhelmingly agrarian population, the majority of whom were peasant serfs. Under Maria Teresa and later Joseph II, Austria introduced reforms across its empire, including in Galician Poland after the first partition of 1772. Reforms in the area of agrarian matters aimed to improve the status of the peasant, most importantly by limiting serfdom (1781), strengthening rights to soil,⁹¹ regulating compulsory labor across the region, prohibiting abuses of the nobility and the introduction

⁹¹ Strong rights to soil were held by peasants on rustical land, meaning that while the peasant is not the owner of the land that he works, it cannot be taken away from the; dominical land, on the other hand, can be taken away from the peasants and reincorporated to the manor.

of village government (Kieniewicz 1969: 36-38).⁹² While Josephine reforms were intended to improve the peasant condition, not to end feudalism, they were short-lived, and most ended with the emperor's death (1790). For the next fifty years the Austrian system reverted to its former ways. The majority of the land remained in the possession of the Polish magnates and nobility; peasants remained subject to serf obligations.

Subsequent reforms did not occur until 1848, arguably as a reaction to the insurrectionary unrest of 1846 and in the midst of a revolutionary movement in the Habsburg Empire (Spring of Nations) in 1848 (Jedruch 1982: 307). The reforms were passed to prevent social unrest in the province by winning the loyalty of the peasants toward the Empire (Kieniewicz and Wereszycki 1979: 418).⁹³ The Imperial Act of 7 September 1848, passed by Emperor Ferdinand, liberated the peasants from serfdom and granted them possession of their holdings (*uwłaszczenie*).⁹⁴ All peasants, regardless of the size of their holding, were granted property rights (Kieniewicz 1969: 137). Their land was a gift from the Emperor, given to the peasants for free, without any payment obligations, while the landlords were to receive compensation from the government.

The reforms had four key drawbacks for the peasants. First, the compensation payments became the burden of the province. To pay for this, a new land tax was created which was to be collected for over thirty years and was to be levied on all citizens.

Every taxpayer: [sic] the *szlachcic*, who had been indemnified and was thus deprived of some part of his due; the burger, who had nothing to do with the matter but was to participate in the landlord's remuneration; and finally, the peasant, who had been assured he would receive his land for free from the emperor but was later obliged to pay for it over a thirty-year period in the form of taxes (perhaps not the full value, but certainly some part of it) (Kieniewicz 1969: 138).

⁹² Stefan Kieniewicz, in his book, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasants*, provide one of the best accounts of peasant emancipation in the partitioned lands of Poland that I could find. As a result, I use the book as the main point of reference on the subject.

⁹³ Revolutionary activity began in March 1848 and swept through the Habsburg Empire. To prevent unrest in Galicia, governor Count Franz Stadion (1806-1853) announced the decree to end serfdom in the province on April 22, 1848, five months prior to the rest of the empire. The reforms were proclaimed in April, but made official by the Imperial Act of September 1848. It was a pragmatic move to win the "favour with the countryside and weaken the opposition of the landed gentry." See, Kieniewicz and Wereszycki, "Poland Under Foreign Rule 1975-1918," 418.

⁹⁴ Compulsory labour was cancelled by the decree of 13 April 1846, but made official by the Imperial Act of 1848. See, R. F. Leslie, "The History of Poland since 1863," in *Soviet and East European Studies*, ed. R. F. Leslie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 8.

Second was the matter of servitudes, peasant access to woods and pastures, the title to which had remained with the landlords. Third, the *propinacja* (peasants were required to buy liquor from the landlord) was maintained. Fourth, the land that the peasants received was not enough for subsistence, and they subsequently remained dependent on the manor. The lack of resolution of these problems remained a cause of tension until the turn of the twentieth century. From 1848 onward, they would develop as the key political issues of the region, shaping the political attitudes and perceptions of rural society towards the national political structures and provide the region with a class motivated political character.

Agrarian Condition after the Reforms

For the rural sector in Galicia prior to 1848, the link between the problems of everyday life and government was weak. The Austrian government, in many respects was an absentee government and the problems of local events and private life were not as yet linked to national political events or structures. Social and economic welfare of the peasants can thus be understood to be a product of local forces, namely the source of immediate peasant oppression were the magnates and the nobility. The best example of this is the peasant uprising of 1846 (*Rabacja galicyjska* or peasant *Jacquerie*).⁹⁵

The *Rabacja* was the unintended outcome of a Polish nationalist insurrection that Polish nationalists had planned to simultaneously carry out in all three partitions.⁹⁶ The main objective of the insurrection was the national emancipation, which was to be achieved by involving the peasant strata, which were promised liberation in the process. Betrayed to the authorities, the insurrection was cancelled in the Prussian and Russian territories, but insurgents still prepared to march on the Free City of Kraków and Tarnów in Galicia. Fearing the assault, the Austrian authorities sought help from the local villages in exchange for the emperor's favor (Davies 2005b; 109; Kieniewicz 1969: 121).⁹⁷ Kieniewicz describes the events that followed:

The peasants saw that their old foes were doomed, and they rushed at them to get rid of their masters. In the night of 18 February groups of peasants attacked

⁹⁵ Another example is the temperance movement, which encouraged the peasants to abstain from drinking. For more detail see, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 116-117.

⁹⁶ For a detailed account of the *Rabacja* see, Kieniewicz and Wereszycki, "Poland Under Foreign Rule 1975-1918," 409-413.

⁹⁷ There is some speculation whether or not the peasant uprising was endorsed by the authorities. Undoubtedly peasant grievances were exacerbated by conditions of famine in 1846 as well as cholera and typhus epidemics in 1847. See, Leslie, "The History of Poland since 1863," 8.

scattered insurgents in some places, disarmed them and drove them, bound and unconscious from beatings, to Tarnow..... In the course of the next three days all the manors in the Tarnow district were plundered and most of their male inhabitants massacred. Persons having nothing to do with the revolutionary plots were massacred as well as gentlemen respect for their democratic convictions and their mild handling of peasants. A crowd, having achieved a program at one manor, went to the next one, setting an example for the other villages and even encouraging their neighbors to follow suit.... (Kieniewicz 1969: 121-122; Also see Davies 2005b: 108).

In Galicia, where the government was distant, the *Rabacja* can be understood as a reflection of peasant grievances directed at the landlords, rather than an expression of political opinion. The *Rabacja* was driven by purely local circumstances of feudal oppression and these actions, although dramatic, lacked political content.⁹⁸ This becomes more evident when contrasted with the actions of the peasants living in the Kraków district.

Here patriotic propaganda fell on receptive ground, the peasants cheerfully backing the national government and enlisting in the insurrection army. This example radiated to some extent to the neighboring Galician communes, which seemed, if not too eagerly, to follow the orders of the new Krakow authorities (Kieniewicz 1969: 120-121)

For the peasants of the Kraków district, the insurrection was political given their support of the democratic movement leading the insurrection. The favorable reaction towards the activities of the Polish national government and democratic trend seem to indicate awareness between the condition of local life and events, and foreign political structures. In contrast, the action of those participating in the *Rabacja* can at best be described as an awakening of rural common interests.

The *Rabacja* took on a new stage when it spread to other districts of the province, including Galician Ukraine. In this latter variant, the peasants did not threaten violence. Instead, they seemed to take advantage of the conflict between state and nobility to organized around their own interests by refusing to perform compulsory labour and demanding rent reforms from the Austrian government (Kieniewicz 1969: 123). The “movement” was self-limiting as it remained centered on old tensions, its objective to diminish the landlords control over peasant land. Austrian authorities, with the help of the

⁹⁸ In some area the peasants took part on the side of the insurrectionists and attacked Austrian authorities. For example, in the case of Chochołów village in the Tatras, peasants “...participated openly in the national uprising, mobilized by the teacher Jan Andrusikiewicz.” See, Kieniewicz and Wereszycki, “Poland Under Foreign Rule 1975-1918,” 411.

army, forcibly pacified the movement. The brief examples of Galicia proper and Kraków area, demonstrate that the politicization of the peasants was just in the beginning stages and developing in an uneven fashion.

The immediate post reform years had a modest effect on peasant political engagement. Changes in economic life and legal status, rather than the integration of peasant society into the political community, contributed to its separateness. At the same time the sharp division between peasant and nobility contributed to the formation of issues particular to Galician peasant society.

The main observable factor of peasant separateness can be observed in the relations between peasants and landlords. While the reforms were meant to win peasant loyalty to the imperial government, they ultimately best served the interests of the nobility. Although the nobility lost manorial rights, they could still assert dominance over the countryside. The imperial provisions granted Galician peasants personal liberty and ownership of their holdings, however peasants now owed indemnity to the landlords rather than compulsory labour (Kieniewicz 1969: 136-138).⁹⁹ Servitudes were restricted, and peasants were forced to pay for access to communal land and wood materials (Kieniewicz and Wereszycki 1979: 419).¹⁰⁰ The new legal status as enfranchised persons, also carried obligations such as the need to pay imperial and crown land taxes (Kieniewicz 1969: 204). Failing to meet their obligations many peasants were either forced to look for additional income at the manor or lost their property altogether, forcing most peasants to seek employment as hired labour.¹⁰¹ Although the reform act of 1848 was relatively complete because it included all the peasant strata, and quite radical given that it happened all at once, it left the peasants worse off economically. The 1848 reform, in short, altered the form of peasant dependence on the landlord from one of feudal serfdom into “economic serf” (Magocsi 1983: 137).¹⁰²

⁹⁹ For the structure of indemnity payments see, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 136-138.

¹⁰⁰ In the original decree of 22 April, peasants were granted rights to the common, but these were later denied. Without access to woods and pastures they were left without fuel or building materials and no space for grazing livestock. Forced to buy wood from the manor and rent land for pasture, the peasants returned to work for the manor, resulting in a “new form of dependence, not feudal but capitalist in essence...” See, Kieniewicz and Wereszycki, “Poland Under Foreign Rule 1875-1918,” 460.

¹⁰¹ According to Kieniewicz, between 1875-1884, approximately “23, 649 peasant holdings were forcibly sold at auction, often because of debts”. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 204.

¹⁰² Other peasant grievances include the nobility’s monopoly in the production and sale of alcohol (*propinacja*), which lasted until 1910, and the hunting and fishing privileges on peasant land.

The second observable factor of emancipation concerns land ownership. More important than personal freedom was access to land. The reform transformed serfs into smallholders. Given the ban of evictions prior to reforms, “there were few landless peasants in Galicia” (Kieniewicz 1969: 137). In many cases however, the size of the plot of land was inadequate to allow for subsistence.¹⁰³ Following reforms this problem continued given the lack of state regularization over peasant holdings. Galician peasants could “buy, sell, mortgage or subdivide his holdings as he wanted” (Kieniewicz 1969: 204). As a result, the number of peasant holdings in Galicia was high, and most were too small to produce any significant amount of agricultural goods.¹⁰⁴ In many cases the problem of small land plots was exacerbated by inefficient parcelization. Poor management of land divisions resulted in the wide scattering of peasant plots over several fields.¹⁰⁵ This pattern of holding divisions prevented the sensible consolidation of land and limited the peasant’s ability to enlarging their holdings to develop an economically viable farmstead (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 23). Seeking additional income, smallholders sought work at the manor farms, providing a cheap source of wage-labour for the landlords. The scarcity of land combined with Galicia’s poor agricultural development offered little prospect for the smallholders. Yet, given Galicia’s lack of industrial development, there was almost no alternative for peasant farmers.¹⁰⁶ The majority of peasants thus remained tied to the land in one way or another.

The above effects of the reform process represent the key peasant interests that would come to form the basis of organized political life in Galicia. Increased tensions in the relations between the countryside and nobility on account of legal inequalities tended to unite the peasants against the upper strata (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 27). As Stauter-Halsted

¹⁰³ This is attributed to the illegal parceling of land between family members. While Austrian law forbid the parceling of land, the inheritance tradition of dividing land among children was practiced in Galicia.

¹⁰⁴ According to Stauter-Halsted, following emancipation the average peasant holding dropped significantly in size, “from 15.5 acres (11.4 morgs) in 1848 to 11.8 acres (8.7 morgs) a decade later. By 1899, 80 percent of peasant farms had less than 5 acres of land, and the number of so-called dwarf plots (1-1 acres), whose owners could not support themselves solely through farming, had increased to 17 percent of the total peasant holdings.” See, Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*, 22-23.

¹⁰⁵ Kieniewicz calls this the “chessboard” (*szachownica*) pattern of holding divisions stemming from inheritance traditions, dowry acquisitions, as well as the buying and selling of land. He states that by 1859, the average peasant was responsible for twenty separate lots, and within a generation this number had increased twofold. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 204.

¹⁰⁶ Most peasants chose to pursue seasonal work in Prussia or immigrate, often to Brazil, the United States and Canada, Ukrainian peasants often favored the latter. For peasant migration. See, Dorota Praszalowicz, “Overseas Migration from Partitioned Poland: Poznan and Eastern Galicia as Case Studies,” *Polish American Studies* 60:2 (2003): 59-81.

(2004: 27) points out, the differences regarding legal rights and public responsibilities “were often experienced as violation of the peasantry’s shared understanding of justice, politics in the early post emancipation years tended to unite newly enfranchised peasants in public struggles against their former lords. Class of estate solidarity remained stronger than ethnic affiliation in those early years...” (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 27). Problems concerning land would also dominate peasant interests. Given that the majority of the peasants became smallholders their interests remained distinct from those of the large landowners and contributed to the isolation of these strata. The problems of the smallholders and wage laborers thus, developed as a set of issues specific to Galician region and village society.

To be sure, emancipation did grant peasants the legal right of participating in the political process. In 1848 peasants were able to, for the first time, participate in Austria’s first parliamentary (*Reichstag*) elections. Of the 100 seats granted to Galicia, 89 were assigned to rural districts, giving peasants considerable political weight in parliament. Ultimately, only 32 peasants were elected (18 Poles and 14 Ukrainians), while landlords, priests and the upper classes filled the remainder of the seats.¹⁰⁷ The casting of peasant votes for peasant representatives was the first real opportunity to challenge the previously existing structure and demand for the formal representation of peasant interests.

Peasant votes and participation in the 1848 election, however, were limited in their capacity as political acts. The relatively small peasant representation, some authors argue, resulted from the general refusal of peasant participation. Illiterate, unable to speak German, and ignorant of electoral procedures as well as the significance of the election, many peasants abstained from voting. Furthermore, Kieniewicz (1969) and Stauter-Halsted (2001) both assert that the disadvantaged position of the peasants left them open to manipulation and fraud.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, voter conduct can be interpreted as the recasting of the peasant-landlord grievances as a political issue. The peasants’ decision to

¹⁰⁷ In the first elections, peasants gained 32 out of 100 seats (18 Poles and 14 Ukrainians). The rest were gained by large landholders (27 seats), intelligentsia (20 seats), priests (14 seats), burghers (4 seats), Jews (2 seats) and 1 Austrian official. For details on the first elections see, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 135-136, as well as, Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*, 63-65.

¹⁰⁸ Afraid of the political influence of mass participation, both the conservatives (representing the landlords) and the Polish national candidates of the Polish National Council in Lwów (*Rada Narodowa Centralna*), sought to keep the peasants from the political-decision process. Both factions had their own interests at heart and many still feared a renewal of a peasant insurrection as happened in 1846. As a result both factions were reluctant to introduce procedures that would encourage effective participation of peasants in the Reichstag, thus limiting peasant political influence and refusing to recognize peasant interests.

either vote, refuse to vote, or even the retraction of their votes demonstrates the nascent formation of peasant attitudes and interests (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 64-65) As Stauter-Halsted (2004: 65) observes,

Far from serving as the automatic ally of either the Polish gentry or the Austrian regime, newly emancipated peasants sought at every turn to act independently, to avoid simplistic offers of upper-class protection, and to deflect perceived threats to their newly won right. Relying on the tools and techniques available to them, Galician peasants sought to defend what they had gained by decree from the emperor in this first, brief democratic election.

This brief experience of political participation demonstrates the peasant political profile beginning to form was one that would have important national ramifications. Agrarian reforms left unresolved several issues of concern for the peasantry; most important among them were indemnity payments and servitudes. Divergent perspectives on these issues and the tradition of strained relations and mistrust between the peasants and their former landlord prevented the peasants from engaging in the nationalist movement.¹⁰⁹ “Polishness” and the “Polish cause” were often understood as something associated with the nobility and as some historians have pointed out, with the maintenance of feudal relations (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 62). From the peasant perspective, Polish national goals ran counter to peasants’ economic interests, and as such, contributed to the desire of political independence of former serfs from their former landlords.¹¹⁰

The political integration of the Galician rural society remained incomplete, however. In response to a period of decentralization and liberalization in Austria, in 1861 Galicia was granted regional autonomy and by 1867 self-rule. The new provincial government was granted to Polish conservatives who, in effort to preserve political power and provincial stability, imposed limitations on the peasant influence on political life. Similarly, the number of peasant representatives in the Viennese Reichstag sharply decreased. Under Galician self-rule the Austrian Commune Law of 1866 was introduced granting each village, town and city a separate administrative structure and self-

¹⁰⁹ For example, Polish Galician peasants refused to participate in the nationalist activities organized by the Polish National Council in Lwów during the 1848 revolution. Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*, 62.

¹¹⁰ The social distance between peasants and former landlord on account of unresolved economic issues could be observed in the sejm (parliamentary) sessions of 1848 and 1861. In the 1848 parliament, for example, skeptical of all things “Polish”, the peasants sided with the conservatives on political matters not pertaining to peasant interests. Only on matters directly affecting peasant life, such as indemnification payments, they voted against the conservatives. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 136.

governance, thus separating the settlement units from the manor (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 80). First, in this changed institutional context, peasant opportunities to participate in the governing structure of the province were vastly reduced and peasants increasingly became distanced from matters of national concern. Pushed back to the countryside peasants became more involved in local political life.¹¹¹ Second, Austrian liberalization transformed Galicia into a center of associational life, facilitating the possibility of widespread peasant participation in public life.

Starting in the 1860's, and more significantly in the 1880's, a wide range of civic associations began to develop through the countryside. Members of the intelligentsia (writers and teachers) as well as the clergy and some of the nobility established organizations with the objective of encouraging peasants to engage in public life. Numerous agronomic circles and self-help groups, as well as newspapers, emerged throughout rural Galicia.¹¹² These civic associations became a platform “of open and informed discussion” for rural improvement and active citizenship (Stauter-Halsted 1998: 558). In the late 1880's, election committees emerged with the objective of integrating peasants into political life.¹¹³ Peasants would choose their own candidates and prepare for elections. These were particularly important in areas where existent electoral committees did not take peasant candidates and peasant interests into account.

Civic associations played an important role in the politicization of Galician peasant society. Through associational life Galician peasants initially became informed about issues of common concern and shared interests, methods of modern politics, and above all they helped build literacy and provided opportunities for education. The growing number of associations as well as newspapers eventually linked single villages to the Polish nation. Motivated by nationalist objectives, rural activists such as the clergy (in opposition to church hierarchy) and the intelligentsia, encouraged the development of national

¹¹¹ See, Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*, 78-94.

¹¹² For example, Father Stanislaw Stojalowski, in 1875 started publishing Polish language papers directed at the peasant audience: “The Wreath and the Bee” (*Wieniec i Pszczolka*). Boleslaw Wyslouch, a Polish noble man, started the peasant journal the “The Friend of the People” (*Przyjaciel Ludu*).

¹¹³ One of the first to encourage peasant integration into political life was Father Stanislaw Stojalowski, who in 1887 encouraged the establishment of peasant election committees. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 209.

consciousness of rural society. It is on the basis of civic activism that in the 1890's mass-based peasant populist parties were formed in Galicia.¹¹⁴

Towards the end of the nineteenth century peasant society was able to find a political voice, and in the process, integrate into national political life. Although this process was by no means complete, it represented a significant political change in the region indicating an expansion of the national public sphere, albeit one that would come to be represented by a highly mobilized peasant society.

Galicia's regional distinctiveness can be explained by the relatively early introduction of agrarian reforms (1848) in a context relatively absent of cultural oppression. When Polish peasants began to think and act politically, they did not do so along national lines but rather independently of them. Above all else, peasants' political attitudes, perceptions and values were shaped by their socioeconomic position. Despite the elimination of serfdom, a sense of separation existed between rural society and the rest of the social strata on account of the unresolved issues of indemnification payments and servitudes. As a result, peasant interests and mobilization was organized along class lines rather than national politics.

The disjuncture between peasant and Polish elites was further strengthened following Galicia's autonomy (1867), when provincial self-government was granted to Polish conservatives. Active exclusion of peasants from political integration at both the imperial and provincial levels forced peasants back to the countryside. Ironically, the exclusion of peasants from political access pushed many peasants to take positions in the newly introduced rural self-governments. By the end of the century, participation in village administration facilitated the rise of a politically more active and aware peasant citizenry. This process was aided by the rise of civic associations, which in addition to providing education and ideas of economic improvement, also created a public forum of discussion and increased peasant engagement in public life. As an outcome of civic activity, peasants were able to organize around a common political problem towards the end of the nineteenth century and integrate into the national political life. Although integration was not complete,

¹¹⁴ The Peasant Party was founded in 1895 by Jan Stapiński, See, Kieniewicz and Wereszycki, "Poland Under Foreign Rule 1975-1918," 495, Also, Narkiewicz, *The Green Flag*.

the opening of the public sphere would be decisive for the political future of the region, which was characterized by highly mobilized peasant interests.

Prussian Partition

The political integration of Polish peasant society into political life in the Prussian partition began with the early abolition of serfdom and the granting of freehold to some of the peasants. Full emancipation, however, did not take place until midway through the century. The Prussian government's efforts at agrarian reform were part of the larger state objective of political and social restructuring in order to strengthen the state. These, however, occurred in conjunction with efforts initially of Prussification and later of Germanizing of Polish peasant society, which in addition to cultural repression took on economic overtones. When peasants began to think and act politically, national ideas had become interdependent with peasant objectives for land. For Polish peasants, the economic struggles took place within the context of a national struggle. As the peasants became more estranged from the Prussian state, they became increasingly more closely aligned with the Polish nation giving the region a nationalist political profile.

Agrarian Reform

The Prussian government made the first efforts towards peasant emancipation and agricultural reform.¹¹⁵ These efforts were part of the broader reform efforts (1807-1819) to modernize the state both economically and politically in order to strengthen Prussian unity and break free from French influence (Kieniewicz and Wereszycki 1979: 340; Hagan 1980).¹¹⁶ In 1807 Prussia initiated the Regulation Reform (also known as the Stein-Hardenberg Reforms) abolishing serfdom. A decree was passed in 1811 (Settlement

¹¹⁵ The first and second partitions did not change matters much for the peasants. When Prussia acquired Royal Prussia, which became West Prussia, the old Polish laws that gave landlords rights over the serf villagers remained in effect. Prussian administrative and civil laws were also in effect, in theory granting peasants limited right of appeal against the abuses of the manor, in practice, as Hagan points out, it is unlikely that the peasants were able to take advantage of these. Following the third partition, when Prussia acquired South and New East Prussia the disadvantaged condition of the peasants remained intact. Changes were only introduced in the early nineteenth century, following Prussian defeat at Jena and Auerstedt. See, Hagan 1980: 39, 54.

¹¹⁶ Prussian efforts towards state modernization and consequently peasant emancipation were an outcome of the Prussian defeat at the battles of Jena and Auerstedt by Napoleon I in on 14 October 1806. These battles represented not only the end of the Frederickian state model, and a new phase of the Prussian state. See, Levinger, Matthew, *Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848* (Cary: Oxford University Press, 2000), 42-46. Also, On Prussian Reform see, Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 71.

Reform) permitting state peasants to buy land in exchange for one-third up to one-half of their holdings (Davies 2005b: 138; Kieniewicz 1969: 62).¹¹⁷ In 1816 the reforms were extended to include private domains (Ibid). The above reforms were first implemented in the Prussian territories of Silesia and Pomerania; in 1823 these reforms were extended to Greater Poland (Poznań) after it came under Prussian rule in 1815, as well as the regions of Gdańsk and Toruń (Kieniewicz 1969: 58).

The Settlement Decree of 1811-1816, however, was subject to several restrictions. First, settlement was limited to a small sector of the peasant population. It only applied to large holdings that were self-sufficient because they already had farm equipment or livestock. Second, only peasants whose families had held the land for a specified number of years were qualified for ownership (Kieniewicz 1969:65). The provisions effectively excluded all smallholders, and all peasants with new holdings from owning land. Furthermore, the new regulations did not eliminate compulsory labour. Final reforms were implemented between 1848 and 1850. Final amendments to agricultural regulation extended to include all peasant holdings and rent for the regulated holding was to be owed to the bank rather than the landlord (Kieniewicz 1969: 67).

Agrarian Condition after the Reforms

Early state intervention to end the feudal system in Prussia effectively kept the majority of the peasants detached from national political events and structures, and reliant on the noble landlords, either German Junker or Polish lords, depending on the area in question (Wandycz 1974: 16).¹¹⁸ While peasants were granted personal freedom and secure rights to land, in practice the administrative function rested mainly in the hands of the larger estates, creating a system similar to that of Galician Austria (Wandycz 1974: 16). Thus, while the reforms were initiated by the state, state objectives to modernize (rural conditions and transition to capitalist production) maintained the laws in favor of large estate interests and ensured the laws were to the advantage of the large Junker estates

¹¹⁷ For evaluation method see, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 62-62.

¹¹⁸ These administrative systems in the West and East of the Elbe created very different conditions for the peasants. See, Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 146-147.

(Kieniewicz and H. Wereszycki 1979: 362).¹¹⁹ Describing the strong position of the German Junkers and Polish landlords, Stefan Kieniewicz and H. Wereszycki (1979: 362) write:

In practice it was left to the landowner to decide if, when, and at what speed new settlement was to be carried out; he also fixed the period during which labour services were to continue. This meant that a landowner wishing to modernize his estate received encouragement from the State to convert to a system of hired labour, while less enterprising landowners could spread the evolution over decades.

As a result of the landlord monopoly during the early period of the nineteenth century, a modest number of peasants, those with larger holdings, were able to benefit from the change. The majority, the poor peasantry, was to remain subject to the feudal privileges of the Junkers and *szlachta*. In contrast, the poor peasant could expect, compulsory labour, compulsory hire, land evictions, or to be altogether evicted from his land and turned into a farmhand.

One effect of Prussian reforms on peasant public life was the emergence of opposing peasant interests (Kieniewicz 1969: 67). Peasants with larger holdings who were able to improve their condition on account of the reforms saw benefit in cooperating with the landlords.¹²⁰ Their improved status removed them from the concerns of the poor peasants, robbing the poor majority of the outspoken element of the peasant strata. As Kieniewicz (1969:67) points out:

For centuries it has always been the well-to-do peasant who exercised authority in the village, and he also led in cases of conflict or struggle with the manor...
The poorest and most injured layer of the peasantry had no tradition of initiative or leadership.

Some research indicates that peasant passivity in Prussia was due to agricultural progress triggered by the favorable conditions of agrarian reform (Frauendienst 1960). Others point

¹¹⁹ In excluding the majority of the peasant population outright, the reforms effectively left the regulatory process in the hands of the large landowners who were ensured a source of cheap labour, thus, continuing the exploitation of the peasants to ensure the growth of capitalism.

¹²⁰ A related outcome is the subsequent rendering of nationalist agitation of the regulated peasant strata by the Polish nobility ineffective. The Polish Democratic Society seeking national liberation and unification put forth the Pontiers Manifesto in 1836, calling for peasants to rise against the partitioning powers, promising land and personal freedom should Poland regain independence. In Prussia this form of nationalist agitation was largely ineffective given that it had been preceded by Prussian regulation. As a result, the section of the peasantry that benefited from Prussian emancipation and freehold regulation lost its social revolutionary potential by forming an alliance with the nobility; the remainder of the small-holding, non regulated peasants, landless farmhands and day labourers, however, remained subject to noble domination.

out that peasant resistance was not entirely absent. Research by Kieniewicz and H. Wereszycki (1979) indicates that in the Pomerania, Silesia and Poznań areas, peasants reacted to the settlement decree by engaging in “acts of resistance”. However, acts of popular demonstration failed to develop into popular uprising, leaving the peasant masses oppressed and excluded from public life while the landlords retained both their social position and political influence derived from landholdings. As Theda Skocpol sums it up, “Certainly the abolition of serfdom put the peasants east of the Elbe in no better position to revolt collectively against their oppression in the nineteenth century than they had been in the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries (Skocpol 1979: 147).¹²¹

Like in Galicia, the emancipation was initiated by the state but implemented by the landlords. Thus while Prussian reforms contrasted with those of Galicia, relations between the peasant and landowner strata similarly remained strained. The fundamental difference between the two partition areas was the role of the Junkers. The Junkers were simultaneously estate lords and local representatives of the Prussian state (Skocpol 1979: 147). They held a “local administrative sovereignty” giving them control over tax collection, justice and military recruitment “...for their own purpose” (Skocpol 1979: 147). In contrast, the Polish nobility, both in Prussia and Galicia, were subject to laws and structures of the new state authorities.¹²² In Galicia however, it was the Polish nobility who benefited most from the agrarian reforms, which they used to assert their dominance over the peasants. In Prussia, reforms were designed to protect, above all else, the interests of the Junkers. Consequently peasant social tensions were largely directed at German authority. By the mid-eighteenth century state sponsored agrarian reforms in Prussia linked peasant perception of problems in private life with German administrative structures.

This outcome can be observed in the event of the Poznań uprising in 1848.¹²³ The national movement was organized by the Polish gentry (The National Committee), but

¹²¹ See Theda Skocpol’s contrast of Junker landlords east and west of the Elbe in Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 146-147.

¹²² In all three partitions the nobility had to submit to a process of registration proving their noble heritage. Through this process the poor nobility, usually smallholders, rent paying nobles, landless and poor members of the strata, were stripped of their rights and privileges, effectively removing their noble status.

¹²³ The Poznań Uprising was a reaction to the revolutionary wave of demonstrations in Europe (Springtime of Nations) occurring in 1848. This event revived the Polish question with the hope that a revolution would bring about Polish independence. A Polish National Committee was created in Poznań seeking national reorganization and to form a “Polish-German” alliance against Russia. In the mean time, a national volunteer army was formed, comprised of both landed gentry and peasant, counting approximately “20,000 insurgents”

joined by the peasants who had been excluded from the settlement reforms. While the Poznań insurrection ultimately failed, it demonstrated the overlap of national and social strata interests (Kieniewicz and Wereszycki 1979: 397). This event stands in stark contrast to the *Rabacja* in Galicia only two years prior. In Galicia, where the Austrian government was distant and unfamiliar, the problems of peasant life were understood as an outcome of local forces. In Poznań, where peasant economic grievances were largely directed at the state, the uprising can be interpreted as a political act.

Moreover, economic inequalities had come to be linked with cultural repression. While agrarian reform sought to liberate the peasant from noble domination and encourage limited integration into political life these efforts encompassed the promotion of Prussian interests and were subject to the tendencies of Prussification.¹²⁴ To encourage German culture or “Prussian Character” in Poznań during the 1830s Provincial President Eduard Heinrich Flottwell reintroduced the policy of German peasant colonization. The former Frederickian policy of introducing and strengthening German settlement in largely Polish speaking areas was supplemented with state funds for the purchase of Polish estate and royal domain land which were sold at bargain prices exclusively to Germans (Hagan 1980: 89-90).¹²⁵ The progression of German colonization further threatened the large majority of peasants (mostly small-holders, landless farmhands and day laborers) who have been excluded from Prussian regulation on land holdings. As a result, in 1848, when the Poznań Uprising broke out, peasants participated under the Polish national banner.

As Kieniewicz (1969: 130) rightly points out, the reason for peasant support in the national insurrection can be found in the Prussian regulation abolishing compulsory labour,

ultimately the Prussian force repressed the movement (which lasted 7 weeks). For details of the Poznań uprising and its legacy see, See, Kieniewicz and Wereszycki, “Poland Under Foreign Rule 1975-1918,” 414-415. Also, Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 104-117.

¹²⁴ Prussian authorities made some limited efforts towards peasant integration into public life by offering, in addition to agrarian reforms, a number of conciliatory gestures. For example, the Prussian reformers (1806-1819), saw agrarian reforms a means by which peasants could become free of their landlords, “encourage to educate themselves, improve their economic practices, and to take on a minor role real role in public affairs.” In the 1830, following the Uprising in the Russian partition, in order to win peasant loyalty to the state, the new governor of the Duchy of Poznań, tried to win over rural society through policies specifically designed to benefit them. These included: the permission to use Polish in dealings with civil authorities, improving infrastructure by building schools and roads, and peasant emancipation measure, among others. Unfortunately, these measures were not enough to counteract the onset of Germanization. Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 87-89.

¹²⁵ German peasant colonization was first introduced under the Frederickian system pre-1806. It was premised on the intermingling of German settlers among Polish inhabitant to encourage the development of a “Prussian character” among the Poles.

and therefore removing the barrier of understanding between Polish gentry nationalist and rural society.¹²⁶ Simultaneously, these same regulations indicate the interdependence of economic and national factors, where economic evolution had a strong German national element. From 1848 onward, peasant society would increasingly become integrated into a unified Polish national community. Under the leadership of the patriotic gentry landlords, priests, and the intelligentsia, the defense of land became part of the defense of language and creed, and spread from Poznań province to Western Prussia, Mazuria and Upper Silesia (Kieniewicz 1969: 131).¹²⁷

The course of subsequent peasant integration would be influenced by Prussian and, after 1871, German government policies. Under the Bismarck regime, following German unification, policies of Germanization had a distinctively anti-Polish character; in their aim to reduce the cultural (national) influence of Polish society, these policies took on strong economic restrictions. In this setting, Polish peasant interests and those of the upper strata began to coincide, as these strata found common cause and began to organize around the Polish national issue.

The onset of shared issues can be seen after 1848 in the formation of village circles, regional agricultural societies, loan societies, savings banks, agricultural schools, self-education groups, lending libraries and even amateur theaters.¹²⁸ In the Prussian context, these organizations were permitted to exist because their focus was limited to economic activity rather than government agitation. Under the leadership of the conciliatory (loyalist) Polish nobility and intelligentsia, they generally advocated loyalism to the state all the while seeking to strengthen Polish cultural and economic strength in what was termed the

¹²⁶ This does not indicate that tensions did not exist between the landowners and the peasants, and between well-to-do peasants and the worse-off peasant majority. The effects of agrarian reforms, which favored those who were “better-off,” overtime became visible in the polarization of rural society. Subsequent anti-Polish policies however contributed to increased cooperation between the social strata, finding common cause in the Polish question.

¹²⁷ One of the leading national groups in the region was right-wing Polish league established by a liberal-minded landlords, priests, and intelligentsia, seeking to centralize mass organization. While the league was short-lived, it represented the first effort at legally organized activity with the objective of bringing together the masses for the defense of nationality. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 130-131.

¹²⁸ For economic/agronomic circle in the Prussian partition see, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 195-197.

Organic Work movement.¹²⁹ This form of organization, as pointed out by Kieniewicz (1996: 197),

...created an atmosphere of civic pride that certainly inspired the peasantry's stubborn opposition to Germanization. The peasants felt challenged to disprove the alleged superiority of German oppressors by demonstrating that they were as good or better farmers and could hold their own in economic competition. An attitude such as this also fostered collaboration with the big Polish landowners, who were facing analogous problems.

In this sense, organization around a common conflict fostered patriotic sentiments contributing to a sense of unity on which a political community could be built.

These developments, however, speak to the imperfect integration of the peasants, given that alongside the set of economic and cultural issues affecting all social groups of Polish society, there were also issues particular to the poorer peasant and landless laborers, which at the time were largely ignored. The organizational activities of peasant circles inspired collaboration between the large estates and the well-to-do peasants, while excluding the poorer segments of rural society. This latter segment would paradoxically gain opportunity for political integration on account of the anti-Polish Colonization Commission.

Peasant developments became especially important when in 1886 Bismarck introduced anti-Polish economic reforms in the form of the Colonization Commission.¹³⁰ The Germanizing objective of the commission was to transfer land ownership from the Poles to German settlers in the provinces of West Prussia and Poznań. To counteract government measures a number of initiatives came into force, the most important being the Polish parceling agencies (Kieniewicz 1969: 199).¹³¹ The aim of these agencies was to keep land under Polish ownership by parcelizing estates, both Polish and German alike, and selling them to Polish peasants interested in increasing their property rather than submitting to the Colonization Commission. Parceling agencies, much like civic associations in

¹²⁹ The Organic Work Movement first arose in 1830.

¹³⁰ For a detailed account of the Colonization Commission see, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 198-202; For the Colonization Commission and the Polish national movement see, Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 225-265. For Colonization Commission post Bismarck and the anti-Polish expropriation bill, see, Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 184-190.

¹³¹ Polish parceling agencies included the Land Bank (*Bank Ziemski*) founded in 1888 with the intent to refinance indebted estates by parceling large Polish estates and selling them to Polish peasants. In 1894, the Farm Parceling company, later the Parceling Bank, took on the practice of "neighborhood parceling" where small plots were sold to small-holders. By the early twentieth century, twenty-four Polish parceling agencies existed in the region. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 199.

Galicia, offered the institutional framework that contributed to the formation of a unified set of interests and national consciousness among the various groups of Polish society. Increasingly, peasants began to demonstrate a political voice of their own. These sentiments would be reinforced in the subsequent decades prior to WWI.¹³²

In the Prussian partition Poles experienced the earliest, but also most gradual implementation of agricultural reforms. These reforms took place in the context of Prussification and Germanization, which led to an interdependence of economic and national factors that facilitated the collaboration of rural society with the patriotic Polish nobility. The politicized struggle for nation and land contributed to the formation of common interests and organizations that strengthened peasant national consciousness in the region. In light of these developments, it can be asserted that in the territories of the Prussian partition, Polish peasant integration into political life was the most complete. Moreover, this outcome took place in the absence of revolutionary intent; instead Polish society organized into civic “circles” and institutions that sought to strengthen Polish culture and economic position through hard work and self-improvement. Working within the institutional framework of the state, Polish political integration can be said to have been influenced by German principles. In the context of the Prussian partition, the process of peasant political integration produced a highly mobilized society whose interests aligned with those of the larger Polish nation.

Russian Partition

Peasant political integration into the political life of the Russian partitions, especially the Congress Kingdom, began much later than in the other two partitions on account of the late introduction of agrarian reforms. Isolated from the rest of the Polish nation, the politicization of peasant society was significantly delayed. On account of this delay, when peasants began to form a political identity, they did so along the traditional lines of conflict between rural society and landlords leading to the formation of strong class interests. The process of rural reform, however, was administered in a context of Russification, which limited the peasant access to the public sphere and threatened traditional ways of cultural life. These developments solidified peasant interests with

¹³² For Germanization policies under William II see, Hagan, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 159-207.

struggle for national rights for the peasant society. The regional character of the Russian partition is one of strong class interest and weak mobilization.

Agrarian Reform

In the Congress Kingdom serfdom had been abolished since 1807, by Napoleon and on account of the Congress Kingdom's past in the Duchy of Warsaw. Yet personal liberty did not equal economic emancipation without the ability to own land and the manorial system remained intact.¹³³ Regulation thus remained in the hands of private landowners who were free to manage their estates as they saw fit. Most (small to medium) landowners continued in the tradition of a manorial system. Latifundia, on the other hand, were inclined to follow the Prussian example of converting compulsory labour to rent.¹³⁴ The state, which owned the former national estates, also followed the regulatory system of rents, although it was slow in its implementation (and did not start until 1841). In short, the situation of the peasants varied according to the private regulatory system that was imposed.

First efforts at state intervention on behalf of Russian authorities were made in 1846 in response to a nationalist insurrection, which was proclaimed in Kraków but included plans against all three partitioning powers. The insurrection called upon the peasant strata for support in exchange for ownership of land. To prevent peasant unrest, Tsar Nicholas I issued the reform of 7 June 1846. The reform banned the abuses of the nobility but did not address the problem of landownership or compulsory labour. In effect, it kept the feudal system in place. The regulations were imposed in the Congress Kingdom as well as the former eastern provinces of the old Republic.

The next state intervention would not occur until 1861. The reform of 16 May 1861 proclaimed the emancipation of all serfs on private land. In Congress Poland, the new edict permitted peasants to convert compulsory labour charges to a "ransom" (*okup*). By 1 October these terms were accepted bringing the end to compulsory labor in Polish territories (Kieniewicz 1969: 158). The new reforms however did not grant peasants that

¹³³ The granting of personal freedom meant that landlord no longer had to provide (shelter, work, etc.) to the peasants that worked his land. This means that he could evict them if he wished. The right to personal freedom was maintained when the Duchy of Warsaw was transformed into the Congress Kingdom in 1815.

¹³⁴ Two key differences existed between the regulatory systems imposed in Prussia (Poznań) and that of the Congress Kingdom. First, in Prussia the system was imposed by the state, while in the Congress Kingdom it was subject to the private inclination, therefore the landlords. Second, in the Congress Kingdom, peasants did not get rights to land. See, Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 96-97.

which they most coveted, independent proprietorship (*uwłaszczenie*). Full rights to land were only granted in 1864, again in response to national insurrection.

The Provisional National Government, on 22 January 1863, had announced two important reforms:

First "...all peasants now farming any amount of land, never mind by what right, would immediately become full owner of their holdings and would retain all the rights or privileges involved. All former charges due to landlords, such as compulsory labor, ransom, rent, and the like would be suppressed immediately. The landowners would be indemnified later out of government funds. The second decree declared that every landless citizen who volunteered in the national army would receive, after the war and on application, three *morgi* (four acres) of land from the national domains, free and with full title. Etc" (Kieniewicz 1969: 162-163).

Property would be granted to all peasants and compensation would be given to landowners; land would be given to the landless. The decrees extended not only to Congress Poland, but also to all the territories of the former Commonwealth under Russian rule.

Fearing that the Polish insurrection would instigate a social revolution, the Russian authorities were forced to act. First, changes were made to the original 1861 reforms and applied in Lithuania and Belorussia, and later in the Ukraine (Kieniewicz 1969: 171). In Congress Poland, the threat of peasant unrest was much higher:

Milyutin came back to Petersburg two months later and gave his opinion bluntly: "The Polish peasants are following the National Government because it has given them full title to land. The only way of curbing the rebellion is to appease the peasants, and this can only be done by granting them what they have already gained from the insurrection" (Kieniewicz 1969: 172).

In 1864 the reforms pertaining to proprietorship, as issued by the national insurrectionists, were adopted in a decree by the Russian authorities along with three other new reforms. The new reforms were to be introduced in the Congress Kingdom, as well as Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian guberniyas (Kieniewicz 1969: 173). Russian reforms (from 1846-1864) sought, on the one hand, to maintain the support of the Polish nobility, who in turn for the rights to land would reject the Polish insurrectionary efforts. On the other hand, reforms were implemented to win peasant support for the tsar who was to be the benefactor who would "liberate the peasants from the yoke of the Polish *szlachta*" (Kieniewicz 1969: 171).

Agrarian Condition after the Reforms

To speak of peasant integration into political life is difficult given that for the better part of the nineteenth century, rural society under Russian authority remained under the domination of either the Polish nobility or the state. However, to assume all peasant society was completely passive would be incorrect. The decades of feudal oppression had brought to the forefront tensions in peasant-nobility relations. The conflict centered on: access and title to land, land evictions, compulsory labor, and level of rents, servitudes, along with various abuses by the nobility. These grievances formed the basis of peasant attitudes towards the Polish nobility until full emancipation and property rights were achieved.

As a result of discontent, peasants refused to participate in the 1830 insurrection, nor were Polish democrats able to secure peasant support for the planned 1846 insurrection. Unlike in Prussian Poland where the new agrarian policies provided some measure of agricultural progress and economic betterment, or Galicia, where peasant grievances led to armed uprising against the landlords, in the Russian partitions, peasants remained in isolation. As Kieniewicz points out, studies of rural conflict prior to emancipation indicate that peasants acted alone (Kieniewicz 1967: 132). This was a response to the facts of everyday life, demonstrating peasant attitudes towards the landlords and at most an expression of private socioeconomic interests but not a serious threat to the existing social structure. These rural conflicts demonstrated peasant society's lack of politicization, and therefore the limited capacity of rural conflicts as political acts. Moreover, they indicate the rural struggle to be separate from the national struggle.

Even the pre-1863 insurrectionary context of Congress Poland failed to arouse much peasant engagement. The proposed agrarian reforms of the Polish Provisional National Government (Central Committee) were not radical enough and did not inspire peasants to join the insurrectionary movement. While the reforms put forth by the Russian government continued to deny peasants access to land, indicating Russian support of the landlords of larger latifundia and estates, who generally gave their loyalty to the Russian throne. The peasants had no cause to support either the Polish nationalist or the Russian authorities. Where peasants did lend their support to the insurgence it was in a limited capacity; in some cases they turned on the landlords in the Galician style; but mostly they preferred to wait for the emperor to improve their condition (Kieniewicz 1967).

Peasant isolation from the upper strata as well as from the Russian government effectively inhibited the political integration of the rural population, exemplifying the profound gap between local and national politics. In contrast, by 1848 Galician peasants had their first opportunity to challenge the existing social order, and by the 1860s they had started to attain partial political integration through participation in local political life and civic organizations. Concurrently, peasant integration in the Prussian partition was even further along, as at least a portion of the rural population was able to align their economic interests under the national banner.

The post-emancipation period in the Russian partition did not provide much opportunity for peasant political integration. If the first step of political integration is the formation of political issues, then the late emancipation of the Polish peasants significantly delayed the politicization of this segment of society. The ignorance and isolation of the peasantry secured them as a general force of stability in the Russian partition, despite the insurrectionary movements instigated by the upper strata. The Polish democratic elites can also take a portion of the blame. Before 1863, the objective of nationalist agitation was to mobilize the peasants only enough to achieve Polish independence without fundamentally changing the social structure of peasant-landlord relations. As a result the second step of political integration, the orientation of political life around commonly shared political issues, was also significantly hampered.

In the Russian partition, but specifically in the Congress Kingdom, it is only at the onset of the twentieth century that the development of nationally shared political issues between the peasant strata and the rest of Polish society began to develop. The political issues, which came to the forefront, were those of national (cultural) autonomy in the face of heavy-handed Russification and the peasant problem. These questions could influence the subsequent development of the region's politics.

While late peasant emancipation delayed peasant integration into political life, the advantageous conditions of land reform contributed to the development of class interests as well as national sentiments. The emancipation settlement granted peasants large holdings and provided landless peasants with land. These favorable agrarian reforms contributed to the rise of a more economically self-sufficient peasantry, and helped reduce the economic gap between peasant and the noble landholders (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 28). Despite

agricultural reforms and economic progress the traditional disjuncture between peasants and landlords continued to inform the peasant struggle and led to the development of a regional political profile based on class character.¹³⁵

Increasingly, however, peasant struggles were accompanied by nationalist sentiments (Kieniewicz 1969: 226). Changes in the agrarian system had also introduced a new system of agrarian administration putting agrarian reform under the direct management of Russian officials of the Peasant Commissions (Leslie et al 1980: 43). Russian officials' lack of familiarity with local problems in addition to Russification policies in the area of culture raised new peasant grievances. These developments helped politicize peasant society, and encouraged the nationalization of political issues culminating in the first peasant movement of the Congress Kingdom during the Russian revolution of 1905. Peasant participation in the revolution represented both a class and national struggle.

Political integration into national political life of the Congress Kingdom occurred last in the Prussian partition. While Russian authorities granted the most radical agrarian reforms of the partitioning powers, the delay in their implementation functioned to isolate the Polish peasants from Polish national life. As a result, when emancipation took place the politicization of the peasants was influenced by the traditional peasant-landlord conflict leading to the formation of peasant political identity along class lines. Agrarian reform, however, took place in conjunction with Russification policies. While these policies limited peasant access to the public sphere, they also contributed to the formation of peasant nationalist sentiments. In this context, the peasant class struggle became linked with the fight for the national rights of peasant society. Despite these developments, the region's class character is also characterized by weak mobilization given the repressive structure of Russian administration.

Chapter Summary

Throughout the nineteenth century the question of Polish national independence has been closely related to the question of peasant emancipation. In this regard, the issue of agrarian reform, as introduced by the partitioning powers of Austria, Prussia and Russia, has been most salient to the subsequent process of peasant political integration into Polish

¹³⁵ The struggle was organized around the unsolved issue of servitudes, as well as the issue of deforestation. Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, 226.

national political life. Through his process, Polish nationalists hoped to integrate into the “nation” free citizens who would fight for it.

This chapter has shown how this process, in large part, has been contingent on the political strategies dictated by the partitioning powers. It has shown that early state intervention in Galicia and in the Prussian partition facilitated the first phase of peasant political integration. In the Russian partition, where state intervention was late, the politicization of peasants was delayed, leaving rural society isolated from the rest of the Polish nation. These outcomes have been summarized below, in Table 3.1.

State structures can also be observed to have affected the direction of peasant political integration. In addition to the agrarian reforms themselves, the circumstances under which agrarian reforms were implemented also influenced the political future of the given region. In the case of the Prussian partition, the early introduction of agrarian reforms in the first half of the nineteenth century and the oppressive policies of the Bismarck era in the second half of the century facilitated the alignment of peasant interests with those of the Polish nationalists. Here a regional class character did not emerge as peasant interests became interdependent with national objectives. In the case of Galicia, early emancipation in the context of Austrian liberalism produced a highly mobilized peasant society independent of the governing Polish elites. In the Russian partition late emancipation and strict Russification measures decisively influenced a regional class character but also limited opportunities for politicization and mobilization. Ironically, in the Congress Kingdom, agrarian reforms were the most radical of the three areas. This led to a regional political profile centered on class interests and national sentiments.

Table 3.1 Peasant political integration in partitioned Poland

	Galicia	Prussian Partition	Russia Partition (Congress Poland)
Agrarian Reforms	1848	1807-1850	1861-1864
Changes to the Structure of Agrarian Strata	Majority were peasant smallholders; own small plots of land	Peasant smallholders initially excluded from regulations; after 1848-1850 mix of holders	Rise of small-holder and medium-holders; significant decrease of noble held land
Local Politics	Regulation in the hands of large landowners	Junker landlords are local representatives of the state; implement regulation	Regulation implemented by tsarist bureaucracy
Politicization	Peasant interests against landlords	Peasant interests against state	Politically passive; late development of class interests
Mobilization	High mobilization	High mobilization	Low mobilization
Outcome	Class antagonism; rise of populist politics	Interdependence of class and national interests	State oppression; class-based politics

Chapter Four: Historical Legacies of Modern Democratic Participation

Introduction

This thesis takes as its main premise that the critical juncture of the partitions of Poland have provided the decisive turning point that has shaped the direction of Polish political development. Polish society as a whole simultaneously underwent this period of significant political change; however, on account of being subject to the three different administrative structures of Austria, Prussia and Russia, the partition period took place in distinctive ways in each of the partitioned regions. Subject to different institutional constraints, the two distinct although related key mechanisms of modern nationalism and peasant political integration took divergent trajectories. The historical legacy of the partitions can be observed in how these two mechanisms manifest in present day regional variations of citizens' political behaviour.

This chapter will make two arguments: First, present-day political mobilization is higher where the integration of rural society took place earlier. Second, political preferences are shaped by the interdependent relationship between modern nationalism and peasant integration into political life. Where nationalism was grounded in traditional culture strong preferences for right-wing political preferences can be observed; where strong ties to traditional culture have been adapted to align with national interests as a result of the partition, left or center right political preferences can be seen. Where peasant interests developed along class lines, strong support is given to the political right, whereas the alignment of peasant interests with national politics has resulted in the support of the liberal center-right.

As can be observed, these outcomes are not mutually exclusive but overlap to provide a political profile of Poland's historical regions. While the historical legacy of the partitions does not explain everything, it can explain more than previously assumed.

Former Historical Region of Galicia

Political Mobilization of Rural Society

Since 1989, the former historic region of Galicia has consistently shown high levels of voter turnout. This outcome can be attributed to the region's unique character as developed under the Habsburg Empire, mainly, peasant society's early integration into political life due to the early implementation of agrarian reforms and Austria's subsequent

liberalization. Peasants' integration, while slow and imperfect on account of national politics being dominated by the nobility, did provide this largely rural region with opportunity to acquire political thinking and engage in public life, even if mainly at the local level. Perhaps, the local "civic schools", to use Putnam's term, of agricultural circles and communal self-government provided a better education on political life than peasants could have attained in the Viennese Reichstag and Galician Sejm. In the latter, peasants' lack of experience, lack of knowledge of German and distance from the nobility "prevented them from establishing an influential presence in political life" (Stauter-Halsted 2004: 78). Participation at the local level, on the other hand, helped shape peasant attitudes and expectations towards the authorities and contributed to a more publicly aware and politically active peasant society. It was in Galicia, for example, that the tradition of peasant activism produced the first peasant populist leaders (Narkiewicz 1976: 38). The early politicization and organization of peasants in Galicia could reasonably be interpreted as setting the stage for the future of electoral behaviour.

Arguably, Galician peasants had an advantage over those in the other partitions. The tradition of a more politically aware citizenry can be observed to have survived the communist period. In the historical region of Galicia, when voting was compulsory under the communist regime, the majority of the region's population chose to stay home. The resulting low turnout has been recognized as an indication of anti-regime attitudes and contestation (Tworzecki 1996: 88). According to a study of voting behaviour conducted by Jasiewicz and Żukowski (1992: 98; Also see, Heyns and Bialecki) for the period of 1984-88, high levels of abstention can be considered: "as the rejection of the authorities' policies and a consequence of the lack of the population's influence on producing candidates."¹³⁶ The authors go on to state that between 1984-1988, a high level of abstentions were characteristic of areas which had "long traditions of public activism", demonstrating, as the authors point out, that "it was not lack of interest in politics or simply laziness which determined the voting results and their differentiation on the country's map" (Ibid. 115). The region's voter behaviour during the communist period indicates that even in the absence of true elections, voter abstention was a political act. The conscious decision to

¹³⁶ On voting behaviour in the elections of 1984-89, see, Krzysztof Jasiewicz and Tomasz Żukowski, "The Elections of 1984-89 as a Factor in the Transformation of the Social Order in Poland," *Democratization in Poland, 1988-90: Polish Voices*, ed. Stanford (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 98-126.

abstain, therefore refuse loyalty to the communist authorities, speaks to the long tradition of peasant opposition in the region.

Traditional Culture and the Political Right

In the 1990s, the former historical region of Galicia emerged as the stronghold of the conservative right-wing post-Solidarity political parties and presidential candidates. In the 2000s this region has given most of its support to the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS). While party names have changed, the common denominator linking these parties is their definition of political community: “Who is the majority” and “Who is not a legitimate participant in the political community?” (Kubik 1994b: 340).¹³⁷ The parties of the political right, place emphasis on the confessional definition of social order and ethnocentric image of the nation (Jasiewicz 2007: 494). Thus defined, a strong link is made between Pole and Catholic. This vision of ideal political community, many have argued, has been inherited from Poland’s communist past and the divergent views regarding decommunization. However, it is possible to argue that present day concepts of Polish identity have far deeper roots.

These traditions of political identity can be observed in voter behaviour. Numerous authors have pointed to the connection between voting behaviour and Catholic traditions (Jasiewicz and Żukowski 1992; Jasiewicz 1993, 2009; Twrozecki 1996). Where Catholic traditions (defined as high church attendance) are the strongest, support can be found for the conservative right. Southeastern Poland happens to be a region of strong traditional Polish Catholicism. The strength of the Catholic character is found in the largely rural composition of the region, founded on traditional local communities. It is within these communities that the concept of Polish nation and political nationalism was transformed into the modern concept of Polish national identity.

As has been outlined in Chapter Two, in this region, the development of rural society’s sense of modern national identity took place in the context of cultural liberty as well as general separateness from the (political) nationalism of Polish nobility. As a result,

¹³⁷ Jan Kubik, in his examination of the early post-communist period (1989-1992), states that one of the basic tensions that emerged from Polish politics is the divide between an ethnocentric and religious social order and a secular one. He labels this divide: Revolutionary vs. Reformist, in regards to how each side addresses the question of national identity. See, Jan Kubik, “The Role of Decentralization and Cultural Revival in Post-communist Transformations: The Case of Cieszyn Silesia, Poland,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 27: 4 (1994): 331-355.

the Galician concept of national identity has strong traditional roots that stem from Polish peasant society's understanding of self and community according to traditional village life as shaped by Roman Catholicism. Even as Polish peasants became integrated into the national fold, their concept of Polish identity and Polish nation remained firmly grounded in peasant concepts of traditional heritage. Present day political behaviour, therefore, continues to be informed by these values.

The question then arises, how did these traditional social bonds survive communism? The introduction of communist rule in Poland in 1945 and the regime's "open assault on Christianity" (Porter 2007-2013) did have an effect on this region. Given that Catholic religiosity, if not necessarily the church itself, has traditionally played a significant social and cultural role in Galicia's culture and even political development, Stalinist State oppression was seen as a threat to those values. Although communist oppression of the church relaxed in 1956, restrictive practices and tenuous relations between church and State had a repressive effect on Polish society, but in particular the Galician way of life. As a result, in the southeast region, as well as the rest of Poland, the role of the church came to be seen as that of "nation builder".

The process of nation building in Galicia, however, differs from that of the rest of Poland. First, the cycle of national repression and resistance, which had been experienced in Prussian and Russian partitions, was new in Galicia, where politics of identity never took place because the Polish language and most significantly, the Catholic religion were not threatened. During the communist period, when the church as an institution came to be seen as a source of resistance to Soviet rule, it relinquished its traditional position of supporting the status quo in favor of representing the nation.¹³⁸ This act of resistance of communist authorities, as stated by Brier "had reinvigorated the cultural imagery of the Polish national and ethnic community characterized primarily by the Roman Catholic Church" (Brier 2009: 68). This outcome, as indicated by Lubecki (2000: 272, after Korbonski, 1965: 207 and Cywinski 1983: 92), "explains the "conversion" of anti-clerical Galician countryside to Catholicism".

¹³⁸ After 1945, the Church became the main transmitter of values in Poland. See, Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 116.

Second, the Galician tradition of public activism and peasant opposition to communism during the 1944-1947 have been shown to be “strongly interdependent” with the region’s high levels of religiosity (Jasiewicz and Żukowski 1992: 121). The church’s role as a site for anti-communist activism and its place as the last source of national autonomy anchored much social support across Poland, but especially in the former Galicia. By the 1980s, when the Catholic Church and the Solidarity-opposition had been united against the state, Galicia emerged as a Solidarity stronghold. It can be observed that Catholic and anti-communist sentiments became closely interlinked during the communist period. The reason that they have survived past 1989 however, is because they are rooted in the regions historical past which continues to inform voting behaviour.

Former Historical Region of Prussian Poland

Political Mobilization of Rural Society

The voter turnout in the former Prussian partition, much like in the former historic region of Galicia, has been generally high. This region showed the highest turnout in the semi-free election of 1989 and continued to show high levels of voter participation throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Only in southeastern Poland has voter turnout been observed to be higher in recent decades. As in Galicia, this development can be accounted for by the early emancipation of rural society and their subsequent integration into political life.

While the process of emancipation in the Prussian partition began early and was carried out gradually, it was completed roughly around the same time as in Galicia. Repressive cultural and economic state policies towards the latter half of the nineteenth century notwithstanding, the opportunity to act “politically” in defense of Polish as well as peasant interests existed mostly in the form of circles and associations. In the Poznań area, trade unions and political organizations did emerge, as did peasant organizations that eventually would send representatives to the German parliament (Tworzecki 1996: 86). These opportunities for political integration, just as in Galicia, helped peasant society establish a tradition of political activity.

As in Galicia, historically established traditions of public life were evident during the communist period. Nonvoting, as Jasiewicz and Żukowski (1992) have indicated, was more likely to occur where historic traditions of public life were established. The reverse

was also true for the 1989 semi-free elections. Turnout was highest in areas such as the former region of Galicia and Greater Poland, where the traditions of political activism can be traced back to the nineteenth century (Jasiewicz and Żukowski 1992: 120). Subsequent voter turnout patterns of the democratic period continue to support the connection between old habits of participation and present day voter turnout. For example, Poznań consistently demonstrates high turnout. It is difficult, however, to draw a concise conclusion for the entire former area of the Prussian partition, as can be done for Galicia. Given that this region is more socioeconomically diverse than the mostly rural southeastern provinces and the impact of communism would have left a much different imprint on the region has to be taken into consideration. Regional stability, however, can be observed in political attitudes.

Traditional Culture and Polish Nationalism

In the historic 1989 semi-elections, the former historical region of the Prussian partitions emerged largely in favor of Solidarity. With the onset of democratic politics this region took a different course from its Galician counterpart, favoring the post-Solidarity splinter groups the Democratic Union (UD) and presidential candidate, Mazowiecki. Political preference was also given to the political (successor) left. Since the mid-2000s, the right of center liberal party, Civic Platform (PO) and PO presidential candidates have gained much support here. In reference to the questions of "Who is the majority", and "Who belongs to political community" (Kubik 1994b: 340), the political parties of the successor left and the liberal right that win support in this region, tend towards more civic, that is more egalitarian, and less ethnocentric views of citizenship and nation. This definition of Poland's political community has been said to be closely related to the communist experience and different assessments of decommunization. This thesis maintains that the explanation can be found in Poland's partitioned past.

While voter behaviour has been connected to Catholic traditions, where high church attendance is linked to conservative support, in the former Prussian partition this is simply not the case. The region is known for high rates of church attendance, but votes for secular or libertarian parties. This outcome can be explained by the early integration of rural society into the national culture of the country.

As demonstrated in Chapter Two, development of modern national identity and nationalism in the Prussian partition was firmly based on ethnic commonalities such as

religion and language. These commonalities were increasingly highlighted by the Prussian administrative structures and policies, which have arguably contributed to the construct of Polish national identity in the region. The Prussian state, by defining the Polish nation in ethnic terms influenced the formation of Polish national identity and nationalism. In the course of this national struggle, most importantly during Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, Poles turned to the Catholic Church. "During this period the Church was often the only institution that had a Polish character. Thus Polish national consciousness came to be tied to a Catholic religious identity" (Bernhard 1993: 136; Also see Lipski 1982). The main difference between the Catholic religious identity of Poles in Prussia and those in Galicia is therefore the institutional context of each partition.

The national struggle in Austria largely took place in the political realm, in the Galician Sejm and Vienna Reichstag, and was driven by the nobility, while the rural society remained rooted in their traditional cultures and religious identity. In the Prussian partition the national struggle included the majority of the ethnically Polish population, noble and peasant alike. Here the Prussian setting had a powerful effect on transforming traditional (political) concept of "nation" to one of modern nationalism, whereby all of Polish society was integrated into the national definition and the goals of the Polish nation. This process facilitated the formation of political community, where religious and national dimensions were linked. The church however, became the site of Polish heritage in reference to the existence of the nation more so than as the guardian of religious values. Thus, while modern nationalism was originally framed in cultural terms, and suffused with religious language, it served a political objective of hostility towards the state.

Recognizing these developments, however, it is also necessary to point out that until 1871, one's creed did not necessarily conflict with loyalty to the state. It became important when under the unified German Empire, tendencies of regionalism and Catholicism came to be seen as a threat to the newly unified and predominately Protestant nation. Even then the long history of mutual existence, the shared oppression of German and Polish Catholics, and Protestant support of "Polishness", are all factors that can reasonably be said to have contributed to a more inclusive definition of Polish citizenship. Thus, while attachment to the Catholic Church is a part of Polish national identity, in this region, it is possible to say that it is not necessarily entirely a manifestation of an ethnically and religiously

homogenous group. Rather, the church's role in the national identity formation of Poles in the former Prussian partition was a process whereby religious and national dimensions were linked, encouraging the integration of Polish society into national life. Through this process the church, in its struggle for religious practice and defense of Polish language, became the legitimate representative of Polish national heritage, more so than just Catholic values. It would resume this role during the communist period.

During the communist period, "The Catholic Church retained its crucial role as a repository of national heritage" (Kubik 1994a: 123). As the only independent institution it became "inadvertently political because the mere fact of its existence challenges such a monopoly" (Kubik 1994a: 119). In the former Prussian partition, having experience political identity formation differently than the rural regions of Galicia or Russian Poland, the political role of the church was perhaps more overt. For example, Władysław Piwowarski, provides that following conclusion,

It is interesting that the dogmatic aspect of preaching was less important for the listeners than its existential aspect related to the existence of the nation.... Participation in religious practices contributed less to the deepening of the bonds with God, to the moral renewal of the members of the nation, or to the development of interactions on the religious level; it however contributed to the deepening of social and national ties and identification with the Polish nation (1983: 346 in Kubik 1994a: 124).

The above statement is made in reference to Poland as a whole; it is possible to assert that it would be truer in the former Prussia partition, where the "deepening of social and national ties and identification with the Polish nation" (Kubik 1994a: 124) took place much earlier in Polish history. Therefore, unlike in Galicia, where church discourse invoked the cultural image of a national and ethnic community, in this region the message would have been received in more political terms.¹³⁹

As a result, it is not surprising that the end of communism in Poland has shown the region to give preference to a more secular vision of political community. This demonstrates a continuity and stability of political attitudes, which differentiate this region from the other two areas of partition.

¹³⁹ During the early communist period, the Catholic Church offered an ambiguous vision of Poland as a Catholic nation, implying the existence of an ethnically and religiously unified entity. By the 1970s, Catholic discourse embraced "Christian patriotism", propagating love for the nation with "brotherly love for others" in "an effort to overcome the negative aspects of the stereotype, Pole = Catholic. See, Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power*, 119-125,

Former Historical Region of Russian Poland

Political Mobilization of Rural Society

Voter turnout in the historic region of the Russian partition has been low since the introduction of democratic elections. These east and central provinces that combine to form this region, with the exceptions of the large cities Warsaw and Łódź, have consistently shown low levels of participation in both presidential and sejm elections. Only in recent years has there been an increase in voter participation. In contrast to the Austrian and Prussian partitions, peasant emancipation had been carried out late resulting in the delay of political integration of peasants into national life. Moreover, emancipation took place in the context of Russification, inhibiting peasant access to the public sphere. Needless to say, the Russian partition did not provide much opportunity for peasant political development and the establishment of civic traditions.

The effects of the partition period on the rural populations lack of concern for politics can be observed in the communist period. While southern Poland (Galicia) refused to partake in the mandatory elections, the population of this historical region turned out at the polling booth (Tworzecki 1996: 88). As Jasiewicz and Żukowski (1992: 115) point out, during the 1984-1988 period, the decision to vote (rather than abstain) can be interpreted as a show of support for the communist authorities. “One can suppose that the voting cards were cast as declarations of loyalty mainly by groups, such as the peasants and rural inhabitants, which were marginal to this system...” (Jasiewicz and Żukowski: 1992: 115-116). It is reasonable to argue that in the former territories of the former Russian partition, where the tradition of public activism has been the shortest, are where the largest number of marginalized peasants could be found. However, over time we have also seen this gap begin to diminish, as the population of this region increasingly becomes integrated into political life.

Traditional Culture and the Political Right

The political profile of region that once formed the Congress Kingdom (later Vistulaland) under the Russian partition in many ways resembled the areas that once comprised the historic region of Galicia. During the democratic period, this area, much like Galicia, emerged in support of right-wing political parties. In 1989 this option was represented by the Solidarity-opposition; in the 1990s, it was the more right-wing post-

solidarity factions; and in the 2000s, most of the political support had been given to the Law and Justice (PiS). Exceptions can be observed in major cities such as the capital city of Warsaw and the city of Łódź, which in recent years have become the source of liberal support in the region. Much like in Galicia, right-wing support can be accounted for by the strong connection between Catholic traditions and rural character of the area.

While Catholic traditions of cultural national identity are not an outcome of cultural liberties, they are an outcome of rural society's long-term isolation from the national politics of the Congress Kingdom. As a result, rural society's concept of national identity remained grounded in traditional culture based on religious traditions.

One of the key differences between the manifestations of peasant national identity in the areas of the Russian partition in contrast to that of Galicia is the connection to peasants' political mobilization. While rural society in the Russian partition was able to preserve its tradition of religious cultural identity, its exclusion from the public sphere prevented the development of a strong tradition of public activism. As a result, since the 1990s, strong support for the conservative right can be observed in the region, although not in the same intensity as in southeastern Poland. This indicates that perhaps Jasiewicz and Żukowski (1992) were correct in their initial assumption that a region's religiosity (church attendance) may be linked with peasant opposition. While the authors are referring to the 1944-1947 opposition of Galician peasants to land collectivization, peasant resistance in general is grounded in the older traditions of peasant activism during the partitions. Where this link is absent, traditional attitudes and values prevail, but are not necessarily reflected in strong mobilization.

Given the prevalence of traditional culture identity in this region, the communist period would have had a similar effect on subsequent development of political preferences. Here too, the connection between Catholicism and anti-communist sentiments strengthened the cultural image of the nation.

Peasant Class Interests and the Political Preferences in the Historic Regions

Strong support for the political right in southeast Poland has also been attributed to the rural character of the region where small-scale (individual-level) agriculture and private landownership continue to be widespread. As indicated above, support for the political right can be attributed to the preservation of traditional culture on account of strong ties to

rural life. On the one hand this speaks to the region's religiosity; on the other, it refers to the special position that agriculture holds in this region and the specific set of interests this creates.

Present day agricultural interests stem from the history of peasant activism centered on economic interests on account of the Galician emancipation reforms and settlement agreements. As examined in Chapter Three, peasant interests and mobilization took place along class lines but also in a relatively liberal cultural and political context, establishing a tradition of strong peasant activism in the region. During the communist period, these traditions manifested in the form of peasant opposition to land collectivization efforts and can be understood as one of the factors contributing to the region's strong support of Solidarity in 1989 and post-Solidarity right-wing factions in the 1990s. More recently, the region has given support to PiS, which upholds protectionist measures that help keep the small farms in the region's rural areas in private hands.

Support for the political left in the former region of the Prussian partition can be explained by the region's agricultural character. Since the onset of the democratic period the interests of large-scale landownership in the Wielkopolska area have differed strongly with those of farmers in southeastern and even central Poland when small-scale farming has been the norm. For example, in their comparison of the rural regions of Poland, Banski et al., (2012) have indicated that distinct voter preferences can be observed between rural areas characterized by small farms and rural areas where large farms were the norm. Their analysis of the parliamentary elections between 1993 and 2007 shows a "polarization of electoral preferences" between these rural regions. In the historic region of Galicia, rural areas give strong support to the political right, while in the historic region of the Prussian partition rural areas are observed to support the left.

These present day agricultural interests can be traced back to land distribution during the agrarian reform process in Prussia. On average, peasant holdings in the Prussian partition were approximately 30 ha as compared to the 3 ha in Galicia and the 7 ha in the Russian partition (Tworzecki 1996: 85; also Kieniewicz 1969). The difference of land distribution, however, is a problem of a more recent history when the large farms found in the former area of the Prussian partition, were converted to State Farms and

nationalized agriculture. These farms later suffered in the wake of economic transition leading farmers in the region to seek support from the political left.

Conclusion

The political profile of each historical region can be explained by the two main problems faced by the Poles during the critical juncture of the partitions: the awakening of a national consciousness and socioeconomic reform. How these problems were solved in the context of the foreign political structures of Austria, Prussia, and Russia has influenced the future development of Polish political participation. And while the legacy of the partitions cannot explain everything, it helps shed light on more than has been assumed in the past. It provides a foundation of cultural traditions and social links between society and national political life. Subsequent political development has been built, or more accurately, layered upon this foundation and democratic politics have revealed patterns of citizen participation that speak to these older traditions. To borrow Jasiewicz and Żukowski's phrase, "The new political geography of the Republic turns out to be a very old one" (1992: 125).

Already, today it is possible to witness democratic politics fill in old gaps, such as differentiation of voter turnout, and bringing forth new ones like urbanization and standard of living. These variables will certainly play a greater role in the future. However, it is also reasonable to infer that older patterns will continue to influence political life in Poland for some time yet, or for as long as collective actors continue to use old symbols to advance their claims.

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
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



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
Appendix A: 1989 Senate (Upper House) Elections



Source: Mariusz Kowalski, "Geografia wyborcza Polski - przestrzenne zróżnicowanie zachowań wyborczych Polaków w latach 1989-1998 [The electoral geography of Poland - spatial differences in electoral behaviour 1989-1998]," Geopolitical Studies (Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania, 2000).


Appendix B: 1990 Presidential Elections






Source: Kowalski, "Geografia wyborcza Polski."





Appendix C: 1991 Sejm (Lower House) Elections






Source: Kowalski, "Geografia wyborcza Polski."


Appendix D: 1993 Sejm (Lower House) Elections






Source: Kowalski, "Geografia wyborcza Polski."





Appendix E: 1995 Presidential Election






Source: Kowalski, "Geografia wyborcza Polski."

Appendix F: 1997 Sejm (Lower House) Elections





Source: Kowalski, "Geografia wyborcza Polski."

Appendix G: 2001 Sejm (Lower House) Elections


left-of-center: Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union Alliance (SLD-UP)



right-of-center: Solidarity Electoral Action, AWS



peasant: Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland, SRP



liberal: Freedom Union, UW



right-of-center: League of Polish Families, LPR




electoral turnout




Source: National Electoral Commission

Appendix H: 2005 Presidential Election


right-of-center: Lech Kaczyński



liberal: Donald Tusk




electoral turnout




Source: National Electoral Commission

Appendix I: 2005 Sejm (Lower House) Election


right-of-center: Law and Justice, PiS




liberal: Civic Platform, PO




left-of-center: Alliance of the Democratic Left, SLD




peasant: Polish Peasants' Party, PSL




right-of-center: League of Polish Families, LPR



peasant: Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland, SRP




electoral turnout




Source: National Electoral Commission

Appendix J: 2007 Sejm (Lower House) Elections


right-of-center: Law and Justice, PiS




liberal: Civic Platform, PO




left-of-center: Alliance of the Democratic Left, SLD+SDPL+PD+UP



peasant: Polish Peasant's Party, PSL




electoral turnout




Source: National Electoral Commission

Appendix K: 2010 Presidential Election


liberal: Bronisław Komorowski



right-of-centre: Jarosław Kaczyński




electoral turnout




Source: National Electoral Commission

Appendix L: 2011 Sejm (Lower House) Elections


liberal: Civic Platform, PO




right-of-center: Law and Justice, PiS




peasant: Polish Peasant's Party, PSL



left-of-center: Alliance of the Democratic Left, SLD



electoral turnout



Source: National Electoral Commission

Appendix M: Average Rate of Turnout 2000-2011

#	Historical Region	Name of Powiat (County)	Average Rate of Voter Turnout (2000-2011)
	Galicia	Chrzanów (Kraków I 2011)***	
1	Galicia	chrzanowski, pow.	52.75
2	Galicia	myślenicki, pow.	52.34
3	Galicia	oświęcimski, pow.	55.61
4	Galicia	suski, pow.	50.99
5	Galicia	wadowicki, pow.	52.72
	Galicia	Kraków (Kraków II 2011)***	
6	Galicia	krakowski, pow.	51.11
7	Galicia	Kraków, m.	60.58
8	Galicia	Kraków, m.**	65.50
9	Galicia	miechowski, pow.	44.33
10	Galicia	olkuski, pow.	51.49
	Galicia	Nowy Sącz	
11	Galicia	gorlicki, pow.	49.89
12	Galicia	limanowski, pow.	53.05
13	Galicia	nowosądecki, pow.	55.39
14	Galicia	nowotarcki, pow.	48.29
15	Galicia	Nowy Sącz, m.	59.17
16	Galicia	tatrzański, pow.	52.35
	Galicia	Tarnów	
17	Galicia	bocheński, pow.	53.73
18	Galicia	brzeski, pow.	51.71
19	Galicia	dąbrowski, pow.	46.92
20	Galicia	proszowicki, pow.	42.53
21	Galicia	tarnowski, pow.	50.53
22	Galicia	Tarnów, m.	55.14
23	Galicia	wielicki, pow.	51.99
		małopolskie, woj.	
	Galicia	Krosno	
24	Galicia	bieszczadzki, pow.	43.71
25	Galicia	brzozowski, pow.	47.35
26	Galicia	jarosławski, pow.	51.85
27	Galicia	jasielski, pow.	49.91
28	Galicia	Krosno, m.	54.17
29	Galicia	krośnieński, pow.	49.84
30	Galicia	leski, pow.	46.28
31	Galicia	lubaczowski, pow.	48.50
32	Galicia	przemyski, pow.	47.02
33	Galicia	Przemyśl, m.	52.80
34	Galicia	przeworski, pow.	50.44

35	Galicia	sanocki, pow.	46.17
	Galicia	Rzeszów	
36	Galicia	dębicki, pow	52.44
37	Galicia	kolbuszowski, pow.	49.87
38	Galicia	leżajski, pow.	52.26
39	Galicia	łańcucki, pow.	55.84
40	Galicia	mielecki, pow.	50.99
41	Galicia	nizański, pow.	45.57
42	Galicia	ropczycko-sędziszowski, pow.	53.91
43	Galicia	rzeszowski, pow.	55.23
44	Galicia	Rzeszów, m.	60.50
45	Galicia	stalowowolski, pow.	48.82
46	Galicia	strzyżowski, pow.	49.32
47	Galicia	Tarnobrzeg, m.	51.52
48	Galicia	tarnobrzegi, pow.	47.18
		podkarpackie, woj.	
	Galicia	Bielsko-Biała	
49	Galicia	bielski, pow.	57.06
50	Galicia	Bielsko-Biała, m.	58.98
51	Galicia	cieszyński, pow.	54.16
52	Galicia	pszczyński, pow.	54.68
53	Galicia	żywiecki, pow.	53.22
	Galicia	Sosnowiec	
54	Galicia	Jaworzno, m.	51.81
		śląskie, woj.	
		Galicia	51.84
	Prussian partition	Bydgoszcz	
1	Prussian partition	bydgoski, pow.	47.52
2	Prussian partition	Bydgoszcz, m.	56.19
3	Prussian partition	inowrocławski, pow.	47.06
4	Prussian partition	mogileński, pow.	46.13
5	Prussian partition	nakielski, pow.	46.99
6	Prussian partition	sępoleński, pow.	45.10
7	Prussian partition	świecki, pow.	43.97
8	Prussian partition	tucholski, pow.	49.19
9	Prussian partition	żniński, pow.	47.29
	Prussian partition	Toruń	
10	Prussian partition	aleksandrowski, pow.	47.16
11	Prussian partition	brodnicki, pow.	45.54
12	Prussian partition	chełmiński, pow.	42.84
13	Prussian partition	golubsko-dobrzyński, pow.	42.99
14	Prussian partition	Grudziądz, m.	48.01
15	Prussian partition	grudziądzki, pow.	39.82
16	Prussian partition	lipnowski, pow.	38.74
17	Prussian partition	radziejowski, pow	41.71
18	Prussian partition	rypiński, pow.	39.71
19	Prussian partition	Toruń, m.	55.48
20	Prussian partition	toruński, pow.	42.89

21	Prussian partition	wąbrzeski, pow.	42.15
22	Prussian partition	Włocławek, m.	51.10
23	Prussian partition	włocławski, pow.	39.97
		kujawsko-pomorskie, woj.	
	Prussian partition	Gdańsk	
24	Prussian partition	Gdańsk, m.	60.95
25	Prussian partition	gdański, pow.	50.51
26	Prussian partition	m. Gdańsk – statki (ships)	97.54
27	Prussian partition	Sopot, m.	65.05
28	Prussian partition	starogardzki, pow.	48.95
29	Prussian partition	tczewski, pow.	48.51
	Prussian partition	Gdynia	
30	Prussian partition	chojnicki, pow.	51.46
31	Prussian partition	Gdynia, m.	61.62
32	Prussian partition	kartuski, pow.	55.65
33	Prussian partition	kościerski, pow.	52.01
34	Prussian partition	m. Gdynia – statki (ships)	94.59
35	Prussian partition	pucki, pow.	55.40
36	Prussian partition	wejherowski, pow.	54.72
		pomorskie, woj.	
	Prussian partition	Katowice	
37	Prussian partition	Mysłowice, m.	52.46
		śląskie, woj.	
	Prussian partition	Piła	
38	Prussian partition	chodzieski, pow.	53.00
39	Prussian partition	grodziski, pow.	48.13
40	Prussian partition	międzychodzki, pow.	46.85
41	Prussian partition	nowotomyski, pow.	50.29
42	Prussian partition	obornicki, pow.	50.53
43	Prussian partition	szamotulski, pow.	49.26
44	Prussian partition	wągrowiecki, pow.	49.75
45	Prussian partition	wolsztyński, pow.	52.08
	Prussian partition	Poznań	
46	Prussian partition	Poznań, m.	61.36
47	Prussian partition	poznański, pow.	55.95
		wielkopolskie, woj.	
		Prussian Partition	51.37
	Russian partition	Lublin	
1	Russian partition	janowski, pow.	55.16
2	Russian partition	kraśnicki, pow.	50.15
3	Russian partition	lubartowski, pow.	48.52
4	Russian partition	lubelski, pow.	48.69
5	Russian partition	Lublin, m.	58.27
6	Russian partition	łęczyński, pow.	45.66
7	Russian partition	łukowski, pow.	49.65
8	Russian partition	opolski, pow.	44.81
9	Russian partition	puławski, pow.	51.27
10	Russian partition	rycki, pow.	50.98

11	Russian partition	świdnicki, pow.	49.18
	Russian partition	Chełm	
12	Russian partition	białski, pow.	47.90
13	Russian partition	Biała Podlaska, m.	54.20
14	Russian partition	biłgorajski, pow.	49.27
15	Russian partition	Chełm, m.	49.79
16	Russian partition	chełmski, pow.	39.75
17	Russian partition	hrubieszowski, pow.	43.27
18	Russian partition	krasnostawski, pow.	44.42
19	Russian partition	parczewski, pow.	47.73
20	Russian partition	radzyński, pow.	50.61
21	Russian partition	tomaszowski, pow.	45.72
22	Russian partition	włodawski, pow.	45.75
23	Russian partition	zamojski, pow.	46.26
24	Russian partition	Zamość, m.	52.07
		lubelskie, woj.	
	Russian partition	Łódź	
25	Russian partition	brzeziński, pow.	47.32
26	Russian partition	łódzki wschodni, pow.	51.71
27	Russian partition	Łódź, m.	55.77
	Russian partition	Piotrków Trybunalski	
28	Russian partition	bełchatowski, pow.	50.82
29	Russian partition	opoczyński, pow.	50.90
30	Russian partition	piotrkowski, pow.	47.25
31	Russian partition	Piotrków Trybunalski, m.	53.75
32	Russian partition	radomszczański, pow.	45.89
33	Russian partition	rawski, pow.	45.44
34	Russian partition	Skierniewice, m.	54.05
35	Russian partition	skierniewicki, pow.	48.86
36	Russian partition	tomaszowski, pow.	50.14
	Russian partition	Sieradz	
37	Russian partition	kutnowski, pow.	46.46
38	Russian partition	łaski, pow.	46.35
39	Russian partition	łęczycki, pow.	44.48
40	Russian partition	łowicki, pow.	48.62
41	Russian partition	pabianicki, pow.	52.31
42	Russian partition	pajęczański, pow.	45.43
43	Russian partition	poddębicki, pow.	45.17
44	Russian partition	sieradzki, pow.	49.20
45	Russian partition	wieluński, pow.	49.43
46	Russian partition	wieruszowski, pow.	48.00
47	Russian partition	zduńskowolski, pow.	50.37
48	Russian partition	zgierski, pow.	50.08
		łódzkie, woj.	
	Russian partition	Płock	
49	Russian Partition	ciechanowski, pow.	46.75
50	Russian Partition	gostyniński, pow.	45.78
51	Russian Partition	mławski, pow.	44.54
52	Russian Partition	Płock, m.	53.93

53	Russian Partition	płocki, pow.	42.48
54	Russian Partition	płoński, pow.	41.71
55	Russian Partition	przasnyski, pow.	45.05
56	Russian Partition	sierpecki, pow.	43.47
57	Russian Partition	sochaczewski, pow.	46.59
58	Russian Partition	żuromiński, pow.	43.17
59	Russian Partition	żyrardowski, pow.	48.62
	Russian partition	Radom	
60	Russian Partition	białobrzegi, pow.	46.73
61	Russian Partition	grójecki, pow.	48.88
62	Russian Partition	kozienicki, pow.	47.56
63	Russian Partition	lipski, pow.	42.71
64	Russian Partition	przysuski, pow.	49.67
65	Russian Partition	Radom, m.	54.50
66	Russian Partition	radomski, pow.	46.46
67	Russian Partition	sztybowiecki, pow.	44.97
68	Russian Partition	zwoleński, pow.	45.10
	Russian partition	Siedlce	
69	Russian Partition	garwoliński, pow.	50.77
70	Russian Partition	łosicki, pow.	50.22
71	Russian Partition	makowski, pow.	47.29
72	Russian Partition	miński, pow.	52.06
73	Russian Partition	ostrołęcki, pow.	43.67
74	Russian Partition	Ostrołęka, m.	52.64
75	Russian Partition	ostrowski, pow.	47.68
76	Russian Partition	pułtuski, pow.	48.51
77	Russian Partition	Siedlce, m.	57.03
78	Russian Partition	siedlecki, pow.	50.62
79	Russian Partition	sokołowski, pow.	53.96
80	Russian Partition	węgrowski, pow.	48.46
81	Russian Partition	wyszowski, pow.	49.40
	Russian partition	Warszawa I	
82	Russian Partition	m. st. Warszawa – zagranica (Abroad)	73.76
83	Russian Partition	Statki (Warszawa)	100.00
84	Russian Partition	Warszawa, m.	64.28
85	Russian Partition	Warszawa, pow. (2000)**	67.13
86	Russian Partition	Warszawa, pow. (2000)**	68.10
	Russian partition	Warszawa II	
87	Russian Partition	grodziski, pow.	54.06
88	Russian Partition	legionowski, pow.	56.51
89	Russian Partition	nowodworski, pow.	48.17
90	Russian Partition	otwocki, pow.	57.96
91	Russian Partition	piaseczyński, pow.	57.04
92	Russian Partition	pruszkowski, pow.	59.69
93	Russian Partition	warszawski zachodni, pow.	55.94
94	Russian Partition	wołomiński, pow.	54.46
		mazowieckie, woj.	
	Russian partition	Białystok	

95	Russian Partition	augustowski, pow.	44.89
96	Russian Partition	białostocki, pow.	49.03
97	Russian Partition	Białystok, m.	56.15
98	Russian Partition	bielski, pow.	49.03
99	Russian Partition	grajewski, pow.	42.07
100	Russian Partition	hajnowski, pow.	44.30
101	Russian Partition	kolneński, pow.	42.79
102	Russian Partition	Łomża, m.	49.71
103	Russian Partition	łomżyński, pow.	44.41
104	Russian Partition	moniecki, pow.	41.10
105	Russian Partition	sejneński, pow.	42.33
106	Russian Partition	siemiatycki, pow.	43.77
107	Russian Partition	sokólski, pow.	42.63
108	Russian Partition	suwalski, pow.	42.70
109	Russian Partition	Suwałki, m.	49.14
110	Russian Partition	wysokomazowiecki, pow.	52.35
111	Russian Partition	zambrowski, pow.	46.60
		podlaskie, woj.	
	Russian partition	Częstochowa	
112	Russian Partition	Częstochowa, m.	55.02
113	Russian Partition	częstochowski, pow.	47.08
114	Russian Partition	kłobucki, pow.	47.06
115	Russian Partition	myszkowski, pow.	46.11
	Russian partition	Sosnowiec	
116	Russian Partition	będziński, pow.	61.07
117	Russian Partition	będziński, pow.	50.73
118	Russian Partition	Dąbrowa Górnicza, m.	51.15
119	Russian Partition	Sosnowiec, m.	52.16
120	Russian Partition	zawierciański, pow.	49.31
		śląskie, woj.	
	Russian Partition	Kielce	
121	Russian Partition	buski, pow.	45.48
122	Russian Partition	jędrzejowski, pow.	44.50
123	Russian Partition	kazimierski, pow.	38.80
124	Russian Partition	Kielce, m.	57.61
125	Russian Partition	kielecki, pow.	44.59
126	Russian Partition	konecki, pow.	45.51
127	Russian Partition	opatowski, pow.	41.76
128	Russian Partition	ostrowiecki, pow.	44.57
129	Russian Partition	pińczowski, pow.	43.39
130	Russian Partition	sandomierski, pow.	45.64
131	Russian Partition	skarżyski, pow.	49.01
132	Russian Partition	starachowicki, pow.	46.94
133	Russian Partition	staszowski, pow.	43.57
134	Russian Partition	włoszczowski, pow.	46.76
		świętokrzyskie, woj.	
	Russian partition	Kalisz	
135	Russian Partition	gostyński, pow.	47.77
136	Russian Partition	jarociński, pow.	48.99

137	Russian Partition	kaliski, pow.	45.42
138	Russian Partition	Kalisz, m.	55.10
139	Russian Partition	kępiński, pow.	50.45
140	Russian Partition	kościański, pow.	50.21
141	Russian Partition	krotoszyński, pow.	50.91
142	Russian Partition	leszczyński, pow.	48.81
143	Russian Partition	Leszno, m.	55.47
144	Russian Partition	ostrowski, pow.	52.06
145	Russian Partition	ostrzeszowski, pow.	47.41
146	Russian Partition	pleszewski, pow.	47.18
147	Russian Partition	rawicki, pow.	47.72
	Russian partition	Konin	
148	Russian Partition	gnieźnieński, pow.	52.78
149	Russian Partition	kolski, pow.	46.55
150	Russian Partition	Konin, m.	55.58
151	Russian Partition	koniński, pow.	44.53
152	Russian Partition	śłupecki, pow.	47.20
153	Russian Partition	średzki, pow.	50.55
154	Russian Partition	śremski, pow.	50.51
155	Russian Partition	turecki, pow.	47.81
156	Russian Partition	wrzesiński, pow.	51.46
		wielkopolskie, woj.	
		Russian Partition	49.49
	Recovered territories	Legnica (electoral district)	
1	Recovered territories	bolesławiecki, pow.	45.92
2	Recovered territories	głogowski, pow.	50.87
3	Recovered territories	jaworski, pow.	45.09
4	Recovered territories	Jelenia Góra, m.	52.18
5	Recovered territories	jeleniogórski, pow.	46.79
6	Recovered territories	kamiennogórski, pow.	45.83
7	Recovered territories	Legnica, m.	50.73
8	Recovered territories	legnicki, pow.	44.64
9	Recovered territories	lubański, pow.	45.72
10	Recovered territories	lubiński, pow.	50.48
11	Recovered territories	lwówecki, pow.	42.82
12	Recovered territories	polkowicki, pow.	47.23
13	Recovered territories	zgorzelecki, pow.	46.71
14	Recovered territories	złotoryjski, pow.	44.57
	Recovered territories	Wałbrzych	
15	Recovered territories	dzierżoniowski, pow.	46.75
16	Recovered territories	klódzki, pow.	46.23
17	Recovered territories	świdnicki, pow.	48.02
18	Recovered territories	wałbrzyski, pow.	45.89
19	Recovered territories	ząbkowicki, pow.	45.48
20	Recovered territories	Wałbrzych, m.	51.01
	Recovered	Wrocław	

	territories		
21	Recovered territories	górowski, pow.	41.69
22	Recovered territories	milicki, pow.	47.00
23	Recovered territories	oleśnicki, pow.	46.30
24	Recovered territories	oławski, pow.	50.32
25	Recovered territories	strzeliński, pow.	46.22
26	Recovered territories	średzki, pow.	43.08
27	Recovered territories	trzebnicki, pow.	45.51
28	Recovered territories	wołowski, pow.	46.98
29	Recovered territories	Wrocław, m.	58.50
30	Recovered territories	wrocławski, pow.	49.59
		dolnośląskie, woj.	
	Recovered territories	Zielona Góra	
31	Recovered territories	gorzowski, pow.	43.95
32	Recovered territories	Gorzów Wielkopolski, m.	52.14
33	Recovered territories	krośnieński, pow.	42.85
34	Recovered territories	międzyrzecki, pow.	45.47
35	Recovered territories	nowosolski, pow.	45.90
36	Recovered territories	ślubicki, pow.	44.43
37	Recovered territories	strzelecko-drezdenecki, pow.	42.26
38	Recovered territories	sulęciński, pow.	44.16
39	Recovered territories	świebodziński, pow.	46.08
40	Recovered territories	wschowski, pow.	43.17
41	Recovered territories	Zielona Góra, m.	57.11
42	Recovered territories	zielonogórski, pow.	46.25
43	Recovered territories	żagański, pow.	43.02
44	Recovered territories	żarski, pow.	43.20
		lubuskie, woj	
	Recovered territories	Opole	
45	Recovered territories	brzeski, pow.	46.91
46	Recovered territories	głubczycki, pow.	43.17
47	Recovered territories	kędzierzyńsko-kozielski, pow.	42.49
48	Recovered territories	kluczborski, pow.	41.94
49	Recovered territories	krapkowicki, pow.	34.65
50	Recovered territories	namysłowski, pow.	47.45
51	Recovered territories	nyski, pow.	45.77
52	Recovered territories	oleski, pow.	38.99
53	Recovered territories	Opole, m.	54.64
54	Recovered territories	opolski, pow.	36.43
55	Recovered territories	prudnicki, pow.	41.63
56	Recovered territories	strzelecki, pow.	36.18
		opolskie, woj.	
	Recovered territories	Gdańsk	
57	Recovered territories	kwidzyński, pow.	43.93
58	Recovered territories	malborski, pow.	46.70
59	Recovered territories	nowodworski, pow.	44.71
60	Recovered territories	sztumski, pow.	38.52
	Recovered territories	Gdynia	
61	Recovered territories	bytowski, pow	46.27

62	Recovered territories	człuchowski, pow.	45.79
63	Recovered territories	łęborski, pow.	50.15
64	Recovered territories	m. Gdańsk – statki (ships)	98.18
65	Recovered territories	Ślupsk, m.	52.99
66	Recovered territories	ślupski, pow.	42.25
		pomorskie, woj.	
	Recovered territories	Częstochowa	
67	Recovered territories	lubliniecki, pow.	47.16
		śląskie, woj.	
	Recovered territories	Gliwice	
68	Recovered territories	Bytom, m.	43.63
69	Recovered territories	Gliwice, m	52.06
70	Recovered territories	gliwicki, pow.	45.11
71	Recovered territories	tarnogórski, pow	48.51
72	Recovered territories	Zabrze, m.	41.31
	Recovered territories	Rybnik	
73	Recovered territories	Jastrzębie-Zdrój, m.	51.90
74	Recovered territories	mikołowski, pow.	53.96
75	Recovered territories	raciborski, pow.	39.82
76	Recovered territories	rybnicki, pow.	49.54
77	Recovered territories	Rybnik, m.	51.41
78	Recovered territories	wodzisławski, pow.	49.96
79	Recovered territories	Żory, m.	50.77
		śląskie, woj.	
	Recovered territories	Katowice	
80	Recovered territories	bieruńsko-lędziński, pow.	52.45
81	Recovered territories	tyski, pow.	54.37
82	Recovered territories	Chorzów, m.	47.74
83	Recovered territories	Katowice, m.	55.62
84	Recovered territories	Piekary Śląskie, m.	49.01
85	Recovered territories	Ruda Śląska, m.	48.78
86	Recovered territories	Siemianowice Śląskie, m.	49.10
87	Recovered territories	Świętochłowice, m.	43.72
88	Recovered territories	Tychy, m.	55.43
		śląskie, woj.	
	Recovered territories	Elbląg	
89	Recovered territories	bartoszycki, pow.	42.09
90	Recovered territories	braniewski, pow.	42.11
91	Recovered territories	działdowski, pow.	43.89
92	Recovered territories	Elbląg, m.	51.87
93	Recovered territories	elbląski, pow.	39.01
94	Recovered territories	iławski, pow.	46.11
95	Recovered territories	lidzbarski, pow.	42.85
96	Recovered territories	nowomiejski, pow.	45.84
97	Recovered territories	ostródzki, pow.	43.65
	Recovered territories	Olsztyn	
98	Recovered territories	ełcki, pow.	41.93
99	Recovered territories	giżycki, pow.	44.25
100	Recovered territories	goldapski, pow.	37.10

101	Recovered territories	kętrzyński, pow.	40.89
102	Recovered territories	mragowski, pow.	44.49
103	Recovered territories	nidzicki, pow.	42.44
104	Recovered territories	olecki, pow.	39.12
105	Recovered territories	Olsztyn, m.	57.89
106	Recovered territories	olsztyński, pow.	42.14
107	Recovered territories	piski, pow.	43.81
108	Recovered territories	szczycieński, pow.	42.65
109	Recovered territories	węgorzewski, pow.	38.50
110	Recovered territories	olecko-goldapski, pow.	44.04
		warmińsko-mazurskie, woj.	
	Recovered territories	Piła	
111	Recovered territories	czarnkowsko-trzcianecki, pow.	48.73
112	Recovered territories	pilski, pow.	53.87
113	Recovered territories	złotowski, pow.	47.24
	Recovered territories	Koszalin	
114	Recovered territories	białogardzki, pow.	42.92
115	Recovered territories	choszczeński, pow.	39.83
116	Recovered territories	drawski, pow.	43.34
117	Recovered territories	kołobrzeski, pow.	51.09
118	Recovered territories	Koszalin, m.	55.91
119	Recovered territories	koszaliński, pow.	44.23
120	Recovered territories	ślawieński, pow.	45.01
121	Recovered territories	szczecinecki, pow.	45.52
122	Recovered territories	świdwiński, pow.	43.24
123	Recovered territories	walecki, pow.	45.66
	Recovered territories	Szczecin	
124	Recovered territories	goleniowski, pow.	44.32
125	Recovered territories	gryficki, pow.	44.69
126	Recovered territories	gryfiński, pow.	42.93
127	Recovered territories	kamieński, pow.	45.87
128	Recovered territories	łobeski, pow.	37.34
129	Recovered territories	m. Szczecin – statki (ships)	97.01
130	Recovered territories	myśliborski, pow.	43.01
131	Recovered territories	policki, pow.	50.08
132	Recovered territories	pyrzycki, pow.	42.14
133	Recovered territories	stargardzki, pow.	46.29
134	Recovered territories	Szczecin, m.	55.11
135	Recovered territories	Świnoujście, m.	52.05
		zachodniopomorskie, woj.	
		Recovered Territories	46.84

Poland Average

51.01

** Post 2000 Kraków was combined into one constituency; Post 2000 Warsaw was also combined into one constituency.

***In 2011, Chrzanów constituency was renamed Kraków I; Kraków constituency was renamed Kraków II.