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An Examination of Counterinsurgency Warfare: “Civic Actions” as a Tool for “Winning” Support of the Population

Eadon, John Kye

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

An Examination of Counterinsurgency Warfare: "Civic Actions" as a Tool for "Winning" Support of the Population

by

John Kye Eadon

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Abstract

Insurgency based conflicts have dominated global conflicts for much of the 20th century and will continue to dominate many of the security challenges faced by most nations in the 21st century. This thesis focuses on ascertaining the effectiveness of a critical aspect of counterinsurgency strategy known as "civic actions." These programs, which are implemented across the spectrum of the conflict, (typically by counterinsurgent forces, and in rare occasions by insurgents) are normally used as a tool for gaining the population's support. Using a case study of the Maoist insurgency waged by *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru from 1980 -1995, the thesis develops a qualitative analysis of these programs from information provided by key informants; individuals interviewed primarily in Ayacucho, Peru, which was the birthplace of *Sendero*. Findings indicate that a variety of civic action programs, which address a population's core needs, are a crucial tool for "winning" their support.

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For my daughter, *Madelynn*

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Chapter 2

List of Abbreviations

ASL – Above Sea Level

CDC – Civil Defense Committees

CFREB - Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics Board

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

COIN – Counterinsurgency

CVR – *Comisión de la verdad y Reconciliación* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission).

DND – Department of National Defence (Canada).

HUMINT – Human Intelligence

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IPB – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

ROEs – Rules of Engagement

UNSCH – *Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Humanga*

Epigraph

Who overcomes by force, hath overcome but half his foe.

John Milton, Paradise Lost

Chapter 1: Introduction

The rural hamlet of Putis is located in the Northwestern corner of the Province of Huanta, in the Department of Ayacucho, in the South American nation of Peru. With a 1980 population of only a few hundred people, who had traditionally farmed small plots of land and raised cattle, the remoteness of the village has seen it serve other strategic purposes beyond the subsistence farming practices of its inhabitants. First, due to its location on the divide between the mountains and rainforest jungle it has long functioned as a gateway to the Apurimac River Valley, a region known for its extreme remoteness, and often controlled by drug cartels, which dominate the country's illicit coca production. Second, the village's remoteness, which has long placed this village outside the influence of state authorities, has allowed the drug cartels to utilize the hamlet as a strategic hub in the country's elicit cocaine production industry. Yet the history of this small hamlet holds a much darker story, written during the war between the Maoist insurgent group *Sendero Luminoso* and the national government.

In 1980, *Sendero* launched its armed revolution against the Peruvian state in the name of the peasant masses. Putis and its inhabitants in the region quickly fell under the domination and control of the guerrillas, who easily exploited the region's isolation to expand their base areas. By 1983, *Sendero*, who had targeted local police, the lieutenant governor, traditional community leaders, and anyone who held positions of authority, had subjected the village to three years of arbitrary and random attacks, forcing the people to seek refuge in the mountains and abandon the village. Responding to the violence in the region, the armed forces, which had been granted supreme authority over national counterinsurgency strategy in late 1982, established a military base in the village in

November 1984, and encouraged the villagers to return. The armed forces promised to provide for the villagers' security, and to develop a fish farm to stimulate the town's economic activity under the banner of a civic action. Wary, the villagers returned in December 1984, and set to work digging a massive pit, which was to serve as the pond for the fish farm. Upon completion of the digging project, the military gathered the unsuspecting villagers around the massive hole, opened fire on them, and executed an estimated 123 men, women and children who were then buried in the pit they had just finished digging, turning it into a mass grave. According to the 2008 *Comisión de la verdad y Reconciliación* (CVR) report (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2008), the reason for the mass killings was that the villagers of Putis were suspected to be *Sendero* sympathizers, yet no evidence was ever collected that suggested this. According to the same report, to this date no one has ever been prosecuted for the murders of these innocent villagers, and the military claims all records related to that day's events were destroyed in a fire many years earlier.

However, not all of the villagers of Putis died that horrible day, and those who managed to avoid being murdered fled high into the mountains where they hid from both *Sendero* and the military until 1997. That year, the state again arrived in the region with promises to aid in developing economic projects for the people, again under the banner of civic actions, which were being utilized by the populist President Fujimori to solidify his government's position among the country's electoral base. Almost like a slap in the face, the village was told it was again to receive a fish farm, which was eventually built the same year. However, the altitude of the region, which sees Putis sit at nearly 2750 meters

above sea level (ASL) (roughly 9000 feet ASL), caused the fish to die, and the people again abandoned the village.

Unfortunately, the story of Putis is not an isolated event, and there are many other horrible actions linked to the political violence, which the rural population had to endure during the 15 years of fighting and war, at the hands of both the Maoists and the military. According to the CVR's 2008 report, nearly 70,000 people died at the hands of *Sendero* and the military from 1980-1995; a number that has been revised upwards many times since the Commission's founding in 2001.

1.1 Why Study Insurgencies

"Low intensity conflict has been more common throughout the history of warfare than has conflict between nations represented by armies on a 'conventional' field of battle" (Nagl 2005, p.15). Insurgencies have dominated global conflict for much of the 20th and 21st century and will continue to play a large role as part of the security challenges faced by most nations (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009). Further, the use of insurgency warfare as a strategy is increasing, as demonstrated by the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, two conflicts dominating much of the security debate in the 21st century. While the possibility of a conventional conflict between states is always present, the fact remains that the primary hegemonic powers, who dominate the international system, continue to remain deeply reluctant to engage in this form of warfare (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009). However, since there is little consensus or cooperation among these hegemons for a global security strategy,

insurgencies can and do flourish as "transnational insurgent groups exploit limitations on government power and authority by strategically placing themselves outside of the state's reach" (Salehyan, 2010, p. 51). Lastly, given the nature of international relations today, it is important to note that governments, who undertake counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, may do so either within their own nation's borders, or they may participate as part of a multilateral force in support of a host nation (HN).

The tactics and strategies employed by those waging or opposing an insurgency are as old as warfare itself. Strategies most commonly employed by insurgent groups include terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and other means of protracted warfare to coerce and ultimately wear down the government or other side into some form of submission or concession (Galula, [1964] 2006; Nagl, 2005). Indeed, insurgents simply need to avoid a military defeat until a political victory, which is more important than a battlefield victory, has been won (Taber [1965] 2002).

History has shown that COIN campaigns are far more difficult and costly than conventional warfare due to the use of "protracted" or "guerrilla" warfare by insurgent groups (FM 3-24, 2007). According to Galula ([1964] 2006), while all war is cruel, insurgency based conflicts are perhaps even more so, as every citizen will be directly or indirectly drawn into the conflict: the insurgent, who needs the population's support, cannot afford to allow anyone to remain neutral. Given the brutal nature of this type of conflict, irregular warfare regularly leads to a test of the political and economic will for those nations or multilateral agencies engaged in COIN operations. Thus COIN operations require intense planning, effective intelligence gathering, vast logistical support, firm political will, and substantial patience by both government(s) and citizens

of the countries providing support to COIN operations (FM 3-24, 2007; Canada. Department of National Defense (DND), 2007).

As more of these conflicts emerge, the seemingly regular occurrences of insurgent warfare by various factions highlights the need for study and understanding of the various tactics used in these conflicts; such understanding will be of great importance when considering security matters at all levels of government and multinational organizations. Unfortunately, some individuals have recently stated that past experiences with insurgencies, and the lessons learned from fighting them are less relevant for today's multifaceted conflicts. While it is most certainly true that no two conflicts are alike, and the advent of technology has reshaped warfare, it remains doubly true that many of the challenges and problems that arise over the course of these conflicts are not completely new either. This position is supported by Julian Paget (1967, p.11) who wrote:

> I found myself in Aden in a staff appointment directly concerned with the planning of measures, both civil and military, to be taken to defeat the insurgents then operating in those parts. The problems that arose were remarkably diverse and complex, but they were seldom completely new; they had almost all cropped up before in some previous Emergency, such as Palestine, Kenya, Cyprus, or Malaya, and it would have been most helpful to be able to study this past experience and learn from it.

According to Kilcullen (2006), more has been written on counterinsurgency warfare in the last four years than in the last forty years. One of the most prominent works in this renewed interest in COIN is the US Army and Marines Corps latest Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24, 2007). This work has received much praise and acclaim within academic and military communities alike for its efforts to mesh the past with present technology, practices and experience, and its inclusion of many non-traditional members such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the writing process. While the list of works by academics, governments, and the military focusing on

examining insurgencies continues to grow, we must not forget that insurgencies are *irregular*, not in the sense that they are *uncommon* (indeed, they are exactly the opposite), but in the literal sense that they *go against the rules*. Further, for those involved in trying to understand their adversaries, and the most efficient ways to counter them, continued study will remain a vital activity (Kilcullen, 2010). Thus we must remember the words of Sir John Chapple, former Chief of the General Staff of the British army who wrote: "Doctrine is not in itself a prescription for success as a set of rules. What it does provide is the basis for thought, further selective study and reading, which is the personal responsibility of us all" (Chapple 1989, p.vii).

1.2 The Aim of this Thesis

While the number of publications examining insurgencies and the resulting COIN efforts has risen substantially in recent years, the bulk of these documents has primarily focused on examining and articulating specific military or government tactics such as nation building and security strategies, or on offering "whole" or complete suggestions for how states or multilateral agencies can "win" these conflicts. What is lacking in most of these works is a real discussion or acknowledgement of how these conflicts impact the lives of those caught in the middle, the local population, how they battle daily to survive and exist amidst the fighting, and a discussion of how actors could potentially go about garnering the local population's support though non-violent action and the implementation of numerous types of social programs. As Taber ([1965] 2002, p. 11) candidly states, "Indeed, although Western analysts seem to dislike entertaining this idea, it is the population which is doing the struggling."

This is not to say that the role played by the local population in these conflicts has been ignored in recent works. In fact, most of the academic literature and government publications are united in acknowledging the importance support from this demographic plays in the conflict, agreeing that no insurgent movement can survive without some form of "popular support," and acknowledging that neither can the incumbent power achieve victory without it as well (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009; Canada, DND, 2007; FM 3-24, 2007; Kalyvas, 2006; Nagl, 2007; Taber [1965] 2002; Thompson, [1966] 1972; Sewall, 2007). Beyond this acknowledgment of the importance of the local population's support, little research has focused on the suffering these people experience as a result of the insurgency or on examining how any civic action efforts should be administered.

The aim of this research project is to better understand the kinds of engagement programs utilized by both state actors and insurgent groups in their efforts to garner the support of the local population. Galula ([1964] 2006, p.4) writes that the side that is able to control the population or to gain its active support will win, as "the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness." Others have used the term "winning hearts and minds" to refer to efforts for gaining support from the locals. Regardless of how one chooses to describe it, it is this interaction between the local population, the insurgent and/or counter-insurgent through the application of specific programs and policies, carried out under the banner of "civic actions," which this research project seeks to better understand.

My central research question is: what kinds of programs garner the most support from the local population? Furthermore, I am interested in whether these kinds of

engagement programs can reduce the duration of an insurgency movement or prevent it from beginning. In seeking to answer these two broad questions, a series of sub-questions are also addressed including: were certain programs or civic actions more popular then others? Were some programs more effective then others, and if so how do you determine individual programs effectiveness? Did the government have any social programs in place prior to the outbreak of hostilities? Were the locals coerced, terrorized or otherwise forced to support either the government's forces or those of the insurgency? What were the underlying needs and concerns of the local populace prior to the outbreak of violence? Was the government, or any other organization, attempting to address these needs prior to the outbreak of the insurgency?

While the concepts surrounding these kinds of programs are discussed at length herein, for the purpose of this thesis engagement programs are considered to include social or other civic action programs administered by the government or insurgent, aimed at providing the population with services or support. These programs typically intend to improve the local population's economic position, health, education, and security to name just a few of the many types of programs typically included under this broad heading.

1.3 Outline of this Thesis

This thesis is divided into six chapters, the structure of which is as follows. Chapter two seeks to establish the research framework, opening with a discussion seeking to address the challenges associated with defining insurgency and counterinsurgency. The chapter then offers a description of the underlying approach and methodology of the research, and presents a detailed discussion of the physical, human, and economic

geography of Peru. The chapter closes with an argument regarding why the discipline of geography is a valid branch of study to utilize in understanding this form of warfare. Chapter three opens with a discussion of the root causes of an insurgency. It then proceeds to discuss four core concepts: intelligence collection; targeting of the local population; leadership of COIN forcers; and other operational concepts, which in my opinion, are central to waging any successful counterinsurgency campaign. This discussion draws upon both classic and modern works on the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency, seeking to draw from both past and present experiences in gathering understanding of this form of warfare. Chapter four undertakes the task of describing the key distinctions of a Maoist insurgency, which are significantly different from other communist movements. The chapter then presents the story of the rise of *Sendero Luminoso*, and the movement's march towards armed conflict. Furthermore, the chapter also offers a brief examination of Peruvian society leading up to the opening of armed hostilities. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the state's counterinsurgency efforts during four distinct time periods. Drawing primarily on my Peruvian fieldwork, chapter five offers an in-depth discussion of what civic actions are and which kinds of programs were administered in Peru during the war with *Sendero*. Further, the chapter examines one of the most important parts of the war, the population based response, which was the rise and expansion of Civil Defense Committees (CDCs), organizations which played a critical role in the state's counterinsurgency effort, and which arguably won the war on their behalf. The thesis concludes in chapter six with an analysis of the effectiveness of both programs, and suggests some key lessons to be learned from the Peruvian experience with insurgency.

The organization of information and discussion in the thesis seeks to follow a logical pattern, presenting key background information of insurgencies in general, and then moving to the specific story of the Peruvian experience. While it is by no means a complete assessment of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and the practices used by those actors who conduct this form of warfare, it is a rare investigation of an exceedingly important aspect of these conflicts, that of civic actions and an attempt to understand how we may improve the delivery of these programs in the future.

Chapter 2: Establishing the Research Framework

2.1 Use of Terms

Insurgency and the resulting counter-insurgency (COIN) action by governments or other multilateral organizations to counter them are complex subsets of warfare. The tactics employed by both sides in waging or opposing an insurgency are as old as warfare itself (FM 3-24, 2007). Prior to defining "insurgency," it is important to address the issue of defining such terms in the first place. All too often definitions are created lacking real clarity, being too narrow in scope and not covering enough key identifiers to give a fair or balanced definition. Contrary to narrow definitions are definitions becoming extremely broad in scope, seeking to include all conceivable aspects of the phenomenon as part of the term's classification. In both cases, these definitions often lack serious credibility or create numerous other problems for those trying to use them. Lastly, a challenge often accompanying many definitions is the very nature of the individual or organization providing the definition, as exterior motivations or pressures can lead to creating highly subjective definitions, which only serve specific and regularly biased objectives. Due to the political nature of insurgent conflicts, providing a non-politicized definition of what an insurgency is proves nearly impossible. Challenges arise simply from the fact that the first question raised in developing a definition is: who is doing the defining (Kiras, 2007)?

It is important to note that "the employment of irregular warfare does not [actually] require a specific cause, revolutionary, Communist, nationalist, or otherwise; it can serve any cause" (Kalyvas 2006, p. 67). Given the newfound attention the study of irregular warfare has received over the preceding decade, many words and terms have

either emerged or reemerged to describe the many players and parts of this war fighting phenomena. As the printed material has increased over this time, many of the terms are often used interchangeably within the literature to refer to insurgencies and COIN. The tactics of irregular warfare have been described as being "guerrilla," "unconventional," or "asymmetric." In each of these terms the unifying factor is the strategy of protracted warfare by at least one of the combatants. In this approach to war fighting, at least one opponent (typically the weaker or smaller one) avoids decisive military engagements, as these battles would quickly destroy any military forces they are capable of mustering. Instead, the combatant utilizing irregular warfare prefers subversion, relying on ambushes, small raids, and propaganda to attack and discredit their opponent (Canada. DND, 2007).

Just as there are many terms to describe irregular warfare, there are also many words used to describe the insurgent fighters of today. These include terms such as "revolutionaries," "guerrillas," and "freedom fighters," to name just a few. Kilcullen (2009) points out that the term "insurgent", as we know it today, first emerged in the 1950s as a label for groups fighting wars of revolution and national independence, as organizations typically struggled to throw off the bonds of colonial rule. These movements often used guerrilla tactics, and protracted warfare to overthrow and defeat their former colonial rulers. Given the diversity of terms today, many of the terms mentioned above are also used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to insurgents, counterinsurgents, and the tactics and strategies each may employ.

2.2 Defining "Insurgency"

There are a number of definitions that have been offered over the years to explain what an insurgency is. One of the most recent and widely accepted definitions offered for the term is found in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps' most recently published Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24, 2007). While outlining the US military's current approach to insurgencies, FM 3-24 has also been distributed widely among non-military audiences, and has also received wide recognition within the academic community as being one of the most comprehensive discussions on counterinsurgency to date. In the manual, two distinct (yet intrinsically linked) definitions for insurgency are provided. First, insurgency is defined as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" (FM 3-24, p.2). Second, insurgency is defined as "an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control" (FM 3-24, p.2). An alternative, yet similar definition was offered by Taber ([1965] 2002, p.10) who writes, "Insurgency, or guerrilla war, is the agency of radical social or political change; it is the face and the right arm of revolution." Since the emergence of the term "insurgency" in the 1950s, there have been several individuals (such as Sir Robert Thompson, David Galula, John Nagl and David Kilcullen) who, over several decades of work, have offered their own unique definition for this term; while each definition typically espouses language dated to the period when the author was writing, the underlying theme found in each definition is that for an insurgency to exist, there must be some form of political violence, in which the insurgent desires to either discredit or overthrow the ruling

authority or government through a combination of subversion and military actions. Yet simply trying to overthrow the government through the use of political violence is not enough to simply define a conflict an insurgency. One important key to labeling a struggle as an insurgency is the use of protracted, unconventional warfare by the insurgent group. Without the use of this tactic, applying the label of "insurgency" to a conflict would not be an appropriate use of the term.

2.2.1 Insurgencies as Social Movements

From time to time, and place to place, disgruntled individuals will coalesce together and attempt to change society. These amalgamations of the discontented can be referred to as "social movements." While an exhaustive discussion of the extensive body of literature on social movements is beyond the scope of this thesis, Tarrow (2011, p. 9) defines "social movements" as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities." The essence of social movements is what Tarrow (2011, p.7) refers to as "contentious collective action" and this occurs when those lacking access to representative institutions act in the name of unaccepted claims and challenge authorities. "Contentious collective action serves as the basis of social movements," wrote Tarrow (2011, p.7), "because it is the main and often the only recourse that most ordinary people possess to demonstrate their claims against better-equipped opponents." People only engage in contentious collective action unless they have good reason and it takes a common purpose to make people run the risks and pay the costs of doing so (Tarrow, 2011). One of the most visible manifestations of contentious collective action is violence, when this occurs there can be little doubt that discontentment has reach an irrepressible level.

2.3 Defining "Counterinsurgency"

FM 3-24 (2007, p.2) defines "counterinsurgency" as "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency." While this definition is succinct and covers the core components of any COIN effort, it does not highlight the extreme complexity required to actually carry out COIN. In today's world of multilateral operations, this complexity is greatly enhanced, often spanning numerous levels of government, including inter-departmental and inter-agency rivalries, as well as differences between nations, who routinely have very different objectives associated with their involvement, and regularly have differing rules of engagement (ROEs), to name just some of the challenges. This is because both organizations and states typically prefer to pursue policies which will increase their respective importance, rather than focusing on the critical task of winning the COIN campaign. Organizations and states regularly end up fighting for the range of capabilities, which they view as essential to their individual essence, and demonstrate comparative indifference to policies, capabilities and functions not viewed as essential by them (Nagl, 2005).

2.4 Methodology

2.4.1 Finding a Case Study

In the early stages of developing my research project, many different insurgencies, which have occurred across a wide spectrum of time, and the many diverse aspects to countering them were considered for study. In the end this project focused specifically upon ascertaining the effectiveness of a critical aspect of counterinsurgency

action known as "civic actions." In civic actions, a variety of different programs are implemented across the spectrum of the conflict, normally by counterinsurgent forces, as a tool for gaining the population's support. While the body of literature on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies has grown over the preceding two decades, there is little in the way of specific studies on this crucial mechanism of obtaining people's support. Using a case study of the Maoist insurgency waged by *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) in Peru from 1980 -1995, this research project focuses on developing a qualitative analysis of these programs. The principal source of data for this research is information provided by key informants.

The reason for selecting a case study of the insurgency in Peru was dominated by two pressing factors; security and recentness of the conflict. Security of any potential research assistant and myself in the field was a great concern, both for me and my supervisor Dr. Holden. While we very briefly entertained the idea of conducting research in an active insurgency zone, where civic actions could be observed and investigated first hand, the reality and risks of undertaking this kind of research, and the dangers, both physical and emotional associated with entering an active combat zone, quickly eliminated the many ongoing insurgencies around the globe as viable research locations. The recentness of the conflict also played a direct role in determining the case study location. As I have previously mentioned, there is very little written on civic actions within the larger body of literature on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Examining these actions required selecting a case study that had recently concluded and where there was a high likelihood of finding individuals who had survived the conflict, and who had first hand knowledge of the phenomena under study. As we considered some of the more

recently concluded conflicts, Peru emerged as being an ideal location. The insurgency between *Sendero* and the central government had ended roughly 18 years before, and stability had been restored across the nation, meaning that the country was relatively safe and secure for travel by foreigners. Secondly, the relativly short time since the conclusion of the conflict ensured that there would be a large number of survivors, who would have firsthand experiences with civic actions, and who would most likely be willing to share their knowledge with a researcher such as myself.

A secondary benefit to selecting a case study of Peru's insurgency was found by the capabilities and experience offered by my field research assistant, Rene Calderon. Rene has spent roughly the last 20 plus years working in Central and South America as a research assistant, guide, fixer, and translator for many academics and other agencies. His capabilities as a translator were something I needed given my lack of ability to speak Spanish. Furthermore, his extensive work over the last two decades has seen him develop a vast network of contacts across the region, including individuals in Peru, which aided greatly in developing initial leads for finding potential interview participants who might be willing to share their experiences with me.

The fieldwork portion of this research project was conducted over the course of a 4-week research trip to Peru during November 2012 centered in, and around, the city of Huamanga, (also referred to as "Ayacucho city" by locals, and commonly known simply as "Ayacucho" by those outside of Peru) which is both the provincial capital of the province of Huamanga, and the department capital of Ayacucho, Peru (Figure 2.1)(for a larger map of Peru please see Figure 2.2 or Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.1: Primary Research Area: Department of Ayacucho, Peru

Source: Robin Poitras, Cartographer, University of Calgary, Department of Geography, 2013

There were a number of advantages in selecting Ayacucho city for this research. First, the city is home to the *Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Humanga* (UNSCH). Originally founded under the Spanish Viceroyalty, the university was re-opened in 1959 as part of the government's efforts to modernize what it considered to be the otherwise "backwards" interior of the country. A more notorious part of UNSCH history, and arguably what it is best known for today, is that the University is the birthplace of *Sendero Luminoso,* founded by Abimael Guzman, who was a professor of philosophy at the campus. Consequently, the school provided Guzman and other Shining Path cadres with a fertile recruiting ground for the movement, as the school was (and still is) full of young people seeking an education as a way to perhaps find some upward social mobility. This history of the region, and UNSCH in Huamanga (as well as the focus the region received from the state during the insurgency), suggested there was likely to be a high percentage of the population who had first-hand knowledge of the

conflict and efforts by the Peruvian military to implement civic actions. Indeed as one research participate stated: “In this city I would say that every family was touched by the violence. Even if they did not experience it [the violence] themselves, they will undoubtedly have a family member or know someone who did” (anonymous respondent #1, 2012).

The majority of the time in Peru was spent directly in Huamanga interviewing research participants. However, two separate day trips were taken to the city of Huanta to meet with interview participants there. The city of Huanta is located approximately 53km north of Huamanga, linked by a single highway. One research participant indicated that the roads in the region had only been paved at some point during the war with *Sendero* (they could not remember what year); prior to this all roads were simply gravel (anonymous respondent #9, 2012). While paved, the “highways” of the area are primarily single lane, with rising mountain faces on one side, and sheer drop-offs with no safety rails on the other. They are certainly not at all like the freeways North Americans think of as roads through the mountains. The roads are all switch backs, winding up, down and over the side of the mountains, changing directions constantly as one weaves their way up or down. Most of the corners are blind, adding an element of surprise and terror at the same time, and make any journey a precarious one. While only a short distance by western standards, the journey between Huamanga and Huanta takes roughly 1.5 hours to complete, as the road’s challenging elevation and winding blind corners dictates a speed of travel which is regularly less then 30km/hour. Yet for all its dangers, the two trips provided a secondary benefit in that they provided a better understanding of the demanding physical terrain, and just how widespread was the impact the insurgency had

on the region and the local population. While the bulk of the fieldwork time was spent in the mountains interviewing key informants, five days at the end of the fieldwork were spent in Lima, where additional interviews took place.

Key informants who were interviewed as part of the research included: leaders of NGOs and local grassroots organizations; local government officials; journalists who covered the conflict; members of the Peruvian Armed Forces who served in the Emergency Zone; and academics located both in and outside Peru. While the risk of harm to most individuals for participating was assessed as being extremely low, every effort was taken to protect all participants' identities, resulting in absolutely no names being used and all interview locations being withheld. Individuals who contributed to this research project were asked to participate in an interview, which utilized an open-ended format to interview questions. Given that the dominant language is Spanish, a language I do not speak or understand, my research assistant Rene had to translate for all but three of the interviews (in these three cases the interview participants spoke English). In total 37 individuals granted me an interview, with the gender composition of these participants being approximately 51 percent men and 49 percent women. Individual interviews ranged in duration, lasting from just 20 minutes to over four hours. However, the average length of interviews was normally about one and a quarter hours.

Due to this research projects use of human interview respondents, an application for an ethics certificate was made to the University of Calgary's Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics Board (CFREB). A Certification of Institutional Ethics Review from the CFREB (CFREB file #7395) was granted on 30 July 2012 for this research project.

2.4.2 Epistemological Approach

The epistemological approach of the research project utilized the philosophical worldview of social constructivism. This worldview sees the researcher attempting to understand and interpret the social relationships from the participant's perspective (Creswell, 2007). Support for the use of this worldview to study such phenomena as insurgencies is also found in the reference by Kalyvas (2006, p. 34) to Durkheim ([1895] 1938, p. 110) who stated: "it is fallacious to explain social phenomena by reference to their manifestation among the states of individual consciousness rather than the social facts preceding them." Recognizing that an insurgency is not an individual act, but rather a social development in response to grievances, either perceived or real, using the social constructivist approach as a tool to interpret the interaction between the different groups involved in the insurgency in Peru proved to be a valid philosophical worldview.

2.4.3 Methods Used

In combination with the philosophical worldview, my methodology also employed a mixed methods approach, whereby two research strategies were used: grounded theory and case study. Grounded theory is a means of qualitative research whereby the researcher begins with an area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In essence, grounded theory is "the discovery of theory from data" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 1). Grounded theory is "an interpretive and inductive process [generating] theory directly from the data, from the particular to the general" (Stiller, 2002, p. 62). According to Charmaz (2000, p.510) grounded theory "offers qualitative researchers a set of clear guidelines from which to build explanatory frameworks" and it requires "simultaneous collection and analysis of data." Because

grounded theory "emerges from the data it must work- at least for that instance and, presumably, for others similar to it" (Charmaz, 2000, p. 511). In regards to its use in this thesis, grounded theory is an appropriate research strategy because it is facilitative of a compilation, and analysis, of a large number of facts and observations made by the local population in Peru, which occurred over a lengthy period of time.

When considering the use of a case study, Stake (2000, p. 435) writes, "Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied." Stake characterizes three variants of case study: intrinsic; collective; and instrumental. An intrinsic case study is "undertaken because, first and last the researcher wants better understanding of a particular case" (Stake, 2000, p. 435). An intrinsic case study is undertaken "to explore a particular case for reasons inherent to that case and a particular researcher's interests" (Stiller, 2002, p. 63). A collective case study involves multiple case studies, which may or may not be physically collocated to other cases (Goddard 2010). Lastly, Grandy (2010) describes an instrumental case study as being the study of a case to provide insight into a particular issue, to redraw generalizations, or two build theory. In an instrumental case study, the case itself is secondary to understanding the particular phenomena under examination.

As was previously noted, insurgencies are extremely broad and encompass many different elements and dynamics. Given that this research project sought to specifically focus in on the development and implementation strategies of civic actions the insurgency in Peru offered a unique opportunity for this researcher to conduct a case study to investigate civic actions. Civic actions are typically employed by the counterinsurgent, as they are normally the ones who possess the resources, economic and

other, to develop and implement such a program. However, in Peru, at least in the early years of the conflict, it was actually *Sendero* who initially implemented civic actions as a tool for garnering the population's support, and only later in the conflict, beginning in 1984, did the state seek to develop and implement their own civic action programs.

2.5 Research Approach

The results put forward in this thesis are perhaps best described as offering a "narrative history" of civic actions drawn from Peru's insurgency experience with *Sendero Luminoso*. The information presented, and the style with which is presented are shaped at least in part by the kind of data I was able to collect, and my desire to tell "participant's stories" rather then turn the research into a simple narrative account. The use of narrative history is applicable, if not necessary, whenever "storytelling" is used. Green and Troup (1999, p. 204) write that "Central to story-telling is the construction of a narrative [having] a beginning, middle, and end, and which is structured around a sequence of events [taking] place over time". However, in using narrative history to present the findings of this research, great care has been taken to avoid doing what Fisher (1970, p.152) describes as "the chronic fallacy." According to Fisher (1970, p.152) the chronic fallacy "is a kind of misplaced temporal literalism in which a historian forces his story into an over rigid chronological sequence and tells everything in the precise order of its occurrence." Fisher (1970, p.162) states that calendars "are the worst of temporal tyrants, which reduce narrative histories to slavish chronicles." Accordingly, this researcher has heeded Fisher's advice and the narrative is organized around the pattern of

change inherent in the phenomena under study as opposed to unfolding the narrative in a strict chronological order (Fisher, 1970).

Lastly, there is the challenge of dealing with the authenticity and validity of data provided by the research participants. Indeed, as Kalyvas (2006, p. 48) writes: "Any study of violence must deal with the thorny problem of data." The goal of this research was to try and understand what had happened with the civic action programs, to ascertain the issues, which the people who had experienced them first-hand themselves identified as being important, and to understand the meanings of these things, which had happened to them and for them. However, while all wars are violent, insurgencies seem to produce a heightened level of personalized violence. This in turn can lead to a number of different biases, which can further complicate any study which has violence as a component of the phenomena being examined. Table A.1 in the appendix offers a summary of five potential forms of bias that can arise while studying violence. Given my reliance on human participants, one of the greatest challenges to overcome are biases victims may hold towards telling their story. Wagenarr (1988; cited in Kalyvas 2006, p. 50) acutely states: "Like everyone else, victims forget, ignore, or misrepresent crucial aspects of the exact sequence of the actions and events that produced their victimization." Furthermore, it is important to remember that those choosing to share their experiences do have something to gain in that:

> Often informants, and especially victims, have a stake in making researchers adopt their truths, especially since they perceive them to be curators of history who will retell their stories and provide them with the halo of objectivity brought by academic status. (Kalyvas 2006, p. 51).

Given the difficulty of participant bias, the challenge for this research project in finding, and conveying the truth of what happened in Peru, how the civic actions were

implemented, and the benefits and problems, is best summed up by Fumerton (2002, p. 32) who writes:

> Despite what we would sometimes like to think, what we are doing as social scientists is not revealing the truth, but merely giving our own specially informed interpretations of the ontological world we observe – and more often then not, we are giving the interpretations of interpretations of the truth.

2.6 Framing the Research Geographically

2.6.1 Physical Geography of Peru

Peru is a country located in west central South America. It is situated between 0° and 18°S (latitude) and 81°W and 70°W (longitude), it is bordered on the north by Ecuador and Colombia, on the east by Brazil and Bolivia, on the south by Chile, and on the west by the Pacific Ocean (Figure 2.2). Peru has a land area of approximately 1,280,000 square kilometers and is the third largest South American country (behind Brazil and Argentina). The land area of modern Peru was part of the Inca Empire and it became a Spanish colony in 1533. In 1821 Peruvian independence was declared. Peru's physical geography consists of three distinct regions (Figure 2.3): a narrow coastal desert (*la costa*), the rugged Andean highlands (*la sierra*), and a very sparsely inhabited portion of the Amazon basin (*la selva*). Peru is dominated by the Andes Mountains - the world's longest and second highest mountain range. To gain perspective on the extreme terrain occasioned by the Andes consider Huascaran National Park in north-central Peru. Huascaran comprises a land area of 3400 square kilometers; in this area there are "60 peaks with altitudes surpassing 5700 meters" (Byers, 2000, p. 54). In all of North America there are only three mountains higher than 5700 meters. Another method of acquiring perspective on Peruvian terrain is the presentation of travel times between

Figure 2.2: Peru

Source: Robin Poitras, Cartographer, University of Calgary, Department of Geography, 2013

selected locations. Quillabamba, a jungle town in the eastern foothills of the Andes, is "a ten hour drive from Cuzco, a place 121 kilometres away" (McCarry, 1996, p. 22). The 322-kilometre drive from Cuzco, in the *Sierra*, to Puerto Maldonada, in the *selva*, "can take as long as 15 days." (McCarry, 1996, p. 22).

2.6.2 Human Geography of Peru

While the physical geography of Peru consists of three distinct zones, its human geography consists of only two: the people of the coast (*los costenos*) and the people of the mountains (*los serranos*). According to Johnson (1965) Peru is a "divided nation" consisting of two distinct societies: there is the Spanish speaking, European, and affluent society of the coast and there is the Quechua speaking, Amerindian, and poor society of the highlands. Since the publication of Johnson's book this perception of a "divided nation" has continued. For example, De La Cadena (1998, p. 46) indicates Peru is "a nation of two societies and two cultures, one of them the national Euro-American culture, the other the Andean indigenous culture." Starn (1998, p. 227) articulates a view that in Peru there is "an imagined geography that presents the coast, and especially Spanish-settled Lima, as 'modern,' 'official,' and 'Western' in contrast with the 'premodern,' 'deep,' and 'non-western' Andes."

Peru, like much of the developing world, has a large and growing population. In 2012, Peru's population was approximately 29.4 million people (World Bank, 2013). Globally, population growth is centered on urban areas; Peru's population growth is no exception to this trend. As of 2012, an estimated 77 percent of the Peruvian population lived in urban areas (World Bank, 2013). Between 2010 and 2015 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that Peru's urban population will grow by 1.6 percent a year (CIA,

Figure 2.3: Ecological Zones of Peru

Source: Robin Poitras, Cartographer, University of Calgary, Department of Geography, 2013

2013). Most of Peru's urbanization occurred in Lima, the capital city. Lima is a crowded sprawling metropolis described by one writer as "a concrete anthill slipping from a pallid beach into a filthy sea" (Fraser, 2003, p.18). Today, Lima's population is estimated to be

8.769 million people (CIA, 2013). Lima's current population dwarfs Peru's second largest city, Arequipa (population estimated at 778,000, (CIA, 2013)). Given its vast population, Lima also serves as the center of Peruvian economic activity. "In 1986 the city generated 69 percent of national industrial value added and collected no less than 87 percent of Peru's taxes" (Leonard, 2000, p.436). As one research participant stated concerning economic and other policy initiatives by the Peruvian government: "Lima is Peru, and Peru is Lima" (anonymous respondent #4, 2012).

2.6.3 Racism in Peru

An important corollary of what Johnson (1965) called the "divided nation" is racism. Marks (1996, p.273) described Peru as having "one of the most racist societies on earth." The ethnographic make-up of the Peruvian population consists of three main groups of people: those descended from the original indigenous inhabitants of Peru ("Amerindians"), those descended from European immigrants ("Euro-Americans"), and people who are a mixture of Amerindian and Euroamerican descent ("Mestizos"). Table 2.1 shows the ethnic and racial composition of Latin America by country.

Peru is second only to Bolivia in having the highest percentage of Amerindians in its population. According to De La Cadena (1998, p. 24) "the cultural construction of race in Peru assumed, and continues to assume, that *serranos* are inferior to *costenos* because they descend from Indians." Wilson (2000, p. 246) made the observation that during colonial times, "in traversing urban public space, the place of the Indian was literally in the gutter. A memory from those times, commonly repeated to the present day, is that only white and *mestizo* citizens were entitled to use the [sidewalks]."

Table 2.1: Ethnic and Racial Composition of Latin American Populations

Country	Amerindian	Mestioz	Euro-American	Afro-American	Other
Argentina	-	-	97	-	3
Bolivia	55	30	15	-	-
Brazil	-	-	53.7	6.2	40.1
Chile	4.6	95.4	-	-	-
Columbia	1	58	20	4	17
Ecuador	7	71.9	6.1	7.2	7.8
Guyana	9.1	-	-	30.2	60.7
Paraguay	-	95	-	-	5
Costa Rica	1	94	-	3	2
Ecuador	25	65	-	3	7
Guatemala	40.5	59.4	-	-	0.1
Mexico	30	60	9	-	1
Panama	6	70	10	-	14
Peru	**45**	**37**	**15**	-	**3**
Suriname	2	-	1	10	87
Uruguay	-	8	88	4	-
Venezuela	2	67	21	10	-

Source:
Central Intelligence Agency. (2013). *CIA World Factbook; South America.* Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_soa.html on April 1, 2013.

2.6.4 Economic Geography of Peru

From an economic perspective Peru is a developing country. The World Bank has categorized the prosperity of countries into four categories: "low income countries" (GNI per capita US$1025.00 or lower), "lower middle income countries" (GNI per capita US$1026.00 to US$4,035.00), upper middle income countries" (GNI per capita US$4,036.00 to US$12,475.00), and "high income countries" (GNI per capita US$12,476.00 and above). The World Bank classifies Peru as an "upper middle income country" having a GNI of US$5,150.00 (World Bank, 2013). In 2012, Peruvian GDP per capita (GDP PPP) was estimated to be US$10,700.00 – which is only 21 percent of the

U.S. GDP PPP, (of US$49,800.00) (World Bank, 2013). Poverty is a very serious social problem in Peru; according to the CIA (World Factbook, 2013) since 2002, Peru's rapid economic expansion, coupled with cash transfers and other programs, many of which champion policies of social inclusion and more equitable distributions of income, have helped reduce the national poverty rate substantially, yet vast inequality continues to persist, especially between those in urban centers and those in rural areas. The CIA estimates that 31 percent of the Peruvian population living in urban centers live below the national poverty line, while 55 percent of the rural population continues to live below the national poverty line (CIA World Factbook, 2013). Perhaps the most glaring evidence of poverty in Peru is the fact that many Peruvians simply do not get enough food to eat; according to the World Food Programs overview of Peru approximately 11 million Peruvians, or 38 percent of the population, do not cover their minimum necessary daily calorie intake (World Food Program, 2013).

Johnson (1965) referred to Peru as being a "divided nation" with an affluent coast and a poor sierra. Economists measure income inequality by using a statistic known as the "Gini Coefficient." The Gini Coefficient is a measure of income inequality that can range from 0 (in the case of perfect income equality) to 100 (in the case of perfect income inequality). This division between the affluence of costal communities, such as Lima's upscale districts of Miraflores and San Isidro, and the poverty of highland communities, such as Huamanga (Ayacucho city) and Huanta, is evident in Peru's 2010 Gini Coefficient of 46 (CIA World Factbook, 2013).

2.6.5 Insurgency in Peru: A Geographic Case Study

Typically research on insurgencies, and the behaviors of those participating or affected by them, has routinely been concentrated in fields of study such as political science or strategic studies. In general, these and other social sciences have seen studies focused on the policy or concerned with articulating the more practical task of how one should defeat an insurgency (Kalyvas, 2006). While these disciplines are not incorrect as a lens for the examination or understanding of "insurgency," a challenge plaguing these disciplines is they regularly see "nations treated as 'points' in space, and environments are apparently assumed to be homogenous over large areas" (Patton 1970, p. 598). However, as the insurgents themselves, and those who have waged COIN know, it is a fatal mistake to assume uniformity in an environment such as a nation, or that the application of specific policies will occur homogenously across space or time. As any study of insurgencies reveals, the success or failure of each side's efforts is largely determined by the specific conditions in the area(s) where the opponents are operating. Said another way, one's success in waging or countering this form of war fighting is extremely sensitive to the immediate surrounding environment, including the physical, political, and human elements. It is important to recognize that success at the macro scale (that is at a national or international level) often hinge on the successes at the tactical or micro scale.

Given the challenges the various social sciences have in understanding insurgencies, what does the discipline of geography have to offer? The Oxford Dictionary defines geography as "the study of the physical features of the earth and its atmosphere, and of human activity as it affects and is affected by these, including the distribution of

populations and resources and political and economic activities" (Oxford English Dictionary 2005, p. 723). As we can discern from this definition, geography as a discipline covers a wide area of study, which focuses not just on understanding the physical world, but also seeks to understand how humans both affect and are affected by it.

So why use the discipline of geography to study insurgencies? FM 3-24 (2007, p. 28) offers an excellent summation stating: "Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors affect all participants in a conflict." While concise, it is clear from this description that insurgencies are not solely impacted by the physical features of the environment, but also by many human factors as well. Further, when considering the study of insurgencies, governments and policy, Hastings (2008) suggests that utilizing geography and its many branches (such as political geography) allows one to deal with the spatial and geographic implications of government policies, or government behavior relevant to geopolitics, as these behaviors can lead to grievances and conflict. Utilizing geography, and the multiple streams this discipline covers, a researcher can draw upon and combine a multitude of discipline specific analyses and practices, to create a unique and well-rounded interpretation of the phenomena under study (Northey and Knight, 2007). With this in mind, the discipline of geography grants a researcher the unique opportunity to take the breadth of scales, which the examination of insurgencies requires, conceptualize these in geographic or spatial terms, and focus in on the spatial analysis of the conflict through the use of multiple lenses. This key ability of geography aids greatly in revealing and understanding major differences, which may

otherwise be obscured when large areas such as nations, national policies, and politics are aggregated and treated as wholes (Patton, 1970).

It has been accurately stated many times that no two conflicts are alike. As we have discussed above, these differences extend not only between different conflicts, but can and do regularly exist at the lower "operational" levels within a single conflict. However, this does not mean there are not similarities between conflicts or localized areas. Indeed as Kalyvas (2006, p. 9) wrote:

> Although violence emerges in unique contexts and, in each case, is expressed and understood in a local idiom, conforms to specific values, and serves the needs of a particular power system, it is a universal process formed by recurrent elements and organized in systems with regular structural features.

Given the fact that violence of all kinds comes from " recurrent elements" there is a need to continue our study of it through all manners of disciplines including geography, as geography offers the opportunity to add significant knowledge to our investigation and understanding of insurgencies and resulting state based action (Flint, 2003). As Patton (1970, p. 600) stated:

> [Our] improved understanding of the processes involved in dysfunctional situations may show us how to accommodate changes in political and social systems with means short of violence. Social cost and hazards are inherent in the improved, and especially the theoretical, understanding of social problems. Undoubtedly there are harmful possibilities, but it seems unduly pessimistic to assume that improved understanding must or is even most likely, to be used detrimentally rather than constructively.

Chapter 3: Four Key Concepts to Counterinsurgency

3.1 Causes of Insurgency

While nationalist, religious, ideological, or other beliefs can be the driving inspiration behind insurgencies, they also include grievances. Grievances, the sources of discontent motivating people to take up arms and attempt to achieve change violently, are an important impetus to an insurgency. Economic grievances, such as mass poverty, are one of the most powerful grievances motivating people to enter an insurgency. As Griffith ([1961] 2005, p.5) wrote, "A potential revolutionary situation exists in any country where the government consistently fails in its obligation to ensure at least a minimally decent standard of life for the great majority of its citizens." According to the United States Army and Marine Corps (FM 3-24 2007, p.173), "Insurgencies attempt to exploit a lack of employment or job opportunities to gain active and passive support for their cause and ultimately undermine the government's legitimacy."

In an agrarian society one of the most powerful grievances is landlessness as it is "every peasant's ambition to own sufficient land" (Thompson [1966] 1972, p.65) and "no other factor looms so large in the consciousness of the peasant as land" (Race [1972] 2010, p.6). Should the bulk of the land in an agrarian society be held by a small number of land owners an insurgency will find numerous recruits among landless peasants; in the words of Galula ([1964] 2006, p.14), "It follows that any country where the power is invested in an oligarchy, whether indigenous or foreign, is potential ground for a revolutionary war."

Often governments, in attempting to suppress an insurgency, abuse the population and, in doing so, drive people into its ranks. In fighting an insurgency, a government may

"act beyond the borders of legality" and if this happens "opposition will increase and the insurgent will thank his opponent for having played into his hands" (Galula [1964] 2006, 45). Many people join an insurgency due to government abuses of power; family members may have been killed during government operations, imprisoned, or tortured for rendering aid to insurgents (Thompson [1966] 1972). The hatred emerging during an armed conflict, as a result of government atrocities, often overshadows the original motivators driving people into the insurgency and these become amplified and the insurgency gains resilience (United States Government 2009).

Identifying the specific point in time at which an insurgency started can be quite complex, yet the counterinsurgent should also not be taken completely by surprise. A reason for the difficulty in identifying a beginning of an insurgent conflict is that insurgent groups often begin and remain small organizations in comparison to those of the counterinsurgent, who will eventually bring the entire weight of the state's resources to bear in the battle against the insurgent. Because of this imbalance in power, these conflicts see the insurgent regularly employ terrorist or guerrilla tactics, such as indiscriminate violence to intimidate the populace or "hit and run" attacks against apparently random targets (Galula, [1964] 2006; Hoffman, 2006).

Today, insurgent forces are still primarily drawn from among the local population. Yet the recent experiences of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that insurgents can be reinforced by foreign nationals who support their cause. Given that insurgents have traditionally come from within the local populace, the ability to identify them becomes difficult for the counterinsurgent. Kalyvas (2006, p. 89) writes; "The inability to tell friend from enemy is a recurring element of irregular war."

Thompson ([1966] 1972, p. 34) writes, dressed as a local "the guerilla, except when he is carrying arms, is indistinguishable from the rest of the people. In fact, he can be both a peasant by day and a guerilla by night." This ability to hide in plain sight has always been an advantage for the insurgent, and a challenge for the counterinsurgent who must try to identify the insurgent from among the population at large.

3.2 Intelligence

Good, actionable intelligence is the lifeblood of any fighting force. FM 3-24 (p.79) states, "Effective, accurate, and timely intelligence is essential to the conduct of any form of warfare." This need for credible, accurate information is even more important for counterinsurgency operations, as COIN is an intelligence driven campaign, and the success or failure of these conflicts depends directly on the effectiveness of the intelligence effort. Kalyvas (2006, p.90) sums up the benefits of good intelligence, writing:

> The advantages guerrillas and terrorists may possess in opposing the far greater resources of the government can largely be countered if the government has adequate intelligence. Whatever advantages of mobility, surprise, and *esprit de corps* the guerrilla possess can usually be more then offset if the government has the crucial intelligence at the right moment.

3.2.1 Intelligence Collection

There are many sources of intelligence information available for collection and analysis. As part of the pre-deployment planning for a COIN campaign, FM 3-24 states that an intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) should be conducted. This document "is designed to support the staff estimate and military decision-making process" and must consider the operational environment, evaluate the enemy threat and possible enemy courses of action (FM 3-24, p. 81). Further as part of the IPBs

preparation, FM 3-24 (2007) states that intelligence analysts should consult open-source material such as websites, books, magazines, journal articles, and academics, as these resources can provide valuable information and knowledge that might otherwise be overlooked in the preparation of the document.

Once engaged in combating an insurgency, intelligence organizations take on an entirely new dimension. Given the dynamics of the unconventional battlefields today, FM 3-24 (p. 80) states, "All Soldiers and Marines collect information whenever they interact with the local population. Operations should therefore always include intelligence collection requirements." This need to have frontline troops participating in intelligence collection activities is seconded by Cohen et al. (2006, p. 50) who stress that intelligence needs to be "gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible levels and disseminated and distributed throughout the force." With frontline troops participating in intelligence collection, FM 3-24 (2007) points out that the typical flow of information is an upward direction, as those on the front lines generate new information, which must be investigated, cross-referenced, verified, analyzed, and then finally acted on. However, it is still the front line operators who must then act on the information. Thus, as Cohen et al. (2006) state, commanders must ensure that all available resources and capabilities are pushed down to the lowest levels to give local commanders the most options, and tools to carry out their mission.

The value of frontline soldiers acting as intelligence collectors is not new. In fact, Thompson ([1966] 1972) points out that frontline troops not only develop human intelligence (HUMINT) (that is information gleaned from human informants) but also often are the individuals that capture other sources of information, such as maps,

documents, and equipment/weapons cashes. While Thompson ([1966] 1972, p. 86) does acknowledge the role frontline troops play in developing information, he stresses that "In an insurgency the army is one of the main consumers of intelligence, but it should not be a collector except in so far as its units obtain tactical intelligence through their operations." Thompson's statement stems from the fact that militaries typically lack the ability to interact with the local communities, and are often viewed with suspicion by the civilian population, especially in rural communities. Coupled with this is that accurate and actionable HUMINT is normally collected, not from coercion or torture, but through the development of networks based on personal relationships and trust. Stubbs (2008) supports this conclusion, in his examination of the British strategy for intelligence gathering in Malaya, citing the fact that initial search and destroy approach did little more than alienate the British from the population at large. Explaining why militaries are poor cultivators of good HUMINT Thompson ([1966] 1972) stresses the importance of cultivating relationships with members of the local population. These relationships take time to develop, and therefore require individuals that can remain in the same region for extended periods of time (if possible the entire duration of the conflict.) Leaving the gathering and development of intelligence networks and information to the military is dangerous, as combat ready units often must remain mobile and flexible, able to quickly re-deploy to new areas threatened by insurgents. If the responsibility for HUMINT network building is left to these combat ready units, should they be redeployed to a new region, "Any intelligence lines which these units may have established are then immediately uprooted" (Thompson [1966] 1972, p. 86).

3.2.2 Organizations Best Suited to Intelligence Collection

According to Thompson ([1966] 1972), FM 3-24 (2007), Kalyvas (2006), Nagl (2005), and Cohen et al. (2006) the best organization suited to the efficient, effective and accurate development of intelligence is the local police force. Using this organization has many benefits for the counterinsurgent. First, police forces are typically static organizations; remaining in the same area all the time thus allowing them to develop critical relationships with members of the local community and allowing for the development of solid HUMINT networks based on trust. Second, Nagl (2005) and Cohen et al (2006) state that police are often viewed as legitimate representatives of the government's authority as they are regularly associated with the rule of law. In fact when conducting raids in urban areas both Nagl (2005) and Cohen et al. (2006) state it is better to allow the police to conduct these operations rather then the military, as the lesser application of force by the police will be viewed as more legitimate by the local population.

The third benefit of developing police forces is that they traditionally have provided long-term, stable employment, which gives potential insurgent recruits an alternative to joining the insurgent cause. As Thompson ([1966] 1972) states, police organizations offer viable employment with decent salaries, and advancement opportunities giving individuals stability and the ability to provide for their families, rather then turning to the insurgency as a source of income. Fourthly, police forces are far less costly to maintain then a combat ready military, thereby reducing the demand and strain on government resources. Lastly, the use of police forces for intelligence gathering operations, especially in urban areas frees up the military of several burdens, allowing

them to be free to more aggressively pursue the fight against the insurgent in the countryside (Thompson, [1966] 1972).

3.2.3 Other Intelligence Gathering Factors

As previously mentioned, counterinsurgencies are intelligence driven operations. Given the very nature of today's counterinsurgency operations it is highly unlikely that only one organization will be tasked with the responsibility of intelligence collection and analysis. In fact, as technological changes continue to advance intelligence gathering capabilities, it is clear that more and more individuals and organizations will be needed to simply analyze and synthesize the vast amounts of information counterinsurgent forces are capable of generating. However, just as it is dangerous to not develop any intelligence networks, it is also risky to have numerous competing agencies. In situations such as this, agencies might withhold information from one another in an effort to exploit the information they do gather to garner credit for their respective department. When this occurs these organizations naturally become suspicious of each other and "merely end up spying on each other" (Thompson, [1966] 1972, p. 85). If this occurs in the intelligence community, the end result will be that plans made by those conducting the counterinsurgency operations will largely be based on faulty intelligence. Given that COIN operations today occur in joint environments with several agencies working together (or in a multinational operation supported by many agencies from several countries) staff at all levels must work together to coordinate the collection, analysis and dissemination of information to all levels and across all organizations involved (Cohen et al., 2006; FM 3-24, 2007; Nagl, 2005).

In the end, it is important to remember the wisdom espoused by Thompson ([1966] 1972), Galula ([1964] 2006), and echoed in Cohen et al., (2006), when considering intelligence collection activities within COIN operations. Each of these writers point out that it is typically not the large-scale operations that generate good intelligence, and win the conflict, but the small operations that generate the best intelligence.

3.3 Targeting the Local population

Due to the nature of insurgent warfare, gaining active or passive support of the local population will be the focus of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. Kalyvas (2006, p. 92) writes: "Almost all writers converge in asserting that no insurgent movement can survive without 'civilian support,' and neither can incumbent victory be achieved with out it." While the counterinsurgent must endeavor throughout the conflict to mobilize the population behind their cause, the insurgent can simply benefit from the population's unwillingness to support either side (Kalyvas, 2006; Taber, [1965] 2002). Galula ([1964] 2006) and FM 3-24 (2007) support this conclusion stating that a key aspect allowing insurgents to survive and expand is simply the complicity of the local population. In his further examination of this link between the local population, Galula ([1964] 2006) states that while complicity of the local population is a victory of sorts for the insurgent, due to the very nature of an insurgency, the insurgent will target the local population, as they cannot afford to leave any individual neutral to the cause.

3.3.1 "Popular Support"

Importantly when considering the "popular support" of the local population, Kalyvas (2006) identifies two critically different characteristics that must be considered in determining whom the population supports. The first aspect when considering popular support are the personal attitudes, preferences and or allegiances of the local population; put another way, this element is whom the population supports in their hearts and minds. The second aspect are the actual behaviors and actions, which the population undertakes on behalf of one side or the other. Given this discussion of how popular support might be known, it must be noted that popular support may not actually reflect the real feelings or allegiances of the population as "people may join the revolutionary movement less because they share its ideals than to save their lives" (Kalyvas 2006, p. 93). Hence, just because support for the insurgent or the counterinsurgent appears to grow rapidly, especially at the outset of open hostilities, it should not simply be concluded to reflect the popular will of the local population.

Typically, support of the local population is conditional in that they will support whichever side they believe has the will and determination to win. Given this fact, the counterinsurgent must do everything possible to communicate and demonstrate its desire to win; otherwise it will loose the support of the population (Galula [1964] 2006). This is supported by Kalyvas (2006, p. 93) who writes: "Military and strategic factors are far less important than popular attitudes in a civil war." Kalyvas (2006, p. 93) goes on to state that if either the insurgent or counterinsurgent forces are welcomed by the local population "its resources and strength are automatically increased. If, on the other hand it is unwelcomed, its strength is tied up pacifying and policing the conquered territory."

3.3.2 Insurgent Logistics

There are multiple reasons why the insurgent targets the local population. Kalyvas (2006, p. 69) writes; "Whether the population acts willingly or not, there is typically a very deep social and geographical overlap between a political actor's "support system" (the source of its military intelligence, food, supplies, and recruits) and the civilian population." According to Nagl (2005, p. 25), the local population will act for the insurgent "as the logistical support, recruiting base, [and] providers of intelligence, cover and concealment"; without this support being provided by the local population (willingly or coerced), there would be no way for the insurgent movement to survive. Lastly, while the local population functions as the logistical support base for the insurgent movement this support may not necessarily reflect the desires of the population. Given this fact, regardless of the population's desires, the counterinsurgent must make every effort to cut the insurgent off from the local population to succeed in COIN efforts.

3.3.3 Cutoff Strategies

As indicated above, insurgents have a great advantage in that they can hide among the local population. Identification of these individuals can be extremely difficult for the counterinsurgent. Kalyvas (2006, p. 91) identifies two critical reasons why the identification of insurgents is a huge challenge. First, there is the insurgent's refusal "to be reduced to a single identity, that of combatant." Second:

> ... is the refusal of the surrounding population to identify them [the insurgent] to their opponents. Either the people do not know who is really an insurgent, which is sometimes true about spies and clandestine agents; or, much more commonly, the refrain from identifying the insurgent combatants who hide among them – out of diverse motivations, including sympathy and [or] fear.

Thus, if the counterinsurgent hopes to win the war, they must make every effort to cut the insurgents off from the local population. The importance of cutting off insurgents from the local population cannot be overstressed (Bruno, 2010). As Cohen et al. (2006) states, it is actually easier to cut the insurgent off from the local population than it is to kill every one of them. Kilcullen (2009, p. 13) supports this opinion, writing that the killing of insurgents "...is strictly a secondary activity" as these actions simply keep insurgents at bay, while failing to address the root causes or grievances contribute to the insurgency in the first place. Thus, rather then focusing on the fighting and destruction of insurgents (which does have its place however), those charged with waging COIN operations should instead focus on developing programs that undermine the very conditions and grievances being exploited by the insurgents. Given the need to focus on separating and cutting off the insurgent from the populace, rather than simply killing them, there are several actions the counterinsurgent can take to accomplish this.

3.3.4 "Population Control"

Historically, efforts to cut the insurgents off from the local population have taken several forms. Galula ([1964] 2006) suggests that one of the best tactics a counterinsurgent can employ is establishing control over the local population. While this sounds rather simple, Cohen et al. (2006, p. 50) write: "In the 20th century, population control often meant resettling people." In fact, this tactic has been employed in almost every counterinsurgency. Yet upon examination as a strategy, this tactic has not been as simple or as humane as it would appear. The simple fact is that in many cases relocation has really been the movement of people into concentration camps, where the government forces can exercise strict control over the population. One of the oft-cited examples of the

successful application of relocation was the British response to the Malayan Emergency; Thompson ([1966] 1972) discussed how the British took care to build the towns the people would be moved to, ensuring that many basic necessities, such as plumbing, schools and administration buildings were in place well in advance. Yet Stubbs (2008) has recently described these camps as concentration facilities that actively targeted the Chinese minority. Both May (1987) and Linn (1989), in their examination of the Philippine-American War, cite similar examples of the horrors of the relocation strategy, reporting that tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of individuals were starved in the relocation settlements established by the Americans during that conflict. Given that many of these resettlement efforts appear to have resulted in abuse of the local population, their employment as a tactic should be carefully monitored (perhaps by an external agency) to ensure any atrocities of the past are not repeated.

Given advances in modern technology, Cohen et al. argue that COIN forces today can rely on items such as biometric identification cards to accomplish population control. Yet this author disagrees with this assessment as well, as it too is not easily employed as a strategy. While the use of technology has many added benefits it also holds several drawbacks. First, if the societies where a counterinsurgency is being conducted are unfamiliar with, do not use, or dislike technologies employed in trying to control them (perhaps because they go against the people's religion), the counterinsurgent is likely to find itself dealing with a hostile population that is now predisposed to support the insurgent. Second, as we have seen in the recent experiences in the so called "War on Terror," and the COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of technology has the potential to generate vast mountains of information, which are extremely difficult to work

through and analyze. Even with computers there are still countless examples of individuals slipping though the cracks. Lastly, forcing measures upon a population runs the risk of alienating the counterinsurgent from the local population, further reducing their credibility, and potentially prolonging the duration of the conflict, especially when the primary COIN force is from an external nation, operating in support of a host government. Thus, any population control measure will have to be subjected to a thorough review and assessment, to ensure all programs are held to the highest ethical and moral standards possible.

3.3.5 "Population Control" through the Provision of Security

A key idea emerging from the classic COIN literature (and being echoed in current work), is the process of gaining the support of the local population through the development of the rule of law (FM 3-24, 2007). Cohen et al. (2006) suggest that the first step in bringing the rule of law is the provision of security for the local population. The importance of security for the local populations is well stated by Kalyvas (2006, p. 12), pointing out that the side appearing most capable of ensuring the local population's safety, gives "...survival-oriented civilians a strong incentive to collaborate with them, irrespective of their true or initial preferences." Galula ([1964] 2006, p. 8) also writes the population's support:

> ... is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most ...these are the criteria governing the population's stand.

This idea of population control through the provision of security is addressed in greater detail below.

3.4 Operational Concepts of COIN

Time and again we have seen counterinsurgent campaigns focus on large scale sweep and clear operations; be it in the Philippine-American war, the British in Malaya, the US in Vietnam, or even the most current engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, militaries seem to begin COIN operations trying to use their vastly superior troop numbers to conduct large scale sweep and clear operations in an effort to destroy the enemy. Yet this idea of large-scale operations has been proven to not deliver the rewards and benefits they are often thought to possess. As Galula ([1964] 2006) points out, while large scale operations may deliver benefits in the short term, in the long run they actually prove to be more detrimental to the counterinsurgent, destroying their credibility with the local population. This is because the local population living in the area being swept needs to be assured of its security so as to carry on with their daily lives. Typically, in such operations, the military forces only remain the area for anywhere from a few hours to a few days while they seek out their enemy, only to then abandon the area and return to their bases. This leaves these areas unsecured allowing the insurgent to then return and again exert influence over the region punishing those suspected of co-operating with the counterinsurgent. Thus, while many commanders believe large-scale sweeps hold great benefit, the fact remains they really do not. Furthermore, the fact that large scale operations net smaller rewards than thought, links back directly to the principles for intelligence gathering: typically it is the small scale operation that nets the best results for the counterinsurgent.

Along with the use of small-scale operations, Thompson ([1966] 1972) and Galula ([1964] 2006) both stress the importance of what the counterinsurgents focus on,

what they describe as securing their base areas. At the commencement of any conflict, there will be areas that are strongholds for the counterinsurgent (typically urban areas), and for the insurgent (normally the rural areas). While the initial reaction of the counterinsurgent will be to strike at the insurgent, they should instead focus on ensuring their areas of strength are secure. Not doing so could leave avenues of entry for the insurgent, and provide them with new opportunities to carry out subversive attacks against the counterinsurgent, exploiting the neglected base areas. Only after ensuring the base areas are secure do Thompson ([1966] 1972) and Galula ([1964] 2006) recommend that COIN forces begin worrying about offensive operations.

As previously mentioned, the provision and ensuring of security for the local population needs to be a cornerstone of any COIN campaign (Bruno, 2010). As Cohen et al., (2006, p. 50) wrote: "The cornerstone of any COIN effort is security of the populace." Cohen et al. (2006) further this argument, citing that one of the best ways to provide security is to have a stable government viewed by the population at large as being legitimate. Because insurgencies are political violence, every insurgent based conflict has sought to maintain, or establish, some form of government, which will be viewed as legitimate. However, COIN efforts, especially in recent times, have focused on a top-down approach; that is establishing a national government, and then working down through the provincial/state levels and eventually focusing on local levels.

These efforts at building a national government, while important, are done in a backwards fashion. Instead of a top-down approach to government building there should be a focus on a bottom-up approach, building out from the local level towards a national government. The reason for this approach is quite simple: a cornerstone for the local

population is their daily security. When survival-oriented civilians are not assured of their own local security, it becomes quite difficult to convince them to participate in national government building strategies. By focusing on local level governance, security can be built out of the establishment of local government organizations, which contribute to regional stability. Only when truly assured of immediate security, supported by local government institutions, will large numbers of the population truly want to participate in larger, national level, government building. As Cohen et al. (2006) point out, without large-scale participation by the population in electing or selecting the government, no national level government will truly be seen as a legitimate entity. However, changes such as these may take a long time to bring about. As Stubbs (2008, p. 129) wrote: "Getting any government to move down the continuum [of change] is often difficult. Senior politicians, military officials, and bureaucrats become tied to specific policies, and find it hard to admit they may be wrong."

3.5 Leadership of COIN Forces

The leadership of government and military organizations plays a critical role in the success or failure of a COIN campaign. Central to leadership is the ability of both the leader and the institution to remain flexible and adapt to the changing situation around them. In the past some writers have tried to sum up the successes of the victorious counterinsurgents as simply luck (May 1987; Stubbs 2008). These individuals are too quick to discredit the ability of military commanders to adapt to changes on the battlefield, and to exploit these changes to their advantage. Clausewitz (2007) supports this conclusion, stating that chance can play an outcome in the role of war, yet this

chance depends in part on the particular character of the commander and his army. As such, it is not simply luck that allows for victory on the battlefield, but also the ability of a commander to recognize opportunities, and to exploit them to his or her advantage. To mimic Branch Rickey, the great baseball general manager, "luck follows design!"

3.5.1 Economy of Force

"Insurgency is cheap, counterinsurgency costly" (Galula [1964] 2006, p. 6)! Given the high cost to the counterinsurgent of conducting COIN operations, commanders must, whenever possible, ensure they use economy of force. For example, if the insurgent lacks large military forces, the counterinsurgent should match this capability in the field. Galula ([1964] 2006) states that, due to the very nature of irregular warfare, counterinsurgents should deploy small, highly trained, light and highly mobile units to counter the insurgent's subversion. This is because "as long as the insurgent has failed to build a powerful regular army, the counterinsurgent has little use for heavy, sophisticated forces designed for conventional warfare (Galula [1964] 2006, p. 65). Thompson ([1966] 1972) also supports the idea of smaller military units stating, there really should be no need to counter a small enemy with a massive force, as doing so simply ties up more resources, and provides the insurgent with opportunities to attack areas, which could have otherwise been secure. Lastly, as was previously discussed, maintaining a smaller more agile military reduces COIN operational costs as maintaining combat ready military units is both a huge cost and drain on the counterinsurgent's resources.

3.5.2 Need for Disciplined Forces

Lastly, there is the need of the counterinsurgent to ensure high levels of discipline across the many organizations involved, and especially within the frontline troops. As has

been discussed, the inability of the counterinsurgent to easily identify the enemy, coupled with a lack of distinct fronts, can cause COIN forces to indiscriminately attack the population at large (Kalyvas, 2006). This need for strong, disciplined leadership is reiterated by FM 3-24 (2007, p. 237) which states: "Army and Marine Corp leaders are expected to act ethically and in accordance with shared national values and Constitutional principles, which are reflected in the law and military oaths of service." While the presence of highly disciplined troops does not ensure against atrocities occurring, it is one of the only measures that can truly be taken in trying to prevent this kind of violence from happening. Given this fact, it is imperative that COIN forces and their leaders be highly disciplined, as they cannot afford to have this kind of action happen. The cost and ramifications of such failures in discipline are highly significant. Indiscriminant targeting of civilians can cause the counterinsurgent to lose credibility and the moral high ground with the local population. Furthermore, as we have seen in recent times in Afghanistan and Iraq, the breakdown of discipline by COIN forces provides fuel to the insurgent, providing material for propaganda, justification for waging subversion, and can truly drive the local population into the open arms of the insurgent (FM 3-24, 2007; Galula, [1964] 2006; Nagl, 2005; Thompson, [1966] 1972).

Chapter 4: The Maoist Insurgency in Peru

4.1 Understanding Maoism as a Revolutionary Strategy

While no two insurgent movements are the same, all are guided, at least in part, by an underlying doctrine, philosophy, or religion. There are many doctrines guiding insurgencies and each has its own unique set of principles and rules influencing organizational structure, both politically and militarily, the kind of tactics it will employ, and how the insurgency will approach its dealings with the local population. Maoism is one such strategy holding specific features unique to it and, different from other communist revolutionary experiences, and while its precise implementation has varied across different revolutions, Maoism draws from a number of guiding tenets.

"Essentially, the Maoist strategy involves the imposition of a political party organized in accordance with Leninist principles and animated by faith in certain basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism onto a purely peasant mass base" (Schwartz 1961, p. 189). The uniqueness of the Maoist strategy as opposed to those of its communist predecessors lies in its intentional focus on the rural peasantry. Prior to Mao's efforts in China, communist revolutions, such as the one having taken place in Russia, relied heavily on the theory that communist revolutions "must show at least a minimum relationship between the Communist Party and the urban proletariat" (Schwartz 1961, p.194). China lacked this previously critical urban mass base and Mao realized that the peasantry could, when politically educated and organized, function as a mass base and provide the energy and motivation needed to bring about revolutionary transformation. In the end, the Maoist experience in China "...demonstrated that a mass basis can be provided by the peasantry

and other strata of society, and that the industrial proletariat need play no role in this formula" (Schwartz 1961, p.203). Coupled with the Maoist approach to obtaining a mass base, three key tenets have emerged, as taught by Mao himself, which are central to understanding any Maoist revolution including that experienced in Peru.

4.2 Maoist Revolutions by the Threes

4.2.1 Three Phases of a Maoist Revolution

Many insurgencies have followed the Maoist model of the protracted people's war developed by Mao Zedong during the Chinese Revolution (United States Government 2009). In the Maoist model, a revolution moves through three distinct phases (Table 4.1): the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate, and the strategic counteroffensive. It is important to emphasize that there is no timeline within which this process is to operate; as Mao ([1937] 2005, p. 46) wrote, "That the war will be protracted is certain, but nobody can predict exactly how many months or years it will last." Being committed to a war with no timetable, Maoists are also committed to an indeterminable period of violence; in the words of Mao ([1937] 2005, p. 40), "It is thus obvious that the war is protracted and consequently ruthless in nature."

4.2.2 Three Instruments of Revolution

Maoist organizations are well known to use what are called the "three instruments of revolution" (Table 4.2) wherein there will be a political party directing the revolution, an armed group, acting as the army of the revolution, and a front group, representing the interests of the party in society (Race [1972] 2010, p.121). According to Race ([1972] 2010, p.121), "The party is the brain, the army the muscle, and the front is the means of

Table 4.1: The Three Phases of the Protracted Peoples' War from the Countryside

Phase	What This Entails
Strategic Defensive	The government has a stronger correlation between its forces and resources and insurgents must concentrate on survival and building support.
Strategic Stalemate	Government and insurgent forces approach equilibrium and guerrilla warfare becomes the most important activity.
Strategic Counteroffensive	Insurgents have superior strength and military force and are able to engage in conventional operations to destroy the government's military capability.

Source: Mao ([1937] 2005).

fracturing the society in such a way that the army can do its job with least resistance." Given its role as the central nervous system of the revolution, the party grants to itself total control of the other two instruments. As Schwartz (1961, p.191) writes:

> The extraordinary and total power, which the Communist Party arrogated to itself and the infallibility, which it ascribes to itself are justified entirely on the ground that it is the head of a social organism the body of which is the proletariat.

The United Front serves the purpose of "splitting the ranks of the enemy and easing the advance of the Party's core forces: the workers and the peasants" (Race [1972] 2010, p.121). It is important to recognize that while the responsibilities and tasks of each of the three instruments of revolution can be explained individually for each, the instruments themselves cannot be isolated from each other. Rather all are intrinsically linked one to the other. As Mao ([1937] 2005, p.89) stated:

> It is vital...to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military [insurgent] action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

Table 4.2: The Three Instruments of Revolution

Instrument	Tasks & Responsibilities
The Party	Functions as the brain of the movement. Provides leadership for the movement, direction, and strategic planning of activities, both politically and militarily.
The Army	Fulfills the political task of revolution as established by the party. Its primary task is to fight. Secondary tasks include: political education, organization, and mobilization of the masses, acquisition, collection, and distribution of weapons.
The United Front	To divide the ranks of the revolutions enemy through any means necessary so as to allow the advance of the party's main objective, which is revolution. Typically division is accomplished through subversive actions, but can also include the exploitation of traditional political or legal avenues.

Source: Race ([1972] 2010).

4.2.3 The Three Rules of Guerrilla Warfare According to Mao

Recognizing the critical role the local population plays in the success of a guerrilla movement, Mao set forth a code of conduct, intended to govern how insurgents were to conduct themselves in their interactions with the local population. This code of conduct became known as the Three Rules and Eight Remarks and is set out in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: The Three Rules and Eight Remarks of a Maoist Revolution

Rules	Remarks
1. All actions are subject to command. 2. Do not steal from the people. 3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.	1. Replace the door when you leave the house. 2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. 3. Be courteous. 4. Be honest in your transactions. 5. Return what you borrow. 6. Replace what you break. 7. Do not bathe in the presence of women. 8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.

Source: Mao ([1937] 2005, p.92).

As was discussed in chapter 2, the population will act as the logistical support for any insurgent activity. When considering the tenets of Maoism, a striking feature is that

the local population serves not as just the movement's logistical support, but it also acts as the mass base from which recruits, as well as supplies will be drawn. For Mao, and those who later based their own revolutionary movements on his tenets (such as *Sendero*), the goal then is not to simply demand the support of the population, or to gain its passive support through in-action, but to gain its active support as part of building the united front. As Mao ([1937] 2005, p.82) astutely observed, "The people must be inspired to cooperate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual."

4.3 Peruvian Maoism and the Rise of *Sendero Luminoso*

4.3.1 A Brief History of the Rise of Sendero

The symbolic burning of ballot boxes on 17 May 1980 marked the first salvo, announcing the beginning of armed hostilities by *Sendero* and the beginning of its self-described "protracted people's war." However, *Sendero* had existed as a communist party for at least a decade prior to this, lurking in the shadows of leftist Peruvian movements, growing slowly, and preparing for the coming war.

Despite its image as an isolated entity, *Sendero* was in fact one of many different communist organizations emerging during the 1960s and 1970s in Peru. Peru has a long and well-documented history of legally recognized leftist institutions, many of which had participated to varying degrees in the democratic institutions and processes of the country (Gorriti, [1990] 1999). The 1960s saw much change in the political landscape of Peru on both sides of the political spectrum. When considering changes on the left, Hinojosa (1998) pointed out that Maoism was unprecedentedly influential on the Peruvian left

during the 1960s and 1970s. It was during this period we are able to trace the rise of *Sendero*, which is intrinsically linked to the rise of the party's founder, Abimael Guzmán.

Guzmán joined the Peruvian Communist Party in 1958 and quickly gained notoriety for his rhetorical skills and ability to heavily influence those who would listen (Fontaine, 1999; Starn, 1997). In 1965 the Communist Party of Peru underwent a Sino-Soviet split and Guzmán helped form a splinter communist group known as *Bandera Roja* (Red Flag). Guzmán's involvement in *Bandera Roja* lasted only a few years before disagreement within that party saw Guzmán leave and form a new Communist group called *Sendero Luminoso* under his leadership. The name *Sendero Luminoso* (translated to "Shining Path" in English) was taken from José Carlos Mariatégui's assertion that Marxism-Leninism would open the "shining path" towards revolution (Fontaine, 1999; Starn, 1997).

Utilizing his position as a senior professor at UNSCH, the early 1970s saw Guzmán seemly content with expanding and solidifying *Sendero's* base primarily through taking control of student organizations at universities both in the highlands as well as in Lima, and its infiltration of the union of primary school teachers (Fontaine, 1999; Marks, 1996). *Sendero's* strategy of recruiting and converting students and teachers was a carefully crafted effort. Many of the rural networks built up in the 1970s were headed by teachers from peasant backgrounds, who had received training at universities by *Sendero* cadres, and then returned to their respective villages where they preached the movement's message to the rural villagers. It was these individuals who constituted the critical link between the party hierarchy and the peasant society they claimed to represent. Peasant teachers routinely received a certain degree of local prestige and influence within their

home communities, and along with teaching duties, many of them occupied posts within village governments. When considering just how important teachers were to *Sendero's* recruitment, Gorriti ([1990] 1999, p. 49) states: "teachers are the main educators on political matters because of their relationship with the parents (community members) and the students as well as the community labor they also participate in without exception."

Along with teachers, the organization also appealed to students. As is the case in developing nations the world over, in Ayacucho, education and literacy (along with traditional patterns of labor migration) has for decades provided an avenue of escape from "the harsh existence of subsistence agriculture and herding" (Isbell 1978, p.70). In Ayacucho, it was typically those with the most education who were the ones able to leave the region. Fumerton (2002) argued that most peasants equated education with "progress" and being "modern," while ignorance was associated with activities thought to keep the peasant down, such as chewing coca leaves, smoking tobacco, or drinking alcohol. Given the premium placed on education, especially a university education, many youth in the highlands saw education as a tool for social mobility. When the acquisition of advanced education failed to meet the expectations of a better life, a scenario was created seeing expectations unfulfilled, and many youth became profoundly disappointed with their inability to remove the shackles of poverty. These unfulfilled expectations in turn provided *Sendero* with a fertile population, eager to join a cause which was promising a better life (Starn, 1997).

During the latter half of the 1970s, *Sendero* became increasingly clandestine in its activities as Guzmán shifted his efforts towards the pending conflict. In 1977 Guzmán, who had been on an extended leave of absence for medical reasons from UNSCH, went

into hiding as he was determined to prepare the party for the coming armed struggle, even though not everyone in *Sendero* shared this same vision at that time (Fontaine, 1999; Fumerton, 2002). According to Gorriti ([1990] 1999), from 1977 onwards, military intelligence reports began mentioning small groups of *Sendero* operatives conducting weapons handling training, and even conducting occasional raids of mining camps to seize crates of dynamite. In contrast with Peru's other communist organizations, which organized and participated in mass protests and strikes during the late 1970s, *Sendero* shunned involvement in such activities. "[*Sendero's*] distance from, and scant influence in, the mass movement was such that Shining Path was not even persecuted. In contrast with other [leftist] organizations, not one Shining Path leader was deported" (Hinojosa 1998, p. 71). While avoiding participation in the mass movement, *Sendero* chose to quietly dispatch political cadres (complementing the many teachers they had already recruited) into the rural highlands with the task of carrying out grass roots indoctrination of the population. While the exact success of these efforts is difficult to determine, these cadres communicated *Sendero's* intent to fight for social justice, which reportedly received widespread sympathy and support from the larger population (as well as the occasional new recruit from the among the local students) slowly and methodically building their mass base (Fumerton, 2002).

Although entirely understandable, it is a mistake to describe Sendero's rise and attempt at revolution as being a "peasant rebellion" or "agrarian revolt" as this view of the insurgency overlooks the top-down character of *Sendero* as a party. It is accurate to say that "many of the peasants were happy to see the departure of inefficient and corrupt authorities, and the punishment by the [party] cadre of adulterers and thieves, which

seemed to validate the promise of a new, more just order" (Starn 1997, p.272). Indeed, *Sendero* received support from the rural peasantry (at least in the early years of the conflict) by "identifying itself with the dynamism engendered by the immediate needs and discontents of the masses" (Schwartz 1961, p.203).

However, despite all its rhetoric exalting the peasantry, *Sendero* ardently operated through a rigid hierarchy, governed by race and class, replicating almost precisely the social order it claimed it was seeking to overthrow. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Peru has long been a nation divided along lines of ethnic decent. When considering the structure of *Sendero*, Starn (1998, p.228) stated; "[*Sendero*] was begun by privileged intellectuals...dark-skinned kids born in poverty filled the bottom ranks under a leadership composed mostly of light-skinned elites." Further evidence of this structure along racial lines, and the attitudes of superiority held by the party leadership, is found in the writings of Guzmán, which showed zero interest in, or mention of, traditional patterns of daily Andean life. It would be this attitude towards the rural population, coupled with a serious lack of understanding of their daily concerns, which would become a major obstacle in sustaining support from the rural population (Starn, 1997; Taylor 1998).

4.3.2 Sendero: Ardent Maoists or a Cult of Personality?

Guzmán was fond of the Maoist model, and there is little doubt of the debt he owed to this philosophical view. Guzmán often cited Mao on the primacy of class struggle and the use of violence and its cleansing character when applied through revolution. Yet Marks (1996) pointed out that, while *Sendero* was an ardent Maoist movement, many of its practices alienated those who would have otherwise been

potential followers, something running contrary to the teachings of Mao's three rules. Starn (1997, p. 268) echoed this digression away from pure Maoist tradition writing:

> Mao pioneered the 'sinification of Marxism,' forging a compelling vision of social transformation at the crossroads of Chinese history and revolutionary theory. The case of Guzmán tells a different story. Shining Path doctrine enshrines the party leader...as the wise inventor of a 'distinctly Peruvian Marxism.'

This "distinctly Peruvian Marxism" was, essentially, a merging by Guzmán of past communist thought with that of his own. At the beginning of *Sendero* in 1969 the members of the organization rallied around communist thought, described in party writings as "Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought." By the time the movement launched the armed struggle in 1980, this had changed to become "Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong-Gonzalo Thought," or simply "Gonzalo Thought" (after Guzmán's *Nom de guerre* of President Gonzalo), which many followers described as being the highest development of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought (Starn, 1997).

This cult of personality within the movement emerged over time fueled by a number of things: first, Guzmán shrouded himself in an aura of mystique based heavily on his own claims of scholarly authority and his image as a learned professor, a feature he was careful to fully exploit; second, he ensured *Sendero* became an organization fashioned solely around the basis of Gonzalo Thought, which served as the foundation to the cult of personality centered entirely on him and his teachings. Members would swear allegiance to the movement taking an oath of loyalty in which they swore "full and unconditional submission to the all-powerful and infallible ideology of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Gonzalo Thought, especially Gonzalo Thought" (Anonymous Letter to Guzmán, p.336). Then, as the movement swelled and launched its armed struggle, Guzman

elevated himself to the same level as Marx, Lenin, and Mao, with many of his followers often referring to Guzmán as being the fourth sword of Marxism (Fontaine, 1999).

In the end it was the "personality cult [which] ultimately proved to be the Achilles heel of the rebel organization" (Taylor 1998, p. 51). Guzmán's capture in 1992 essentially "cut the head off the beast of *Sendero*" as his arrest in Lima netted not just the mythical leader, but also the movement's key computer files. The information contained therein allowed the government to capture upwards of 90 percent of *Sendero's* highest-ranking leaders within a few short months following Guzmán's arrest, sending the remaining elements retreating high into the sierras and deep into the jungle (Klarén, 2000). Guzmán's arrest, and ensuing caged display, shattered the myth of the man and his organization, but not before tens of thousands of regular Peruvian had paid with their lives. In the end Guzmán built *Sendero* through a process, which copied but also recoded many of the Maoist traditions it claimed to embody (Starn, 1997).

4.3.3 The Quota

From the outset of its conception the idea that a cadre would need to kill or die for the party was a central tenet of *Sendero*. Guzmán reaffirmed this notion in an interview in 1988 where he stated:

> Marx, Lenin and principally Mao Zedong have armed us. They have taught us about the quota and what it means to annihilate in order to preserve... If one is persistent, maintains politics in command, maintains the political strategy, maintains the military strategy, if one has a clear, defined plan, then one advances and one is able to meet any bloodbath... We began planning for the bloodbath in 1980 because we knew it had to come (El Diario, 1988).

In its quest for the bloodbath referred to by Guzmán, the party had addressed the issue of "the quota" at its fourth plenary session, held in May 1981 (Gorriti [1990] 1999). As part of the debate the party was wrestling with how to handle the social costs of the

revolution. Recognizing that the only way to achieve revolution was through blood, the party leadership concluded that the militants it was fielding needed to be convinced of two things: first, they would need to be prepared to kill in a systematic and depersonalized way; second, it was felt that members must have not just a willingness to die, but instead have an *expectation* that they would give up their own life for the cause. It was this second aspect, that of essentially owing a blood debt to the revolution, which became know as "the quota" (Gorriti [1990] 1999).

The notion of a blood debt or "quota" is not new to communist revolutions. In fact communist revolutions have long held a view that "the state apparatus and its structural supports in society cannot simply be conquered; out of necessity they must be destroyed to be later rebuilt based on revolutionary principles" (Shy and Collier 1986, p.826). As part of this process to destroy, and then rebuild, communist revolutions have long recognized that cadres will eventually need to sacrifice themselves for the struggle if they hope to achieve their goal. The idea of self-sacrifice or "the quota" had been a central element in the development of orthodox Marxism, and no less in the development of *Sendero* and its cult of personality under Guzmán. The idea of a blood debt held great benefits for *Sendero* (as it has for communist revolutions throughout history) as it essentially induced a disposition to sacrifice, which gave the movement excellent control over its cadres making it able to do with their lives whatever it wanted without any form of protest (Gorriti [1990] 1999).

4.3.4 Loss of Popular Support of the Population

With the launch of the armed struggle in 1980, *Sendero* quickly took to opening up guerrilla zones, and establishing control over its base areas. These acts corresponded

directly to Maoist strategy during phase one (Table 4.1) where the guerrilla focuses on population control and the gradual take-over of territory. Key action by the movement during this phase saw attacks on isolated police posts (in an effort to gather weapons), and the targeting of corrupt government representatives, adulterers, and persons generally viewed with disdain by the local population. While these actions sought to fulfill a key part of the first phase of the Protracted People's War, to create a political vacuum in the guerrilla zones, the reality was that most of the areas where *Sendero* was operating were in regions more or less already abandoned by the state (Taylor, 1998). In describing the area around Ayacucho, Marks (1996, p.261) states that the areas where *Sendero* first initiated its armed struggle were in regions where there had traditionally not been any government presence for years, decades, and sometimes even longer. Hence, while *Sendero* eagerly claimed it had liberated parts of the country, there were in fact "...no liberated areas, only abandoned areas."

For *Sendero* the loss of popular support occurred quickly after it had launched its armed struggle. In the later half of 1982, buoyed by its early successes, apparent support from the locals, and the abysmal performance of the *Guardia Civil* (National Police) in combating them, *Sendero* launched into its second stage, calling for the encirclement of the cities from the countryside. The aim of this second stage was to cut the urban centers off from the supply of produce and labor, and required the rural peasantry to sever their economic ties with the urban centers and the many traditional markets, which occurred there (Tapia, 1997). This effort was meet with great resistance and displeasure by the peasantry, who has long relied on these traditional markets as a place to sell their wares and to purchase basic commodities needed for daily life. These efforts by *Sendero* did

little more than add to the hardships of the rural peasants, most of whom struggled on a daily basis to simply survive, and who regularly relied on the cash economy of these traditional market places to earn extra money, which was typically used to purchase other goods they could not produce on their own.

Along with efforts to stop the rural population from conducting economic exchanges with the urban centers, *Sendero* also began establishing collectives in areas they controlled, often killing land owners (at least those who had not already fled) and redistributing their land. It should, however, be borne in mind that Marks (1996) made it clear that land reform had already been carried out under the Velasco Military Revolutionary Government, well ahead of *Sendero's* efforts. Compounding matters for those organized into collectives was that at the time of harvest, the entirety of the produce was subsequently expropriated by *Sendero* to support the movement giving nothing back to the peasantry in exchange. This action was a flagrant violation of traditional Andean principles of reciprocity, and directly contradicted the movement's claims that it would establish a new democracy free of exploitation (Coronel, 1996). Further, Fumerton (2002) points out, this practice of expropriation ran in direct contrast to the "capitalist merchants" (*Sendero* was so fond of denouncing) as these individuals routinely paid the rural peasants for their produce and labor.

Efforts to implement revolutionary change did not stop with economic practices. From the outset of the armed struggle *Sendero* had sought to remove all vestiges of state authority, routinely executing anyone who held a position of authority. As was earlier noted, the populace met the removal of corrupt officials with quick support. However, when *Sendero's* efforts moved beyond corrupt state officials, attempting to also remove

and replace traditional peasant authorities (such as community presidents) with their own cadres, *Sendero* eroded much of the earlier support it had gained (Taylor, 1998). As one anonymous participant stated to this researcher concerning these actions in Ayacucho:

> When *Sendero* took to killing our community leaders we became very upset. These were people we had chosen to be our leaders; they were good people. When *Sendero* started killing them it felt like they were killing us as well (anonymous former CDC commander #6, 2012).

Lastly, Coronel and Loayza (1992, p.524) point out, the replacement of locally appointed authorities with members of *Sendero* gave the (accurate) impression to the peasantry that the party was attempting to limit the degree of peasant leadership within the revolution, again contradicting a previous pledge to create "a government of the people, of the peasants."

4.3.5 Violence, Terror, and Sendero: Further Erosion of Support

It has always been confusing why revolutionary movements regularly apply violence against the very people they supposedly support. As Greene (1990, p.105) states: "whatever its range or intensity...violence is a common thread running through all revolutionary movements, whether on the left, center, or right." When considering the application of violence in revolutionary guerrilla warfare one must recognize that this form of war fighting is first and foremost political-psychological warfare where the primary target is the population's collective mind (Bulloch, 1996; Greene, 1990). The key to understanding this concept is that one must recognize that either side may simply use the threat of violence to influence the behavior of the population to further either side's objectives. Tayacán (1985, p.51) further highlights how the psychological element of irregular warfare impacts the population stating:

> A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because the population, without saying it aloud feels terror that the weapons may be used against them. In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of physical damage. If the government police cannot put an end to the guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the government, which had the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of citizens. However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an explicate terror, because this would result in a loss of popular support.

When considering the application of violence as part of the revolution, Guzmán viewed its application as necessary, not only to overthrow the state, but also to be used against the masses as a tool essential for keeping the population under control (Fumerton, 2002).

By the end of 1982, it was clear that Guzmán and *Sendero* were becoming increasingly divorced from the masses they claimed to serve. Guzmán's rhetoric of a new "Peruvian utopia" quickly gave way to a realization that *Sendero* was simply transforming the traditional structure of power and domination, placing itself at the top, with the peasant masses continuing to remaining at the bottom (Isbell, 1992). By the end of 1982, momentum from the original grievances exploited by *Sendero* had all but run out as the party had proved itself incapable of governing to the benefit of the population (Kent, 1993). The application of terror and violence became all that was left for *Sendero* to consolidate its gains and further expand across the nation, as *Sendero* believed it could hammer a seemingly passive peasantry into submission (Marks, 1996). This reliance on increased violence and terror, combined with the aforementioned grievances, caused widespread resentment among the population towards *Sendero*, ultimately planting the seeds for its destruction. The movement's failure time and again to deliver on promises of establishing a "new democracy" led to unfulfilled expectations, and gradually by the end of 1982, the vast majority of the peasant population abandoned any form of support for

Sendero and its leaders (Fontaine, 1999). Yet even though *Sendero* blatantly ignored Mao's three rules of guerrilla warfare, which contributed to turning much of the population against them, the movement and the insurgency would continue to drag on over the next 13 years as the state failed to seize and exploit the golden opportunity *Sendero's* own actions had presented to it.

4.4 The Peruvian State 1968 – 1975

4.4.1 Peru in the 1960s

Inspired by the Cuban revolution, many Latin American countries experienced leftist based revolutions during the 1960s and Peru was certainly not immune to this. In 1965 the *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) (translates in English as: Movement of the Revolutionary Left) attempted to overthrow the civilian government. This short-lived insurgency was, however, quickly crushed by the military that same year. Nevertheless, the rise, and quick demise, of the MIR insurgency had a profound effect leading to drastic changes for Peru in the coming years. The 1965 insurgency saw the military begin to emphasize the promotion of internal security through national development programs and it became more vocal in its criticisms of the government and the many inequalities of Peruvian society (Fumerton, 2002; Marks, 1996).

The military has long played a prominent role in Peruvian history, especially since the country achieved independence in 1821. Coups d'états have regularly interrupted civilian governance as the military has traditionally seen itself as a moral compass and protector of the state, intervening when it feels it needs to set the country back on "a correct path" (anonymous respondent #27, 2012). In the early morning hours of

3 October 1968, the military again seized power through a bloodless coup, the end result of which brought General Juan Velasco Alvarado to power (Fumerton, 2002).

The reasons behind the military coup were twofold: first, the coup prevented the likely victory of the conservative *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA) party (whose platform was aligned with that of the old oligarchy) who were obstructing many of the social reforms proposed by progressive military officers to check the dangerous advances of radical left; second, the coup overthrew an already discredited civilian government heavily tainted by corruption and scandal lacking the motivation and will to bring about many of the reforms touted as necessary by the far more progressive military (Fumerton, 2002; Klarén, 2000; Kruijt, 1996). In light of the civilian government's failings to produce real social change, coupled with its increasing corruption, Velasco and a small group of like-minded progressive military officers became "increasingly confident that they had the will, the civic responsibility, and the expertise to carry out the transformation of the country" (Klarén 2000, p.337).

From the moment they seized power, Velasco and the military set to reshape Peru developing an ambitious program of social and economic reforms "conceptualized as a coherent anti-poverty strategy...[intended] to prevent another guerrilla uprising in the future" (Kruijt 1996, p.243). Reforms included nationalizing certain oil holdings and mining operations, as well as some of the country's banks. Further, the military government expropriated land from haciendas and organized worker co-ops in more capitalized agrarian and industrial enterprises along the coast (Stern, 1998).

4.4.2 "The Master Will no Longer feed off your Poverty!"

While there were many parts to the military's plans to transform Peru, arguably the most notable development was the revolutionary government's action of land reform. On 24 June 1969, General Velasco announced in a televised address *Decreto Legislative* No. 17716, which brought to law the agrarian land reform plans of his government, stating:

> Today for the Day of the Indian, the Day of the Peasant, the Revolutionary Government honors them with the best of tributes by giving to the nation a law that will end forever the unjust social order that impoverished and oppressed the millions of landless peasants who have always been forced to work the land of others. Today, Peru has a government dedicated to conquering the country's development with the definitive cancellation of old social and economic structures. And among them, without any doubt, the highest priority pertains to the country's agrarian system. Peasant: the Master will no longer feed off your poverty! (Velasco [1969] 1995, p. 264-269).

Prior to Velasco's agrarian land reform, much of the country's land had been held by a very small group of elite landowners. For decades successive civilian and military governments had attempted (mostly unsuccessfully) to implement land reform. These efforts were routinely blocked by the old oligarchy that had dominated political activities for decades. In fact, in the 1960s, Peru had already seen two other efforts at land reform, first by the military junta of General Ricardo Pérez Godoy in 1962-63, and then again by President Belaúnde in 1964. However, both of these attempts were disappointing, both in their overall scope of effort and level of success. The goal of General Velasco's land reforms was meant to bring to life the dreams of Peru's poor and landless peasants and, as Fumerton (2002, p. 49) wrote, "certainly, no prior attempt at agrarian reform was as vigorous in scope and intensity as the one implemented by the military between 1969 and 1975."

The agrarian reforms of the military's Revolutionary Government of the 1960s and 1970s failed to prevent another insurgency in Peru. Kay (2001) points out one reason for their failings on this front was the rise of new bureaucratic structures within the Revolutionary Government, many of which exacerbated and complicated the process of land reform through corruption, and created problems which later served to fan the flames towards the very insurgency they were supposed to be preventing. Along with the state's failings to implement reform (when considering land distribution amongst the general population) the agrarian reform set forth by the military in 1969 appears to have shattered more expectations than it ever satisfied. Klarén (2000, p. 348) stated: "at the end of the reform period, only a quarter of the rural population had gained access to the land, which still ranked Peru, along with India, as having the worst man-land ratio in the world." Moreover, the attempt at land reform did little to alleviate the continued poverty faced by peasants, especially in the poorest parts of the country such as in the Department of Ayacucho, where only a few short years later *Sendero* would launch its insurgency. Unfortunately, while the intent of the sweeping land reform initiatives was to benefit the poorest of society, the fact remains that much of this effort did not reach the majority of the peasantry, as land reform did not occur across the country in a uniform fashion. Instead, its implementation was highly limited to specific regions, which were experiencing unrest (Fumerton, 2002; Marks, 1996).

Along with the many shortcomings in its implementation, efforts at land reform by General Velasco's military Revolutionary Government were simply not a primary concern for much of the population in certain areas of the country. One such area where this was the case was in the Department of Ayacucho. Within the department, the most

important peasant mobilizations of the 1960s took place, not in demand for land (something they would obtain through Velasco's agrarian reform), but against the Revolutionary Government's attempt to end free secondary school education throughout Peru. In Ayacucho, land reform was of little socioeconomic or political relevance to the vast majority of peasants in the department, especially during the 1960s. The most important issue to its population was actually their ability to receive free education (Fumerton, 2002). On 4 March 1969 the Revolutionary Government attempted to end this practice, promulgating *Decreto Supremo* 006-69EP (D.S. 006), which specified that each student would be required to pay a monthly fee of S/ 100 when attending any secondary school. Given the economic plight of the vast majority of the population in regions such as Ayacucho, this new cost levied by the state for tuition was "a sufficiently high figure, especially for the families from rural Andean zones" (Degregori 1990, p. 51). Given the high level poverty within the department, it should have hardly surprised the government when students, first in Huanta (and later in Huamanga), poured into the streets protesting the demand for tuition. Support for the students quickly grew, and thousands of people, from many of the surrounding villages in the department, hurried to Huamanga to join the students in their protest.

Just as the student's protest quickly grew, the state hurriedly dispatched police reinforcements to the region, utilizing tear gas and firearms to break up the demonstrations. This action had the opposite effect to what the state had hoped for. Rather than quelling the protests, the intensification of brutality and repression by the police only served to further enrage the population, and more protesters flooded into the central squares of Huanta and Huamanga. The protests against the state and D.S. 006

continued to grow over the following days and weeks, escalating until "[they] took on the characteristics of a popular rebellion" (Degregori 1990, p.69). With the original police regional detachments and their reinforcements seemingly doing little to suppress the protesters, the state dispatched units from a specially trained police force known as *Sinchis*. Known for their willingness to use any means necessary, the *Sinchis* opened fire, shooting indiscriminately into the gathered protesters. As Fumerton (2002, p.39) wrote: it was "with vicious and brutal efficiency, the *Sinchis* quickly suppressed the demonstrations, first in Huamanga and then in Huanta." Stunned by the level of protests and open resistance to D.S. 006, the Revolutionary Government repealed the law the very same month it was announced, however, not before eighteen people had been killed by the violence of the police and *Sinchis* (Fumerton, 2002). Thus, at least in the department of Ayacucho, the problems associated with land reform were never the central political issue for the population. Rather it was the defense of access to free education that dominated the social movements of the region during the 1960s and 1970s.

4.5 The Peruvian State 1975 – 1980

In 1975 the military experienced a palace coup when General Francisco Morales Bermúdez deposed General Velasco, citing the latter's poor management of the country's economy and poor health as the reason for his removal. Upon his ascension to the presidency, General Bermúdez undertook a much more conservative approach to the military's revolution, striving to temper many of the measures brought into place by his predecessor in an effort to rebuild the nation's economy, launching the Revolutionary Governments apply named "second phase" economic plan (Stern, 1998).

4.5.1 The Peruvian Economy 1968-1980

It was during this period of the "second phase" that the national economy of Peru took a serious nose dive, as many of the reforms implemented under Velasco finally caught up with the reality of global economics. Many of the policies implemented during this period, such as the nationalization of foreign holdings, had alienated both Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from corporations, as well as other forms of aid and investment from national governments around the world; according to Figueroa (1984), the GNP per capita dropped by almost ten percent between 1974 and 1980. This downturn coincided with skyrocketing inflation, which shot up from 24 percent in 1975 to 68 percent in 1979 (Figueroa, 1984).

The loss of income and increased poverty hit much of the population hard and contributed directly to rising levels of discontent with the military government. Efforts by General Bermúdez's government did little to improve the socioeconomic positions of many, and the growing unrest over economic conditions, which were routinely manifested in national strikes, threatened the stability of the state. Their image heavily tarnished by the economic crisis they had created, the military decided to try and salvage what little credibility and reputation they had left by agreeing to hand power back to a civilian government. The recommencement of democratic elections began in 1978 first, to elect a Constituent Assembly, and then, Second, in 1980, to elect a new President (Fumerton, 2002). Following the election of May 1980, and vanquished by the failure of successive economic policies that had led to the collapse of the national economy, the military retreated back to its barracks, conceding power back to President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, the very man it had so ignominiously deposed in 1968.

4.6 The Peruvian Military & Counterinsurgency: Opportunity Lost

4.6.1 The Peruvian Armed Forces: A Reflection of the Country

Within Peru, the military has a long history of populism as well as authoritarianism within the country. Just as education plays a role for many in Peru to attempt to raise their stature in life, the military, and especially the army, has also long served as rare avenue for social mobility (Starn, 1998). For many, the military offers an opportunity to attend university at the state's expense, in exchange for a period of service. While some may remain in the various branches of the armed services, many others leave after their period of enrolment, often returning to the rural communities they previously left. As one interview participant stated, it is these individuals that then receive, or are elected to, various government positions within the community, because they are educated, can read, and have connections to Lima (anonymous respondent #9, 2012; anonymous respondent #23, 2012). While the armed forces provide opportunities for things such as education, it also reflects one of the negative aspects of Peru: systemic racism. Just as the country has long been plagued by systemic racism, so too have the country's armed forces. As another interview participant stated: "The whites have the Navy, the mixed blood the Air Force, and the rest have the Army" (anonymous respondent #27, 2012). This stratification of the military was bluntly confirmed to this researcher when, in a discussion with an interview participant, the participant casually stated; "see the [Army] Colonel there, he could never be a marine simply because of his skin color" (anonymous armed forces representative #33, 2012). As is discussed later, it is this stratification along ethnic backgrounds that contributed directly to a poor performance by the military in its COIN efforts and dealings with the local population.

4.6.2 The "Lost" Intelligence Files

The transition back to civilian rule in 1980 was mostly peaceful, at least in appearance. While there were no shots fired, the reality was that the military had agreed to concede power more out of a need to cover its previous failure, than out of a genuine wish to restore civilian rule. As many government bureaucracies were transitioning back to civilian leadership it seemed, at least in some cases, that the military had taken actions, which would later have grave ramifications for the new civilian government. Gorriti ([1990] 1999) pointed out that the military seemingly withheld critical intelligence on subversive groups, including *Sendero*. Specifically, as the transition of command of the country's Interior Ministry was handed back to civilian authorities, the many rooms full of intelligence files, much of which contained reports on the many leftist organizations operating in Peru, including *Sendero*, went missing. When the incoming Interior Minister, López Martínez asked about the files (which he had seen and been briefed on only a month before) he was told, "they have been evacuated" (Gorriti [1990] 1999, p.44). As Taylor (1998, p.43) wrote, this action to evacuate intelligence files out of the Interior Ministry left "...the new civilian government with a severe intelligence deficit," especially on *Sendero.*

When it was exposed to the public in 1983 that the military had destroyed many of the critical intelligence files on *Sendero* many different theories abounded as to why. According to Gorriti ([1990] 1999) the most dominant theory was that the military had hidden just how serious the threat from *Sendero* was in an effort to humiliate and discredit the civilian government, and thereby hide its many previous failings in governing the nation. Regardless of the exact reason behind the military's removal of

critical intelligence, the fact remained that the many of the military's intelligence services had long been reporting and sharing information on *Sendero*. However, much of the intelligence gathered was deemed as unimportant, and no action was ever taken to check *Sendero's* march towards armed struggle (Taylor, 1998).

4.6.3 Peru's Counterinsurgency Efforts: 1980-1982

The war began in May 1980, but no one at the time would have made that assertion. The transition back to a democratically elected civilian government in 1980 was a very tumultuous time in Peruvian politics. Pre-handover, the military had spent its last few years of power preoccupied with many other issues, such as the nation's floundering economy and dealing with the many large-scale national strikes, often organized by the mainstream left. Government priorities towards *Sendero* did not change as President Belaúnde assumed power. As Marks (1996), Gorriti ([1990] 1999), and Taylor (1998) pointed out, each side was wary of the other, and none more so than President Belaúnde, who feared some in the armed forces were displeased with the election results of May 1980 and were looking for any opportunity to once again bundle him onto a Miami-bound flight. Wary of how the military would behave if ordered to deal with the insurgents, and determined to avoid a second one-way ticket out of Peru, President Belaúnde moved to quickly marginalize the military's role in combating *Sendero* and instead sent in the *Guardia Civil* (National Police) to address the growing insurgency (Marks 1996; Taylor 1998).

As discussed previously, Thompson ([1966] 1972) stated to effectively counter an armed rebellion, the state or agency tasked with this responsibility must move quickly and decisively to penetrate and neutralize the insurgent's political structure as once the

insurgent gains momentum, they become increasingly difficult to defeat. Further, Thompson stated that the ideal organization to combat an insurgency is the police. Unfortunately for the President, the *Guardia Civil* were far from being a force capable of conducting COIN operations, as they lacked the training, equipment, intelligence collection networks, discipline, and morale to conduct such an undertaking (Taylor, 1998). There are many reasons why the police were incapable of conducting COIN operations including the political turmoil in Lima, where many of the senior commanders were more worried about advancing or preserving their personal careers then they were on running effective COIN. This focus on self preservation often led to inter-agency infighting and competition that often trumped focusing on fighting the real enemy: *Sendero*. Second, many of the organizations within the state (including the numerous different police forces) were rampant with systemic corruption (Gorriti [1990] 1999). Given the condition of the various police forces it was not surprising they were incapable of effectively combating *Sendero*.

Within the *Guardia Civil*, an elite unit of police, known as the *Sinchis* was dispatched to the countryside to combat *Sendero*. This elite unit had received training, equipment, and funding from the CIA in the 1960s as part of American efforts to counter potential revolutions in Latin America, such as had happened in Cuba (Gorriti [1990] 1999). Renowned for their ability to fight, the *Sinchis* were also known for their brutality in dealing with the population. Instead of winning the population's support, the *Sinchis* often tormented the population in the areas they operated, regularly robbing, raping, and terrorizing the locals. Their brutality towards the populations did little to help the government's COIN efforts, and instead severed to create more *senderistas*, driving

previously uncommitted elements of the population into the arms of *Sendero* (Marks, 1996; Taylor, 1998).

4.6.4 Peru's Counterinsurgency Efforts: 1983-1985

After nearly two years of consecutive failure by the police to defeat *Sendero* President Belaúnde relented to his critics and ordered the military to take over the country's COIN operations in late 1982. The government declared a handful of provinces in the department of Ayacucho, including Huamanga, Huanta, Cangallo, La Mar, and Victor Fajardo as emergency zones (EZ). Along with the granting of supreme authority to the military, this action suspended the constitutional rights of the population inside the EZ for 60 days (Fumerton, 2002). Over the following seven years these emergency zones would be expanded to cover eight different departments, suspending the constitutional rights of roughly 9 million Peruvians indefinitely (CVR, 2008).

From the start of their involvement in the state's COIN strategy, the military was poised to be able to exploit the growing discontent among the population for *Sendero* and its violence. Unfortunately for the local population, rather than seizing this excellent opportunity, the military was arguably even more ferocious in its execution of COIN operations than the police had been, leaving a bloody trail of corpses, massacred villages, and unmarked mass graves (Starn, 1997). Upon their arrival in the EZ, rather then seeking to gain the population's support, or develop a robust intelligence collection strategy, the military simply embarked upon on a scorched earth campaign with the goal of showing the population that the state was far stronger then the insurgents and that it would be wise for the population to support the armed forces (Taylor, 1998). This approach stemmed, in part, from the military's view of the local population as being

inferior to those within the military. As was previously noted, the military has long reflected the social stratification found in much of Peru. When ordered to take charge of the country's COIN operations in 1982, the military was quick to dispatch troops to the newly declared EZ. However, many of these troops sent into the EZ were not from the region, but were imported from coastal bases and lacked an understanding of the population's language, culture, and 'local' customs. Starn (1997, p.272) points out regarding this importing of troops from the coast: to "many *Ayacuchans* [the arrival of the military was] viewed as akin to a foreign occupation by...a colonial army." Just as the locals viewed the military with apprehension, the military also viewed the locals with fear and suspicion; this "led many field commanders in Ayacucho and surrounding departments to go for the quick fix and commit indiscriminate murder" (Taylor 1998, p.44).

The military's view of, and approach taken to deal with, the population for much of the following seven years is best summed up in an interview with General Luis Cisneros, who served as the Minister of War for President Belaúnde from 1980-1985. In the interview the General stated: "If to kill two or three *senderistas* it is necessary to kill 80 innocents, then it does not matter...The peasants have decided where they wish to die: with Sendero or the armed forces" (Taylor 1998, p.43). It was this view towards the local population, which undoubtedly was carried by many in the military, and this directly contributed to the heightened levels of violence used against the population and the high numbers of deaths attributed to the armed forces during the first three years of the military's involvement in the war.

4.6.5 A Beacon of Hope in an Otherwise Dirty War

While the insurgency had been a horrific experience for many of the population, there was a slight (albeit short lived) reprieve to the military's approach in 1984. At the beginning of the year, General Adrian Huamán Centeno was appointed Commander of the military's efforts in the EZ. While reports are unclear on exactly where General Centeno was born and raised, it is widely believed he had grown up in one of the provinces of Ayacucho and fluently spoke Quechan, the language of the majority of the population. It was this personal knowledge of the area, its traditions, and cultures that led him to try a far more benign approach in dealing with the population. Specifically, General Centeno instituted reforms similar to what would later be called civic action programs, in an effort to repair the image of the military and police organizations under his command. One of the first such programs was to have members of the *Sinchis* hand out toy cars to children (anonymous respondent #3, 2012). While these programs were greatly limited in scope and reach, it was a dim beacon of humanity in what was otherwise a very dirty war (Fumerton, 2002; anonymous respondent #3, 2012).

4.6.6 Changes to Peru's Counterinsurgency Efforts: 1985 – 1990.

On 28 July 1985 Alan García Pérez was sworn in as the President of Peru. One of the cornerstones of his campaign had been his pledge to bring and end to the "dirty war" being waged by the military, and to hold members of the armed forces accountable for human rights violations. According to Crabtree (1992), a central part of how the García government intended to tackle the insurgency was through the implementation of socioeconomic development rather than by repression. By September of 1985 it seemed the apparent changes in approach ordered by García were taking root, as "the military

started to hold back on military operations and more attention was given to military public works programs" (Crabtree 1992, p.110). However, in the following years the military found itself more alone in conducting COIN, and the President and his administration not only failed to deliver a comprehensive plan, but García himself openly appeared to sympathize with guerrillas and *Sendero* expressing personal admiration of the mystique of the movement (Tapia 1997).

The first two years of García's presidency were somewhat of a honeymoon for the country on many fronts. The President's attempt to establish more civilian oversight of the armed forces (as opposed to his predecessor, who simply sought to abdicate responsibility for the war to the military) had been successful, as García had merged all three branches of the armed forces under one civilian minister. This increased oversight and change in approach by the military contributed directly to a reduction in civilian deaths during García's first two years in office (Fumerton, 2002). García himself also raised his popularity among the population instituting policies such as "zero interest loans" and meeting with peasants to discuss their most pressing concerns and needs (Crabtree, 1992). Yet this apparent benefit and economic improvement had little to do with actual policy, and more to do with a reduction in the military's brutal COIN campaign (Tapia, 1997). Then, in 1988, the honeymoon ended as the country's economy again began to crumble. Hyperinflation soared, rising to 7,649 percent in 1989, and resentment towards García and his administration were widespread (Klarén, 2000). Crabtree (1992, p.57) states the economic collapse stemmed largely from a "lack of detailed policy coordination, coupled with a lack of forward planning...for the economy as a whole."

While the country seemed to be benefiting from the García government, and its changes in national policy during the early years of his administration, so too was *Sendero* and its network, which had been battered by the armed forces during the Belaúnde administration; as Kent (1993) pointed out, the repression by the central government had checked expansion of *Sendero* in the department of Ayacucho, which resulted in the geographical dispersion of the movement and the intensification of the insurgency within other parts of the country. As was noted earlier, soon after taking office García seemingly left the military twisting in the wind with regards to conducting the COIN campaign. As Tapia (1997, p.39) states: "The military felt that the government was indicating to it what things they should not do, without receiving the indispensable directives that might define the strategic orientation of their action." This lack of clear direction from the President and his administration led the armed forces to relax their efforts to combat *Sendero*, giving it a much needed reprieve to reconsolidate its own operations in regions of the country where the state had long lacked any discernable presence.

The country had been immersed in combating a bloody insurgency for nearly a decade. Quickly written off as "bandits" who would easily be dispensed of in 1980, *Sendero* and its leader both continued to survive and thrive. When the military had attempted to "drain the water to kill the fish," their actions resulted in a series of massacres, which targeted the population as a whole, rather then netting the insurgents, who had often slipped away, back into the sierra. These actions did little to win the support of the population. Yet the military was not entirely to blame for the continued survival of *Sendero*. Here, two successive civilian government administrations share in

this failure for multiple reasons. As Taylor (1998, p.44) indicated: both administrations "were characterized by economic mismanagement, widespread corruption within the civil service and political classes" creating socioeconomic chaos not seen in Peru since the 1879 War of the Pacific. Coupled with poor fiscal management of the national economy, both administrations as well as the military leadership failed to devise and implement a coherent COIN strategy (Starn, 1997). This failure along with *Sendero's* own intuitive responses meant that after nearly a decade of fighting, the insurgency was seemingly no closer to ending.

4.6.7 President Fujimori and the Military: Change in Approach 1990-1995

By 1991, *Sendero* was active in 21 of Peru's 24 departments (Taylor 1998). The movement's expansion across most of the country was due directly to the poor performance by the police, military, and state, allowing *Sendero* to expand rather than go into retreat (Starn 1997). In 1990, the nation saw the departure of García as President, being replaced by Alberto Fujimori Fujimori. Fujimori had risen to power on the twofold promise of fixing the national economy and bringing about a conclusion to the insurgency. While he was able to deliver a close to the war, Fujimori was, in reality, more of a beneficiary of several actions started well before his tenure, which produced real results, starting with the capture of Guzmán in 1992; an event Fujimori was quick to take full credit for (even though it was actually the result of two plus years of dedicated police work started before he had even taken office).

Mired in many a controversy of his own during his decade long rule of Peru, Fujimori was first sworn in as the nation's President on 28 July 1990. Two years later, on 5 April 1992, Fujimori would execute a bloodless self-coup, in which he suspended the

country's constitution and dissolved the national congress as it was allegedly hindering his ability to repair the nation's economy and effectively wage war against *Sendero* (Fumerton, 2002). Often overlooked in the discussion of the coup, is that it allowed Fujimori to arrest, detain, and even disappear, some of his most aggressive critics within the state's governing bodies and the public media. Within one year after the coup, when donor countries, such as the United States, threatened to suspend their economic aid to Peru, Fujimori relented and promised to write a new constitution and hold elections. However, he continued to rule by decree, backed by the nation's military for nearly two more years (Klarén, 2000).

Surprisingly the coup "proved to be widely popular with most Peruvians, who seemed to agree that the country needed a stronger government to deal with the ongoing crisis. Public opinion polls indicated that 70 percent of the population supported the coup" (Klarén 2000, p.413). The self-coup allowed Fujimori to gain an iron grip on power, as he was able to co-opt many of the senior commanders of the military, while dismissing those he suspected of having political ambitions of their own and replacing them with officers loyal to himself (Kruijt and del Pilar Tello, 2002). Cameron (2000, p.4) wrote: the new appointments were made directly by Fujimori and his intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, who through the appointments "inspired both fear and loyalty within the armed forces."

Fujimori also took sweeping action to expand the political and judicial power of the military in exchange for its unwavering support. Taylor (1998, p.45) described how, until Fujimori's reforms, the state's legal system had struggled to deal with prosecuting members of *Sendero*, having a scandalously low conviction rate as "judges...were

suborned or intimidated into granting acquittals through a lack of evidence." Klarén (2000) suggests that conviction rates were as low as 10 percent by the civil courts from 1980 – 1992. Through the enacting of a number of different terror laws, Fujimori granted the military authority to hold special military tribunals for trying terrorism cases. In these tribunals, the judges were granted special permission to wear hoods, preventing their identity from being known, and making it impossible for *Sendero* to take reprisals against them or their families. Unsurprisingly, under these tribunals the rate of convictions skyrocketed, and gave the armed forces the impression that its efforts to combat *Sendero* were no longer being waged in vain. Unlike García, who had long been blamed for his inability to uphold human rights during his time in power, Fujimori's actions (though arguably worse then his predecessor) were routinely met with popular approval. The reason for this according to Tapia (1997) was because García always appeared to have been reacting to events as they occurred, while Fujimori gave the impression of being a decisive man with a plan.

In conclusion, Fujimori did bring new energy and ideas to combating *Sendero*, just as he had promised. Routinely referred to as a populist President by several interview participants (anonymous respondent #2, 2012; anonymous respondent #5, 2012) it was undoubtedly his persona as a President for the people, which allowed Fujimori to remain in power for over a decade. In the end, and like many a predecessor before him, Fujimori would be brought down by both his, and his administration's, rampant corruption. While many of his policies to end the insurgency also violated the rights of many, arguably one of his best decisions to help defeat *Sendero* was to give legal recognition, protection and arms to the *Comités de Defensa Civil* (Civil Defense Committees or CDCs) in 1991. As

we see in the next chapter, it was these organizations that arguably won the war against *Sendero* for the Peruvian people.

Chapter 5: Civic Action Programs: A Population Based Response

5.1 Civic Actions as a Tool of Counterinsurgency

In chapter two it was noted that little has been written concerning the use of civic actions as a tool for gaining the support of the population. Indeed, the term's appearance in FM 3-24 (among other works) leaves much to be desired in understanding these actions, as no explanation, or definition, of what kinds of programs constitute "civic actions" is offered, and one could easily place many different and broad programs under this banner.

5.1.1 Understanding what Civic Actions Are

For the purposes of this thesis, civic actions are programs (such as humanitarian aid, construction projects, or other non-combat actions) that attempt to better the daily lives of the local population and, through their implementation, to win the population's support. Either the insurgent or counterinsurgent may conduct these programs[1]. However, this thesis focuses on their administration by the state or multilateral agency conducting COIN operations, as these organizations typically possess the level of resources required to implement them. Programs, which commonly fall under the banner of civic actions, include: provision of health and dental care services; food programs, either distribution of food stuffs, or in some cases the provision of seeds and plants; water projects, such as water purification or irrigation; and infrastructure repair or new development, such as repairing roads, bridges, or buildings destroyed by the fighting, or entirely new infrastructure. While this list highlights some of the larger types of projects, typically

[1] In Peru, especially in the first two years of the war, *Sendero* often delivered civic actions in the form of a moral cleaning. The party often warned corrupt officials, judges, merchants, and thieves to reform their ways, or suffer execution. These acts were welcomed by the population, and bolstered support for the Maoists in the early years of the war (Degregori, 1998).

considered to be civic actions, it is certainly not a complete list of possible programs. Further, given the ever-connected world we live in, where pictures or videos taken by different mediums can suddenly be streaming out across the globe, it would be incorrect to not recognize that even small gestures can constitute a civic action. Indeed very small, individual acts, such as giving a candy bar to a child, or a bottle of water to a weary villager could also be viewed as being a civic action.

When considering the delivery of civic actions by the state or multilateral agency to the population, it must be recognized that while these tasks have regularly fallen to the military during an insurgency, the armed forces is not the ideal organization for the administration of these programs. Indeed FM 3-24 (2007) acknowledged this fact and indicated that whenever and wherever possible, it is best to have civilians perform civilian tasks. Militaries are built to fight, to apply maximum force and violence against an enemy, and when this is complete, and their enemy has been vanquished, they are to return to their barracks where they replenish, repair equipment, heal their wounds, train, and await their next combat operation (Galula, [1964] 2006; Nagl, 2005). Nevertheless, during insurgencies, when the other instruments of national power fail to show up, cannot stay, or are ineffective, the task of implementing civic action programs has routinely fallen to the armed forces (Sewall, 2007). In some cases, certain non-military agencies (government or civilian) may place restrictions on the operational capacity of their personal for security or other reasons. Alternatively, budget considerations may restrict other agencies from delivering certain programs (Canada, DND, 2009). When considering the administration of civic actions by the military in Peru, an anonymous interviewee (#7, 2012) stated:

> In Peru, civic actions are simply social programs where the state lacked the will, or capability, of implementing and delivering them to the local population. The military, while not the preferred organization, was the only remaining organization capable of seeing such programs carried out.

One may wonder, in the examinations of insurgencies and the resulting COIN actions, if it is possible to disentangle violent from non-violent methods, or combat from non-combat operations, such as civic actions? This is problematic because the very nature of an insurgency precludes the separation of violence from the non-violent methods due to the characteristics of this kind of warfare, which is, according to Marks (1996, p.85), "a political response to societal realities." Certainly the Velasco (1968-1975) and Bermúdez (1975-1980) military regimes' attempts to address grievances among the population did little to quell the population's frustration, and arguably left the country in a latent state of insurgency. As the efforts of these regimes showed, even when a state takes efforts to address grievances among the population, failure to accurately understand or address such grievances can contribute directly to a continuance or increase in resentment towards the state, compounding matters further and creating the key fuel needed by an insurgent group. Indeed my research in Peru reaffirmed this view that one cannot separate violent means from non-violent ones when studying insurgencies. As participants agreed to discussions concerning the delivery of civic actions, a pattern began to emerge, whereby the conversation surrounding these programs was always accompanied by a discussion of how violent the conflict had been. Time and time again, often through the sharing of personal experiences, it emerged that the delivery of civic action programs was routinely entwined with, or accompanied by, violence towards those the programs were supposed to be benefiting. Clearly for these individuals, the violence, which they had personally experienced, at the hands of *Sendero*, the military, or both, left

an indelible mark on them, and it was impossible (and would have been inappropriate to ask) for them to separate their discussion about these experiences while trying to examine programs, which frequently fell into the category of non-violent counterinsurgency activities.

Superficially, civic actions appear to be social programs aimed at the population being affected by the insurgency, yet I suggest there is a distinct difference between "civic actions" and "social programs." The difference between them is twofold and lies in a combination of the agency tasked with providing the services, and what the program's key aims are. When considering the delivery of social programs, the agencies tasked with their delivery usually are civilian, and the end-state sought in their provision is the improvement of the population's lives. Furthermore, social programs routinely have long-term funding, are available to a broad sector of the population, and are administered in a predictable way across a peaceful society. In contrast, when considering civic actions in Peru, the primary organization tasked with implementation and delivery of programs is the military. It often delivers these programs for only a limited period of time. The programs are typically implemented in a specific area and are available to a very small segment of the population and the programs are only provided in a society experiencing unrest. While these programs may seek to improve the population's current plight, this is typically a secondary benefit as overwhelmingly the primary objective is gaining support from the population for the ongoing COIN effort, or garnering some other advantage, such as improved intelligence or improved local infrastructure. Regardless of exactly what civic action is provided to the population, its primary function is to provide the organization supplying the program with a combat related advantage.

Consider, for example, the paving of roads in the Department of Ayacucho during the insurgency. As mentioned earlier, before the war the vast majority of roads in the department (including the primary road linking Huamanga, back to Lima) were gravel roads. Journeying between cities could take hours or days, as movement throughout the region was undertaken with great difficulty and at great risk. At some point during the conflict, the state paved many of the roads linking the key urban centers of the department. While there could be many different reasons for paving roads, undeniably a primary benefit to the state was that improved roads helped facilitate travel into, and around the department for the military. In fact, when participants were asked about the paving of the roads, not one person indicated it had been a primary concern of theirs during the war! While this action of paving roads may not have been directly related to combat operations, there can be little doubt that this action was taken largely to facilitate the military's need to move troops in the region with greater ease and in less time. Today, the paved roads provide a secondary benefit to the population, as their paving created a much improved transportation network. Thus, non-combat actions may serve combat activities, and it can be quite difficult to separate their short-term benefits from longer-term ones.

5.1.2 Why Employ Civic Actions

Any counterinsurgency program strives to link local level operations with national level strategic and security objectives, and its organizational and operational scope will ordinarily be wide ranging and multi-leveled. The general goal of COIN, then, is to isolate, destroy, and/or convert the insurgents, and to discredit the political message which they are preaching to the population at large (Greene, 1990; Kilcullen, 2010).

While these actions often rely heavily on combat related activities, history has shown repeatedly that military measures alone will not suffice if one is to prevail in any armed conflict, especially when that conflict is dealing with revolutionary guerrillas (Griffith, [1961] 2005).

In Chapter three I noted that because insurgencies are political in nature the various actors representing either side will try to shape and influence popular support for their respective side's cause (Kalyvas, 2006). There are two key tools available to either side for garnering the population's support: the application of violence or the use of non-violent actions (including civic actions). Although both will eventually be utilized, often in combination, for the insurgent during the strategic defensive stage (see table 4.1), the focus will be on non-violent actions, which seek to undermine the state, as a key goal of the guerrilla movement in this period is "to inspire [their] state of mind in others" (Taber [1965] 2002). While the eventual application of violence within an insurgency is inevitable, throughout history, including in Peru, its application does little to win the collective "hearts and minds" of the population, whose support is essential, and without which no state or guerrilla organization would be able to remain in existence (Kalyvas, 2006; Taber [1965] 2002). Additionally, while violence may cause the population to appear as though it supports one's cause, especially when applied indiscriminately, its application becomes counterproductive, quickly eroding support as the population turns against the agency employing this approach (Kalyvas, 2006).

Given that violence will eventually occur against the populace, providing their security will be of utmost importance, especially for the counterinsurgent (Bruno 2010). Indeed, it is widely agreed within the COIN literature that the most important aspect of

counterinsurgency is the security of the population, and the actor who is able to ensure the population's security gives survival oriented civilians a strong incentive to co-operate with them (Bruno 2010; Kilcullen, 2010; Nagl, 2005, 2007; Sewall, 2007; Thompson [1966] 1972). It appears that the simplest way to ensure security is to place police or military members "on every corner" but the resources necessary for this form of action are staggering, and routinely lacking (Kalyvas, 2006). Also, ensuring that the population is secure is not enough if one hopes to "win the war". As Nagl (2007, p.xix) wrote:

> Population security is the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency, but it is not sufficient. Economic development, good governance, and the provision of essential services, all occurring within a matrix of effective information operations, must all improve simultaneously and steadily over time.

Military and security measures alone will not suffice in "winning" a struggle against an insurgency. Instead, a multitude of different actions, including civic actions must be employed if one hopes to "win." Thus, civic actions are simply one part of a multi-pronged approach, and are actions, which if employed early on in an insurgency, can serve as a preventative measure, potentially mitigating the use of retaliatory or violent action.

5.2 Civic Action Programs in Peru: Findings in the Department of Ayacucho

There is no doubt that both *Sendero* and the armed forces in Peru relied heavily on violence as the primary tool for motivating and controlling the population. Yet leading into the fieldwork, there were indications in the literature (albeit brief) where mentions of civic actions held out hope that perhaps there had been some efforts to utilize these actions in isolation from violence (Fumerton, 2002; Starn 1998). While the discussion of

these actions was very limited, it had been hoped that perhaps, at times, the military, functioning as the state's banner men, would have arrived in the region bringing aid to the communities, and conducting civic actions which one could describe as "popular" with the people, and which addressed not only the immediate needs of the people, but also gave them the tools, skills, or other attributes, which would serve to help them gain self-reliance and independence from the state. Unfortunately this was not the case.

The fieldwork led to a continuation in the search for information surrounding civic actions, which proved challenging in its own right. First, it would seem that many of the programs were not well documented at all, and there are few, if any written records available. Second, the collective memory of the population had little in the way of kind words to offer concerning the state's and military's efforts at *acciones civica*. It often seemed that these efforts were overshadowed by the military's many other atrocities towards the population, and that these had eclipsed any recollection of the civic programs. However, as I spent more time in the field, bits of information regarding these activities began to appear. Unfortunately, contrary to previous hopes, time and again, as research participants shared their experiences about these actions, it became clear that these programs had only been applied in a very limited fashion, and quite unevenly over the landscape.

5.2.1 Specific Elements of Civic Actions in Ayacucho, Peru

As was mentioned in Chapter four, the Department of Ayacucho saw the first efforts at civic action programs ordered by General Centeno in 1984. While the scope of these actions was quite limited, it was the first time that the Ayacuchans saw an effort by the state to gain their support through non-violent means. Following Centeno's

replacement in late 1984, efforts by the military to implement similar programs could be best described as ad hoc and extremely limited. According to an anonymous armed forces officer (#8, 2012), the period from 1984 to 1991 saw the majority of civic actions implemented in the rural areas of the emergency zone, and they targeted the poorest of the country's population. According to this individual the implementation of civic actions was described as follows:

> We typically carried out civic actions every three months, targeting the poorest parts of the department or areas where there had been a lot of activity by *Sendero*. We never conducted programs in the same area twice; we always went to a different area where we had never been to before. The kinds of programs we provided to the population, and how often we could administer them was determined predominantly by the amount of money the government in Lima made available for these programs. This meant that while we tried to do civic actions every three months, but on many occasions we did not deliver civic actions that frequently because there was no money provided by the central government. Sometimes we only went after four months, sometimes even longer, but not usually less than six months since the last operation. Also, the amount of funding meant that we could not always provide all the same programs that we had previously taken to another area.
>
> Depending on where in the department the programs were going to be carried out, we could either move the personnel into the area by truck. If it was to a very remote area they would have to be flown in by helicopter, which could greatly limit what we would take as we did not have many helicopters. If the area we were going to carry out the programs were really far away, the personnel would normally arrive the day before to let the people know we were coming and to set up the tents, otherwise we would just travel to the village on the day we were going to conduct civic actions. The civic actions only lasted for one day no matter where we were, usually from 8 in the morning until 4 or 5 in the afternoon.
>
> There were a number of programs the military would take as civic actions to an area. These included the provision of medical attention, where doctors would treat the local population for a variety of ailments that they might be suffering from or they would just provide basic checkups. In some cases the doctors might also take along vaccines, which they would then administer during the course of their time there. When available, a dentist would also go along to provide simple checkups for the people and do minor work, like removing bad teeth. Sometimes we would take food to the area, which could either be bags of potatoes or rice, or sometimes we would take seeds and plants, which the people could then use to grow their own food. On rare occasions we would even take in animals, such as cows, sheep or chickens, which we would distribute to the people

> so they could have fresh milk, eggs or meat. We also would take agriculture tools, such as shovels, rakes, and hoes, which we would give out so people would have the ability to work the land with more modern equipment. A barber was also taken to give the people haircuts. And usually there was a military band there to play music for the people while they were at the event. Most of the people tasked to carry out these operations were members of the military. On some occasions we would get a civilian doctor or two or a civilian dentist to support the military doctors and dentists, but again the availability of these civilian personnel depended on the amount of funding that was available.

When asked what benefits these programs sought to bring to the population or attain from them by their implementation, the same participant stated:

> The programs were not about bringing services to people, they were meant to change the image of the military and its perception by the population. The civic actions were to gain the support of the population for the military and thereby pacify the country.

While much of the content concerning the various programs mentioned by the previous participant was confirmed though other independent sources in Peru, their description fails to capture some of the many frustrations and opinions, which the local population held towards the military's civic actions in Peru. One of the most common of these frustrations, which was expressed by many participants, was that the civic actions delivered to the people lacked a clear conceptual framework on how to affectively and efficiently provide civic actions to the population. When asked about this an anonymous interviewee (#7, 2012) stated (and this was confirmed by at least 5 other independent research participants) that the military routinely showed up to conduct the civic actions with very little warning or entirely unannounced. This meant that many of the people in the rural areas, who often had no access to the services being offered, such as doctors or dentists (and who lived many hours or even days away from the sites where the civic actions were to be administered), were unable to actually attend or receive the help from the state. As a second participant stated: "It was difficult for the population to know when

the military was coming, why they were coming into an area, what programs they would bring with them, or even know exactly what they would do" (anonymous respondent #14, 2012). One individual's description, when asked about the many services provided by the military at these events, captured the general tone of the majority of locals in the department concerning these programs:

> All the civic actions did was offer us useless items such as candies, haircuts, and if you were lucky some food. They were about not giving people anything that would help them ease the suffering of the war or help them truly survive (anonymous respondent #13, 2012).

Another interviewee described civic actions during the period from 1984-1989, stating:

> The central government would send some food to the department for distribution to the population, but there is a big difference between the state and the army. The army would often keep the shipments of food for themselves. They always seemed to have food, while many of people in the department lived on one meal a day or starved (anonymous respondent #14, 2012).

Or, as an additional research participant (#11, 2012) stated concerning food programs:

> When the government sent in food to be distributed to the people you could tell how little they understood the population. Many times they would send in noodles as the main staple food for distribution. The people here do not eat noodles; most cannot stand the taste or texture.

When considering the military's distribution of animals it would seem that these were of little use to the population. As a interviewee (#6, 2012) stated:

> Animals were given to some areas of the department. However, the marines and army had been stealing most of the population's animals already, and they simply did this again after the animals were given out. If you were lucky enough to hide your animal from the military, you then had to worry about *Sendero*, who would often come into the villages after the military had left, and kill all the animals that remained. Another problem with giving the people animals is that many of these

> died. The animals were not the right breeds to survive at the high altitudes of the sierras.

While the vast majority of civic action programs by the military appeared to be the distribution of food and aid to the population, there were other programs placed under the banner of civic actions, which had little to do with easing the plight of the population. As an anonymous research participant (#11, 2012) stated:

> Another policy implemented by the military as a civic action was during the raising and lowering of the national flag. People would be forced to stop in the streets and square whenever the military would raise or lower the flag. They would have to face the flag, place their hand over their heart and sing the national anthem. If they did not do this they could be arrested.

Additionally, in areas where the civic actions had been brought following *Sendero* attacks, the military routinely spent more time grilling the locals for information on *Sendero* than on actually taking care of the population's immediate needs or providing the civic actions they claimed to have brought to that area (anonymous respondent #7, 2012; anonymous respondent #11, 2012). As another participant stated concerning this forced involvement: "participation in the civic actions was not voluntary; the population was expected to show up at the civic actions or risk arrest, detention and torture" (anonymous respondent #31, 2012). Still another research participant offered this insight concerning forced involvement stating:

> The civic actions, really, were less about delivering much needed food and aid to the population, and were far more about using the assembly of the locals to try and gather as much intelligence as they could on the comings and goings of the *senderistas*. Sure the military may say that they wanted to change their image, but even that was only a halfhearted objective of these programs. The primary goal was to gather information. Because they wanted this from these programs, the military decided it was better to force the population to participate, rather than to allow them to choose to do so (anonymous respondent #26, 2012).

While the election of President Fujimori brought significant change to the administration of civic actions in the department the programs remained heavily focused on garnering ulterior benefits besides helping the population, as the President initiated what many participants described as "populist programs" under the banner of civic actions. With his sweeping efforts to reverse the economic crisis, Fujimori began selling many of the private companies and their interests, which had been nationalized during the military governments of 1968-1980. According to Klarén (2000) this action alone swelled the state's treasury to over $3 billion by 1995. Furthermore, many of the President's economic policies returned the country to favorable positions with the United States, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and all were eager to send funds in the form of aid packages to Peru. It was this money that became the primary source of funding for many of the government's social assistance and development programs both in the Department of Ayacucho and around the country (anonymous respondent #5, 2012).

5.2.2. Assessing the Impact of Civic Action Programs in the Region

It is difficult to measure the precise benefits or impacts of civic actions within the department, especially since any discussion of these actions ultimately results in a discussion concerning the violence perpetrated by both *Sendero* and the military against the population. Indeed, during my research it was impossible to have a conversation with civilians concerning civic actions and not discuss the violence. Also, it was difficult to find any civilians who held positive attitudes towards the state, or who could recount much concerning the civic actions. As several research participants (including interview participants #2, #10, #22, #37) indicated, much of the region had long been neglected by

the state in the provision of even the most rudimentary services. When the war broke out, and the military began attempting to implement civic actions, it was the first time many of the local people had ever seen any representative from the state, let alone observed an organization attempting to deliver any kind of aid or program! Given that the vast majority of people had nothing, they were all too eager to accept any kind of aid. As an anonymous interviewee (#5, 2012) stated:

> The political impact of the civic actions from 1984-1991 was quite small in scale for both the government and the military, and it is most unlikely that the civic programs significantly influenced the population in the battle for their hearts and minds. The military had been, and continued to be, exceedingly violent in their dealings with the people, and the civic actions during this time were really like a very poorly planned and funded public relations campaign meant to try and change the peoples' perception of the military and nothing more. The people in the department were not fools, and they quickly realized that they could at least get some benefits from the programs. The population quickly learned how to negotiate with the military, and even *Sendero* in some cases to get things they needed, mostly just a few basic necessities. To do this, the people would regularly tell either side, the military or *Sendero* what they wanted to hear if it meant getting some food, candy, medical aid, tools, or most importantly, not killed.

The election of Fujimori in 1990 brought a marked shift in the kinds of programs implemented under the banner of civic actions and the way in which they were delivered. In an effort to deliver on election promises to combat poverty and the neglect of the rural Andean people, Fujimori increased the number of civic action projects in the department (as well as most of rural Peru), focusing heavily on infrastructure development and repair projects in areas where the devastation from the war had been immense. Among the most prominent efforts during this period was the effort to rebuild homes and villages, which had been destroyed during the fighting as a way to help people displaced by the fighting to return to their traditional lands. In discussing these specific efforts an anonymous respondent (#14, 2012) stated:

> Fujimori tried to rebuild many of the homes and villages destroyed by the war. However, the homes were regularly not built in exactly the same place as the previous ones due to the level of destruction. But there were many problems with this because many of the rural people are quite attached to their land, as it has been the land their families have worked for generations. Also, when they rebuilt many of these villages they failed to understand traditional Andean building practices. When they rebuilt the homes, they used modern design plans where everything is built on a grid system, placing the homes very close together, much like homes built in the cities. Traditional Andean homes and villages are never built like this though. They are usually random in placement, and the houses always built well apart from each other. Many of the people who moved back to these new developments abandoned them shortly afterwards, preferring to stay in the cities where they had put down roots, and where their children were, and would only return to work the land around the developments.

This failure to understand the population's needs and culture greatly reduced the ability of the programs to have a lasting impact in the areas where they were implemented. Further hampering the state's efforts was the short planning timeframe and the limited interaction and consultation with the population concerning what programs the population actually needed, or what programs would be best suited the specific area. Starn (1999, p.197) pointed out that many of those responsible for planning the civic actions held paternalistic attitudes towards the peasantry, attitudes, which he described as leading to the "infantilization of the villagers." This view as being superior meant that local leaders, such as community presidents, were almost always denied any responsibilities for making decisions, and regularly were not consulted as to what development projects were needed or which would be brought to their respective communities as they were not considered experts on development (anonymous respondent #28, 2012). An armed forces representative (#34, 2012), who speaking on the condition of anonymity confirmed this view of the population, stating:

> We carried out many civic actions under President Fujimori in the Department of Ayacucho including; making improvements to the region's irrigation, repairing and improving the departmental and national electrical infrastructure, as well as

> many other infrastructure projects. We also took medical and dental personnel with us, and tried to teach the Indians about family planning. The goal there was to convince them to have fewer children. We had an "Office of Civil Affairs" who decided which programs would be implemented and where; our *little Indians* would not have been able to make good decisions for themselves. Most have no education and did not know what programs they needed; we knew what was best for them (emphasis added).

When considering the delivery of civic actions from 1991-1995 under the Fujimori government, Kruijt and del Pilar Tello (2002) stated that most of the government's projects were unmistakably motivated by political interests, and were aimed at strengthening the President's electoral base rather then on improving the lives or self-sustainability of the rural population. As Fumerton (2002, p. 262) wrote:

> Beneath the civic rights rhetoric expounded for the benefit of the press and foreign diplomats, the President's political message to the locals was simple and clear: the next time you are at the ballot box, remember what I have done for you and your community.

Indeed my research results in Peru concur with these assessments participants repeatedly expressed that Fujimori's programs had been focused on populist politics instead of on truly helping the population. Indeed it would be safe to say that all non-governmental or non-military participants interviewed in Ayacucho expressed this view concerning the President's civic actions. As one anonymous interviewee (#5, 2012) stated concerning this time period:

> Unlike the civic actions from 1984-1991, the impact of these programs under President Fujimori did have a marked political impact, as both the government and army were able to improve their image with the population. For the military, their image improved simply because they were the ones tasked with delivering the civic actions, and this, in many ways, distracted them from utilizing violence. Further, while there was an upsurge in civic actions during this time period, the primary goal for the President was to foster popular support for himself rather then genuinely improving the economic and social plight of the population.

In assessing the impact of civic actions in the department the following conclusions can be drawn from my research. First, it would appear that the only positive benefit of the civic actions was that they offered the survival-oriented civilians some much needed and long neglected attention by the state providing sporadic access to some extremely basic necessities, such as medical treatment and simple foodstuffs. Beyond this it seems that no other benefits were garnered for the population, state, or military from the program's implementation. In cases where the programs followed the activity of *Sendero,* the benefits of these actions as tools for intelligence collection also seemed quite limited. As many participants pointed out, when you offer people who have nothing, something in exchange for information, of course they will tell you what you want to hear; when your enemy returns after you have left, and offers other goods, or threatens that population's safety, they will be just as happy to take any items they offered, and report on your own activities, especially if those actions ensure they will survive another day. In the end, the failure by the state and the military to develop a cohesive plan for the implementation of civic actions, both in the near and far term, meant the delivery of civic actions did little to provide the civilian population with security or protection from *Sendero*. Furthermore, the limited support and funding from the state meant that civic actions did little to improve the long-term outlook or survivability of the population and failed to plant the seeds for long-term support from the population.

5.3 The *Comités de Defensa Civil*

A strategy that has been implemented frequently in combating insurgencies is to attempt to isolate the population from the insurgent though a multitude of different methods. Examples of these efforts can be seen in the Philippine-American war, where the US. Army embedded itself among the population and undertook "civil works" focused on building schools, government buildings and other critical infrastructure (Deady, 2005; Gates, 1973). In Malaysia, the British military isolated the insurgents by restricting the distribution of foodstuffs and the building of "strategic hamlets" (fortified villages, with fencing surrounding the entire village and controlled entry/exit points) (Thompson [1966] 1972). In Peru, the military implemented its own variation of such programs, instituting *Comités de Defensa Civil* (Civil Defense Committees; CDCs) throughout the emergency zones. As an anonymous former army officer stated concerning the CDCs: "The organization of the population during the insurgency, led to the creation of roughly 7800 individual CDCs across the country, and mobilized approximately 800,000 men and women on behalf of the military and state's efforts to combat *Sendero Luminoso*" (anonymous armed forces officer #8, 2012).

5.3.1 A brief History of the Comités de Defensa Civil

Comités de Defensa Civil, Rondas Campesinas, Montoeros, or Defensa Civil Antisubversiva are just some of the names used when referring to the civil defense committees which played a key role in defeating *Sendero* in Peru (Fumerton 2002). While the use of these names often conjures images of rural villagers assisting the country's armed forces, or in many cases, taking matters into their own hands against *Sendero*, the origins of the *Comités de Defensa Civil* (CDC) are found well before the

war with *Sendero*. The creation of *Rondas Campesinas* can be traced back to the 1970s in the northern departments of Cajamarca and Piura, where rural villagers, often located well outside the influences of state governance, organized themselves into self-defense committees to stop cattle rustling, petty thievery, resolve disputes with other villages, and in some cases even assist with small public works projects (Starn, 1995). Starting in 1984, the military began to impose a highly modified version of these organizations upon the population in the emergency zone, and quickly borrowed the name *Comités de Defensa Civil* to deliberately gloss over the compulsory nature and starkly different mission of these "new" organizations (Starn, 1995). As an anonymous interviewee (#20, 2012) stated in differentiating between the many names: "*Rondas Campesinas* refers to self-defense organizations well before there was any military involvement. *Comités de Defensa Civil* is what all the organizations became known as once the military was involved and regardless of how they were organized."

When discussing the CDCs, which arose as part of the state's efforts to defeat *Sendero*, one must understand that two distinct forms of these organizations existed during the war. First, there were those CDCs located in the rural sierra, far away from the provincial and departmental capitals and the state's influence. These organizations regularly formed voluntarily, and often without the influence or assistance of the military, as the population in these communities relied on each other for early warning, protection, and survival. In discussing these rural CDCs, one anonymous interviewee (#6, 2012) indicated that, as early as 1984, some of these remote CDCs, such as those in the *Vizcatán* (VRAE, Valley of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers) who had money enough, had been able to purchase modern weapons of their own from the various drug cartels who

cultivated coca in the region. In other remote areas, the peasant population was given nothing by the state or military to combat *Sendero.* In some areas where the drug trafficking did not provide finances, peasants, when able, would make homemade guns (called *hechizos*), which were essentially single shot rifles made from an iron pipe attached to hand carved wooden stocks with bits of wire. Others used traditional Andean slings (called *Warakas*), which in the hands of a skilled user can hurl a stone the size of a baseball 40 feet with lethal accuracy. Lastly, many of these CDCs were left to fight simply with sticks and stones, often fashioning crude homemade spears to try and fend off *Sendero* guerrillas with modern machine guns. When confrontations between the *senderistas* and locals did occur, they typically resulted in a staggering loss of life for the latter, as the homemade weapons were little use against modern firepower (anonymous former CDC commander #6, 2012; anonymous respondent #7, 2012).

In many of the rural areas villagers took to building temporary houses surrounded by fences near the fields in which they worked. Inside these makeshift compounds watchtowers would often be build and residents would take turns standing as sentries, both day and night, to provide early warning for their fellow residents (anonymous respondent #4, 2012). In many rural areas the military tried to force these CDCs to conduct patrols around their settlements. Understandably there was great reluctance by the population to conduct such actions, preferring instead to remain inside their fortified compounds, where they stood a better chance of defending themselves against the *senderistas* (Fumerton, 2002).

The second of these CDC organizations were those located in the urban centers. Once the military had established themselves in the emergency zones, they quickly set

about trying to organize any existing urban CDCs into paramilitary type organizations, and where none existed, forced the population to organize (anonymous respondent #20, 2012). These urban-based CDCs were far less about self-defense, and more about intelligence collection for the military. As an interview participant shared with me in recounting their experience in the urban based CDCs:

> We were told to report to the city's central square at certain times of the day, usually at least once in the morning and once in the evening. Sometimes if they [the marines] demanded it we would have to report at many points throughout the day. We had to do this seven days a week. At this time the CDC commanders (local leaders appointed from among the population) would have to report to the marine captain that all their people were present and accounted for. If someone was not present, they better have had a good reason not to be because the marine captain would have them arrested and even disappeared if they did not show up. Also at this time, the captain would ask us about anyone who had come into the city since we last reported in. We had to account for each person and if we did not know who any persons were that had come into the city, the marines would go arrest them and disappear them on suspicion of being *Sendero* operatives (anonymous former CDC commander #6, 2012).

In the Department of Ayacucho, the creation of urban-based CDCs was almost always forced on the population by the military. Two separate and independent research participant's attested to this, indicating that the urban CDCs were routinely forced on the population regardless of the larger population's desires, as this demographic would have never organized on their own otherwise (anonymous respondent #21, 2012; anonymous former CDC commander #6, 2012). The efforts to resist organization were especially predominant in cities such as Huanta (and many of that city's surrounding villages) where the population held a deep-seated mistrust of the marines, who had been especially brutal in their repression of the population, and whose efforts to organize the population were fervently resisted (anonymous former CDC commander #6, 2012; Coronel, 1996). A different research participant shared their story regarding the marines' vicious subjugation of the population in Huanta stating: "I was arrested by the marines in Huanta

and held for 10 days. There were 12 of us detained when they arrested me and I am one of only four who survived" (anonymous respondent #4, 2012).

The organization and participation (voluntarily or forced) in CDCs was not kind to the population as neither *Sendero* nor the military allowed the population to remain neutral. While Huanta stands out as an example of resistance to these organizations, the population as a whole had other grounds to oppose organization. First, refusal to organize a CDC almost certainly lead to being arrested by the police or the military, an event which could also lead to one's disappearance, as these organizations viewed refusal to organize as being a sign of sympathy for, if not membership in *Sendero;* coupled with the threat of arrest the military also routinely utilized physical violence and terror to pressure otherwise reluctant villagers into co-operating (Degregori, 1998). Second, reluctance to organize was heavily rooted in the very real fear of drawing savage reprisals from *Sendero* for forming CDCs, an act which the movement interpreted as showing support for the state and lead the movement to target many communities for "pitiless annihilation" (Fumerton 2002, p.98). These threats prompted many villages to organize CDCs if only done in an effort to alleviate pressure from the military. As soon as the military would leave, these same villages would again quickly disband their CDCs (Isbell 1992). Lastly, another hurdle challenging the success of these organizations was that many military leaders found the very idea of civilian self-defense groups loathsome and many commanders regularly, and openly, opposed them. The lack of support and training offered by the military caused many of the CDCs to remain weak and ineffective in combating *Sendero* in Ayacucho during the 1980s (Fumerton, 2002; Fumerton and Remijnse, 2004). In some cases, the distain for these organizations by the military was so

great, that the military simply took to using them as human shields while on patrols. Fumerton and Remijnse (2004) reported that on many occasions the CDCs, armed with sticks and stones would be sent a few hundred meters ahead of the military's patrol to flush out *Sendero*. Given their lack of modern firepower, many of these advance patrols were slaughtered, caught between the crossfire of the guerrillas they were looking for, and the very military they were supposedly working for. Yet, even with a serious deficiency in training and support from the state and its armed forces, many interview participants attested to the early effectiveness of these organizations in combating *Sendero* almost from the moment the military began expanding the CDCs in 1984 (anonymous armed forces officer #8, 2012; anonymous respondent #7, 2012; anonymous former CDC commander #6, 2012). One reason for the early success of the CDCs was explained as follows:

> The army and marines were sent here from the coast. Here we are at 9000 feet, and most of those military personal sent here have never been that far from the coast in their life. The soldiers did not receive any training or preparation for the altitude before they were sent here. When they got here they would tell the local CDCs "We are going on a patrol to this area and you are going to lead us there." Those in the CDCs had usually lived in the area their whole life and would leave with minimal provisions for the mission. They knew the terrain and how to get around quickly. The soldiers would show up with huge backpacks full of provisions and ammunition and with their huge guns. They would set off, and quickly run out of breath, unable to keep up with the CDC patrols. Many times the CDC members would end up carrying most of the military's equipment and even then the military could hardly keep up. Often the CDC patrols would tell the army guys to give them their weapons. They would leave the soldiers behind and go on to conduct the mission without the soldiers (anonymous former CDC commander #6, 2012).

Hostility towards the CDCs by the military began to change around 1989 as many of the CDCs had proved themselves more than capable in the war against *Sendero* (anonymous former CDC commander #6, 2012). Further, any issues surrounding the

legality of these organizations in the fight against *Sendero* was put to rest by President Fujimori's government, who in 1991 passed law No. 27908, giving them legal recognition and protection, and enshrined them as a key element in the country's fight against anti-subversion, anti-narcotics activity, and the rural populations' self-defense (Fumerton and Remijnse, 2004). Along with resolving the legal status of the CDCS as a key instrument of anti-subversion and anti-narcotics activity the law granted limited authority to the CDCs to carry firearms such as shotguns. This was not the first time the CDCs had been armed. As a former CDC commander described (#6, 2012) concerning CDCs and weapons:

> The marines gave the *Montoeros* Mauser riles and Mossberg shotguns as early as 1986. Once the military saw that the people were beginning to organize, and that we were effective in fighting *Sendero*, they became much more trusting of us and gave us the weapons. The guns were really in rough condition though; most of them were worn out and obsolete. I know this because most of the rifles they gave us were silver; they were not black like the ones the military carried, all the finish had been worn off. But we learned to use them pretty well and an experienced marksman could hit someone up to 750 meters away with the Mauser.

Today, with the cessation of open hostilities between the state and *Sendero* more than a decade old, the importance and activities of many of the CDCs has greatly diminished, and in many cases, the CDCs have been dismantled (especially in urban areas). However, in many rural communities the CDCs continue to operate, albeit along their more traditional lines of community watch programs. The reduction in activity has also led the state in rural areas of the country to attempt to collect back the weapons distributed during the war, but most of the CDCs are reluctant to relinquish them, and many still proudly carry their shotguns while on patrol (anonymous respondent #20, 2012).

5.3.2 An Unseen Social Cost to the Comités de Defensa Civil's Expansion

Unfortunately there is also a somber side to the CDC's expansion during the war. While the many newly created CDCs were central to the state's strategy to isolate *Sendero,* and to control the population, many of these organizations were responsible for perpetrating human rights abuses against the population they were supposed to be defending. In many regions where these organizations arose, so to did conflicts between individuals or neighboring committees. In some cases these disputes had been long running feuds, sometimes decades or more old, and for some, the war's horrific levels of violence served as a perfect cover to settle personal disputes with assured finality. This was accomplished through several means. In some cases, rival CDCs would intentionally misinform the military that other CDC members were sympathetic to *Sendero*, letting the military take responsibility for the deaths of these rivals. Others chose to take matters into their own hands and attacked their rivals, whose murders were simply hidden in the greater bloodbath of the war (anonymous respondent #4, 2012; anonymous respondent #5, 2012; anonymous respondent #7, 2012).

In other cases, many of the CDCs became quite corrupt, demanding brides from the locals in exchange for them being left alone. In some situations these payments would not suffice, and raiding parties would be sent out to loot the villages they were supposed to be protecting. Further, when considering their treatment of suspected *Sendero* guerrillas, on many occasions the CDCs chose to take the law into their own hands, acting as the police, judge and jury of those they captured. As one interviewee (#5, 2012) stated:

> Those in the CDC were not fond of keeping people they had detained around, regardless of whether they were members of *Sendero* or not, and in many cases

> did not wait to give them due process. If a person was captured by one of these groups, it was essentially a guaranteed death sentence for that individual; most were executed on the spot as the CDCs did not wait to turn them over to the military or police. In some areas, the *Montoeros* were eager to show the military how effective they were in fighting *Sendero* and they took to mailing body parts from their victims to the military base here in Huamanga.

5.3.3 Comités de Defensa Civil: A Population Based Response that Won the War

The simple explanation for why the CDCs were effective in the government and military's efforts to defeat *Sendero* is that these organizations, whether formed spontaneously and independently (or through coercion), allowed the state to separate and isolate *Sendero* members from the larger population. While accurate, this view is overly simplistic and overlooks many other factors which contributed to the success of these organizations in defeating *Sendero*. First, as mentioned, the most important aspect during an insurgency is providing security for the population (Bruno 2010). When considering the formation of CDCs, at least in the rural areas away from the influence of the military, these locally organized groups offered the population a coalition solely dedicated to this task. Furthermore, because they were created independently of outside influence, these CDCs often held a degree of legitimacy not found in CDCs formed through coercion. As an anonymous respondent (#21, 2012) stated concerning these groups:

> Often in the very rural areas these groups would form regardless of whether it was *Sendero* or the military that were attacking them. In these areas the population simply wanted to protect themselves from violence. In many cases, the people in these regions often had their own interests, which were being jeopardized by the conflict, and forming CDCs usually stemmed the violence at least from the military, and allowed these people to carry on with their traditional ways of life with minimal interference from the state. At times these organizations actually worked with the military as guides, they knew the land and the most efficient ways to travel, which routes were safe and often where the *senderistas* were hiding.

Indeed in many remote areas, the CDCs served as the only presence of the state's efforts to combat *Sendero*. Many respondents, including representatives from the country's military, concurred independently that without the assistance of the population through the many CDCs, the government and military would not have been able to defeat *Sendero*. As one armed forces representative (#32, 2012) remarked concerning the support of the CDCs:

> The *rondas campesinas* became a very important factor for our success in the war against *Sendero*. These individuals were part of the community and they knew the land, the people, and who was a supporter of the guerrillas and who was not. Given our inexperience in the department, we had been overlooking many different things, which the *senderistas* had been exploiting. Once we had solid relationships with the CDCs they began teaching us about the region, how people traveled, and where things were hidden from sight. They told us how the *senderistas* would come down into the communities, usually in the afternoon, and then what routes they would take when they left. They also showed us how the guerrillas would disappear into the mountains, and where they would hide their weapons when not on missions. Many of the *senderistas* carried out operations in areas where they were not from. It was the *campesinas* who taught us how to question the people about where they were from, and how to hear variations in the pronunciations of words, something that was very helpful in identifying people who were from another department or province. The physical terrain heavily influenced our ability to operate and move about in the emergency zone. It was even difficult for our helicopters to get into many of the areas due to the elevation and terrain. This meant that in many cases we had to rely on the CDCs for information on these very remote areas. You could say in many cases the *campesinas* became extensions of our own eyes and ears in the areas where we had none.

In the urban areas, the creation of CDCs through force allowed the military to effectively control the population and separate the insurgents from the larger population. As Fumerton and Remijnse (2004) indicated, the formation of CDCs in the urban areas put people under constant observation, and militarized the population on behalf of the state.

The numerous CDCs across Peru undeniably played a critical role in the state's counterinsurgency strategy, providing the government and military with the ability to

defeat the Maoists, something, which the military, Peruvian academics, and regular citizens regularly acknowledge (anonymous armed forces officer #8, 2012; anonymous armed forces representative #32, 2012; anonymous armed forces representative #33, 2012; Degregori, 1998; Del Pino H, 1998; Fumerton, 2002; Fumerton and Remijnse, 2004; Starn, 1995; 1998; 1999). Yet in understanding why the CDCs were successful in aiding the state to defeat *Sendero* it must be stated that the limitations and achievements of the CDCs cannot be neatly disentangled from each other (Starn, 1998). Indeed a detailed examination reveals that much of the success of the CDCs was actually a combination of their successes and strategic failures on the part of the two main protagonists, who failed to understand the population's true feelings and deep-seated instinct to simply survive.

When considering the CDCs and *Sendero,* the first strategic error on the part of the latter was its inability to anticipate the adverse reaction its 1982 escalation of violence would have on the population. Perhaps this was due to the party's rigid structure of operation, which left no room for adaptation in approach when the armed forces arrived in Ayacucho. The military began its own brutal repression of the population, and as Kent (1993) pointed out, put *Sendero* into a strategic retreat. Regardless of the military's action, the disenchantment with the shift in *Sendero's* treatment was cause enough for the expansion of the CDCs, which continued to grow at an ever-increasing rate during the 1980s. By 1988 there was widespread disaffection for the Maoists throughout much of the population, which was weary of the heavy toll and suffering the conflict had brought. Del Pino H (1998) suggests that, among the Ayacuchans, it was mostly the civilian population during the 1980s, through the CDCs, who blocked the movement's ability to

consolidate its principle base area. According to Degregori (1998) *Sendero's* escalation of violence correlated directly to the growth of the CDCs, which had expanded so greatly by 1990, and was inflicting serious damage to the movement's efforts, that *Sendero* had become trapped in a kind of trench warfare with the peasants.

The loss of base areas and personnel began to cast doubt on the party's strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside (Degregori, 1998; Del Pino H, 1998). While Guzmán was most likely aware of the impact these losses were having, at least openly *Sendero* did not considerer the expansion of the CDCs to be a serious threat. It is not quite clear why *Sendero* missed the significance this major growth in opposition entailed during the 1980s. Perhaps Guzmán and his fellow cadres were blinded by their own propaganda, which routinely referred to members of the CDCs as "armed goons," and claimed that the military's efforts to organize the population were hitting rock bottom. As early as 1988 Guzmán began placing great emphasis on accelerating the party's work in the urban centers in preparation for reaching the second phase of the people's war, that of strategic equilibrium (See Table 4.1), a phase Guzmán confidently proclaimed the party had reached in 1991, but in reality had failed to do.

As previously discussed, the military's arrival in the emergency zone saw the execution of a brutal plan of repression, against both *Sendero* and the population; yet when the conflict is examined from the perspective of the Ayacuchans, it is clear that *Sendero* and the military were on two very different trajectories that would crucially shape the conflict's outcome. Starting in 1982 the strain between the Maoists and the people they claimed to be fighting for became increasingly visible, while as early as 1984, the military began to slowly but steadily forge closer ties to the population.

Degregori (1998) pointed out that a key reason for the willingness of the population to support the military instead of *Sendero* stemmed from the fact that the military was the lesser of two evils. Central to this view was that, unlike their Maoist opponents, the armed forces were uninterested in disrupting many of the social elements that made up the fabric of daily life. In contrast, *Sendero* had placed great pressure on the population, demanding their sons and daughters for the revolution, and limiting the production of agricultural surpluses and other economic activities. These acts were resented greatly by the population who relied heavily on these activities for daily survival.

Furthermore, Kent (1993) and Marks (1996) argue that while the CDCs helped put *Sendero* on the retreat, the brutal campaign of repression launched in 1983 by the military had forced the Maoists into a strategic retreat. As the party's central power base in Ayacucho began to shrink in response to the actions of both the military and CDCs, the Maoists were forced to change their recruitment strategy to support gains in other areas of the country, gathering supplies and recruiting additional guerrillas through coercion rather than relying on volunteers. This was a critical error that resulted in the repudiation of the party's infallible authority from within (Del Pino H, 1998). As one respondent (#37, 2012) stated concerning this change:

> In the early stages of the war *Sendero* would ask us to send people to support them. They asked us for everything though, not just people, but also food, animals and money; and some people did go to support the Maoists. When the army arrived and started targeting *Sendero* very aggressively, things became very tough for the guerrillas. They stopped asking and simply started taking what they wanted, and that was certainly not limited to food or money. They would tell you, we are going to take your chickens, or your money, or your daughters, or that you would have to join them. If you refused any demands, you were simply killed. I personally witnessed this on one occasion when I observed some guerrillas who demanded money from a woman who was in a truck they had stopped. When she refused to hand over her cash one of the *senderistas* pulled a pistol out and shot

her point blank. There was no mercy, and no refusing their demands; something that many people here came to despise about the guerrillas.

Three key point's highlight why the CDCs were able to be effective. First, in response to the expansion of the CDCs, *Sendero* increased its own level of violence against the population, an act which only encouraged the proliferation of the CDCs instead of discouraging them. Coronel (1996) described the heightened levels of violence as fueling the peasants, who weary of the war and violence, were ready to take action to end the revolution that had only brought suffering and death to their communities. Second, the efforts of the military to improve relations with the population, something a former CDC commander (#6, 2012) indicated had begun in and around Huanta as early as 1986, were significantly accelerated by the election of President Fujimori in 1990. Financing, equipping, training, and supporting these organizations suddenly became the central objective of military units stationed in the emergency zone and the benefits of this new approach quickly bore fruit. Thrid, the necessity of CDC creation took on a self-reinforcing image all its own. Certainly in the early stages of expansion by the armed forces, *Sendero* had been able to respond to these efforts, putting down some of these groups by use of force, which made many wary of joining them. However, as time progressed, the ability of the CDCs to defend against the Maoist attacks emboldened others to organize self-defense groups of their own (Starn, 1998).

5.3.4 Comités de Defensa Civil: A Social Movement in Response to a Dirty War

Seeking to understand the experience of the CDCs in Peru beyond the basic need of pacifying the population, viewing the creation of self-defense organizations as a social movement is important, as these were organizations based on common purposes and social solidarity (Tarrow, 2011). Fall (1998) describes insurgencies as a form of political

warfare where, from a very early stage, the insurgent will seek to establish a competitive system of control over the population, especially in the rural areas where the state's presence has been lacking or where the insurgent's action has succeeded in neutralizing the state's authority. Given that it requires a staggering amount of resources to counter this alternate governance by the insurgent, it is not surprising that the counterinsurgent cannot be in all places at all times. According to Tapia (1997), in theory, if states act decisively, legitimate population-based organizations, such as the CDCs in Peru, can serve as important organizations in attempting to instigate a counter-rebellion within the population, on behalf of the state, capable of contesting the insurgent's own efforts for control. I argue here that the formation of these organizations also offers an additional benefit, in that they address the population's primary need and concern for personal security, especially people in remote areas far removed from the traditional vestiges of a state power. However, should efforts to generate these organizations take place in a society where the government fails to protect its citizens from illegitimate violence, fails to maintain public order, or itself utilizes illegitimate and arbitrary violence against the people, one can expect to see the rise of non-legitimate vigilante groups, and self-defense militias; these organizations do not aid in establishing the rule of law, and often end up utilizing violence to pursue personal interests well outside the context of the conflict (Fumerton, 2001; Koonings 2001; Kruijt, 2001)[2]. Given the political environment of Peru in the 1980s, it is clear that both forms of CDCs emerged during the war with *Sendero*. Certainly it would seem that both the Belaúnde (1980-1985) and Garcia (1985-1990) administrations failed to understand the value that CDCs could play in their fight against

[2] For further discussion on how such organizations have functioned well outside of the context of the conflict for which they were created see Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1990), and Kalyvas (2006).

the insurgents, the neglect of which resulted in self-defense groups hampering more then helping the state's counterinsurgency effort. Arguably, it was only Fujimori's administration which recognized the value these organizations offered and incorporated them into the nation's COIN strategy, granting financial and legal support to the CDCs, and forcing the military to support the organizations with training and equipment.

In chapter two it was noted that an insurgency acts as a social movement in response to grievances. Similarly, one can also view the formation of CDCs in Peru as a social response to the alarming levels of political violence perpetrated by the *Sendero* and the armed forces. According to Radcliff (1999) there are a number of key characteristics, distinguishing social movements from other political groups, such as political parties, or unions. First, social movements of this sort have a transitory and cynical character, and may even disappear once the movement has achieved its goals. Second, social movements do not utilize the same institutionalized channels as other political movements, relying instead on "social mobilization as power" (Radcliff 1999, p.204). Third, "social movements need to define their terms and agendas, and provide some closure around their projects. Such closure is provided by the movements' cultural resources, as well as by the political, economic, and social context in which they operate" (Radcliff 1999, p.205).

In relating these concepts to the formation of CDCs, applying the title of social movement to these organizations certainly appears appropriate (summarized in Table 5.1). First, at least in the case of CDCs in urban centers, many of these groups were not permanent establishments, being quickly disbanded following the end of the war, a fact a former CDC commander (#6, 2012) personally attested to. Furthermore, in almost all

Table 5.1 Peru's CDCs as a Social Movement

Characteristics of a Social Movement	Specific Example In Peru
Movements have a transitory and cyclical character, and may even disappear once they have achieved their goals.	The vast majority of the CDCs in Peru were highly cynical towards the state and military. Also, while the majority of the rural CDCs have remained well after the war's end, in the urban centers, the majority of the CDCs were quickly disbanded following the cessation of open hostilities.
The organizations rely on social mobilization for their support, growth and power.	Especially in the rural areas, the CDCs mobilization was spontaneous and occurred in response to the threats of violence the population was facing from both *Sendero* and the military. In these remote areas the CDCs formed outside of the influences of the military, offering these remote communities a way to protect themselves and their interests from both protagonists during the war.
Movements need to define their terms and agenda, and have closure around their project. Closure is provided by the political, economic, and social context in which the movement is operating.	The CDCs formed out of a need to provide the population with security, something which the state and military had failed to do. In many cases, the CDCs relied on support from neighbors and extended family members in the communities to provide round the clock patrols and over watch to warn others of impending danger. Closure arrived for many of these organizations following the end of the war, when, at least in the urban centers, there was little need for them to continue providing security for the population.

Source: Radcliff (1999).

cases, the population was highly mistrusting of the state, military, and *Sendero*, giving the CDC organizations a strong cynical nature. Second, at least in the case of rural CDCs, the evidence suggests that the local population created CDCs, mobilizing in response to

the threats they were experiencing (Fumerton, 2002; Starn, 1995, 1998). Thrid, these organizations certainly defined their objectives in relation to the social and political contexts they were operating in. Socially, the population needed to address the threat to their personal safety, often turning to their family, neighbors, and local communities for this, as the state was partially responsible for the violence they were experiencing.

Chapter 6: Recommendations, Summary, and Conclusion

6.1 Extrapolation of Findings to the Larger Problem of Insurgency

The challenges of battling an insurgency are not new. While each conflict undoubtedly possesses its own unique circumstances and problems, it is important to learn from past experiences, drawing upon them to improve both our understanding of these conflicts, and how to better develop, strategies, programs, and tactics, which can (hopefully) reduce the duration, economic, and human cost of these conflicts.

Prior to discussing the key findings, it is important to address the problematic notion of defining success within the context of insurgencies. There are many ways and criteria one might use to measure achievements in waging or countering an insurgency, making a determination of "success" a highly subjective matter. Within an insurgency, individual victories for either combatant can be difficult to measure or determine, as the items and goals used to quantify success may be entirely different for either side. Indeed, there are many occasions where both opponents claim victory for the same event. Given that insurgencies involve many elements, beyond just physical violence, it is perhaps best to define success as being the development and implementation of policies, strategies, and actions, military or otherwise, which enhance one party's legitimacy while marginalizing the opponent's argument (Bulloch, 1996). However, success must not be confused with popularity, as one can have popular programs, which fail to be successful, and unpopular programs that bring success to a campaign. Certainly programs do not have to be popular to have a meaningful impact. Indeed, the evidence previously presented in chapter five suggests that both the civic actions and formation of CDCs in Peru were highly unpopular programs with the population. Yet, at least concerning the

CDCs, these organizations played an indispensible role in the military and national government counterinsurgency strategy, and are intrinsically linked to the state's success against *Sendero*.

6.1.1 On Civic Actions: Exporting Lessons Learned

My examination of the administration of Civic actions in Peru revealed very quickly that the delivery of these programs failed to enhance the state's or the armed forces legitimacy, while marginalizing *Sendero's* appeal or argument, among the population. Certainly the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the population was not convinced that the state could provide protection, or deliver critical aid and services to those most affected by the war; thus, the military's efforts to administer civic actions were unsuccessful in garnering the "popular support" of the Ayacuchans. Drawing on specific approaches and actions utilized in Peru, the following discussion offers some suggestions on how to improve the delivery of these critical programs.

Clearly, the poor structure, infrequent implementation, and limited notice and access to the civic action programs in Peru contributed greatly to their inability to win the people's support. Interview partners repeatedly revealed this frustration. Certainly it would seem that, for programs to achieve a maximum level of impact, they must have a clear framework, with plainly stated objectives and measures for determining their impact. What challenged the success of the programs in Peru was a failure on the part of the military or state to understand the real physical needs of the population. This prevented the state from tailoring specific programs addressing many of the underlying grievances of the population. Instead, the programs offered were what I would deem as "feel good" opportunities, where people could get a free haircut, enjoy a bit of food and

music, only to return to the hell that was war. As one interview respondent (#22, 2012) stated regarding the military's approach to civic actions:

> When the military began doing civic actions, they seemed to think the people wanted handouts from the government or the military. But this is not what the people were looking for from these programs. Sure, they took the free things to be had in the moment, but what do you expect from people who have nothing? Of course they will take will take whatever you offer. However, what they really wanted was for the state to actually address their needs, not just in the immediate term, but for the long term as well. They wanted the government to provide them with basic services, not unlike those that the people receive in Lima. They did not want programs on a one-time basis, with limited care like they did in the civic actions, but on a regular basis. They also did not want free food or animals, but rather to see meaningful economic investment in agriculture programs and industries that would help them achieve something more than a subsistence existence.

The timeframe of delivery of civic actions is another aspect of the programs which needs careful planning; certainly the evidence from my research suggests that single day events do not work, and much more time among the population is required. Embedding forces among the population will have a dual benefit, which extends beyond the simple delivery of effective programs. First, this also allows for state organizations to provide security, an act giving the population incentives to trust and work with those organizations. Second, remaining among the population will allow those conducting civic actions to understand what the population's needs truly are and to determine which programs will bring the most benefit to the people. By implementing programs which address their core needs, the populace is given even more incentive to support the organization delivering these services. When considering the lack of this approach in Peru, one interview participant (#2, 2012) stated:

> For many of the people, they had never ever heard of, or seen, any action taken by the government on their behalf. The war was the first time that the state seemed interested in them, and many did not even feel like they were or are Peruvian. They did not trust the military, not simply because of the violence, which was

> directed at the population, but because they had not been present before. Following the shift in approach under President Fujimori, this trust from the people began to emerge. Not just because the violence was less, but because the presence of the state, through the deployment of the armed forces and the building of outposts, made the population feel like the government cared about their security, and was looking out for the population's best interests.

While the embedding of troops certainly allows one to learn about the populace, care must be taken to ensure that the population is consulted with and involved in the decision making process surrounding the implementation of civic actions. Involving members of the public also gives them a vested interest in seeing projects be successful. This aids in avoiding otherwise offensive projects, which could result in programs not being accepted by the population, adding to the list of grievances that turn the population against the counterinsurgent. Involving the population in decision-making also ensures that scarce resources are not needlessly wasted, as was the case in the Peruvian government's efforts to rebuild homes in developments that were completed but remain abandoned because they did not match the cultural practices of the population.

Perhaps most importantly, the discussion from participants in my research would suggest that the best way to reduce the likelihood of an insurgency from beginning is to implement social programs or civic actions long before the outbreak of armed hostilities. Having these kinds of programs present well in advance can address many of the grievances found among the population. While this approach may sound idealistic, it certainly appears to have merit. As an anonymous interview respondent (#22, 2012) stated:

> Many national governments in Lima have long neglected this area and the conditions of poverty and neglect had existed in the department long before the arrival of *Sendero Luminoso*. For many years the conditions were present in the department for an insurgency; anyone who would have promised the population that they would bring change to the region would have had the support of the vast

> majority of people in this area. When *Sendero* started promising this change to the people, they had no opposition to their ideas because the state was not present. I believe that this caused many people here to have supported *Sendero*, simply because they promised the people they were going to bring change and improve their lives. When the state and military finally began to take the threat from *Sendero* seriously, and showed up in 1982, it felt like foreigners had arrived, like the conquistadors of old, because the national governments had neglected the area for so long.

Indeed, another research participant (#6, 2012) pointed to the neglect of the department by the state as a key reason why *Sendero* found so much support:

> There is no way to change what happened in the past concerning the war and *Sendero*. However, I do think that if the national government had tried to show real interest in the region, had tried to invest in the people, and had tried to help us develop social and economic programs helping people feel as though the government truly cared about them, and that they can be less reliant on the state for daily survival, and to attain a level of self-sustainability, *Sendero* would not have found the level of support that they did. I do not believe that Sendero would have been able to launch a war. If that had been the case, *Sendero* really would have been the bandits that the government thought they were fighting in 1980.

6.1.2 On Comités de Defensa Civil (CDC): Exporting Lessons Learned

For most of the 1980s, the forced or spontaneous organization of the population into CDCs served two primary objectives. For the military, the formation of CDCs was seen as a key part of its effort to control and pacify the population, and at least in the remote areas of the country where the state was only the nominal governing authority, these groups often became the eyes and ears of the armed forces. However, for most of the population, the formation of these organizations had a far more pragmatic objective, that of self-defense. For these people, the creation of CDCs served to reduce the political violence, which they were experiencing at the hands of the military, and offered them a means of defense against *Sendero*. Unfortunately in some areas, the expansion of these

organizations also gave rise to those who abused their positions, and used the war's violence to commit human rights violations of their own.

Every conflict will have its own unique challenges surrounding the notion of how to mobilize the population in support of a specific cause. And while each new attempt will require an ongoing, dedicated, and thorough analysis of the best approach to take, the Peruvian expansion of CDCs in the war against *Sendero* offers an opportunity for critical insight, and highlights two key considerations. First, in attempts to organize the population it will be critical to follow the ideas offered by Tapia (1997), to move decisively in the creation of these organizations. This will require a high degree of organizational planning, and must include avenues of accountability for self-defense organization members, and a clear chain of command, not unlike any other militia organization. In following these guidelines, it might be possible to prevent some of the human rights violations, such as those in the Peruvian experience Second, any effort to organize the population must ensure that this action receives their support to do so. As was noted in chapter three, if this support is not sought, or the populace does not welcome the efforts to mobilize them, more time will be spent on policing and pacifying the population than on countering opponents. Fumerton (2002) also points out that there is a fine line between the capabilities of an imposed organization and those formed voluntarily, a difference which drastically changes the effectiveness of these organizations. As a research participant (#37, 2012) stated:

> People in the department had been surviving on their own for hundreds of years without any kind of support from the state. When the military began to force them to organize into CDCs, many were told it was to help protect their interests. This confused many people because they had been struggling for their whole lives to protect their interests. They did not need the military or government to tell them

this in such a hollow fashion. Many people were angered by this approach, and it contributed directly to the resistance of the population to organize in many areas.

6.2 Areas for Future Research

When considering applying the lessons learned from the Peruvian experience with insurgency and counterinsurgency, the suggestions offered here are theoretical, and only time will tell if they can contribute to the reduction in the duration and costs of these forms of conflicts. My research has just scratched the surface of examining civic actions as a tool for COIN. While there is little doubt that these programs have been implemented across a wide spectrum of conflicts, those of us who study insurgencies have yet to truly understand exactly how they should be utilized as a tool for gaining the population's support. In the past, these programs served the primary purpose of garnering support from the population, with minimal efforts towards utilizing them to help the population establish long-term self-sustainability. While gaining the population's support through these programs is not entirely undesirable, it should be a secondary objective rather than the primary one. Instead, in my opinion, a first step, which must become the cornerstone of any civic actions, is to involve the local population in the decision-making process concerning what programs are necessary and which ones will bring them the most benefit. In doing this, efforts to deliver civic actions will automatically net the secondary benefit of gaining the population's support, as these endeavors will give the key stakeholders a real reason to trust and support those who are administering the civic actions. These ideas may seem idealist given the nature and environment of the battlefield during an insurgency. It is true that not everyone can be consulted or pleased in this process, and there are risks that individuals or organizations may err along the way.

Furthermore, striking the right balance between meeting the most critical needs of the population and gaining their support amidst a combat centric operation is undoubtedly a difficult task at the best of times. Yet if those countering insurgencies fail to integrate these efforts they run a far greater risk of adding to the list of current grievances against them, prolonging the conflict, and ultimately seeing battles and the war lost.

6.3 The Three Stages of COIN in Peru

"Wars, and their violence, display enormous variation – both across and within countries and time" (Kalyvas 2006, p.7). Insurgent based conflicts are wars for the people, as the local population is the target (main effort) of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent (Thompson [1966] 1972; Galula [1964] 2006; Nagl, 2005; Stubbs, 2008; FM 3-24, 2007). In general, military action alone can never be the solution to these political wars. As Sewall (2007, p.xxx) wrote: "success in COIN relies upon nonkinetic activities like providing electricity, jobs, and a functioning judicial system." Thus, serious efforts to plan effective civic actions, addressing the primary needs of the population, must become a core part of any COIN effort.

The story of the government and military's approach to counterinsurgency in Peru is marked by three distinct phases, corresponding to the changes in the national government, as each administration held its own opinions of how to best approach the nation's COIN strategy.

Phase one, from 1980-1985, was led, at least in name, by President Belaúnde, who essentially relied on a process of attrition in hopes of defeating *Sendero*. For the

military, this process relied on a process of all-out brutal repression, not just of the insurgents, but also of the population. Thus began the dirty war, where arrests without charge, torture, disappearances, and massacres of entire villages became the norm for nearly a decade. The reason why the military was so quick to turn to violence is something that is still not understood (Klarén, 2000; Kruijt, 1994). During the 1960s, their doctrine and statements professed that to prevent the radicalization of the nation, and to promote internal security, the state needed to focus on national development. Nevertheless, by the early 1980s, they were engaging in wanton acts of violence against their own people (Beggar 2005). Indeed in my efforts to understand this, I asked direct and pointed questions to senior members of the military, which netted little more than an uncomfortable squirm, a hollow cough (followed by a quick sip of coffee), the avoidance of eye contact, and then a long silence (as the expression goes "you could have heard a pin drop" in that seemingly incredibly long moment). In the end, these individuals reluctantly confirmed that perhaps there had been an excessive application of violence by the military, but they also followed these admissions up hastily with hollow efforts to justify it, or to divert attention away from the question all together. In the end, I never did receive a straight (honest) answer to the question of why the military had chosen such a violent approach to dealing with the population in the early years of the war. During this period, almost no attention was given to the creation or administration of civic action programs.

The election of President Garcia in 1985 saw the commencement of phase two (1985-1990), as the state attempted to deal with the insurgency by utilizing a "developmentist" approach (Fumerton, 2002). Under this new strategy the government

attempted to initiate social and economic development in an effort to bring the fighting to a close. However, for all the optimism that surrounded these ideas when Garcia took office, there was really little in the way of change in how both the state and the military dealt with the insurgency. Heightened levels of violence and disappearance of members of the population remained a routine occurrence. Further, the government failed regularly to follow through on its many promises of economic improvements for the poorest in Peru. While Garcia did replace many senior commanders for previous human rights violations under his predecessor, he failed to provide the military with guidance on how they should conduct the war, often frustrating the military as he seemingly praised the efforts of their adversaries. This lack of guidance saw the military become increasingly apathetic towards its role in combating *Sendero*, leading to a drastic reduction in combat activities in rural areas of the country (Strong, 1992). The end result was a reduction in COIN activity by the military in the rural areas, which only served to prolong the war, as this reprieve granted *Sendero* a much-needed opportunity to solidify its position in certain departments, and then expand across most of the country.

Phase three (1990-1995) opened with the election of President Fujimori in 1990. Fujimori brought sweeping changes to the national and military COIN strategy with his no-nonsense style of governing, his populist policies, and his willingness to back the country's armed forces in the face of human rights abuses. Fujimori's actions put in place the framework needed to bring the conflict to a close (Obando, 1998). In addition to supporting the military, the government established sweeping anti-terrorist laws, where faceless judges had the power to put suspected and confirmed *senderistas* away for life (Tapia, 1997; Taylor, 1998). The President's efforts to stabilize the economy also

provided him with sufficient resources to finance socioeconomic programs under the banner of civic actions and social assistance programs. As Klarén (2000) pointed out, these efforts saw the President receive high approval ratings, even following his bloodless coup, and began to win the popular support of the people, especially that of the peasantry. Perhaps the most important step the President took was the passing of law No. 27908 in 1991, granting legal status to the CDC organizations. While these organizations had been expanded by the armed forces as early as 1984, it was arguably only Fujimori who attempted to fully incorporate them into the national counterinsurgency strategy, providing funding, training, and weapons for them in their support of the state and military's efforts to combat *Sendero*. While the CDCs had been experiencing success in combating *Sendero* through much of the 1980s, when granted proper training and supplied with modern weapons under Fujimori's government, these organizations became lethal against the *senderistas*. As a anonymous armed forces officer (#8, 2012) stated concerning the war and the CDCs:

> Without the organization and efforts of the *Comités de Defensa Civil* it would have been very difficult for us to defeat *Sendero*. Perhaps the military would have beaten them eventually, but it would have taken us far longer, many more years to do so, if we had not had the CDCs.

Kalyvas (2006, p.23) wrote, "Political actors may use violence to achieve multiple, overlapping, and sometimes mutually contradictory goals" Certainly this statement would describe the approach of *Sendero Luminoso* towards the population. In response to the arrival of the armed forces, the Maoists simply escalated their own levels of violence towards the people, the result of which only served to push the populace into the state's arms, and "alienated the very sector of the population essential to the further development of the movement" (Greene 1990, p.107). Weary of the extreme levels of

violence, and the movement's repeated failures to show the masses it could govern to their benefit, the peasantry opted to support the lesser of two evils, as the state did not seek to change many of the elements, social or economic, upon which the population depended for daily survival (Degregori, 1998; Kent, 1993; Taylor, 1998). By the time *Sendero* attempted to change its ways in the mid 1990s, it was too little too late, as the capture of Guzmán and many of the organization's senior cadres in 1992 essentially cut off the head of the party, and removed the energy and guidance needed to continue the revolution.

6.4 Closing Remarks

This thesis marks a first step towards better understanding the role civic actions play in gaining the local population's support during an insurgency. My analysis suggests that the delivery of these programs can indeed be used as an instrumental tool for swaying the population's support either for or against an opponent. There are two key lessons, which emerged during the course of this research. First, when implementing civic actions, the programs must ensure they address the most pressing needs of the population, as defined by the people. Failure to understand this runs the risk of alienating the population further, and potentially pushing them into the arms of an opponent. Second, when organizing the population, be it through self-defense committees, such as in Peru, or through the building of strategic hamlets, like the British in Malaya, great care must be taken to minimize human rights abuses. To accomplish this, any programs – in whatever form they take – must involve careful and detailed planning including clearly

defining avenues of accountability for all levels of these organizations and operations, both for their civilian and military counterparts.

Obviously it is not always possible to defeat an insurgency, as no clear formula exists for combating these kinds of wars. Further, the end-state sought by insurgents varies greatly across both time and space making the process of applying lessons learned from yesterday's conflicts to today's battlefields all the more difficult. Beyond specific situations of "in the moment applications," there is yet no way of testing theories about how to "win" these kinds of conflicts. Thus, for those who find themselves engaged in this form of warfare, it is their responsibility, as governments, militaries, academics, and many other individuals, to continue to try and understand these phenomena, especially as this form of conflict is now seemingly the choice of most opponents. While answers to all aspects of these conflicts may not readily appear, we must continue to try and understand them, as these efforts will serve to stimulate the broader discussion surrounding these conflicts and how we can perhaps prevent them from arising in the first place.

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Appendix A: Summary Table on Research Biases

Table A.1: Kalyvas' Typology of Bias

Bias	Description and Summary
Partisan Bias	The study of violence is often done in a competitive discussion of comparative cruelty, where opponents attempt to show that the other faction was far crueler than theirs, and therefore absolve themselves from responsibility. Sometimes atrocities by one protagonist are studied by a partisan "expert" from the other side, contributing to further contamination of existing data, and bias can often extend beyond those parties engaged in the conflict. Partisan bias is further complicated by the fact that researchers often fail to avoid taking sides. Sometimes these individuals fall to manipulative political actors, and sometimes they consciously exaggerate the amount of violence or suffering to achieve a desired policy outcome. Further adding to this bias is vulnerability of fieldworkers to human suffering, and they sometimes uncritically reproduce victim's testimonies, taking them as complete truths and then reproducing them mechanically.
Political Bias	Political bias is the failure to recognize the fundamental distinction between peaceful political competition and armed combat. Many analysts' will often describe all manner of wars as a matter of tactics, techniques, and firepower, while failing to account for the political and social nature of the conflict. Many social scientists emphasize the political processes while overlooking the military processes. This bias results in a neglect of key institutions which shape the social and economic context, structure the political landscape and define the relevant political actors, their strategies, and determine individual incentives and behaviors. War is a social and political environment fundamentally different from peace in at least two key ways: first, there are more constraints and less consent; second, the stakes are incomparably higher for everyone involved. It is one thing to go and vote for a political party and quite another to fight, and possibly die, for it.
Urban Bias	This form of bias focuses on the complications arising from urban-based scholars studying conflicts in rural areas. These studies on insurgencies are often conducted by urban-based intellectuals despite the fact that most of these conflicts are fought in rural areas predominantly by peasants. This bias often leads to a general tendency to interpret the conflict acontextually and in a top-down manner. The prejudice of urban elites towards those in the countryside also impacts the study of these conflicts. This disposition towards the rural areas has lead to a long history of interpreting rural violence as the manifestation of primitivism, where the rural insurgents are summarized as bandits, or the

Urban Bias (Continued)	peasantries rustic life is somehow inferior to that of population who live in urban centers. Urban bias is also impacted by costly information. Access to the countryside tends to be hard, if not impossible, especially while the war is raging on. Further, within small communities, everything becomes known quite quickly by neighbors, making it very frightening for people to provide interviews or any kind of information. The invisibility of the countryside hardly ends with the war, as many people in these rural areas will simply want to be left alone, to rebuild their shattered lives. Further complicating this bias is the tendency of many urban scholars to avoid the required labor-intensive fieldwork needed to access information from the population in these rural areas. Here, another part of the urban bias can emerge in that researchers may rely too heavily on written records, often produced by those in the urban areas. These records may be highly distorted as they will often be produced by the predominant power present in the cities, and will ignore their own violence towards the population, while overemphasizing their opponents. A third part of urban bias is based on the ideology of those conducting the research. Because urban scholars tend to be motivated by ideological concerns, they often assign unambiguous ideological motives to research participants, even if this in not the case for these individuals. Such perspectives can lead to inaccurate assumptions about the true motivation behind the action of the rural population. A fourth manifestation of urban bias is the desire to ascribe fixed, unchanging labels, such as “peasant,” “catholic,” or “communist.” These labels promote a view of the conflict as being between clearly identifiable sides, with stable and loyal social bases. There are at least two problems with assigning labels during conflicts. First, labels may be assigned to opponents as a political weapon, rather then reflecting the truth of the individual or institution. This application of labels may in fact disregard many internal conflicts or divisions, such as gender, lineage, age, or socioeconomic position. Secondly, this bias assumes that identities are more or less permanent, and does not recognize that people may adopt a label more from a need to disguise their real feeling than from a true support of a cause.
Selection Bias	The scale of a study directly impacts what parts of the conflict are examined. Instances of violence cannot be considered separately from instances where violence does not occur. Smaller studies are more susceptible to this form of bias, as they typically focus on the

Selection Bias (Continued)	most violent outcomes of the conflict, while neglecting places or times with more limited violence or where none occurred at all. Another form of selection bias concerns focus on those actors perpetrating the violence. Often studies neglect to examine, or acknowledge, one of the protagonists' use of violence against the civilian population. Besides not explaining the violence of the side not being studied, this form of selection bias also distorts the analysis of the conflict by overlooking the interaction process between the rival actors.
Overaggregation Bias and Data Problems	Any study of violence faces the thorny problem of data. Beyond the distortions imposed on the collection and interpretation of data by the other biases, data on political violence are vulnerable to two other problems. First, data on political violence tends to be inconsistent and unreliable across nations and over time. Second, the available data is often overly aggregate. Data on violence can be widely distorted, due to actions such as overestimating or underestimating fatalities; a practice heavily influenced by partisan bias. Even when political pressure is absent, measurements problems can be enormous. Data on violence is difficult to collect; especially when the fighting is waging all around, and the proverbial fog of war undermines efforts. Put another way, the higher the violence, the scarcer the data on that violence becomes. Other complications with data on violence arise from the fact that much of the information we receive comes from victims of the violence. Such evidence can be problematic because victims may not have full or accurate knowledge of the actions that produced the violence. Furthermore, these individuals may forget, misrepresent, or ignore crucial characteristics or sequences of the events that resulted in their victimization. Also, victims have a stake in seeing researchers adopt their "truths," especially because these researchers are seen to provide a halo of objectivity brought by their status as academics. Finally, individual accounts sometimes turn out to be entirely fabricated, distorting the data on violence even further.

Source: Kalyvas (2006)