



**FLOWERS IN THE WALL**  
**Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, Indonesia, and Melanesia**  
by David Webster

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## Cracks in the Wall: Indonesia and Narratives of the 1965 Mass Violence

BASKARA T. WARDAYA

*If we were flowers  
 You were the wall  
 But in the wall we have planted seeds  
 One day we will grow together  
 With the conviction: you have to crumble  
 In our conviction  
 Everywhere tyranny has to crumble*

—Wiji Thukul, “Bunga dan Tembok” (Flower and Wall)<sup>1</sup>

When, in the early hours of 1 October 1965, six top Indonesian generals were abducted and killed in the capital city of Jakarta, most Indonesians were taken by surprise. Of course, the events did not come out of the blue.<sup>2</sup> But thanks to the scarcity of media and the censorship that was soon imposed, it was difficult for the general public to monitor developments from one moment to the other. Only later did they learn that in addition to the generals who were violently murdered, a lieutenant was also killed, along with the daughter of one of the generals. Three of the generals were killed in their homes, while the other three were still alive when they were

brought to the southern outskirts of the capital before eventually also being killed. Their bodies were then dumped in an unused well in a village called Lubang Buaya, not far from Jakarta.

As it was not immediately clear who actually masterminded these bloody events, a variety of information, rumours, and speculation circulated in the first days following the violence. One group, which called itself the September 30th Movement, claimed responsibility, declaring that its main intention was to save President Sukarno from a government takeover that they believed was about to be launched by a council of generals in the Indonesian National Army (TNI).<sup>3</sup> The September 30th Movement's main members were three army officers—Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Colonel Abdul Latief, and Brigadier General Soepardjo—but others may have been directly or indirectly involved, including the top leaders—but not the rank-and-file members—of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Before it was clear who was responsible for these killings, a group of army officers under the control of Major General Suharto—who was then the commander of the Indonesian army's Strategic Command—declared that the PKI, the army's political archrival, was the mastermind of the bloody events. Suharto and his group then waged a propaganda campaign saying that the PKI had not only plotted the kidnapping and killing, but also planned to launch a *coup d'état* and abandon the reigning political ideology of Pancasila (or Five Principles) in favour of “godless” communism. The propaganda campaign also spread the rumour that women members of the PKI mutilated the bodies of the generals while dancing erotically around their dead bodies.

Though it was at best half true, the campaign was effective in spreading anti-communist sentiment among Indonesians, especially on the islands of Java, Bali, and Sumatra (particularly North Sumatra). Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Sarwo Edhi Wibowo, of the army's Special Forces Command (then known as RPKAD, now Kopassus), military units were dispatched from Jakarta to other parts of Java. Their goal was to transform anti-communist sentiment into collective violence against those accused of being members of the PKI or of being communist sympathizers. Under the provocation and coordination of army units, civilian groups apprehended, arrested, tortured, and killed those who were thought to have played a role in the killings of the generals in Jakarta—although most of them never personally set foot in the capital city.

The mass violence against alleged communists started in Central Java around the third week of October 1965. In November it spread to East Java, and in December similar violence took place on the island of Bali.<sup>4</sup> The violence also occurred on a smaller scale in other parts of the country, continuing until 1968. In the end, it is estimated that somewhere between 50,000 and 1 million civilians were killed in the violence, mostly in the last three months of 1965. Many more were tortured, imprisoned, exiled, and discriminated against.

Beginning in early 1966, a phased takeover of national leadership took place in Jakarta, in which the left-leaning President Sukarno was gradually pushed from power. Slowly but surely he was replaced by none other than General Suharto. Suharto gave himself the responsibility not only of maintaining order, but of presiding over political matters as well. To this end, he made himself acting president and then, in 1967, president.

Suharto's ascension to power was soon followed by militaristic and authoritarian-style government. Moreover, Suharto's government implemented policies favourable to foreign investment. During Suharto's presidency, many major Western corporations did business in Indonesia, exploiting the country's rich natural resources and favourable market potential as one of the most populated nations on earth. Suharto would rule Indonesia for the next three decades, before he himself was pushed out of power in 1998 in the midst of social, economic, and political upheaval.

Viewed in a broader context, the gory events of 1 October 1965, and the mass violence that took place afterwards, were not simply a matter of crime and punishment. Realizing that the mass violence against suspected communists did not only involve mass killings but also torture, incarceration, destruction of property, exile, and even the revocation of citizenship, it was clear that the violence was more than a spontaneous act of revenge, as was often claimed by the Suharto government.

Despite common claims, especially in the West, that the violence was part of the Indonesian custom of "running amok," it was clear that the violence was actually carried out in stages, each of which involving planning, coordination, and control, especially by the army's Special Forces Command.<sup>5</sup> As historian John Roosa writes, "the typical pattern was for the victims to be detained first, taken out at night, trucked to an isolated spot in the countryside, shot, stabbed or bludgeoned to death, and then left in unmarked mass graves or dumped in a river. ... Cold-blooded executions,

not frenzied mob attacks, accounted for most of the deaths.”<sup>6</sup> Such a pattern in no way indicated that the acts of killing and torture were simply expression of spontaneous traditional customs.

Douglas Kammen and Kate McGregor argue that attacks on the PKI were only the first stage of a plan to reorganize Indonesian society from the people-oriented and anti-foreign-investment regime of Sukarno to an elite-oriented society with close ties to Western business interests. In their words, the mass violence that spanned from the second half of 1965 to the end of 1968 was a “counter-revolution” that aimed “to curtail the mass mobilization and popular participation unleashed by the national revolution; to destroy the social bases of Sukarno’s left-leaning political system, called Guided Democracy; and to establish a new pro-Western military authoritarian regime.”<sup>7</sup>

In a still broader context, the 1965 violence in Indonesia had strong international dimensions. Bradley Simpson, for instance, demonstrates that, more than just national political upheaval, the 1965 mass killings in Indonesia and their aftermath “were a form of efficacious terror, an indispensable prerequisite to the overthrow of Sukarno, to Indonesia’s reintegration into the regional political economy and international system, and to the ascendance of a modernizing military regime.” In Simpson’s words “the mass violence against the Indonesian Left ... had a political and economic logic apparent to officials in London, Washington, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Moscow and elsewhere.”<sup>8</sup>

### *The Narratives*

Despite the complexities of the events of 1965 and what followed afterwards, the Suharto government’s official narrative was rather simplistic and self-serving. The government essentially said that the PKI solely masterminded the generals’ abduction and killing on 1 October 1965 and planned to change the state’s ideology from Pancasila to communism. As a result, this narrative implies, the PKI deserved the harshest punishment possible. It also implies that any harsh measures taken against suspected communists in the wake of the 1965 events were justified, even necessary.

With regard to the massacres that took place after the killing of the generals in Jakarta, the government simply stated that they were part of “spontaneous” acts of revenge by patriotic Indonesians against the

Communist Party. In other words, the government's narrative suggested that the mass killings were not coordinated but were necessary in order to save the country from the nefarious forces of communism.

Throughout its reign, the Suharto government also tried to perpetuate the notion that the PKI remained the main danger to the nation. Because of this perceived danger people were asked to be vigilant, regardless of the fact that the Communist Party had been annihilated. But the alleged threat was continuously reiterated as if the PKI had returned to life to haunt and influence the people. The Suharto government then used every method available to reproduce this notion, be it through monuments, rumours, radio and television programs, names of public spaces, propaganda films or books<sup>9</sup>—all with the intention of supporting the official narrative of the 1965 events and to justify the authoritarian rule of President Suharto and his supporters.

One of the propaganda films used by the Suharto government to promote its version of the 1965 events was a docudrama called *Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (or *Suppression of the Treacherous Plot of the September 30th Movement/the PKI*). Produced in 1984, the film portrayed in visual form the official narrative that the PKI was indeed behind the brutal abduction and murders of the generals in the early hours of 1 October 1965. It also showed Sukarno as an unreliable as president because of his dubious attitudes toward the PKI. Beginning in 1985, students were required to see the film every year on 30 September; it was also shown on national television.

Meanwhile, the official narrative was enshrined in a 1967 book by government historian Nugroho Notosusanto called *40 Hari Kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober–10 November* (*The 40-Day Debacle of the September 30th Movement from 1 October–10 November 10*). Another official book was called *Gerakan 30 September: Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia: Latar Belakang, Aksi, dan Penumpasannya* (*The September 30th Movement: The Attempted Coup of the Indonesian Communist Party: Its Background, Actions and Eradication*).<sup>10</sup> It was published by Indonesia's State Secretariat as late as 1994, and was widely known as *buku putih* (the white book) pertaining to the official (read "true") history of the 1965 events.<sup>11</sup> In sum, these books, official proclamations, and repeated film screenings created an official narrative—a "wall," if you will—bolstering the Suharto government.

## *The Wall of Political Taboo*

Under the rule of President Suharto and his self-proclaimed New Order government (1966–98) the official narrative of the 1965 events was closely guarded. The production and interpretation of the history of this period were backed by the Indonesian military.<sup>12</sup> Gaining access to the relevant military documents was difficult if not impossible. At the same time, it was also difficult to ask potential informants to share their knowledge or experiences about 1965 for concerns of personal safety.<sup>13</sup> Any criticism of the official narrative was met with pressure either from the government or government supporters. Any open and critical public discourse on the period became a political taboo. As Mary Zurbuchen puts it, “divergent perspectives, controversial events, and critical voices were not allowed to compete alongside the official record.”<sup>14</sup> Like an impenetrable wall, this well-guarded taboo stood firm. In the midst of such a situation it was almost impossible for Indonesians, and even foreigners, to talk critically about the violence of 1965–68.<sup>15</sup>

As reflected in the title of the propaganda film mentioned above, the government insisted that people mentioning the term *G30S* (the September 30th Movement) add the suffix *PKI*. This was considered an important aspect of strengthening the claim that the PKI was the sole mastermind of the abduction and killing of the generals on 1 October 1965—and therefore deserved harsh punishment.

Under Suharto any discussion of the 1965 events that deviated from the official narrative was either banned or discouraged. These included victims’ and witnesses’ testimonies, as well as any critical scholarly accounts. Among the latter was a 162-page paper written by Cornell University professors Benedict Anderson, Ruth McVey, and Frederick Bunnell, and published under the title *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (also known as the “Cornell Paper”).<sup>16</sup> In the wake of its publication, Anderson was banned from entering the country for twenty-six years. During the same period, any forum intended to publicly discuss the 1965–66 events was prevented from forming.

Meanwhile, the manufactured fear of *bahaya laten komunis* (the “ever-present danger of communism”) was reproduced and circulated among the Indonesian population. This was done by stigmatizing former political prisoners; for example, the government placed special identifying codes

on the identity cards of people who were taken prisoner in 1965. Such measures, in turn, made it difficult for these former individuals to live as regular citizens or ordinary members of society.

Many questions about the 1965 events have gone unanswered. These include questions about General Suharto's true role in these events, especially in the planning of the events of 1 October 1965 and in the purging of its key organizers; the roles played by foreign business interests; and the fact that many non-communists were also subjected to violence by the army and its civilian supporters.

### *The Fall of the Wall?*

All this began to change when, in 1998, President Suharto was forced out of power in disgrace. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 was followed by economic instability in Indonesia and the onset of socio-political upheavals. Widespread student demonstrations against Suharto's authoritarian rule ensued. As a result, in May 1998 the president was forced to resign. He was succeeded by his vice president, B. J. Habibie, who served as acting president until 1999.

Under the Habibie transitional government, the official narratives of the 1965 events appeared to tremble and break. As authoritarian-style government was succeeded by a more open-minded presidency, the public, as well as academics and former political prisoners, began to talk openly about the events of 1965 and what followed. As Mary Zurbuchen puts it, during this period "a flood of relief and euphoria inundated the landscape of public awareness."<sup>17</sup>

The compulsory annual screenings of *Penumpasan* stopped in 1998.<sup>18</sup> In 2001 then president Abdurrachman Wahid (1999–2001)—on behalf of his fellow-members of the Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama—apologized for the organization's involvement in the 1965 violence. In 2004 a law regarding the formation of a truth and reconciliation commission (which went under the title Undang-undang Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi) was enacted by then president Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–04), the daughter of the first Indonesian president, Sukarno. A growing number of people—especially among academics and human rights activists—began to openly speak of the G30S without adding *PKI*.



Non-governmental organizations were established to address the 1965 events, including demands for truth-seeking and truth-telling initiatives and the rehabilitation of wrongly accused political prisoners. Grassroots initiatives regarding truth and reconciliation were introduced. In 2005, for instance, in the town of Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, one initiative began promoting the idea of reconciliation among survivors of the 1965 events. Every once in a while members of these groups gather together to hold a seminar, a workshop, or a film screening. The main purpose of these NGOs is to connect the survivors while promoting reconciliation at the local level.

To use and to underline such momentum in the post-Suharto period, a conference on 1965 and related issues was held at the University of California, Los Angeles, in April 2001. The conference was intended “to pursue research interests in how the past is being revisited and re-interpreted in the Indonesian present.”<sup>19</sup> One of the questions being addressed during the conference was: “Why is it ... that we have seen in Indonesia since 1998 so few thorough investigations, commissions, trials, textbooks overhauls, rehabilitation, or other examples of ‘getting to the bottom of’ any one of the host of dimly understood incidents (*peristiwa*) that so many believe to have taken place?”<sup>20</sup>

A similar conference took place at the National University of Singapore in 2009. Viewing the mass violence that started in 1965, the aim of the conference, according to its organizers, was to further understand “the counter-revolutionary violence in Indonesia between 1965 and 1968.” The conference was also aimed at understanding “the broad contours of the attack and the regional peculiarities of the violence” in a broader context.<sup>21</sup>

### *The Wall Re-erected*

In spite of the progress outlined above, the once hegemonic anti-communist interpretation of the 1965 events gradually returned. In the early 2000s, as initiatives for dealing with Indonesia’s legacy of violence were taking shape, so, too, were countermeasures aimed at discouraging people from talking about these issues. Rumours that communism was re-emerging began to be spread among the people. Public discussions on 1965 began to be discouraged or simply attacked. In other words, the anti-communist

“wall” was being re-erected, and as a result the political taboo on talking about 1965 slowly returned.

Although they were heads of state, the country’s presidents had only very limited political space (and will) to change this situation. President Wahid’s apology to the victims of 1965 violence, for instance, was not widely supported by fellow members of the Nahdlatul Ulama organization, and it was generally ignored. To the surprise of many, in 2006 the law regarding the formation of a truth and reconciliation commission was annulled, less than two years after it had been enacted by President Megawati. In the same year, the Indonesian government decided that in all history textbooks the suffix *PKI* would once again be added to the term *G30S*.<sup>22</sup> Any textbooks that did not respect this rule were banned. Officials of district attorney’s office in many cities burned the books in public. One such event took place in the town on Depok, just outside Jakarta. It was witnessed by the town’s mayor, who was also a former State Minister of Research and Technology.<sup>23</sup>

In 2012 the government-sanctioned Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Komnas-HAM) presented a report—based on three years of research—to the government: it was simply ignored and has never been followed up. Earlier that year, there were reports that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14) would apologize to the victims of the mass violence, but the apology never materialized. The was in part because of pressures from politicians and members of anti-communist groups.<sup>24</sup> But at the same time it was also due to the fact that President Yudhoyono himself is married to the daughter of the late Sarwo Edhi Wibowo, who was—as mentioned above—the commander of the army’s Special Forces Command, which led the anti-communist purge in 1965 and afterwards.<sup>25</sup> Any apology, or any serious efforts to look into the 1965 violence, it was feared, might implicate Yudoyono’s own late father-in-law. As a result, no serious action was taken. This situation continued until the very last day of President Yudhoyono’s government in October 2014.

## *Cracks in the Wall*

With the accession, in October 2014, of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the Indonesian government’s attitude to 1965 began to change. During the election campaign, Widodo promised that finding solutions to past human rights abuses would be one of his priorities if he were elected president. When he was indeed elected president, and as his government was relatively more accommodating to the wishes of the people, there were signs that the president wanted to be more open in discussing the 1965 issues and looking for a lasting solution. As *Time* magazine noted, “President Joko Widodo, the first leader of Indonesia to have no ties to the military or political elite, has repeatedly expressed his commitment to settling past human-rights violations, including the 1965–66 mass killings.”<sup>26</sup> In May of 2015, Widodo’s attorney general announced a government-backed reconciliation committee with the task of dealing with the 1965 mass violence along with other past human rights abuses, though this has not yet been formed.<sup>27</sup> There were also reports that the president would apologize to the victims of past human rights violations and their families.<sup>28</sup> In his state address to members of parliament on 14 August 2015, the president repeated his intention to find solutions to lingering human rights issues related to the 1965 anti-communist pogroms.<sup>29</sup>

Meanwhile, forces opposed to any reckoning with the 1965 events remain influential.<sup>30</sup> Leaders of certain military and civilian (especially religious) groups have continued to argue that the PKI had truly been guilty of a coup attempt, and that any form of apology to the 1965 victims would be seen as a call for the return of communism in Indonesia. Indeed, one minister in the president’s own cabinet—a retired army general—declared that it was not proper for the government to offer an apology for the suppression of the PKI.<sup>31</sup> When the International People’s Tribunal was held in The Hague in November 2015, a number of Indonesian government officials were critical. Some forums and events called to discuss 1965 were also attacked, including one in West Sumatra on 22 February 2015 and another in Solo, Central Java, two days later. In October 2015, in the midst of uncertainty over government pressures and self-imposed censorship, panels on 1965 at the Ubud Writers and Readers Festival in Bali were cancelled.<sup>32</sup> In February 2016 a forum at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, at which a guest lecturer from the Netherlands was going to talk about 1965,

was also cancelled because of pressure from Indonesia's national intelligence body.<sup>33</sup>

Yet despite the strong opposition, numerous initiatives to address the 1965 events continued at the grassroots level. While some public forums were disrupted, others were held without any difficulty. In Central Java, for example, a number of government officials held dialogues with 1965 survivors. In Central Sulawesi, a city mayor publicly apologized to the victims of the 1965 mass violence residing in his jurisdiction. In East Nusa Tenggara, church groups encouraged former victims to speak up and tell their stories.<sup>34</sup> Through initiatives like Komnas-HAM and the Witness and Victims Protection Body, the Indonesian government provides health services to the victims of the 1965 violence. The Ministry of Culture and Human Development even provides funds for income-generating skills training to survivors and their families.

When, in November 2015, some young human rights activists held an event called Museum Bergerak (Museum in Motion), at which they displayed artefacts belonging to the survivors of the 1965 violence, the event went ahead undisturbed.<sup>35</sup> In the same month a choir group consisting of women survivors successfully performed Sukarno-era patriotic songs at the opening of an international arts festival in the city of Yogyakarta. Around the same time, at the state-run Gadjah Mada University, academic forums on 1965 convened, again without any interference. In early December 2015, a number of young Indonesian artists held a major arts exhibition with the 1965 events as its main theme in a prominent cultural centre in Jakarta. Despite some initial worries that it was going to be the target of protests, the exhibition received positive public reaction and media coverage.<sup>36</sup> Meanwhile, books that challenge the New Order government's official story can now be published, distributed, and discussed freely.<sup>37</sup>

Reasons to doubt that Indonesia will ever have the courage to seriously address the mass violence of 1965 abound. At the same time there are also many reasons for optimism. Despite political bickering among members of the political elite in Jakarta, at the grassroots initiatives—especially those aimed at restoring survivors' place as inseparable members of Indonesian society—are flourishing. Like small cracks in the wall of political taboo, local and national initiatives to tackle the issues of 1965 are spreading.

## Closing Note

As expressed in the poem quoted at the beginning of this chapter, people have been planting seeds of hope. They hope to see them grow in the wall of tyranny established by the Suharto government. “One day we will grow together,” the poet Thukul wrote. “Everywhere tyranny has to crumble.”<sup>38</sup> Whether or not the cracks in the wall of 1965 mass violence will someday make the wall crumble, we do not know. But we can always hope. Indeed, we share the conviction that everywhere tyranny has to crumble.

### Notes

- 1 This is a quote from a poem called “*Bunga dan Tembok*” (Flower and Wall), written by anti-Suharto poet-activist Paulus Wiji Thukul during the final years of President Suharto’s rule. Thukul later mysteriously disappeared. See “Puisi-puisi Wiji Thukul,” *Kumpulan Fiksi* (blog), 3 September 2011, <https://kumpulanfiksi.wordpress.com/2011/09/03/puisi-puisi-wiji-thukul/> (accessed 26 January 2016).
- 2 Douglas Kammen and Kate McGregor, eds., *The Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia, 1965–68* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012), 13.
- 3 Asvi Warman Adam, *Seabad Kontroversi Sejarah [The Age of Historical Controversy]* (Yogyakarta, ID: Ombak, 2007), 65–66.
- 4 Robert Cribb, ed., *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali* (Melbourne, AU: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990). See also Geoffrey Robinson, *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
- 5 Kammen and McGregor, *Contours of Mass Violence*, 7.
- 6 John Roosa, “The September 30th Movement: The Aporias of the Official Narratives,” in *ibid.*, 47.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 8 Bradley Simpson, “International Dimension of the 1965–68 Violence in Indonesia,” in *ibid.*, 51. See also Bradley R. Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).
- 9 Roosa, “The September 30th Movement,” 25.
- 10 *Gerakan 30 September: Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia, Latar Belakang, Aksi dan Penumpasannya* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1994).
- 11 Roosa, “The September 30th Movement,” 31.
- 12 Mary S. Zurbuchen, ed., *Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), 4.
- 13 Kammen and McGregor, *The Contours of Masse Violence*, 6.

- 14 Zurbuchen, *Beginning to Remember*, 5.
- 15 M. C. Ricklefs, a well-known scholar on Indonesian history who was based Australia, wrote a five-hundred-page book on the history of Indonesia. And yet he dedicated only one page to the 1965 events. See Kammen and McGregor, *Contours of Mass Violence*, 5. Other Western Indonesianists also avoided being overly critical for fear of losing access to the country.
- 16 Benedict Anderson, Ruth T. McVey, and Frederick P. Bunnell, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1971).
- 17 Zurbuchen, *Beginning to Remember*, 3.
- 18 Asvi Warman Adam, "September Affair in History Courses," paper presented at "The 1956-1966 Indonesian Killings Revisited," Singapore, 17-19 June 2009.
- 19 Zurbuchen, *Beginning to Remember*, xv. The papers from this conference form the basis of Zurbuchen's edited book collection.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 21 Kammen and McGregor, ix-x.
- 22 Adam, "September Affair in History Courses," 3.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 5.
- 24 Anwar Siswadi, "SBY Diminta Tak Minta Maaf Pada Korban 1965," *Tempo*, 5 August 2012, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2012/08/05/078421412/sby-diminta-tak-minta-maaf-pada-korban-1965> (accessed 26 January 2016).
- 25 "No Inquiry Into 1965 Killings on SBY's Watch," *Jakarta Globe*, 2 March 2014, <http://jakartaglobe.id/news/no-inquiry-into-65-on-sbys-watch/> (accessed 26 January 2016).
- 26 Yenni Kwok, "The Memory of Savage Anticommunist Killings Still Haunts Indonesia, 50 Years On," *Time*, 30 September 2015, <http://time.com/4055185/indonesia-anticommunist-massacre-holocaust-killings-1965/> (accessed 27 January 2016).
- 27 Hasyim Widhiarto, "Govt Forms Team to Settle Past Rights Abuses," *Jakarta Post*, 22 May 2015, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/22/govt-forms-team-settle-past-rights-abuses.html> (accessed 26 January 2016).
- 28 Kwok, "The Memory of Savage Anticommunist Killings."
- 29 Danu Damarjati, "Pemerintah Bahas Permohonan Maaf ke Korban G30S/PKI dan Pelanggaran HAM," *DetikNews* (Jakarta), 18 August 2015, <http://news.detik.com/berita/2994968/pemerintah-bahas-permohonan-maaf-ke-korban-g-30spki-dan-pelanggaran-ham> (accessed 26 January 2016).
- 30 Kwok, "The Memory of Savage Anticommunist Killings."
- 31 Indra Wijaya, "Ryamizard Tak Senang Jokowi Minta Maaf Soal PKI, Ini Sebabnya," *Tempo*, 20 August 2016, <https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2015/08/20/078693495/ryamizard-tak-senang-jokowi-minta-maaf-soal-pki-ini-sebabnya> (accessed 25 January 2016).

- 32 See <http://www.pen-international.org/10/2015/the-ubud-writers-and-readers-festival-bans-the-last-in-a-long-line/> and <http://mojok.co/2015/10/ubud-writers-readers-festival/> (accessed 25 January 2016).
- 33 See [http://ruangtempur.blogspot.co.id/2016\\_02\\_01\\_archive.html](http://ruangtempur.blogspot.co.id/2016_02_01_archive.html) (accessed 25 January 2016).
- 34 See Mery Kolimon, et. al., *Forbidden Memories: Women's Experiences of 1965 in Eastern Indonesia* (Melbourne, AU: Monash University Publishing, 2015).
- 35 The idea of setting up a "moving museum" came from the fact that in Indonesia it is almost impossible to build a stationary or permanent museum on the 1965 events that are not in line with the government's official narrative.
- 36 M. Agung Rajasa, "Museum Rekoleksi Memori untuk Tolak Pengaburan Sejarah," *Tempo*, 8 December 2015, <https://m.tempo.co/read/beritafoto/36904/museum-rekoleksi-memori-untuk-tolak-pengaburan-sejarah/2> (accessed 26 January 2016).
- 37 Adam, *Seabad Kontroversi Sejarah*.
- 38 See <https://kumpulanfiksi.wordpress.com/2011/09/03/puisi-puisi-wiji-thukul/> (accessed 26 January 2016).