China's Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada

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Notes

Introduction


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The Trudeau Government, elected in fall 2015, has indicated that it intends to “refresh” Canada’s Northern Strategy and Arctic Foreign Policy in 2017. In August 2016, the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Carolyn Bennett, appointed Mary
Simon as the Minister’s Special Representative “responsible for leading engagements and providing advice to the Government of Canada on the development of a new Shared Arctic Leadership Model.” The process remains ongoing as of January 2017. In his December 2016 joint statement with President Obama, Prime Minister Trudeau emphasized that “Canada is committing to co-develop a new Arctic Policy Framework, with Northerners, Territorial and Provincial governments, and First Nations, Inuit, and Métis People that will replace Canada’s Northern Strategy.” The statement indicated that this new framework “will include priority areas identified by the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs’ Special Representative, such as education, infrastructure, and economic development. The Framework will include an Inuit-specific component, created in partnership with Inuit, as Inuit Nunangat comprises over a third of Canada’s land mass and over half of Canada’s coast line, and as Inuit modern treaties govern this jurisdictional space.” White House, “United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement” (December 20, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/20/united-states-canada-joint-arctic-leaders-statement. Anticipated developments are elaborated upon in our conclusion to this book.

12 Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (July 2009).


14 Ibid., 13.


16 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (August, 2010). All quotations in this section are derived from this document unless otherwise specified.


18 We discuss this transition, with specific reference to offshore oil and gas development, in the conclusion.

19 DFAIT, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 4, 11, 14.


Ilulissat Declaration, adopted at the Arctic Ocean Conference hosted by the Government of Denmark and attended by the representatives of the five costal states bordering on the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the US) held at Ilulissat, Greenland, May 27–29, 2008.


David Wright, The Panda Readies to Meet the Polar Bear: China and Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Challenge (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2011), 1.

David Wright, “Canada Must Stand Up against China’s Increasing Claim to Arctic,” Calgary Herald, March 7, 2011.


Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II.”

See, for example, “Harper Speaks up for Canada’s Arctic,” Globe and Mail, January 28, 2006.


“China’s Navy Making Waves,” Calgary Herald, October 1, 2007. See also Shelagh Grant, “Troubled Arctic Waters,” Globe and Mail, June 30, 2010. This assessment, while still far from proven, was given some support by the arrival of five PLAN warships in the Bering Sea in September 2015. The voyage, which coincided with the Glacier conference then being held in Alaska, was the closest the Chinese Navy had ever come to US territory without an invitation.


38 Nathan VanderKlippe, “China Reveals Plans to Ship Cargo across Canada’s Northwest Passage,” Globe and Mail, April 20, 2016. This article was also reprinted in Time magazine as “China Could Be Preparing to Challenge Canada’s Sovereignty over the Northwest Passage” (April 21, 2016)

39 Michael Byers, “Will China Become a Partner or Pariah after Court Decision?,” Globe and Mail, July 12, 2016.


See, for example, the recent volume Leiv Lunde, Yang Jian, and Iselin Stensdal, Asian Countries and the Arctic Future (Singapore: World Scientific, 2016).


49 People’s Republic of China (PRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China’s View on Arctic Cooperation” (July 30, 2010).
52 Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC), 2012 National Opinion Poll: Canadian Views on Asia (2012), 12, 16.
53 Ibid., 4, 9, 26.
54 Ibid., 3–5, 14, 17, 29–30.
55 Ibid., 3.
57 Ibid., 7–8, 11, 31–2, 41–3, 48.
59 Ibid., 3, 9.
On this fear see, for instance, the Huang Nubo controversy in Iceland and Norway outlined in more detail in chapter 4.

Workshop Report, “Sino-Canadian Workshop on the Arctic,” Beijing and Shanghai (February 25–27, 2010).


See, for example, “Admiral Urges Government to Stake Claim In the Arctic,” South China Morning Post, March 6, 2010; Linda Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, 7.

For a Russian example, a 2009 article in Dongbei zhi chuang (Window on the Northeast) quotes a recent prediction in the Russian tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda (the Communist Youth League version of Pravda, still in publication today and in fact the top-selling newspaper in Russia) about the likelihood of a Third World War breaking out in the Arctic: “With the continual discoveries of new resources beneath the Arctic Ocean, this previously neglected land of snow and ice has become a treasure house at which each country gazes with the cruel greed of a tiger. Although the land areas of the Arctic are owned by the eight countries Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United States, and Russia, the strife over Arctic sovereignty has not only not subsided, but has become more vehement over time. Russia’s Komsomolskaya Pravda even predicts that “because there are serious discrepancies over the division and delimitation of Arctic interests, the World War III of the future may well break out in the Arctic.” Translated by David Curtis Wright in The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World, 5.

MELAW, Second Sino-Canadian Exchange on the Arctic, Halifax (June 25–26, 2012), Final Workshop Report, December 2012. Identity of the speaker withheld due to Chatham House rules. The presenter stressed that China is the only nuclear-weapon country that has publicly stated it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, or use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. He also noted that China calls for settlement of disputes over territory and maritime rights and interests with neighbouring countries through dialogue and negotiation (and has settled historical boundary issues peacefully with twelve land neighbours).

For a more extensive discussion of defence and security considerations related to China’s Arctic interests, see Timothy Wright, “China’s Race towards the Arctic: Interests, Legitimacy, and Canadian Security Implications” (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 2014).

Linda Jakobson and Jingchao Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, 23.

On these themes see Chih Yuan Woon, “China, Canada and Framings of Arctic Geopolitics,” 175.

Chapter 1 - Situating the Arctic in China’s Strategy

6 Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, “A Player But No Superpower,” Foreign Policy, March 7, 2013. These authors note that the US National Intelligence Council predicts that China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States in purchasing-power-parity terms in 2022, and near 2030 at market exchange rates. For a Canadian perspective on these trends, see Elinor Sloan, “Responding to China’s Military Build-Up,” OpenCanada.org, Canadian International Council, March 20, 2013.


8 William A. Callahan, Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 82.


17 Mingjiang Li, “Rising from Within: China’s Search for a Multilateral World,” Global Governance 17 (2011): 347.


Mark Burles and Abram Shulsky, *Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 31. The PLA has identified five likely types of conflict: small scale border conflicts; conflicts over territory, seas, or islands; surprise air attacks; resistance against hostile intrusions; and punitive counter-attacks.

You Ji has argued that the doctrine was contradictory. See You Ji, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and China’s Strategic Thinking,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 21, no. 3 (1999): 352–5.


Teddy Ng, "Xi Sets Out Priorities for Foreign Policy," South China Morning Post, October 26, 2013.

Malte Humpert an Andreas Raspotnik, “From ‘Great Wall to ‘Great White North’: Explaining China’s Politics in the Arctic,” Longpost, August 17, 2012.


Wang, “China’s Search.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Canada and Russia are both G20 members and Canada is influential at the International Monetary Fund and other financial institutions.


Ibid., 368.

Jakobsen and Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, 4.


Susan V. Lawrence, “China’s Political Institutions and Leaders in Charts,” CRS Report to Congress, R43303, November 12, 2013, 44.


State Oceanic Administration People’s Republic of China, “The Main Duties of the State Oceanic Administration” [国家海洋局主要职责], April 9, 2010.


The CACPR comprises experts from thirteen Chinese ministries or bureaus under the State Council and the General Staff Department of the PLA.


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**Chapter 2 - The Snow Dragon: China, Polar Science, and the Environment**

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly,” Speech to the Third Arctic Circle Assembly, Iceland, October 17, 2015.


6 The First Sino-Canadian Exchange on the Arctic brought together senior Canadian and Chinese academics and experts to exchange views with respect to the international legal and political ramifications of current activities in the Arctic Ocean. It was convened in Beijing and Shanghai from February 25–27, 2010 by the China Institute of Marine Affairs in cooperation with the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC), Marine and Environmental Law Institute of the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University, the Ocean Management Research Network, and the Faculty of Law of the University of Victoria. MELAW convened the Second Exchange from 25–26 June 2012 at Dalhousie University in cooperation with the Faculty of Law of the University of Victoria and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie in Canada, and the CIMA in Beijing. The report of the second workshop noted: “The First Sino-Canadian Exchange was the first bilateral meeting between academic and experts from the two countries. The purpose of the exchange was to enable a better understanding among Canadian and Chinese participants of each country’s respective interests and activities as they relate to Arctic waters. The meeting occurred against the backdrop of growing international interest in the region as a result of greater accessibility resulting from impacts of climate change and in particular a decrease in sea ice cover, especially during the critical summer season. These changes are resulting in increased international activities in the region, notably for resource exploration and development, international shipping and navigation, fishing and marine scientific research.”


9 Brady, “Polar Stakes,” 11, 15.
Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Antarctic Interests,” 31.


See, for example, Borgerson, 66.


Estimates vary among scientists and projection models. In terms of commentaries on China and the Arctic, examples include the study by Joseph Spears, “A Snow Dragon in the Arctic,” *Asia Times Online* (February 8, 2011), who had estimated that the Arctic would be ice-free during the summer months as early as 2013. Other estimates include Brady, “Polar Stakes,” whose projected date is 2020; Ho, “The Opening of the Northern Sea Route,” who estimates between 2026 and 2046; and in “Semantic-Based Web Service Discovery and Chaining for Building an Arctic Spatial Data Infrastructure,” W. Li. et al. estimate 2050.


28 Ho, “The Opening of the Northern Sea Route,” 108.


32 ACIA.


39 Lasserre and Alexeeva, “China and the Arctic,” 82.


41 Brady, “China’s Arctic Interests,” 31–49.

43 Lasserre and Alexeeva, “China and the Arctic,” 81.


46 Jakobson, *China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic*, 4.


48 Jakobsen and Peng, *China’s Arctic Aspirations*, 5.


51 Jakobson, *China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic*, 4.

52 Yizhi Li and Xuan Zhang, “International Observation: China’s Cooperation with Northern Europe in the Arctic Has Had Steady Progress” [国际观察：中国与北欧国家北极合作稳步推进], *Xinhua Web* [新华网], June 4, 2016.

53 Xiaoyi Wang, “American Media: Russia Has Changed its Mind and Has Started to Attract China to Arctic Exploitation” [美媒：俄转变立场，吸引中国开发北极], *Wangyi Finance* [网易财经], October 3, 2016.


55 Lasserre and Alexeeva, “China and the Arctic,” 82.

56 Jakobson, *China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic*, 3. According to plans currently being developed, the new icebreaker could conduct up to two research cruises to the Arctic during the summer months. This would allow for long-term monitoring of changing Arctic marine environments and allow Chinese researchers to make observations that would provide insight into how a changing Arctic might influence weather and climate in China. Jean de Pomereu, “China Spreads its Polar Wings: Investing in Infrastructure,” *Science Poles*, December 5, 2012.

58 Brady, “Polar Stakes,” 11–12. Brady notes that the Dome A project for deep space research is a collaborative effort by Australian, Chinese, and US scientists, but Chinese-language reports only highlight China’s involvement.

59 Brady, “Polar Stakes,” 12. China’s future Antarctic expeditions will include a Bastler 67 type airframe to support operations (particularly at Dome A) and facilitate airborne remote sensing and atmospheric observation. Yang, “Development of China’s Polar Linkages,” 32.

60 See, for example, Muhammad Makki, China’s Quest for Arctic Access and Resources, April 19, 2012; Huebert, “Canada and China in the Arctic.”

61 Brady, “China’s Antarctic Interests,” 33.


65 Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration, “Science and Data.”

66 Nancy Teeple, “A Brief History of Intrusions into the Canadian Arctic,” Canadian Army Journal 12, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 52.

67 Teeple, “Brief History,” 53; Huebert, “Canada and China in the Arctic.”


71 At the Arctic Science Summit held at Kunming, Yunnan Province in 2005, China was invited to join the Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee – a committee established in 1994 to enhance cooperation among the research centres at Ny-Ålesund. Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, 4.

72 Chaowei Yang et al., “Establishing a Sustainable and Cross-Boundary Geospatial Cyber Infrastructure,” 1721.
Yang, “Development of China’s Polar Linkages.”


Jakobson and Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, 1.


“Chinese Arctic Expedition Team Returns Home,” Xinhuanet, September 26, 2016.


Chinese representative’s presentation to the Second Sino-Canadian Arctic Exchange (2012). Meeting held under Chatham House rules.


Quoted in Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, 7.


Presentation to the Second Sino-Canadian Exchange (Chatham House rules).

LOSCE, Articles 238 and 239.

LOSCE, Article 240. MSR in the Canadian Arctic must also comply with territorial scientific licensing processes.

LOSCE, Article 232.

Lasserre, China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation, 4
Notes to Chapter 3 - Sovereignty and Shipping


3 Ibid., 50.


6 Linyan Huang, Frédéric Lasserre, and Olga Alexeeva, “Is China’s Interest for the Arctic Driven by Arctic Shipping Potential?,” Asian Geographer 32, no. 1 (2015).


Notes to Chapter 3 - Sovereignty and Shipping

20 See, for example, Guo Zhen, “China’s Ocean Rights in the Arctic – Based on an Analysis of UNCLOS [中国在北极的海洋权益及其维护——基于《联合国海洋法公约》的分析], Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work [军队政工理论研究] 1 (2014); Wu Jun and Wu Leizhao, “An Analysis of China’s Ocean Rights in the Arctic – Based on the Perspective of International Maritime Law [中国北极海域权益分析——以国际海洋法为基点的考量], Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sciences) [武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版)] 67, no. 3 (2014).


23 See, for example, Nash Jenkins, “China Could Be Preparing to Challenge Canada’s Sovereignty Over the Northwest Passage,” Time, April 21, 2016.


25 Ibid., 34–5.

26 Ibid., 125.

27 See, for example, Paul Waldie, “A Reality Check on the Northwest Passage Boom,” Globe and Mail, January 7, 2014.


29 Although the Danish bulk carrier Nordic Orion completed the first commercial transit of the Northwest Passage in October 2013, it did not complete its planned voyages in 2014 owing to heavy ice conditions that effectively cancelled the shipping season. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse, “More Ships in the Northwest Passage Will Boost Our Arctic Claim,” Globe and Mail, January 5, 2015.


33 Zhou Leilei et al.


39 AMSA, 31.


44 The survey was conducted in September 2013. Interviews were conducted with the following firms: COSCO; CSCL; Chipolbrok; Winland Shipping, Tongli Shipping, Suns Shipping; West Line; Dandong Shipping Group; Lufeng Shipping; Shangdong Mou Ping Ocean Shipping; Shandong Ocean Shipping; Tianjin Harvest Shipping Co.; Zhongchang Marine Shipping Co.; Ningbo Silver Star; Maritime Shipping Co.; Ningbo Jun Hao Ocean Shipping; Nanjing Henglong Shipping Co.; Uniwill Shipping Co.; King Far East
Shipping; Evertop Intel Shipping; Harmony Maritime Inc.; Pacific Glory Shipping; Liao Yuan Shipping Co.; and SITC Shipping.

A SWOT analysis is a planning method used to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats involved in a project.

Leagh Beveridge et al., “Interest of Asian Shipping Companies in Navigating the Arctic,” Polar Science 10, no. 3 (September 2016).

Ibid.


Frédéric Lasserre and Linyan Huang, “China’s Strategy in the Arctic: Threatening or Opportunistic?,” Polar Record (2015): 5.

Lajeunesse, “A New Mediterranean?”


Quoted in Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, 7.


Malte Humpert, “The Future of the Northern Sea Route – A “Golden Waterway” or a Niche Trade Route,” The Arctic Institute, September 15, 2011.


67 RT.com, “China to Ship up to 15% of Trade through the Arctic,” March 18, 2013.


69 Ibid.


71 Ibid.


74 CentralAmericaData, “China’s Coscon Launches New Multimodal Service in Panama,” July 8, 2008.

75 “Piraeus Port has Further Investment Planned,” *Port Technology International*, June 28, 2013.


77 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy*.


82 James Manicom interview with Guo Peiqing, Qingdao, November 20, 2012.
84 Linda Jakobson and Jingchao Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, SIPRI Policy Paper 34 (November 2012), v–vi, 15–16. By contrast, Japan and South Korea are more likely to be sympathetic to American and European legal perspectives on transit through the Northwest Passage, although neither country is particularly interested in the prospect of actually using the passage for shipping. James Manicom, Conversation with MOFA official, July 27, 2011.
89 As far back as 1971 Pierre Trudeau rejected any implications that Canada might seek to close those waters to foreign ships, the prime minister stated: “to close off those waters and to deny passage to all foreign vessels in the name of Canadian sovereignty, as some commentators have suggested, would be as senseless as placing barriers across the entrances to Halifax and Vancouver harbours.” Prime Minister’s Statement in the Throne Speech, House of Commons Debates (October 24, 1969).
90 Lajeunesse, “A New Mediterranean?,” 537.
93 Ibid., 330.
95 Staalsen, “For China, Barents Region Comes Closer.”
96 Guo Peiqing, “The Arctic is Not Desolate” [北极并不冷清], Huanqiu 17 (September 2008) quoted in Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, 11.
This was highlighted by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly,” Speech to the Third Arctic Circle Assembly, Iceland, October 17, 2015.

Chapter 4 - Arctic Resources and China’s Rising Demand
1 Konstantin Garibov and Igor Denisov, “Norway May Shut China out of the Arctic Council,” Voice of Russia, January 30, 2012.
3 The most frequently cited estimate for oil and gas supplies is also among the most bullish: United States Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle” (2008).
7 See, for example, Roger W. Robinson, “China’s Long-Term Arctic Strategy,” Inside Policy (September 2013).
8 DFAIT, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (August 2010): 11.
9 DFAIT, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 4, 11, 14.
12 Lasserre, China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation, 7.
14 Jonathan Seymour, Canadian Arctic Shipping Assessment, 7; Robert M. Bone, The Geography of the Canadian North: Issues and Challenges, 2nd ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003), 105.


19 Alana Wilson, Fred McMahon, and Miguel Cervantes, Survey of Mining Companies 2012/2013 (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2013), 9.

20 Ibid., 65–7.


22 Wilson et al., 72.


25 Jane George, “Nunavik Mine Owes $72 Million to Creditors; Chinese Owners Turn Project over to Toronto Bank” NunatsiaqOnline, August 14, 2013.


29 Munson, “China North.”


32 Ibid.


Statsministeriet, “The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement,” http://www.stm.dk/_p_13090.html. The website explains: “The Self-Government Act contains a provision regarding Greenland’s access to independence. The provision stipulates that if the people of Greenland take a decision in favour of independence, negotiations are to commence between the Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut regarding the introduction of independence for Greenland. An agreement between the Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut regarding the introduction of independence for Greenland is to be concluded with the consent of Inatsisartut and is to be endorsed by a referendum in Greenland. Furthermore, the agreement is to be concluded with the consent of the Folketing, cf. Section 19 of the Danish Constitution. Independence for Greenland implies that Greenland assumes sovereignty over the Greenland territory.”

Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen, New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region (Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2012), 78.


Andreas Jakobsen, “Copenhagen Zoo to Borrow Two Pandas from China,” Copenhagen Post, April 24, 2014.

Pu Jun, “Greenland Lures China’s Miners with Cold Gold,” CaixinOnline, July 12, 2014. Pu notes that “the culture gap is wide but some of the 56,000 people who live in Greenland will get a chance to understand China’s culture when Chinese labor crews arrive.” He also notes that, as of 2011, “many of Greenland’s imported mine workers are Canadians, working for Canadian mining companies.”


Ibid.


Pu Jun, “Greenland Lures China’s Miners with Cold Gold.”


51 Kevin McGwin, “Editor’s Briefing | Another One Bites the Ore,” Arctic Journal, December 9, 2014.


56 Nicolas van Praet, “Cliffs Natural Resources Retreats from Canadian Disaster.”


59 Ibid.

60 Holman Fenwick Willan et al.


64 Holman Fenwick Willan et al.


For instance, a return to the REE prices of 2011 would make Great Western Minerals’ Steenkampskraal mine (South Africa) profitable and bring 1,512 tons/a online; Avalon Resource’s Nechalacho mine in the NWT with a capacity of 10,000 tons/a and Quest Rare Minerals’ project at Strange Lake (Northern Quebec) with a capacity of 10,4000 tons/a: Great Western Minerals, “Steenkampskraal Feasibility Study,” May 12, 2014; Avalon, “Project Fact sheet: Nechalacho, Thor Lake,” April 16, 2013; and Quest Rare Minerals, “Developing a World-Class Rare Earth Project in Canada,” October, 2014.

Briscoe, “Greenland-China's Foothold in Europe?”

Ólafur Ragnar Grimsson, “Why the Arctic Matters,” Keynote Address to the Arctic Imperative Summit, June 20, 2011.

See, for example, Kevin McGwin, “Game of Alliances,” Arctic Journal, March 7, 2014.


On this, see Huang Ding and Zhao Ningning, “Arctic Governance and China’s Participation – An Analysis Based on the Theory of International Public Goods [北极治理与中国参与——基于国际公共品理论的分析], Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sciences) 3 [武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版)] (2014).


See, for example, Roger W. Robinson, “China’s Long Con in the Arctic,” Macdonald Laurier Institute Commentary (September 2013). On this theme more generally, see Matthew Willis and Duncan Depledge, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying about China’s Arctic Ambitions: Understanding China’s Admission to the Arctic Council.

85 Higgins, “Teeing Off at Edge of the Arctic?”


92 Alexander Panin, “Russia Plans Giant State Oil Services Company to Replace Western Firms,” Moscow Times, October 12, 2014.


99 This is a rough comparison for illustrative purposes only – it should be kept in mind that a big part of the Nexen acquisition was its potential for future production.


108 Mia Bennett, “China-Russia Gas Deal Creates Arctic Winners and Losers.”


111 Graham Chandler, “Stranded Gas,” Up Here Business (June 2008). For more on this period see Tom Kennedy, Quest: Canada’s Search for Arctic Oil (Reidmore, 1988).


113 Chris Windeyer, “There and Back Again,” Up Here Business, February 2013, 27.

114 Lasserre, China and the Arctic, 7.

115 Q. Li, “The Situation and Challenges for Deep Water Oil and Gas Exploration and Exploitation in China [我国海洋深水油气开发面临的挑战], Zhongguo Haishang Youqi 18, no. 2 (April 2006), quoted in Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, 8.


117 See, for example, Chinese National Petroleum Company’s emerging relationship with Sovcomflot discussed in chapter 4.


120 Quenneville, “Tough Oil, Easy Decision.”

121 See, for example, Li Hui, “The Dream of the Arctic Gas and Oil Might Break [北极油气开发或将梦碎], Sinopecnews [中国石化报], March 6, 2015.


Some commentators encourage Canada to engage the international community to enact a regulatory framework that ensures “fair and transparent management of fisheries in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing.” See, for example, Rob Huebert and Brooks Yeager, A New Sea (WWF, 2008), 10–12. Experts propose various governance models, including an Arctic regional seas framework agreement, a regional ocean management organization, or a protected area designation. See, for example, Oran Young, “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North,” Polar Record 45, no. 1 (January 2009): 180.


DFAIT, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 7.

A peaceful framework was agreed to at the Ilulissat declaration in 2008.


143 See, for example, Linda Jakobsen, *China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic*; Wright, *The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World*.


145 Ted McDorman, Presentation to the First Sino-Canadian Workshop, February 2010, Beijing.

146 Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, United Nations, No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 (July 8, 2010).

147 On Li Zhenfu’s statement to this effect see David Wright, *The PandaReadies to Meet the Polar Bear: China and Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Challenge* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2011), 8–9.

148 Investment Canada Act, Part IV, 25.2 (l).


151 Willis and Depledge, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying,” 767–8.


Chapter 5 - China and Arctic Governance: Uncertainty and Potential Friction

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly,” Speech to the Third Arctic Circle Assembly, Iceland, October 17, 2015.

2 DFAIT, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (August 2010).

3 Ibid.


7 See, for example, Li Zhenfu “A Northeast Asian Perspective on the Greater Arctic” [大北极视角下的泛东北亚], China Ship Survey [中国船检] 8 (2016); Meng Zhenrong, “The Competition in the Arctic and China’s Response” [北极之争与中国应对], Intelligence [才智] 2 (2016).


Jakobson and Peng, *China’s Arctic Aspirations*, 12.


In his review of China’s Arctic interests for Defence Research and Development Canada, Kyle Christensen seems to have examined these authors and not the other side of the debate. See “China in the Arctic: Potential Developments Impacting China’s Activities in an Ice-Free Arctic,” *On Track* (Conference of Defence Associations Institute) (Winter 2010–11): 19–20. His report “China in the Arctic: China’s Interests and Activities in an Ice-Free Arctic” (DRDC CORA LR 2010-210) is now available online at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/rddc-drdc/D68-6-196-2011-eng.pdf.


The Arctic Governance Project, “Arctic Governance in an Era of Transformative Change: Critical Questions, Governance Principles, Ways Forward,” April 14, 2010. Bridget Larocque of the Gwitch’in Council International criticized the Arctic Governance project proposals as flawed. She was reported stating that “the report was directed by people who don’t live in the Arctic and that their steering committee sidelined the Arctic Council’s indigenous permanent participants.” She also noted that the Arctic Council was completing its own review. Jane George, “Group Touts Big Makeover for Arctic Council,” *Nunatsiaq News*, May 20, 2010.

This section draws from James Manicom and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Demystifying China’s Arctic Ambitions: What Can We Expect from China in the Arctic?,” a paper presented to the international symposium *China and the World after the 18th NCCPC*,

21 DFAIT, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 9.


26 Arctic Council, “Working Groups,” http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups. Working Groups also regularly invite guests or experts to attend their meetings. Several Task Forces, appointed at the Ministerial meetings to work on specific issues for a limited amount of time, also operate within the framework of the Arctic Council. The Task Forces are active until they have produced the desired results, at which point they become inactive. In May 2011, the Nuuk Declaration also established an Ecosystem-based Management Experts Group to recommend further activities in this field for consideration by the Senior Arctic Officials before the end of the Swedish chairmanship.

27 For Inuit perspectives on the EU seal ban, see the Inuit Circumpolar Council website at: www.inuitcircumpolar.com. Another controversial aspect of the EU’s application related to the European Commission’s first Communication specifically on the Arctic on November 20, 2008 (IP/08/1750), which proposed the need for an Antarctic-like treaty. This directly contradicted the Illulissat Declaration by the Arctic coastal states announced on May 28, 2008.


30 Jakobson and Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, 13.


The Nuuk Ministerial Meeting also decided to adopt the recommendations of the Senior Arctic Officials on the role and criteria for observers to the Arctic Council (SAO Report, May 2011). The SAO Report acknowledges at the outset that “Since the establishment of the Arctic Council participation by observers has been a valuable feature through their provision of scientific and other expertise, information and financial resources. The involvement of observers should enhance and complement the unique and critical role of permanent participants in the Arctic Council.” As for the role of observers, it resolved that “decisions at all levels in the Arctic Council are the exclusive right and responsibility of the eight Arctic states with the involvement of the permanent participants.” Once observer status has been granted to them, the primary role of observers is “to observe the work of the Arctic Council” and “continue to make relevant contributions through their engagement in the Arctic Council primarily at the level of working groups.” Observers are allowed to propose projects through an Arctic state or a permanent participant “but financial contributions from observers to any given project may not exceed the financing from Arctic states, unless otherwise decided by the SAOs.”


Statement by H.E. Ambassador Lan Lijun at the Meeting between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and observers, November 6, 2012.

Willis and Depledge, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying,” 766.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Cheng, “Arctic Aspirations.” In addition, Cheng Baozhi of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies cast the new criteria as an attempt by the Member States to raise “The Political Threshold in Order to Stop Non-Arctic States Interfering in Arctic [Affairs].” Quoted in Jakobson and Peng, *China’s Arctic Aspirations*, 14.

Arctic Council, “Observers.”

Guo Peiqing, “An Analysis of New Criteria for Permanent Observer Status on the Arctic Council and the Road of Non-Arctic States to Arctic,” draft article, *KMI International Journal of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries* 4, no. 2 (2012): 4, 6. Peiqing also raises specific concerns related to subjects such as excessive straight baselines, outer continental shelf claims, and LOSC Article 234.


Lasserre, *China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation*, 11.


50 Quoted in Jakobson and Peng, *China's Arctic Aspirations*, 14.


55 See, for example, Huang Dung and Baolin Zhu, “Arctic Governance Mechanisms and Innovation, A “Community of Destiny” Concept [基于“命运共同体”理念的北极治理机制创新], *Exploration and Free Views* [探索与争鸣] 3 (2016); Huang Ding and Chong Zhang, “China’s Participation in Arctic Governance – A Perspective Based on Institutional Neoliberalism” [中国参与北极治理的价值分析基于新自由制度主义的视角], *Wuhan University Journal* [武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版)] 3 (2016).


58 Despite the official assurances that the core of Canada’s Northern Strategy is first and foremost about people, Northern indigenous groups have expressed concerns about their involvement in national and international decision-making. Inuit representatives, for example, have suggested that the government agenda prioritizes investments in defence and resource development at the expense of environmental protection and improved social and economic conditions. They insist that “sovereignty begins at home” and that the primary challenges are domestic human security issues, requiring investments in infrastructure, education, and health care. As such, indigenous voices add to the complexity of the Canadian message projected to the rest of the world. See, for example, Inuit Qaujisarvingat/Inuit Knowledge Centre, *Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Sovereignty, Patriotism, and Security* (Ottawa: Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2013). The Inuit Circumpolar Council’s transnational *Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic* (2009) emphasized that “the inextricable linkages between issues of sovereignty and
sovereign rights in the Arctic and Inuit self-determination and other rights require states to accept the presence and role of Inuit as partners in the conduct of international relations in the Arctic.” The declaration envisions the Inuit playing an active role in all deliberations on environmental security, sustainable development, militarization, shipping, and socio-economic development.


60 DFAIT, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (August 2010).


65 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), An Integrated Arctic Strategy (2008), 12.

66 Cochran. While regional institutions involving non-Arctic states “can provide useful mechanisms for international exchange and cooperation,” the Inuit declaration on sovereignty also insists that “the conduct of international relations in the Arctic and the resolution of international disputes in the Arctic are not the sole preserve of Arctic states or other states, they are also within the purview of the Arctic indigenous peoples. The development of international institutions in the Arctic, such as multi-level governance systems and indigenous people’s organizations must transcend Arctic states’ agenda on sovereignty and sovereignty rights and the traditional monopoly claimed by states in the area of foreign affairs.”

67 In August 2010, for example, the Qikiqtani Inuit Association secured an injunction to halt seismic testing in Lancaster Sound on the grounds that this activity could affect whales, polar bears and other marine life and change migration patterns. “Inuit Win Injunction on Seismic Testing,” CBC News, August 8, 2010. In December 2006, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. filed a $1 billion lawsuit against the government of Canada for breach of contract, arguing that Canada “is not living up to its implementation responsibilities and is therefore violating the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA)” and “keeps Inuit dependent and in a state of financial and emotional despair despite promises made when the NLCA was signed in 1993.” NTI, “NTI Launches Lawsuit against Government of Canada for Breach of Contract,” December 6, 2006.

68 Jakobson and Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, 14–15.

See, for example, Huang Ding and Chong Zhang, “China’s Participation in Arctic Governance - A Perspective Based on Institutional Neoliberalism” [中国参与北极治理的价值分析基于新自由制度主义的视角], Wuhan University Journal [武汉大学学报 (哲学社会科学版)] 3 (2016); Lu Jing, “An Analysis of the Arctic Governance Dilemma and Coordination [北极治理困境与协同治理路径探析], International Studies [国际问题研究] 5 (2016).


Frédéric Lasserre has also argued that “engaging China and supporting the admission of other countries as observers at the Arctic Council could prove useful for Canada in keeping its own agenda prominent in cooperation discussions … working on building common grounds with China and taking its concerns and interests into account could prove profitable inasmuch as China, in turn, consider Canada’s specific interests in the Arctic.” Lasserre, China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation, 11. See also Piotr Graczyk, Małgorzata Smieszek, Timo Koivurova, and Adam Stepien, “Preparing for the Global Rush: The Arctic Council, Institutional Norms, and Socialisation of Observer
Chapter 6 - The Way Ahead

1. DFAIT, Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy, 23.


4. See, for example, Matthew Bondy: "Justin Trudeau is Putting the 'Liberals' Back in 'Canadian Foreign Policy,'” Foreign Policy, October 21, 2015; Lee Berthiaume, "A Return to Multilateralism,” National Post, December 29, 2015; Stéphane Dion, “On 'Responsible Conviction' and Liberal Foreign Policy,” Maclean’s, March 29, 2016. On the new government’s main priorities and their relationship to the North, see Thomas Axworthy, "In the North, Justin Trudeau Can Accomplish Great Things,” Toronto Star, March 6, 2016.


12. After PM Harper “ordered a rewrite of Canada’s international claim for Arctic seabed rights to include the North Pole” in December 2013, Trudeau (as Liberal leader) noted:
“I am going to defer to scientists. There has been an awful lot of work done over the past years, and even decades, on mapping out the undersea floor of the North Pole to align with the United Nations regulations … And I don’t know that it is a place where we need necessarily to have political interference. I trust our scientists and oceanographers in terms of how we’re mapping it.” Steven Chase, “Turf War with Russia Looms over Ottawa’s Claim to Arctic Seabed,” Globe and Mail, December 5, 2013.

13 See, for example, Borgerson and Byers, “Arctic Front in the Battle to Contain Russia”; Levon Sevunts, “Canada’s Defence Review and the Arctic,” Radio Canada International, April 8, 2016.


15 In highlighting the need for “an agile, responsive, and well-equipped military force that can effectively defend Canada and North America,” and by mentioning the Arctic in particular, there is no indication that Arctic defence, security, and safety will be downgraded in importance. Instead, the Liberal party promised to make investments in the Royal Canadian Navy to be a “top priority,” including completing the six Arctic and offshore patrol ships (AOPS) announced by the Conservatives and the construction of more icebreakers (presumably for the Canadian Coast Guard). Liberal Party of Canada, “Defence Platform [2015],” https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/royal-canadian-navy/.


17 While the Harper Conservatives had suspended almost all bilateral contact with Russia after the latter invaded Crimea in March 2014, Dion stressed that this extreme stand deviated from the actions of the US and other G7 partners. “We also need to think about our national interests because Russia is our neighbour in the Arctic,” the minister explained. Lee Berthiaume, “Canada Ready to Re-engage with Russia, Iran, Despite Differences, Dion Says,” Ottawa Citizen, November 11, 2015. During the election campaign in October 2015, Trudeau had told reporters that, if he became prime minister, he would “tell off” Putin “directly to his face” after accusing the Russian leader of “being dangerous” in eastern Europe, “irresponsible and harmful” in the Middle East, and “unduly provocative” in the Arctic. Canadian Press, “Justin Trudeau Would Tell Off ‘Bully’ Vladimir Putin ‘Directly to His Face’ If He Becomes Prime Minister,” National Post, October 13, 2015.

18 In January 2016, Dion reiterated that Canada hoped to resume dialogue with Russia, despite that country’s military aggression in Ukraine, and cited the Arctic as a region where Canada would benefit from reengagement with its circumpolar neighbour. Scott Borgerson and Michael Byers, “The Arctic Front in the Battle to Contain Russia,” Wall Street Journal, 8 March 2016. See also Matthew Fisher, “Allies Wait for Great Defence Commitment from Canada While Russia Militarizes the Arctic,” National Post,


31 According to the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB), the Nunavut Marine Council (NMC) was established in 2012 by Section 15.4.1 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), “which allows the Nunavut Impact Review Board, the Nunavut Water Board, the Nunavut Planning Commission and the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board to, together as the NMC, or individually advise and make
recommendations to other government agencies regarding the marine areas of the Nunavut Settlement Area.” Pursuant to the NLCA, the Canadian government “must consider such advice and recommendations in making decisions which affect marine areas,” with the objective of ensuring “the ongoing protection and wise use of the marine areas for the long-term benefit of Inuit and the rest of the public of Nunavut and Canada, in a manner consistent with the principles of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit and of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement.” NIRB, “Nunavut Marine Council,” http://www.nirb.ca/marine-council. See also NMC, “What is the Nunavut Marine Council?,” http://www.nunavutmarinecouncil.com/node/30.

37 Heather Exner-Pirot also suggests that the December joint statement also shows a realignment of Canadian Arctic foreign policy with US priorities, as well as the influence of environmental groups such as WWF and Oceans North Canada which, she observes, “Boast Alumni Currently in Senior Canadian Government Roles.” Exner-Pirot, “Six Takeaways from this Week’s US-Canada joint Arctic Statement,” OpenCanada, December 22, 2016.
38 This objective stresses that “all Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic are vital to strengthening and supporting US and Canadian sovereignty claims,” and both countries “commit to working in partnership to implement land claims agreements to realize the social, cultural and economic potential of all Indigenous and Northern communities.” Priority areas include renewable energy and efficiency alternatives to diesel; community climate change adaptation; “innovative options for housing and infrastructure”; and action to improve mental wellness, education, Indigenous languages, and skill development, particularly among Indigenous youth. “US-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership,” March 10, 2016.
41 Exner-Pirot, “Six Takeaways from this Week’s US-Canada Joint Arctic Statement.”
42 On this characterization of the Conservative government’s agenda see, for example, Lisa Williams, “Canada, the Arctic, and Post-national Identity in the Circumpolar
See P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, eds., Canada’s Northern Strategy under the Harper Conservatives: Key Speeches and Documents on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 2006–15, Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) No. 6 (Calgary and Waterloo: Centre for Military, Strategic and Security Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism/Arctic Institute of North America, 2016).


Evans, Engaging China, 75.


Mulroney, Middle Power, Middle Kingdom, 291.


Ibid.


58 Saunders, “What Are Justin Trudeau’s End-Game Ambitions?”

59 For a poignant discussion of Chinese state and corporate espionage and the risks to Canadian security, see Mulroney, *Middle Power, Middle Kingdom*, 160–70.

60 Jakobson, *China Prepares For an Ice-Free Arctic*, 7.

61 China maintains a fleet of ten nuclear submarines, none of which have been designed for under-ice operations. It should be remembered that developing this capability took the Soviet and American navies decades of practice.


63 Chen translation of Baranikova, “China’s Arctic Policy.”


72 See P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Rob Huebert, “Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 320–33.


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China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada is the one of the first in-depth studies of China’s increasing interest in the Arctic. It offers a holistic approach to understanding Chinese motivations and the potential impacts of greater Chinese presence in the circumpolar region, exploring resource development, shipping, scientific research, governance, and security.

Drawing on extensive research in Chinese government documentation, business and media reports, and current academic literature, this timely volume eschews the common assumption that China poses an acute threat to Arctic states’ polar interests. Instead, it offers a nuanced assessment of how different Chinese stakeholders approach the region and how carefully managed relationships can contribute to positive circumpolar development.

Analyzing Chinese interests and activities from a Canadian perspective, the book provides an unparalleled point of reference to discuss the implications for the Canadian and broader circumpolar North.

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