2018-09-21

Direct and Indirect Effects of Authoritarianism on Policy Preferences in Canada

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Direct and Indirect Effects of Authoritarianism on Policy Preferences in Canada

by

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY, ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER, 2018

Abstract

Authoritarianism, as a value orientation that prioritizes conformity over autonomy, is a popular explanation for political preferences and behaviour but it is misunderstood as existing only on the right; as either an all-powerful or insignificant predictor of policy preferences; and as a predisposition that is activated by threat. Our understanding of it is further hampered by a lack of research outside of the United States. I address these problems by constructing a model where authoritarian values, moderated by perceived threat, exert a direct effect on policy preferences and indirect effects through prejudice, ideology, and partisanship. Testing this model on data from the Canadian Election Study, I find evidence that authoritarianism cuts across the political spectrum; is not activated by threat, but rather has greater effects in the absence of threat; and is partially mediated by prejudice and ideology. This shines a new light on some Canadian policy debates (especially the banning of religious facial coverings) and replicates previous American findings.

Acknowledgements

It has been a long road to get to this point, and I have many people to thank. First are three individuals who had the most proximate effect on my decision to go back to school. My boss, mentor, and friend Janet Brown not only encouraged me to pursue my MA, but graciously allowed me to take time off work to do so and helped me develop the analysis and writing skills that have enabled me to do well in my graduate school. Duane Bratt has never taught me a course but has still been an academic mentor to me. It was Janet and I's collaboration with him on an election sign count project and his invitation to present our results to a group of academics in Banff that led me to reconnect with my old professors, who promptly asked me, "Why haven't you come back yet?" My friend and ski partner, Kelly Bloxom, made sure I relieved some stress by getting out to the mountains, and besides keeping me out of trouble in avalanche country, he lit the spark for the academic fire when he asked me, "What the hell are you waiting for?"

The Department of Political Science has been very supportive of my efforts, both through funding and by helping me survive the graduate school experience. Administrators Judi Powell and Ella Wensel made sure the trains ran on time and that I never missed a deadline. Professors Gavin Cameron, Anthony Sayers, Pablo Policzer, and Jack Lucas conducted my graduate seminars and cultivated a challenging, engaging, and supportive learning environment. I also thank Jack for hiring me as research assistant and giving me the chance to co-write with him. Kim-Lee Tuxhorn and David Stewart not only agreed to be on my thesis committee but have always been available to talk politics or research. I also thank Kim-Lee for hiring me as a teaching assistant and as a research assistant, and for introducing me to mediation analysis, which became an integral part of my thesis. I also had the opportunity to be a teaching assistant

for Brenda O'Neill and Rob Huebert, who have been mentors to me since my undergraduate days.

My greatest academic debt is to Melanee Thomas, who taught my Canadian political processes seminar, helped me develop my teaching skills, offered me a research assistant position, and served as my MA supervisor. Without knowing much about me, she agreed to take me on as her student and has gone beyond what I could have expected a supervisor to do, like reading drafts of my work while in transit on vacation and providing detailed feedback before dropping out of network coverage. Melanee, you are awesome AF.

My peers are a source of invaluable intellectual and emotional support. Luke Czernecki introduced me to the concept of authoritarianism. Chance Minnett-Watchel worked hard to foster a sense of community among the graduate students. I am especially grateful for the fellowship of my cohort, who have become some of my closest friends. Connor Molineaux helped me love the academic lifestyle and never shied away from unpacking difficult concepts, being a sounding board for ideas and bits of writing, or providing much-needed distraction in times when taking a break for a beer was actually the more productive course of action. Andrew Klain is a model athlete-academic whose discipline and personal constitution inspire me to hold myself to higher standards; I do not know anyone who is just as capable of discussing institutions as anthropology or nutrition. Jessica Weber always reminds me (even when she does not directly) of the importance of meaning, truth, goodness, and friendship in not just politics and political science, but in all manners of life. Her brilliance is matched by her generosity of spirit, and both are eclipsed by her wisdom. To Connor, Andrew, and Jess—thank you for being there, but most of all thank you for being you.

My studies have meant I have not had as much time as I would have liked to spend with those I love. My parents, Anatalia and Rene Santos, to whom this thesis is dedicated, have supported me from the beginning and have never stopped believing in my academic potential. They have sacrificed much so that I may succeed, and words cannot express my gratitude to them. My grandparents, Efrain and Rosalina Santos, continue to provide encouragement, as well as nutritional sustenance. My brothers, Carlo and Chris Santos, have been incredibly patient with my inability to hang out and play board games or music. I am so proud of what they have achieved in their own lives and learn from them now as much, if not more so than what they have learned from me in the past. My in-laws, the Eastons (and Bornats) have welcomed me into their family with open arms and even indulge me in discussing my research. David, Irene, John, Lisa, Kaiden, Cassie, Helen, Francois, and Edward, thank you for being wonderful people and being better in-laws than I could have hoped for.

Finally, and most importantly, there is the home front. My then-partner now-wife, Kate Easton, has been immeasurably supportive, whether it is driving so I can read/write/mark, putting up with me being unable to go on vacation because of my work, or discussing politics with me into the wee hours of the night and offering a much-needed outsider's perspective. Kate, your support has made this journey less brutal and more enjoyable. Thank you.

Dedication

For my parents, Anatalia and Rene Santos, who lived under the regime form of authoritarianism. They sacrificed much for their family and were the first ones to teach me the importance of personal autonomy.

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Chapter One: A Popular and Misunderstood Concept

Neither human behaviour nor political phenomena surrender themselves to easy explanations, yet that has not deterred commentary in the mainstream media (by both journalists and academics) from proffering them regardless. Consider this provocatively-titled article in *Politico* magazine*:* "That One Weird Trait That Predicts Whether You're a Trump Supporter" (MacWilliams 2016). The trait to which the article refers is authoritarianism—not as a regime type, but as a psychological phenomenon. "But wait! There's more!" the commentariat exclaims. It is not just Trump, but the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe, and an increased "security ethic and politics of fear" in Canada that are explained by authoritarianism (Graves 2016). And yet, there are others who say, "It's not authoritarianism, it's racism" (Wood 2017), or that the whole concept of authoritarianism is just an ideologically-motivated, stereotype-fueled campaign waged against conservatives by liberals, who themselves are no less authoritarian (Singal 2018). Worse still is that some of these popular treatments of a complex psychological concept either avoid defining the concept in favour of identifying who is afflicted with it or mischaracterize the definition of the concept altogether.

This resurgence in the popularity of the concept of authoritarianism echoes the initial excitement, controversy, and confusion over the original theory outlined in *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno *et al.* 1950). Today, as was the case seventy years ago, misunderstanding abounds as to what authoritarianism is, what it is not, what it causes, and how it exerts its effects. So, it is for reasons of academic advancement of our understanding of the concept, and for the correction of some popular myths, I present here a study of authoritarianism in Canada, focusing on what authoritarian is (and isn't) and on how (much) it affects attitudes about public policy.

1.1 What's the problem with authoritarianism?

Describing authoritarianism is often easier when we understand what it is not first. This study does not refer to authoritarianism as a regime type, which could also be called autocracy, dictatorship or non-democracy. I am also not referring to authoritarianism as a component of a political ideology that calls for individualized rule by strong men who personify the so-called "will of the people" (Mudde 2007). Instead, this study focuses on authoritarianism as a psychological concept— that is, something within the human mind. At various times, studies of authoritarianism have presented it as an attitude, ideology, personality type, or a value (Schuman, Bobo, and Krysan 1992).

The most popular understanding of authoritarianism is also the original version, popularized in the book, *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno *et al.* 1950). Written in the aftermath of World War II, it argues that a potentially fascistic personality type exists: it is intolerant of "the other," highly conventional in belief, aggressive and impulsive, susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda, and susceptible to becoming an actual fascist if circumstances provided an opportunity. The concept has subsequently undergone considerable revision, and is currently better understood as a predisposition, or a deep-seated personal quality or trait where someone places high value on order, conformity, and sameness over chaos, autonomy, and difference (Duckitt 1989, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005).

Two myths about authoritarianism persist in both the academic literature and in popular understandings of the concept. The first myth is that authoritarianism is a conservative phenomenon. Common variations of this myth include that it is the same as conservatism, is a type of conservatism, or is only found amongst conservatives. This myth runs through most conceptualizations of authoritarianism, starting with *The Authoritarian Personality*, where their

"F-scale" ("F" for fascist) measurement instrument is seen to be a catalogue of a type of conservatism driven by an underlying, latent authoritarian personality. It continued with Altemeyer and his concept of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, which baked conservatism into the name (1981, 1988). He would later emphatically state that he could find very few individuals who had left-wing political orientations—i.e. high support for redistribution—and were highly authoritarian (1996). It continues today, with the classification of authoritarianism as a variant of conservatism alongside support for the status quo and support for free market economic (Stenner 2009). This last one is even more notable because it comes from Karen Stenner, who along with Stanley Feldman, is most responsible for advancing contemporary understanding of authoritarianism.

The second myth is that authoritarianism explains everything and nothing at the same time. On one hand, it is a powerful predictor of human behaviour across policy domains and across contexts. On the other, it fails to meaningfully explain of variation in attitudes, preferences, or behaviours. The first case comes through clearly in the popular press, with articles such as "That One Weird Trait That Predicts Whether You're a Trump Supporter" (Macwilliams 2017)—which was the mainstream news distillation of a legitimate and compelling academic project—or bold claims like, "Authoritarianism is the single biggest predictor of general intolerance" (Stenner 2005, 9). The second case is exemplified by claims that variation explained by authoritarianism is better explained by some form of prejudice, such as racism (Wood 2017) or ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2010).

Part of why these myths persist is because there are empirical generalizations that provide some support for them. Authoritarians are more are more likely to have traditional or conventional views on moral issues (Adorno *et al.* 1950, Altemeyer 1981, 1988). They have a

greater need for order and be more likely to see the world in black-and-white terms, rather than shades of grey (Stenner 2005). They tend to have a reified view of the world—that "the way things are" are fixed, immutable, and governed by forces outside of human control as opposed to being the product of human actions (Gabennesch 1972). They are more suspicious of outgroups and more likely to express ethnocentric attitudes and prejudice (Adorno *et al.* 1950, Allport 1954, Altemeyer 1981, Forbes 1985, Stenner 2005, Kinder and Kam 2010). Conservatism is associated with some of the same things, whether it is holding traditional notions of morality or wanting to protect and promote traditional institutions (Hunter 2003, Laycock 2002, Lusztig and Wilson 2005, Farney 2012), believing the laws governing human behaviour have extra-human origins (Freeden 1996) or wanting to maintain order, reduce or reverse social change, and protect traditional institutions (Budge 2002, Mair 2007, Feldman and Johnston 2014, Cochrane 2015). As well, at least in the United States, conservative ideology, conservative partisanship, social attitudes, and authoritarian predispositions are becoming increasingly aligned, which makes isolating any of their effects more difficult. Given all this, it is perhaps understandable that authoritarianism and conservatism are sometimes conflated. Yet, it would be an error to claim that these concepts are, in fact, the same thing.

Similarly, both myths persist because authoritarianism is typically poorly defined. As a result, most attempts to model authoritarianism's effects suffer from endogeneity problems, making it difficult to disentangle what might be caused by authoritarianism, and what might be caused by other, related factors. Thus, the conceptual problem tackled in this project is this: how do we separate authoritarianism from conservatism? More specifically, how do we separate authoritarianism from social conservatism, which is typically defined as a political value orientation that prefers conventional moral standards, especially in terms of family structure and

sexual relations (Farney 2012)? Authoritarianism and social conservatism are certainly related, but they are not the same thing, as authoritarianism priorities conformity over autonomy as a means of preserving social order. Forcing individuals to live according to conventional moral standards is one example of enforced conformity, and many social conservatives are likely authoritarians, and vice versa.

However, relation and coincidence are not the same as equivalence, and there are at least three cases that challenge the conflation between preferring conventional morals and enforcing social conformity. The first is the "socially conservative, but not authoritarian" scenario. One can hold conventional moral preferences without seeking to impose them on others. For example, a woman might be pro-life, believe it to be morally wrong, never seek an abortion themselves, but she may nevertheless support others having the right to access abortion services. The second is the "socially liberal, but authoritarian" scenario. This could take the form of social desirability bias, where such an individual knows the politically correct answers to questions about contentious social issues and so their answers to those questions paint a picture of readiness to accept difference, but that picture is insincere. This individual expresses socially liberal preferences, but only "in their head and not their heart." They profess support for accommodation of sexual or racial minorities in theory but resist when there are real policy or spending implications, or if there is a perception government has "gone too far." A third possibility is a "left-wing authoritarian" where someone has a real and enduring commitment to liberal social values, and seeks to impose conformity to those values. The historical, perhaps extreme example used by critics of the original theory of authoritarianism is the Soviet Revolution, where the Bolsheviks sought to impose a forcibly radical conception of equality on Russian society (Rockeah 1960, Ray 1979). A less extreme example of this might be a left-

leaning, morally liberal atheist, who opposes any form of religious schooling, even when such schools receive no public money, believes children should be taught that all religion is bad and the only authorities they should trust are scientists, and holds a high degree of anti-Christian prejudice. Such a person would score left on the ideological measures, but clearly have a desire to enforce social conformity. Given these three challenges, this project seeks to clarify how authoritarianism is defined so that it can be conceptually disentangled from concepts such as conservatism.

The empirical (endogeneity) problem is related to the conceptual problem. It is difficult to isolate authoritarianism's effects because of the mechanics of how dominant statistical techniques, such as regression analysis, work. In order to rule out alternative explanations, a model with authoritarianism as the key predictor of interest will have to control for alternative explanations. If the dependent variable is, for example, opposition to same-sex marriage, social ideology, anti-LGBTQ prejudice, and party identification are alternative explanations to rule out. However, it is not as simple as throwing everything into a regression model because regression assumes the predictors are independent of each other in order to isolate the effect of each of them on the dependent variable of interest. This assumption will not hold in this hypothetical model because authoritarianism is related to social ideology (Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009), prejudice (Adorno et al. 1950, Altemeyer 1981, Stenner 2005), and partisanship (Mockabee 2006, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Cizmar *et al*. 2014, Feldman 2017), so including all of them in a single model could result them appearing to cancel out each other's effects on the dependent variable because they are all related to one another and thus explaining similar parts of why someone might be opposed to a given policy. One approach to solve this empirical problem could be to exclude ideology and partisanship when measuring

authoritarianism's effects on the grounds that their inclusion "somewhat obscures the effects of authoritarianism" (Feldman 2017), but that opens to door to omitted variable bias. The goal of this project, then, is to use conceptual clarity to bring empirical precision to the problem.

1.2 The research question

My research question is: *how, and to what extent, does authoritarianism structure political preferences in Canada?* The use of the word "how" is deliberate because authoritarianism's effects on politics are not just a matter of *how much*, or *to what extent*. As will be discussed in the Chapter 2, the mechanisms of how authoritarianism "does work" in politics is as important as how much work it does to political attitudes and preferences. It is not a simple matter of "if authoritarian, then X," because authoritarianism's effects are partially mediated by factors related to it, namely prejudice, ideology, and partisanship. Given this, authoritarianism will influence policy preferences directly and indirectly through its influence on prejudice, ideology, and partisanship, and those three variables' direct influence on policy preferences. An additional complicating factor is that of perceived threat, which conditions the effect of authoritarianism, such that the size of authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences differs across levels of perceived threat (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suhary 2011).

My claim that there is a causal pathway from authoritarianism to policy preferences with stops along the way for prejudice, ideology, partisanship, and threat. This has six testable implications, which are listed below:

1. There is a positive relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice such that those with higher levels of authoritarianism will also express higher levels of prejudice;

2. There is a positive relationship between authoritarianism and conservative ideology such that those with higher levels of authoritarianism will express more conservative values;
3. There is a relationship between authoritarianism and partisanship, such that identifiers for the Conservative Party of Canada will have higher levels of authoritarianism than voters for the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, the Bloc Quebecois, or non-partisans;
4. There is a positive relationship between authoritarianism supporting policies that enforce cultural homogeneity, enforce traditional social arrangements, favour punishing over rehabilitating criminals; and curtail civil liberties in the name of national security;
5. Because prejudice, ideology, and partisanship also predict policy preferences, the size of authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences will be smaller when these three factors are included in the model than when they are not the model; and
6. For all the previous, the positive relationship between authoritarianism and policy preference is conditional upon perceived threat such that the effect of authoritarianism is greater at low levels of threat than at high levels of threat (i.e. a negative interaction).

Thus, in addition to providing testable hypotheses, this setup also directly addresses the two myths outlined above. If authoritarianism and conservatism are the same thing, then measures for one of should almost perfectly predict the other, and vice-versa. Their effects on policy preferences should also cancel each other out when included in a regression model. If the correlation between various measures of conservatism and authoritarianism are less than

extremely high (i.e. r=0.8), or if the effect of authoritarianism in a regression model continues to be non-trivial (i.e. statistically and substantively significant) after the introduction of authoritarianism, then that challenges the first myth that authoritarianism is the same thing as conservatism, or that conservatism accounts for any variation thought to be from authoritarianism.

The modeling procedure I use also deals with the endogeneity problem with authoritarianism. Running multiple models provides the advantage of being able to see the full size of the "authoritarianism gap" in policy preferences without interference from prejudice, ideology, *and* seeing how much of the gap remains after we control for one or all of those mediating variables. This avoid the "authoritarianism is everything or nothing" false dichotomy and allows for a more nuanced understanding of authoritarianism's effects—that they happen both directly and indirectly. When authoritarianism's effects seem to disappear, it is not because it does not have an effect, but because its effect is happening indirectly.

1.3 The plan of attack

This project proceeds across seven chapters. Chapter Two accounts the evolution of the theory of authoritarianism, which theoretical issues remain unresolved, and motivates for why it makes sense to study authoritarianism in a Canadian context. The main theoretical issues rest with the level at which authoritarianism occurs, the nature of the interaction between authoritarianism and threat, the relationship between authoritarianism and conservatism, and which preferences we should expect authoritarianism to predict. This will be set within the context of the "funnel of causality" understanding of voter behaviour (Campbell *et al.* 1960), where more distant factors

cause and are mediated by more proximate factors.[1] The relevance of authoritarianism to Canadian politics is found through longstanding issues around accommodating minorities, the evolution of moral norms, and with matters of national security.

Chapter Three explains the measures and methods used in this study. The Canadian Election Study includes the same questions as the American National Election Study to measure authoritarian predispositions. I will also discuss the other variables used in the analysis and outline the modeling procedures I used to test the implications of my theory.

Chapter Four is the first empirical chapter. It demonstrates the first three empirical implications of my theory (authoritarianism predicts prejudice, conservatism, and partisanship), and in so doing, provides evidence that the measures of authoritarianism I use are valid and distinct. Chapter Four also sets up the mediation analysis in the following chapter. This is a substantive chapter in its own right because many of the correlates of authoritarianism that will be used to validate which concepts are causally in-between—that is, they intervene the relationship between—authoritarianism and political attitudes.

Chapter Five assesses authoritarianism's effects on eight policy preferences. It demonstrates four things: 1) there is an "authoritarianism gap" for each of these issues, such that those scoring highest on the authoritarianism scale are more likely to have different preferences than those scoring lowest on the authoritarianism scale; 2) the authoritarianism gap is conditional upon level of perceived threat, such that it is larger in the low threat condition than in the high threat condition; 3) the gap substantively persists, albeit in a reduced size, when prejudice,

[1] While the goal of my study is not to explain vote choice, political attitudes are one of the most proximate factors to vote choice, so the funnel model is still relevant to understanding the causal chain that stems from authoritarianism.

ideology, and partisanship are accounted for; and 4) because authoritarianism is causally related to the variables introduced as controls, the diminishing of authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences when these controls are included in models is evidence of a mediational relationship, such that prejudice, ideology, and partisanship mediate authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences.

The conclusion will explain the implications of my findings with particular focus on the two authoritarian myths, discuss limitations of this study, and suggest future avenues for research on authoritarianism.

Chapter Two: A Theoretical Framework for Studying Authoritarianism

The literature on authoritarianism is vast but is disjointed and often talks past itself. This has led to some scholars branding authoritarianism as a "theoretically impoverished concept" (Lavine et al. 2002). This chapter does not provide a comprehensive account of the totality of the literature—that seems to happen every few decades (see for example, Christie and Jahoda 1954, Altemeyer 1981, Stone, Lederer, and Christie 1993; Stenner 2005). Rather, it covers the core problems with how authoritarianism is understood and operationalized and builds up to a model that addresses' those problems and is capable of testing if this thing called "authoritarianism" does what people claim it does.

This chapter has three sections. The first sets the stage by providing a basic definition of authoritarianism, describing its "levels-of-analysis" problem, and defining other concepts relevant to the application of psychology to political science. The second provides a brief history of the development of the concept and explains why the definition I use in this study is the most appropriate. The third section places authoritarianism in a time-ordered model of understanding political behaviour.

2.1 A basic definition and the levels-of-analysis problem[2]

The core idea that is common to all understandings of authoritarianism is that both conformity and autonomy are desirable priorities, but they often come into conflict with one another. Autonomy is desirable because it promotes fulfilment of individual needs and wants. Conformity

[2] The idea that abstract phenomena can be classified in hierarchical categories where higher-order categories have fewer defining criteria and apply to a wider range of objects (low intension, high extension) and lower-order categories have more defining criteria and apply to a narrower range of objects (high intension, low extension) is featured in the classic article, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics" (Sartori 1970).

is desirable because it promotes social cohesion and solidarity. Authoritarianism concerns the relative ordering of those priorities, where authoritarians prioritize and desire conformity over autonomy. (Duckitt 1989, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005). This basic human dilemma is applicable in many contexts and across various types of groups, from large, complex, and loosely-tied together groups such as a polity, or the smallest and most intimately-tied-together of all groups, the family.

What differs among the "competing" understandings of authoritarianism is what else gets added to this core idea that authoritarians prioritize and value conformity over autonomy, as well as the where it is situated in the psyche.[3] Arguing about whether authoritarianism is an attitude (or even collection of attitudes) or a value is meaningless because attitudes are not values. Values are enduring, general standards about desirable end-states or modes of living, (Rokeach 1973, Schwartz 1992). Attitudes are affective postures concerning an object of cognition, or a feeling of like or dislike towards something (Allport 1935, Zaller 1992). In constrast to attitudes, values are more general, relatively stable, and deeply-seated, whereas attitudes are more specific, relatively unstable, and somewhat superficial. When this basic distinction is understood, it opens up the possibility for a concept like authoritarianism to be situated on either level.

Authoritarianism as an attitude might include specific targets who are viewed as threats to social cohesion (i.e. social attitudes), specific policies which are the means through which one wishes to enforce conformity (i.e. political attitudes), and a set of standards one wishes to

[3] I use quotes around "competing" because arguing about which definition is correct begs the question if any of them are correct. A better way to approach the disagreement over defining authoritarianism is that there is no such thing as authoritarianism, but instead, there are many authoritarianisms, depending on where one looks.

enforce (i.e. values). On the other hand, authoritarianism as a value would only contain the core element: prioritizing conformity over autonomy.

In political science, where the goal is causal inference, or the explanation of "what causes what" in a general way (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), studying authoritarianism as a value is the more useful approach because it is a "minimally sufficient definition."[4] A minimally sufficient definition focuses on the core concept and avoids including other things that might be related or even caused by the core concept but are not the core concept itself. This has been a recurring theme of various conceptualizations of authoritarianism, which lump in other concepts beyond the conformity-autonomy dimension. Put more bluntly, it would be tautologous to use a definition of authoritarianism that includes prejudice, political values, and policy preferences as components of that definition to explain how authoritarianism influenced policy preferences directly and indirectly through prejudice, and political values.

What follows is a brief history of how authoritarianism has been used in past work in political science: as a personality, as a set of attitudes, and as a value orientation. Even though the definition used in this study does not easily comport with some of this past, work, reviewing these other conceptualizations is important for three reasons: they provide more detail about what the concept is; they recount the pattern of relationships between authoritarianism and other variables of interest in political science; and they provide useful insights that this project I subsequently use components to construct my time-ordered understanding of how authoritarianism affects policy preferences.

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[4] This term is borrowed from comparative scholars of regime types and is a way to avoid "definitions with adjectives" (Collier and Mahon 1992, Collier and Levitsky 1997). Coincidentally, these scholars address the problem of defining authoritarianism in the form of regime type.

2.2 Three theories of authoritarianism

2.2.1 *Authoritarianism as personality*

Authoritarianism was originally presented as an explanation for the Holocaust and support for fascism (Adorno *et al.* 1950). Using surveys and interviews conducted in a clinical (psychology) setting, researchers found that individual-level social and political psychological pathologies tend to occur together. For example, antisemitism does not occur on its own, but is typically accompanied by other negative social attitudes, such as racial prejudice more broadly, homophobia, an obsession with "purity," a general fear of others, and so forth. These anti-social attitudes tended to be associated with certain political attitudes, such as resistance to accommodating others, support for official suppression and containment of minorities, suspicion of democratic norms and institutions, and a preference for non-democratic regime types. Moreover, Adorno and his colleagues also found these negative social and political attitudes exist alongside maladaptive personality traits, such as an inability to deal with ambiguity, poor emotional regulation, obsession with power and toughness, fatalism, and aggression.

Based on how these psychological attributes "go together," Adorno and his colleagues argued they formed an all-encompassing personality. Some people are rational, tolerant, peace-loving democrats, while others are irrational, intolerant, violent, protofascists ready to turn against democracy when given the chance. These factors, called the F-scale "were thought of as going together to form a single syndrome, a more or less enduring structure in the person that renders him receptive to antidemocratic propaganda. One might say, therefore, that the F-scale attempts to measure the potentially antidemocratic personality" (Adorno *et al.* 1950).

Freudian psychodynamic theory is crucial for understanding why Adorno *et al.* took a seemingly "kitchen sink" approach to authoritarianism. Psychodynamics argues that conscious

thoughts and behaviours can be explained by the interplay between different parts of an individual's subconscious. The mechanics of this relationship between the conscious and subconscious are set in formative childhood experiences. From this perspective, authoritarianism is formed by childhood experiences such as overly harsh parenting, as it fosters both resentment towards but also a need to submit to one's parents as the first authorities one encounters. This relationship with parental authority carries over to other authorities encountered across the life cycle and ultimately sets how a person believes everyone should relate to authority, including in politics.

Like many other psychological phenomena, the authoritarian personality is latent and cannot be directly measured as a result.[5] Given this, Adorno *et al*. (1950) measure it indirectly through the F-scale, a 77-question long instrument that measured the following nine traits argued to make up the authoritarian personality:

1. Conventionalism (rigid adherence to traditional values);
2. Submission (a deferential and uncritical attitude toward the idealized moral authorities of the ingroup);
3. Aggression (the tendency to seek, condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values);
4. Anti-intraception (opposition to things of a subjective or imaginative nature);
5. Superstition or stereotypy (the belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories)

[5] Obviously, if someone was inciting hatred, engaging in political violence, or actively supporting an anti-democratic party, these could be considered as directly observable indicators of authoritarianism. To return to the levels-of-analysis issue, those are authoritarian behaviours, which would be consequences of authoritarian values or predispositions.

6. Power-and-toughness (identification with power figures, an exaggerated assertion of strength);
7. Cynicism (generalized hostility and vilification of other individuals);
8. Projectivity (the belief that wild and dangerous things go on in the world); and
9. Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on" (*Ibid.*, 228).

By defining authoritarianism as a personality rather than as a particular or singular personality trait, all of nine of these factors in the F-scale were thought to be essential components of authoritarianism. This is a major conceptual weakness for several reasons. First, it made authoritarianism a necessarily conservative or right-wing phenomenon by including conventionalism as a necessary component of it. This precludes the possibility of finding it on the left, despite ample evidence that there are anti-democratic, intolerant individuals also on the left, such as the Russian Bolshevik revolutionaries in the early twentieth century, or communist terrorists active in the latter half of the twentieth century like the Red Brigade (Hyman and Sheatsley 1954, Rokeach 1960). Questions about economic organization aside, communists and fascists would find much agreement on the necessity of strong state authority and the need to protect the ingroup through enforcing conformity—something demonstrated in subsequent empirical research (Ray 1971).[6]

Second, the relationship between a desire to enforce conformity and outgroup prejudice in the F-scale demands clarification. That they are related makes intuitive sense: if someone outwardly rejects "the way things ought to be," then it follows that an authoritarian would not

[6] Another criticism of Adorno and his colleagues had to do with their association with the Frankfurt School," group of leftist academics. This led to persistent allegations of anti-conservative bias (Stenner 2005).

like that person because they violate the conventionalism requirement of the authoritarian personality. Take for example an immigrant with different religious practices than those of the country in which she settled. An authoritarian might believe her religious practices to be uncharacteristic of the way religion should be practiced in the country. If the authoritarian's dislike of her is because of her alien ways, then she could "earn" the authoritarian's approval by adopting to authoritarian's perceived norms of the land. However, if the authoritarian dislikes her simply because she is different, then no amount of conforming to in-group norms would make her acceptable. Does the authoritarian dislike her because is different or because she is following different customs? If it is the latter, then an authoritarian might be tolerant of her, if she were to cast of her alien ways (i.e. conforming to the norms of the ingroup). If it is the former, then there is no amount of conformity that would get an authoritarian to accept her. Perhaps more importantly, even if negative evaluations of others are linked to authoritarianism, it does not seem to be an essential component of it and is more appropriately seen as a correlate or even effect of it. These two conceptual critiques suggest that the original concept of authoritarianism, as defined by Adorno et al. and the F-scale is too broad, too ambitious, and includes too many concepts that, while related, are distinct from one another.

There are also methodological problems with the F-scale. Not only was the scale very long, but all of its items were worded in the same direction. Studies that used more balanced F-scales (with an equal number of questions worded in both direction) and that controlled for education found that the F-scale is only a valid measure of authoritarianism for those who are highly education (Campbell *et al.* 1960, Altemeyer 1981), but those with lower levels of

education were merely acquiescing to the questionnaire (but see Lipsett 1959).[7] In addition to this, individuals' scores on the nine traits often had weak or inconsistent correlations with their scores on other traits, suggesting that these questions are measuring different things or—more likely—those traits are distinct things and not part of the same core concept. This grounds the conclusion that these methodological problems are a consequence of the conceptual ones, and that the former cannot be solved without first solving the latter.

2.2.2 *Authoritarianism as attitudes*

The next major development in the study of authoritarianism more driven by methodological rather than theoretical development. By this time, Freudian psychodynamics had been discredited as pseudo-scientific and unfalsifiable (Grünbaum 1976). Scholars abandoned the idea of early childhood trauma as an explanation for authoritarianism's origins in favour of socialization-based explanation (see Bandura 1977). Instead, they moved away from defining authoritarianism as a comprehensive personality, and defines it simply as a set of three social and political attitudes: submission, aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996). Dubbed *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* (RWA), the new theory identified authoritarians as individuals who have been socialized to be highly submissive (towards traditional authorities), highly aggressive (towards those who threaten traditional authorities), and highly conventional (to traditional modes of living).

RWA addressed some of the methodological problems with the F-scale by using experiments to select the best-performing measures from various iterations of or alternatives to the F-scale. Measures were retained if they had good psychometric properties—i.e. they showed

[7] Part of the argument Lipset makes is this acquiescence on the part of individuals with lower levels of education is evidence for "working-class authoritarianism."

high reliability and high inter-item correlations with other measures. Arguably, measures of RWA produce strong, statistically significant correlations with intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and other social attitudes. This is likely part of why the measure continues to be used today (see Choma and Hanoch 2017, Crawford and Pilansky 2014, Duckitt *et al.* 2010).

However, Altemeyer's empirically-driven approach is criticized for being atheoretical, or at least insufficiently theoretically-driven (Forbes 1985, Duckitt 1989, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005). However improved in empirics, RWA suffers from the same conceptual criticisms that apply to the theory of the authoritarian personality: why must authoritarianism be necessarily conservative or right-wing? In his later career, Altemeyer (1996) tried to find left wing authoritarianism, believing it to be a set of traits characterized by submission to radical leaders, aggression towards traditional authorities, and very unconventional moral codes, only to conclude such left wing authoritarians did not exist: "If you want Unauthoritarians [sic] on the political left, I have found plenty. If you want nonauthoritarians on the right, I have found some. If you want authoritarians on the right, I have found tons. But if you want a living, breathing, scientifically certifiable authoritarian on the left, I have not found a single one," (Altemeyer 1996, 231).[8]

Furthermore, even though Altemeyer's RWA scale performs much better statistically than the F-scale (i.e. correlations with related concepts and inter-item reliability), closer examination of question items from the scale reveals weaknesses one would miss if they only looked at statistical measures. Part of this stems from the conceptual issue of including related,

[8] To find Left-Wing Authoritarians, Altemeyer adapted his RWA scale to measure submission to those dedicated to overthrowing established authorities, aggressiveness against established authorities, and adherence to the norms of those revolutionary authorities dedicated to overthrowing established ones (p. 218). He bases his conclusions on the results of a two-wave survey conducted among a student populations of 402 (p. 221).

but distinct material in the questionnaire, which leads to the same tautological problem of measuring authoritarianism by its effects.[9] A good example of this is prejudice, which Altemeyer claims to be a consequence of RWA, yet the RWA contains measures of prejudice against various outgroups. There is also the issue that some question items being "double-barreled," or measuring multiple things at the same time, which obscures identifying which thing is actually exerting an effect.[10]

2.2.3 *Authoritarianism as values*

The last major development has been to focus on the core concept of authoritarianism and to remove any correlates or consequences that are not part of the core concept, such as ideology, intolerance, or cognitive styles. This theory starts with a basic human dilemma. As social beings, humans naturally form groups because groups can accomplish things individuals cannot accomplish on their own. However, living in a group creates tensions between individual needs and wants, and group needs and wants. Individual self-autonomy and social cohesion are both *values*, or desirable end-states or modes of living that have wide generality and transcend and specific situation (Rokeach 1973, Schwartz 1992). It is not that one of them is bad and one of them is good; both are desirable, but there are inevitable moments when they come into conflict and individuals and societies are forced to give precedence to one over the other. Authoritarianism, then, is a value-orientation that prioritizes conformity to group norms over

[9] This is less of a problem if the issue is just "diagnosing" authoritarians, as was the case with the F-scale, but if the goal to explain authoritarianism's effects, as is the case with RWA, then it is inappropriate to use other effects to measure the original cause.

[10] Consider this item: *"What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path."* Arguably, this measure captures moral intolerance (i.e. there is evil that must be crushed), conventionalism (i.e. we need to get back to that true way), and support for a potentially autocratic leader. Even if these things are conceptually related, which is not a given, they should be measured separately.

individual autonomy in the name of protecting social cohesion (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005).

This approach isolates the core concept of authoritarianism as the conformity-autonomy dimension. Other components previously thought to be part of authoritarianism can now be understood as consequences. For example, both Adorno *et al.* (1950) and Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) include prejudice and conventionalism (i.e. conservatism) as essential components of authoritarianism. If authoritarianism is a value dimension, prejudice and conventionalism are consequences of having an authoritarian value orientation. Furthermore, seeing authoritarianism as a value dissociates it from ideology. Not only does this theory open up the possibility of the "nonauthoritarian social conservative" (i.e. a hypothetical individual with socially conservative moral orientations and personal standards, but who does not desire to impose that standard one others), but it also opens up the possibility of the "authoritarian progressive" (i.e. a hypothetical individual with morally liberal standards who wishes to preclude others from having morally conservative standards).

Another way to conceptualize authoritarianism as a value is to see it as a personality-based approach that does not invoke non-falsifiable Freudian psychodynamic theory. Instead, in this view, authoritarianism can be explained as a socially-learned orientation (Bandura 1977). Individuals form an orientation about the relative priority of conformity and autonomy based on their first group experience, which is the family. Parental authority is the first form of authority a child encounters, and how one relates to their parents becomes a template for not only how they relate to other authorities encountered later in life, but how they believe others ought to relate to

those authorities.[11] This has an important theoretical implication for contextualizing our understanding of authoritarianism: it is an orientation that is formed very early and before other orientations (Rokeach 1960). In fact, other orientations—like prejudice or ideology—might even be consequences of an authoritarian value orientation (*Ibid.*, Feldman and Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005). Most recently, this understanding of authoritarianism causing enduring political orientations has expanded to include partisanship and ideological self-identification (Barker and Tinnick 2006, Mockabee 2007, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suahy 2011, Cizmar *et al.* 2014, MacWilliams 2017, Feldman 2017).

Thus, we arrive at the endogeneity problem (again) by trying to measure authoritarianism's effects on political preferences. Preferences, because they are attitudes, are unstable, surface-level psychological phenomena influenced by a multitude of factors (Converse 1964, Zaller 1992). The solution is to see authoritarianism, a value orientation formed early on, as something that influences not just political preferences, but many of the factors used to explain preferences, such as social attitudes (in the case of authoritarianism: prejudice), ideology, and partisanship. Here, authoritarianism has a both direct effect on preferences, and also an indirect effect on preferences that flows through its influence on prejudice, ideology, and partisanship. In order to fully understand this mediated process, one more important piece of the puzzle that must be discussed: the relationship between authoritarianism and threat.

[11] A related way of understanding the relationship between family life and political life is through Lakoff's idea moral politics theory, where family serves as a conceptual metaphor for the polity (1996). According to moral politics theory, a "strict father" view of the family leads individuals to want the state to be coercive and oriented towards order. This has clear parallels to the prioritization of authoritarianism. Where Lakoff's theory differs is his understanding is explicitly ideological.

2.3 The role of threat

Authoritarianism necessarily involves threat because authoritarians seek to enforce conformity in the name of social cohesion. Previous research demonstrates those scoring high on measures of authoritarianism are more likely to perceive threats from a variety of sources (Adorno *et al.* 1950, Altemeyer 1981). Analyses of aggregate-level historical data suggests authoritarian behaviours increase during times of heightened sociotropic, or society-level threat (Sales 1973).[12] More recent research puts forward an "activation" hypothesis where authoritarianism's effects on political preferences are conditional upon the presence of a perceived threat. When that threat is present, authoritarianism is activated, causing authoritarians to express intolerance and support pro-conformity policies. This was first demonstrated in secondary analysis of survey data (Feldman and Stenner 1997). This theory has inspired experimental work that has demonstrated the external manipulation of threat causes attitudinal and behaviour differences in authoritarians and non-authoritarians alike. For authoritarians, these changes include increased support for curbing freedom of assembly rights (Feldman 2003), increased expressions of intolerant attitudes (Stenner 2005), heightened perception of threatening stimuli (Lavine *et al.* 2002) and increased propensity to seek only bias-confirming information (Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005).[13] In regression models, evidence for this activation hypothesis is typically a

[12] Sales analyzed archival data to find evidence of increased authoritarianism in the United States during two periods of high threat—the Great Depression of the 1930s and the height of the Cold War in the 1960s. He used, amongst other measures, increased prevalence of power and toughness themes in comic books, requirements of teachers to make "loyalty oaths" to federal and state constitutions, and tougher sentences for those convicted of violent crimes, as indicators of an increased prevalence of authoritarian behaviours.

[13] In one word-classification experiment, authoritarians responded to threatening stimuli (in the form of words associated with dangerous things) faster than nonauthoritarians, but there was no difference in response time between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians in classifying nonthreatening words. In one experiment on seeking bias-confirming information, priming threat caused authoritarians to be more likely than nonauthoritarians to seek out unbalanced information (in the form of articles only discussing pro-death penalty arguments).

positive and statistically significant coefficient for an interaction term between threat and authoritarianism.[14]

However, other studies suggest the opposite—that authoritarianism and threat interact, but the interaction is negative, suggesting authoritarianism affects preferences more when threat is low. Heatherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) find that authoritarianism has greater effects on policy preferences when perceived threat is low than when threat is high. An alternative conclusion to draw from these findings is that that threat has a greater effect on policy preferences for non-authoritarians than for authoritarians. These results suggest that threat and authoritarianism work to cause authoritarians and non-authoritarians to converge towards similar positions, not diverge.

Part of this convergence explanation is methodological. The strongest case for the activation hypothesis comes from experimental design studies conducted on small samples of student participants where threat is externally manipulated, but are too controlled and have poor external validity, or applicability to the "real world" (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 118). Previous survey research that finds a positive interaction (Feldman and Stenner 1997), has few direct measures of threat and relied heavily on indirect measures, such as negative affective evaluations towards the presidential candidates from both major American political parties, or a high degree of perceived ideological distance from both the Republicans and the Democrats. Indirect measures of threat are not necessarily a problem, but these specific ones are. Affective evaluations could be the result of threat or authoritarianism or both, so it would be tautologous to

[14] Lodge *et al.* find instances where threat causes both authoritarians and nonauthoritarians to respond, but in these cases, the are effects "boosted" among authoritarians compared to nonauthoritarians. In this case, threat "boosts" authoritarians' responses over and above those of nonauthoritarians. This results in the same positive and significant interaction term coefficient in regression models.

use a consequence as a proxy for something when the goal is to understand what that thing causes. Perceived ideological distance, is more accurately described as political alienation than perceived threat, and it does not necessarily follow that alienation would lead to demands that the system resemble something less alien to one who felt alienated[15] (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). For the few items that are measures of perceived threat (two questions about economic threat and one question about fear of war), the sign of the interaction term is negative (Feldman and Stenner 1997, 757-758).

A more compelling argument comes from thinking about this theoretically. If authoritarianism only matters when threat is high, why then did so many previous researchers find reliable empirical generalizations without conditioning on perceptions of threat? Would it not be possible for authoritarians and nonauthoritarians to take different paths to the same conclusion? Take for example, the case of supporting warrantless wiretaps. An authoritarian places a higher value on conformity than autonomy, and therefore might perceive the sacrificing of privacy rights as a relatively low cost to pay when national security is at stake, *regardless of whether or not they felt directly threatened by terrorism*. They prefer conformity as a "default option," so why would threat matter to them? On the other hand, nonauthoritarians might ordinarily favour protecting individual rights (in the form of freedom from government surveillance) until they are faced with a threat that diminishes the value assigned to autonomy.

An important caveat should be mentioned here: the negative interaction theory is applicable when studying authoritarianism using large-n surveys, like the Canadian Election

[15] On example of this would be religious minority group such as the Amish, who live "outside of normal society." They are arguably alienated in the sense that they feel most elements within the system are very different from them, though whether this means they feel threatened or want to make mainstream society look like their way of life does not necessarily follow.

Study or the American National Election Study (*Ibid.*). It is not that authoritarianism is not subject to activation. It might be, but survey data does a poor job of capturing that because it uses self-reported perceptions of threat. Because I use the Canadian Election Study for this study, I expect my results will show a negative interaction and line up with the findings of Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011).

2.4 A time-ordered model of authoritarianism's effects on policy preferences

I end this chapter by presenting a model that incorporates the theory and empirical findings regarding authoritarianism outlined above. As an illustrative metaphor, I will employ Campbell *et al.*'s (1960) illustrative metaphor of a horizontally oriented funnel of causality, where preferences originate from factors located at the wide part in the left through a progressively narrowing space containing other until it emerges out of the narrow opening on the right. This wide part contains basic individual characteristics—attributes that are enduring, slow-to-change (if not fixed). The middle part contains a series of more unstable attributes thought to be consequences of previous factors, but also causes of things occurring afterwards. At the end, is the vote decision, which is the consequence of a series of "causal chains" that flow from left to right.

Applying this model to my study, authoritarianism belongs at the first stage because it is one of the first (if not the first) orientation formed by an individual. A visual representation of this model can be seen in Figure 2.1.[16] Since I have separated concepts previously thought to be essential components of authoritarianism but are now better understood as consequences of it, those concepts form the middle stage of the funnel. Those concepts are prejudice and ideology,

[16] For simplicity of presentation, I lump both economic ideology and social ideology within a single box, but my models have separate parameters for both dimensions of ideology.

Figure 2.1. A Model of Authoritarianism's Direct and Indirect Effects on Policy Preferences



or more precisely operational ideology in the form of social values and economic values (i.e. social conservatism/liberalism and economic conservatism/liberalism).[17] Joining prejudice and ideology in the middle stage is partisanship, which has become increasingly intertwined with authoritarianism in the United States (Mockabee 2007, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Cizmar *et al.* 2014, MacWilliams 2017, Feldman 2017). Partisanship is especially relevant because of the partisan divide over contemporary policy issues involving a conformity-autonomy dimension in Canadian politics, such as the Conservative government's unsuccessful attempt to ban the

[17] In terms of ideology, I am principally concerned with social ideology because of its historical association with authoritarianism. I do not expect it to be a consequence of authoritarianism because it is difficult to see a prima facie link between favouring conformity over autonomy and a preference for free market economics, or a distaste for government intervention in economic matters. However, I include it to ensure effects on policy preferences attributed to social conservatism are actually from social conservatism, rather than social conservatism's shared association with economic conservatism. Moreover, including it and potentially obscuring the effect of social conservatism rather than excluding it and possibly introducing omitted variable bias strikes me as the more conservative approach. Alternatively, I could have used symbolic ideology as a single-left right dimension, but that has—at least historically—been though to be less relevant in Canada than the United States (Kay 1977, Lambert *et al.* 1986; but see Cochrane 2015). As it turns out, the expected pattern of results emerges, even with the inclusion of economic conservatism.

wearing of religious facial coverings—commonly called the "niqab ban" after the name of the garment worn by some traditionalist Muslim women— during citizenship ceremonies. The ban was struck down in the middle of the 2015 Canadian federal election campaign, whereupon the Conservatives doubled down on their support of a ban, the Bloc Quebecois joined in their support of the ban, and the Liberals, NDP, and Green Party, thus forming a clear partisan divide on this issue (Coletto 2016, Clarke *et al.* 2016). Finally, at the other end is the policy preference, which is the consequence of a direct pathway from authoritarianism (conditional upon threat), direct pathways from prejudice, ideology, and partisanship, and indirect pathways from authoritarianism (conditional upon threat) leading to prejudice, ideology, and partisanship. Authoritarianism's effects being conditional upon perceived threat are denoted by threat affecting the path between authoritarianism and prejudice, ideology, partisanship, and policy preference.

In summary, situating authoritarianism on the level of values allows us to isolate the concept at the core of it, which is the prioritization of conformity over autonomy. This, in turn, facilitates the modeling of authoritarianism's effects because it avoids the tautologous definitions of previous theories, which included things better seen as products of authoritarianism, such as prejudice and conservatism. The model I present can be thought of as a disaggregation of previous conceptualizations of authoritarianism (either the personality/F-scale or the attitude/RWA-scale approaches) into several constituent elements forming a causal chain. Having now introduced this model, the next chapter will operationalize its components.

Chapter Three: Data and Case Selection

Data for my analyses come from the 2011 and 2015 Canadian Election Studies (CES) (Fournier *et al.* 2011, Fournier *et al.* 2015). Each CES includes measures of authoritarianism, as well as other indicators covering a wide range of topics from demographic characteristics, economic evaluations, social attitudes, political attitudes, and political behaviours. These surveys were designed to facilitate a broad range of research projects as opposed to focusing on political psychology (let alone authoritarianism specifically). While this means I had to substitute some general indicators in lieu of specific ones used by other researchers (the most notable example is in measures of perceived threat), this also means there are wide variety of questions, which permits measuring authoritarianism's effects on political attitudes while accounting for other important factors.[18] The other benefit of this approach is, if I am successful in demonstrating authoritarianism's relationship with key variables of interest in Canada with a less-than-ideal instrument, then that is another piece of evidence that authoritarianism has a meaningful effect on political behaviour.

The bulk of recent research on authoritarianism and political preferences has focused on the United States, with American political scientists justifying their focus based on the "culture wars" theory (Hunter 2003) that cultural, racial, social, and moral issues divide American politics more today than economic issues (Barker and Tinnick 2006, Mockabee 2007, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, Cizmar *et al.* 2014). My study focuses on Canada,

[18] This is a common problem in research on authoritarianism. In Hetherington & Weiler's study on authoritarianism (2009), they were only able to use the American National Election Studies for half of their analyses because of the same limitations I face with the CES. While they had a budget to add their questions to the American Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I do not, so I am forced to stick with the CES.

which is an important contribution to both the literature on authoritarianism and Canadian politics for at least three reasons.

First, authoritarianism is, in theory, a universal phenomenon. The idea that human beings are inherently social creatures and inevitably form societies goes back to at least the ancient Greeks; therefore, the balancing of individual interests against group interests is a perennial dilemma of human life.[19] Empirically, social psychologists researching human values have found social conformity and individual autonomy are not only universal, but so to is the tension between them (Kohn 1977, Kohn and Schooler 1983, Rokeach 1973, Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, Schwartz 1992). Thus, it is less of a question of why we ought to study authoritarianism in Canada as much as we ought not to study it in Canada.

Secondly, in terms of the structuring of contemporary issues, Canada has had a similar experience as the American "culture wars." Conventional wisdom holds that, at least historically, the Canadian voters, parties, and politics tended to be middle-of-the-road and non-ideological (Clarke *et al.* 1984, Lambert *et al.* 1986). However, the death of the Progressive Conservative Party and the rise of the Reform and Bloc Quebecois Parties in the electoral earthquake of 1993, ushering in a new political dynamic where voters, parties, and politics became more ideologically-differentiated than before (Carty, Cross, and Young 2000, Nevitte *et al.* 1999, Blais *et al.* 2002b). This differentiation was not only on economic issues, but moral issues as well, with supporters of the Reform Party and its successors, the Canadian Alliance and the "new" Conservative Party of Canada taking positions well to the right of supporters of other

[19] Indeed, one of the more philosophically-inclined treatments of authoritarianism starts with Plato's ideal constitution of the elements within an individual (Forbes 1985).

parties on abortion, same-sex marriage, women's social role, out-of-wedlock births, and other issues (Laycock 2002, Lusztig and Wilson 2005). This parallels the development of the so-called "moral majority" in American politics, where voters with similarly morally conservative positions became increasingly identified with the Republican Party (Hunter 1993).

But it is not just moral issues. Like the American Republican Party, the Conservative Party of Canada and its antecedents have also been associated with anti-immigrant and even ethnocentric sentiment. Restricting immigration and opposition to multiculturalism were policies of the Reform Party (Manning 1995). The Conservative Party of Canada would eventually shift away from Reform's active opposition to immigration and multiculturalism to aligning their immigration and multiculturalism policies with a broader philosophy of smaller-government (Tolley 2017), and the Conservatives made a concerted effort to expand attract visible minorities as supporters and candidates (Flanagan 2008). However, events in the 2015 election such as the niqab ban, a proposed "Canadian values test" for immigrants, and admitting only a limited number of refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War renewed perceptions of the Conservatives being anti-immigrant (Tolley 2017, Clarke *et al*. 2015). Regardless, what is important is less so what positions the Conservative *Party* took on these issues and more so that there is a constituency for these positions. That they parallel the moral and ethnocultural issues Hetherington and Weiler (2009) use to demonstrate authoritarianism's power to structure policy preferences in the United States suggests we can expect the same pattern in Canada.

Thirdly, the enforcing social conformity versus permitting individual autonomy is a recurring theme in many of the long-standing issues in Canadian politics. Consider the relations between the British, French, and Indigenous peoples of Canada. *The* problem in Canada has long been characterized as a "race question" where Canada's "two founding peoples" were locked in

competition, with the French portion fighting for survival of their culture and the English portion fighting to assimilate the French (Siegfried 1907). Even in Siegfreid's time, this was not a new observation, as one of the reasons for uniting the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada was to facilitate the assimilation of French by English, so as to stop the "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state" (Durham 2007 [1792-1840]). Until recently, the forced assimilation, attempted cultural genocide, and widespread abuse and even murder of Indigenous Canadians has gone largely unacknowledged (Truth and Reconciliation Canada 2015). Much of this was conducted through the network of church-run but state-sanctioned residential schools, which were tasked with "killing the Indian in the child" (*Ibid.*). In both of these cases—English versus French, Settler versus Indigenous—the dynamic of the majority attempting to make the minority conform to the majority's ways can be seen, and this parallels the same prioritization of conformity over autonomy within authoritarianism. This dynamic extends outside of the relations between the founding peoples.

There is also the issue of how immigrants and racial minorities relate to Canadians and the Canadian state. Race has been notably absent as an analytical dimension in Canadian political science (Nath 2011) even though the structuring of Canadian society along racial lines is a long-established fact (Porter 1965). Canada may be an officially multicultural society, but non-whites occupy a lower social tier than whites (*Ibid.*). Perhaps ironically, one of the best examples of this is within Quebec. While Quebec's francophone population is a linguistic minority struggling to maintain its cultural identity against the English-speaking majority in Canada, francophones constitute the majority within Quebec and have come into conflict with ethnic minorities who have tried to maintain their own practices. This reached a boiling point in the

mid-2000s over what constituted "reasonable" accommodation for religion minorities living in Quebec's ostensibly secular society (Bouchard and Taylor 2008).

So, it is because of authoritarianism's universality and its historical and contemporary relevance in Canadian politics that we can expect it to structure policy preferences in Canada. Having established its relevance to Canada, the next section discusses how authoritarianism is best measured.

3.1 Authoritarianism: from concept to measurement

For reasons of social desirability bias, we cannot just ask individuals if they wish to force others to conform to their own standards (see Philipps and Clancy 1972, Swim *et al.* 1995). Given the problematic history of measures of authoritarianism described in the previous chapter, both the F-scale and the RWA scale are unsuitable for my study. A measure of authoritarian values or predispositions should capture the core concept (the prioritization of conformity over autonomy when the two come into conflict) but not contain measures of consequences of authoritarianism, since those are what I am trying to explain. The solution lies in going back to when the authoritarianism is likely formed, which are childhood experiences. Parental authorities are the first authorities one encounters, and family life is the first experience of group life one experiences. So, the extent to which one's parents enforce conformity or encourage autonomy form the template for how one resolves future encounters with the conformity-autonomy dimension. The mechanism linking one's early experiences to value orientations need not be Freudian psychodynamics; it could be socialization (Bandura 1971), or cognitive (Rokeach 1960)[20] or metaphorical (Lakoff 1996).

[20] Rokeach's argument is based on a hypothesized cognitive process, where deeper, "more central" psychological orientations within an individual leads them to form shallower, "more peripheral" orientations. These orientations

What is important is not what an individual has actually experienced parental authority, for they may have formed their orientation because of or in spite of what they have experienced. Their parents may have permitted autonomy and they liked it, so they formed an autonomy orientation; or their parents might have enforced conformity and they hated it, so they formed an autonomy orientation. Instead, what is important is how an individual believes children *ought* to experience parental authority, and which of the two priorities children should be taught to place first. Accordingly, the values that one believes children ought to be taught are a way to measure the conformity-autonomy orientation at the heart of authoritarianism. It is an indirect measure, but it avoids the problems of social desirability bias, inclusion of unnecessary content, and being tautologous with the outcomes to be predicted. Both the F-scale and RWA scale contained measures of child-rearing values (Adorno *et al.* 1950, Altemeyer 1981). More importantly, there is precedent in using a battery comprised exclusively of child-rearing questions to study authoritarianism (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Barker and Tinnick 2006, Mockabee 2007, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, Cizmar *et al.* 2014, MacWilliams 2017, Feldman 2017). While that list is comprised exclusively of studies from the United States, the association of child-rearing values with the conformity-autonomy value dimension has demonstrable validity across several countries at different points in time (Rokeach 1973, Kohn 1977, Kohn and Schooler 1983, Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, Schwartz 1992). Most importantly for this study, the child-rearing values scale has also been used in research on Canadian individuals (Kanji and Nevitte 2002).

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are, in order from deepest to shallowest, are one's understanding of one's own self; how one understands their relationship to authorities; and finally, how one understands how they relate to society (1960, 40).

The CES measures authoritarianism through two questions asking an individual to chose which qualities are more important for children.

"Here are some qualities that children can be encouraged to learn. Which one do you think is more important?"

1. Independence or respect for authority [pes11_84/pes15_84]
2. Obedience or self-reliance? [pes11_85/pes15_85]

Arguably, children ought to learn both values in each question, but forcing respondents to choose choice between them gets at the underlying tension between conforming to norms and authority figures versus acting autonomously. Answers of respect for authority and obedience are coded as the authoritarian response, and responses of "independence" and "self-reliance" are coded as nonauthoritarian responses.[21] The items were added together and recoded so that one corresponded to an authoritarian response to both questions, 0.5 corresponded to one authoritarian and one nonauthoritarian response, and 0 corresponded to the nonauthoritarian response for both questions. The resulting scale has an alpha of 0.49.[22] Ideally, this would be higher, but the measures align with theory and have precedence in prior research. Previous political behaviour research has used scales with lower alphas when theory provided good reasons for doing so (Nevitte *et al.* 2000). Moreover, though the ANES authoritarianism scale has four questions and higher reliability (alpha=0.65), when the ANES scale is reduced to the

[21] The ANES allows respondents to give an answer of "both," the CES does not. However, the CES does allow respondents to answer, "don't know."

[22] Rule-of-thumbs for "good" alpha coefficients suggest a minimum of 0.7 (Furr 2011). However, most of those guidelines come from psychology and psychometry, and the measurement reliability and validity standards from those disciplines cannot reasonably be expected in political science (Adcock and Collier 2001). Moreover, part of the problem with previous authoritarianism research was its empirically- as opposed to theoretically-driven approach. In the case with the RWA scale, this resulted in a scale that did well in terms of psychometric benchmarks, but only because it had so many items, and at the expense of conceptual clarity (Stenner 2005).

same two items in the CES authoritarianism scale, its reliability is the same (0.50). This suggests we could expect a four-item Canadian authoritarianism scale to be similarly reliable.

3.2 Dependent variables

Previous research has uncovered relationships between authoritarianism and policy preferences on a range of issues including: capital punishment, national defense, national security, foreign military operations, affirmative action, immigration, LGBTQ rights, reproductive rights, and "tough-on-crime" measures (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Barker and Tinnick 2006, Mockabee 2007, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, Cizmar *et al.* 2014, Feldman 2017). I test two policies each from four policy areas: moral issues, ethnocultural issues, law and order issues, and national security issues. In each area, authoritarianism's emphasis on conformity as a means of preserving social cohesion and order is the key to understanding why authoritarianism is expected to structure policy preferences in each of these four areas. I provide theoretical justifications for my choices below. A summary table of the policies and their wording can be found in the Appendix.

The moral policy issues of same-sex marriage and abortion are well-established fault lines in both Canadian (Lustig and Wilson 2005) and American (Hunter 1993) politics, but they are usually framed as a demographic battle (the religious versus non-religious) or an ideological battle (social conservatives versus social liberals).[23] However, these policies have an authoritarian dimension because they deal with individual rights that an authoritarian might not want to extend to those who the authoritarian sees as seeking special treatment. An authoritarian, irrespective of their religion or vision of traditional morality might see women with unwanted

[23] Arguably, this is the same battle, but understood in different ways.

pregnancies and LGBTQ persons as rabble-rousing "special interests" seeking "special treatment." For authoritarians, it is not that they think it is sinful to be gay or to terminate a pregnancy—though undoubtedly, many of them might also hold that view—it is that they do not want to help sexual minorities because they are different, and they do not want to help women with unwanted pregnancies because those women should just do what "every other pregnant woman" does and carry their pregnancy to term.

Moreover, authoritarians might even resent the campaigns for these policies less so for the content of their cause and more so for the loss of social cohesion (i.e. polarization) that has resulted. The authoritarian might say, *"It's not that I'm against gay rights, but it's not good for society what these activists are doing."* Given this, for moral issues, the measure of threat is a question asking to what extent one believes so-called "new lifestyles" are contributing to the breakdown of society. While this question has tended to be used as an indirect measure of homophobia (see for example, Brewer 2003), the term "new lifestyles" could also be interpreted to mean a less traditional approach to sexuality more broadly—i.e. not just sexual relations between persons of the same sex, but sexual relations outside of the parameters of a heterosexual marriage for the purposes of procreation.

Ethnocultural issues are *the* policy domain in the United States where authoritarianism's effects are most strongly seen (Heatherington and Weiler 2009). Given Canada's similarities to the United States in this regard—a settler state with continued high rates of in-migration, questions about the accommodation and integration of immigrants, etc.—this is a good opportunity to see if the same relationship between authoritarianism and ethnocultural issues

exists in Canada also.[24] I test two specific policies here: support for a ban on religious facial coverings and support for reducing immigration levels to Canada. The former deals with accommodating a cultural other, and authoritarians can be expected to resist accommodation and promote assimilation. The latter deals with whether the cultural other should even be permitted to come to Canada, and authoritarians can be expected to support reducing the number of immigrants Canada admits. The measure of threat used in these two models is a question asking the extent to which an individual believes "some immigrants just don't want to fit in" with Canadian society, which gets at the idea that immigrants present a cultural threat to Canada.

Authoritarianism can be expected to structure attitudes on law and order policies such as the death penalty and punishment (as opposed to rehabilitation) of young offenders. Aggression and punitiveness were considered part of the authoritarian personality (Adorno *et al.* 1950) and RWA attitudinal complex (Altemeyer 1981). When authoritarianism is defined as a value or predisposition, aggression and punitiveness are consequences of authoritarianism, or tools to enforce conformity, either by "making an example" out of criminals (in the case of punishing young offenders) or eliminating them altogether (in the case of supporting the death penalty). It is important to note here that wanting to maintain law and order is not necessarily what distinguishes authoritarians from nonauthoritarians; after all, even the most libertarian-minded would agree that some order needs to be preserved for people to be free. What distinguishes authoritarians is the willingness to use aggressive, even violent means to preserve order. There

[24] Moreover, Canada is a multinational country where there has historically been a hierarchical relationship between the founding peoples. The English-speakers dominate the French-speakers, and both dominate the Indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, the CES lacks good questions to test support for pro-conformity policies being imposed on either Quebecers or Indigenous peoples, so I am unable to test this in this analysis. I discuss this as a potential future avenue for research on authoritarianism in Canada.

are no direct measures of perceived threat from crime that are available in the CES. However, there is a question asking about general trust or distrust of other people. Two of the traits included in the personality conceptualization of authoritarianism were cynicism, or possessing a generally dim view of human nature and the world, and stereotypy, or the tendency to ascribe sweeping generalizations to other people (Adorno *et al.* 1950). These traits could lead someone to harbour a general distrust of other people, which could lead a non-authoritarian to the same preferences as an authoritarian. Put another way, if we used the F-scale to test preferences regarding law-and-order policies, and if there were a positive relationship, we wouldn't know if it was because of the conformism or because of cynicism, or both. By separating conformism from cynicism and allowing them to interact, it allows for individuals to take different pathways to support for the death penalty. Cynics might believe criminals to be beyond rehabilitation and thus support capital punishment. Authoritarians might support capital punish as a deterrent to others who would disturb the social order. Cynical authoritarians might support the death penalty for both of those reasons, but non-cynical non-authoritarians would be less likely to support the death penalty.

Finally, authoritarianism is necessarily intertwined with national security because individual freedoms—of association, assembly, speech, access to information, etc.—are the ones that come into conflict with the coercive power of the state in the name of providing security. Canada saw this first-hand during the October Crisis of 1970 when some Quebec nationalists waged a terrorist campaign against federal government, economic, and civilian targets in Quebec. Part of the Canadian federal government's response was to invoke the War Measures Act, which suspended many civil liberties and extend the state's power of arrest. Terrorism continues to be a national security threat today, but from international organizations like al-

Qaeda and independent "lone-wolves" (Sageman 2004). I test two questions here: support for the government to "crack down on suspected terrorists, even if some people lose their rights" and a support for limits being placed on public access to information for reasons of national security. There is no measure perceived threat from terrorism, so similar to the law-and-order policies, I use the measure of general distrust of people as a measure of threat. In the case of national security, as with the case of law-and-order, general distrust might be connected to cynicism or a tendency to ascribe stereotypes on others. It may also be an indicator of a general sense of threat—i.e. the authoritarian is distrustful of other because they feel a perpetual state of threat.

3.3 Endogenous variables: ideology, prejudice, partisanship

As identified in the direct and indirect model of authoritarianism's effects on policy preferences in Figure 2.1, ideology prejudice, and partisanship are parts of the model. These variables have been selected because they are consequences of authoritarianism but also predictors of the policy preferences.

Economic conservatism is generally considered to be the primary dimension of ideology in advanced industrial democracies and concerns orientations about how economic activity ought to be organized, the extent to which government should be involved in managing production and redistribution, and how deep of a social safety net the government should provide for its citizens (Budge 2002, Mair 2007, Feldman and Johnston 2014). To measure these, I create a scale that taps a belief in trickle-down economics, support for government doing more to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, and support for government involvement in job creation.[25]

[25] Detailed descriptions of the ideology and prejudice scales can be found in the Appendix.

Social conservatism is thought to be the secondary ideological dimension and is oriented on a dimension of conventional versus non-traditionalist conceptions of appropriate sexual behaviour, the nature of the family, the role of women (Feldman and Johnston 2014). I measured using a scale that taps beliefs in adapting moral standards in the face of a changing world, the importance one places on so-called traditional family values, and a belief society would be better off if more women stayed at home instead of working.

Prejudice is antipathy towards an identifiable group or member of that group based on a faulty or inflexible generalization (Allport 1935, 9). As prejudice involves a target group as an object towards which prejudice is directed, different measures will be needed, depending on the policy to be tested. Before describing the measures, it is important to address the issue of social desirability bias. Prejudice is a socially undesirable attitude, and even those who harbour prejudiced attitudes know this and, as a result, try to hide their prejudice. While this is a concern and should be taken seriously, research that has operationalized prejudice (or the related concept of ethnocentrism) through direct measures of either feeling thermometers or the endorsement of negative stereotypes about target groups still find the expected results (Kinder and Kam 2010 is a prominent recent example). This is not to say this is not a problem that should be avoided where possible—only that the unavailability of indirect measures should not preclude studying prejudice.

For the niqab ban, I use a direct measure of a feeling thermometer that asks respondents how feel about Muslims living in Canada on a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 means they really dislike them, and 100 means they really like them. For reducing immigration, I use an indirect measure of racial prejudice that is a scale comprised of two questions: the belief that it is more

difficult for persons of colour to be successful than white persons, and the extent to which immigrants make an important contribution to Canada (*Ibid.*).[26]

For opposition to same-sex marriage, I use a feeling thermometer asking respondents how they feel about LGBTQ persons. For abortion, I use an indirect measure of sexism constructed of two items: denying continued discrimination against women in the workplace, and believing that equality between men and women has been achieved (Swim *et al.* 1995).

For both law-and-order policies (support for the death penalty and favouring punishment over rehabilitation of young offenders), I use an indirect measure of *generalized* prejudice, which is a scale comprised of the mean feeling thermometer rating given to all outgroups identified in the CES: feminists, LGBTQ persons, Indigenous peoples, racial minorities, and Muslims living in Canada. Two of the traits included in the personality conceptualization of authoritarianism were cynicism, or possessing a generally dim view of human nature and the world, and stereotypy, or the tendency to ascribe sweeping generalizations to other people (Adorno *et al.* 1950). Authoritarians may see the problem of crime not as a problem of free will gone awry (i.e. criminals breaking the law out of self-interest) or as a problem of structure (i.e. criminals turning to crime because of circumstance). Rather, the authoritarian might turn those who commit crime into "others" who are naturally deviant. If that is the case, then a general measure of prejudice should predict prejudices towards criminals-qua-outgroup, since prejudice towards one group tends to go hand-in-hand with prejudice toward other groups (Allport 1935, Kinder and Kam 2010).

[26] As a robustness check, I re-ran the models with feeling thermometer ratings of various ethnic and racial outgroups (immigrants, racial minorities, and Muslims) taking the place of the indirect racism scale and the findings are not substantively different. .

For national security issues I use the feeling thermometer for Muslims living in Canada. This is because international terrorism is widely perceived to be the top national security threat facing western liberal democracies today (Sageman 2004), and terrorism has increasingly come to be associated with Islam (Mazaar 2007). Therefore, anti-Muslim prejudice will have more bearing on positions towards national security issues than generalized prejudice.

Partisanship—more specifically, partisan identification—is measured through two questions. The first asks if there is a party to which the respondent feels closer to versus any of the other parties. The second asks if the respondent feels very close, somewhat close, or not very close. I code a partisan attachment as feeling either very close or somewhat close to a party. Feeling not very close to a party is coded as non-partisan. This was done for the Conservatives, Liberals, NDP, and Bloc Quebecois, with non-partisans, weak partisans, and partisans of other countries being the reference category.

Socio-demographic controls are included in all models. Religion—more, specifically being Christian versus non-Christian—and religiosity are important predictors of political preferences in Canada (Lustig and Wilson 2005), and their connection with social conservatism in Canada (*Ibid.*, Laycock 2002, Farney 2015) and authoritarianism in the United States (Hetherington and Weiler 2009) will mean they are necessary controls in my models. Abortion and the niqab are explicitly gendered, and gender gaps persist across several public policy issues in Canada because of gendered differences in underlying value commitments (Gidengil 1995, Gidengil *et al.* 2003), so it will be important to control for gender. Race as a variable of interest has been notably absent in Canadian political science (Nath 2011), but I account for it because

several of the policies can have an ethnic or racial dimension to them.[27] Socioeconomic variables (education and income) are important, given the correlation between lower socio-economic status and authoritarianism (Lipset 1959, Schuman 1992), socioeconomic status' possible effects on policy preferences in terms of self-interest (i.e. not wanting to pay taxes to support payment of those policies). Age is included (to account for possible generational or life-cycle effects, and region is included to account for political culture or region-specific considerations, such as Quebec.[28]

3.4 How the analysis proceeds

Recall the six empirically testable implications of my theory:

1. There is a positive relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice such that those with higher levels of authoritarianism will also express higher levels of prejudice;
2. There is a positive relationship between authoritarianism and conservative ideology such that those with higher levels of authoritarianism will express more conservative values;

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[27] Perhaps a more accurate term would be that they are *racialized*, or have race ascribed to them, even when race need not necessarily apply. For example, in the case of immigration, an immigrant to Canada is not necessarily a person of colour, but may be racialized in the sense they are assumed to be non-white.

[28] The norm in Canadian political behaviour research has been to analyse Quebec separately from the Rest of Canada. However, when I ran separate models for Quebec and the Rest of Canada, the results in each set of analyses were broadly similar. Therefore, in the interest of parsimony and statistical power, I run a single analysis on Canada as a whole and include a "Quebec" dummy variable. From a Canadianist perspective, the lack of a Quebec/Rest-of-Canada gap might seem surprising because of Quebec's different political culture and different party system. However, a recurring theme in the authoritarianism literature is the universality of the tension between conformity and autonomy, so the lack of a difference is not surprising from a political psychology perspective. If I were analyzing questions about accommodating Quebec, perhaps there would be a difference in the pattern; however, no such issues were of significant importance in either the 2011 or 2015 election. Perhaps a similar analysis on the 1993 and 1997 elections, when Quebec sovereignty was a major issue, would uncover such a difference. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of good indicators for authoritarianism in both of those election studies. Similarly, separate analyses were conducted for 2011 and 2015; the results did not substantively differ, which is why pooled analyses are presented here.

3. There is a relationship between authoritarianism and partisanship, such that identifiers for the Conservative Party of Canada will have higher levels of authoritarianism than voters for the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, the Bloc Quebecois, or non-partisans;
4. There is a positive relationship between authoritarianism supporting policies that enforce cultural homogeneity, enforce traditional social arrangements, favour punishing over rehabilitating criminals; and curtail civil liberties in the name of national security;
5. Because prejudice, ideology, and partisanship also predict policy preferences, the size of authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences will be smaller when these three factors are included in the model than when they are not the model; and
6. For all the previous, the positive relationship between authoritarianism and policy preference is conditional upon perceived threat such that the effect of authoritarianism is greater at low levels of threat than at high levels of threat (i.e. a negative interaction).

Because I have presented a time-ordered model of how authoritarianism exerts direct and indirect effects on policy preferences, my analytical strategy is test for a mediational relationship in the way prescribed by Baron and Kenney in their classic text (1986). There is evidence for a mediational relationship when three conditions are met: a) an independent variable (i.e. authoritarianism) has a relationship with the mediating variables (i.e. prejudice, ideology, and partisanship); b) the mediating variables have a relationship with the dependent variable (i.e. policy preferences); and c) the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable decreases when the mediating variables are added to the regression equation. Chapter Four

addresses the first three hypotheses, which address Part A of that test. In the process of showing authoritarianism's relationship with prejudice, ideology, and partisanship, I also provide evidence of the construct validity (Adcock and Collier 2001) of the child-rearing values measure of authoritarianism—i.e. it predicts what the theory says it should predict. Chapter Five addresses hypotheses four and five, which address Parts B and C of the test for mediation.

This is broad overview of how the analysis proceeds. More specific details about modeling procedures and specifications will precede presentation of the findings.

Chapter Four: Measuring Authoritarianism

Chapter Four demonstrates authoritarianism's relationship with prejudice, ideology, and party identification. The first section presents bivariate correlations (Pearson's R) between the authoritarianism scale and the measures of prejudice described in Chapter Three.

Table 4.1 presents these correlations, with subgroup differences reported for relevant policy areas. With one exception and a few nuanced instances, authoritarianism has consistently positive and statistically significant correlations with various forms of prejudice. The second section does two things. It presents a factor analysis (Table 4.2) that provides evidence that the indicators I have selected as measures of authoritarianism, social conservatism, and economic conservatism are, in fact, measuring different concepts. Then, it demonstrates authoritarianism is correlated with ideology, whether in the form of social conservatism, economic conservatism, or symbolic left-right ideology (Table 4.3). Finally, I compare the average level of authoritarianism between the identifiers of the different parties to show that authoritarians and nonauthoritarians tend to identify with different parties.

4.1 Authoritarianism and Prejudice

The first hypothesis is that authoritarianism should be positively correlated with prejudice towards outgroups because these groups could threaten social cohesion. Table 4.1 presents the results of pairwise correlations between authoritarianism and various measures of prejudice. As the correlation coefficient is a measure of linear association between two variables, the expected pattern here is positive, statistically significant correlations that are, at a minimum, are weak in magnitude (r=0.1), but usually higher. This indicates higher levels of authoritarianism correspond to higher levels of prejudice. The top panel shows correlations with all measures of

prejudice across Canada across years.[29] The second panel focuses on sexism and anti-feminist prejudice, subdivided by gender. The third panel shows all measures of prejudice, subdivided by ethnicity. The fourth panel looks specifically at anti-Quebec and anti-francophone prejudice among non-francophones in Canada and anti-Canada, anti-anglophone prejudice among francophones in Quebec.

The findings across all four panels provide broad support that authoritarianism and prejudice in many forms go hand in hand—generally, the sign of the correlation coefficient is positive and is statistically significant. The results in panel four are particularly compelling because they demonstrate how authoritarianism causes prejudice within the ingroup towards the outgroup but not within the outgroup towards the ingroup.

The strongest relationship is for prejudice against LGBTQ persons ($r=0.302$, $p<0.001$). Part of this would be due to both of those being associated with social conservatism, and the overlap between authoritarians and social conservatives. But authoritarians and social conservatives would also have different reasons for dislike LGBTQ persons. Whereas social conservatives are motivated by moral concerns (especially of a religious nature), authoritarians' concern is social cohesion and see the campaign for the rights of sexual and gender minorities as a battle waged by "special interests" who would harm social stability to get "special treatment." There is a moderately-high correlation with prejudice against Muslims in Canada ($r=0.240$, $p<0.000$), and this correlation is higher than that with racial minorities in general ($r=0.205$, $p<0.000$). Given the association—if oftentimes stereotypical and misguided—between Islam and

[29] The results presented here are pool 2011 and 2015 data. There are no substantive differences in the results when the analyses are conducted separately by year.

terrorism since the terrorism attacks of September 11, 2001, this is not surprising. Racial minorities and the "foreign culture" they bring into Canada could be seen as a threat to the existing cultural norms of Canada, and Muslims would not just be a cultural threat, but a security threat as well.

Table 4.1. Correlations Between Authoritarianism and Outgroup Orientations

Subgroups	Orientation	Corr.	Sig.	n
Canada	Modern racism	0.240	0.000	2329
	Modern sexism	0.076	0.000	2400
	Dislike of indigenous peoples	0.136	0.000	5571
	Dislike of LGBTQ persons	0.302	0.000	5570
	Dislike of feminists	0.254	0.000	5646
	Dislike of racial minorities	0.205	0.000	5622
	Dislike of Muslims living in Canada	0.240	0.000	5524
Men and Women	Modern sexism (men)	0.052	0.080	1153
	Modern sexism (women)	0.101	0.000	1247
	Dislike of feminists (men)	0.228	0.000	2634
	Dislike of feminists (women)	0.284	0.000	3012
Whites and Non-Whites	Modern racism (white)	0.256	0.000	2138
	Modern racism (non-white)	0.162	0.041	160
	Modern sexism (white)	0.060	0.004	2219
	Modern sexism (non-white)	0.295	0.000	155
	Dislike of indigenous peoples (white)	0.136	0.000	5006
	Dislike of indigenous peoples (non-white)	0.142	0.002	453
	Dislike of LGBTQ persons (white)	0.302	0.000	5004
	Dislike of LGBTQ persons (non-white)	0.300	0.000	454
	Dislike of feminists (white)	0.258	0.000	5073
	Dislike of feminists (non-white)	0.217	0.000	461
	Dislike of racial minorities (white)	0.206	0.000	5047
	Dislike of racial minorities (non-white)	0.157	0.001	463
	Dislike of Muslims living in Canada	0.238[30]	0.000	4963
	Dislike of Muslims living in Canada (non-white)	0.227	0.000	450
Canada / non-francophone and Quebec / francophone	Dislike of Quebec (non-francophone, ROC)	0.192	0.000	4072
	Dislike of Canada (francophones, QC)	-0.085	0.005	1092
	Dislike of Francophones (non-francophone, ROC)	0.164	0.000	2037
	Dislike of Anglophones (francophones, QC)	0.001	0.981	406

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

[30] Note, the correlation among whites is slightly lower than the correlation for the entire Canada-wide sample (0.238 for whites versus 0.240 for Canada), and it is lower than the correlation among non-whites (r=0.227), which seems like an impossible result, since both subsamples are lower than the national average. The explanation for this is missing values for ethnicity. Among those who refused to disclose their ethnicity, the correlation between authoritarianism and dislike of Muslim is very high (r=0.392, p<0.000).

The strongest relationship is with prejudice against LGBTQ persons ($r=0.302$, $p<0.001$). Part of this would be due to both of those being associated with social conservatism, and the overlap between authoritarians and social conservatives. But authoritarians and social conservatives would also have different reasons for disliking LGBTQ persons. Whereas social conservatives are motivated by moral concerns (especially of a religious nature), authoritarians' concern is social cohesion and see the campaign for the rights of sexual and gender minorities as a battle waged by "special interests" who would harm social stability to get "special treatment." There is a moderately-high correlation with prejudice against Muslims in Canada ($r=0.240$, $p<0.000$), and this correlation is higher than that with racial minorities in general ($r=0.205$, $p<0.000$). Given the association—if oftentimes stereotypical and misguided—between Islam and terrorism since the terrorism attacks of September 11, 2001, this is not surprising. Racial minorities and the "foreign culture" they bring into Canada could be seen as a threat to the existing cultural norms of Canada, and Muslims would not just be a cultural threat, but a security threat as well. Note, that for all these outgroup orientations, there are no substantive differences in the results between Quebec and the Rest of Canada (this comparison can be seen in Figure A.1 in the Appendix).

The lowest correlation is with sexism. At $r=0.076$ ($p<0.001$), the relationship between authoritarianism and bias against women is rather weak. At first, this seems counter to expectations because sexism is a form of prejudice. However, women as whole are not necessarily a threat to social cohesion. If anything—especially for authoritarians who are threatened by increasing cultural diversity—women can be allies in maintaining social cohesion so long as they "stay in their place" by tending to the home and to the children. On the other

hand, authoritarianism drives prejudice against feminists ($r=0.254$, $p<0.000$)[31] because their activism challenges conventional gender norms, and this is a threat to social cohesion.

The third panel of Table 4.1 shows the same correlations, but for subsamples of white and visible minority respondents.[32] The relationship between authoritarianism on one hand and both racism and dislike of racial minorities on the other is stronger among whites than among persons of colour. This makes sense, given that being white can be considered the norm in Canada (Porter 1965);[33] therefore, the cultural threat from racial minorities would be more acute for whites than people of colour. However, when it comes to authoritarianism and negative affect towards LGBTQ persons, there is no difference in the correlation among whites and non-whites. In this context, the ingroup would be those who conform to traditional sexual identities (heterosexual, cisgender), which does not have a racial dimension to it.

The fourth panel of Table 4.1 presents some of the most compelling results. Recall, authoritarianism prioritizes conformity in the name of protecting the ingroup. As such, when it causes prejudice, it should be towards outgroups, not everyone. Among the outgroup, it should not cause prejudice towards the ingroup, but the outgroup is not concerned with making the ingroup conform—their main concern maintaining their autonomy to preserve their culture. This

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[31] There is a gender gap when it comes to authoritarianism's relationship with modern sexism and dislike of feminists, which can be seen in the second panel of Table 3.1. In both cases, the correlations are slightly stronger among women, than men. This is not a result suggested by previous theories of authoritarianism, and no explanation immediately comes to mind as to why this would be the case.

[32] I coded a survey respondent as non-white is they gave an answer other than Canadian, American, British, Irish, Australian, New Zealander, or European to at least one of the questions asking about their ethnic identification (questions CPS11_85-89 and CPS15_85-98, "To what ethnic or cultural group do you belong?" / "In addition to being Canadian, to what ethnic or cultural group do you belong?").

[33] This is not just because persons of color make up a minority (22.3% according to the 2016 Census). Porter's argument (1965) is that Canada is not only stratified by class but that ethnic and racial divisions intertwined with class divisions such that white (and especially of Anglo-Saxon descent and Protestant) were overrepresented at the top echelons of society, business, and government.

is exactly the pattern observed. Among non-francophones in the Rest of Canada, authoritarianism is moderately correlated with anti-Quebec prejudice (0.192, $p<0.000$) and weakly to moderately correlated with anti-Francophone prejudice (0.164, $p<0.000$). However, among francophones in Quebec, there is no correlation between authoritarianism and anti-anglophone prejudice ($r=0.001$, $p=0.981$), and there is actually a negative correlation between authoritarianism and negative feelings towards Canada (-0.085, $p<0.01$). However, if the target of prejudice is shifted towards cultural minorities, authoritarianism has the same effects on anti-ethnic prejudice in Canada and in Quebec (see Table A.3in the Appendix). This is an interesting individual-level psychological level for the behaviour of the Quebec government: in dealing with the federal government (i.e. as an outgroup dealing with the ingroup) Quebec argues for increased provincial autonomy, more decentralized federalism, and to be "left alone" and live in its own way as a distinct society. However, when it deals with ethnic minorities within its borders (i.e. as the ingroup dealing with the outgroup), it calls for assimilation, "Quebec values," and solidarity.

The pattern of correlations discussed above shows that the two-question parenting values scale correlates with various outgroup orientations in a pattern that conforms to the expectations set by previous studies of authoritarianism (Adorno *et al*. 1950, Altemeyer 1981, Duckitt 1989, Stenner 2005, Mockabee 2007). This is the first piece of evidence that confirms these measures are, in fact, measuring authoritarianism.

4.2 Authoritarianism and conservatism

The second hypothesis is that authoritarianism and conservatism (in various forms) while related to one another, are conceptually distinct. If this is, in fact, the case, three things must be demonstrated. First, analysis should show that there are three distinct, underlying concepts

present – authoritarianism, social conservatism, and fiscal conservatism. This will be addressed through factor analysis. Second, indexes measuring each concept should be positively correlated with each other. This will be demonstrated through a correlation matrix. The expectation here is that authoritarianism will have a positive and statistically significant correlation coefficient with all measures of conservatism. Third, the distribution of each concept should be different across at least some subgroups in the electorate (because if the distribution of both concepts were the same across all subgroups, that would be an indication they are the same concept). This will be illustrated by comparing the means across subgroups.

4.2.1 *Three distinct concepts: authoritarianism, social conservatism, economic conservatism*

Factor analysis takes many indicators (in this case, nine) which are observable phenomena and seeks to uncover if there are a fewer number of underlying, unobserved (or latent) factors that cause the variation among those many indicators. The goal of factor analysis is to explain the variation among many indicators with fewer factors. The results of a factor analysis are "factor loadings" for each indicator. An indicators factor loading is equal to its correlation with that underlying factor. If there are two or more indicators with high loadings on a factor, that factor is said to be common to both of them.

The expected pattern here is that the two authoritarianism indicators, the three social conservatism indicators, and the three economic conservatism indicators should load "heaviest" (i.e. have the largest factor loadings) on their own indicators. There may be some overlap between authoritarianism and social conservatism (i.e. indicators of one factor might load weakly on the other, and vice versa), but the authoritarianism indicators' loadings on the social conservatism factor should be smaller than their loadings on the authoritarianism factor and smaller than the loadings of the social conservatism indicators on the social conservatism factor.

Economic conservatism, which is readily distinct from either economic conservatism or social conservatism should be easily identifiable in that the three economic conservatism items load heaviest on their own factor and minimally on the other factors, and the indicators for both authoritarianism and social conservatism should load minimally on the economic conservatism factor.

I conducted a factor analysis using iterated principal factors. To facilitate interpretation, I rotated the data using varimax rotation. The results are presented in Table 4.2. Three factors produce eigenvalues of 1.090, 0.908, and 0.620, suggesting there are three distinct concepts measured by these nine variables. In other words, the factor analysis provides evidence of the discriminant validity of these three concepts.

Table 4.2. Results of Factor Analysis of Nine Indicators with Varimax Rotation

Factors Extracted

Factor	Variance	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Social Conservatism	1.090	0.182	0.366	0.366
Economic Conservatism	0.908	0.288	0.305	0.671
Authoritarianism	0.620	0.436	0.208	0.880

Factor Loadings

	Factors		
Indicator	Social Cons.	Economic Cons.	Authoritarianism
Independence vs. respect for authority	0.341	0.050	**0.550**
Obedience versus self-reliance	0.275	0.068	**0.480**
More emphasis on family values	**0.708**	0.094	0.256
Adapt morals to changing times	**0.387**	0.102	0.049
Society better if women stayed home	**0.426**	0.113	0.096
Trickle-down economics	0.123	**0.584**	0.014
Leave job creation to private sector	0.222	**0.368**	0.069
Do more to reduce rich-poor gap	0.043	**0.627**	0.071
Proportion of variance explained (Total variation explained=88.0%) n=2147	36.6%	30.5%	20.8%

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

The first factor corresponds to social conservatism and support for traditional family values, resistance to adapting morals to a changing world, and believing society would be better if more women stay at home load together on the social conservatism factor. This factor accounts for 37 percent of the variation explained across these nine items.

The second factor corresponds is economic conservatism. Its indicators load on it as expected: how much should the government do to reduce the gap between rich and poor (0.627), everyone benefits when business makes a lot of money (0.584), and the government should leave it to the private sector to create jobs. As expected, economic conservatism is the concept most clearly differentiated from the others. The indicators for the other two factors load very weakly on the economic conservatism factor.

The third factor corresponds to authoritarianism. The two child-rearing values indicators load strongest on this factor (0.550 for independence versus respect for authority; 0.480 for obedience versus self-reliance). All three of the economic conservatism indicators load very weakly on the authoritarianism factor (loadings less than 0.100), and two out of three of the social conservatism factors load very weakly on authoritarianism (the "adapt morals" and "women at home" indicators have loadings less than 0.100). The family values indicator loads weakly on the authoritarianism factor (0.256), which, along with the authoritarianism indicators also loading weakly on the social conservatism factors (0.341 for independence versus respect for authority and 0.275 for obedience versus self-reliance), provide more evidence for authoritarianism and social conservatism being related but not equivalent. That the authoritarianism indicators load relatively strong on the social conservatism factor (0.341 and 0.275) than the social conservatism indicators load on the authoritarianism factor (0.256, 0.049, and 0.096) suggests that, while there could be a case to include authoritarianism as part of social

conservatism, it would be inappropriate to include social conservatism as part of authoritarianism. The implication of this is that authoritarians comprise a greater proportion of all social conservatives than social conservatives comprise of all authoritarians.

Looking at the proportion of variation explained, the underlying factors of social conservatism, economic conservatism, and authoritarianism, explain, respectively, 37, 31, and 21 percent of the variation among the nine indicators. These proportions are large enough to suggest that each of the three concepts are explaining different sources of variation, and that including all of them in models predicting policy preferences would result in them all being significant predictors despite the presence of the others.

With the results of the factor analysis providing empirical support to the theory that authoritarianism, social conservatism, and economic conservatism are distinct, I created additive scales for each of them, using the indicators that loaded strongest for each of the factors. [34] Using these scales, we can examine the associations between them, which will provide another way to examine how they relate to one another and how similar they are to one another. A correlation matrix of those three measures is reported in Table 4.3, which also includes a measure of symbolic left-right ideology for comparison. As expected, all four of these measures are positively correlated with one another, which suggests a positive relationship between all of them. In the case of authoritarianism and economic conservatism, the correlation is only 0.140 ($p<0.001$), which suggests only a weak association between these two concepts. In the case of

[34] The results from the factor analysis could be used to create measures that, at least theoretically, have less measurement error than summated rating scales. However, factor scores are standardized and have no inherent metric, which makes quantifying the substantive effects more difficult. As such, I stick with summated rating scales. As a robustness check, I re-ran all models using factor scores instead of the summated rating scales and the results are not substantively different.

authoritarianism and social conservatism, the coefficient is 0.404 ($p<0.001$), which suggests the two are more strongly related. However, even that association is still moderate enough to suggest the two scales are not measuring the same thing. A correlation coefficient of 0.404 would correspond to an R^2 of 0.163, suggesting that this measure of authoritarianism only explains 16.3 percent of the variation in this measure of social conservatism and vice-versa.

Table 4.3. Correlation Matrix Between Authoritarianism and Ideology Measures, Canada[35]

	Authoritarianism	Social Conservatism	Economic Conservatism	Left-Right Ideology
Authoritarianism	1.000			
Social Conservatism	0.404	1.000		
Economic Conservatism	0.140	0.247	1.000	
Left-Right Ideology	0.250	0.370	0.432	1.000

*Note: All correlations are significant at $p<0.001$
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

The final analysis I present in this section looks at how these constructs are distributed among voters. If authoritarianism and social conservatism are the same thing, their distribution patterns among identifiable population subgroups should run in tandem (i.e. be high in the same groups or be low in the same groups). This is the case for most demographic groups, such as gender, age, and education. Figure 4.1 is a dot plot that shows how much a subgroup's average authoritarianism and social conservatism scores differ from the national mean (0 equals the national mean). It shows that groups with lower-than-average levels of social conservatism are also below-average in authoritarianism, and groups that are above-average in social conservatism are also above-average in authoritarianism.

[35] The results from Quebec differ from the Rest of Canada only in that the association between economic conservatism and social conservatism is weaker in Quebec ($r=0.141$, $p<0.001$). Otherwise, the results are substantively the same, so I only report the correlation matrix for Canada as a whole.

Figure 4.1. Difference Between Subgroup (Gender, Age, Education) Mean Score and National Mean Score on Authoritarianism and Social Conservatism



The figure shows how much higher or lower a a demographic subgroup's mean authoritarianism or social conservatism score differs from the national mean (i.e. zero=Canadian average). The units are the original 0 to 1 scale, but mean centred.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

This is less true, however, in the case of region. Figure 4.2 shows to how much province's mean authoritarianism and social conservatism scores differ from the national mean. British Columbia (BC), Alberta, and Manitoba are more socially conservative than authoritarian; Quebec is more authoritarian than socially conservative. Moreover, whereas BC is at the national average in social conservatism, it is the province with the lowest level of authoritarianism.

Figure 4.2. Difference Between Provincial Mean Score and National Mean Score on Authoritarianism and Social Conservatism



The figure shows how much higher or lower a province's mean authoritarianism or social conservatism score differs from the national mean (i.e. zero=Canadian average). The units are the original 0 to 1 scale, but mean centred.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Conversely, Quebec scores the lowest on social conservatism, but is slightly above average in authoritarianism. This is an important finding, given that Quebec tends to score to the left of the Rest of Canada on measures of ideology (Gidengil *et al*. 2012). But, if the left is associated with pluralism, tolerance, openness to the other (Cochrane 2010), why then does Quebec lead the rest of the provinces in opposing religious accommodation for Muslims (see Bouchard and Taylor

2008). That the average authoritarianism score in Quebec is slightly higher than the national average (and statistically indistinguishable from stereotypically redneck Alberta) might provide the answer. While Quebec might be more permissive, morally speaking, their historical cultural anxiety in the face of English Canadian dominance, combined with their slightly higher-than-average level of authoritarianism might be what is driving assimilationist and anti-Muslim sentiment.

Taken together, these three analyses provide construct validity for the measure of authoritarianism constructed from the two parenting values questions. This measure predicts prejudice in the same way that previous measures of authoritarianism have. It is also correlated with various measures of conservatism, particularly social conservatism, but not so highly correlated to suggest that they are the same thing (i.e. that authoritarianism has convergent validity with social conservatism). The factor analysis shows we miss out on a substantial amount of variation in public opinion if we are either to conflate authoritarianism with social conservatism or to ignore it outright. This is most notable in the case of Quebec and BC, which are on opposite sides of authoritarianism and social conservatism. In fact, if we were to combine the measures for authoritarianism and social conservatism and then recalculate the provincial averages, BC and Quebec would be indistinguishable from one another in terms of that combined measure—something that would strike even the most casual observer of Canadian politics as odd. More evidence of the difference between authoritarianism and conservatism will be presented in the regression models where, authoritarianism's direct effects on policy preferences persist, albeit with a decreased size. This demonstrates that, while authoritarianism shares some effects with—or more accurately through—social conservatism, some of the variation they explain is unique to either of them.

Demonstrating that authoritarianism predicts both prejudice and ideology, is the one of the steps in Baron and Kenny's (1986) test for mediation, and having established that, we can now proceed to the main set of analyses, which are models predicting policy preferences. If the introduction of prejudice and ideology to models predicting policy preferences results in statistically significant effects for both and a decrease in the effect size of authoritarianism, then there is evidence of mediational relationship, such that part of authoritarianism's effects on policy preferences occur indirectly through authoritarianism's effects on prejudice and ideology. This, along with the conditional relationship between authoritarianism and threat, are the focus of Chapter 5.

Chapter Five: Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences

How does authoritarianism structure policy preferences? This chapter answers this question by constructing series of models showing the extent to which authoritarianism, conditional upon level of perceived threat, structures preferences on eight different policies, while also accounting for the effect of prejudice, ideology, partisanship, and socio-demographic factors. The models demonstrate four patterns: 1) there is an "authoritarianism gap" in each of these issues, such that those scoring highest on the authoritarianism scale are more likely to support a niqab ban, oppose abortion, support the death penalty, etc. than those scoring lowest on the authoritarianism scale; 2) the authoritarianism gap is conditional upon level of perceived threat, such that it is larger in the low threat condition than in the high threat condition; 3) the gap persists, albeit in a reduced size, even when prejudice, ideology, and partisanship are accounted for; and 4) because authoritarianism is causally related to the variables introduced as controls, the smaller direct effect of authoritarianism on policy preferences when these controls are included in models is evidence of a mediational relationship, such that prejudice, ideology, and partisanship mediate authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences.

As stated in the Chapter 3, I test authoritarianism's effect on four policy areas, with two specific policies within each area: moral issues, ethnocultural issues, law and order issues, and national security issues. In each area, authoritarianism's emphasis on conformity that preserves social cohesion and order is key to understanding why authoritarianism is expected to structure policy preferences in each of these four areas.

5.1 Predicting policy preferences

Recall that the goal of this section is to show four things: 1) the authoritarianism gap; 2) the conditional nature of that gap; 3) that it persists, albeit in a smaller size, even when accounting for prejudice, ideology, and partisanship; 4) this is evidence for a mediated relationship. To do this, I run a series of seven models for each policy:[36]

1. Authoritarianism
2. Authoritarianism + threat
3. Authoritarianism + threat + [authoritarianism x threat]
4. [Model 3] + prejudice
5. [Model 3] + social conservatism + economic conservatism
6. [Model 3] + party ID
7. [Model 3] + prejudice + social conservatism + economic conservatism + party ID

The first three models establish the size and nature of the authoritarianism gap. Model 1 establishes the size of the gap, on average. Model 2 shows that, while threat also predicts pro-conformity positions, it is not really a mediator of authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences. Model 3 shows that authoritarianism and threat have a negative interaction with each other, such that authoritarianism's effect on taking a pro-conformity position is stronger under a low threat condition than under a high threat condition.

[36] Note, as mentioned in the methods chapter, all models control for relevant socio-demographic characteristics that could influence policy preferences such as gender (because some of the issues have a gendered aspect to them, or a gender gap in preferences), ethnicity (because some of the issues have an ethnic or racial aspect to them), age (to account for generational or life-cycle effects), and region (to account for political culture or region-specific considerations, such as Quebec). I do not run separate analyses for Quebec because the results from running models on Canada and Quebec subsamples are not substantively different (see Note 27). Full model results are available in the Appendix.

The last four models demonstrate authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences is partially mediated by prejudice, ideology, and partisanship. Recall, there is evidence for a mediational relationship when three conditions are met: a) an independent variable (i.e. authoritarianism) has a relationship with the mediating variables (i.e. prejudice, ideology, and partisanship); b) the mediating variables have a relationship with the dependent variable (i.e. policy preferences); and c) the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable decreases when the mediating variables are added to the regression equation (Baron and Kenney 1986). The decrease in authoritarianism's effect can be thought of as the size of the indirect effect that is exerted through the mediating (or intervening) variables. While I could skip straight to Model 7 and compare authoritarianism's effects in that model to its effects in Model 3, because I would have added three intervening variables at the same time, it would be impossible to identify which mediators are doing most of the mediation. By running three separate models (Four, Five, and Six) I can assess the effect of each of the mediators on authoritarianism individually. The equation in which authoritarianism has the smallest effect sizes will correspond to which mediator is the strongest one. This approach is widely used in voter behavior research (Miller and Shanks 1996, Gidengil *et al.* 2012) and has been applied to authoritarianism research as well (Barker and Tinnick 2006, Mockabee 2007, Cizmar *et al.* 2014).

5.1.1 *Specification details and expectations*

All policy areas are binary coded with one being the pro-conformity position (limit access to information, oppose abortion, etc.), so logistic regression is used.[37] Because the estimated

[37] For most of the policies, there is a clear yes or no question (e.g. pro-same-sex marriage or against same-sex marriage). The two questions on national security matters are Likert-type items with a four-point scale of "strongly agree," "somewhat agree," "somewhat disagree," and "strongly disagree," and both were collapsed into a binary agree-versus-disagree scale. The immigration question asked respondents if Canada should admit "more," "about the

coefficients in logistic regression are not easily interpretable, I present marginal effects alongside the regression coefficients, which permit interpretation of the substantive significance of the effect in terms of the change in probability of support for a given policy (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). All scale variables (authoritarianism, threat, prejudice, economic conservatism, and social conservatism) coded from zero to one, where zero indicates the minimum level of that quantity and one indicates the maximum level. Accordingly, the marginal effects equal how much more likely someone at the highest level of authoritarianism is to support a policy than someone at the lowest level of authoritarianism. Party identification and the socio-demographic controls are dummy-coded, so the marginal effect corresponds to the difference in probability of taking a particular policy position between being in the named group versus not being in the named group. Marginal effects are usually calculated for an "average person," but since most of the control variables are dummy coded (e.g. Christian or non-Christian), I calculate marginal effects for a white man between the age of 35 to 54 living in Ontario, with some post-secondary education, an annual household income between $60,000 to $110,000, and is a Christian of average religiosity. Marginal effects are presented as percentage point differences in the predicted probability of supporting (or opposing) a policy between those at the maximum value of a scale and those at the lowest value of a scale, or in the case of categorical or "dummy-coded" variables, being in the named category versus not being in the named category.[38]

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same," or "fewer" immigrants, and this was collapsed into a binary scale of "more or the same" versus "fewer." For these three variables, the results of the regression analysis is substantively the same, regardless if the ordinal scale is used and an ordered logistic model is specified or if the binary scale is used and a binary logistic model is specified. As a robustness check, I run the same models with a probit specification and the marginal effects do not substantively differ.

[38] This is preferable to using values at their means for two reason. First, one cannot really x percentage Christian, or any other dummy-coded attribute. Second, having multiple dummy variables at their mean (e.g. region) could produce results that, while mathematically calculable, are impossible in reality.

My expectations for the models are as follows. In Model 1, authoritarianism will have a positive and statistically significant coefficient. That is, its effect on predicting the policy position should be positive and significant. In Model 2, authoritarianism and threat will both have coefficients and marginal effects that are positive and statistically significant.[39] In Model 3, authoritarianism and threat should continue to have positive and statistically significant coefficients. As outlined earlier, because I use survey data and the measure of threat I use is self-reported perceived threat, and not an external manipulation, the interaction term (i.e. authoritarianism multiplied by threat) should be negative, as suggested by the theory that authoritarians and threatened nonauthoritarians converge on the same positions (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suhay 2011). In the language of conditional effects, authoritarianism will have a greater effect in a low threat condition than in a high threat condition (because most authoritarians feel threatened). Alternatively, the model can also be understood in terms of authoritarianism being the moderator of threat: the effect of threat on policy preferences is larger for nonauthoritarians than authoritarians. Statistically, both understandings are equivalent and produce the same model results.

The significance of the interaction term is not readily interpretable from the regression output—sometimes it is marked as not significant, but actually is—so it is manually calculated when the output suggests it is not significant (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). The marginal effects for threat in Model 3 should be comparable to Model 2. The marginal effect of authoritarianism in Model 3 corresponds to the effect of authoritarianism at an average level of

[39] It is possible at this stage that the marginal effect of authoritarianism may decrease slightly because there is no interaction term between authoritarianism and threat, so threat might appear to be acting as a mediator of authoritarianism rather than a moderator.

threat and is of less substantive importance than how the effect of authoritarianism varies between low and high threat. When threat is low, authoritarianism's effect should be statistically significant and comparable or larger than its effect in Model 2. Authoritarianism's effect should be smaller at higher levels of threat, possibly even be trivial or indistinguishable from zero. Altogether, results that follow these patterns will provide further support for the theory that there is a negative interaction between authoritarianism and threat (Heatherington and Weiler 2009, Heatherington and Suhay 2011), and disconfirming evidence to the theory that authoritarianism is activated by threat, which suggests a positive interaction (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005).

Models Four, Five, and Six control for prejudice, economic and social ideology, and partisanship, respectively. In each of those models, the respective mediating variable will be a strong predictor of policy preference and will likely have a larger effect size than authoritarianism because it is causally more proximate to policy preferences. Authoritarianism, threat, and their interaction are expected to continue to be statistically significant and have the expected signs (positive, positive, and negative, respectively), but their effect sizes will be smaller than in Model 3. In Model 7, their effect sizes will be even smaller, given that Model 7 accounts for all three mediating factors.

Broadly speaking across all the models across all the policies, the results demonstrate authoritarianism does structure policy preferences, has a stronger effect when threat is low, and is only partially mediated by prejudice, ideology, and partisanship. Because of the volume of data and the broad similarities in the findings, I provide the most detailed accounts of the two cases that represent the strongest and weakest demonstrations of authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences. Support for the niqab ban is a "textbook" example, shows a strong effect of

authoritarianism, the expected negative interaction between authoritarianism and threat, and virtually replicates the findings from Hetherington and Weiler's analysis of racial issues in the United States (2009). Conversely support for reducing immigration shows weak effects for authoritarianism and an inconsistent (and ultimately non-significant) interaction between authoritarianism and threat. The results for the other six models are discussed together and at a more general level because of their broad similarity.

5.1.2 *Support for a niqab ban*

Support for a niqab ban is the clearest example of the expected pattern of authoritarianism on policy preferences. Across every model, the coefficients for authoritarianism, threat, and their interaction are in the expected direction—positive, positive, and negative, respectively—and statistically significant.[40] Also, authoritarianism's effect is consistently greater at low levels of perceived threat than at high levels of perceived threat (at which its effect is indistinguishable from zero). This means that, of those who perceive a low level of threat, authoritarians are more likely than nonauthoritarians to support a niqab ban. Among those who perceive a high level of threat, there is no difference between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians in predicted probability of supporting the niqab ban. The results can be seen in Table 5.1.

In Model 1, authoritarianism has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This corresponds to a statistically significant marginal effect of about 18 points ($p<0.001$), which means those scoring highest on the authoritarianism scale are 18 percentage points more likely to support a niqab ban than those who score lowest on the authoritarianism scale. As this model

[40] The regression table shows that the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant in Model 5 and Model 7, but this is a consequence of how the p-value is also conditional upon the levels of authoritarianism and threat. Testing the parameter confirms it is non-zero for at least some values of authoritarianism and threat.

controls for socio-demographic characteristics, the effect of authoritarianism exists even while accounting for gender, age, education, ethnicity, religion, religiosity, and region.

In Model 2, both authoritarianism and threat have positive and statistically significant coefficients. The effect of threat is very large, at 46 percentage points ($p<0.001$), which means those who perceive the highest level of threat are 46 percentage points more likely to support a ban than those who perceive the lowest level of threat. Authoritarianism's effect continues to be statistically significant but has decreased in size from 18 to 11 points. It might be tempting to interpret this as authoritarianism's effect on supporting a niqab ban is partially mediated by threat because the effect of authoritarianism has decreased with the addition threat in the model. This idea is put to rest in Model 3, which shows authoritarianism and threat both have positive and statistically significant coefficients, but the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. At low levels of threat, the effect of authoritarianism is 24 points, but at high levels of threat, the effect is indistinguishable from zero.[41]

Model 4 shows that prejudice (here, in the form of anti-Muslim prejudice) is an important factor in explaining support for a niqab ban. Not only does it have a positive sign and is statistically significant, but the effect is very large, at 31 points. It does not mediate the effect of authoritarianism, as the marginal effect of authoritarianism at low threat is 23 points, which is statistically indistinguishable from its effect of 24 points in Model 3. In Model 5, the effects of both social and economic conservatism are positive, statistically significant, and have large effects—19 and 18 points respectively. Moreover, there is evidence they mediate

[41] Because of the interaction term, and the scaling of variables from zero to one, the marginal effects in Model 3 are unconditional marginal effects and difficult to interpret, so I calculate the marginal effect of authoritarianism at the highest and lowest levels of threat.

Table 5.1. Models Predicting Support for a Niqab Ban

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of supporting a niqab ban, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	0.921***	0.779***	1.584***	1.566***	1.184***	1.513***	1.273***
	(0.043)	*(0.185)*	*(0.089)*	*(0.151)*	*(0.346)*	*(0.063)*	*(0.371)*
Threat		3.168***	3.904***	3.333***	3.476***	3.769***	2.930***
		(0.208)	*(0.449)*	*(0.281)*	*(0.471)*	*(0.444)*	*(0.398)*
Auth. x Threat			-1.635***	-1.800***	-1.385	-1.565**	-1.568
			(0.496)	*(0.497)*	*(0.846)*	*(0.502)*	*(0.951)*
Prejudice				2.222***			2.182***
				(0.054)			*(0.252)*
Social cons.					1.324***		0.891***
					(0.016)		*(0.077)*
Economic cons.					1.226***		1.241***
					(0.213)		*(0.082)*
PID Cons.						0.240	-0.145
						(0.280)	*(0.193)*
PID Liberal						-0.194	-0.104
						(0.249)	*(0.285)*
PID NDP						-0.165***	0.058
						(0.033)	*(0.035)*
PID BQ						0.131	0.149
						(0.073)	*(0.346)*

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	17.8***	11.4***	10.6***	8.6***	6.5***	10.0***	6.2***
	(0.8)	*(2.6)*	*(2.5)*	*(1.5)*	*(1.6)*	*(3.0)*	*(1.8)*
Threat		46.4***	46.6***	34.8***	40.9***	44.8***	30.3***
		(3.5)	*(3.5)*	*(0.9)*	*(0.9)*	*(3.3)*	*(0.7)*
Auth. @ high threat			24.4***	23.4***	19.0***	23.4***	19.5***
			(0.4)	*(1.9)*	*(5.0)*	*(0.1)*	*(5.1)*
Auth. @ low threat			-0.6	-3.0	-2.4	-0.6	-3.8
			(4.8)	*(4.5)*	*(6.0)*	*(5.4)*	*(7.4)*
Prejudice				30.5***			29.5***
				(0.9)			*(3.2)*
Social cons.					18.9***		12.1***
					(0.1)		*(1.1)*
Economic cons.					17.5***		16.8***
					(2.9)		*(1.2)*
PID Cons.						3.5	-2.0
						(4.1)	*(2.6)*
PID Liberal						-2.8	-1.4
						(3.6)	*(3.9)*
PID NDP						-2.4***	0.8
						(0.5)	*(0.5)*
PID BQ						1.9	2.0
						(1.1)	*(4.7)*

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

authoritarianism's effects, as the effect of authoritarianism at low threat is only 19 points, or 6 points lower, in Model 5. Partisanship is a non-issue when it comes to the niqab ban; associating with any political party has a nonsignificant or trivial effect on support for the niqab ban.

Finally, in Model 7, the effect of authoritarianism at low threat is 20 points, or the same as in Model 5. That its effect is virtually unchanged with the inclusion of all mediators shows that, concerning a niqab ban, ideology is the only mediator of authoritarianism's effect. Interestingly, while the effect of prejudice and economic conservatism are virtually unchanged, the effect of social conservatism has decreased 19 to 12 points, suggesting that some of the variation that seemed to be explains by social conservatism is either happening through or because of prejudice.

Altogether, this is the clearest example of authoritarianism exerting a direct effect—conditional upon threat—on a policy preference, with only partial mediation (about 25 per cent mediation). Not only do these results all conform the expected pattern, but they replicate Heatherington and Weiler (2009) and Heatherington and Suhay's (2011) findings, albeit a decade later in a different country, on a different ethnocultural policy. Moreover, these results provide disconfirming evidence for the "activation hypothesis," which contends that threat activates authoritarianism (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005). If threat activated authoritarianism, the interaction term would be positive, and authoritarianism would have a larger effect at high levels of threat than at low levels of threat, where its effect might even approach zero.

These findings suggest a bleaker picture than what Stenner and Feldman suggest. Authoritarianism matters more when threat is low than when threat is high, which means

authoritarianism and threat cause individuals to converge on similar positions.[42] As Heatherington and Weiler put it, "threat makes non-authoritarians act like authoritarians." (2009, 49). This convergence can be seen in Figure 5.1, which shows the predicted probabilities of supporting niqab ban at different levels of authoritarianism and threat. Note how the two lines

Figure 5.1. Predicted Probability of Supporting a Niqab Ban at Different Levels of Authoritarianism and Threat (Results from Model 7)



(Source: 2011 and 2015 CES, pooled, generated from results presented in Table 5.1)

[42] In terms of causal explanation, it might seem odd to say that the effect of a deep-seeded, distal factor (authoritarianism) is conditioned by a proximal stimulus (i.e. threat), especially in a survey-design study where there is no experimental manipulation. As outlined by Baron and Kenny in their piece on mediation and moderation (1986), in a conditional or interactive relationship, the independent variable and moderator variables are mathematically indistinguishable. So, the alternative explanation for the results are that authoritarianism moderates (or conditions) perceptions of threat, such that threat has a larger effect on probability of supporting a niqab ban at low levels of authoritarianism than at high levels of authoritarianism. Were I conducting an experimental design study, that is how I would set up my analysis. However, I continue with presenting authoritarianism as the independent variable and threat as the moderator because authoritarianism is my main variable of interest and because that is the approach taken by Heatherington and Weiler (2009) and Heatherington and Suhay (2009), which are the two studies whose results I aim to replicate in this and the subsequent section.

for low threat and high threat approach each other as authoritarianism increases. Without including both threat and interaction in the model, we both overstate and understate authoritarianism's effects—understate, in the case of those who do not perceive much threat and overstate in the case of those who do perceive threat.[43]

5.1.3 *Support for reducing immigration*

Whereas the models for the niqab ban show the expected pattern clearly, the models predicting support for reduced immigration are the weakest example of authoritarianism's effect on policy preferences. The results from Models 3 and 7 can be found in Table 5.2. Authoritarianism's coefficient consistently has the expected sign, but it is not significant when either prejudice or ideology or both are included in the model (Models 4, 5, and 7, respectively). Threat's coefficient is consistently positive, and statistically significant. The coefficient for the interaction term consistently has a negative sign, but is not significant in any of the models, and this was confirmed with a manual significance test for the coefficient. Looking at the marginal effects, threat behaves as expected: its (unconditional) marginal effect is positive, statistically significant, and large in all models, though it decreases from 55 points in Model 3 to 37 points in Model 7. Prejudice has the strongest mediation effect—the effect of threat is the same in Models Five and Six as it is in Model 3, suggesting neither ideology or partisanship mediate threat's effect on support for reduced immigration.

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[43] If threat activated authoritarianism, then the line for low threat would be horizontal or at least shallower than the line for high threat. If threat mediated authoritarianism, then both lines would have similar slopes, and both slopes would have relatively shallow slopes or be close to horizontal. Because authoritarianism and threat are moderately positively correlated (Pearson's $R=0.244$, $p<0.001$)—which is also in line with the original studies into authoritarianism have found (Adorno *et al.* 1950, Altemeyer 1981)—it is only with an interaction term that the model shows threat is a moderator and not a mediator.

Table 5.2. Predicting Opposition to Immigration, Models 3 and 7

Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients or marginal effects, with robust standard errors, clustered by year, in parentheses. There are two entries for the marginal effect of the authoritarianism x threat interaction term. The top shows authoritarianism's effect at low threat; the bottom shows authoritarianism's effect at high threat. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

	Model 3		Model 7	
Predictors	b (s.e)	effect (s.e.)	b (s.e)	effect (s.e.)
Authoritarianism	1.730*	11.7***	0.852	7.2**
	(0.771)	*(1.1)*	*(1.086)*	*(2.7)*
Threat	4.954***	54.8***	3.651**	36.9***
	(1.141)	*(5.2)*	*(1.215)*	*(5.1)*
Authoritarianism x threat	-1.323	11.1**	-0.262	5.7
	(1.053)	*(4.3)*	*(1.277)*	*(6.9)*
		7.1		9.2**
		(5.7)		*(2.9)*
Modern Racism			4.763***	49.9***
			(0.134)	*(0.3)*
Social conservatism			0.993***	10.4**
			(0.279)	*(3.3)*
Economic conservatism			-0.546	-5.7
			(0.870)	*(8.9)*
PID Conservative			0.171	1.8
			(0.304)	*(3.1)*
PID Liberal			-0.001	-0.0
			(0.041)	*(0.4)*
PID NDP			-0.024	-0.3
			(0.015)	*(0.2)*
PID BQ			-0.383	-4.0
			(0.353)	*(3.6)*
Observations	1487		1090	
Pseudo R-squared	0.436		0.498	
BIC	1125.744		722.062	
Log lik.	-559.220		-357.534	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Though the significance of the authoritarianism coefficient is sometimes non-significant, authoritarianism does have statistically significant marginal effects. In Model 7, the marginal effect of authoritarianism at high threat is nine points and is statistically significant. At low threat, however, it is six points with a confidence interval that overlaps with zero. This is best

interpreted as evidence that authoritarianism and threat's effects on support for reduced immigration are not conditional upon each other. Running the model again without the interaction term produces substantively the same parameter estimates and marginal effects, with authoritarianism having the same effect size (seven points) as the unconditional marginal effect in Model 7 (results unreported).

As for the other predictors, the model shows variation in preferences on immigration basically boils down to racism. The marginal effect of racism is a staggering 50 points, meaning that the most racist Canadians take fundamentally different views on immigration than do Canadians with the least amount of racial bias. The effect of social conservatism is ten points, or a bit larger than the unconditional effect of authoritarianism, which is seven points. Economic conservatism is non-significant in all models, suggesting that narratives about opposition to immigration on the basis of free market economics are perhaps unfounded. Partisanship produces some small but statistically significant marginal effects in Model 6 (with Conservative partisans being four points more likely to support reductions than non-partisans, and Liberal partisans being three points less likely to support reductions than non-partisans). However, these effects are not robust and completely wash out in the final model. Overall, attitudes about immigration are primarily about racism and threat, with social conservatism and authoritarianism playing only smaller, supporting roles. The power of racism can also be seen in that it is racism, and not social conservatism that partially mediates authoritarianism's effect on wanting to reduce immigration

5.1.4 *Opposition to abortion*

Opposition to abortion rights is an interesting case because the negative interaction between authoritarianism and threat becomes more apparent after controlling for additional factors. For all models, the coefficients for authoritarianism, threat, and their interaction are all significant

and have the expected sign—respectively, positive, positive, and negative. The marginal effect of authoritarianism at low threat is consistently larger than the effect at high threat, and the gap is actually larger in the final fully-specified model than the basic model. Model 7 in Table 5.3 shows authoritarianism' effect on abortion is 14 points at high threat and five points at low threat, whereas is in Model 3 it is 12 points at both high and low threat. This pattern can be explained by threat being mediated by social conservatism. The unconditional marginal effect of threat in Model 3 is 19 points, and drops to eight points in Model 5, which controls for ideology, and in Model 7, which is the full model. Threat's effect is unaffected by sexism or partisanship.

In the full models, social conservatism and Bloc Quebecois identification are the only variables that have significant marginal effects on the predicted probability of opposing abortion—28 points and negative ten points, respectively (i.e. BQ partisans are ten percentage points less likely to oppose abortion rights than non-partisans). Note, partisanship appears to exert small effects on positions towards abortion (with effects ranging from two to 16 points), but these effects wash out once sexism and ideology are included in the model. This suggests that the partisan gap on abortion, the BQ excepted, is spurious and variation in partisans' opinions on abortion can explained by sexism and social conservatism's effect on partisanship. Comparing the effect sizes, while social conservatism has a larger effect than authoritarianism (28 points and 14 points respectively), a 14-point difference is not trivial, especially since the models also control for religion and religiosity, which along with social conservatism, are usually thought to be the be-all end-all explanation for opposition to abortion. Abortion is usually framed as debate between the secular support for women's rights versus the enforcement of religiously-motivated (usually Christian) codes of morality. That authoritarianism influences positions on abortion suggests individuals might oppose abortion for reasons other than moral or

Table 5.3. Predicting Opposition to Abortion and Same-Sex Marriage (Model 7 Only)

Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients or marginal effects (shaded column), with robust standard errors, clustered by year, in parentheses. There are two entries for the marginal effect of the authoritarianism x threat interaction term. The top shows authoritarianism's effect at low threat; the bottom shows authoritarianism's effect at high threat. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

	Oppose Abortion		Oppose Same-Sex Marriage	
Independent Variables.	b (s.e)	effect (s.e.)	b (s.e)	effect (s.e.)
Authoritarianism	1.695***	9.3***	1.529**	10.1
	(0.110)	*(0.3)*	*(0.523)*	*(5.3)*
Threat	1.626***	8.3*	1.347	8.2***
	(0.445)	*(3.7)*	*(1.390)*	*(2.4)*
Authoritarianism x Threat	-1.282***	14.0***	-0.789	12.8***
	(0.011)	*(0.8)*	*(1.901)*	*(3.2)*
		4.8***		8.2
		(1.3)		*(14.1)*
Prejudice	0.201	1.9	3.814***	35.6***
	(0.244)	*(2.5)*	*(0.176)*	*(1.8)*
Social conservatism	2.885***	27.7***	2.665***	24.9***
	(0.083)	*(1.4)*	*(0.269)*	*(2.4)*
Economic conservatism	-0.178	-1.7	0.654***	6.1***
	(0.158)	*(1.4)*	*(0.050)*	*(0.5)*
PID Conservative	0.263	2.5	0.365***	3.4***
	(0.186)	*(1.6)*	*(0.080)*	*(0.7)*
PID Liberal	-0.187*	-1.8	-0.324	-3.0
	(0.095)	*(1.1)*	*(0.189)*	*(1.8)*
PID NDP	-0.506	-4.8	-0.006	-0.1
	(0.378)	*(4.0)*	*(0.007)*	*(0.1)*
PID BQ	-1.022***	-9.8***	-1.081	-10.1*
	(0.130)	*(0.5)*	*(0.554)*	*(5.1)*
Observations	1768		1835	
Pseudo R^2	0.361		0.418	
BIC	967.352		1080.207	
Log likelihood	-479.937		-536.346	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

religious ones, and there are individuals who are not particularly or socially conservative who nevertheless oppose abortion rights. For authoritarians, it is not necessarily that women who

access abortion services and the feminists that advocate on their behalf are morally errant sinners—even if many authoritarians likely believe that—but rather that they are rabble-rousing, non-conformists pushing for special treatment for themselves. Without this, we would miss a key component as to why some Canadians still do not support reproductive rights.

5.1.5 *Opposition to same-sex marriage*

The models predicting opposition to same-sex marriage show a similar pattern to the those predicting opposition to abortion in that the negative authoritarianism-threat interaction becomes more apparent when prejudice and ideology are accounted for. For brevity, I will focus on Model 7, which is reported in

Table 5.3. The marginal effect of authoritarianism when threat is low is 13 points but is indistinguishable from zero when threat is high. This is slightly lower than the effect of authoritarianism at low threat in Model 3, where it was 17 points. Anti-LGBTQ prejudice, or homophobia, is the main mediator here, and this is demonstrated in that the effects of authoritarianism in the full model are the same as in the model that only controls for prejudice.

The other variables that have a positive relationship with opposition to same-sex marriage are prejudice (with a marginal effect of 36 points), social conservatism (25 points), economic conservatism (six points), and Conservative party identification (three points). Bloc Quebecois party identification is negatively associated with opposition to same-sex marriage, with an effect of negative ten points. As with opposition to abortion, that authoritarianism has a direct effect on opposition to same-sex marriage rights suggests one might oppose those rights for reasons outside of religion or traditional morality. In addition to the effects of homophobia, authoritarians see sexual minorities as “special interests” asking for “special treatment;” part of

their opposition to these marriage rights rests with authoritarians' rigid ideas about social cohesion.

5.1.6 *Support for the death penalty and punishing young offenders*

Given both these policies concern punitiveness in sentencing convicted criminals, and both follow the expected pattern, I will discuss them together. For both policies, authoritarianism, threat, and their interaction have significant coefficients and the expected sign (positive, positive, and negative, respectively). The effect of authoritarianism is largest in the low threat condition and is around 20 points for both policies—22 points in the case of the death penalty, and 19 points in the case of punishing young offenders. The conditional relationship between authoritarianism and threat is most pronounced when it comes to attitudes towards the death penalty: in the low threat condition, authoritarianism has no effect on support for capital punishment.

In both policies, prejudice, ideology, and partisanship (especially Conservative identification) are all important predictors as well. Yet, for both policies, ideology appears to be the primary mediator. In the case of the death penalty, when social and economic conservatism are added in, authoritarianism's effect at low threat decreases from 29 to 22 points, which is the same as authoritarianism's effect at low threat in the fully-specified model. Twenty-two points is still a substantively large effect, and it is comparable to the effects of social conservatism (25 points) and economic conservatism (20 points). In the case of punishing young offenders, authoritarianism's effect decreases from 30 points to 21 points when social and economic ideology are added to the model. In Model 7 of punishing young offenders, authoritarianism's effect at low threat is 19 points, which is still a substantively large effect, though smaller than the effect of either prejudice (23 points) or social conservatism (28 points). This suggests that about

a third of authoritarianism's effect (at low levels of threat) on favouring stricter sentencing of young offenders occurs indirectly through social conservatism.

Figure 5.2. Predicting Support for the Death Penalty and Support for Punishing Young Offenders (Model 7 Only)

Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients or marginal effects (shaded column), with robust standard errors, clustered by year, in parentheses. There are two entries for the marginal effect of the authoritarianism x threat interaction term. The top shows authoritarianism's effect at low threat; the bottom shows authoritarianism's effect at high threat. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

	Support Death Penalty		Favour Punishment over Rehab of Young Offenders	
Independent Variables	b (s.e)	effect (s.e.)	b (s.e)	effect (s.e.)
Authoritarianism	1.024**	15.0	0.896**	13.8***
	(0.355)	*(7.7)*	*(0.300)*	*(4.2)*
Threat	0.856***	11.4***	0.876***	13.4***
	(0.075)	*(0.8)*	*(0.062)*	*(0.7)*
Authoritarianism x Threat	-0.755***	21.8***	-0.542**	18.9***
	(0.169)	*(5.8)*	*(0.182)*	*(5.6)*
		5.7		7.7**
		(10.5)		*(2.6)*
Prejudice	1.676	34.9	1.122***	23.4***
	(1.146)	*(20.8)*	*(0.067)*	*(0.9)*
Social conservatism	1.191***	24.8***	1.330***	27.8***
	(0.235)	*(2.7)*	*(0.244)*	*(4.5)*
Economic conservatism	0.959***	20.0***	0.761	15.9
	(0.127)	*(4.4)*	*(0.484)*	*(10.4)*
PID Conservative	0.266***	5.5***	0.379***	7.9***
	(0.011)	*(0.7)*	*(0.002)*	*(0.2)*
PID Liberal	-0.401***	-8.4***	-0.279	-5.8
	(0.002)	*(0.7)*	*(0.187)*	*(4.0)*
PID NDP	-0.135***	-2.8***	-0.081	-1.7
	(0.001)	*(0.2)*	*(0.105)*	*(2.2)*
PID BQ	-0.403*	-8.4**	-0.804	-16.8
	(0.182)	*(3.0)*	(0.542)	*(11.0)*
Observations	1751		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.172		0.164	
BIC	2041.929		2219.469	
Log likelihood	-1017.231		-1105.973	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

5.1.7 *Support for security crackdowns*

The models predicting support for security are a good example of how mediation complicates our understanding of authoritarianism's effects. The results for Model 7 for both policies are reported in Table 5.4. In Model 3 and Model 4 (not shown in text, but available in the Appendix), authoritarianism, threat, and their interaction have their expected signs (positive, positive, and negative, respectively) and are all statistically significant. The marginal effect of authoritarianism at low threat is also higher than at low threat. Authoritarianism's effects at both levels of threat decrease slightly from 30 to 27 points with the addition of (anti-Muslim) prejudice, providing some evidence of partial mediation. When ideology is added, both social and economic conservatism are important predictors with substantively large effects of 32 points and 44 points respectively. They also decrease authoritarianism's effect at low threat from 30 points to 19 points. What is more interesting is how this affects the interaction between authoritarianism and threat—the addition of ideology causes authoritarianism's effect at high threat to be indistinguishable from zero (the estimated effect size is 16 points, but with a confidence interval that includes zero).

On a final note, in the full model predicting support for security crackdowns, authoritarianism's effect at low threat in is 17 points, which while a substantively large effect, is almost half (55 per cent) of its effect without inclusion prejudice, ideology, and partisanship. This suggests a high degree of mediation and half of authoritarianisms effects (at low levels of threat) on support for security crackdowns happen indirectly.

Table 5.4. Predicting Support for Security Crackdowns, and Support for Limiting Access to Information (Model 7 Only)

Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients or marginal effects (shaded column), with robust standard errors, clustered by year, in parentheses. There are two entries for the marginal effect of the authoritarianism x threat interaction term. The top shows authoritarianism's effect at low threat; the bottom shows authoritarianism's effect at high threat. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

	Support Security Crackdowns		Limit Access to Information	
Independent Variables	b (s.e)	effect (s.e.)	b (s.e)	effect (s.e.)
Authoritarianism	0.797***	15.4***	0.592***	13.1***
	(0.016)	*(4.0)*	*(0.060)*	*(0.8)*
Threat	0.327	5.5*	0.324***	7.6***
	(0.319)	*(2.3)*	*(0.066)*	*(1.1)*
Authoritarianism x Threat	-0.151	16.9***	0.131***	12.5***
	(0.520)	*(0.6)*	*(0.016)*	*(0.9)*
		13.7		14.2***
		(10.0)		*(0.7)*
Prejudice	0.897***	18.8***	0.440	8.9
	(0.248)	*(4.7)*	*(0.283)*	*(5.4)*
Social conservatism	1.046**	21.9***	1.181**	23.9***
	(0.334)	*(6.4)*	*(0.367)*	*(6.4)*
Economic conservatism	1.611***	33.8***	0.706*	14.3**
	(0.190)	*(4.9)*	*(0.282)*	*(5.1)*
PID Conservative	0.416	8.7	0.481***	9.8***
	(0.382)	*(7.8)*	*(0.063)*	*(0.9)*
PID Liberal	0.070	1.5	0.143	2.9
	(0.166)	*(3.4)*	*(0.391)*	*(7.8)*
PID NDP	-0.157*	-3.3	-0.013	-0.3
	(0.080)	*(1.8)*	*(0.067)*	*(1.4)*
PID BQ	-0.673**	-14.1**	-0.545***	-11.0***
	(0.243)	*(5.5)*	*(0.108)*	*(1.7)*
Observations	1960		1968	
Pseudo R^2	0.133		0.145	
BIC	2431.131		2360.950	
Log likelihood	-1211.775		-1176.683	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

5.1.8 *Support for limiting access to information*

Support for limiting access to information is an interesting policy area because, while authoritarianism and threat behave as expected (positive, significant coefficients, and positive, significant, and substantively large marginal effects), the interaction term changes sign, depending on which mediators are included in the model. This means that, sometimes authoritarianism has a larger effect when threat is low (no controls for ideology), and sometimes authoritarianism has a larger effect when threat is high (with controls for ideology). In Model 3, authoritarianism's effect is 20 points at low threat and 16 points at high threat. In the complete model, authoritarianism's effect is 13 points at low threat and 14 points at high threat. Looking at how authoritarianism and threat and their interaction's effects change with the introduction of the mediators, we see that authoritarianism's effect at high threat is relatively consistent between 14 to 16 points.

However, authoritarianism's effect at low levels of threat decrease from 20 points in Model 3 to 13 points in Model 7. In Model 7, there is no substantive difference between authoritarianism's threat at low threat versus at high threat. Thus, it would be a stretch to interpret the positive and statistically significant interaction term coefficient as evidence for the activation hypothesis. A better interpretation is that ideology—which is the mediator with the greatest effect—mediates authoritarianism but does not mediate threat. So, because the two variables that go into the interaction term are mediated to different degrees, what starts off as a meaningful conditional relationship is no longer conditional with the addition of the mediating variables.

This policy is interesting for other areas too. Prejudice (here, in the form of Islamophobia), has a relatively small effect of nine points when it is introduced, and the effect

washes out completely when both ideology and partisanship are added to the model. This is in contrast to the effect of Islamophobia on support security crackdowns, which was 19 points in the final model. Perhaps there is a priming effect with invoking "suspected terrorists" that triggers Islamophobia that does not occur when discussing access to information. Both forms of ideology have large marginal effects, and while social conservatism's effect is largely unchanged (26 points in Model 5 and 24 points in Model 7), economic conservatism's effect is cut down from 22 points to 14 points by Conservative Party identification, which make an individual 10 points more likely to support limits on access to information.

5.2 The importance of moderation and mediation in studying authoritarianism

Scholars tend to make one of two possible analytical moves when studying authoritarianism. The first is to include the conditional relationship with threat to differentiate how authoritarianism's effect varies at different levels of threat. (Feldman 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weielr 2009, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, MacWilliams 2017). The other is to account for the mediation authoritarianism experiences at the hands of intervening factors on its way to influencing political preferences (Barker and Tinnick 2006, Moackbee 2007, Cizmar *et al.* 2014). Both are important, and my attempt to make both moves at once find evidence to support a moderated (i.e. conditional, interactive) and a mediated understanding of authoritarianism. Out of the eight polices I test, six show conditional relationships where authoritarianism's effect on policy preference is larger in the low threat condition than in the high threat condition: the niqab ban, opposing abortion, opposing same-sex marriage, punishing young offenders, and security crackdowns. The conditional effect is most pronounced in the niqab ban, opposing same-sex marriage, support for the death penalty, and security crackdowns, where authoritarianism's effect at high threat is non-significant. This provides broad support for

the theory advanced by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) that authoritarianism and threat cause convergence to similar preferences. At the sane time, the models for supporting reducing immigration and supporting limits to access of information show no conditional relationship between authoritarianism and threat, though they do show authoritarianism and threat having separate, non-trivial effects on both policies.

At the same time, that the data demonstrate mediation is very important. Generally, across almost all models, authoritarianism's marginal effect decreases at all levels of threat with the addition of ideology, prejudice, and partisanship. This is summarized in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5. Percentage (%) Change in Authoritarianism's Effects When All Mediators and Included in the Model

Policy	%Δ authoritarianism's effect at low threat	%Δ authoritarianism's effect at high threat	%Δ authoritarianism's unconditional effect
Niqab ban	-20%	Effect typically 0	-42%
Reduce immigration	**-100%**	Effect becomes significant with controls	-38%
Oppose abortion	+17%	-59%	-24%
Oppose same-sex marriage	-24%	Effect typically 0	**-100%**
Death penalty	-24%	**-100%**	**-100%**
Punish young offenders	-37%	-58%	-44%
Security crackdowns	-44%	**-100%**	-38%
Limit access to information	-37%	-8%	-26%

It is important to note to what most of the mediation can be attributed. For most of the policies, authoritarianism's effect decreased the most with the introduction of ideology, or more specifically social conservatism. This helps explain why authoritarianism and social conservatism are often conflated—they look similar, they have similar effects, tend to be the

same people, and as I have argued here, social conservatism is a possible consequence of authoritarianism. That said, they are not the same thing and the introduction of social conservatism cannot make authoritarianism's effects completely go away. The two policies that are exceptions to this are the niqab ban and opposing same-sex marriage, where the principal mediator is prejudice. What is less important is partisanship. I did not devote much space to the discussion of partisanship because its effects, while statistically significant and even interesting at times, are not as consistent as prejudice and ideology. When it does have an effect, it is usually only when ideology (and sometimes prejudice) are not controlled for, suggesting partisanship's effects are better explained by its causes. The other implication is that partisanship is not as related to authoritarianism in Canada as it is in the United States. This is in keeping with the prevailing view that partisanship is generally less salient than in the United States (Clarke *et al.* 1984).

Finally, to circle back to the myths outlined at the very beginning, both of them have decisively fallen. If authoritarianism is exclusively a phenomenon on the right, then introducing ideological measures would have caused its effects on policy preferences to completely disappear. Moreover, authoritarianism is neither all-powerful nor insignificant—its effect is conditional and mediated, which suggests that denying its salience as an explanation for attitudes is as much of a simplistic "easy answer" as believing it is *the* one driver. Authoritarianism's effects are complex, and so to must our understanding of it.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

The large patterns uncovered by the seven models of each of the eight politics can be distilled to five main conclusions. First, an authoritarianism gap exists on several public policy issues in Canada. This contributes to our understanding of authoritarianism by providing another test case for the theoretical and methodological innovations in authoritarianism research in the past two decades (since Feldman and Stenner 1997). Authoritarianism's political consequences are best seen when we look at authoritarianism on the level of values, and the child-rearing scale, even with its limitations in an abbreviated two-question form, is a valid measure of authoritarian predispositions, and a useful explainer of political preferences. This contributes to our understanding of Canadian politics in uncovering the relevance of the conformity-autonomy orientation at the heart of authoritarianism. For all of the stereotypes of Canada being a tolerant, pluralist, socially liberal society, there is an undercurrent of pro-conformism that is easily missed and would continue to be miss by simply looking at social conservatism.

Second, the authoritarianism gap, at least in its original, unmediated form, is conditional upon threat, such that authoritarianism's effect is larger at low levels of threat and smaller at high levels of threat. With some nuances, the results show confirmatory evidence for the idea that authoritarianism and threat cause convergence onto pro-conformity positions (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suhay) and disconfirming evidence for the idea that threat activates authoritarianism (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005). That this study uses the Canadian equivalent of what the proponents of the convergence theory also gives further evidence that at least part of the difference in findings is methodological: it is easier to

activate threat in experiments, whereas the lack of experimenter control over why survey respondents feel threatened means the same results cannot be expected of surveys.

Third, authoritarianism's effects are mediated. Because authoritarianism is so deeply-held, and so many things lie in between it and political preferences, the working assumption should be that authoritarianism *should* experience mediations, not that it should not. When authoritarianism is properly situated within a causal chain of opinion formation, what emerges is actually a portrait of its ability to explain social and political phenomena. Yes, its effect is mediated, but that it continues to exert a direct effect despite "throwing at it" three very powerful alternative explanations of political preferences is testament to authoritarianism's power of explanation. This finding provides confirmatory support for mediated understandings of authoritarianisms effects already advanced by Barker and Tinnick (2006), Mockabee (2007), Cizmar *et al.* (2014).

Fourth, explaining mediation is difficult when multiple mediators are involved, and further complicated when the original relationship to be explained is conditional or moderated. I noted the trend that studies on authoritarianism tend to look at how it is moderated by threat (Feldman 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, MacWilliams 2017) or how it is mediated by intervening factors (Barker and Tinnick 2006, Moackbee 2007, Cizmar *et al.* 2014). To my knowledge, no one has tried to do both, and a critic might say I have gained nuance at the expense of elegance. Perhaps, but the findings in this study suggest it is possible to merge both accounts, and that the authoritarianism's conditional relationship could change, depending on which causal pathway it takes. The original plan for this study included plans for path analysis, but those have been reserved for future work, given the volume of data already presented.

Fifth, replication is important. Twitter rants from academics abound concerning the apparent replication crisis in social science research. If this study does nothing more than find the same pattern found by other researchers in other countries in other times studying slightly different policies, then it will have made a contribution.

6.1 Limitations and next steps

I have tried to explain authoritarianism's effects in a way that does justice to the complexity of the concept and the nuance of its influence, and I have done this using a secondary dataset that is adequate, but was not designed specifically with authoritarianism research in mind. The main limitation is having only two indicators for authoritarianism instead of four, which is the norm in American research. Because constructing a scale with fewer items decreases the distance between the minimum and maximum of the scale, this likely had the effect of attenuating the estimated effects of authoritarianism, which might be greater if the scale had more items. Moreover, for some policy models, I had to use indirect measures of prejudice and threat, which while more theoretically justifiable than previous indirect measures like political alienation, are not as directly associated with the policy issues I have identified. I hope that the demonstration of authoritarianism's salience in Canada encourages more research on the topic in Canada, and the inclusion of the full four-question scale in future election surveys.

Besides improving our measures, there are emergent (or alternatively, once-dormant and now-salient) issues with which we should test the link between authoritarianism and policy preference. Canada has faced an increase in refugee claimants, something the opposition Conservatives have labelled a crisis and have called for the federal government to clamp down on (Bryden 2018). The newly elected Ontario Progressive Conservative government has not only refused to implement a sexual education curriculum developed by the previous Liberal

government, but would take measures to punish teachers who taught material from it (Riety 2018). Reconciliation between Canada's Indigenous and settler peoples is an ongoing effort, and some individuals oppose even the most basic of measures such as the practice of territorial acknowledgement (Ivison 2018).[44] In Alberta, there has been controversy over peer support groups for sexual minorities (commonly called "gay-straight alliances") with faith-based schools arguing parents have the right to be notified if their child joins such a group—a measure that is tantamount to "outing" a child's sexual identity without their consent (Krugel 2018). These are the current battlegrounds of Canada's culture war, and the results from this study suggest authoritarianism will be a salient force in those debates as well. With a federal election and several provincial elections on the horizon in the next year, there will be able opportunities to replicate (or falsify) my findings. I hope that Canadian political scientists take that opportunity.

[44] A territorial acknowledgment is a statement before a public event acknowledge which Indigenous peoples traditionally occupied the land where the event is taking place. At a recent political event, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was heckled by a protestor affiliated with far-right nationalist groups who said, "This is not Mohawk territory."

Appendix

Coding of Variables

Authoritarianism: A scale comprised of two questions *"Here are some qualities that children can be encouraged to learn. Which one do you think is more important, independence or respect for authority?"* [pes11_84, pes15_84]; and *"[same preamble]… obedience or self-reliance?*" [pes11_85, pes15_85]. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the most authoritarian (i.e. prioritizes respect for authority and obedience).

Threat: The measure of threat depends on the policy preference being tested. For supporting a niqab ban and supporting reducing immigration, it is a four-point scale comprised of one question: *"Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society."* It takes the value of 1 if a respondent strongly agrees and 0 if a respondent strongly disagrees. For opposing abortion and opposing same-sex marriage rights, it is a four-point scale comprised of one question: *"Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society."* It takes the value of 1 if a respondent strongly agrees and 0 if a respondent strongly disagrees. For supporting the death penalty, favouring punishment over rehabilitation of young offenders, supporting security crackdowns, and supporting limiting access to information, it is a binary question: *"Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful when dealing with people?"* It takes the value of 1 if a respondent says one must be careful and 0 if a respondent says generally people can be trusted.

Social conservatism: A scale comprised of three questions: "Society would be better off if fewer women worked outside the home" [pes11_26, pes15_26]; "The world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral behaviour to these changes" [mbs11_c7, mbs15_c7]; and "This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family values" [mbs11_c8, mbs15_c8]. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the most socially conservative position (i.e. prefers women to stay at home; believes we should not adapt our view of moral behaviour, and wants more emphasis on traditional family values).

Economic conservatism: A scale comprised of three questions: "How much do you think should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada?" [pes11_41, cps11_41]; "When businesses make a lot of money, everyone benefits, including the poor" [pes11_47, cps15_47]); and "The government should leave it entirely to the private sector to create jobs" [pes11_22, cps15_22]. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the most economically conservative position (i.e. believes less should be done to reduce the gap between rich and poor, believes in trickle-down economics, and believes job creation should be left to the private sector).

Prejudice: The measure of prejudice depends on the policy preference being tested. For supporting reducing immigration, it takes the form of *racism*, which is a scale comprised of two questions: "Immigrants make an important contribution to this country" [mbs11_c4, mbs15_c4];

and "It is more difficult for non-whites to be successful in Canadian society than non-whites" [mbs11_c9, mbs15_c9]. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating more racist attitudes (i.e. immigrants do not contribute to Canada and it is not more difficult for non-whites than whites to succeed). For opposing abortion rights, it takes the form of *sexism*, which is a scale comprised of two questions: "Equality between men and women has been achieved in Canada" [mbs11_a7, mbs15_a7]; and "Discrimination makes it extremely difficult for women to get jobs equal to their abilities" [mbs11_c3, mbs15_c3]. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating more sexist attitudes (i.e. believes equality has been achieved and does not believe discrimination makes it difficult for women to get jobs equal to their abilities). For supporting a niqab ban, supporting security crackdowns, and supporting limiting access to information, it takes the form of *prejudice towards Muslims*, which is measured using a 100-point feeling thermometer scale where 1 means an individual "really dislikes Muslims living in Canada" and 0 means and individual "really likes Muslims living in Canada." For opposing same-sex marriage rights, it takes the form of *prejudice towards LGBTQ persons*, which is measures using a 100-point feeling thermometer scale where 1 means an individual "really dislikes gays and lesbians" and 0 means and individual "really likes gays and lesbians." For supporting the death penalty and favouring punishment over rehabilitation of young offenders, it takes the form of *general prejudice towards outgroups*, which is the average of five different feeling thermometer scores pertaining to different groups: Indigenous peoples, LGBTQ persons, feminists, racial minorities, and Muslims living in Canada. A value of 1 on this scale indicates a respondent "really dislikes" all five groups, and a value of 0 on this scale indicates a respondent "really likes" all five groups.

Party identification [pes11_59a-b, pes15_59a-b]: Party identification (or partisanship), is dummy-coded with four categories: Liberal identification, Conservative identification, NDP identification, and Bloc Quebecois identification. To be counted as an identifier, a respondent must both identify with a party [pes11_59a, pes15_59a] and say they identify either "fairly strongly" or "very strongly" [pes11_59b, pes15_59b]. The reference category are those who do not identify with any party, identify with a party other than the Liberals, Conservatives, NDP, or Bloc, or weakly identify with any party.

Female [gender, rgender]: Sex is binary-coded and takes the value of 0 when a respondent indicates they are male and 1 if they are female.

Age [cps_intyear11, cps15_78]: Age is dummy-coded with categories for "*under 35*" and "*55 and over."* The reference category is those between 35 and 54 years old.

Education [cps11_79, cps15_79]: Education is dummy-coded with categories for *"high school or less*" and "university degree" (or higher). The reference category is those who have some post-secondary education (e.g.. CEGEP, a college diploma, a technical diploma, or some university).

Visible minority [cps11_85-89, cps15_85-89]: Race is binary-coded and takes the value of 1 if a respondent indicates in at least one of the ethnic/cultural group identification questions that they identify with a cultural group that is not Canadian, American, British, other Anglo (Irish,

Australian, New Zealander), or European. Otherwise, it takes the value of 0 (i.e. the respondent is white).

Non-Christian [cps11_80, cps15_80]: Religion is a binary variable that takes the value of 0 when a respondent indicates they are Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, or "other Christian" and 1 when they indicate they are non-religious (i.e. atheist or agnostic) or a identify with a non-Christian faith (e.g. Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, etc.).

Religiosity [cps11_81, cps15_81]: Religiosity is a four-point scale comprised of a single question: "In your life, would you say religion is very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all?" The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating religion is very important, and 0 indicating religion is not important at all. Respondents who indicated in cps11_80/cps15_80 that they are non-religious are coded with a *religiosity* equalling 0.

Income [cps11_92, cps15_92]: Income is dummy coded with categories for "*low income"* (annual household income of less than $60,000), "*high income*" (annual household income of $110,000 or more), and "*income undisclosed*" (respondent refused to disclose their annual household income). This was done to maximize the number of available cases for analysis.

Region [province11, cps15_province]: Region is dummy coded with categories for Atlantic Canada, Quebec, the Prairies (Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba), and British Columbia. The reference category s Ontario.

Election year: This is binary-coded and takes the value of 1 if the respondent was part of the 2015 CES and 0 if the respondent was part of the 2011 CES.

Table A.1. Policy Domains, Policies, and Questions in the Canadian Election Study

Domain	Policy	Question	Wording
Ethno-cultural issues	Support reducing immigration	pes15_28	Do you think Canada should admit: more immigrants, fewer immigrants, or about the same? [1=fewer immigrants; 0=more immigrants or about the same]
	Support banning religious facial coverings (niqab)	pes15_31	Some countries have banned Muslim women from covering their faces in public. Should Canada do the same? [1=yes; 0=no]
Moral policies	Oppose abortion rights	mbs15_h3	Should abortion be banned? [1=yes; 0=no]
	Oppose same-sex marriage rights	pes15_29	Do you favour or oppose same-sex marriage, or do you have no opinion on this? [1=oppose; 0=favour]
Law and order policies	Support death penalty	mns15_h2	Do you favour or oppose the death penalty for people convicted of murder? [1=favour; 0=oppose]
	Favour punishment over rehabilitation of young offenders	mbs15_g9	What is the BEST way to deal with young offenders who commit violent crime? [1=give them tougher sentences; 0=spend more on rehabilitating them]
National security issues	Support security crackdowns as an anti-terrorism measure	pes15_48b	The government should be able to crack down on suspected terrorists, even if that means interfering with the rights of ordinary people. [1=strongly or somewhat agree; 0=strongly or somewhat disagree]
	Support limiting access to information for national security	pes15_52	The government must limit public access to information for reasons of national security [1=strongly or somewhat agree; 0=strongly or somewhat disagree]

Table A.2. Summary Statistics of Variables in Models

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range	N
Dependent Variables				
Ban niqab	0.539	0.499	0 to 1	4,072
Reduce immigration	0.356	0.479	0 to 1	4,126
Oppose abortion	0.152	0.359	0 to 1	4,581
Oppose same-sex marriage	0.176	0.380	0 to 1	6,333
Support death penalty	0.398	0.490	0 to 1	4,405
Prefer punishment over rehabilitation of young offenders	0.435	0.496	0 to 1	2,832
Support security crackdowns	0.549	0.498	0 to 1	4,520
Support limiting access to information	0.604	0.489	0 to 1	6,324
Authoritarianism and threat				
Authoritarianism	0.431	0.387	0 to 1	5,904
Threat from immigrants	0.526	0.296	0 to 1	2,544
Threat from "new lifestyles"	0.453	0.286	0 to 1	2,499
General threat (distrust)	0.482	0.500	0 to 1	6,232
Prejudice				
Modern racism	0.418	0.194	0 to 1	2,479
Modern sexism	0.440	0.201	0 to 1	2,561
Prejudice towards Muslims	0.306	0.275	0 to 1	5,877
Prejudice towards LGBTQ persons	0.241	0.265	0 to 1	5,934
General prejudice towards all outgroups	0.247	0.193	0 to 1	5,404
Ideology				
Social conservatism	0.447	0.216	0 to 1	2,371
Economic conservatism	0.368	0.210	0 to 1	5,812
Party Identification				
Liberal PID	0.200	0.400	0 to 1	6,350
Conservative PID	0.259	0.438	0 to 1	6,350
NDP PID	0.117	0.322	0 to 1	6,350
Bloc PID	0.034	0.182	0 to 1	6,350
Socio-demographics				
Female	0.539	0.499	0 to 1	8,510
Under 35 years old	0.135	0.341	0 to 1	8,295
Over 55 years old	0.515	0.500	0 to 1	8,295
Visible minority	0.107	0.310	0 to 1	8,263
Non-christian	0.305	0.460	0 to 1	8,299
Religiosity	0.511	0.391	0 to 1	8,221
High school or less	0.306	0.461	0 to 1	8,450
University degree	0.350	0.477	0 to 1	8,450
Annual household income <$60k	0.331	0.471	0 to 1	8,510
Annual household income >$110k	0.236	0.425	0 to 1	8,510
Refused to disclose income	0.138	0.345	0 to 1	8,510
Atlantic Canada	0.073	0.259	0 to 1	8,510
Quebec	0.236	0.424	0 to 1	8,510
Prairies	0.176	0.381	0 to 1	8,510
BC	0.132	0.339	0 to 1	8,510
Year (2015)	0.491	0.500	0 to 1	8,510

Table A.3. Correlations Between Authoritarianism and Various Outgroup Orientations

	Canada			Rest of Canada			Quebec		
	Corr.	Sig.	n	Corr.	Sig.	n	Corr.	Sig.	n
Modern racism	0.240	0.000	2329	0.241	0.000	1833	0.240	0.000	496
Modern sexism	0.076	0.000	2400	0.101	0.000	1903	-0.019	0.669	497
Dislike of Indigenous peoples	0.136	0.000	5571	0.134	0.000	4334	0.141	0.000	1237
Dislike of LGBTQ persons	0.302	0.000	5570	0.315	0.000	4299	0.245	0.000	1271
Dislike of feminists	0.254	0.000	5646	0.258	0.000	4336	0.233	0.000	1310
Dislike of racial minorities	0.205	0.000	5622	0.202	0.000	4324	0.210	0.000	1298
Dislike of Muslims living in Canada	0.240	0.000	5524	0.249	0.000	4242	0.207	0.000	1282

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Figure A.1. Interaction Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Niqab Ban



Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 5, Table A.4.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES

Figure A.2. Interaction Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Reducing Immigration



Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 5, Table A.5.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES

Figure A.3. Interaction Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Opposing Abortion



Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 5, Table A.6.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES

Figure A.4. Interaction Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Opposing Same-Sex Marriage



Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 5, Table A.7.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES

Figure A.5. Interaction Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Death Penalty



Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 5, Table A.8.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES

Figure A.6. Interaction Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Favouring Punishment over Rehabilitation of Young Offenders



Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 5, Table A.9.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES

Figure A.7. Interaction Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Security Crackdowns



Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 5, Table A.10.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES

Figure A.8. Interaction Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Limiting Access to Information



Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 5, Table A.11.
Source: 2011 and 2015 CES

Table A.4. Full Results Predicting Support for Niqab Ban

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of supporting a niqab ban, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	0.921***	0.779***	1.584***	1.566***	1.184***	1.513***	1.273***
	(0.043)	*(0.185)*	*(0.089)*	*(0.151)*	*(0.346)*	*(0.063)*	*(0.371)*
Threat		3.168***	3.904***	3.333***	3.476***	3.769***	2.930***
		(0.208)	*(0.449)*	*(0.281)*	*(0.471)*	*(0.444)*	*(0.398)*
Auth. x Threat			-1.635***	-1.800***	-1.385	-1.565**	-1.568
			(0.496)	*(0.497)*	*(0.846)*	*(0.502)*	*(0.951)*
Prejudice				2.222***			2.182***
				(0.054)			*(0.252)*
Social cons.					1.324***		0.891***
					(0.016)		*(0.077)*
Economic cons.					1.226***		1.241***
					(0.213)		*(0.082)*
PID Cons.						0.240	-0.145
						(0.280)	*(0.193)*
PID Liberal						-0.194	-0.104
						(0.249)	*(0.285)*
PID NDP						-0.165***	0.058
						(0.033)	*(0.035)*
PID BQ						0.131	0.149
						(0.073)	*(0.346)*
Female	-0.058	0.070	0.077	0.121	0.165	0.110	0.203
	(0.063)	*(0.158)*	*(0.156)*	*(0.091)*	*(0.197)*	*(0.163)*	*(0.131)*
Under 35	-0.560***	-0.740***	-0.744***	-0.624**	-0.494***	-0.725***	-0.443***
	(0.010)	*(0.116)*	*(0.155)*	*(0.209)*	*(0.035)*	*(0.125)*	*(0.073)*
55 and over	0.298***	0.404***	0.411***	0.378**	0.474**	0.434***	0.415*
	(0.070)	*(0.116)*	*(0.111)*	*(0.134)*	*(0.159)*	*(0.097)*	*(0.201)*

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	17.8***	11.4***	10.6***	8.6***	6.5***	10.0***	6.2***
	(0.8)	*(2.6)*	*(2.5)*	*(1.5)*	*(1.6)*	*(3.0)*	*(1.8)*
Threat		46.4***	46.6***	34.8***	40.9***	44.8***	30.3***
		(3.5)	*(3.5)*	*(0.9)*	*(0.9)*	*(3.3)*	*(0.7)*
Auth. @ high threat			24.4***	23.4***	19.0***	23.4***	19.5***
			(0.4)	*(1.9)*	*(5.0)*	*(0.1)*	*(5.1)*
Auth. @ low threat			-0.6	-3.0	-2.4	-0.6	-3.8
			(4.8)	*(4.5)*	*(6.0)*	*(5.4)*	*(7.4)*
Prejudice				30.5***			29.5***
				(0.9)			*(3.2)*
Social cons.					18.9***		12.1***
					(0.1)		*(1.1)*
Economic cons.					17.5***		16.8***
					(2.9)		*(1.2)*
PID Cons.						3.5	-2.0
						(4.1)	*(2.6)*
PID Liberal						-2.8	-1.4
						(3.6)	*(3.9)*
PID NDP						-2.4***	0.8
						(0.5)	*(0.5)*
PID BQ						1.9	2.0
						(1.1)	*(4.7)*
Female	-1.1	1.0	1.1	1.7	2.3	1.6	2.7
	(1.2)	*(2.3)*	*(2.3)*	*(1.3)*	*(2.8)*	*(2.4)*	*(1.7)*
Under 35	-10.8***	-10.9***	-10.9***	-8.6**	-7.1***	-10.6***	-6.0***
	(0.2)	*(1.6)*	*(2.2)*	*(2.8)*	*(0.6)*	*(1.7)*	*(1.0)*
55 and over	5.7***	5.9***	6.0***	5.2**	6.8**	6.3***	5.6*
	(1.3)	*(1.7)*	*(1.6)*	*(1.8)*	*(2.3)*	*(1.4)*	*(2.8)*

High school or less	0.251**	0.523***	0.545***	0.523***	0.514***	0.534***	0.454***
	(0.091)	*(0.113)*	*(0.113)*	*(0.039)*	*(0.145)*	*(0.105)*	*(0.103)*
University degree	-0.474***	-0.087	-0.080	-0.094	-0.040*	-0.071	-0.090
	(0.042)	*(0.075)*	*(0.078)*	*(0.104)*	*(0.020)*	*(0.090)*	*(0.048)*
Person of color	0.055	0.393	0.394	0.235	0.279	0.435	0.159
	(0.134)	*(0.329)*	*(0.342)*	*(0.251)*	*(0.504)*	*(0.359)*	*(0.430)*
Non-Christian	-0.738***	-0.466***	-0.439***	-0.420***	-0.517***	-0.423***	-0.510**
	(0.019)	*(0.009)*	*(0.000)*	*(0.070)*	*(0.017)*	*(0.020)*	*(0.169)*
Religiosity	-0.340*	-0.378***	-0.365***	-0.324***	-0.661***	-0.403***	-0.494*
	(0.169)	*(0.075)*	*(0.094)*	*(0.021)*	*(0.165)*	*(0.075)*	*(0.201)*
Low income	0.011	-0.241	-0.239	-0.302	-0.349*	-0.247	-0.358***
	(0.186)	*(0.188)*	*(0.219)*	*(0.156)*	*(0.160)*	*(0.216)*	*(0.100)*
High income	0.034	-0.121*	-0.115**	-0.084	-0.053*	-0.121	-0.025
	(0.042)	*(0.060)*	*(0.044)*	*(0.056)*	*(0.021)*	*(0.083)*	*(0.069)*
Income undisclosed	0.297	0.039	0.014	-0.020	0.014	0.009	0.108
	(0.188)	*(0.260)*	*(0.252)*	*(0.207)*	*(0.320)*	*(0.244)*	*(0.331)*
Atlantic	-0.223***	0.088	0.126	0.183	0.131	0.157	0.253***
	(0.051)	*(0.055)*	*(0.069)*	*(0.103)*	*(0.099)*	*(0.117)*	*(0.028)*
Quebec	0.932***	1.291***	1.302***	1.203***	1.260***	1.304***	1.113***
	(0.015)	*(0.068)*	*(0.074)*	*(0.003)*	*(0.017)*	*(0.032)*	*(0.215)*
Prairies	0.116***	0.187	0.224	0.209	-0.084	0.148	0.011
	(0.005)	*(0.163)*	*(0.137)*	*(0.209)*	*(0.258)*	*(0.140)*	*(0.268)*
BC	-0.023	-0.049**	-0.031	-0.066*	-0.254***	-0.069***	-0.205***
	(0.070)	*(0.018)*	*(0.018)*	*(0.031)*	*(0.057)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.023)*
Election year (2015)	-2.282***	-2.325***	-2.323***	-2.401***	-2.334***	-2.298***	-2.368***
	(0.003)	*(0.041)*	*(0.043)*	*(0.037)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.036)*	*(0.002)*
Constant	1.689***	-0.282	-0.672*	-0.920***	-1.142**	-0.610	-1.276**
	(0.130)	*(0.156)*	*(0.318)*	*(0.206)*	*(0.400)*	*(0.464)*	*(0.413)*
Obs.	3546	1929	1929	1838	1581	1929	1522
Pseudo R^2	0.222	0.345	0.347	0.380	0.355	0.350	0.382
BIC	3852.201	1741.040	1741.090	1578.127	1408.933	1726.246	1291.789
Log lik.	-1922.014	-866.737	-862.980	-781.547	-697.101	-859.341	-642.231

High school or less	4.8**	7.7***	8.0***	7.2***	7.3***	7.8***	6.1***
	(1.7)	*(1.6)*	*(1.6)*	*(0.5)*	*(2.1)*	*(1.5)*	*(1.4)*
University degree	-9.1***	-1.3	-1.2	-1.3	-0.6*	-1.0	-1.2
	(0.8)	*(1.1)*	*(1.1)*	*(1.4)*	*(0.3)*	*(1.3)*	*(0.7)*
Person of color	1.1	5.8	5.8	3.2	4.0	6.3	2.1
	(2.6)	*(4.9)*	*(5.1)*	*(3.5)*	*(7.2)*	*(5.3)*	*(5.8)*
Non-Christian	-14.2***	-6.8***	-6.4***	-5.8***	-7.4***	-6.2***	-6.9**
	(0.4)	*(0.2)*	*(0.1)*	*(0.9)*	*(0.2)*	*(0.2)*	*(2.3)*
Religiosity	-6.6*	-5.5***	-5.4***	-4.4***	-9.4***	-5.9***	-6.7*
	(3.2)	*(1.1)*	*(1.3)*	*(0.3)*	*(2.4)*	*(1.0)*	*(2.8)*
Low income	0.2	-3.5	-3.5	-4.1*	-5.0*	-3.6	-4.8***
	(3.6)	*(2.7)*	*(3.2)*	*(2.1)*	*(2.3)*	*(3.1)*	*(1.4)*
High income	0.7	-1.8*	-1.7**	-1.2	-0.8**	-1.8	-0.3
	(0.8)	*(0.9)*	*(0.7)*	*(0.8)*	*(0.3)*	*(1.2)*	*(0.9)*
Income undisclosed	5.7	0.6	0.2	-0.3	0.2	0.1	1.5
	(3.7)	*(3.8)*	*(3.7)*	*(2.8)*	*(4.6)*	*(3.6)*	*(4.5)*
Atlantic	-4.3***	1.3	1.8	2.5	1.9	2.3	3.4***
	(1.0)	*(0.8)*	*(1.0)*	*(1.4)*	*(1.4)*	*(1.7)*	*(0.3)*
Quebec	18.0***	18.9***	19.1***	16.5***	18.0***	19.0***	15.1***
	(0.4)	*(0.8)*	*(0.9)*	*(0.1)*	*(0.1)*	*(0.6)*	*(2.8)*
Prairies	2.2***	2.7	3.3	2.9	-1.2	2.2	0.2
	(0.1)	*(2.4)*	*(2.0)*	*(2.8)*	*(3.7)*	*(2.0)*	*(3.6)*
BC	-0.5	-0.7**	-0.5	-0.9*	-3.6***	-1.0***	-2.8***
	(1.3)	*(0.3)*	*(0.3)*	*(0.4)*	*(0.8)*	*(0.0)*	*(0.3)*
Election year (2015)	-44.0***	-34.1***	-34.0***	-33.0***	-33.3***	-33.5***	-32.0***
	(0.1)	*(0.3)*	*(0.3)*	*(0.3)*	*(0.3)*	*(0.2)*	*(0.2)*
Obs.	3546	1929	1929	1838	1581	1929	1522
Pseudo R^2	0.222	0.345	0.347	0.380	0.355	0.350	0.382
BIC	3852.201	1741.040	1741.090	1578.127	1408.933	1726.246	1291.789
Log lik.	-1922.014	-866.737	-862.980	-781.547	-697.101	-859.341	-642.231

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Table A.5. Full Results Predicting Support for Reducing Immigration

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of supporting reducing immigration, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	1.151***	0.935***	1.730*	0.986	1.514	1.578*	0.852
	(0.206)	(0.220)	(0.771)	(0.694)	(1.095)	(0.763)	(1.086)
Threat		4.311***	4.954***	3.632**	4.963***	4.808***	3.651**
		(0.620)	(1.141)	(1.245)	(1.119)	(1.157)	(1.215)
Auth. x Threat			-1.323	-0.413	-1.092	-1.160	-0.262
			(1.053)	(0.946)	(1.355)	(1.014)	(1.277)
Prejudice				5.342***			4.763***
				(0.077)			(0.134)
Social cons.					1.049***		0.993***
					(0.289)		(0.279)
Economic cons.					-0.072		-0.546
					(0.396)		(0.870)
PID Cons.						0.290*	0.171
						(0.129)	(0.304)
PID Liberal						-0.239*	-0.001
						(0.114)	(0.041)
PID NDP						-0.323	-0.024
						(0.209)	(0.015)
PID BQ						-0.142	-0.383
						(0.354)	(0.353)
Female	0.388	0.609*	0.607*	0.623*	0.665**	0.638*	0.539*
	(0.296)	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.266)	(0.255)	(0.262)	(0.236)
Under 35	-0.149	-0.356***	-0.347***	-0.096	-0.667***	-0.318***	-0.434***
	(0.101)	(0.046)	(0.063)	(0.139)	(0.026)	(0.002)	(0.037)
55 and over	-0.347***	0.022	0.030	0.202	-0.122	0.068	0.106
	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.142)	(0.127)	(0.071)	(0.167)

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	20.4***	12.0***	11.7***	7.7***	10.3***	10.9***	7.2**
	(3.1)	(2.2)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(2.7)	(1.2)	(2.7)
Threat		55.2***	54.8***	36.2***	54.3***	53.2***	36.9***
		(5.3)	(5.2)	(7.2)	(3.2)	(5.2)	(5.1)
Auth. @ high threat			11.1**	6.9	9.3	10.2*	5.7
			(4.3)	(4.2)	(6.2)	(4.0)	(6.9)
Auth. @ low threat			7.1	8.9*	7.3	7.4	9.2**
			(5.7)	(3.7)	(4.9)	(5.1)	(2.9)
Prejudice				56.2***			49.9***
				(1.0)			(0.3)
Social cons.					12.8**		10.4**
					(4.1)		(3.3)
Economic cons.					-0.9		-5.7
					(4.8)		(8.9)
PID Cons.						3.6*	1.8
						(1.8)	(3.1)
PID Liberal						-3.0*	-0.0
						(1.3)	(0.4)
PID NDP						-4.0	-0.3
						(2.4)	(0.2)
PID BQ						-1.8	-4.0
						(4.3)	(3.6)
Female	6.9	7.8**	7.7**	6.6*	8.1**	8.0**	5.6*
	(5.1)	(3.0)	(2.9)	(2.6)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(2.3)
Under 35	-2.6	-4.6***	-4.4***	-1.0	-8.1***	-4.0***	-4.5***
	(1.9)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(1.4)	(0.7)	(0.2)	(0.5)
55 and over	-6.1***	0.3	0.4	2.1	-1.5	0.8	1.1
	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.6)	(1.5)	(0.9)	(1.8)

High school or less	0.421***	0.422*	0.439*	0.297	0.378***	0.430*	0.227
	(0.038)	(0.202)	(0.180)	(0.290)	(0.082)	(0.192)	(0.237)
University degree	-0.705***	-0.497	-0.481	-0.351	-0.373*	-0.459	-0.290
	(0.086)	(0.265)	(0.250)	(0.205)	(0.156)	(0.244)	(0.202)
Visible minority	-0.148	0.287	0.294	0.891	0.057	0.357	0.700
	(0.519)	(0.609)	(0.613)	(0.920)	(0.705)	(0.624)	(1.029)
Non-Christian	-0.740*	-0.870	-0.847	-0.852	-0.748	-0.801	-0.732
	(0.351)	(0.681)	(0.663)	(0.485)	(0.697)	(0.651)	(0.521)
Religiosity	-0.676**	-1.072*	-1.071*	-1.056***	-1.146**	-1.120*	-1.077***
	(0.254)	(0.437)	(0.457)	(0.230)	(0.379)	(0.464)	(0.237)
Low income	0.088	-0.231	-0.219	-0.262	-0.091	-0.226	-0.047
	(0.080)	(0.282)	(0.278)	(0.380)	(0.300)	(0.298)	(0.292)
High income	-0.259**	-0.273**	-0.250***	-0.245*	-0.192***	-0.266***	-0.046
	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.065)	(0.120)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.167)
Income undisclosed	0.453***	0.178***	0.153**	0.364**	0.208*	0.135***	0.296***
	(0.047)	(0.020)	(0.049)	(0.126)	(0.094)	(0.021)	(0.067)
Atlantic	-0.754	-1.104**	-1.077**	-1.203***	-0.881***	-1.041**	-0.897***
	(0.456)	(0.374)	(0.347)	(0.234)	(0.112)	(0.344)	(0.029)
Quebec	-0.255	-0.364	-0.381	-0.355	-0.335	-0.299	-0.121
	(0.311)	(0.695)	(0.657)	(0.662)	(0.691)	(0.688)	(0.747)
Prairies	-0.031	-0.088	-0.063	-0.106	-0.235	-0.182*	-0.309***
	(0.182)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.426)	(0.216)	(0.071)	(0.047)
BC	-0.452***	-0.507***	-0.494***	-0.556***	-0.577**	-0.555***	-0.680**
	(0.011)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.103)	(0.212)	(0.076)	(0.225)
Election year (2015)	-2.401***	-2.606***	-2.609***	-2.840***	-2.680***	-2.595***	-2.815***
	(0.124)	(0.290)	(0.275)	(0.236)	(0.259)	(0.283)	(0.256)
Constant	1.242***	-1.199***	-1.606***	-3.350***	-2.004***	-1.519***	-3.457***
	(0.065)	(0.005)	(0.283)	(0.436)	(0.215)	(0.228)	(0.184)
Obs.	3603	1487	1487	1312	1206	1487	1090
PR2	0.289	0.434	0.436	0.496	0.454	0.440	0.498
BIC	3413.400	1129.191	1125.744	874.228	881.054	1117.928	722.062
Log Lik.	-1702.605	-560.943	-559.220	-433.524	-436.979	-555.312	-357.534

High school or less	7.5***	5.4	5.6*	3.1	4.6***	5.4*	2.4
	(0.5)	(2.8)	(2.6)	(3.1)	(1.2)	(2.7)	(2.6)
University degree	-12.5***	-6.4*	-6.1*	-3.7	-4.6**	-5.7*	-3.0
	(1.2)	(3.1)	(2.8)	(2.0)	(1.7)	(2.7)	(2.0)
Visible minority	-2.6	3.7	3.7	9.4	0.7	4.5	7.3
	(9.1)	(8.0)	(7.9)	(10.0)	(8.6)	(8.1)	(11.0)
Non-Christian	-13.1*	-11.1	-10.7	-9.0	-9.1	-10.0	-7.7
	(5.9)	(8.2)	(7.9)	(4.8)	(8.1)	(7.6)	(5.2)
Religiosity	-12.0**	-13.7**	-13.6**	-11.1***	-14.0***	-14.0**	-11.3***
	(4.2)	(4.9)	(5.1)	(2.1)	(4.0)	(5.0)	(2.1)
Low income	1.6	-3.0	-2.8	-2.8	-1.1	-2.8	-0.5
	(1.4)	(3.8)	(3.7)	(4.1)	(3.7)	(3.9)	(3.1)
High income	-4.6**	-3.5***	-3.2***	-2.6*	-2.3***	-3.3***	-0.5
	(1.7)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(1.2)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(1.7)
Income undisclosed	8.0***	2.3***	1.9**	3.8**	2.5*	1.7***	3.1***
	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.7)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(0.4)	(0.6)
Atlantic	-13.4	-14.1***	-13.6***	-12.7***	-10.8***	-13.0***	-9.4***
	(7.7)	(4.1)	(3.7)	(2.1)	(0.9)	(3.6)	(0.0)
Quebec	-4.5	-4.7	-4.8	-3.7	-4.1	-3.7	-1.3
	(5.6)	(9.1)	(8.6)	(7.1)	(8.6)	(8.8)	(7.9)
Prairies	-0.5	-1.1	-0.8	-1.1	-2.9	-2.3**	-3.2***
	(3.2)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(4.4)	(2.8)	(0.8)	(0.4)
BC	-8.0***	-6.5***	-6.2***	-5.8***	-7.0*	-6.9***	-7.1**
	(0.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.3)	(2.9)	(1.4)	(2.6)
Election year (2015)	-42.5***	-33.4***	-33.0***	-29.9***	-32.7***	-32.5***	-29.5***
	(1.1)	(2.1)	(1.8)	(1.5)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.7)
Obs.	3603	1487	1487	1312	1206	1487	1090
PR2	0.289	0.434	0.436	0.496	0.454	0.440	0.498
BIC	3413.400	1129.191	1125.744	874.228	881.054	1117.928	722.062
Log lik.	-1702.605	-560.943	-559.220	-433.524	-436.979	-555.312	-357.534

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Table A.6. Full Results Predicting Opposition to Abortion

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of opposing abortion rights, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	1.349***	1.196***	1.720***	1.806***	1.586***	1.568***	1.695***
	(0.093)	(0.149)	(0.362)	(0.025)	(0.406)	(0.329)	(0.110)
Threat		1.865***	2.394***	2.463***	1.534**	2.138***	1.626***
		(0.336)	(0.541)	(0.440)	(0.506)	(0.563)	(0.445)
Auth. x Threat			-0.905**	-1.067***	-1.138***	-0.752*	-1.282***
			(0.346)	(0.023)	(0.296)	(0.358)	(0.011)
Prejudice				0.546***			0.201
				(0.007)			(0.244)
Social cons.					3.308***		2.885***
					(0.096)		(0.083)
Economic cons.					-0.001		-0.178
					(0.195)		(0.158)
PID Cons.						0.193***	0.263
						(0.034)	(0.186)
PID Liberal						-0.480***	-0.187*
						(0.003)	(0.095)
PID NDP						-0.671***	-0.506
						(0.186)	(0.378)
PID BQ						-1.576***	-1.022***
						(0.014)	(0.130)
Female	-0.263***	-0.357*	-0.360*	-0.350	-0.432*	-0.338*	-0.443*
	(0.033)	(0.168)	(0.161)	(0.197)	(0.208)	(0.157)	(0.210)
Under 35	-0.157*	-0.230	-0.201	-0.382	-0.352	-0.153	-0.354
	(0.066)	(0.479)	(0.517)	(0.293)	(0.357)	(0.481)	(0.239)
55 and over	-0.492**	-0.877***	-0.873***	-0.826***	-0.931***	-0.815***	-0.820***
	(0.163)	(0.092)	(0.073)	(0.112)	(0.036)	(0.065)	(0.003)

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	14.0***	12.3***	12.2***	11.8***	9.2***	11.2***	9.3***
	(1.1)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.4)	(1.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)
Threat		19.2***	19.0***	18.2***	8.4***	16.7***	8.3*
		(2.1)	(2.0)	(3.5)	(2.3)	(2.3)	(3.7)
Auth. @ high threat			12.0***	12.2***	13.7***	11.1***	14.0***
			(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.7)	(1.3)	(0.8)
Auth. @ low threat			11.8***	10.5***	5.3***	11.1***	4.8***
			(0.5)	(0.2)	(1.0)	(0.8)	(1.3)
Prejudice				5.4***			1.9
				(0.3)			(2.5)
Social cons.					32.5***		27.7***
					(2.2)		(1.4)
Economic cons.					-0.0		-1.7
					(1.9)		(1.4)
PID Cons.						1.9***	2.5
						(0.2)	(1.6)
PID Liberal						-4.8***	-1.8
						(0.4)	(1.1)
PID NDP						-6.7**	-4.8
						(2.3)	(4.0)
PID BQ						-15.6***	-9.8***
						(1.2)	(0.5)
Female	-2.7***	-3.7	-3.7	-3.5	-4.3	-3.4	-4.2
	(0.3)	(2.0)	(1.9)	(2.2)	(2.5)	(1.8)	(2.3)
Under 35	-1.6*	-2.4	-2.1	-3.8	-3.5	-1.5	-3.4
	(0.7)	(5.1)	(5.5)	(3.1)	(3.9)	(4.9)	(2.6)
55 and over	-5.1**	-9.0***	-9.0***	-8.2***	-9.2***	-8.1***	-7.9***
	(1.7)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.6)	(1.2)	(0.1)	(0.6)

High school or less	0.275***	0.043	0.033	0.097***	-0.126	0.021	-0.095
	(0.067)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.021)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.072)
University degree	-0.026	0.082	0.078	0.140	-0.072	0.077	-0.025
	(0.162)	(0.333)	(0.333)	(0.340)	(0.369)	(0.318)	(0.311)
Visible minority	0.032	-0.209	-0.248*	-0.340	-0.302	-0.172***	-0.160
	(0.237)	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.231)	(0.437)	(0.024)	(0.359)
Non-Christian	0.417	0.301	0.319	0.520	0.589	0.418	0.687
	(0.221)	(0.473)	(0.461)	(0.372)	(0.549)	(0.425)	(0.442)
Religiosity	3.547***	3.534***	3.557***	3.657***	3.482***	3.559***	3.462***
	(0.374)	(0.594)	(0.587)	(0.519)	(0.631)	(0.550)	(0.495)
Low income	0.313***	0.378***	0.379***	0.321**	0.328*	0.380***	0.209***
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.103)	(0.130)	(0.012)	(0.047)
High income	-0.159	-0.219	-0.216	-0.180	-0.060	-0.218	-0.041
	(0.254)	(0.422)	(0.434)	(0.405)	(0.468)	(0.486)	(0.557)
Income undisclosed	0.021***	-0.097	-0.085	-0.203***	-0.079	-0.124	-0.178
	(0.004)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.003)	(0.232)	(0.085)	(0.328)
Atlantic	0.277	0.062	0.064	0.050	0.122	0.125***	0.187
	(0.154)	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.215)	(0.130)	(0.027)	(0.131)
Quebec	-0.601*	-0.842*	-0.847*	-0.781*	-0.541***	-0.685	-0.422***
	(0.280)	(0.374)	(0.356)	(0.370)	(0.161)	(0.395)	(0.106)
Prairies	0.469***	0.642***	0.658***	0.569***	0.470***	0.562***	0.406***
	(0.139)	(0.050)	(0.069)	(0.017)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.090)
BC	-0.049	0.464	0.463	0.422***	0.246	0.411	0.223
	(0.336)	(0.278)	(0.283)	(0.105)	(0.353)	(0.261)	(0.242)
Election year (2015)	-0.073	0.095	0.092	0.122	0.126	0.121	0.173
	(0.064)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.113)	(0.080)	(0.098)	(0.119)
Constant	-4.736***	-5.402***	-5.709***	-6.129***	-6.678***	-5.507***	-6.614***
	(0.221)	(0.680)	(0.811)	(0.623)	(0.899)	(0.796)	(0.716)
Obs.	4114	2245	2245	2061	1887	2245	1768
PR2	0.249	0.316	0.317	0.315	0.363	0.327	0.361
BIC	2658.220	1309.502	1307.782	1181.663	1036.777	1289.173	967.352
Log Lik.	-1324.949	-650.893	-650.033	-587.016	-514.617	-640.728	-479.937

High school or less	2.8***	0.4	0.3	1.0***	-1.2	0.2	-0.9
	(0.7)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.6)
University degree	-0.3	0.8	0.8	1.4	-0.7	0.8	-0.2
	(1.7)	(3.5)	(3.5)	(3.5)	(3.6)	(3.2)	(3.0)
Visible minority	0.3	-2.2	-2.5*	-3.4	-3.0	-1.7***	-1.5
	(2.4)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(2.1)	(4.0)	(0.1)	(3.3)
Non-Christian	4.3	3.1	3.3	5.2	5.8	4.2	6.6
	(2.3)	(4.6)	(4.5)	(3.4)	(4.8)	(3.9)	(3.7)
Religiosity	36.7***	36.3***	36.5***	36.4***	34.3***	35.3***	33.2***
	(4.2)	(3.5)	(3.3)	(3.0)	(2.9)	(3.1)	(2.2)
Low income	3.2***	3.9***	3.9***	3.2***	3.2*	3.8***	2.0**
	(0.3)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.8)	(1.6)	(0.4)	(0.6)
High income	-1.6	-2.3	-2.2	-1.8	-0.6	-2.2	-0.4
	(2.6)	(4.2)	(4.3)	(3.9)	(4.5)	(4.7)	(5.3)
Income undisclosed	0.2***	-1.0	-0.9	-2.0***	-0.8	-1.2	-1.7
	(0.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(0.2)	(2.4)	(0.8)	(3.3)
Atlantic	2.9	0.6	0.7	0.5	1.2	1.2***	1.8
	(1.6)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(2.2)	(1.4)	(0.4)	(1.4)
Quebec	-6.2*	-8.7**	-8.7**	-7.8*	-5.3***	-6.8*	-4.0***
	(2.9)	(3.2)	(3.0)	(3.2)	(1.1)	(3.5)	(0.7)
Prairies	4.8**	6.6***	6.8***	5.7***	4.6***	5.6***	3.9***
	(1.5)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.6)
BC	-0.5	4.8	4.8	4.2***	2.4	4.1	2.1
	(3.5)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(0.8)	(3.2)	(2.3)	(2.1)
Election year (2015)	-0.8	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.7
	(0.7)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(1.0)
Obs.	4114	2245	2245	2061	1887	2245	1768
PR2	0.249	0.316	0.317	0.315	0.363	0.327	0.361
BIC	2658.220	1309.502	1307.782	1181.663	1036.777	1289.173	967.352
Log lik.	-1324.949	-650.893	-650.033	-587.016	-514.617	-640.728	-479.937

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Table A.7. Full Results Predicting Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of opposing same-sex marriage rights, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	1.544***	1.408***	2.143***	1.442***	2.167***	2.050***	1.529**
	(0.235)	(0.369)	(0.457)	(0.409)	(0.446)	(0.553)	(0.523)
Threat		2.310***	3.046***	2.168**	2.158*	2.840***	1.347
		(0.086)	(0.735)	(0.819)	(0.943)	(0.824)	(1.390)
Auth. x Threat			-1.296	-0.678	-1.553	-1.236	-0.789
			(1.479)	(1.308)	(1.818)	(1.559)	(1.901)
Prejudice				3.992***			3.814***
				(0.250)			(0.176)
Social cons.					3.250***		2.665***
					(0.088)		(0.269)
Economic cons.					1.188***		0.654***
					(0.003)		(0.050)
PID Cons.						0.582***	0.365***
						(0.059)	(0.080)
PID Liberal						-0.591**	-0.324
						(0.205)	(0.189)
PID NDP						-0.364***	-0.006
						(0.016)	(0.007)
PID BQ						-0.994**	-1.081
						(0.373)	(0.554)
Female	-0.679***	-0.763***	-0.761***	-0.415*	-0.708***	-0.741***	-0.425
	(0.040)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.169)	(0.128)	(0.074)	(0.242)
Under 35	-0.496***	-0.645***	-0.612***	-0.542***	-0.671***	-0.624***	-0.652***
	(0.047)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.157)	(0.197)	(0.158)	(0.028)
55 and over	0.204***	-0.122***	-0.121***	-0.363***	-0.100***	-0.045***	-0.317***
	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.092)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	18.7***	17.7	17.6***	10.6**	15.0*	15.8***	10.1
	(3.5)	(.)	(4.3)	(3.2)	(6.6)	(3.8)	(5.3)
Threat		29.1	28.6***	17.8***	14.4***	24.8***	8.2***
		(.)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(1.1)	(0.7)	(2.4)
Auth. @ high threat			16.8***	11.0***	20.5***	16.1***	12.8***
			(4.0)	(2.7)	(3.6)	(4.4)	(3.2)
Auth. @ low threat			16.1	10.9	9.5	14.3	8.2
			(17.8)	(11.6)	(20.0)	(16.4)	(14.1)
Prejudice				40.1***			35.6***
				(3.0)			(1.8)
Social cons.					37.8***		24.9***
					(2.3)		(2.4)
Economic cons.					13.8***		6.1***
					(0.5)		(0.5)
PID Cons.						6.8***	3.4***
						(0.5)	(0.7)
PID Liberal						-7.0**	-3.0
						(2.6)	(1.8)
PID NDP						-4.3***	-0.1
						(0.3)	(0.1)
PID BQ						-11.7*	-10.1*
						(4.6)	(5.1)
Female	-8.2***	-9.6	-9.5***	-4.2*	-8.2***	-8.7***	-4.0
	(0.8)	(.)	(1.4)	(1.7)	(1.8)	(1.1)	(2.3)
Under 35	-6.0***	-8.1	-7.7***	-5.4***	-7.8***	-7.3***	-6.1***
	(0.4)	(.)	(0.9)	(1.6)	(2.0)	(1.7)	(0.3)
55 and over	2.5***	-1.5	-1.5***	-3.6***	-1.2***	-0.5***	-3.0***
	(0.1)	(.)	(0.1)	(1.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)

High school or less	-0.037	-0.290***	-0.289***	-0.586***	-0.330***	-0.318***	-0.683***
	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.023)	(0.077)	(0.016)
University degree	0.175***	0.366***	0.365***	0.331***	0.364***	0.409***	0.337***
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.096)	(0.013)	(0.025)
Visible minority	0.213	0.122	0.080	-0.348**	0.055	0.184	-0.329
	(0.190)	(0.283)	(0.362)	(0.129)	(0.073)	(0.365)	(0.196)
Non-Christian	0.392***	0.450***	0.480***	0.685***	0.499*	0.654***	0.744**
	(0.012)	(0.133)	(0.080)	(0.140)	(0.197)	(0.054)	(0.272)
Religiosity	2.289***	2.195***	2.218***	2.358***	1.722***	2.227***	2.000***
	(0.207)	(0.231)	(0.184)	(0.307)	(0.280)	(0.139)	(0.370)
Low income	0.236**	0.095*	0.098*	0.023	0.117	0.095	0.091
	(0.081)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.108)	(0.092)	(0.050)	(0.196)
High income	-0.233	-0.398	-0.391	-0.220	-0.354	-0.426	-0.082
	(0.408)	(0.531)	(0.553)	(0.580)	(0.498)	(0.624)	(0.692)
Income undisclosed	-0.050	0.067	0.083	0.199*	0.185***	0.054	0.302
	(0.155)	(0.106)	(0.123)	(0.094)	(0.016)	(0.077)	(0.220)
Atlantic	-0.450***	-0.387*	-0.383*	-0.376***	-0.394***	-0.316	-0.389**
	(0.040)	(0.155)	(0.167)	(0.026)	(0.073)	(0.272)	(0.151)
Quebec	-0.406***	-0.369**	-0.374*	-0.530***	-0.299	-0.142	-0.203
	(0.097)	(0.120)	(0.148)	(0.154)	(0.282)	(0.099)	(0.285)
Prairies	0.289***	0.238	0.259	0.153	-0.121	0.044	-0.291
	(0.042)	(0.149)	(0.152)	(0.222)	(0.291)	(0.102)	(0.404)
BC	0.048	0.036	0.035	-0.009	-0.258	-0.088	-0.242***
	(0.066)	(0.112)	(0.130)	(0.049)	(0.169)	(0.106)	(0.045)
Election year (2015)	-0.558***	-0.671***	-0.673***	-0.611***	-0.794***	-0.640***	-0.740***
	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.057)	(0.034)
Constant	-3.453***	-4.114***	-4.537***	-5.197***	-5.765***	-4.546***	-6.160***
	(0.121)	(0.407)	(0.046)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.104)	(0.147)
Obs.	5559	2261	2261	2172	1898	2261	1835
PR2	0.197	0.261	0.263	0.377	0.313	0.284	0.418
BIC	4140.885	1672.012	1667.708	1348.374	1321.291	1619.948	1080.207
Log Lik.	-2066.131	-832.144	-829.992	-670.345	-656.871	-806.112	-536.346

High school or less	-0.5	-3.7	-3.6***	-5.9***	-3.8***	-3.7***	-6.4***
	(0.3)	(.)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.1)	(1.0)	(0.2)
University degree	2.1***	4.6	4.6***	3.3***	4.2***	4.8***	3.1***
	(0.3)	(.)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(1.3)	(0.1)	(0.3)
Visible minority	2.6	1.5	1.0	-3.5**	0.6	2.2	-3.1
	(2.2)	(.)	(4.5)	(1.3)	(0.8)	(4.3)	(1.8)
Non-Christian	4.7***	5.7	6.0***	6.9***	5.8**	7.7***	6.9**
	(0.3)	(.)	(0.8)	(1.3)	(2.1)	(0.5)	(2.5)
Religiosity	27.7***	27.6	27.8***	23.7***	20.1***	26.2***	18.7***
	(3.5)	(.)	(1.2)	(2.8)	(2.6)	(1.1)	(3.4)
Low income	2.8**	1.2	1.2	0.2	1.4	1.1	0.9
	(0.9)	(.)	(0.7)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(0.6)	(1.8)
High income	-2.8	-5.0	-4.9	-2.2	-4.1	-5.0	-0.8
	(5.0)	(.)	(6.7)	(5.8)	(5.7)	(7.2)	(6.4)
Income undisclosed	-0.6	0.8	1.0	2.0*	2.2***	0.6	2.8
	(1.9)	(.)	(1.6)	(0.9)	(0.1)	(0.9)	(2.0)
Atlantic	-5.4***	-4.9	-4.8*	-3.8***	-4.6***	-3.7	-3.6**
	(0.3)	(.)	(2.3)	(0.3)	(1.0)	(3.3)	(1.4)
Quebec	-4.9***	-4.6	-4.7*	-5.3***	-3.5	-1.7	-1.9
	(1.3)	(.)	(2.0)	(1.6)	(3.4)	(1.2)	(2.7)
Prairies	3.5***	3.0	3.3	1.5	-1.4	0.5	-2.7
	(0.4)	(.)	(2.0)	(2.2)	(3.3)	(1.2)	(3.8)
BC	0.6	0.4	0.4	-0.1	-3.0	-1.0	-2.3***
	(0.8)	(.)	(1.6)	(0.5)	(2.1)	(1.3)	(0.4)
Election year (2015)	-6.7***	-8.5	-8.4***	-6.1***	-9.2***	-7.5***	-6.9***
	(0.2)	(.)	(0.9)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.3)
Obs.	5559	2261	2261	2172	1898	2261	1835
PR2	0.197	0.261	0.263	0.377	0.313	0.284	0.418
BIC	4140.885	1672.012	1667.708	1348.374	1321.291	1619.948	1080.207
Log lik.	-2066.131	-832.144	-829.992	-670.345	-656.871	-806.112	-536.346

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Table A.8. Full Results Predicting Support for the Death Penalty

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of supporting the death penalty, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	1.098***	1.021**	1.231***	1.181***	0.996**	1.101***	1.024**
	(0.314)	(0.312)	(0.306)	(0.256)	(0.370)	(0.287)	(0.355)
Threat		0.612***	0.812***	0.775***	0.901***	0.780***	0.856***
		(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.123)	(0.049)	(0.075)
Auth. x Threat			-0.419***	-0.471***	-0.628***	-0.357***	-0.755***
			(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.150)	(0.014)	(0.169)
Prejudice				2.058**			1.676
				(0.700)			(1.146)
Social cons.					1.937***		1.191***
					(0.510)		(0.235)
Economic cons.					1.438***		0.959***
					(0.051)		(0.127)
PID Cons.						0.612***	0.266***
						(0.032)	(0.011)
PID Liberal						-0.496***	-0.401***
						(0.060)	(0.002)
PID NDP						-0.306***	-0.135***
						(0.083)	(0.001)
PID BQ						-0.582***	-0.403*
						(0.054)	(0.182)
Female	-0.328***	-0.322***	-0.319***	-0.159***	-0.177***	-0.285***	-0.085***
	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Under 35	-0.128	-0.114	-0.113	-0.101	-0.387*	-0.082	-0.448*
	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.134)	(0.146)	(0.163)	(0.158)	(0.197)
55 and over	-0.212*	-0.182*	-0.176*	-0.337**	-0.313	-0.132*	-0.373
	(0.105)	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.111)	(0.187)	(0.065)	(0.241)

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	26.2***	23.8***	24.1***	21.5***	15.8	20.9***	15.0
	(6.7)	(6.6)	(6.3)	(4.7)	(8.5)	(5.9)	(7.7)
Threat		14.3***	14.6***	12.7***	13.8***	13.9***	11.4***
		(1.3)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.9)	(0.8)	(0.8)
Auth. @ high threat			28.8***	26.5***	22.0**	24.8***	21.8***
			(6.6)	(4.7)	(7.0)	(5.8)	(5.8)
Auth. @ low threat			19.0**	16.2***	7.8	16.9**	5.7
			(6.3)	(4.9)	(10.6)	(6.2)	(10.5)
Prejudice				45.8***			34.9
				(13.0)			(20.8)
Social cons.					41.6***		24.8***
					(8.6)		(2.7)
Economic cons.					30.8***		20.0***
					(2.8)		(4.4)
PID Cons.						13.7***	5.5***
						(0.3)	(0.7)
PID Liberal						-11.1***	-8.4***
						(1.0)	(0.7)
PID NDP						-6.9***	-2.8***
						(1.6)	(0.2)
PID BQ						-13.1***	-8.4**
						(0.8)	(3.0)
Female	-7.8***	-7.5***	-7.4***	-3.5***	-3.8***	-6.4***	-1.8***
	(1.0)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Under 35	-3.1	-2.7	-2.6	-2.2	-8.3**	-1.8	-9.3**
	(3.3)	(3.1)	(3.0)	(3.1)	(3.0)	(3.5)	(3.3)
55 and over	-5.1*	-4.3*	-4.1**	-7.5***	-6.7	-3.0*	-7.8
	(2.4)	(1.7)	(1.5)	(2.0)	(3.6)	(1.4)	(4.3)

High school or less	0.223***	0.174***	0.178***	0.092***	0.138***	0.142***	0.027
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.031)
University degree	-0.650***	-0.596***	-0.589***	-0.552***	-0.797***	-0.575***	-0.797***
	(0.059)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.071)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Visible minority	0.241***	0.163**	0.164***	0.163**	0.196	0.237***	0.287
	(0.038)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.314)	(0.037)	(0.355)
Non-Christian	-0.370**	-0.370**	-0.365**	-0.334***	-0.397*	-0.304**	-0.403**
	(0.137)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.085)	(0.178)	(0.117)	(0.147)
Religiosity	-0.500***	-0.532***	-0.532***	-0.547***	-0.766***	-0.607***	-0.730***
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.100)	(0.171)	(0.091)	(0.195)
Low income	-0.017	-0.062	-0.056	-0.144***	-0.118	-0.048	-0.213***
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.003)	(0.124)	(0.061)	(0.039)
High income	0.037	0.079	0.085	0.049	0.062	0.076	-0.007
	(0.159)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.185)	(0.174)	(0.178)	(0.206)
Income undisclosed	0.002	-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.021	-0.105	-0.068***	-0.210
	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.162)	(0.063)	(0.007)	(0.144)
Atlantic	-0.074***	-0.074***	-0.072***	0.001	-0.343	-0.006	-0.225
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.207)	(0.039)	(0.174)
Quebec	-0.307*	-0.377**	-0.371**	-0.455*	-0.363	-0.169	-0.393
	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.205)	(0.203)	(0.131)	(0.312)
Prairies	0.289*	0.328*	0.325*	0.336*	0.165	0.149	0.223
	(0.129)	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.132)	(0.120)	(0.155)	(0.140)
BC	-0.045	-0.011	-0.010	0.080*	-0.127	-0.049	-0.053
	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.100)	(0.032)	(0.286)	(0.062)	(0.152)
Election year (2015)	0.236**	0.240**	0.240***	0.315**	0.286*	0.347***	0.417**
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.102)	(0.116)	(0.087)	(0.155)
Constant	-0.124***	-0.379***	-0.480***	-0.947***	-1.468***	-0.514***	-1.339***
	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.120)	(0.135)	(0.019)	(0.209)
Obs.	3952	3910	3910	3429	1925	3910	1751
PR2	0.074	0.089	0.090	0.117	0.153	0.113	0.172
BIC	5057.948	4926.902	4921.543	4188.320	2300.015	4794.965	2041.929
Log Lik.	-2524.833	-2459.315	-2456.636	-2090.090	-1146.226	-2393.347	-1017.231

High school or less	5.3***	4.1***	4.1***	2.0***	3.0***	3.2***	0.6
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.6)
University degree	-15.5***	-13.9***	-13.7***	-12.3***	-17.1***	-12.9***	-16.6***
	(1.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.1)	(1.4)
Visible minority	5.8***	3.8**	3.8**	3.6**	4.2	5.3***	6.0
	(1.1)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.4)	(7.0)	(1.0)	(7.9)
Non-Christian	-8.8**	-8.6**	-8.5**	-7.4***	-8.5*	-6.8**	-8.4***
	(3.0)	(2.7)	(2.6)	(1.5)	(3.3)	(2.4)	(2.3)
Religiosity	-11.9***	-12.4***	-12.4***	-12.2***	-16.4***	-13.6***	-15.2***
	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(2.7)	(1.6)	(2.7)
Low income	-0.4	-1.4	-1.3	-3.2***	-2.5	-1.1	-4.4***
	(1.9)	(1.8)	(1.7)	(0.1)	(2.8)	(1.4)	(1.2)
High income	0.9	1.8	2.0	1.1	1.3	1.7	-0.1
	(3.8)	(3.5)	(3.5)	(4.2)	(3.8)	(4.0)	(4.3)
Income undisclosed	0.1	-0.6***	-0.7***	-0.5	-2.2	-1.5***	-4.4
	(0.7)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(3.6)	(1.2)	(0.1)	(2.6)
Atlantic	-1.8***	-1.7***	-1.7***	0.0	-7.3	-0.1	-4.7
	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(4.9)	(0.9)	(4.1)
Quebec	-7.3**	-8.8***	-8.6***	-10.1*	-7.8*	-3.8	-8.2
	(2.8)	(2.6)	(2.6)	(4.0)	(3.9)	(2.8)	(5.8)
Prairies	6.9*	7.7*	7.6*	7.5**	3.5	3.3	4.6
	(2.9)	(3.0)	(3.2)	(2.5)	(2.4)	(3.4)	(2.5)
BC	-1.1	-0.3	-0.2	1.8**	-2.7	-1.1	-1.1
	(2.4)	(2.2)	(2.3)	(0.6)	(6.3)	(1.4)	(3.3)
Election year (2015)	5.6***	5.6***	5.6***	7.0***	6.1**	7.8***	8.7***
	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.5)	(1.9)	(2.1)	(1.7)	(2.5)
Obs.	3952	3910	3910	3429	1925	3910	1751
PR2	0.074	0.089	0.090	0.117	0.153	0.113	0.172
BIC	5057.948	4926.902	4921.543	4188.320	2300.015	4794.965	2041.929
Log lik.	-2524.833	-2459.315	-2456.636	-2090.090	-1146.226	-2393.347	-1017.231

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Table A.9. Full Results Predicting Favouring of Punishment over Rehabilitation of Young Offenders

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of favouring punishing over rehabilitating young offenders, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	1.200***	1.075***	1.304***	1.181***	0.967**	1.167***	0.896**
	(0.239)	(0.227)	(0.314)	(0.292)	(0.334)	(0.294)	(0.300)
Threat		0.659***	0.890***	0.888***	0.825***	0.818***	0.876***
		(0.060)	(0.133)	(0.145)	(0.035)	(0.171)	(0.062)
Auth. x Threat			-0.505**	-0.604**	-0.432*	-0.412*	-0.542**
			(0.169)	(0.224)	(0.214)	(0.194)	(0.182)
Prejudice				1.855***			1.122***
				(0.217)			(0.067)
Social cons.					1.799***		1.330***
					(0.293)		(0.244)
Economic cons.					1.261***		0.761
					(0.266)		(0.484)
PID Cons.						0.542***	0.379***
						(0.009)	(0.002)
PID Liberal						-0.421	-0.279
						(0.238)	(0.187)
PID NDP						-0.422***	-0.081
						(0.106)	(0.105)
PID BQ						-1.116***	-0.804
						(0.260)	(0.542)
Female	-0.164	-0.143	-0.138	0.002	-0.015	-0.081	0.055
	(0.089)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.123)	(0.164)	(0.096)	(0.121)
Under 35	-0.102	-0.056	-0.053	0.002	0.093	-0.014	0.119
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.044)	(0.181)	(0.153)	(0.164)
55 and over	-0.144	-0.088	-0.077	-0.149	-0.076	-0.012	-0.096***
	(0.101)	(0.122)	(0.134)	(0.120)	(0.045)	(0.125)	(0.027)

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	28.2***	24.6***	24.7***	20.3***	16.7***	21.6***	13.8***
	(5.2)	(4.6)	(4.6)	(3.3)	(4.5)	(4.0)	(4.2)
Threat		15.1***	15.4***	13.9***	13.7***	14.0***	13.4***
		(1.0)	(0.8)	(0.4)	(1.8)	(1.5)	(0.7)
Auth. @ high threat			30.0***	26.3***	20.9***	25.7***	18.9***
			(5.7)	(4.9)	(6.2)	(5.4)	(5.6)
Auth. @ low threat			18.5***	13.2***	12.0***	17.1***	7.7**
			(3.8)	(1.8)	(2.7)	(2.5)	(2.6)
Prejudice				40.8***			23.4***
				(3.4)			(0.9)
Social cons.					38.8***		27.8***
					(5.1)		(4.5)
Economic cons.					27.2***		15.9
					(6.5)		(10.4)
PID Cons.						11.9***	7.9***
						(0.4)	(0.2)
PID Liberal						-9.2	-5.8
						(5.4)	(4.0)
PID NDP						-9.2***	-1.7
						(2.5)	(2.2)
PID BQ						-24.4***	-16.8
						(5.2)	(11.0)
Female	-3.9	-3.3	-3.1	0.0	-0.3	-1.8	1.1
	(2.1)	(2.5)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(3.5)	(2.1)	(2.5)
Under 35	-2.4	-1.3	-1.2	0.0	2.0	-0.3	2.5
	(1.7)	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.0)	(4.0)	(3.3)	(3.5)
55 and over	-3.4	-2.0	-1.8	-3.3	-1.6	-0.3	-2.0***
	(2.4)	(2.8)	(3.1)	(2.8)	(1.0)	(2.7)	(0.6)

High school or less	0.136***	0.080***	0.085***	0.023	0.104***	0.075*	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.142)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.107)
University degree	-0.609***	-0.549***	-0.541***	-0.529***	-0.523***	-0.524***	-0.549***
	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.045)	(0.102)	(0.025)	(0.134)
Visible minority	0.343***	0.196***	0.201***	0.266**	0.333***	0.275***	0.478***
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.036)	(0.002)
Non-Christian	-0.469	-0.465	-0.463	-0.428	-0.353	-0.359	-0.405
	(0.336)	(0.339)	(0.348)	(0.392)	(0.392)	(0.329)	(0.380)
Religiosity	-0.192	-0.169	-0.177	-0.139	-0.332	-0.231	-0.308
	(0.223)	(0.244)	(0.243)	(0.195)	(0.333)	(0.224)	(0.221)
Low income	0.115***	0.073	0.082	0.013	0.062	0.058	0.028
	(0.022)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.077)	(0.138)
High income	0.039	0.047	0.052	0.034	0.085	0.039	0.049
	(0.137)	(0.151)	(0.149)	(0.124)	(0.116)	(0.203)	(0.124)
Income undisclosed	0.181**	0.171***	0.157**	0.043***	0.138***	0.120***	0.112
	(0.065)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.024)	(0.107)
Atlantic	-0.001	-0.058	-0.058	-0.020	-0.112	0.032	-0.037
	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.167)	(0.045)	(0.150)
Quebec	-0.062	-0.158***	-0.154***	-0.283***	-0.032	0.127**	0.005
	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.039)	(0.171)
Prairies	0.359***	0.375***	0.374***	0.341***	0.251***	0.208	0.226
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.129)	(0.133)
BC	0.069	0.096	0.099	0.143	-0.058***	0.016	0.038***
	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.012)	(0.094)	(0.009)
Election year (2015)	-0.420***	-0.430***	-0.432***	-0.394***	-0.390***	-0.383***	-0.355***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.010)
Constant	-0.104	-0.378	-0.484	-0.890	-1.651***	-0.493	-1.498***
	(0.377)	(0.438)	(0.493)	(0.524)	(0.440)	(0.508)	(0.313)
Obs.	2544	2517	2517	2250	2035	2517	1850
PR2	0.092	0.108	0.109	0.128	0.144	0.133	0.164
BIC	3274.375	3186.930	3182.053	2788.416	2493.075	3097.392	2219.469
Log Lik.	-1633.267	-1589.550	-1587.111	-1390.349	-1242.728	-1544.780	-1105.973

High school or less	3.2***	1.8***	1.9***	0.5	2.2**	1.6*	0.2
	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(3.1)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(2.2)
University degree	-14.3***	-12.6***	-12.3***	-11.6***	-11.3***	-11.5***	-11.5***
	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(1.9)	(0.8)	(2.6)
Visible minority	8.1***	4.5***	4.6***	5.9**	7.2***	6.0***	10.0***
	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.9)	(1.8)	(1.7)	(0.7)	(0.2)
Non-Christian	-11.0	-10.6	-10.6	-9.4	-7.6	-7.9	-8.5
	(8.0)	(8.0)	(8.2)	(9.0)	(8.7)	(7.4)	(8.1)
Religiosity	-4.5	-3.9	-4.0	-3.1	-7.2	-5.0	-6.4
	(5.3)	(5.7)	(5.6)	(4.4)	(7.4)	(5.0)	(4.8)
Low income	2.7***	1.7	1.9	0.3	1.3	1.3	0.6
	(0.6)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(1.7)	(2.9)
High income	0.9	1.1	1.2	0.7	1.8	0.8	1.0
	(3.2)	(3.5)	(3.4)	(2.8)	(2.6)	(4.5)	(2.6)
Income undisclosed	4.2**	3.9***	3.6**	0.9***	3.0***	2.6***	2.3
	(1.6)	(0.9)	(1.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.6)	(2.2)
Atlantic	-0.0	-1.3	-1.3	-0.4	-2.4	0.7	-0.8
	(2.0)	(1.8)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(3.5)	(1.0)	(3.1)
Quebec	-1.5	-3.6***	-3.5***	-6.2***	-0.7	2.8***	0.1
	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(1.4)	(1.6)	(0.8)	(3.6)
Prairies	8.4***	8.6***	8.5***	7.5***	5.4***	4.6	4.7
	(0.9)	(0.8)	(1.1)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(2.7)	(2.7)
BC	1.6	2.2	2.3	3.2	-1.2***	0.3	0.8***
	(1.5)	(1.9)	(1.8)	(1.9)	(0.3)	(2.1)	(0.2)
Election year (2015)	-9.9***	-9.8***	-9.8***	-8.7***	-8.4***	-8.4***	-7.4***
	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.5)	(0.1)
Obs.	2544	2517	2517	2250	2035	2517	1850
PR2	0.092	0.108	0.109	0.128	0.144	0.133	0.164
BIC	3274.375	3186.930	3182.053	2788.416	2493.075	3097.392	2219.469
Log lik.	-1633.267	-1589.550	-1587.111	-1390.349	-1242.728	-1544.780	-1105.973

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Table A.10. Full Results Predicting Support for Security Crackdowns

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of supporting security crackdowns, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	1.172***	1.099***	1.324***	1.216***	0.888***	1.139***	0.797***
	(0.190)	(0.199)	(0.148)	(0.109)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.016)
Threat		0.392***	0.588***	0.535***	0.391	0.515***	0.327
		(0.006)	(0.080)	(0.149)	(0.265)	(0.093)	(0.319)
Auth. x Threat			-0.484***	-0.493**	-0.155	-0.345	-0.151
			(0.126)	(0.166)	(0.456)	(0.188)	(0.520)
Prejudice				1.071**			0.897***
				(0.350)			(0.248)
Social cons.					1.489**		1.046**
					(0.500)		(0.334)
Economic cons.					2.041***		1.611***
					(0.092)		(0.190)
PID Cons.						0.771**	0.416
						(0.254)	(0.382)
PID Liberal						-0.020	0.070
						(0.047)	(0.166)
PID NDP						-0.354***	-0.157*
						(0.060)	(0.080)
PID BQ						-0.691*	-0.673**
						(0.273)	(0.243)
Female	-0.143	-0.125	-0.119	-0.083	0.027	-0.054	0.009
	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.155)	(0.223)	(0.108)	(0.206)
Under 35	-0.394***	-0.386***	-0.387***	-0.400***	0.136	-0.377***	0.073
	(0.048)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.045)	(0.418)	(0.092)	(0.415)
55 and over	0.133	0.162	0.172	0.101	0.255*	0.212	0.212
	(0.180)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.176)	(0.112)	(0.165)	(0.115)

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	26.5***	24.7***	24.9***	22.0***	17.6**	21.6***	15.4***
	(3.4)	(3.8)	(4.1)	(3.5)	(5.4)	(2.8)	(4.0)
Threat		8.8***	9.1***	7.6***	7.0***	8.4***	5.5*
		(0.4)	(0.8)	(1.9)	(1.8)	(0.6)	(2.3)
Auth. @ high threat			30.4***	27.2***	19.2***	25.5***	16.9***
			(3.0)	(1.8)	(1.4)	(1.1)	(0.6)
Auth. @ low threat			18.6***	15.9**	15.7	17.3***	13.7
			(5.4)	(5.5)	(10.8)	(4.8)	(10.0)
Prejudice				23.6***			18.8***
				(7.0)			(4.7)
Social cons.					31.8**		21.9***
					(10.0)		(6.4)
Economic cons.					43.6***		33.8***
					(1.1)		(4.9)
PID Cons.						16.9***	8.7
						(5.1)	(7.8)
PID Liberal						-0.4	1.5
						(1.0)	(3.4)
PID NDP						-7.8***	-3.3
						(1.5)	(1.8)
PID BQ						-15.2*	-14.1**
						(6.4)	(5.5)
Female	-3.2	-2.8	-2.7	-1.8	0.6	-1.2	0.2
	(2.0)	(2.3)	(2.4)	(3.5)	(4.8)	(2.4)	(4.3)
Under 35	-8.9***	-8.7***	-8.7***	-8.8***	2.9	-8.3***	1.5
	(0.8)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(0.7)	(8.9)	(1.8)	(8.7)
55 and over	3.0	3.6	3.9	2.2	5.5*	4.6	4.4
	(4.2)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.9)	(2.5)	(3.8)	(2.5)

High school or less	0.054	0.029	0.037	0.049	0.041	0.053	0.076
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.081)	(0.062)
University degree	-0.297***	-0.244***	-0.236***	-0.174***	-0.290***	-0.205***	-0.239***
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.006)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.052)
Visible minority	0.098	0.057	0.059	0.047	0.078	0.098	0.071
	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.182)	(0.227)	(0.184)	(0.161)	(0.259)
Non-Christian	-0.357	-0.332	-0.328	-0.229	-0.098	-0.249	-0.028
	(0.192)	(0.197)	(0.193)	(0.150)	(0.263)	(0.216)	(0.228)
Religiosity	0.255	0.286	0.281	0.357	0.222	0.225	0.271
	(0.184)	(0.209)	(0.204)	(0.209)	(0.392)	(0.221)	(0.408)
Low income	-0.055	-0.095***	-0.089***	-0.157***	0.065	-0.094***	0.015
	(0.030)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.186)	(0.005)	(0.149)
High income	0.268*	0.282*	0.288*	0.277	0.408***	0.252	0.380***
	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.148)	(0.007)	(0.147)	(0.084)
Income undisclosed	0.118*	0.094	0.086	-0.037	-0.060	0.072	-0.217
	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.148)	(0.052)	(0.200)
Atlantic	-0.114***	-0.141***	-0.145**	-0.085	-0.141**	-0.053	-0.053**
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.077)	(0.018)
Quebec	-0.110	-0.165	-0.165	-0.267	-0.098	0.098	0.009
	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.164)	(0.168)	(0.099)	(0.209)
Prairies	0.010	0.006	0.001	-0.042	-0.316***	-0.161***	-0.296***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.090)	(0.000)	(0.039)
BC	-0.102	-0.103*	-0.103*	-0.117***	-0.164***	-0.142*	-0.174*
	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.062)	(0.068)
Election year (2015)	0.379***	0.366***	0.364***	0.419***	0.421***	0.402***	0.445***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.060)
Constant	-0.382**	-0.564***	-0.653***	-0.947***	-2.047***	-0.807***	-2.026***
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.136)	(0.058)	(0.142)	(0.089)	(0.103)
Obs.	3949	3891	3891	3672	2040	3891	1960
PR2	0.074	0.079	0.081	0.091	0.124	0.101	0.133
BIC	5091.952	4991.527	4984.720	4657.371	2562.035	4873.123	2431.131
Log Lik.	-2541.835	-2491.630	-2488.227	-2324.581	-1277.207	-2432.428	-1211.775

High school or less	1.2	0.7	0.8	1.1	0.9	1.2	1.6
	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(0.7)	(1.1)	(1.7)	(1.3)
University degree	-6.7***	-5.5***	-5.3***	-3.8***	-6.2***	-4.5***	-5.0***
	(1.1)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.2)	(0.6)	(0.9)	(1.0)
Visible minority	2.2	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.7	2.2	1.5
	(4.3)	(4.2)	(4.1)	(5.0)	(4.0)	(3.6)	(5.5)
Non-Christian	-8.1*	-7.5	-7.4	-5.0	-2.1	-5.5	-0.6
	(4.1)	(4.2)	(4.1)	(3.2)	(5.6)	(4.6)	(4.8)
Religiosity	5.8	6.4	6.3	7.9	4.7	4.9	5.7
	(4.4)	(4.9)	(4.8)	(4.8)	(8.5)	(5.0)	(8.7)
Low income	-1.2	-2.1***	-2.0***	-3.5***	1.4	-2.1***	0.3
	(0.7)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.3)	(4.0)	(0.2)	(3.1)
High income	6.1*	6.3*	6.5*	6.1	8.7***	5.5	8.0***
	(2.9)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(3.4)	(0.0)	(3.4)	(2.0)
Income undisclosed	2.7	2.1	1.9	-0.8	-1.3	1.6	-4.5
	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(3.1)	(1.2)	(4.1)
Atlantic	-2.6***	-3.2***	-3.3**	-1.9	-3.0**	-1.2	-1.1**
	(0.7)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(1.5)	(1.1)	(1.7)	(0.3)
Quebec	-2.5	-3.7	-3.7	-5.9	-2.1	2.1	0.2
	(3.1)	(3.1)	(3.0)	(3.8)	(3.6)	(2.1)	(4.4)
Prairies	0.2	0.1	0.0	-0.9	-6.8***	-3.5***	-6.2***
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(1.8)	(0.1)	(0.7)
BC	-2.3	-2.3*	-2.3*	-2.6***	-3.5***	-3.1*	-3.6**
	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(1.3)	(1.3)
Election year (2015)	8.6***	8.2***	8.2***	9.2***	9.0***	8.8***	9.3***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(1.0)	(0.7)	(1.0)
Obs.	3949	3891	3891	3672	2040	3891	1960
PR2	0.074	0.079	0.081	0.091	0.124	0.101	0.133
BIC	5091.952	4991.527	4984.720	4657.371	2562.035	4873.123	2431.131
Log lik.	-2541.835	-2491.630	-2488.227	-2324.581	-1277.207	-2432.428	-1211.775

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

Table A.11. Full Results Predicting Support for Limiting Public Access to Information

The left panel shows logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors). The right panel shows marginal effects (with robust standard errors). Marginal effects can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in the predicted probability of supporting limiting access to information, moving from the lowest value to the highest value of a given variable, or of being in the named category (for nominal variables).

	Parameter Estimates (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	0.849***	0.825***	0.897***	0.900***	0.552**	0.751***	0.592***
	(0.144)	(0.110)	(0.215)	(0.178)	(0.170)	(0.199)	(0.060)
Threat		0.258	0.318	0.286	0.332***	0.266	0.324***
		(0.132)	(0.215)	(0.164)	(0.077)	(0.211)	(0.066)
Auth. x Threat			-0.150	-0.124	0.135	-0.047	0.131***
			(0.218)	(0.182)	(0.110)	(0.206)	(0.016)
Prejudice				0.416**			0.440
				(0.153)			(0.283)
Social cons.					1.274***		1.181**
					(0.294)		(0.367)
Economic cons.					1.069**		0.706*
					(0.360)		(0.282)
PID Cons.						0.537***	0.481***
						(0.033)	(0.063)
PID Liberal						0.002	0.143
						(0.237)	(0.391)
PID NDP						-0.318***	-0.013
						(0.025)	(0.067)
PID BQ						-0.689***	-0.545***
						(0.200)	(0.108)
Female	0.152	0.157*	0.158*	0.166*	0.192***	0.202*	0.214***
	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.000)	(0.080)	(0.044)
Under 35	-0.262	-0.291	-0.291	-0.258	-0.271	-0.285	-0.221
	(0.219)	(0.215)	(0.214)	(0.236)	(0.375)	(0.223)	(0.340)
55 and over	-0.199***	-0.186***	-0.184***	-0.193***	-0.258***	-0.172***	-0.236***
	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.001)	(0.060)

	Marginal Effects (robust standard errors)						
Ind. Vars.	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Auth.	18.2***	17.6***	17.7***	18.1***	12.5***	15.4***	13.1***
	(2.2)	(1.5)	(1.7)	(1.3)	(2.1)	(1.5)	(0.8)
Threat		5.5*	5.6*	5.1**	7.9***	5.2*	7.6***
		(2.6)	(2.5)	(1.8)	(0.4)	(2.5)	(1.1)
Auth. @ high threat			19.7***	19.7***	11.8***	16.2***	12.5***
			(4.0)	(3.3)	(3.3)	(3.8)	(0.9)
Auth. @ low threat			15.5***	16.2***	13.6***	14.5***	14.2***
			(1.1)	(0.9)	(0.6)	(1.1)	(0.7)
Prejudice				8.9**			8.9
				(2.9)			(5.4)
Social cons.					26.2***		23.9***
					(5.1)		(6.4)
Economic cons.					22.0***		14.3**
					(6.6)		(5.1)
PID Cons.						11.3***	9.8***
						(1.2)	(0.9)
PID Liberal						0.0	2.9
						(5.0)	(7.8)
PID NDP						-6.7***	-0.3
						(0.2)	(1.4)
PID BQ						-14.5***	-11.0***
						(3.6)	(1.7)
Female	3.3	3.3*	3.4*	3.5*	3.9***	4.3*	4.3***
	(2.1)	(1.7)	(1.6)	(1.7)	(0.2)	(1.9)	(1.1)
Under 35	-5.6	-6.2	-6.2	-5.5	-5.6	-6.0	-4.5
	(4.4)	(4.3)	(4.3)	(4.8)	(7.5)	(4.4)	(6.7)
55 and over	-4.2***	-4.0***	-3.9***	-4.1***	-5.3***	-3.6***	-4.8***
	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(1.0)

High school or less	0.283***	0.273***	0.276***	0.260***	0.279**	0.260***	0.175*
	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.107)	(0.036)	(0.084)
University degree	-0.334***	-0.289***	-0.286***	-0.275***	-0.224***	-0.272***	-0.256***
	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.007)	(0.042)
Visible minority	-0.095	-0.103	-0.102	-0.050	-0.329	-0.076	-0.208
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.123)	(0.228)	(0.087)	(0.296)
Non-Christian	-0.246	-0.248	-0.247	-0.225*	-0.102	-0.194	-0.094
	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.091)	(0.175)	(0.142)	(0.108)
Religiosity	0.419***	0.417***	0.417***	0.401***	0.552	0.378***	0.485*
	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.027)	(0.300)	(0.050)	(0.237)
Low income	-0.032	-0.039*	-0.038*	-0.010	0.137	-0.026***	0.138
	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.088)	(0.003)	(0.122)
High income	0.217***	0.233***	0.235***	0.292***	0.221*	0.199***	0.277***
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.113)	(0.027)	(0.039)
Income undisclosed	0.297***	0.298***	0.296***	0.300***	0.403***	0.269***	0.419***
	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.099)	(0.044)	(0.114)
Atlantic	-0.049	-0.060	-0.060	-0.045	0.191	-0.003	0.301***
	(0.120)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.105)	(0.159)	(0.124)	(0.065)
Quebec	-0.952***	-1.005***	-1.004***	-1.067***	-1.018***	-0.797***	-0.864***
	(0.123)	(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.143)	(0.007)
Prairies	0.074	0.057	0.056	0.029	0.011	-0.043	0.057
	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.040)	(0.169)
BC	-0.223***	-0.221***	-0.221***	-0.208*	-0.206***	-0.229***	-0.152*
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.082)	(0.017)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Election year (2015)	0.086***	0.065***	0.063***	0.041***	0.202***	0.075**	0.185***
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.015)
Constant	0.213	0.102	0.074	-0.046***	-1.006***	0.004	-1.131***
	(0.135)	(0.080)	(0.040)	(0.008)	(0.067)	(0.024)	(0.260)
Obs.	5558	5482	5482	5153	2048	5482	1968
PR2	0.082	0.087	0.087	0.091	0.130	0.099	0.145
BIC	6923.894	6793.489	6792.606	6363.254	2506.407	6701.814	2360.950
Log Lik.	-3453.324	-3392.440	-3391.998	-3177.353	-1249.391	-3346.602	-1176.683

High school or less	6.1***	5.8***	5.9***	5.6***	5.7**	5.5***	3.6*
	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(2.0)	(0.5)	(1.6)
University degree	-7.1***	-6.2***	-6.1***	-5.9***	-4.6***	-5.7***	-5.2***
	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.4)	(0.6)
Visible minority	-2.0	-2.2	-2.2	-1.1	-6.8	-1.6	-4.2
	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(2.6)	(4.5)	(1.8)	(5.8)
Non-Christian	-5.3	-5.3*	-5.3*	-4.8**	-2.1	-4.1	-1.9
	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.6)	(1.8)	(3.5)	(2.8)	(2.1)
Religiosity	9.0***	8.9***	8.9***	8.6***	11.4	8.0***	9.8
	(1.8)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(0.9)	(6.6)	(1.4)	(5.2)
Low income	-0.7	-0.8*	-0.8	-0.2	2.8	-0.6***	2.8
	(0.8)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(1.9)	(0.1)	(2.6)
High income	4.6***	5.0***	5.0***	6.2***	4.6*	4.2***	5.6***
	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(2.2)	(0.8)	(0.5)
Income undisclosed	6.4***	6.4***	6.3***	6.4***	8.3***	5.7***	8.5***
	(0.8)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(1.7)	(0.7)	(2.0)
Atlantic	-1.0	-1.3	-1.3	-1.0	3.9	-0.1	6.1***
	(2.5)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.2)	(3.4)	(2.6)	(1.6)
Quebec	-20.4***	-21.5***	-21.5***	-22.9***	-20.9***	-16.8***	-17.5***
	(1.7)	(2.4)	(2.4)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(2.3)	(0.6)
Prairies	1.6	1.2	1.2	0.6	0.2	-0.9	1.2
	(1.6)	(1.9)	(1.9)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(0.8)	(3.4)
BC	-4.8***	-4.7***	-4.7***	-4.5*	-4.2***	-4.8**	-3.1*
	(1.1)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.9)	(0.5)	(1.6)	(1.6)
Election year (2015)	1.8***	1.4***	1.4***	0.9***	4.2***	1.6**	3.8***
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.6)	(0.5)
Obs.	5558	5482	5482	5153	2048	5482	1968
PR2	0.082	0.087	0.087	0.091	0.130	0.099	0.145
BIC	6923.894	6793.489	6792.606	6363.254	2506.407	6701.814	2360.950
Log lik.	-3453.324	-3392.440	-3391.998	-3177.353	-1249.391	-3346.602	-1176.683

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: 2011 and 2015 CES (pooled)

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