



University of Calgary

PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository

University of Calgary Press

University of Calgary Press Open Access Books

2019-01

Environment in the Courtroom

University of Calgary Press

Ingleson, A. (Ed.). (2019). Environment in the courtroom. Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press.


<http://hdl.handle.net/1880/109483>

book

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>

Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 International

Downloaded from PRISM: <https://prism.ucalgary.ca>



ENVIRONMENT IN THE COURTROOM

Edited by Allan E. Ingelson

ISBN 978-1-55238-986-7

THIS BOOK IS AN OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK. It is an electronic version of a book that can be purchased in physical form through any bookseller or on-line retailer, or from our distributors. Please support this open access publication by requesting that your university purchase a print copy of this book, or by purchasing a copy yourself. If you have any questions, please contact us at ucpress@ucalgary.ca

Cover Art: The artwork on the cover of this book is not open access and falls under traditional copyright provisions; it cannot be reproduced in any way without written permission of the artists and their agents. The cover can be displayed as a complete cover image for the purposes of publicizing this work, but the artwork cannot be extracted from the context of the cover of this specific work without breaching the artist's copyright.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE: This open-access work is published under a Creative Commons licence. This means that you are free to copy, distribute, display or perform the work as long as you clearly attribute the work to its authors and publisher, that you do not use this work for any commercial gain in any form, and that you in no way alter, transform, or build on the work outside of its use in normal academic scholarship without our express permission. If you want to reuse or distribute the work, you must inform its new audience of the licence terms of this work. For more information, see details of the Creative Commons licence at: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

UNDER THE CREATIVE COMMONS LICENCE YOU MAY:

- read and store this document free of charge;
- distribute it for personal use free of charge;
- print sections of the work for personal use;
- read or perform parts of the work in a context where no financial transactions take place.

UNDER THE CREATIVE COMMONS LICENCE YOU MAY NOT:

- gain financially from the work in any way;
- sell the work or seek monies in relation to the distribution of the work;
- use the work in any commercial activity of any kind;
- profit a third party indirectly via use or distribution of the work;
- distribute in or through a commercial body (with the exception of academic usage within educational institutions such as schools and universities);
- reproduce, distribute, or store the cover image outside of its function as a cover of this work;
- alter or build on the work outside of normal academic scholarship.



Acknowledgement: We acknowledge the wording around open access used by Australian publisher, **re.press**, and thank them for giving us permission to adapt their wording to our policy <http://www.re-press.org>

The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion: Challenges to Environmental Prosecutions

ALEX IKEJIANI

Introduction

The position of a Crown counsel is unique in that the goal of the Crown is not entirely predicated on seeking a conviction. Instead, the goal of the Crown is to assist the trier of fact in ensuring that all of the credible evidence is put before the court. This chapter will examine some of the factors that shape and guide Crown counsel in exercising their discretion to prosecute environmental cases. Environmental cases carry some inherent challenges that will influence and shape a Crown counsel's discretion in various elements of the decision-making process, such as determining plea resolution, whether to proceed to trial or discontinue a prosecution, private prosecutions, entering a stay of proceedings, and appeals.

Crown Discretion: A Brief History

The Crown counsel has a duty to ensure the proper administration of justice and in doing so must take into account the fairness of the accused, victims of crime, and the public interest. The public confidence in the administration of justice is strengthened where the system encourages Crown counsel to be strong and effective advocates.¹ The role of a Crown counsel has been described as a symbol of fairness within a complex system of law and order. The Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Boucher*² provided the following comments concerning the role of a Crown counsel:

It cannot be overemphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the

Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented; it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. *The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater responsibility.* It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness, and the justness of judicial proceedings.³ [Emphasis added.]

The Attorney General has the responsibility to carry out prosecutions independent of pressure from interest groups and free from political influence. This unique and powerful position is fundamental in enabling the balance of power within the criminal-regulatory justice system. Prosecutorial discretion has been described as the discretion exercised by the Attorney General in matters within his or her authority in relation to the prosecution of criminal offences.⁴ The Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Crown and a member of the Cabinet within the government. This unique relationship was discussed in *Kreiger*⁵ by the Supreme Court of Canada, whereby the court referred to prosecutorial discretion as follows:

Significantly, what is common to the various elements of prosecutorial discretion is that they involve the ultimate decisions as to whether a prosecution should be brought, continued or ceased, and what the prosecution ought to be for. Put differently, prosecutorial discretion refers to decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General's participation in it. Decisions that do not go to the nature and extent of the prosecution, i.e., the decisions that govern a Crown prosecutor's tactics or conduct before the court, do not fall within the scope of prosecutorial discretion. Rather, such decisions are governed by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes once the Attorney General has elected to enter into that forum.⁶

Decision to Prosecute

The Crown counsel must consider two factors in determining whether to prosecute a case. The first question to ask is—*Is there is a reasonable prospect of conviction based on evidence that is likely to be available at trial?*; and secondly: *Would a prosecution best serve the public interest?*⁷ The courts will afford a

Crown counsel with a high degree of deference, but the scope of the deference is not unlimited. In determining whether there is enough evidence to support a proceeding, the courts have specified a test that encompasses both subjective and objective elements. In *Proulx v. Quebec (Attorney General)*,⁸ the Supreme Court of Canada determined that there must be an actual reasonable belief on the part of the prosecutor—it must be reasonable in the circumstances—that there is enough evidence to support a prosecution. As this determination is one of law, not fact, the judge is tasked with the responsibility to make that determination.

With that said, in Canadian legal jurisprudence, the scope of prosecutorial discretion and what constitutes Crown misconduct continues to receive considerable judicial attention in the context of malicious prosecutorial actions against Crown counsels. In these cases,⁹ the courts continue to afford a high level of deference to the decisions made by the Crown.

THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

There are a number of factors a Crown may consider in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. The list of factors is not exhaustive and will be based on the circumstances of the case. Environmental prosecutions present a unique set of challenges to a Crown counsel in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. This unique class of prosecutions are considered to be regulatory prosecutions rather than true criminal law offences. This is an important distinction because it places environmental offences within the category of strict liability offences. This was discussed in great detail by the Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Sault Ste. Marie*,¹⁰ which held that strict liability offences do not require *mens rea* but only an *actus reus* to prove the elements of the offence. In addition, it was reasoned that the defence of due diligence was available to the defendant.

Credible Witnesses and the Expert

As part of a Crown counsel's exercise of reviewing the evidence, the Crown must assess the credibility of a variety of potential witnesses. In doing so, counsel must take into account such matters as the availability, competence, and the credibility of various witnesses. This becomes a more difficult exercise when applied to an expert witness. The expert witness plays a crucial role in explaining the scientific elements of an offence in most environmental prosecutions.¹¹ Unlike other witnesses, an expert witness is viewed as having *special knowledge* in his or her respective discipline. This knowledge may assist the trier of fact in understanding the case before the accused. Once a witness is qualified under

a *voir dire* as an expert, the expert witness may provide opinion evidence. A court may rely on the expert evidence in reaching its decision.

The high degree of deference that a court may grant an expert witness will have an impact on the discretion exercised by Crown counsel. The challenge for the Crown is not limited to the assessment of the credibility of the expert witness; in addition, the Crown is required to present the special knowledge of an expert in an attempt to aid and assist the trier of fact. This raises questions such as: Who is the right expert? What is the experience of the expert? Is the data quantifiable? Is there a shortage of experts? Is the debate of the experts one of data or methodology?—all of which must be given great scrutiny by the Crown in relation to the overall reasonable expectation of conviction.

Admissibility of Evidence (Section 8 of the *Charter*)

It can be argued that the admissibility of evidence is one of the most important factors affecting the discretion of a Crown counsel. This includes all aspects of the Crown's case and, in particular, the evidence gathered as a result of an inspection and search. In most environmental legislation there are distinct powers that enable designated authorities to conduct inspections to ensure compliance with legislation or regulations. In this context, a Crown counsel must dedicate extra scrutiny to the examination of the evidence, as it relates to the use of the inspection authority by agents of the state.

A number of key cases involving section 8 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* have caused Crown counsel to revisit the law associated with the authority to conduct an inspection and investigate regulatory offences.¹² In the regulatory world, the courts have acknowledged that inspection powers are necessary in order to ensure compliance with the legislation in question. The facts of a particular case will determine what test a court will apply in a given factual circumstance. In *R. v. Jarvis*,¹³ the question for the court to determine was at what point a government-appointed investigator crosses the threshold—often referred to as the “*Rubicon*”—that results in the suspension of an inspection and the application of the *Charter*. In *Jarvis*,¹⁴ the Supreme Court of Canada, in deciding the breadth of an inspection power, reasoned that an inspection will violate section 8 of the *Charter* if the predominant purpose of the site visit is to gather evidence for the purpose of a prosecution. This was articulated by Iacobucci and Major JJ. for the court:

In our view, where *the predominant purpose of a particular inquiry is the determination of penal liability*, CCRA officials must relinquish

the authority to use the inspection and requirement powers under ss. 231.1(1) and 231.2(1). In essence, officials “cross the Rubicon” when the inquiry in question engages the adversarial relationship between the taxpayer and the state. There is no clear formula that can answer whether or not this is the case. Rather, to determine whether the predominant purpose of the inquiry in question is the determination of penal liability, one must look to all factors that bear upon the nature of that inquiry.¹⁵ [Emphasis added.]

In *R. v. Nolet*,¹⁶ the Supreme Court of Canada considered the authority of an inspection in the context of a routine highway stop under the authority of provincial legislation. In that case, the court distinguished the *Jarvis* decision and created a new test in determining when the Rubicon has been crossed and when section 8 will be triggered. Although the court recognized the “*Jarvis* test” as the appropriate test for the particular facts of that case, it did—however—distinguish those facts from *Nolet*. Binnie J., for the majority of the court, reasoned that in cases where the intent of the search is penal, the question for the court to determine is whether the search was reasonable in the *totality of the circumstances*.¹⁷ The distinguishing factor between the two cases suggests that a Crown counsel must determine whether the facts and the legislation support a situation where there is a “crossing of the Rubicon” from a civil dispute into an adversarial relationship with penal liability (*Jarvis*)—whereas, in *Nolet*, the courts determined the inspection had a penal consequence and there was no option to solve the matter through civil means. In essence, there was no Rubicon to cross in the case of *Nolet*. Binnie J. provided a summary:

The present case is wholly different. We are not “crossing the Rubicon” from a civil dispute into penal remedies. Here the context was always penal. The *Charter* applies to provincial offences as well as to criminal offences. The shifting focus argument was appropriate in *Jarvis*, but I do not think it helps in the solution of this appeal. The issue here is whether the police search of the duffle bag did “in the totality of the circumstances” invade the reasonable privacy interest of the appellants. I would hold that it did not.¹⁸

The *Nolet* decision was followed in *R. v. Mission Western*,¹⁹ which dealt with an inspection of a construction site under the authority of the *Fisheries Act*.²⁰ In *Mission*, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that a court must review

the actions of the officers and determine if those actions were reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. Bennett J. held:

Like the inspection in *Nolet*, the DFO employees' actions always took place, broadly speaking, in a "penal" or "adversarial" context, in the sense that s. 49(1) of the *Fisheries Act* grants powers of entrance and inspection "for the purpose of ensuring compliance with this Act and the regulations". Ultimately, the proper question for consideration, as Binnie J. held in *Nolet*, is whether the officers' regulatory inspection powers were exercised reasonably in the totality of the circumstances.²¹

The case law surrounding section 8 of the *Charter* and the use of inspection powers by environmental agents will continue to challenge Crown counsel. In that respect, the test developed in *Jarvis* is still considered valid law in Canada. The challenge of a Crown counsel is to understand which test should be used based on the facts and the legislation in question. In addition, the Crown must assess the facts in order to determine if any evidence-gathering was carried out in contravention of section 8. These factors will have a critical impact on the discretion exercised by the Crown as it pertains to the approval of charges. The existence of a *Charter* violation may lead to an exclusion of evidence that may be essential to sustain a conviction—all of which weighs on the Crown counsel to make a sound decision based on an accurate interpretation of the law and fact.

Possible Defences

A zealous consideration of potential defences should be part of a Crown counsel's routine assessment of a case. Although in theory, a Crown counsel must consider all the evidence available at the time it is presented by an investigator, this may not be possible in certain environmental cases. One example is the submission of a defence counsel's expert report. The Crown is not entitled to the expert report of an accused until the close of the Crown's case.²² In such cases, a Crown counsel must consider a number of defences that are open to an accused, None of which are required to be disclosed to the Crown before trial. There is a range of defences available that will impact a Crown counsel's discretion:

Due Diligence

- In *R. v. Gemtec Ltd. and Robert Lutes*, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal convicted an engineering consulting company of violating

federal environmental laws based on a failure to incorporate environmental compliance into their advice. As a result, Crown counsel must anticipate due diligence defences of all parties involved: landowners, operators, subcontractors, and consultants;²³

- In *R. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd.*, the Alberta Provincial Court described the due diligence test: “To meet the onus, Syncrude is not required to show that it took all possible or imaginable steps to avoid liability. It was not required to achieve a standard of perfection or show superhuman efforts. It is the existence of a “proper system” and “reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of the system” that must be proved. The conduct of the accused is assessed against that of a reasonable person in similar circumstances; [Emphasis added.]”²⁴
- Despite the fact that an employee of the defendant poured several thousand litres of a liquid substance into a storm drain on the defendant’s property in contravention of provincial legislation, the Ontario Court of Justice, in *Ministry of the Environment v. Control Chem Canada Ltd.*, dismissed all charges and reasoned that the “scope of the Defendant’s efforts to avoid and remediate any out of doors spills or discharge was broad, thorough, detailed, well documented, understood by employees and subject to frequent internal and external compliance review.”²⁵

Act of God

- In *R. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority*,²⁶ Lamperson J. stated that a one in one thousand year event is to be treated as an act of God. However, he held that one in one hundred year events are “routinely planned for” and cannot be treated as such. The Ontario Provincial Court in *R. v. Weyerhaeuser* took a different position and considered a one in one hundred year rainfall to be an act of God—despite evidence of a lack of maintenance and care of the collapsed road crossing.²⁷ Such inconsistencies provide little to no guidance to Crown counsel in circumstances where a large unexpected event is alleged to have contributed to the offence.

Science vs. Law (Adequate Science)

- In *R v. Weyerhaeuser*, the Ontario Court of Justice reasoned that the science discrepancy between experts from the defence and the Crown was not enough to enter a conviction.²⁸ Crown counsel must consider the complexity and adequacy of the expert evidence. In doing so, a

Crown must determine if an expert's evidence will offer a convincing opinion that a court will understand and relate to the elements of the offence in question.

Officially Induced Error

- The Supreme Court of Canada considered the defence of officially induced error in *La Souveraine, Compagnie d'assurance générale v. Autorité des marchés financiers*.²⁹ In doing so, Abella J. endorsed the six criteria for this defence as elaborated by Lamer CJ in *R. v. Jorgensen*.³⁰
 1. that an error of law or of mixed law and fact was made;
 2. that the person who committed the act considered the legal consequences of his or her actions;
 3. that the advice obtained came from an appropriate official;
 4. that the advice was reasonable;
 5. that the advice was erroneous; and
 6. that the person relied on the advice in committing the act.

PUBLIC INTEREST

If there is enough evidence to support the institution or continuation of a prosecution, Crown counsel must consider whether, in light of the evidence, the public interest requires a prosecution. The meaning of the public interest was considered by Sir Hartley Shawcross, QC, former Attorney General of England:

It has never been the rule in this country—I hope it never will be—that suspected criminal offences must be subject to prosecution. Indeed, the very first regulations under which the Director of Public Prosecutions worked provided that he should ... prosecute, amongst other cases: “wherever it appears that the offence or the circumstances of its commission is or are of such a character that a prosecution in respect thereof is required in the public interest.” That is still the dominant consideration.³¹

In the exercise of the discretion by the Crown counsel, a number of different factors may guide a Crown in deciding whether to institute proceedings. In theory, the more serious the offence, the more likely the public interest will weigh on that discretion. With that said, it does not suggest that lesser offences

should employ a lesser threshold. Consultation with the investigative agency can help a Crown counsel in such cases, but ultimately such decisions reside with the prosecution.

Seriousness or Triviality of the Alleged Offence (*de minimis non curat lex*)

In most circumstances, Crown counsel is required to consider the public interest, even in cases where an alleged offence is not serious. With that said, Crown counsel may be presented with an occurrence that may appear to be a trivial violation of the Act. The difficulty with the concept of *de minimis* is that case law has suggested that *de minimis* does not apply to public welfare offences or strict liability. Platana J, in *R. v. Williams Operating*,³² stated as follows:

The trial judge used the maxim of *de minimis non curat lex* to determine that the quantities of the substances deposited were so insignificant as not to constitute an offence. I accept the Appellant's argument that based on the principles in *R. v. Sault Ste. Marie*, *R. v. Goodman* and *R. v. Croft*, *de minimis* does not apply to public welfare offences or strict liability offences.³³

In essence, it could be argued that one drop of oil in a large water body with fish could potentially trigger a regulatory prosecution.³⁴ The question to consider is whether the public interest is satisfied in such cases—in other words, should limited resources be assigned to trivial matters? This determination becomes a difficult exercise in the balance between the public interest and application of *de minimis* to environmental prosecutions.³⁵ This can only be answered on a case-by-case basis with a delicate consideration of the facts.

Significant Mitigating or Aggravating Circumstances

The behaviour of an accused will likely affect the way a Crown counsel will exercise their discretion during a prosecution.³⁶ For example, if an accused remediates a site soon after the commission of the offence, this may be seen as a mitigating factor in determining whether to pursue charges or in a sentencing hearing. In contrast, an accused that knowingly breaches environmental laws—and does so as a cost of doing business—would likely be viewed as aggravating.

This issue was discussed in *R. v. Ivy Fisheries*,³⁷ where a court ordered a fine in the amount of \$650,909 for fishing tuna contrary to *Fisheries Act* licence conditions. Of that fine, \$625,909 was ordered to be paid under section 79 of

the *Fisheries Act*, which deals with an additional fine. The court reasoned that the additional fine was required to offset proceeds from the sale that was made as a result of the licence breach.

SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS

The goal of an environmental prosecution is not necessarily to seek punishment of an accused. For example, in some cases, Crown counsel should be guided by the principle of seeking a remediation plan that would put the environment in a position as if the offence had not been committed. In addition, Crown counsel must understand what type of sentence is appropriate and proportional to the offence committed. In other words, does the offence match the fine? Some environmental legislation may have abundant case law that will aid a Crown counsel in such circumstances, but this may not always be the case. The latter consideration will place the Crown in a position of trying to decide if the case is worth prosecuting based on the prospect of a low fine amount. For example, in cases where a Crown counsel is tasked with deciding whether to prosecute a particular case—where the allegation against the accused is one drop of oil in a large body of water—what factors should a Crown consider in the assessment of the public interest?

Such decisions can be said to be based on the public interest. However, it is understood in these cases that Crown counsel may be motivated to make a decision that will undoubtedly be influenced by the prospect of a low fine amount. I don't intend to suggest that a fine amount is the only factor to consider in such cases. However, it certainly is a factor that a Crown counsel will be unable to overlook, depending on the circumstances. Some other factors a Crown counsel may take into account are as follows:

- Do the facts support a low fine that is not worth pursuing?
- Will the court order technical details for a restorative action? (e.g. under s. 79.2 of the *Fisheries Act*)
- What are the estimated costs of the prosecution? Will the cost of the prosecution surpass the fine and remediation estimates?
- Remediation: Will the court order remediation in addition to a separate fine?³⁸
- Will the case provide a bad precedent (bad facts can create bad law)?

Alternatives to Prosecution

In some cases, Crown counsel may consider it to be in the public interest to pursue a prosecution. However, this may not be the most appropriate course of

action in every circumstance. If that is the case, Crown counsel may consider alternatives to prosecution. The availability of alternatives to prosecution will depend on the facts of each case and the legislation in question.

This may include, for example, the use of corrective measures³⁹ under the *Fisheries Act*, aimed at stopping an actual deposit of a deleterious substance from entering waters frequented by fish; or an occurrence that results in serious harm to fish that are part of a commercial, recreational, or Aboriginal fishery; or to fish that support such a fishery. The above-noted authority can only be issued by a designated fishery officer or an inspector under the *Fisheries Act*. In such cases, a Crown counsel could decide that such an order may suffice and a prosecution under the general prohibition⁴⁰ would be unwarranted.

In addition, subsection 717(1) of the *Criminal Code*⁴¹ provides in certain circumstances the option to consider the use of the alternative measure. The measures may be considered by Crown counsel if certain conditions are satisfied. Similarly, alternative measures may be considered if it is part of the legislation under which charges have been laid. For example, section 296 of the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*⁴² provides the option for alternative measures to a Crown counsel only if the alternative measure is not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and the conditions set out under the section have been satisfied.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to examine the role of a Crown counsel and the exercise of discretion. In particular, the chapter focuses on the challenges to environmental prosecutions. It is clear that Crown counsel face many challenges in deciding how to exercise their unique form of discretion. It can be argued that environmental cases carry some inherent challenges that may affect the discretion to prosecute or continuance of a case. Although such challenges may exist, there is a body of case law that can aid the Crown in determining the proper exercise of discretion.

NOTES

1 *R v Cook* (1997), 114 CCC (3d) 481 (SCC) at 489.

2 [1955] SCR 16 (Rand J).

3 *Ibid* at 23–24.

4 *Krieger v Law Society of Alberta*, 2002 SCC 65.

5 *Ibid* at paras 23–32.

6 *Ibid* at para 47.

7 Public Prosecution Service of Canada, *The Federal Prosecution Service Desk Book*, c 2.3, online: <http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/p2/cho3.html#section_2>.

8 [2001] 3 SCR 9.

9 *Nelles v Ontario* (1989), 60 DLR (4th) 609 (SCC); *Proulx v Quebec (Attorney*

- General*), 2001 SCC 66. There are four necessary elements that must be proved for success in an action for malicious prosecution: A. the proceedings must have been initiated by the defendant; B. the proceedings must have terminated in favour of the plaintiff; C. the plaintiff must show that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable cause, and D. the defendant was actuated by malice. *Nelles*, *ibid* at 615.
- 10 [1978] 2 SCR 1978.
 - 11 *Fisheries Act*, RSC 1985, c F-14, ss 35–36(3) [*Fisheries Act*]. Both sections of the *Fisheries Act* require expert opinion evidence to prove certain elements of the offence. The exception to this general rule is offences under s 36(3) where the deleterious substance in question that was deposited, and its quantity or concentration, is authorized by regulations. In such instances the requirement of leading expert evidence is lifted. This was the subject of debate in *Williams Operating*, *infra* note 27; the court deemed expert evidence unnecessary if by way of regulation substances are deemed to be deleterious.
 - 12 The *Constitution Act, 1982*, Sched B to the *Canada Act 1982* (UK), 1982, c 11.
 - 13 [2002] 3 SCR 757.
 - 14 *Ibid*.
 - 15 *Ibid* at para 88.
 - 16 [2010] 1 SCR 851.
 - 17 *Ibid* at para 86.
 - 18 *Ibid* at para 86.
 - 19 2012 BCCA 167. (Important to note: this case was a decision on leave to appeal to the BCCA. The BCCA denied the appeal.)
 - 20 *Fisheries Act*, *supra* note 11.
 - 21 *Ibid* at para 40.
 - 22 *Criminal Code*, RSC 1985, c C-46, s. 6573(c): in addition to complying with paragraph (a), an accused, or his or her counsel, who intends to call a person as an expert witness shall, not later than the close of the case for the prosecution, provide to the other party or parties the material referred to in paragraph (b).
 - 23 *R v Gemtec Ltd* (2007), 321 NBR (2d) 200 (CA).
 - 24 *R v Syncrude Canada Ltd*, 2010 ABPC 229.
 - 25 *Ministry of the Environment v Control Chem Canada Ltd* (15 March 2016), ON Prov Ct No. Burlington 139537-01.
 - 26 [1997] BCJ No 1744
 - 27 *R v. Williams Operating* (2008), CanLII 48148 (ON SC) [*Williams Operating*].
 - 28 *R v. Weyerhaeuser* (2007), ON COJ [Unreported].
 - 29 [2013] SCJ No 63.
 - 30 [1995] 4 SCR 55.
 - 31 UK, House of Commons Debates, vol 483, col 681 (29 January 1951).
 - 32 (2008), CanLII 48148 (ON SC).
 - 33 *Ibid* at para 86.
 - 34 The release of oil could be considered a deleterious substance which is prohibited under s 36(3) of the *Fisheries Act*.
 - 35 Various cases have ruled that *de minimis* does not apply to strict liability offences—*Williams Operating*, *supra* note 27; *R v Croft* (2003), NSCA 109, 218 NSR (2d) 184; *R v Goodman*, [2005] BCJ No 542 (Prov Ct – Crim Div).
 - 36 Other factors to consider: the accused’s alleged degree of responsibility for the offence, previous convictions, other records of non-compliance.
 - 37 (2006), 245 NSR (2d) 381 (Prov Ct).
 - 38 The *Fisheries Act* supports separate fine amounts under ss 40, 79, and 78 and restoration under s 79.2.
 - 39 *Fisheries Act*, *supra* note 11 at s 38(7.1).
 - 40 *Fisheries Act*, *ibid* at s 36(3), general prohibition against the release of a deleterious substance.
 - 41 RSC 1985, c C-46.
 - 42 *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*, 1999, SC 1999, c 33.