Environment in the Courtroom

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Aboriginal Law in the Context of Regulatory Prosecutions

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The history of the interface of Europeans and the common law with aboriginal peoples is a long one. As might be expected of such a long history, the principles by which the interface has been governed have not always been consistently applied. Yet running through this history, from its earliest beginnings to the present time is a golden thread—the recognition by the common law of the ancestral laws and customs of the aboriginal peoples who occupied the land prior to European settlement....

Most recently in *Mabo*, the Australian High Court, after a masterful review of Commonwealth and American jurisprudence on the subject, concluded that the Crown must be deemed to have taken the territories of Australia subject to existing aboriginal rights in the land, even in the absence of acknowledgment of those rights. As Brennan J. put it at p. 58: “an inhabited territory which became a settled colony was no more a legal desert than it was ‘desert uninhabited’ ....” Once the “fictions” of *terra nullius* are stripped away, “[t]he nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to [the] laws and customs” of the indigenous people....

This much is clear: the Crown, upon discovering and occupying a “new” territory, recognized the law and custom of the aboriginal societies it found and the rights in the lands they traditionally occupied that these supported....

... It follows that the Crown in Canada must be taken as having accepted existing native laws and customs and the interests in the land
and waters they gave rise to, even though they found no counterpart in the law of England. In so far as an aboriginal people under internal law or custom had used the land and its waters in the past, so it must be regarded as having the continuing right to use them, absent extinguishment or treaty.¹

R. v. Van der Peet, the case quoted above that set out the test for proving an Aboriginal right, was, like most of the cases in which the law regarding Aboriginal title, Aboriginal rights, and treaty rights has been developed in Canada, a regulatory prosecution. The defendant, Dorothy Van der Peet, was charged with a Fisheries Act offence, as were the defendants in several of the other leading cases on Aboriginal rights.² Other cases in which the principles and tests applicable to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 have been established have stemmed from hunting charges and charges laid for logging without permits.³ Indigenous individuals, practising their rights under their own laws as they have always done, found themselves being charged with offences under federal or provincial legislation. They raised their Aboriginal and treaty rights as defences to the charges. Few of the Aboriginal rights, Aboriginal title, and treaty rights cases have been brought as civil actions commenced by the Indigenous rights holders.⁴

This chapter does not discuss the tests for proof of rights protected under subsection 35(1) and the analysis and tests developed and applied by the courts for determining whether a right protected by subsection 35(1) has been unjustifiably infringed.⁵ The chapter will address two interrelated issues: Are regulatory prosecutions the appropriate forum for working out these issues, and what is the role of Indigenous peoples’ laws and legal systems, which, as noted by then Justice McLachlin in the above-quoted excerpts from Van der Peet, pre-existed and survived the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over what is now Canada? The chapter concludes with a consideration of the role of negotiations and the courts in bridging the gap between Indigenous and settler legal systems.

**Indigenous Laws and Legal Systems Exist and Are Constitutionally Protected**

While Justice McLachlin was dissenting in Van der Peet, since its first decision on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 in R. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently identified, as a key principle of Aboriginal law, the requirement to incorporate the Aboriginal perspective,⁶ including
Indigenous legal systems. In Van der Peet, the majority judgment adopted Professor Slattery’s characterization of Aboriginal rights as intersocietal law, and held that reconciliation requires that equal weight be placed on the common law and the Aboriginal perspective, which includes Indigenous peoples’ laws. Similarly, in Delgamuukw v British Columbia, the court confirmed that Aboriginal title is sourced in part from pre-existing Indigenous legal systems. The court held in particular that Indigenous laws regarding land tenure and land use are relevant in establishing occupation of lands for the purpose of proving Aboriginal title.

These principles flow from the law that governed the British Crown in colonial times. The principle of continuity provided that pre-existing rights under local law continued after the Crown asserted sovereignty over lands occupied by Indigenous peoples. As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mitchell v. M.N.R., Aboriginal laws survived the assertion of sovereignty and were absorbed into the common law as rights. Those rights now receive constitutional protection under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In Campbell v. British Columbia, Justice Williamson of the British Columbia Supreme Court held that section 35 protects the right of Indigenous peoples holding Aboriginal title “to make decisions as to the use of the land and therefore the right to have a political structure for making those decisions.” The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia that Aboriginal title includes the right to make land use decisions. Where there are treaties, the Indigenous signatories arguably did not surrender their jurisdiction over natural resources.

Chief Justice Finch, formerly of British Columbia’s Court of Appeal, has urged judges, the legal profession, and society to learn about Indigenous laws and legal systems, and to make space for the operation of Indigenous legal orders. In his words, “the current legal system must reconcile itself to co-existence with pre-existing Indigenous legal orders.” Professor Jeannette Armstrong refers to the recognition of Indigenous legal traditions and to collaboration between the Crown and Indigenous governments as a shift towards “bio-justice.”

Indigenous laws include land tenure systems and rules governing the use of land and resources. These Indigenous laws need to be recognized and integrated into resource management in Canada. One result would be fewer prosecutions of Indigenous individuals taking part in traditional resource use practices. What might be labelled and prosecuted as an “offence” when considered from the perspective of a Canadian or provincial law might, when
considered from the Indigenous perspective, be an exercise of an Aboriginal right, in compliance with the Indigenous legal system. The Indigenous legal system is likely to have its own rules for taking care of the lands and resources. Two examples illustrate how the failure to make space for the operation of Indigenous laws and systems has led to charges, prosecutions of Indigenous people, and protracted litigation.

**R. V. MORRIS**

In *R. v. Morris*, the accused were charged under British Columbia’s *Wildlife Act*. The accused were members of the Tsartlip Band of the Saanich Nation, who are signatories to a treaty entered into with the Crown in 1852. The treaty provided that the Saanich Nation would be “at liberty to hunt over the unoccupied lands; and to carry on our fisheries as formerly.” The accused hunted at night with aid of illumination, which was prohibited by the *Wildlife Act* on the basis that such practices are unsafe. The accused hunters were trapped by a decoy operation and charged with offences. Under their Indigenous legal system, hunting at night with the aid of illumination is permitted, and the evidence was that the Indigenous laws governing this practice were effective: the Tsartlip people have engaged in this practice since time immemorial, and there is not one known accident resulting from it.

Three levels of court convicted, and upheld the convictions of, the accused. The Supreme Court of Canada overturned the convictions, ten years after the defendants were arrested and seven years after they were convicted. There are likely many Indigenous individuals who have been charged with similar offences, and who have not been able to pursue their defences all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. The defendants in *Morris* might have remained convicted of an offence or pled guilty despite having engaged in the exercise of a treaty or Aboriginal right in accordance with their own peoples’ laws. The lower courts accepted the assumption underlying the province’s law: that hunting at night with an illuminative device is inherently unsafe. A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, however, did not accept this assumption, because the evidence established that night hunting with illumination is safe when done in accordance with Tsartlip laws and practices.

The court concluded that both parties to the treaty shared a common intention that the treaty right to hunt would not include a right to hunt in an unsafe manner; however, the accused did not engage in an unsafe practice, and the court concluded that they were engaged in the exercise of their treaty
right to hunt. The court, therefore, found the ban on hunting at night with an illuminating device to be an infringement of the treaty right, and because of the division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867 and section 88 of the Indian Act, the provision was therefore inapplicable and the court set aside the convictions. Had the province been willing to learn about and make space for the operation of Tsartlip law, there would have been no need for the Indigenous defendants to be charged and prosecuted.

BRITISH COLUMBIA V. OKANAGAN INDIAN BAND

In 1999, the Okanagan Nation issued a permit to one of its member Bands, the Okanagan Indian Band (OKIB), to log trees in an area in close proximity to the OKIB reserve. The community was in desperate need for housing for its members, and the logs were to be used to build a home for an elder who suffered from health risks because he lived in a house with a leaky roof, no central heating, no plumbing, and no toilet facilities. The Band was in a deficit position and could not get any funding for housing for this elder or anyone else on the reserve in need of housing.

The OKIB carried out the selective harvest of logs under the permit issued by the Okanagan Nation, and the OKIB was charged with cutting, damaging, or destroying “Crown timber” without authorization under the provincial forestry legislation. The OKIB were unsuccessful in obtaining access to timber under that legislation.

The dispute between the First Nation and British Columbia laws ran much deeper than the conflict between the Okanagan Nation’s issuance of a permit to cut timber and the province’s prohibition of cutting timber without its authorization. There was a long-standing dispute between the Okanagan and the province about the management of the forests and watersheds. For many generations, the Okanagan people managed the watersheds under their laws. Their laws give them the responsibility to take care of the land; when the people were created, “a covenant was made that we, as humans, were required to do things in a certain way and in return we would be looked after.”

One of the practices the Okanagan engaged in under their own laws and systems for managing the use of natural resources was the practice of controlled burns. Based on Okanagan ecological knowledge, controlled burns were used to take care of the forest ecosystem. If a natural burn cycle did not burn an area periodically, overgrowth would prevent understory plants from growing, including berries and medicines used by the Okanagan and plants
relied on by animals and birds. The Okanagan have knowledge about the time of year, and how to read wind cycles and air pressure cycles so that the burns could be carried out safely. The Okanagan have not been able to carry out these burns because they are illegal under British Columbia’s laws. In addition, also under British Columbia’s laws, vast areas of the Okanagan peoples’ forests have been clearcut. The Okanagan believe that the clearcutting and replacement of their forests with less diverse tree farms, combined with the prohibition on Okanagan management practices, contributed to the Mountain Pine Beetle epidemic that has in recent years devastated much of their forests and led to an accelerated rate of clearcutting of the forests in order to salvage the economic value of the trees before the beetles reduce their commercial value.33

Are Regulatory Prosecutions the Appropriate Context for Developing Aboriginal Law?

In Sparrow, the first decision of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding section 35 rights, the court noted that “the trial for a violation of a penal prohibition may not be the most appropriate setting in which to determine the existence of an aboriginal right.”34 Similarly, 16 years later, in his minority concurring reasons in Marshall; Bernard,35 Justice LeBel opined that prosecutions for regulatory offences are not an ideal forum for the development of Aboriginal law.

In Marshall; Bernard, the accused raised Aboriginal title as a defence to regulatory prosecutions for harvesting timber without authorization. Justice LeBel noted that in Delgamuukw, the court held that physical occupation is only one source of Aboriginal title; the other source is Indigenous peoples’ laws:

139 The aboriginal perspective on the occupation of their land can also be gleaned in part, but not exclusively, from pre-sovereignty systems of aboriginal law. The relevant laws consisted of elements of the practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal peoples and might include a land tenure system or laws governing land use.

140 … anyone considering the degree of occupation sufficient to establish title must be mindful that Aboriginal title is ultimately premised upon the notion that the specific land or territory at issue was of central significance to the aboriginal group’s culture. Occupation should therefore be proved by evidence not of regular and intensive
use of the land but of the traditions and culture of the group that connect it with the land. Thus, intensity of use is related not only to common law notions of possession but also to the aboriginal perspective.

While Justice LeBel concurred with the majority judgment, holding that the Aboriginal title claim had not been made out, he cautioned that the decision ought not to be considered a final pronouncement on Aboriginal title in the area at issue, partly because the nature of the proceedings led to an inadequate record being before the court. Part of what was missing was the Indigenous legal perspective:

141 The record in the courts below lacks the evidentiary foundation necessary to make legal findings on the issue of aboriginal title in respect of the cutting sites in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and, as a result, the respondents in these cases have failed to sufficiently establish their title claim. In the circumstances, I do not wish to suggest that this decision represents a final determination of the issue of aboriginal title rights in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick. A final determination should be made only where there is an adequate evidentiary foundation that fully examines the relevant legal and historical record. The evidentiary problems may reflect the particular way in which these constitutional issues were brought before the courts. [Emphasis added.]

IV. Summary Conviction Proceedings

142 Although many of the aboriginal rights cases that have made their way to this Court began by way of summary conviction proceedings, it is clear to me that we should re-think the appropriateness of litigating aboriginal treaty, rights and title issues in the context of criminal trials. The issues that are determined in the context of these cases have little to do with the criminality of the accused’s conduct; rather, the claims would properly be the subject of civil actions for declarations. Procedural and evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal claims arise not only out of the rules of evidence, the interpretation of evidence and the impact of the relevant evidentiary burdens, but also out of the scope of appellate review of the trial judge’s findings of fact…. In addition, special difficulties come up when dealing with broad title
and treaty rights claims that involve geographic areas extending beyond the specific sites relating to the criminal charges. [Emphasis added.]

143 There is little doubt that the legal issues to be determined in the context of aboriginal rights claims are much larger than the criminal charge itself and that the criminal process is inadequate and inappropriate for dealing with such claims.

The court noted again in Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General) (21 years after Sparrow) that regulatory prosecutions are not well suited for litigating Aboriginal and treaty rights issues. In Marshall; Bernard, Justice LeBel suggested that prosecutions be put on hold while title and rights issues are litigated in the civil courts:

144 The question of aboriginal title and access to resources in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia is a complex issue that is of great importance to all the residents and communities of the provinces. The determination of these issues deserves careful consideration, and all interested parties should have the opportunity to participate in any litigation or negotiations. Accordingly, when issues of aboriginal title or other aboriginal rights claims arise in the context of summary conviction proceedings, it may be most beneficial to all concerned to seek a temporary stay of the charges so that the aboriginal claim can be properly litigated in the civil courts. Once the aboriginal rights claim to the area in question is settled, the Crown could decide whether or not to proceed with the criminal charges.

While summary conviction proceedings may not be the appropriate forum for determinations of Aboriginal title and rights and treaty rights, or for receiving evidence of Indigenous laws and legal systems, civil proceedings have thus far not proved to be a great alternative. In the meantime, prosecutions continue, and Indigenous people engaged in practices that have been central to their cultures for countless generations are charged and treated as criminals.

Civil Actions: Risks and Difficulties

While full evidence can be expected to be put before the court in a civil lawsuit, and the Indigenous Nation’s laws can be put before the court, civil lawsuits addressing Aboriginal title and rights are expensive and take many years
to litigate, and, thus far, most civil cases brought by Indigenous peoples in Canada to prove their title and rights have been decided at least in part on pleadings or other technical issues raised by the Crown.

TECHNICALITIES AND PLEADINGS ISSUES

In *Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia*, three judges of the Supreme Court of Canada held that Aboriginal title had been extinguished, three held that the Nisga’a continued to hold unextinguished Aboriginal title, and the seventh and deciding judge dismissed the case on a technicality because the Nisga’a did not obtain a fiat from the province to proceed with the case.

Initially, the *Delgamuukw* litigation was brought by individual Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en Houses; on appeal, the claims were amalgamated into two collective claims, one by each nation. The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the respondents suffered prejudice because the Gitsksan and Wet'suwet'en did not amend their pleadings, and it therefore ordered a new trial rather than applying the tests it set out for proof of Aboriginal title to the facts.

At trial, the *Tsilhqot’in* case was decided on a pleadings issue. The trial judge concluded that the wording of the declaration in the Tsilhqot’in statement of claim advanced an “all-or-nothing” claim. Because the trial judge found that the evidence established Aboriginal title to only part of the area claimed, he held that he could not issue any declaration of Aboriginal title. The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed and granted the declaration of Aboriginal title, concluding that: (1) in cases such as this, legal principles may be unclear at the outset; (2) evidence as to how the land was used may be uncertain at the outset and historic practices will be clarified through the course of trial; and (3) “cases such as this require an approach that results in decisions based on the best evidence that emerges, not what a lawyer may have envisaged when drafting the original claim.”

In the *Lax Kw’alaams* case, the statement of claim was focused on a right to a commercial fishery. Partway through the trial, the Lax Kw’alaams sought, as alternative relief, declarations of lesser rights, including a right to fish for subsistence purposes. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the defendants “must be left in no doubt about precisely what is claimed” and that the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant a declaration of “lesser” rights. While the evidence established that the Lax Kw’alaams people “largely sustained themselves” by fishing, which ought to give rise to an Aboriginal right to do so, a member of Lax Kw’alaams facing a fishing charge would have to prove an Aboriginal right to raise it as a defence unless the prosecutor admitted the existence of the Aboriginal right.
COSTS

Around the same time that the defendants in the Bernard and Marshall cases were logging without provincial authorization on the east coast, in British Columbia, the Okanagan, Neskonlith, Adams Lake, and Splats’in (Spallumcheen) Bands engaged in logging under permits issued by their respective Nations (the Okanagan Nation Alliance and the Secwépemc or Shuswap Nation Tribal Council), rather than under permits issued by the province. The province issued stop work orders under its forestry legislation, seized the logs, obtained injunctions against the Okanagan and Secwépemc, and brought proceedings to enforce the stop work orders. The Okanagan and Secwépemc raised Aboriginal title and rights in defence, and on the province’s motion, the summary proceedings were converted into civil trial proceedings; the courts were of the view that discovery and cross-examinations were required in order to properly determine the scope of Okanagan and Secwépemc Aboriginal title.44

A civil trial involving claims of Aboriginal title and rights can be prohibitively expensive, as it involves a factual inquiry spanning many years and many witnesses, including experts and oral history witnesses.45 The Okanagan and Secwépemc could not afford an Aboriginal title trial and so they sought, and were granted, an order requiring the Crown to pay their costs in advance of the trial and in any event of the cause.46 The Supreme Court of Canada set out a new test for advance or interim costs orders in public interest litigation as follows: (1) the party seeking costs genuinely cannot afford to pay for the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the issues to trial; (2) the claim to be adjudicated is *prima facie* meritorious; and (3) the issues raised transcend the individual interests of the particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been resolved in previous cases.47

Because of the third requirement, advance cost orders are not available for most Indigenous peoples with unresolved Aboriginal title and rights claims, either as a defence to a regulatory prosecution or in a civil lawsuit. Unless the Indigenous peoples can show that their case is a test case raising an unresolved legal issue, the case will not qualify.48

The Tsilhqot’in Nation was already partway through its Aboriginal title and rights trial when the British Columbia Court of Appeal granted the advance costs award to the Okanagan and Secwépemc. The Tsilhqot’in were then granted an advance costs order as well, based on the test set out in the Okanagan case.49 The Crown was then able to rely in part on the Tsilhqot’in case to deny to the Okanagan and Secwépemc the ability to prove their Aboriginal title in their cases under their cost order. The Secwépemc case was stayed pending the outcome of the Okanagan case.50 In 2007, after the Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed that the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet have an Aboriginal right to harvest timber for domestic purposes,\textsuperscript{51} the province admitted that the Okanagan have this same right. Though the Okanagan and Secwepemc never pled this kind of right, the province successfully applied to defer the Aboriginal title issues in the Okanagan case, to be heard only if necessary after a decision on whether the province could justify the infringement of the admitted right, and after the outcome of the \textit{Tsilhqot’in} litigation.\textsuperscript{52} The Okanagan have thus far been deprived the ability to defend themselves on the basis of their title and laws.

\textbf{Where To From Here?}

The courts have repeatedly called upon the parties to negotiate reconciliation.\textsuperscript{53} The closing paragraph of Chief Justice Lamer’s decision in \textit{Delgamuukw} was as follows:

186 Finally, this litigation has been both long and expensive, not only in economic but in human terms as well. By ordering a new trial, I do not necessarily encourage the parties to proceed to litigation and to settle their dispute through the courts. As was said in \textit{Sparrow}, at p. 1105, s. 35(1) “provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take place”.\ldots Moreover, the Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in good faith. Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I stated in \textit{Van der Peet, supra}, at para. 31, to be a basic purpose of s. 35(1)—“the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown”. Let us face it, we are all here to stay.

In \textit{R. v. Marshall}, the court noted that accommodation of treaty rights would be best achieved through consultation and negotiation of an agreement for Mi’kmaq participation in resources.\textsuperscript{54} In \textit{Haida}, the court once again called on the parties to engage in negotiations to resolve the outstanding issues between Indigenous peoples and the Crown:

20 Where treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown requires negotiations leading to a just settlement of Aboriginal claims: \textit{R. v. Sparrow}, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, at pp. 1105–6. Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed by s. 35 of the \textit{Constitution
Section 35 represents a promise of rights recognition, and “[i]t is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises” (Badger, supra, at para. 41). This promise is realized and sovereignty claims reconciled through the process of honourable negotiation. It is a corollary of s. 35 that the Crown act honourably in defining the rights it guarantees and in reconciling them with other rights and interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate. [Emphasis added.]

... 25 Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.

Justice Vickers, the trial judge in Tsilhqot’in, expected the parties to negotiate, and attempted to facilitate those negotiations by making findings about Tsilhqot’in Aboriginal title even though he (in error) concluded that he could not grant a declaration: 55

[1136] Over the years, British Columbia has either denied the existence of Aboriginal title and rights or established policy that Aboriginal title and rights could only be addressed or considered at treaty negotiations. At all material times, British Columbia has refused to acknowledge title and rights during the process of consultation. Consequently, the pleas of the Tsilhqot’in people have been ignored. 55

[1375] I have come to see the Court’s role as one step in the process of reconciliation. For that reason, I have taken the opportunity to decide issues that did not need to be decided. For example, I have been unable to make a declaration of Tsilhqot’in Aboriginal title. However, I have expressed an opinion that the parties are free to use in the negotiations that must follow.
What is clear to me is that the impoverished view of Aboriginal title advanced by Canada and British Columbia, characterized by the plaintiff as a “postage stamp” approach to title, cannot be allowed to pervade and inhibit genuine negotiations.

Crown positions often fail to comply with the jurisprudence, making a negotiated resolution difficult to achieve. For example, for many years, British Columbia sought to advance its position, supported by various legal arguments, that Aboriginal title had been extinguished throughout the province. These arguments were put to rest by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Delgamuukw*, where the court held that Aboriginal title had not been extinguished and continued to exist in British Columbia.\(^{56}\)

In response to the *Delgamuukw* decision, rather than acknowledge that Aboriginal title continues to exist and engage in negotiations based on recognition, the province took the position that everything the court said about Aboriginal title was *obiter*, and that as no Indigenous people had actually proven Aboriginal title and received a court declaration, nothing on the ground had changed. It would not recognize Aboriginal title and would not negotiate based on recognition, or even consult with Indigenous people before impacting their interests, unless an Indigenous Nation proved its Aboriginal title and rights in court. This eventually led to the *Haida* case, in which the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the Crown’s position that until Aboriginal title is proven, the Crown has no legal obligations.\(^{57}\)

The province then attempted to confine Aboriginal title to individual small sites, such as villages, fishing rocks, hunting blinds, and buffalo jumps—a theory rejected as “impoverished” at trial in the *Tsilhqot’in* case\(^ {58}\) but successful on appeal to the BC Court of Appeal.\(^ {59}\) This approach to Aboriginal title ignores Indigenous peoples’ laws and perspectives despite *Delgamuukw*’s requirement to give weight to those laws. It is also an approach that implicitly adopts stereotypes about Indigenous peoples that the Supreme Court of Canada rejected almost 30 years earlier.\(^ {60}\)

The trial judge noted that the Crown’s positional and “impoverished” approach to Aboriginal title had stood in the way of negotiations. In response, the Crown appealed, continuing to advance this impoverished approach. *Tsilhqot’in* proceeded to the Supreme Court of Canada, which rejected the Crown’s argument and held that a culturally sensitive approach that accounts for the Indigenous perspective—including Indigenous laws—is required.\(^ {61}\) The court granted the Tsilhqot’in a declaration of Aboriginal title to 1,700
square kilometres of land. The court noted that governments are under a legal duty to negotiate in good faith the resolution of land claims, and encouraged governments and proponents not only to negotiate but, more specifically, to seek Indigenous peoples’ consent, “whether before or after a declaration of Aboriginal title.”

In British Columbia, where most Indigenous nations have never entered into treaty with the Crown, the British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) Process, a tripartite process, was commenced in 1993. Government mandates and policies for treaty negotiations have not changed since, despite developments in the law. Sixty First Nation groups have entered the BCTC process, representing 110 of British Columbia’s 203 First Nations; only three final agreements have been ratified in the 25-year history of this process.

Recent developments provide some hope that negotiations could lead to Canadian governments making space for the operation of Indigenous legal systems in the regulation and management of land and resource use.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was adopted by the United Nations in 2007. It sets out rights that “constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the Indigenous peoples of the world.”

UNDRIP’s Articles include the following:

- Article 18: Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters affecting their rights, and to maintain their decision-making institutions;

- Article 26: Indigenous peoples have the right to their lands, territories and resources, and to own, use develop and control such lands and resources. States must recognize and protect these lands, territories and resources with due respect for the Indigenous customs, traditions and land tenure systems; and

- Article 32: Indigenous peoples have the right to determine priorities and strategies for the development and use of their lands and resources. States shall consult Indigenous peoples in order to obtain
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories or resources.

Canada was one of four countries to vote against UNDRIP. In 2010, Canada announced its support of UNDRIP as an “aspirational document” that is not legally binding, does not reflect customary international law, and does not change Canadian law. As discussed further below, in 2015, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its Final Report, which called on Canadian governments to fully adopt and implement UNDRIP as the framework for reconciliation (Call to Action 43). In 2016, Canada announced that it now fully supports UNDRIP without qualification. In 2015, Alberta announced that it would adopt UNDRIP. In 2017, British Columbia announced that it will adopt UNDRIP.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Calls to Action

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) was established in 2008, and was mandated to:

- reveal to Canadians the complex truth about the history and the ongoing legacy of the church-run residential schools, in a manner that fully documents the individual and collective harms perpetrated against Aboriginal peoples, and honours the resilience and courage of former students, their families, and communities; and
- guide and inspire a process of truth and healing, leading toward reconciliation within Aboriginal families, and between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal communities, churches, governments, and Canadians generally. The process was to work to renew relationships on a basis of inclusion, mutual understanding, and respect.66

The commission released its final report in 2015, including a number of Calls to Action. Of particular relevance to this paper are the following:

45. We call upon the Government of Canada, on behalf of all Canadians, to jointly develop with Aboriginal peoples a Royal Proclamation of Reconciliation to be issued by the Crown. The proclamation would build on the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Niagara of 1764, and reaffirm the nation-to-nation relationship between
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. The proclamation would include, but not be limited to, the following commitments:

i. Repudiate concepts used to justify European sovereignty over Indigenous lands and peoples such as the Doctrine of Discovery and *terra nullius*.

ii. Adopt and implement the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* as the framework for reconciliation.

iii. Renew or establish Treaty relationships based on principles of mutual recognition, mutual respect, and shared responsibility for maintaining those relationships into the future.

iv. Reconcile Aboriginal and Crown constitutional and legal orders to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are full partners in Confederation, including the recognition and integration of Indigenous laws and legal traditions in negotiation and implementation processes involving Treaties, land claims, and other constructive agreements.

50. In keeping with the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, we call upon the federal government, in collaboration with Aboriginal organizations, to fund the establishment of Indigenous law institutes for the development, use, and understanding of Indigenous laws and access to justice in accordance with the unique cultures of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

**The Government of Canada’s “Ten Principles”**

In 2017, the Government of Canada announced its commitment to achieve reconciliation through a renewed relationship “based on recognition of rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership as the foundation for transformative change.” In particular, Canada “recognizes that Indigenous self-government and laws are critical to Canada’s future …”

The Government of Canada set out ten principles respecting its relationship with Indigenous peoples. The first principle reads as follows: “The Government of Canada recognizes that all relations with Indigenous peoples need to be based on the recognition and implementation of their right to self-determination, including the inherent right of self government.” Canada further recognizes that this country’s “constitutional and legal order recognizes the reality that Indigenous peoples’ ancestors owned and governed the lands,”
and calls on all governments “to shift their relationships and arrangements with Indigenous peoples so that they are based on recognition and respect for the right to self-determination, including the inherent right of self-government,” including “changes in the operating practices and processes of the federal government.”

The fourth Principle is that Canada “recognizes that Indigenous self-government is part of Canada’s evolving system of cooperative federalism and distinct orders of government.” Under this principle, Canada recognizes self-government as a right protected by section 35, and states that “Recognition of the inherent jurisdiction and legal orders of Indigenous nations is therefore the starting point of discussions aimed at interactions between federal, provincial, territorial and Indigenous jurisdictions and laws.” Canada acknowledges the need to ensure “space for the operation of Indigenous jurisdictions and laws.”

**Judicial Oversight of Rights Implementation and Negotiations**

Given recent developments, there is some hope that reconciliation negotiations that make space for the operation of Indigenous laws and legal systems in the regulation and management of Canada’s lands and resources will be fruitful. Respect for Indigenous laws and legal orders should in turn end the criminalization and prosecution of Indigenous resource users.

In *Delgamuukw*, the court noted that reconciliation would be best achieved through good faith negotiations “reinforced by judgments of this Court.” The courts might also play a role in overseeing reconciliation negotiations as needed in this era of UNDRIP adoption, and cooperation should issues remain unresolvable without further judicial guidance. One role the courts play in advancing reconciliation through negotiation is in settling legal issues whose resolution is necessary to remove barriers to negotiated agreements. An example is the *Tsilhqot’in* decision, which resolved the dispute between the Crown and Indigenous peoples regarding whether Aboriginal title is confined to small sites. Courts have also supervised government/Indigenous relations as an outcome of litigation.

As in Canada, much of the early treaty rights case law in the United States involved defences to prosecutions. In 1968, several tribes brought a civil action against the State of Oregon for failure to protect Indigenous peoples’ right to fish under treaty. Judge Belloni held that the treaty fishing right guaranteed to the tribes a fair share of the fish harvest, and that Oregon
was required to protect the treaty fishing right. Judge Belloni retained jurisdiction to grant further or amended relief, and supervised allocation decisions for 12 years. Eventually, this decision led to a negotiated salmon management plan under which the fishery became co-managed by Oregon and the tribes.

In *United States v. State of Washington*, a case commonly referred to as the “Boldt” decision, the federal government and Western Washington Tribes commenced a lawsuit alleging that Washington State was not honouring the Tribes’ treaty fishing rights. Judge Boldt held that the Tribes were entitled to half of the total salmon catch and should be responsible for regulating the Indian fishery off-reservation, with the state having the power over Indian off-reservation fishing only for the purpose of conservation. Judge Boldt held that Washington’s regulations were invalid because they favoured non-tribal fisheries. Washington argued that it was imposing restrictions for the sake of conservation and to stop overharvesting by the tribes, but Judge Boldt found an absence of “any credible evidence showing any instance, remote or recent, when a definitively identified member of any plaintiff tribe exercised his off-reservation treaty rights by any conduct or means detrimental to the perpetuation of any species of anadromous fish.” The decision led to controversy and confrontation, and Judge Boldt retained jurisdiction in order to assist the parties in resolving problems and disputes arising from his decision, and to ensure that Washington complied.

In Canada, courts have retained jurisdiction in duty to consult cases, giving the parties leave to apply to the court for further directions; giving the Indigenous party leave to bring the matter back before the court if they are of the view that consultation and accommodation are inadequate, including liberty to reapply to quash the decision or approval in question; and ordering mediation, allowing the Indigenous party to seek further directions from the court if mediation fails.

**Conclusion**

As noted above, most prosecutions of Indigenous resource harvesters would be unnecessary if space were made for the operation of Indigenous legal systems in the regulation and management of resource use. While prosecutions of Indigenous resource harvesters are brought on the basis that there is a need to conserve the resource, the real threats to the resource are usually the result of the operation of federal and provincial laws, and prosecutions often result from a failure to recognize and respect that the Indigenous harvester is
exercising an Aboriginal right and operating under an Indigenous legal system that ensures safety and protects resources for future generations.

We are at a crossroads in Canada with the recent Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and government responses that pledge adoption of UNDRIP, recognition of Aboriginal title and rights, respect for Indigenous legal systems, and an inclusive cooperative federalism. Negotiations in accordance with these principles should lead to collaborative resource management and make prosecutions of Indigenous harvesters a rare occurrence. What seems certain is that prosecuting Indigenous resource harvesters carrying on practices passed down through the generations does not advance reconciliation.

NOTES

4. The most notable cases that have been commenced by Indigenous peoples as civil actions involve Aboriginal title claims: *Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia*, [1973] SCR 313 [Calder]; *Delgamuukw v British Columbia*, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw]; and *Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia*, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in]. The Lax Kw’alaams pled both Aboriginal title and fishing rights, but the Aboriginal title issues were severed: *Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2006 BCSC 1493. The case was decided on the basis of the Aboriginal rights claims, and the Aboriginal title claim remains outstanding: *Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2011 SCC 56 [Lax Kw’alaams].
5. The leading cases on treaty rights include: *Morris*, *supra* note 3; *R v Marshall*, [1999] 3 SCR 456; *Badger*, *supra* note 3; and *Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources)*, 2014 SCC 48. The cases setting out the tests and analysis under s 35 in the context of Aboriginal rights include: *Sparrow*, *supra* note 2; *Van der Peet*, *supra* note 1; *R v Sappier*, 2006 SCC 54 [Sappier]; and *Gladstone*, *supra* note 2. The leading decisions on Aboriginal title are *Delgamuukw*, *supra* note 4; *Bernard*, *supra* note 3; and *Tsilhqot’in, supra* note 4. While this is not an exhaustive list of Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on these issues, it is worth noting that almost all of these cases began as regulatory prosecutions.
8. *Van der Peet*, *supra* note 1 at paras 42 and 49–50.
9. *Delgamuukw*, *supra* note 4 at paras 114, 145, and 147.


13 *Campbell v British Columbia*, 2000 BCSC 1123 at para 137. This case also held that ss 91 and 92 of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, are only exhaustive as between the provinces and the federal government.

14 *Tsilhqot’ in*, supra note 4.


17 Finch, *ibid* at para 44.


19 *Morris*, supra note 3.

20 *Morris*, *ibid* at paras 5, 11, 26; 2002 BCSC 780 at paras 29, 31.

21 [1999] BCJ No 3199 (BCPC) (QL); 2002 BCSC 780; and 2004 BCCA 121.

22 *Morris*, supra note 3 at para 11.

23 *Morris*, *ibid* at para 56.

24 *Morris*, *ibid* at para 60.

25 Courts have also held that Indigenous individuals accused of an offence were not exercising an Aboriginal right when they have failed to follow the relevant Indigenous laws. An example of the courts recognizing Indigenous laws in this context is the decision of the Provincial Court of British Columbia in *R v Bruce William Wilson Jr*, 2003 BCPC 56. In that case, the evidence was that the individual was not following Gitxsan law, and he was therefore not exercising an Aboriginal right. The accused shot and killed a grizzly bear and two cubs. His defence was that he was exercising an Aboriginal right to kill the bears because they were dangerous and a threat to the local community. The evidence at trial demonstrated that his actions were contrary to Gitxsan law, which requires that grizzly bears be treated with respect. The Gitxsan way to deal with a problem bear is to put out an alert to the community and notify the local Fish and Wildlife office in the hope that they can trap and move the bear. Only if this is not successful will the chief and elders call on a hunter to remove the problem bear, and only an experienced hunter will be called upon for this job. The accused also did not use all of the bear, and this, too, was against Gitxsan laws. The judge held that the exercise of the Aboriginal right would be subject to Gitxsan law (see paras 18 and 27).

26 Affidavit of Chief Dan Wilson, filed 30 November 1999 in *British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band*, SCBC Vernon Registry, No 23911 [Okanagan No 23911].

27 *Ibid*.


29 Affidavit of Dan Wilson #7, filed 5 August 2010 in *Okanagan* No 23911, *ibid*.

30 The province continued to authorize clearcuts in the watersheds at issue while the litigation was ongoing, leading to further litigation in which Tolko, a logging company given cutting rights by province, and the Okanagan Indian Band, each sought injunctions against the other: *Tolko Industries Ltd v Okanagan Indian Band*, 2010 BCSC 24.
31 Affidavit #1 of Jeannette Armstrong, filed 15 May 2007 in Okanagan No 23911, supra note 26 at para 18.
32 Ibid at para 29.
33 Ibid at para 30; Affidavit of Fabian Alexis, filed 15 May 2007 in Okanagan No 23911, supra note 26.
34 Sparrow, supra note 2 at para 30.
35 Bernard, supra note 3.
36 This problem arose in the Okanagan litigation discussed above, wherein the province attempted to confine the litigation to the cutblock where the logging took place and the stop work order was issued, rather than the watershed area within which the cutblock was located and over which the Okanagan asserted Aboriginal title in defence. The Case Management Judge rejected an application by the province to confine the evidence that the Okanagan could put before the court to evidence of use and occupation of the cutblock, after the proceedings were converted into a civil action: HMTQ v Chief Jules et al, 2005 BCSC 1312 at paras 30–52.
37 Lax Kw'alaams, supra note 4 at para 11.
38 Calder, supra note 4.
39 Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at paras 76–77.
40 Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at paras 120–129 [Tsilhqot'in Trial Decision].
41 Tsilhqot'in, supra note 4 at paras 21–23.
42 Lax Kw'alaams, supra note 4.
43 Ibid at para 45.
44 British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2000 BCSC 1135 [Okanagan 2000]; British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Jules, 2001 BCCA 647.
45 See, for example, Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2006 BCCA 2. The trial in Tsilhqot'in lasted 339 days, over a five-year period.
46 Okanagan 2000, supra note 44; British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2001 BCCA 647; British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71 [Okanagan 2003].
47 Okanagan 2003, ibid.
48 Hagwilget Indian Band v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2008 FC 574. While granting an advance costs award, the court suggested at para 19 that if the legal issues were not unique, had been resolved in another case, or were likely to be resolved in another case “at an early date,” it would not have made the order.
51 Sappier, supra note 5; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54.
52 British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2008 BCCA 107.
53 See Van der Peet, supra note 1 at para 313.
54 R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533 at para 22. See also Lax Kw’alaams, supra note 4 at para 11.
55 Tsilhqot’in Trial Decision, supra note 40 (emphasis added). See also paras 506, 961, and 1349.
56 Delgamuumk, supra note 4 at para 172–186.
57 Haida Nation v British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73 at paras 8–10, 28–31 [Haida].
58 Tsilhqot’in Trial Decision, supra note 40 at para 1376.
59 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285 (Tsilhqot’in v BCCA) at para 221.
60 Simon v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at para 21. In that case, the court below had held that as savages, the Indigenous signatories to the treaty in issue lacked the capacity to enter into a treaty. Limiting Aboriginal title to small pieces of land fails to recognize that Indigenous peoples existed as organized societies prior to contact and the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, fails to recognize that the Indigenous sovereignty pre-existed Crown sovereignty (Haida at para 20), and fails to incorporate and give weight to the Indigenous perspective.
61 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 41.
62 Ibid at para 18.
63 Ibid at para 97.
64 See online: <www.bctreaty.ca>.
65 Article 43.
68 Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 186.
70 Sohappy v Smith, 302 FSupp 899 (D Or 1969) (commonly referred to as the "Belloni" decision).
71 Blumm & Steadman, supra note 69 at 666 and fn 68.
74 Such regulations had to be "reasonable and necessary to the perpetuation of a particular run or species of fish." Boldt, ibid at 342.
75 Boldt, ibid at 338, fn 26.
76 Boldt, ibid at 347. The Boldt decision resulted in further litigation, including a clarification that the treaty right guaranteed no more than was necessary to provide a moderate living, up to 50% of the catch. See, e.g., Washington v Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 US 658 (1979) at 686–687.
77 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2002 BCCA 147 at paras 58–62; Homalco Indian Band v British Columbia (Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries), 2005 BCSC 283 at para 127 [Homalco]; Heiltsuk Tribal Council v British Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management), 2003 BCSC 1422 at para 129.
78 Homalco, ibid; Gitxsan and other First Nations v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2002 BCSC 1701; Gitanyow First Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 BCSC 1734.
79 Hupacasath First Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2005 BCSC 1712; Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2008 BCSC 1505. The Crown was ordered to pay for the costs of the mediator. Smith J provided the parties with direction as to what would be discussed at the mediation, including, for example, ways of including Hupacasath in discussions regarding environmental, wildlife, and watershed protection on the lands in issue, and accommodation from resources on Crown lands for the impact of the decision in issue on the Hupacasath.
80 See Tsilhqot'in BCCA, supra note 59 at paras 290–343, where the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusions that British Columbia's forestry legislation unjustifiably infringes Tsilhqot’in rights to hunt and trap, by directly impacting wildlife, reducing species diversity and populations, and destroying their habitat, including through the removal of coarse woody debris, soil compaction, changes to hydrology, and the resulting slower regeneration of the forests.