Regulatory Inspections: A Private Practitioner’s Perspective

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Individuals and businesses with questions pertaining to regulatory development or methods of how to comply with Environment and Climate Change Canada administered legislation should consult legal expertise with experience in environmental legislation.

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Introduction

If, in the 1970s, Canada had followed the United States and adopted federal environmental laws requiring standard setting and enforcement for pollution control, and containing citizen suit provisions allowing NGOs and others to force the federal government to comply with those laws, the courts could now play a vital role in helping the country achieve long-term environmental goals by keeping political opportunism at bay.1 And if Canada had a federal environmental policy agenda, built around federal standard setting and oversight and provincial and territorial implementation—which it does not—the courts could, as they do in the United States, provide a valuable safeguard against federal regulatory overreach, weighing in on the constitutionality of environmental protection rules made by the federal government under its authority to, say, regulate interprovincial commerce or navigation.2

And were the federal government of Canada inclined to use the courts to protect biological diversity on Canadian soil, then there would be a large body of contemporary jurisprudence, as there is in the United States,3 describing the reach of federal conservation authority on non-federal land. Indeed, policy makers in Canada have long known that land use planning is the means by
which conservation goals are achieved. The Policy for the Management of Fish Habitat (1986) and the federal Water Policy (1987) pretty much say so. Unfortunately, Canada gave up on integrated land use planning in the late 1990s, and as in other parts of the Constitution, in the absence of litigation, there is nothing to force the parties back to the table. None of these policy failures can be addressed at a project level without the risk of government being ordered to indemnify aggrieved investors.

What has this got to do with regulatory inspections and the courtroom, you may ask. My point is that there is rarely a connection, in Canada, between environmental regulatory inspections and the courts, and one of the reasons therefor is that in Canada governments don’t normally use the courts to achieve compliance with environmental laws.

**Inspections**

Now for inspections. A business can be taken off guard by an environmental regulatory inspection. The owners may not know that the operations are subject to environmental controls, perhaps on the mistaken assumption that the business is grandfathered. Or a neighbour may have called authorities to report a release to the environment coming from a facility, a release of which company employees or management may, as yet, be unaware. Or maybe it’s a spot check. But it can also be routine, or triggered by an application to install new pollution control equipment, or increase production levels, or transfer the company’s assets to a new owner.

In all cases, an inspection is an act by which the state reminds a landowner or the operator of a business that ownership or occupancy of land is subject not only to common law rules of tort, such as the rule that if you cause a nuisance you are liable to pay compensation to those whom you owe a duty of care and who have suffered harm attributable to your breaching that duty, but also to statutory rules such as the prohibition on unauthorized releases of contaminants to the environment. The arrival of an inspector can also be a reminder that governmental authorizations aren’t always a shield against liability, whatever you may have thought.

Whatever the reason behind the inspector’s presence in the lobby, an inspection is likely to feel like a medical exam: intrusive, unpleasant, and somehow unfair. You’d rather not have to go through with it. You ask yourself if everyone has to put up with this. You may feel anger mixed with resentment, especially if the inspector appears to be younger than your grandchildren and seems to understand not a word of what you’re saying. You probably wonder if
you are being given the same treatment as your neighbours and competitors, especially if you are foreign or from out of province. The fact is, your feelings are valid, and the government knows it.

First, there is no common law duty to enforce the law, but if the government chooses to enforce, then there are rules on how that needs to be done in order to avoid government civil liability. Predictability and fairness are two important considerations in this regard.

Second, while the common law and the laws of Canada may not require enforcement to occur, Canada has an obligation to enforce its environmental laws under a side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since others will talk to you about the common law, the Charter, and the Criminal Code, and because it’s important, I’ve chosen to focus on free trade.

Environmental Measures Conditioned by Trade Agreements

Canada and its provinces do not argue about jurisdiction over environmental protection only. Among many other things, they fight about jurisdiction to implement the terms of international treaties. So, for example, when Canada negotiates a trade agreement with one or more countries, the provinces will take the position that they are not bound by that agreement on matters under their jurisdiction until they say so. If the treaty contains undertakings relating to environmental protection and conservation, you can see how matters can get muddled. You would think that if an environmental problem is serious enough to warrant a global, regional, or bilateral treaty, then the federal government would have authority to require the provinces to step up and ensure compliance or get out of the way. Yet only the courts can say for sure, and even on the bench, there has been considerable disagreement.

The difference between trade agreements and environmental agreements is that in the former, the focus is on reducing barriers to the free flow of goods, services, and even capital, while in the latter, the objective is generally to slow down or reverse the loss of biological diversity or control pollutants. One is a green light, the other is red; in the words of the Beatles, “you say stop and I say go.” So it should come as no surprise that in international business circles, much of environmental law is shrugged off as protectionism, thinly disguised. It follows that when you read the dispute resolution provisions of trade agreements, you learn that when a foreign investor challenges an environmental measure adopted by a party to such an agreement, the tribunal
set up to look into the matter will be hearing arguments on, first, whether the measure really is about protecting the environment and, second, whether it affects local and foreign companies equally. Third, even if it really is about protecting the environment and applies to everyone equally, the tribunal will examine whether the measure has the effect of expropriating the foreign investor without compensation and runs contrary to assurances made by the host government upon which the foreign investor relied in making its investment decision. Every litigator should know this. Trade law is a treasure trove.

Normally, it is trade agreements that speak to environmental agreements. Near the beginning, you are told that nothing in the trade agreement takes away from the obligations of the parties under the following environmental agreements: [...]. Deeper in the text, trade agreements often specify that when countries make environmental laws, they should endeavour to do so in the least trade restrictive manner possible. And when they enforce those laws, they must treat local and foreign companies in like manner, they should not use non-enforcement of environmental laws as a means of attracting or retaining investment, and if an environmental measure amounts to expropriation, then indemnification must be paid. Insofar as a sudden, overwhelming concern for the environment not infrequently coincides with the realization that a project that was supposed to be a vote getter is actually guzzling political capital, you may say that trade agreements help keep decision makers honest by making governments pay damages to aggrieved investors.

**Recessions, Free Trade, and Federal Facilities Enforcement**

Canada’s experience with negotiating free trade agreements centres on the Canada–US agreement, followed by NAFTA. The relevant time period is from the recession in the early 1980s to the recession of the 1990s. Not surprisingly, this was also the period when Canada made its best efforts to get its act together on environmental protection. Indeed, “[i]n the post-Cold War world, free trade plus sustainable development was supposed to achieve, for all of us, what regular capitalism and communism hadn’t: an improvement in the human condition motored by self-interest and conditioned by ecological constraints.”

So, aside from issuing policy mentioned earlier on fish habitat protection and water resources conservation, in 1988, Canada adopted the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*, a legislative *fourre-tout* for dealing with federal environmental responsibilities. Canada then created a Canadian Council of
Ministers of the Environment (CCME) to work on aligning Canada’s jurisdictions on all things environmental.\textsuperscript{24} In 1992, Canada was the first of the treaty’s signatories to ratify the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity;\textsuperscript{25} in 1993, Canada entered into the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),\textsuperscript{26} and in 1994, Canada’s provinces entered into the Internal Trade Agreement,\textsuperscript{27} which, among other things, gives people and provinces standing to challenge a province’s relaxation of environmental controls in cases where this is done to attract or retain investment.\textsuperscript{28}

In the NAAEC, which was signed to placate a very wary US Congress, the countries of North America promised each other to effectively enforce their environmental laws through appropriate governmental action, and they defined enforcement as including, among other things, inspections (see Article 5 of the NAAEC, reproduced in Annex A to this paper, “NAAEC Part II – Obligations”). I believe that the obligations found in the NAAEC explain much of what has happened in Canadian environmental law and policy since the mid-1990s. Below I’ll identify some of the information I rely on.

In 2002, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Environment Canada made public a compliance and enforcement policy for the habitat protection and pollution prevention provisions of the federal *Fisheries Act*.\textsuperscript{29} The policy document states:

One of the principal tools available to the federal government to ensure sustainable fisheries for Canadians is the *Fisheries Act*. The Act provides the legal basis for protecting and conserving fish and fish habitat. Specifically, the habitat protection and pollution prevention provisions of the *Fisheries Act* include sections 20 through 22, 26 through 28, 30, 32, and 34 through 42, and are intended to protect fish and fish habitat from harm caused by physical alteration or pollution (a synopsis of these sections is presented in Annex A). These provisions are an important component of the federal government’s overall environmental protection program.

However, laws and regulations are not sufficient in themselves; they must be administered and enforced in a fair, predictable, and consistent manner. Those who administer the laws and those who must comply with them need to understand how the government intends to achieve compliance with the legal requirements. For these reasons, this *Compliance and Enforcement Policy* has been developed for the habitat protection and pollution prevention provisions of the *Fisheries Act*. 
This Compliance and Enforcement Policy lays out general principles for application of the habitat protection and pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act. The Policy explains the role of regulatory officials in promoting, monitoring and enforcing the legislation. It is a national Policy which applies to all those who exercise regulatory authority, from Ministers to enforcement personnel.

The Policy explains what measures will be used to achieve compliance with the Fisheries Act habitat protection and pollution prevention provisions. It sets out principles of fair, predictable, and consistent enforcement that govern application of the law, and responses by enforcement personnel to alleged violations. This Policy also tells everyone who shares a responsibility for protection of fish and fish habitat—including governments, industry, organized labour and individuals—what is expected of them.

You can see how this policy is relevant to regulatory inspections. It tells the regulated community that inspections will be part of an overall plan, that regulatees will know what is expected of them, and that government enforcement activity will be fair, predictable, and consistent.

The Fisheries Act was gutted in a budget rider in 2012, and it’s not clear where the enforcement policy stands. But that doesn’t mean that we can’t glean information from the document itself and statements made about the policy more than 20 years ago, for example, in this excerpt from a speech given by Environment Canada’s head of enforcement at an international conference in 1992:

In addition to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, environment [sic] Canada enforces the pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act. That act is probably Canada’s first environmental statute, and has been in force since 1868. The purpose of the statute is to protect fish, fish habitat and human use of fish. One of the strongest provisions to achieve that statutory objective is the prohibition against the deposit, into waters where fish are found, of any substance that is harmful to fish. Like CEPA, the Fisheries Act states, in section 2, that the federal government is subject to the act and all its regulations.

So, the concept of federal law applying to Canada’s federal government is not new in Canadian law. But what is new is that in 1988 the minister of environment announced the intention of his department
to treat the public sector, that is, government, the same way as the private sector in terms of enforcement of Environmental law. The minister believed that the federal government must be exemplary in its environmental behavior and specifically committed the government of Canada to that goal.

Consequently, in July 1988, environment [sic] Canada published its enforcement and compliance policy for the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, which provided equal treatment in enforcement to both government and non-government regulatees. The soon to be published compliance policy for the habitat protection and pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act takes the same approach.

Give this some time to sink in. Now take a moment to enter “federal facilities enforcement” into Google.

Making information available to the public has never been our government’s strong suit, so you can understand why Canadian government websites are relatively empty on all things environmental, including enforcement. Luckily, the same does not hold true in the United States

The US EPA and FWS (Fish and Wildlife Service) enforce the law against the federal government of the United States, notably because they are directed to do so by presidential fiat.

According to the NAAEC, inspections are enforcement. For details on how governments plan and carry out inspection programs, google “US EPA inspections.” We know from the NAAEC that enforcement needs to occur and it needs to be fair. If the law is not enforced against government, then enforcement is not fair if it is done against industry. One of the ways to prevent enforcement from occurring is by not exercising the power to regulate. So, for example, the federal government has not issued regulations under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act requiring federal facilities to assess and clean up their contaminated sites, including those that might be contaminating waters frequented by fish, even though in 2002, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada issued a report containing the following recommendation and response:

2.71 Recommendation. Environment Canada should develop a clear, mandatory requirement for federal organizations to clean up or manage their contaminated sites.
Environment Canada’s response. The Department does not accept this recommendation at this time. It does not propose to develop a mandatory instrument under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) at this time. Environment Canada views Treasury Board Policies as mandatory. Departments are making progress and significant investments are being made. The Department will continue to monitor progress on the implementation of the Treasury Board policy and will explore the development of CEPA instruments.

If federal facilities are not required by law to clean up their contaminated sites, it would seem unfair to force industry to do so.

Fast forward to the US presidential elections in 2008. The Democratic candidates made statements to the press about reopening NAFTA, notably to bring the terms of the NAAEC into the trade agreement itself, to make them enforceable. Then in 2009, the federal government of Canada made sweeping amendments to its environmental laws to toughen the enforcement provisions and put more tools in the toolbox, including adding a system of administrative penalties. Quebec followed suit in 2011.

These developments are instructive. First, the timing of these systematic changes to Canadian environmental laws is in keeping with what I said earlier about recessions being good for environmental law in Canada. 2008 was a disastrous year for the American economy. It was therefore not surprising that NAFTA would take a beating during the primaries and that environmental law enforcement by the US’s NAFTA partners would come under scrutiny. I have heard it said that the changes to Canadian legislation that were brought into force in 2009 had been in the works for a long time, the implication being that they were in no way related to statements coming from US presidential candidates in 2008 about reopening NAFTA. I do not doubt that Canada had been working on these amendments for quite a while. All I’m saying is that US pressure might have had something to do with getting them across the finish line.

Conclusion

To enforce a law fairly, you need to have the ability to detect non-compliance and you need a range of measures for dealing with violations appropriately. There is no point in inspecting facilities when the only tool you have for dealing with violations is prosecution. In the vast majority of cases, prosecution is too blunt a tool. Administrative penalties, issued like parking tickets, are usually more fitting. Also, for chronic offenders, levying administrative
penalties repeatedly allows you to build a case file that you can later table with the Department of Justice along with a recommendation that charges be laid.

So you would think that by forcing us to upgrade our environmental laws, NAFTA has been good for the environment in Canada. Well, it’s not that simple. Remember that the provinces don’t like federal interference on environmental matters. And remember that the NAAEC obligation is only to enforce the laws you’ve got; repeal the laws and the obligation becomes less burdensome. In the period 2010–2012, the federal government rolled back federal environmental laws drastically, shrinking the territorial scope of application and refocusing the statutes as natural resource management laws. By doing so, the prime minister called the provinces’ bluff. Generally speaking, each province can now protect its environment as much or as little as it likes. The prime minister even hinted that henceforward, any penalties the federal government has to pay because of a failure by a province to meet commitments under international agreements entered into by Canada may be deducted from the province’s transfer payments.

The approach described above is fiscally advantageous for the federal government at two levels. First, the federal balance sheet is not thrown off by a province’s actions, because although the federal government is still on the hook vis-à-vis its treaty partners, it can set off the penalty when making transfer payments to the offending province. Second, the relative absence of federal environmental law requirements means that the problem of non-enforcement against federal facilities is resolved: the law is not being enforced unfairly because, more often than not, it simply doesn’t apply. This shields the federal government from civil liability and, significantly, rules out the problem of having to account for extremely onerous environmental liabilities in the financial statements of the Government of Canada, something that is required under accounting principles to which Canada subscribes.

To wrap up, then: governmental inspections are key to environmental law enforcement, but to withstand judicial scrutiny, they need to be part of a coherent, defensible system. We can thank our biggest trading partner for pushing us to make such a system. As for the fact that our response has been to dismantle federal environmental laws, we have only ourselves to blame.
Article 2: General Commitments

1. Each Party shall, with respect to its territory:

   (a) periodically prepare and make publicly available reports on the state of the environment;
   (b) develop and review environmental emergency preparedness measures;
   (c) promote education in environmental matters, including environmental law;
   (d) further scientific research and technology development in respect of environmental matters;
   (e) assess, as appropriate, environmental impacts; and
   (f) promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient achievement of environmental goals.

2. Each Party shall consider implementing in its law any recommendation developed by the Council under Article 10(5)(b).

3. Each Party shall consider prohibiting the export to the territories of the other Parties of a pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within the Party’s territory. When a Party adopts a measure prohibiting or severely restricting the use of a pesticide or toxic substance in its territory, it shall notify the other Parties of the measure, either directly or through an appropriate international organization.

Article 3: Levels of Protection

Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.

Article 4: Publication

1. Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter covered by this
Agreement are promptly published or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable interested persons and Parties to become acquainted with them.

2. To the extent possible, each Party shall:

   (a) publish in advance any such measure that it proposes to adopt; and
   (b) provide interested persons and Parties a reasonable opportunity to comment on such proposed measures.

**Article 5: Government Enforcement Action**

1. With the aim of achieving high levels of environmental protection and compliance with its environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental action, subject to Article 37, such as:

   (a) appointing and training inspectors;
   (b) monitoring compliance and investigating suspected violations, including through on-site inspections;
   (c) seeking assurances of voluntary compliance and compliance agreements;
   (d) publicly releasing non-compliance information;
   (e) issuing bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement procedures;
   (f) promoting environmental audits;
   (g) requiring record keeping and reporting;
   (h) providing or encouraging mediation and arbitration services;
   (i) using licenses, permits or authorizations;
   (j) initiating, in a timely manner, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings to seek appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its environmental laws and regulations;
   (k) providing for search, seizure or detention; or
   (l) issuing administrative orders, including orders of a preventative, curative or emergency nature.

2. Each party shall ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings are available under its law to sanction or remedy violations of its environmental laws and regulations.
3. Sanctions and remedies provided for a violation of a Party’s environmental laws and regulations shall, as appropriate:

(a) take into consideration the nature and gravity of the violation, any economic benefit derived from the violation by the violator, the economic condition of the violator, and other relevant factors; and
(b) include compliance agreements, fines, imprisonment, injunctions, the closure of facilities, and the cost of containing or cleaning up pollution.

Article 6: Private Access to Remedies

1. Each Party shall ensure that interested persons may request the Party’s competent authorities to investigate alleged violations of its environmental laws and regulations and shall give such requests due consideration in accordance with law.

2. Each Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a particular matter have appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the Party’s environmental laws and regulations.

3. Private access to remedies shall include rights, in accordance with the Party’s law, such as:

(a) to sue another person under that Party’s jurisdiction for damages;
(b) to seek sanctions or remedies such as monetary penalties, emergency closures or orders to mitigate the consequences of violations of its environmental laws and regulations;
(c) to request the competent authorities to take appropriate action to enforce that Party’s environmental laws and regulations in order to protect the environment or to avoid environmental harm; or
(d) to seek injunctions where a person suffers, or may suffer, loss, damage or injury as a result of conduct by another person under that Party’s jurisdiction contrary to that Party’s environmental laws and regulations or from tortious conduct.
Article 7: Procedural Guarantees

1. Each Party shall ensure that its administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial proceedings referred to in Articles 5(2) and 6(2) are fair, open and equitable, and to this end shall provide that such proceedings:

(a) comply with due process of law;
(b) are open to the public, except where the administration of justice otherwise requires;
(c) entitle the parties to the proceedings to support or defend their respective positions and to present information or evidence; and
(d) are not unnecessarily complicated and do not entail unreasonable charges or time limits or unwarranted delays.

2. Each Party shall provide that final decisions on the merits of the case in such proceedings are:

(a) in writing and preferably state the reasons on which the decisions are based;
(b) made available without undue delay to the parties to the proceedings and, consistent with its law, to the public; and
(c) based on information or evidence in respect of which the parties were offered the opportunity to be heard.

3. Each Party shall provide, as appropriate, that parties to such proceedings have the right, in accordance with its law, to seek review and, where warranted, correction of final decisions issued in such proceedings.

4. Each Party shall ensure that tribunals that conduct or review such proceedings are impartial and independent and do not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter.

NOTES

2 See Ann Althouse, “Enforcing Federalism After United States v Lopez” (1996) 38 Ariz L Rev 793; Eugene A Forsey, “Powers of the National and Provincial Governments” in How Canadians Govern...


13 See Kamloops v Nielsen, [1984] 2 SCR 2 at 13; Laurentide Motels Ltd v Beauport (Ville), [1989] 1 RCS 705.


23 Katia Opalka, “Sustainable Development, NAFTA and Water” in Kinvin Wroth &


28 Ibid, ch 17.


29 Ibid at 1.


46 See also Scott Sinclair, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, “130 million NAFTA payout sets troubling precedent” (22 March 2011, accessed 15 February 2018), online: <https://www.policyalternatives.ca/>.