Education "Without Fear," or a Proper 'Fear' Education?

Fisher, R. Michael

http://hdl.handle.net/1880/110201
working paper

Unless otherwise indicated, this material is protected by copyright and has been made available with authorization from the copyright owner. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.

Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca
Proper 'Fear' Education? - R. Michael Fisher ©2001

[Note: This is my original doctoral comprehensive exam paper as it set the research and context for my final dissertation. In a few brackets I add recent update words now and then. As I am retyping this in Sept.-Oct. of 2014. The writing began in early September, 2001 with the plan to have it done by September 4, but the text expanded and I was writing it on September 11 (see p. 48) and a few days after before handing it in to my dissertation research committee. To say the least there was a lot of emotion going on behind the writing of this post-9/11. I intended to submit it for publication to Educational Theory but that never happened as it was too long and convoluted for a journal, and I wasn’t in to shortening it at the time. It was never published as a whole although many parts of it have been used in my publications since. -RMF]

Education "Without Fear," or a Proper 'Fear' Education?

R. Michael Fisher

Graduate Student, The Center for the Study of Curriculum & Instruction,
Faculty of Education, The University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, BC, Canada

September 4, 2001

Paper submitted for Publication to:

Educational Theory

Author may be contacted at:

rmfisher@interchange.ubc.ca
#101,1638 E. 3rd. Ave.,
Vancouver, BC, Canada V5N 1G9
(604) 224-3384
Abstract
[added new in 2014]

The author shares decades of experience studying fear and fearlessness. He concludes that educators and teachers tend not to want to discuss "fear" with any depth or consistency. A change in this attitude is required, especially in a post-9/11 era. A critical 'fear' theory, with emphasis not on "fears" but a portrayal of the hidden crisis in fear-knowledge, is the goal of this paper. Yet, there is no conclusion to this exploratory journey into the beginnings of a critical 'fear' theory for education and for the world. There are some important guides we have met along the way in this article: Parker Palmer's admission of a "culture of fear" in contemporary education, Peter McLaren's admission of a "new species of fear" in cultural politics and education, and Deborah Britzman's admission of a "love and hate [fear]" emotional landscape and relationship that modulates all teaching and learning. Britzman is the only educator to lead the way to an in depth and queer theory of fear (feer) [other than the author's work on 'fear' theory].

The author argues that good as these theorists are to lead us in better understanding fear and its role in education, they are not good enough and too often still rely on the psychological basis of meaning for fear (McLaren, less so). Love is not enough either to challenge fear and its rule in education and society. We need a transdisciplinary approach as in fearanalysis, where the emphasis is on the path of fearlessness as the location and process of living a life eternally ambivalent between Love and Fear. We cannot simply get or be Love. There is not simply 'just Fear' either nor are we only fear. There is no formula nor humanistic or theological guarantee for the 'good' without the 'bad,' so to speak. There is a dialectical relation and existential sensibility required that most people are unable or unwilling to bring to awareness in education. I believe a good quality 'fear' education would improve our capabilities to enter this path of fearlessness. It is risky business to each in a culture of fear and a politics that exposes the "glue" of the 'Fear' Matrix of pathological patriarchy, and adultism. This critical location and process, this living a life in such a precarious and ambivalent place, is the most dangerous of all pedagogies, and an impossibility with possibility, a dangerousness with desire for truth at all costs. Simply, the path of fearlessness demands a 'fear' theory which is determined to study Fear, feer, 'fear' and any other creative expression that opposes pedagogies of love. This methodological shift in fearanalysis and critical 'fear' theory proposed (and incomplete yet) is toward the "negative" and a counterbalance to the hegemonic fetishism of the current "positive" in today's neo-liberal, neo-conservative climate in North American culture and education. -RMF

A CRISIS IN FEAR-KNOWLEDGE

And I'm wonderin' where the lions are... -Bruce Cockburn

How do you find a lion that has swallowed you? - Carl G. Jung

There's fear everywhere. - Connie Zweig

Educators do not seem to want to talk about fear. Typically, in a very large book on Making School Reform Happen, two female business-efficient authors talk about re-building "Safe and Orderly Learning Environments," "Regaining Hope" in a contemporary climate of cynicism and despair, and finally, "The New Paradigm: Escaping Our Psychic Prison." The

2 From a dream entry in the journal of Connie Zweig, "Prologue," in Zweig and Abrams, Meeting the Shadow, xiv.
3 Pamela Bullard and Barbara O. Taylor, Making School Reform Happen (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1993), 40, Chapter Two, Chapter Three.
"New Paradigm" escape from the traditional prison that limits our minds, sounds particularly alluring to a radical educator like myself—but expectations are soon dashed. The word fear is virtually invisible in the text. There is no direct mention anywhere in the book about how we are supposed to deal with fear of change, fear of the uncertainty of a globalizing future, fear of conflict, fear of non-conformity to tradition, fear of conformity to non-tradition, fear of violence (and "culture wars"), or fear of discussing and conceptualizing fear itself as a cultural and political construct beyond merely an individual feeling or emotion.

Parker Palmer, an important American educator, who has written the most about fear as context for teaching, has introspectively argued that a devastating "culture of fear" is animating most of our current schooling practice. Yet, he neither offers a theory of fear, nor potential ways to critically analyze how we conceptualize and talk about fear or a "culture of fear." As one looks through volumes of journals, reports, and books in the educational field, it appears educators don’t take fear very seriously. Why take what is 'natural' and 'normal' to be a problem? Maybe we fear that fear is the glue of our "psychic prison" and we cannot imagine a way out form its sticky grasp. Andrea Dworkin, feminist author and cultural critic, wrote on the politics of fear that, as a society, we would not like to admit. She wrote,

> Fear cements this ["male supremacist society"] system together. Fear is the adhesive that holds each part in place.... children are rewarded for learning these fears.... We are taught to be afraid....

For Dworkin, fear is not natural and normal—not politically value-neutral. I would have to conclude, after years of researching documents from many disciplines, that educators comparatively speaking, do not like to speak or write about fear. Literary, Drama, and English teachers are more likely to do so, probably because they work with a broad range of, often popular and contemporary, cultural content. I think educators may be too afraid to confront fear in writing. Perhaps they take fear much too seriously, to the point where it is so negative, or terrifying, of an issue, that it is better either framed in reformist neo-liberal positive terms/disguises, like the term courage, or virtually denied respectable status because of the long-held Enlightenment belief that negative emotions (like fear) are merely non-educable irrational interference in the real task of education and civil high culture. I suspect, most educators/reformers are not yet willing to examine so intimately, critically, and honestly the ‘inner landscape’ of teaching in a culture of fear that Parker has pursued.

Certainly, every person has their own body of fear-knowledge and they use it when needed, especially when confronting crisis and life transitions. Many of us assume that some fear is essential to learning but have suspect theoretical grounds for that powerful pedagogical claim. There are hundreds of definitions of fear to choose from across the disciplines and within cultural traditions, which one do we privilege in our biased notions of fear? My own research shows many definitions and meanings given to fear are confusing, if not contradictory. Concomitant prescriptions of how best to handle fear, are likewise. I see a

---


crisis in fear-knowledge today. I recommend a new discipline called fearology\(^6\) to address this crisis.

Habitually and unwittingly, educators have produced a certain quality of fear-knowledge which is so easily accepted, while it implies the message that it is the best knowledge about fear we have. At the least, it is good enough knowledge within a particular context of understanding and use. Without defining and theorizing fear in educational discourse, how would we be able to critique the (power of) knowledge we create and perpetuate about fear? Without a critical theory of fear (or many), how could we expand our imaginary of fear and how best to work with it, or against it? How would we determine (if it is even possible), in reliable and systematic rational fashion, answers to the critical question posed by educators Lehr and Martin, "...when fear is working for us and when fear is working against us?"\(^7\) Parker Palmer, like Lehr and Martin and so many other authors, claim there "is a healthy fear that enhances education."\(^8\) For Dworkin, and a radical feminist critique, this may be the wrong question for fear research. From what perspective, politics, and definition of fear do we proceed?

In general, we do not freely write about our own "theories" of fear, in particular, as they relate to learning and teaching, or educational leadership and policy development. It is difficult to find any serious systematic writing about fear in educational theory or teaching practices. Psychology, and educational psychology have provided most of the 'authority' on fear-knowledge for teachers. Beyond those two traditional discourses of fear, most educational writing contains only a sporadic mention of the word fear, while characteristically lacking a theory (or theories) of fear accompanying the discussion. Curiously in the past decade, there has been an out-pouring of writing and political action in American educational communities to clean-up drugs, violence, fear, and moral decay so we may live "without fear" (see below). Rarely is fear defined, but rather assumed, as if it is a phenomena and concept that is unproblematic itself. This article argues that our fear-knowledge is in crisis and thus it challenges our hegemonic fear discourses and presents creative options for expanding our imagination of fear.

Education ought to have a fear [sic]—'fear' theory (or, many). Deborah Britzman, feminist educator and queer theorist, utilizing psychoanalytical theory, has best articulated the beginnings of a theory of fear\(^9\) related to learning and teaching. Any reform movement in...

---

\(^6\) This discipline is defined as "the study of fear in relation to life." A much more complex definition would be inappropriate for this current article which has a different focus. Fearology, is one of several emerging new disciplines like sexology, victimology and terrorology, to name a few.

\(^7\) J. B. Lehr and C. Martin, Schools Without Fear: Group Activities for Building Community (Minneapolis, MN: Educational Media Group), 37.

\(^8\) Palmer, The Courage to Teach, 39.

\(^9\) New categories and terms are troublesome but are required in the deconstruction of the too familiar. In my research, fear is on the chopping block, and new terms fly-in-and-about quickly, although, not necessarily presupposed as ultimate solutions to the reconstruction and re-naming of fear. I use a few distinctions that may be useful to guide the reader through this organizational chaos to reconceptualize fear: (1) the use of fear without signifying markers of change (e.g., spelling, or inverted commas), indicates the term is being used in common everyday parlance, as well as commonly defined in psychology/medicine; (2) inverted commas (') mark the word 'fear,' thus, signifying that the term is under deconstruction and reconstruction, therefore, no popular or academically privileged definition or meaning is assigned to 'fear' as the correct one—rather, a
education that 'pushes the envelope' toward a radical transformation of education and curriculum reconstruction, ought to include a critical depth analysis of fear, 'fear,' and fear, as these phenomena, and diverse knowledges about them, powerfully impact upon our world. Are these the missing lions? This article (re)presents this topic trio as an apparent unity most commonly labeled fear (in English translation); problematically, the trio remain as "lost subjects, contested objects" (a la Britzman) in educational theory.

It ought to be repeated: it is virtually impossible in contemporary education to find anyone researching, writing, or talking about fear and fear-knowledge in politically serious, theoretically grounded, ways. This seems queer, especially when there is so much evidence that tells us people are increasingly fearful living in the 21st century, with an explosion of violence in its complex domestic and international forms—with school communities being particularly plagued in the past decade. A plethora of reactions in text and in organizing

spectrum of diverse and sometimes contradictory definitions and meanings (across historical time and borders of disciplines and cultures) is employed to understand 'fear' more holistically (using a Wilberian critical integral theory/epistemology, see Ken Wilber, The Eye of Spirit: An Integral Vision for a World Gone Slightly Mad (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1997); (3) "theory of fear" is a phrasing that refers to a non-critical (attempting to be politically value-neutral) way of organizing knowledge about fear—for example, the psychology of fear has some theories of fear (see Stanley J. Rachman, Fear and Courage (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1990)—however, the "theory of fear" is also a marker I apply to less formal, more implicit, knowledge that is produced and consumed as "truths" about fear amongst lay, professional or academic communities; (4) "fear theory" (or 'fear' theory) is a marker which is used for my own project—as it attempts to accomplish the work of distinguishing itself from theories of fear, with the former being synthetic, highly critical (often deconstructionist) and politically overt (if not, emancipatory) in claims and potential praxis for disruption of oppression/violence in our world.


11 Gavin de Becker, "Fear: What Americans are Afraid of Today," USA Weekend (August 22-24, 1997), reported that 90% of adult Americans, polled in 1997 (n=1009), believe the world is not a safer place now, compared to when they grew up. "There is consensus on this point among people of every race, sex, age, income level and geographic location," says de Becker, an internationally-renowned private security/risk analyst.

12 There is no doubt that at other historical times people, individually and collectively, have felt plagued by fear, equal (or more so) to contemporary times. However, especially in America, the 1990s were uniquely littered with publications and slogans calling for life and education "without fear" (see citations in the main text). Fear and fearlessness, of sorts, albeit still limited in scope, were at least being made "speakable" (as resistance to the status quo) in the public and educational discourses at large. Recall the emergence of the youth extreme trend-wear "NO FEAR!" in the late 1980s [1989) and early 90's? This 90s' phenomenon beg the question as to whether the Americans are generally more fearful than other nations, or they are more fearless to speak about their fearfulness. This question (a standard form of inquiry) is part of conception of fearanalysis and deserves further research and discussion in the future. See R. Michael Fisher, "A Movement Toward a Fearless Society: A Powerful Contradiction to Violence," (Technical Paper no. 10, Vancouver, BC: In Search of Fearlessness Research Institute, 2000) for a discussion of AGORA, a Swiss think-tank group of activists who charge the Americans as instigating and promoting globalization and "the new cultural imperialism" of "fear of living"—that is, "consensual paranoia" (Keen) as the context of the American adult mind. Sam Keen, The Passionate Life: Stages of Loving (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), 112-13, 146. Future sociological and political implications of this fear-based Americanism, have led to the concerns of sociologists, like Joel Best, with his idea of the "paradox of paranoia" linked to undermining social progress/social policy and the growing "fears of social collapse" (cf. Furedi, and the "culture of fear" in the UK). Joel Best, "Social Progress and Social Problems: Toward a


15 Sarah Miller, Janine Brodine and Terri Miller, eds., Safe by Design: Planning for Peaceful School Communities (Seattle, WA: Committee for Children, 1996).


zones.” Now, with this overwhelming evidence of educational discourse on no fear [i.e., without fear], what I call pedagogies of “fearlessness,” how do we reconcile these claims with the search to distinguish "healthy fear" (a la Parker) from unhealthy fear in education? Can we make up our minds about fear (fearlessness)? How will we do this, with what theoretical guidance? In re-defining and re-constructing fear (and fearlessness), I argue later, that fear is better conceptualized as feer and/or 'fear' within an emerging 'fear' theory.

This introductory article's intention and use of 'fear' theory, analogous to my reading of Queer theory (a la Britzman), is to disrupt the hegemonic fixed-category of fear and contextual remnants of any theories of fear that are taken as given.31 Such a disruption could awaken our consciousness of what is lost in silences. Krishnamurti state the problem of evil (could be read as violence), similarly as I would state the problem of 'fear':

The evil of our time is the loss of consciousness of evil. - J. Krishnamuriti32

[in my words:] The 'fear' of our time is the loss of consciousness of 'fear.'

With the overwhelming negative impact of 'fear' in this world, I recommend a new 'fear' education and expanded 'fear'-imaginary. Like Carl Jung once envisioned the problem of evil as not evil itself, but our limited "imagination for evil," I believe we require fear-knowledge that goes beyond the imagination of Western psychology (and its roots in W. philosophy). And if mainstream psychology as a scientific discipline, which currently dominates the conceptualization and meaning of 'fear,' is inadequate to knowing evil due to "fear of the consequences" (says Scott Peck33); then, we best take analogous heed of Scott Peck's critique and attempt to move beyond psychology's fear of the consequences of knowing 'fear.' To begin this task, we require a shift from "theories of fear" to some kind of fear ('fear') theory.

'Fear' theory shifts the one-sided traditional "objective" focus of attention on fear as a biological-behavioral phenomena, and asks that we attend equally to a more subjective

---

31 For example, W. Fischer, Theories of Anxiety (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). Curiously, I have found no titles, in any discipline, which directly speak about "theories of fear" or "fear theory." My aim, to bring 'fear' theory into the discourses of education, is a counter-hegemonic strategy, and some improvement of awareness beginning among a few educators who are directly addressing the fear, violence, and learning connections (see near the end of this article).
32 Cited in Zweig and Abrams, Meeting the Shadows, inside front cover.
34 I emphasize the problematic of "objective" (scientific-psychology) ways of knowing because their suspect ground in fear itself. Palmer wrote, "The personal fears that students and teachers bring to the classroom are fed by the fact that the roots of education [theory, epistemology] are sunk deep in fearful ground. The ground I have in mind is one we rarely name: it is our dominant mode of knowing, a mode promoted with such arrogance often masks fear.... This mode, called objectivism." See Palmer, The
focus of attention on epistemological and political concerns of fear-knowledge, that is, how it is constructed and used in power/knowledge relations of identity formation via regimes of truth (a la Foucault). This shift includes a critical self-reflective analysis of one’s own fear-subject/self/society, ethical complicity in fear production and consumption, and so on. Reading, writing and practicing 'fear' theory ought to be an exercise of contradiction and uncertainty in regard to the common question what is fear? I prefer, as a 'fear' theorist (and fearologist), to ask what is the 'Fear' Matrix?\textsuperscript{35}

If gay, lesbian and queer scholarship, to be critical, has to immediately confront homophobia to get beyond destructive stereotyping and avoidance of political inquiry into identities of sexual orientation, then the study of 'fear' has to confront phobophobia (i.e., terror)—the fear of 'fear' itself,\textsuperscript{36} in order to get beyond a certain comfortability (or avoidance) re: fear-knowledge(s). Exactly what "to get beyond" means, is not so clearly evident, as we might like, nor can it be easily assumed to exist. However, confronting either homophobia or phobophobia with a critical consciousness (a la Krishnamurti or Freire), at least, is essential to encourage elicitive pedagogical means of analyzing, imagining, recalling "dangerous memories"\textsuperscript{37} and creating "dangerous knowledge" for "dangerous territories" in education.\textsuperscript{38}

---

\textsuperscript{35} The concept of a 'Fear' Matrix was developed from a reading of the Wachowski's extremely popular 1999 sci-fi action movie, The Matrix. See R. Michael Fisher and Fred Ribkoff, "From Fear Matrix to Fearless One: A Reading of The Matrix" (Unpublished paper, 2000).

\textsuperscript{36} This phrase, with a slight conceptual twist here, has become the most famous dictum about fear in the West, and with good reason. It has been published, with slight variations, beginning with philosophical roots in Epicurean thought: "Above all, live so as to avoid fear," according to Russell. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1946/93), 254; Stoicism, with the primary spokesperson being Seneca (first century AD), who wrote, "Nothing is terrible in things, except fear itself," cited in Callwood. June Callwood, Emotions (New York: Doubleday, 1964/86), 107. This has been echoed by Francis Bacon ("Nothing is terrible except fear itself," cited in Cordry. Harold Cordry, The Multicultural Dictionary of Proverbs (London: McFarland, 1997), 93; and Montaigne ("The thing of which I have most fear is fear," cited in Comfort. N. Comfort, Brewer’s Politics: A Phrase and Fable Dictionary (London: Cassell, 1993), 201; and W. D. Thoreau, as well, most recently, popularized by former President of the USA, F. D. Roosevelt, in his 1933 Inaugural Address (which is thought to have originated from the Biblical version "Be not afraid of sudden fear" -Proverbs 3:25, according to Comfort, 201). F. D. Roosevelt said, "First of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror," cited in Stewart. R. Stewart, A Dictionary of Political Quotations (London: Europa, 1984), 140. Arthur Schlesinger, "avatar of postwar American liberalism" was adamant in this writing and lectures to the American public that the only enemy is the one at home—in the American psyche—for it is there, that the 'battle against fear' must take place so as to ensure that the people in free societies do not become 'traitors to freedom,' according to Robin. Corey Robin, "Why Do Opposites Attract?: Fear and Freedom in the Modern Political Imagination," in Fear Itself: Enemies Real and Imagined in American Culture, ed. N. L. Schultz (West Lafayette, IN: Perdue University Press, 1999), 15. My concern, somewhat like Robin’s critique of liberalism in western political theory, is that fear (‘fear’) is never defined in these speeches and so, it is rhetoric without theoretical substance or philosophical rigor, and likely has had little significant impact on reducing the 'fear' that actually betrays freedom. See also Corey Robin, "Reflections on Fear: Montesquieu in Retrieval," American Political Science Review 94, (June, 2000): 347-60; and Corey Robin, "Fear: A Genealogy of Morals," Social Research 67, no. 4 (2000): 1085-1115.

\textsuperscript{37} Roger Simon, following critical pedagogues like Sharon Welch and Henry Giroux, refers to this as an awareness of past and present suffering (violence/hurting) in educational sites, and the role of
I cannot imagine a more dangerous knowledge than a critical fear-knowledge, with an appropriate critical methodology to analyze fear [and 'fear']. Following Britzman's lead in what I'll call her feer theory, albeit somewhat implicit, the major question a fearanalysis

suffering and remembering in building solidarity and hope in the struggles against injustice. Simon wrote of this critical pedagogical agenda, "It is the resolve to bring about a messianic time when we can dream without oppression a the material grounds of our dreams." Roger I. Simon, Teaching Against the Grain: Texts for a Pedagogy of Possibility (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1992), 26. I liken my own critical pedagogy to Simon's approach generally. Albeit, I am not a fan of Simon's (or Freirean) "hope" conceptualizations for education. I support a new 'fear'-imaginary that can dream of possibilities beyond 'fear' (the 'Fear' Matrix). The 'Fear' Matrix which, in many regards, is another way of talking about oppression (suffering).


might ask is: what knowledge do educators find unthinkable, unspeakable, unable to tolerate, because of fear?—because of fear—of 'fear'? I engage Britzman’s writing specifically, later in this article.

As yet, there is no speakable ‘fear’ theory in education and, as educators, we ought to demand why that is. Perhaps “fear of theory” itself is limiting our tolerance of inquiry, exacerbated by a predictably greater fear of ‘fear’ theory. I lament that the focus of this paper is a request to "do theory" and introduce many new, or queer, terms. I do not wish this to create unnecessary jargon and resultant exclusions or specialized knowledge that silences learners in fear. There is more than enough fear in the world already. I have no perfect solution; what is demanded in 'fear' theory will raise fear awareness for sure. Ethically, and generally, I recommend Sardello’s thinking on the dangerous problems of even speaking about the topic fear. The risk to employ (playfully) many terms in 'fear' theory, is one Raymond Williams recommended at times in cultural work against hegemony. Williams reminds us, "the use of a new term or definition is often the necessary form of a challenge to others’ ways of thinking or of indication of new and alternative ways." 


40 See S. J. Shapiro, "Fear of Theory." The University of Chicago Law Review 64, (1997): 389-403 and Roger Simon’s, Teaching Against the Grain, chapter on "Fear of Theory."

41 Another barrier to my recommending 'fear' theory (a Queer theory conceptualization of fear) is likely to come from the general global fear of anything queer, cf. M. Warner, Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

42 Sardello, speaks of fear "at the level of the soul" and distinguishes that from fear felt in the body and sensations, or in thoughts. I recommend this book highly, as essential reading in any 'fear' education. He argues we cannot avoid talking about fear, but we ought not to over-saturate ourselves with it either. He is dedicated to reduce fear in the world, like my own project, but he is adamant that it cannot all be eradicated (at least easily in our life time as adults today). He offers several types of relaxation methods, imaging techniques and spiritual rituals to preserve the vitality of soul as we work to increase our understanding of fear and challenge its domination in the world. The purpose of this book is love—“For fear can teach us to love in entirely new ways, and that, I think is the ultimate secret of fear. When we don’t run from fear, or try to eradicate it, we discover ourselves anew. We discover ourselves as beings of love.” Robert Sardello, Freeing the Soul from Fear (New York: Putnam/Penguin, 1999), vii.

43 Cited in Simon, Teaching Against the Grain, 83.
In a Lacanian psychoanalytic\textsuperscript{44} and poststructuralist sense, this demand itself, along with unclarity of concepts and knowledges, lack of linear causality, and transference/countertransference (resistance), creates the conflict essential to a fearanalysis and its pursuit in the study of ‘fear’ (‘fear’ theory). ‘Fear’ theory inevitably challenges the stable theory of knowledge underlying current notions of education—whereby, the passions of love and ‘fear’ intersect and the inevitability of the unconscious (unknowable and non-rational) provide outrageous outbursts in teaching and learning.\textsuperscript{45} According to Palmer,

In the human psyche, apparent opposites chase each other around in circles all the time: love and hate [cf. Britzman], laughter and tears, fear and desire. Our intense fear of connectedness, and the challenges it brings, is pursued by an equally intense desire for connectedness....\textsuperscript{46}

With this view, education, like learning and teaching, is anything but clear, concise, unidirectional, harmonious, safe, or easily defined. The passions cannot be ignored in their role to disrupt and create a dangerous and ‘impossible’ process of educating. Lacan’s pedagogical politics challenges clarity in discourses, as Douglas Aoki\textsuperscript{47} has argued.

Fear, fear-knowledge, and the teaching of that knowledge can “never speak for itself” (\textit{a la} D. Aoki). A major premise of ‘fear’ theory is that most humans have created fear-knowledge to \textit{defend against} a concept of ‘fear,’ which is not completely truly knowable; and, cannot speak for itself, without doubt and questioning.

I would rather a critical fear-knowledge acts to enable a better inquiry into ‘fear’ rather than merely defend against it. Current fear-knowledge, then, may be ego-knowledge. The ego likes to know (control), but the fear of ‘fear’ itself is perhaps the ego’s own limitation to know the ‘fear’ that both lies in the unconscious, and that becomes the unconscious, within the ‘fear’-based ego’s representations of the Other. Whatever the case, it is likely there is no greater terror, than to imagine we do not know with clarity and certainty what exactly fear is. Maybe a trans-egoic approach to fear (‘fear’) is a possibility?

In the mean time, we are facing the everyday reality of fear on a collective level of cultural

\textsuperscript{44} The French intellectual, Jacques Marie Emile Lacan (1901-81), and his difficult writing, are somewhat evident in Britzman’s 1998 book and the discussion that follows in this article. Lacan’s 1932 doctoral thesis was on paranoia. Basically, Lacan (by 1951), advocated a re-reading, and re-writing of Freud’s work, with a strong emphasis on language and its function in the analytic relationship and observations of the unconscious in general. In many ways, for Lacan, and his unique modified “poststructuralist” orientation to language: "Words became the very stuff of symptoms, the fabric of the life and torment of human beings," according to Leader and Groves. See Darian Leader and Judy Groves, \textit{Lacan for Beginners} (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1998), 37. Lacan was particularly interested in notions of desire, lack, and a new theory of alienation in the “register of language” (cf. Britzman, \textit{Lost Subjects, Contested Objects}).

\textsuperscript{45} "Any notion of education depends upon a theory of knowledge, but one of the central arguments in this text [\textit{Lost Subjects, Contested Objects}] is that such a theory must begin within the tensions exercised when the knowledge offered through pedagogy meets the knowledge brought to pedagogy. These are the passionate tensions of love and hate [‘fear’], learning to love and love of learning. Within this exercise, yet another sort of history must be admitted: that of the unconscious." Britzman, \textit{Lost Subjects, Contested Objects}, 5.

\textsuperscript{46} Palmer, \textit{The Courage to Teach}, 58-59.

(psycho)dynamics. Risk/security expert de Becker summarizes his 25 years of experience with fear as its own terroristic problematic:

I’ve learned through this experience that fear [‘ego’] is often its own monster and carries its own terroristic threat all by itself... After a thing like Colombine or Oklahoma City, fear is in such a hurry to be soothed that it will take the first train that comes along and it doesn’t matter if its even headed where we want to go—because that’s where we are going.

_Fear rules!_ too often, in crisis, says de Becker. How does fear rule when we cannot detect and obvious crisis—when fear (‘fear’) is "part of what constitutes the collective ground of possible experience?" What fear rules as ‘fear’ theory now presents us with a crisis in our fear-knowledge? To deconstruct the word fear, its uncritical textbook definitions, stable conceptualizations, hegemonic representations and meanings, is rightfully resisted as a sign of sure chaotic madness. With respectful and ethical considerations that accompany this crisis premise of ‘fear’ theory, it seems to me that such a ‘fear’ theory (and fearanalysis) is the best way to go, theoretically speaking. That is where ‘fear’ knowledge begins, in crisis/trauma, in conflict, and in contestation with traditions in very "difficult spaces," not unlike the everyday classroom of "culture wars" (Graff) within a violent world—which, currently is being labeled by sociologists and others as a "culture of fear.” Violence is fearful, traumatic, and always a crisis. Where is it fearful, that, is a good place to come to know fear—is it not? Then, how do we also provide the careful and loveful context to contain the important cultural and political fearwork?

Our pedagogical challenge, and my own overall project, is to encourage research and praxis for _learning how to learn well under fire_ (Fisher) in difficult spaces—in conflict, in
violence, fear and terror. Post-colonial anthropologist of "cultures of terror," Taussig offers some critical guidance for the attitude required to approach the problems of "writing effectively against terror ['fear'] and creating the ethnographic and pedagogical "space of death" (Phobos-Thanatos) for creation of meaning and critical consciousness. he wrote,

The space of death is crucial to the creation of meaning and consciousness, nowhere more so than in societies where torture is endemic and where the culture of terror flourishes. We may think of the space of death as a threshold, yet it is a wide space whose breadth offers positions of advance as well as of extinction... The construction of colonial reality that occurred in the New World has been and will remain a topic of immense curiosity and study—the New World where the Indian and the African became subject to an initially far smaller number of [fear-full] Christians. Whatever conclusions we draw as to how the hegemony was so speedily effected, we would be most unwise to overlook or underestimate the role of terror [then and now]. And by this I mean us to think through terror, which as well as being a physiological state is also a social fact and a cultural construction whose baroque dimensions allow it to serve as the mediator par excellence of colonial hegemony. The space of death [fear = Phobos-Thanatos] is one of the crucial space where Indian, African, and white gave birth to the New World. (p. 242)

Taussig's "space of death," is in spirit, much like the political fiction writer Toni Morrison's therapeutic project to create a 'place for fear' in our world. Taussig, writing within a post-colonial critique, admonishes and reminds us to never underestimate the role of 'fear' in creating the New World, which so many white privileged folks take for granted and, forget is at the source of our power relations, education and knowledges. Of course, I would prefer a "peaceable" space, a "safe" space "without fear" for education and learning to learn; most pedagogy has already assumed that benign foundational condition as ideal, and/or ought to be the norm for education. This article, following post-colonialist, feminist, and postmodern/post-structural sentiments, challenges such pedagogical assumptions as more fantasy than reality, and this becomes most evident, when fear, fear and 'fear' are

---


55 Phobos-Thanatos come from the ancient Mediterranean (mostly Greek) metaphysical and spiritual traditions and are used in Ken Wilber’s writing. See Ken Wilber, Sex, Ecology and Spirituality, Vol. 1: The Spirit of Evolution (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1995). I see these as very useful metaphysical conceptions, with long histories, in helping us to distinguish ‘fear’ patterns that both "Ascend" (transcend/progress) and "Descend" (regress/return). For a more complex description of these terms see Wilber’s writing, and/or my own summary. See Robert M. Fisher, "Thanatos and Phobos: 'Fear' and its Role in Ken Wilber’s Transpersonal Theory," (Unpublished paper, 1997).

56 Taussig, "Culture of Terror," 242.

57 D. Q. Miller, "‘Making a Place for Fear’: Toni Morrison’s First Redefinition of Dante’s Hell in Sula," English Language Notes 37, no. 3: 68-75.
given their rightful place as legitimate subjects and objects for research in educational discourse.

THERE'S SOMETHING QUEER ABOUT FEAR EDUCATION

Human beings are perhaps never more frightening than when they are convinced beyond doubt that they are right.  

- Laurens van de Post

Being [human] a fear-driven species, however, makes us unstable.  

- R. W. Dozier

A crisis in fear-knowledge requires an appropriate fear ('fear') education. Like sex education, everyone receives some kind of fear education, like it or not. This ubiquitous informal fear education, perhaps is better called "fear management" training.  

---


management/education], as distinguished from good elicitive education with quality fearless\textsuperscript{61} pedagogy. It comes from traditions, texts, professionals, leaders, parents, teachers, and peers. Some fear education is consumed unconsciously, and some simply accidental. Sex education and fear education are the "basics" to human existence in contemporary societies.

Somehow, everyone knows about fear and is not afraid to tell others what they think one ought to do about it. A plethora of prescriptions to "befriend fear," "conquer fear," "cope with fear," "heal fear" or "have no fear" travel around in cultures. In a globalizing economic world, adults ought to be more than a little concerned about "fear appeal" advertising, usually subtle, but becoming overt commercial replacement therapy and teaching about fear for the masses of youth. This Nike ad performs its own version of a twisted "therapeutic" conflict management ("fearwork\textsuperscript{62}") regime:

\begin{quote}
fear of failure fear of success fear of losing your health fear of losing your mind fear of being taken too seriously fear of not being taken seriously
\end{quote}

Total Quality Management approach (Deming) of systematically "getting rid of fear" from the organization (e.g., Coombs, Gibb, Gilley, Sherer, and Simmons). H. E. Chambers and R. Craft, \textit{No Fear Management: Rebuilding Trust, Performance and Commitment in the New American Workplace} (Boston, MA: St. Lucie Press); W. E. Deming, \textit{Out of Crisis} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); Ann Coombs (with M. E. Raycheba), \textit{The Living Workplace: Soul, Spirit, and Success in the 21st Century} (Toronto, ON: HarperCollins, 2001); Jack Gibb, \textit{Trust: A New View of Human Relationships for Business, Education, Family, and Personal Living} (Hollywood, CA: Newcastle, 1991); Kay Gilley, \textit{Leading from the Heart: Choosing Courage Over Fear in the Workplace} (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann); Kay Gilley, \textit{The Alchemy of Fear: How to Break the Corporate Trance and Create Your Company's Successful Future} (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998); R. D. Sherer, \textit{The Corporate 'F' Word: How to Drive Out the Fear that Kills Productivity and Profits} (Oceanside, CA: Criterion House, 1997); A. Simmons, \textit{A Safe Place for Dangerous Truths: Using Dialogue to Overcome Fear} (New York: American Management Association Communications, 1999). Without necessarily adopting a full-blown Freudian/Hobbesian view of social order, isn't fear management the core of all of what is 'religious/political'? Krishnamurti wrote, "Religions have cultivated that fear through hell and all that business. There is the fear of the state and its tyranny. You must think of the public, the state, the dictators, the people who know what is good for you, the Big Brother and the Big Father [all reproduce fear]."] Krishnamurti, \textit{On Fear} (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 39. Camus argued that so-called "rational" and "irrational" State structures in history have been "founded on terror." Albert Camus, \textit{The Rebel} (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1956), pp. ii-iii. Is there not a good case to be made that the Western pursuit of knowledge (education) is itself a type of fear management, in which rationality (reason, mind) is the solution/manager?—for example, reason vs. fear is seen in statements like this by Dozier: "... in any society under severe stress, fear can spread wildly. The irrational reactions of the primitive fear system overwhelm rational thought and mass hysteria follows." Dozier, \textit{Fear Itself}, 149. Why then is fear management systematically ignored as a topic of study—and, a part of a much needed 'fear' education?

\textsuperscript{61} This term \textit{fearless} is used consciously, as part of a conception of a \textit{fearless standpoint theory}. Some discussion follows in the text of the importance of fearlessness as the dialectic in studying fear. Most simply, I equate quality with \textit{fearless} to indicate that quality pedagogy (education) is one that confronts 'fear' and utilizes some form of 'fear' theory for fearanalysis—those, are conditions for labeling some practice as fearless, in this context. However, because of the complexity of these terms, a full account is best left for another article.

\textsuperscript{62} I use \textit{conflictwork} (after Mindell) and \textit{fearwork} (my own wording) to signify something more than hegemonic conflict management and fear management discourse. This something more, is emerging from 'conflict' and 'fear' in a deconstructive and critical theoretical framework, which typically are absent in knowledge of conflict management and fear management. See Arnold Mindell, \textit{Sitting in the Fire: Large Group Transformation Using Conflict and Diversity} (Portland, OR: LaoTse Press, 1995).
enough fear that you worry too much fear that you don't worry enough your mother's fear you'll never marry your father's fear that you will—
Group therapy from Nike—just do it!63

We have our fear (‘fear’) education work cut out for us, if we are to challenge our competitors. But fear is never clear. Amongst the academic and popular documents/literature, the definitions, conceptualizations, meanings, the categories of fear often contradict each other;64 as do the prescriptions that follow from the definitions. I have been amazed at the unproblematized confidence, often habitual arrogance, that adults generally have when they give advice, solicited or otherwise, on how to best handle fear(s). As a fear scholar, I am becoming increasingly skeptical of the value of common discourses on fear that fill our minds, schools, universities, churches and societies.

There is something queer about this informal (rarely formal) fear education. This article provides some sketch for a revised and more dangerous, pleasurable and more rigorous, ‘fear’ education. Queer theory and feminist psychoanalytics (a la Britzman)65 offers us a useful tactical, analytical device and a guide for imagining a better future fear (‘fear’) education, one that has spaces for "lost subjects, and contested objects" like fear, ‘fear,’ and fear—perhaps, even one that contains an articulating fluid 'fear' theory for educational practice.

FEAR, FEER, 'FEAR'

With limited space in this article, I cannot sufficiently argue all the reasons why this trio of fear, fear; and 'fear' are significant to 'fear' theory. What follows is a preliminary exploratory journey, looking for some rationale for these lost subjects/contested objects, in-and-through the writing of Kagan on fear, Britzman on feer, and my own thoughts on 'fear.' The latter, being my obvious favorite choice, with reasons provided. Any 'fear' theory ought to critically embrace this trio, at least heuristically, and encourage the formation of other forms of fear to discuss and re-search for new meanings that challenge the status quo hegemony.

Without giving a history of the idea of fear here, suffice it to say, the discipline of psychology, generally speaking, has well-captured and established [itself to be] leader/winner of the contested meanings of fear. This brings us to the recent challenge to psychologists by Kegan66 with his illuminations on the problematics of fear as a "seductive idea," ready for a big change.

64 See R. Michael Fisher, Spectrum of 'Fear' (Unpublished ms., 1997); R. Michael Fisher, "'Fear' Encyclopedia." [in progress].
65 See Britzman, "Is There a Queer Pedagogy," for a good summary of the work on Queer theory, which "often exceeds disciplinary boundaries" (154). Like Britzman, in this context, I refer to Queer theory heuristically. She explains this as "... an attempt to articulate a thought of a method rather than a pronouncement of content [from Queer Studies], to bring a pedagogical spaces consideration of [discomforting difference] what Edelman terms 'unstable differential relations'" (155).
Look in any popular English dictionary or medical/psychological encyclopedia and fear is defined as "a feeling or emotion" and so forth. This has been largely an uncontested psychological (biophysiological) conceptualization for, I suspect, many centuries. Fear in this discourse, is a signal of danger, and is often associated with memory and the amygdala in our brain as well as the "flight-fight" reaction/syndrome, characteristic of many animals other than humans. Anxiety is commonly thought to be a less objective/concrete form of fear, in which the object of danger is more or less unrecognizable and/or unconscious, or simply created as illusion and thus often called "irrational fear," which is often the basis of all neuroses. A complete analysis of these definitions in psychological discourses is far beyond the purpose of this article. These above generalizations, are thought to be adequate basic definitions for this discussion.

What happens when one thinks critically and suggests that psychology's findings are not merely about phenomena but are representations (metaphors) and ideas about phenomena? What happens when fear-knowledge construction is seen as an important part of psychological inquiry and political analysis? 'Fear' theory is very interested in these kinds of questions, the ambiguity of their "answers" and who is asking them and why. In this regard, one particular, rather mainstream, psychologist has recently caught my eye.

Jerome Kagan, a seasoned well-respected developmental psychologist at Harvard University, began authoring internationally influential papers and books in the mid-60s that questioned the basic premises of psychology and the rigid authoritarian attitude of its many practitioners. He wrote,

The psychology of the first half of this century was absolutistic, outer directed [objectivist, behaviorist, empiricist, positivist], and intolerant of ambiguity.... But the era of authoritarian psychology [psychologism] may be nearing its dotage, and the decades ahead may nurture a discipline that is relativistic, oriented to internal [subjective, interpretive] processes, and accepting of the idea that behavior is necessarily ambiguous. Like her elder sisters, psychology began her dialogue with nature using a vocabulary of absolutes. Stimulus, response, ...

67 "Fear: An emotional state in the presence or anticipation of a dangerous or noxious stimulus. Fear is usually characterized by an internal, subjective experience of extreme agitation, a desire often differentiated from anxiety on one (or both) of two grounds: a) Fear is treated as involving specific objects or events while anxiety is regarded as a more general emotional state; b) Fear is a reaction to a present danger, anxiety to an anticipated or imagined one. Phobia, a specific, persistent, irrational fear." Arthur S. Reber, Dictionary of Psychology (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 271.


70 I will deal with anxiety and its meaning in the (later) discussion of fear theory (Britzman's work). I merely wish to draw the reader's attention to the diverse complexity of conceptualizations of anxiety as one travels across the disciplines from psychology to existential philosophy. I have chosen not to focus on this literature in my development of 'fear' theory, mainly because of the volume of material, but also because I have enough evidence that convinces me that anxiety is best conceptualized (not necessarily in an absolute concrete sense) as a sub-species (or form) of 'fear.' See Fisher, 'Fear' Encyclopedia, for a detailed survey of the definitions, forms and sub-species of fear ('fear') in the texts of many traditions and disciplines of thought.
emotion... were labels for fixed reality. We believed we could write a definition of these constructs that would fix them permanently and allow us to know them unequivocally at any time in any place.\textsuperscript{71}

Kagan goes further to suggest that psychology, in the first half of the 20th century, "was the product of a defensively sudden rupture from philosophy to natural science." In psychoanalytic terms, psychology as a young discipline, was vulnerable much like a child separated from a parent, with all the anxiety (fear) that accompanies the "sudden rupture" of the familiar and secure. In this fear, Kagan suggests, the discipline of psychology was prone to overly attach itself to an "absolute" epistemological attitude, not unlike a fearful "5-year-old clings to an absolute conception of morality."\textsuperscript{72} Arguably, fear-based rigid categories of knowledge made much of psychology's history intolerant to ambiguity, difference, Other, and so on. Symbolic violence (\textit{a la} Bourdieu), necessarily, accompanies this type of epistemology. Kagan concludes with a forceful criticism:

Mannheim once chastised the social sciences for seeming to be obsessed with studying what they could measure without error, rather than measuring what they thought to be important with the highest precision possible. It is threatening to abandon security of the doctrine of absolutism [positivism] of the stimulus event [concrete fact]. Such a reorientation demands new measurement procedures, novel strategies of inquiry, and a greater tolerance for ambiguity. But let us direct our inquiry to where the pot of gold [significance of questions and answers] seems to shimmer and \textit{not fear} to venture out from cozy laboratories where well-practiced habits have persuaded us to rationalize a faith in absolute monarchy.\textsuperscript{73} [underline for emphasis]

To "not fear" (an echo of the same call of educational communities and schools to have teaching and learning "without fear") ought to be the appropriate epistemological basis of a 'fear' theory or 'fear' education. Kagan is also on this "fearless" trail, in similar fashion to the psychoanalytical critique of social science methodology by George Devereux and critique of the dominating fear-driven cognitive pathology of the sciences, in general, by Abraham Maslow.\textsuperscript{74} However, Kagan is ambiguous as to what he means by his demanding "fearless" prescription for better psychological methods and knowledge. This ambiguity, in Kagan's case, is not particularly useful in terms of 'fear' theory, but rather, is a worthwhile

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{74} Kagan's 1972 piece was originally published in 1967. Curiously, these authors, writing in psychology, are all saying much the same thing (apparently independently, as they do not cite each others' work) and publishing in the same time period 1966-67. See John Rowan, "From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral Sciences by George Devereux: An Appreciation," in \textit{Human Inquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research}, eds. Peter Reason and John Rowan (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), 77-82; and John Rowan, "The Psychology of Science by Abraham Maslow: An Appreciation," in \textit{Human Inquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research}, eds., Peter Reason and John Rowan (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), 83-93. I have expressed a similar concern in writing about an epistemology of 'fear' in general, see R. Michael Fisher, "An Introduction to an Epistemology of 'Fear'."
Proper 'Fear' Education? - R. Michael Fisher ©2001

directive that is still under-theorized. There is a difference between a well-theorized ambiguity in meaning, and an under-theorized neglectful (or incomplete) ambiguity in meaning of concepts. 'Fear' theory aims to have well-theorized ambiguity in its discoveries and claims about fear, fear, 'fear' and fearlessness.

In discussions of fear, it is easy to fall into a bias against this "negative emotion," as it is often labeled, psychologically speaking. I admit my bias generally in that direction but that leaves much left unsaid about what I (or others) are meaning by the term fear. In my case, utilizing 'fear' theory, I generally think 'fear' instead of traditional meanings from the psychology of fear. For our discussion about Kagan's notion of fear and the psychology of fear, I propose we stay open and flexible to the question put forth by educators Lehr and Martin: "Does fear have a positive side? If so, how do we determine when fear is working for us and when fear is working against us?"

Note, that fear-knowledge itself is not being addressed in Lehr and Martin's implicit call for an open questioning attitude to withhold excessive prejudgment about fear and its value. Kagan is not saying fear is bad overall. He is asserting a negative valuation toward fear-based knowledge production, however, he seems to accept fear is part of being human, being a child separated from the parent/familiar, and that we best ought to overcome it but not try to erase it, or claim it is all bad. This developmental sensibility of Kagan is also very common among those scholars writing on fear within a psychological discourse. Erik Erikson, an eminent psychoanalytic developmentalist at heart, was adamant that affective development contains some fear (anxiety) but the healthy development of an individual will lead to a final stage of maturity as a time of "lack of resentment, absence of fear."

Kagan's recent essay on the "seductive idea" of fear is not particularly interested in judging fear as a phenomena. He is critical of how psychologists represent and use fear and anxiety as scientific concepts in research and make certain claims from that research. His

75 Many authors have labeled fear rather negatively, including many philosophers, but most all see that some fear (preferably less than more) is part of life and makes us human. Basically, these are mainly male authors and they have their own bias towards fear in relation to concepts of mind, rationality, and reason (i.e., Reason vs. fear, as the battle 'to be' courageous). And recall, as Kegan says, that psychology emerged from philosophy in the Western worldview, where mind over passions (emotions) has been the dominating value-bias. Rollo May, an existential psychologist, has written extensively on fear and anxiety (and distinguished them). He suggests both are a "threat" to one's existence—fear threatens the "periphery of one's existence" and anxiety threatens "the foundation and centre of one's existence," according to Thomte's reading of May's work. Rene Thomte, Introduction to The Concept of Anxiety by Soren Kierkegaard (1844) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), xvi. I have noticed a decidedly 1980s-90's "positive thinking" trend in re-valuing fear among many writers in the human potential and new age genres. This positive tendency (within limits) has been articulated by many women authors (e.g., Quigley & Shroyer, 1996), who wish to validate the positive side of unpleasant emotions, in contradistinction to much of the prevailing negative Western male attitude toward the passions/emotions, for example, [Fear] "It's a messenger, not a monster." S. Quigley and M. Shroyer, Facing Fear, Finding Courage: Your Path to Peace of Mind (Berkeley, CA: Conari Press, 1996), 11.

76 Lehr and Martin, Schools Without Fear, 37.


78 Rachman, an experimental psychologist and expert on fear, has similarly been concerned: "Although the word 'fear' is used without difficulty in everyday language to mean the experience of
focus is on the inexact use of language (a la Wittgenstein) and the way psychological concepts, like fear, consciousness, intelligence and temperament, are overzealously applied in habitual generalizations. He chose fear (and consciousness) to study because it has recently been targeted by "elegant research by neuroscientists, who have begun to give new meanings to these old words."

Kagan argued that the deep affection of scientists (and psychologists) for "big concepts," like fear, or learning, is misguided and misrepresents the complexities and specificities of phenomena; with their tendency to create unity and commonality under one "big concept" when it doesn't actually exist. He points out the problems of measuring fear/anxiety because of the unique states and conditions of individuals measured, their response differences and so on. He then traces the historical changes in how fear and anxiety have been clearly distinguished as concepts but notes that this has now eroded. With Darwin's study of emotions, the "emotion of fear" was finally re-categorized and treated as an inherent aspect of human nature and "was freed from its long-standing moral [largely Christian] connotations." Whether fear is functional or dysfunctional has a long history with lots of changes, according to Kagan. Sometimes fear is ally, sometimes the enemy, depending on the situation. Generally, history has altered the scripts of how best to behave and "fear displaced desire as the emotion to subdue."

Contemporary neuroscientists are having a significant impact, at some level, on the meaning of fear. Kagan wrote,

During the thirty-year ascendancy of behaviorism in American psychology—roughly 1930 to 1960—fear was regarded as an uncomfortable but natural state, originating in pain, that nevertheless motivated the learning of new, often adaptive, habits. But during the last two decades, as neuroscientists studied the brain events mediating fear and as public and private funding agencies became more concerned with mental illness, fear has once again become the villainous cause of psychological disorders and, as such, has been marked with the stigma of abnormality.

Kagan notes, with much dismay, that neuroscientists, who are dominating the meaning of fear in academic circles (at least), are perpetuating an absolutistic "neural base apprehension, problems arise when it is used as a scientific term." Stanley J. Rachman, The Meanings of Fear (Marham, ON: Penguin, 1974), 11. Rachman is particularly pointing to the gender bias in measuring fear, when expressing fear is less likely (or obvious) in males than females due to cultural influences about the meaning of fear and its relation to identity, social status and so on.

80 Ibid., 18.
81 "If life’s assignment is to control hedonistic desires, as in Saint Augustine’s century, fear is an ally and not an alien force. But if the [contemporary] day’s assignment is to gain friends, seduce a lover, and take risks for status and material gain, fear is the enemy. As history has altered the daily scripts people were to follow, fear displaced desire as the emotion to subdue. If humans must restrain greed, lust, competitiveness, and aggression, then self-control, in the form of will, is a prerequisite. But each person’s will is less potent when fear is the demon to be tamed, for it is more difficult to rid oneself of fear than to control and action aimed at gaining a desired state of affairs. Thus history relegate will to the same ash heap of ideas where Newton’s ether lies gathering dust. The belief that humans can and should be free of anxiety [fear] is one of the distinguishing illusions in Western thought in this century.” Ibid., 18.
82 Ibid., 18.
for fear" that can then be manipulated by pharmacological or surgical interventions. They believe, thus, that they "could eliminate anxiety from human experience."83 To live 'without anxiety' (or "without fear") may be part of the same impulse and initiative that is seen in various reform movements in education (albeit, with different methods of intervention), as mentioned earlier in this article. Kagan believes, with his own historical preferences of meanings, this is a mistaken belief, and misuse of the concept fear in a biological reductionist manner which eliminates a more historically-sensitive reading of anxiety and its role. He becomes rather absolutistic himself and asserts, "The modern assumption that anxiety is abnormal and maladaptive has to be incorrect."84

My point, is not to side one way or another with Kagan's historical criticism of the collapse of anxiety into one over-generalizing neurobiologistic concept of fear. Kagan's alternative proposals to correct the confusions created around the concept of fear are very interesting and worthy of study, especially for those of us interested in a psychological discourse of fear. He wants researchers and writers to be more cautious in their sentences that use the word fear. He is asking us to re-write fear more consciously with environmental context and more specificity to the subject's situation and reactions. That is beyond my interest here. Rather, I brought Kagan's work into 'fear' theory discussion to highlight his struggle with the idea of fear, its evolution, conflicting meanings, politics, and consequences.

Fear is not merely a phenomena but it is an idea with its own biography—and a biography [genealogy] as complex and unique perhaps as any human individual's history/herstory.85 To ask what does fear mean? is analogous to asking what does this person, R. Michael Fisher mean? Stereotyped, rigid, absolutist categories and generalizations about fear (like people) just do not hold up to the dynamic reality of the territory in which subjects and objects participate in lived experience. A critical analysis of the construction of concepts, discourses, and thus, the construction and politics of fear-knowledge is critical to Kagan's project [which is] to remind us all that "Fear is in desperate need of such an analysis."86 The very familiar, of which fear is universally well-known across many cultures, is immediately ambiguous, requiring analytic deconstruction and reconstruction.

Continuing this fear analysis, I would like to move to Kagan's educational psychology discourse on fear, to education and learning as the focus. Deborah Britzman teaches in the Faculty of Education (Social and Political Thought Program) at York University, Toronto, ON. Her work on Queer theory and psychoanalytic applications to education and learning are very important in general, but particularly are important in my own pursuit of a 'fear' theory. I began this paper, provocatively, by suggesting that Britzman is a leader, following Anna Freud's writing on education,87 in developing a theory of fear for education. Any educator ought to be seriously engaging with her writing.

Britzman may not see herself as involved in a project to develop a theory of fear, and even less likely is she to have imagined that her work is important in articulating a strategic

---

83 Ibid., 18.
84 Ibid., 19.
85 Corey Robin is currently writing a much needed book entitled Fear: The Biography of an Idea.
86 Kagan, Three Seductive Ideas, 32.
87 Britzman, Lost Subjects, Contested Objects. I am referring to Anna Freud's lectures that took place c. 1930.
deconstruction of fear to, what I, rather playfully call, *feer*. I present, first, her interpretation of Queer theory, and then her interpretation of psychoanalysis, as two readings that have brought me to a study of *feer*, in relation to ideas about education, teaching and learning.

Britzman's intellectual depth and complexity is not easy to grasp for the newcomer, like myself, to either Queer theory or psychoanalysis (especially Lacanian). Below, I scratch only the surface of her work, and I apologize for that limitation, which is a necessity due to my primary focus on her theory of *feer* (*feer*). Her easiest to remember contribution, from a fearanalysis (and 'fear' theory) perspective, is the reminder to *STOP READING FEAR STRAIGHT!* Following this dictum, I have replaced the discussion of fear under a partial erasure (*e* for an *a*), in which *feer* (looking quite queer) is its replacement. The rationale and potential impact of this move is introduced below.

Britzman challenged educators to engage with Queer theory (QT) and/or to "*STOP READING STRAIGHT.*" She wanted gay and lesbian writing [at least] experiences, methodologies of research, and ideas to have a larger impact on educational theory and practice than merely a superficial inclusivity and political correctness. She charges education (and curriculum) with a political bias toward reading, teaching and learning, from the perspective called "straight"; largely meaning, white-male-heterosexual-orientation as the 'norm' and privileged position to understand the world. QT (see also queer pedagogy89), with many authors across many disciplines, has a tendency to challenge all clear categories (labels) of identity, including those other than heterosexual, like gay, lesbian and so on, because they are likely to reinforce further fixity or oppression of possibilities for identity formation, for any person at different times and in different situations. QT can prepare us for some queer ideas and queer sounding languages. Be so prepared, I recommend, for reading the following discussion of *feer*.

Analogously, reading *fear*, straight, as given in 'norm' discourses, assumes a positionality of dominance and privilege. It is not surprising that white men of heterosexual 'norm' privilege and education have historically biased the conceptualization of fear. Fear, in this biased reading, has become natural and normal—even assumed healthy [best]. Any other view, e.g., Kagan’s challenge, is seen as suspect; or, my own challenge to have us think of *feer* and 'fear,' is likely to be met with major resistances by all kinds of people. *Feer* thus, becomes abnormal, unnatural, and downright 'queer.' Those who privilege *feer*, are unlikely to accept *feer*, for all of the reasons we have heard about for decades in the critiques of classism, racism, sexism, and so on. I would suggest *feer* ('fear') is the driving force and motivation behind the violence/hurting and oppression of these big 'isms.'

Homophobia, in this playful QT analogy, becomes phobophobia (modified: i.e., *fear of feer*). Arguably, the fear-motivating rejection (and projection) of difference (and Other), as typical in homophobia, is applicable to asserting *feer* as a strategic re-placement for fear, in order to disrupt the hegemonic oppression. Now, I propose *feer* as the object/subject of study. It would seem, based on removing semiotic Otherness, that *feer* is no longer afraid of *feer*, as was phobophobic90 *fear*. We apparently, have created *feer* as fear-free;91 there, we

---

88 Britzman, "Is There a Queer Pedagogy?"
89 For a good introduction, see Mary Bryson and Suzanne de Castell, "Queer Pedagogy: Praxis Makes Im/Perfect," *Canadian Journal of Education* 18, no. 3 (1993): 285-305.
90 Like all analogies, this one has limits to its usefulness. However, it is interesting to note that the original discussion about phobophobia in this article, referred to fear of fear itself. Moving beyond
have a cursory definition, I think. But is fear totally fear-free? I doubt it. We have a lot of new questions to inquiry about fear (and fear). Is fear, now going to be afraid of fear? and so on. I suspect fear is not going to be afraid of fear (in a constraining effect, as we would normally understand that phrase), because of the very foundations of critical (impertinent) inquiry that QT demands and, as fear theory demands, necessitate a very different attitude and worldview from which to read fear, compared to the traditional ways of reading fear. Fear, apparently, is on the way to a fearless standpoint for its epistemology, and that ought to reveal some very interesting things about the fear-hegemonic ('Fear' Matrix) we have all been living within for a very long time. Of course, I am fear theorizing here. It is only a beginning toward a fear practice in education (see later, at the end of the article).

Fear is capable of an "impertinent performance"92 of challenging our thinking about fear—and that, is consistent with a QT perspective in general and, specifically, is consistent in application to a theory of fear (and fearlessness), fear-knowledge, pedagogy related to fear, and a future 'fear' education. In its impertinence, QT has strategically taken the word "queer," in a curious move which Britzman calls a "double gesture."93 She wrote,

The double gesture Queer Theory attempts concerns its refusal of an essentialist position on identity and its calling into question its own theoretical conditions of possibility. William Haver engages this contradiction: 'precisely because [Queer Theory] does not reject the historically and culturally specific normative predicates of 'queer,' and indeed because 'queer' here is a parodic affirmation of our over-determined inscriptions as 'queers,' it is theoretical[ly viable]....94

the experiential aspect of that famous quote "fear of fear" itself, there is the semiotics of that expression that are of interest here, as well. Why would fear fear itself when they are the same? Is there some analogous relation in the fear of sameness to homophobia? Is there some semiotic contradiction here that is revealing something important about fear? From a QT perspective, no analogy is too queer to pursue, no identity of fear is too silly or disgusting to suggest, and no question is too queer to ask.

91 Why would we want to create a "fear-free" ("without fear") situation/location for studying fear (fear, 'fear')? This is a complex problematic question for the epistemology of fear. I do not have space here to investigate this further, but suffice it to say, that I am interested in a critical theoretical perspective (i.e., fearless standpoint theory) which defines the nature of "without fear" or "fear-free" in very different (contradictory) ways than what is normally envisioned when these latter terms are employed in discourses—especially, in educational discourses, like those in the first part of this article.

9292 Britzman elucidates here basic search for ways to include QT: "In this essay, I am trying to imagine specific techniques of Queer Theory and what these might offer to the rethinking of pedagogy and the rethinking of knowledge. To do so I will be following Queer Theory's insistence upon three methods: the study of limits, the study of ignorance, and the study of reading practices. Each method requires an impertinent performance: an interest in thinking against the thought of one's conceptual foundations; an interest in studying the skeletons [unthinkable, unspeakable] of learning and teaching that haunt one's responses, anxieties, and categorical imperatives; and a persistent concern with whether pedagogical relations can allow more room to maneuver in thinking the unthought of education." Britzman, "Is There a Queer Pedagogy," (155). These are very useful guides I attempt to follow in thinking about 'fear' theory/education.

93 Ibid., 153.

94 Ibid., 153.
Any good feer theory, from a QT perspective, ought to refuse essentialist positioning re: fear (cf. Kagan or my own writing). But the double gesture of using feer, rather than fear (going beyond Kagan’s challenge), is to make the entire projects of theorizing and conceptualizing about fear highly suspect re: the label fear itself. I prefer, to make fear queer-looking and queer-sounding [?], by labeling it feer. The purpose of queering fear is to dislodge comfort, categorical imperatives, and power/knowledge formations of fear. The implications are yet unknown. To state that queer feer (as sexier than fear95) is as important as fear, is to assert a parodic affirmation of the disgusting, messy, and confusing aspects of an identity (norm) challenge, change and transformation. The objective of any good ‘fear’ theory is to transform fear as we have come to know it, as a seemingly ‘sacred’ identity-formation (construction). Feer (and feer theory) is one way to move toward a good ‘fear’ theory (to be outlined later).

A QT of feer seems an im/perfect response to a crisis in fear-knowledge. The double gesture QT signifies, as does feer, calls for us to investigate ”improper subjects [and objects] and improper theories.”96 Rightfully pedagogical, she asks us: “Why can education not tolerate psychoanalysis?”97 [analogously, I’d ask: Why can education not tolerate fearanalysis?] Following up on all the documents and the movements for ”without fear,” one ought to ask: Why can education not tolerate fear (feer, ‘fear’)? Utilizing Britzman’s own terms, the ”contested object” of education’s knowledge has been feer [sic]... fear. Fear is not only uncommon in educational discourse, as Britzman sarcastically notes, that ”anxiety is not a key concept in education or in theories of learning,”98 but its construction and meaning go uncontested. The ”lost subject” is who am I in fear? as a fear believer?, as a fear researcher?, fear teacher?, fear learner?, and so on. The questions are endless and intriguing, once we make the identity-shift to a non-straight reading of fear. I strongly suspect that a shift in our norm readings of fear, via QT (feer), is the first step in shifting the entire way we feel, think, talk and engage with fear (and terror)—which, inevitably, so my thesis goes, will lead to an improved pedagogical response to conflict and violence. And that, is very exciting.

Britzman’s, implicit, notion of feer and an emerging feer theory for education are queer because she brings both QT and feminist (and Lacanian) psychoanalysis to the field. Education, generally, has resisted these approaches to analyzing itself. In the following discussion of how Britzman utilizes anxiety/fear in learning, it is evident she has been more

95 This impertinent comment is not without a lot of thought and previous theorizing. In challenging our fear-knowledge, in crisis, I believe we are going to have to take a deep long look at the relationship of ‘sex’ to ‘fear’ (Freud would not be surprised)—and, ultimately, make ‘fear’ a lot more sexier of a concept in order to transform traditional (phobophobic) relations. My recent reflections on a theory of Love and Fear begin with the premise that humans first choice is always to have ”Love without Fear” as opposed to ”Love with Fear”—and, sex and love become closely associated in the discovery of fear and its role in human lives. The other concern I have regarding the teaching of fear in education, is that of the presenting resistance to the topic. From my decades of discussing fear, just to bring up the topic ”fear” in educational circles (and others) has proven to be overly loaded with a negative response. People, generally, don’t want to see, hear or talk about the subject. That’s a pedagogical problem and theoretical problem I want to tackle in future research. Compare this with Britzman’s writing on love and hate in Lost Subjects, Contested Objects.
96 Ibid., 153.
97 Britzman, Lost Subjects, Contested Objects, 27.
98 Ibid., 36.
successful introducing a psychoanalytic analysis, than a queer analysis of fear. To begin to understand her psychoanalytic reading of education via Anna Freud, we ought to begin by distinguishing very briefly Sigmund Freud’s contribution to the study of anxiety/fear.

My own developments of ‘fear’ theory have inevitably engaged with, albeit, not exclusively by any means, the major critical writers in the Western canon on some form of oppression-repression dynamics and fear. Hacker99 compares three100 very important white-Eurocentric-male thinkers and creators of a great deal of the fear-knowledge in the modern West. Hacker wrote of their common inquiry into the nature of fear and its critical relationship to human existence,

For very different reasons indeed have these three thinkers—the cautiously scientific psychiatrist [Sigmund Freud], the didactic social reformer [Karl Marx], and the solitary passionate theologian [S. Kierkegaard]—influenced the climate of our opinion, our conscious awareness and, even more, our unconscious fears and expectations... they share a common concern for the great topics and meaningful issues of our time and perhaps all time: truth, anxiety, and the possibilities of survival. How much truth can man [sic] face without being blinded by its brilliance? What does he [sic] do if he cannot and will not tolerate his glorious burden? How much and what kind of anxiety does he need or can he take? What are the various forms of deception and manipulation that he [sic] uses to console himself and to escape? What are the conditions of truth and freedom?101

Their work is hardly radical in terms of ideas of feer or 'fear,' but they have inordinately influenced Western thinking about fear, and thus, deserve critical attention if we are to understand the fear discourses that still prevail in the current hegemony of educational theory and practices. Conflict, both external and internal, forms the core of their diverse theories. With conflict is anxiety/fear, not to conclude which comes first or later; they are likely mutual causal.102 The development of a 'conflict' pedagogy ought to include the development of 'fear' theory (see later below).

A complex discussion could ensue in trying to distinguish these two terms, anxiety and fear. I have mentioned earlier, the position of this article in this regard. Further, Kagan

---

100 One could have just as easily included the philosopher Martin Heidegger [or Nietzsche].
101 Ibid., 140-41.
102 A more detailed analysis of the relation of conflict and fear is worthy of research. My own masters thesis research [1998-2000] has recommended a Domination-Fear-Conflict-Violence (DFCV) theory, in which fear ('fear') and conflict ('conflict') are very closely related. I have further developed this DFCV theory in an originary conceptualization before oppression, and after oppression is the human condition. In grossly short form, the DFCV theory hypothetically states: conflict follows from domination, and fear follows from violence. Domination, used very specifically in this theory (and not violent per se), which is not sufficiently worked through via conflictwork, will leave some form of violence and fear operating in the system—thus, polluting domination ever further, to the point where dominant-subordinate relations are virtually the same as violent relations, as they become fear-based. Eventually, with insufficient conflictwork, the system eventually moves into self-reinforcing cycles of violence causing fear, and fear causing violence—a cycle that is very hard to break without intervening in the way fear ('fear') is produced and consumed.
has reviewed the tangled history of the relationship between the two terms, fear and anxiety, and tends to suggest that fear is broad enough, in a modernist conceptualization, to incorporate anxiety, when both terms and phenomena are examined in relation to danger. He noted,

The modern view, by contrast [with medieval view a la St. Augustine], holds that fear restricts the capacity for love. We have Freud to thank [says Kagan sarcastically] for this perspective, for he distinguished between the fear created by a present danger and the anxiety created by anticipation of a possible one and indicated the latter as the culprit in all of the neuroses. Neurotic symptoms, according to Freud and his followers, were learned behaviors whose purpose was to reduce anxiety produced by conflict over sexuality. By arguing that anxiety could be resolved if one emptied the unconscious of its repressed wishes, Freud [unlike the existential’s view of anxiety or angst] implied that anxiety was not a necessary emotion and that everyone, potentially, could be freed from this feeling. It was pleasing to entertain the possibility [a modernist (and silly) notion alone, according to Kagan] that, with effort, we could all be rid of this enemy of serenity. Who would not welcome such a lovely state?103

According to Hacker, Freud was a modernist of the Enlightenment, and "believed in the ultimate triumph of reason" over anxiety/fear but he was no overt optimist. He regarded such a victory as only potential in a "far-distant future,"104 I will use the term fear from this point forward as the generic term, of which, anxiety is a special sub-species (form); often, the latter is regarded as the irrational/neurotic form of healthy rational (true)105 fear. Freud, according to Hacker, was interested in removing virtually all neurotic fear, while preserving true fear as a natural protection/signal of real danger. Hacker noted there are subtleties in Freud’s conceptualizations (not easily clarified, nor always consistent as I read his work),

Freud was forced to admit that anxiety is at times justified by actual realistic danger [he called this 'actual,' 'realistic' or 'normal anxiety’106]—that at times man [sic]...

104 Furthermore, to be accurate to Freud’s position on reason (and will), Hacker suggests that Freud was very aware of Eros and Thanatos in the unconscious, and thus, could "only be tamed, not eradicated by reason." Kagan, in the above quote in the text, is treating Freud’s future vision over-simplistically. Hacker, "Freud, Marx, and Kierkegaard,” (134); Kagan, Three Seductive Ideas.
105 See de Becker for this distinction, but there are many other authors who would agree with this basic distinction, albeit, they may use slightly different terms to label good fear and bad fear. I am skeptical of this clinical/moral labeling of fear, and I attempt, somewhat, to resolve this in utilizing ‘fear.’ Gavin de Becker, The Gift of Fear: Survival Signals that Protect Us From Violence (New York: Dell, 1997). Also, see the following discussion.
106 “Freud was from the very first at pains to insist on the close relation between anxiety due to external and to instinctual dangers [id]. In his first paper on the anxiety neuroses (1895b) he wrote: ‘The psyche is overtaken by the affect of anxiety if it feels that it is incapable of dealing by an appropriate reaction with a task (a danger) approaching from the outside. In neuroses it is overtaken by anxiety if it notices that it is incapable of allaying a (sexual) excitation that has arisen from within. Thus it behaves as though it were projecting this excitation to the outside. The affect [normal anxiety] and the corresponding neurosis stand in a firm relation to each other: the former is the reaction to an exogenous [external] excitation and the latter to an analogous endogenous [internal] one.”’ James
has every rational reason to be afraid; and he discovered that although repression creates anxiety, originally it was anxiety that begot repression. Danger [external and internal] and anxiety thus become inextricably bound together in ever-novel nuances and complications. Anxiety is the signal of the ego, warning the organism of existing danger originating either in his [sic] physical or social environment, or particularly within himself.... The human being, constantly beset by external and internal danger, is therefore always exposed to anxiety.... And, even more complex, anxiety is often found before the danger which it presumably signifies, and some dangers are created [illusory and false] in order to justify, to rationalize [as a defense], anxiety. The history of every individual [Kierkegaard and Heidegger, more or less, would agree107] at any time thus becomes a history of his [sic] anxiety.108

Critically applying Freud's theory of fear, to the "without fear" movement (mentioned earlier), creates a problem of definitions, meanings, and intervention methods. How can "without fear" be claimed and justified—upon what theoretical (and rational) grounds? Or does it matter that theory or rationale are given, if all that is wanted is to get rid of some (or all) fear? To apply certain interventions to rid [manage] fear, do we need theory to be able to critique the interventions? What if fear motivates the very interventions which are aimed to eliminate fear? When is fear-motivation another form of violence? Is a fearless child or society a good moral aim? or, in a fearful child or society preferred?

Dozier [among others] argued that fear is the most powerful emotion that shapes our personal and collective lives today. He too grapples with the general question of which, fearful or fearless, is the best way to go, with his own bias (probably reflective of most

---

107 "For Kierkegaard, anxiety is central, at the very core of the human being. It is the awareness of radical freedom that is the source of all great human accomplishments [and suffering]... Kierkegaard’s [existential] freedom is more than just another cherished [liberty or] dependency; that is why freedom creates anxiety—in fact, is anxiety." Hacker, "Freud, Marx and Kierkegaard," (137). Kierkegaard’s anxiety could potentially be written as "fear of freedom" (cf. Fromm, and Sartre’s "freedom is terror"). I would not claim, in disagreement with Kierkegaard, "freedom is fear" or "fear is freedom," as the logic of his claims tends to make. ‘Fear’ is definitely not freedom, in my own theorizing, and yet, working with ‘fear’ is a way on the path to freedom. Kierkegaard’s notion of anxiety (like most existentialists I’ve read) is not best called fear, in any form, and it is best not called anxiety either. I think "awe" is the better word, using theological and spiritual discourses. Hacker suggested that Freud would have agreed with Heidegger [that] "... (who wrote that ‘physiological manifestations of anxiety are possible only because existence, at the basis of its being, is afraid’) and with all the spokesmen of the age of the century of anxiety, who discovered existential anxiety as a constitutive element of human life. Freud went even further than that. In clinical detail, he showed the specific scenes and guises in which anxiety appears in the life of the individual. He proved that the unique experience of human being—he’s prolonged period of biological, infantile dependency—deeply imprints the feeling of impotent helplessness within him. It was probably Freud’s limitation that he did not elaborate the collective forms of expression of anxiety. In the world-history of anxiety, he had no interest; otherwise, he would probably have described the discontents of civilization as collective representations of the eternal human helplessness which soothes its anxiety by ever-new compromise solutions, and, with the collapse of these compromises, suffers ever-new anxiety." Hacker, "Freud, Marx, and Kierkegaard," (135-46).

people and institutions) that a fearless society is untenable. Dozier summarized the problem,

Relatively fearful societies are more like to have coercive governments, limited civil rights, resistance to change, and hostility toward outsiders. A fearless society in contrast, is more likely to have the maximum latitude toward individual liberties, outside influences, and social change that is consistent with public [traditional] order. Fearful societies run the risk of stagnation and decay. Fearless societies are vulnerable to rampant individualism and fragmentation.\footnote{Dozier, \textit{Fear Itself}, 149.}

I don’t necessarily agree with Dozier’s synopsis, as his analysis of fear (not 'fear') is limited largely to a hegemonic biopsychological foundationalism. One does recognize in this quote the implicit political linking of conservatives (Right-wing) with more fearfulness and, liberal (Left-wing) with more fearlessness [my word]—a topic I return to near the end of this article. Dozier does place before us, as educators, pivotal issues that ought to be included in dialogues on diverse school communities, leadership and governance, violence, conflict, safety and security, educational policy, curriculum and instruction and so on.

There are no easy answers to those questions, especially, if we have no critical self-reflective (queer) fear ('fear') theory from which to make arguments. A psychoanalytic (Freudian) theory of fear would also challenge the oversimplification, and undertheorized claims made by any political or educational community wishing for no more fear [i.e. being "without fear"] in life, education, and learning. I return to this criticism after reviewing Britzman’s contribution to this debate via fear theory.

If we assume, for a moment, fear is a powerful "organizing principle" (Dozier),\footnote{Ibid. 150.} which can become an oppressive "organizing structure of life" (Salimovich et al.),\footnote{Sofia Salimovich, Elizabeth Lira and Eugenia Weinstein, "Victims of Fear: The Social Psychology," in \textit{Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America}, eds., J. E. Corradi, P. W. Fagen and M. A. Garreton (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 89.} then it is not a big leap to see that fear is intimately associated with conflict (or violence\footnote{I follow the sociologist, Black, in theorizing violence within "a single field: conflict." Donald Black, \textit{The Social Structure of Right and Wrong} (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1998), xiv-xv. Black views violence in terms of morality, law and the ubiquitous universal battle between 'right' and 'wrong.' Violence, from a Blackian sociological perspective, is a form of conflict management—a form of justice—whether a particular dominant norm group categorizes it that way or not. See also M. Cooney, \textit{Warriors and Peacemakers: How Third Parties Shape Violence} (New York: New York University Press, 1998).} as an organizing principle becoming an oppressive (or liberating) organizing structure of life/social order (cf. Hobbes and the large body of knowledge from conflict theories, \textit{a la} Collins\footnote{Randall Collins, \textit{Four Sociological Traditions} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).} ). Arguably, in a post-Cold War era there is a heightened emergence of local conflict and wars\footnote{J. Barbara, "Some Wars Never Happen: Can We Increase the Proportions of Conflict That do not Result in War?," \textit{Peace Magazine}, Sept.-Oct. (1996): 8-11.} as people are continuing (aided by globalizing forces) to cross boundaries and live together in extremely diverse communities.
"Culture Wars” has been one expression of this collapsing of traditional barrier and insertion of new boundaries, in which the average public educational site (community) is confronted with contestations for meanings amongst diverse opinions, beliefs, values and worldviews. Sometimes, historical 'enemies' are brought together, "forced” to sit side-by-side in classrooms and other civic sites. Although diversity training, conflict resolution practices, and multicultural education have been put in place in many areas of societies (especially in North America), I do not think we are close to figuring out how best to deal with intractable cultural conflict that takes into account a critical/conflict perspective on historical, social, political, religious, and pedagogical dimensions of difference. Conflict resolution/management documents, curriculum, and teaching have notoriously ignored fear and have not even imagined a theory of fear ('fear'). Young has spoken to the fear that a politics of difference/identity entails. She wrote,

In the United States today, identification as a member of such a community also often occurs as an oppositional [conflictual] differentiation from other groups, who are feared or at best devalued. Persons identify only with some other groups, feel in community only with those, and fear the difference others confront them with because they identify with a different culture, history, and point of view on the world.\textsuperscript{115}

Britzman’s writing\textsuperscript{116} has offered educators an important, psychoanalytical, conflict-focused educational theory, in the tradition of what I would label pedagogies of conflict.\textsuperscript{117} Britzman in her 1999 article, deals with the problem of learning and "uses of emotional conflict” in the context of "extreme examples of violence in schools and panicked responses to them,"\textsuperscript{118} group psychology\textsuperscript{119} and educational life in institutions. Far in advanced of most

\textsuperscript{115} Iris M. Young, "the Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference," in Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990), 311.


\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 313.
thinkers dealing with conflict as a focus, she applies impertinent epistemological and pedagogical questions about thinking in these sites of violence, conflict and fear. She continuously explores "the importance of thinking through the emotional ties [of love and hate, as she calls them] made to knowledge, to others, and to the ambivalence made through institutional goals." She is perplexed, and curious (like myself), why psychoanalytic theory is disregarded in educational settings. For the sake of simplicity, and purposes of the next section of this article, I will focus only on Britzman’s 1998 book, Lost Subjects, Contested Objects, and her ideas of fear (feer), leaving her group psychology writing to future articles.

Although my article here focuses on fear, equally, and dialectically, the immediate topic for education and life, is love. Lest the reader become overly melancholic in all this talk about such "negative" topics and "lost subjects," Britzman invokes a spirit that inspires as well, without submitting to the chains of a false romanticism of hope:

---

119 Britzman does not focus on mainstream social psychology or group psychology theorists but rather on psychoanalytic group dynamics theorists, in particular, Bion, who's work has been pivotal in a lot of conflict/peace theories and psychohistory research. See Wilfred R. Bion, Learning From Experience (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1994) and Wilfred R. Bion, Experiences in Groups and Other Papers (London: Routledge, 1994).

120 Ibid., 320.

121 Bettelheim begins his book on Sigmund Freud’s work with Freud’s own words: "Psychoanalysis is in essence a cure through love" (Freud, in a letter to Carl Jung). Bruno Bettelheim, Freud and Man’s Soul (New York: Vintage, 1984). My own fearanalysis would not be any differently inclined. Love, however, is a highly problematic term with many different, often contradictory, meanings depending on culture and contexts of use and practices. Our love (and/or desire) may not always be conscious and known. Erich Fromm, on his death bed, turned to his friend Robert Fox and asked, "Why is it, Bob, that the human race prefers necrophilia to biophilia?"—which means, why do humans generally prefer a love of death [Thanatos drive] compared to a love of life [Eros drive] (cited in Fox); and that is a very big challenge to what really is love. How are we also, to make sense of the [Judeo-]Christian and Islamic religious traditions that preach a love of God is a fear of God?; and how do we make sense of parenting traditions that preach a love of the parent is a fear of the parent?; and how do we make sense of political traditions that teach a love of the nation/state is a fear of the nation/state? Love is one big problem. My preferred epistemological approach to know love (or God/Goddess or Spirit), is to know fear via the path of fearlessness—a modified type of negative dialectical, or cataphatic via negativa way of knowing. It was Bettelheim’s mission in this book to point out the seriously defective English translation of Freud’s writing from the German. In many ways, I believe this problem of translation is profound, leaving English-speaking audiences with a dismissive cold, and abstract feeling for Freud’s soul work with the soul (interpreted, in English, American-style, as psychological work with the psyche). Matthew Fox, Original Blessing: A Primer in Creation Spirituality (Santa Fe, NM: Bear and Co., 1986), 33.

122 A large discussion, important to life and education, could open up on the relationship of "hope" and "fear.” I prefer to leave that for another time. In general, I find most educators typically driven by trying to install hope in their students, which I sense is an attempt to rekindle hope in themselves by using their students for their own needs. It is not a big stretch to imagine how parents do this as well. I tend to see this “use” of hope as primarily ‘fear’-based, and unhealthy. Roger Simon is a pedagogue that is interested in the hope and fear dynamic in classroom practices. He writes of "the fear of theory" in classrooms. His sensibility to teaching, much like Britzman and my own, comes through in his self-critique: “While this ground [education as moral, political social practice] is intended and often seen as a hope-gendering space, it is important for me to recognize that for many students it is simultaneously a space provocative of fear.” Simon, Teaching Against the Grain, (81). In particular, Simon approaches the concept of fear with a caution, close to my heart of inquiry. He wrote, "There is
Can education become a place where one’s life continues its own work of art, a place where one encounters the vicissitudes of love, a place to re-find, the means whereby love of ideas can be made from the stuff of one’s dreams, from the otherness offered from within, and from the otherness encountered in the world? Following the problematic line of thinking from the child’s point of view in Anna Freud’s attempt to bring the “demands of psychoanalysis and the demands of education” together, Britzman sees learning and education, psychoanalytically in essence, as a concern with the internal and external dynamics of love and authority. For Anna Freud, and Britzman, the confictual organizing dynamic of learning is embedded within, and presupposes a definition of education as “types of interference” (p. 1). This interference can be violent, a topic which Britzman includes in her critique of how educational discourses (and research) are inadequate in dealing with conflict and violence because they so often “refuse to distinguish the arbitrary violence of the street from the [systemic and institutionalized] defensive and aggressive [violent] dynamics of the classroom.” I agree.

This violence, conflict, and interference, arguably, breeds fear, and comes from fear. Children and learners resist interference (domination) and concomitant fear. Then teachers can become trapped in fear. Transference and countertransference are an essential part of the concept of fear in that we so often take for granted that emotions are located in the dynamics of an individual psyche. I reject this view and as the argument in this chapter will show, locate the experience of fear as fundamentally social. There is no intention here to victimize with a self-referencing blame that posits personal emotional inadequacies that may be a block to learning” (98). I agree with Simon that to critique the ways in which fear operates in people, groups, institutions, the world, is not to be a blaming of victims for operating from fear, in which negative impacts are incurred from them being afraid. Fearlessness, is not about not being afraid (as some puritanical goal), but about the admission of (Trungpa), and "working through" (Freud) what being afraid may mean in larger contexts than mere feeling and emotion. See fearlessness, as defined by Tibetan Buddhism, in Chögyam Trungpa, Shambhala: Sacred Path of the Warrior (New York: Bantam Books, 1986).

Britzman, Lost Subjects, Contested Objects, 44.

Britzman is not attempting to reduce or limit the definition of education either, and thereby suggests that "Education is best considered as a frontier concept: something between the teacher and the student, something yet to become. The work of learning is not so much an accumulation of knowledge but a means for the human to use knowledge, to craft and alter itself." Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 4.

Lacan, following Freud “emphasizes that transference, or ‘the acting out of the reality of the unconscious,’ can only take place when there is somewhere a subject is supposed to know. He goes on to stress the direct correspondence between the question of knowledge and the question of love: [Lacan says,] ‘Transference is love... I insist: it is love directed toward, addressed to, knowledge.’ Teaching proceeds by way of seduction; ... education cannot take place without transference...”, according to Constance Penley, “Teaching in Your Sleep: Feminism and Psychoanalysis,” in Theory in the Classroom, ed. Cary Nelson (Urbana, IL: Illinois University Press, 1986), 132. "Freud made a name for the exchange of love and authority for learning: transference. Transference is perhaps the most central dynamic of time and space that organizes and stalls the practices of learning,” according to Britzman, Lost Subjects, Contested Objects (33). Countertransference is the (often unconscious) reactions that teacher (caregiver, parent) may have when encountering the transference of the child/learner onto them, as the child/learner is in search of love and authority (power). Typically, in countertransference, the authority-figure will be pushed to dramatize (and examine more consciously) their own unmet needs for love and authority (power) from past relations with their...
of this educational dynamic, just like in the psychoanalytic relation. The psychoanalytic tradition brings conflict (interference) to the foreground as a matrix of the educational enterprise. Britzman laments that,

“If one could write the history of education’s response to the psychic events of learning, the result might be the history of the woeful disregard of the work of conflict in learning.”

Duryea for example, has shown that "fear of conflict" is almost universal, across cultures. One cannot expect that conflictwork will improve until fear is better dealt with in educational theory and practice. Britzman asks, more or less, how can education, truly believe it is helping a child learn, when education is based on interfering with the child’s desire for love and love of desire—learning to love and love learning? Education demands from the child what the child does not necessarily desire—[the] child desires love vs. education demands learning. When the child desires love (a nature drive), education offers learning (a cultural drive); and, in a substitution for the child’s love of an adult/parent/caregiver, learning is the child’s (second) best and problematic means to access the love and authority; at least, as it seems possible within the generic child's imaginary and wishes, within the local learning context and within the universal institutional imperatives of a society and culture.

Learning, is also education’s substitution (compromise) for he love it is not prepared to fully offer. Teachers are the 'lightning rod’ for this conflictual relation of demanding love (a child’s view) and demanding learning (education’s view). The result, often, of this conflict (battle), is a boiling cauldron of love and hate—what I prefer to call love and fear. Learning is emotionally problematic—more, than most adults are willing to admit. Love (expansion-giving) and fear (contraction-taking) create a great ambivalence in the learning relationship of learner and teacher.

In my experience, ‘doing conflict,’ internally and externally, requires a great emotional patience for ambivalence and fear, chaos and the unknown. Externally speaking, most authority-figures in my life have so insufficiently been capable of dealing with fear (and conflict) well. The worst part of that incapability is the denial (false confidence) that

own parents and other authorities. Bernfeld, writing in the 1920s captured a common experience from the countertransference in relations. According to Britzman, "Bernfeld argued that adults cannot tolerate the immature learner—its mistakes, fantasies, accidents, and detours—for this immature learner reminds adults of their former selves and present failings, even as this learner stands in as a measure to the [hopeful] achievement of adults." Ibid., 25. This lack of tolerance, argues Britzman, is a lack of tolerance for anxiety [fear] in the countertransference.

Ibid., 24.

M. L. Duryea, Conflict and Culture: A Literature Review and Bibliography (Victoria, BC: University of Victoria Institute for Dispute Resolution, 1992).

most authority-figures (especially teachers) have habitually constructed, within a culture that reinforces this as socially acceptable. Recall my earlier claim that most adults (especially professionals in helping professions), are quite arrogant in their self-assured manner of defining fear and recommending prescriptions for management of fear (or conflict).

My experience is that the arrogance toward fear of conflict, is actually a defensive reaction of 'fear' to avoid fear and conflict. The purpose is self-control and Other-control by using power over others, rather, than a healthy and respectful engagement in fearwork or conflictwork processes in which power relations are exposed and minimized in the therapeutic or logistic outcomes. Educators, I believe, are particularly prone to adulthood by using institutional (state) power, authority, and privilege, to create oppressive controlling environments as priority (based on their own fear), rather than dealing with their fear and others in healthy educative and emancipatory ways. Block writes of the violence perpetrated by modern ideologues of social control, who are threatened by the (postmodern) child’s desire and ensuing chaos and ambivalence within relations to authority. The child’s desire is beyond the adult’s complete control, and "indeed, may not even be comprehended by the adult." The child reminds us of the postmodern condition of ambivalence that so terrifies the ideologues [and teachers] of modernity...", says Block, My point, like Britzman’s, is that teachers hat to admit they (and their students) hate, or fear to admit they (and their students) fear, in their relations with children and other adults whom they are teaching—and, psychoanalysis (or fearanalysis) are thus, regularly rejected from educational theory and discourses. Can we see why? But will we admit why?

Education, for Britzman, is not alone about accumulating knowledge, but must itself be a self-reflective practice critical of its own dependent (and emotionally-invested) assumptions and theories of knowledge itself. Fear theory, once could argue, for Britzman, is one that,

... must begin within the tensions exercised when the knowledge offered through pedagogy meets the knowledge brought to pedagogy. These are the passionate tensions of love and hate [fear], learning to love and of love of learning. Within this exercise, yet another of history must be admitted: that of the unconscious.

---

130 “Jersild [1955, in studying teachers] maintained that 'the history of education... is in part a history of [people’s] efforts to evade or to face anxiety'... More often than not, as Jersild came to find, the denials that sustain the fronts one puts up to evade anxiety [fear] are usually those that are socially acceptable, even as they serve precariously to block out the threatening and difficult truths of ordinary fragilities. Here are two of Jersild’s observations on daily life in education: 'There is anxiety when the aggressive people who habitually dominate educational meetings suspect (by the intensity of their impatience when other people are talking), but dare not face the thought, that they talk so much because of a compulsion to talk rather than because they have so much to contribute. There is anxiety, likewise, if those who do not talk, but would like to, feel tense and aggrieved but do nothing about it,” according to Britzman. Britzman, Lost Subjects, Contested Objects, 36.

131 A. A. Block, I’m Only Bleeding: Education as the Practice of Violence Against Children (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 11.

132 Ibid., 10.

133 Ibid., 5.
I read in this quote, that just like a quality educational experience is accepting of (and engaging dialogically with) different cultural histories and knowledges, there is a requirement to invite, and engage with, the history of the passions, the unconscious, and the tensions (battles) of love and fear in learning and teaching. Love and fear are dialectical in Britzman’s fear theory. Generalizing for heuristic purposes, one sees the core of adultism (the oppression of children by adults) when one sees that love is the motive of the ‘natural’ (‘child’), and fear is the motive of the ‘cultural’ (‘adult’). Fear slips in the cracks and ‘gap’ between what the child desires (love) and education (authority) demands—there, in that space we have a conceptualization of Anna Freud’s inter-feer-ence at the core of all human learning in culture.

Britzman discusses the problems of education’s refusal to incorporate notions of the unconscious (and "emotional conflict") in institutional structures and discourse. Here ideas on learning, refusal to learn and failure to learn, in relation to psychoanalytic concepts and experiences, are invaluable for educational theory. I will pass by that discussion *per se*, and focus on her ethic of learning and education, based in an emerging fear theory of education. Britzman wrote,

... the work of education might attempt to transform *neurotic anxiety* into *existential angst*. The move is to consider the vicissitudes of thought and suffering. Education might attempt to address the irrationality and violence [fear] of the superego (the irrationality that demands to be punished or to watch the punishments of others) and hence not exacerbate the superego's 'compulsive character which manifests itself in the form of a categorical imperative.' Something from within must pressure the learner... The inside pressure must tolerate the illusion [love] and disillusion [fear] that inaugurates learning. [underline for emphasis]

Britzman’s argument, with Lacanian equivocal unclarity, is not always understood easily. I will attempt to route around its rich depth and summarize, due to the limited space here. My reading of Britzman, is that she accepts that education and learning takes place in

---

134 I assume adultism, like sexism, classism, racism, heterosexism etc. are forms of oppression that include categories and privileges (of power/knowledge) that go with those categories. Being an adult relative to being a child, in the modernist fear-based society I (and Block) have in mind, is a relation of domination-subordination which is invested in creating fear in children for purposes of social control (Hobbes applied this to adults oppressing adults (e.g. Blits; Malnes) and so, it is not a big stretch to imagine that would be part of the matrix of social order in which education and learning are designed, more or less consciously, in the West). J. H. Blits, "Hobbesian Fear," *Political Theory* 17, no. 3 (1989): 417-31; R. Malnes, *The Hobbesian Theory of International Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Adultism functions well on the assumptions and methods of what Alice Miller has called "poisonous pedagogy." Alice Miller, *The Drama of the Gifted Child*, trans. Ruth Ward (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Alice Miller, *Thou S, transhalt Not Be Aware: Society’s Betrayal of the Child*, trans. Hildegarde and Hunter Hannum (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1985); Alice Miller, *The Untouched Key: Tracing Childhood Trauma in Creativity and Destructiveness*, trans. Hildegarde and Hunter Hannum (New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1990). Adultism is embedded in fearism. *Fearism*, is my own term, which describes the subtlety of violent uses of 'fear' that eventually are recognized and labeled terrorism.

135 It is evident, in Britzman’s fear theory, following the logic of this claim, that it could be written differently with more provocative intent, that is, *the child desires (love) and education/authority demands (fear)*. Now, that is a scary thought.

136 Britzman, *Lost Subjects, Contested Objects*, 42.
a context of "social anxiety" [feer], what Bruno Bettelheim referred to as the "irrational superego anxiety," what I would call the 'Fear' Matrix. I am not suggesting Bettelheim, Britzman and I are talking about exactly the same thing, but the attention to feer in Britzman's writing as a significant psycho-political context for education is undeniable, admirable and far too rare in educational discourse.

Echoing my own aim for an educational ethic based on a discourse around 'fear,' Britzman's educational ethic is, arguably, centrally-imagined around feer—of which she discusses as "two forms of anxiety: neurotic anxiety and existential angst." Moving from one feer to another feer, is her ethical aim. She implies that neurotic feer is less healthy, less mature, less adaptable, than existential feer—the latter, she claims is virtually natural to the fragile human (ego-)condition of existence. Unromantically, Britzman claims there is no unconditional "pure love" in growth, development and evolution via learning. In stereotypical analytic (existential) style, she writes like many sober authors of history, who suggest advances of humankind are based upon overcoming (sometimes exchanging) one fear for another, on and on. I recommend readers sort through Britzman's original text on this for your own interpretations.

For Britzman, the ego cannot be without feer motivations and defenses in relation to the unconscious (id and superego). Feer is deep within our 'tissues' both individually and collectively. But love (i.e., desire) is also at the root of that feer, and one ought not to overly-reduce education and learning to merely feer (i.e., need-iness, and neurosis). I agree. And, arguably, because education is centrally an engagement with ego, education and learning cannot do without feer—a point she makes quite clear, while disclosing her own bias:

Following Anna Freud and August Aichorn, Bettelheim claims that there can be no education without fear. The kind of fear at stake here is not the panic fear noted earlier by Bernfeld, in which the educator induces a 'panic hatred' into the student for the purpose of binding a community [a la Hobbesian]. The fear these educators

---

137 Ibid., 43. Here, I find Britzman's writing overly based in a psychology of fear discourse, which I believe, undermines her own political intentions to utilize feer theory. I pick up on this point of critique later in this article.


139 'Fear' I see as having the qualities of 'evil' (against Life). I use this phrase in the text, as I am reminded of Noddings's conception: "Cultural evils have a way of embedding themselves in the tissues of society. They resist elimination and instead undergo transformation... the evils remain potent." Nel Noddings, Women and Evil (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 104-05.

140 "What kind of love can be made in education? Can the ego's interest in the world be made more generous and flexible.... education must appeal to the ego's potential to love, to work, to touch and to be touched. But what is it for education to address itself to the ego when the ego is not exactly in charge? Britzman, Lost Subjects, Contested Objects, 45. I think the solution is that education has to address itself to the ego as "equivalent" to feer (feer, 'fear'), but this is not yet developed theoretically in my own thinking on 'fear' theory. I think Britzman's contribution is invaluable in this regard to an education for a fragile ego and human condition. Of course, there are big limitations with psychoanalysis (based often in "ego psychology," as is the case of Britzman's bias) never quite being able (or willing) to imagine human existence as transegoic, for example, in a Wilberian, Maslowian, or transpersonal sense.

141 Britzman, Lost Subjects, Contested Objects, 43.
have in mind is called 'anxiety,' the angst made from the stuff of uncertainty and
the interest to do something creative in this pressure. Then, as now, the
question that structures debates on this matter is how much fear is too much?142
[underline added for emphasis]

Notice Britzman’s rather puzzling linguistic shift from using anxiety to fear—which
seems rather queer, without any explanation—so, I presume she is really better off to be
talking about fear. Both Kagan and Britzman ought to have pushed the reader along to, at
least, seriously question, if we really know what we are talking about when we talk about
fear and all its forms, sub-species, and guises.

The ethicality that Britzman has in mind for education, challenges the domination of
an ego structure/identity that is based only in neurotic fear, and the creation of neurotic
fear for so-called "educational" (social order) purposes. Her ethicality is based upon the
qualitative distinction of neurotic from existential fear, and on the question of quantity,
when she asks "how much fear is too much?" Her conclusion and aim, without guarantee, is to
embrace and enhance "existential anxiety" (or "angst") in educational settings, and
consequently to delimit "neurotic anxiety." She wrote,

We might say that existential anxiety, or the capacity for agony and concern,
provides a possibility within which one attempts to do less harm in uncertainty,
to risk the love of learning.143

A certain kind, and quantity of fear is essential to Britzman’s best way to learning
and loving. The word compassion comes to mind when I think of the capacity she is speaking
about. Again, why ought we call it existential anxiety or fear that gives that capacity or is
that capacity, as she assert? Nussbaum, a feminist political philosopher, would likely agree
with the general shaping of Britzman’s fear theory and existential fear as having ethical
value.144 But then, there is ambiguity in Nussbaum’s later writing, that seems to indicate
inconsistency. Nussbaum’s ethics ("The Central Human Capabilities")145 lists that it is
imperative that human beings everywhere and everywhen, ought "... not [to be] having one’s
emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety."146 Is this part of a general feminist call

142 Ibid., 45.
143 Ibid., 43.
144 Nussbaum argues, in a Greek philosophical tragic sentiment, that pity and fear are part of life;
and, that "... a repeatedly betrayed or disappointed person will be fearful and suspicious of everything."
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy
Aristotle) of emotions in moral issues and thought and questions whether we should always be
automatically mistrustful of "... the information given us by our fear, or grief, or love?"
Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990), 175. She claims, "... it seems reasonable to fear death...". Ibid., 380.
145 Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge,
146 Cited in R. E. Goodin and D. Parker, "Symposium on Martha Nussbaum’s Political Philosophy,"
Britzman, at this point, leaves me with many unanswered and troublesome questions—not a bad thing. Care/ethical theories in education, like Nel Noddings are critical of the general patriarchal assumptions and discourses of Western ethics that circulate in school communities. Noddings does not believe all fear can be eliminated by society, but she is very critical that fear is assumed to be the originary basis of moral and ethical life (a feminist critique of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, that Britzman does not address).

The third, in the trio of "lost subjects, contested objects" for an emerging 'fear' theory in education, is 'fear' itself. Whatever the diverse phenomena or the experience encountered, we have seen that each sign, signifier and signified in play with language is a representation. We re-present subjects and objects ongoing, like telling a story, it never is always exactly the same, nor need be exactly the same. Part fact, part fiction, a good story serves its purposes. In this case, I, along with others cited, have been telling a story about fear/fear/'fear', with a few twists and turns. So far, we have seen different general orienting-demands that the story puts on a teller and listener: (1) fear- tended to demand a primal universality that is deeply biological, whereby, we experience a sensation, feeling, or emotion, and react to danger known or unknown; (2) fear- tended to demand a questioning of the universality, stereotypy, and authoritative label that fear engenders, whereby, we are allowed many diverse, rebellious, even queer, meanings in diverse contexts and discourse communities.

The purpose of the trio is to expand the fear-imaginary in individual and collective lives, in both informal and formal institutional settings. Why do we need an expanded fear-imaginary? This question has no one answer and is an ongoing research stimulus for me. Perhaps, it is so we can produce better quality, richer and deeper stories about fear, in fear, and without fear; or, maybe we can produce better quality fear knowledge. Perhaps, it is merely bringing more creativity into a topic that tends to be fairly uncreative, albeit, we never seem to suffer from diverse ways to scare ourselves 'to death' in stories of horror. But I am searching for a creativity that is not stereotypical, as the common tale of horror we see so often in popular entertainment media and in the bad news that feeds us.

Carl Jung, once said, more or less, that the problem with evil is not evil itself, but rather that we have lost our imagination for evil. This statement implies, to me, that we have lost an imaginary for evil because we fear it so much. Evil seems constructed on ruling by fear—a fear of evil that severely (unhealthily) limits our ways of understanding evil and working against (with) evil. I'd like to apply, in part, Jung's notion to fear, and suggest there is something to work with for the common wisdom that "all we have to fear is fear itself"—not, that I am suggesting that is purely to be taken literally. We have seen that fear, is external and internal, universal and diverse, with no one way to capture it in a box, while fooling ourselves that we "have it!" Remember, that the initiative of 'fear' theory is one that

---


148 Referring to the patriarchal Freudian assumptions about fear and morality. Noddings wrote, “This approach is closely connected to the Freudian idea that moral and ethical life begin in fear.” Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools (New York: Teacher College Press, 1992), 81.
argues that part of the problem of fear in our world is not fear itself (in a box) but equally the problem of the political nature of fear knowledge(s). Who gets to say what about fear and why? Do we have good (ethical, healthy) knowledge about fear?, becomes a question that usurps the traditional hegemony of always asking "what is fear?"

Our story of the trio has moved from the field of psychology (Kagan) to psychoanalysis and education (Britzman), and now, to 'fear' as the foundation of a, more or less, 'fear' education I envision. The general orienting-demand of 'fear' is that we read 'fear.' Influenced by Derrida’s deconstruction in literary and philosophical terms, I have created 'fear' as a deconstruction of fear. Most simply, I wish to keep 'fear' from taking on authoritative categories, traditional meanings, definitions, just because it has the letters f, e, a, r, and the sound we hear when we speak it, or the imaginary we have when we think it. But, as well, I have always been interested to integrate 'fear' with all its other categories, traditional meanings, definitions and so on. I wanted 'fear' to do the work of embracing what was before (as hegemonic), as well as what is alternative (as marginal), and include new construction or reconstruction. I suppose you could say I have a methodological orientation toward a postmodern deconstructive reconstructionist project149—whatever, that means to you. Now, onto a story about 'fear,' with the demand to read 'fear' something like you would read a good novel—whatever, that means to you. To me, it means be an [active-participant] interpreter.

My first systematic concern about fear in our world took the form of writing a newspaper article150 where I was using fear in the everyday common form. Over the years of reading everything I could get on the topic of fear, it led me to being more interested in the problems of definition and conceptualization of fear, than the content of what was being feared [i.e., fears]. I was curious as to what the best attitude was in order to know fear—truthfully. This epistemological interest in fear has proved the most fruitful in my research, and as a person teaching about fear. I was always amazed at the contradictions in the writing about fear and how to best deal with it, cope with it, heal it and so on. I noticed, rarely, did anyone (with the exception of Krishnamurti151), discuss the problem of knowing fear. I could see there was little dialogue across the disciplines and traditions of accumulated fear-knowledges, and no one seemed interested in critiquing or re-creating better fear-knowledges—rather, everyone was more interested in preaching their own


150 R. Michael Fisher, "Future Not to be Feared," Olds Optimist (1984), June 10. [I was challenging the fundamentalist religious "Right" (specifically, pastors, ministers, priests) in the city and region where I lived and taught in regard to their use of "fear" to try to recruit and convert people to their religious communities and a perfect life in the here-after called 'Heaven'].

151 Any of the writings of the late Jiddu Krishnamurti have a remarkably perceptive and aware critical epistemological reflectivity in them. I like that he has accepted no tradition, nor formulas, and has creatively sought truthfulness in his own unique style, while respecting what he has learned from many traditions, including spiritual ones. This transdisciplinarity has appealed to my own epistemological sensibilities. The best summary of his writing on fear is in a collected volume of his talks on fear in J. Krishnamurti, On Fear and, some pertinent comments in J. Krishnamurti, Beyond Violence (London: Victor Gollanz, 1973/91).
limited, often dogmatic, views. Some saw fear as wisdom, some saw fear as evil, and a lot saw fear as something in between.

By 1986, I was forming a bias about fear. I was heavily influenced by Harvey Jackins’ writing on human distress and liberation work. My own healing work using Jackin’s theory proved very helpful. From some casual notes, I wrote,

Most of our fears and other emotions are based on past experiences and are not appropriate to present time; they are fixed behavioral patterns developed around unexpressed distresses, when these distresses are released through various forms of emotional discharge, so can the fixed behavioral patterns be seen more clearly and rationally so they can be ‘discharged,’ opening up the flexible capacity of human intelligence a little more.

From this rather clinical-sounding discourse, with an interest in fears and emotions as concrete behaviors, I shifted the entire conceptualization and meaning that fear itself had. I no longer was very interested in fears (fear of x, y, z) because they seemed to be distracting projections onto ‘objects’ [or ‘events’] (out there) and thus, shifted the inquiry to fear itself (in the subject). By 1990, I found myself putting (’) marks on the term, because I felt I had my own “original” ideas about what ‘fear’ was, and no other signifier seemed adequate to the complexity I was putting into ‘fear.’ My intimate female partner at the time assisted me in an experiential experiment where we could see our love relationship in contrast to a ‘fear’-based relationship. We explored using metaphors to describe ‘fear.’ In a set of casual notes c. 1991, I wrote,

Last year my intimate partner and I slipped lovingly across the abyss into the arms of the dark unconscious sea. With one foot still on the dock and the other well into the boat, we were swept into the hot breath of the ‘green dragon.’ We came to a ‘life-jolting’ discovery, as John Bradshaw (1988:vii) called it, that the core ‘demon’ was not outside of ourselves but breathing hotly within. We named it ‘fear.’ We had discovered authentic intimacy and in the same moment the terror of abandonment. The oppression of our past his [her]story and culture was revealed brightly only to haunt us in the present. Naming the beast ‘fear’ freed us long enough from its deathly grip to see that it was the core dragon behind all forms of terrorism, massive social and environment destruction and the loss of faith in Love and goodness over evil. We also clearly witnessed the death-making addictions of our modern civilization as flames burning endlessly in a conflagration of fear. The world and our grief were seemingly overwhelming... In naming ‘fear,’ we understood for the first time the possibility of a life, a relationship and world beyond fear.

This writing still brings shivers to my skin. The switching back and forth between fear and ‘fear’ was significant enough to record in those days, but I was not aware of why.

---

152 The late Harvey Jackins, founder and leader of the Re-evaluation Co-counseling community, provided a theory of peer-focused healing and liberation for a grassroots international movement that is very impressive to this day. For a beginning to the theory and practice, I recommend Harvey Jackins et al., Fundamentals of Co-Counseling Manual (Elementary Counselor’s Manual) for Beginning Classes in Re-evaluation Counseling (Seattle, WA: Rational Island, 1982) and Harvey Jackins, The Human Side of Human Beings: The Theory of Re-evaluation Counseling (Seattle, WA: Rational Island, 1985). I have taught this model for eight years to hundreds of people.
had no 'fear' theory then. I was pushing the hegemonic, common sense 'envelope,' and rejecting that fear was merely a natural or normal feeling or emotion, something necessarily understood by what we feel alone. In an article in 1994, still in my naive idealistic phase of focusing on what is 'fear'? as a phenomena, I wrote,

*Fear is the parent of cruelty.* - J. A. Froude

We all know well the experience of 'fear' and terror and their potentially paralyzing effects. Often we know the fears we have are conditioned and patterned from our past experiences of distress. But knowing fears are part of a pseudoreality (illusion) .... The evidence is beginning to stack up that we can no longer avoid looking deeply into the phenomenon of 'fear' in all its aspects.... After studying the conventional popular and academic conceptualizations (theories) of 'fear' in the Western world and my own experience with 'fear,' I conclude that generally Western society (myself included) knows little rationally about the actual phenomenon of 'fear'.... I am challenging the reality we are creating... around the conceptualization, speaking, and writing about 'fear' (and its cousins).... In metaphorical language, it was clever when the 'Fear' Project reduced 'fear' (oppression) to a feeling or emotion. Reductionism is well known as a tool of oppressive knowledge systems.... When 'fear' is reduced to a feeling, emotion, startle or stress response, defense mechanism, or 'flight-fight' instinct based on biophysiological determinants, the human being is reduced.... All of these reductions of 'fear' as a whole human experience, place 'fear' into a comfortable value-neutral box.\(^\text{153}\)

This earlier writing hinted at the direction (hypothesis) that was brewing. I was becoming convinced that any fear-knowledge was likely dressed up in reductionistic methodologies, and various names (guises). The word fear had to be challenged as part of a 'Fear' Project\(^\text{154}\) that was somehow controlling a skewed view of fear, and thus, oppressing us further by fear. I envisioned 'fear' as a pattern—what, I called a 'fear' pattern virus (FPV+), which included dualism, evil, dissociation, violence, hurting, toxicity, defense mechanisms, and a host of other processes and concepts that seemed to be 'bad' news for humans and life here on earth.

I was challenged by readers of my work, and my own thoughts, as to the value of cramming so much into one notion of 'fear.' I was also challenged on being a bit of a conspiracy theorist, in that I didn't trust our knowledges about fear. I saw "false consciousness" (in the Marxian sense) almost everywhere that fear was being written about and talked about. I have not completely given up on this attitude, but I trust I have evolved a more textured critique of fear-knowledge. My answer to cramming so much into 'fear'—is


\(^{154}\) This notion of a 'Fear' Project has a long history, dating back to 1989. I won't go into the details here. Suffice it to say, that the 'Fear' Project was, in part, inspired by Wilber's earliest 1980s writing about the "Immortality Project" and "Atman Project." The idea is based in metaphysics, and a transpersonal model of consciousness based on the perennial philosophy. See Ken Wilber, *The Atman Project: A Transpersonal View of Human Development* (London: Theosophical Publishing House, 1980/82); Ken Wilber, *Up From Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution* (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1981).
based upon the application of Ockham's Razor,\textsuperscript{155} as a means in philosophy to improve a theory or concept that has become so cumbersome or un-useful over time. I see this Ockham's strategy, for my own work, as bringing many terms (forms and subspecies) into one concept called 'fear.' This is my attempt at simplicity (economy) to put the "razor" to cutting away the truths that cannot be seen anymore about the 'Fear' Project ('Fear' Matrix). The trouble is, with such a razoring (cleaning-up of abstraction), I tend to put all the razed-garbage into one pot—into 'fear' itself (which may become dirtied-up with abstraction). It is a trade-off, and only one strategy, of many, to better understand oppression (i.e., 'fear').

At the same time, paradoxically, I am drawn to the epistemological implications of deconstruction (including poststructural and postmodern orientations). I wish to use 'fear' as a concept to tell stories about. I wish to have it be freed of too much old baggage and over-predetermined ideas that make it good or evil. My own bias to see 'fear' as on the evil-side, is problematic, and at times undermining of my research intentions. This tension, sometimes battle, seems to be unresolvable for me, thus far. So be it. I work with it and see what happens. I look for better ways. Readers, interpreters, and others are most welcome to comment and assist this evolution of 'fear' theory. I use 'theory' in a very loose and narrative manner, rather, than attempting to create an empirical (positivist) kind of theory for prediction and control (the latter, often 'fear'-based itself). Although, who knows what is possible in the future as 'fear' theory evolves.

Talking a Wilberian critical integral theory perspective on knowledge, I was interested in a "spectrum of 'fear.'\textsuperscript{156} Ideally, I wanted to imagine 'fear' that was inclusive of all knowledges, from all levels of consciousness, all cultures and so on. I also wanted those knowledges to act in critical ways with each other, a more complex issue, which I won't discuss here. I waned conflict in the diverse 'fear' knowledge(s) of the spectrum of 'fear.' Through conflict, dialogue, reflecting, I envisioned the contesting fear-knowledges would be able to see themselves and critique themselves, in similarities and differences, and see their own limitations when brought together in a spectrum conceptualization. My Ph.D. research intends to apply this spectrum of 'fear' approach to the relationship of 'fear' and violence, in particular, examining educational discourses of 'fear.'

---

\textsuperscript{155} "Ockham's (Ockam's or Occam's) Razor-- also called the principle of parsimony, principle of simplicity, or principle of economy, a methodological principle developed by William of Ockham [English philosopher/theologian, c. 1285-1349]." *Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity,*... *The Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994), 211. I don't necessarily take the positivist (realist) approach to knowledge (alone) here that Ockham is insinuating but I think there is something to what he is suggesting in the principle. I do strive for beauty in a theory (or idea, or conception, or metaphor), and that beauty carries, in part, a certain economy of truthfulness—which, is the basis of my intention to read 'fear' and use interpretation and social constructionist approaches as the primary methodology (but not to be restricted to these either).


---
WHY A 'FEAR' THEORY FOR EDUCATION NOW?

If we are interested in violence that hurts us all each day, educators, parents, leaders and all citizens have a grave reality, and tough questions to face. Here are a few quotes that animate my day in this regard:

The 17th century was the century of mathematic, the 18th century that of physics; the 19th century of biology; and the 20th century is the century of fear.157

Love is letting go of fear.158

Love is not enough.159

Education is an act of love, and thus an act of courage. It cannot fear the analysis of reality, or, under pain of revealing itself as a farce, avoid creative [and critical] discussion.160

How does one reconcile this orgiastic indulgence in our supposedly beastial instincts for violence and cruelty with the ubiquitous spread of education and civilization in our own time?... The twentieth century will go down in history as the bloodiest and most murderous....161

Since we live everyday with the most frightening animal on earth, understanding how fear works can dramatically improve our lives.162

Conducting a fearanalysis of the current situation, of our educational system, of our relationships, and of our planetary ecosystems, it appears no simple sweet, sour, or smug 'politics,' or religious or ethical answer will do. History has answered all the simple answers with a resounding record of how they have not worked to eliminate our worst problems of human and environmental injustices.

With this caution of oversimplification in mind, what are we to make of Dr. Ellen Taliaferro’s comment? She is co-founder of Physicians for a Violence Free Society. After years of research, she concluded that "all sources of violence" are, simply "fear."163 I think she may be correct. I also think she has not provided us with a definition of fear, nor a theory of fear in which to critique what she says. What are we to think when a risk

---


162 de Becker, Gift of Fear, 284.

assessment expert, like Gavin de Becker¹⁶⁴ tells us "We are at a peak fear point" in American history, if not the world? He has not provided us with a conceptualization of 'fear' nor feer, but has accepted only fear, as it is normally talked about in psychology. There is little room, certainly no encouragement, for critique in these claims, without a 'fear' theory (or many).

I ask what fear-knowledges, what fear education, do these experts draw on in making their claims about fear, and our current condition? I ask what fear education is there available, other than by informal chance, that provides a young person (or adult) with the necessary information and skills to be able to critique these experts' claims and advice? What body of fear-knowledge is drawn upon by parents, educators, and leaders in guiding others and ourselves through the 21st century? How do we teach and learn an expansion of our fear-imaginary? There are many questions, and few answers, at this point. Maybe, we have just not needed so much systematic and critical knowledge about fear before in history, at least in North America?

In building something called 'fear' theory, I have been drawn to expand my own knowledge and scope of vision to incorporate research and writing from post-modern sociologists, concerned about the massive "insecurity" ('fear') that comes with globalization today;¹⁶⁵ including the democratic implications of 'fear' in a "risk society"¹⁶⁶ both locally and on a global scale. Educators, for example, Ratinoff,¹⁶⁷ directly assess the impact of global insecurity ('fear') on and within education. Other sociologists and political analysts have zoomed-in on the specific problems of living in a "culture of fear" (in some cases, terror)¹⁶⁸ Others have looked at this concept of a culture of fear in education¹⁶⁹ and, how it is

¹⁶⁴ From an interview with de Becker on the Internet.
sometimes created in trying to eliminate fear by introducing strict (sometimes violent) security measures in schools.\textsuperscript{170}

Massumi, literary and cultural media critic, has argued that in late capitalist societies, "fear is a power mechanism for the perpetuation of domination."\textsuperscript{171} Burmese political dissident and Nobel Prize Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi\textsuperscript{172} says, "It is not power that corrupts.... It is fear." Massumi, along with several other authors in \textit{The Everyday Politics of Fear}, suggest that cultural practices, politic and the new mass media have combined in unique ways, like never before in history, to actualize "a basically uninhabitable space of fear,"\textsuperscript{173} that has become part of a fear production and consumption (he called an "organized fear trade"),\textsuperscript{174} a veritable industry of fear, perhaps(?) "so pervasive and invasive that we can no longer separate ourselves from fear,"\textsuperscript{175} No longer, does Massumi believe, that fear is merely an emotion or personal experience, but rather it is the ground of subject formation and the very process of subject formation, all, for economic and political interests.

Ellin's conception of a "defensive urbanism" and "architecture of fear"\textsuperscript{176} are, like Massumi's, extremely important studies that provoke us to re-look at 'fear' as something much larger as a phenomena and concept than what psychological discourse has offered. The only educators, I know of, to at least briefly address Massumi's notion of 'fear,' are Kris Gutierrez and Peter McLaren\textsuperscript{177} in a dialogue re: "a new cultural politics" associated with the hyperreality of technology or the "imploded regions of cyberspace" that creates "media-saturated lives" (\textit{a la} McLaren). Gutierrez suggested that "Fear has taken on a new meaning, it seems. It has become intensified in new ways"; McLaren responds, suggesting that "we are witnessing the hyperreal formation of an entirely new species of fear."\textsuperscript{178} McLaren puts forth some excellent questions (and challenging claims) for research, theory formation, and any future 'fear' education in the 'Fear' Matrix:

I think that as teachers we need to ask ourselves: What does it mean to live in this fear in an arena of shifting forms of global capitalism? How does such fear direct urban policy and school policy? How is everyday life saturated by such fear and what role does this fear play in student learning? What kinds of learning need to take place in order to resist or overcome the fear of participating in the construction


\textsuperscript{171} Massumi, "Preface," ix.


\textsuperscript{174} Massumi, "Preface," iii.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., ix.

\textsuperscript{176} Ellin, \textit{Architecture of Fear}.


\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 148.
of terminal identities? What politics of liberation must be engaged in as part of a struggle for a better future for our schools and our youth who attend them.

Capitalism has colonized all geographical and social space and schools have not been immune. In fact, they are perhaps one of the most vulnerable social sites for this kind of colonization... [via] corporate logic to ensure the privatization of education. Massumi argues that capitalism is co-extensive with its own inside such that it has now become both a field of immanence and exteriority. There is no escape. There is only fear [a 'Fear' Matrix, "culture of fear" or what McLaren calls a "predatory culture"].

A chilling quote. There is no need to be a card-carrying Marxian critic, nor fatalist believing all agency is gone from our youth and culture. The important point, of all the references above, is that we are faced with a new context and a new "species" of fear—that is, 'fear,' that requires a new vigilance in education, and society at large. When 'fear' is read within a historical, sociological, cultural, and political context, the very nature of fear, as we have commonly defined it and experienced it, begins to shift—perhaps, the idea of education itself also has to shift.

I was given a coffee mug by a fellow teacher decades ago. It has all the statements printed on it that make educators proud of what we do. One of the statements reads: "Man's fear of ideas is probably the greatest dike holding back human knowledge and happiness." Just how far has education advanced in overcoming the "fear of ideas"? How advanced is our knowledge, which we so blithely suggest is improved by "fighting fear with facts"? How easily Education as the Modernist/Enlightenment project, assumes a direct link (and agentic) with progress; then, learning, like education, is easily associated with a "moving beyond fear"—that is, a moving beyond mere "animals," "primitives," "barbarians," and the "uneducated" who are thought to be steeped in a world dictated by the terror of magic, myth, superstition and ignorance. But it is perspective, and viewpoint, that carries the hidden assumptions about who is really the most afraid? Massumi's postmodern criticism, or Camus's prophetic claim (earlier in the article), are challenges to our educated privileging, and perhaps, the educated have only replaced old fear with new 'fear.' The definition of progress itself, is up for grabs.

179 Ibid., 149. McLaren wrote, "We now inhabit a predatory culture. Predatory culture is a field of invisibility—of stalkers and victims—precisely because it is so obvious. Its obviousness immunizes its victims against a full discourse of its menacing capabilities. In predatory culture identity is fashioned mainly and often violently around the excesses of marketing and consumption and the natural relations of post-industrial capitalism.... Predatory culture is the great deceiver. It marks the ascendancy of the dehydrated imagination that has lost its capacity to dream otherwise. It is the culture of eroticized victims and decaffeinated revolutionaries. We are all its sons and daughters. The capitalist fear that fuels predatory culture is made to function at the world level through the installation of necessary crises, both monetary and social.... The social, the cultural and the human has been subsumed within capital. This is predatory culture. Have fun." Peter McLaren, "Introduction: Education as a Political Issue," in Critical Pedagogy and Predatory Culture: Oppositional Politics in a Postmodern Era, P. McLaren (New York: Routledge, 1995), 2.

180 M. Schechter and S. Sheps, AIDS: Fighting Fear With Facts (video, Vancouver, BC: Dept. of Health Care and Epidemiology, Faculty of Medicine, The University of British Columbia, 1989).

It is not the purpose of this article to suggest that there are no worthwhile theories in education that look at fear. We could call them "theories of fear." There is no room to review these here, but rather, we can think of them as part of educational psychology and learning theories. Lots of literature exists which shows the impact of fear on productivity, discipline management and even psychoanalytic classroom dynamics. The call of this article, based on a larger perspective of 'fear' and 'fear' theory, pushes us to be critical of the very ways we’ve limited our fear-imaginary and production of fear-knowledge. The latter, is a different level of questioning and analysis, what I like to call a fearanalysis.

Fearanalysis, is one method of applying (and contributing to) 'fear' theory. Such an analysis ought to immediately be part of a critical (and conflict) theory tradition, as I have indicated throughout this article. A feminist perspective which critiques the nature of patriarchy\textsuperscript{182} (as a 'Fear' Matrix = cf. "phallocentric culture" or "woman-hating culture," according to Frye\textsuperscript{183}), is a perspective that ought to challenge the way 'fear' has been substantial and essential in the violence against girls and women. Two important feminist writers, among many others, remind us, of what can be so easily forgotten:

Fear cements this ["male supremacist society"] system together. Fear is the adhesive that holds each part in place.... children are rewarded for learning these fears.... We are taught to be afraid....\textsuperscript{184}

... an unwritten code of behavior, called femininity, which makes a feminine woman the perfect victim of sexual aggression.... Each girl as she grows into womanhood is taught fear. Fear is the form in which the female internalizes both [masculine] chivalry and the double standard.... She must deny her own feelings and learn not to act from them. She fears herself... Passivity itself prevents a woman from ever considering her own potential for self-defense and forces her to look to men for protection. The woman is taught fear, but this time fear of the other; and yet her only relief from this fear is to seek out the other.... It is in this sense that a woman is deprived of the status of a human being. She is not free to be.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{182} Eisler, a feminist archeologist and author, has suggested that patriarchy is best labeled "dominator culture" in contrast to "partnership culture." Her research found that dominator culture has been the norm in the Western world for some 5000+ years. The main features of this type of culture are "fear and mistrust." Riane Eisler, The Chalice and the Blade: Our History, Our Future (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1987). Jungian (male) researchers, Moore and Gillette wrote, "Patriarchy is the expression of the immature masculine. It is the expression of Boy psychology, and, in part, the shadow—or crazy—side of masculinity. It expressed the stunted masculine, fixated at immature levels. Patriarchy, in our view, is an attack on masculinity in its fullness as well as femininity in its fullness. Those caught up in the structures and dynamics of patriarchy seek to dominate not only women but men as well. Patriarchy is based on fear—the boy's fear, the immature masculine's fear—of women, to be sure, but also fear of men. Boys fear women. They also fear real men. [underline added for emphasis]. See Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette, King, Warrior, Magician, Lover: Rediscovering the Archetypes of the Mature Masculine (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), xvii. It seems plausible, that the 'Fear' Matrix I have written about, is also recognizable as a phobocentric culture (cf. "culture of fear").


\textsuperscript{185} Susan Griffin, "'Rape': The All-American Crime," in Feminism and Philosophy, eds. M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston and J. English (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, 1979/90), 278.
One rationale for making fear transform into 'fear' is that patriarchy has for millennia constructed the definitions of fear, the experiences of fear, and the prescriptions for how best to tolerate, cope, deal with fear, or be "without fear." To both critique and move beyond that patriarchal hegemony in conceptualizing fear, I recommend marking 'fear,' in a deconstructive move, as the identificatory signifier for a feminist perspective. I also acknowledge there are many feminisms, with unique views and theories, and each deserves its own variation in reconstructing 'fear' and fear-knowledge. Feminist pedagogues, from what I have seen, have largely ignored the centrality of fear, feer, or 'fear' in their theorizing and practices. This is an astounding neglect, when the evidence for a culture of fear (matrix) is historically and politically evident from the many sources cited in this article. A postcolonial critique, by some educators, has brought out some minimal focus on fear in education.186 Others, writing on racism and fear in education also deserve attention.187

With the impact of feminism(s) and affective education, a resurgence of studies on the sociology of emotions188 in relation to moral education,189 "emotional labour,"190 "emotional management" in business,191 "emotional intelligence,"192 and feelings [affect] in general, have come to the attention of the educational community in the last decade. This ought to create space for more interest in fear as a critical topic in education communities.

Increasing pressures to examine fear in relation to societal violence, bullying,193 and AIDS194 in education are part of a growing interest to examine fear and children "at-risk," within frameworks of crisis, trauma and rising numbers of international refugee children in classrooms.195 The negative relationship between fear/violent abuse and learning has also

189 Boler, Feeling Power.
192 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence.
received a lot of attention with calls for "safe" learning environments. Educators today are being confronted with teaching and learning in the context of what some authors call a "post-traumatic culture" and a "culture of shame.

A 'fear' theory would have to take account of all of the above contexts and politics that go with cultural and social change. Anyone interested in a philosophical reconstructionist approach to educational theory and curriculum has to engage with the non-rational and irrational, as we are seeing from these changing social contexts "the limitations in man's [sic] rationality..." Within a reconstructionist framework, Brameld further suggested,

In many ways, man [sic] possesses tremendously powerful un rational drives, both within himself and in his relations with other men. If we are to channel the forces of education effectively toward achievement of such a great purpose as democratic world civilization, it is necessary for us to recognize and utilize these powerful un rational forces [e.g., 'fear']—the forces of emotion, the forces of hostility and conflict, as well as the forces of love and harmony. Reconstructionism searches for fresh insights into the nature of man, individually and collectively, in order to understand how he may capitalize upon his energies to the utmost in behalf of imperative new goals.

The non rational and irrational are not merely 'spaces' of 'fear' within our minds and hearts. Today (September, 11th, 2001) while writing this article, while school children are into their second week of school, and everything is 'normal' news comes across the airwaves that the largest and most potent "terrorist attack" in the U. S. A. has successfully

---


199 ... the reconstructionist modifies the progressivist philosophy. The latter emphasizes the ends emerge out of the means we use: if we develop effective means, the ends will eventually come into view. The reconstructionist philosophy emphasizes more strongly that means are also shaped by the ends we decide upon and commit ourselves to. That is, if we are clear about where we are going, we will be more likely to develop the necessary processes by which to get there.... education should now concern itself much more deeply and directly than hitherto with the great ends of civilization," according to educational philosopher, Brameld, Theodore Brameld, Education as Power (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 38. I do not agree with Brameld's entire biased view, but I think his reconstructionist vision fits very closely my own, especially, as I have not fully accepted all of the poststructuralist and postmodern approaches, nor the merely progressivist "process" focused approaches to education. Utilizing Wilber's work as a basis for my own critical integral theory of education, I am theoretically, what Brameld would likely label as a perennial reconstructionist (p. 28), with an odd mixture of conservative and liberal [and radical] interests and vision for education.

200 Brameld, Education as Power, 38.

201 Ibid., 38.
devastated the World Trade Buildings and parts of the Pentagon. The political symbolism of the irrational—officially called a "carefully co-ordinated attack," is apparent and fear rules; America is in chaos. Officially the radio says "America is under attack!" The culture of fear is demonstrating itself to the world, once again but this time, in a way that will affect all our lives like never before. Security and Fear easily become indistinguishable, a more deadly operation of misconception, I can hardly imagine. The radio announcer, in my local area says our future will be "a bunker mentality... but we will do our best [as a radio station] to keep everyone safe."

What will we learn this time? What tools, skills, and knowledges do we draw upon to think and learn in sites of 'fear'? Will our fear direct us to the "first train to come along" to find someone to blame, as de Becker warned, to the nearest creation of the worst evil enemy to focus our revenge—echoes of Hiroshima-Nagasaki go through my mind. And the radio announcers ended their news bulletin saying President Bush, showed outstanding composure when confronted with the news this morning.202 The ongoing loss of lives, and suffering, is real and tragic.

Fear has been seen as important, if not central, in some models of reform in education203 and organizational development models of Total Quality Management (e.g., Deming, and his many followers). Riley204 includes fear in understanding the politics of schooling and curriculum. Much more research and dialogue among educators could be included under the topic of over-use of "fear appeals," advertising and consumerization of school and educational life (e.g., Lively205). The Right-wing backlash and Culture Wars in education, and in Western society generally, are often riveted with fear and loathing. Some backlashing, via conservative educators, has recently attacked environmental education for scaring students with too much biased Green-information on only the negative-side of global problems [e.g., Global Warming].206

If these direct problems with fear are not enough of a challenge to the educator today, there is the dialectical-side of the picture remaining. How do we make sense of all the

202 In this construction of a [official] narrative of fear, we will get heroism, we will get the evidence that we are courageous and rational. Apparently, President Bush Jr. was at an "educational conference" in Florida, and reading a book to a group of American elementary children. When someone came into the room where he was reading, they asked if he had heard the bad news. He said he had, and would respond in a minute, after he had finished reading to the children. Where there is fear—there arises fearlessness. But how to decide upon the quality of that fearlessness, that is the question of this article and my own research.


pedagogies of "fearlessness" that are arising lately? It seems there is an opposing and resistant reaction in Western culture [at least] to all the victimization, shame, and fear that victimizes us? Where there is a "culture of fear," immediately there seems a "culture of fearlessness" emerging. If Toni Morrison argues we need a "place for fear" then, we must need a "place for fearlessness." Is that 'place' of fearlessness the same as courage? What critical theoretical perspective can we use to challenge the resurgence of "fearless females," "warrior women," and a general [assertive to] aggressive Western business-oriented trope to be young and "fearless" (e.g., Zweig) in order to be successful? Ideas of fearless leadership and "fearless women superintendents" in schooling are

---

207 Pedagogies of fearlessness is a term I use to refer to approaches to education (or otherwise) that involve an encouragement to be "without fear," "safe and secure," "free from fear," or "fearless" and so on. These are typically not based on any definition or theory of fear (certainly not on a fear theory or 'fear' theory). They are also typically void of any theory of fearlessness either. In short, such pedagogies are more reactive, rhetorical, and superficial, than they are theoretically or philosophically sound.

208 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, I am a strong critic of discourses of courage and bravery that have been the patriarchal legacy of the Western world. Fearlessness, or fearless, as I use these concepts, are part of, but not contained within, Western (or a lot of Eastern) notions of courage and bravery [and bravado or braggadocio].

209 I am thinking particularly of American pop culture with its glorification of 'tough-killer' girls and women (e.g., "Charlie's Angels," the female protagonist Trinity in The Matrix sci-fi film trilogy; "Buffy, The Vampire Slayer" cult and so on). Cosmopolitan Magazine has perpetuated this in less violent ways with a more "fearless" sexy approach to marketing, See Anonymous, Cosmo's Fun Fearless Female Quiz Book: 30 Great Sex and Relationship Quizzes (Hearst, 1999); A Gleave, Fun, Fearless, and Female: The Reflection of American Female Society Found in Cosmopolitan Magazine (New York: Cosmopolitan, 1999). There are also a lot more ads and books appearing that support females in the martial arts (e.g., Callan; Danylewich) and in military, or traditional masculine aggressive careers (Hanson), where authors are encouraging a new breed of "Amazon" woman, as "fearless" warrior. Historical studies for "fearless" heroine's are a call for new role models (e.g., Ragan, 1999), See D. Callan, Awakening the Warrior Within: Secrets of Personal Safety and Inner Security (Novato, CA: Nataraj, 1995); P. H. Danylewich, Fearless: The Complete Safety Guide for Women (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2000); J. Hanson, Fearless Women: Athletes, Explorers, Other Competitors (Austin, TX: Raintree Steck-Vaughn, 2000); and K. Ragan, Fearless Girls, Wise Women and Beloved Sisters: Heroines in Folktales from Around the World (New York: Norton, 1999). With rising incidents of urban females in gangs and violent crimes, this area deserves a lot more study and documentation in a separate article. In no way, do I wish to create an entirely negative and dismissive attitude toward this concept of a "fearless female," as there are authentic, non-trivial, traditions of sacred warriorship (for males and females; and others) in most all cultures—for example, M. Hibbets, "Saving Them From Yourself: An Inquiry into the South Asian Gift of Fearlessness," Journal of Religious Ethics 27, no. 3 (1999): 437-62.


211 Undeniably, much of this business movement was spurred on by the "NO FEAR!" Gen-Xers in America in the 1990s, see J. M. Pethokoukis, "Young and the Fearless: Why Gen-X Managers Outdo Old Timers," U.S. News and World Report 126, no. 4 (1999), 62, 64.


challenging to our traditional ideas, and fears, about someone being "fearless" and in charge. Do we want to educate fearless children, parents, leaders? Would we know how? How would we critically assess the discourses of fear and fearlessness that presuppose an interest in these cultural shifts, or movements?

Beyond these new cultural developments that engage our sensibilities toward fear and fearlessness, educators have a tradition of radical thinkers (in the 1950s and 60s) who have pushed the 'envelope' toward an educational philosophy and practice that is purported to be "without fear." In the short remaining space of this article, I mention Jiddu Krishnamurti and A. S. Neill (Summerhill) as important thinkers and educators that any 'fear' theory ought to engage.215 Fitting well with Britzman's educational theory of fear and her interest in hate (and love), yet, in opposition to Britzman's conclusion, A. S. Neill once said, "Fear must be entirely eliminated.... Only hate can flourish in an atmosphere of fear."216 I agree. But all these ideas of education "without fear," in whatever form or social movement, are suspect under the criticism of fearanalysis and the emergence of a critical 'fear' theory. What exactly that 'fear' theory will be, is unclear, and "unproven." What seems reasonably clear, is that, we are in a mess of confusion about fear, feer, and 'fear' and fearlessness in reference to pedagogy, curriculum and educational policy.

Without some kind of theory of fear (and many), or without 'fear' theory (and many), there is likely to be very little advance in depth of understanding of 'fear' and violence for the future. Without 'fear' theory, and a proper 'fear' education, there will merely be a lot of 'fear'-based reactionism, increasing terrorization, and continuing ignorance, denial, and outright stupidity, in our ways of handling 'fear'—and worse, our very well-intended interventions to eliminate or control and manage 'fear' (and violence), will perpetuate the very phenomena we are attempting to manage (the pending reactions of the U.S.A. military and governments post-September 11, 2001, ought to show us a good deal about how not to manage 'fear' and violence). However, I am not certain of anything, at this point in the study of 'fear'.

I venture to risk that the best solutions to our problems of understanding 'fear' will come, not from bantering about in the hype of the "without fear" pedagogies of fearlessness, but rather, from a rigorous fearanalysis, 'fear' theory and fearless standpoint theory; the latter, giving us a new view of 'fear' (the 'Fear' Matrix), a new responsibility for our complicity in 'fear' production and consumption, and a new attitude toward allyship, caring, loving, and you name it. I am fairly certain, that such a standpoint will confront us with our worst fears, so to speak. Typically, when confronting our worst fears, there is a conditioned tendency to demand uncritically 'more security.' Neocleous217 has offered a powerful philosophical and political argument "Against Security" that deserves attention for the over-zealous safety-seekers amongst us. One of the biggest fears we face in the future is "teaching

---

217 In challenge to the thousands of documents and energies to bring "more security" and "safety" in our world, I believe a critical voice is needed to disrupt the overly hegemonic nature of those discourses. See Mark Neocleous, "Against Security," Radical Philosophy 100, March/April (2000): 7-15.
without hope," in a political [neoliberal] context, where we realize that one "cannot be
free and safe" in this violent world, of the everyday we live. Kane (among others)
argues that "fear of freedom" is the basis to the politics that constructs public education and
democracy in America. I tend to agree, in general. We then ought to ask what kind of
democracy does fear ('fear') create? I suspect, a violent one.

A BEGINNING CRITIQUE OF FEAR IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY

There is no conclusion to this exploratory journey into the beginnings of a critical
'fear' theory for education, for the world. There are some important guides we have met
along the way in this article: Parker Palmer's admission of a "culture of fear" in
contemporary education, Peter McLaren's admission of a "new species of fear" in cultural
politics and education, and Deborah Britzman's admission of a "love and hate [fear]"
emotional landscape and relationship that modulates all teaching and learning. Britzman is
the only educator to lead the way to an in depth theory of fear (fear) [other than my own
work on 'fear' theory].

From a fearanalysis and critical 'fear' theory, the above theorists of fear are barely
scratching the surface of a rich and important body of thinking and knowledge re: 'fear'
education. They have been all caught in a psychological discourse on fear, which offers no
expanded fear-imaginary nor politics of fear. Britzman is offering an important
psychoanalytical reading of fear in our world and in education. The psychoanalytic tradition
believes psychoanalysis is "a cure through love" (a la Sigmund Freud). This is compatible
with Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy of education as an "act of love." But a theory of fear,
and a critical 'fear' theory are not romantically in love with love—and education is as much
a demon of interference in love as it is a deliverance. In less metaphorical terms, the theory
of education Britzman is constructing has a most important maneuver; the purpose of
education is to be critical of its own fear, and let love alone.

In fearanalysis, the emphasis is on the path of fearlessness as the location and
process of living a life eternally ambivalent between Love and Fear. We cannot simply get
Love. There is not simply just Fear either. There is no formula nor [humanistic, or
theological] guarantee for the 'good' without the 'bad,' so to speak. There is a dialectical
relation and existential sensibility required that most people are unable or unwilling to
bring to awareness in education. I believe a good quality 'fear' education would improve our
capabilities to enter this path of fearlessness.

It is risky business to teach in a culture of fear and a politics that exposes the "glue"
of the 'Fear' Matrix of pathological patriarchy, and adultism. This critical location and
process, this living a life in such a precarious and ambivalent place, is the most dangerous of
all pedagogies—an impossibility with possibility—a dangerousness with desire for truth at

218 Taubman has challenged educators in how they allow fear to drive reforms, thus creating a false
hope. See P. Taubman, "Teaching Without Hope: What is Really at Stake in the Standards Movement,
High Stakes Testing, and the Drive for 'Practical Reforms,'" Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 16, no. 3
220 Jeffrey Kane, "In Fear of Freedom: Public Education and Democracy in America," Proceedings no.
all costs. Simply, the path of fearlessness demands a 'fear' theory which is determined to study fear, feer, 'fear' and any other creative expression that opposes pedagogies of love. Fearlessness demands that all 'stones are overturned' without exception. It demands, looking at that which gets in the way of Love. In fear analysis, it is more important understanding 'fear' than looking for Love. This methodological shift toward the "negative" is, at least, a counterbalance (counterhegemonic) strategy to what I see as a general fetishism of the "positive" in today's neo-liberal/neo-conservative climate in North American culture and education.

Britzman provides leadership in developing a theory of fear [and 'fear'] for educators based on recovering that which we are too afraid to examine (in any depth). Her recovery initiative to bring forth "lost subject, contested objects" in educational discourses is ultimately a project that confronts the hidden fears and 'fear' itself—as the lost subject in education. She provides the needed feminist, queer, poststructural, and psychoanalytic perspectives that counter the "positive" common sense of modernisms's excessive Western Enlightenment bias of thought and knowledge-making. Modernism’s love of harmony and order [unity], is disrupted by Britzman’s desire for more attention and work with conflict as a foundation to teaching, learning and curriculum design. Britzman’s intimation of attention to the unconscious, repressed, the feared [hated]—is admirable and needed.

Her notion of the "work of education" is always humble. If education can attempt a conscious transformation of "neurotic anxiety into existential angst" then she believes that learning is successful. Unfortunately, Britzman’s writing and imagination [register], perhaps her own limitations to face 'fear' at the political global crises level, have kept her theory of fear [feer] locked into a rather narrow clinical obsession with "ego psychology"—and a comforting one based in a tradition that tends to protect her every claim about fear and education. Her interest is "anxiety" rather than fear, and her distinctions of the two terms are, I believe, unfortunately, overly conservative. This has, I believe, limited her work to a theory of fear which cannot playfully conceive of its own demise and improvement, potentially initiated by a critical 'fear' theory. Britzman has not utilized the best of Queer theory in her writing by applying it to the conception of fear itself. I look forward to examining feer and any other imaginative categories that deconstruct and reconstruct the Western hegemonic psychological discourses of fear.

Britzman has not yet fully entered a politics of fear-knowledge nor a theorizing of the crisis of such knowledge, as does this article. She has not yet entered a full cultural study of 'fear' nor has she written about the works of Palmer or McLaren on fear. With these limitations in mind, educators have much to gain by reading her very fine work—perhaps, within the context of a new critique of fear. This must be a 21st century critique of fear which has decided that Camus was right, and that Camus needs updating: The 20th century was the century of fear—the 21st century is the century of terror. With thousands of Americans killed in a terrorist raid on New York and Washington, this is only the beginning of our engagement with a new species 'fear.' No longer can we merely attempt quantitative solutions to the fear-problem. We have to move beyond this quantitative mentality that

---

221 "I do tend to stay very close to clinical orientations to psychoanalysis and bring some of the views of object relations and ego psychology to education," writes Britzman in personal correspondence August 16, 2001. My own interest in a Wilberian critical integral theory and transpersonal (transegoic) psychology in general, is therefore, somewhat at odds with the reductionism of her ego-psychological favoritism.
keeps asking the limited (if not wrong) question: "How much fear is good, and when is it too much fear?"

I suggest we find what has been lost and repressed in the unconscious—in our terrorizing nightmares and, we allow conflict with what has been too easily dismissed as unquestionable and knowable fear. A superficial "without fear" project and goal is hardly the best direction educators ought to take, when the flood gates have been opened releasing a terror upon the world like never before. Everything speaks to us that 'things are going to get a lot worse before they are going to get better.' Parents, educators and leaders in this world are being challenged to face 'reality' without hope of peace in any near future. I recommend, as an alternative, the study and implementation of 'fear' education.

****