Mobilizing Global Knowledge: Refugee Research in an Age of Displacement

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Capacity, Complicity, and Subversion: Revisiting Collaborative Refugee Research in an Era of Containment

Loren B. Landau

Introduction

Power imbalances are intrinsic to every social relation. In research or teaching collaborations spanning geographic and economic divides, these imbalances can be acute. There are often benefits of such partnerships—new data, louder voices, effective advocacy—but there may also be a high price to pay. Indeed, the most lasting consequence of such collaborations may be to legitimize the presence, perspectives, and budgets of relatively empowered scholars and institutions. Ideally partners are aware of privilege and work towards equity in ways that erode long-standing structural and institutional constraints. As the introduction makes clear, this was the primary goal of the Refugee Research Network (RRN). However, such explicit self-awareness is rare and there are times when that awareness is absent or privilege is expressly overlooked. This oversight, combined with misaligned expectations and incentives, can ultimately disempower precisely those the relationships ostensibly aim to assist (cf. Cooke and Kothari 2001). A deluge of resources flowing into refugee and migration
research due to the “European migration crisis” will likely heighten these risks. This chapter explains why this may be and offers suggestions for how groups with fundamentally different and inequitable endowments can interact in ways that are just, sustainable, and mutually beneficial to themselves and the populations they serve: students and displaced people.

With increased Western and donor interest in migration within Africa and the Middle East, pressure for translocal research partnerships is growing. Motivations include, inter alia, the neo-imperialist (attempting to generate data to frame migration prevention interventions [see Curzi 2016]), the paternalistic (building capacity at poor universities), and the scholarly (how to better assess translocal processes). More politically correct engagements lean towards the paternalistic and political: aiming to level scholarly playing fields by enabling marginalized partners to shape a global research agenda and improve research quality. They also frequently seek to relay southern perspectives to northern policymakers and scholars.1 These are important and potentially worthy objectives inasmuch as they improve the quality of scholarly teaching and research while addressing (or at least seeking to) the “dual imperative” in refugee research: making an academic contribution while meeting ethical obligations to assist the often-vulnerable populations on which we build our professional success (see Jacobsen and Landau 2003).

However well meaning, research partnerships also come with substantial risks of heightening inequality and becoming complicit in global strategies of migrant containment.2 Insufficient funding, administrative hiccups, shifting interests, or an ill-informed choice of partners all play a part—although these are by no means unique to cross-continental collaborations. There are also factors at once distinct and more fundamental behind these shortcomings. International research partnerships enact and expose the inequalities, structural constraints, and historically conditioned power relations implicit in the production of knowledge. These include unequal resource endowments and discordant incentive structures and funding schemes. As Zingerli (2010, 222) suggests, “research partnerships are not an easy remedy for inherent asymmetries and inequalities.” Indeed, partnerships risk entrenching some of the north-south dichotomies they seek to overcome (see Standing and Taylor 2009).

With increased pressure for collaboration due to northern funding regimes and African scholars’ need for recognition and resources, African
scholars frequently trade their most valuable international currency—legitimacy and local insight—for financial resources, travel opportunities, and prestige. But these exchanges may work against the long-term success of southern partners in satisfying the dual imperative: contributing to scholarship while addressing real world problems. Northern scholars may recognize and work against these trends and Africans may find creative subterfuges, but the general trend is nonetheless worth debating. In an era where Europe—in particular—is funding substantial research projects across Africa with the goal of preventing migrants and refugees from “escaping” the continent, the risks go beyond entrenching academic inequality. By responding to Europe’s obsession with containment, cross-continental partnerships risk not only distorting local research agendas but doing so in ways that may ultimately work against the populations we study.

Many of the challenges faced in refugee or displacement research networks echo north-south academic relations generally. Nonetheless, displacement research is infused with distinguishing forms of politics and ethics. Indeed, the field’s close ties to practitioner communities—direct service providers, donors, humanitarian agencies, advocacy groups—reinforces two enduring inequalities and distortions within partnerships and transnational collaborations:

- The structural position of northern and southern researchers means that northern researchers can convert information generated through policy-oriented projects into scholarly outputs while offering critical perspectives from the security of tenured offices. Yet the emphasis on promoting “local insight into local problems” often fixes scholars geographically and analytically. Moreover, for reasons described below, local scholars are often wary of overtly criticizing the officials or agencies supporting their salaries. For those working in the south—particularly in acutely under-resourced African universities—needs for funding and policy recognition reinforce a dependence on policy actors.

- An emphasis on global governance and international best practices inadvertently positions people at the centre of international cooperation as the collective voice. In most
cases this means northern partners become the voice for southern actors whose language is too fragmented and particularistic to be globally legible. In an era in which global governance concerns are dominated by a containment compulsion, this may mean southern scholars are increasingly caught between the Scylla of irrelevance and inaction and the Charybdis of complicity.

Perspectives on African Displacement Research

Before continuing, a few qualifications are in order. First, I am concerned here almost exclusively with work based in the social sciences rather than the natural sciences or more applied fields (e.g., social work, law, and engineering). Second, for my purposes, northern universities are schools in Europe, Australia, or North America. Southern ones are those elsewhere in countries characterized as middle or low income. There is enormous diversity within both north and south (see Mouton 2010), but it is the research collaborations spanning this divide that concern me here. My perspective is informed largely by my experience with sub-Saharan African universities and work at a South African institution. My colleagues and I are often nominated as “southern” partners despite South Africa’s relative wealth, which privileges us vis-à-vis the rest of the continent. Nonetheless, I hope others from the continent will consider this something of a southern perspective on partnerships, perspectives that remain “few and far between” (Bradley 2006, 4).

My comments here are intentionally general and imprecise. Other chapters in this collection offer more concrete examples and insights (see chapters 3, 4, and 12). This chapter refines comments I made in a similar forum half a dozen years ago in a paper initially commissioned by the Refugee Research Network (RRN). The discussion has continued since then, and I have noted a growing awareness among some “northern” partners regarding the nature of partnership. In many instances, these simply translate into higher levels of frustration given the structural obstacles we all face. Moreover, while many universities have become more aware of the hazards of partnership, the political economy of knowledge production has shifted in dangerous ways given the large-scale commitment from the United States and Europe—two of the largest donors to humanitarian
action and research—to create a global technology of containment (see Landau 2019).

Revisiting the Dual Imperative in Refugee Research and the Political Economy of Knowledge Production

In 2003, Karen Jacobsen and I argued that most displacement related research seeks to influence agencies and governments to develop more effective responses. This orientation stems in part from our research subjects, whose experience of violent conflict, displacement, and human rights violations compels us to work—whether from compassion, charity, or self-interest—to reduce their burdens and vulnerability. Many of us remain swayed by David Turton’s (1996, 96) admonition that research into suffering can only be justified if alleviating that suffering is an explicit objective.

While concerned with refugees’ rights and welfare, university-based scholars typically premise research on a belief that sound inquiry can and should serve multiple masters. Indeed, for those facing disciplinary tenure committees, scholarly audits, or publication demands, policy recommendations are never enough. Moreover, for universities to offer critical thought and reflection on the local and global societies of which they are part, they must also reserve distinct space for non-policy oriented research, theorization, and provocation (see Rodgers 2004; Bakewell 2008). It is encouraging to see questions of displacement gaining increased prominence in expressly scholarly fields like economics, political science, and anthropology within Europe and North America. This has not been the case across much of Africa. If anything, African-based migration research has become increasingly policy or activist oriented.

The relative absence of African (and other) voices from scholarly debates diminishes our understanding of the world while allowing a relatively privileged, geographically concentrated group of scholars to set global academic agendas. Even if the majority of the world’s refugees and migrants and the bulk of the humanitarian interventions are located in the south, southern-based scholars are hard to find in the leading (i.e., most broadly cited) scholarly journals on the topic. Even more infrequently does their work on displacement appear in disciplinary journals or interdisciplinary outlets oriented towards the academy. Where they appear, it is usually through country case studies or as secondary authors. Rarely do
they proffer multi-sited comparative studies; even more infrequently do they include multiple countries. One must dig deep to find a theoretically informed critique of aid modalities, concepts, or academic theory and methods written by an African scholar working at a southern institution. While northern scholars may struggle to justify more practical work, African-based researchers often remain excluded—or exclude themselves—from anything but case studies and policy driven reports.

The highly localized orientation and limited conceptual vocabulary of African-based refugee research can be explained by a set of interrelated circumstances: 1) extended isolation from global scholarly publications and dialogues; 2) the limited amount of course work required to complete advanced degrees, particularly those who have conducted work within the British system; and 3) the practical orientation of many African universities and state-funded research organizations. Due to these and additional factors described below, scholars trained and working at African universities often express a limited impulse to produce for anyone other than a local audience or audience concerned with the particularities of specific cases. When provided chances to define questions that are more conceptual or theoretically promising, few of the African-based scholars with whom I have collaborated take the opportunity to do so. Instead, their inquiries are typically framed by policy issues or immediate normative concerns. The idea of conducting “demand-led research” in which southerners are asked only to drive research that can solve pressing social problems or otherwise “unleash southern potential” risks reinforcing this tendency (see Nair and Menon 2002).

The strict local and policy focus also compromises one of African scholars’ most significant comparative advantages: the ability to identify what might be invisible or inexplicable to outsiders, where local empirics challenge global presuppositions either practical or scholarly. Consequently, collaborations often see southern scholars generating data on narrowly defined topics while northern scholars synthesize, analyze, and theorize (see Zeleza 1996; Chimni 2009). Schweigman and van der Werf (1994) call this the Ganausa dilemma. The absence of a strong or unified southern intellectual agenda creates the space/necessity for northern partners to dominate decision-making and research directions. Encouraging southern partners to collect and relay “local knowledge” further incentivizes deep, sometimes myopic, local engagement. At an immediate level this
may satisfy all involved, but it does little to overturn northern dominance of global academic discourse. As discussed below, a range of institutional factors further reinforces this status quo.

Conceptual and theoretical narrowness are by no means unique to forced migration research, but the topic itself further limits the scope of our inquiry. A field founded to satisfy a humanitarian and academic impulse and supported by policy or rights-oriented funding, refugee research has conceptually encircled itself. Rather than drawing extensively on the insights of other fields—and thereby contributing to them—self-identified refugee researchers focus almost exclusively on displaced peoples, their activities, and interventions oriented exclusively towards them. In many cases, researchers draw on (and speak to) literature that is similarly blinkered in ways that work against contributions to established disciplines. Instead, we see the repeated focus on refugee vulnerability, exploitation, and bureaucratic ineptitude. Our tendency to see refugee rights and welfare as the sole, important outcome also leads us to ignore interests and actions that may indirectly prejudice (or promote) the displaced. This is especially true in the global south where refugees may have distinct, but by no means uniquely acute, vulnerabilities (see Kihato and Landau 2016).

Thinking Locally, Acting Globally?

Beyond generating scholarly work, many north-south partnerships aim to channel information from where refugees are (i.e., the south) to the northern policymakers and organizations behind the global humanitarian enterprise. This is an important function and one potentially well served by collaborations with representatives strategically placed around the world. Nonetheless, such relationships are not without their shortcomings and risks, four of which I raise here. First, they presume research is a powerful tool for achieving policy change. Second, they typically suppose substantial and unproblematic gains of channelling southern voices to policymakers in the north. Third, inasmuch as the previous two points are true, such collaborations effectively generate institutional configurations where northern scholars choose and shape the southern voices that get heard. Lastly—and building on points made above—the framing of much new migration research may well make Africans complicit in an emerging containment regime.
First, does research influence policy change? Sound research design, representative sampling, and objectivity may be the hallmarks of good academic and policy-oriented research, but there are often only weak correlations between research quality and practical influence. Even when research is commissioned or funded by governments and aid agencies, it is often ignored if the recommendations are politically or financially inconvenient. This is clearly not limited to displacement research; all research is more likely be used if it confirms existing principles or furthers policymakers and advocates’ interests (Argyris 1982; Feldman and March 1981). Moreover, given the pace at which humanitarian interventions are planned, by the time good research is ready to share, we are often left fighting yesterday’s policy battles. Researchers able to offer shiny, cleverly packaged solutions score newspaper and television coverage in ways that help their careers far more than those they claim to aid. African scholars are rarely able to package their work in these ways—nor should they—and their recommendations and critiques often get overshadowed by global perspectives that may have little local relevance.

Faced with researchers’ frustrations at their work being ignored and funders’ anxiety that their investments are coming to naught, the typical response has been to spend more money on dissemination and develop ever more elaborate strategies for getting policymakers and researchers in the same room. This has produced some successes—but precious few given the time, energy, and money put into it. Indeed, there are reasons to doubt whether such research initiatives can produce substantial policy change in their lifespan. Where it does produce change, it likely will come only by capitalizing on opportunity windows opened by circumstances well beyond our control. That African policymaking processes are often so obtuse and arbitrary—or shaped by donors and international organizations—means that the kind of forums and initiatives used in Europe or North America are unlikely to drive policy exchange. Instead, they may be formed to legitimize government decisions or as a tool for northern policy influence (via their southern partners) as has been the case regarding the dissemination of particular norms around trafficking and border management (Segatti 2011a). The use of the media to mobilize public opinion may be equally unsuccessful where the press is controlled or largely irrelevant (as is public opinion in policymaking).
Rather than throw more money at dissemination, we should shift thinking about research use in important ways: instead of simply producing more sophisticated work on policy outcomes, we need to better understand policymaking processes. There has already been some work on policymaking around refugee concerns (see, for example, Schmidt 2008; Handmaker 2001; Segatti 2011b). This is important, but we must go further. As with many other aspects of refugee related research, we are overly bound by our focus on displacement and the humanitarian space. In many instances, the policies that matter will not be about migration, per se, and may only tangentially mention refugees and migrants (see Landau and Amit 2014). As such, we must complement our work on humanitarian issues with analyses of housing, agriculture, security, and a range of other issues and an effort to understand (a) how these policies intersect with our concerns and (b) how those policies are made and how they might be proactively reformed. This means not only nesting forced migration research within broader migration studies, but actively identifying and exploring intersections between forced migration and other fields of inquiry. This does not mean losing our focus but may instead mean forging collaborations with the substantial number of scholars working in these areas. While more careful analysis of policymaking processes may disabuse us of our often-naive notions of how policy is made (and our ability to influence it), those continuing this campaign will have better strategies for doing so.

Channelling African Voices

Speaking of policy influence, forced migration studies places a disproportionate emphasis on global governance, donor policies, and international organizations. There is value in working at this level, but the most immediate and important changes will be achieved through local and regional (or even sub-regional) initiatives. Even where there are sensible modifications to existing regional or international instruments, such global frameworks provide protection only when supported by highly specific national and sub-regional dynamics: the local politics, not the principles, of protection are what typically matters most (see Kihato and Landau 2016). However, Scholey (2006) argues (in her work on peace building and human security) that where research is framed in policy terms, it is typically informed by
global or northern policy concerns, rather than the immediate, concrete problems facing communities grappling with armed conflict. This has been the case for our field, where discussions of UN reform, resettlement, international legal frameworks, and the global aid regime have shaped research agendas in ways that exclude local meanings of those terms or other issues of relatively greater importance. Obsessions with the global migration and refugee compacts or the “European refugee crisis” are yet further examples.

Rather than supporting our research interests, our relationships have generated a kind of coercive isomorphism: we either fall in line with others’ agendas or we risk losing much needed financial support. Where so many new research projects across Africa are expressly oriented towards generating data for European policymakers, there are particular dangers of complicity. Undoubtedly, improving our understanding of African migration and displacement can be valuable. I, for one, have long advocated the need to promote African-based interventions that can aid and absorb those who move by choice or compulsion. However, when the data is intended to feed European efforts to discourage movements within or out of Africa, Africa-based scholars may quickly become complicit in an enormous and highly funded containment apparatus. A call for increased attention to local political processes and other local dynamics (social, economic, etc.) gives cause to question just how useful networks and efforts are to influence global policymaking. While many value participating in high level dialogues, we must recognize that international laws and policies (and often even domestic ones) may make little difference to most migrants. More than a decade ago, Chimni (1998, 352–6) persuasively argued that the field had been wilfully apolitical and asocial in its approach to improving refugees’ lives and refugee-related scholarship. While there have been some improvements, we could and should go further. This means looking closer by complementing global generalizations with local or regional perspectives.

Returning again to the symbolic value attached to information reveals an additional dimension of collaboratively generated knowledge. In some instances, northern institutions’ imprimatur enhances a finding’s credibility and the likelihood that it will be considered. For many years, the City of Johannesburg hired British and American consultants to provide models from London, New York, or other first world cities. More recently,
the UNHCR in Pretoria has begun building intervention programs on a two-week research project by the Women’s Refugee Committee while largely ignoring years of locally generated research. If policy influence is the goal, there may be instances where southern researchers must reinforce the northern experts’ power in global debate, swallow their pride, and hand over results to those who will get heard.

While we can accept partnership and invisibility as the price we pay for influence, the issue here is a simple one: as long as these partnerships continue to depend on northern partners to set the research agenda, manage funding, and provide legitimacy, southern-based scholars will rarely have the opportunity to participate in global dialogues on their own terms. That information is so frequently relayed via northern partners (or synthesized and then presented by them) only furthers the imbalance. Most obviously, northern scholars are in a position to act as gatekeepers, filtering out “noise” by silencing those who work against their agendas and presenting only that information which they find convincing, relevant, or otherwise suitable. (As a scholar working in South Africa, I confess to excluding local and regional voices from joint projects where I felt they were misguided or counterproductive. This is a similarly damaging form of paternalism that can only be countered through dialogue and radical generosity.) While refugees and others may benefit in some way from engagements done under these auspices—notwithstanding the points raised above—the work of southern scholars inadvertently confirms northern scholars’ position as experts, theorists, and the most powerful critics. It is, after all, northern scholars who choose and shape the southern voices that are being heard. Given the increasingly powerful position that experts play in international humanitarianism (see Barnett 2011), these further academic and global political hierarchies.

Some will undoubtedly respond that as unfortunate as northern involvement may be, this is the price scholars pay. However, trading visibility and autonomy for policy influence is no guarantee of success. Across much of the south, political authorities view northern involvement in research projects as nefarious neo-imperialism. In some instances, the presence of northern partners (even if they are living and working in the south) can cause work to be summarily dismissed as a product of meddling outsiders. In the worst circumstances, a reasonable policy option may be partially or completely stigmatized if it becomes conceptually linked to political
outsiders or foreigners. The consequences are likely to depend heavily on local political systems, the timbre of civil society-state relations, and the qualitative content and strategies surrounding other advocacy issues. That said, where authorities are looking for reasons to ignore unflattering analyses, donors’ insistence on branding can work against their stated objective of policy change. If we accept that local or national policies are equally (or more) important than global frameworks, we must take these politics seriously.

I am increasingly convinced that effective policy influence demands a twofold adjustment. On the one hand, we need to understand and work to influence policy at the intersections of the “humanitarian space” with other policy fields whether those of urban management, environmental science, or health and nutrition. On the other, we need to “go local.” International law, global policy, and multilateral donors are important, but substantive policy change in that realm is hard to achieve and its effects are dilatory and diffuse. We need to seek solidarities on multiple scales, largely with those empowered to make structural or political changes. In most cases, these are people and interests outside of the humanitarian community. The “low-hanging fruit” are often at the national or even sub-national level, where change is both easier to achieve and more likely to produce immediate effects. This demands a level of critical local literacy, not local knowledge mobilized for global interests. As such, we must be acutely aware of how partnerships towards these ends can both endanger our efforts to influence policy and marginalize the voices and autonomy of southern partners.

Reshaping Partnerships

Responding to the dual-imperative for refugee research in the south—or at least in Africa—means confronting the political economy of knowledge production and recognizing the limits of scholarship in achieving changes in policy and practice. As scholars, there are limits to what we can do about general funding patterns and the fragility of scholarship across sub-Saharan Africa. Yet if we are serious about building African capacity and influence, we ought to carefully consider the nature of interaction and the intended and unintentional outcomes of our north-south partnerships.
The following are a series of practical steps that can help improve research generated in the south and the success of future collaborations.  

**Take Small Steps Wisely:** Research consortium partners are often selected more for their geography and ability to legitimize collaboration than their intellectual interests or endowments. The results include motley crews that lack focus, have little personal rapport, and struggle internally for resources. While not always avoidable, more energy spent in selecting partners and greater upfront openness about objectives, resources, and expected outcomes can help ensure more fruitful collaboration. Even in existing networks, there are benefits of starting small with concrete projects involving relatively few partners. This may help avoid a “lowest common denominator” approach to research and the kind of pressure where southern partners are overwhelmed by a dominant “northern” or comparative agenda that marginalizes the value of small-scale research (this is the kind of tyranny of consensus that Cooke and Kothari outline). As “The Nairobi Report” suggests, successful small-scale collaborations can be the base for broader projects managed by people who have established a functional and productive working relationship (British Academy 2006). Whenever possible, these partnerships should be forged as early possible. Once a project has been conceptualized (or a funding proposal submitted), the die is cast: no matter how much an ancillary partner may “push back,” the parameters are already established.  

**Open the Gates:** Partnerships should be at once more specific and more broadly conceived. Collaborations between a refugee studies person in the north and a refugee studies person in the south will tend to reproduce or strengthen existing knowledge and presuppositions with additional case study materials. Given the close connection of policy and the field, this limits the work’s audience and its potential scholarly impact. It may also reinforce a global hierarchy of knowledge production. Both enhancing our research agenda and broadening our policy impact demands building links with people outside of the humanitarian field. These people can provide both technical expertise and insights and, equally importantly, connections to policymakers outside our comfortable stovepipes and silos. In the long term, this can open new funding sources and break the close and potentially damaging dyads of refugee researchers and practitioners.  

**Fences Make Good Neighbours:** Alternatively, call a spade a spade. Too many north-south collaborations are shrouded in the politically correct
language of partnership, a fiction that disguises inherent inequalities with the relationships and differences in objectives and endowments. To address these, there should be a full assessment of the participants’ resources and objectives from the get-go. In instances where objectives differ substantially, project leaders should walk away or consider devolving financial resources to allow individuals or small groups to continue work. Where this is not possible, partners should define their roles from the beginning. If this means southern partners are to act as research assistants and data generators, so be it. At least they will know where they stand and the risks and benefits associated with their position. Full accountability and transparency in budgeting and planning will also help southern partners to assess the degree to which they are partners or participants.

*Live within Our Means:* To secure funding, applicants often make elaborate claims about their scholarly and practical impact. This may win grants, but it often levies too many demands on overcommitted partners who will not be fully compensated for their time. A series of smaller projects that require less ongoing participation may ultimately be more likely to be completed and cost-effective. The heavy demand for policy influence at all stages of research also draws scholars uncomfortably close to the policy community, sacrificing autonomy and reinforcing a consultancy culture.

*Pay the Bills; Pay in Advance:* Partnerships must recognize that southern partners’ participation in research collaborations is often as much (or more) about securing financial resources as intellectual inquiry or policy impact. To encourage substantive collaboration and scholarship, budgets must consider the full cost of involvement. Where long-term partnership is desired, support must cover scholars’ university salaries and other opportunity costs associated with such participation. It must also provide the research infrastructure required to conduct the work (e.g., travel, logistics, printers) and the somewhat extortionate overheads African universities typically charge on funds they manage (in exchange for managing them poorly) (see British Academy 2006, 10). If such payments are prohibitive, alternative arrangements may be considered such as short-term and highly focused writing retreats or other fora in which partners are able to dedicate—albeit for a short period—their full attention to a given project or collaborative initiative.
Buy Local: Inasmuch as policy influence remains an objective, greater emphasis should be placed on building relationships with local advocacy organizations and with partners outside of the refugee field. Although there are reasons why southern scholars may not wish to be publicly associated with policy critics, where the options for such associations exist they are likely to produce more immediate change and at least partially avoid channelling information to northern institutions in ways that enhance their expertise and voice.

Replant and Replenish: Senior scholars across Africa have strong incentives for monopolizing fields in their respective countries. It is typically these people who attract international attention and get drawn into global or multi-region partnerships. This both fortifies their dominance of local scholarship and lessens the likelihood of full participation in collaborative initiatives. Insisting on the independent participation of doctoral students and early career scholars can help to multiply the voices being heard both in and out of their respective countries. This will especially be the case if such participation enables scholars to gain experience in proposal and grant writing and research management, skills that will ultimately provide them with a level of autonomy (see chapter 10). As with other aspects of collaborations, selection for participation should be done carefully and transparently to avoid providing senior scholars with further patronage opportunities. Care must also be taken as such arrangements are potentially paternalistic and risk creating imbalances where senior scholars in the north are working with less established scholars elsewhere.

You Get What You Negotiate: African and other southern scholars often underestimate their importance to northern researchers’ legitimacy, research funding, and ability to do research. While there are some risks to doing so, African scholars are often able to play on northerners’ liberal sensitivities and genuine desire for collaboration to assert their interests and demands. If such negotiations fail, southern scholars should walk away or be clever enough to realize what they are getting into. While we must honour our commitments, we must also ensure that even the most unequal relationships become mutually beneficial. If this requires slyness or subterfuge, so be it. Some of the most effective and radical forms of social change have started with little more.
Notes


2. For a broader discussion of this theme, see Haraway 1991.


4. An earlier version of this chapter was published as Landau 2012.

5. For more on Europe’s efforts to develop containment technologies, see Knoll and de Weiker 2016; Brachet 2016; and Perrin 2012.

References


