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By Charles G. Thomas and Toyin Falola

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Conclusion: Secession and the Secessionist Motive into the Twenty-first Century

This work has discussed a conceptual idea of three different waves of secession that have rolled across the continent of Africa since the initial independence of sovereign nations in the late 1950s. The first, the Civil Secessions, offered a unique typology that would quickly ignite a firestorm and then be snuffed out. These secessions are so named because they were attempting to create civil states, states that were multi-ethnic and constructed around a civil structure of laws and institutions. Those that had pursued such projects in Katanga and Biafra understood that international political recognition was the only possible path forward for their political project and structured their secessionist actions around this goal. However, their desires to directly declare and demonstrate their existence as independent states backfired, as in both cases recognition was denied and the perceived need to defend the borders of their nation left them in the path of far more powerful opponents.

The second wave, the Long Wars, proved far more ambiguous than their Civil Secession counterparts. Whereas with the Civil Secessions there was a direct declaration of secession as their motive and the immediate attempt to defend what was now sovereign state territory, the Long Wars drifted through secession and separatism and often blurred the lines where the contestation of sovereignty was actually taking place. Whereas the Civil Secessions were modelled after the negotiated and recognized independence of African states such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Mali, the Long Wars...
would find their models in the global liberation struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. These have been dubbed the Long Wars because they involved the secessionists’ waging protracted struggles as they husbanded their strength and created parallel governance structures to continue their contestation of sovereignty. The extended construction and evolution of these military, political, and even social structures over the long conflicts meant that not only could these conflicts be sustained, but there were at least functional governance structures to take over when these conflicts ended rather spectacularly in success.

The Long Wars found success during a period of rapid political change on both a continental and global scale, and this same changing context helped fuel what has been termed the New Wave of secessions. While structurally the Long Wars had been waged in a very different way than the Civil Secessions, they offered at least a similar vision for their end point: complete secession and the establishment of a multi-ethnic state for their people fighting for their independence. The forces unleashed by the end of the Cold War would mean that, although the New Wave of secessions would be structurally waged in the same way as the Long Wars, their end goal would shift. A combination of resurgent subnational ambitions along with the collapse of state capacity after the Cold War would mean the New Wave of secessions would instead pursue often more openly separatist goals as opposed to secessionist ones, as subnational interest groups looked for more autonomy under the umbrella of weakened state control.

However, as each wave progressed, it can be seen that the actual secessionist motive and the methods by which it was pursued in independent Africa altered over time. The way that secession and separatism were understood underwent a radical change, with the initial political demands of immediate and recognized sovereignty giving way to a more ambiguous process by which the motives often skirted the line between secession, separatism, and irredentism. By the time the New Wave had hit, the very idea of secession had to a large degree drifted away despite the signal successes of Eritrea and South Sudan. This alteration in the secessionist motive was largely driven by a combination of political changes on the continent of Africa as well as African states’ relationship with the global community, but it is important to understand this evolution in order to also understand
where the ideas of secession, separatism, and irredentism exist now within the context of the African continent.

**The Evolution of the Secessionist Motive**

The secessionist motive in Africa was born at the same time as its drive for independence. While certainly the drawing of borders of the colonies and later independent states did not help tamp down the subnational frustrations and ambitions within the states, the drive for multinational, multi-ethnic states following the Second World War meant that almost any borders that existed would see a degree of contestation of political control and sovereignty. However, the drive for independence along the lines of the colonial boundaries did inspire the initial secessionist motive within the now-independent states. The idea that there was an international body of law that demanded self-determination and that demanded respect for the concept of sovereignty meant that those subdivisions within the colonies would believe that their own self-determination and desire for sovereignty must be respected, just as the demands of the larger nationalist fronts of Africa’s had been. In this sense, the early secessionist motive was modelled after the premises of international law that had granted independence to Africa over the late 1950s and early 1960s.²

During this time, this must not have seemed that remote a goal. Most of the nationalist movements in Africa had struggled for years in seeking political control of the colonies they had found themselves in, and following the Second World War these movements saw recognizable movement toward their desires. The major colonial powers of France, Britain, and Belgium all were severely weakened by the war, and Portugal, despite being neutral, had been in decline for decades.³ At the same time the creation of the United Nations as an international governing body, which included self-determination for all peoples within its charter, offered hope that the emerging global order would help dismantle the colonial system that controlled Africa.⁴ This combination of rising nationalist ambitions and organization,⁵ weakened colonial powers, and the global acceptance of a political regime that demanded self-determination then managed to enable the dreams of the nationalists in a far more rapid manner than they had ever anticipated. While the colonial powers had imagined they had decades
to slowly enact a program of decolonization, within a decade the colonial system was in its initial stages of being torn down across Africa.

Of course, these same factors drove forward the secessionist motives of subnational groups. Groups like the Moïse Tshombe’s Katangans, while working with other nationalist groups for their own larger national independence, questioned whether the redrawing of the continental order could only deal with the political governance of the already-existent colonies. This came into even sharper focus as many of these subnational groups had very different relationships with their colonial powers, relationships that often made the integration into independent state political orders much more difficult. Whether because of the economic development that had occurred in the region, such as with Katanga, or the privileged status the population held within the colonial order, such as with the Kel Tamasheq of the French Sahara, these groups were not necessarily opposed to their political independence, but were not amenable to the new state order being ushered in by the nationalists. They were already looking for chances to assert their own political independence, especially as many of these groups already had at least a semi-functional political organization to drive forward their ambitions.

These parallel organizations were swept along with the same tides that had driven nationalist motives in the postwar period. The weakening colonial powers, while perhaps not quite as excoriated amongst some subnational groups as they were amongst the nationalist groups, offered the same opportunity for new political leadership within their homelands and real sovereignty as opposed to colonial rule. However, whereas the nationalists were focused on the political control of colonies transformed into sovereign states, this first wave of secessionists were looking at the restructuring of the colonial order into multiple sovereignties. Underpinning these beliefs was the general view that if the European colonial order was to be rejected, why should not the boundaries that system had imposed be rejected as well? This was bolstered by the wording of the new United Nations charter, which demanded self-determination for all the populations of the world. To the secessionists, this was a clear indication that the new global order would not be constrained by elements of the old. Thus, the initial secessionist motive had been informed by the idea that the political leadership of a population could help guide those people through the creation of
a new sovereign state, effectively creating new, completely self-determined states on the continent.

This first wave of secessions had unfortunately been very optimistic in its assumptions that the dismantling of the colonial order had ushered in a new era of renegotiation of state boundaries and sovereignty in Africa. Whereas the state as a structure did indeed still represent the default social and political organization on the continent, no existing state accepted the renegotiation of boundaries to create new states. Instead, with limited exceptions, these new attempts to assert political sovereignty and then receive recognition were rejected by all parties involved in the process. Katanga had a brief period of international quasi-legitimacy but lost any support it had with the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba by Katangan forces. In the rebellion’s wake the international community quickly quashed the legal justifications for secession through a series of United Nations and Organization of African Unity precedents, but the secessionist motive still found a new spark with Biafra. While Biafra could not lean on international law, it had hoped that the instability of Nigeria and the violence of the coups and pogrom would generate sympathy and possible recognition for its secessionist project. However, the door had been closed on secession and the attempt was finally ended in 1970.

While the formal secessionist motive had been effectively abandoned by 1970, with the path to complete political separation on the African continent largely closed off in international legal thought and no longer within the capabilities of any aggrieved subnational group, this didn’t mean that the struggles for political autonomy or separatism were over. Instead, within this new frozen international order, the secessionist or separatist motive entered a far more ambiguous and fluid realm. The states that had emerged in Africa were not necessarily fully functional, but the development of capacity within their borders was largely reliant on external exchange with the developed nations of the world. The keys to this exchange were held by the new nationalist political elite, who managed to effectively make themselves gatekeepers between their own sovereign nation and the increasingly polarized world of the Cold War. However, this very ability to gatekeep allowed for the creation of circumscribed networks of patronage that controlled the flow of development within the rest of the new state. This often left marginalized groups outside the limited development taking place even
as they continued to exist under the monopoly of legitimate use of violence that the new states maintained. This, combined with often increasingly undemocratic governments, led to a series of clashes with the new states by the subnational groups. However, despite the weakness of the new states, they still were more powerful than their subnational groups and could exert far more deadly firepower in these struggles than any constituent group. This capacity was of course also well subsidized by Cold War patrons that did not want to lose friendly African governments. This meant that in order to persist in these clashes the subnational groups necessarily had to pursue quiet, prolonged conflicts.

It was during these prolonged conflicts that the aforementioned ambiguity was explored. While secession had seemingly been quashed as a political goal following the fall of Biafra, that did not mean that it was entirely gone. However, those groups fighting for their own political, social, and economic control locally had fierce debates within their ranks about the official end goal of their struggles, debates that could continue for as long as their struggles did. These debates in turn often meant that the stated goal of a struggle might change from year to year as new leadership or factions ascended to power. For example, the Sudanese Civil War began as a secessionist attempt that eventually saw its leadership realize that secession would be an impossibility within their political context. Instead, the question of regional autonomy and integration into the networks of gatekeeper patronage was raised, leading to separatism being achieved in 1972. However, when these networks of patronage and development failed to be fully realized, the next phase of the conflict saw the re-emergence of, at first, a desire for reform within the autonomous system that the South inhabited. During the course of the conflict, the increasing organization of the Southern fronts and the weakening of the North saw this desire for reforming the earlier agreement instead transform into the re-emergence of the secessionist motive that the rapidly changing geopolitics of the post–Cold War era had made a possibility. This sort of pattern played itself out throughout the longer, evolving conflicts across the continent, where secessionist desires might transition into reform or separatist ones and back, as the capabilities of the combatants and the context within which they struggled changed.
The crushing of the attempts in Katanga and Biafra and the precedents their loss set had largely quashed the secessionist motive as a realistic goal for those groups fighting prolonged insurgencies for their subnational rights. While the idea of secession had re-emerged from time to time throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s during these fights, as noted they often were discarded as an ideal once negotiations with the parent states were underway—or sometimes were even discarded within intergroup rivalries as more capable groups took control and fought for more moderate reforms. This often found a decent amount of success, as local groups could still fight for regional autonomy or a larger reform of the central government that would include them within the networks of development they had been left out of.

This general lack of pursuit of secession as a goal would eventually be overturned as several momentous events occurred that undid the perceptions that had stymied secession as a desired end of these struggles. During the decades of the Cold War it had become patently obvious that the international system would not recognize secessionist states, thus undermining the very reason for which subgroups would pursue secession. Without this recognition, the secessionist region would not have the access to international markets or even political support that would allow them to function for the benefit of their populace. Beyond this, thanks to their access to the international system and the military support of the Cold War blocs, the parent states could call on economic and military strength that could crush all but the most determined of insurgencies.

These perceptions would all be belied or reversed with the end of the Cold War. The idea that no secessionist state would be recognized within the international order was undone during the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Old states were immediately partitioned and larger unions were split across Eastern Europe, with these new states welcomed into the new world order by the United Nations. For those African groups watching, this was an obvious overturning of what they had always perceived as the blanket condemnation of secession; not only was the international community welcoming secessionist states, but the lone remaining superpower, the United States, was actively encouraging more splits within their former adversaries, citing the ability of the local populations to self-determine their political fates. Perhaps just as important, the end of the Cold War meant
that the support that African states had been receiving from the two poles of the struggle to maintain their security capacity was undergoing rapid changes. For those states that had aligned themselves with the Communist bloc, their patrons had now largely collapsed. The Soviet Union was no more, and its successor states had their own problems to deal with due to their own political turmoil and moribund economies. On the other side of the spectrum, those that had been supported by the United States and its Western allies saw their support become conditional not on halting the spread of Communism but now on the emergent security threats of the new global order.  

Allies like Zaire found themselves far less critical in the new security priorities of the United States, while those like Sudan found themselves rapidly transformed from allies against Communism to targets due to their ties to fundamentalist Islam. In all of these cases, the capacity of African governments to maintain their abilities to extract, provide, and control were all undermined. This opened the possibility that localized insurgencies could survive and perhaps even thrive against the now weakened parent states. In both cases, the factors that had largely undermined the secessionist motive and driven many more toward reform or separatism had themselves been largely dismantled. While this might have seemed theoretical at first, the success of the Eritrean bid for secession seemed to hinge largely on the weakening of the Ethiopian Derg regime in the late Cold War as well as the direct acceptance of its independence by the United Nations in 1993, signalling that there might indeed be something new afoot on the continent.

Beyond this, there was now another new factor to add to the secessionist motive. Whereas all previous African secessions had largely been built along what might be referred to as civil lines, the events in Europe pointed to the new acceptance of nation-states as the end state of secessionist activities. This meant that the idea of ethnic identities being the basis for whole political sovereign states was now an accepted phenomenon, something that the aversion to ethnic nationalism in the wake of the world wars had previously ruled out. Given that the majority of subnational identities in Africa were based on ethnicities and that many of the existent regimes in Africa saw the deep ethnicization of politics despite their civil state structures, this new acceptance was noted with deep interest. Suddenly, those ethnic groups that had previously been struggling for autonomy or their
own access to the network of gatekeepers could instead dream on their own ethno-state, where instead of competing with the groups that had historically held power for a share of the access and networks, they could have control of them in their entirety.

Of course, this did not always mean that subnational groups would drive for their own secession, ethnic or not. Instead, much like during the Long Wars, these still-lengthy struggles would see an evolution of motives and often compromises made as both sides of the conflict often lacked the capacity to force a decisive result. However, while some groups set out for secession and ended up with autonomy under their old parent states, this did not necessarily end their secessionist ambitions, and now it was more than possible to reignite a conflict and continue to push for complete separation following a period of reinforcement and retrenchment. The signal success of the South Sudan showed this was now a potential path forward, where despite significant splintering and an earlier agreement for regional autonomy, secession was eventually achieved along the lines that the long-struggling Southerners had desired from the beginning. At the very worst, these groups could use whatever military successes they achieved to argue for a better deal with their host state—settling for separatism on better terms or a reformed regime. As such, while the new wave would now allow for possible secession, it certainly did not guarantee the secessionist motive and instead far more often saw negotiated reform or separatism as the end state, with the possibility of revision in the future. This paradigm would play itself out into the present day, as those regimes that managed to achieve separatism rarely saw themselves entirely happy with the result, while those few that actually achieved secession quickly found that it was not the answer to the challenges that had initially spurred their extended military endeavours.

**Whither the Secessionists Now?**

While this work has largely looked at the military conflicts that have taken place to achieve secession, it has to be noted that these are not simply episodic events that begin with shots being fired for a political goal and then end with either a crushing of the attempt or the achievement of secession. The actual driving forces behind the secessionist attempts form
as ideologies and ideas long before conflict begins, and even following the cessation of hostilities the idea of secession does not simply disappear. This often is even more complex because, as we have seen, it is often difficult for a secessionist movement to have a completely coherent, accepted, and immutable political goal. Even during and after these conflicts, attempts to achieve a satisfactory end state for any or all sides can often be a far more challenging process than the conflict themselves. On top of this, oftentimes the political project of secession or separatism can intersect or be co-opted by other political projects as the situation changes, making the challenge take on additional dimensions. Given such complexity, although this work has presented six historical case studies for contextualizing secessionist conflicts, it must be asked what the eventual end state of any of them actually has been.

In terms of the Civil Secessions, there was in theory a decisive endpoint to the conflicts involved, as was to be expected of the conventional struggles they represented. In the Congo the secessionist government under Moïse Tshombe was driven from its territory and the local administration dismantled. However, while the civil government involved was removed, these were not the only actors. The Katangan Gendarmerie, that mixture of locally raised forces and expatriate mercenaries, escaped to Portuguese-controlled Angola along with some of the administration, forming another secessionist front, the Front de Libération nationale Congolaise, or FLNC. Its armed elements continued their regional struggle by invading Katanga twice during the 1970s in struggles that became known as Shaba I and Shaba II. In both cases these invasions were beaten back by Mobutu Sese Seko’s government with significant international aid, including direct military intervention by the French and Belgians. Following these eruptions, the FLNC kept up its agitation, but with the resources of the province being strategically critical to Mobutu’s government, the drive for secession largely died away. However, with end of the Cold War there have been continual challenges from Katanga and other regions of the country seeking their own voice during the transformation of the Congo during and after the deadly Congo Wars (1996–97 and 1998–2003).

While in the Congo there was a weak state combatting at best a political rival, the aftermath of Biafra offered a very different case. The Nigerian government emerged from the civil war as the unchallenged administration
of a high-capacity African state with significant international support. However, conversely, while the secessionist state of Biafra was decisively defeated, the manner of its defeat, the emotional appeal of its government during its final year of existence, and its recasting as essentially a quasi-ethnic polity created a strong ideological project that survived long after its military defeat. In the southeast of the country there has been continuing sympathy for the Biafran project and a significant mythology formed around the three years the Biafran state existed. Numerous popular groups have claimed to continue the work of the Biafran state throughout the years of military rule, with the most prominent being the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra or MASSOB. MASSOB has continued agitation for the secession of the Biafran homeland and has remained a significant thorn in the side of the government of Nigeria, leading to several high-profile clashes and crackdowns, even as the country passed from military rule back to electoral democracy. While these clashes have not broken out into a formal military conflict, the idea of Biafra and its political goals remain an animating force in parts of the country. There have also been newer groups that have been more active in recent years, such as the Indigenous People of Biafra, or IPOB. IPOB has largely undertaken a peaceful approach, offering demonstrations and remembrances while demanding a referendum to answer once and for all the status of a separate Biafra. However, despite their peaceful methods, IPOB has been targeted by the Nigerian government, with several injuries or deaths caused by the Nigerian military during their crackdowns.

While the Civil Secessions studied here have experienced definitive failures of their political projects to manifest as independent states, the case studies offered for the Long Wars actually succeeded in their goals. While this makes them often an exception, as smaller conflicts started during this period (and in some cases still ongoing) have not reached their goals of independence, both of these case studies can point toward the complexity of the political goal of secession even following the successful prosecution of a secessionist conflict. As noted, both Eritrea and South Sudan emerged victorious in their conflicts. However, simple victory and even the international recognition of their independence did not necessarily answer the immediate questions of transition to civil governance that these victories allowed. In fact, although this volume has argued that the emergence of
essentially a system of civil and social governance within these conflicts was a precondition to their victory, in turn the forms and capacity of this governance would lead these two case studies down very different paths following their military successes.

The story of Eritrea’s successful secession was essentially one of a disparate population eventually organizing itself into a disciplined society that could sustain and prosecute its long conflict against Ethiopia. Although this took decades, the consolidation of power under the EPLF, the building of a militarized and politically conscious society, and the incorporation of numerous interest groups allowed the EPLF to continue its conflict even during the massive influx of military capacity from the Soviet bloc to the Ethiopian Derg. This same centralized and disciplined organization took the lead in the plebiscite that would help grant Eritrea its independence and then took on the role of the interim government of the new state. During this time the EPLF under Isaias Afwerki promulgated the idea of general elections and a new constitution by 1997, allowing representative government to be established within the new polity. However, this was never carried out. The EPLF renamed itself the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and established itself as the sole allowed party within the new country, filling the National Assembly with its own members and installing Afwerki as the first, and to this date only, president of Eritrea.

Since then Eritrea has become an increasingly authoritarian state, with the PFDJ exercising extremely oppressive single-party rule. Dissent from this new order has largely been met with brute force and, increasingly, political imprisonment, with Eritrea’s human rights record being one of the worst in the world. This oppression of its citizens has been paired with a mandatory national service component for all Eritreans between eighteen and forty, alienating the rising generation of youth who were born or came of age after the liberation struggle. Beyond its domestic authoritarianism, Eritrea’s foreign policy has seen it become increasingly isolated. Regionally Afwerki’s regime has had both major and minor conflicts, including a conventional war with Ethiopia in the late 1990s and a scuffle with Yemen over Red Sea islands. In the broader international context, the increasingly strident human rights violations of his regime have largely made Eritrea a pariah to all but the most desperate international partners, with Eritrea having been given the moniker of the “North Korea of Africa.”
Given these results, it is rather obvious to note that simply winning a secessionist conflict is not a guarantee of effective or representative governance, even for that group which has led the secession. While those members of the EPLF (and later PFDJ) have largely emerged from that conflict with representation and state authority, this is certainly not anything close to a universal experience. Instead, the larger part of the population has found itself within a system of governance that appears somewhat at odds with what had been promised initially: self-determination, representation, larger social caucuses, and the ability to mould a new Eritrea for themselves and their children. Instead, the expansive and disciplined organization, which had proven its strength and resilience in its long war, followed the path of many revolutionary fronts to dictatorship and authoritarianism.

However, in contrast to the EPLF, which emerged as an extremely centralized and robust secessionist front, the South Sudanese case featured a loose organization of numerous fragmented fronts that had only been welded together in the final few years of the conflict. Even then, while John Garang had managed to bring the majority of the fronts under his unified SPLM-Mainstream, his group never necessarily had control of all of the armed groups struggling against the North. Instead, it was far more common for numerous small splinter groups to continue their own struggles or for groups like the Southern Sudan Independence Movement, which themselves splintered even as they made an accommodation with the North. Garang’s group had managed to at least create a basic social and political infrastructure beyond that of its rivals, and it was this infrastructure that enabled him and his followers to survive the challenging period following the collapse of the Mengistu government, which had been supplying much of his arms.

However, whereas the Eritrean infrastructure created a firm and powerful force for unification, even if it descended into authoritarianism, the South Sudanese political base would be one that had trouble enforcing its authority over its various constituent parts. This became even more evident during the period between the official cessation of hostilities in 2005 and the plebiscite that would give the South its independence. Shortly after the signing of the ceasefire, Garang was killed in a helicopter crash in July 2005. He was succeeded by Salva Kiir as president, with Riek Machar retaining the vice presidency. Initially beginning their careers on very
different sides of the very fractured military landscape of the SPLA, the
two would often have trouble seeing eye to eye, and to many they embod-
ied the precarious relationship between the various factions of still-armed
fighters, including an ethnic split between the Dinka and the Nuer peoples
of South Sudan.\textsuperscript{21} Already dealing with the challenge of building a gov-
ernment, the Kiir regime then faced a series of crises as it inched toward
independence. In 2010 it fought against an armed rebellion by the South
Sudan Democratic Movement, which attracted a series of dissident officers
and fighters who felt estranged from the new government.\textsuperscript{22} This was fol-
lowed in 2011 by another group, the South Sudan Liberation Movement,
and a series of continuous raids between various pastoralist groups.\textsuperscript{23} In all
cases the government did its best to suppress or pay off these dissidents, but
they represented increasingly alienated constituencies that could only be
ignored at the peril of the emerging state.

At the same time, hostilities re-erupted with the North over territory in
the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces, leading to serious blood-
shed. While the struggle initially arose primarily because the populations
of the two provinces were not included within South Sudan but the SPLA
had been active within them, it took on a new cast thanks to the Abyei
territory that straddled the Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal provinces.\textsuperscript{24} This
territory was particularly oil-rich and was desired by both the North and
the South, leading to support to local affiliated groups and eventual direct
intervention by both the Sudanese military and SPLM. While eventually
the Abyei dispute was quashed with the aid of United Nations peacekeep-
ers, the struggle between SPLM-allied forces in the Blue Nile and Kordofan
regions and the North has continued for years. While the South has avoid-
ed official involvement in these continuing conflicts, they illustrated the
continued challenges and centrifugal forces facing the new and ill-defined
nation regarding citizenship, participation, and borders, especially follow-
ing the end of the long war against the North.

Even entering independence in 2011, South Sudan had extremely lim-
ited capacity to maintain a unified governance. The various factions within
the SPLM/A remained at odds, numerous smaller armed conflicts were
erupting within and without the new country, and the main figures within
the government represented far more their individual ethnicized factions
than the unified government. Despite the best-intentioned efforts by the
international community, led by the United States, Africa’s newest country was at best a fractious sovereign territory heading into 2013. In the wake of a rumoured coup attempt, President Kiir began to swiftly reorganize his government, dismissing numerous members of the police, military, and government while trying to position his own loyalists in place. At the same time, he accused his rivals of fomenting the ethnic and political divisions that had characterized so much of the secessionist struggle, heightening tensions within the country. Finally, in July 2013, Kiir dismissed Machar and the rest of his cabinet, dismantled much of the political structure of the SPLM, and indicated his continuing resolution to lead the country.²⁵

These actions, occurring as they did within the context of ethnic and political tensions, precipitated a crisis. Following what was characterized as a mutiny in Juba in December 2013, fighting broke out throughout the country. By early 2014 a civil war was in full swing, with rebels led by Riek Machar fighting Bor and Kiir’s forces, which were being aided by Ugandan troops that had been deployed in support of his regime.²⁶ Despite a series of ceasefires and mediation by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other parties, the violence continued off and on into 2016, with increasing indications of ethnic cleansing, sexual violence, and the use of child soldiers. By the beginning of 2017 there was continuing political manoeuvring between various ethnic factions and there still was no end in sight despite a threatened redeployment of an aggressive United Nations presence. Finally, in December 2017, the government signed another ceasefire with the rebels after capturing much of their territory through the previous year, and the conflict has momentarily ceased. However, the state itself remains fractured and damaged from the four years of war and the cleavages within its population remain largely unresolved, with the government largely remaining in power through external intervention and support.

While the Civil Secessions ended as formal conflicts but carried on as political causes and the Long Wars saw success in secession but failures in achieving sustainable governance, the newer wave has offered a series of other fascinating lessons. The historical contexts of the Cold War–era conflicts offered a distinct path of rebels versus the state attempting to demand their own sovereignty, which lent itself to the binary of success or failure in their secessionist goals. However, as seen in the earlier attempts, failure
in the secessionist conflict did not necessarily end the desire for secession, even though the Cold War support given to sovereign states often precluded further attempts. Interestingly, it was also the end of that support that aided the success of the Long Wars, but in turn the changing nature of the African state meant that the emergent nations would deal with the challenges all other African states were dealing with. Thus, Eritrea found itself isolated while South Sudan found itself born without the capacity to sustain itself. However, this same context would offer an entirely new complexity to the New Wave secessions during and indeed after their conflicts.

For Somaliland the intervening years have not yielded much change from where the case study ended. While the post–Cold War moment has largely seen a weakening and in some cases collapse of state capacity in Africa, Somaliland has managed to not only maintain theirs but grow into its own de facto state during its now over twenty-five years of existence. However, as noted this is only really half the story. Somalia, its notional parent state, has remained a broken polity, and it is this exact collapse of capacity that has allowed Somaliland to flourish as opposed to being forced into an interminable conflict to retain its self-determination. Even long past its collapse in 1991 Somalia has not managed to rebuild itself, having faced a series of internal conflicts with clan-based warlords, the Islamic Courts Union, and now the insurgent group al-Shabaab. Specifically, these latter two have significantly changed the context within which Somalia and thus Somaliland must be understood. The Islamist character of these two movements have compelled both regional and international powers to intervene. With the Islamic Courts Union’s rise in 2006, Ethiopia intervened directly in Somalia to overthrow the waxing Islamist group. Following the overthrow of the ICU, a new Islamist threat built around jihadis returning from Afghanistan arose in 2009 calling itself al-Shabaab. Proving itself even more formidable in its struggle against the federal government than even the ICU had been, al-Shabaab triggered an international response, with interventions by Kenya, the African Union, and the United States all occurring to blunt the power of the rising Islamist threat. Following a series of aggressive campaigns during 2011–2014, the Federal Republic of Somalia and its allies managed to crush much of the conventional strength of al-Shabaab, but this simply led the group to adopt more irregular tactics, launching a series of guerrilla and terror strikes both in Somalia and
abroad. While al-Shabaab has continued to be a deadly terror group, this has conversely continued the military pressure exerted by the United States as part of its Global War on Terror.

During this period of time and to the present, the federal government of Somalia has slowly built its capacity, but due to the interminable military struggles it has had to undertake as well as the challenges of rebuilding effective governance, it has only been able to promulgate a constitution and build the constituent parts of government within the past five years. However, this has meant that while the South of the country has finally been finding its way and Puntland has slowly been entering negotiations to be part of the new federal government, the de facto state of Somaliland has used its stability to fully flesh out as much of a de jure existence as it can. The informal state has used its position free from the turbulence of Islamists to reach out to its other neighbours and establish, if not formal recognition, at least lasting relationships that have helped continue the economic development of Somaliland. Specifically, its port of Berbera has proven to be an excellent transit port for both landlocked states in the Horn and for trading partners in the Arabian Peninsula, offering Somaliland the status of an increasingly bustling entrepot.

However, beginning in the second decade of the twenty-first century there has been a resurgent challenge that might change the trajectory of Somaliland. The federal government has finally begun gaining enough capacity to press forward its claim as the central government of the entirety of the old state. In a large part this capacity has been aided by its African and increasingly international partners, in particular Turkey. This increasing international aid has been viewed as part of a complex series of alliances tying countries of the Horn into a larger struggle amongst the Gulf Nations, such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. However, whereas Somalia has found itself aligned with Turkey and Qatar, Somaliland has recently signed an agreement involving access and construction in Berbera with Ethiopia and a United Arab Emirates–owned company. This has caused a strain within the equilibrium of the region, as Somalia has formally rejected any authority Somaliland has to enter into such an agreement even as Somalia’s patron Turkey has increasingly been placing pressure against the UAE. While Somalia has had little chance to challenge Somaliland since 1991, with its increasing capacity and the support of its
newfound allies, a challenge to the actual state apparatus that has been built in Somaliland might not be long in coming.

Finally, in Azawad, the autonomy that was granted following the conflict between Mali and the Kel Tamasheq in the mid-1990s never quite managed to live up the expectations of the Kel Tamasheq, with the local autonomy still not allowing the Kel Tamasheq full access to the resources of the state that they had desired nor integration into the political and military structures of the state. This process was paralleled in Niger, where resources that had been promised to the Nigerien rebels never fully materialized and the integration of fighters into the armed forces under French auspices did not occur in large numbers as desired. From the end of the armed confrontations in 1995 until 2007 there was at best an uneasy peace as the Kel Tamasheq of both countries felt the peace deal they had signed was not being lived up to. This eventually led to a re-eruption of hostilities in 2007 in both countries, as armed groups of nomadic fighters launched attacks against government installations.33

The fighting was largely in the Kidal region in Mali and the Agadez region in Niger, with a series of piecemeal offensives by the rebels throwing the government troops in both regions into chaos. This was seen as extremely alarming by international observers, as the Agadez region of Niger held large uranium deposits that, absent formal state control, could very quickly provide fissile material to non-state actors. However, in both countries the response was relatively swift. In Mali the army quickly sent troops to garrison northern towns and launched a diplomatic offensive in the hopes of defusing the new rebellion before it spiralled further out of control. This offensive proved to be effective, as non-rebelling Kel Tamasheq communities put pressure on those fighting to end their conflict, resulting in a new ceasefire toward the end of the year. While several smaller splinter groups of rebels continued the fight and launched several audacious raids deep into Mali, by 2009 these groups had largely been marginalized and driven into Libya, where they found safe haven with Muammar Gaddafi’s government. In Niger the conflict raged on for a longer period, with neither the Nigerian forces nor the Kel Tamasheq able to land a decisive blow against the other. By 2009, with the Malian conflict largely over and attempts at broadening their conflict having failed, the Kel Tamasheq forces in Niger split, with some hardliners fleeing to Libya to join their Malian brethren,
while the bulk negotiated a settlement along the lines of that reached in Mali. In both cases, the agreements called for amnesty for the rebels, closer integration of the Kel Tamasheq into the government, and the disarmament of the former rebels.

There was also a sideshow of these conflicts that would prove to be a harbinger of later issues. During the conflict, six hostages were taken by a group that would become known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, which had formed in the aftermath of the Algerian Civil War. This group, professing radical Islamist beliefs, was initially confused by onlookers as being part of the larger Kel Tamasheq rebel movements and was seen as heralding a new wrinkle in these struggles. Despite this confusion, AQIM was never formally part of any of the existing Kel Tamasheq nationalist groups but was instead an increasingly capable armed group that professed its own form of radical Islam as a solution to the issues of the Maghreb and claimed connections to the larger international web of Islamist fighters known as al-Qaeda. Ever since the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States, there had been a growing concern amongst international actors that radical Islamist groups would form the vanguard of a new era of instability in the developing world. While the Kel Tamasheq groups were not formally affiliated with AQIM, their involvement in the larger struggle was taken by many to be a warning sign of a possible new vector for Kel Tamasheq grievance.

These fears seemed to be validated with a new eruption of violence in 2012 in northern Mali. The toppling of Muammar Gaddafi’s government in 2011–2012 had left those remaining Kel Tamasheq hardliners in Libya without safe haven, leading them to return to northern Mali. However, they had not spent the intervening years idle. Many had served as mercenaries in the service of Gaddafi, gaining new arms and training as well as forging connections with several Islamist groups within the region. With their return to Mali, fighting began anew, but the returning Kel Tamasheq and their allies proved to be too well armed and trained for the Malian army, decisively sweeping them out of the North and seizing Timbuktu and Gao in the opening months of 2012. In turn, the Malian armed forces launched a short-lived coup, crippling the response against the combined Kel Tamasheq and Islamist offensive. However, with the North now firmly in their hands, the newfound allies fell out over arguments of how the North
was to be governed. The Kel Tamasheq nationalists, represented largely the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), wished to see the North finally become the Azawad state they had desired. However, their Islamist allies of the Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) instead wished to carry on a larger struggle to create a local Sharia-compliant state in the Maghreb. This disagreement eventually led to violent clashes within Gao in late June, leading the MNLA elements to withdraw from the city and its surrounding environs.

The initial partnership had raised concerns that the new drive for ethno-nationalist secession or separatism might find potent new partners in the transnational Islamist fronts that were proliferating in the first decade of the new century. However, the falling out of the MNLA and MOJWA seemed to reinforce the central tension between the ethno-nationalists and the Islamists, where one defined itself via its national identity whereas the other demanded a larger transnational subservience to an ideological form of Islam. This fissure was reinforced as the MNLA actually launched several independent attacks on MOJWA and Ansar Dine positions, including an unsuccessful attempt to regain Gao. The fissure also led to a realignment, as the MNLA forces opened talks with the Malian government, renouncing their claim on an independent Azawad. While this nation-state had initially seemed so close at hand, the nationalists were now caught between strong and aggressive former allies and a national government that was shortly to be receiving massive international aid to put down an Islamist threat. The MNLA thus made the calculations that it would be best to abandon their hopes for Azawad again and instead drive for Kel Tamasheq home rule, an agreement the Malian government endorsed shortly before French and African Union forces arrived to bolster their struggle against the Islamists in early 2013. The French launching of Operation Serval and its supporting AU missions quickly smashed most of the Islamist forces in the North and allowed for the Malian and allied contingents to reassert their control over their territory as quickly as it had been lost the previous year.

This struggle has continued to the present day. While the increasingly fragmented Islamists in the Sahel have kept up their struggle, launching isolated attacks against the government forces of Mali and Niger (as well as the remaining French and United Nations forces), the Kel Tamasheq have largely avoided being swept up into these struggles. While isolated
members of their community have found their way into the Islamist camp, the communities have largely continued their struggle for self-rule and separatism within their states. While this has not always been achieved to the degree these communities would have hoped, there has not been another general rebellion by the Kel Tamasheq and the much-feared alliance between the nationalists and the Islamists has never re-emerged. Essentially, while the ethno-nationalist and irredentist desires of the MNLA and other Kel Tamasheq have not disappeared, they have largely settled for as much autonomy as they can achieve at the moment while trying to avoid being swept into the larger and deadlier conflicts that continue to rage in the region.

A NEW DYNAMIC TO SÉCESSION

Since the success of South Sudan's plebiscite and secession with the unified support of the international community, we have seen a paucity of new secessionist attempts, much less successes. This has largely been due to yet another shift in the international context since the end of the Cold War. This shift is actually revealed within the failure of the 2012 declaration of Azawad by the MNLA and their eventual re-alignment with the Malian state and their French allies. This failure of an almost-achieved de facto secession serves as a central example of the current new dynamics within secession in Africa for the near term. The immediate post–Cold War moment had reopened the question of secession for a number of reasons. The lack of international intervention or consensus had removed much of the threat of either hegemonic or regional-organization interference in secessionist struggles. In addition, there was the question of the legitimacy of the existent state and state governments amongst the international community, opening the intellectual, ideological, and even diplomatic space for possible alternative states on the continent. Simply put, in the absence of the Cold War dynamics forcing competing camps to support the existing balance of states in Africa, there was suddenly a fluidity to sovereignty that hadn’t existed before.

However, this changed again in 2001 with the sudden eruption of the Global War on Terror as led by the hegemonic United States and supported by its developing world allies. Suddenly African state governments found
a new avenue for international support: to cast themselves as the bulwark against the new wave of Islamist groups that were emerging across the continent. This summoned the same diplomatic, developmental, and defence support that previously choosing a side in the Cold War would have, once again infusing weaker states with the capacity and international support necessary to stabilize their own monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and again largely suppressing the secessionist or separatist movements within their country. This eventually crystallized in many cases into partnerships across regions to suppress the Islamist threat and any other groups that could be construed as furthering those threats. Agreements such as the Trans-Saharan Counter Terror Partnership (TSCTP) pumped money and training into regional military partnerships that then allowed them to more effectively fight back against any illicit groups seen as threats to the sovereign state.

In addition, while the Organization of African Unity had transitioned into the African Union in 2001 and reformed its initial ironclad focus on state sovereignty, particularly in issues of peacekeeping and stability, new dynamics were afoot. Often frustrated with the seeming inability of the OAU to deal with the problems they were facing, the states of the continent largely began forming more effective regional partnerships with the support of the international community. These regional partnerships existed to help stabilize the regional order of their constituent states and as such offered increased capacity to any individual member. Regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) offered forums where internal issues could be negotiated but in times of deep instability could also offer entire peacekeeping contingents to help restabilize a region and suppress any internal revolt.

With the new post-9/11 dynamics recasting the African state as the ultimate bulwark against the Islamist threat and the consequent reimposition of hegemonic support for those existent states, the fluidity that had seemed to emerge for the concept of sovereignty disappeared again. While the plebiscite for the secession of South Sudan continued apace with the blessing of the United States, almost all other ambitions for secessionists were dashed, with separatism as the at-best consolation prize for their efforts. Even to the present day, many of those populations with
separatist ambitions, whether in the Casamance region of Senegal or in the anglophone region of Cameroon, have found their hopes crushed as their host countries have instead become staunch partners in the expansive and ill-defined Global War on Terror. Africa has thus largely re-entered a period where the official boundaries of states have again become immobile and even separatism remains a rare and often ill-defined quality due to the resurgence of state capacity and the growing regional consensuses on the continent.

**Coda**

Since the drawing of boundaries on the continent and the devolution of political power to the newborn states, there has been the concept of secession in Africa. The very first attempt happened a mere three days after the independence of the Congo on 30 June 1960, an attempt that would prove to be almost archetypal in its reasons if not its execution. Populations within the continent, defined either through common understandings of political power or through ethnic communities, have desired to exercise their own political and ultimately economic and social autonomy with respect to the nation whose borders were drawn around them. Absent any peaceful way to attempt this separation from their host state, these communities have turned to violent means to secure their separation or autonomy.

Of course, these violent means have in turn been shaped by their political, social, and economic contexts, just as are all forms of warfare. While initial attempts at secession tried to simply declare their separation and fight the conventional wars that might grant them recognition, this was quickly seen to be a pipe dream. Future attempts were more realistic, fighting protracted conflicts intended to maximize the advantages of the secessionists or separatists, who often knew the ground and communities where the struggle would be fought. For a lucky few, these protracted conflicts continued burning until the shock wave of the end of the Cold War undermined so many states on the African continent and allowed these combatants a brief window to achieve their goals of an independent state for their community.

However, for many more secessionists and separatists, the protracted war continues even as their long-time opponents and hosts regain their
strength and the concept of secession recedes even further under the surface of a resurgent Africa. While these groups might be able to call upon aid from other dissidents against the new US-centric world order, this has not been enough to truly force the separation that the collapse of Ethiopia or Somalia had or even to draw on a hegemon’s aid as South Sudan did. Instead, for the moment these groups can at best survive and hope for a local settlement even as they face new regional orders that deny them their desired autonomy, and the concept of secession seems as remote as it might ever have in the 1980s.

Of course, this all again depends on the current world dynamics, which are underpinned by a state-centric policy supported by a hegemonic United States pursuing a war on terror. While at the moment this might be seen as extending into the foreseeable future, one might have reasonably said that the Cold War would continue indefinitely from their perch in 1984. However, much as the Cold War ended slowly and then quickly, there is no telling how much longer the Western Consensus will last or even if the Global War on Terror will remain the central initiative it has been. Even now revisionist powers such as China and Russia are currently challenging the US-led Western consensus and the political and military establishment of the United States is increasingly looking toward near-peer adversaries and less at Islamist insurgencies. This isn’t to say that the current political dynamics that support legacy African states will disappear overnight, but simply that no world order lasts forever and that even now the current global moment might be changing. While secession and even separatism on the African continent might seem remote now, those groups still waging a protracted conflict might find their own opportunity at some future date and establish their own formal sovereignty under the auspices of the nations of Africa.
Notes

Introduction

1 Frontline States is being used as a general shorthand for those African countries engaged in the loose alliance that formed during liberation struggles at any point during those struggles, including Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, and Botswana; however, it is understood that the formal term for the Frontline States did not emerge until later. See Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007), 10.

2 Cuito Cuanavale was a battle fought from mid-1987 to early 1988 in the so-called South African Border War between the South African Defence Force, with their UNITA Allies, and the Cuban/Angolan armed forces. It was the largest conventional battle on African soil since the Second World War, and although a tactical draw, it was strategically a crushing blow for the South Africans and likely led directly to the end of the war. See Timothy J. Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa: From the Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 181–86.


4 Of course, it is inappropriate to view these particular struggles in a vacuum. While the individual struggles of liberation fronts occurred, they did so within the context of much larger struggles, which led these individual struggles to flow into one another. At a base level, these fronts aided and helped one another across their guerrilla struggles, with groups such as the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) aiding the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) with their fight in what would eventually be Namibia. In addition, the larger conflicts of the Frontline States against the white settler regimes cannot be disentangled from these guerrilla liberation fronts. Not only did Frontline States such as Tanzania offer material aid and support to these liberation movements, but the larger conventional struggles such as the Border War and the Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique were undertaken specifically to try and neutralize those governments that were supporting the continued guerrilla liberation struggles.

5 Much as with the liberation struggles listed above, while the combatants within RENAMO and UNITA might have viewed their struggles as independent reform insurgencies, these did not exist independently from the other continental
conflicts. Both RENAMO and UNITA were armed and supported by the South African government as part of their larger conventional and irregular conflicts against the Frontline States and were an attempt to undermine the new governments of Angola and Mozambique, both of which were strategically threatening to the South Africans. In fact, UNITA forces fought side by side with conventional South African forces throughout the Border War, and the offensive that culminated in the aforementioned Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was largely intended to help preserve UNITA as a fighting force against the advancing Cuban and Angolan forces. The sustained conflicts that both the Angolan and Mozambican governments undertook against these insurgencies can thus be viewed both as a struggle against a reform insurgency and as part and parcel of a larger conventional war for African liberation.

6 Clapham also identifies a category called “Warlord Insurgencies” in his introduction to African Guerrillas, a category this volume will not delve into due to its more recent and specialized existence.

7 This will be covered more extensively in chapter 5.


12 See OAU Charter, article III.

**Part I**

1 The lone country left was Poland, which was at the meetings drafting the agreement but was absent at the signing of the charter.

2 This was the second purpose enunciated in chapter I, article 1 of the UN charter.

3 UN charter, chapter 12, article 76, section (b).

4 Henry S. Wilson, African Decolonization (London: Hodder Education, 1994), 82–83. This extremely relevant section refers to the manoeuvring of the British during the creation of the UN and the initial struggle of the USSR and China to treat trustee territories and those other “non self-governing territories” as the same in the postwar world.

5 UN charter, chapter XI, article 73, section (b).
6 Which of course were led toward independence since they fell under the jurisdiction of chapter XII as opposed to chapter XI due to their status as former Axis colonies, although Italian Somaliland was given back to Italian administration in 1950 until its joining with British Somaliland in independence in 1960. The story of Eritrea will be covered in its case study in chapter 3 of this volume.

7 Despite the fact that the Sudan was technically a sub-Saharan African nation, its independence was not greeted with any continental cheer for a variety of reasons. The first was the limited greater nationalism the Sudan had displayed—it had no Nkrumah to make its independence a fully African matter. The second was the fact that it was not entirely a British colony in international law, being instead under the joint control of Britain and Egypt, which led to revolutionary Egypt being instead the greater partner in securing the Sudan’s independence.

8 Nkrumah served as prime minister for the Gold Coast Colony from 1952 to 1957, helping press forward the independence claims of the colony while also helping form an effective plan for a centralized nation under his political party’s control.

9 Prior to this the French had been working within a relationship with their colonies called the French Union, which had been enshrined in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic in 1946. However, following the war in Algeria and the attempted coups in France, the Fifth Republic tried to form a looser but still French-led community called the Communauté française or French Community. This construct would have offered France’s African colonies a degree of self-rule while keeping them within the French military and economic orbit. Guinea, under its nationalist leader Sékou Touré, refused to accept the 1958 constitution and French Community and thus transitioned to independence.

10 The Salazar government and its successor under Marcelo Caetano firmly believed that the Estado Novo had managed to bring forth the compelling idea of lusotropicalism, the idea that thanks to colonial assimilation there was one indivisible nation that stretched between Europe and Africa. This argument, coupled with their strategic island holdings, which were critical for NATO, would hold Portugal’s empire in Africa in place until the Carnation Revolution in 1974.

11 These borders would finally become complete and legitimate following the creation and agreement of the states within the Organization of African Unity.


13 Ijalaye makes this exact argument in terms of Biafra: Ijalaye, “Was ‘Biafra’ at Any Time a State in International Law?” 559.


15 Katanga in terms of the Comité spéciale du Katanga and Biafra in terms of its previous status as the state of Eastern Nigeria.
For more on the waning and waxing legitimacy of ethnic states, the reader is directed to Philip L. White, “Globalization and the Mythology of the ‘Nation State,’” in *Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local*, ed. A. G. Hopkins (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 257–84. White maintains that following the destructive forces unleashed by nationalism in the Second World War, the idea of the ethnic state fell into disrepute and therefore lost what legitimacy it had gained since the burst of nationalist revolutions in 1848. Ethnic states would not be acceptable in the world community until the fall of the Soviet Union, when the United States began encouraging the ethnic nationalisms of the former Soviet peoples.

The South Sudan’s complex situation does not fit easily into any category of separatism or secession or even reform insurgency, but it still serves as a useful example in this sense in that its separate administrative boundaries have indeed been used as the basis for its legitimacy as its own autonomous state.


This was the party he formed after splitting from the older and more established United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1949.

Interestingly enough, Nkrumah would win this election to lead the first indigenous government of the Gold Coast while in jail.


The Kenyan African National Union (KANU) was one of two parties formed during Kenyatta’s imprisonment, the other being the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU).

Assensoh, *African Political Leadership*, 126. Nyerere used this degree to earn a teaching position at St. Francis’ School at Pugu, where he earned his nickname of Mwalimu (Kiswahili for teacher).

For example, Moïse Tshombe was an elected member of the CONAKAT party in the Congo and Ojukwu was the military governor of the Eastern region before its secession from Nigeria.

Such figures as Moïse Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo are synonymous with the Katanga Crisis, and it is impossible to separate the figure of Ojukwu from Biafra.
29 For an excellent discussion of the colonial military and police in East and West Africa up to the transition to independence, Anthony Clayton and David Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989), offers a still unmatched overview of their structures and usage.


33 Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Biafran War was the almost total mobilization of available adult and adolescent male manpower.

34 Again, see Moyse-Bartlett, *The King’s African Rifles*, and Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue*, for general readings on the tactics, strategy, and construction of the inherited militaries.

35 This of course also tied into the economics of the postcolonial African nations. With little industrial base, it was easier and cheaper to train and equip infantry than it was to import tanks, armoured cars, aircraft, and the expertise to use them. This is not to say that the African armies did not do so, but that the work to make the militaries complete systems did not begin until independence and was generally incomplete at the time of the Civil Secessions.


37 This is not to say that guerrilla operations did not occur, but they were the exception and not the rule in these secessions and were generally only used in the pursuit of secondary objectives.

38 Although, as will be seen, part of this was due to support from its former colonial power and part was due to the historical legacy of the administration of the region.

39 While UN Security Council Resolution 169 declared the secession illegal, it was the final extension of several other resolutions, including 161 and 143, all of which will be covered in chapter 1.

40 Again, see chapter 1 for an expansion of this point.
Chapter 1

1 White defines a “civil nation” as one where the sovereign government is obliged to oversee a heterogeneous population with little to no discrimination based upon ethnicity. This is taken from Philip L. White, “Globalization and the Mythology of the ‘Nation State,’” in Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local, ed. A. G. Hopkins (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 260.


5 Gérard-Libois, Katanga Secession, 296.

6 Patrice Lumumba, Lumumba Speaks (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 222.

7 Gérard-Libois, Katanga Secession, 85.


9 When confronted following Independence, Janssens had written “Before Independence=After Independence” on a blackboard while making a speech to the soldiers of the Force Publique. It is often assumed that Janssens was attempting to be deliberately provocative in an attempt to undermine Congolese independence, but there is little direct evidence of this hypothesis.

10 Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, 98.


14 Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 36.

15 For a revealing description of Mobutu’s actions and its results, see Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008).

16 In particular, the Eisenhower administration had been viewing him as a Communist agent or proxy since his inauguration and were already working on numerous ways to remove him from power, preferably permanently. See Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 128.
Hoskyns offers an excellent discussion about this self-declared government in *The Congo Since Independence*, 289–92.

This was United Nations Security Council Resolution 161, which urged the UN to immediately take measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, allowing even the use of force. The council also demanded the withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign military personnel not serving with the UN and that all member states refrain from aiding such personages to enter the Congo. The UN also decided that it would launch an investigation into the death of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues, promising punishment to the perpetrators.


This episode is recounted thoroughly in Rose Doyle and Leo Quinlan, *Heroes of Jadotville: The Soldiers’ Story* (Dublin: New Island, 2016).

There are numerous theories on how this crash actually occurred, from instrument failure to the pilot losing his way in a region that had little air traffic infrastructure. However, there is also evidence that points to foul play, with members of the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, South Africa, and France all implicated to various degrees in what is generally held to be an aerial attack that downed Hjammarskjöld’s plane. For one of the more popular theories pointing to foul play, see Susan Williams, *Who Killed Hjammarskjöld?: The UN, the Cold War, and White Supremacy in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

UN Security Council Resolution 169, which empowered the UN forces to use even greater force to bring the foreign personnel of Katanga to heel and formally declared the secession illegal.


Provisions included the adoption of a federal constitution, the splitting of mining royalties between Katanga and the Congolese central government, unification of currency, absorption of the gendarmerie into the ANC, restructuring of the Katangan government to allow representative government, and an amnesty for
political prisoners. This information is from Findlay, *The Blue Helmets’ First War?* 127.

30 These were largely sourced from South Africa, whose government was sympathetic to the Katangan secession. See Dorn, “The UN’s First ‘Air Force,’” 1409–10.


33 For a more complete portrait of Tshombe, see Ian Colvin, *The Rise and Fall of Moïse Tshombe: A Biography* (London: Leslie Frewin, 1968).

34 Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession*, 293.


40 Lefever and Joshua, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo*, 104.


51 Charter of the United Nations, chapter XV, article 99.


53 OAU Charter, article III, sections 2 and 3.
Chapter 2

1 The “Dual Mandate” refers to the two missions that British colonialism saw as its central goals: the development of the economy of a colony and the uplift and education of its people, although both of these tended to take forms that heavily benefited Britain. The initial use of the term as well as a useful explanation of its underpinnings is found in F. J. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 5th ed. (London: F. Cass, 1965). This work also serves as an excellent introduction to the processes that led to Nigeria taking its colonial and later postcolonial form. For another accessible source on the formation of colonial and postcolonial Nigeria, see Sir Rex Niven, *The War of Nigerian Unity, 1967–1970* (London: Evans Brothers, 1971), although his narrative of the history has a decidedly pro-Federal slant.

2 Interestingly enough, it was this relationship that led Horowitz to use the Igbo as one of his prime examples of advanced groups in backward regions in his work on ethnic secession. See Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, updated ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 243–79. As will be shown, this volume agrees that there was an ethnic motive for secession but not for the creation of an ethnic state.


5 Ironically, what was seen as the failure of an “Igbo” coup attempt installed Ironsi, who was himself an Igbo, at the head of the state.


7 Niven, *The War of Nigerian Unity*, 85–86, serves as an excellent example of the more extreme narration of these events in terms of a suspected Igbo coup.

8 This was largely the legacy of the British military construct in Nigeria. Under the Martial Race theories that were prevalent during the colonial era, the Northerners were often largely seen as uneducated but tough and proper material for the rank and file. However, this meant that when transitioning to independence the Northern Muslim populations were often seen as unfit for commissioning and instead Southern populations were heavily recruited for the leadership positions, so that by the mid-1960s Southern populations such as the Igbo were overrepresented in the higher officer ranks while the Northern Muslim groups such as the Hausa were only beginning to catch up.


10 It was also marked by protests at the prominent Northern University at Zaria and the town of Kaduna. Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 26.

14 Col. Yakubu Gowon’s speech upon ascension to power, 1 August 1966, reprinted in Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 261–64.
15 Making matters worse, several of these incidents involved uniformed soldiers of Northern extraction, adding to the Easterners’ perceptions that the Federal government would not intercede to halt the violence.
16 The numbers claimed vary throughout the conflict. Initially they were assumed to be somewhat low but climbed as the conflict continued, hitting an almost impossible high of 50,000 in Ojukwu’s Ahiara Declaration. See Niven, *The War of Nigerian Unity*, 93; de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 86, and Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 37–38, for commentary on the figures.
17 In later years Ojukwu would discuss this direction to Igbos to return north as his greatest regret.
23 The entirety of this whirlwind mini-campaign and the short-lived Mid-West separatism is very well told by de St. Jorre in his chapter “Ojukwu’s Mid-West Gamble,” in *The Nigerian Civil War*, 147–75.
24 Onitsha would prove to be the site of several major engagements that also decided the fate of the small mercenary detachments that were working for Biafra.
26 Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 63. It has been said by many that after the fall of Port Harcourt the war was unwinnable by the Biafrans. The authors agree with this sentiment and regard its fall as the decisive moment of the military operations against Biafra.
28 Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 65. The arms that were delivered had come from the French and were flown into Biafra from the former French colonies of Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire. France’s reasons for supporting the Biafran cause will be covered in depth later in this chapter.


31 A full text of the Ahiara Declaration can be found at http://www.biafraland.com/Ahiara_declaration_1969.htm.

32 This line is often quoted from Gowon’s final speech after the Biafran surrender in January 1970.

33 This is somewhat complicated by the fact that Biafra still took aid wherever it could get it, including from South Africa, France, and Portugal, all three of whom had proven less than sympathetic to African self-determination. However, whereas Katanga actively aligned themselves with Belgium and other Western powers, Biafra at most quietly took what aid was offered and put forth little foreign policy aside from its demands to be recognized.

34 Although this conception was based almost solely on the idea that the region produced roughly 50 percent of the income of the nation yet received a much smaller portion of tax revenues and governmental representation.

35 See Biafra’s Resolution giving Ojukwu a mandate to declare the separatist state of Biafra, which notes, “WHEREAS in consequence of these [the pogroms in the North] and other acts of discrimination and injustice, we have painfully realized that the Federation of Nigeria has failed, and has given us no protection.” See C. O. Ojukwu, *Biafra: Selected Speeches with Journals of Events* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 191–93.

36 Niven, *The War of Nigerian Unity*, 28, offers a short and concise recollection of these events.

37 This was done by the Ironsi government following his accession to power in 1966.

38 De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 132. De St. Jorre pithily notes that both the Somalis and (most importantly in terms of this volume) non-Igbos of the region might dispute that claim.

39 It is estimated that Igbos only made up about 64 percent of the total population of the East. J. N. Saxena, *Self-Determination: From Biafra to Bangladesh* (Delhi: University of Delhi Press, 1978).


41 Again note the specific language mentioned in note 35. This is repeated in Ojukwu’s “Declaration of the Republic of Biafra,” where he lays out the claim “AWARE that you can no longer be protected in your lives or your property by any government based outside Eastern Nigeria.” Ojukwu, *Selected Speeches*, 193.
De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 39, and Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 24. Of course there is still today the contentious argument as to the exact constitutionality of Ironsi’s investiture of power, with most agreeing it had at best a faint patina of legality. Even a relatively short time later the act was already being criticized by Nigerian intellectuals such as O. Onipede, “Nigeria Crisis,” in *Africa Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (1969): 233–63.

This is of course complicated by the fact that Ironsi also drew acceptance from the East due to his Igbo heritage, whereas Gowon’s Northern heritage meant he faced an uphill struggle to be accepted as legitimate within much of the South.

The most commonly available retelling of Ojukwu’s life so far is Frederick Forsyth, *Emeka* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum, 1992). While it is an accurate retelling of the bulk of Ojukwu’s life, Forsyth himself was deeply involved in the conflict and can occasionally be a rather biased and inaccurate observer.

For example, his interference in the Niamey peace talks of 1969, where his telegram cooled any warm feelings being expressed between the two sides. De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 227.


Ojukwu’s final statement to his PR firm, Markpress. Quoted in de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 413.


Arachie, *The Bye-Gone*, contains an excellent narrative of the ad hoc training the average recruit underwent, including a “graduation” exercise involving a mock deployment.

This figure is taken from the controversial but generally accurate Scott Report (named for its author, Col. R. E. Scott), which was regrettably leaked and printed in the July 11, 1970 issue of the *Sunday Telegraph*.

Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 141.

Steiner brazenly lionizes himself and his unit in his own volume, but Thomas offers a more muted response, writing that the utility of the 4th Commando was notably compromised by the friction it experienced with the more traditional Biafran High Command. Thomas, *Mercenary Troops*, 89.


This was largely due to French concerns about British influence in the region and to help fragment the powerful anglophone bloc in West Africa, which otherwise could dominate regional affairs beyond the control of the French Community states spread across the region. While there were initially some accusations that this was to gain France access to the Biafran oil resources, both de St. Jorre (210–13) and Červenka (113–15) dismiss this reasoning with strong evidence that
France’s actions never were focused on the oil resources of the region, although they were happy to take oil money in return for their arms shipments.

56 De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 216. This is backed up in Scott’s report, although he refers only to “30 large aircraft and a correspondingly large tonnage nightly.”


58 In Arachie, *The Bye-Gone*, the author recounts the creation and use of homemade ordinance against the Federal forces.

59 Scott Report; also Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 150, and Steiner, *The Last Adventurer*,

60 While this ambush was not of the magnitude expressed in Frederick Forsyth, *The Biafra Story* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), 126–27, it was still a notable victory and remained a site of interest to the press for the rest of the war.

61 It does bear noting, though, that much of the support for these secessions came from the secessionist governments leveraging natural resources that had great value to the outside world; copper for Katanga and oil for Biafra. The centrality of these resources for material and political support likely helped dictate a need for military tactics that would hold territory, a consideration that would not be present in the contemporary conflicts in Eritrea and the South Sudan.


63 However, Nigeria did let in an international observer team formed by the United Nations to watch for atrocities and assuage international humanitarian concerns. This team’s later report served as the largest single blow to the narrative of Igbo genocide.

64 Some also expected the UN secretary-general to bring the Nigerian conflict before the General Assembly under the provisions of article 99, but the secretary-general made his stance that the war was an OAU matter very clear at the Algiers Assembly of that body. See Saxena, *Self-Determination*, 44.

65 For a slightly lengthier synopsis see the invaluable Červenka, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 121–30. Other than this, whole volumes have been written such as the aforementioned Thompson, *American Policy and African Famine*.


The reasons for this limited aid tend to be viewed as an attempt at playing both sides. If the limited aid allowed Biafra to win, then France gained its regional goals of fragmenting the anglophone bloc and having Biafra as a strong ally and potential area of economic development. If the limited aid failed to turn the tide, then France would be able to extricate itself from the situation and not lose what standing it had with the Federal Government of Nigeria. See Christopher Griffin, “French Military Policy in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 1 (2015): 114–35.


In fact, the OAU can only serve as a diplomatic instrument in terms of peacemaking, as lamented in Gemuh E. Akuchu, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Unsolved Problem for the OAU (A Case Study of the Nigeria-Biafra Conflict),” Africa Today 24, no. 4 (1977): 39–58.

De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, 191.


OAU Resolution 51, adopted at the Kinshasa meeting of the OAU, September 1967, section C.

Although Ijalaye argues that these recognitions were unjustifiable and illegal under international law and therefore essentially invalid. Ijalaye, “Was ‘Biafra’ at Any Time a State in International Law?” 556–59.

De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, 196.

As will be seen in Chapter 3, Ethiopia would break this consensus when the EPRDF took control of the country and gave permission for the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front to hold a plebiscite on separation. The plebiscite itself would take place in 1993.

See note 55.

These would be the foundation of the legend of the Swedish Count von Rosen and his intrepid air force. See de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, 334–39, and Thomas, Mercenary Troops, 6.

De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, 328

Thomas, Mercenary Troops, 22. Interestingly enough, this work cites Faulques’ contract, which supposedly directed him to raise a Katanga-style army manned by Biafrans but encadred by European mercenaries.
Notes to Part II

84 One notable exception in this category were mercenary pilots. Modern warplanes required significant technical training to effectively use, and the air war on both sides featured foreign pilots being employed to offer air cover. On the Federal side there were pilots from Egypt and Pakistan flying Nigeria’s newly acquired MiG fighters, whereas on the Biafran side there was Count Gustav von Rosen, who repurposed several small Minicon planes to offer close air support for Biafran forces.
87 Scott’s report was scathing in this regard and was not greeted with enthusiasm by the Federal High Command.
88 This from Major General Philip Effiong, quoted in de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 223. Similar sentiments were expressed by Raph Uwechue, Biafra’s emissary to Paris (at 224), and N. U. Akpan, the head of the Biafran Civil Service (Akpan, *The Struggle for Secession, 1967–1970*, 13–14).
90 As discussed in the previous chapter.

*Part II*

1 The Whampoa Academy would prove to be a political hotbed, producing the majority of the military figures for both the Communists and Nationalists over the next decade.
2 For a good narrative of this period, see Suyin Han, *The Morning Deluge: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893–1954* (St. Albans, UK: Panther, 1976).
3 These conflicts were primarily between the orthodox Bolsheviks who believed that the revolution was an urban proletarian occurrence and the dissenters such as Mao who looked toward a rural peasant uprising. See Mao Tse-Tung, “From the City to the Countryside,” in *Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War*, ed. M. Rejai (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), 58–59.
5 Although they did receive aid from the Russians in the form of allowing them to capture the Japanese garrisons and equipment in Manchuria, overall the Chinese Communists gained almost no direct military aid.
6 Yenan had been the Communist capital throughout the Sino-Japanese War. It was retaken by the Communists within a year of the Nationalist victory.
Translated to English, this means “League for the Independence of Vietnam.”


Giap, *People’s War, People’s Army*, 12–15.

The United States by this point had become very concerned about the possibility of a Communist government in Vietnam and assumed it would be a puppet of either Russia or China as well as a node for spreading Communism throughout Southeast Asia. Thus, although the US had initially been supportive of an independent Vietnam, the Eisenhower administration changed policy and instead offered significant financial and military aid to the French.


As will be discussed briefly, this mandate dates from the end of the First World War.

This act was known as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. See Wilson, *African Decolonization*, 190.


Portugal received NATO support as both a member state and in return for letting the United States lease the Azores as a base. Houser, *No One Can Stop the Rain*, 160.


Houser, *No One Can Stop the Rain*, 257.

Stapleton, *A Military History of South Africa*, 161. The use of “Alone” as the secret name for the forces was intended to confuse the South African security forces as to the formation and numbers involved in the armed liberation forces.

Stapleton, *A Military History of South Africa*, 162 and 166. Countries that housed and trained these developing forces included Algeria, Egypt, and, most notably, Tanzania, where both inhabited military camps.


Stapleton, *Military History of South Africa*, 166

Houser, *No One Can Stop the Rain*, 248–49.


Rhodesia was initially Southern Rhodesia; however, the process of decolonization had eventually led to the territory to shorten its name. Initially in 1953 it had joined with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to form the Central African Federation, but the federation fell apart in late 1963 and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland claimed their independence in 1964 as Zambia and Malawi respectively. This led to Southern Rhodesia renaming itself simply Rhodesia, although Britain never recognized it as such.


In fact, their hopes for a final confrontation involved a conventional invasion of Rhodesia along several axes, overwhelming the Rhodesian security forces. This invasion was still being prepared as the liberation struggle ended. Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History* (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2008), 72–77. This focus on conventional warfare is also discussed at length in Jeremy Brackhill, “Daring to Storm the Heavens: the Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 to 1979,” in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (London: James Currey, 1995), 48–72.

Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War*, 72–76. This linkage is also talked about in David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (London: Faber & Faber, 1982), 12. It is also notable that ZANU specifically began working with FRELIMO, who had also used Maoist strategic thought in their own struggle, and that the reconstruction of the ZANU guerrilla forces was considerably helped by both FRELIMO and Chinese trainers in Tanzania and Mozambique.

Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War*, 74–75, specifically note that the training of their fighters included ideological indoctrination, with the goal of
being able to radicalize the populations they worked with, including discussions of historical grievances.

35 South Africa sent limited military support under the auspices of a police mission after ANC guerrillas were found in the Zambezi Valley along with ZAPU cadres. See Stapleton, *Military History of South Africa*, 163.

36 South Africa never removed all of their support; troops were still deployed in strategic points within Rhodesia until the Lancaster House agreements but were rarely in combat. However, South Africa did choke off much of their economic support beginning in 1976 to try and force a resolution to the question of majority rule. This was done in exchange for the United States once again offering aid to South Africa per the plans of Henry Kissinger. See Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War*, 125.

37 This makes sense, given that the Maoist strain of ideology followed by ZANU was intended to mobilize the masses and get them aligned with the political program of the liberation front. This same process will be seen in successful social revolutionary initiatives put forth by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front later in this section.

38 Interestingly, this idea had been enunciated 400 years earlier in Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Luigi Ricci (New York: Signet Classics, 1999), 64–65.


Chapter 3

1 See Dan Connell, *Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1993), 58. This is also accepted by the account of Richard Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 73. Other studies sometimes choose 1962 as the starting year of the formal beginning of the conflict, as this was the year the federation was officially dissolved. A prime example of this dating of the conflict is Haggai Erlich, *The Struggle Over Eritrea, 1962–1978: War and Revolution in the Horn of Africa* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983). The authors have chosen the 1961 start date, as this book is a study of secessionist conflicts, and thus the beginning of violence marks the beginning of interest.

2 Connell, *Against All Odds*, 53. There has been relatively little work done on the actual service of Eritrean Askaris in the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia, but this service had lasting effects on the relations of the two regions.

3 Connell, *Against All Odds*, 55


Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution*, 27. For a concrete representation of this linguistic policy, see Connell’s related anecdote in *Against All Odds*, 58–59.

Connell, *Against All Odds*, 58.

Connell, *Against All Odds*, 57–58.

Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution*, 29. In terms of the threat of violence against the Eritrean Assembly, Connell claims Ethiopian jet fighters were buzzing the city and police had surrounded the assembly while the proceedings were underway. See Connell, *Against All Odds*, 57.

Osman Saleh Sabbe has a very unique and complex role in the Eritrean Revolution, one that this study cannot fully explore. Let it suffice to say that he served both major liberation fronts in senior positions before being forcibly removed from each in turn. He then formed his own front to lead, although this was never a major force. While a controversial figure due to his extremely conservative Islamist and Pan-Arab agenda, his strong supply and training connections with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and other Pan-Arab states made him valuable enough for all involved to try and work with him for prolonged periods of time. He finished the struggle as a distrusted and largely irrelevant figure.


The United States had been a major patron since the end of the Second World War, rebuilding the Ethiopian military in return for the establishment of the Kagnew listening station in Ethiopia. Ethiopia in turn was an enthusiastic ally, sending troops to support the US-led efforts in the Korean War.

Following Haile Selassie’s return, the United States became Ethiopia’s primary military partner and supplier, with the total amount of aid granted during 1946–1975 equalling approximately US$286.1 million. For a total breakdown of these costs, see Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution*, 176–77.


De Waal, *Evil Days*, does an excellent job discussing the prevalence of these blunt tactics of populace sweeps and random bombing.

Villagization is a common counter-insurgency strategy used since the days of the Boer War or even before. It consists of the forced removal of the populace to fortified and controlled villages to both protect them from and limit their contact with the insurgents, thereby cutting off the enemy guerrillas from any popular support. It generally emerged into the popular consciousness during the Vietnam
War, but in that conflict as in most others the actual effects of the strategy are debatable.

18 Derg is the Amharic word for “Committee” and was the name taken by the new regime.

19 Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution*, 46. This temporarily ended what has been known as the Eritrean Civil War, although the peace was always uneasy and would be shattered again in the wake of the 1978 Ethiopian offensives.

20 As will be briefly discussed, the TPLF’s role in the conflict was pivotal and deserves far greater attention than is given in this chapter. For a more complete overview of their contributions, it would be difficult to do better than John Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975–1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

21 The Ogaden War began in 1977 with Somalia invading the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to support the irredentist claims of the ethnic Somalis living in the region.

22 Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution*, 90. This section also deals with the wide array of weaponry involved in the transaction.


24 Connell, *Against All Odds*, 154. However, this direct ground intervention seems to have been more due to the recent arrival of the weaponry and subsequent Ethiopian unfamiliarity with it. As to the naval bombardment, it remains a pervasive but unsubstantiated rumour.

25 The numbers given for the Cuban troops vary from approximately 11,000 to over 15,000, with a large number of these being frontline combat troops and not simply advisors and trainers. Tareke notes that at several points it was Cuban armoured formations that formed the backbone of the Ethiopian counteroffensives: see Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 207.


28 For more details on this, see Connell, *Against All Odds*, chapter 10.

29 See De Waal, *Evil Days*, 114. De Waal pinpoints this second offensive as the one that truly broke the ELF, noting, “By continuing to engage the Ethiopian army rather than retreat, it ensured its military defeat.”


34 Connell, *Against All Odds*, 228.
41 For an example, see James Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile* (Edinburgh: Robinson, 1790).
44 Connell, *Against All Odds*, 52.
47 Connell, *Against All Odds*, 53.
48 Connell, *Against All Odds*, 54.
49 This has been well established in the previous chapters on Katanga and Biafra.
50 The fact that Ethiopia was the host nation in fact made things more complex, both for external political reasons, as Ethiopia remained a symbol to many Africans, and internal ones, as the multi-ethnic composition of the state would cause problems in the philosophical relations between the Eritrean fronts and those housed in Ethiopia.
51 OAU Charter, article II, section 1, and article III, section 6.
52 Against both the Kuomintang government and the Japanese, 1929–1949.
53 Against both the Japanese and the French, 1941–1954.
54 Connell, *Against All Odds*, 80 and 144.
56 Strategically this difference would also be shown in the Cuban Revolution, where, lacking distances, the revolutionaries became dependent on the difficult terrain of the Sierra Maestra Mountains.
60 Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 280.
61 Mao Tse-Tung, “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” in Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War, 285–86.
63 It was during this period that the future leadership figures of the EPLF encountered the liberation front, joined, and then were sent to China for training. See Connell, Against All Odds, 79–80.
64 Connell, Against All Odds, 163–65.
65 Interestingly, positional warfare is almost always avoided under Maoist doctrine, as it removes the advantages of mobility and stealth from the usually weaker revolutionary forces. However, in the case of the EPLF as in the case of the Cuban Revolutionaries, there was not adequate territory to pursue a mobile strategy, so strong positional warfare in mountainous terrain was used to bolster the military strength of the numerically inferior revolutionaries while guerrilla bands roamed behind the Ethiopian lines.
66 A concrete application of Mao’s strategic principle number nine, as enunciated earlier in this chapter.
67 The losses incurred in repulsing the counterattacks of 1984–1985 serve as an excellent illustration of the principle that the difficulty of applying Maoist strategy is not in understanding the stages of the conflict but of properly timing the transition between them. In this case (and as the TPLF would continue to maintain) the EPLF prematurely transitioned from a combination of positional defence and guerrilla operation to a conventional mobile offence, thus opening themselves up for losses to a still strong enemy.
68 Connell notes that it took the British two weeks to defeat the Italians at Keren while it took the EPLF a mere four days to defeat the Derg forces. See Connell, Against All Odds, 95–96.
69 This comparison was explicitly made by scholar Basil Davidson on the BBC news broadcast of 21 March 1988. It has since been quoted or paraphrased in the majority of the literature on the Eritrean war.
70 Connell provides several excellent anecdotes about the EPLF’s spirit of morale and momentum. The most telling example of the shift of power is the EPLF’s dismissal of the “Sparta” brigades and their gimmickry. See Connell, Against All Odds, 235.
71 These ideas are central to most other revolutionary war theorists of the time, with Vo Nguyên Giáp’s People’s War, People’s Army (New York: Bantam, 1962) stressing the necessity of popular peasant and proletariat support. Even Che Guevara’s
Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1970), put forth the idea of a people’s war, although the Cuban Revolution at its heart was based in the bourgeoisie.

72 Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 98.

73 This split in turn reflects the split within revolutionary theorists, where one camp (represented primarily in the ideas of Mao and Giap) argues that the education and organization of the populace must precede the launching of any armed struggle. This view is opposed by those theorists who feel that the armed struggle is paramount, and that any and all organization and changes are only truly possible after a military victory. Guevara’s idea of *foquismo*, where the struggle is sparked by military action first and transformation later, falls into this category.

74 A full accounting of these concepts can be found in article 2, section A of the document “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF,” which can be found in a number of publications, including Appendix B of Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution.

75 The example of Zagher is a particularly famous one, as it served as a model village for the EPLF and was reported on in both Connell, Against All Odds, 109–26, and Pool, From Guerrillas to Government, 111–14.

76 See “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF,” article 2, section B.

77 “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF,” article 2, section E.

78 “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF,” article 4, section a, part 8.


80 Pool, From Guerrillas to Government, 124.

81 “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF,” article 3, section B, part 1.

82 Connell, Against All Odds, 38–39.

83 Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 104.

84 “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF,” article 3, section C.

85 Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 102

86 “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF,” article 4, section B.

87 Notably, the role of women in the aftermath of the success of the FLN has been cited as less than satisfactory.

88 Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 106.
Connell does an excellent job explaining the extraordinary effects that these reforms had on women's lives in Eritrea. His chapter “Destroying Shyness” is an excellent window into the process. Connell, Against All Odds, 127–37.

Connell also offers an interesting look into the interconnectedness of the revolutionary consciousness with the refusal of poor peasants to consent to the stripping of Eritrean women of their rights, rightly seeing the parallels between their own new-found freedoms and those of women. Connell, Against All Odds, 136.


Even after the return of Ethiopian troops in the 1978–1985 offensives, the EPLF loyalist areas still resisted the Derg forces and clandestinely aided the EPLF, a decisive factor in the struggle.

The current best work on the subject of the TPLF is Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia.

During this same time period the ELF established closer ties with other Ethiopian dissident groups such as the Ethiopian Democratic Union and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party. These unfortunately did not prove as successful as the TPLF, and during the second Eritrean Civil War the TPLF helped drive the ELF out of Eritrean and Tigrayan territory.


Young, “The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts,” 108. As mentioned in note 67, this is part of a larger debate as to the timing of the alterations of mode of warfare in the Maoist framework of conflict.

Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, 152–54.

Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, 154–55.

Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, 156–57. This splinter group, the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrea (DMLE), eventually fell by the wayside and by 1991 only existed abroad.

Despite the Ogaden War’s conclusion in 1978, Ethiopia and Somalia each maintained significant troop levels in the region and tensions remained high. After a small clash in 1988, the two countries agreed to withdraw their troops from the border region.

Interestingly, the TPLF itself began as a separatist insurgency and only later became a reform insurgency by Clapham’s definition. The transition left them in an interesting form, as they advocated nationalist separatism but in a federal form under a greater Ethiopian government.
Notes to Chapter 4

Chapter 4


6 Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan*, 34.


13 Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, 42.


18 There is some debate as to how connected the 1955 mutineers actually are to the formation of the Anya-nya. For an alternative viewpoint, see Øystein H. Rolandsen, “The Making of the Anya-Nya Insurgency in the Southern Sudan, 1961–64,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 5, no. 2 (2011): 212.

19 Deng, *War of Visions*, 140.


27 Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, 123.
36 During this period scattered groups of Anya-nya fighters occasionally continued to attack the Sudanese military forces, but this was not as part of an accepted strategy of the South to continue the conflict.
37 For example, Numeiry put up Abel Alier as the sole candidate for president of the High Executive Council, ensuring his election. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 115.
38 Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, 41; Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 114. Part of the reason for this was that the underdeveloped educational system of the South often meant Southern fighters lacked the formal education to qualify for officer positions within the Sudanese military.
40 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*, 62.
42 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*, 63.
43 Scott, “The Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Liberation Army (SPLA),” 71.
50 Local militias would offer a potent and, most importantly, inexpensive tool to pursue the continuing counter-insurgency campaign.
53 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*, 74.
54 As seen in the previous chapter.
57 Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, 116. As Johnson notes, there had been the assumption that the initial rupture would be between Dinka and Nuer forces, but instead the strong ties of some SPLA forces, which contained both Dinka and Nuer troops, led to a confrontation between two groups of Nuer combatants.
59 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*, 90.
63 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*, 106. This was accomplished with significant Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) involvement.
Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, 31. Johnson notes that initially at least SANU kept their slogan as “self-determination” to avoid the negative optics of secessionist attempts, but the leadership generally assumed self-determination would lead directly into independence.

They did, however, reach out to Southern officers in the Sudanese Army to try and get them to defect to form their own forces. See Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, 64.

The Anya-nya were very lightly armed until 1964, when the Abboud government was in turmoil and more hardware fell to them. The surrender of the Simbas fleeing the Congo also offered a ready store of arms. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, 31.


Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, 143.

The Soviets would deploy significant forces in both these regions. While they offered military hardware to the North and there are some accusations of the provision of pilots, the Soviet involvement in the Sudan never reached the levels of these two primary conflicts.


**Part III**

An excellent account of this period can be found written by the hand of Gorbachev himself. See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (Norwalk, CT: Easton Press, 1996).
2 A series of interviews and recollections of this coup attempt have been archived online for reading and use, called collectively “Voice from and (Attempted) Soviet Coup,” edited by Anya Chernyakhovskaya, John Jirik, and Nikolai Lamm, at https://sites.google.com/site/jiriksoviet/.

3 In stark contrast to the Congo Crisis, where eventually the United Nations intervened to patch the entirety of the Congo back together following the multiple fissures within its territories.


6 See chapter 3 and its ending.

7 As noted in the initial chapter, this idea is largely taken from Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel. “Let’s Stick Together: Understanding Africa’s Secessionist Deficit.” African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 400.


9 This isn’t to say that there were not several states that rejected this bipolar construct. Led by Nasser in Egypt and Sukarno in Indonesia, a large bloc of the decolonizing world chose to cast itself as non-aligned in the great global struggle and not hew to any particular allegiance. However, the simple fact of the matter was that the vast majority of these countries were economically underdeveloped, and despite the growth and support offered by the non-aligned faction, they still needed the manufactured goods and global markets that the two poles of the struggle offered. While these states did not necessarily accept the global Cold War, they were obliged to still deal with its effects and shape their diplomatic, economic, and military choices around its dynamics.


11 Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5.

12 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 5–6.


14 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 160.
Uganda appears in both lists thanks to the career of Field Marshal Idi Amin, who rose to power in Uganda in 1971 under the patronage of the West and enjoyed warm relations with Britain and Israel. However, by the mid-1970s these patrons had cooled on Amin and were beginning to refuse his demands for robust military and financial support. This led to Amin seeking and receiving Soviet support for his regime, as well as conspicuously dropping his connections to the capitalist powers.

Mobutu would briefly attempt some show reforms to continue staying in the West’s grace, but these would not last long enough or go far enough to qualify as anything beyond a façade. See Jason K. Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012), 64–65.

This had also shown some recent non-secessionist success with the victory of Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army in the Ugandan Bush War, which brought Museveni to power. Some discussion of his reported methods can be found in his speech to the US Army’s Command and General Staff College captured in Yoweri Museveni, “The Strategy of Protracted People’s War: Uganda,” in *Military Review* 88, no. 6 (2008): 4–13.

As will be discussed at greater length later in this chapter, the Somali population had been divided between regions controlled by the British, French, Italians, and Ethiopians. During decolonization, only Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland were joined to become Somalia. French Somaliland voted against joining Somalia, although this plebiscite is still looked upon with some suspicion. The Ogaden region, despite being a Somali homeland, was retained by the Ethiopian state per their 1897 treaty with Great Britain. More will be discussed on this region shortly. Finally, a significant Somali population lived in the northeast region of Kenya; this population would later fight the lengthy but ultimately unsuccessful Shifta War through the 1960s to try and effect irredentist goals.

The Haud was the extensive grassy lowlands within the Ethiopian-held region of Somali territory. It had commonly been a source of contention, with Ethiopia claiming the Haud but with it bordering Somalia, Djibouti, and British Somaliland.

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1 Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, 53.
2 Notes to Chapter 5
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### Chapter 5

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7 Lewis, Making and Breaking States in Africa, 119; Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 187. Tareke goes to great lengths to discuss the coordination between the WSLF and Siad Barre’s military regime.

8 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 39.

9 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 42.

10 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 61.


12 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 62.


14 Beyond that of the Derg regime in Ethiopia.

15 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 62.

16 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 63; Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty, and the State in Somalia, 211.


19 This conflict is most fixed in international eyes through the American-led Operation Restore Hope.

20 Part of the tensions between the north and south had to do with their colonial history. The north had been a British colony and had been administered as British Somaliland; the south had been an Italian colony and administered as Italian Somaliland. These divisions would follow Somalia into its unification and decolonization, where the administrators and soldiers of the former British colony were often marginalized in the new government.

21 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 82.

22 Lewis, Making and Breaking States in Africa, 151–53.

23 Lewis, Making and Breaking States in Africa, 160–61; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 89.

24 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 89.


26 Lewis, Making and Breaking States in Africa, 169.


31 Diya-paying groups are the family groupings that are defined by who would owe the fine for the wrongdoing of a member and thereby form an ad hoc self-contained authority group, as the group has direct responsibility for its members and their behaviour.


34 Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 121.


36 With the death of Aideed, the strongest faction in the south lost its leader and thus any drive for “federalism” was significantly weakened.


38 Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 125.

39 The Transitional National Government was set up in the southern part of Somalia in Mogadishu and purported to represent the entirety of former Somalia as the legitimate government. It had been granted wide international recognition upon its formation but had been unable to effectively project its power and authority to all of its claimed territory. The Transitional National Government has since been superseded by first the Transitional Federal Government and now the Federal Government of Somalia.

40 Puntland was another breakaway territory that attained self-government upon the collapse of the central Somalian state. Encompassing the northeastern portion of Somalia, including the tip of the Horn, Puntland managed to form its own government and has largely governed itself since. However, since the rise of the Federal Government, Puntland has been increasingly aligning itself with the central government and has offered no support or recognition to Somaliland.

41 Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 127.

42 Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 133.


Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 33.

Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 34.


Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 142–43.

Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 81.

Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 153. It is estimated that Ethiopian trade makes up 30–50 percent of the total trade passing through Berbera.


Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 41.


**Chapter 6**


5. Starratt, “Tuareg Slavery and Slave Trade,” 84.


10 Starratt, “Tuareg Slavery and Slave Trade,” 88.
12 Starratt, “Tuareg Slavery and Slave Trade,” 98.
13 Starratt, “Tuareg Slavery and Slave Trade,” 98.
16 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 33.
17 The OCRS was floated as a concept in 1956–57 but survived as an idea beyond the independence of the French Colonies. However, given the vague issues around border, sovereignty, and trade involved in its conception, the nationalist governments did not find it as appealing as did its architects. See LeCocq, Disputed Desert, 41.
18 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 60–61.
19 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 40.
20 This date is generally recognized due to the theft at gunpoint of a native goumier’s gun and equipment by two Kel Tamasheq insurgents and the insurgents’ subsequent declaration of resistance. See LeCocq, Disputed Desert, 151.
21 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 161.
22 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 168.
23 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 168.
24 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 168.
25 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 175.
26 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 177.
27 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 180.
28 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 186.
29 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 158.
31 Kohl, “Modern Nomads, Vagabonds, or Cosmopolitans?” 452–53.
32 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 206.
33 Kohl, “Modern Nomads, Vagabonds, or Cosmopolitans?” 450.
34 Lecocq, *Disputed Desert*, 207.

35 Lecocq, *Disputed Desert*, 222.

36 The applicability of the nation-state ideal can be seen through the Tenekra creed of “One Country, One Goal, One People.” See LeCocq, *Disputed Desert*, 218.


38 Lecocq, *Disputed Desert*, 233.


40 At the time the government of Morocco was fighting to retain its control over the region known as the Western Sahara against its indigenous liberation movement, the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, or Polisario. The Western Sahara had been annexed by Morocco as part of a tripartite agreement with Spain, who had ruled the region since 1884. However, its local populace believed they had the right to self-determination and had taken up arms to enforce that right. Algeria had been supporting Polisario’s efforts against Morocco and had been urging the older Kel Tamasheq leaders to channel the armed support of their followers to aid Polisario’s efforts as well.

41 Lecocq *Disputed Desert*, 239.


43 Lecocq, *Disputed Desert*, 244.


45 Technicals were the name given to arms platforms used in the Libyan-Chad wars that were constructed out of all-terrain four-wheel-drive pickup trucks with a crew-served weapon in the bed, usually a heavy machine gun or a rocket launcher. These platforms became iconic within these conflicts, combining powerful weaponry with reliable mobility, and their centrality to the Chadian war efforts eventually led to these military operations being called the Toyota Wars after the ubiquitous Toyota Hilux pickup trucks that made up the bulk of their technicals. Many armed groups noted the effectiveness and simplicity of these weapons systems and they were quickly adopted across the developing world.


47 Lecocq, *Disputed Desert*, 257.


LeCocq notes that ARLA split off as a group of Kel Adagh that felt that significant reform was needed within Kel Tamasheq society, which had caused tension with the more moderate leadership of the MPA. See LeCocq, *Disputed Desert*, 267.

Krings, “Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger,” 61.


Krings, “Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger,” 61.


Krings, “Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger,” 61.


Alpha Oumar Konaré was a scholar and political activist in Mali during the administrations of President Keita and General Traoré. Following the arrest of General Traoré by his Presidential Guard in 1991, Konaré participated in the transition to a representative democracy and won election to the presidency in 1992.


Krings, “Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger,” 61.

With both these organizations being represented by a singular figure in Iyad ag Ghali, as noted earlier.

Lecocq, *Disputed Desert*, 267.


Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation,” 516.
Conclusion

1 As noted, this form of warfare often took a specifically Maoist cast, hence the use of the term "protracted warfare"; however, these sorts of conflicts were waged across much of the world in very similar ways throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with additional military and political thought being imported from other revolutionary places such as Cuba, Algeria, and even Yugoslavia.

2 In this case, specifically the premises laid out in the United Nations charter, with the most relevant pieces being chapter I, article 1, and chapter XII, article 76.


A good overview of these powers and their roles is in Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 18–29. The remainder of the book also offers several well-researched case studies illustrating the role of these international patrons in African conflicts.

In some cases these were issues of humanitarian interest, as noted in Alicia C. Decker and Andrea L. Arrington, *Africanizing Democracies, 1980–Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2; for others, as noted, the new perceived threat of Islamism was cited as a deep concern, as noted in Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa*, 214.

Now the Democratic Republic of the Congo.


Shaba was the new name given to Katanga during Mobutu's period of Zairanization.


Their website is still active and discusses their activities. See MASSOB, http://massob.biafranet.com/.


Salva Kiir is Dinka and Machar is Nuer.


27 The Islamic Courts Union was a reaction to the continued violence of the warlord conflicts. The ICU arose as a stern but pacifying force in the south of Somalia and rapidly gained support and legitimacy. See “Profile: Somalia’s Islamic Courts,” BBC.com, 6 June 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5051588.stm.


41 ECOWAS, for example, sent contingents with increasing ability to stabilize the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, while SADC intervened in Lesotho and helped organize the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

42 Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa*, 213.
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Wars fought for political separation have become omnipresent in post-colonial Africa. From the division of Sudan, to the continued fragmentation of Somalia, and the protracted struggles of Cabinda and Azawad, conflict over secession and separation continues to the present day.

This is the first single volume to examine the historical arc of secession and secessionist conflict across sub-Saharan Africa. Paying particular attention to the development of secessionist conflicts and their evolving goals, *Secession and Separatist Conflicts in Postcolonial Africa* draws on case studies and rigorous research to examine three waves of secessionist movements, themselves defined by international conflict and change. Using detailed case studies, the authors offer a framework to understand how secession and separation occur, how these are influenced by both preceding movements and global political trends, and how their ongoing legacies continue to shape African regional politics.

Deeply engaging and thoroughly researched, this book presents a nuanced and important new overview of African separatist and secessionist conflicts. It addresses the structures, goals, and underlying influences of these movements within a broader global context to impart a rich understanding of why these conflicts are waged, and how they succeed or fail.

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