



University of Calgary

PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository

University of Calgary Press

University of Calgary Press Open Access Books

2021-11

Stress Tested: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Canadian National Security

University of Calgary Press


West, L., Juneau, T., & Amarasingam, A. (Eds.). (2021). *Stress Tested: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Canadian National Security*. University of Calgary Press.

<http://hdl.handle.net/1880/114134>

book

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>

Downloaded from PRISM: <https://prism.ucalgary.ca>



STRESS TESTED: THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

Edited by Leah West, Thomas Juneau,
and Amarnath Amarasingam

ISBN 978-1-77385-244-7

THIS BOOK IS AN OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK. It is an electronic version of a book that can be purchased in physical form through any bookseller or on-line retailer, or from our distributors. Please support this open access publication by requesting that your university purchase a print copy of this book, or by purchasing a copy yourself. If you have any questions, please contact us at ucpress@ucalgary.ca

Cover Art: The artwork on the cover of this book is not open access and falls under traditional copyright provisions; it cannot be reproduced in any way without written permission of the artists and their agents. The cover can be displayed as a complete cover image for the purposes of publicizing this work, but the artwork cannot be extracted from the context of the cover of this specific work without breaching the artist's copyright.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE: This open-access work is published under a Creative Commons licence. This means that you are free to copy, distribute, display or perform the work as long as you clearly attribute the work to its authors and publisher, that you do not use this work for any commercial gain in any form, and that you in no way alter, transform, or build on the work outside of its use in normal academic scholarship without our express permission. If you want to reuse or distribute the work, you must inform its new audience of the licence terms of this work. For more information, see details of the Creative Commons licence at: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

UNDER THE CREATIVE COMMONS LICENCE YOU MAY:

- read and store this document free of charge;
- distribute it for personal use free of charge;
- print sections of the work for personal use;
- read or perform parts of the work in a context where no financial transactions take place.

UNDER THE CREATIVE COMMONS LICENCE YOU MAY NOT:

- gain financially from the work in any way;
- sell the work or seek monies in relation to the distribution of the work;
- use the work in any commercial activity of any kind;
- profit a third party indirectly via use or distribution of the work;
- distribute in or through a commercial body (with the exception of academic usage within educational institutions such as schools and universities);
- reproduce, distribute, or store the cover image outside of its function as a cover of this work;
- alter or build on the work outside of normal academic scholarship.



Acknowledgement: We acknowledge the wording around open access used by Australian publisher, **re.press**, and thank them for giving us permission to adapt their wording to our policy <http://www.re-press.org>

Defence Intelligence and COVID-19

James Cox

Introduction

Did the Defence Intelligence Enterprise ever lose its effectiveness as a result of constraints imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic? Throughout 2020, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) conducted over thirty missions at home and abroad. Some were short-term. Others continue in or near conflict zones around the world. Many operations were adjusted to varying degrees as a result of the effects of COVID-19 (Government of Canada 2020c). Despite constraints, all missions received effective intelligence support.

This chapter explores the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Defence Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) active across DND and the CAF at the strategic and operational levels during 2020. It shows that the DIE, despite having to adopt novel personnel and systemic work practices to meet mandated public health requirements, continued to meet all priority intelligence requirements set by government and delivered operational intelligence products to deployed CAF missions. However, such continued effectiveness was not easy.

The DIE is an enabling function that provides strategic and operational intelligence to deployed military missions at home and abroad, and to government decision-making related to the defence of national interests and pursuit of national objectives. It co-operates extensively with other government intelligence organizations across the broader

Canadian intelligence community, as well as with the intelligence agencies of Canada's closest allies and partners. Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) is the institutional lead of the DIE, but it also has a corporate role that contributes to defence policy development, provides all-source intelligence analysis, generates deployable intelligence capabilities, and conducts training and professional development programs. Within CFINTCOM, throughout the pandemic, capability generation enjoyed the same primacy of effort as intelligence production, while other activities became less urgent.¹

In early 2020, when COVID-19 arrived in Canada and authorities imposed decisive public health restrictions across DND and the CAF, defence intelligence activity was initially—and dramatically—slowed and reduced. Nonetheless, DND and CAF attention remained focussed on what *must be* done, particularly the provision of intelligence products to senior decision-makers, ongoing missions, and prioritized intelligence support to allies and partners. By the end of the summer, the DIE had found its “sea legs” and, thanks to a number of procedural and workforce adjustments, had returned to a more comfortable, but no less hectic, level and pace of activity.

In the sections that follow, I first outline the general effects of COVID-19 at the national strategic level within National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), which sets the stage for a more detailed look at what happened within CFINTCOM and the impact of COVID-19 on defence intelligence generally. Concluding material follows.

There are three principal reasons why the DIE continued to function effectively during the pandemic. First, it was never a question whether defence intelligence production would continue, requirements would be met, or deployed missions supported. Military personnel in particular are trained to operate in various threat environments, and COVID-19 was just another threat environment to be tolerated and mitigated. Intelligence products have continued to flow throughout the pandemic, although their presentation was not always as polished as had been the custom before.

Second, military doctrine and DND instructions placed a high priority on workforce protection. Any organization is unlikely to operate at full effectiveness if personnel fall ill or become subject to unmitigated risks that divert attention and effort from the main mission. With the warning

of COVID-19 in early 2020, DND/CAF leaders at all levels set their minds to implementing force protection protocols that conformed to regional and local public health measures.

Third, the defence team is well acquainted with adaptation and change, so DIE leaders at all levels were alert to the need to monitor performance and change work habits as required. Throughout the pandemic, restrictions and practices were modified to meet operational requirements. Some weeks were slower than others, but local “battle rhythms” eventually stabilized, and work continued.

CFINTCOM is one of a number of military commands headquartered in Ottawa, and the DIE is systemically integrated in the defence operational planning process, so a general review of the overall NDHQ reaction to COVID-19 will help understand what happened within CFINTCOM and how the pandemic affected the DIE.

COVID-19 in National Defence Headquarters

Long before warnings of COVID-19 began to surface in late 2019, the DND/CAF already had a counter-pandemic contingency plan in place—Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) LASER. It described the intended response to a worldwide pandemic of an influenza-like disease. This contingency plan had been drafted as a result of the recognition of a pandemic as one of the eight modern potential threats to Canadian national security listed in the 2004 National Security Policy (Government of Canada 2004). When activated, CONPLAN LASER became Operation (OP) LASER (Government of Canada 2021c).

The four phases of OP LASER cover measures to protect defence personnel and reduce the impacts of a pandemic in order to sustain operational capabilities and readiness in support of national objectives and requests for assistance. It is important to note that there are two aspects to this operation. The first is focussed on military force protection, integrity, and effectiveness. The second provides for military support to civil authorities. Phase 1 (pandemic preparedness) was ongoing in late 2019, with routine monitoring of world pandemic threats and mitigation planning. During this phase, in February 2020, the CAF were already supporting government activity by opening a quarantine centre at Canadian Forces

Base Trenton to receive Canadians evacuated from Wuhan in China and Canadian tourists evacuated from a cruise ship in a Japanese port. As COVID-19 continued to spread and related risks were better understood, in part due to medical intelligence (MEDINT) reports dealing with probable COVID-19 effects on CAF troops generally and deployed missions in particular, the Deputy Minister (DM) and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) activated Phase 2 (pandemic alert) on 2 March 2020. This phase involved continued monitoring of COVID-19 and the adoption of protective measures as directed by local commanders.

On March 4, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced the creation of a Cabinet Committee to lead the federal response to COVID-19 (Prime Minister's Office 2020). On March 11, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the crisis to be a global pandemic (World Health Organization 2021). Then on March 13, Parliament agreed to adjourn for five weeks because of COVID-19. That same day, the DM and CDS activated Phase 3 (pandemic response) of Operation LASER (Colonel Orest Babij, pers. comm. 2020). Phase 3 formally recognized widespread and continuous transmission of COVID-19 in the general population and the imminent threat of its impact on military personnel and missions. Responses to civil authorities' requests for assistance continued to be received and, where approved by government, actioned.

Within NDHQ, complementary direction from the DM and CDS imposed a virtual lockdown. People were sent home and only essential personnel remained in their offices or at their worksites. Direction was given to activate command-level business continuity plans. Out of an abundance of caution, the immediate intent was to adopt force protection measures based on guidance by regional and local public health officials (Colonel Orest Babij, pers. comm. 2020; Colonel Steven Desjardins, pers. comm. 2020).

Two priorities were set. First, a deliberate strategic prioritization of work ensued so as to identify what *must* be done. This included responding to requests for assistance from civil authorities. What *should* be done was tackled as best it could be, usually from home offices. What *could* be done would be addressed later. Second, staff who were required to do work that *must* be done continued to work in their offices in NDHQ. Others worked remotely from home. According to Marie-Hélène Chayer, the Assistant

Chief of Defence Intelligence at the time, all operational and deployed force protection requirements continued to be met, but longer-term, less important non-operational activity was put off for another day.

Personal routines changed. Those who continued to work in their offices had their work environment regulated by a number of new protocols, including one-way traffic arrows on the floor, copious amounts of hand sanitizer located on tabletops, and maximum limits on the number of personnel allowed on any level, conference room, or elevator at any one time. Everyone had to wear a mask when not at their desks. Custodial staff increased the frequency with which they cleaned office furniture. Personnel dispatched to work at home proceeded to organize their home offices and personal work routines, shaped by family circumstances.

As March turned into April, there was considerable experimentation with various online video conference platforms and email connections at the unclassified level. Local commanders and civilian managers adopted measures that suited their situations. These challenges were interesting enough within Canada, but with travel being cancelled, international co-operation brought its own set of problems. Face-to-face meetings with allies and partners are important for relationship dynamics, but adverse effects of the pandemic were not as grim in this area as might have been expected because allies and partners were facing their own pandemic challenges and force protection restrictions. Mutual understanding and empathy prevailed.

With over thirty different operations at home and abroad, DND/CAF had to conduct a detailed analysis of each mission to determine the adjustments required to protect deployed personnel while ensuring the achievement of critical mission objectives. Adjustments ranged from delaying deployment of some capabilities and amending the number of military personnel deployed to modifying operational and training activity within deployed missions, all of which sought to achieve a balance between acceptable risk factors for personnel, the ability to sustain the mission, and the impact any change would have on the mission. In some cases, adjustments came because of a pause in operational activities by host or partner nations (Government of Canada 2020c). For example, as a result of the effects of COVID-19, the United States Pacific Fleet restricted the timing and scope of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020, a large multinational

maritime exercise usually conducted over two months, to just the last two weeks of August with no training events ashore (Government of Canada 2020f; see also Saideman, von Hlatky, and Hopkins, this volume). In Latvia, Canada's battle group deployed as part of Operation REASSURANCE adjusted how it trained and cut most contact with the general public outside its barracks (Berthiaume 2020).

Throughout April 2020, NDHQ settled into something of a routine. The to-and-fro of various force protection initiatives abated somewhat but never completely stopped. On May 1 the DM and CDS were able to issue their first of many regular DM/CDS Joint Directives that served to control defence work across the department and throughout all CAF commands, formations, and units. This first Joint Directive was clear regarding its applicability

to all employees of the Department of National Defence (DND employees) [as] an order that applies to all officers and non-commissioned members of the CAF, and any other persons granted access to defence establishments in accordance with the Defence Controlled Access Area Regulations, SOR/86-957 (ref A) and the Inspection and Search Defence Regulations (ref B). Members of the Defence Team (DT) on named domestic or international missions will follow the direction and guidance issued in relevant operational tasking orders. (Government of Canada 2020e)

In early autumn, DND/CAF had accepted that they would have to continue to function safely in a COVID-19 threat environment for the foreseeable future. On 22 October 2020, things had settled to the extent that the DM and CDS could issue a "CDS/DM Directive for Sustained Activities in a COVID-19 Environment," which was updated in December 2020. In outlining guiding principles, the directive stated that,

Notwithstanding COVID-19 transmission rates, DND/CAF will ensure unfettered continuity of operations for critical capabilities and services to include designated operational force elements . . . military support and advice to government,

command and control, intelligence. (Government of Canada 2020b)

The directive went on to define enabling priorities, including the direction to “continue to execute all aspects of the intelligence function.” As well, given DND/CAF experience adapting to the COVID-19 environment and the need to enhance its intelligence practices, CFINTCOM was specifically tasked with “work[ing] with the Privy Council Office and other intelligence organizations to explore the feasibility of establishing a joint intelligence fusion team to better harmonize COVID-19 specific requirements.” There is no public information on whether or how this last direction has been actioned, but since cabinet formed a committee to deal with the pandemic, it would not be unusual for the Privy Council Office to establish something of a COVID-19 intelligence working group under the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister.

CFINTCOM

The Commander of CFINTCOM is the functional authority for defence intelligence and, as such, reports directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff. Concurrently, he also holds the appointment of Chief of Defence Intelligence, which reports directly to both the CDS and the DM (Government of Canada 2020d). CFINTCOM’s principal role is to provide credible, timely, and integrated defence intelligence capabilities, products, and services to support Canada’s national security objectives (Government of Canada 2016). Within that role, CFINTCOM has three key responsibilities. First, it provides multi-source intelligence analysis, strategic warning, and threat assessments, while also conducting integrated collection management and managing the defence intelligence cycle, including coordination of defence intelligence requirements. Second, in its “force generator” mode, CFINTCOM trains, prepares, and deploys intelligence capabilities to meet DND/CAF intelligence requirements. Third, the command develops policies and directives governing defence intelligence activities and leads compliance reviews of intelligence activity throughout the DIE. The detailed organization of CFINTCOM is not publicly available, it is generally organized as shown in figure 9.1:




FIGURE 9.1: Outline of CFINTCOM organization

CFINTCOM has an integrated civilian-military staff, one branch of which is responsible for intelligence production and led by a senior public servant. The intelligence production branch includes a Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DSTI), with a senior civilian defence scientist at its head. A MEDINT cell is located within DSTI, led by a military Health Services Officer. Far from being “tucked away on the edges of the country’s security and defence establishment,” as claimed in some media reporting, the leader of the MEDINT cell provided frequent input to intelligence analysis in early 2020 on the existence, effects, and likely spread of COVID-19 (Brewster 2020; Marie-Hélène Chayer, pers. comm. 2020).

Media stories tended to either misinterpret the role of MEDINT or misunderstand it altogether. The CFINTCOM MEDINT cell was seldom more than one person working within DSTI. Its role was to monitor and report on disease and other health threats that would impact CAF personnel, both at home and abroad on deployed missions. It contributed to CFINTCOM strategic and operational analyses. The cell did not have a mandate to report findings outside DND/CAF. It is not a “central” intelligence agency.

The head of the MEDINT cell routinely collected open-source information from the WHO, other countries, and relevant public websites, and she often had classified liaison with equivalent offices across the Five Eyes and NATO, particularly with US military MEDINT elements. MEDINT products were not disseminated as sole-source assessments, but were crafted into all-source intelligence products reported to the DM and CDS, which enabled effective DND/CAF decision-making, as all intelligence should.

DND/CAF MEDINT reports would have been shared, as is routine, among other intelligence assessment offices in government, such as the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat in the Privy Council Office, or with Global Affairs Canada. Research found no indication that CAF MEDINT was requested by, or shared with, the Public Health Agency of Canada, which had its own pandemic surveillance capability and was regularly in contact with the WHO and other governments.

When the NDHQ lockdown came in mid-March 2020, the strategic intelligence production staff immediately prioritized the assessments they were in the process of completing.² People working on those assessments that *must* be done and requiring frequent access to classified information systems continued to work from the office. Other less urgent assessments were completed by staff at home, who came back into the office only when they absolutely had to have access to classified material. Risk-management decisions were delegated down to mid-level managers, who tweaked staff working hours to achieve an effective workflow and manage a work/home balance that was different for every individual.

Somewhat unexpectedly, human resource management became the most challenging issue. No one questioned the need to continue producing intelligence assessments, but trying to manage who was needed where and when required engaged leadership at all levels. Supervisors had to remain attentive to a workforce sometimes stressed by complex family issues at home or nervous about returning to work in a pandemic environment. The synchronization of work activities needed to meet the different expectations of missions, clients, and senior leaders (who were now always in the building), allies, health-care officials, spouses, and kids was tricky, but eventually found its own rhythm in the different staff offices across CFINTCOM.

Over time, supervisors became aware of possible adverse effects on people's mental health, perhaps caused by social isolation at home. As it turned out, many analysts apparently enjoyed working from home, alone, where they could think and work at their own speed, without undue distraction or interruption, family life notwithstanding.

With their attention directed to the new personnel management issues, there was less opportunity for supervisors to provide analysts with the usual detailed instructions for the completion of various assessments. Some analysts may have momentarily faltered without such direction, but, in a pleasant surprise, it soon became apparent that many analysts relished the opportunity to fill the instructional void with their own novel ideas and inclinations about how to proceed on certain issues. This development allowed senior leaders to identify those with talent and potential who "bloomed" during a stressful period and to "mark" those who might develop into future effective intelligence managers.

Interestingly, co-operation with intelligence allies seemed to improve during this period because everyone was in the same boat. Not only were various parties more inclined to connect online, assessment burden-sharing among partners picked up because, alone, no one could continue to do what they had been doing at the same level. "Tag-teaming" became common as co-operative allied groups shared analytical projects to the benefit of all. For example, in a NATO context, in "normal" times, a working group of allied analysts might meet to collaborate on a joint analysis of a certain issue, but now, with time and availability at a premium, close allies more readily accepted products developed by one nation and subsequently shared with all. The Canadian cadre, being smaller than that of its principal allies, enjoyed some agility in switching from subject to subject as prioritization demanded. It was often hectic, but throughout the year, assessment products remained actionable, relevant, and timely, even if they were not presented in as polished a format as had been the case before the pandemic.

Another component of CFINTCOM, the CF Intelligence Group, provides a range of specialist intelligence collection capabilities, including imagery from the Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre, human intelligence in Joint Task Force X, counter-intelligence in the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU), the Joint Meteorological

Centre (JMC), and the Mapping and Charting Establishment. It also oversees the CF School of Meteorology and the CF School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI). The Commander and staff of the CF Intelligence Group are located in NDHQ, but the units have personnel deployed across the country and on missions abroad.

Some military officers with command responsibility were unsatisfied with their ability to remotely exercise command influence. Command is an intensely personal endeavour and when both commanders and subordinates are working remotely from a laptop at home, personal presence and influence are missing. Some found video-teleconferencing useful, but not everyone had access to such a capability. Not surprisingly, this issue was felt more acutely by leaders than by their subordinates.

At a personal level, in the course of a day, COVID-19 restrictions had one senior officer with command responsibilities going from working in the office all the time, when not travelling, to working from home exclusively. Within a week it became apparent that he and his key staff could not effectively continue remote work because communicating via a Blackberry and the intermittent Defence Virtual Private Network Infrastructure connection was ineffective. The network was eventually upgraded (Government of Canada 2020a). CF Intelligence Group leadership initially returned to the office about one to two days a week, then increased to three to four days when needed. At the time of writing, their “battle rhythm” remains about two to four days a week in the office, with some days seeing reduced work hours.

Significantly, in March 2020, as part of the original lockdown, the CDS decisively ordered the cessation of all CAF training activity. Courses stopped running and candidates were returned to their home units. Field exercises were abruptly ended, and units redeployed back to garrisons. Imperative training for senior officers about to be posted abroad as defence attachés had to be completed via a distance learning module.

At the non-commissioned member level, not only were candidates already in training at the CFSMI ordered to go home before completing their training, but personnel waiting to commence training would be held up for even longer, creating a projected shortage of future junior ranks in the training pipeline. The situation was not so dire in the junior officer ranks, which were largely up to strength before the pandemic hit.

More broadly, when training ceased in March 2020, CFSMI had been in the middle of a multi-year plan to increase training capacity, with the objective of bringing the Intelligence Branch up to its permitted manning level. The plan was set back because of the shutdown. Even when training was allowed to start up again in the summer, capacity remained lower than usual because of imposed physical distancing. At the time of writing, in early 2021, centralized CAF recruit training is still operating at considerably less than full capacity, so the flow of entry-level personnel to CFSMI for primary intelligence training also remains low. However, the reduction in primary intelligence training allowed CFSMI to increase the number of more senior training courses, a development that is serving to reduce the backlog, built up in recent years, of those requiring more advanced intelligence training (Colonel Orest Babij, pers. comm. 2020).³

It can also be noted that while in-house training was suspended, CFSMI instructional staff turned their minds to adapting training courses to online formats, which have been subsequently instituted for a number of courses (Colonel Orest Babij, pers. comm. 2020). This will allow for more flexible training of more Intelligence Branch personnel in the future.

Between April and June 2020, NDHQ began planning for the resumption of “normal” business activity, and the leadership spent much time and effort ensuring a safe working environment for those returning to the office. During this time and later into the summer, the CF Intelligence Group met all of its force generation requirements. Production, however, was adversely affected, particularly at the CF Joint Imagery Centre, where a very high percentage of the work is highly classified, and at the Mapping and Charting Establishment, where tremendously large data files could not be efficiently accessed remotely. On the plus side, many analysts at both units took advantage of newly created online training opportunities provided by Canada’s intelligence allies and sought to adapt as best they could. The CF National Counter-Intelligence Unit, for its part, took a hit in terms of its activity. Details are not publicly available, but one might imagine the constraints experienced by this largely HUMINT-oriented endeavour. Despite all this, it was “business as usual” at the Joint Meteorological Centre, where staff continued to provide 24/7/365 meteorological support to the CAF. On balance, though, at the end of 2020, the

CF Intelligence Group had still not returned to its full, pre-COVID-19 posture or capacity.

Overall, as a force employer, CFINTCOM continued to meet its strategic intelligence-production requirements, but perhaps with less polish than it, or its clients, had been accustomed to. It might be that a senior leader who would normally receive a personal briefing, presented by a briefer with a practiced script and polished set of PowerPoint slides, might now get only an email with slides attached, or just the slide deck itself, or just a verbal briefing without notes or slides. The CFINTCOM force generation role was slowed somewhat but continued to work to catch up. At the time of writing in early 2021, defence intelligence at the national strategic level continued to meet all requirements, and as time goes on, it moves steadily closer to regaining the operating level it had before the arrival of COVID-19.

Conclusion

The 2004 National Security Policy recognized a pandemic as one of eight significant potential threats to Canadian national security. Accordingly, DND/CAF had a counter-pandemic contingency plan in place when COVID-19 arrived. When it hit, defence leaders immediately prioritized essential work and related staffing requirements. DND/CAF also adopted force protection measures ordered by public health authorities. Those who did not have to work in the office were ordered to work at home. Despite the disruption, the DIE continued to meet prioritized intelligence production and force generation responsibilities. Mandatory intelligence products were delivered as required, but they were not as aesthetically pleasing as they once were. In these circumstances, substance trumped looks.

Leaders, managers, and staff alike found the effort to gain effective balance and rhythm in workflows, at all levels, to be a significant early challenge, as personnel juggled work in the office or at home—the latter for some or all of the time, depending on the individual's role. Family circumstances influenced who could do how much, and when. However, as leaders and their staff members settled into workable routines, people became more comfortable with communications technology and remote

work. Some staff are keen to continue working remotely where it is appropriate to do so.

In the end, it was never a question of whether the DIE could or would continue to work effectively in support of deployed missions and government decision-making requirements. COVID-19 just made the work more difficult, but it was nothing CFINTCOM and the DIE could not overcome. In fact, the lessons learned regarding new technical tools and processes will likely benefit the DIE in the long run (Marie-Hélène Chayer, pers. comm. 2021).

NOTES

- 1 I owe a debt of gratitude to Colonel (Retired) Steven Desjardins and Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Greg Jensen, both of whom are experienced military intelligence officers who now provide contracted intelligence policy advice at both the strategic and operational level in DND/CAF. Their help in understanding “the big and long picture” is truly appreciated.
- 2 I am indebted to Mme Marie-Hélène Chayer, Assistant Chief of Defence Intelligence in CFINTCOM for the information regarding intelligence production in this section.
- 3 I thank Colonel Babij for his information about the CF Intelligence Group, and also for his perceptive insights into the complexities of the CF Intelligence Branch generally.

REFERENCES

- Babij, Colonel Orest. 2020. Canadian Armed Forces. Personal interview via Zoom. Ottawa, 26 October 2020, with follow-up email 4 January 2021.
- Berthiaume, Lee. 2020. “Canadian Troops in Latvia Stay On Target as COVID-19 Upends Other Missions.” *CTV News*, 21 May 2020. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canadian-troops-in-latvia-stay-on-target-as-covid-19-upends-other-missions-1.4947986/>.
- Brewster, Murray. 2020. “Canadian Military Intelligence Unit Issued Warning about Wuhan Outbreak Back in January.” *CBC News*, 10 April 2020. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/coronavirus-pandemic-covid-canadian-military-intelligence-wuhan-1.5528381>.
- Chayer, Marie-Hélène. 2020. Assistant chief of defence intelligence, Department of National Defence. Personal interview via Zoom. Ottawa, 10 November 2020, with follow-up email 4 January 2021.

Desjardins, Colonel Steven (Retired). Contract adviser to CFINTCOM. Personal interview via Zoom. Ottawa, 22 October 2020.

Government of Canada. 2004. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Ottawa: Privy Council Office, April 2004. <http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.686980/publication.html>.

- . 2016. “Canadian Forces Intelligence Command.” Last modified 12 August 2016. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/organizational-structure/canadian-forces-intelligence-command.html>.
- . 2020a. “Ask Anything: ADM (IM), Len Bastien Answers Questions about Defence O365, Wi-Fi Connectivity, GPNet Stations.” Last modified 25 August 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/video/leadership/2020/08-25-dtnews.html>.
- . 2020b. “CDS/DM Directive for Sustained Activities in a COVID-19 Environment.” Last modified 17 December 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/cds-dm-directive-fall-2020-posture.html>.
- . 2020c. “Changes to Military Operations in Response to COVID-19.” 18 September 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html>.
- . 2020d. “Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command—Rear Admiral Scott Bishop.” Defence 101—Transition Binder, last modified 11 March 2021. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/defence-101/2020/03/defence-101/cfintcom.html>.
- . 2020e. “DM/CDS Joint Directive—DND/CAF COVID-19 Public Health Measures and Personal Protection.” 1 May 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/dm-cds-joint-directive.html>.
- . 2020f. “Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).” 26 June 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2020/09/canadian-armed-forces-successfully-complete-rimpac-2020.html>.
- . 2020g. “Joint CDS/DM Update on Defence Team COVID-19 Fall Posture.” 6 October 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2020/10/joint-cds-dm-update-dt-covid-19-fall-posture.html>.
- . 2021a. “Defence Team—COVID-19.” Last modified 13 April 2021. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/campaigns/covid-19.html>.
- . 2021b. “Military Response to COVID-19.” Accessed 21 June 2021. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/campaigns/covid-19-military-response.html>.
- . 2021c. “Operation LASER.” Last modified 28 June 2021. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/laser.html>.

Jensen, Lieutenant-Colonel Greg (Retired). Contracted adviser, Canadian Joint Operations Command. Personal interview via Zoom. Ottawa, 16 October 2020.

Prime Minister's Office. 2020. "Prime Minister Creates Committee on COVID-19." News release, 4 March 2020. <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2020/03/04/prime-minister-creates-committee-covid-19>.

World Health Organization. 2020. "WHO Director-General's Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19." 11 March 2020. <https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020>.