THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION

by

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ABSTRACT

The expression 'multicultural education' will be analyzed conceptually in order to establish its relationship to the sociological nature of Canadian society. My perspective is that of an educational philosopher therefore I will identify concepts central to the expression, which are: culture, tolerance, understanding, development and change. These will be examined in order to locate their place in a theoretical framework for the expression "multicultural education."

Two of these notions, tolerance and understanding are dispositions particularly well-suited to a multi-ethnic environment, yet the concept of understanding provides the more fruitful application to teaching because of the educational value of its important features and due to its relationship to the states and needs of children.

With respect to the needs of children, "multicultural education" is ambiguous in that, for example, it may stand either for an education only for some, i.e., the disadvantaged, or it may be directed toward the goal of encouraging students to become multicultural people and therefore include all students in its purview. In order to assess the larger social and political implications, in either becoming a multicultural person or in ameliorating conditions for a particular group, we require a sociological explanation of Canadian patterns, such as the distribution of rights and power, so that pedagogic purposes may be located

within our changing context and the dynamics of nation-building.

Education itself implies development and the particular changes inherent in multicultural education can be expressed in three stages which will be outlined in the thesis. This development encourages self-reflective thinking in children thereby creating a moral space around them in which they may move or shift position in order to see beyond their egoistic generalizations.

My intention for the thesis is to establish a body of notions that are essential to the future development of the purposes, content and practice of an education that could properly be called "multicultural." I will outline what I consider to be important limits to an acceptable understanding of the expression for Canadian schooling.

Finally, multicultural education is about living well in Canada. Living well implies that all citizens begin to make the moves inherent in coming to understand persons who are different and make the moral choices that will bring about our national well-being.

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In this thesis I have considered the question of reference to gender and elected to use both male and female pronouns throughout where appropriate. Generally, I try to use the term 'humankind' to refer to the species but there are some places where a sense of style dominated and the term 'man' is used, this is to be read as humankind. I trust that the reader will accept the usages presented as a genuine expression of concern both for linguistic fairness and stylistic effect.

CHAPTER ONE

The Culture-Concept and Literature On Multicultural Education

This chapter will include a discussion of the concept of culture and its relation to the expression multicultural education. Next, three problems attached to its use in educational literature will be pointed out. And finally, four approaches typical of multicultural education will be outlined in order to show that at present the term multicultural is ambiguous and therefore confusion surrounds the expression. First then, is a discussion of the term culture.

The Culture-Concept

The word culture, the root of the term multicultural, has a relatively recent history even though records of cultural interchanges are as old as the inquiries of Herodotus. Culture was derived from "cultus", the stem of "colere," and refers to "the care directed to the refinement of life" and also to "style of dress, external appearances and the like."[1] From its origin the term had two dimensions: appearance or dress, and improvement or refinement of life. That is, culture refers to an inward as well as an outward condition.

Tylor, an Englishman, is credited with the first formal, explicit definition of culture in the introducion of Primitive Culture (1871), and this marks the birth of the scientific concept. In the introduction of the text, Tylor acknowledges his indebtedness to a German (Klemm) because the

concept underwent an expansive and influential development in Germany prior to Tylor's articulation of it.[2] The German development spread into two branches. The first was the study of "cultur" the actual story of what appeared to have happened to mankind; this was essentially a concern with the customs and institutions of various groups. This branch became culture-conscious, comparative and ethnographic. Humankind was viewed as an array or series of particular peoples. The second branch was concerned with supreme principles rather than peculiarities. It aimed at clarifying basic schemes and operated on the notion of "spirit" or "geist" which was a consideration of human solidarity.[3] The tension created by the weight of difference between these two branches poses a problem of applicability from the anthropological notion of cultures as discrete entities to the culture-concept required for a multicultural nation-state. To focus attention on particularity is to contain societies within cultural boxes and to do this is to make it impossible for members of different groups to speak to and understand one another--the stated aim of intercultural exchanges. To focus attention on universal human qualities to the exclusion of differences may amount to nothing more than draping a thin, theoretical veil over egoistic and enculturated notions of what constitutes human development. Our forebears felt no scruples about this latter form of judgement-making; that is, the widespread view that a people should be assessed in terms of their own

cultural system is recent.[4] To summarize the culture-concept, three ideas can be strained out of its development: 1. the Latin root which refers to becoming cultured or cultivated and which implies a standard of perfection against which groups or individuals are measured; 2. the German philosophical concern with a unifying "geist", e.g., a universalizeable spirit of reason which humankind as a whole is working toward; and 3. the anthropological concept, based on the idea of customs, which was then given a "time backbone" in the form of tradition or social heritage.[5] Of these, I will concentrate on 3 as Geertz (1973) develops it, however 2 has a problematic relationship with 3 and will be included throughout the discussion. The strain between universals (2) and particulars (3) is noticeable when we consider a value such as fairness. While each culture will have a concept of fairness, particular expressions derived from the concept may obscure the general value, making it difficult for one cultural member to recognize an action performed by a different cultural member as falling under the category of fairness.

Culture as a Meaning-System

The dissonnance between differences observed and similarities proposed makes it problematic to describe humankind as either innately and universally human or man as an actor on a particular cultural stage. Each description has at its root an overdependence on the outward expressions

of culture as it has unfolded in various locations. To universalize may be to overgeneralize from home culture and to map ethnocentric designs on others. To particularize may be to ignore common human themes around which all people must construct their realities. In a collection of essays, Geertz examines the culture-concept in a way which moves beyond this dichotomy.

Geertz believes that a human being is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun and he takes culture to be those webs.[6] While the extreme relativist wraps each group in a cultural cocoon, the universalist expects to pull one or two threads to reveal Everyman. The image of a web informs our idea of the relationship between specific values and the general trends or concepts within a cultural setting. Prior to describing this relationship it must be noted that cultural forms are both implicit and explicit. To move to another metaphor, explicit cultural forms, expressed in observable patterns, are the girders of a culture while implicit forms are the architect's conception of the total over-all effects he wishes to achieve.[7]

Geertz describes the culture-concept as consisting of socially established structures of meaning in terms of which people do things.[8] Meaning then refers to the significance of a group's beliefs, values and practices. An individual belief or practice may be either a bridge or foundation line, that is, it may be a belief from which hang all other beliefs, or it represent values which set the limits and

shape of that culture's meaning-system. Damage to one of these threads is destructive to the entire web. Other threads comprise the tangle of silk that forms the most visible parts of the web and plucking out or rejecting one of these may be less serious.

When particular beliefs of a group are questioned we must remember that their significance is not contained in an isolated description of that belief. Significance is relational to some degree. For example, as unacceptable as apartheid is, outsiders may underestimate the labyrinth of attachments that fix the policy to an historical context. And of course, it is easier to notice a neighbor's fault than it is to notice our own because we take the reasons we do things for granted. The recognition that each culture consists of meaning-systems learned and negotiated by members of that culture allows an outsider to look for patterns in order to decipher the meaning of another group's interactions.[9]

This is not to suggest that cultural values are always logically or tightly related internally but cultures have at least a minimum of coherence since significant symbols are prerequisites for our biological, psychological and social existence.[10] That is, cultural members recognize certain patterns and construct a reality in terms of them. What constitutes inappropriate behavior is understood, recognized and internalized. For example, since I expect Canadian students to agree on rules about cheating on an exam I will

punish them when they are caught cheating during a test. Yet I have frequently found it difficult to convince Vietnamese students that they should not tell each other the answers while writing an English language quiz. This latter uninhibited and irrepressible sharing of answers during a quiz baffled me until I played table tennis with some of the students who politely ignored my persistent prodding that perhaps we should keep score.

In establishing a concept of cultural humankind, then, we "need to look for systematic relationships among diverse phemomena, not for substantive identities among similar ones".[11] My Vietnamese students may have an idea of what unfairness is, but because of their behavior it may not be clear to me at the outset that they do. When we try to observe "systematic relations among diverse phenomenon" what may initially appear before us is cultural chaos. Yet, culture itself is essential to the existence of man as he is: without man, no culture; without culture, no man.

Culture can be understood as a set of control mechanisms--plans, recipes, rules, instructions for the governing of behavior. Man is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms, such as cultural programs, for ordering his behavior. Humankind is incomplete or unfinished and completes itself through culture--not through culture in general but through highly particular forms of it.[12] This is because there is a distinction

between "being a human" and "being human." One is a human at birth but what it means to be human is learned through primary and secondary socialization and is worked out during one's lifetime in relation to cultural ideals.

This is not to suggest that all ways of becoming human are equally admirable merely because they are in existence, but what humankind has in common is this "becoming" under cultural systems of meaning which give form and point to our lives. A human being is

> defined neither by his innate capacities alone, nor by his actual behaviors alone...but rather by the link between them, by the way in which the first is transformed into the second, his generic potentialities, focussed into his specific performances. This, neither an unchanging subcultural self nor an established cross-cultural consensus, is what we really have in common.[13]

What human beings have in common is that they can, and must, become human by experiencing particular cultural meaning-systems. The basis for understanding what it signifies to be caught in a new web of cultural meaning, either through migration or expanding cultural diversity, is the recognition of the need for individuals and groups to work out a relationship among past, present and future meaning-systems. Home culture groups are affected by migration just as are immigrant groups in that both must restructure meaning-systems and make new socio-political selections. The culture-concept as webs of meaning is a foundation for multicultural education that has the potential for ameliorating conditions of misunderstanding that arise as two or more groups meet and expect to interact. This point

will be elaborated in chapter five.

Three Problems

Unfortunately, as yet the culture-concept has been as problematic as it has been useful to educational studies. It has been distorted in three ways, namely, cultures are reified, ossified or relativized.

Reification refers to the process of turning cultural content into a reality quite apart from its bearers. That is, culture acquires a life of its own and individuals "have no choice but to conform to the folkways of [the] group."[14] This idea involves two assumptions: first, that it is not possible to think outside of the constraints of a group norm, and second, that individuals are passive recipients of culture; a passivity that is the stuff of a George Orwell novel. The second tendency, ossification, has to do with the perceived impermeability of cultural boundaries [Kallen, 1982; Lynch, 1986; Burtonwood, 1986]. The internal cultural system is thought of as rigid and homogeneous. Cultures are conceived as self-contained meaning-systems and members are thought to uniformly express societal norms. The extreme forms of such a hardening of cultural boundaries results in policies like apartheid.

The effect of assigning passivity and uniformity to the culture-concept is two-fold. In the first place, it precludes change, innovation and development within and between cultures and, therefore, intercultural learning and exchange are rendered impossible. In the second place, it is

a conceptualization of other cultures that insiders immediately recognize as false because they experience and observe the degrees of agency and diversity within their group that reification and ossification deny. A third major tendency, and a much more complex issue in educational studies, has been the move toward relativism.

Cultural relativity has made a contribution to cultural studies because of the descriptive use of the term. The notion raises the awareness that many judgements made of "foreign" cultures are inapropriate and it welcomes the idea of assessing a civilization on its own merits. This valuing of cultural expressions has far-reaching effects. The recognition by individuals of themselves as moral beings of similar worth to others is rooted in cultural definitions. To require them to accept the unimportance or worthlessness of things held dear is, in extreme cases, to threaten their existence as a moral being.[15] But, while we maintain on the one hand that moral worth is rooted in cultural definitions, to be contained within those definitions, to be pre-judged on the basis of them without regard for individuality and difference is to be discriminated against; it is to be treated prejudicially.

Therefore, the concept of cultural relativity needs to be unpacked so that its nature and limits can be picked out. The term stands for a very loosely joined cluster of thoughts and feelings often incoherent but immensely powerful in education and elsewhere. Characteristic expressions include

comments like, "There is no such thing as objective truth," "It's all a matter of belief," "Values and knowledge are just social products," "What right have we to impose our ideas on pupils."[16]

These expressions tend to be taken as instances of relativism but the core term 'relate' has a number of meanings which range from narrating an event to indicating family associations. The important sense to the current discussion has to do with the sense of 'relate' as something which is borne or thrust between things. Relatedness has to do with X being connected with Y so that X is understood to some extent in terms of Y. There is a pertinence or significance between the two in that X arises from, is dependent on, or is in some sense determined by Y. The connection which is present between two relative things carries the following explanatory power.

There are four ways in which X may be related to Y. 1. the connection is a necessary one in the sense that a child is necessarily a part of his or her parents. 2. X could be connected to Y; that is, the relation is uncertain or incidental, ie., contingent. 3. X is associated with Y through some intervention, such as in the case of marriage in which the relationship is <u>made</u> in accordance with the laws of the land, ie., the relationship comes into being through human intervention, as opposed to relations which are natural, such as those between siblings in the family. Choice operates to some extent in the first case but not in

the second. 4. associational relations may exist between X and Y as a result of certain inventions. For example, the color white may be associated with purity in one culture and with death in another; in the first culture white may be worn by brides at weddings and in the second, on corpses at funerals.[17]

3 and 4 have special significance for multicultural issues. 4 accounts for some of the disparity in meaning which often accompanies intercultural exchanges. 3 points to a fundamental problem in ethnic relations. Migration occurs as a result of state policies which are beyond the control of the public. Yet immigration dramatically affects home culture members especially when there is considerable cultural distance between the two groups. Multicultural societies are <u>made</u> and are not natural; to the extent that multicultural policy tries to ignore this artificiality ongoingly tense relationships remain. This is not to suggest that racism is acceptable. It is however, to argue that we must acknowledge relationships which are unnatural because a great deal of moral work needs to be done with regard to how we are to live together in one nation. Preparation for this moral work should be reflected in any responsible proposal for multicultural education.

"Relativism" then, is the doctrine that knowledge is only of relations as opposed to the idea that knowledge is absolute. Cultural relativity presupposes that values and beliefs are understood only in relation to a particular

culture.

Relativism, generally, can be divided into two types. Weak relativism amounts to putting oneself into another's shoes while strong relativism denies that social practices and conduct rooted in other cultures are understandable and analyzable except by means of the concepts employed within those other cultures. The former implies an attitude which can be characterized best by empathy. The latter presents far reaching difficulties for multicultural education.

For example, since the debate over multicultural education inevitably leads one to "consider the nature of human knowledge, understanding and values"[18] relativity has implications for what constitutes knowledge and its relation to truth and value. The importance of relativism to multicultural education is that, following Winch (1958, 1964) and his anthropological study of Wittgenstein's "forms of life," there was a move from Evan-Pritchard's position of the social determination of <u>beliefs</u> to the social determination of <u>truths</u>. That is, Winch, and more particularly his followers, developed the thesis of cultural relativity in which truth is nothing more or less than the consent of the community in question.[19]

The numerous problems inherent in this move are dealt with at length elsewhere [Zec, 1980; Walkling, 1980; Wilson, 1986; Reynolds, 1972; Watt, 1982]. I will not discuss these views here except to make a distinction between truth and meaning. To say that cultures build up meaning in conceptual

schemes is not to make claims about the truth of those constructions. While a conceptual scheme growing out of a way of life guarantees its meaningfulness it does not provide a quarantee of its truth any more than of its falsity. Establishing questions of truth or falsity "requires criteria for deciding...which do not exist within the conceptual scheme, although they involve using it. To decide...one must interact with a world of things which have an independence, an intractibility of their own".[20]

Values, beliefs and truths must be distinguished from one another. The mere occurrence of someone holding a belief does not constitute a good reason in itself for supporting or respecting that belief. There is a difference between trying to understand something and supporting it. Watt argues that even though diverse conceptual schemes (e.g, various counting systems) cannot be shown to be true or false since they "do not consist of statements about the world which can be checked for accuracy" they may be assessed on pragmatic grounds. That is, the question about various conceptual schemes has to do with their appropriateness to a given way of life.[21] Schemes imported to Canada must be assessed with regard to their adaptability to an advanced industrial nation and to the set of functions that such a society entails. It is not a question of establishing which conceptual scheme is superior, as Watt notes there may be no culture-free ground for such a judgement, but establishing which functions best in the environment in question.

The objection that could be raised at this point by a cultural relativist, is that it is all very well to establish the case against cultural relativity on the basis of those conceptual schemes (such as counting systems) which can be assessed in terms of reference to the material world but what of the problem of disagreement over intangible values, and what of the institutional force which resists change of any kind? To this criticism two points can be made to set the discussion in a context.

The first point is that the strong form of relativism described above challenges the basic notion of what constitutes truth, and, since education is the transmission of truths, confidence in the classroom is undermined.[22] That is, cultural relativity frustrates particular educational aims. Where education is the development of rationality, relative assessments of what that aim implies are centrally confrontative to it. Rationality presupposes characteristic overarching principles and the derived pedagogy would involve making selections on this basis. The legitimacy of this selective process has been the source of sustained debate in educational philosophy where the rationalist tradition has had its most prominent and lengthy carreer. [eg., Britain, Australia]

Another pedagogic purpose which is troubled by the strong form of relativism is more typically a Canadian one. We have "traditionally viewed formal schooling as the major institution for the transmission of society's core values and

beliefs."[23] Relativism raises the problem of establishing what those core beliefs will be. To the extent that multicultural education frequently has been conceived as a "minority group interest" it can and has been identified as a threat to the "Canadian way of life".[24] In short, the strong form of relativism can fragment the polity. In my view it is the relativism attached to minority interests that stimulates the resistance to change by some otherwise well-meaning individuals in places of power. Relativism calls into question the validity of making pedagogic decisions on the basis of overarching statements of purpose which historically were derived, to some degree, from a consensus within the home culture.

The second point is that the initial problem faced by immigrants in the midst of cultural chauvinism is that there is no value attached to their position and decisions are made without listening and without reference to their views.

The strong form of cultural relativity is not a solution to either of these two main problems since it implies that intercultural understanding is debarred on the basis of the closed meaning systems characteristic of each group. Further, the very support for diversity can have the appearance of fairness but in fact deflect attention from the underlying structures which serve the interests of those who remain unhindered in their maintainance of power.[25]

The central problem that relativism in its strong form poses for multicultural education is the difficulty in

establishing an overarching set of criteria which could be used to develop its content, methodology and purpose. Relativists are suspicious of attempts to formulate such organizing criteria because these represent to them formulations based upon features of the dominant group's conceptual scheme. In short, the relativist concludes that the only way to transcend a conceptual scheme is to abandon it. The vantage point proposed by one spokesman of relativism is a vantage point synthesized from a person's own needs and purposes.[26] Such a proposal fuels the criticism that ultimately extreme relativism is reducible to solipsism.

Multicultural education logically requires that overarching principles be selected so that purposes may be made clear. Encouraging pupils to be multicultural people is not educational in itself unless cognitive and dispositional ends are proposed. Canadian education is properly directed toward intellectual growth and functional competency in a post-industrial society.

It is also imperative that multicultural education serve the end of nation-building. What is needed is a middle position that asserts the transcultural nature of formal principles that could be both absolutist and tolerant in their approach to substantive issues between cultures. Such a perspective would take substantive cultural differences seriously but would seek for rational transformations of such issues rather than uncritical and dogmatic assertions of one side as right.[27]

That is, while relativism is an accurate description of cultural systems as ends-in-themselves it is not sufficient to explain how we ought to live together in a multicultural state. Relativism is an attitude toward knowledge which emerges in specific cultures but ignores the "common human form of life...a basic human community of judgement that cannot exist without language and without society but that, nevertheless is not dependent on the particular judgements of particular societies."[28]

Multicultural Education: Four Approaches

What therefore is required is to establish multicultural education as an approach that has a foundation based upon two things: common human forms of life, and the social and political realities inherent in sharing a territorial boundary that has an identifiable history and cultural identity. Multicultural education however, must be committed to understanding that history so as to transform cultural identity into something connected with the past but different from it.

Yet on the basis of a review of the literature it is reasonable to say that when the expression multicultural education is used by Canadian theorists they are generally more interested in the adjective than the noun. A number of theorists have organized current approaches to multicultural education into categories (Magsino, 1985; Kallen, 1982; Young, 1979; Gibson, 1976), and four may be outlined using Gibson:

1. there is benevolent multicultural education which is intended to equalize opportunity for culturally different students; that is, it is an education of and for minority students;

2. there is an education about minorites, that is, everyone is taught about diversity in order that cultural understanding may emerge;

3. there is an education for cultural pluralism, that is, its aim is to increase parity among groups in the culture by decreasing the power of the majority or by raising the status of the minority;

4. there is multicultural education which aims to produce individuals who can operate successfully in more than one culture.[29]

The boundaries drawn above are not as clearly delineated in actual programs as this analysis would suggest, but the distinctions reveal the ambiguity of the expression. 2, 3 and 4 are concerned with 'education for all' while 1 tends to focus on ameliorating minority group conditions and ignores the majority group. 2 draws attention to diversity, an issue which will be taken up more fully in chapter five. 3 and 4 imply social and political goals.

In concert with the four approaches above, there are three types of policy that may be applied to multicultural education, namely transitional, residual and stable. Transitional policies are eventually aimed at assimilationism or submergence into the dominant group. Residual policies respect diversity but only within a framework of the social and economic perspective of the broader society. Stable multiculturalism is characterized by a specific set of shared values including a positive evaluation of ethnic diversity.[30] Despite the clear distinctions above it is very difficult to

assess the categorical location of, for example, our new national multiculturalism policy[31] and its implications for education. Regardless of the educational policy or program proposed, social, economic and political structures lie outside the classroom. While the teacher may have to wrestle with social problems, sociological problems are beyond her reach.

Yet, I would argue that what we need is a clear idea of what sort of education will best serve multicultural interests. Education involves content, methodology and statements of purpose or aims. In the literature, questions of content center around the use, misuse or lack of use of other than dominant cultural values, practices and beliefs and of the need to use first language to enhance learning. Methodology, or the manner of teaching, raises issues such as the teacher's attitude toward and expectations of minority students.[32] Methodology represents a larger concern than this but in terms of the literature, the emphasis is on treatment of students and the need for staff to compensate for cultural distance experienced by parents and students, and for teachers to deal with their own need to develop openness to difference.[33]

Conclusion

Schooling is thought of as a process of secondary socialization as a result of which pupils come to see and secure a place in society. In Canada, schooling is essentially transmissionist, that is, its aim is to convey

and reinforce the interests and beliefs which constitute the culture.[34] The relationship between primary and secondary socialization will be taken up more fully later, but it is important to note that the fourth purpose and the policy of stable multiculturalism expressed above are not essentially transmissionist; they imply transformative goals in which students are expected to transcend primary socialization. Further, transmissionist policies are necessarily frustrated by the fact of diversity since diversity, if valued, raises questions of what should be passed on to pupils of either the dominant or the minority group.

A commonly raised pedagogic purpose of multicultural education is to develop intercultural understanding, tolerance and respect for persons.[35] These aims imply that students transcend enculturated conceptualizations of the notion of personhood. Such an implication is not represented in transmissionist purposes. These contrary aims are seldom noted. A philosophy of multicultural education must construct an explanatory framework for ways in which transformative and transmisssionist purposes may be joined. Yet even if the fourth purpose cited is transformative, or aimed at preparing students to change society rather than merely reproduce it, schooling by itself could not accomplish that aim. This does not mean that schooling makes no contribution, however.

The question is, What are the central concepts in multicultural education, as education, that would encourage

the cognitive and dispositional changes in pupils so that they are eventually prepared for activity in a pluralistic democracy? To this end the concept of tolerance and understanding will be analyzed so as to bring them to the center of just such a multicultural education as conceptualized in this thesis.

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[6] Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973), p. 5.

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[9] Geertz, p. 49.

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CHAPTER TWO

Why Should We Tolerate and Understand?

In the study of multicultural education tolerance emerges as a central and problematic notion. It is central because intercultural learning is thought to require it and problematic because of the conceptual confusion which accompanies its use. Two questions arise with respect to the term: What is tolerance? and, Does diversity require tolerance? On the basis of my analysis, tolerance will be considered as a moral principle, as an educational ideal, and its relationship to understanding will be drawn out. It will be shown that the pedagogic importance of the term can only be derived from clear thinking about the word, a clarity which is frequently lacking in the Canadian debate.

The Tolerance-Concept

The notion of tolerance has several dimensions, namely: psychological, conceptual, epistemological and utilitarian. The conceptual aspect is the concern of this essay; the others may be dealt with indirectly.

Tolerance is not a technical term; it is common in everyday language. Two nouns correspond with the verb tolerate and the adjective tolerant, these are tolerance and toleration. In the British discussion of the issue a distinction is sometimes made between the two nouns such that toleration is used to describe the act of being tolerant, or the disposition to be tolerant, while tolerance is understood

to refer to a more purely physical endurance of something.[1] The British tendency points out a Canadian one. Theorists in our nation use tolerance primarily and toleration as its synonym; that is, one word does all our work. This latter habit is adopted in this paper, but such economy makes it all the more important to map out the concept so that all of its features may be pinpointed.

There are two main divisions within the concept: tolerance as a specific instance of enduring or forebearing something, and the disposition or trait to show tolerance. The specific act and the trait have certain descriptive features in common.

In all cases tolerance has an object. One can tolerate yogurt or classical music, but it would be odd to say I tolerate nothing. The nature of the relationship between the tolerator and the tolerated object may be characterized by dislike or disapproval, whether mild or extreme. This is so because tolerance as endurance or forebearance implies a difficulty which may produce hardship or suffering of some kind. [O.E.D.]

We do not use the word tolerate unless we want to represent that what is tolerated deviates from a preference. If I like yogurt I would not say that I tolerate it. The object tolerated is measured against some ideal state or standard and is found wanting. Tolerance represents an instance of, or tendency to fill in the gap between the object and the standard with either patience or indulgence.

To be indulgent is to expect no change in the object and therefore passively to accept what one disapproves. Patience on the other hand implies the willingness to wait out an event, such as childishness, in the hope that maturity will emerge. That is, the quality of the endurance may be either passive or active. One may put up with something, or allow it to continue, in a variety of ways.

Yet, since tolerance involves dislike or disapproval, it may not be said that a person is tolerating X if he or she has no strong feeling about not X. A condition that must be satisfied is that those who are tolerant care about the object. A characteristic of toleration is that it is "half-hearted"; we accept on one level what we cannot accept on another.[2] So that if I tolerate someone's snoring I am half-hearted or divided in mind about it. The sound of snoring is measured against quiet sleep and found wanting. To be tolerant is to act in a particular manner toward the one who snores for some reason, such as affection for him or her. I am not however indifferent about sleep!

Not only is tolerance to be distinquished from indifference, but a "second condition that must be satisfied is that those who are tolerant could get their way if they chose".[3] This distinction is marked by the difference between tolerance and acquiescence. That is, the power to prohibit is implied in tolerating. This condition moves Nicholson to assert that: "strictly speaking there cannot be toleration of opinions, or the holding of opinions, only of

the expression of opinions, since the latter alone is within other people's power to reject or not."[4]

While the tolerator is in a position to exert power, to be tolerant is to restrict oneself from its use. This idea is connected with the sense of tolerating in the statement: She has a tolerance for penicillin; that is, she does not have a strong reaction to it. While one has strong feelings about X one chooses not to express a strong reaction toward not X through the use of force.

The question arises as to what is meant by force. There are three senses which are important: physical force, through violence; psychological force, through threats; and epistemological force, through deception.[5] Those who may be described as tolerant refuse to use their power in any one of the above ways. Often it is disdain for intolerance that motivates toleration.

Intolerance, which is primarily psychological, is fueled by prejudice which is primarily epistemological. Prejudice, or pre-judgement based on flimsy or inaccurate evidence, operates on two levels. These are: supposedly "empirical" judgements about the characteristics of a person or group, such as "All natives are lazy"; and judgements about people which are logical errors or errors in inference.[6] An example of the latter is the following syllogism. There is a high crime rate in low-cost housing developments. Native Indians live in low-cost housing developments. Whites should not associate with native Indians. Newman proposes that logical

errors are more difficult to detect than empirical ones, and even when errors in judgement-making are pointed out, and when the individual appears normal, he or she may still choose to hold to a pre-judgement, and to express intolerance. This is so because intolerance has a moral base. We describe someone as intolerant who will not put up with something that we believe she or he should put up with.[7]

The intolerant person may be caught up in some enthusiasm or superstition, to use Hume's terms, and is therefore unrelenting in his rejection of those who neither fear nor obey his gods.[8] Yet it must be noted that the alcoholic who anaesthetizes himself from any responsibility to support what is good and valued in his culture, or the arch materialist who pursues no good but goods, is just as unhelpful with respect to what tolerance requires as is the fanatic who would save us against our will from his particular brand of hell.

It is the moral base of toleration that distinguishes two concepts within the term. The descriptive concept whose features have been outlined already, and the moral concept are now to be separated from one another by raising the question of whether all instances of toleration are to be thought of as good. It is not the same to ask someone to tolerate snoring as it is to ask that she tolerate Hitler, pornography, or child abuse. Just as intolerance stands on one side of the tolerance-concept as its opposite, so indiscriminate tolerance stands on the other. That is,

tolerance does not extend to allowing or enduring what ought not to be allowed.[9]

In summary, our values are displayed in large measure through our tolerant, intolerant, or indiscriminantly tolerant responses. To be tolerant is to set limits upon our interference in another's action, but a reaction is only properly tolerant if it expressed towards a proper object. Agreement about showing tolerance is a second-order activity based upon first-order activity of establishing what should be esteemed.

Does Diversity Require Tolerance?

In raising the moral aspect of tolerance it is often supposed that the mere presence of diversity is sufficient reason to insist that tolerance be shown. The argument is that diversity, or the existence of individual differences, in itself requires tolerance. The question arises as to the relationship between the presence of differences and the moral prescription to be tolerant. Does the existence of individual differences constitute conclusive reason to show tolerance? The answer is no, since differences may give rise to other reactions as well, such as indifference or punishment, and these may be justified depending upon the particular difference in question. Features of tolerance as a moral principle and an historical context for the concept will help to establish the nature of this relationship.

Tolerance as a Moral Principle

J.S. Mill's essay, "On Liberty", is an historical focal

point for the tolerance debate. In this work Mill proposes and defends one principle:

> the sole end for which mankind are warranted, [sic] individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercized over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others....Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.[10]

Two arguments concerning toleration formed a backdrop to Mill's essay. The first justified tolerance on the claims of conscience; that the nature of conscience is such that it cannot be subject to effective external coercion. While behavior may be controlled, thoughts cannot. The second arises from Locke's view that there are some areas of individual activity that are not the state's business unless they pose a serious threat to its security.[11] These arguments can be picked out in modern society as a rationale for showing toleration. Three areas of difficulty arising from Mill's assertions are: his concept of harm; his distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions; and his defence of free speech.[12] A discussion of these problems is necessary to an understanding of tolerance as a moral ideal.

In considering toleration as a moral ideal, Nicholson outlines six constituents of the term: deviance, importance, disapproval, power, non-rejection, and goodness. What is tolerated deviates from the tolerator's values, is important, receives disapproval from the tolerator, represents an area in which the tolerator has power to interfere, but he or she

chooses not to and the deviation continues. The assertion that tolerance is a good distinquishes it from the descriptive aspect of the concept in that the moral ideal is not value-neutral. Disapproval rather than dislike is a constituent because toleration "is a matter of moral choice and our tastes...are irrelevant."[13]

In a descriptive or sociological assessment, one merely reports that X was tolerant of Y. In order to discriminate between the two aspects within tolerance, two differences are worth noting. First, if one is being descriptive what is morally right depends upon social context, whereas the moral ideal raises questions about the rightness or fairness of that social context. Second, in the descriptive sense, people either are or are not showing toleration, whereas the moral concept supposes that one has a duty to be tolerant.[14] There are two arguments for showing tolerance, a negative and a positive one.

The negative argument arises from the disinclination to show intolerance and four points are included: 1. it may be too expensive in material costs or moral values to end the wrong; 2. it may be more effective to tolerate a wrong while actively campaigning against it; 3. it may be argued that beliefs and motives are beyond the law's reach; and, 4. if opinions and actions are not socially injurious, what reason is there for not tolerating them?[15] The negative and positve aspects can be thought of as two complementary sides of the toleration concept. But the positive argument is seldom

raised and it is only this aspect that is fully useful in the multi-ethnic classroom.

By itself the negative argument raises certain problems. Statement 1, referring to costs, is a value judgement. The current debate over pornography provides an illustration. There is no agreement in our society over pornography and its effects. To many feminists pornography constitutes violence against women and these individuals want it abolished. This concern comes from an entirely different set of values than those held by someone who is trying to establish whether, or to what extent, pornography tends to deprave or corrupt.[16]

An argument that it may be too expensive to eliminate pornography presupposes that something else has an equal or greater value. To some, eradicating pornography would be too costly; to others no expense is too great. The nature of this debate is similar to the multicultural one. Multicultural education presupposes new societal ends; to some the cost of achieving these ends is too high, to others no price would be.

To return to the negative argument for showing tolerance, statements 2 and 3 allude to the effective use of influence to eradicate what one does not approve. In 2 the advice is that a direct attack, i.e., a use of force, on what one wishes were different may not be productive, but active campaigning against it may be. 2 raises the question, Is one tolerating a thing if one campaigns against it? The answer is yes because commitment to X does not preclude tolerance of

not X. Disapproval of not X is a condition of tolerating it. So I may tolerate X but still try to persuade others that X is not something to support or encourage; I could even try to campaign against X and remain within the bounds of tolerance. So I may tolerate X but at the same time try to persuade others not to support X since tolerance only requires that I not interfere by using any of the three kinds of force mentioned earlier. This point is missed by theorists who expect tolerance to dissolve intercultural dispute; only acquiescence would serve such a function.

In statement 3, to say that something is beyond the law's reach is to beg the question of whether it should be, or what features of it should be, beyond the law's reach. In 4 the problems are full-blown. The difficulty we have with tolerance is in deciding what constitutes social harm. As Horton asserts: "there is no uncontroversial way in which such a distinction [between actions that are and are not harmful] can be drawn, and...any attempt to justify toleration which relies on such a supposedly agreed distinction is likely to be seriously defective".[17]

The problem is not with proposing tolerance as a moral ideal but with assuming it as the primary one in its general form. Statement 4 obscures the difficulties that are inherent in the notion. To show toleration toward a wrong action may amount to showing indifference to an individual's need to be reinstated within the community which has been harmed by the wrong.

Further, the moral effect of reckless action by A, may involve B in a duty to A which causes or brings harm to B. Suppose B sees A walk along the top rail of a bridge then slip and fall into the river. As A calls to B for help, B has a moral duty to assist. Tolerance as a moral principle is, on the one hand, the refusal to interfere with another's walk along the rail, and on the other, the moral duty to aid a drowning person. Interference in the first instance is accused of being paternalistic and in the second applauded as Samaritan concern. Supposing that B cannot swim the issue of equity between A and B suggests that there are some instances in which tolerance or intolerance may bring about harm to someone.[18]

In Mill's idea of harm there are three assumptions: that the individual is sovereign over his or her own person; that freedom of expression will lead to positive social progress; and that the individual is the best judge of his own situation. The current debate is carried on in a culture that has changed since Mill's time certainly, and even since the 1960's and 1970's when tolerance was conceived as the best policy to address dramatic changes in the cultural landscape. The question of how much and what kind of dissent, faction or conflict a society can endure and survive as a society must be weighed against Mill's assumptions.

Fortunately the society at large is not our immediate concern; the classroom is. Yet the discussion above is intended to counter facile prescriptions that teachers should

show and teach tolerance. Tolerance is not enough to create the environment that fosters intercultural learning. Two conditions would have to be met in order to support the view that diversity requires tolerance in the classroom. First, differences must center on issues important to the children, and second, children must not be expected merely to acquiesce. A description of the moral development of the young should accompany the proposal that students learn to show tolerance. And it is only when teachers come to understand what the moral requirements of the classroom are that a positive argument for tolerance can assist them.

It is a political or religious question whether one is sovereign over oneself, a sociological question whether free expression in the classroom leads to positive social ends, and a psychological question whether children are the best judges of their own situation. Yet these underlying assumptions must be shown to be related to the moral principle to be tolerant in order for it to be useful in the way that multicultural literature presumes that it is. It is only the positive argument for showing tolerance, as the teacher understands and adopts the assumptions inherent in the assertion that tolerance is a good, that enables children to be brought along in a rational manner eventually to see that this is so.

There are two sets of reasons for seeing tolerance as a good: instrumental and intrinsic. The first reasons make relations between tolerance, liberty and justice. "Everyone

has an equal right to toleration: no one can claim it for his own opinions and actions, and in fairness deny its extension to everybody else...[and] toleration is necessary for human progress and the advance of civilization, both technological and moral".[19] This instrumental view fails in three ways: it does not appreciate tolerance except as a means to something else; it does not account for effects created by indiscriminate tolerance; and it ignores the lack of value-concensus within a society. Yet it must be said that tolerance on the whole is good because it serves as a safeguard against misuses of power. If children are to become autonomous moral agents they must be empowered to do so.

Tolerance as a Pedagogic Aim

The intrinsic set of reasons for showing tolerance are well suited to serve the intention to empower children. In this view tolerance functions as a format for thinking that moves an individual to consider others seriously and to set limits on himself with respect to his reactions to difference. An extensive quotation is useful:

> By being required to take heed of the ideas of others, whether simply as opinions or as embodied in their lifestyles, and above all when one is forced to do so, one is schooled and educated. One is shown that part of being moral, and of treating other moral agents morally, is to give serious consideration to their ideas; not to do that, whilst claiming it for one's own ideas, is not simply selfishness or the illegitimate demand for a privileged position, it is in a profound sense immorality, failure to respect human personality. Again, one is having pointed out a duty to understand ideas which may be alien and unpalatable, even evil, but which have a valid claim to our attention because they too are deeply held convictions of human beings. The

> moral ideal of toleration does not require the tolerator to acknowledge any merit in the opinions of which he disapproves; but he must respect the personality of the holders of those opinions, and treat them as rational moral agents whose views can be discussed and disputed, and who are capable of changing their minds on rational grounds.[20]

It is therefore important that children come to understand one another. It is evident that Nicholson assumes that no harm will befall someone who engages with divergent views in this manner, and he considers changes in the tolerator's views as a result of such an exchange to be side-effects independent of toleration's intrinsic moral worth.[21] In refusing to use power to interfere with another we set limits on our own responses rather than eliminating the expressions or behaviors of the other. It must be remembered that the tolerator freely consents to self-restraint since he must possess the power to do otherwise for tolerance to be operative.

This brings us to the recognition that toleration sets its own limits, as must any moral ideal. Two major limits are: that we should reject whatever contravenes the moral base on which the ideal rests, namely, respect for all persons as full moral agents; and that we should reject whatever contravenes the ideal of toleration itself. Quite simply, we do not tolerate the destruction of toleration. A crucial practical problem remains in distinquishing between expressions of opinions that must always be tolerated and acting out of opinions that need not always be tolerated.[22]

Tolerance and Understanding: Connections between the Concepts

The general difficulties that children encounter with tolerance, their lack of clearly articulated values and their lack of power, make tolerance a long term pedagogic goal. To tell a child to "be tolerant" is as useless and unfair as it is to tell someone to "be creative" or "be happy" since all of these responses are by-products of learning to do something else. The question arises as to the something else implied in the tolerance question. Since tolerance requires self-restraint of a particular kind then the child must come to understand the appropriate conditions and occasions that call for this restraint; that is, the tolerator has learned to be discerning. Understanding on the other hand, is a shorter term goal which has much to do with the everyday business of teaching. In order to evaluate the relationship between tolerance and understanding we must first ask what it means to understand.

In ordinary language there is a distinction made between understanding something (a cognitive activity) and being understanding (an attitude). Understanding something is related to knowing and believing while being understanding is closely connected with empathy, or putting oneself in another's position. That is, "[a] person can understand [cognitively] someone's behavior yet not be understanding (attitudinally) toward him at all; and conversely, a person can be understanding toward someone yet fail to understand (cognitively) his behavior."[23] One kind of understanding may lead to the other but there is no necessary connection.[24]

One may understand something as a participant or as an observer. A football player and a spectator understand different things and understand things differently; both have some kind of knowledge. The player knows the game internally and has the know-how necessary to throw and catch the ball and play out the game. The spectator may know what these skills are but he does not have them. He understands the game because he knows the rules and strategies. He may in fact know more history and statistical data than any of the players, but is dependent upon some players somewhere for his understanding since the game has developed over time through the activity of its players.

The participant is inside of the activity, the observer outside. But whether one is inside or outside in this sense, he or she may strive for one or both of two types of understanding: external or internal. Internal understanding refers to "seeing into" a thing; seeing how parts interrelate. When we look at a painting to "see" the connections or relations between one color, shape or symbol and another we are trying to get an internal understanding of the painting as it is constituted. External understanding treats something as a whole or a unity and makes connections between it and something else;[25] that is, between two paintings or one painting and a type of art. While the insider/outsider categories refer to a person's experience with something, internal/external aspects describe the manner of, or approach taken toward something by someone who wishes

to understand it.

Implied in this formulation of internal/external is the idea that we never understand a thing per se; rather we understand some description of it.[26] Understanding is partial. In the same way that two witnesses may give different accounts of the same traffic accident, descriptions vary with a point of view. Relationships within a thing or between that thing and something else may be temporal, spatial, causal, logical; or they may be linear or organic or some combination of the two.[27] To say that understanding is partial is to say that no describer has exhaustively included all features of a thing in his description of it.

Not only is understanding partial, it is fraught with difficulties. Suppose two people, A and B, discuss X:

> 1. X may be understood in two different ways, by looking around or beyond it (external understanding) or by looking into it (internal understanding);
>
> 2. A may be an insider and B may be an outsider;
>
> 3. A and B may both be either insiders or outsiders but may pick out different features of X to generate their description of it;
>
> 4. A and B may agree on initial descriptions of X but relate it to different things: X to Y, X to Z.
>
> 5. A and B may agree on initial descriptions of X and agree that it is related to Y but differ on descriptions of Y.
>
> 6. A an B may both agree on initial descriptions of X and relate them to an agreed upon decription of Y.

It is the nature of understanding itself that allows for this range of possibilities for misunderstanding represented in one to five. Six would constitute a clear case of

understanding.

So there may be a gulf between two people trying to gain cultural understanding of one another and this fact must not be trivilized by "quick-fix" political or pedagogic approaches. Understanding is based upon knowing that and knowing how and involves seeing connections or making relations within X or between X and Y. Three conditions of understanding emerge: 1. connections must be there to be seen; 2. each person must see for himself (an element missing from an interpretation of the notion of seeing connections in terms of knowing that); and 3. confrontation or involvement with the subject is required.[28] That is, understanding involves a personal and active engagement with some information. To understand is to do more than to know that or know how, it is to know why, to explain or give reasons.

Another distinction that complicates attempts at cultural exchanges must now be addressed. It is one thing to try to achieve cultural understanding and it is another to understand a particular member of another culture. The first refers to subject understanding in which it is generally clearer and easier to establish that one does understand and what one understands. Public criteria operate almost exclusively as evidence of understanding. It is therefore less likely to be mistaken that someone understands because the test of subject understanding is a public performance of some kind, such as a math quiz or an essay in a Philosophy class.

Understanding someone who is a member of a different group on the other hand, has to do with empathy. There is a public and a private sense attached to understanding as empathy because criteria may be difficult to present. It is easy to be mistaken that you understand someone or that someone understands you. For example, the difference in length of pauses in a conversation between members of two cultures can result in a distortion of the meaning of each other's thoughts and intentions.[29]

In order to empathetically understand someone we must put ourselves into the other's position; for example, think her thoughts, feel her feelings. To understand someone is to construct or reconstruct the calculations that went into her action. Our understanding of an act is displayed in our description of the actor's point or rationale in performing the act.[30]

Cultural understanding and understanding someone from another culture are both dependent upon insider knowledge since it is authoritative on matters of meaning. So that for both theoretical understanding (knowing why) and practical understanding (knowing how) it is necessary to consider the insider's point of view. The distinction to be made is between taking someone's point of view into account and taking someone's point of view.[31]

Three dimensions of taking someone's view may be pointed out:

1. knowing what X's point of view is and being able to say

what it is to his or her satisfaction, this does not imply agreement with the position;

2. taking X's point of view into account by involving it in important decision-making events, 2 implies 1 but does not necessarily imply empathy with the position since it may signal respect for the person or compliance with other moral principles;

3. taking X's point of view, that is, adopting it as one's own which implies 1 and is an option to 2; 3 goes beyond empathy.[32]

A may understand B's point of view cognitively and express any one of a number of responses to it from sympathy to rejection or tolerance. If tolerant, then she would not move to 3 and if sympathetic she may or may not move to adopt the view as her own. Adopting a point of view is a volitional act separate, even, from being empathetic towards it. The positive argument for the intrinsic set of reasons for showing tolerance, analyzed under the tolerance-concept, is congruent with statements 1 and 2. Genuine cultural understanding and understanding of specific cultural members only requires that 1 and 2 be operating. Tolerance can function as a format for thinking that moves the individual to consider another seriously and to set limits on initial reactions to difference.

The relationship between tolerance and understanding is therefore somewhat complex. Tolerance implies disagreement about important matters. Understanding (excluding agreement) must precede tolerance because the tolerator requires reasons for expressing toleration as opposed to showing force. The tolerator must come to see for himself that a particular case calls for self-restraint and be able to say why so that he is

not merely indifferent or acquiescent to it. Showing tolerance may lead to enhanced cognitive understanding about tolerance itself. That is, as the tolerator restrains his use of force--psychological, physical or epistemological--he may come to see more fully why it is right to do so. However, since negative feelings toward what he tolerates is a pre-condition, showing tolerance by itself would not lead to empathetic understanding or sympathy toward the object since the tolerator wishes he lived in a world where no one engaged in the behavior or attitude in question. That is, he must be tolerant because he really cannot put himself in the other's shoes.

It is in this sense that we speak of tolerating the person's right to do X while not tolerating X. Respect for persons is essential to meaningful interactions. If the purpose of teaching in a multicultural setting is to promote understanding, the educator will have to attend to the question of whether his students have the required skills and abilities to be understanding and tolerant and what to do about it if they do not.[33] The question that arises is, given the confusion about multicultural education as outlined in chapter one, what are the skills and abilities that students need to develop in an ethnically diverse classroom?

Talk about empathy, tolerance and understanding often suggests that these are easy states to achieve. They are not. Developing in pupils the ability to put themselves in the position of others is a major educational task in itself,

but in a pluralistic society it is enormous. The next chapter will adress the question of what kind of development is implied in multicultural education so that we may pick out the skills and abilities that are central to a new direction for multicultural education.

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CHAPTER THREE

The Concept of Development Implied in Multicultural Education

The confusing and sometimes contradictory roles that multicultural education may be expected to play (i.e., as outlined in Gibson's four approaches at the end of chapter one) include two basic orientations for an education for all. The expression has to do either with a process of learning "about" diversity or the expectation that students will "become multicultural people" by accommodating themselves in some manner or to some degree. While learning "about" involves intellectual gains, learning "to be" adds the development of certain tendencies which eventually may become dispositions. Tolerance and understanding are two such dispositions.

It is important to note that while the intention of learning "about" may be fitted into the pedagogy of any classroom in any state, the second intention moves the teacher into a socio-political realm. To propose that students should eventually become multicultural people who display understanding and tolerance implies particular political ends, in that it implies a policy of stable multiculturalism.

Therefore, the intention of this chapter is four-fold. First, it is to analyze the concept of development in order to establish a framework for picking out the notion of change implied in multicultural education; and Kallen's notion of

change and development will be assessed. Second, a description of primary and secondary socialization will make evident the relationship between schooling and the state. Third, a distinction between pluralism and multiculturalism will establish connections between particular state models and appropriate educational ideals, particularly noting a relation between democracy and pedagogy. And the conclusion is a proposal of a model for development in multicultural education.

The Development-Concept

The word development is used in everyday language. We develop things from film to countries, an apparently intentional and purposeful activity expressed in a process or product. The idea of development presupposes that something exists potentially and is brought to a new state through some agent--a chemical or a CUSO worker--and the evidence of the activity is a concrete product. Development then, involves change.

The concept entails a gradual unfolding or bringing into fuller view of something; a rudimentary condition that is replaced by a well-grown or advanced one. Development, originally a biological concept, is borrowed and extended analogically, to describe psychological, sociological, economic, political, aesthetic or artistic events.[1] Development has two essential components: a system with definite structure and definite pre-esisting capacities; and the idea of sequential sets of changes which yield relatively

permanent but novel increments in structure and modes of operation.[2] Change implies time and is cumulative and "irreversible." Child development, as an example, involves choice as well as biological change. Choices over time are made more and more with reference to the unfolding system of thought that characterizes the individual, and it is in this sense that development is cumulative. It is irreversible in that once a child learns to talk he or she does not revert back to one who has not used language, even if production is suspended through an accident.

The ideas of sequence and structure are inside of the idea of development.[3] But this does not negate that choice is operative, that is, sequence and structure do not infer coercion nor do they constitute a guarantee that development will unfold to the same extent for all. Rather, the presence of sequence and structure give opportunity to assess the question of where the factors are that are simultaneously controlling in human action and controllable by human intervention; a question which cannot be settled without invoking the idea of autonomy in human choice.[4]

A further distinction, useful in applying the development concept to multicultural education, is that development functions in two ways: descriptively and evaluatively. The descriptive sense picks out what changes are occurring and what stages are successfully achieved or passed through. This sense is concerned with observation and empirical investigation. The evaluative sense is concerned with making

judgements of whether what is going on is what should be going on, in the right and approved manner, so that evaluations depend on the implied end-state of development.[5]

In summary then to speak of human development is to "speak of pre-existing structures which unfold" in a process guided by human intentions. A clear case of development entails: (1) structures (physical), (2) sequential processes or stages, and (3) an end-state. The nature of the stages or sequences raises the interesting problem of whether human development is irreversible or not. These stages may be thought of as transformations in levels of understanding and movement from one to another is stimulated by conflict. That is, development is related to developing since it is ongoing and the end-state of one stage becomes, because it provides the material for, a new "end-state".[6]

Kallen's Concept of Development

In a well used text Kallen (1982) suggests that development has to do with ontogeny and she describes the particular existing structures which are the source of growth. She states that a fundamental biological substructure is the basis of ethnic interrelatedness. Because it is possible to reproduce young successfully between racial groups Kallen argues for racial unity.[7] Two dimensions of this essential oneness between races are expressed in her idea of (1) two group memberships and, (2) the question of rights.

With respect to the first, Kallen outlines human

development in terms of two processes: enculturation (distinctive ethnic socialization), and becoming human or joining the human group.[8] She argues that infants learn what it is to be human first as a member of a specific collectivity and second through an association with the universal human group. The second membership follows neither logically nor necessarily from the first and Kallen does not show how one leads to the other. Her omission of a stage between these memberships prevents her idea from constituting a useful pattern for development. That is, Kallen's analysis provides no basis for developing a national allegiance.

In multi-ethnic societies, enculturation prepares the child for loyalty to the collective and membership in the human community would prepare the child for a transnational loyalty. Kallen's omits a category which would serve as an intermediary stage, and therefore a level of understanding, between the ethnic and the universal.

With the question of rights, Kallen attempts to establish a basis which will counter the institutional racism she identifies in Canadian socio-political structures. Rights are divided into three categories: individual, collective and categorical.[9] While liberal tradition has had at its base the valuing of individual rights, the expansion of the other two categories is a departure from that tradition. It is the emergence of pluralistic states that explains the blossoming of these other categories, an idea which will be pursued at length later.

The effect of expanding rights has been to inspire the rights' claim contests that Canada has witnessed since the 1970's. Rights have come to be thought of as social constructions and while the descriptive sense of rights as social constructions is useful, clarity as to who has and has not the right to a particular coveted benefit has been lost. Formerly the term "right" signified "entitlement" and established clear grounds for who was and was not able to vote, for example. Obligations were built into rights, ie., the teacher's duty of care is inside a child's right to an education. More theoretical work needs to be done on the question of rights in order to establish the relationship between the former and the current use of the term.

While social construction theory is descriptive it is not evaluative. That is, it can inform us about what is going on but it cannot aid our attempts to establish what should be going on with respect to a rights' claim. In fact, the theory seems to presume that such an evaluation is inappropriate. Yet Peter Berger's optimism in assuming in the mid 'sixties that pluralistic societies will be held together by "tolerance and even cooperation"[10] was not justified and evaluation is precisely what we now need.

New rights coupled with inherent contradictions in the categories of rights themselves have confused Canadian society about equality and special status. For example, a Native woman's 'right' to return to the reserve after ending her marriage to a non-native seems to conflict with the

band's right to decide membership criteria. In order to make sense of equality versus special status a distinction can be made. There are two concepts within the idea of equality: equal as same and equal as fitting.[11] Both ideas are slippery since treating two people as equals is not necessarily equivalent to treating them the same since they may be very unlike each other and may require different treatment in order eventually to be seen as equal persons. And the fittingness notion has a meaning which shifts across contexts and language users which further complicates the issue.

But even though equality is problematic, the idea of equality presupposes a set of reasons (rules) to which one appeals in assessing how to treat a particular individual. Therefore, special status is not necessarily contradictory to the idea of equality provided that a society is clear about the end-state or eventual status of individuals and particular groups within the state, and clear about the rules to be applied in the personhood-concept. In the fittingness sense, unequal treatment is justified in order to raise denegrated individuals up to a condition of equality, or equal access. In a meritocracy a feature of equality is not that everyone will come out the same at the end of the race but that everyone is allowed to come up to the starting line.

Theorists such as Kallen have proposed problematic and conceptually contradictory ideas. There are no clear developmental stages implied in Kallen's work on which to

base a notion of change. And further, since rights are collapsed into interests, and interests are devoid of obligations, there is no theoretical base for moral growth as there is in Durkheim's pedagogic ideals. To call something a right is to give it a moral force that the term interests does not bear. It is, however, useful to moral development and to concepts such as tolerance to speak of the "harmonious adjustment of interests" in a pluralistic state.[12] But to call life styles choices rights, as Flanagan (1985) notes, is to obfuscate the moral obligation to ameliorate the condition of those whose personhood has not yet been raised past encultured notions of the dominant group. Neither is Kallen helpful in deciding how much tolerance a society can bear and still hold together as a society.

Peter Berger's description of primary and secondary socialization does provide a basis congruent with conditions inherent in the development-concept, and without an overtly political agenda.

Primary and Secondary Socialization

Berger outlines the characteristcs and relations of primary and secondary socialization and the following is a summary of his description.[13] Primary socialization is synonymous with Kallen's term, enculturation. The process of becoming human takes place in an interrelationship between the child and a natural as well as a socio-cultural environment. The child has the potential (structures) to be human and realizing one's humanity is played out in concert

with significant others. The ways of becoming human are as numerous as are individual cultures.

A child is born with a predisposition towards sociality and therefore becomes a member of a given society. This process is a comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or sector of it. The child learns the particularistic "rules of the game" in which the social world is filtered to him through a double selectivity. For example, a lower class child absorbs a lower class perspective of the world and also absorbs his or her parental interpretation of that view. Therefore, such a child's view will differ from an upper class child as well as from the lower class view of the child next door.

As the child identifies with significant others he becomes capable of identifying himself, of acquiring a subjectively coherent and plausible identity. This self is a reflected identity. It is a construction built by reflecting the attitudes first taken toward him; the individual becomes what he is addressed as by others. But this is not a one-sided, mechanistic process. It is a dialectic--an interaction between what others reflect and what the child identifies as the self. Therefore, the lower class child mentioned earlier will have a self-identity which differs from siblings as well as a world view characterized by double selectivity.

The child generalizes from his primary social world to the society at large. He or she abstracts from the primary

social world to what is called the "generalized other". For example, if my father is loving, warm and accepting I generalize that all men are; if my father is cold, angry and rejecting I generalize this. Such a picture becomes a taken-for-granted reality but is alterable through later experience.

In primary socialization there is no problem of identification since there is no choice of significant others. The child internalizes the world produced and mediated prior to schooling as the only world existent, the only conceivable world. This world is massively real, and is much more firmly entrenched in consciousness than worlds internalized later. However, socialization is never total and it is never finished.

While primary socialization results in the construction of an "at-home" or base world, secondary socialization (generally synonymous with schooling) is the internalization of institutional or institution-based sub-worlds. That is, schooling is the world one "brings home" and it is built upon the base world formed in the child's home. Secondary socialization is the acquisition of role-specific knowledge, the roles arising out of culture-specific division of labour. The sub-worlds internalized during schooling are generally partial realities in contrast to the base-world acquired in primary socialization. Sub-worlds are more or less cohesive realities.

In most societies rituals accompany the transition from

primary to secondary socialization (i.e., entering school). Schooling always presupposes a preceding process, an already formed self, and an already internalized world. Secondary socialization is characterized by (1) formality, (2) anonymity, and, (3) interchangeability of those caring for the young. That is, it is easier for a child to hide from his teacher than to hide from his mother. Further, the child can dissociate parts of the self during schooling but this is not so easily done at home.

Since secondary socialization is the internalization of cultural forms or institutions there is a relationship between pedagogy and the state. Two models of the state and the attendant implications for schooling provide a framework in which this relationship can be analyzed. It is schooling that has the potential function of moving a child from home to national to universal allegiances. But as many theorists have noted schooling may involve contradictory roles. On the one hand, "schooling is to make children fit the system, on the other it is to help children remake the system to fit them."[14] Where there is a wide discrepancy between home and national values conflict is unavoidable. In Durkheim's view this conflict is precluded by consensus.

The Nation-State and Durkheim's Pedagogy

Durkheim developed pedagogic principles in light of his sociological longings for France as a nation-state. It seems that in Durkheim's thinking the state could be an extension of primary world experience. Note his language. Three

components of moral education are: to respect discipline; to be committed to the social group; and to be autonomous, where autonomy equals the ability of the person to come to understand and accept the legitimacy and good of the rules and norms that he performs. The morally educated person is one who acts in accord with the moral climate and ideals of his or her particular society. Moral socialization is a legitimately educational enterprise that helps the child find a place in a reasonable social order.[15]

Durkheim's notion of society is "above all a [shared] consciousness [and] it is therefore this collective consciousness that must be imparted to the child". The first obligation of schooling is to "create a moral consensus" and to act morally is to "act in terms of the collective interest...the domain of the moral begins where the domain of the social begins."[16] His view is made even clearer as he describes discipline in the social order as "the father as commanding us" and attachment to the social order as "the mother as attracting us".[17]

Further, with respect to indentificaton and identity-finding, identity is congruence with the state. He says: "Society lives in and expresses itself through the individual of course, it is infinitely greater than the individual: it is outside of us and envelops us. But at the same time it is within us. We are fused with it." Identification with the "nation" provides the elementary basis for morality.[18]

Yet, I would argue that the optimism about a reasonable social order in which the child can find his or her place must be juxtaposed with the development in Nazi Germany of a nation-state mentality that subsumed the individual under the national or collective identity, "the larger individual", in such a way that moral choice came to be equated with what the state wishes me to do rather than what I ought to do as a responsible moral agent.[19] Merging one's identity with the state's as an end in itself can work against morality. At any rate, Durkheim's view presupposes a social and cultural consensus which is not available in the modern pluralistic state and his pedagogy is not as it stands a model for it.

Multicultural Education and the Pluralist State

M. G. Smith contrasts plural societies and nation-states. To him a nation is the antithesis of a pluralistic social order. The nation-state embodies three characteristics: (1) usually a single inclusive corporate group whose members, or the majority of them--share common traditions, institutions, history, and ethnic identity (yet, a state may contain a plural society); (2) a state identity which is the derivative political expression of the nation's cohesion and unity (access to and obligation to the political organization and equality of opportunity for participation in the political process are essentials of national identity and citizenship); and (3) regulatory corporations which are equally representative of, binding on, and accessible to all members.[20]

Van den Berghe provides a general description of a pluralistic state by articulating two basic characteristics, which are: 1. segmentation into corporate groups that frequently (not necessarily) have different cultures or subcultures; and, 2. a social structure compartmentalized into analogous, parallel, noncomplementary but distinquishable sets of institutions, such as the public and separate School Boards in Alberta. Seven characteristics of such societies are:

> 1. relative absence of value consensus; 2. relative presence of cultural heterogeneity; 3. and of conflict between the significant corporate groups; 4. relative autonomy between parts of the social system; 5. and the importance of coercion and economic interdependence as bases of social integration; 6. political domination by one of the corporate groups over the other; 7. primacy of segmental, utilitarian, nonaffective, and functionally specific relationships between corporate groups and of total, non-utilitarian, affective, diffuse ties within groups.[21]

There are two traditions in the interpretation of what constitutes pluralistic states. The older tradition following deTocqueville conceives pluralism as a dispersion of power between two groups which are held together by common values or a balance of power. This is a positive view of pluralism adhered to by North American political and social scientists. Pluralism, in this view, is an important condition making for democracy. The newer tradition following from Furnivall, associates pluralism with despotism and dominance by a powerful minority. This view is supported by British and British-trained anthropologist.[24] The disparity between the former "equilibrium" and the latter

"conflict" school is a problem to theorists. Kuper tries to decide whether the difference is one of degree or kind;[25] and, van den Berghe assumes it is essentially a question of definition.[26]

Yet, it must be noted that the only way to sustain the equilibrium notion that pluralism supports democracy is to ignore the lack of civil equality between Blacks and Whites in the United States, and Indians, Inuit and the dominant "group" in Canada. The question of whether pluralism represents equilibrium or conflict is central to the general issue of social relations in a plural society; that is, it is important to deciding what the rules about living together are, and how they should be applied.

Plural societies are characterized either by paternalism in the form of a dominant majority or by competion among corporate groups and in both the central issue is the distribution of power and privilege.[25] Canada is categorized as a pluralist democracy, a phrase which to conflict theorists is an oxymoron since their view presupposes that pluralism is characterized by the domination of one group over another. Multiculturalism is the third step in a series of attempts to resolve corporate group rivalries. A progression occurs, according to some, in which the changing position of mirgants follows a pattern: 1. assimilationism, 2. intergration, 3. the migrant problem to which multiculturalism appears as a solution.[26] Multiculturalism, unlike pluralism, is a tactic for rather than a descriptor of

corporate relations within the state.

But the feature of multiculturalism which is pertinent at this point is its potential to frustrate the building of consensus that is central to the development of democratic pluralism.[27] Canada is not a multicultural state, if such a polity could exist. Yet it is in the evolution of Canada as a pluralist state that multicultural education may serve its most fruitful function as a check and balance to the dominant group. This could occur if its educational aim includes two things, a basis for enlarging the concept of personhood and for developing the ability to understand. The latter purpose will be addressed in chapter five.

Democratic pluralism raises the question of "Who am I?" in a world which is characterized by conflict and competing world views based upon sometimes widely divergent social realities. Identity in the nation-state is conceived in terms of a consensus over what constitutes personhood: one is either a national or one is not; but the nation-state does not encourage the development of a universalized identity as a member of the human group. Pluralism, on the other hand presents choice and therefore the possibility of confused identities. The issue of national and individual identities will be taken up later.

A Model For Development in Multicultural Education

At present, the central developmental problem for schooling has to do with the notion of personhood. Through enculturation one picks up a concept of person which

precludes the acceptance of ethnic difference. Within its framework, to share the world is to expect that everyone who is different will elect to join my world. To be unlike me is to be less than me, and therefore neither entitled to, nor able to make appropriate use of, the rights and freedoms that I have. A national identity is based on convergence toward the dominant group's enculturated notion of personhood and is an extension of this process.

So it is respect for persons, where person is not conceived of as one who is culturally or racially the same as me, that must be included in the ethical commitments of a pluralist state. The language of the racist, for example, describes the outsider in terms other than human, such as "trash", thereby giving himself permission to dispense with or brutalize the other. What is necessary in pedagogy is to come to see that enculturated or nationalistic definitions of personhood are inadequate. This process of de-reifying notions of personhood assumes that all students will be treated as active members of a democratic plurality and it is an assumption which sides with the conflict conceptualization of pluralism.

Conflict is inherent in pluralities. In order to engage in effective schooling a way of handling its unavoidable presence in the classroom must be worked out. While Durkheim could suggest a pedagogy that was contiguous with primary socializaion, Giroux, basing his ideas on Gramsci, proposes the pedagogy of resistance which equips the child to analyze

the social and political structures around him so as to decide what should be resisted and what should be accepted.

The differences implied in the approaches to teaching of Durkheim and Giroux are enormous in terms of the implied structures, stages and end-states of development. To Durkheim, the educated individual absorbs the social order, to Giroux he interrogates it. What Giroux's approach does is involve the child in questioning and examining the state and in so doing prepares the ground for his or her allegiance to it as an intermediary step to transcending enculturated views of personhood. Change, in terms of the stages of development in a plural society, needs to include:

1. primary socialization (enculturation) in which a specific identity is learned and valued;

2. secondary socialization in which the child learns to be discerning and comes to value his own position while remaining open to the realities of others;

3. a movement towards membership in a universal community founded on a concept of personhood that would encompasses all.

The interesting problem that the three stages raise is the relationship between 1 and 2. This relationship will be analyzed further in chapter five.

In proposing that students learn to be discerning, the tolerance-concept presents itself as a useful pedagogic tool. Tolerance, properly understood, holds sacred the tolerator's values while engaging him in the self-restraint necessary to hear the other and to act out of the conviction that persons are equally worthwhile as ends-in-themselves. As children

come to understand and to choose to be tolerant, the way is made clear for the emergence of their active parts in a democratic and pluralistic state so that each child may construct meaning in the concentric circles of personal, national and universal worlds. Yet proposals for multicultural education that fail to come to grips theoretically with the conflict inherent in a pluralist state will simply not succeed in developing tolerance and understanding. In order to make multicultural education work it must include a theoretical analysis of the role of minority and dominant groups and the distribution of power between them.

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[1] Dale B. Harris, Ed., The Concept of Human Development (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 3-4.

[2] Harris, pp. 1-17.

[3] Harris, p. 17.

[4] Harris, pp. 23-24.

[5] Evelina Orteza y Miranda, "Educating Women For Development," Canadian and International Education, Vol 11, No. 1, (1982), p. 11.

[6] Orteza y Miranda, pp. 10-12.

[7] Evelyn Kallen, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada (Toronto: Gage Publishing Ltd., 1982), pp. 12-41.

[8] Kallen, p. 11.

[9] Kallen, pp. 75-77.

[10] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 142.

[11] Paul Komissar and Jerrold R. Coombs, "The Concept of

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[13] Berger, pp. 149-166.

[14] George H. Wood, "Schooling in a Democracy: Transformation or Reproduction?" Multiculturalism as an Educational Policy, Ed. Fazal Rizvi, (Victoria, Australia: Deakin University press, 1985), p. 92.

[15] Barry Chazan, Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education: Analyzing Alternative Theories (New York and London: Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1985), pp. 21-23.

[16] Emile Durkheim, Moral Education, Transl. Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnerr, (New York: Collier Publishing Co., 1961), p. vii.

[17] Durkheim, p. xii.

[18] Durkheim, p. xii.

[19] Reinhold Neibuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: Vol. 1 Human Nature (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), pp. 74-92.

[20] M.G. Smith, "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism," Pluralism in Africa, Eds. Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 76-77.

[21] Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 67-68.

[22] van den Berghe, p. 67.

[23] van den Berghe, pp. 7-26.

[24] van den Berghe, pp. 68-81.

[25] van den Berghe, p. 36.

[26] Rizvi, p. 45.

[27] van den Berghe, pp. 76-77.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Boundaries of Change: Canada and Nation-Building

To this point I have presented four major concepts: culture, tolerance, understanding and development. These concepts have change of some kind as a common feature. The nature of change implied in each will be examined. I will include a summary of the concepts and pick out aspects from each in order to build up the description of the change presupposed in multicultural education. First, a summary of concepts and then an analysis of the change implied in a multicultural environment will follow.

Culture-concept

Culture refers to an inward as well as an outward condition. Geertz construes man as an animal suspended in webs of significance she herself has spun, and he takes culture to be those webs. Man is a maker of meaning. Taking threads from past, present and future, she weaves the design that becomes her identity.

Meaning-making is fundamental to the nature of being human in the normative sense; it is ongoing and continues throughout individual, group, national or transnational experience. The immigrant who comes to Canada continues to construct meaning in one of two ways: either by setting up old forms as barriers to new ideas, carefully making repairs to these old frameworks, or else, by adding on new cultural features at will, sometimes replacing the whole with an

entirely new construction.

The "native" Canadian is also engaged in meaning-making since the presence of newcomers requires a re-working of the moral requirements for living in the same nation. That is, migration is a two-directional phenomenon, though not enough study has been done on the effects of immigration on members of the home culture.[1] Anxiety can arise in a relationship which is made rather than natural, as was outlined in chapter one. The State creates relationships through immigration, and policy is written to hold these relationships together.

Three tendencies attached to our thinking about someone else's culture that deny the element of change are: reification, ossification and relativization. In their moderate to extreme forms these ideas misrepresent cultural reality. To reify a culture is to render its bearers passive recipients of implicit and explicit cultural forms. To ossify cultural boundaries is to presume a uniformity within them that is not descriptive. To relativize cultural contents is to preclude organizing principles that are needed to guide the selection of educational content, methodologies and purposes which would then serve to build intercultural understanding and respect. Further, cultural relativity fragments society so as to frustrate the development of a body politic.

Therefore, the culture-concept employed must not negate change. We must set the boundaries of the culture-concept between egoism on the one side, which conceives the world

only on its own enculturated terms, and a descriptive form of cultural relativity on the other.

Tolerance-concept.

Tolerance is central to our philosophy because its important features serve multicultural education well. The concept presupposes conflict and functions as a format for thinking which allows for primary and secondary socialization eventually to come to terms with one another in a multi-ethnic environment.

Tolerance:

1. has its conceptual dimension (also psychological, epistemological, and utilitarian ones)

2. is either a specific act or a disposition

3. always has an object, ie., someone always tolerates something

4. is both a rejection and an acceptance at the same time since it is a rejection of X and an acceptance of Y (where Y equals X under certain conditions or Y equals X rather than something less desirable than X)

5. therefore, tolerance is not mere acceptance or indifference, ie., X is something I care about

6. neither is it acquiescence, ie., X is something I have the power to stop if I choose to

7. therefore, tolerance is an act or a tendency I have not to use force--physical through violence, psychological through threats, and epistemological through deception--to interfer with an instance of X
   a. I may show tolerance because I really do not want to show intolerance which is fueled by prejudice or pre-judgement
   b. values are displayed in large measure through our tolerant, intolerant or indiscriminately tolerant responses.

In general, what is tolerated deviates from the tolerator's values, is important, receives disapproval from the tolerator, and represents an area in which the tolerator

has power to interfer, but he or she chooses not to and the deviation continues. Agreement about showing tolerance is a second-order activity based upon the first-order activity of establishing what should be esteemed. The boundaries for tolerance are intolerance on the one side and reactions such as acceptance of things not acceptable, acquiescence or indifference on the other.

Understanding

Understanding is related to tolerance and is best conceived as empathy or getting oneself on the same path as another; it implies change. To imaginatively re-orient ourselves along new paths we must clarify exactly what is entailed in grasping someone's intention (even our own). A necessary condition for realizing something is an internal change, a perceptual shift. Understanding actions is necessarily bound up with the concept of self-hood. This is why trying to really understand difference is so difficult and frequently so painful. Understanding someone of another culture involves continual re-interpretation of one's own culture and hence one's self-concept in the light of social change.[2] The proper boundaries of understanding lie between a complete separation of self in enculturated, stagnant forms or in complete submergence, and therefore forfeiture of self, in a generalized social reality.

Development

The concept of development has two dimensions: the natural or unfolding biological sense, and a non-natural

sense in which human intentions play a part in the initiation and maintenance of the process and in decision-making about end-states. The two aspects are simultaneously ongoing and neither would fully explain human development by itself.[3] A clear case of development entails structures (pre-existing capacities), sequential stages (levels of understanding), and an end-state.

In the case of multicultural education, development includes three stages: identity-formation based on a grounding in first-culture; exposure to significant second-culture encounters so that the disposition to be tolerant and understanding eventually may emerge; and, the establishment of a perspective achieved from a trans-cultural vantage point. Such a development of understanding implies that the learner is discerning of which features from each may be kept in order that possibly a new "third-cultural" vantage point may be reached.

The boundary markers for development are enculturated preconceptions which are extended and used as a device for measuring personhood on one side and the complete lack of commitment to any universally binding criteria which could be used to establish worthy and unworthy human attributes, behaviors and beliefs on the other.

Change Implied in Multicultural Education: The Concept of Change

As was mentioned at the outset, change is common to all four concepts. In picking up the main threads from them it

is possible to weave a conceptual design for our notion of change. First the threads. The culture-concept implies that meaning-making is ongoing and adaptive. Tolerance potentially provides the opportunity and understanding provides the perceptual shift that enables someone to move outside a merely enculturated perspective. And the simultaneous and ongoing aspects of natural and non-natural development interrelate so that the human values and intentions that are guiding change may be noticed.

Therefore change will be understood as a derivative of the nature of things. It is ongoing in that particular end-states become new material for the next developmental move. Change is not to be equated with imposition since it is the inevitable result of being in contact with others who are different and it is inherent in human development generally. This is not to argue that the imposition of dominant values is not frequently applied within the pluralist state since in some instances domination has taken the form of a brutal deculturation of a subordinate group, reducing its members to symbiotic subservience.[4] It is however, to argue that evidence of change in the sub-group is not automatically evidence of intentional imposition by the dominant group.

It is the uncovering or proposing of these values and intentions with respect to multicultural education, and the assessment of how they are being represented in policy and practice that is the proper task of an educational

philosopher, as discussed in chapter five. The perception of Canada as an essentially peaceful, non-confrontative and compromising society must be taken into account when one makes suggestions about values and intentions for multicultural education.

That is, in order to make plans or devise purposes for change that respect the natural development of the Canadian context, the planner is required to assess the historical structures, stages or sequences to date, and to analyze current policies defining national aims (such as multiculturalism) that comprise the nature of the country so that reasonable expectations for change arise which are congruent with that history. Not to make such plans as educators is to remain passively by while values and intentions from the marketplace and the political arena fill in the space left by silence.

Change: Dominance and Conflict

In order to depict the concept of change implied in multicultural education it is necessary to set up a working definition for the expression "dominant group" since multiculturalism presents itself as a critique of, or in resistance to, the exclusive maintenance of the dominant, at the expense of the minority, group. In proposing this description it must be noted that this is a departure from M.G. Smith's judgement, cited earlier, that a nation is the antithesis of a plural order.

The working definition is provided by Gluckman as he

identifies a political type that emerged in post-colonial societies which he terms the "non-national state". He proposes that this type is marked by the presence of two societies within one political network. Although the entire population is included in a single system of political bonds, he argues that only a part of the population is fully aware of the national entity, participates significantly in its policies, and has sentimental and personal bonds of attachment to it. This group extends thoroughout the national territory: it is divided into social classes and is marked by rural and urban differences. This group is, in fact, the nation and the state.

Ranking below this national group in power and prestige are a series of local societies, the members of which have no, or little, conception of the nation, and no significant participation in its political apparatus. These local societies are of small scale and their customs and way of life are different from the group which constitutes the nation and the state. The only way a non-national state can become a nation is by winning the adherence of the members of its component local societies.[5] The evidence of the effectiveness of multicultural policies is <u>felt</u> in the degree of voluntary inclusion of minorities into social strata and rural and urban society.

This analysis of dominant and minority groups raises the prior question of the very nature of a group. Rex identifies three characteristics of a group which gives ethnic groups a

"quazi-group" status. Groups have closed social relationships, representativity and responsibility may be imputed to members, and generally they have a head or leader. He concludes that while ethnic "groups" may be communal and closed they may not have the characteristics of a group and therefore are not communities. Groups may form within minorities but the whole is not a group and does not act as one.[6] The definition of a dominant group must be readjusted to a "quasi-group" status as well. This distinction is important with respect to the management of power in the dominant 'group' because power is not in any sense managed "by the group" but by parts of it. Membership in either dominant or minority groups is often an imputed membership rather than one based on clear criteria.[7]

Four qualities are commonly attached to minority groups: identifiability, differential power, differential and pejorative treatment, and group awareness.[8] When one compares the working definition of the dominant group with that of a minority, a particular characterization emerges--a problematic wolf and sheep scenario.

Change and National Consciousness

The questions that the working definition raises have to do with identity--individual, group, national or transnational. Individual identity was discussed in chapter three, group identity is addressed above, transnational identity will be included in chapter five. Therefore, I now analyze national identity-formation.

National identity formation has two aspects: the individual comes to see himself as a member of a national group and the society comes to see itself as having a particular character. This character emerges as the non-national state becomes a nation-state. The aim of this process should be more toward developing a national consciousness than toward encouraging nationalistic zeal because the latter may override individual moral responsibility.

That is, national consciousness encompasses loyalty, but not blind loyalty. Loyalty implies commitment to a state largely because of the values it embodies and identity it represents. If loyalty is low in a significant segment of a population a society's capacity to act effectively in relation to problems and opportunities is reduced.[9] Such reconstruction entails two related tasks. First, the adoption of new values, meanings and cultural traits which involves the introduction of new symbolic forms, and the elimination of those felt to be obsolete. And second, the reallocation of status among some of the constituent groups.[10]

We need to work out a national character on the basis of the inclusion of sub-groups into social strata and local levels. Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework:

> becomes something very North American: voluntary marginal differentiation among peoples who are equal participants in the society. If it is interpreted in a second way--as enabling various peoples to transfer foreign cultures and languages as living wholes into a new place and time--multiculturalism is doomed.[11]

What is at issue is that ethnicity, rooted in the past, is in tension with modernity. With respect to identity, a distinction needs to be made between Kuper and Geertz's term "primordial attachments" and Mazrui's term "total identity".[12] The first refers to an identity which is rooted in history and heritage while the second suggests that identity is influenced by location and time. If multicultural education is thought of as a type of modernization planning it involves a "partial fabrication or creation of the past".[13] The histories involved include Canada's as well as those of immigrant populations. Planning repeatedly requires both the "selective abandonment" of the past as well as its "selective ideologization and reconciliation with the new".[14] The new identity must be legitimated and able to elicit consensus. Inclusion of minorities in the nation and state and the representation of some features of their symbolic content in state institutions are necessary conditions for the legitimation of a national identity.

I would argue that ethnicity as equated with "primordial attachment" works against involvement in a post-industrial society. Canada has its own history which includes legally safeguarded rights and freedoms and a tradition of liberty quite unlike some of the cultures represented in immigrant populations. The inclusion of cultures which are fundamentally different, or different in some important aspects, raises the question of what to do about these

differences.

Ethnicity conceived as "primordial attachment" implies the maintenance of these objectionable cultural features, i.e., those which denegrate the status of segments of the population. The justification for not maintaining these features rests in the notion of a descriptive form of cultural relativity. That is, Canadian culture must be taken seriously by immigrants. And therefore, not all features of all cultures have an equal claim on Canadian moral support.[15] There is a difference between allowing the expression of certain differences and supporting them. Some cultural features such as those that work against equality for women, for example, do not warrant support in a western liberal tradition. There are limits to the value of cultural features which amount to a justification of harm to others. To connect this with the tolerance-concept we do not tolerate those values which would, if allowed, eclipse tolerance.

The question that this argument raises concerns an understanding of the relationship between individual, collective and national identity. The process of national integration is a "partialization of group identities". As sub-groups lose their coherence as distinct systems of life in a pluralist state, a new kind of "total identity" may be formed. Some would argue that identities and psychic shelter may come to be found in forms other than those based on descent.[16] Integration toward a national identity is not synonymous with assimilation (the swallowing up of one

culture by another). It refers to the accommodation that comes about when different groups maintain their respective core cultural identities while at the same time merging into a superordinate group in other, equally important respects.[17] The process is moved from stage to stage through the cumulative effect of resolved conflict between groups. What makes conflict resolutions possible is the cumulative power of precedent, the awareness of reciprocal dependence, and a shared ideology, eg., the ideology attached to national consciousness itself.[18]

Four stages may be noted in the emergence of a national identity. First, there is bare co-existence and distinct identities involved in a minimal degree of integration. Second, contact with other identities in which minimal dealings need not imply friendliness. Third, compromise with other identities in which interaction is sufficiently complex, diverse and interdependent and requires peaceful reconciliation between conflicting interests even though distinct identities and distinct interests remain. And four, coalescence of identities is the final stage in the integration process.

It must be noted that this last category involves a coalescence of identities rather than a merger of interests. This analysis distinguishes interests from identities. The diversity of interests continues but a national character is recognizable and loyalty to it is expressed. That is, a French, a Ukrainian and a Vietnamese individual would

identify themselves as Canadian in terms of participation in and loyalty to state activities. Since interests remain diverse the working out of their harmonious adjustment continues to be a central social activity. That is, first language rights and linguistic equality would continue to be important issues. Compromises regarding those interests would still be needed at the stage of coalescence. But the conflict of interests is no longer a contest between "total identities".[19]

An important distinction is to be made between integration which results from synthesis and that which arises through compromise. The "quest for synthesis is essentially anti-pluralistic while a quest for compromise is an acceptance of pluralism".[20] Compromise equates with the "will of all" and is an arithmetic exercise, a balancing of particular interests. Synthesis, a liquidation of separate identities, is connected with assimilationist policies in that any compromise would only serve a transitional function; the intention is to create a new "unicultural" and dominant identity. Compromise and coalescence arise out of a reconciling of opposites in which what is combined is what is least objectionable to the groups involved. Compromising actions are tied to genuinely multicultural policies since stable multicultural features, described in chapter one, are included intentionally in the national identity.[21]

In many ways stable multicultural educational policy would seem to be an obvious complement to the idea of an

emerging national consciousness. Yet it is unclear from reading documents such as the Multiculturalism Bill whether the Canadian intention is toward stable, residual, or transitional effects. Policies are proposed and written up only to cause confusion and stir up resistance when implementation begins. Multiculturalism itself is vague and therefore a Bill can slip through the Commons and the Senate with unanimous approval.[22]

The central problem with multicultural education is that there has been no attempt to limit its central concepts so that a theoretical base could be built on which one could establish a clear analysis of the relationship between the individual and group. This lack of clarity is intensified by the undistinquished use of two different theories of immigration: the functional and the conflict view.

To functionalists, migrants move in order to improve their economic condition. They want to educate their children, improve their life-style or escape conflict; that is, generally they come in order to start all over again. The State encourages immigration because of a perceived economic need for this influx of people. Immigration is conceived as the result of a simple function of supply and demand. No account is taken in this view of the conflict that exists and which expresses itself in racial hatred and discrimination. Functionalist accounts are linked to a theoretical framework of methodological individualism, focusing attention on the conceptual orientation of the

individual, but not explaining how this orientation is constructed and reproduced. Neither do functionalists explain why some policies are projected and accepted at certain periods in a country's history and not at others. Functionalism represents reality as static. Further, this view ignores two tendencies: the maintenance and persistence of ethnicity, and the role and distribution of power.[23]

To conflict theorists, immigration is an economic process. They would argue that it is the movement of labour to places where capital has come to be located. To meet the requirement of capital, the State regulates the movement of labour with varying degrees of rigidity, often making invidious judgements about the appropriateness of people of particular origins for particular jobs; a selective process which has characterized immigration policies of all Western countries this century.[24]

A "reserve army of workers" keeps costs of labour down and reduces the bargaining power of unions. Hegemony is thus based more on the routine application of effectively unchallenged assumptions than on any manifest dominance of one interest or policy over others in an open conflict. Multiculturalism fails to penetrate the solid defences of the status quo. As a slogan, it continues to serve an important ideological purpose in legitimating the current economic and political structures and in diffusing social conflict that might result from the increased politicalization of ethnic groups. As ideology it serves both an obscuring as well as a

legitimating function.[25]

Functionalist views are often connected with western liberal tradition which is built upon and issues in cumulative benefits to citizens as individuals. The belief is that citizenship rights are universalistic while group rights are particularistic and a society organized on the basis of group rights or claims is sharply opposed to one based on citizenship rights.[26] Yet the attainment of a society of citizens is questionable even to functionalists since it is a political reality that it is difficult in modern societies for deprived minorities to seek redistribution of social resources to redress grievances. This raises the question of whether interethnic conflicts can be resolved in ways that are both ethnically acceptable and sociologically possible.[27]

If one is concerned with the maintenance of things as they are, the disturbing effect of positive discrimination on "existing relations" is noticed; what is gain to the newcomer is perceived as loss to those already established. The suppressed premise in such thinking is that multiculturalism cannot really reflect the actual nature of a modern society because culture as a basis for identity is considered to be rooted in the past not in the present or future. The question is not which point of view to adopt, the conflict or the functionalist, so much as it is to notice how the former reveals problems in the latter.

Two points must be addressed more fully. Group or

collective identities are significant and this identity directly influences current access to structures which allow for inclusion and participation in the nation and the state. So that even though the social and political aim of citizenship regardless of ethnicity may be supportable as an eventual outcome, functionalists provide no guidance for how one accomplishes the interim changes which would place all Canadians on even a relatively equal footing now, or at some point in the future. As Rizvi points out, assimilation does not work toward promoting loyalty to and involvement in the State for second generation immigrants.[28]

The second factor missed by theorists who support citizenship based on individualism is the taken-for-grantedness of membership in the dominant group. At bottom, the issue arises from discrepancies over what it means to "earn rights" as an individual. Since rights, privileges and responsibilities are always attached to systems and systems to people how can we say that anyone achieves or moves upward entirely as an individual? One's capacity to move is influenced by imputed group membership whether this is a dominant or minority association.

The only way that an individual can believe that he or she has succeeded completely on his or her own (ie., as an individual) is to ignore the structures that have made upward mobility possible. The attachment to the dominant group is as invisible as Durkheim's "plate-glass window" which is only perceived when broken through.[29] Minority group

consciousness is written across our plate-glass window in black grease pencil and functionalists would like us to just get out the Windex. This is not to argue that the extension of citizenship rights to all is not the reasonable and eventual aim of an inclusive national identity. However, functionalist views do not take into account the nature and degree of change required to accomplish this end; neither do they establish fair principles on which to decide on such an identity.

At present there is confusion as to the status of potential or actual members of the Canadian state. Are we to see ourselves as individual citizens with equal access to participation and power or are we to see some as citizens and others firstly as members of a collective, and hence secondarily as Canadian citizens? The catchwords of modernity, progress, and upward mobility imply individual movement toward material goals. Ethnic groups may or may not fundamentally support these values. Yet it is only those who do that can be citizens in the sense employed in Gluckman's definition of participatory members of the state, cited earlier in the chapter. So citizenship is not open to everyone but only to those who support the above values, as opposed, for example, to values of heritage, community and extended family. Only those willing to pay the functionalist price can become citizens; yet it may be a price that is currently beyond their reach, not just their will.

The change that is implied in multicultural education is

transformative. The ultimate goal is consistent, in my view, with a society of citizens. But there is no easy way to get from here to there if we proceed as if minority members actually have the same chance at inclusion within the nation and the state as do indigenous Canadians. Multicultural relations are non-linear and functionalists tend to conceive progress in a linear fashion. While I would argue that Canadian society is best served by evolutionary change, it is the system of domination that is the critical factor affecting the possibility of evolutionary change.[30]

Interactions in the classroom aimed at developing tolerance and understanding are the subtle motions that eventually draw in the winds. If stable multicultural features are to be included in the national identity, political and social processes will have to encompass ways of making ethnic relations work on the grounds of our moral responsibility to one another. So in schooling we must begin to treat each other as though we are all citizens already, until we actually are in the world. Multicultural education must include the perspectives, perceptions and theory to clarify and achieve this end.

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CHAPTER FIVE

The Concept of Understanding and Its Application to the Multi-Ethnic Classroom

In this concluding chapter I will pick up ideas from earlier sections and pull together a description of multicultural education as an education for the development of tolerance and understanding. As outlined in chapter two, the aim of enhancing a pupil's ability to understand and tolerate differences is central to an appropriate educational curriculum in a rapidly changing, pluralistic Canadian society.

Tolerance was identified as a long-term pedagogic aim, dependent upon the development of understanding and characterized by volitional self-restraint and discernment. The tolerator must understand what should and should not be tolerated and be able to say why this is the case. Toleration as a disposition arises from the tolerator's knowledge of and confidence in his or her personal views and out of a regard for the other's right also to have views. While indifference or acquiescence may be fairly easy to elicit, tolerance is complex because it assumes that power, knowledge and understanding are operative in the tolerator's action.

Therefore, tolerance is really a concept for the mature. The aim of developing tolerance as a disposition is consistent with the intention to treat students as though

they already are citizens of the state. Toleration arises from confidence in what one believes and is not synonymous with closed-mindedness.[1] But tolerance is dependent upon the development of understanding. A careful analysis of the concept will reveal educational features of understanding.

Understanding: The Concept

Understanding, as presented in chapter two, is both an attitude and a cognitive activity. A distinction is made conceptually between taking (adopting) a point of view and taking a point of view into account. That is, understanding as 'knowing that' or 'knowing why' does not imply agreement and 'taking into account' does not necessarily imply empathy with the point one wishes to understand. One could not logically be tolerating a view if he or she took this view on, since a precondition for toleration is that one disapproves of the act or attitude. So tolerance stops short of empathy and adoption of the other's view. As tolerance and understanding are described this distinction must be made clear so that individuals do not come to believe that agreement with, or adoption of a view are necessarily inside of the disposition to be tolerant. If they were, diversity itself would be eclipsed by sameness.

Chapter three outlined stages implied in multicultural education conceived as the development of tolerance and understanding which need to be kept in mind during the discussion. These are namely:

1. primary socialization (enculturation) in which a specific identity is learned and valued;

2. secondary socialization (schooling) in which the child learns to be discerning and comes to value his or her own position while remaining open to the realities of others;

3. progress towards 'membership' in a universal community founded on a concept of personhood that would encompass all human beings.

A problem arises because 1 represents the acquiring of a particular cultural frame of reference or 'perspective' which then comes into contact with different perspectives in schooling. The work of teaching in a culturally diverse setting must include helping children to understand and be understanding given that these perspectives may conflict.

Understanding as a Pedagogic Aim

The general description of understanding as given so far omits much of what is necessary for teachers to know in order to bring the disposition to life in the classroom. The question that arises is, What is entailed in coming to understand? Any model for "theorizing about how to enhance children's understanding of actions must adequately conceptualise [sic] the inherence of the interactive development of mental capacities and selfhood in the cultural processes from which [these actions] basically derive".[2] That is, coming to understand requires a reassessment of some kind and it is this re-evaluation of perspectives that the teacher needs to guide.

Understanding is both a cognitive and a dispositional concept. When the teacher is concerned that students be understanding he is thinking of the disposition and evidence of understanding is found in the capacity to do something;

the doing may be in the sense of following, interpreting, or making sense of something. Yet, understanding in this case is a fait accompli. 'Understand' shares with 'see' the pecularity that its present is really a perfect. This is because 'understand' is used both to mark the actual dawning of the truth, (an episode) and to indicate that it has previously dawned and still illuminates.[3]

The teacher's interest is not only <u>that</u> one understands (perfect aspect) but is with how one comes to understand. He needs opportunities within the process of the pupil's coming to understand that allow him to guide the child to examine and reflect upon the content and manner of his or her thought. Therefore, this 'coming to understand' needs to be analyzed so that the implementation of the educational aim to teach children to be understanding may become clear and less frustrating to teachers. If end products only are of interest then the opportunities for change are lessened since reflection may not be part of the child's habitual way of arriving at a conclusion.

<u>Understanding as Realizing</u>

Reynolds (1972) analyzes Ryle's (1966) concept of understanding and proposes its relation to education and culture. Reynolds points out that understanding people in "open-ended transactional situations" such as those which take place in intercultural exchanges, requires more than Ryle allows. Ryle describes understanding as an ability or competence. Reynolds' focus is on clarifying "what exactly

is entailed in grasping people's intentions (or our own) when to do so requires some change in our habitual categories of thought."[4] Whether we are trying to understand why someone smokes when we do not or why an Arabic speaking woman is content to leave cultural expectations of her as they are, we are confronted with the unfamiliar or initially inexplicable. That is, our frame of mind about smoking or feminism is different from the one we are trying to understand and this difference is not merely in degree but in kind.

While for Ryle, understanding is 'recognizing' which implies familiarity or a common basis for the action or belief, to Reynolds understanding is 'realizing' what an activity is and 'realizing' what rules serve as a guide in a situation which is unfamiliar.[5] 'Realizing' in this sense is neither routine nor predictable. It is the application of concepts to contexts which would previously have seemed to have no relevance. If we are to think of understanding as an ability then we must distinguish two types of ability:

> In the first type of ability, we become more competent in the sense of becoming more able to identify and control objects in our environment; in the second sense, we become more competent in the sense of becoming more able to identify and control the a priori concepts through which we interpret our environment. We become (though we may rapidly lose the ability) able to de-reify our environment.[6]

In the first type of ability we progressively pick up the rules which characterize the ability; in the second, we start off with a ready-made set of rules in the form of a concept which we subsequently elaborate and refine.[7] We 'have' these concepts through primary socialization, ie., through our

initial learning of cultural 'rules of the game'. 'Recognizing' how an already categorized action is guided by rules is distinguished from 'realizing' how a rule is exemplified by bringing an action under a new description, ie., someone else's rules of the game. 'Realizing' often requires coming to see what someone's intentions are and therefore it plays a more important part in understanding a member of another culture.[8]

A distinction also can be made between 'realizing' and 'noticing'. In general, to ask someone "whether he has noticed that every time X occurs Y also occurs is to ask him whether on each occasion he has noticed Y accompanying X; whereas to ask him if he has realized that when every X occurs Y occurs is to ask him if he has seen this general truth.[9]

'Realizing' that X and Y are in relation of some kind denotes an internal change in the observer's perceptions. That is, the outer world has shifted in some sense and therefore one's perspective on the world changes in relation to this outward shift. These internal changes are necessary, though not sufficient conditions for understanding through 'realizing'. To realize something is not to see some attributes, or even infer regularities in these attributes, it is to see them falling under a different conceptual scheme. The difference suggested above may be picked out in the distinction between understanding "what we do consciously" and "what we are conscious of doing".[10]

For example, I may be consciously disciplining a child but I may not be conscious of my wish to punish him because he embarressed me in front of the principal. If I become conscious of my wish to punish it is not because I have brought new rules to the concept of discipline; it will be because I am struck by the realization that my action falls under another concept altogether, that of punishment.

At bottom, the distinction is between descriptions of the observable attributes of an action and descriptions of underlying intentions.[11] What is required in understanding is that an appropriate set of intentions are assigned to an action. Cultural behavior is founded on norms which are held within particular meaning-systems. What is required is that someone take the meaning-system into account when behavior is observed in order that intentions can be traced back to their context. This is not to suggest that an action is true, right or worthwhile for others to take up, but rather that it is meaningful within a particular system. Someone who understands the action can make the appropriate internal and external interconnections.

In the activity of understanding three distinct but closely related moves may be named; 1. instances of being struck by the applicability of new ways of discribing experiences to ourselves (an occurrence); 2. of judgement-making about the appropriateness or validity of these new descriptions (a rational act, satisfying norms of order and directedness); 3. of making applications of new

descriptions to further instances and in various circumstances (a disposition).[12] These moves may be picked out and practiced as part of training and educating children.

The first way of understanding (from Ryle) denotes a habitual way of applying rules of meaning; the second derived intially from realizing and including the three moves mentioned above, denotes a dispositional way of thinking, for its manifestation is proof of the ability to apply rules non-habitually.[13] That is, to understand a member of another culture one develops the disposition to think outside of one's habit.

The problem raised by the latter notion has to do with the complicated issue of one's capacity to understand between cultures or sub-cultures as it were. The strong form of cultural relativity presupposes that we have not got this capacity. And since cultural relativity is descriptive to some extent we must conclude that understanding a member of another culture is hard work. But to say that we have not got the capacity is to suggest that we never really understand another individual at all, we merely think that we do and behave as if we understand and as though we are understood. The solipsism implied in this view of itself would prevent understanding and therefore is either self-defeating or self-fulfilling. Assuming that your listener/reader can eventually understand is a precondition to beginning to talk or write.

Understanding and Multicultural Education

I have pointed out that understanding someone is difficult and misunderstanding ubiquitous. Yet the task for multicultural education is primarily the "development of a capacity for sympathetic but clear headed understanding of people and contexts of social relations and language useage."[14] There are two perspectives on an activity, as actor and as spectator. By the term 'perspective' I mean an individual's point of reference on the external world as distinguished from his 'perception' which comes from the outer reality or nature of things and is taken in by the individual; perspectives affect perceptions and vice versa. In order to be conscious of what one is doing, one must be both actor in and spectator to her activities.

In the development of understanding some new relationship begins between perceptions and perspectives due to a shift of some kind. Reynolds explores the idea of such a shift in this discussion of switching perspectives (actor/spectator) which is as follows:

> I am not at all sure that realising [sic] implies either mutual exclusiveness of concepts (ie., a total supplanting of one description of an action with another from a different perspective), or a sort of alternation in time and context between the two so that one was using it in an appropriate context and as part of an appropriate conceptual scheme. It seems to me that cultural and sub-cultural systems are open and manifestly do change.[15]

The idea is that there is a dialectic between different ways of talking about actions which can lead to modifications in the rules of usage to one or both ways of talking. What is important educationally is that we become aware of these

modifications of rules.[16]

However, when we realize that an alternative concept may be applied to an action we must first think about the criteria for that concept so decisions about its appropriateness may be set out. The reflection involved in non-habitual thinking is 'reflectiveness on criteria'. For example, consider the statement: A zen terrorist is happy. The concept 'happy' has a meaning which is violated in this juxtaposition with 'terrorist'. To some the problem may be resolved by the use of the word 'zen'; to others these three letters do nothing to explain how a terrorist could properly be described as 'happy'. In times of socio-cultural flux, the boundary-markers for the recognition of concepts change and the application of rules of meaning change as well.[17] Tension is created in dialogue when new 'paradigms' for concepts challenge enculturated ones.

The rules used in connection with a term such as 'happy' may serve to govern or guide. One may be governed by rules in the sense of playing a game of chess or guided by rules in the sense of bringing up a family or running a business.[18] Therefore, while we must start from the perspective of the participant, since not to do so may be merely to generalize from our own perceptions, we then make interpretations as to the role of rules for particular actions we wish to understand.

An individual usually thinks about the actions of another in terms of concepts he explicitly or implicitly holds. If

required to consider that an action may be moved by different concepts or that concepts may be different from one's own, an individual must change the rules of meaning attached to that concept. Therefore to "radically change my understanding of others is to change myself".[19]

That is, the concept of understanding actions is necessarily bound up with the concept of self. The process by which a culture bearer begins to be influenced by concepts from another culture can be described as marginalization.[20] The implied movement from the center to the periphery of one's group dramatically affects inter- and intra-cultural activities and involvement in both groups for the marginalized individual.

We must call to mind again that we are dealing with an exploration of understanding another's meaning not of deciding about truth-claims. To say that the boundary-conditions for the developing concept of feminism change is to say that the Arabic woman alluded earlier will be asked questions and will hear debate which is "foreign" to her thinking. Language is "open-textured" and she will be either governed or guided by her rules for the concept, just as are members of Canadian society. What is needed, if dialogue is to take place about feminism, is that we start with her way of conceptualizing feminism. We must however, distinguish between rules which she professes to follow and those she actually follows since cultural bearers are typically characterized by dissonnance between ideal and

actual rule-following.[21] For example, in our culture wife-beating is not thought of as a norm but instances of wife-beating are not uncommon.

If she is guided as opposed to governed by the rule-following attached to her concept her perspective may shift, but what is more central to the discussion, meanings may be understood rather than missed. Suppose an Arabic woman says that she is consciously showing contentment with her cultural rules because she is conscious of maintaining family solidarity. While we may disagree with her consideration that family solidarity is more important than feminism (or we may agree) we will at least understand what she is doing. Culture shock is precisely the unanticipated surprise of discovering that there may be other ways to secure family solidarity that do not include one's former manner of doing so.

The very act of realizing that one is consciously maintaining family solidarity brings to light the function of values that previously were not directly thought of at all, or were thought of as implicitly correct because their meaning was caught up in a tangle of cultural threads. The value was not previously seen "by itself" as it were. This "becoming seen" in a new culture, or in the context of a multi-ethnic society, is necessarily bound up in the concept of selfhood. For example, if we wish people to come to understand that they are prejudiced we are in effect asking them to redefine themselves.[22]

The school is the place where we expect to transcend enculturated views and therefore schooling becomes re-socialization rather than secondary socialization. In fact, it could only be secondary in the sense of adding to primary socialization in Durkheim's nation-state. Coming to understand does not occur in abstraction but through involvement with others who are different. In order for children to realize or understand the applicability of new descriptions they must be given "the supporting system of social relations and discourse which alone can bring the new descriptions into the wider system that constitutes understanding".[23] That is, school experience must provide real life "confirmatory frameworks of meaning which develop the student's ability to bring to bear new categorisations [sic] in a range of situations".[24] This means that understanding amounts to working with the meaning-systems of others rather than ignoring them or working against them.

Change is part of our life together in a pluralistic state. If we are to engage in non-habitual thinking we must consider how this is to be done in some way which is not merely spontaneous and undisciplined since the point of our exercise is to outline the non-natural and therefore pedagogically significant aspects of the disposition to be understanding.

This raises the question of the nature of an education for children toward understanding of this kind. This question envelops two issues: What sort of understanding do

teachers need in order to teach in a multicultural state? and, What education is required by children?

In addressing the first issue, we need an education for teachers that would help them to sort through the contents of their own thinking and 'interrogate' their views, asking critical questions of themselves and the institution of schooling. In general terms, they would gain a point of view as a "world citizen". Kant used the term "pluralism" to contrast with the term "egoism" and pluralism was described as the disposition not to see all the world included in one's own self, but to have the attitude and perspective of a world citizen.[25] There is some research on the notion of "third culture" which is similar to Kant's use of the term pluralism. "Third culture" individuals (mediators) have in addition to their own culture a sense of belonging to a global community, a world system with which they identify and from which they derive their values.[26] These individuals are rare and research on the subject is sparse as yet.

Such an education for teachers implies that they would pursue an understanding of how schooling operates in Canadian culture. Student teachers must wake up to an eagerness to see from new perspectives. To adapt an idea from Giroux's views on curriculum theory-construction, we need an education that encompasses a process of "self-criticism and self-renewal".[27]

Multicultural education is more than a mere curricular content item. It is properly understood as a new perspective

on Canadian society. One caveat to mention with regard to Giroux and critical pedagogy generally, is that Friere was part of a movement that is highly contextualized; it was situated in Brazilian and then in Chilean society.[28] Before we can take up some form of critical pedagogy, or better, as we take it up we must come to sense what it means to be Canadian and to assess what is currently happening in our schools that wants changing.

When we come to address multicultural education as required by children, we will be able to resolve some of the tension between the transmissionist role and the transformationist role of schooling if we consider that the first may lead into the second, ie., if we apply an additive model. This is possible because coming to understand is transformative in nature. We transmit, convey or pass on knowledge and culture (rules of the game) but when one comes to understand then one is ready to make the moves inherent in understanding. This additive relation will not entirely solve the curricular problem that diversity presents until we make some headway politically, ie., in nation-building.

The question that presses us is, If tolerance and understanding are eventual aims of learning, what are reasonable expectations for pupils of 6, 10 or 12 to manage or work toward with respect to these aims? What features of the concept can be recognized in a beginning form in the young? Since "[i]nadequate social performance is often due to faulty perception--simply not attending enough, or making

inaccurate interpretations"[29], children need to be guided throughout the curriculum in such a way that they learn to notice and attend to the nature of things. If we go back and pick out features of understanding it is possible to draw together aspects of multicultural education, not as a content course, but as a critical and reflexive education for living well in a pluralistic democracy; an education to develop thinking which is non-habitual.

At present, multicultural education directs children toward the superficiality of noticing (valuing) cultural diversity. This purpose is not productive of understanding as described above. To notice ethnic differences between oneself and another is not the same as being struck by the realization that one's perception of another's concept or action diverges from his meaning for that concept or action. Understanding is properly directed toward coming to notice and realize the difference between one's own construction of another's meaning and that individual's intended meaning.

An example of a focus on diversity is found in the Multicultural Council of the Alberta Teacher's Association's statement of purpose. The statement defines multiculturalism based on a division into three categories of the term's usage.

> Multiculturalism refers to the reality of our ethnic and cultural diversity, is a policy of the federal and provincial governments, and expresses a social goal. Further, multiculturalism, so defined, suggests that the educational system must:
> a) reflect the historical and sociological realities of ethnicity in all curricula,
> b) respect and support the cultural heritages of

> students,
> c) make students sensitive to and aware of the meaning of cultural diversity in Canadian life,
> d) recognize the effect of culture on learning styles,
> e) create a climate in school that 'operationalizes' the philosophy of human rights, and
> f) develop within education personnel a sensitivity to the concern of ethnic communities.[30]

This focus on support for diversity is problematic and raises the question, On what grounds is diversity itself supportable? While the statement does not explicitly establish (either as its goal or intention) the promotion of equality, it does refer to multiculturalism as a social goal which "suggests that, as Canadians, [we]...strive to establish a society of true equality for all citizens regardless of ethnic...origin".[31]

While the actual presence of diversity is an empirical question, the issue of what to do about it requires moral deliberation. For example, allowing someone the right to smoke does not necessarily express support for smoking; it may express tolerance in that the tolerator restrains herself from using force to stop the smoker. If Canadian society agrees to limit the freedom to smoke wherever an individual pleases, on what grounds is the freedom to 'practice' the so-called cultural tendency to beat one's wife for disobedience, for example, to be sustained? The promotion of support for home culture assumes that home life is supportable. There may be any number of cases in which we would not want the school to support what goes among family members in our own culture as well as in others.

The mere existence of diversity does not obligate a

society to support its expression since moral and legal questions must first be satisfied. That is, support is only one possible response among several to the presence of difference; others include indifference, acquiescence, tolerance, or moral outrage depending on the behavior or belief in question. Canadian society has established values over time through some degree of consensus and aspects of this history, such as gender equality or the rights of children, may not lightly be set aside in order to be seen to be supporting divergent values. To describe a society as value-pluralistic is one thing but to suggest that it should be, is another.[32] The objective of promoting diversity begs the question of whether, or to what extent, diversity is supportable.

The nature of the problem outlined above is paradoxical. That is, the problem arises in connection with any culture which does not equally respect its own members. If we respect or support a culture which in its theory endorses unequal treatment for some of its members (eg., women and children) are we not endorsing this unequal treatment?[33] One way of responding to the presentation of this paradox is to suggest that:

> If...the cultural practices which threaten the equalitarian spirit of our social institutions and our commitment to equality for women, can be shown to be immoral, then the freedom for an individual to pursue them counts for less. We do not need so strong a justification in terms of the social importance of the institutions being practiced, if we are confident that no one has a moral right to do what we want to prohibit.[34]

I am not suggesting that multicultural education should pick out and try to prohibit certain practices given that we could clearly establish their immoral nature. The issue is whether our commitment to diversity and "equality and to the establishment of a just multicultural society requires us to show an equal concern for such cultures?"[35] We seem to have one of two difficulties if we focus on diversity. Either we make judgements and select acceptable features of a culture as we teach about it omiting the objectionable aspects, or we select those cultures which we are prepared to endorse and confine our discussion of diversity to them.

In either case we run into trouble. If we teach by judgement-making we threaten the transmission process of children who are members of those cultures and therefore violate the first condition of development outlined in chapter three. And, if we refuse to teach about troublesome features of a given culture we are not contributing to the goal of schooling as transformation of primary socialization. On the other hand, if we simply exclude cultures which contain these problems we are not reflecting Canadian diversity. In Canadian society we value human rights, though not yet as they are envisioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and we therefore feel compelled to extend these rights to cultures who do not share the current extent of our commitment to equality. This is the paradox of multicultural societies.

But, as with many a paradox, the problem arises from a

misunderstanding of a central issue and in this instance the issue is support for diverity and promotion of equality. I am not argruing against equality, but against vague uses of the term. It is frequently hard to establish a clear case of equality, as was stated in an earlier chapter. It is misleading to give the impression that Canada has even the intention to provide equally for all her citizens. Let us take the example of three children: a Hutterite child who is being schooled in the colony; a native child who is in a school run by and for Natives; and a Vietnamese child who has been 'mainstreamed' too soon and is submersed rather than immersed in an English--only system.

The category of individual rights, according to Kallen, includes fundamental human rights and earned rights.[36] Earned rights suggest a category which justifies the unequal distribution of rewards and status in society on the basis of merit. Yet, each child in our example is excluded to some degree, either because her community chooses to maintain ethnic boundaries or because of inadequacies in language or experience, from earning her way in a culture which measures merit on grounds she cannot reach.[37]

The sociological dilemma that the rights issue presents is that it is unclear in Canadian society when to apply individual as opposed to group rights. As discussed in chapter four, the earning of rights in a meritocracy is necessarily bound up in membership in the dominant group. It is only because dominant membership is implicit and therefore

transparent to dominant group members that they can assume they climb the societal ladder merely on merit. The rights question is fundamentally unsettling and unsettled. The issue of equality is also perplexing since the minority member first requires unequal or special treatment in order to bring him or her up to the dominant group's starting line so that fair competition in the meritocractic race might eventually be realized. Again, this is not to argue for anything other than a nation built upon individual citizenship rights eventually, but it is to argue that certain provisions must be made on the behalf of immigrants in order that this goal can be achieved.

Conclusion

Multicultural education should not focus on ethnic diversity. Rather it should concentrate upon the active and reflexive thinking which will contribute to understanding. Neither should multicultural education stress equality. It should stress citizenship, a standard against which all Canadians can be measured and members of the dominant group may or may not come up highest on the scale. Multicultural education should become a Canadian perspective on life characterized by understanding and compromise. Yet, even if multicultural education becomes all these things it will still not be enough.

The central issue is a moral one. Understanding is a mental operation and even though I understand, and am understanding (empathetic), I am left with the need to decide

how to behave toward the person that I have come to understand. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights with its insistence on a world-inclusive recognition of the fundamental human right to respect for persons has no legal force but rests upon moral persuasion. Yet, human life is, and has to be, a moral life because it is a social life. [38] What is occuring in a formation of a multicultural state is that values which are ideally assured to insiders need to be extended to those once considered as outsiders. It is on the unifying notion of citizenship that Canadians could focus intentions to live out the high ideals expressed in documents such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and policies such as Multiculturalism.

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[1] William Hare, "The Attack on Open-Mindedness," Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1981), pp. 119-129.

[2] J. Reynolds, "Education, Culture and the Concept of Understanding," Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 4, (1972), p. 12.

[3] Reynolds, p. 12.

[4] Reynolds, p. 12.

[5] Reynolds, p. 14.

[6] Reynolds, p. 15.

[7] Reynolds, pp. 15-16.

[8] Reynolds, pp. 15-16.

[9] Reynolds, p. 16.

[10] Reynolds, p. 17.

[11] Reynolds, p. 10.

[12] Reynolds, p. 18.

[13] Reynolds, p. 19.

[14] Reynolds, p. 20.

[15] Reynolds, p. 21.

[16] Reynolds, p. 21.

[17] Reynolds, pp. 21-22.

[18] Reynolds, p. 22.

[19] Reynolds, p. 24.

[20] Reynolds, p. 21. The term "marginalization" is used by Kallen and others, and I am adapting it here somewhat.

[21] Reynolds, p. 22.

[23] Reynolds, p. 26.

[24] Reynolds, p. 26.

[27] Henry A. Giroux, Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), p. 113.

[28] Rosa del Carmen Bruno-Jofre, "The Question of Human Emancipation: Liberal Education, Critical Pedagogy and the Popular Education Movement in Latin America," (Manuscript, 1988).

_____"Interpretations and Propositions About Popular Education," (Manuscript, 1988).

[29] M. Argyle, The Psychology of Interpersonal Behavior (London: Pelican Books, 1983), p. 97.

[30] Multicultural Education Council of the Alberta Teachers' Association "Statement of Purpose", Multicultural Education Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, (November, 1984), p. 46.

[31] "Statement of Purpose", p. 46.

[32] Sven Erik Nordenbo, "Pluralism, Relativism and the Neutral Teacher," Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 12, (1978), p. 129.

[33] John Harris, "A Paradox of Multicultural Societies," Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 16, No. 2, (1982), p. 224.

[34] Harris, p. 229.

[35] Harris, p. 229.

[36] Evelyn Kallen, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada (Toronto: Gage Publishing Co., 1982), pp. 75-77.

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