Some aspects of political culture and political development in India and Pakistan: a comparative study

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Some Aspects of Political Culture and Political Development in India and Pakistan: A Comparative Study

By

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Some aspects of political culture and political development in India and Pakistan: A comparison.

Abstract

The two independent South Asian nations of India and Pakistan came into existence half a century ago after a long history of British colonialism and a prolonged political struggle for freedom. Though they are parts of the same continent and share common geography and history, they now exist as two separate countries with different political cultures and different political developments. Soon after independence, the Republic of India formulated a formal written document, the Constitution of India and declared herself to be a secular democracy with a formidable number of fundamental human rights and human freedoms, while Pakistan was to pride in proclaiming itself to be an Islamic Republic. Using a theoretical framework for the growth of political culture and political development, and the differences and changes in them as the main variables, a comparative study of India and Pakistan is undertaken and a set of comparative observations would be made, demonstrating that the democratic transition in both countries are dependent upon differences in the
aforementioned variables, strongly influenced by social structural, cultural, ideological and other non-political factors.
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Chapter 1

Political culture and political development: Theoretical considerations and an overview

Introduction

Politics could be generally described as the management of human affairs through the exercise of power. Power is the ability to influence or control human minds and actions in spite of the resistance of others. However, one component of power that influences and controls human minds is the unequal relationships humans have in groups and institutions. One basis of such relationships could be located in culture. It is a distinctive way of life in a society, a complex combination of learned behaviors, beliefs, values, and attitudes, which make up the patterns of relationships, polity, ideology and the governing structures of society.

Politics does not exist in a vacuum. Culture clearly influences action, thought and feeling for almost any political structure. "Powerful institutions and culture
interact in a two-way process: culture is expressed by institutions and the institutions in turn affect culture. The action, structure, and resulting culture form 'the will' of the people...which is enacted into law, thus giving institutional force to public opinion" (Mills 1963:3). Hence, culture becomes a configuration of patterns and behaviors that help shape the understanding of political behavior, political emotion, political ideas, political structures and political actions of various nations. The concept of political culture is central to the understanding of political development. Nowhere is this more relevant than in two close neighbors in Asia, two parts of the same whole, similar and yet very different countries of India and Pakistan.

In a dramatic turn of events about half a century ago, the most significant event took place in the political history of South Asia. The British colonial power that had ruled India for more than a century and had affected her in many respects, including her social structure, ideology, political culture, political development and historic destiny left, and left behind the most permanent legacy; it left behind two nations out of one country: India and Pakistan.
Since then the growth of political culture and political development in the two new independent nations have posed an interesting challenge for research to the field of political science: to examine the degrees of similarities and dissimilarities between the growth of political culture and political development of both countries and to search for the reasons for differences in such growth by way of comparison.

Culture has played an active role in shaping people's political actions in the Indian and Pakistani political structures and directly contributed to the very foundations of those structures. Culture affects these structures by influencing the way the people of India and Pakistan perceive politics and thus influence the political development of the two entities. Culture thus is a coalescence of many factors, that form political orientations and political actions of India and Pakistan.

Political orientation can be broken down into three component parts: the perceptions an individual has about the personalities, structures, and the overall political system of the country in which he is living and his feelings about these aspects of the system and the conclusions and opinions drawn about them (Khan, Mackown, and Stuart 1972:45-99). The
perception, feelings, and evaluations the people of India and Pakistan have about their political system are influenced by political socialization.

Political socialization refers to the process by which the values, attitudes, and skills that constitute political culture are diffused throughout society (Almond and Verba 1980). It is important to investigate how the values, attitudes, and skills come to exist in modern political systems. There are several influencing factors such as: family, religion, educational systems, societal structures, mass media, socioeconomic variables, and historical experiences that often reflect the political culture of a country.

The aforementioned factors by no means exhausts the numbers of components which compose political culture. The political development that has emerged in India and Pakistan is a result of the political culture and political socialization the people of India and Pakistan have endured over a period of time.

Historically, however, the populace of India and Pakistan has been an amalgamation of inhabitants whose roots and cultural socialization are co-joint, but in spite of it, the
political development of the two modern entities is distinct. This is a unique circumstance, in that India and Pakistan shared many common characteristics such as the same colonial experiences, the same struggle for freedom, the same invasions/rulers, and the same sources of political socialization.

Notwithstanding however the two entities have taken dramatically different political development paths and have emerged with distinct political cultures. Understanding why this has happened is strategic, for in today's environment both political actors are geopolitically pivotal and their actions have a direct impact on world politics.

The premise of this research then is to investigate and develop new insights into the role of political cultures and the political development of India and Pakistan. This research deals with the comparisons and contrasts of political culture and political development of India and Pakistan. The assumption is that there are components of political culture that have either promoted or impeded their political development in certain directions.

The main problem of research for this thesis and the central hypothesis guiding this research is that though both
India and Pakistan are two parts of the same continent and though both share some common social, economic, educational and historical experiences in the past, especially during the British colonial period, the most notable differences between the two are hypothesized to be located in the political-cultural and political-developmental variables somewhat submerged and affected by social structural and socio-cultural factors. This broad and general hypothesis has an advantage of focusing directly on the political culture and political development variables, the most important and immediate concern for a student of political science. However, in developing countries which are not yet very highly differentiated, structural, institutional, and even cultural factors could not be clearly isolated from political cultural and political developmental variables. We would focus on the latter as they are hypothesized to be most crucial but influenced in a variety of ways by the former.

Political Culture and Political Development: Theoretical Orientations

The way in which people engage in political behaviour, the way in which governments form or develop, the way in which those governments function, and the way in which a country develops are all generalities strongly linked to the concept
of political culture. That is, in order for any social scientist to be able to conduct any sort of political analysis one must first have an understanding of the notion of political culture. What follows, is an examination of the concept of political culture, its usefulness in political analysis, and its contribution to political development studies in understanding the rise of industrial states.

The nature of man's association with his fellows, and his institutions set him apart from rest of the world. Man's forms of association are cultural and are learned (Horton 1980:7). Man learns to interact with other human beings in patterns of relationships, groups, institutions and societies. One component of power that influences and controls human minds, is the aforementioned patterns of relationships man has with groups, institutions, and societies. The basis of these relationships is culture. That is, culture is a distinctive way of life of a society. If one is to undertake the study of different political structures or comparative governments, one must first have an understanding of the basis of those structures or of culture. Therefore, in order to understand and form opinions of other political entities, one must first understand their political culture. Most important are the examination of the concept
of political culture, its theoretical foundations, its components, and its use in the study of comparative politics and in the concept of political development.

The Interpretation of Political Culture

Psychologists often characterize people as optimists or pessimists, based on how people view a glass of water that is filled only half way. Those who see glass as half full, are deemed optimists, and those who see the glass as half empty are seen as pessimists. Respectively, both groups of people have different perceptions as to what a half filled glass of water means. The same ideology holds true for those who attempt to define political culture. Each person perceives it differently. If we view political science as being the management of human affairs through the exercise of power, then we must have an explanation of one component of power, that of political culture (Andrain 1988:12).

According to Rosenbaum (1975), political culture entails a two fold definition. Essentially he believes that political
culture has a psychological focus. Political culture entails all the important ways in which a person is subjectively oriented towards the essential elements in a political system. Therefore in order to understand political culture it is important to recognize what an individual feels and thinks about the symbols, institutions, and rules that constitute the fundamental political order of society and how the individual responds to them. Rosenbaum (1975) also refers to political culture as the “the collective orientation of people toward the basic elements in their political system. This a system level approach”. Pye (1965) refers to political culture as “attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process” and hence provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern political behavior. Almond and Verba (1965) view political culture in a simple conceptual outline. They state that individuals within a political system are oriented toward that system in terms of cognition's (knowledge and beliefs about the political system, its officials and its inputs and outputs), affects (emotions about the political systems personnel, and performance, and evaluations (judgments and opinions of political objects. Finally, Khan, MacKown, and McNiven (1975) see political culture as
merely the political attitudes, skills and values of the members of community.

It can be readily observed that the definitions of political cultures vary. One may see political culture as a system, another may see it as a learned attitude. Hence, there is no definitive meaning of the concept of political culture. Rather the homogeneous message implied is that political culture is the basis or foundation of all political systems (Broek and Heunks 1993). Further, the definitions of political culture alluded to in the past and present remain essentially "theories", which are not necessarily correct or incorrect, nor complete. Rather, these theories provide a basis for the working vocabulary of political culture.

**Historical and Theoretical Foundations of Political Culture**

The development of the concept of political culture evolved is viewed through the history of comparative government studies. Prior to the 1950's, studies in comparative government dealt either with single countries or with numerous countries in a serial fashion. These studies focused on descriptions of the manner in which institutions
operated within the political system, their legitimacy, and how they influenced political decisions (Wesson 1985). This kind of "traditional approach" to comparative politics typically described functions of a government such as the formal tasks performed by the prime minister of India, or it described the origins of the cabinet in Indian government. Further, prior to the 1950's, the types of governments that existed were mostly democracies or colonies. Hence all foreign governments were viewed through the "American" democratic model of government. In the traditional studies of foreign political systems (pre 1950's) there was an emphasis on Western European institutions. The availability of data, the less formidable language obstacles, and the cultural similarities account for this emphasis as well as the American view that Western European countries were democracies. France, West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy have received extensive treatment in comparative government texts. The selection of these countries for study and comparison frequently overlooked a major assumption made by many writers in this field namely, that democracy represented a normal and stable form of government. Because of an overemphasis on the major institutions and legal foundations of these political systems, efforts to understand the
similarities and differences between democratic and non democratic countries were impeded (Stupack 1977:34). This narrow outlook of the traditional approach to comparative politics was its major shortcoming.

The post World War Two era marked the development of various styles of new political systems. Political processes in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East yielded diverse political entities. Traditional democratic constitutional documents, law and bureaucracies did not necessarily play a significant role in the politics of these new governments. Mere descriptions of political organizations forwarded by the traditional approach to comparative government studies could no longer suffice in explaining the dynamic nature of these new government structures. Hence the field shifted from a description form of inquiry into the concept of political culture to a investigation based formation. This was a required shift, for since 1945 there have were successful coups in 18 of 20 Latin American countries, in 10 African nations, and in six Middle Eastern and West African nations. Even the old western style democracies of Europe had changed. Further, the post World War Two period spawned a host of new Asian
nations that struggled and often failed to create and maintain national governments in the aftermath of their colonial experiences (Rosenbaum 1975:56).

The momentum of these new developments were especially congenial to the minted term "political culture" even though much of what is now defined as political culture was studied under such names such as political ideology, national character, and political psychology. Hence it was evident that explanations of political stability and nation growth, if they could be found, would need to go beyond the examination of different governmental forms and constitutions or other formalities; rather, some deep probing seemed imperative to understand how emotional and attitudinal linkages were formed and how they influenced members of a political community and their government (Carson 1990). The focus now shifted to how different patterns of linkage encouraged or inhibited national development and order. Hence the concept of political culture was born. The subject area concentrated on the political behavior of the individuals and of groups in regards to institutions of governments.
Components of Political Culture

In order to fully examine the concept of political culture it is important to distinguish the way in which people are oriented towards political systems. As already mentioned, culture is a coalescence of many factors that form political orientations. Political orientation can be broken down into three component parts: the perceptions an individual has about the personalities, structures, and the overall political system of a country in which one lives, the feelings towards these aspects of the system and the conclusions and opinions drawn about them. (Khan, Macknown, and Stuart 1972:45-99). The perception, feelings, and evaluations are influenced by political socialization and political socialization refers to the process by which the values, attitudes, and skills that constitute political culture are diffused throughout society.

The agents of political socialization are many. Prominent agents of socialization include family. Family is the core group to which individuals are exposed. This group formulates values and attitudes in reference to political groups and political culture (Diamond 1993). The level of
democracy in a family also influences views and attitudes. Religion is another component that heavily influences political cultures. When members of a society adhere to a faith, the impact of religion on attitudes and values in politics is substantial. The Middle East is a clear example of the influence of religion on politics and political culture. Educational systems also create impressions of the world and reinforce certain basic cultural values. Higher education encourages a greater level of political knowledge, opinion holding, and activity. Peer groups also play a role in shaping attitudes and beliefs which influence political culture. Normative values are transcribed in peer groups and thus certain behaviors in political terms are encouraged and others are ostracized. Many attitudes, and prejudices are created and reinforced in peer groups. Socio-economic variables also affect political culture. Differences in socio-economic variables between groups may lead to different patterns of political culture. Many socio-economic characteristics influence political culture. Some common characteristics include race, occupation, family, caste, and income. Historical experiences naturally affect people's political orientation. People's views and behaviors respond to historical events that are part of their lives. The past
influences, shapes, and guides the future orientation of a country's inhabitants and its political culture. Mass media also shapes the way we think, act, and react to political structures by presenting news, stories or views that are filtered through other's view-points. Finally, political variables themselves play a significant role in shaping political culture. Governments and political parties have vested interests shaping political culture. Elite's need to show their effectiveness and keep individuals oriented toward them and the political institutions they manage if they hope to stay in power. Governments further control education and other institutions of political socialization hence produce mass opinions and influence political culture.

The aforementioned factors by no means exhaust the number of components which compose political culture. No one component necessarily has more impact than another. Political culture is composed of an individual's thoughts, feeling, and behaviors that are linked to the creation of a political order. Pye (1965) feels that attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process and provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior basically define political culture.
Usefulness of the Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics and the Understanding of Political Development.

Political culture provides the basis for understanding how and why political systems work, act and function. A base understanding of the dynamics of political systems, is essential for comparative discussion. The importance of political culture for comparative politics cannot be underestimated. The role of political culture in explaining political behavior and predicting political behavior can be understood by examining the dynamic of political socialization (Hocking and Smith 1990). Operating with a basic knowledge of how and why political attitudes are formed has broad ramifications for the explanation of political behavior. Thus only when political culture is understood can we understand comparative politics. Political culture enhances the understanding of political events. An example of this is Canada’s political bilingualism struggle. Official bilingualism in Canada’s context is comprehensible only when the importance that the large French minority attaches to its language and culture is understood. The conviction of the French majority struggling for cultural survival against the
English majority, and its determination, essentially forces official governmental recognition of French cultural demands. (Rosenbaum 1975:45-99). Hence, only when the political culture behind the French movement is understood, do we get a glimpse of the impact it has on overall Canadian political development. The study of political culture is essential to having an understanding of the underlying psychological forces that shape civic life in all countries. Hence in order to understand and compare other political structures the concept of political culture must be taken into account.

Once the concept of political culture is understood as the root of political analysis, other dynamics of politics can also be studied, such as political development. The structures that a state adopts to carry out the management of human affairs through the exercise of power is strongly influenced by the culture of the people who reside in that state (Lauer 1982). The structures a state adopts can have a potent effect on the way a state distends economically, politically and even culturally. According to Lauer (1982) government can be a pilot of change and development for a state. In countries such as the United States, Japan, China, India, Pakistan and Singapore, the government has played a
crucial role in initiating and directing changes. In the United States, the American government has been active in all the major changes such as industrialization of the nation, the growth of education and science, and political development. In Japan, a similar situation occurred; the government was actively involved in the modernization of the nation. The government involved was a new government created by the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The new government was an oligarchy in the hands of fewer than one hundred young men (Reschauer 1964). This government embarked on a program to develop Japan. It borrowed from Western society the various tools of modernization such as administrative techniques, a national banking system, a modernized currency etc. Universal education was emphasized and Japan became the first nation in Asia to have a fully literate population. The government also stimulated the industrialization of the nation by creating and controlling services such as railways, the telegraph and public utilities, and by stimulating businesses through loans and other methods. The unleashing of these forces in turn influenced the political development of Japan. In sum, the core of Japanese change came through government activity, but this activity would not of been possible if were not for the political culture of Japanese
society. Hence the role of political culture in conducting political development analysis of states or government analysis is self evident. In order to understand the political development of a state it is essential to first understand its culture.

Of course, the role of government in effecting change and political development varies with each individual country. There are several different political vehicles through which the government shapes economic development at the institutional level. A government may work to create conditions that facilitate economic development, but not take an active role in that development. This economic development in turn leads to increased political development. Hence a government that provides a secure social order and supports various kinds of commercial and industrial development by private entrepreneurs, paves the way for some sort of political development. A government might attempt to regulate actively the process of state development to some extent or finally, a government might directly engage in planning and implementation of political development through such mechanisms as nationalization or through specification of national priorities and goals in turn effecting political
development. However, the role each government takes is highly dependent on the political culture of the state. The role played by the government in engaging in political development is varied. The aforementioned scenarios are characteristic of capitalism, advanced capitalism, and perhaps socialism. Thus, the form of government will make a difference in the course of political and economic change a state implements, and the type of government that is adopted by a state will depend on political culture of that state.
Chapter 2

Political culture and political development in India

Introduction

Nietzsche wrote that "Culture and state - one should not deceive oneself about this-are antagonists: Kultur-Staat is merely a modern idea. One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. All great ages of culture are ages of political decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political" (Kaufman 1954:4).

When Nietzsche made this acute observation of the world in the late nineteenth century, he could not have foreseen the symbiotic relationship of political culture and political development in the countries of the twentieth century. One such country where the relationship between political culture and political development is particularly unique is India.

The rapid political development of India came as an unexpected set of events to the rest of the world. Its
political development has not followed the gestalt of its "modernized" forerunners and hence the study of India's political culture and resulting political development has been challenging.

In August 15, 1997, India completed five decades of independence and self-government. In the period of this half a century of independence, she has achieved much. This is testified by her rapid economic growth and political development, particularly in the last decade that has seen her adopt the policy of economic liberalization (Jones 1992). During her colonial period, India came in close contact with the Western world and felt the impact of some major forces of change such as industrialization, urbanization and westernization.

Additionally, further political development of India began with the disintegration of the feudal economy and the rise of capitalism. However, looking back at the fifty years of independence it is apparent that despite the recent economic growth India had to struggle continuously with her new emerging political challenges. Periodic but more frequent outbursts of serious conflicts and brutal violence, at times apparent in India's unsolved problems of minorities and casteism, surface to challenge her strength as a new
nation-state and sometimes stultify and slow her progress towards greater political development (Gupta 1989:7). However, prior to India's independence from the British Empire her political culture had been shared by another entity, namely, modern Pakistan. The assumption that India and Pakistan's political cultures could now be similar, however, is questionable for the fact remains that though the two countries shared somewhat similar historical upbringings the two now have extensive differences in political development.

The formation of India's political culture and the role of castes: adaptability and stagnation before colonization

India is a land of diversity and contrast. Spread throughout its 1,269,346 square miles is a population of more than 800 million people.

While there are significant numbers of Christians, Sikhs, and Muslims, the strong majority of the population (83 percent) are Hindus. Besides ethnic variations, India contains at least "sixteen major languages" and at least "sixteen hundred regional dialects" (Bryjak 1989:105). Things which make Indian society so rich and diverse are well
established traditions and culture around which so much of India's daily life revolves.

A country's political system is a product of its total culture. Politics do not develop within a country separate from the social, economic, ideological, or historical sectors of that culture, but interact with all of them as both effects and causes of that political system (Wesson 1985:12). Nowhere is it more apparent than in India.

To understand the history and formation of Indian political culture and political development, one cannot merely present a time-line of political events or occurrences. The political culture of India is far more complex and involved. In order to understand Indian political culture and Indian political development, one must first focus on the Indian caste system and its enormous influence on India's political development. While many factors beyond the caste system have also had an impact on India's political development, caste can undoubtedly be an all encompassing factor.

Castes were described by Marx over a century ago as stereotyped and disconnected units that had survived the break up of the village economy and government. He predicted
that they were to be dissolved by the effects of industrialization yet have not totally dissolved in India to date. "Instead, they seem, in traditional Hindu style, to have been reincarnated in various modern forms and one of the most striking is the formation of caste associations. Caste associations have become a vehicle for internal cultural reform and social change in all parts of India by mobilizing (caste members), caste associations have contributed significantly to the concept of political democracy in India. (Lloyd and Rudolph 1967)

Fundamentally, there are three periods in Indian political history that have had a significant effect on political culture and political development (and its caste system): India before colonization, India during colonization and India after colonization.

When the British discovered India's caste system in the eighteenth century it was already at least 2000 years old. Generally, Hindu society was divided into a great number of 'castes'. Each caste was ascriptive, endogamous and distinguished from the others by various ritualistic practices. Each caste had a particular occupation or set of occupations, that maintained its separate identity.
Each caste through defined roles and responsibilities had fostered a system of social and economic interdependence. But at the same time, each caste was hierarchically ranked with a defined social status. Individual mobility between castes was rare and social mobility of a caste as a whole was possible only over several generations (Randall and Theobald 1995). The political direction and social order created by such a system was unique, for each member of a caste was already imbibed with a sense of responsibility or dharma. For Hindus, dharma created order. Dharma holds society together; breach of dharma creates a lack of societal footing and disrupts a natural order.

In Indian society, the concept of dharma and caste strongly dictated the political culture and political development of the time. The time when Indian society was under constant foreign invasions, the Hindu hierarchy was

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1 Dharma in the Hindu context refers to prescribed duties or roles of various caste members. For example members of Kshatriya caste had the role being rulers and warriors. Kshatriya members could only be warriors or rulers, they could not be labourers etc. Caste members were born into their position and it was difficult for them to enhance their position within the caste. According to Hindu philosophy you were born into a particular case because of karma or behavior in your past life. Those people who did not belong to any caste were known as outcasts or untouchables. Untouchables performed to lowest of tasks such as taking care of dead bodies of animals or humans. Any contact with untouchables was considered repulsive. Hence a social order was created.
most fearful of social disintegration; it developed detailed rules governing almost every aspect of human conduct, and insisted that any deviation from them spelt disorder and chaos. It was believed by Hindus that each person had a specific social role and social position at a specific stage of life. Hindus believed that above all a person must follow his or her dharma and follow it within a particular caste structure.

Scriptures in Indian religion such as the Gita, gave further emphasis to the fact that an individual who disregards dharma courts unhappiness and destruction; there is therefore, no disorder, and hence no need for control by force or dictator and obviously no need for government (Parekh 1986:21). In fact, although Hindus knew of republican and non-monarchical forms of governments, they concentrated on monarchy since it enveloped the concept of dharma.

It seemed that the king's main function was to maintain the social order. Since a society was believed to "remain well-ordered only so long as each individual observed his personal and caste dharma, the king's dharma consisted in maintaining the rule of dharma in society at large" (Parekh 1986:20). In concrete terms, this meant that the king's rule was not the rule of an iron fist, but rather it involved
encouraging the development of industry, commerce and education to maintain proper relations between different castes. The creation of a social order within Indian society fostered a political culture that was almost fatalistic and self-governing in nature.

Despite invasions and differences in rulers, India held tight to the concept of political order through the caste system. Even if kings and feudal rulers abused their power, society in general was governed by an unyielding social structure. The scriptural literature (Prabhu 1961:30) reports that around 600 B.C. (the end of the Vedic period) the four broad divisions distinguishing the hierarchy or stratification of castes was already established in ancient India: the priests (the Brahmins), the warriors (Kshatriyas), the peasant-traders (the Vaishyas) and the serf-slaves (the Shudras) composed the main groups. The latter are referred to as the servant of others and even below them was a slowly emerging category of a fifth one (Panchamas) believed to be the early representatives of the later day Untouchables, the lower status "out-castes".

The Untouchables were also mentioned by such occupational names as the Chandalas, the carriers and cremators of corpses, the leather-workers and the basket-
makers. The Untouchables were socially segregated, as "they were not allowed to reside in the neighborhood of Aryans, dwelling outside their villages. They were to be dressed in discarded garments, eat from broken vessels and wear only iron ornaments" (Basham 1969:20). In the Hindu myth of the Primeval Man, Brahmins are reported to have issued from the mouth of God while the Shudras were born from the feet of the Lord.

In the Bhagvad Gita (the bible of the Hindus) itself, the Lords are assumed to have sanctified the system, attributing low birth class to material nature and work performed by the person. Thus, top and the bottom of the rank-order are more or less fixed. The permanent condition of servitude is attached to the Shudras and the Untouchables: "they should neither take to education nor accumulate wealth nor should they come into contact with the Brahmins as the latter would be defiled by the touch of the former" (Basham 1969:21).

The social order observed by caste created a political culture that was to a large extent unconstrained, hence despite numerous rulers and invaders, India retained its caste system as its social, economic, cultural and political expression. During India's pre-colonial history, the social
and political structures endured a tremendous amount of change, and it was influenced by foreign invasions: they also absorbed new religious movements such as the Jainism and Buddhism.

Essentially, new castes appeared as a result of an influx of foreign settlers, intermarriages and the rise of new empires such as those of the Mauryas and the Guptas. The existing caste system adjusted to this situation in typical Hindu fashion as is clear from the following observations on caste and politics since ancient times:

[T]he new social groups must be accepted as autonomous and self-governing communities entitled to have their traditions and customs upheld and to make their own rules. Thus the communities of foreign settlers, corporations, religious communities, heretics, even atheists, villages and districts, guilds and new castes, were recognized as having their own distinctive dharma, which they were free to enforce on their members and whose legitimacy was accepted by the king... In short the Hindu political thinkers broadened their earlier theory and recognized vyavahara (traditions and customs), caritam (conduct of good man) and rajsasan (royal edicts and civil laws) as the legitimate bases of dharma (Parekh 1986:21-22).

Thus, the sanctioned social structure of caste in ancient India gave form to Indian political culture; postulated political socialization and indirectly fostered political development.
India's ability to adapt its political culture and modify its political development to accommodate outside forces set the stage for its next epoch, that of British colonization. Of course political culture and political development in India went through a complex period of growth under the Moguls. The Mogul economy was essentially feudal in nature. The moguls created an elaborate management of state, government and India's vast Hindu population. They also had one of the most powerful military machines in the world at the time. Not only did the Moguls bring Islam to India but also fostered the conversion of many Hindus, especially lower castes to Muslim.

Both Islam and Muslim minority were destined to play important roles in India's political culture and development. Indeed, according to some historians the seeds for the separate movement of Pakistan could be traced to this period in history. However, despite the impact of Islam and Muslim culture in India, it is safer to assume that the majority of India's population, the Hindus, maintained their social structure almost unaltered (Karunakaran 1975). India's caste system persisted and adapted to the Mogul rule. However Mogul India created a complex bureaucratic state and an
effective medieval government with many Hindu states co-existing with central Islamic states. These pre-British developments were to play a crucial role in British India. We would leave the task of examining the Mogul political culture and development to historians and proceed further with the impact of the British on India's political culture and political development the task which would involve the influence of structural and cultural alterations produced by the new western impact.

India's political culture, and political development in the British Era: The impact of British occupation on Indian culture

British administrators first played its role in India through the establishment of the British East India Company. India's political doctrine had been grounded in the concept of liberalism. The British East India Company slowly, and perhaps indirectly, took control of the Indian continent.

The realization of the fact that Britain was now responsible for the government of all India led men to take a new view of the functions of government. It helped to give birth to new political aims and a new and deeper sense of responsibility for the welfare of the Indian peoples (Stokes 1959:15).
Through various means the British introduced changes in many aspects of India's social structure, including changes in its state apparatus, legal system, judiciary, educational system and press.

A critical characteristic of British administration was its controlled effort at regulating India. Britain did not fundamentally alter India's existing political structure. With changes in Secretaries of State or Viceroy's, it rather consolidated the power of all Indian state governments.

This took place at two levels: at the center, where the Government of India emerged as a power which could make itself felt throughout the country and at a district level where the representative of the government functioned as the symbol of the mighty state whose orders could not be challenged by any other authority. Hence, under British rule, the people of India began to be subjected to the influence of an efficient and powerful government bent on introducing uniformity in many spheres. Race, language, religion and social conditions might have continued to separate, but political association under one rule began to weld-the people of India together (Karunakaran 1975:24).

However, gradual changes in India’s state apparatus, legal system, judiciary, educational system and press were
helpful in facilitating the political awakening of the country. Constitutional developments gave fundamentally new political instruct to the people of India.

There have been many landmark changes in India's constitutional history since the official take over of India by the British government in 1833, such as the Indian Councils Act of 1861, The Act of 1909, etc. However, no such acts could be interpreted as an approach toward British representative Parliamentary government. The Government of India Act of 1919 however was different in that it laid the foundations for representative institutions in the country and provided some opportunities for political training of some educated Indians (Keith 1936).

Consequently, while there was no conscious attempt on the part of the British administrators to promote self-government in India there was no doubt that British political practices in India did, in all likelihood, help develop political awakening within the country and helped give birth to the atmosphere that eventually sparked a national movement in the country.

As is well known, the political philosophy of India's
freedom movement was greatly influenced by both the liberal and authoritarian trends in British India's attitudes towards India. However, the changes that the British brought to India in terms of its establishment of a strong government, an efficient civil service, new legal system, judiciary and universities based on modern concepts of education, were most helpful to the political training of Indians (Bardhan 1984).

The impact of the British occupation on Indian culture, as historians have observed, pushed India into a new charter in the nineteenth century. The British enhanced India's concepts of commerce and trade, facilities for communication, administrative unity, and western learning. For the first time in India's history, it seemed as though an alien civilization impinged upon every detail of Indian life, changed its pattern and created new values (Desai and Mukerji 1975:34-35). Thus, India's wealth ceased to be based on treasures; money became capital, goods became commodities, land became a source of monopoly rent, and the self-sufficiency of rural economy was transformed into the interdependence of urban, and then slowly, world economy. Western philosophy and science introduced reason into daily habits and made Indians realize the meaninglessness of many ancient customs and prejudices:
[W]hen educated Indians began to re-examine their ancient civilization and customs in the light of their modern education and of their knowledge of western science and philosophy they realized that they must at first concentrate on social and religious reforms. For this purpose they organized many social and religious reform movements. The most important among them were: the Brahmó Samaj, the Social Reforms Conference, the Arya Samaj, the Ramakrishna Mission and the Theosophical Society. The broad aims of these movements, which influenced primarily the Hindus, were as follows: In the social sphere, there were movements of caste reform or caste abolition, equal rights for women, a campaign against child marriage, a crusade against social and legal inequalities. In the religious sphere, there sprang up movements which combated religious superstitions and attacked idolatry, polytheism and hereditary-priesthood. These movements, in varying degrees, emphasized and fought for the principle of individual liberty and social equality, and stood for nationalism (Desai, and Mukerji 1975:36).

Sometimes intentionally and at times unintentionally, the British had an immense effect on India's political culture. A country which, prior to the coming of the British was politically and socially ruled by the concept of caste and dharma, was changing at a faster rate. Nevertheless any changes in India's political culture could not be possible without fundamental changes in India's pervasive caste system that influenced so much of India's
political history and political development. These changes were greatly shaped by the British influence.

The caste system under British control: A formentor of political development and political cultural change.

India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in his *Discovery of India* noted that:

Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardization of externals or even of beliefs. It was something deeper, and within its fold the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged (Nehru 1946:10).

It was not that Nehru was unaware of the diversities and divisions in India but he was more impressed by a common outlook on life (that) develops a spirit peculiar to it. During the British Rule (1757 - 1947 AD) in India, politico-administrative and politico-cultural unity was imposed from above to give an external appearance of unity. (or uniformity). However, this unity, some believed, was a delusion. Serious scholars of history, politics and society have questioned whether during British rule religious, regional and caste divergence and conflicts became more acute and more frequent. Could they be
attributed to the British influence? Nehru was resigned to this belief when he wrote that the British Rule deliberately pursued the policy of creating divisions among Indians, of encouraging one group at the cost of the other. He stretches this point further by pointing out that:

Nearly all our major problems today have grown up during British rule and as a direct result of British policy: the princes; the minority problem; various vested interests, foreign and Indian; the lack of industry and the neglect of agriculture; the extreme backwardness in the social services, above all, the tragic poverty of the people (Nehru 1946:15).

However, with reference to a caste system, even though forces of change were always at work on the Indian subcontinent, after the coming of the British as a colonial power, they became more pervasive. Though at first slow and unintended, the British were responsible for releasing a force of change identified as industrialization and the creation of new economic opportunities the immediate beneficiaries of which were probably the upper caste members. Industrialization changed the mode of production, gave rise to a more complex division of labour and this had a greater impact on traditional occupational structures associated with castes.
New industrial occupations could not fit into traditional caste occupations, some of which were considered to be "degrading" and "polluting". Filling industrial jobs provided some 'liberating influences' for lower castes. Similarly, urbanization brought about by British capitalism meant the slow emergence of colonial and industrial cities and the migration of people from rural to urban areas. The individuals of lower castes who migrated to the cities indirectly benefited. New educational institutions and the diffusion of Western values also increased the benefits for castes in cities. Similarly, new means of transportation and communication, attempts at establishing an equality of law and distributive justice for all castes, did make a significant dent on the social position of castes. In short, it could be argued that the changes in Indian's caste system under British influence were greater and faster as a response to changes in its political institutions.

Thus, the changes in the processes of production and the increase in the impact of industrialization and urbanization, gradually brought about new industrial occupations in contemporary India. The process of change, however, seemed to be slow and gradual (Prabhu 1961). Although the new industrial opportunities were available to Indians which
created aspirations for upward socioeconomic mobility and opened up avenues for occupational change, there was still a resistance coming through the politico-cultural dimension of caste as it seemed to be traditionally fused with the styles of life inherent in the caste communities of India. However, with sufficient incentive to take advantage of the new industrial opportunities, the further initiative for improving economic positions and with the motivation for upward movement, all caste members (including the lower caste members), experienced occupational mobility in industrial India. In this sense, the direction of change for caste members under British hegemony was clear.

It should be noted however that whatever changes occurred in the traditional social structure, consequent to the introduction of modern political institutions, were probably far from being "disruptive or disintegrative" for the caste system. In fact it could be said that the propensity of castes to survive, expand, and transform is a strength of the system. Representative politics in particular, seems to have strengthened rather than weakened castes. Politics itself was most likely overcome and absorbed by the traditional structures of social change (Manor 1994).
Adjustments in the hierarchical ordering of status groups and the flexibility of functions, is a process not unknown to India's historical caste system (Stern 1993). Therefore, adoption of new functions by castes and changes in status locations of a few caste groups, are not indicative of discontinuities in the most basic levels of the ongoing traditional social structure of castes. However the caste system in India, traditionally and ingeniously seemed to fuse together class, status and power, creating an extreme form of a "closed" social order. It slowly but surely succumbed to the inevitable forces of change, via industrialization, urbanization, westernization, secularization, the beginning of capitalism, and above all, bringing the political dimension of caste to the forefront.

Theoretical framework of caste politicization in a historical milieu: India's altered political culture and political development.

The issue of caste community and class in terms of identity formation and political consciousness in modern India is critical to the understanding of India's political culture and political development. The issue, within the context of India's caste system, is neither a function nor existence of
class or caste, but rather a need to understand the elements of identity and the changing status of class and caste in relation to the structures and mobilization strategies of political parties in post independent India (Parekh 1995).

The issue of caste mobilization strategy in political development is particularly important because ruling class parties have relied on caste and community ties as a tactic for augmenting support. Therefore, in India political organization and party strategies by nature, play an important role in the development of group consciousness, political development and political culture. Previous studies of Indian political development have indicated that caste mobilization assisted the political development and political cultures of India. These studies indicated that "caste, far from being an impediment to democratic politics, was seen as an essential element of the democratization process because the mobilization of caste networks helped in the incorporation of large sections of people in modern political activity" (Khan, Jha, and Hasan, 1989:24. Hence, caste with communal differentiation's served as tools for

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political mobilization and as vehicles for political gain by political parties.

For more than two decades, Rajni Kothari at the Center for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi have engaged in a study of the political institutions of India, bringing the polity and modern Indian society under careful scrutiny.

Many studies done at the center are directly oriented to the analysis of the processes of change in the system of caste stratification and political socialization/development. Kothari (1970) considers the point of departure for his studies to be a response to the question: What form is caste taking under the impact of modern politics and what form is politics taking in a caste-oriented society?

Focusing his attention on the power dimension of caste in India, Kothari (1970) makes the shrewd observation that the alleged 'casteism in politics' is neither less nor more than the politicization of caste. It is something which brings both the forms of caste and the forms of politics nearer each other - in the process changing both.

However, not all studies of caste and politics view political development as Kothari did. The most notable alternative are the studies of Ghurye (1970) and Srinivas
(1960) who believed in the stubbornness of caste system even in the face of the forces of change. Ghurye's view is that the problem of caste mainly arises out of caste-patriotism, not necessarily caste politicization. He believed that the castes or sub-castes - which group together for political purposes - develop a militant attitude against other castes and the formation of caste associations for political (or non-political) purposes, is nothing but the renewed re-assertion of the strength of caste. Hence it was felt that there really is no politicization of caste, but rather a reinvention of the old caste structures from pre-independence, like old wine in a new bottle. In an analogous argument, Srinivas conceded that a number of "non-caste" elements may have operated in state politics but his assertion is that there is a wide gulf between caste as an inherent concept and the 'caste units' which are so active in politics and administration in modern India. Srinivas contends however, that amidst these entities there is a large degree of connection and communication and hence, the transformations in the power dimension of caste, seem to be clearly recognized by Srinivas. Yet other classical studies such as those of Leach (1960) and Bailey (1963) emphasized alternative perspectives.
According to Leach "[I]f a whole caste group plays the role of a political faction by competing with other such factions for some common economic or political goal it thereby acts in defiance of caste traditions." (Leach 1960:35) Similarly, Bailey (1960) argued that when castes behave independently, according to a system of hierarchy they belong to the original caste system; when they operate as political entities or as parts of a political entity, they belong to the political system and are not really part of the caste system. Kothari (1970) reiterates however, that it is futile to argue whether caste uses politics or politics uses caste. Kothari seems to be convinced that the actual process of interaction between caste and modern political institutions was necessarily selective, it impinged on certain aspects of caste more than on others.

According to Kothari, The first to be drawn into the development stream was the power dimension of the caste system. The second was the distribution of economic benefits. These two were closely related: the distribution of divisible benefits seemed to be inter-linked in the nature of the power system that operated. In short, classical studies of caste politicization seem to indicate that
members of India's caste communities, when confronted with new political institutions, no longer find a collective solution to the problem of power from within their castes; instead, they discovered that the caste system is impaired in solving the problem of power in modern India and hence became either politicized, or influenced by political institutions. The result is a form of political development. As Schermerhorn succinctly puts it:

[I]n pre-independence India it is doubtful whether much more than 10 percent of the population ever voted. for property and communal restrictions were relatively confining. Suddenly with the adoption of the new Constitution, the franchise was thrown open to all without limit, unlocking forces hitherto held in check. (Schermerhorn 1978:36)

Hence the caste system of India, which seemed to traditionally and ingeniously fuse together class, status and power creating an extreme social system and form of political development seems to have slowly but surely succumbed to change, through the politicization of caste. Drawing the closed status communities within its ambit, it appears that Independent India made its members politically aspirant. For the first time the tight structure of caste was cut open by power ambitious political parties.
While participating in a variety of political processes and activities, political parties seem to make use of caste whenever and wherever possible (for their own gain) and turned caste itself into an instrument of political development, the most ambitious of which was, and is, India's first political party: the congress party.

The role of the state in the formation of India's political culture and political development: The Congress Party and modern comments on caste mobilization and politicization.

The state as a shaping tool in the formation of political culture and political development is not one to be taken lightly. Skocpol feels that the explanatory centrality of State as a potent and autonomous organizational actor (Skocpol 1985) cannot be undermined. India is no exception, in fact it maybe the precedent.

In the case of India, the dominance of one political party, the Congress, has helped to shape the political base of India. The Congress party's platform when it first emerged as a focus of power in India was that of pluralism. Fundamentally, the party operated on the principles of consensus/compromise which was necessary if India was to incorporate its cultural ebb into a democracy. The patrons of
India's Congress party knew that consensus and compromise were essential if political democracy was to be successful and recognized and that both factors were needed for the State to play a crucial role in the social transformation of India (Pantham and Deutsch 1986). However to say that the Congress party of India promoted a consensus platform does not go very far in explaining how relationships of common consent style people's lives facilitating the advance of extrinsic cultural shapes and connections. A common consent viewpoint overlooks the fact that Indian politics following British separation was coalitional in the class sense. Also, that both the political order and the political socialization were based on a coalition of classes, including different sections of the upper class, professional groups, landlords and rich peasants. It was the class content of this coalition, rather than the functional arrangement of the political order operating as a loosely organized Congress coalition that accommodated the pressures of the much smaller opposition at the periphery that played a decisive part in influencing the structure of dominance and the strategy of governance and political development (Kan, Jha and Hasan 1989).
Under the precepts of "new found independence", India's first and oldest ruling party (The Congress Party) made bold changes to India's constitution; supposedly to eliminate caste discrimination and foster political democracy. India adopted the policy of "protective discrimination" or "preferential treatment" for lower castes and took measures to adopt it under the new constitution.

The Constitution was a great instrument for promoting such measures. First, it guaranteed certain Fundamental Rights (Part III, Articles 12 to 35). Among them the two most important are: The right to equality, including equality before the law, prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth and equality of opportunity in matters of employment. It also included provisions for a right against exploitation and prohibited all forms of forced labor, child labor and traffic in human beings. (India 1990:21) Moreover, the constitution prescribes protection and safeguards for Scheduled Castes (lower castes) , either specially or by way of insisting on their general rights as citizens with the object of promoting their educational and economic interests as well as removing their social disabilities.
The main safeguards include: (I) abolition of Untouchability and forbidding of its practice in any form (Article 17); (ii) promotion of educational and economic interests and protection from social injustice and all forms of exploitation for all castes. (Article 46); (iii) throwing open by law of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus (Article 25b); (iv) removal of any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment or use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partially out of state funds or dedicated to use of general public (Article 15 (2)).

Politically, the Constitution of India made provision by (Articles 330 and 332) reserving seats for lower caste members in the Lower House (Lok Sabha) in both Parliament and the state legislatures - in proportion to their population. For Scheduled Castes, reservation is 15 per cent of the vacancies for which recruitment is made by open competition on an all India basis and 16.66 per cent of the vacancies to which recruitment is made on an all India basis other than by open competition.
For a variety of governmental jobs, competitive examinations are held. Reservation is also made at 15 percent of the vacancies for Scheduled Castes in promotion on the result of competitive examinations. Ministry of Welfare is the nodal agency for overall policy, planning and coordination of programs and developments for scheduled or lower castes. Additionally, the Indian government has established scheduled caste development corporations (1978-79), girls and boys hostels for Scheduled Castes, book bank schemes, as well as special scholarships for high school and college students.

Moreover, the Ministry of Welfare also offered post-graduate and post-doctoral research scholarships as well as overseas scholarships and travel grants to the eligible scheduled caste students. (India 1990:237-245)

The forces of change unleashed by Indian government through its Constitutional Acts, protective measures and the preferential treatment of Scheduled Castes joined hands with changes occurring through industrialization, and Westernization. These changes made caste members conscious of their rights and further enhanced their ambitions for upward mobility, political development, social and economic advancement. It seemed as though Schedule Caste members were
in a sense experiencing a revolution of rising expectations. This consciousness of caste represented a significant vote-bank for the Congress and for other candidates contesting democratic elections in India.

These changes brought home to every section of caste, the importance of organized politics. Lower castes used it to bargain a better position in society. Often referred to as the politicization of India from top to bottom, it is regarded as one of the most potent forces of change since the independence movement of India, involving all castes and communities.

After 1947, the universal franchise granted in the new Constitution resulted in the further involvement of all people in politics leading to the politicization of castes, and made it difficult to disentangle caste from politics. People used their castes whenever they wanted to further their political and economic interests and argued against caste when their interests were threatened, turning castes themselves into the instruments of upward mobility. Thus, through contradictions and conflicts, the dialectics of caste paved way for the politics of future India.

Scheduled Castes were historically excluded from the positions of power in traditional India. However, due to
Constitutional changes the caste members began to increasingly participate in the political processes. Caste members became aware of the significance of political parties, movements, machines and election campaigns. Members were courted during elections by eminent party and political leaders and this resulted in their direct confrontation with the high caste Hindus. Riots and violent conflicts between high caste Hindus and other lower caste Hindus have been reported from several parts of India for the past four decades, which could only be directly attributed to the politicization of caste members. (Sheth 1989:36) The peaceful co-existence of the untouchables and high caste Hindus no longer seems feasible in modern India because the untouchable consciousness has radically changed with the process of politicization that has taken place over a long period of time, since Independence (Kumar 1989).

The idealistic leaders who first ruled Independent India under the banner of the Congress party promised national ideals that exemplified sacrifice and patriotism. The Congress Party's moral authority was embraced by India, so much so that its leader Nehru, could and did with impunity, assault traditional Hindu practices.
Nehru, as previously mentioned, forwarded the concepts of equality for India regardless of race, religion, caste or sex. So strong was Nehru’s determination that it seemed as though he was advancing a country centuries ahead in a matter of years. The impact of such advancements is being felt in India today. The Congress Party of India was the prime controller of politics of change. Slowly it developed its political process, and became the ruling party in exclusivity. As time evolved and the democracy in India grew challenging, the Congress party began using practices that involved the use of “caste politics” to influence the voting pattern of various caste members (Nandy 1989:34). By appealing to the sentiments, needs, and desires of the highest level of caste hierarchy the Congress Party influenced voting behavior.

However the caste system in which caste members traditionally and blindly obeyed caste hierarchy was a natural vehicle for political influence. In essence, the Congress Party and parties that followed built coalitions of support based on the organization of castes. The Congress Party, however, over the years, turned into a party whose main aim was to exercise control and dominance over the levers of power and authority. Devising electoral strategies
became its most enduring concern and radical rhetoric and diffused socioeconomic policies provided the broad ideological ambience for building a popular image:

[C]ongress rule became more corrupt and less efficient. Political meddling and pay-offs sapped the morale and effectiveness of the civil administration, the police and the courts. Goondas-hoodlums-began to be used to organize votes then to seize control of voting booths...This criminalization of politics gathered momentum in the 1980’s to the disgust of voters. Congress is the greatest culprit though others are not far behind (Kohli 1990:195-99).

If one undertakes a massive dissemination of Indian politics at all levels, the practices of the Congress party come to the forefront. Many political developments of modern India can be traced to the political culture created and shaped by the Congress Party. It seems as though the decline of the Congress Party over the years in terms of corruption, bureaucracy and ability to rule, has left a vacuum at the local and state levels. This vacuum has allowed various castes, who were previously controlled by the strong arms of Congress, to form political parties and in this manner, enhance political development in India. These political parties are not necessarily very well organized but they often elected populist leaders forcing power challenges. These power challenges could be viewed as political
conflicts, the roots of which are located in the rapid politicization of a previous rigid and hierarchical society.

Political structures that one would believe to impart some degree of governmental coherence have been weakened. Power struggles at the level of community and state have multiplied: "Weak political institutions have encouraged undisciplined political competition, and that has politicized all types of social divisions, including caste, class and ethnic cleavages" (Kohli 1990:385).

Hence, it seems that the structure of caste was challenged with and politico-cultural changes and political transition. But with the decline of the Congress party it has resulted in a disorderly process because of the incapacity of the traditional system to legitimize the new political requirements of democracy in India and hence the political conflicts.

Issues of changing values and new patterns of socialization, including the emergence of new political development phenomena, are important for understanding a situation of increasing conflict within India's political paradigms. This is natural and gives insight in terms of political culture's role in political development. For instance democracy blended with a caste system that was
hailed as the bridge to both the past and present in the 1960's is in India today, providing challenges to the power of the established elite in state government, causing instability (Linz 1990).

Initially, for a decade and a half, the working of modern politics seemed to have given a grievous jolt to traditional structures of dominance and exploitation, represented by the caste system. Realistically, however, it is questionable if this has been beneficial to caste members. It seems as though caste structures that were used for political purposes could have lost from two perspectives: (1) they have been uprooted and displaced from their traditional habitat and the social milieu which provided them with a modicum of physical, social and economic security; and (2) they find no place in the modern political and economic structures except as voters performing a five yearly ritual. (Seth 1983) The political development of India seems to have eroded the legitimacy of conventional politics and of politicians in the eyes of ordinary people generating disillusion with politics at the popular level.

Essentially, it could be said that the displacement of the old pattern of class relations and the changes in
political culture that India has entailed has been one important cause of the erosion of key political institutions, in particular the Congress Party. The erosion of Congress has fostered support for other parties and mobilized members of lower castes creating further politicization of castes. Hence in India today, the repeated exercise of the rights of democracy has been an especially important catalyst for government instability and caste riots.

A number of political, cultural and developmental variables could be advanced as the explanations for the growing crisis in India. Four major factors seem to be most prominent. (1) the de-institutional role of national and regional leaders (2) the impact of weak political parties (3) the undisciplined political mobilization of various castes, ethnic, religious, and other types of groups and (4) the increasing conflicts between the have’s and have-not’s. (Kohli 1990:205-215)

One thing is common in all four factors. They all represent an outcome of the changed political culture. The belief that “in its transformed state caste has helped India’s peasant society make a success of representative democracy and fostered the growth of equality” (Rudolph and
Political culture and political development in modern India

Political development and Political culture have been interacting in Indian society for over two thousand years. Initial beliefs that political culture would have to perish before political development could occur, have been displaced. The political problems in India are numerous, and many origins of those problems can be traced to the contrasts of political culture and political development. However India is in the process of far reaching social, cultural, economic, and political changes.

But, perhaps, the two thousand years of history India has lamented, India may face two thousand more! During that time the struggle between political culture and political development will continue. It seems as though the
The politicization of caste has given individuals who did not have or were not allowed the means necessary to enter the political terrain, a great sense of power and ascendancy, while at the same time, creating a sense of inferiority, powerlessness, and discontent.

The reaction of the Indian people to the Mandal Commission recommendations exemplify this. The Commission was created by the government to help promote the welfare of lower caste members by promoting social strategies such as reserving twenty seven percent of government jobs for low caste members. But it met with massive caste riots by other higher caste members in Indian states such as Bihar, Surat and Gujrat.

Upper caste university students, dismayed at the prospect of being denied much-prized and well rewarded positions in government, took to the streets in protests that included several cases of self-reparation. The Mandal Report recommended that the country be led away from the injustice that has historically kept the country's best jobs from lower caste members and has instead assigned them to higher caste members such as the Brahmin, Kshatriya and Vaishya castes (Datta 1991). V.P Singh who was prime minister at the time did not win the majority in the election
that year, despite the political mobilization of the largely undereducated caste members which represent a significant proportion of India's voters. While there were undoubtedly many factors at work, dislike of the Mandal Commission's recommendations by higher caste group members also played a role (Omvent 1991:33).

While it seemed that the Mandal Commission recommendations were an attempt at forging unity and changes in political culture/political development among exploited low caste members, this process, instead of consolidating and politically developing the caste structure, devoured it from within. This radically exemplifies the dialectics and polarity in the process of political development.

The forces of political culture and political development in the case of India are not symmetrical and yet are not diametrically opposed either, thus giving growth to India's polymorphous nature. As it stands right now the reaction of the two forces has created an atypical situation:

[T]his is the great hiatus which divides the Indian people...It is a situation in which democracy and socialist transformation have become inextricably interlinked. The denial of one is necessarily a denial of the other, and the two tendencies have together produced growing discontent and unrest which cannot be regulated except through strong action. (Kothari 1976:34)
Nevertheless caste and class disputes do fundamentally reflect challenges to established patterns of domination and privilege. Judged from a liberal standpoint, these disputes reflect democratization of community power and thus must be deemed essential and desirable elements of a developing political situation in a highly inegalitarian rigid society. (Kohli 1990:193)

**Fifty years of independence: Consolidating political development**

India is celebrating fifty years of independence and democracy. The multicultural polity with its preponderance of democracy has endured much foreboding regarding its future. Nevertheless, much of India's political development can be attributed to its established political culture regardless of the milieu in which that culture developed. The role of caste and caste politicization have been major factors in the political socialization and formation of political culture in India. This has undoubtedly led to some form of political development. The mosaic of multiple castes, racial, religious and ethnic groups, gives one an impression of coexistence, tolerance, co-operation and the
so-called "adaptation" of various groups in India and hence, at times, an ideology of integration is put forward (Ramaiah 1992:1203-1207).

However, hidden beneath the ideological cloak is the problem of power politics and the resulting conflicts which assert themselves from time to time. The emergent dichotomy in the context of caste and political development has produced social protest movements in India. Earlier, caste ideology was not predicated upon egalitarianism. The Constitution of independent India and official values now make it so.

In the five decades since Indian Independence (1947-1997), because of the Indian and global emergent norm respecting equality of treatment and opportunity, various movements have gathered momentum in India and stronger reactions against them have resulted in conflict and violence. The Scheduled caste movement for the continuation of reserved admissions in the institutions of higher education/government and the reaction of the upper caste Hindus, social reform movement with the reaction of the fundamentalist Muslims matched by Hindu orthodoxism and the Sikh movement for separation from India and the demand for "Khalistan" are only a few examples (Duyker 1990).
Nevertheless, this level of involvement in politics and political movements has created a political culture that values the efficacy of democratic politics and has fostered political development. Recent opinion polls\textsuperscript{3} indicate that 59

\textsuperscript{3} Opinion Poll done in \textit{India Today Journal}, August 31 1996. The poll done by ICSSR-CSDS-India Today, compares political attitudes of Indians from a survey done by CSDS in 1971 to a similar study done by ICSSR-CSDS-India Today Journal in August of 1996. According to the poll In an attempt to answer this question, the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) and INDIA TODAY supported the Centre for the Studies of Developing Societies (CSDS) to conduct the largest and the most comprehensive social scientific survey of the Indian electorate ever. Opinion polls usually get bogged down in monitoring the routine fluctuations of the voters'mood. But the ICSSR-CSDS-INDIA TODAY poll makes comparisons with a similar survey done in 1971 to focus on the long term changes that have occurred in democratic politics and throws light on its future. Rather than a snapshot of the popular mindset, it is an attempt at something deeper and more comprehensive to dissect the political mind of India. Underlying this effort was the conviction that a dispute about democracy cannot be settled without reference to the people. That ordinary citizens matter. That their beliefs count. The- ICSSR-CSDS-INDIA TODAY SURVEY IS THE first nationwide social scientific survey of political opinions and attitudes in the past 25 years. It is also the largest ever. The previous survey of this kind-by the CSDS in 1971 had a sample size of 3,800 drawn from 81 Lok Sabha constituencies. In the present survey 9,457 respondents were interviewed in 108 Lok Sabha constituencies. No other survey of political attitudes in India has had such a large sample. It is easily one of the largest of its kind ever in the world. The sample of 108 Lok Sabha constituencies, 216 assembly segments and 432 polling booth areas was selected through rigorous multi-stage random sampling (probability proportionate to size). A target sample of 15,030 was drawn randomly from the electoral rolls of the sampled polling booths. Unlike commercial opinion polls, the investigators were not free to pick up localities or respondents. No substitution was permitted. Strict
percent of Indian voters feel that their vote does make a significant difference in the way India is governed. There is almost an 11 percent increase in the legitimacy of the Indian political system from opinion polls done in 1971. But, the same does not hold true for political parties and institutions. According to the poll, there has been a 10 percent increase in those who do not trust representatives and a 17 percent drop in the trustworthiness of the Congress party as a whole. Overall, this shows a decline in the Indian people's faith in political parties. There has however been a 75 percent increase in the membership of caste/religious organizations, which unquestionably shows the impact those organizations have as agents of political socialization and political development. Hence there is a

adherence to this procedure yielded a representative sample of the 9,457 interviewees including 75 percent rural respondents, 49 per cent women, 42 percent illiterates, 11 percent muslims, 19 percent scs and 9 per cent STS. Its margin of error is estimated to be 1.5 per cent. The survey was completed between the first week of June and the second week of July. A team of about 30 distinguished social scientists, belonging to 23 universities and research institutes, were involved in conceptualising and executing this unprecedented venture. The interviews were conducted by a team of nearly 250 researchers specially trained for the survey. Face-to-face interviews were conducted mostly at the respondent's house, on the basis of a written questionnaire which was translated into 15 languages. An average interview lasted between one and two hours. On the completion of final analysis, the entire data of the survey will be
gap between the claim and reality. Less than two percent of caste members claim that they take direction from caste leaders or vote according to their group opinions. However, in the last quarter century, the proportion of those caste members who name a party which specifically looks after the interests of their caste/community has increased.

It is obvious that political parties, instead of acting in a true representative sense, are increasingly becoming political fronts of caste, communal and regional forces. Political parties in India, rather than representing the people as a whole are becoming accountable to the regions/castes/communities. (Seth 1996:7)

The government of India has involved all caste groups in politics by emphasizing the importance of distributive justice and equality in view of the inegalitarian caste system and has taken measures by way of protective discrimination, to provide lower caste members with reserved seats and political representation in parliament as well as other economic and educational benefits.

The governmental, political and party leaders also involved castes in political action by making them politicized and mobilized and using them for the purpose of

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deposited in the data archive of the ICSSR and will be open
gaining significant numbers of votes, and in turn, making caste members even more conscious of their importance. Added to all of these were forces of change ushered in by industrialization, new technology, urbanization and a more definite shift of Indian economy towards capitalism. It has been argued that political democracy in India has not led to any significant increase in the social base of democratic consciousness, except in the formal sense of voting in elections, which can be a deceptive indicator of such consciousness (Ray 1989). According to Ray, it was felt that political democracy was imposed from above, and instead of helping structures like caste to move in more democratic directions, has instead set the ground work for increased unstableness within India and was causing increasing social and political violence.

But while it is true that there has been an increase in social and political violence in India, there has also been an awakening in terms of political development. The political culture of India has been dramatically changed. Political development in India has been most notably of parliamentary democracy. In five decades, India has emerged as one of the world's few stable parliamentary democracies.
This democracy has been rooted in a society that is more populous and diverse than any other democracy in the world.

India is fundamentally a society that is largely tradition bound and inegalitarian with a lower degree of literacy. Yet how can one explain the adoption of parliamentary democracy and the adoption of democratic politics in Indian society? A paradoxical question that should not be viewed from a eurocentric viewpoint but rather non-judgmentally. This anomaly has a direct relationship to the concept of caste and caste politicization. Perhaps because so much of the political development in India was originally and is still an indigenous component of the ancient caste system. But Indians seem to have changed the rules via caste mobilization and politicization to suit their context. The old rules which in the past defined access to village wells, define access to polling booths today.

So in a society whose social ideologies are in a sense antidemocratic, the workability of parliamentary democracy may be explicable in part because its acceptance is not based in an ideology but in a means sufficient for the modern political business.

Significantly, Indian political development, supported and developed to some extent by the caste system has
provided an indirect and buoyant mechanism for conflict management and negotiations among the established classes and castes with all their internal divisions and regional and social diversities. (Bardhan 1984) It is evident that the Indian political machine with its network of caste privileges and hence caste politicization, its ability to responded to pressures from groups at different levels in the political system, its ingrained methods of transaction which lend it a degree of legitimacy as well as moderation, and its way of absorbing dissent and co-opting leaders of the subordinate classes, has led to an interrelationship between political culture and political structures that is essential to the political development of India.

The existence side by side however, of a traditional structure of economic and social relationships that keep the old attitudes, thought processes and channels of communication intact has also resulted in regional and social imbalances which further accentuate the existing social heterogeneity in India creating new cleavages and conflicts unknown in pre-British Indian society. The Congress Party (i.e., its policies) posed a threat to those social groups (upper castes) whose survival was directly linked with the survival of hierarchical traditional relationships (i.e.,
exploitation of lower castes) and the privileges that went with them. (Kohli 1990)

The onset of changes in Indian political culture that led to some form of political development, seemed to give support to a form of Hindu nationalism which not only gave rise to conflicts with other lower caste groups but also seemed to result in the further marginalization of India's impoverished and supported the upsurge of religious fundamentalism resulting in the Hindu/Muslim riots. This is one of the fundamental contradictions of Indian political development. While the political culture supported political development in India it also provided fuel to a host of other social dilemmas.

The members of traditionally closed status communities (castes) of India found it necessary to pattern their groupings into patterns of power and class. Although the changes in the use of caste structure for political purposes was initially and strategically initiated though changes in its power dimension, the changes also resulted in further changes in economic and socio-cultural dimensions (Calman 1985).

With the passing of every new day, contradictions and conflicts, co-operation and competition between millions of
members of India's unstable status groups are involving themselves in the political and social delineation of India's political development. While this is resulting in growing pains, India's masses are nevertheless maturing in both a political and social sense. Changes in the political culture of India has made this possible. Caste seems to be one more element along side religion, language, regional differences and economics. However, the debate between caste and politics has been perhaps the fundamental factor in India's political development.

Not only is there a politicization of castes, but by using politics, caste members participate in the national arena and transcend the traditional local boundaries imposed by the caste system, in this way they eventually set the stage for caste-free politics. According to scholar Paul Kennedy:

the autonomy and functions of the states in today's world have been eroded by transnational trends, and no adequate substitute has emerged to replace it as the key unit in responding to global change. The role of the political leadership of the nation will be critical in preparing its people for the twenty first century, because traditional instruments of the state are weakening. (Kennedy 1993:15)
During the last (1996) elections in India, no party emerged with a clear majority, and in a coalition government the hold of upper castes became considerably weaker (in terms of sheer numerical strength) as the Bhartiya Janata Party (the main party in power) obtained 41 of the lower caste and Scheduled Caste seats, almost doubling its strength since the 1991 elections. In the past two elections (1991 and 1996), it seems as though the lower castes have come to realize that they do not have to vote the way their traditional caste superiors tell them.

Politicians are awakening to the fact that they need the votes of lower castes or Untouchables as much as they need the votes of upper castes or Brahmins. Castes in Indian politics remain essentially segregated due to a combination of common economic interests, and political interests. Caste members are generally keen to have their caste fellows get elected, because people in the national parliament and the state assemblies are in a position to look after the other members of their caste by promising them jobs and contracts. Politicians appeal to lower castes by promising them bigger quotas of jobs and college admissions and to higher castes by offering to cut quotas. In general however,
these are not the principal factors that are determining the outcome of Indian politics, as it did in the past.

Other factors such as general economic policies, international relations, human rights issues, moral issues and the integrity of political leaders are also beginning to play a role in the unfolding of India's political drama. Some of this can be attributed to the political development of India's caste membership through the process of caste politicization (Seitz 1988).

The World Bank projects that India's population will grow by 45 percent from 1981 to the year 2000. According to the most recent census, all minorities, with the exception of Christians in India, have increased more rapidly than the population as a whole (Weiner and Huntington 1987). It is further projected that in the time to come, by the year 2000, only between 45 and 52 percent of the population can be regarded as 'majority' and it is likely that the 'majority' will fall below 50 percent in several states.

Thus the changing nature of the political culture of Indian caste politics will again have a profound impact on the political development of India's polymorphous nature.
An overview of political culture and political development: India

Following an overview of the history and interpretation of the concept of political culture and its importance in comparative political theory, we examined its usefulness to the understanding of its political development. We then applied both, the theories of political culture, and political development to the case of India for the purpose of comparing them with the political culture and political development of Pakistan.

In the course of this exercise it was inevitable that we refer to India's past history as the present politics becomes past history and past history conditions present politics, much more so in the case of a country like India that has a known history of at least 3000 years. In the course of our analysis, we found that the phenomenon of utmost importance that is strategic, and stands out clearly both in the past and in present politics of India, is its caste system.

So pivotal is the role of castes in understanding not only India's social, cultural and economic aspects but also its contribution to the formation of India's political culture
both in the past and present that we analyzed in more depth. We found the caste system of India to be resistant to change and yet adaptable enough to guarantee its survival and continue its contribution to Indian political culture.

Before the colonization of India by the British, the caste system had survived, and adapted, but by the time of the arrival of the British, it was somewhat stagnated, losing its dynamics. With the beginning of the British era in Indian history, a new stage of change was set for India's political culture and political development. Needless to mention that the impact of British occupation of India was to bring about some far-reaching changes in its social, cultural, economic and political aspects, especially through unleashing such forces of change as industrialization, urbanization, westernization, capitalism and politicization. Since the British were the dominant rulers in colonial India for more than a century, they naturally affected every aspect of Indian life, including India's caste system, and at times, they directly took measures to change it, especially through social, legal and political reform to deliberately benefit from the disadvantaged lower castes. The British intentionally or unintentionally began the politicization of India's castes and hence India's masses. Under British
rule, India's caste system as usual, first resisted change, then adapted to new political culture and development.

The British not only set the stage for the dialectics of the caste system creating its contradictions, conflicts, and its own dynamics, but made it adaptable to the differentiated political system under the foundations of modern state, furthering political development and political cultural change in India.

The stagnant caste system prior to the coming of the British got a new lease of life; it became a part of India's political culture changing it, but undergoing transformation itself under the forces of change; playing its own role but being in turn changed by the role of the modern state, thus affecting and being affected by India's political culture and political development. It was this dialectics of the system that was inherited by the Congress Party that was to help it emerge as the most strategic and single most important political party that challenged the British rule, and led a long movement for India's independence, ultimately succeeding in establishing itself as the leading ruling party of India. The Congress Party was an outcome of the British politicization and political development of India, which
ultimately challenged and displayed the British rule itself. The Congress Party was responsible for creating a mass movement, appealing to the symbols and traditions of the past, on the one hand, but politically mobilizing India's caste members Hindus, and the non-caste people such as Muslims on the other hand. It provoked both, the intellectuals and the masses alike to challenge and change India's past traditions under new political culture but finally fell victim to its own strength under the Hindu dominance, the discontent of the Muslims fanned by The Muslim League and the British policy of "divide and rule", leading (at the end) to the partition of India. The partition created two countries out of one, strangely labeling one as "India" and the other as "Pakistan".

It is here that we begin the analysis of modern Indian Political culture and political development and then the analysis of Pakistani political culture and Pakistani political development. Though they showed the past which was alike and different at the same time, the new political experiences of these two new independent nations are different and deserve closer examination for comparative politics.
The political culture and development of modern India on its own could be said to have started with its independence, though it had already begun with the impact of the British rule. Independent India was forced to chart its own political course and herald a new but the transitory stage of change for its own independent political development. Modern independent India (1947) declared itself to be a democracy molded as per the parliamentary system of England. Some of the makers of modern political culture of India were educated in England. Under the colonial rule, they questioned and challenged the dominance of the British and the exploitation of Indian people. Under free, new independent India, they started putting into practice what they had learned from the British Parliamentary System during their student days in England. This was not an easy task as India operated under a different socio-cultural milieu and it was a poor "Third World" nation left pauper and exploited by the former colonial power.

However, India formulated its new democratic constitution, learning lessons from the modern democracies from around the world, adopted the parliamentary system but incorporated
a series of fundamental rights, and declaring measures to improve the lot of poorer masses and lower disadvantaged castes. The declarations were legal-constitutional, committing everything to writing under the able and intellectual leadership of late Babasaheb Ambedkar (himself a low caste member), and under the guidance of such shrewd politicians as Nehru and Gandhi. India set its own course of political development influenced its new political culture and forced it to adapt to the Indian social milieu.

The first step India took was to protect the rights of its minorities and thus further deeply involved Muslims and lower caste people in modern political currents. Thus India begun the deeper politicization of all its institutions, including the caste system, and all other non-caste people of India. Right from the beginning of the first political elections of India to the last (in 1996), the masses, the voters were made politically conscious and internalizing India's new political culture which enhanced India's political developing. The free elections in the world's largest democracy became a political school for both India's political parties and voting masses. This does not mean that free elections in modern independent nations-state were
not influenced by its socio-cultural milieu with which they took place. On the contrary, for example, political parties and their political leaders in pursuit of power made ample use of India's caste systems appealing people to vote on caste basis and elect a fellow caste member to Indian parliament. People formed caste associations cutting across local and regional boundaries and leaders took advantage of contesting elections on the basis of "block voting" based on caste.

This beginning increased caste conflicts in India. In fact the impact of politicization of India masses was to create caste conflicts in all regions of India, and special measures taken by the government for the positive discrimination of lower castes (as opposed to the negative discrimination) created large scale discontent among upper castes. The discontent led conflict and violence all throughout India. However, the caste system, once again, proved to be extremely dynamic and adaptable, teaching political lessons to the masses but under the pressures of politicization, leading to "caste-force" politics (Sidu 1993). We should carefully observe this typical political dialectics of the caste system which becomes instrumental in gaining a
political foot-hold but at the end, becomes self-destructive after teaching important political lessons to the people. Caste may work against democracy but it can be made to work for democracy; it can be used to learn politics, it can contribute to political socialization but could be discarded when it outlives its usefulness.

The above observations may make one feel as though the only institution of importance in India is its caste system. However, while not de-emphasizing the dynamics and the dialectics of the system the system itself has changed under the pressures of industrialization, under new technology, and the system of capitalism which has its firm grip on India since the adoption and encouragement of the free-enterprise system in the name of "liberalization". Add to this the impact of globalization and India is ready for new political culture and political development as an active participant in the new global system. However, at this juncture, we return to the other dimension of this research. What about political culture and political development of Pakistan which was created on the eve of independence? We now turn to Pakistani political culture and political development,
beginning with the historical contact of Islam in the subcontinent.
Chapter 3
Pakistani political culture and political development

Introduction

Both India and Pakistan were carved out of the same country, yet their political fortunes turned out to be different. In the case of Pakistan, the state has been playing conspicuous role not only as a manager of conflicts, but as a cultural force in an attempt to solve its many plaguing problems, especially regionalism (the periphery) versus the center (the government). The political history of Pakistan, in the last fifty years, seems to be an experimental laboratory of various regimes; parliamentary, presidential, and military-civilian authoritarianism. However, the latter type of regime appears to have been the most widely practiced. How did it become so common in Pakistan? Was there anything unique in historical circumstances, religion, and socio-economic factors that resulted in a distinct political culture that influenced the political development in Pakistan as reflected by the form of government adopted by that country? These are the questions
which should be responded to by referring to the brief historical context of Islam in the Indian sub-continent, the British impact on the then Mughal regime, the British policy of "divide and rule", the creation of the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority problem, the partition of India, and the ultimate formation of modern Pakistani political culture and political development in the pages to follow.

**Historical context of Islam in the subcontinent**

The undivided history of Pakistan dates back to the Indus Valley civilization (2500 - 1600 B.C.), particularly in Punjab and Sindh provinces of Pakistan. Indus Valley civilization was a city culture sustained by agricultural surplus and extensive trade with what is today Iraq. The Indus Valley civilization seems to have survived on a centralized administration system. In about 711 A.D., a Muslim expedition conquered and ruled Balochistan and Sindh; Muslim influence grew with more conversions the underpinning of which was the coastal trade that permitted the introduction of the Muslim way of life into the subcontinent,
and allowed significant cultural exchanges to take place.  
(Blood 1995:8) About three centuries later, some Muslim Turks and Afghans expanded Muslim rule over most of the subcontinent, the Bengal, and almost all of the area in present day Pakistan, and established what was called the Delhi Sultanate (1206) until it was taken over by the Mughals in about 1526. (Blood 1995:9-11)

The rule of Delhi Sultanate was, in the main, urban, and at times tolerant of non-Muslim communities. It inaugurated a period of "Indo-Muslim" cultural fusion which manifested itself in architecture, music, literature, and religion. (Blood 1995:11) Babur of Ferghana (in present day Uzbekistan) was the founder of the Mughal Empire which lasted until the British, formally took over in 1858. Mughals' sway extended over an area encompassing what is known today as Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Bengal, and most of India. They "brought not only political unification, but introduced a considerable measure of administrative and financial sophistication;" (Hayes 1984:20) it was called mansabdari, and it was introduced by Akbar (1556-1605). He created a centralized, rank ordered imperial service based on ability
and loyalty to the person of the ruler, and remunerated the members of the system with cash and kept them away from their inherited estates. The military and political functions of the imperial service system were separated from revenue collection which was the function of the imperial treasury to ensure the supremacy of the ruler's house against the two possible sources of challenge: the Afghan-Turkish aristocracy and the Ulema. (the traditional interpreters of Islamic law) This system, the mansabdari, was the backbone of the Mughal empire. It depended much on the power play of members' loyalty to the emperor and the latter's acumen to choose, and supervise. (Blood 1995:13) The system was not only a personal creation, its maintenance was equally personal. A regime so personalized would be vulnerable to the vicissitudes of succession when the vision and the character of the new ruler was incongruent to the predecessor's system of government. Thus death of the creator may mean demise of his system. This is what happened with the successors of Akbar who neither partook of his vision nor of his administrative strategy which was not maintained or reinforced by impersonal vehicles of control and mass-support.
The last important emperor Aurangzeb (1658 - 1707) aggressively expanded Islam's frontiers and enforced Sunni school of Islam. The empire under his rule, reached its greatest geographical extent; but bore the seeds of decline entailed in logistics—basic problems of unmaintainable extensive lines of communications, (characteristic of those days) swift deployment of sufficient military forces, military entreats of supportive services and food, etc. in culturally alien territories whose population consisted of, among others, unwieldy fierce warriors. The logistics was further aggravated by Aurangzeb's administration which was based on remuneration with land rather than cash to be given to the high ranking officials as Aurangzeb did not possess the ability and skill to choose and control as Akabar. (Blood 1995:14) Such remuneration system created the foundation for future hereditary land aristocracy with sufficient powers to collect rent and challenge the central authority if such a group so chose. As control of central authority weakened, succession to offices of power, even at the provincial level, was a drama of force and intrigue.

The main source of ruler's legitimacy was his profession
and guardianship of Islam; but it was a version of the "early pristine" Islam incorporating inimical elements of pre-Islamic cultures. This subcontinental Islam assumed a range of social practices that related to geo-cultural dimensions. "In areas remote from the political and spiritual center, populations were converted by Muslims not themselves well versed in the law of Islam or personally committed to teaching its requirements. Islam did not absorb or eliminate local cultural patterns of Hindu rituals and other accretions; but, often fused with them, and over time, local and regional variations in religious practice made Islam in South Asia less than uniform" (Louis 1984:1). Islam, as the main fountain of value system for both individual and collectivity is, in its pristine form, unitary; that is it combines both private and public spheres of action and make them inseparable from faith in One all-powerful God to whom one will render full account of his worldly life. Thus the individual is the building block in Muslim community; Islamic values assume a coherent totality and worldly life matters in as much as it contributes to a happy after-life. But subcontinental Islam produced a compartmentalized faith, not a unitary one. An individual may be a deep believer and a practicing Muslim of all rituals, but may manifest an
incoherent compartmentalization of faith-derived values because the mechanisms of socialization may not be purposefully Islamic (Talukder 1982). Although Islam values the family, the Indian version of Islam more strongly makes "life revolve around family and kin" (Blood 1995:100). It de-emphasizes the general and independent status of the individual. Here again the natural basic equality between man and woman as revealed in the Qur'an is replaced by subordination of women to men through self-servicing rationalization of innate weakness of women, and identifying men's family honor with sexual morality and chastity of women. In some regions, restraints on women are such that "women only leave their homes only to marry, and almost never meet unrelated men." (Blood 1995:118) Corollary to this perception of women's station is a concept of revenge of family honor in cases of suspected sexual immorality which, in itself, is anti-Islamic, yet widely practiced and socially enforced.

Literacy was the privilege of the few, particularly among the ruling members of the elite at the top. Education was confined to the traditional knowledge of the mosque which was handed down from generation to generation. The common Muslim
masses, basically illiterate, believed in world mission of Islam, and a glorious destiny of their own that God would unfold. They were inclined to be politically apathetic; an attitude that bolstered the government's tendencies for centralization and monolithic power. The Muslim rulers in India usually assumed both the executive and the legislative functions. Moreover, they engaged in a struggle to monopolize the judiciary which was the bastion of rendering justice. Akbar not only displaced the Ulema, but altered a basic Islamic ruling when it suited his plans. In creating his centralized administration he lifted the "Jujiya", the head tax from non-Muslims, and initiated a religion called "Din-I-Ilahi" or the Divine Faith whose ritual and content compromised orthodox Islam.

The British Impact

In about 1498, Vasco Da Gama sailed to Calicut on the southwest coast of India. In 1510, the Portuguese overtook Goa, and successfully dominated the sea route and the Indian sea trade for about a century. England responded by forming private trading company to challenge Portuguese monopoly of
trade. (Blood 1995:14-15) The Mughals allowed Britain's East India Company considerable export trade latitude in establishing posts (or for that purpose, factories) in India. By the 18th century, the East India Company had gained so much power that its posts became virtually fortified centers applying British law and forming a haven for both Indian and foreign refugees. The British East India Company became a state within a state involved in politics, plots and counter plots until its armies led by Robert Clive vanquished the Mughal forces led by Nawab Siraj-ud-Dawlah at Plassey in the province of Bengal in 1757. Clive also defeated the emperor Shah Allam II at the Battle of Buxar (in Bihar) in 1764. The British East India Company became the revenue collector in important Mughal areas of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa and the supreme if not the titular power in most of the Ganges Valley. The decisive defeat of the Mughal armies must have been a shock to Muslim self-perceived glory and might. But the British were there to make money and profit with minimum expense, not to upset the modus vivendi of the locals, except when it would serve their economic and strategic goals. Even then for that matter the British would act circumspectly and unobtrusively.
Economics of money-making dictated geographical expansion, which the British accomplished by two methods: first and foremost was the subsidiary agreements (sanad) with local rulers whose substantive authority, through such agreements, were at times forcefully contracted. However, the British designed agreements made those rulers quite content because they were left alone and away from foreign interference to do as they pleased. This method created the world of princely states of India ruled by Hindu maharaja or Muslim nawab and brought most of the subcontinent under British control. The second method of economic expansionism was via annexation by armed forces, which were used in bringing under control the Punjab and (present-day) North West Frontier Province.

Economic undertakings and prudent administrative reforms correlated with the war-like qualities and temperament of local inhabitants made Punjabi troops fight alongside the British. (Blood 1995:17) For about a century, the Company enjoyed prosperity derived from de facto colonial despoliation of the subcontinent especially the Bengal (Chomsky 1994:8). It provided stability commensurate with its unchallenged power position. The British East India Company pursued an expansionist policy to attain economic gains. But this same policy of expansion and the hegemony of the British, might very well have provided a spring board for
Indian self awareness. However, the adventitious introduction of a new Enfield rifle whose cartridges were greased with pig or cow fat, (and had to be tipped off by the mouth) in about 1857, set in motion an uprising of the sepoys, the Indian military regiment (including both Hindu and Muslim soldiers) for a year. The uprising marked a concrete inception of the irreversible process of self consciousness that heralded the end of the Company Rule and commenced the British Raj (1858 - 1947). The grease of either cow or pig was offensive to Hindu and Muslim religious beliefs respectively; but in itself would be neither sufficient nor necessary to unleash an uprising were it not for the long fomenting of self awareness of the Indian masses. The sepoy revolt had far reaching political repercussions which created British mistrust of Indian Muslim aristocracy because the revolt attempted to enthrone the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah though the principal leaders, Nana Sahib and Tantia Topi who were Hindus took active roles in the revolt (Blood 1995:21).

The British Raj

The British introduced Western political thought through
their educational system, and civil training and performance. Their main policy was "divide and rule", but their administration was inexpensive and had a centralized structure (Louis 1984:25).

The formal British model of British India was a centralized pyramidal structure on the top of which stood a British governor general holding supreme executive and legislative powers. British India was divided into provinces, (suba) provinces were further divided into districts, (zilla) that constituted the basic administrative units. Provinces were headed by the Governor'. His districts were headed by officers, who provided the vital connections in the system because they dispensed justice and collected revenue. They were, by virtue of office, in contact with the hard daily realties of the local population, (usually local notables and the upper echelons of social strata because of linguistic barriers) a fact that would require much finesse and diplomatic prudence and strengthen the position of local nobility and landlords at the expense of the masses. Such officers were drawn from the prestigious Indian Civil Service (exclusively British in the beginning) which later opened its doors to indigenous successful recruits (to cut down expenses). Selection was based on merit and competitiveness.
Schooling and education were not only secular and Western in substance and spirit though in the beginning it was almost inseparable Christian missionary activity which ventured into the subcontinent to convert, to converse, and to record observations of India (Blood 1995:15). Muslims, nostalgic for their past glory, believed in a world mission of Islam. They were fearful of the sway of missionary education and potential conversion. Unlike the Hindus, they withdrew into themselves, forgoing the opportunities created by modern education. During the British Raj, Hindus were more amenable to co-operation with the British. They were benefited by the modern knowledge created by Western education covering themes of politics, management, organization, natural sciences, and civil administration. (Louis 1984:21) Modern education involved more young Hindus than Muslims and provided them with general sophistication and sharpened their political skills. (at the time of partition, there were only 101 Muslim civil servants out of 1157 in the Indian civil service.)

The response of the Muslim elite to the fears of Western education came in two forms: the Deoband and the Aligarh Movements. The Deoband Movement was Ulema-based, emphasizing and expanding traditional education on an all-
India basis. Here again, one can note the nostalgia for glorious Islam in unified India as it was under the Mughals. The Aligarh Movement founded by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in 1875 considered access to British education, but not politics, as the key to social mobility and Muslim advancement (Ahmed 1986). This is why Muslim graduates from Aligarh University made their careers in administration, not politics forfeiting opportunities for taking part in representative institutions at the provincial level by the India Councils Act of 1892 (Blood 1995:22-23).

A modicum of elective politics was introduced after 1871 in the form district boards and municipal committees to assist in the functions of the district officers. But at the same time the doctrine of "paramountcy" was set out. It meant the perpetuation of the old Company rule of qualified non-interference in the internal affairs of the princely states in return for prince's loyalty and submission of their authority over defense, military and foreign relations to the British governor general. Initially the British Raj was socially and politically conservative detrimental of mass participation in the management of their affairs. The British were self-consistent in pursuit of profit-making. This
would make, their policy anachronistic but that was exactly the "forward policy" (Louis 1984:24). According to the British it began in 1874, and involved the tribal people in the northwestern frontier (Balochistan) to maintain order in return for British subsidies and suzerainty. Local customary law was upheld, and authority of tribal chiefs continued on the previous traditional lines. To maintain a sufficient buffer zone between the British and the Russian empires (in the far north) with the least expense, the British enhanced the significance of tribal loyalty and organization when tribalism was on decline.

Colonial administrators adroitly used "divide and rule" to the frustration and retardation of Indians, especially Muslims who were displaced as a dominant ruling group, and replaced by British dominance which acted out a different culture of secular values that were not only offensive to Muslim traditions but tended to underplay the value and culture of the Mughal dynasty. The British realized the cultural differences that had existed among Indians population and exploited them. For example, "in 1846 they permitted a Hindu prince to rule the state of Kashmir with Muslim majority to minimize the chances of co-operation
between native ruler and people" (Louis 1984:24). Moreover, the British endorsed and implemented the concept of separate electorates and reserved seats for Muslims in the legislative assemblies. This infuriated the Hindu majority that must have seen in it as a compromise of the principle of the "rule of majority" which most befitted them as a majority. In about 1906, governor general, Lord Minto said, "Any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent." (Louis 1984:24)

In 1905, Lord Curzon, the then viceroy, divided the province of Bengal on religious lines, (although all Bengalis spoke a common language and entertained a homogeneous culture) eastern Bengal with a Muslim majority, and western Bengal including Bihar and Orissa with a Hindu majority. This action triggered a long anti-partition campaign spearheaded by Hindu revolutionaries who used every means (including terrorism) to accomplish their goal (Blood 1995:23).

Although the physical presence of the British, its expansionist policy, and grafting of Western institutions and political methods upon "foreign" Indian culture fostered
Indian self-awareness, it was Hindu component of the population which was most politicized. The rebellion of the Sepoys left a strong British distrust of Muslim aristocracy, the landed Muslim upper class which retreated into cultural and political isolation. It failed to re-emerge economically and politically and produced no significant mobile educated class of equal quality that could be matched with the Hindu middle class. The Muslim aristocracy failed to face the challenges posed either by Christian missionary or by occasional Hindu attempts at conversion (by sects such as Arya Samaj); they became noncompetitive when Hindu nationalism was gaining vigor and sophistication (Blood 1995:22-23). Muslims could not conceptualize the dimensions and manifestations of the basic cementing value of the Muslim community of brotherhood.

Another consequence of British dominance and policy was demotion of Muslim officeholders to mere functionaries. Muslim civil servants could only achieve personal enrichment by exploiting the regulations and governing processes of the British administration to their own interest, a practice that had a potential for corruption and development of manipulative personalities. The poor Muslim classes,
specially the farmers, were miserably exploited. The Land Alienation Act of 1900 which purported to relieve peasant's misery, still allowed the big land-owners to become even bigger. It was difficult for the Muslim community in such social and organizational disarray to mobilize opposition to the British rule.

Self - government , one may argue, was to naturally evolve, at least, as an ancillary to changes in international climate after the First and Second World Wars when costs of colonization rose. There were very few apologists for colonialism, and many critics of imperialism, including the United States. However, the rise of Indian self - consciousness, the growth of intelligentsia and the enlightened elite's (especially among the Hindus) became politicized and they mobilized sufficient numbers so as to form the Indian National Congress in 1885 ( known as Congress ) placing demands for a unified, independent India. Although Sir Syed Ahmad Khan shared the views with Congress, he remained aloof, and advised his Muslim followers not to join it because he feared that organization would be dominated by Hindus, and it would eventually become anti-Muslim (Blood 1995:22-23). It was a Hindu, not a "majority"
phobia, clad in "Two Nations Theory." This theory was the main rationale of the All India Muslim League founded in 1906 (later known as The Muslim League) to press, eventually, for a separate Muslim state.

The Congress was a nationalistic and vigorous organization with direct or indirect emphasis on religious revivalism it caused concerns among other religious groups. Henceforth, the incidents of Muslim persecution increased considerably. The Muslim request for weighted representation in separate electorates (with Muslim majority) and communal representation spelled out a sense of helplessness in facing numerically superior Hindus (3 to 1) who, once subjects of Muslim rulers, were now also qualitatively indomitable. The British acceded to Muslim demands and it was reflected in the reforms embodied in The Government of India Act of 1909 known as Morley - Minto Reforms. The Government of India Act of 1919 (or Montagu - Chelmsford reforms) made the gradual establishment of self-government the goal of British policy by increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, extending franchise and increasing the authority of central and provincial legislative councils. But the viceroy remained accountable only to London (Nasr 1994:3-4). These imperial reforms did not, however, salvage the
Muslim status or restore their political prominence which seemed to have been lost to the Congress and its Hindu members who were, from the beginning, active in mobilizing and politicizing mass-action. The Muslim League, which had been founded by Western-educated Muslims, in response to the Congress, was busy envisaging the formulation of political agenda while attempting to disentangle itself from organizational atrophy and inconsistency.

The earliest organized expression of Muslim mass-activism was the Khilafa movement between 1921-1924 which was formed to preserve the Turkish caliphate, or the symbolic unity of Muslims. The movement, despite its collapse in 1924, stirred more Muslim communalism through the decades which followed and catapulted Islam into the political arena. Essentially, Islam's symbols were politicized and mobilized to elicit mass public support. (Nasr 1994: 4) The open collision between Hindu hostility and Muslim activism in the wake of the Khilafa movement reinforced the fears of Muslim masses and elite about their future. (Nasr 1994:3-4) It prompted them to ally themselves with the British to promote their interests (Louis 1984:27). In 1935, Britain issued the Government of India Act that was a step toward independence of India, and provided for a federal constitutional
government responsible to provincial legislatures. The whole political arrangement was made totally accountable to the secretary of state for India in London. The Muslim League negatively received the Act because of the limited provincial autonomy contained in it. The League aspired more autonomy to increase political weight of Muslims where they constituted a majority.

The Muslim League ran the elections of 1937 following the Act of 1935, and lost to the Congress. The latter began to successfully entice Muslims into serving as junior partners, thus acknowledging Hindu political ascendancy. (Nasr 1994:5) The Muslim League could not claim sole representation of Muslim Indians as it even fared poorly in the elections where Muslims were a majority in such provinces as Punjab and the North - West Frontier. The Congress, however, in Muslim - minority provinces permanently alienated the Muslim League (Blood 1995:29). It is possible that the Muslim League was an ad hoc organization created by Muslim urban bourgeoisie, intellectuals and professionals on whose financial support the League depended heavily (Khan 1985:5). It was not the kind of political party that cut across classes aggregating their interests and articulating their demands with a commitment to a national project. That was one important
reason why the League lost the election of 1937. In the Punjab, there was an impressive array of societies, sects, and organizations... Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh; orthodox, heterodox, and reform; each with its own ideology and program, each caught up in a struggle with one or more opponents (Louis 1984:27). In the North-West frontier, it was customary law and tribal structure whose needs and demands were remote from bourgeois mentality whose platform was incomprehensible in a tribal context.

Towards partition

While Muslim masses could not compromise their faith and sense of world mission under Hindu domination, the Muslim league began to think of a context, other than unified India, to avoid the inevitable political and cultural humiliation brought about by Hindu ascendancy. The leading political figure of the League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, combined all ideas of race, culture, national origin, tradition, manner of life, civilization, and religion to substantiate his demand for an independent country (Louis 1985:27). Jinnah was a shrewd and
cynical pragmatic leader who not only possessed the ability to relay his vision with rhetoric and conviction to the multitudes of Indian Muslims, but to change, in time, his sails to the prevailing winds. He relinquished his membership in the Congress. He established All - India Muslim League with the hope to restore Muslim glory in unified India, which, when dashed on the rocks of reality, he cleverly fought for "the survival" of the Muslim community and its eventual independence under the banner of Muslim League. The legitimacy of the League was based on the charismatic personality of Jinnah, a fact that explains its fragmentation and debilitating factionalism after his death in 1948.

In 1940, the League issued the Lahore Declaration which advocated an independent Muslim state. The British acceded to the League's demand because, as some have argued, the declaration fell neatly in line with the British policy of "divide and rule". To create two rival states or countries in the once unified subcontinent would establish a region of low intensity conflict which could invite international involvement. Between 1940 and 1946, the British made a number of proposals and sent missions for transfer of power. By 1947, the political situation in whole India was breaking
down, a fact that compelled both the Congress and the League to reach an agreement regarding partition. On August 14, 1947, India and Pakistan became two sovereign nations.

Modern Pakistani political development: The influence of political culture.

In addition to the technical problems that beset partition, (such as army partition, redefining boundary lines, control and allocation of Indus River water, communal riots and lawlessness) Pakistan had distinct misfortunes of its own.

On genesis, Pakistan occupied the northern part of the subcontinent that spans the Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the North-Western Frontier (where Pakhtun tribes join ancestry with Afghanistan), and the Bengal forming the eastern wing, separated from the other four provinces of Pakistan by about 1600 miles of Indian territory. Pakistan was delivered into twentieth century political system of nation-states without virtually any industrial base, institutional, financial, or energy resources, without effective political parties, or strong
middle class, or any experienced politicians in the art of
government and tactics of political fray. Shorn of such
essentials, Pakistan was equipped with only some 95 Muslim
bureaucrats, (from 1157 Indian Civil Service) one Christian,
eleven military officers transferring to civilian service,
and fifty Britons for a total of 157. Only twenty of them had
more than fifteen years of service experience; they formed
the core of the administrative machinery and became one of
the most privileged elite civil service in the world.
Pakistan inherited an enthusiastic Muslim army willing to
defend the state that was predicated on reviving and living
the faith and teachings of Islam (Louis 1984:37). The
military was divided as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored Regiments</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Regiments</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport Units</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>34</td>
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<th>NAVY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sloops</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Frigates</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Trawlers</td>
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<th>AIRFORCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fighter Squadrons</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Transport Squadrons</td>
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However, looking from the window of the "ruler" one could not fail to see more threats than opportunities to the fledgling state. Ashok Kapur (1969:13-15) enumerates such threats to Pakistani politics:

1- Power structures are narrow, and dominated by shifting coalitions without sufficient organized mass movement.

2- Leaders are personally ambitious to the point of manipulativeness.

3- Leaders are inexperienced and lack political vision sufficient to develop a Pakistani national identity.

4- Centrifugal forces of regionalism, ethnicity, and religion are competitive and outmatch the centripetal force of the state in its attempt to integrate them.

5- Political parties and public opinion are divided and disorganized without a meeting ground between them. There is a congeries of democratic, socialist, and leftist tendencies in Pakistani thinking.
The retreat of the British left a power vacuum in Pakistan which was filled, at the top, by the colonial model of centralized administration with a strong executive. However, issues involving political and socio-economic changes were left unappraised.

Indeed the first task the Muslim League took up, after independence, was to chart a constitution to democratically accommodate the Bengalis and provide a formula for an Islamic political system. In September 1948, Jinnah died. His right-hand man, Mohammad Liaquat Haq took over, but was assassinated in 1951. During that period the system was one of rigid centralization of executive and legislative powers with army at bay from politics because of the legitimacy-based charisma of the two leaders of the League. With their demise, however, the tenuous structure of the League fell to splinter competing factions. During this period of state infancy, there could not possibly be any other form of state organization. Following the downfall of the League a number of self-serving civil servants came to the top of the political organization of the state. This was a beginning of
a period of army political involvement which was the sole disciplined organization to maintain the skeleton of the state. During this period of military involvement (1951 - 1988), there emerged unplanned dialectics between the superstructures and the socio-economic formations which were unfolding in the historical context.

The socio-economic groups did not cut across ethnic cleavages which, otherwise, would minimize the impact of ethno-regional culture and interests on the process of national integration. (which is a function of the center, i.e. the state). The groups were more or less localized and representative of their respective provincial cultures. Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim country (over 97% are Muslims) and only a strong sense of brotherhood-based faith overrides the ethnic and linguistic diversity and the localized value-patterns of ruralism. It cements the people at a subconscious level. But Punjabis, Baloch, Pakhtuns, and Sindhis have diverse cultural traditions and they speak different languages. Ethnic and family loyalties assume a far more important role for the commoner than do national loyalties. Punjabis, the largest ethnic group and most prosperous, predominates the central government and the
military which reflects negatively on the aspirations of the other three groups and it deepens the socio-psychological rift detrimental to ideological consensus and national integration. Family or personal interest and status has been a hurdle to promoting public good, and developing civic-minded citizenship (Blood 1995:77). Adding further to Pakistani predicament was the problem of the Bengalis, in East Pakistan. Bengalis spoke their own language, constituted a homogeneously cultural unit that had so much more in common with Hindus and Southeast Asia than with West Pakistan. The two wings did not experience either similar or even complementary economic development, whether under the British rule or after independence. Given the great distance that separated the two wings and the mutual distrust of the elite leadership on either side of large Indian territory dividing them, it was practically impossible to bridge the rift. Further, the people had little opportunity to gain understanding of their countrymen because the exchange of culture between the two wings was minimal (Louis 1984:22).

Secession of East Pakistan, and its eventual naming, Bangladesh, in 1971, was not far from probable. In twentieth century system of nation-state, building of the
political system presumed convergence of certain values and patterns of behavior that preceded the emergence of the state with its institutions, massive resources and capacity for coercion. In case of Pakistan, the state was hurled into life without the necessary foundation of political culture - basic values and other non-governmental institutions.

Pakistan, from inception, has been characterized by horizontal and vertical cleavages. On the horizontal level, is a cleavage among different ethnic, linguistic, and regional groups. On the vertical, there is a noticeable gap between the Westernized elite and the masses; between the rich and the poor (Maniruzzaman 1982:63). Because of the discrepancies in the socialization process, Western elite's have failed to solve their identity question at the personal level. They have developed a sense of mutual distrust of each other. This results in non-commitment to any particular ideology but instead, plays up regional issues buttressing the local prejudices to remain on the top. The main problem in Pakistan is two-fold; resolution of regionalism and creation of overarching set of political values that reinforce development in the democratic direction which
encompasses not only political, but socio-cultural and economic integration.

The Center Verses the Periphery

The province versus center is an old problem buttressed by the British practice during the period of colonization. The provinces (that comprise today's Pakistan) were, for all practical purposes, autonomous in their internal affairs. The center-province conflicts have historical moorings (Kardar 1985:219). To the provinces, political, executive and economic authority rest either with the Punjabi or the Urdu-speaking refugees with their control over the military and civil services which consume over 60% of government's revenue. The debt service cost is over 25% of government revenue paid by all citizens; but foreign loans are utilized in the Punjab or areas dominated by Urdu-speaking population. Consequently one segment of society gets richer and more powerful while the rest incurs the cost. This dichotomy, to some extent, ran on basis of provincial nationality that involved almost 50% of society and alienated their participatory capacity in the development process and the management of the
nation's affairs. The pursuit of political economy programs as the sole instrument for integration was myopic. It resulted in increasing regional imbalances, and sharpening polarization. From the table one, the following observations can be drawn:

1- Mechanization of agriculture in Punjab has been much faster than in other provinces.

2- Use of fertilizer is concentrated in Punjab and Sindh which implies adoption of modern agro-techniques.

3- Punjab share of agriculture credit continues to rise at the expense of other provinces.

4- Electrification of villages in Sindh, Baluchistan, and some backward regions of Punjab started only from 1975.

Table 2 highlights some other development indices. It follows from the table that development tends to be more widespread in the Punjab than the other three provinces. In terms of development, the second and third quartiles of population have a very large Punjabi representation. All districts in Baluchistan, except for Quetta, (inhabited by Indian refugees) are found to be in the bottom twenty five percent.
The periphery - center conflict is further accentuated by interprovincial resentment of Punjabi domination, which on occasions, allies with the industrial conglomerates of the refugees. The two main interest groups, feudal landlords and refugee businessmen have had a noticeable impact on political dynamics when it precipitated into political parties. Because the political elite did not indulge in a future vision of political development - based consensus, political parties reflected regional or group interests without undercuts their forces.

The largest three parties are Islamic Jamhoori Itthad, (IJI) Pakistan People's Party, (PPP) and Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz.(MQM) The first one, IJI, consists of an alliance of nine parties formed in 1988 to oppose the PPP in election. The most important party in the alliance is Pakistan Muslim League, (PML-N) for Nawaz Sherif who is a Punjabi, and became the province's chief minister in 1988. He is the most powerful politician outside the PPP. He represents the Punjabi interests. The PPP was founded by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1967, in Lahore, Sindh. It was built on the support of the
wealthy, landed elite in the province. MQM was formed by Altaf Hussain in 1984 to represent the interests of the refugees (Muhajir community) in Pakistan. Their main strength comes from urban areas in Sindh, and they emphasize better opportunities for the Muhajirs. One does not fail to observe not only the localized interests of the main parties. In their infancy they lack experience which make them vulnerable to come together to forge a national project.

In twentieth century system of nation-states, building of the political system presumed convergence of certain values and patterns of behavior that preceded the emergence of the state with its institutions, massive resources and capacity for coercion. In the case of Pakistan, the state was hurled into life without the necessary foundation of political culture - basic values and other non-governmental institutions.

The state has been charged with the extra task of cultural integration, socio-political consensus and political development with limited resources of honest, skilled politicians, experienced leadership, and committed parties based on large support. This historical specificity, some
claim, could explain the multiplicity of inconsistent political regimes, (presidential and parliamentary democracy, military-bureaucratic, and what is called Islamisation system) Every Pakistani political regime made an attempt to find an optimum modus operandi that would improve the socio-political conditions. Despite the controversies over success, at least one advantage was the significant addition to the repository of political experiences and sophistication amalgamated with the birth of young educated generations who involved almost two generations but deferred pay off.

The early stages after partition were characterized by preponderance of non-associational and anomic groups, and few associational groups of feudal classes, and no industrial bourgeoisie. The political culture associated with such a socio-economic matrix engraved in ethno-regionalism could not possibly generate and reinforce a significant spectrum of individual values of equality, liberty, trust and co-operativeness which appear to be requirements of building a nation state. (Pye and Verba 1965:22-23) Even if one presumes the existence of such values, they were encapsularised in kinship and regionalism.
The main reason lies in the process of political socialization by which values are instilled, but in the case of Pakistan, it was left to regional dynamics which, in itself, could not provide a national scheme of psychological orientations to the citizens and the elite necessary for building a developed polity (Maniruzzaman 1982:37). However, the socialization process in Pakistan, over the period of its existence, has just begun to be modified by the state input of mass-mobilization, which higher rates of education, rising literacy rates, urbanization, economic projects, infrastructure and the participation in mass-media have a spill-over effect on political values. Such tools enable people to acquire mobility, empathy and opinion, thereby the potential for political development. Economic undertakings provide financial ability and spare time needed for associational activity. Qualifying change in socialization is a long term process, which in turn brings about important changes in performance style of groups, parties and elite.

The socio-economic base of early Pakistan consisted mainly of big landlords of the Punjab and Sindh, and the handful of Muslim traders and merchants that supported the
League financially without any direct contact with the masses. There were no rich peasants on the top of a rural market with a surplus to challenge the existing landed aristocracy. They could not ally themselves with an urban bourgeois class to usher an economic and political change. This explains the repeated failure of landforms, particularly in the sixties, and the futile state attempts to tax the enormous agricultural incomes. (Khan 1985:20-21)

The nascent state, in those circumstances, depended on external sources of finance: U.S.A and the petro-dollars of the Gulf countries. This state of economic dependency, improved the economy but circumscribed the states political options.

The people verses the leaders

The people of Pakistan want democracy, justice and freedom. They also want the comforts of modern life, and for this purpose, they perceive Islam as the potential ideology to realize their aspirations. But Islam, like any cultural force, can not be cultivated by the power of law. That was what General Zia Ul-Haq (1977 - 1988) did. The people called it a hoax, and the people were right. (Maniruzzaman
The Islamisation program of President Zia Ul-Haq, enunciated some technical legalities but Pakistan's large army was not to be Islamised. Instead, staff officers were under orders to watch out for tendencies of Islamic fundamentalism among the armed forces. An Islamic army could potentially create an Islamic state. Islamisation was a political program to perpetuate Zia's regime. It did not create the necessary level of ideological consensus.

Despite all these immense and unusual problems, the people of Pakistan have proven to be resilient enough to survive threats and setbacks, and to show some consensus on, what S. Huntington calls, "procedural democracy". From 1990 onwards "procedural democracy" can be defined as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's votes" (Huntington 1991:6-7). Procedural democracy involves fair contestation, participation, and a smooth and peaceful transfer of power. This has been the characteristic of Pakistani political process since early 1990s in spite of temptations of the Eighth Amendment in the constitution which provides the president with immense powers including declaration and use
of martial law. Yet ideological consensus and national integration are difficult to achieve. The only common bond is the brotherhood of the faith of Islam. It embodies the spirit of altruism and emphasizes giving before taking. If the state vigorously pursues the cultivation of this Islamic value, will it convince the begrudged Punjabis to contribute to national commitment and set an example for the other less privileged communities to follow? This is, perhaps, the only source of uncontended consensus that can be found in the Pakistani milieu of diverse cultures.
Chapter 4

The political culture and political development in India and Pakistan: Some comparative observations

Introduction

Not only the past history, but the experiences in the political world are consequential for the formation of political culture and political development of any country. Political socialization is significant for the readjustments a country makes within the changing political world. India and Pakistan provide examples of South Asian entities that are readjusted their political cultures and political development as a result of their political experiences. This "political change" that is taking place in India and Pakistan is perhaps the oldest and least understood of social phenomena. Scholars of political culture and political development have long sought adequate explanations of political change, but no satisfactory, comprehensive theory seems to have been developed. There is still a great need to find explanations of how it is possible to transform one network of social relations, one pattern of cultural values, into another. That is, what processes cause, or
permit, India and Pakistan to break sharply with the political outlooks of their political history and political socialization? In the case of India and Pakistan it can be clearly understood, however, that political cultural change that is centrally directed is enormously difficult to bring about. The exercises in social and political transformations have met with limited success in both India and Pakistan. In both cases changes in political culture and political development has been accompanied by frequent political violence whose aim it has been to purge traditional thinking or foster a movement back to it (Benzanis 1995). Caste and religion in both regions are perhaps best examples to support this argument.

**Political socialization: India and Pakistan**

What is readily observable in the cases of India and Pakistan is that political ideas are transmitted and political thinking is nurtured through a wide variety of associations. The agents of political socialization include small personalized groups such as the family and caste groups that are not easily controlled and manipulated by political officials, as well as religion and political propaganda that
often contain officially sanctioned political messages. Nevertheless much of what the inhabitants of India and Pakistan have learned about politics, and what makes up the essence of India’s and Pakistan's political culture and development was learned from socialization agencies and social experiences that were only indirectly linked to the formal political system. In particular, traditional caste structures, and religion were and are important in shaping political outlooks of the two nations.

While to some extent these factors do lie in the direct control and manipulation of political authorities, the dynamic nature of political culture of India and Pakistan offer certain resistance to programmed change. Political engineers, political educators, and political propagandists in India and Pakistan are quickly learning about the potency and the rigidity of the informal network in effecting political socialization and change. Political elite's in both countries can manipulate only the edges of these processes.

Authoritarian regimes in Pakistan and its military generals as well as the devotees of democracy in India may want to
promote increased political participation. But neither in India nor in Pakistan have they found it easy to alter political views and habits (Vali 1994). What parents pass on to child, teacher to student, or friend to friend concerning the political world remains unprogrammed. The experiences the people of India and Pakistan have had with politics in some instances could not be manipulated. To convince a population that the political order is efficient, some efficiency must be demonstrated. Political propaganda cannot replace the tangible experiences citizens have. Hence the turbulence in the continuing political development of India and Pakistan.

In the case of India the political experiences have been rich and well guided. The caste system, and the colonial experience has directly or indirectly given India a base to form political culture and a path for political development (Joshi 1991:6). Modern political institutions indirectly introduced new principles of organization and opened up new avenues of status mobility for caste-groups as well as for individuals. Individuals and castes from lower social strata could improve their status through political activities. Prior to the introduction of new political institutions, this was unheard of. Further differentiation of political structure has introduced several centres of power in Indian
society. This has led to a shift of dominant status of one caste or group to another. The rise of the BJP party, and are decline of the Congress party are appropriate examples of this. Both parties contain factions of caste groups that could of never dreamt of such political power as is provided by modern political institutions in India. Hence there has been a shift from the caste-system itself to a structure of power whose mode of differentiation is based on new political principles.

Although involvement of castes in politics has strengthened particularistic loyalties, in the long run caste solidarties seemed to dissolve into social groups whose existence is based on economic and political interests, rather than caste loyalties. Hence political parties, in their bid to secure support of different castes, promote dissension's and splits in castes groups, and enter into alliances across caste groups (Masselos 1993). But political alliances among castes and between castes and political parties gradually get eroded. To the extent that these processes of generation and the distribution of power lead to new forms of association, they tend to loosen the traditional structure. Hence political organization provides caste with new sources of security which help in reducing tensions. However the involvement of caste in politics has made political factions (rather than castes) the important units of power structure.
These factions are not concurrent with caste beliefs. Their membership consists of individuals and families belonging to several castes. They are more like personalised groupings or multi-caste power alliances. Hence the involvement of caste in politics has indirectly lead to the growth of a political culture and political development which has to some extent fostered democracy within India. The power structures left behind by the British, and marrying of the traditional structures of caste with modern political processes, has resulted in the political growth of India.

Pakistan

In general, political institutions are geared to producing political cultures that more or less replicate their predecessor's political culture and help foster new growth. This was and is the case with India. In Pakistan the contrary has happened.

Pakistan's political culture, and political development has deep roots in the ideological and cultural outlooks of pre-independent India. Despite this, the political experiences of Pakistan has had a complex and different impact
on its political ideology, political culture, and political development. In Pakistan the suppression of freedoms, coupled with the belief that Pakistan was established in order to provide an independent home for (Indian) Muslims and Islam has established a collective mind that has not been allowed to grow and has made the country strongly resistant to the influence of modern experiments in political democracy. Structurally, India and Pakistan share many similarities, however, India's experiences with caste and differences in cultural perspective may account for the contrasts in the political culture and political development of Pakistan.

The majority of caste members were generally excluded from the positions of power in traditional India. As entities they did not have much influence from a political perspective. From an economic perspective, however, many of these groups were forging ahead. At the time of partition, in India many caste groups had already made inroads in farming and other sectors to produce a class of rich peasants. These class of economically rich peasants were a major the driving force behind the land reforms in the 1950s. They played a critical role in accounting for the transfer of land to
tenants and made their voice heard by policy-makers in India. These actions had a dual effect. Primarily, political leaders realized that they needed to pay attention to such powerful groups for ignoring them could mean political unease. Further by way of assimilating and politicization, the upwardly mobile caste members may become political opportunists and find a platform with which to make enormous political strides. Indirectly by engaging in such tactics, India created a participatory political culture, that fostered a high level of political development. It was precisely this condition that did not exist in Pakistan in 1947. That is, dominant class structures and economic development did not exist in Pakistan (Robinson 1974).

During partition in 1947, the Congress Party represented mainly the interests of the emerging Indian lower and middle class. Pakistan at partition however had no industry of its own to speak of and no rising agrarian or industrial caste. The Muslim League, which led the movement for the creation of Pakistan, was dominated, at least after 1945, by a feudal class party system. Particularly the big landowners of the Punjab and Sindh (Khan 1985:12). The Muslim traders and merchants who were largely financed by the League were in a position to dictate the direction of the party and did so.
The League had little contact with the Muslim masses, and instead chose to have relations with powerful traders and merchants who the controlled the majority of Pakistani citizens. Therefore the political ideologies of the two countries was different. The Muslim League which was dominated by the feudal landowners ended up supporting the landowners and invariably ended up glorifying Pakistan as an Islamic state rather than promoting a critical political consciousness. This led to a narrow political culture, and stunted political development in Pakistan. By not involving the masses in the political process, Pakistan has evolved a repressive political culture. The result has been inability of Pakistan to forge a Constitution that is genuinely accepted by the citizens of Pakistan. The trickle down effect of such an oppressive political culture is evident in Pakistan's economic, social, and fiscal health. Hence it's path of political development seems coloured.

The aforementioned factors account for some of the reasons for Pakistan's current level of political development and political culture. Other critical factors are important as well. Pakistan had little or no experience in the political realm. Unlike India, which had the support of the British,
established political parties with a history of political involvement, a politicized caste system, and guidance from visionary leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi, Pakistan conversely had no such facilities. The dominant party in Pakistan after partition was, as previously mentioned, the Muslim League. The primary mandate of the Muslim League was to try to restore to Pakistan's historical Muslim glory. The legitimacy of the League was based on the charismatic personality of just one leader that of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah unfortunately was only able to lead the party until his death in 1948 after which there was extreme fragmentation and factionalism in the party. A newly formed country that had little political guidance and experience was at this time ripe for political strife. Years of authoritarianism has decisively altered the political structure of Pakistan. The country has become polarized, and has split along ethnic and regional lines. While it can be said that the same has become of India the difference is that socio-political institutions, like a free legislature, free judiciary and free media which are used in India for voicing demands and social crisis do not exist in Pakistan due in part to the political path it has taken. Institutional structures in India facilitate decentralisation and help in resolving
regional differences. In Pakistan these are distant. Hence the government in Pakistan by not providing an avenue for the people of Pakistan to voice discord have given rise to a political culture of fear, non-participation, and indifference. Hence the political development of Pakistan leaves it unprepared for the explosion of regional strife and it is therefore unable to determine an arrangement in which such problems could be settled. India has experienced many such regional problems; however, it's ability to manage such strife is self-evident. This is mainly due to the creation of a stronger political culture, and powerful political development. Both are weaker in Pakistan due to its emphasis on Islamization, the polarization of ethnic groups, extremes of regional differences and its continuation of authoritarian regimes.
Chapter 5

Concluding comments

The main purpose of this thesis was to examine some aspects of political culture and political development in India and Pakistan and to make some comparative observations in response to the suggestion as to why both have taken different avenues of political development despite prior to 1947, being parts of the same whole. The task was neither easy nor could it be said to be complete as it calls forth deeper analysis for the purpose of arriving at valid generalizations. However, with the help of the secondary data, archival information and historical, social and political facts available to us, it is possible to arrive at tentative conclusions.

The analysis of historical, social and political facts required that we should first have an useful theoretical framework within which they could be interpreted, and on the basis of such theoretical interpretation, identify important
variables which may be helpful in explaining the different course of development taken by India and Pakistan. The theoretical framework of political culture, its applicability to comparative politics and its usefulness in the understanding of political development were found to be most appropriate.

It was also thought to be appropriate to make a review of the theoretical framework of political culture, examine the main components of it and to observe their usefulness in understanding political development. In fact, it was decided to take political culture and political development as main variables and to examine the changes in them in order to study development differences in India and Pakistan. However, it soon became apparent that both aforementioned variables were strongly influenced by 'non-political' variables such as social structural, cultural and ideological, though the main focus remained on political variables.

Carrying our analysis of the formation of political culture in India from its past to the present, it was found that despite India's diversity the underlying structural factor of India's caste system was most influential in developing
India's political culture. Hence, it was imperative to examine the role of castes in more details. The adaptability of this single most important structural factor of caste to political culture, and political cultures willingness to use caste was found to be a remarkable phenomenon in the Indian situation. However, it was found that prior to the colonization of India (in pre-British India), caste had stagnated and it had stopped exhibiting its dynamism. Hence the 'negative aspects' of the system has come to the surface. For the vast majority of the Hindus, routine performance of social, cultural and religious rituals had become important and caste had ceased to perform any 'political' functions.

The British impact on caste was its reawakening, its politicization and its ability to revitalize itself for having access to new rulers. The members of India's upper castes learned new political lessons, the members of intermediate castes also availed themselves of the new educational opportunities, became upwardly mobile and sought political careers either working within the bureaucratic British system or challenging the political supremacy of the British. The lower castes raised their heads against injustices and inequalities under the special protection and
the reformative attempts of the British.

Thus caste used politics and politics used caste. The process of this dynamic adaptability of caste continued in independent India. In the task of its industrialization, urbanization and modernization, the politicization of India's caste members played an important and significant role and thus contributed to the development of India's political culture. Modern India sought to change caste but it used caste in its development, and in the end, caste started eating away at its roots so far as Indian politics were concerned.

Though the Muslims of India had their own caste system, it bears no comparison to the Hindu majority when it came to the performance of its vital role in the Indian political situation. The Muslims had ruled India for centuries before the coming of the British, there were strong ethnic, religious and status differences among them. Though the common thread uniting them was their religious faith in Islam, it too had adapted to the Indian situation. On the one hand the Muslims were resentful of the British occupation of India, as they under the Mughal regime were a ruling power; on the other hand, they remained in the past, thoughts of reviving the glorious days, and orthodoxism of Islamic
beliefs became obstacles in availing themselves of the opportunities presented by the British regime.

Their resentment of the British, their orthodoxy and the lack of any paralleled institution like caste, contributed to lower political participation and weaker development of political culture during the British rule. As the Hindu majority benefited from its politicization, the Muslims were suspicious of both, the British and the Hindus. The outcome was obvious. Muslims united in action of movement for independence with the Hindu majority in the Congress Party and afterwards dissented, and established the Muslim League. Such dissension deferred them from having more mature political experiences. Even in the League the Muslim participation was as a religious minority which demanded a separate Islamic state of Pakistan, the demand that was nurtured by some politically ambitious Muslim leaders and supported by the "divide and rule" policy of the British.

The seeds of different political development and the development of a 'non-democratic' culture were sown right during the British occupation of India and continued to grow during the movement for independence.
On the eve of independence of India and Pakistan (1947) the challenge and the opportunity were available to both new nations for the development of democracies that could have set examples to South Asia and the world. But there were obvious differences. Geographically India was vast while Pakistan was small. The former consisted of religious diversity and opted for secularism and parliamentary democracy, the latter chose to remain Islamic. With the tactical use of the political lessons learned from the British utilizing the vast intellectual, industrial and agricultural power it had, India opted for its rapid modernization and promised its citizens the written constitution that would guarantee liberty, equality and justice irrespective of caste or creed. While Pakistan soon got lost within its factions, internal power struggles and religious hegemony. While India began to put into practice its constitution, Pakistan eschewed constitutionalism and diverted towards authoritarian regimes.

However in reality in independent India, the vehicle of caste was found to be a primary receptacle for the development of political culture within the country. This,
in turn, influenced India's path to political development. In post colonial India, one can both observe the change and the resistance to change in the institutions of caste and the patterns of interactions associated with it. Both, continuity as well as discontinuity could be observed in Indian political development in relation to caste. The discontinuity is found to be more prominent in the political orientation of caste in India. In its relation to political culture, caste in India was found to exhibit pugnacious change. The politically aspirant castes participated in political processes and activities in independent India, making use of caste whenever and wherever possible, turning caste itself into an instrument of political development. Hence independence in India, forged a political culture, of involvement and power struggles which showed discontinuity from traditional methods of political development. It gave rise to a new political culture. Castes in India became more clearly a political phenomenon, having their origins chiefly in Indian political culture after independence. The power ambitious caste people, contributed significantly to India's political culture and its political development. Members of traditionally closed caste communities of India
found it necessary to modify the patterns of power in the Indian political scene. This continues even today. The changes in caste were initially and strategically initiated through changes in its political dimension, it was almost parallel and closely followed by changes in its economics and socio-cultural dimension. The latter appears to be the last stronghold of resistance to change. However with the passing of every new day through contradictions and conflicts, co-operation and competition, millions of members of India's caste groups are forging ahead with continual changes in India's political culture and political development. Hence from inception, India developed the structure for a political culture that contributed to political development. From active participation in politics, to political involvement and manipulation of the caste system, to freedom of press, and the concept of "majority rule" but "minority protection" India has created a genuine unified political consciousness.

Pakistan as a separate entity emerged from the Indian subcontinent in 1947. However in its political culture and political development, it differs vastly from India.
Though in the past it had common history with India, Pakistan emerged from India with a different political orientation. Its political culture and political development deflected towards authoritarian regimes. Immediately following the withdrawal of the British government, Pakistan seemed to be left with a power vacuum which was filled by the colonial model of centralized administration. This gave little opportunity for mass political participation and political cultural awareness to the peoples of Pakistan. From the beginning, Pakistan was a country with no formal experience in statecraft; its people were unified by faith in a religion and a way of life. The concepts of political culture and political development were distant. The economic rise of India's agrarian and industrial classes prior to and after independence proved to be a resilient factor in politically mobilizing the masses. This also contributed to India's stronger political culture and political development. In Pakistan the non-emergence of such class structure seems to be a contributing factor that impeded political mobilization and the structural conditions were not conducive to the development of a flexible institutional structure. Rather, the emergence
of a central administration that had links to traditional aristocracy created a strong centralized political culture in Pakistan that has a complex social structure and little internal flexibility. Hence effective links between the central government and the masses which is the portal for political awareness and development were weaker. Political groups in Pakistan remained within the older, traditional settings, became disorganized, and large parts of their population were withdrawn from effective political participation. In India such links were first established with the masses and outlying groups under the influence of the British, and then in the national movement, and finally through the Congress Party. The nature of the links has changed over time; however, the effect of such links has been the development of a distinctive political orientation.

Despite the fact that on paper Pakistan looked like it was predestined to political failure, it has endured. The creation of a political culture and subsequent political development though weaker, has somewhat occurred in Pakistan. Pakistan's attempts at democracy was evident in the December 1984 Referendum, and the February 1985
elections of members to the National. In the Referendum, the people were asked to vote for General Zia by voting for Islam. But this was more or less a method to ensure that Zia would be elected since it was assumed that the Pakistani people could not be expected to vote against Islam. In the National Assembly elections Zia was also forced to hold elections to establish the façade of democracy. Once again he assured his victory by banning all opposition parties and by promoting propaganda. "Despite all this, however, and despite the intensive propaganda on behalf of Islam and General Zia to which the people had been subjected day and night for the previous eight years, the people upset all calculations of the General: the referendum was almost totally boycotted (the official denials notwithstanding); while in the National Assembly elections all those candidates who were believed to be favoured by Zia were systematically ignored and these included the representatives of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the most aggressive advocate for an Islamic state in Pakistan" (Khan 1985:9). Hence the people of Pakistan had defied the military regime who was basing its false platform on Islam, and instead struggled to adhere to a political culture characterised by individual and group convictions.
Political development therefore is much aspired to by the people of Pakistan, but is obstructed by the stumbling blocks put forth by the Government. With new leaders and political cultural processes evolving, the future of political development in Pakistan may transcend historical experiences and create new circumstance for evolving political culture.

The collective history of the past provided the foundation for political cultural development in both countries but is slowly being replaced by new ideology and concrete actions based on equality of various groups. The gap between the behaviour and the attitude of the elite's and the people in power, the government, and those who are closer to the seat of government, is being bridged by the new ideologies of nationalism and the equality of opportunities for all citizens of India and Pakistan. While India has the advantage of a greater level of political development, Pakistan is slowly developing its own political culture. Historically, India had the advantages of political experience, structural integrity, visionary leaders, and caste politicization to help build its current level of political culture and development. These have not come
without cost. Pakistan, while sharing the historical experiences of India had no such advantages. It is to build a political culture of its own kind and bring about the Pakistani political development. However both India and Pakistan are countries in transition. India's caste system which helped formed its structural base, has evolved from a rigid, to a more flexible system of dispersed politicization. The bureaucracies are still, however, imbued within the hierarchical system, which impedes the further political and social transformation.

Pakistan aspires to build an alliance of relationships to encourage political will on the part of the government to identify and set realistic goals, and construct culturally sensitive programs to assist and involve the underprivileged and exploited members of society in the economic and political development the country. In Pakistan if such transformative ideals are ignored, and the "divide and conquer" mode of governance continues in order to protect personal agendas, more blood will be shed (Ahmed 1990). However the violence and conflict demonstrated in both India and Pakistan are not necessarily indicative of developmental problems, per se, but indications of societies politically
adrift and confused as to what direction to take in a rapidly changing world. It is precisely from this paradox however, that both political culture and political development blossom.
Table 1: Development indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind (Rupees)</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1476</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>1357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rural areas—Percentage of households Monthly income groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Below Rs. 1000</th>
<th>Above Rs. 3500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total farms</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total areas</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total areas</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Total Farms (in brackets percentage of total areas) 1981 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>below 5 acres</th>
<th>25 acres</th>
<th>25-150 acres</th>
<th>Above 150 acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>31% (7%)</td>
<td>58% (54%)</td>
<td>9% (33%)</td>
<td>(-6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total areas</td>
<td>26% (6%)</td>
<td>68% (60%)</td>
<td>7% (27%)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total areas</td>
<td>61% (16%)</td>
<td>34% (41%)</td>
<td>5% (29%)</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total areas</td>
<td>28% (3%)</td>
<td>54 (34%)</td>
<td>16% (41%)</td>
<td>1(22%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Total Farms (in brackets percentage of total areas) 1972 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>below 5 acres</th>
<th>5-25 acres</th>
<th>Above 150 acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>26% (5%)</td>
<td>62% (54%)</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total areas</td>
<td>18% (5%)</td>
<td>73% (63%)</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total areas</td>
<td>56% (13%)</td>
<td>37% (30%)</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total areas</td>
<td>24% (2%)</td>
<td>53% (26%)</td>
<td>2% (32%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ADP Allocations for Agriculture (utilization in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980-81 Rupees in</th>
<th>1981-82 Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rupees in 1981-82</td>
<td>Millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>454(281)</td>
<td>482(282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>109(100)</td>
<td>133(101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>93(76)</td>
<td>107(90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluch</td>
<td>65(76)</td>
<td>114(87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Punjab's share in ADBP loans increased from 57% in 1973-74 to 76% in 1979-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loan-Rupees per crop</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hectare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Loan outstanding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rupees Millions</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3537</td>
<td></td>
<td>829</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Irrigation Intensity (Irrigated Area as percentage of Cultivated Area)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1946-62</th>
<th>1970-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluch</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Punjab has 88.3% of tubewells, Sind 5.6%, NWFP 2.6% and Baluchistan 3.5%

Use of inputs- Percentages of total farm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizers</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manure's only</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecticides</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Punjab has 80.5% of total tractors in the country
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960, 71, 72</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1980-81</td>
<td>4214</td>
<td>2180</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Total Villages Electrified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959-60</th>
<th>1971-72</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of national production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959-60</th>
<th>1971-72</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Further Development Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literacy Ratios</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>46.70%</td>
<td>50.80%</td>
<td>35.80%</td>
<td>33.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15.60%</td>
<td>17.30%</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutions per Million Population (numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post offices</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>2763</td>
<td>6342</td>
<td>5042</td>
<td>1582</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enrolment in Primary Schools in Sind-Karachi and Hyderabad figures in brackets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>987000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which in Karachi and Hyderabad</td>
<td>-538000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1094000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>582000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1292000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>653000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the total enrolment in degree colleges over 85% takes place in Karachi and Hyderabad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Schools in Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977-80</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>High Schools</th>
<th>Enrolment in College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1977-80 444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-80</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>in Quetta -295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-79</td>
<td>1979-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which in Karachi and Hyderabad</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beds</td>
<td>N/A 9800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensaries</td>
<td>58 85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Baluchistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospitals</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Of which in Quetta</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beds</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Dispensaries | 398 | 335 |

### Health Facilities in Rural Areas Percentage of Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maternity Units</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Care Centres</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td>11.70%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Clinics</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Clinics</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Housing Census
#### Rural Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rooms per housing unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-average</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete outer walls</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of drinking water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-pipe</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-handpump</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity as a source of lighting</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking Fuel used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-gas and electricity</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-wood and coal</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-kerosene oil</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back in". In *Strategies of Analysis in Current Research* eds. Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschmeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


