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
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IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009

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THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
INTERDEPARTMENTAL
LEADERSHIP AND THE BEIJING
CONFERENCE ON WOMEN

Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon

Introduction

In September 1995, the United Nations convened the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Canada actively participated at the conference — the largest the UN had ever held — and in the preparatory meetings leading up to it.¹ Furthermore, Canada was one of 189 countries that unanimously adopted the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) exercised a lead role in the interdepartmental process to develop Canada's positions on the *Declaration and Platform for Action*. The process took place in an environment radically different from that of the Pearsonian era, when DFAIT's predecessor, the Department of External Affairs, had exercised a near monopoly over the formulation and implementation of Canadian foreign policy.² During the three decades preceding the Beijing conference, a series of factors combined to undermine the department's pre-eminence in foreign policy. Of these factors, the most salient to this case are the

expansion of the international agenda to give greater priority to economic and social issues and the increased participation of other branches of the federal government.³ As the international agenda expanded to include new issues, the definition of Canada's national interest was broadened. The increased involvement of diverse branches of government made the defining of the national interest much more challenging as each had its own particular idea of what constituted the national interest and of how it could best be realized. As a result of these factors, the Canadian foreign policy-making process became much more complex.

The chapter begins by identifying the characteristics that make this case unique and intriguing. Thereafter, it focuses on two themes: the interrelationship of external and domestic determinants, and the interdepartmental process to develop Canada's positions and strategies on the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*. Assessments of the extent to which the expansion of the international agenda and the increased participation of other branches of the federal government affected the role and influence of DFAIT in this case are integrated into these discussions. The themes are interrelated: the broadening of the international agenda has had a profound influence on the interdepartmental decision-making process and contributed to the greatly increased participation by other branches of the federal government. The section on the interdepartmental process briefly describes the actors and the interaction among them, giving particular emphasis to DFAIT. The relative importance of federal government actors, including departments and the central agencies, is assessed, the relevance of the governmental politics approach to explaining the interaction among the key players is examined, and the question of whether DFAIT functioned as a generalist and/or a specialist department is addressed.

In keeping with the general tenets of the literature on Canadian foreign policy, the chapter concludes that the external environment established parameters within which foreign policy-makers operated.⁴ Nonetheless, Canada's positions on the *Beijing Platform for Action* exerted some influence on other areas of the country's policies, both domestic and foreign. In terms of the involvement of other government actors, program departments played key roles, while the central agencies had little involvement. Although the governmental politics approach does not rule out collaboration among

government officials involved in the foreign policy-making process, it tends to see competition as a more dominant characteristic. Yet, cooperation rather than conflict characterized the interdepartmental work to develop Canada's positions and strategies for the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*. In this process, DFAIT functioned both as a specialist department, which sought to maximize gains on issues most salient to it, and as a generalist department, which advocated compromise on some contentious issues in order to secure international agreement on the best attainable text rather than the ideal text.

A Unique and Intriguing Case

Canada's policies for the Fourth World Conference on Women must be seen in the context of the country's participation in a long series of conferences and summits that the UN convened in the 1990s. The process of preparing for UN conferences and summits is similar. There are always interdepartmental committees, consultations with the provinces and territories, and the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The conferences and summits of 1990s addressed many of the same issues; hence they involved many of the same actors, both governmental and non-governmental. Nonetheless, the process of developing Canada's positions and strategies vis-à-vis the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* is unique and intriguing for a number of reasons: the wide range of issues addressed, the number of actors, and the complexity of the process. The *Platform for Action* dealt with twelve interrelated issue areas: poverty, decision-making, education, human rights, health, media, violence, environment, armed conflict, rights of the girl child, economics, and mechanisms for the advancement of women. Thus the agenda was huge. By comparison, the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, which was held the same year as the Beijing Conference, focused on only three sets of core issues: poverty, employment, and social integration. Summit participants considered their agenda to be substantial, yet it paled in comparison with that of the Beijing Conference on Women.

In light of the number of issue areas in the *Platform for Action*, over twenty Canadian government departments and agencies participated in

the policy-making process. Preparations for the Beijing conference involved an even larger number of government departments and agencies than did preparations for the Group of Seven (G7) Summits held during that time period. The conference also attracted the attention of large numbers of NGOs, including not only women's organizations but also labour, development, education, health, human rights, environmental, peace, and indigenous groups.

The complexity of the policy-making process contributed to making the case unique and intriguing. The development of Canada's positions and strategies was complex because of the number of governmental and non-governmental actors, the number of issue areas and their interrelatedness, and the controversial nature of many of these issues. The tone and substance of the negotiations was very much affected by the macro-level dichotomy between religious/conservative forces and those who took a pro-feminist approach.

At the state level, the religious/conservative forces comprised the Holy See⁵ and its allies (most notably Guatemala, Ecuador, Honduras, Argentina, and Malta), as well as fundamentalist⁶ Islamic states (in particular, Iran, Sudan, Algeria, and the Gulf states). Their anti-feminist stances were supported by conservative NGOs, such as Catholic Campaign for America, Focus on the Family, and Canada's REAL Women. On the other side, taking pro-feminist positions, were the European Union, Canada, Australia, and the Caribbean countries. The vast majority of the Canadian NGOs involved in the Beijing process were also pro-feminist in their orientations. Needless to say, this polarization rendered the process of reaching consensus on the *Platform for Action* much more arduous.

When the Beijing Conference on Women began, 25 per cent of the *Platform for Action* remained in square brackets, meaning that agreement had yet to be reached on one quarter of the text. Participants at the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development thought they faced a daunting task when 10 per cent of the text remained in square brackets at its onset. While significant, 10 per cent is still a great deal less than 25 per cent.

Interrelationship of External and Domestic Determinants

The Beijing case exemplifies how intertwined the external and the domestic realms can be. As is usual in Canadian foreign policy-making, the process in this case was largely reactive. Negotiating texts were drafted by UN officials and sent out to countries for their reaction — often only a few weeks before the negotiations began — leaving little time for developing positions and strategies. Such tight time lines are the norm for UN negotiations.

Canada's positions and strategies apropos the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* were influenced by its experience at previous UN meetings. The most salient of these negotiations were the three preceding conferences on women: the 1993 Conference on Human Rights, the 1994 Conference on Population and Development, and the 1995 Summit for Social Development. The UN had convened the First, Second, and Third World Conferences on Women in 1975, 1980, and 1985, respectively. Each had produced documents addressing the themes of women's equality, development, and peace. Over time, the documents became more sophisticated and more analytical. In 1985, the Third Conference on Women adopted the *Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to the Year 2000*, which examined obstacles to women's advancement and recommended strategies for overcoming them. The 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights declared women's rights to be human rights and called for the mainstreaming of gender analysis within human rights regimes. The 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development recognized women's empowerment as a prerequisite for population control and economic development, while the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for Social Development recognized gender equality as a crucial component of sustainable development. Canadian officials planning for the Beijing conference sought to build on and further strengthen the language pertaining to women's rights that had been negotiated at these previous UN meetings.

There were both advantages and disadvantages to the Beijing conference's placement in a long line of UN conferences and summits. On a positive note, the lead departments — DFAIT, Status of Women Canada (SWC), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

had already established patterns of cooperation to promote women's issues before the Beijing conference and its preparatory meetings were convened. The negative consequences included conference fatigue, and often inadequate preparatory time. For example, the final and most important preparatory meetings prior to the Beijing conference were convened in March 1995, immediately following the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development. As a result, there was no time to incorporate provisions agreed to in Copenhagen into the draft *Platform for Action*. Furthermore, many of the delegates came straight from the Summit to attend the preparatory meetings; negotiations had been difficult and, among most participants, there was a certain amount of physical and mental exhaustion.⁷ The Group of 77, in particular, had not had time to prepare its joint positions on the *Platform for Action*, with the result that the preparatory meetings were delayed while their members met behind closed doors trying to reach a consensus.

Thus Canada's positions were influenced by external developments. At the same time, Canada's preparations for the Beijing Conference on Women influenced its policies and positions in other forums as well. At home the need to develop positions on the *Platform for Action* served as leverage for developing umbrella policies for advancing women's rights. During the Beijing process, cabinet approval was sought, and received, for a formal mandate to promote women's equality and to mainstream gender-based analysis.⁸ The policy applied not only to the *Platform for Action* but also to subsequent domestic and international policies. Preparations for the women's conference provided the impetus and the justification for seeking cabinet approval for the mandate, but its effects were much further-reaching.

In some cases, decisions were taken apropos the Beijing conference that had implications for Canada's positions at other conferences. For instance, when planning for the Beijing conference began, the lead departments agreed on objectives, not only for that venue, but also for addressing women's issues in other international negotiations, including the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights and the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for Social Development.

While external developments very much influenced Canada's positions on the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*, the country's positions had to be consistent with Canadian legislation. The Canadian delegation

worked to get gender-based persecution recognized as grounds for claiming refugee status because such provisions were enshrined in Canadian law. Canada led this campaign because its legislation offered greater protection to women refugees than did that of other countries. In short, Canada was the field leader in terms of its legislation; hence, it took the lead role in the negotiations on this issue.

Questions have been raised regarding whether or not Canada is exerting sufficient influence in the world.⁹ Has it lost its status as a significant player on the international stage? In this case, Canada can be said to have punched above its weight. The Canadian negotiators achieved some major successes, both at the preparatory meetings and at the Fourth World Conference in Beijing. At the 1995 New York Preparatory Meetings, for example, the Canadian delegation was instrumental in having the Health Section in the draft *Platform for Action* expanded beyond a preoccupation with sexual and reproductive rights to include a more holistic approach that took into account the effects of poverty. Canada also played an important role in ensuring that a gender perspective was incorporated into the *Platform for Action*. In Beijing, Canadian delegates chaired a majority of the working groups that were established to negotiate particularly contentious issues such as parental rights, unpaid work, and sexual rights. Furthermore, several of the major precedent-setting advances in the *Platform for Action* resulted from Canadian initiatives. They included the definition of rape as a war crime and as a crime against humanity, the requirement to develop international, gender-sensitive classifications for measuring unpaid work, and the stipulation that violence and gender-related persecution are grounds for claiming refugee status.

Having noted the considerable gains made by the Canadian negotiators, it is time to examine the interdepartmental process by which Canada's positions and strategies were formulated. This process was very much affected by developments in the international environment.

Interdepartmental Policy-Making Process

As mentioned earlier, the environment in which DFAIT operated in the 1990s was quite different from that of the Pearsonian era, when its predecessor, the Department of External Affairs, had been pre-eminent in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. A series of developments in the 1960s served to erode the pre-eminence of the Department of External Affairs. Military security was still deemed critical but the international agenda was increasingly concerned with economic and social issues. As a result, the mandates of far more federal departments were affected by foreign policy. Each of these departments sought to advance its own objectives by exerting influence over the direction and substance of Canada's foreign policies. For instance, the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Department of Manpower and Immigration participated in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies relating to their respective mandates. As Tammy Nemeth has detailed in chapter 9, the primacy of the Department of External Affairs was further challenged when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau took office in 1968. In an effort to open up the policy-making process, he created coordinating mechanisms, such as interdepartmental committees, to ensure that a broad range of government actors was included in policy debates and that competing policy options were presented to cabinet. Trudeau relied heavily on the central agencies, in particular the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office, for foreign policy advice. Thus, the Department of External Affairs' iron grip over foreign policy was eroded of the increased participation by domestic departments and the central agencies. Such trends were accelerated in the post-Cold War era, when the forces of globalization intensified and economic and social issues became the priorities on the international agenda.

Although more than twenty government departments and agencies were involved in formulating Canada's positions for the Beijing Conference on Women, three were pivotal throughout the process: Status of Women Canada; the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; and the Canadian International Development Agency.¹⁰ SWC was the lead department and served as the secretariat for the interdepartmental policy-making process. Its public servants began preparations for the conference

in 1992. In August 1994 — just over a year before the conference began — the position of Executive Director of the UN World Conference on Women Secretariat was created within SWC. Valerie Raymond, the former director of DFAIT's Human Rights, Women's Equality and Social Affairs Division, was seconded to SWC to fill the position. Raymond had extensive experience, both in international negotiations and with women's issues, and had already been working closely with SWC on the preparations for the Beijing conference.¹¹ Having a Foreign Affairs official serving as the lead negotiator and as the chair of the interdepartmental negotiations at the bureaucratic level was not unusual. Such was also the case for the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, for which Marius Bujold, another DFAIT official, was appointed Canadian Coordinator. The difference was that Bujold remained in DFAIT and was never seconded to one of the other lead departments.

Legally and operationally responsible for conducting Canada's foreign policy, DFAIT is also tasked with negotiating international agreements and representing Canada at international conferences. Thus, it was not surprising to see it exercising a leadership role in the Beijing process. Furthermore, DFAIT assumed the lead on matters regarding international human rights and peace and security, as these were areas in which it had established expertise and they involved international treaties and covenants.

Within DFAIT, the Human Rights, Women's Equality and Social Affairs Division was pivotal, and it coordinated the department's preparations for the Beijing conference. No formal mechanisms for consultations were established within the Department. Instead the individuals involved consulted informally as the need arose, which meant at least bi-weekly discussions between the Director of the Human Rights, Women's Equality, and Social Affairs Division, and the Director of the Refugee, Population, and Migration Division. Regular contact was also maintained with the Legal Operations Division. Although Valerie Raymond was formally seconded to SWC in 1994, her Foreign Affairs colleagues continued to regard her as one of their own.

The Fourth World Conference on Women was also important to the Canadian International Development Agency on several scores. The conference's three themes (equality, development, and peace) coincided with CIDA's mandate, which is "to support sustainable development in developing countries, in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world."¹² Furthermore, advancing the well-being of women in development comprised one of CIDA's key priorities. In particular, it had a commitment:

- To increase women's participation as decision-makers in the economic, political, social and environmental spheres;
- To improve women's economic conditions, basic health, education and human rights;
- To promote activities aimed at eliminating discrimination against women;
- To support developing country partners in voicing their concerns on gender issues in development.¹³

Hence the Beijing conference, which addressed many issues directly related to women and development, was important to the agency.

SWC, CIDA, and DFAIT were all key players in the Interdepartmental Committee on the World Conference on Women, which began meeting in August 1992 and was chaired by SWC. The committee functioned collaboratively to develop Canada's positions. Its recommendations were then given to the Secretary of State for the Status of Women and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for approval. The full cabinet never became involved because the committee's recommendations were in keeping with existing policy guidelines; thus, further cabinet approval was not required. Public servants on the Interdepartmental Committee nevertheless kept their respective ministers apprised of its work. While their ministers were generally supportive, none was directly involved in the formulation of positions and strategies.

The governmental politics approach provides a framework for analyzing the nature of the policy-making process within government. According

to the approach, public policies result from a bargaining process in which diverse governmental actors interact to affect outcomes.¹⁴ Issues often come within the jurisdictions of several government departments and agencies; hence, they share responsibility for policy formulation. Since each department has its specific areas of interest to protect and promote, they compete to influence policy outputs. As the governmental politics approach contends, issues in the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* came within the jurisdictions of multiple government departments and agencies; hence, developing Canada's policies and strategies involved extensive interdepartmental consultations. Yet, in contrast to the tenets of the governmental politics approach, which predicts actors competing to determine outcome, the decision-making process within federal government circles was for the most part harmonious. In this respect, the case stands in contrast to several others of the same period. For example, during Canada's 'fish war' with Spain, tensions arose between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, on one hand, and DFAIT, on the other, over which department would assume the lead and over what approach should be used — the "quiet diplomacy" advocated by DFAIT or the more aggressive style taken by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.¹⁵ Governmental politics also featured prominently during the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines as the Department of National Defence and DFAIT each wrestled to control the file and assert primary leadership.¹⁶ Interdepartmental wrangling — primarily involving the Department of the Environment, on one hand, and National Resources Canada, on the other — was also very much in evidence when positions for the 1997 Kyoto negotiations for a legally binding protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were being determined.¹⁷

Three sets of factors account for the interdepartmental collegiality during the preparations for the Beijing conference. First and most importantly, the issues in the *Platform for Action* all fell within existing government policies. Thus, most of the interdepartmental conflicts that these issues might have triggered had already been resolved in interdepartmental negotiations for previously held UN conferences and summits. Secondly, and closely related, government officials shared a high degree of consensus on priorities and objectives. All departments shared the macro-level goal of advancing women's equality globally. Most of the key public servants had been involved in previous conferences and summits; therefore, they understood the

precedents that had been set and the parameters within which they had to operate, both at home and at the international negotiations. A third factor contributing to collegiality was the fact that questions of finance had been settled in advance. While finances frequently trigger interdepartmental strife, they did not do so in this case, because Paul Martin, Minister of Finance, André Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sheila Finestone, Secretary of State for the Status of Women, had agreed in advance that no additional funds would be allocated. There was, therefore, no controversy between the Department of Finance, on one hand, and the lead departments, on the other, over how much new commitments would cost.

Although questions of finance did not cause direct conflict among members of the Interdepartmental Committee on the World Conference on Women, the 1995 federal budget cast a heavy shadow over Canada's participation at the Copenhagen Summit and the final six months of preparations for the Beijing conference. Many of the budget provisions directly undermined the positions that Canada was promoting in these negotiations. For example, the budget dramatically cut funding for social programs vital to the well-being of Canadian women and for foreign aid, which could have been used to help empower women in Southern countries and to enhance their political, economic, and social status. It also slashed funding for Canadian NGOs. The budget clearly illustrated that, when push came to shove, the views of the Minister of Finance prevailed over the concerns of the lead departments. The ascendancy of the Department of Finance is not uncommon in Canadian politics.¹⁸ The department that controls the federal budget exercises a formidable influence over the extent to which Canada can pursue diplomatic activities, military endeavours, and foreign aid programs abroad.

There was some friction between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Status of Women, largely over questions of jurisdiction, which was at times exacerbated by personality clashes. The rivalry was, however, minor. Although André Ouellet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was officially responsible for two of the three key departments involved in this case, he was preoccupied with issues of national unity. He had been appointed by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien as a political move to place a senior francophone from Quebec in a major portfolio, from which he could promote national unity in the period leading up to the Quebec

referendum on independence. As a result, Ouellet devoted little time to the Beijing conference and was generally willing to let the secretary of state for the status of women take the limelight. Thus, the preparations for the Beijing conference involved little of the “pulling and hauling” generally associated with governmental politics, at either the bureaucratic or the ministerial levels.

Although DFAIT is traditionally seen as a generalist department, in this case, it also functioned as a specialist department. The latter gives priority to achieving specific negotiating objectives that pertain directly to its mandate. It is reluctant to compromise on these objectives as doing so can result in weak provisions that are of marginal use in attaining its goals. Of the twelve issue areas in the *Platform for Action*, DFAIT gave highest priority to human rights, violence, armed conflict, reproductive rights, economic equality, and the rights of the girl child. As specialists, foreign affairs officials sought to maximize gains in these areas, making as few concessions as possible. A generalist department gives priority to securing the best overall package and as a result, it is willing to compromise on some issues to achieve a degree of unanimity on a negotiated text that reflects many of the country’s priorities. Following the March 1995 preparatory meetings for the Beijing conference, where the conservative forces had been particularly active, there were some philosophical differences in approaches among federal departments. For instance, Health Canada sought to broaden the health agenda and to push for further gains in a position that reflected a specialist’s focus on maximizing gains in its issue area. At the same time, DFAIT and SWC opposed the introduction of new language and new initiatives for fear that doing so would trigger a conservative backlash aimed at rolling back the progress already achieved. Their approach reflected a generalist preoccupation with securing the best overall negotiating text.

Conclusion

The policy-making process for the Beijing Conference on Women was particularly complex because of the range of issues under negotiation, the controversial nature of many of these issues, and the number of actors.

With so many issues on the agenda — all of which were considered salient to Canada's national interest — one might have expected a rigorous competition among diverse actors to determine whose concerns received priority. Yet, the interdepartmental policy-making process was marked much more by cooperation than conflict. The role of DFAIT in this process was very different from that of the Department of External Affairs in the two decades following the Second World War. The international agenda had changed significantly. Not only was the range of economic and social issues under negotiation in the 1990s hugely expanded from that of the Pearsonian era, but these issues were subjected to far more in-depth analysis in UN meetings. As a result, large numbers of Canadian government actors were involved. In this process, the Department of Foreign Affairs played a lead role — but not *the* lead role — largely because the conference was much more important to the Secretary of State for the Status of Women than for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. SWC's leadership was further solidified when the chief negotiator was seconded from DFAIT. Thus, in the 1990s, it was the department responsible for the well-being of women in Canada — not the department responsible for conducting foreign policy — that assumed the lead in preparing for the Beijing conference. SWC nonetheless received strong and vital support from DFAIT in this endeavour.

Although DFAIT has traditionally been seen as a generalist department, in this case it acted as a specialist department as well as a generalist department. When specific interests in the realm of foreign affairs were at stake, it acted as a strong advocate for them. When the interests of other departments appeared to threaten securing the best overall package in the *Platform for Action*, DFAIT acted as a generalist department to achieve a compromise position. The negotiating skills, expertise, and flexibility of DFAIT officials helped to foster the relatively harmonious working relations among members of the interdepartmental committee and to ensure Canada's success in achieving most of its negotiating objectives at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Thus, Canada's national interest was well served.

NOTES

- 1 The discussion of the case draws on Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, *Canada and the Beijing Conference on Women: Governmental Politics and NGO Participation* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001). Research for the book relied heavily on interviews with a wide range of government and NGO representatives, to whom I extend my heartfelt thanks.
- 2 For a discussion of the department's primacy in the two decades following the Second World War, and the factors that subsequently challenged it, see Andrew F. Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), 418-70; and Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), 239-64. The Pearsonian era refers to the period when Lester B. Pearson was first secretary of state for external affairs and then prime minister of Canada.
- 3 Other factors include the increased participation of the provinces and territories; and the proliferation of non-governmental actors demanding access to the policy-making process, both of which are discussed in the context of this case in other venues. See: Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, *Canada and the Beijing Conference on Women*; Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "Democratizing Canadian Foreign Policy?: NGO Participation for the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development and the Beijing Conference on Women," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 11, no. 3 (2004): 99-118; and "Organizing for Beijing: Canadian NGOs and the Fourth World Conference on Women," in *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Claire Turenne Sjolander, Heather A. Smith, and Deborah Steinstra (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2003), 185-97.
- 4 Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, especially chap. 8, 281-95; Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Don Mills, ON: Oxford, 2002), 10; and Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, especially chap. 2, 19-51.
- 5 The Holy See is the Roman Catholic Church's supreme organ of government whose membership comprises the Pope, the College of Cardinals, and the Church's central government bodies. It is considered by the UN to be a non-member state with permanent observer status. Nevertheless, at most recent UN conferences, including the Beijing Conference on Women, it has been a full participant with a vote. The contrast between the Holy See's status as a full participant and the observer status of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women did not go unnoticed. The Holy See did not oppose all provisions in the *Platform for Action*. For example, it supported education for the girl child. On the other hand, it opposed many of the provisions related to sexual and reproductive rights.
- 6 Marie-Andrée Roy, professor of Religious Studies at the University of Quebec in Montreal, defines fundamentalism as "a religious movement which tries not only to resist modernity, secularity, separation of Church and the state, but also wants to impose its values and belief system on the whole population. Religious Fundamentalism rejects all other interpretations of tradition and in fact it positions itself as the only thinking authorized interpreter." See Canadian Beijing Facilitating Committee, "Fundamentalism at the NGO Forum," *Onward from Beijing* (December 1995): 16.
- 7 The World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen focused on three sets of core issues: the alleviation and reduction of poverty, the expansion of productive employment, and the enhancement of social integration, especially of those groups that are most marginalized and disadvantaged. Many of the proposals for achieving these goals involved diametrically opposed, core interests of Northern and Southern countries; thus they were highly controversial. For example, the "20/20 Initiative" in its

- original form required rich countries to allocate at least 20 per cent of their foreign aid spending to meet basic human needs and poor countries to spend 20 per cent of their respective national budgets to achieve the same social objectives. Such mandated obligations were vehemently opposed by many participants and, in the final text, the “20/20” allocation of funds was left as voluntary rather than as required policy.
- 8 The policy was outlined in Canada, Status of Women Canada, *Setting the Stage for the Next Century: The Federal Plan for Gender Equality* (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1995).
 - 9 Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003); and Jennifer M. Welsh, “Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in *Canada among Nations, 2005: Split Images*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 23–46.
 - 10 In addition to SWC, DFAIT, and CIDA, the other major participants included the Departments of Heritage, Justice, Health, Human Resources Development, Environment, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, National Defence, Citizenship and Immigration, and the Privy Council Office.
 - 11 Raymond had also served on the Canadian delegation to the 1985 Nairobi Conference on Women and as the women’s rights advisor on the Canadian delegation to the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights.
 - 12 Canada, International Development Agency, *Engendering Development: Women in Development and Gender Equity* (Hull: CIDA, 1995), 3.
 - 13 CIDA, *Engendering Development*, 4.
 - 14 See Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Kim Richard Nossal, “Allison through the (Ottawa) Looking Glass: Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy in a Parliamentary System,” *Canadian Public Administration* 22 (Winter 1979): 610–26; and Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “Deep Seabed Mining: A Hotbed for Governmental Politics,” *International Journal* 41, no. 1 (1985–86): 72–94.
 - 15 See Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 157–72.
 - 16 Brian W. Tomlin, “On a Fast Track to the Ban: The Canadian Policy Process,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 5, no. 3 (1998): 3–23.
 - 17 See Douglas Macdonald and Heather A. Smith, “Promises Made, Promises Broken: Questioning Canada’s Commitments to Climate Change,” *International Journal* 55, no. 1 (1999–2000): 107–24.
 - 18 See, for example, Duncan Wood, “Canada and International Financial Policy: Non-Hegemonic Leadership and Systematic Stability,” in *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O’Reilly (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 265–86.