

**THE FAST-CHANGING ARCTIC:
RETHINKING ARCTIC SECURITY
FOR A WARMER WORLD**
Edited by Barry Scott Zellen

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
15. Regional Security and Prosperity: The U.S.–Russia Reset in the Antimeridianal Arctic

Caitlyn Antrim

It has been over two decades since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the declaration by President George H. W. Bush that a “new world order” would rise to replace the East versus West orientation of the Cold War era. Slow in coming and evolving along the way, this new approach is seen in the security strategies and policies of both the United States and Russia. This new order retains the military security components of the past but increases emphasis on interests in sovereignty and border security, economic prosperity, and international cooperation.

This new approach is particularly well suited to the Arctic Ocean, where changes in climate, advances in technology and growing demands for energy are opening a region that in the twentieth century had little role other than as a buffer zone between east and west, a frigid laboratory for scientific research and a hidden realm of nuclear deterrence. Cooperation, respect for sovereign rights, sustainable development, environmental protection, and respect for native culture all a part of a new definition of security that promotes peaceful uses of the Arctic.

As security perspectives have evolved, the United States and Russia have emphasized a need to change their relationship from contention to cooperation, represented by the concept of a “reset” in U.S.–Russian affairs. Much



THE ANTIMERIDIAN ARCTIC

work has been undertaken in the three years since the initial U.S.–Russia joint action plan in July 2009, including the establishment of the U.S.–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission in October 2009 as the mechanism for pursuing the reset in relations.¹ The Commission, with its seventeen bilateral working groups, has a broad agenda, but visible results seem mainly focused on arms control and other great power issues, with notable success in the approval of the “New START” agreement on strategic weapons.

The effort has a distinct government-to-government approach, but the effects of a “reset” that is primarily limited to the two federal governments may last only as long as the leaders of both countries find it politically beneficial. A more lasting reset would require change at the level of the people of each country, not just the current leaders. Grounding the evolution of the U.S.–Russia relationship in the populations, businesses, civil society organizations, and sub-national governance bodies across the vast Eurasian state would help ensure that the turn toward cooperation is vulnerable to another change in the capitals of either country.²

While Russia and the United States each have their own particular interests in the Arctic, their national security and sustainable development policies are strikingly similar. Under the umbrella of the new concepts of national security, the United States and Russia, neighbors across the Bering Strait, have the opportunity to put into practice a partnership that would promote the interests of both nations and cement a reset of relationships between the people of the Russian Far East and Alaska that will be deeper and more stable than the relations between capitals.

Arctic Change and Changing Geopolitics

Geography may not be “destiny,” but for geopolitical analysts it is the first place to look to understand issues of international politics. Lack of awareness of arctic geography and the extent of change in the Arctic has been a critical weakness of many analysts and commentators who have jumped to conclusions about the potential for conflict while underplaying opportunities for collaboration as the Arctic becomes increasingly accessible.

The “Antimeridional Arctic” is the area that spans the Arctic region across the Anti-Meridian – 180 degrees directly opposite the Prime Meridian. It includes territory north of Alaska and the Far East Federal District of Russia.

In Alaska, it includes the oil-rich North Slope, the Brooks Range, and the Yukon River. The land is home to native people and Alaska residents. At sea, it includes the Bering Strait, the Beaufort, Chukchi, East Siberian, and Laptev seas and part of the central Arctic Ocean. While the Bering Strait divides the two countries, it is also an area of common interests in maritime commerce and safety, environment, and culture.

The waters are home to fish and marine mammals, and the seabed to the north is projected to have extensive, though as-yet undiscovered, oil resources. Russia's territory includes Chukotka and the northern borderlands of the Sakha Republic, including the mouth of the great Lena River, the gateway to a watershed of 2.5 million square kilometers that reaches to the southern border of Russia. Along its northern coast, Russia has a string of aging ports, airfields and mineral production facilities, a legacy of the Cold War that has eroded over the two decades since the end of the Soviet Union and is only now being redeveloped.

Recent changes in the Arctic have been the source of both excitement and alarm. The opening of Russia's Northern Sea Route in 2008 to foreign shipping and several commercial transits of the Northwest Passage led to predictions of a growth of commercial shipping that would take advantage of shortened trade routes between Europe and the Far East, saving thousands of miles and many days at sea. Forecasts of potentially large, though as yet undiscovered, oil and gas reserves under the Arctic continental shelf have focused attention on issues of sovereignty, security, and sustainability throughout the region.

Changes in the Arctic may be addressed in four categories: technical, economic, climatic, and legal:

- *Technological Advances and the Arctic:* Technology to conquer the Arctic ice made gradual but consistent advances throughout the twentieth century. Reinforced bows and hulls gave way to steel ships with hulls specially designed to break through ice. Nuclear reactors were introduced to provide the power and endurance for icebreakers to patrol the length of Russia's Arctic coast. The introduction of the azimuth pod and dual-acting hull designs led to the construction of commercial cargo ships and tankers able to operate without icebreaker assistance. These advances were followed by new technologies for development of oil and gas deposits in deep water and polar conditions.

- *Economic Change:* In the later decades of the twentieth century, rising energy demands in western Europe led to partnerships linking resource production in the Soviet Union with markets in Europe that broke the economic isolation of the USSR that had followed World War II. The breakup of the Soviet Union further increased European access to Russian energy resources. This led to acceptance in Europe that Russian resources not only diversified energy supplies but opened new sales and investment opportunities for the West. Oil on Alaska's North Slope and natural gas in Russia's northwest highlighted the Arctic as a world-class energy resource. The 2008 estimate by the U.S. Geological Survey that perhaps a quarter of the world's undiscovered hydrocarbon resources may be found in the Arctic further increased interest in the potential contribution of resources of the Russian Arctic to European markets and to markets in east Asia and the Americas.
- *Changes in Climate:* The increased accessibility of the Arctic in recent years has also resulted from cumulative changes in climate over the past three decades. Over that time, winter ice cover has declined by nearly 10 per cent. Summertime observations in 2007 revealed the area of ice cover reduced by one third from its 1979–2000 average. In 2008, the sea routes transiting both the Russian and Canadian arctic were, for the first time, simultaneously declared ice-free, even if only for a short period. These changes are projected to continue for decades to come. In its 2008 report to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Russia's Hydrometeorological Service projected that by 2040 winter temperatures could increase along the Arctic coast by about four degrees centigrade and by two to three degrees in the summer.³ Such increases will moderate the severity of winters and lengthen ice-free periods on rivers and coasts. Over several decades, this will change plant life in the region, with forests moving further north and extended growing periods in the south. It is geopolitically significant that climate change and global warming will increase the

accessibility of the heartland of Russia and connect it to the rest of the world. It is important to recognize that climate change will bring costs as well. Melting permafrost will undermine roads and buildings in the north and frozen rivers that serve as winter ice roads will be increasingly less available.

- *Changes in the Legal Regime:* In 1926, the Soviet Union proposed a sectoral division of the Arctic with lines drawn from the North Pole to the eastern and western extremes of its northern coast that proclaimed that all land area within the sector was the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union.⁴ Due to the inaccessibility of the Arctic, the proposal had little impact. It was not until the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea considered the limits of national jurisdiction at sea that global agreement on the extent and limits of national jurisdiction at sea was reached. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) codified new rules to establish the extent of coastal states' offshore jurisdiction. In 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a treaty delineating their common maritime boundary in the Pacific and Arctic oceans. Russia joined the Convention in 1997 and accepted the its definition of sovereignty in the Arctic, including a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea and a two hundred-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off its coast and islands in the Arctic Ocean.⁵ The Convention also provided a detailed definition of the continental shelf that held out the prospect of encompassing much of the seabed within the region of the 1926 sectoral claim. The establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 added a new forum for cooperation on sustainable development among Arctic states. While the founding documents specifically excluded "security" from the purview of the Council, the evolution of the concept of national security into areas of prosperity and cooperation may slowly bring these aspects of national security into the scope of the Arctic Council.

National Security in the Twenty-first Century

In the two decades since the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, both the United States and the Russian Federation have developed new concepts of national security that better reflect the complexity and interconnections of the modern international order.

The importance of the Arctic in modern Russia's security is best noted by recognizing that Russia's Arctic watershed encompasses 13 million square kilometers or three quarters of the land area of Russia and an area larger than any other country save Russia itself. The Lena, the Yenesei, and the Ob river systems are each comparable to the entire Mississippi River system in the United States. While these rivers have been largely limited to internal communications due to near year-around ice in their northern reaches, the prospect of increased river access to the Northern Sea Route is a game-changing concept in the development of the watershed and the conversion of Russia from a 'heartland' to a maritime state.

Geography also defines America's arctic security interests. In contrast to Russia's vast arctic watershed, Alaska's arctic coast is a much narrower coastal plain bordered to the south by the Brooks Range. The arctic coast lacks major rivers and bays that are suitable as harbors for large ships. The major river of northern Alaska, the Yukon, flows from Canada south of the Brooks Range and reaches the north Pacific south of the Bering Strait. The coastal plain and continental shelf are well endowed with oil, and recent research suggests that the continental shelf extends perhaps 650 nautical miles or more northward along the Chukchi Plateau with indications of possible hydrocarbon deposits.⁶ Maritime traffic between the Arctic and the Pacific Ocean must pass through either the U.S. or Russian sides of the Bering Strait where increased traffic may over-stress existing navigational aids and vessel tracking systems.

Security Policies of the United States

In the past five years, the United States published a new national security strategy and a maritime security strategy. Recently, the themes of both strategies were consolidated and extended in a paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.⁷ Together, these publications identify the current framework and direction of U.S. security policy as it guides the country's arctic policy.

The U.S. National Security Strategy

The 2010 U.S. national security strategy views security in four aspects:⁸

- *Security*: Security interests span from the management of weapons of mass destruction and control of their dissemination to protection of borders and the homeland from violation and attack. This encompasses traditional views of security based on military and diplomatic capability, emphasizes the maintenance of alliances and creation of new partnerships and addresses new threats such as cyber-attacks.
- *Prosperity*: Interests in prosperity focus on building the domestic base to support traditional security programs and to ensure that the domestic economic base of society remains strong. Strengthening human capital through education, supporting future competitiveness through science, technology and innovation, maintaining balance in development, and ensuring development is sustainable are the core aspects of prosperity for national security.
- *Values*: U.S. interests in values provide a focus for strengthening democracy and promoting respect for individuals and cultures. Supporting the rights of individuals and movements to be heard, protecting human rights, fighting corruption, and fostering transparency are all aspects of strengthening U.S. security through the promotion of public participation in governance in foreign countries. Values supported by the United States of relevance to the Arctic include respect for rights of indigenous people, promotion of roles of civil society, and application of the principles of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
- *International order*: Extending beyond bilateral relationships and alliances with like-minded states, the U.S. strategy views a strong international order supported by capable international institutions as important to U.S. security. In substantive areas, U.S. interests in the international order include safeguarding the global commons and promoting

national interests in the Arctic through regional cooperation and international organizations.

U.S. national security policy has a special position for Russia in all four of its aspects. Russia's role was singled out in the 2010 National Security Strategy as follows:

We seek to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia that respects international norms. As the two nations possessing the majority of the world's nuclear weapons, we are working together to advance nonproliferation, both by reducing our nuclear arsenals and by cooperating to ensure that other countries meet their international commitments to reducing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. We will seek greater partnership with Russia in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan. We also will seek new trade and investment arrangements for increasing the prosperity of our peoples. We support efforts within Russia to promote the rule of law, accountable government, and universal values. While actively seeking Russia's cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors.⁹

A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower

As a maritime nation, U.S. policy toward the ocean commons is part of the bedrock of its security policy:

We must work together to ensure the constant flow of commerce, facilitate safe and secure air travel, and prevent disruptions to critical communications. We must also safeguard the sea, air, and space domains from those who would deny access or use them for hostile purposes. This includes keeping strategic straits and vital sea lanes open, improving the early detection of emerging maritime threats, denying adversaries hostile use of the air domain, and ensuring the responsible use of space. As one key effort in the

sea domain, for example, we will pursue ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.¹⁰

The strategy issued by America's sea services (the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard) in 2007 begins with the premise that "the security, prosperity and vital interests of the United States are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance."¹¹ The strategy recognizes that major disruptions, whether from war, conflict, or natural disaster, threaten both U.S. security and global prosperity. As such, it is important, not only to be able to fight and win wars and to prevent wars altogether, but also to respond to natural disasters and other non-military crises. The strategy posits that "maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an open, multi-polar world."¹²

Maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response are recognized in the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower as areas ripe for international cooperation. The Cooperative Strategy moves beyond traditional cooperation among military allies to developing relationships among sea services worldwide to support collaboration and joint activities through agreements such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and global and regional initiatives such as the multinational anti-piracy patrols operating off the coast of Somalia under the authority Security Council resolutions.

The "Mr. Y" Paper

This expanded view of national and maritime security is new and still evolving. The trend of a more expansive definition of national security developed in the National Security Strategy and the Cooperative Strategy was explored further by two officers on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who recently published an article that elaborated on the broadening concept of American national security.¹³ Writing under the pseudonym "Mr. Y" in order to emphasize that the views were those of the authors, the two officers continued to develop the emerging themes of the National Security Strategy and the Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower.

The “Mr. Y” paper puts additional emphasis on economic issues as an element of national security, with focus on three key factors: *Human Capital*: focus on the health, education, and social support structure for American workers; *Sustainable Security*: Involve all relevant departments and agencies in national security policies in a “whole of government” approach; and *Natural Resources*: Invest in natural resources management to address supplies in a period of growing world demand.

U.S. Policies in the Arctic

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy addresses American security interests in the Arctic in a single concise paragraph:

Arctic Interests: The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues.¹⁴

U.S. policy towards the Arctic was the subject of a major review in 2008 and 2009, leading to the adoption of a significantly revised and expanded policy adopted at the end of the Bush Administration. This policy was continued by the incoming Obama administration and expanded by President Obama in the summer of 2010 as part of a new national oceans policy.

U.S. arctic policy is given more depth in the 2009 NSC Decision Memorandum on Arctic Policy adopted at the end of the Bush Administration and continued by the Obama administration.¹⁵ According to this document, it is the policy of the United States to:

- Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
- Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
- Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable;

- Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);
- Involve the Arctic's indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
- Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.

U.S. arctic policy identifies eight specific topics for attention that can be grouped into three overarching interests:

Security and Sovereignty

1. *National Security and Homeland Security* interests in the Arctic focus on the protection of U.S. territory and resources, maintenance of border security, and enforcement of domestic laws and regulations on vessels and other maritime activities.

2. *Sovereignty* issues lie in the definition of the outer limit of the extended continental shelf and in the delineation of boundaries with Russia and Canada. This includes promoting Russian ratification of the 1990 Maritime Boundary Agreement, resolution of claims in the Beaufort Sea, and the division of the extended continental shelf north of the U.S.–Canada land boundary.

Prosperity

3. *Arctic Maritime Transportation* interests in the Arctic include assurance of access for ships to the waters north of Alaska and the development of harbors and port facilities to support development and commerce. This further entails establishment of additional navigational aids and new capabilities for search and rescue, emergency environmental response, and regulation and enforcement.

4. *Ecosystem Management and Spatial Planning* for marine activities is the mechanism for addressing U.S. uses of the oceans and coasts to achieve national policy goals. The final recommendations of the U.S. Ocean Policy Task Force in 2010 endorse ecosystem management as the process for evaluation

of ocean activities and interactions and the use of marine spatial planning as the tool for conducting these evaluations.

5. *Environment and Conservation of Natural Resources* are primary considerations of the ocean policy recommendations. In implementing a precautionary approach to the oceans, U.S. policy emphasizes caution in expanding human activity in a region such as the Arctic until sufficient information is gathered and assessed to guide and regulate activities to protect the environment and conserve resources. Examples of this include the moratorium placed on exploitation of living resources in the EEZ north of Alaska and review of the potential impact of exploratory drilling in the Chukchi Sea, particularly in light of the unexpected marine disaster of the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.

6. *Economic development* interests begin with the development of on-shore and offshore hydrocarbon deposits, including exploration and assessment activities as well as oil and gas production activities at sea. Interest in commercial fishing in the Arctic is likely to increase as fish stocks migrate to the warming waters north of the Bering Strait. As energy and living resource exploitation develops, onshore development will increase as well, bringing with it increased need for food and supplies, housing, health services, port facilities, and other infrastructure to support human habitation on or near the Alaskan arctic coast. Caution is a significant factor in U.S. offshore energy policy, but the Administration has committed to support exploratory drilling in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, and federal efforts will be made to gather scientific information and public views in advance of deciding whether to advance to commercial exploitation in the Arctic Ocean.¹⁶ While recognizing special issues of the region, U.S. Arctic policy will be guided by national and global level policies. Energy development in the Arctic will y emphasizes caution in expanding human activity in a region such as the Arctic until sufficient information is gathered and assessed to guide and regulate activities to protect the environment and conserve resources. Examples of this include the moratorium placed on exploitation of living resources in the EEZ north of Alaska and review of the potential ibe subject to regulatory policies of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. Regulation and Enforcement, policy will be developed and management will be implemented through marine spatial planning techniques, fisheries management will be eventually be guided by regional fisheries councils, and arctic conservation policies will be a subset of national policies. Because of the criticality of the provisions of UNCLOS

on international straits, the U.S. position on the Northwest Passage will remain rooted in the position that the passage is an international strait and will be guided by the national interest in freedom to pass through international straits worldwide rather than accept a compromise of a limited recognition of Canadian claims of internal water status of the passage.

International Cooperation

7. *International Governance* in the Arctic is supported from the bi-lateral level to the global. The United States engages bilaterally with Russia and Canada on arctic issues. With Russia, the navies and coast guards of the two countries conduct joint exercises and even support joint fishery enforcement activities. Matters of nuclear forces are primarily limited to bilateral interactions. At the regional level, the United States recognizes the Arctic Council as the primary forum for discussion of issues of environment and development. At the global level, the United States recognizes the role of the International Maritime Organization in establishing rules and guidelines applicable in the arctic and elsewhere. It also recognizes the role of the International Whaling Commission in protecting marine mammals. The United States is party to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks agreement that defines the role of regional fisheries organizations and can guide the eventual establishment of a fishery management council for the Antimeridianal Arctic.

8. *Promoting International Scientific Cooperation* has been a foreign policy interest in the Arctic since the first International Polar Year in 1882–83. President Reagan’s Ocean Policy Proclamation of 1983 specifically recognized the right of states to conduct scientific research at sea and specifically noted that the United States would not exercise the right to block research in its EEZ as permitted by the LOS Convention. International scientific cooperation is facilitated through the International Oceanographic Commission.

U.S. National Oceans Policy

In the 2010 *National Policy for Stewardship of the Ocean, our Coasts, and the Great Lakes*, emphasis is given to maintaining the health and resiliency of the ocean and coasts, incorporating science and knowledge into policy-making, promoting sustainable, safe, and productive access to, and uses of, the oceans, coasts, and the Great Lakes.¹⁷ Development of living or mineral resources is

not specifically addressed. National priorities for the oceans emphasize information, ecosystem management and spatial planning, and coordination among all levels of government, native peoples, and the international community. One of the “National Priority Objectives” specifically addresses the Arctic:

Changing Conditions in the Arctic: Address environmental stewardship needs in the Arctic ocean and adjacent coastal areas in the face of climate-induced and other environmental changes.¹⁸

The 2010 National Oceans Policy emphasizes information, sustainability, coordination, ecosystem management and marine spatial planning, U.S. energy policy, and other ocean activities. Raw materials found in the Arctic can provide a basis for economic development both regionally and as a nation. While the United States has an interest in arctic hydrocarbon development, such development is subject to an environmental sustainability criteria. Similarly, fishery development in the Arctic is guided by a conservation criterion. This reflects a growing incorporation of conservation and environmental protection interests into the prosperity aspect of national security.

Russia’s National Security Strategy

Russia’s current National Security Strategy, most recently revised and issued in 2009, identifies three long-term national interests:

- Enhancing the competitiveness of the national economy;
- Ensuring the inviolability of the constitutional order, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the Russian Federation;
- Transforming the Russian Federation into a world power that seeks to maintain strategic stability and a mutually beneficial partnership in a multipolar world.¹⁹

While national defense, government, and public safety are important priorities, the security strategy recognizes that its interests cannot be secured

by traditional military and border forces alone. It goes on to say that the Russian Federation's policy is to ensure the country's national security and advance its security policy priorities by focusing on priorities for sustainable development:²⁰

- Improving the quality of life of Russian citizens by ensuring personal safety, as well as high standards of livelihood;
- Economic growth, which is achieved primarily through the development of national innovation systems and investment in human capital;
- Science, technology, education, health and culture, which develop by strengthening the role of the state and improve public-private partnership;
- Ecology of living systems and environmental management, the maintenance of which is achieved through balanced use and development of advanced technology and purposeful reproduction of natural-resource potential of the country; and
- Strategic stability and equal strategic partnership, which is strengthened through the active participation of Russia in the development of a multipolar model of world order.

Russia's Security and Policy in the Arctic

Over two-thirds of Russia's ocean coastline is found in the Arctic. Until recently, that appeared to be more of an item of curiosity than a fact of significance to Russia's interests and policies. During World War II, Murmansk has served as the arctic terminus of the North Atlantic shipping route through which supplies could be shipped from the United States to support the war effort on the Eastern Front. During the Cold War, Russia's Arctic coast was primarily an aerial frontier, with bases watching for incursions from the West and ports and airfields from which strategic forces could be deployed in times of tension. Ice breakers and ice-reinforced cargo ships traveled the coastline to supply bases and carry strategic materials from the mines of the North to

the production facilities and rail lines of the Kola Peninsula near Murmansk and Archangel.

Russia's vision of the Arctic has gone through several revisions since the latter years of the Soviet Union. The most significant change began under Michael Gorbachev, the USSR's last secretary general. As part of Gorbachev's effort to reduce international tension, he proposed that the Arctic should be a zone of peace and cooperation and even suggested that the strategic waterway of the North – the Northern Sea Route – could be opened to foreign shipping.²¹ Gorbachev's Arctic vision was derailed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes wrought during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. Although the Northern Sea Route was declared open to foreign shipping in 1991, the route fell into disuse and disrepair. The reduction of the military threat from the United States removed the state imperative of maintaining the strategic forces and defenses along the Arctic coast while rapid privatization of state assets decimated the Russian-flag shipping fleet. Annual shipping on the Northern Sea Route dropped from almost 6.6 million tons in 1987 to about 2.0 million tons in 1998.²²

As traffic on the NSR declined, so too did the facilities strung across the North that supported traffic on the route. By the time Yeltsin left office in 1999, the Northern Sea Route and Russia's capacity to use it were at their lowest ebb since the NSR was established in the 1930s. Much as western geostrategists had assumed for more than a century, Russia became nearly isolated from its northern frontier. As Moscow and St. Petersburg increasingly became the focal points of Russian government, economics, and culture at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia was in danger of being relegated to the role as Europe's eastern frontier. But while the concentration of power and wealth in the two major cities would continue, political, economic, resource, technology, and climate changes would soon begin to reverse the vision for Russia's Arctic.

Vladimir Putin became prime minister in 1999 and president in 2000, and with him came a number of changes that reflected a greater role for the central government. This was particularly true in the case of the Arctic. There should have been no surprise in the turn of policy, given that President Putin's 1999 PhD dissertation was titled "Mineral and Raw Material Resources and the Development Strategy for the Russian Economy."²³ As president, Putin quickly became the chief advocate for northern resource development and rehabilitation of the Northern Sea Route. Within a decade, a series of formal

strategies would change the role of the Arctic from a forgotten fortress to a new source of national strength for Russia. This was formalized when an Arctic security strategy was endorsed by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008.²⁴ In this strategy, the basic national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are:

- Use of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation to deal with the socio-economic development;
- Preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation;
- Conservation of unique ecosystems of the Arctic; and
- Use the Northern Sea Route as a national integrated transport communications in the Arctic, the Russian Federation²⁵

The strategy also identified six primary policy objectives:

1. Socio-economic development, including application of advanced technology for production, modernization of the transportation and fisheries sectors, and improved quality of life for indigenous people and other arctic residents;
2. Defense and protection of the state border in the Arctic, including collaboration with other arctic states in delimiting the outer limits of Russian jurisdiction in the Arctic;
3. Preserving and protecting the natural environment of the Arctic, including cross-border cooperation for conservation of the natural environment;
4. Creating a unified information space in the Russian Arctic utilizing information and communications technologies;
5. Ensuring an adequate level of basic and applied research to support security, life-support, and production activities in the Arctic climate;
6. Ensuring an international regime of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Russia and other arctic states, increasing

the involvement of public institutions and organizations in international arctic forums, and ensuring that the northern sea routes are managed in conformity with international treaties.

These objectives were taken further in Russia's draft "Development Strategy for the Arctic Zone to 2020,"²⁶ which was discussed at the Moscow conference "The Arctic: Territory of Dialog" in September 2010 and released in draft form by the Ministry for Regional Development in 2011. The theme of the draft strategy has been summarized by Dr. Alexander Pelyasov as "Knowledge, Presence, Innovation."²⁷ The strategy implements these three elements with its emphasis on gathering information about the Arctic and developing new understanding, strengthening human capital through education, improved work and living conditions and use of the internet and satellite communications to strengthen society in the Far North, and developing and implementing new technologies, including alternative energy systems, to the problems of living and working in the harsh arctic environment.

Opportunities for a Joint Arctic Strategy

Russia and the United States are both "Arctic Nations," but they differ in the degree to which the Arctic is integrated into their national vision. With objectives established by their respective national security policies, both the United States and Russia approach their Arctic policies guided by sustainable development concepts integrated into ocean and regional development policies, but emphasis differs based on their geography, climate, resources, culture, and national and local interests and policies.

Russia's draft development strategy for the Arctic encompasses several key points that are part of the U.S. national security strategy and are highlighted in the "Mr. Y" paper:

- The U.S. security interest in the development of human capital is matched by the arctic development strategy's focus on developing human capital in the Arctic, including education, health, and quality of life;

- The U.S. focus on enhancing science, technology, and innovation can be paired with the focus on the need to apply knowledge, understanding, and innovation to Russia's arctic development;
- A U.S. strategy to develop natural resources in response to growing U.S. needs is matched by Russia's commitment to develop its natural resources in the Arctic.

Contrasting National Approaches

Russia and the United States share the general themes of security and sovereignty, prosperity through sustainable development, and governance through cooperation and collaboration. In practice, however, there remain differences in emphasis that affect the potential for collaboration in managing the Arctic.

In sovereignty and security, both states have agreed to respect the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention for determining the limits of national jurisdiction. This is hampered, however, by the failure to date for the United States to ratify the LOS Convention and Russia to ratify the U.S.–Russian maritime boundary delimitation treaty.

Both countries are still developing their own balance between environmental protection and economic development. While these are largely domestic matters, differences in national policies that affect trans-boundary fisheries, protection of marine mammals, and effects of development on the marine environment may lead to disagreement and political conflict. Russia's policies see the Arctic first as a strategic resource warehouse that can kickstart development while U.S. policies approach Arctic resources with a high degree of caution and unresolved conflict between development and environment.

Russia and the United States both support bilateral coordination and cooperation and regional cooperation through the Arctic Council, but there are likely to be different perspectives of the roles of local, national, and global interests in developing and implementing security, sustainable development, and governance policies for the Arctic. When interests coincide, the potential benefit of cooperation can be high, as demonstrated by the successful negotiation of a binding agreement among Arctic Council members for search and rescue in the Arctic Ocean.

In both countries, however, Arctic policy is driven by internal interests at the national level. Bilateral cooperation is already conducted by the navies and coast guards stationed in the Pacific and Arctic oceans. Only to a lesser degree do regional and local governments, civil society, and native people have a say in policy. These other groups generally lack the resources to pursue their different agendas on their own and are limited to working around the edges of federal policy. U.S. environmental NGOs may collaborate with Russian counterparts. Communication among native people of the two countries has been facilitated by the lifting of visa requirements for crossing the U.S.–Russian border and efforts are underway to obtain a reciprocal extension of the duration of visa for other travelers.

Toward An Antimeridianal Arctic Partnership

The official policies of the United States and Russia demonstrate that the two nations share interests and approaches in the Arctic in the areas of security and sovereignty, prosperity, the environment, and international and regional cooperation. These shared interests provide the basis for increased collaboration and partnership. While they have different perspectives and emphasis, both nations place high emphasis on safe navigation, development of domestic sources of energy, management and conservation of living resources, protection of the marine environment, inclusion of native people in developing and implementing Arctic policies, and adherence to the principles of state sovereignty and regional cooperation specified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Rio Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development.

The interests of Russia and the United States are particularly aligned in the areas of border and boundary delimitation and in homeland security. Approaches differ significantly in regard to the balance between economic development and environmental protection and conservation, but the general approach based on sustainable development is shared. Both endorse multilateral approaches, including regional cooperation through the Arctic Council and broader cooperation through functional international organizations, notably the International Maritime Organization.

Prosperity and environment, the constituent components of sustainable development, address aspects of each nation's new view of national security. Maritime transportation in the Arctic is a core aspect of both country's

policies. For Russia, the development of the Northern Sea Route across Arctic Asia as a national transportation corridor is a primary interest. For the United States, safe transportation and security in the maritime domain are likewise primary security interests that contribute to security and prosperity aspects of the national interest.

While relations at the national level have ebbed and flowed according to relations between capitals, there is a history of regional and local cooperation that dates back to the beginning of the “glasnost” era. Led by early academic cooperation and exchanges, cultural exchanges followed, as did state-level negotiations and cooperation on international fishery policy in the Bering Sea. As Governor of Alaska, Wally Hickel made extensive efforts to build connections with the regional and provincial governments of the Russian Far East. Cities in Alaska and Russia have established “sister city” relationships.²⁸

The United States and Russia share a long maritime boundary and at their closest approach their shores are less than two and a half miles apart. Over the past three decades, there have been many scientific, cultural, and resource interchanges between Alaska and the Russian Far East at the state/federal district, city, and organization levels. Native people in Alaska and the Russian Far East share roots of language and culture that reach deep into pre-history. Far from their respective capitals, the people of Alaska and the Russian Far East have developed their own low-key relationships, mostly outside of the awareness of policymakers in their capitals.

An Agenda for Reset and Partnership in the Antimeridianal Arctic

The common interests in security, prosperity, and cooperation in the Arctic give rise to a promising opportunity to make the reset of relations between the United States and Russia more robust and durable. Here is a twelve-point program for an Arctic Regional Partnership that focuses on the three core areas of interest to both the United States and Russia: security, prosperity and cooperation:

Security and Sovereignty

Shared interests in protecting sovereignty and maintaining security in the northern Pacific Ocean have led the United States and Russia to develop pragmatic relationships to facilitate collaboration on matters of search and rescue, communications, regulatory enforcement, and traffic monitoring in the Bering Strait region. Out of the public eye, working relationships in ocean use and management under international law that have been a model of cooperation in the north Pacific should be extended northward to the Antimeridian Arctic:

1. *Reinforce the rule of law:* First, Russia and the United States need to take the lead in strengthening the rule of law in the Arctic. Russia should finally ratify the 1990 maritime boundary agreement with the United States and the United States should accede to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A firm commitment to a common understanding of the Law of the Sea Convention will help Arctic states to resolve issues among themselves and to implement policies and regulations governing Arctic use that will be accepted by non-Arctic states seeking to transit the Arctic, exploit its resources, and conduct marine scientific research.
2. *Cooperate in strategic force activities in the Arctic:* As long as the United States and Russia maintain strategic nuclear weapons, these forces will be deployed in the Arctic, primarily under the polar ice and high in the atmosphere. Effective deterrence depends on continued demonstration of response capability, but such demonstration can be achieved while also maintaining communication and enacting confidence-building measures regarding operations, intelligence, and interaction between offensive and defensive systems.
3. *Enhance military cooperation and plan for emergency response:* Improve the capability of all Arctic states to respond to natural disasters and man-made crises. Increased activity in the Arctic need not require each Arctic state to maintain a full spectrum of ships, aircraft, satellites, and observation stations or emergency supplies. Shared awareness of assets,

joint planning, and training in combined operations would benefit all users of the Arctic in providing combined aid and assistance. Successful implementation of the Search and Rescue agreement adopted in Nuuk in May 2011 will demonstrate the potential for further cooperation.

4. *Maritime safety and regulation of activities:* The Arctic states, with Russia and the United States in the lead, should collaborate to ensure safety at sea in line with national and international regulations, from implementation of the search and rescue agreement to response to major disasters at sea, such as vessel damage and oil spills. Leadership by the Arctic states in the International Maritime Organization can help avoid different, perhaps conflicting, national design specifications and operating regulations for trans-arctic shipping, and collaboration on regional fisheries management can lead to sustainable fisheries rather than over-exploitation. Agreement between Russia and the United States on traffic separation and monitoring in the Bering Strait is an important step in addressing safety and security in the Arctic to the benefit of both countries as well as other nations whose ships enter the Arctic for commercial or scientific purposes. Cooperation in communication, GPS, and observation satellite coverage can reduce the cost, widen the coverage, and speed the availability of these services to Arctic users.

Prosperity and Sustainable Development

The Antimeridianal Arctic is already a resource base for the United States and a part of the national transportation infrastructure of the Russian Arctic. Increasingly, both energy and fishery resources will lead the expansion of civilian interests in economic development, protection of the environment, conservation of resources, and support for Arctic residents and peoples. Proximity suggests that people, businesses, and organizations of both the United States and Russia will have increasing opportunities to collaborate in pursuing sustainable development, but this will require considerable effort to lay the groundwork for cooperation:

5. *Sustainable development and integrated planning.* Both the United States and the Russian Federation have included the concept of spatial planning as a tool for balanced development in the Arctic. Policy-making based on concepts of ecosystem and watershed management and spatial planning, both in the marine environment and on shore, is still in development. This should be topic of collaboration in which planners and policymakers further develop the concepts and learn lessons from one another.
6. *Improved business and investment environment.* Trans-border business opportunities should be fostered, but this will require improvements in commercial law and practice. Joint business opportunities will need special attention and oversight in order to develop a fair and predictable environment for trade and investment with processes to resolve conflict and enforce agreements. Codes of business practices, training in cultural differences, effective remedies for disputes, support for investment and other policies to promote U.S.–Russian business activities in the Arctic need support and oversight at both the national and regional level (state level in the United States, district and federal subject level in Russia). Federal ministries should establish policies that allow local governments to reduce barriers to cross-border business arrangements.
7. *Regional, local, and indigenous people's interests.* U.S. and Russian interests can benefit from collaboration below the national level. The State of Alaska, the Russian Far Eastern Federal District, and Russian provincial governments on the Arctic and Pacific coasts have much to gain from collaboration, communication, and educational exchanges. Policies on issues such as distance education, public health in remote areas, and renewable energy in the Far North and support for cross-border travel and communication among indigenous people need to be given greater support.
8. *Conservation and environmental protection.* Designation of protected areas, development of guidelines for oil and gas

development, implementation of procedures for rapid response to environmental emergencies, and guidelines and regulations for marine shipping and structures should be approached as a matter of joint interest. Non-governmental organizations should participate in the identification of areas of concern, proposal of protection measures, and local participation in policy development and implementation. U.S. and Russia coordination in these areas can foster agreement within the Arctic Council.

Regional Cooperation

The primary focus for Arctic governance of both the United States and Russia is regional, primarily through the Arctic Council. However, common interests can support bilateral collaboration in joint initiatives and in the application of collaborative tools for ocean governance that can then be further expanded to the entire region. Recognizing that interest in the Antimeridianal Arctic is not limited to just the United States and Russia, such collaborative activities will need to be conducted in cooperation with both the Arctic Council members and the more distant parties that have interests and rights in Arctic waters, as well as with indigenous people who have their own interests in maintaining and developing their way of life through traditional activities and through new trade and economic development opportunities made possible by a warming Arctic. These parties must be involved in all Arctic management activities that touch their substantive interests, not just in the Arctic Council, but in other organizations and agreements that address Arctic issues:

9. *Oversight of Arctic activities and policies:* The Arctic Council should serve as the principal forum for discussion of Arctic issues related to sustainable development, even when specific actions are conducted under State authority or oversight of other organizations (for example, the negotiation of Arctic ship design codes in the IMO). Border issues, including boundary delimitation, customs and immigration, vessel inspection, and regulatory enforcement should be regularly

discussed bilaterally by diplomatic and coast guard officials and reported upon periodically to the Arctic Council.

10. *Arctic domain awareness and foresight*: Support for maritime security, resource management, and marine environmental protection should be enhanced by collaborative collection, assessment, and dissemination of accurate and up-to-date information regarding human activities and ocean, ice, and climate data. Joint observation of the maritime domain, identification and tracking of ships and aircraft, particularly those of non-Arctic states, will be needed to maximize the effectiveness of the limited monitoring assets available in the Arctic. This information can be supplemented with reports from Arctic Council working groups, national reports, and other contributions to support a joint assessment and foresight capability within the Arctic Council that can integrate information and analyses from diverse sources to support issue identification and policy development by Council members.
11. *Arctic science*: Conduct of Arctic research by all interested parties and sharing of results should be promoted, especially in areas of sustainable development and climate-change mitigation. Coastal states should facilitate approval of foreign scientific research within their EEZs, promoting collaboration and ensuring sharing of data and findings. Multilateral polar science programs should be fostered and given access to non-security, non-commercial data from national sources.
12. *Increase cross-border cooperation by sub-national actors*: As interest and activities in the Antimeridianal Arctic increase, there will be greater interest in Alaska, the Far East Federal District and its sub-units, private enterprises, NGOs, and native peoples' groups. This needs to be facilitated with cross-border communication, increased ease of travel, improvement of commercial codes and dispute resolution systems, and transparency of regional and local governance.

Conclusion

Since the summer of 2009, the United States has followed a policy of a “reset” in U.S.–Russian relations. This policy has focused on high-profile great power issues epitomized by the successful conclusion of the “New START” treaty in late 2010. However, the reset has largely focused on intergovernmental activities and relations between the two national capitals. As such, the durability of the reset may be only as long-lasting as the current leadership of the two nations.

Broader and more lasting results may be achieved when the local populations and the regional governments of both countries are engaged in relations between the two countries. Alaska and the Russian Far East, adjacent on their shared maritime border and far from the federal power centers, can provide a complementary form of reset that reaches deeper into the social fabric of both countries, building familiarity, and addressing day-to-day issues of cooperation in government regulation, development, and environmental management. Such a reset can build upon regional connections and partnerships to address issues of environment and development and can work in partnership with federal agencies, particularly the U.S. Coast Guard, and Federal Security Service’s Coastal Border Guard, in creating the maritime infrastructure to support regional commerce and collaborative regulatory enforcement. Increased regional collaboration and trans-border commerce can be facilitated by national ministries but needs active involvement and leadership by state and regional government as well.

Policy for the Antimeridional Arctic is not the exclusive province of the United States and Russia, but as the nations that bear responsibility for maritime safety, whose citizens are best placed to exploit arctic resources and to be affected by failures to manage resources well, they need to be the leaders in developing policy for the region. While they cannot manage the region in isolation from other arctic states and more distant states that have interests in the Arctic, they are the natural geopolitical leaders of the region. Together they can build on their common interests to ensure that the Antimeridional Arctic truly becomes a region of peace and prosperity.

Notes

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