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THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONE PROJECT

The Death of Peacekeeping; The Rise of Peace Operations: What Should Canada Do?

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September 12 2016

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of PPOL 623 and completion of the requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree



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Acknowledgements

I would like to give an enormous amount of thanks to my capstone supervisor, Dr. David J. Bercuson. I wouldn't have been able to gather my thoughts into something coherent without his endless support and reassurance. The amount of time he dedicated to my success in completing this project is unparalleled.



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Capstone Executive Summary

This policy brief brings attention to the Government of Canada's mandate to renew its commitment to United Nations peace operations. This brief provides an analysis that will form a basis for recommendations that would be required in order for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to contribute support to future United Nations (UN) missions.

This brief first provides a historical background of Canada's role with the UN and the evolution between traditional peacekeeping and more robust peace operations. In the Cold War period, the UN had embraced peacekeeping missions as an international organization, while NATO focused on security. Canada used its position in a bipolarized Cold War to supplant its role as a peacekeeping nation to obtain a power position in the international system. The post-Cold War period saw a rise in UN "peacekeeping" missions and the restructuring of NATO to embrace stability. After failure of traditional peacekeeping missions by the UN, NATO had become another player in the role of international peace.

Since the conclusion of Canada's role in Afghanistan, Canadians have begun to see the CAF as a capable conventional military, aimed towards a combat role. There are strong indications that, in the post-Afghanistan period, international crises have once again shifted towards the United Nations, with NATO beginning to limit its involvement primarily to air strikes, such as Libya in 2011. However, this does not mean the CAF should be restricted only to combat missions. The shift seems to lie in the fact that a majority of Canadians have recognized that future participation in multilateral operations will effectively involve robust peacemaking.

This brief then describes the current situation that Canada is presented with in the CAF. In spring of 2016, the Department of National Defence published the *Defence Policy Review: Public Consultation Document 2016*, which includes information on the current capabilities and focuses of the CAF. Internationally, Canada is currently involved in a total of 15 missions abroad, accounting for 1,345 personnel as of April 2016. Due to the current restraints of the CAF, there are approximately 2,500 deployable troops maximum that Canada can contribute internationally to these UN peace operations. In the time constructing this brief, the Government of Canada and the Department of National Defence have recently announced the launch of Global Affairs Canada's new Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs)– with a pledge of up to 600 CAF personnel to be available for UN peace operations. This recent pledge has confirmed the amount of personnel that Canada plans to contribute to future UN missions. However, it has left out more specific areas of future participation. Therefore, this brief will help the Government of Canada to continue to narrow down its peace operations parameters from its recent commitments.

As for the UN, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) currently supports 16 missions. As of July 31st, 2016, Canada contributes a total of 103 military troops, military observers, and police personnel. Even with the small amount of personnel contributions, Canadians continue to believe in the “peacekeeping myth” - that Canada is naturally inclined to promote and lead UN peace operations, and that the CAF has been actively involved with the UN up until today. While Canadians still believe the CAF is highly active in UN operations, public opinion has also recognized the need for an evolution of what the UN terms “peacekeeping.” Therefore, this brief will further bridge the gap between public opinion, the CAF, and the UN in order to establish a healthy working order for future UN peace operation commitments by Canada.

This brief then looks into some key areas of consideration for the Government of Canada before entering into future UN Peace Operations. These include:

- Danger
- Political Will
- Media
- Experience with the United Nations
- Equipment and Training
- Negotiation and Mediation
- Opinion of Missions
- Solving the Underlying Problem
- Information
- Credibility, Failure, and Success
- Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
- Veterans
- NATO

Using these areas of consideration, this brief comes to a conclusion with 11 recommendations for the Government of Canada to consider for future UN peace operations. The author believes that Canada should:

1. Participate in less missions that Canada can have a larger role in rather than many missions
2. Understand the underlying context and history of the conflict and the region
3. Participate in missions with a flexible mission mandate and flexible rules of engagement
4. Participate in missions in which Canada can have a role with its allied partners
5. Participate in missions that have the opportunity to deploy the Canadian Armed Forces together
6. Understand Canada’s ultimate objectives in a mission, and ensure a clear withdrawal date and exit strategy
7. Communicate with Canadians the type of mission the Canadian Armed Forces will be a part of, as well as any relevant operational changes during the mission
8. Establish a clear chain of command with other participating parties
9. Deploy with the proper equipment, training, and personnel to achieve Canada’s objectives
10. Hold accountability to the behaviour of Canada’s personnel, and lead by example with a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse
11. Adapt current policies on veteran support to include those that participate in UN peace operations

Issue:

This policy brief brings attention to the Government of Canada's mandate to renew its commitment to United Nations peace operations.¹ This brief provides an analysis that will form a basis for recommendations that would be required in order for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to contribute support to future United Nations (UN) missions and how this can restore commitment to the UN. For this brief, the author's definition of the terms Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding, Peace Enforcement, Chapter VI and Chapter VII can be found in Table 1 of the annex.

Background:

At the end of the Second World War, Canada – along with many other nations - recognized the consequences of the failure of the League of Nations. With the establishment of the United Nations, Canada had made the success of the UN a priority for its foreign policy from the beginning. At the start of the Cold War, the UN faced the culmination of international conflicts and tensions. The UN first tried a form of international peacekeeping with the establishment of UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East during 1948 in order to observe and report the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict after the signing of a ceasefire agreement. A year later, the UN established its second mission – UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), similar in nature to UNTSO. With North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, the UN temporarily took off its peacekeeping hat and sent in military fighting units to prevent the spread of communism into South Korea.

During escalations of the Sinai Crisis between Israel and Egypt in 1956, the UN had to decide what type of role it would have in the conflict. It was Canada's Minister of External Affairs at the time, Lester B. Pearson, who suggested the notion of a UN-led "peacekeeping" force to the special emergency session of the General Assembly on November 2nd 1956. Pearson argued that current mediation attempts would be unsuccessful at dealing with the tensions within the Suez region. Instead, Pearson believed that "a truly international peace and police force... large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out"² was needed. Pearson's suggestion culminated in the formation of the first official armed UN peacekeeping mission— UN Emergency Force (UNEF). Its first commanding officer would be the Canadian General E.L.M. Burns. UNEF was seen as innovative because it was the first UN peacekeeping mission "to use military personnel to create a buffer zone between belligerents and to supervise the withdrawal of forces."³ In 1957, Pearson was awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for this recommendation,⁴ and carried this honour into his new role as the Prime Minister of Canada.

The basic principles that began in UNEF continued to guide future peacekeeping operations until the end of the Cold War. These principles are as follows:

- The mission mandate and approval was under the command of the Secretary General and the Security Council
- Recruitment of military would be from UN member states other than the Permanent Members of the Security Council as to ensure impartiality
- The use of force in a mission was only in self-defence situations⁵

The UN conflicts of the 1940s and 1950s represented a time of inter-positional peacekeeping, in which the military was stationed to report developments of the conflict to the

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) in New York to prevent escalation.⁶ In the 1960s and 1970s, the UN faced missions in which the ultimate goal was to stabilize regions where there was danger of clashes between the NATO and the Soviet spheres of influence.⁷ With the eruption of UNFICYP in Cyprus in 1964, these missions began to have a more internal and ethnic background, with Cyprus being an attempt to prevent what would later be acknowledged as ethnic cleansing.⁸

Up until the end of the Cold War, these conflicts continued to be largely observer-based missions and involved the disengagement of inter-positional forces. Canada's involvement during this period was extremely high. Table 2 summarizes the UN peacekeeping missions, past and present, which Canada made contributions to. From 1948 to the end of the Cold War in 1991, Canada participated in 21 out of 23 missions—excluding UNIKOM in Iraq/Kuwait, which began in 1991 and UNAVEM I in Angola, which began in 1998. During the period from 1989 to 1992, Canada was asked to participate in four new missions in Africa, three new missions in Central America, and a new mission in Afghanistan.⁹ This short push of new missions, combined with its previously made commitments, caused Canada to experience a capability-commitment gap—Canada had too little capability for the amount of commitments it had made.¹⁰

In the post-Cold War period, the nature of missions the UN took part in began to change. A. Walter Dorn summarizes the differences between Cold War and post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. He claims that peacekeeping changed from:

- Interstate and inter-alliance conflicts based on ideology and power rivalries to intrastate and internal conflicts based on ethnic/tribal/religious/secessionist movements
- Armed attacks in external invasions to civil wars, human rights violations, and terrorism

- National/international security and conflict management to human security, conflict resolution and prevention
- Deterrence and negotiation to mediation, humanitarian action, disarmament, elections, enforcements, and other forms of robust involvement
- Being stationed at state boundaries to movement throughout a nation or a region
- Soldiers of non-Permanent Five nations to include soldiers, civilians, police, and observers that include Permanent Five members and developing countries¹¹

Sensing the evolving nature of post-Cold War conflicts, in 1992, the *Agenda for Peace*— at the time led by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali— removed the principle of required consent by the hosting parties in peacekeeping operations.¹² Ideally, this move was designed to ensure that nations would not be able to get away with human rights violations by claiming national sovereignty. It may even have been initiated to justify intervention within the Former Yugoslavia. However, according to Sean M. Maloney, this led to tragic consequences for the Somalia mission one year later¹³ and to the beginning of the ‘deadly trilogy’ that disintegrated UN peacekeeping in Canada.

For Canada, the Somalia mission led to credibility issues within the CAF. Canada’s contribution to Somalia was largely a result of public opinion forcing the Canadian government to take action. With limited options after personnel cuts, budget cuts, and reshuffling of departments and personnel, Canada sent in the Airborne Regiment, which had its training in fighting potential wars with the Soviet Union, and was not prepared for peacekeeping.¹⁴ Due to misinformation, the Airborne Regiment was sent into an area of Somalia that did not need protection and was not under threat by warring factions or starvation. With no clear goal in sight, combined with the breakdown of the CAF morale and command structures, the result was two Canadian personnel from the Airborne Regiment torturing and murdering a Somalian

teenager, as well as allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). For Canada, this resulted in a disbandment of the entire regiment, the resignation of a number of senior military leaders, and distrust from the Canadian population of the military.¹⁵

In the signing of the Arusha Accords, the UN asked Canada to contribute at least 40 peacekeepers to ensure the peace mandate in Rwanda. Due to being extremely preoccupied with its role in the Former Yugoslavia and its precautionary feelings after Somalia, Canada only offered two bodies, which turned out to lead the mission. When it was apparent that genocide was beginning to occur, UNAMIR in Rwanda was neither equipped nor properly mandated to stop it, resulting in an estimated 1 million people dead within 100 days.¹⁶ The unwillingness of the Security Council and the international community to reinforce UNAMIR or send an intervention force, especially after the failings in Somalia, meant UNAMIR II was there to clean up bodies.¹⁷

The drafting of the 1994 *White Paper on Defence*, shortly after the experience in Rwanda, took the lessons learned from Canada's experiences and attempted to clarify the conditions that Canada must consider when involving itself in future missions. Based on this paper, Canada believed missions should have:

- A clear and enforceable mandate
- Clear goals and an exit strategy
- An identifiable reporting authority
- Clear division of responsibilities
- Consent of all parties
- An effective command and control structure
- Clear rules of engagement
- Sufficient international political will
- Adequate financing¹⁸

The failure of the mission in Rwanda represented Canada's major break with the UN forms of peacekeeping. Inability to respond sparked a Canadian debate on whether the UN was really "an egalitarian expression of worldly brotherhood."¹⁹ While Canada's *White Paper on Defence* was meant as a solid commitment to peacekeeping, it represented a shift of priorities from UN-led missions to NATO-led missions.²⁰ However, the *White Paper on Defence* did have suggested reforms for the UN form of peacekeeping that spoke to previously failed experiences:

- The need for the UN to establish a standby peacekeeping force in order to respond to conflicts easily
- The need for flexibility in the organization and mandate of missions in order to be able to properly react in specific situations
- The need for mobility in order to prevent situations from escalating²¹

Canada's purpose in pushing for these reforms to UN peacekeeping was to ensure proper operational command and support for the rise of NATO prominence.²² This time period represented the UN's loss of its monopoly on peacekeeping²³ and the need for the UN to make fundamental changes to how it conceptualized plans and provided support for peacekeeping operations.²⁴

Around the same time, the Yugoslavia mission— specifically in Bosnia— had started to stall. While Canada had been involved in the region for a number of years, many soldiers complained of feeling ineffective and useless. Preston Manning, the leader of the Opposition Party during this time, stated in Parliament when discussing Canadians in Bosnia that "the time has come to bring our peacekeepers home so they might better serve the cause of peace another day."²⁵ Due to the increasing inability of the UN to follow through on the peace

agreements within Bosnia, in 1995 the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, where NATO replaced the UN as the provider of peacekeeping forces within the region.²⁶ 1995 signified the year that— at least for many Western countries— UN peacekeeping died, and its NATO replacement was sent into Bosnia to be the international guardian of peace.²⁷

The origin of NATO's transition from a collective trans-Atlantic security defence alliance into a peace enforcement organization stemmed from the end of the Cold War. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the need for a collective defense against the Eastern superpower diminished. If the alliance was to continue in the post-Cold War period, NATO had to reinvent its idea of security.²⁸ Shifting security interests from inter-state tensions to intra-state conflicts enabled NATO to confirm its new role in the international system. NATO's growing involvement in proactive security measures had secured itself, in the failure of the UN, to properly react in the Former Yugoslavia.²⁹ In 1995, when UN peacekeepers were held hostage in Bosnia due to the inability to protect themselves, the need for a newer and more robust peacekeeping system was apparent.³⁰

This failure allowed for the US-led NATO alliance to re-evaluate the role of the UN in peacekeeping. Seeing the UN as a structure that has limited ability to react— with peacekeeping as a last resort option—³¹ NATO dedicated itself to fulfilling the UN's old role. Adapting its *Strategic Concept* in 1999, NATO still gave the UN the primary responsibility for international peace and security.³² However, this role was interpreted as an administrative role linked to international law in which NATO would be the primary response system to prevent conflict and crisis.³³ With the expansion of NATO as a credible peacekeeping force, Canada began to focus its efforts in NATO-led missions.

However, shifting allegiances from the UN to NATO was not a decision of consensus. While the military and troop members had a preference for more clear and robust NATO missions, the public and Canadian politicians preferred the universal legitimacy of UN-led missions.³⁴ Much of the Canadian disagreement came from the mythology of UN peacekeeping, in which involvement in NATO was associated more with the American military complex.³⁵ This guilt by association had been largely due to the increasing amount of military interventionism that NATO-led missions had required. Much of the hostility that is directed toward Canada's role in peacekeeping regards their NATO involvement more than their UN involvement.³⁶

Despite the disagreement that ensued over Canada's peacekeeping role with NATO, the policy shift to promote NATO security only came from the failure of the UN as a robust peacekeeping institution at the time.³⁷ This sentiment continued into involvement in Kosovo, which the international community felt could be a repeat of Rwanda if left in the wrong hands. Canada's role in Kosovo began in the KFOR NATO mission. After years of involvement in stability building, Canada withdrew from the NATO-led KFOR mission and began to work with UNMIK on transitional administration assistance.³⁸ While Canada stood by NATO during the robust peacekeeping period, it felt like the role of the UN in transitional peace building was still an area Canada wanted to be involved in.

NATO was not the only multi-lateral organization that Canada turned to. In East Timor, the UN had been stationed to work towards an independence referendum and to maintain the integrity and peace throughout the vote. When violence and terror broke out after the referendum vote, the UN mission was ill prepared for the change in circumstance. As a result,

UN personnel evacuated from East Timor. As one Globe and Mail article cited during the conflict, the UN had “betrayed the Timorese people.”³⁹ Seeing the failure of the UN, Australia stepped up and asked nations to form a coalition enforcement mission, which Canada contributed to after the withdrawal of its Canadian troops from the UNAMET mission.⁴⁰

There were some attempts by Canada to improve UN operations as well. In 1996, Canada commissioned a study on ways to enhance the UN’s capability for more rapid and effective response mechanisms. In order to respond to peacekeeping needs more efficiently, they proposed a standby force— Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Peace Operations— that would be able to be quickly deployed in time-sensitive situations until other contingents could be deployed. In 1996, seven countries signed letters of intent to establish the SHIRBRIG, which would have included around 60-90 personnel stationed in Copenhagen who would be ready for duty in the year 2000.⁴¹

Canada also had a role in the shift of UN policy on intervention. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in 2000— also known as the ‘Brahimi Report’— signified the UN’s acceptance of the necessity of change. The report went into detail on eight different fundamental shifts in UN peacekeeping practices, which were meant to reinstate faith in the UN system. Relying on many Canadian suggestions and the appeals of NATO, the eight improvements were:

1. The need for a robust doctrine focusing on realistic mandates.
2. The need to respond effectively and efficiently to peacekeeping challenges.
3. The need for peacekeepers to defend themselves, and in turn be able to defend citizens from violence.
4. The need for new headquarters that had the capacity for appropriate information management and strategic analysis.
5. The need for improved mission guidance and leadership.
6. The need for advanced capacity to properly plan and support peacekeeping operations.

7. The need to integrate mission task forces from different fields to plan and support.
8. The need to adapt peacekeeping operations to the information age.⁴²

From the UN's perspective, Canada's role in international peacekeeping rested on their contribution of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2001. In September 2000, the Canadian government responded to the UN Security Council meeting in 1999 that emphasized the need to improve operations' conditions.⁴³ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) speculated on the issue of mandates in the UN's inability to extend and NATO's overextension. This commission presented a major contribution to modern UN peacekeeping, stating that when a population is suffering harm and the state is either unwilling or unable to avert it, the traditional principle of non-intervention yields to an international responsibility to protect (R2P).⁴⁴ Responsibility was enforced threefold: by the responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild.⁴⁵ The commission concluded that prevention was the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect,⁴⁶ and in order to diagnose possible conflicts, the UN needed to secure a functional program. The report outlined clearly the just causes for interventionism in order to disallow corruption of the system and to encapsulate the preventative measures of R2P.

The most recent shift of Canadian policy on interventionism since the Brahimi Report was in 2005, with the defence-specific section of the international policy statement. This 2005 report set guidelines on how Canada should perceive international intervention. According to the 2005 statement, a mission:

- Does not need consent of conflicting parties
- Should support Canada's foreign policy objectives
- Should not jeopardize other CAF commitments
- Should have a clear exit strategy

- Should have consultation among mission partners⁴⁷

Canada's reputation as a peacekeeping nation is predicated on the changing role of the UN and NATO in organizing peacekeeping operations. In the Cold War period, the UN had embraced peacekeeping operations as an international organization, while NATO focused on security. Due to bipolarization, Canada supplanted a peacekeeping role into national foreign policy in order to obtain a power position in the international system. The post-Cold War period saw a rise in UN peacekeeping missions and the restructuring of NATO to embrace stability. After failure of UN missions— many heavily involving Canadian leadership and recruits— NATO had become another player in the role of international peace. This period marked Canada's theoretical dedication to the UN and physical dedication to NATO missions. The attack of 9/11 and the years after it enforced a United States-led counter-insurgency method of 'peacekeeping' that Canada originally welcomed. As the positive reputation of NATO decreased with its role in Afghanistan and Iraq, Canada once again has refocused on UN peacekeeping missions in order to re-establish its national reputation.

Table 3 uses UN data to calculate the contributions of Canada to peace operations and Canada's rank in them from 1990-2016. In November 1990, Canada contributed a total of 1,002 personnel, ranking 1st in contributors.⁴⁸ In November 2000, Canada dropped to a ranking of 28th, with only 401 contributors.⁴⁹ The downward trend continued in October 2010, where Canada ranked 50th, with 200 total personnel contributed.⁵⁰ In the 25 years the UN has data recorded for personnel contributions by nation, Canada has gone from the top contributor to the low rating of 73rd as of April 30th, 2016, with only 79 contributions. The most recent

document the UN has out, for July 31th, 2016, has Canada ranking 67th out of 124 nations, with 103 total contributions.⁵¹ These numbers showcase the changing focus in Canadian history on the UN's role in peacekeeping.

Current Situation:

Canadian Armed Forces' Current Capabilities and Contributions

In the spring of 2016, the Department of National Defence published the *Defence Policy Review: Public Consultation Document 2016*, which includes information on the current capabilities and focuses of the CAF. As of this report, the defence team composes of:

- 24,000 Civilians
- 28,500 Reserve Forces
- 68,000 Regular Forces⁵²

As for the Canadian Army, the regular force personnel is made up of three mechanized brigade groups, the bulk of which consists of: three infantry battalions, three armoured regiments, one artillery regiment, three engineer regiments, and one service battalion.⁵³

The reserve units make up 115 army primary reserve units, which are organized into 10 brigade groups.⁵⁴

As for Special Operations Units, there are:

- Joint Task Force 2
- Canadian Special Operations Regiment
- Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit
- Special Operations Aviation Squadron⁵⁵

And for Joint Forces, there are:

- Joint Support Regiment
- Joint Support Group
- 4th Engineer Support Regiment
- 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support)
- 21st Electronic Warfare Regiment⁵⁶

As for International Operations, Canada is involved in a total of 15 missions abroad, accounting for 1,345 personnel as of April 2016. Table 4 in the annex summarizes these missions.

With the current regular forces at 68,000, minus the current internationally deployed CAF, there are currently around 66,655 regular forces that can be deployed– not all at once, however. Yet there are many CAF officers who are deployed domestically, are not deployable, or are committed to a battalion sized NATO Standby Force. As a result, there are approximately 2,500 deployable troops maximum that Canada can contribute internationally.

The *Defence Policy Review 2016* also discusses Canada’s potential to be involved in UN peace operations. The review states that “Canada has had a longstanding history of contributing both military and civilian capabilities to UN peace operations. This is a legacy of which Canadians are proud, and the Government is committed to renewing Canada’s contribution to peace operations.”⁵⁷ However, the policy review recognizes the evolving nature of peace operations, stating that most current UN peace operations are deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “where there is no clear peace accord to be monitored, the contested terrain is ever-changing, and the combatants rarely represent formal armies of recognized states.”⁵⁸

The *Defence Policy Review 2016* claims that Canada is among the top ten contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget, yet claims that Canada continues to “modestly” contribute to capacity building and training of other forces in the field and is “active” in UN efforts to reform

UN peacekeeping methods.⁵⁹ Even this review recognizes that Canada does not contribute to current UNDPKO in the form of military manpower. The review also overemphasizes the Canadian role in UNDPKO training— as most of Canada’s internationally available institutions for peacekeeper training have been dissolved, and domestic courses have been abandoned.⁶⁰

A report published in February 2016 by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, in partnership with the Rideau Institute on International Affairs, discusses the consequences of this abandonment. In *Unprepared for Peace? The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and What to Do About It)*, A. Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben state that “Unfortunately...training mechanisms and institutions involved in peacekeeping have been steadily eroding since the turn of the century, especially over the last decade, to the extent that Canada is in danger of becoming fundamentally unable to field adequately trained peacekeepers.”⁶¹ The report also states that:

“Given the dynamic nature of peacekeeping and the unique challenges that peacekeeping personnel face on an everyday basis, there is a need to ensure that they are adequately equipped with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required to perform their duties. Peacekeeping training is a strategic investment that enables UN military, police, and civilian staff to effectively implement increasingly multifaceted mandates.”⁶²

Both the *Defence Policy Review 2016* and *Unprepared for Peace* recognize the current government’s dedication to UN peace operations and highlight some areas the Canadian government may need to focus on with this renewal of its commitment.

In the time constructing this brief, the Government of Canada and the Department of National Defence have recently (26 August 2016) announced the launch of Global Affairs Canada’s new Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs)— with a pledge of up to 600 CAF personnel to be available for UN peace operations.⁶³ This launch comes with guaranteed

funding of \$450 million over three years to PSOPs.⁶⁴ Canada's PSOPs have three areas of responsibility:

1. To lead Canada's stabilization and fragile state policy.
2. To coordinate whole-of-government responses to conflicts internationally.
3. To support targeted stabilization programming and deployments to fragile and/or conflict-affected states.⁶⁵

The CAF are prepared to offer personnel within a variety of areas, including ground troops, air transport, leadership in command and headquarter positions, engineers, medical expertise, military and police training, and capacity building.⁶⁶

This recent pledge has now confirmed a concrete number for the amount of personnel that Canada plans to contribute to future UN missions. However, it has left out more specific areas of future participation, such as what type of role Canada hopes to have in future commitments. Therefore, this brief will help the Government of Canada to continue to narrow down its peace operations parameters from its recent commitments.

Public Opinion and the Role of the Canadian Armed Forces

Even as the CAF stands today, many Canadians have been blatant in discussing the potential for the military to be more internationally involved. Largely since the return of Canadian troops from Afghanistan, many have perceived the CAF needs to have a new contribution or focus area. Amongst the defence experts, there are numerous examples of very recent discussions of the CAF's UN role. David Perry, from the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, stated in September 2015 that there will be room for the next government to do more in

peacekeeping missions, especially with the return of the well-trained conventional Afghan troops.⁶⁷ Perry states that even if Canada does not deploy troops, the CAF can contribute specialists, commanders, or equipment, such as aircraft, to peacekeeping missions.⁶⁸

Paul Heinbecker, former Ambassador to the United Nation, also claimed around the time of Canadian election that Canada can begin contributing to UN peacekeeping again without having “boots on the ground.”⁶⁹ Heinbecker— like many others— suggests that Canadian soldiers could instead assist less militarily advanced nations in areas such as intelligence, transportation, or communication, or that Canada could assist with mission logistics or medical care.⁷⁰

George Petrolekas from the Canadian Global Affairs Institute— who also served in Bosnia and Afghanistan— argued in February 2016 that the CAF is more than ready for peacekeeping after Afghanistan. Petrolekas claims that during counterinsurgency operations, much of the CAF’s role was to protect and engage with the local populations “not only from a security standpoint but in rebuilding of civic structures and institutions.”⁷¹

As for public opinion, Canadians seem to have shifted their attitudes regarding the role of the CAF. A report published by Martin Shadwick in the Canadian Military Journal in Summer 2015 used the Department of National Defence’s Annual Tracking Study to determine Canadians’ perspectives of the CAF. According to the data, 43% of Canadians stated that the CAF should prioritize domestic issues, which is the highest on record since 2005, when data collection began.⁷² However, 40% of Canadians claimed that international issues should be of top priority.⁷³

In determining what the CAF's role should be internationally, the Annual Tracking Study defined:

- Peacekeeping as “operations around the world that involve observation duties or monitoring a ceasefire or truce between two conflicting parties”⁷⁴
- Peacemaking as “operations around the world that could include security patrols, development assistance, and fighting alongside allied troops to implement peace in an unstable area”⁷⁵

The study then used these definitions to ask Canadians what types of missions they support the CAF undertaking. In the results of the study, it was found that 52% of Canadians supported an international role that would be better defined as peacemaking, versus the 44% of Canadians that preferred more traditional peacekeeping roles.⁷⁶ While these numbers are very close, since 2011 the study has shown that Canadians have turned to favour peacemaking.⁷⁷

Though Canadians prioritize domestic military operations, having an international role is still very important. Since the conclusion of Canada's role in Afghanistan, Canadians have begun to see the CAF as a capable conventional military, aimed towards a combat role. There are strong indications that, in the post-Afghanistan period, international crises have once again shifted towards the United Nations, with NATO beginning to limit its involvement primarily to air strikes, such as Libya in 2011.⁷⁸ However, this does not mean the CAF should be restricted only to combat missions. The shift seems to lie in the fact that a majority of Canadians have recognized that future participation in multilateral operations will effectively involve robust peacemaking.⁷⁹

United Nations' Current Peace Operations and Canada's Current Contributions

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) currently supports 16 missions. Table 5 provides a summary of all 16 UN peace operations. As of March 31st, 2016, 10,658 uniformed personnel (troops, military observers, and police) are stationed across the 16 current UN missions. Even with 16 missions, UN peace operations account for less than 1% of global military spending.⁸⁰ For example, in the 2012-2013 budget, the UN spent 7 billion dollars on 15 missions involving more than 80,000 personnel – which equaled the amount that Canada spent in the 2010-2011 calendar year in Afghanistan with only 2,500 soldiers.⁸¹

Out of the 16 current UN peace operation missions, five are classified under Chapter VI mandates, while the remaining 11 are authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII conflicts largely contain four phases:

1. Pre-conflict phase
2. Combat phase
3. Stabilization phase
4. Nation building phase

Where the Cold War period of peacekeeping focused largely on freezing conflicts in place between the Combat phase and the Stabilization phase, these current Chapter VII missions focus largely on the reconstruction and reintegration of normalcy into post-conflict societies.⁸²

As of July 31st, 2016, Canada contributes a total of 103 military troops, military observers, and police personnel.⁸³ The UN does not provide data for the number of international civilian personnel from Canada that contribute to UN peace operations. Table 6 shows the troop, military observer, and police personnel contribution for the 5 UN peace

operations Canada participates in. Out of 103 total personnel, 75 are police personnel stationed on MINUSTAH in Haiti. Canada contributes 19 military troops and 9 military observers and/or experts throughout all 5 missions. 80 of Canada's total personnel are stationed on MINUSTAH in Haiti, with the second highest contribution stationed on UNMISS in South Sudan with 9 personnel.⁸⁴ This information shows that the distribution of Canadian involvement in UN peace operations is mostly put towards police involvement in Haiti. Considering that 87% of total UN peace operations personnel are involved in the nine operations on the African continent,⁸⁵ Canada's distribution is skewed and not aligned with UN directions.

Public Opinion and the Role of United Nations Peace Operations

Canada's relationship with the UN has been turbulent over the years. The refusal of the previous government to discuss the Standby High-Readiness Brigade that Canada had originally developed in 2009, followed by the loss of the UN Security Council seat in 2010⁸⁶ and the drop of UN military contributions from 10% to 0.07% in 2011,⁸⁷ has brought Canada currently to its lowest involvement with the UN. Many have tried to explain the loss of interest in the UN. Jocelyn Coulon and Michel Liégeois diagnose some of these concerns in "Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping? The Future of a Tradition."⁸⁸ They state that Western militaries— such as Canada's— are reluctant to be part of traditional peacekeeping missions due to the "painful memories in which the disrespect given to them by the warring parties resulted not only in mission failures, but also heavy losses."⁸⁹ The repercussions of these failures under the UN have led many military experts to prefer peacemaking operations to traditional peacekeeping.

Yet this opinion has not been reflected amongst the public in Canada. In 2010, a Nanos poll found that Canadians continued to rate UN peace operations as the highest future priority of the military (7.2 out of 10), while NATO operations were rated second, and combat missions rated the lowest.⁹⁰ According to a 2011 Canadian Elections Survey, 64% of Canadians believed Canada should participate in UN peacekeeping missions– even if CAF soldier’s lives will be at risk.⁹¹ Sean M. Maloney from the Royal Military College of Canada puts forth the idea that Canadians wholeheartedly believe in the “peacekeeping myth.”⁹² Canadians continue to believe that Canada is naturally inclined to promote and lead UN peace operations, and that the CAF has been actively involved with the UN up until today. Walter Dorn, a professor from the Canadian Forces College, reminds the Toronto Star that Canada has not contributed new troops for a UN peace operation since Eritrea in 2001.⁹³

While Canadians still believe the CAF is highly active in UN operations, public opinion has also increasingly recognized over the years the need for an evolution of what the UN terms “peacekeeping.” The UN has acknowledged the inefficiency of the Chapter VI method in a post-Cold War society as well. Recently, the United Nations has begun to speculate on what UN peace operations will entail in the future.

In June 2014, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous published a document on behalf of the UN titled: “New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping.”⁹⁴ He discussed that the UN and Department of Peacekeeping Operations faces fewer, but more complicated and entrenched conflicts.⁹⁵ Ladsous states that it is no longer enough for UN peace operations to protect by physical presence.⁹⁶ Peace operations must instead shift from

peacekeeping to “proactive protection”, such as the Intervention Brigade for MONUSCO in Democratic Republic of Congo.⁹⁷ Ladsous also discusses the need to expand the base of contributors in order to close the gap between capabilities required and capabilities provided.⁹⁸

In October 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a formal statement about the appointment of a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.⁹⁹ Ki-moon states that the last review was the Brahimi report from 2000, and since then operations have been directly targeted at volatile security environments.¹⁰⁰ The creation of the panel was meant to have a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peace operations.¹⁰¹ The assessment will include areas such as the changing nature of conflicts, peacebuilding challenges, the need for evolving mandates, and administrative and bureaucratic arrangements¹⁰² in order to ensure the success of future UN operations.

However, within the stakeholder nations that are part of the authorization, payment, or contributing troops, there are divisions. Roland Paris explains that countries such as France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and the West in general, are countries with low troop contribution rates, but with high monetary investment in the missions, which makes them push for robust actions. The African states have high troop contribution rates, and because of their heavy personnel involvement in many of the areas of peace operations, also push for highly robust peace actions.

On the opposite end, high contributing countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Brazil are more conservative and are likely to support more traditional peace operations. Other Security Council members— such as Russia and China— have low contribution rates both

financially and in personnel, and are much more conservative on the role of peace operations.¹⁰³ Paris goes on to explain that the “greatest risk to UNPO is not operational failure, but the growing divergence of opinion among countries that mandate, finance, and supply personnel to these operations— regarding purposes and practices of peacekeeping itself.”¹⁰⁴

Bridging the Gap

Currently, the three major parties— the Canadian citizenry, the CAF, and the UN— seem to be at an impasse. Yet, all of these parties want the same thing: to promote international peace. Canadians are mixed about how they want this to be achieved. Just over half of Canadians responded positively to the idea of the CAF taking on a larger peacemaking role in order to promote conflict resolution, while just under half would prefer Canada to stick to traditional Cold War peacekeeping. With the intermittent focus on NATO-led missions from the mid 1990’s to the present, Canadians are increasingly seeing the potential of a multi-functional army. As J.L. Granatstein states, “a professional army can do anything from the most benign blue beret to fighting a war; a peacekeeping military can only do peacekeeping.”¹⁰⁵

The Canadian Armed Forces have always had some reluctance towards UN peacekeeping. Before 1956, and up until the mid-1990s, this reluctance from army leadership was due to the fact that they thought peacekeeping was a distraction from the real task— defending against an attack by the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶ After the Cold War ended, the ideal of UN peacekeeping was eroded in the CAF by being involved in many unsuccessful missions. This led the CAF and Canadians to prefer NATO-led or other multinational missions with more robust mandates. Despite the decline of Canada’s role in NATO after Afghanistan, the CAF still wants to

participate in promoting peace internationally. However, the CAF is still scarred by the failures. As a result, the CAF is now of the opinion that in order to be involved, they must be able to evolve into a robust form of peacemaking. The CAF also faces the problem that “the Canadian military wants to be all things for all situations on a budget that does not allow for those ambitions.”¹⁰⁷

The United Nations is in the same situation as the CAF. While UN peace operations are at an all time high, the UN has not forgotten its failures. As a result, the UN has recently been attempting to rewrite the way it is involved in international conflicts. While they still believe in the inherent good of traditional peacekeeping, a lot of the old barriers that resulted in failures have been reformatted in order to fit the conflicts of the world today. However, since Canada has slowly retracted itself from UN operations, the CAF has not been able to redevelop alongside the UN. According to Dorn and Libben, “the methods, standards, numbers, and doctrines of the United Nations have all evolved considerably over the past decade as the UN experienced the surge of the new century, but Canada has not kept up. Neither has their CAF doctrine: the PSO manual has not been updated since 2002.”¹⁰⁸

This brief is designed to bridge the gap between public opinion, the CAF, and the UN in order to establish a healthy working order for future UN peace operation commitments by Canada.

Considerations:

Danger:

As peacekeeping missions have become increasingly more robust and complex, what becomes important to consider is the danger and fatality factor in choosing a future mission. As early as Somalia, Canadian commanders recognized the shifting consequences of a mission. Colonel Serge Labbe— commander of Canadian Joint Force in Somalia— stated after the fact that: “we were not going off to war, we recognize(d) that, but we also recognize(d) that in the snap of a finger we could be in a situation where we were amongst warring belligerents in a very hostile scenario.”¹⁰⁹ In order to properly react to these changes, personnel must be able to respond accordingly. Being tied down to a mandate that only allows a response at the last moment— such as for self-defence— does not allow personnel to assure the safety of its peacekeepers.

In situations such as Rwanda, Brent Beardsley discusses the need for proper peacekeeper protection, referring to the kidnapping and murder of Belgian peacekeepers in the early days of the violence in order to push the UN out of Rwanda. He states that the Canadian government needs to be aware of the fact that actors in conflicting societies can look into the recent past, such as Rwanda or Yugoslavia, and see that violence against peacekeepers can work.¹¹⁰ Beardsley states that if peacekeepers are not taken as a source of power, “safe havens are neither safe nor havens.”¹¹¹ In order to counteract the danger that peacekeepers face, Canada must consider the need for its personnel to be prepared to deploy counter attacks and violence.

Canada must also consider the potential of casualties in a reaffirmed peacekeeping role. As in any conflict situation, Canada must overcome its “allergy” to casualties in all modern operations.¹¹² By not accepting the risk of casualties, Canadian responses will remain focused strictly on the protection of troops in expense of the success of its mission– in the sense that the “arms of commanders will be bound (so) that they will not have the flexibility to be effective on the ground.”¹¹³ Carol Off describes this phenomenon by comparing the focus of both Lewis MacKenzie and Roméo Dallaire in their respective missions:

“There’s an unofficial debate within the ranks of the Canadian Forces: on the one hand, Lewis MacKenzie argues that the security of the soldiers comes first, the mission second and the force commander third. Then there’s the Dallaire view: it’s the mission first and the soldiers second. MacKenzie opened the Sarajevo airport and made sure that all his soldiers left Bosnia alive. Saving the country from war was not his job. He did all he could, he says, to persuade the two sides to end the war. It’s not his fault if they didn’t.”¹¹⁴

By accepting the risk early on, Canadians are prioritizing certain values that are important to them. Roméo Dallaire discusses the need for reinforcement in Rwanda, and states that: “Would we have risked more UN casualties? Yes, but surely soldiers and peacekeeping nations should be prepared to pay the price of safeguarding human life and human rights.”¹¹⁵ It is important to consider how the CAF represents its role internationally and amongst Canadians to ensure that values align with action.

Canada should also consider the evolution of casualties in peacekeeping missions. A report produced by James I. Rogers and Caroline Kennedy from 2014 compares UN peacekeeping fatalities from the periods 1948-2002 and 2003-2012 to see if the changing format of missions has resulted in different allocations of deaths. From 1948-2002, 33% of fatalities were from malicious acts, followed by 20% from illness, and 42% from accidents.¹¹⁶ From 2003-2012, the percentage of malicious acts drops to 14%, in which illness becomes the

first reason for death at 46%, followed by accident at 35%.¹¹⁷ While the report does state that peacekeeping deaths are higher within the second generation of peacekeeping, much of the casualties are preventable with the proper medical pre-requisites and care, as well as with proper communication within the mission to ensure accidents are less prominent. When Canada is considering the danger factor of peacekeeping, it must also ensure that it considers the preventable areas of fatalities as well as malicious acts.

Political Will:

In looking to join missions, Canada must consider the amount of political will and interest available for the mission. Understanding this political will can be separated into understanding the potential for international support and domestic national support. Internationally, this calculation was much easier to determine in the Cold-War peacekeeping era, where there were true areas of ideological influence and allies on both sides. However, understanding others' national interest in a conflict has become more difficult recently. After the Cold War, the success of a mission became highly dependent on the amount of international interest it garnered. In the first few years after the Cold War, Canada experienced a fluctuation of not only its own national interest in missions, but also on missions where other contributing nations were not interested in getting involved.

In Bosnia, Fred Doucette describes the failure of the UN to control the Serbians, in which: "The Serbs were making gains all over Bosnia, and the outside world seemed powerless to stop them. No, I'm wrong. They didn't care to do anything."¹¹⁸ In Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire

describes his difficulty with trying to get further help for the country of Rwanda during his leadership, in which:

“As the person charged with the military leadership of UNAMIR, I was unable to persuade the international community that this tiny, poor, overpopulated country and its people were worth saving from the horror of genocide – even when the measures needed for success were relatively small.”¹¹⁹

In considering future missions, Canada must consider the potential interests that it may have in the mission, as well as the amount of international support that exists in order to ensure the success of the mission.

As for Canadian national will, it is important for Canada to consider what its national interest in entering a specific mission and if that interest aligns with the mandate and goals of the mission itself. Dawson describes this phenomenon with misalignment during the Somalia crisis, in which:

“Canadian decision makers wanted to support multilateralism and humanitarianism in Somalia, and these objectives were supposed to be fulfilled by Canada’s UN peacekeeper contribution. The government did not offer deep and intensive support – such as working to construct a democratic system of governance for Somalia – even though this was necessary to achieve self-sustaining peace and security. The Canadian government was not interested in diplomatic peacemaking roles. It stayed aloof from the UN’s Somalia peace process because it was receiving little international or domestic attention.”¹²⁰

Another area that Canada must consider is the importance of the political will of the parties themselves to resolve the conflict. Discussed further under Negotiation and Mediation, E.L.M. Burns emphasizes the need for the parties to be respectful of a mission’s goals in order for the mission to be successful. In his experience in the Middle East, he points out that “both sides restricted the (UN) observers’ movement from time to time, especially when they thought that their ‘military security’ would be prejudiced – that is, when they had something to hide.”¹²¹

Canada must consider that it will be entering into a hostile environment, in which many of the conflicting parties may not have the will or the desire to end the conflict– especially when these

parties are separated from the state apparatus. Judging the amount of support that will be given by the population and the conflicting parties is important when deciding on future involvement in an area.

Media:

Another area in which Canada should consider for its future involvement in UN peacekeeping is the impact of the media on the amount of interest a conflict garners. The ability of the media to make the public extremely passionate about a certain mission on a short-term level in this generation is unheard of. This ability has been influenced by the end of the Cold War, in which changes to information and media technology resulted in conflicts being brought into living rooms.¹²² Now more than ever, the ability to hold media in the palm of your hand brings individuals extremely close to a conflict. Yet the ability for the media to keep a long-term hold on the public is still dependent on how aligned a mission is with Canada's national interest. Doucette describes the media phenomenon with his experience in Bosnia through an example of a bombing within a busy marketplace:

"I have no idea what outrage this bombing caused in the rest of the world, or how the media portrayed it. ... The media wolves had come and gone; they had captured the anguish of rescuers dragging the wounded, dead and dying to cars to be rushed to Kosovo Hospital. But the grisly aftermath – the litter of human body parts – was ignored. There is nothing sensational about a clean-up."¹²³

Canada must consider the importance of the media in ensuring that Canadians are properly informed on the mission's progress, as well as its ability to align the mission with more broad national interests for Canadians.

Experience with the United Nations:

Due to Canada's history in UN peacekeeping, it is important to consider the type of experiences that Canadians have had with the UNDPKO in previous years. While there were some positive experiences, many of the experiences that Canadians spoke about were written in the negative— and largely in the post-Cold War era. On the UNDPKO itself, Roméo Dallaire describes the offices as “essentially a thirty-sixth floor sweatshop.”¹²⁴ He further described the office conditions as a type of political scheme, in that “its sorely under-equipped state was possibly part of the image game that the UN plays in order to avoid the wrath of irresponsible media and the international political vultures who use any excuse to accuse it of ‘wasting’ money.”¹²⁵ Fred Doucette describes the idealistic attitude of the UN in not providing personnel with weapons in combat zones, in which: “(the) theory behind this was that the warring factions would feel that we were less of a threat and so would meet freely with us. Nice theory. In practice, it meant that anyone with a weapon would barge into your accommodation or pull your vehicle over and rob you and it.”¹²⁶ Being unable to protect themselves also translated to the vulnerable population they were meant to protect. Doucette describes his relationship with the Bosnian population under the UN flag:

“It was frustrating and heartbreaking to talk to the Bosnians. They believed – and this belief was based on their experience – that the UN Protection Force was useless ... I always tried to portray myself as ‘Fred from Canada and can I help?’ I didn’t try to legitimize myself just because I wore the UN badge. I tried keeping my word and never promised anything. A broken promise, regardless of the reason, was lost credibility.”¹²⁷

This inability to feel useful also leads to the inability to respond to situations properly.

According to Rick Hillier, under the UN:

“We put soldiers and sailors and airmen and airwomen, who served on the ground, in positions where they saw brutal acts that they were powerless to stop. That was a scar that a lot of our people brought back from the Balkans, and a scar that the entire Canadian Forces, particularly the army, brought back as an institution.”¹²⁸

Doucette also describes what he feels is the inefficient nature of the UN as a peacekeeper in comparison to NATO, in which he claims:

“Working for the NATO-led organization was a completely different experience from working under the UN. The ideal of UN peacekeeping is beautiful, but after my time in Zagreb, I concluded that the United Nations itself couldn’t run a one-man rush to the outhouse. Pragmatically, it was almost criminal to put Canadian troops under UN command in missions that were anything but absolutely benign because the UN was fundamentally incapable of running effective military operations. The UN Security Council, a large and dysfunctional committee based in New York, cannot provide effective vision, strategy and guidance to a UN military commander in the field. It certainly could not respond to dynamic and rapidly changing situations, particularly on weekends and holidays.”¹²⁹

Due to the many negative experiences discussed throughout this brief, numerous Canadians have focused on the importance of an evolution of the UN way of thinking—especially in the new era of conflict fighting. Dallaire describes this need in *Shake Hands with the Devil*, in which:

“(The) UN must undergo a renaissance if it is to be involved in conflict resolution. This is not limited to the Secretariat, its administration and bureaucrats, but must encompass the member nations, who need to rethink their roles and recommit to a renewal of purpose.”¹³⁰

Lewis MacKenzie discussed a lot of the disappointments of the UN in commanding missions, but also its ability for potential. Generally, he claims that:

“The vast majority of the people I worked with in the UN New York office were hardworking, dedicated individuals. They gave me every bit of support within their capacity to do so. Unfortunately, they were handcuffed by systemic inefficiencies within the overall UN bureaucracy.”¹³¹

Specifically, he describes a major fault of the UN capabilities, in which:

“At time of writing, (1993) there is still no military style command centre in UN New York: no one on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; no communications room with maps of the various operational areas on the wall and mission-knowledgeable duty officers manning the radios and keeping a log of all the information and requests coming in from the field. No army in the world would deploy its troops with so little direct control over what they were doing. The UN shouldn’t either.”¹³²

However, MacKenzie keeps the potential of the UN as peacekeepers as an option. He believes that:

“it is perhaps unfair and unwise to condemn the UN for failing to resolve the world’s problems, because when we do that, we are condemning ourselves. The UN is merely the sum of its parts: the best version we have of an international parliament.”¹³³

There are numerous testimonials on the Canadian UN peacekeeping experience, and it is important for Canada to consider its previous experiences when making decisions on its involvement. Canada must also consider that a lot of the experiences written come from a period where Canada was heavily involved in peacekeeping– and that the UN has continued to try to improve its capabilities for peacekeeping missions since Canada has taken a step back. Therefore, Canada must also be considerate of the amount of changes to the UN that have occurred during its hiatus.

Equipment and Training:

Canada must consider the ability of the UN to be able to provide the proper equipment necessary for the mission. Lewis MacKenzie describes this in many circumstances, including a specific example of which:

“In UNPROFOR, the role of the officer grew tremendously in importance; however, the vehicles and radios critical to their effectiveness never did show up in adequate numbers. Lives were put at risk as the observers’ vehicles were forced to go on patrol singly, when pairs of vehicles were absolutely necessary for safety.”¹³⁴

He also discusses the importance of a chain of logistics bases that would be stationed around the world to support these UN operations, in which the equipment would either be available, or the ability to purchase the equipment in a short period of time would be available.¹³⁵ According to Granatstein, during the later years of Canada’s peak contributions, the CAF had known the UN record for being disorganized and unable to supply equipment and

supplies regularly.¹³⁶ As a result, the CAF regularly took action to get around UN problems, such as sending more personnel carriers with the troops deployed on UNPROFOR than the UN asked for in order to ensure efficiency.¹³⁷

As for the proper training and placement of personnel, Rick Hillier describes the UN preparation for peacekeeping missions as inefficient and chaotic. He states that:

“We faced a diversity of languages and disparity of language skills, different orders from every national capital to their own troops, often bizarre directions from headquarters in New York (which varied from micromanagement to no direction at all) and bullets flying in all directions, leading to what could be interpreted as total chaos.”¹³⁸

Canada must also consider its role in preparing Canadians with the proper equipment and training in order to ensure success. Much of the testimonial discussions by Canadians involved in previous UN peacekeeping missions revolved around the disintegration of the CAF after the Cold War ended. A combination of budget cuts to National Defence and the CAF, personnel cuts by numbers and by the types of benefits, the reorganization and restructuring of many service areas, and the higher gender and bilingual language standards caused the breakdown of the military discipline of regiments.¹³⁹ Granatstein describes this decrease in Canadian military support as a large reason for the torture and murder of the Somali teenager in 1993.¹⁴⁰ The effective resource allocations of equipment and training are important in reaching the Canadian value of effective international involvement.

Negotiation and Mediation:

Much of the role of UN peacekeeping is to be part of the negotiation and mediation process. Depending on the status of the conflict when going in, this process may be more complicated than expected. Canadians have also experienced their share of UN mediation and

negotiation experiences. Similar to many of the factors of peacekeeping, most of the dynamics and strategies of this process changed in the ending of the Cold War. Lewis Mackenzie discusses his struggles in Sarajevo in gathering the two parties for the peace process, in which he states:

“The UN Strategy before 1991 was simple but pragmatic: if the fighting was to be kept under control, the best way was to keep talking. That’s why I became so frustrated in Sarajevo when I couldn’t convince the Bosnian President Mr. Alija Izetbegovic to talk directly with Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs.”¹⁴¹

Rick Hillier discusses the inability of the UN to carry any weight in upholding the peace.

He discusses that after the targeted massacre in Srebrenica:

“It became overwhelmingly clear that the United Nations’ approach to the crisis was dysfunctional and that its presence was tolerated by the warring parties only as long as each could manipulate it for partisan gain. The UN could do nothing to change the dynamics that were tearing the country apart and was usually completely ignored, with only the occasional local success to cheer about.”¹⁴²

However, Canadians who participated in UN missions during the Cold War also learned the difficulties in negotiation and mediation. E.L.M. Burns, the first major Canadian leader in a UN peacekeeping mission, describes the difficulties in obtaining peace during UNEF I:

“Diplomatic negotiation is ordinarily a kind of bargaining, where in each side hopes to get something and is prepared to make a concession to get it. The policies and purposes of the two negotiating parties must be such that at some point their interests coincide, or are parallel, if the negotiation is to be successful. In the negotiations in which the Chief of Staff UNTSO was engaged, the object of his principal, the United Nations, was to preserve peaceful conditions under the terms of the GAA. But the parties were pursuing objects which they esteemed more than simple maintenance of peace... These basically opposed objects not only inhibit peace negotiations, as I have several times observed, but they stultified all dealings between the two sides. A point was soon reached where one side or the other reasoned: ‘If I agree to this proposal which will make conditions more peaceful, I shall be limiting the possibility of attaining my ultimate object.’ So they found some pretext or other for not agreeing, while usually paying lipservice to peace, the sanctity of the GAAs and the Charter of the United Nations.”¹⁴³

Lewis MacKenzie summarizes his experience in Saigon, Vietnam during the 1970’s – he claims that there:

“was a peacekeeping lesson that was slowly etching its way into the area of my brain where unequivocal truths are kept... In reality, you were rarely, if ever, an important part of the solution to an armed conflict; but you were a critical factor in getting the entire peace process rolling.”¹⁴⁴

In order for Canada to consider its role in UN peacekeeping, it must remember the inherent fact that both Canada and the UN are separate, independent entities entering to promote the discussion of conflicting parties and that the process is highly dependent on the cooperation and intent of the parties to resolve the conflict. It is therefore important to take in the previous Canadian experiences and understand the potentials for specific conflicts to be resolved under a UN mandate.

Opinion of Missions:

Canada must consider the impact that an increased involvement in UN peacekeeping may have on the CAF. The opinion of the CAF on its involvement in the UN may have a large impact on the potential for Canadians to be successful in their roles. This requires taking a look at some of the opinions of Canadians who participated in missions. Much of the opinions are torn, and they seem to be highly dependent on the relative mandate and deemed success of the mission. For example, E.L.M. Burns describes his experience in UNTSO, an operation that began in 1953 and still exists today, as “the feeling that I was trying to stop a runaway truck on a steep hill by throwing stones under the wheels.”¹⁴⁵ Rick Hillier has also described the military opinion of its role in Egypt as “infinitely boring, in squalid conditions, and completely without glamour.”¹⁴⁶

However, Hillier describes the difference between those that served in missions such as Egypt and those in missions such as Yugoslavia. Due to the high profile Canadian involvement in Yugoslavia, and “thousands of troops on the ground,” Hillier describes that:

“the feeling in the army was that if you hadn’t been, you just didn’t have credibility. This was soldiering, and if you did not want to be there, you should not have been in uniform.”¹⁴⁷

Along with Rick Hillier, Lewis MacKenzie was an experienced UN peacekeeper. Specifically, he describes the difficulties faced by soldiers in Cyprus that were similar to the description of Egypt, in that:

“no one ever left our unit for civvie street because military life was too hard. But over the years, lots of soldiers left because it was not as exciting as they’d expected. Soldiers like to be busy, and in Cyprus it was becoming increasingly difficult to provide them with an adequate challenge.”¹⁴⁸

MacKenzie carries on to explain that generally:

“As a rule, Canadians like serving on peacekeeping duty. A soldier’s morale is directly proportional to what you can brag about. No one brags about the easy assignments, or about working at a desk in the Department of National Defence headquarters in downtown Ottawa. And nothing is worse than having to suffer in silence through your colleague’s war stories after their return from duty in one of the world’s hotspots. I’m sure some military personnel do volunteer for peacekeeping duty for higher reasons, such as alleviating human suffering wherever it may be found, but for the majority of us, it’s the excitement and camaraderies that beckon. I doubt soldiers will ever change in this regard, and hope they never will.”¹⁴⁹

In order for Canada to consider its involvement in future missions, it is important to get a gauge on the attitudes of the CAF towards specific missions and mandates. A positive attitude on the CAF contribution internationally will ensure positive morale and a higher chance of mission success.

Solving the Underlying Problem:

One of the concerns with conflict resolution is dealing with the underlying issues or problems that allowed the conflict to escalate. This requires an inherent and deep understanding of the history and culture of the area Canada is entering, and the type of issues that instigated the conflict— areas such as land disputes, cultural disputes, political conflict, and tribal or ethnic conflicts.

Rick Hillier describes the inherent hatred that continued to exist in Bosnian society after the conflict there— regardless of the Dayton Peace Accords. He describes revisiting a Bosnian village after the conflict and visiting a school, only to find hateful propaganda within its history textbooks in its library and to find the children singing violent songs. He states that “the hatred was being promulgated from one generation to the next through their education system. It was a stark lesson in how hatred can perpetrate itself.”¹⁵⁰

Dallaire and Beardsley both also discuss the need to study the roots of the conflict. Their conclusion comes from the difficulty assigning blame for the results of the conflict in Rwanda, to which Dallaire summarizes that:

“Too many parties have focused on pointing the finger at others, beyond the perpetrators, as the scapegoats for our common failure in Rwanda... Instead, we need to study how the genocide happened not from the perspective of assigning blame – there is too much to go around – but from the perspective of how we are going to take concrete steps to prevent such a thing from ever happening again. To properly mourn the dead and respect the potential of the living, we need accountability, not blame. We need to eliminate from this Earth the impunity with which genocidaires were able to act, and re-emphasize the principle of justice for all, so that no one for even a moment will make the ethical and moral mistake of ranking some humans as more human than others, a mistake that the international community endorsed by its indifference in 1994.”¹⁵¹

Dallaire also comes to a conclusion on what he feels the root causes of these conflicts are. He feels that the “lack of hope in the future is the root cause of rage. If we cannot provide hope for the untold masses of the world, then the future will be nothing but a repeat of Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Congo, and September 11th.”¹⁵²

Canada must consider the importance of understanding the underlying issues of a conflict and help to resolve them in a post-conflict reconstruction process. Canada must consider this area not only for its inherent good, but also to determine the type of conflict it will

involve itself in, the specific role that it will hold in the mission, and the time line of its involvement in the mission.

Information:

The importance of up-to-date and proper information on a UN mission is critical. One of the major areas of issue for all of the Canadian testimonials examined was the lack of properly communicated information on the mission.

Grant Dawson describes the improper information provided to the Government of Canada when they were asked to provide support to the Somalia mission, where the UN requested them to take a specific area of North East Somalia. According to Dawson:

“the government discovered its troops would have little aid escort work when they deployed to Bossaso in North East Somalia. It had assumed as late as 25 September that the Airborne was needed to protect relief supplies in North East Somalia, but on the 30th, a team from the Canadian High Commission in Nairobi paid a visit and found that no one in the area was starving... Conversation with the faction (Somali Salvation Democratic Front) revealed that NGO operations were unthreatened and not in need of protection.”¹⁵³

This miscommunication caused a deployment of the CAF to be relatively useless in providing any support for the Somalia mission. Even when Canada realized its error in deployment, the Canadian government continued to keep the CAF deployed in order to prevent a backlash of public opinion.

Canadians also had their experiences with a lack of information on the mission – or the area it was located – at all. Dallaire describes his reaction of being told of his leadership position in UNAMIR, in which he responded: “Rwanda, that’s somewhere in Africa, isn’t it?”¹⁵⁴ He later goes on to discuss his own personal lack of knowledge on Rwanda and the African continent, stating that:

“Growing up Catholic in Quebec in the fifties, I had been captivated by missionary tales from the ‘dark continent.’ As a result, my notions of Africa were outdated and Eurocentric. I combed the library for anything I could find on Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of central Africa. There wasn’t much. But serious work was afoot, and time was of the essence.”¹⁵⁵

Dallaire reemphasizes this lack of information and knowledge on the area later in his reasoning for the failure in Rwanda.

For Canada, it is important to consider the role of proper information on the mission, the mandate, and the region that the CAF will enter into before deployment through training and during deployment through incessant communication throughout the mission. While ideally the UN should be a major participant in updating Canadians on the information necessary for the mission before deployment, Canada should consider not being solely reliant on the UN to provide the necessary information. Instead, it should ensure that it provides proper research and training for its CAF personnel itself.

Credibility, Failure, and Success:

Canada must consider how it will judge its credibility in future missions. Previously, the judgment of success or failure seemed to be emphasized by either those that had leadership roles on the mission or by the media interpretation of Canada’s role. Carol Off describes the differing opinions on how these mission leaders deemed success. According to Off, “Lewis MacKenzie is as convinced of the success of his 1992 mission to Bosnia as Roméo Dallaire is convinced of the utter failure of his mission to Rwanda two years later.”¹⁵⁶ Dallaire himself discusses the belief of personal failure in Rwanda, which he links back to his own lack of information on the region and UN missions generally. He questions:

“Why was I chosen to lead UNAMIR? My experience was in training Canadian peacekeepers to go into classic Cold-War style conflicts. I had never been in the field as a peacekeeper myself. I had no political expertise and no background or training in African affairs or maneuvering in the weeds of ethnic conflicts in which hate trumps reason. I had no way to gauge the duplicity of the ex belligerents. No essential prerequisites of formal education and training for the job.”¹⁵⁷

Off contradicts this leadership view, however, by claiming that:

“There is another standard by which to judge their respective missions. Roméo Dallaire is welcome to return to the country he served in. Those who survived its horror believe that he, at least, did all within his power to save them. MacKenzie is not welcome back in Bosnia, unless he wants to face Mustafa Bisic in court.”¹⁵⁸

As for the media perception, Rick Hillier describes the impact of how the media and public opinion can judge the entire Canadian role of a mission. Largely exemplifying Somalia,

Hillier states:

“The public perception was that the entire Somalia mission had been a dismal failure. The fact that the mission, or at least our piece in it, went as well as one could expect in a mission, without a clear strategy, without a clear plan, was lost. The politicians sent us in there thinking ‘We must do something, and therefore we’ve got to do something.’ I think that set our soldiers up for failure. The troops did the best they could. Then we had the breakdown in discipline and breakdown in the command and control structure that allowed something like taking a detainee and torturing him so badly that he eventually died to occur, which is absolutely unforgivable, absolutely unacceptable. And that is the only thing that people remember about the mission. So one thousand people went, worked their asses off under appalling conditions in an ambiguous, unclear mission, without much support from the Government of Canada, and all that people remember is that one episode.”¹⁵⁹

He carries on further with his own lessons about the public opinion’s impact on the CAF’s credibility, and how the CAF was to handle situations such as the Somalia scandal:

“Up until then, I wasn’t sure I wanted to continue to be a part of this devastated Canadian Forces, but I started to realize that the problem was that we had lost contact with Canadians, and if we were going to survive, the Canadian Forces had to win back their respect. We needed to recruit the entire nation and get the Canadian people back on our side. That recruitment had to be done from a basis of credibility. Average Canadians and our countries leaders had to have complete confidence in their military and its leaders. Credibility was our centre of gravity and had to be built and protected at all cost. That would sometimes mean publically correcting the record if others said something wrong, but our integrity as leaders had to be beyond question. Those were my biggest lessons out of the Somalia affair, but it was only later that I found out how difficult they were to implement.”¹⁶⁰

Canada must consider its history in UN peacekeeping– its successful missions, failures, and political and military ramifications when these failures amount to a loss of credibility. By

looking at these previous areas, Canada will be able to ensure it responds to these situations properly in future UN involvement.

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse:

Another area of concern for Canada is approaching the dark history of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) allegations and actions by UN peacekeepers.¹⁶¹ Official allegations of such magnitude involving UN personnel have been made in Bosnia Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and the Central African Republic.¹⁶² While this problem has existed for multiple generations, the UN only took steps to address this in the early 2000's with Resolution 1325, which committed "to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations."¹⁶³ This move was important for the UN, as these allegations damage not only the UN's international reputation, but also its reputation among the local populations and parties of conflict.¹⁶⁴ However, the UN has been largely aloof about the message they are trying to send about SEAs. According to Machiko Kanetake, who accessed the UN's Zero Tolerance Policy:

"The UN has been sending a somewhat double-edged message about sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. On the one hand, it expresses grave concern about the exploitation of the vulnerable and vows to take more stringent measures against it; while, on the other hand, it is eager to cool public fever against the misconduct, on the grounds that it was the 'behaviour of a relative few.' This illustrates the UN's sensitivity to its public reputation and its desire to divert public attention from the stain on the record of UN peacekeeper's success and dedication."¹⁶⁵

Instead, a lot of the focus on resolving these SEAs has been put on the contributing states. In 2007, the UN published the memorandum of understanding model that entrusts contributing states to take the lead in investigations of SEA allegations committed by their

personnel.¹⁶⁶ While Kanetake claims that most member states vote on the importance of a zero tolerance policy, “its implementation will only succeed if pertinent states have the capacity and the willingness to exercise their disciplinary or criminal jurisdiction.”¹⁶⁷

Recently, Canada has experienced a series of allegations against officers stationed in Haiti – two Sûreté du Québec sergeants and two Montreal police force officers.¹⁶⁸ Out of these recent allegations, only the two members of the Montreal police force were punished– and only with a suspension of five and nine days– for the fathering of children with Haitian women.¹⁶⁹

These allegations have raised questions about Canada’s ability to comply with its responsibility to protect vulnerable populations and its impartiality in UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁷⁰ To this capacity, Canada must consider its role in the ensuring the implementation of a domestic zero tolerance policy and also look to further support the UN processes of SEA allegations.

Veterans:

During Canada’s capability-commitment gap, CAF personnel went from around 80,000 in the early 1990s to around 20,000 in the late 1990s, but were still expected to maintain a high level of UN operations.¹⁷¹ This resulted in soldiers being forced into a new cycle of life: sent away for up to six months, returning for six months, and then being sent away for another six months.¹⁷² Combined with high personnel cuts, the wage cuts forced many soldiers to have to take part time jobs to support their families, resulting in an extreme strain on service

families.¹⁷³ This strain largely stimulated household problems such as drunkenness, wife battering, and divorce within service personnel.¹⁷⁴

One must also consider the importance of Veteran Affairs in increasing peacekeeping involvement. Up until 2001, Veteran Affairs did not consider peacekeepers to be veterans until 2001, when those that served in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were included.¹⁷⁵ Up until 2001, those that suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from the atrocities witnessed in peacekeeping missions— especially in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda— were inherently ignored, with little support or treatment.¹⁷⁶ Fred Doucette, who was a Canadian stationed in Sarajevo, recalls his experience with PTSD in his book *Empty Casing: A Soldiers Memoir of Sarajevo Under Siege*. In it, he describes coming home and being put through a routine military mental health check and the lack of follow up on the results:

“After almost two months, and only after I inquired, did they realize I was special. It was as if they were required to ask us on paper how we were doing, but not required to tell us how we were doing. For them, it was simply a paper exercise that had no link to the mental health of the soldiers.”¹⁷⁷

Since Canada has not had a major role in UN peacekeeping since 2001, Canada must consider the importance of defining who a veteran is before those of future missions return from deployment. This will ensure the integrity of the peacekeeping culture the Government of Canada is trying to recreate will be respected throughout the CAF.

NATO:

The impact of NATO on the evolving concept of peacekeeping is a very important area of consideration for Canada. In order to comprehend the future international role that Canada intends to have, it must take into consideration its involvement in NATO. Largely, the

movement towards NATO-led missions began when NATO went into Yugoslavia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in which it was given responsibility to implement the Dayton Peace Accord. Hillier describes NATO's determination and ability to use its combat power to get all the parties in line and comply with the Accords.¹⁷⁸ Doucette also states: "NATO spared no expense in convincing the Serbs that it was time to comply."¹⁷⁹

However, Doucette also held mixed feelings on the arrival of NATO. In one sense, he describes the mood of Sarajevo after the arrival of NATO as upbeat:

"I was downtown one day and noticed more people out and about, enjoying the sense of security that the NATO planes seemed to offer. Everyone knew this was what should have been done years ago."¹⁸⁰

In reflecting on NATO, Doucette claims he "also felt that NATO was doing its best to make amends for the times when it should have gotten involved but didn't."¹⁸¹

It is also important to consider the impact NATO had specifically on Canada. While the Canadian role in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan has been debated, Granatstein believes the CAF were able to re-establish its damaged military credibility in Afghanistan,¹⁸² both to Canadians and internationally. Afghanistan allowed the CAF to move beyond the "Canadian peacekeeper and nothing else" mythology.¹⁸³ Internationally, the NATO mission proved to Canada's allies that its old reality as a 'Can't bat' (as the British labeled Canadian battalions in Yugoslavia) had disappeared.¹⁸⁴

Canada must also consider its current commitments to NATO in determining potential involvement with the UN. Canada's NATO commitment of a Standby Force that is ready to deploy is a barrier to the amount of personnel Canada could commit to other organizations, such as the UN. Canada has not only begun to consider strengthening its role in the UN, but has

also committed to increased involvement in NATO as well. The commitment of 450 Canadian personnel to Latvia– which is likely to be from the standby battalion– is an example of how Canada has already taken action in committing personnel to NATO.

In considering NATO, Canada must ensure that its decisions in further UN involvement do not jeopardize the relationship Canada holds with NATO. It should consider taking the lessons learned from the previous focus on NATO missions and apply them to its renewal of commitment to the UN in order to ensure the consistent growth and development of the CAF.

Recommendations:

In order for the Canadian Armed Forces to consider heavier involvement in UN peace operations, this brief provides recommendations on conditions that the Government of Canada should follow when considering future UN peace operation involvement.

1. In making decisions on future UN involvement, the Government of Canada must consider undertaking fewer, high quality missions instead of committing to high quantities of missions.

One of the topics in the above discussion was the capability-commitment gap that developed in the peak of Canadian peacekeeping contributions. This gap, combined with the military budget and personnel cuts, meant the CAF was unable to properly address the needs of their military or the needs of the missions. To this end, when the Government of Canada makes future decisions on the missions it would like to get involved in, they should consider taking on less missions with more concentrated resources and personnel in order to make Canada's contribution to the mission more safe and effective. The Government of Canada should also consider the type of impact Canada can make on a specific mission— whether it is a specialization that Canada has a unique advantage in, or on the status of the mission itself.

2. In making decisions on specific missions, the Government of Canada must work to understand and communicate the context and history of the conflict and its region. There must be a focus on resolving the underlying issues that escalated the conflict in order to be involved in the mission most effectively.

Some of the major failings of many previous peace operations have been a lack of understanding of the real roots of the conflict. In the case of UNAMIR, both Dallaire and Beardsley discuss the failure of knowledge. Citing France and the United States as an example, Dallaire states that those nations got involved in the mission too late and ended up protecting the genocidaires— leading to permanent destabilization of the Great Lakes region.¹⁸⁵ Beardsley discusses lessons learned from Rwanda in future missions, stating that in order to justify a missions actions, “they (contributors to the mission) must understand the situation on the affected grounds with knowledge of the past and the present in order to develop an effective operational level campaign plan for the future.”¹⁸⁶ While it is difficult to fully determine the motivations from the outside, in order to conduct successful missions, the Government of Canada must have the proper context and information specific to the conflict in order to consider whether it should participate in that specific mission.

The Government of Canada must also consider the UN plans for the use of reconciliation and justice within the recovery process in order to prevent future conflicts in the area. The ability for the UN to acknowledge the underlying issues that escalated the conflict is important for the long-term stability and peace within the region. While Canada may not choose to be part of this peace building process, they would have an inherent interest in the success of the mission, as it reflects on their use of resources as a positive for the military. Therefore, it is important that Canada consider being involved in peace operations that have more potential to succeed based on the likelihood of post-conflict support by the UN.

3. In making decisions on specific missions, the Government of Canada must consider joining missions with flexibility in the mission's mandate and rules of engagement.

The difficulties that the CAF faced during its peak time as peacekeepers largely revolved around the inability to react to changing environments. Canada's failures in the deadly trilogy—Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda— largely coincided with the Security Council's inability to rapidly react to new situations. In order for Canada to participate in a future mission, the Government of Canada must choose missions that will respond to new situations and modify outdated mandates and rules of engagement. One way to ensure this rapid response would be to establish alternatives and models for different possible situations within mission parameters – in which the Security Council and troop contributing nations would already be prepared for an evolving mission environment.

4. In making decisions on specific missions, the Government of Canada must consider who will be involved with the mission. The Government of Canada should consider peace operations that coordinate Canada's role with its allied partners' roles in the mission.

In order for Canada to participate in a specific mission, it should consider information about the current troop contributing nations, their role within the mission, which nation(s) is/are taking the lead on the mission, what type of personnel will be available from these troop contributing nations, and what level of commitment they have provided towards the mission. In discussing the lessons learned from Afghanistan, J.L. Granatstein and David J. Bercuson state that: "Canada needs to know who is on its left flank, who is on its right, what their capabilities are, and what degree of political will they will bring to the fight."¹⁸⁷ By understanding who

Canada will be participating with, Canada will be able to properly access its own role within the mission in order for its participation to be efficient.

By researching into the contributing nations, Canada can also make decisions on its role in the mission based on the amount of allied support that the CAF would have. While some may argue that this defeats the purpose of neutrality, Canada's willingness to take sides in the past has actually empowered it as a peacekeeper.¹⁸⁸ Adam Chapnick cites examples such as Canada's support of Egypt with the Suez Canal, which allowed it to push forward a decision of action that the world still listened to.¹⁸⁹ Chapnick also cited that in the coordination of the Cyprus mission, where Canada's alliance with both Greece and Turkey allowed it to have a better position in the establishment of that mission.¹⁹⁰ Coordinating future UN peace operations with allies provides Canada with the advantage of having reliable logistics support and ensured rapid reaction times.

5. In making decisions on specific missions, the Government of Canada must consider involvement in missions that allow for the CAF to deploy personnel together.

Rick Hillier and Lewis MacKenzie— both highly experienced, multi-mission military men— discussed the need for the CAF to be deployed together. For MacKenzie, this realization came during UNEF II, in which he claimed:

“I was absolutely convinced that, given any choice in the matter, only formed units should be sent on peacekeeping duty. Throwing together a heterogeneous force of individuals from across the country at the eleventh hour created an almost impossible problem for the unit's leadership.”¹⁹¹

Hillier also saw the chain of command problem when he reflected on his experience in Yugoslavia:

“When you threw in a multinational mix of soldiers and commanders, it became clear why so little was accomplished ... 60 different nationalities under UN in former Yugoslavia. None of those nations had trained together, and each had different operating procedures, values and approaches that varied enormously from one nation to another.”¹⁹²

Rick Hillier also discussed the consequences of having Canadians deploy separately:

“(The) other lesson from my first Bosnian tour was that if Canada wants to maximize the effects of having its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwomen involved in operations, we have to work together as a Canadian Force, under one flag. Under the UN mandate, we had Canadian troops scattered all over Bosnia and Croatia – an abysmal way of doing business.”¹⁹³

He goes on to describe that even though Canadian numbers totaled 4,000 troops, every 6 months for 3 years, “none of the individual parts were big enough to give Canada the clout among NATO allies to give us any real influence or voice on how the former Yugoslavia was going to develop.” As a result, “despite the enormous investment, cost, amounts of work and loss of life, we got almost zero credit for it internationally.”¹⁹⁴ To this end, Canada should ensure its personnel would be deployed together to keep track of efficiency of the mission and ensure Canada is seen as an impactful member state of the mission.

6. In making decisions on specific missions, the Government of Canada should establish a clear exit strategy or withdrawal date.¹⁹⁵ The Government of Canada should be clear on Canada’s short-, medium-, and long-term objectives of the mission.

Before Canada commits to a new UNPKO mission, it must consider the long-term objectives of the mission. The CAF must be made aware of what status this mission is before going in: Prevention, Peacemaking, Peace enforcement, Peacekeeping, or Peacebuilding. The CAF must also be clear on the intentions of the UN mission to incorporate all or some aspects of these five stages. Brett Beardsley discusses the importance of time and commitment when it comes to UN peace operations. He states that:

“These decision makers must also understand the importance of time. In the near-term, they need to act rapidly, but the mid-term and long-term, requirements must be realistically measured in terms of years and decades of commitment.”¹⁹⁶

Not only will this information provide credibility to the mission, it will also inform the CAF on the type of role it hopes to facilitate if it chooses to be part of this mission. Knowledge on the extent of the mission will provide information to the Government of Canada for future contributions of police and civilian personnel. It will also allow Canada to have a clear exit withdrawal strategy based on how it will position its role in the mission and how the mission will shape Canada’s international priorities.

7. When a decision is made, the Government of Canada needs to communicate to Canadians the type of peace operation that Canada will be involved with. The Government of Canada needs to communicate operational and tactical changes in the mission to Canadians in a timely manner.

On August 10, 2016, The Globe and Mail published an article on Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan’s fact-finding tour in Africa, where he stated:

“What Canada will ask its soldiers to do in Africa can no longer be called peacekeeping because the term doesn’t reflect modern demands of stabilizing a conflict zone... I think we can definitely say what we used to have as peacekeeping before, is no longer. We don’t have two parties that have agreed on peace and there’s a peacekeeping force in between...Even using the terminology of peacekeeping is not valid at this time... Those peacekeeping days, those realities, do not exist now and we need to understand the reality of today.”¹⁹⁷

These types of statements are important in preparing the Canadian public to enter back into UN peace operations.

As seen throughout this brief, the theme of public opinion is extremely important for the CAF. Public support of a mission is not only important for military morale, but also to ensure that Canada has the political will to achieve its mandate in the mission. According to Dallaire, it

is also extremely important in choosing future missions, in which he claims: “Canada and other peacekeeping nations have become accustomed to acting if, and only if, international public opinion will support them.”¹⁹⁸ To this end, Canada needs to ensure proper communication with the public on the status of its missions to ensure that Canadian public opinion is supportive of Canada’s role within the operation.

8. Before deployment, the Government of Canada needs to establish a clear chain of command between participating militaries, participating governments, and the bureaucratic institutions of the United Nations.¹⁹⁹

One of the issues experienced by Canadians under previous peace operations was the inability of anyone on the mission to know ranks and who to report to. This fractured command structure makes it difficult for the consistent relaying of information between all parties involved and can lead to inefficiency in the mission. Before deployment, the Government of Canada must make the command structure of the mission clear to the CAF, as well as the command structure of the UNDPKO office in order to ensure proper communication throughout the life of the mission.

9. Before deployment, the Government of Canada needs to integrate preparation for peace operations into the institutional culture of the CAF.²⁰⁰ ***In deployment, the Government of Canada needs to ensure that the CAF is deployed with the proper equipment, training, and personnel numbers in order to achieve operations mandate.***²⁰¹

Due to the decreasing prominence of peacekeeping as a focus for the Government of Canada and the CAF, Canada must ensure that there is enough time provided to reinstitute

proper training mechanisms and peacekeeping culture back into the CAF. According to A. Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, “it is not sufficient for the CAF to train purely for war-fighting on the assumption that preparation can be “scaled back” for stability operations like peacekeeping.”²⁰² To ensure that peacekeeping etiquette and culture is recognized, units must undergo months of mission-specific training that includes areas such as: cultural awareness, reinforcement of the Geneva Conventions, negotiating skills, and incident simulation.²⁰³ The UN also values training in areas such as:

“Understanding the United Nations and peacekeeping institutions and processes; mandated tasks (such as protection of civilians, child protection, promotion of human rights); cross-cutting issues such as gender and how to integrate them in one’s work; and the application of UN peacekeeping fundamental principles (like consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate).”²⁰⁴

This time is valuable not only for the efficiency of the personnel, but also to ensure that Canada can supply the proper amounts of personnel and equipment to meet its specific role within the mission.

10. *During deployment, the Government of Canada must ensure accountability of its own troops for their behaviour. The Government of Canada must be a leader in holding other troop contributing nations accountable under a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy.*

In recent years— regardless of its low contribution rate— Canada has been the centre of many sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) allegations by our peacekeepers.²⁰⁵ The UN and other advocacy groups have pleaded with the Trudeau government to set an example in the zero-tolerance policy for sexual abuse and exploitation claims of UN peacekeepers.²⁰⁶ While adding peacekeeping-specific training for the CAF will likely mediate some of these issues, it involves Canada being accountable to the vulnerable population it intends to serve, as well as

to the international community. Canada must ensure that it takes initiative to properly punish those individuals who have allegations against them in order to set an example for the international community to have a zero-tolerant attitude towards SEAs in UN peacekeeping missions.

11. After deployment, the Government of Canada must be accountable to its veterans by adapting its policies on veteran support for personnel who are part of UN peace operations.

Despite the amount of peacekeeping missions that Canada has contributed to—compared to traditional wars—Canada’s veteran policy does not treat Canadians on UN missions as true veterans. Regardless of the previous reasoning, the requirements and actions of peacekeeping have become increasingly similar to those of war fighting. The type of experiences realized within these situations is, unfortunately, becoming more extreme. As a result, those from the CAF need to be assured that Canada recognizes their contribution as a full military contribution, in the sense that they will be supported as they return home. With a special focus on mental health, Canada must change its restrictions on peacekeepers being considered as veterans and ensure that Canada promotes a strong, safe, and healthy CAF.

ANNEX:

Table 1: Definitions

Type of Mission	Purpose of Mission	Means of Mission
Peacekeeping; Chapter VI Missions	Observer and Inter-positional; Peacekeepers are brought in after the warring parties sign a ceasefire agreement or peace agreement in order to ensure that both parties are adhering to the conditions set within the said agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical presence at borders/barriers • Use of foot and vehicle patrols, posts, checkpoints • Use of UN military observers, civilian observers, and or troops • Force can be used only in self-defence
Peacemaking; Chapter VII Missions	Multi-dimensional; Peacekeepers are brought in to a current conflict in order to be involved in the arbitration and mediation of the conflict in order to oversee and assist in the creation and implementation of a ceasefire and/or peace agreement	Observation roles from Chapter VI Mission, plus: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of vulnerable civilians • Oversight of police and security sector forces • Humanitarian assistance
Peacebuilding; Chapter VII Missions	Transitional; Peacekeepers and civilian personnel come into a post-conflict area to govern a territory during a transition to independence and/or self governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elections monitoring • Security sector reform (SSR) • Establish a state of law and order • Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) • Stabilization efforts • Resettlement of displaced civilians • Reconciliation
Peace Enforcement	Multi-dimensional; In more severe full-fledged conflict, peace enforcement actions would include all the actions involved in peacemaking, plus more robust actions taken against parties who are committing atrocities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counter-insurgency • Sanctions • War operations

*** Peace Operations is the term used both by the Prime Ministers' mandate letters and by the UN to replace the traditional use of the word Peacekeeping. Peace Operations may involve all or parts of the above four definitions.**

Table 2: List of UN Peacekeeping Operations with Canadian Contributions Past and Present

UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization, 1948-Present
UNMOGIP: UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, 1949-Present
UNSK: UN Service in Korea, 1950-1954
UNEF I: First UN Emergency Force Sinai Peninsula, 1956-1967
UNOGIL: UN Observer Group in Lebanon, 1958
ONUC: UN Mission in Congo, 1960-1964
UNSF: UN Security Force in West New Guinea, 1962-1963
UNYOM: UN Yemen Observation Mission, 1963-1964
UNFICYP: UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 1964-Present
UNIPOM: UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission, 1965-1966
DOMREP: Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966
UNEF II: Second UN Emergency Force Sinai Peninsula, 1973-1979
UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon, 1978
UNIIMOG: UN Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group, 1988-1991
UNGOMAP: UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1988-1990
UNTAG: UN Transition Assistance Group, 1989-1990
ONUSCA: UN Observer Group in Central America, 1989-1992
MINURSO: UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 1991-Present
UNAMIC: UN Advance Mission in Cambodia, 1991-1992
UNAVEM II: UN Angola Verification Mission II, 1991-1995
ONUSAL: UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, 1991-1995
ONUMOZ: UN Operation in Mozambique, 1992-1994
UNOSOM I: UN Operation in Somalia, 1992-1993
UNPROFOR: UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia, 1992-1995
UNTAC: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 1992-1993
UNMIH: UN Mission in Haiti, 1993-1996
UNAMIR: UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 1993-1996
UNOSOM II: UN Operation in Somalia, 1993-1995
UNOMUR: UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, 1994
UNMIBH: UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995
UNCRO: UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, 1995-1996
UNPREDE: UN Preventative Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslavia, 1995-1999
UNTAES: UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovenia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, 1996-1998
UNSMIH: UN Support Mission in Haiti, 1996-1997
UNTMIH: UN Transition Mission in Haiti, 1997
MIPONUH: UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, 1997-2000
MINUGUA: UN Verification Mission in Guatemala, 1997
MINURCA: UN Mission in the Central African Republic, 1998-2000

MONUC: UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1999-2010
UNAMET: UN Mission in East Timor, 1999
UNAMSIL: UN Mission in Sierra Leone, 1999-2005
UNMEE: UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2000-2008
UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia, 2003-Present
UNAMI: UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, 2003-Present
MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2004-Present
UNOCI: UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire, 2004-Present
UNMIS: UN Mission in Sudan, 2005-2011
UNMIT: UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, 2006-2012
MONUSCO: UN Organization Stabilization Mission the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2010-Present
UNMISS: UN Mission in South Sudan, 2011-Present

Table 3: Canadian Contribution to UN Missions 1990-2016

Monthly Data of Countries Contributions	Total Canadian Contribution to UN Missions	Canadian Contribution Ranking
November 30 th 1990	1002 ²⁰⁷	1st
October 31 st 1991	978 ²⁰⁸	2nd
October 31 st 1992	2283 ²⁰⁹	1st
October 31 st 1993	2521 ²¹⁰	7th
October 31 st 1994	2739 ²¹¹	8th
October 31 st 1995	2204 ²¹²	6th
October 31 st 1996	1058 ²¹³	7th
October 31 st 1997	911 ²¹⁴	5th
October 31 st 1998	296 ²¹⁵	15th
October 31 st 1999	344 ²¹⁶	15th
November 30 th 2000	401 ²¹⁷	28th
October 31 st 2001	309 ²¹⁸	33rd
October 31 st 2002	259 ²¹⁹	34th
October 31 st 2003	239 ²²⁰	35th
October 31 st 2004	323 ²²¹	33rd
October 31 st 2005	361 ²²²	33rd
October 31 st 2006	124 ²²³	61st
October 31 st 2007	157 ²²⁴	56th
October 31 st 2008	177 ²²⁵	52nd
October 31 st 2009	179 ²²⁶	56th
October 31 st 2010	200 ²²⁷	50th
October 31 st 2011	198 ²²⁸	53rd
October 31 st 2012	149 ²²⁹	56th
October 31 st 2013	153 ²³⁰	57th
October 31 st 2014	88 ²³¹	72nd
October 31 st 2015	116 ²³²	66th
July 31 st 2016	103 ²³³	67th

Table 4: Current CAF International Operations

Operation Name	Location	Number of CAF stationed
Operation JADE/ UNTSO	Middle East	4
Operation PROTEUS	Jerusalem	21
Operation ADDENDA	Kabul	19
Operation IMPACT	Iraq	395
Operation UNIFIER	Ukraine	161
Operation KOBOLD/KFOR	Kosovo	5
Operation REASSURANCE	Central and Eastern Europe	472
Operation SNOWGOOSE/ UNIFICYP	Cyprus	1
Operation CALUMET/ MFO	Egypt	70
Operation FOUNDATION	Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan	13
Operation ARTEMIS	Arabian Sea	7
Operation CARIBBE	Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific	151
Operation HAMLET/ MINUSTAH	Haiti	5
Operation CROCODILE/ MONUSCO:	Democratic Republic of Congo	9
Operation SOPRANO/ UNMISS: ²³⁴	South Sudan	12

Table 5: Summary of Current UN Peace Operations

Mission Name	Location	Start Date	Current Mandate	Current Personnel (July 31st 2016)²³⁵	Canadian Involvement	Fatalities	Budget (US Dollars)
UNMISS	South Sudan	July 2011	- Protection of civilians - Human rights monitoring - Humanitarian aid support - Support implementation of Cessation of Hostilities Agreement ²³⁶	- 12,099 troops - 188 military observers - 1454 police	Military: Yes Police: No	36	\$1,085,769,200 ²³⁷
MONUSCO	Democratic Republic of Congo	July 2010	- Protection of civilians - Protection of humanitarian personnel - Support stabilization and peace efforts - Support implementation of regional peace agreement. ²³⁸	- 16,797 troops - 475 military observers - 1392 police	Military: Yes Police: No	93	\$1,332,178,600 ²³⁹
MINUSTAH	Haiti	June 2004	- Humanitarian and recovery efforts - Support government resettlement strategy for displaced persons - International electoral assistance - Restructure Haitian police ²⁴⁰	- 2360 troops - 2326 police	Military: Yes Police: Yes Leadership: Serge Therriault, Police Commissioner	181	\$380,355,700 ²⁴¹
UNFICYP	Cyprus	February 1964	- Support safe and passage within the buffer zone - Humanitarian activities in the buffer zone	- 862 troops - 67 police	Military: Yes Police: No	183	\$52,538,500 ²⁴³

			- Promote discussion on official ceasefire agreement ²⁴²				
UNTSO	Jerusalem, Beirut, Ismailia, Damascus	May 1948	- Supervision of armistice agreements - Observation of ceasefire in Suez Canal and Golan Heights - Assistance to UNIFIL to fulfill mandate ²⁴⁴	- 148 military observers	Military: Yes Police: N/A	50	\$74,291,900 ²⁴⁵
UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	- Protection of civilians - Demobilization, disarmament, reintegration of ex combatants - Security sector reform ²⁴⁶	- 2601 troops -142 military observers - 759 police	Military: No Police: No	135	\$402,794,300 ²⁴⁷
MINURSO	Western Sahara	April 1991	- Supervision of ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Agreement - Assist displaced persons and families - Promote negotiations for referendum ²⁴⁸	- 18 troops - 193 military observers	Military: No Police: No Leadership: Kim Bolduc, Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of Mission	15	\$53,190,000 ²⁴⁹
UNMIL	Liberia	September 2003	- Protection of civilians - Humanitarian assistance - Support reform of justice and security institutions - Human rights protection and promotion ²⁵⁰	-1171 troops - 62 military observers -570 police	Military: No Police: No	191	\$344,712,200 ²⁵¹
MINUSMA	Mali	March 2013	- Support implementation of peace agreement - Assistance to transitional	- 10358 troops - 39 military observers - 1295 police	Military: No Police: No	66	\$923,305,800 ²⁵³

			<p>authorities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection of civilians - Cultural preservation - Humanitarian assistance - Human rights protection and promotion²⁵² 				
MINUSCA	Central African Republic	April 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promote national and international justice and rule of law - Human rights promotion and protection - Humanitarian assistance - Protection of civilians - Support government transition process - Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation.²⁵⁴ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10094 troops - 149 military observers - 1641 police 	<p>Military: No</p> <p>Police: No</p>	9	\$814,066,800 ²⁵⁵
UNISFA	Abyei	June 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Authorized use of force to protect civilians and humanitarian workers within disputed area²⁵⁶ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 4403 troops - 128 military observers - 15 police 	<p>Military: No</p> <p>Police: No</p>	19	\$268,256,700 ²⁵⁷
UNAMID	Darfur	July 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection of civilians - Monitoring implementation of peace agreement - Border security with Chad and Central African Republic - Support political process - Promotion of rule of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 13,608 troops - 162 military observers - 3293 police 	<p>Military: No</p> <p>Police: No</p>	224	\$1,102,164,700 ²⁵⁹

			law and human rights ²⁵⁸				
UNDOF	Golan Heights	June 1974	- Supervise ceasefire between Israel and Syria - Supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces - Supervise area of separation ²⁶⁰	- 787 troops	Military: No Police: N/A	46	\$51,706,200 ²⁶¹
UNMIK	Kosovo	June 1999	- Promotion of security and stability - Promotion of human rights ²⁶²	- 8 military observers - 7 police	Military: No Police: No	55	\$40,031,000 ²⁶³
UNMOGIP	India and Pakistan	January 1949	- Monitor 1971 ceasefire ²⁶⁴	- 44 military observer	Military: No Police: No	11	\$19,647,100 ²⁶⁵
UNIFIL	Lebanon	March 1978	- Monitor Cessation of Hostilities Agreement - Support Lebanese Armed Forces in withdrawal of Israeli forces - Humanitarian assistance - Assist displaced persons - Support border security ²⁶⁶	- 10,497 troops	Military: No Police: N/A	308	\$506,346,400 ²⁶⁷
TOTAL:	Personnel: 100,746		Fatalities: 1728		Budget: \$7.87 billion	Canadian Involvement: Military: 5 missions Police: 1 mission Leadership: 2 missions	

Table 6: Current UN Missions and Canadian Contribution

Mission Name	Police Contribution	Troop Contribution	Observer/Expert Contribution	Total Contribution (July 31th 2016)
MINUSTAH	75	5	0	80
MONUSCO	0	8	0	8
UNFICYP	0	1	0	1
UNMISS	0	5	5	10
UNTSO	0	0	4	4
TOTAL	75	19	9	103

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