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Strategy 2020 and the Future of DND/CF

by

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
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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

Does Canada's Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces have adequate guidance to pursue a strategic path for the future? This paper will explore this issue by using the latest strategic document Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. Assessing this 'statement of strategy' requires a better understanding about why and how this document was crafted, and the vision and plans it articulates. The document's successes and failures are then determined, based on whether these ideas have been accepted throughout the organization, with specific attention given to the three environmental military branches. How the Canadian Forces and the Canadian government connect to Strategy 2020's corporate, rather than military, guidance will shed light on its strengths and weaknesses.

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## **DEDICATION**

For my parents  
and the loyal followers and supporters of  
The Republic of Szetor:

And now for something completely different...

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1994WP	1994 White Paper on Defence
AAN	Army After Next – US Army force development initiative
ACF	Aerospace Capability Framework – Canadian Air Force
ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
ADM(POL)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CRS	Chief Review Services
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DDA	Director Defence Analysis
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFPPC	Director Force Planning & Program Coordinator
DGPA	Director General Public Affairs
DGSP	Director General Strategic Planning
DM	Deputy Minister of Defence
DMC	Defence Management Committee
DMS	Defence Management System
DND	Department of National Defence
DND/CF	Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (as one)
DSP	Defence Spending
DSS	Decision Support System
ECS	Environmental Command Staffs
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
LO 2020	Land Operations 2020 – NATO force development initiative
LFSDG	Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence
OAG	Office of the Auditor General of Canada
OGD	Other Governmental Departments
PMF	Performance Management Framework
QOL	Quality of Life
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SFST	Strategic Formulation Support Team
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
UN	United Nations
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff



## **Chapter One: Introduction**

Understanding the concept of strategy originally required knowledge of its military application. Determining military strategy is commonly understood as an activity that defines how military activities and the employment of the military will accomplish national political objectives in times of peace and war.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the determination of the means must coincide with the ends stated by the policies derived from the government in command of the military. The writings of noted strategists such as Karl von Clausewitz on strategy and war continue to be the principal sources of understanding for this fundamental and original form of strategy.

The development of a uniquely Canadian military strategy began after the First World War, and had since followed behind the allied strategy led by the British and Americans through the Second World War. Even during the Cold War, Canadian military strategy has often been seen as being reliant on its allies, depending upon the strategies of others to determine its own. The conclusion that Canada produced little strategic thought of its own and that any such thinking had been imported from foreign, predominantly American, sources, has not lost support among the majority of defence academics, and remains the main conclusion about Canada during the Cold War. However, Andrew Richter argued the opposite view, that Canada had asserted its own strategic thought, and had successfully identified and articulated strategic interests independent from those of its allies.<sup>2</sup>

Whether or not a strategic vacuum existed in Canada during the Cold War would seem to have few implications now. The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet

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<sup>1</sup> For an in-depth understanding of strategy, both national and military and their connection, refer to: United States Marine Corps. Strategy. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1 (Washington, DC: USMC, 1997). Available online at: [https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/mcdp/html/mcdp1\\_1.htm](https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/mcdp/html/mcdp1_1.htm)

<sup>2</sup> Richter, Andrew. Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950-63. (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2002), p. 5

Union, signalling the rise of the ‘new world order’. This new world had promise of new opportunities, but it also had its share of new unknowns. Countries, including Canada, needed to shed their Cold War ways and either prepare for anything this ‘new world’ presented or assert a radical concept to make the ‘new world’ into something desirable. The opportunity was there for independent thought, but it was overshadowed by the uncertainties presented by the new international security environment.

Canada’s first white paper on defence since the Cold War’s end represented Canada taking an opportunity of sorts.<sup>3</sup> Although the government foresaw the military becoming a “robust, multi-purpose combat capable force that could operate across the full spectrum of military operations,” it took advantage of the new peace that emerged to cash in on the ‘peace dividend’ by slashing defence funding to help pay back the national debt. The attitude of the defence policy suggested a ‘be prepared for anything, but let’s wait and see’ attitude towards the new global environment, and remained firmly attached to many Cold War tenets of our alliances and towards peacekeeping. The period that followed was marked by an increased operational tempo into hot-spots abroad while fiscal management and efficiency were instituted in the wake of cut-backs at home. For the years that followed, Canada’s military waited and saw what happened in the world, testing the waters without any strategic direction to guide what they had to become for the future. Meanwhile, DND/CF adopted business practices to improve management and the “running of business” in a post-Cold War world as it learned to balance capability requirements with budgetary limitations while finding its own path and strategy in a time of uncertainty and unstable peace.

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<sup>3</sup> Department of National Defence [DND]. 1994 White Paper on Defence. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 1994).

In July 1999, the Canadian Department of National Defence released a document entitled Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020, commonly referred to as Strategy 2020. This document is the most recent attempt by the Department of National Defence to set its own path in the uncertain post Cold War era by providing guidance, direction and vision to the Department. In this thesis, the Strategy 2020 document will be assessed concerning its nature and its impact on the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. The document itself encapsulated the Department's strategic statement and vision that would provide the plans and direction necessary for the institution to move. It was given great importance by DND's leaders, since not only was it to give new direction to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (DND/CF)<sup>4</sup>, but also because it was the first time that such a document was produced by high-ranking civilian and military decision-makers and since no such source for strategic direction, corporate or otherwise, was present since the release of the government's defence policy in the form of the 1994 White Paper on Defence. Strategy 2020 was enthusiastically promoted with praise and optimism as an achievement in itself, since it provided the institution with "a vision of the future of Canadian defence, a roadmap of where we want to be and an outline of the role we see ourselves playing in a complex world to the year 2020."<sup>5</sup> The document itself thus was to provide the direction desperately needed in National Defence since the end of the Cold War.

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<sup>4</sup> The abbreviated 'DND/CF' is meant to reflect the identification of the entire Defence institution which includes both the managerial bureaucracy and the military as one identity. References made to solely the DND or the CF will be made throughout the thesis, meaning to reflect one part of the larger organization.

<sup>5</sup> Baril, Gen. Maurice "About the Canadian Forces," speech before the Huron College History Club, London, ON <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=452](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=452)> (14 October 1999).

By examining this document's development, substance, and impact on the institution, with emphasis on the military branches whose operations define the entire establishment of Defence, its strengths and weaknesses can be identified and used to devise solutions for improving the Defence Department. From this assessment and examination, it will be possible to gauge not only how 'strategic' Strategy 2020 really is, but also how useful this strategy has been for a government defence department.

Strategy as a concept has become so widespread with different meanings that it will be necessary to identify just what kind of strategy this document really is. Although the military definition of strategy has survived for centuries, the concept has also been borrowed and transformed for other forms of human activity, organization and application. Businesses have often borrowed concepts from the military that have proven to give an organization strength, efficiency and effectiveness. Transformed from its original form, the business community has introduced variations of 'strategy' to suit their needs. Corporate strategy is a determination and declaration of what an organization's goals, objectives, and purposes are, the kinds of policies and plans necessary to achieve them, the range and kinds of business the organization will pursue, the kind of organization the business must become and the nature of its contribution to stakeholders, clients, the public and its employees.<sup>6</sup> Business or competitive strategy defines for a given business the basis on which it will compete by relating a company's capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses in relation to market characteristics to those of its competitors.<sup>7</sup> Strategy 2020's identification by DND's leaders

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<sup>6</sup> Andrews, Kenneth. The Concept of Corporate Strategy. (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1994), p. 18-19

<sup>7</sup> Nickols, Fred. "Three Forms of Strategy," 2000, < [http://home.att.net/~nichols/three\\_forms\\_of\\_strategy.htm](http://home.att.net/~nichols/three_forms_of_strategy.htm) > (5 July 2004).

as a corporate strategy will have implications for how it should be treated, and for the criteria that will determine how it may have succeeded or failed in a different context, specifically a military perspective.

A basic tenet of military strategy states that strategy is reliant and dependant on the national objectives as decided and handed down by the political level. As guidance for the Department of National Defence, one would presume that Strategy 2020 follows from political guidance. The implication that this document was not endorsed by the Government of Canada raises curiosity concerning the document's legitimacy as a strategic document, and its viability if unsupported. If Strategy 2020 should to be considered corporate in nature, that it is derived from and is meant for the Defence organization itself, involvement from outside the Department – even by the Government to which it belongs – would have been deemed unnecessary as such involvement fell outside the scope during its development. This insular behaviour and short-sightedness may have greater ramifications for the Department trying to develop, institute, and implement strategy, change, and vision.

Looking below the strategic level, an advocate of the strategic statement may point to the number of documents that circulated following the release of Strategy 2020. These other 'strategies' and 'visions' under a '2020' banner appeared, each citing Strategy 2020 as their source for direction and continued from it with greater emphasis on specific areas within the Department, such as human resources and leadership. One may argue in support that Strategy 2020 as a strategic statement would suggest that there is sufficient information with respect to objectives, roles, vision and direction to provide the institution with guidance, and that many sub-departments within DND have followed it as evidenced by their published

documentation. However, it is also possible that these documents suggest weaknesses in the department's strategic direction, because they suggest independent views that further parochial interests by exploiting such weaknesses. An example of this is the perversion of an underdeveloped, under-defined strategy from its original, general sense by a use that can still maintain it follows this strategy, but gives an interpretation unintended by the original authors.

Another possibility is far more pessimistic – that Strategy 2020 has no military strategic value and that players within the institution are making up for this void in strategic thought. The result of such a possibility would be that decisions taken are reactions that may lead to inefficiency, waste, and ultimately to the degradation of national defence.<sup>8</sup> It is interesting to note a conclusion made in a report by a ministerial advisory committee, tasked with assessing DND's administrative efficiency, that distances the Government from the document:

“While the 1994 White Paper on Defence is the Government's most recent policy statement on Canada's defence policy, the Government did not formally approve the Department's future vision Shaping the future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020, nor has it approved an overall strategic plan.”<sup>9</sup>

If the Government of Canada was unwilling to endorse this strategy, then Strategy 2020's validity should be brought into question. What exactly was this document? What were the thoughts of its designers when they created the 'defence strategy', and is there anything 'strategic' about Strategy 2020?

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<sup>8</sup> Bland, Douglas. Chiefs of Defence. (Toronto, ON: CISS, 1995) p. 211.

<sup>9</sup> DND, Minister's Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency. Achieving Administrative Efficiency. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2003), p. 17.

Documents obtained publicly and with consent from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, as well as interviews conducted with members of various strategic planning directorates will help in gaining a better appreciation of how Strategy 2020 has succeeded or failed in its guidance handed down from the senior level of decision-making to the operational branches. Defence documents such as Defence Strategy 2020:Path to Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy and Achieving Administrative Efficiency were used to gain an understanding of the process that created Strategy 2020 and of how decision-making is done in DND. Examining the messages contained in service documents such as Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020 and The Army Strategy determined how these documents were related to the corporate strategy. Interviews with members from the Directorate Air Strategic Plans, the Directorate of Maritime Strategy, and the Directorate Land – Strategic Concepts exposed both reactions to Strategy 2020 and behaviour expressed by the services. Because this thesis is primarily based on open-source, unclassified, and accessible information, it is subject to a view that DND/CF has allowed publicly.

It will be argued that Strategy 2020 has had some degree of success by providing a motivational idea for the institution to rally behind to propel Defence forward. However, the vision of Strategy 2020 is too vulnerable to neglect from higher authorities, characterized by a lack of national direction and scarce defence funding, and as such its success and implementation are not guaranteed. In fact, the lack of top-down authority made it difficult to ensure proper alignment and complete ownership of the vision throughout the Department. Defence's corporate strategy lacked any military strategic and doctrinal guidance to provide the branches of the military with sufficient direction for military planning. The branches

themselves are forced to take it upon themselves to find direction, much like the entire Department did because there did not exist a military strategy.

Chapters two and three of this thesis seek to gain a better sense of Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. What is it, and what does it say? How was it developed, by whom and why? One may presume that Strategy 2020 is merely a product of a timely cycle of strategic planning which occurs regularly in response to continuous change. One may also assume that a document of such importance would be a comprehensive edict of guidance, whose vision provides sufficient definition of the military's role in achieving national aims and the shape such a military would require for achieving these aims. The message contained in the strategy should be easily understood so that all within the institution can follow it without becoming lost. Instead, the motivation for this document corresponds to a lack of strategic guidance during the period of 1994-1998, and in response to criticisms that weaknesses existed in DND/CF planning as a result.

Chapter four provides an assessment of the document. Strategy 2020's brief content, abstract vision, and lack of definition make its usefulness questionable as anything more than a corporate strategy document. This poses some interesting issues, the most important being the lack of connection to the authority and leadership from the political level that dictates the national interests which drive defence.

Chapter five will examine responses to the strategic statement, specifically those of the three military branches of the Canadian Forces. The institutional vision's strength as a uniting force for progress can be traced by comparing how each environmental command – the Navy, Army, and Air Force – have continued from Strategy 2020 in their respective



organizations, if at all. Ideally, strategy would bring the branches together to follow on one joint path with one commonly understood vision. However, in the case of the Canadian Forces, the branches have had varying success with their continuations from Strategy 2020, each branch taking a different approach and perspective than its counterparts. Some have even undertaken strategic planning of their own to reflect branch-centric mentalities and parochial interests. The reasons for this may point to deficiencies in the corporate strategy document.

Chapter six gauges how successful Strategy 2020 has been as a corporate strategy, a vision, and as the motivating and rallying force for the entire Defence organization. The overall concept of having a corporate strategy has been successful, as the ideas promoted by the corporate strategy have been adopted in principle by groups within the organization, including the three service branches. However, the viability of the vision and plans is vulnerable to a lack of commitment, attention, and leadership by the political level of government. Without political leadership to guide defence's role in relation to broader national objectives, there is no provision of any military-strategic and doctrinal reference to guide military planning. Without political support, specifically by way of military funding, achieving the departmental vision is even more difficult. Resource scarcity, coupled with a lack of doctrinal direction, has encouraged a departmental culture of competition instead of cooperation, of management instead of leadership, and of sluggishness instead of progress. Improvement can only occur when the political level gives security and defence issues the serious attention they deserve, when questions of "how much to spend on defence" and "what do we want defence to do?" are asked in conjunction. An injection of top-down

authority, starting at the political level and working its way down into the leadership of DND, is a necessary step towards filling the strategic void with effective direction.

Canada is at a critical time for strategic and military development. Numerous reports, such as A Wake Up Call for Canada, To Secure a Nation, For an Extra \$130 Bucks, and A Nation at Risk, have been published by academics and academic institutions, lobby organizations, and also senate committees on National Defence that all warn of the impending downfall of the Canadian military should measures not be taken to revitalize it.<sup>10</sup> This thesis, in part, serves to identify not only problems created by strategic drift that have resulted in the military's decay, but also as an assessment of how practical the application of business techniques in military organizations are through the case of Canada.

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<sup>10</sup> Royal Canadian Military Institute [RCMI]. A Wake Up Call for Canada: The Need for a New Military. (Toronto, ON: RCMI, 2001); Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century [CCS21]. To Secure a Nation: Canadian Defence and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. (Calgary, AB: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2001); Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence [SCONSAD]. For an Extra \$130 Bucks... Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis: A View from the Bottom. (Ottawa, ON: Senate, 2002); Conference of Defence Associations [CDA]. A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces. (Ottawa, ON: CDA, 2002).

## **Chapter Two: Strategy 2020's Purpose, Participants, and Process:**

A seemingly new era was ushered in when Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (henceforth referred to as Strategy 2020) was released in the summer of 1999. Members of the military's senior leadership were quick to praise the result of six months of deliberation: a document that was to serve as direction and guidance for defence planning for future years. "It is proactive, achievable and pragmatic," said then Chief of Defence Staff General Maurice Baril publicly. "It's a vision of the future of Canadian defence – a roadmap of where we want to be and an outline of the role we see ourselves playing in a complex world to the year 2020."<sup>11</sup> He would go on also to say that "with Strategy 2020, we have chosen a route, with a clear idea of where we intend to go."

Four years after Baril's optimistic and enthusiastic statements, an advisory committee on administrative efficiency charged with examining the running of the Department of National Defence produced their critical findings of DND's strategic planning and decision-making processes. The committee's report identified numerous pitfalls in how decisions were made, ranging from the lack of prioritization in capability requirements to the hindering effect of large memberships of committees. The report concluded that there exists a lack of unity of effort and commonality of purpose across DND and the CF; long term planning has become an internal resource competition rather than a concerted effort to achieve defined results or corporate goals.<sup>12</sup>

Does this mean that the vision and plan crafted in Strategy 2020 were compromised by these pitfalls and that they are flawed?

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<sup>11</sup> Baril, "About the Canadian Forces," <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=452](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=452)>

<sup>12</sup> DND, Achieving Administrative Efficiency, p.17.

In order to determine Strategy 2020's merit as a forward-looking and guiding document, its development must be examined. What was the intent of the exercise? How was it crafted and by whom? Only by understanding the circumstances of its creation can the examination of Strategy 2020's content proceed properly.

#### Intentions:

In 1998, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) released its annual report that highlighted certain areas of concern in government operations. One was strategic guidance in the Department of National Defence (DND). An investigation of the Department was conducted, premised on determining if policy and doctrine were sufficient to guide major acquisitions, if operational scenarios were in place that described performance expectations, if performance data was sufficient to alert officials to capability degradation and where renewal was needed, and if clear priorities were in place to guide investment.<sup>13</sup>

The audit team discovered strategic planning that was far from efficient and effective. Despite some successes in performance measurement framework development, DND did not yet have fully developed performance measures for decision-makers to determine operational effectiveness and areas requiring additional effort. Priorities for determining those requirements needing attention were unclear. Furthermore, there were indications that the process was "adversarial and concludes with senior direction that balances requirements and affordability."<sup>14</sup> Planning scenarios were similarly under-developed. Finally, a new

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<sup>13</sup> Office of the Auditor General of Canada [OAG]. "National Defence: Equipping and Modernizing the Canadian Forces," 1998 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, April 1998, <[www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9803ce.html](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9803ce.html)> (8 August 2001)

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

framework was needed to guide modernization within DND. Mechanisms such as the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG), a source of strategic-level guidance, covered only a five-year planning time-frame and did not provide a long term vision of how the military would operate.<sup>15</sup>

In its conclusions, the OAG's report cited other allied countries, specifically the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which were better able to match defence requirements to resources. Allies more successful at matching the two had completed major assessments of funding for their defence policies, and had developed the ability to match outputs and policy goals to resources and to provide performance information on how well goals were achieved. Additional mechanisms for success included better governmental oversight of defence spending, greater collaboration between the minister and the military resulting in a binding agreement on what could be accomplished with government-provided resources, and defence reviews undertaken with greater frequency.<sup>16</sup>

Concerning Canada and DND, the Auditor General's report recommended that DND complete its scenarios, force development framework, and strategic assessments with a focus on future force development and the resources necessary to operate. It also recommended that DND provide Parliament with sufficient information on such capabilities, performance, and resources to determine whether resources truly matched Canada's defence objectives.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

The pitfalls recognized by the OAG were similarly identified by leaders within DND, although it remains unknown whether these revelations were made as a result of, or independently from, the Auditor General's report. Statements made in the 1994 White Paper on Defence that "it [The White Paper] will enable Canada to respond and adjust as necessary to deal with the range of challenges to our security that could arise, now and into the next century"<sup>18</sup>, suggested that DND/CF would need to perform some appraisal of the future in order to plan, respond and adjust accordingly with change. By 1998, however, it became evident that DND/CF did not possess a strategic vision or plan that could provide the kind of direction needed to respond to these expectations. In fact, it was admitted that

"As the department engaged in annual business planning from 1994 on, it became clear that the nature and pace of changes affecting the military establishment demanded a more strategic approach than the annual incremental fine tuning that business planning, in the absence of a strategy, usually produces."<sup>19</sup>

Hence, ever since the implementation of the 1994 White Paper there was a need for a more long-term approach to strategic vision and planning, and that action was required to deal with this deficiency if DND/CF was to progress.

On 9 September 1998, DND's Senior Leadership Team – the Department's head managers and military leaders, also known as the Defence Management Committee (DMC) - went on a strategic retreat to discuss DND/CF's vision, and to raise questions about its future direction. During the discussion, many comments were made about the state of strategic

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<sup>18</sup> DND. 1994 White Paper on Defence. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 1994), p.50.

<sup>19</sup> DND. Defence Strategy 2020: Path to Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy, (Ottawa, ON: DND, 1999) p. 3. [hereby cited as 'Formulation of the Statement of Strategy']

vision and planning within the Department. Very few of them were positive. Among the thoughts expressed were the following:

- “The Vision of DND/CF needs to be more concrete, must encapsulate the strategy, and reflect the force of the future.”
- DND/CF has not: developed its strategic leadership; achieved the optimum balance across forces, with each command supporting the defence mission; integrated the White Paper; fostered an innovative corporate culture; engaged government to determine what is expected from DND/CF; introduced performance measurement and management.
- This impediment to progress was caused by the: lack of top-down direction regarding the interpretation of the White Paper; lack of follow-through once decisions were rendered; lack of a balanced picture of corporate and force structure in relation to affordability.
- What DND/CF must do well in the future: more sophistication in interpreting the Government’s agenda (White Paper); limit DND/CF agenda to issues that are achievable and within control of institution; provide Senior Leadership Team with a suite of ‘tools’ to ensure follow-up (Integrated Defence Management System); measure performance against priorities and expectations.

- DND/CF must overcome these impediments to progress: culture and ‘stove-pipe’ thinking; interpretation of White Paper’ parochial interests versus collective corporate decision-making; political and central support.<sup>20</sup>


The progress report on the Defence Management System (DMS), DND’s cyclic decision-making process, was no more optimistic than the thoughts already shared. Notably, the DMS presumed the existence of a corporate strategy that aligned and connected the White Paper with Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) and the ensuing Level-1 business plans, ultimately leading to a Performance Measurement and Management Framework (PMF) and an Accountability Framework (See Fig 1). In September 1998, no such strategic document existed against which DND/CF could measure the institution’s progress.<sup>21</sup> In other words, no document existed from which direction would flow and propel the DMS. Such a document would provide the strategic direction, mission and vision for the department to guide business planning, resource funding and activities, which would lead to action. Results and outputs from action could then refer back to the strategic direction and be measured against the original objectives of the Department and adjustments made to deal with any shortfalls in the next cycle.

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<sup>20</sup> DND, Formulation of the Statement of Strategy, p. 6.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 7.





In response to this shortfall in strategic direction, the Strategy 2020 document was commissioned with the following intentions:

- “Strategy 2020 turns our attention forward”<sup>22</sup>: Strategy 2020 was to provide DND/CF with some form of vision, a sense of the future world and the shape and form of the department and military needed for such a world.
- “...a bridge - the strategic vision it expresses forms a link between defence policy and future activities”<sup>23</sup>: Strategy 2020 would be an interpretation of and follow-through from the current defence policy.
- “A long term strategy to guide defence planning”<sup>24</sup>: Strategy 2020 would give necessary guidance through long-term objectives and short-term goals, and also serve as the reference for the Department’s actions.

<sup>22</sup> Baril, Gen. Maurice. “Canadian Forces, business and industry,” Speaking Notes for General Maurice Baril, 25 October 1999, <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id453](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id453)> (2 February 2004).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Baril, “About the Canadian Forces,” <[http://www.forces.gc.casite/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=452](http://www.forces.gc.casite/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=452)>

- “A long-term guide for investing in the future”<sup>25</sup>: Given the resource limitations of DND, Strategy 2020 would allow the department’s leadership to make hard decisions concerning capabilities, people, and equipment from an informed vantage point.<sup>26</sup>

The overall scope of Strategy 2020 was larger than being a declaration of strategy for DND/CF. Rather, it was to serve as a culmination of many things:

“[Strategy 2020] is the cornerstone of an integrated defence management system fusing strategic direction, force and resource planning, planning guidance, business planning, long-term capital planning, and performance measurement and management. This strategy covers all aspects of the defence-and-security mandate given us by the People and Government of Canada within the context of threats and opportunities presented by the external environment. The Statement meshes our corporate and defence strategies, producing a coherent and viable path into the future for the institution.”<sup>27</sup>

Beyond the ‘essence’ of what the document was to provide, there were certain characteristics that were expected. First, it was to cover the “tomorrow” (5-year) and the “future” (20-year) horizons. Second, it was to cover all aspects of the DND/CF mandate, all components of the organization, and all processes within the context of challenges and opportunities presented by the external environment. Its breadth was to also mesh both corporate and defence strategy and produce a coherent, achievable, and sound strategic path. Third, its overall length was to be between 12-15 pages. Fourth among its intended results, or

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Baril, “Canadian Forces, business and industry,”  
<[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=453](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=453)>

<sup>27</sup> DND, Formulation of the Statement of Strategy, p. 1.

‘deliverables’, was not only to produce the strategic statement, but also achieve senior management consensus.<sup>28</sup>

With all these objectives, the statement of strategy was an ambitious document to develop, especially since it was the first time that such a document would be generated at the Department level.<sup>29</sup> Whether or not Strategy 2020 was successful at achieving all of its intended objectives and roles would depend on not just its content but also on the process from which it was conceived.

#### Participants:

Development of Strategy 2020 was undertaken by two key groups. The first was the Defence Management Committee (DMC) that represents the ‘Senior Leadership Team’, the major decision-making body within the DND. The DMC is the primary source for direction and advice on policy and strategic defence issues. It meets regularly to consider matters of management affecting the strategic direction of the Defence department and to enable the Deputy Defence Minister (DM) and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to coordinate decisions and advice with the Minister of National Defence. Members of the committee include the DM and CDS as co-chairs, the three environmental branch heads, and all level-1 business managers.<sup>30</sup> Since the consensus of all senior leaders was an intended result of the development of Strategy 2020, all members of the DMC shared equal influence over the decisions.

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<sup>28</sup> DND, Formulation of the Statement of Strategy, Annex A: SFST Mandate, p. 1-2/3

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p. 1/3.

<sup>30</sup> DND. “Defence Management Committee,” Defence Planning & Management, 18 December 2003  
<[www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/pubs/commit/dmc\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/pubs/commit/dmc_e.asp)>

<b>The Defence Management Committee (DMC)</b>			
Co-Chairs:	Deputy Minister (DM)		
	Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)		
Members:	Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS)	ADM (HR-Civ)	
	Deputy-Chief of the Defence Staff	ADM (Mat)	
	Chief Maritime Staff	ADM (IE)	
	Chief Land Staff	DND CIO	
	Chief Air Staff	DGPA	
	ADM (Pol)	DGSA	
	ADM (Fin CS)	DND/CF LA	
	ADM (HR-Mil)		
<b>The Strategic Formulation Support Team (SFST)</b>			
BGen D Dempster,	DFPPC	Mr NJ Black,	CRS
LCol D Moore,	DGSP/COS Strat P	Mr S Taymun,	DGPA
LCol H Kennedy,	DGSP/DFPPC	Ms A Burns,	DSC/DSS
Ms M Fallis,	DGSP/DSC	Mr S Robertson,	DGSP/DDA
Maj G Liddy,	DGSP	Mr M Whittingham,	ADM (Pol)
Mr H Hubley,	CRS	Mr L Makosky,	InterQuest Consulting

**Figure 2: Defence Management Committee & SFST Membership (Defence Strategy 2020: The Path to Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy; p. 4.)**

The second group involved in Strategy 2020's development was the Strategic Formulation Support Team (SFST), whose purpose was not only to provide strategic analysis but also to frame how the DMC shared ideas, made decisions and arrived at agreement. This group brought together members from the Director Force Planning & Program Coordinator (DFPPC), the Director General Strategic Planning (DGSP), Chief Review Services (CRS), Director General Public Affairs (DGPA), Directorate of Defence Analysis (DDA), Assistant Deputy Minister - Policy (ADM(POL)), and an independent consulting firm.<sup>31</sup> This group was pivotal in shaping the direction of discussion and the arena for thought, but all decisions and final ideas had to be 'owned' by the Senior Leadership Team.<sup>32</sup>


<sup>31</sup> DND, Formulation of the Statement of Strategy, p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> The term 'owned', used by the crafters of Strategy 2020, is assumed to mean that members of the DMC share a sense of belonging with their vision; that decisions made are theirs and so they must take responsibility for them.

## Development

Following the 9 September 1999 meeting of the DMC, preparations began for the impending strategic formulation process. Once the SFST was brought together and the mandate for the strategic statement was handed down by the VCDS, preparatory information and analyses were gathered for the first phase.

The process that crafted Strategy 2020 followed three phases, each involving a period of development work by the SFST preceding DMC meetings. Over the course of six months, the SFST assembled, prepared, and framed the information, analyses, and framework used for discussion prior to the DMC's day-long meetings. In these, the SFST's work was digested with direction and decisions delivered back to it for further development.



### Phase 1: Define the external environment, strategic drivers and key issues.

The first phase (prior to the 5 November 1998 DMC meeting) sought to define the context for strategy formulation, specifically the nature of the external environment, strategic drivers and key issues that influence Canada's strategic thinking. This involved looking at

both present-day and possible future situations (international and domestic) that challenged Defence. Environmental and internal scans were made describing both the international and domestic situations surrounding the Department. In addition, seven studies by DND/CF personnel were commissioned to provide context for specific issues troubling the Department<sup>33</sup>. A cross-section of eight critical groups among DND/CF principal stakeholders was also consulted about their needs and their expectations of the Department.<sup>34</sup>

At the November meeting of the DMC, the work by the SFST was examined, with the objective being to gain a sense of Defence's environmental surroundings in the context of the world of 2020, to determine DND/CF's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT), and then to derive its priorities. This was done by asking each member of the DMC "what were the greatest opportunities presented?" and "what were the most pressing threats?" Answers for these questions were in the form of scores from 1 to 5, assigned by the participants, who ranked opportunities based on 'criticality' and 'difficulty in addressing' and challenges based on 'probability of occurrence' and 'impact on DND/CF'.<sup>35</sup> The result was the SWOT table (Fig. 4) that described the elements, influences, and factors of greatest import and concern to Defence's leaders and that comprise the organization's environment.

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<sup>33</sup> The studies at this stage include: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Emerging Technology, DCDS Future Operations Study, Interoperability – The Challenge in 2010; Into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Strategic HR Issues; and National Defence Analysis-Procurement Reform. The remaining two studies are classified.

<sup>34</sup> This analysis defined the expectations from international, domestic, government and other stakeholders to whom the Department is accountable. Produced by the Strategic Planning Staff Action Team (SPSAT)

<sup>35</sup> DND, Formulation of the Statement of Strategy, p. 12-14.

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada-US Relationship</li> <li>• Professionalism</li> <li>• Tactical Operations</li> <li>• Military Diplomacy</li> <li>• Resource Stewardship</li> <li>• Change Management</li> <li>• Human Resource Policy and Management</li> <li>• Transparency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government Engagement</li> <li>• Force Structure</li> <li>• Capital Equipment Program</li> <li>• Change management</li> <li>• Tactical Level focus</li> <li>• Force Protection</li> <li>• "Leading Edge" technology</li> </ul>
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refocus core capabilities</li> <li>• Leverage resources</li> <li>• Develop integrated management environment</li> <li>• Harness emerging capabilities</li> <li>• Develop closer ties with allies</li> <li>• Improve procurement</li> <li>• Re-examine traditional military roles</li> <li>• Restructure force to be more agile in global arena</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational Irrelevance</li> <li>• Lack of technological capability</li> <li>• Lack of coherent strategy with US</li> <li>• International weapons proliferation</li> <li>• Declining human resources retention rates</li> <li>• Lack of defence foresight</li> <li>• Ineffective external communications</li> </ul>


**Figure 4: Table of DND/CF's Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Challenges (SWOT) (Defence Strategy 2020: The Path to Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy; p. 15.)**

With the SWOT table generated, the SFST followed up from the November DMC meeting with an analysis of its elements. Specifically, the team used a Cross Impact Analysis matrix tool to interrelate each of the four elements in the SWOT to determine and define activities of high interest that could serve or reflect more than one area. Acting on an opportunity, for example, could have the additional effect of negating a threat. The results from the Cross Impact analysis are summarized by four key match-ups: strategic winners (strengths and opportunities compared); desirable strategic winners (weaknesses and opportunities compared); threat mitigation (strengths and threats compared); and greatest vulnerabilities (weaknesses and threats compared).<sup>36</sup>

From the results of the analysis, the SFST was able to identify strategic imperatives that DND/CF would need to pursue to take advantage of its opportunities and strengths and handle its weaknesses and challenges.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 14-15.

## Phase 2: Develop and Test Strategic Options



Preparation for the next DMC meeting in December 1998 began with the recognition that a new strategy suggesting change would occur. That said, the SFST concentrated on providing options to gauge how much change the DMC would be willing to accept, and in preparatory meetings, the DMC was specifically asked this question. After presenting an analysis that compared increasing levels of change against increasing relevance and capability, the DMC stated that it was comfortable with a substantial level of change between the innovative change level (i.e. significant, but evolutionary), and the transformational change level (i.e. dramatic, fast-tracked and revolutionary).<sup>37</sup>

To further describe the facets of change the DMC envisioned, three strategic options were developed, each providing different approaches to the future for DND/CF. The nature of each strategic option was elaborated based on particular attributes: alliances, technology,

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p. 18.



force structure, Government of Canada/citizen engagement, people/change strategy, and end-state capability. These options are merely illustrative representations of the degree of change being suggested and were meant to generate discussion and gauge the inclinations of DMC members. Each option demonstrated an amount of change to which the Defence institution may commit, and how various ideas, capabilities and programs are influenced as a result. The option to 'progress' provided a description of what kind of business the organization will be should it decide to afford only minimal amounts of resources and effort towards change. This option reflects the least amount of change, and resembles the present status quo of the organization. The 'innovate' and 'transform' options represent more creative and inventive notions of re-designing and redefining the kind of organization DND/CF could be in the future and how it could 'run its business'. Both options suggest smaller, more specialized military organizations capable of meeting changes in the military environment due to greater attention to adaptation, courtesy of increased research and development, technological advantages, and capital spending.

Attribute	Option: Progress	Option: Innovate	Option: Transform
<b>Core Idea</b>	Develop core capabilities with a “menu-driven” orientation	Retain and hone specific tactical capabilities, while researching and developing new capabilities at the operational level	Concentrate on specific capabilities at the operational and strategic levels, while preserving selected tactical-level capabilities: “quality versus quantity”
<b>Modernization, RMA, simulation and experimentation</b>	Rationalize existing force structure while cognizant of the principles of the revolution in military affairs (RMA)	Modernize where cost-effective, and invest in those capabilities that embrace the RMA	Focus R&D efforts on fielding technology demonstrators that exploit the principles of the RMA
<b>Deployability, Readiness and Sustainment</b>	Maintain deployable forces, ready to respond to crisis situations with in-depth sustainment	Focus on deployability, rapid response, less able to sustain for long term deployments	Focus on deployability, rapid response, able to sustain, recognized as best in specific areas
<b>Domestic Capability</b>	Able to respond to any crisis with augmentation from the Reserves	Able to respond to crisis with some roles filled by Reserve Units	Full transfer of many domestic roles to Reserves, Vanguard by Regular Units
<b>Allied Interoperability and integration</b>	Retain and enhance established, interoperable roles (UN, NATO, NORAD, etc)	Inter-operability with our principal NATO allies, particularly the US Armed Forces, while also developing “niche” capabilities	Inter-operability in a primarily coordinated role with the US Armed Forces, while maintaining collaborative operational relationships with like-minded communities, both domestically and internationally
<b>Degree of new service offerings</b>	Maintain current services but more focus on community	Focus R&D effort to target leading-edge, competitive technologies; Community, JTF for WMD, asymmetric threat, earmark to UN	Exploit Canada’s advanced telecommunications, information and sensing technological prowess to dominate specific capabilities, Community, JTF for WMD, asymmetric threat, earmark to UN
<b>Capital Program</b>	Prioritize the Capital Program to alter and sustain the force structure (Minimum 19% of DSP)	Re-orient the Capital Program to reformulate the force structure (Minimum 22% of DSP)	Redefine the Capital Program to transform the force structure (Target 25% of DSP)
<b>Force Structure (full time, Reg F and civ)</b>	Gradually modernize and recapitalize the force structure (75K Pers)	Move towards a “leaner, meaner, more meaningful” force structure (70K Pers)	Transform the force structure to optimize the use of our energy and resources (65k Pers)
<b>DND/CF C2 &amp; Management</b>	Evolutionary Change	Increased joint commands	Integrated command structure
<b>Interaction with OGDs and Canadians</b>	Able to respond to OGD’s needs; Consolidate ongoing changes and communicate progress to Canadians	Engage Canadians and OGDs to communicate our value	Actively engage Canadians and OGDs to develop and communicate our new visionary structure
<b>Human Resources</b>	Continue QOL and Relieve efforts	Increasingly flexible management approach, greater mixture of full and part-time Regulars and Civil Servants	Completely integrated personnel structure of full and part-time Regulars, Reserves and Civil Servants
<b>Approach to change</b>	Less flexible, better at generating classic combat capabilities	Flexible, needs help from Reserves to generate classical combat capabilities	Highly flexible, problems generating classical combat capabilities, dependant on Reserves

**Figure 6: Strategic Options elaborated (Defence Strategy 2020: The Path to Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy; Annex G(1).)**

Given the unpredictable nature of the international environment, these strategic options needed to be tested against different future scenarios in order to determine how flexible they could be. Three alternative futures were developed by the SFST for this purpose. They varied based on their relative international, regional, domestic and transnational stability, as well as an estimated defence budget. The scenarios ranged from benign and stable, uncertain, to an unstable, chaotic future. These scenarios suggest different worlds that are possible depending on the characteristics presented by the future world, how particular socio-economic levels of that world may change, and how these may translate to expectations for the Canadian military.

<i>Domain</i>	<b>Benign</b>	<b>Base</b>	<b>Unstable</b>
<b>International</b>	Stable	Uncertain	Unstable
<b>Regional</b>	Growing prosperity	Irregular development	Chaotic
<b>Domestic</b>	Prosperous federation	Maturing federation	Polarizing federation
<b>Transnational</b>	Manageable	Random “crises”	Regular “crises”
<b>Defence Budget</b>	\$7B	\$10B	\$20B


**Figure 7: Alternate Futures**  
(Defence Strategy 2020: The Path to Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy; p. 21.)

Using these three strategic options and the three alternate futures, and combining them with the list of strategic imperatives, the SFST made it possible for the DMC to select the preferred attributes of the ‘best option’.

The DMC’s meeting on 17 December 1998 was aimed at testing these three options and determining the ‘best option’. After reviewing the SWOT Cross Impact Analysis, and reviewing and refining the strategic imperatives, members of the DMC were asked to scale their sense of urgency against a set of overarching questions facing the Department on such

issues as organizational performance, geo-political environment stability, technology impact on capability delivery, government funding security, the feasibility of new strategy development and implementation, and whether the budget apportionment was appropriate to deal with equipment rust-out and funding pressures. Assessing these results reflected where the DMC felt the most urgency.

From this point, DMC members directed their attention towards understanding the alternate futures through mock intelligence briefings of a day 20 years in the future, including visual highlights of hotspots and unfolding scenarios. With this understanding, each strategic option was assessed by its performance in each alternate future. This was done by dividing the DMC members into smaller groups to discuss how each option fared in the alternate futures, with each member rating each option. The results were debriefed, and then members identified the qualities of each option they believed provided the greatest strengths. Again in smaller groups, DMC members also rated the options against the strategic imperatives, in order to assess how each would help address the imperative.



Through this exercise, the DMC was able to pick the attributes from two options they favoured, again between the innovative and transformation levels of change, referred to temporarily as the “Innovate Plus” option.<sup>38</sup> Further refinements were also made to the strategic imperatives that enhanced their definition and needs.

<b>Highlights of the preferred 'Innovate Plus' option (based on Innovative option with selected features from 'Transform' added)</b>	
<b>Attribute</b>	<b>Innovate Plus</b>
Core Idea	Retain and hone specific tactical capabilities, while researching and developing new capabilities at the operational level.
Modernization, RMA, simulation and experimentation	Modernize where cost-effective, and invest in those capabilities that embrace RMA and focus R&D efforts to target leading-edge, competitive technologies (particularly Canada's advanced telecommunications, information and sensing technological prowess) to field technology demonstrators.*
Deployability, Readiness and Sustainment	Focus on deployability, rapid response; less able to sustain for long term deployments.
Domestic Capability	Able to respond to crisis with some roles filled by Reserve units.
Allied interoperability and integration	Inter-operability with our principal NATO allies, particularly the US Armed Forces, while also developing "niche" capabilities, and strengthening support to the UN.
Degree of new service offerings	Deliver a new joint capability to handle WMD and other asymmetric threats, and earmark ready forces to the UN*
Capital Program	Re-orient the Capital Program to reformulate the force structure (Minimum 22-25% of DSP).
Force Structure (full time reg and civ)	Move towards a smaller, focused, combat capable, transformed force structure (65-70K Pers).*
DND/CF C2 & Management	Increased joint commands.
Interaction with OGDs and Canadians	Actively engage Canadians, at both national and local community levels, as well as OGDs to develop and communicate our new visionary structure.*
Human Resources	Completely integrated personnel structure of full and part-time Regulars, Reserves and Civil Servants.*
Approach to change	Flexible, needs help from Reserves to generate classical combat capabilities.

**Figure 9: Highlights of the preferred ‘Innovate Plus’ option (Defence Strategy 2020: The Path to Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy; Annex H.)**

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p.23.

### Phase 3: Define a Vision and Path Incorporating Objectives and Goals

The work that followed the DMC's second meeting saw the SFST refining and developing the envisioned direction resulting from the preceding meeting. In particular, the SFST explored what actions would be necessary for DND/CF to achieve the "Innovate Plus" option, define the "distinctive competencies" that it would need to perform well in this option, and identify the gaps between the current state and that envisioned in the future Innovate Plus option. A draft vision statement, description of the path, and indicative shorter-term goals to match objectives and fill gaps were drafted to assist in providing direction in making the favoured option a reality.<sup>39</sup>

The third DMC meeting of this strategic development process was aimed at consolidating all the work from previous meetings, by further refining it to match the DMC's intended direction, and extrapolating competencies and goals needed to project the departmental vision. First, the DMC reviewed and strengthened its Innovate-Plus hybrid strategic option by adding more key elements. Second, the vision statement and path description to 2020, which elaborated more on the Strategic Imperatives, were reviewed. Third, the committee engaged in drafting a set of strategic objectives that were meant to define specific lines of activity for guiding the DND/CF towards the strategic option and vision. Fourth, distinctive competencies were explored and defined to set the essence of the Department's "excellence and comparative advantage."<sup>40</sup> Fifth, both the gap analysis that

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p.24.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, p. 26.

identified gaps and shortfalls between the desired and current state, and the first wave of five-year goals that addressed these gaps, were reviewed and generated.

With the bulk of the new strategy defined, the SFST's follow-up work was geared towards making final refinements before publishing a completed, public document. During this stage of revision, the SFST conducted bilateral discussions with relevant DMC members to test the committee's interpretation and focus. The final document went through numerous revisions, until the SFST was content to distribute the sixth version of the draft document to DMC members in March 1999, after which each member provided a final review of the statement.<sup>41</sup>


#### Performance measurement:

This period of strategy development also resulted in a new framework for organizing and understanding performance measurement. It was necessary to create a corporate Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) that harmonized with Strategy 2020 - specifically, a common framework to integrate two different agendas, one attentive to the present-day 'running of the business' (a "sustaining agenda"), and one reflecting the changes marked by Strategy 2020 (a "change agenda"). The resulting framework demonstrated a similar organizational understanding of the objectives, goals and tasks, focus areas and performance measures for both the change and sustain agendas that anyone within the Department could interpret. This framework provided more of an 'organizational language'

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 25-27.

that synchronized the two agendas and their respective documents, the Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure and Strategy 2020.<sup>42</sup>



### Additional Insights

Throughout the process, the SFST used a form of computer system to ensure that working groups could function more smoothly. The Decision Support System (DSS), a computer-based tool used for brainstorming and organizing ideas, setting priorities, and developing consensus, proved essential to receiving and tabulating results. During DMC meetings, each committee member would be asked questions that required input based on a ranking system. The DSS system provided simultaneous contribution by all participants, without compromising the anonymity of the members, and it kept a complete electronic record of proceedings. This anonymity of input allowed freedom of opinion and expression, and it also acted as a discussion chair by allotting speaking time for individual inputs, unlike

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p.28.



pre-DSS meetings where verbal contributions were extremely time-disciplined and limited to functional responsibilities.<sup>43</sup>


How Strategy 2020 fits in DND practices:

The strategic guidance that Strategy 2020 provides is a key driver in the Department of National Defence's business practices. As previously indicated, the document was to serve as the source for direction that would flow and propel Defence management. By stating the strategic corporate priorities as established by the DMC, Strategy 2020 provided the management system with the foundation of the organization's change agenda. Since defence capability is the central element that drives departmental planning, resource allocation and accountability,<sup>44</sup> the provision of an agenda of strategic priorities that are concerned with realizing the defence's future capabilities was essential for progress.

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<sup>43</sup> DND, Formulation of the Statement of Strategy, p.13; 31.

<sup>44</sup> DND. "Management Principles & Business Model," 30 September 2003, <[http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp\\_m/management\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp_m/management_e.asp)> (14 May 2003).



Both the mission – the mandated tasks that Defence must be presently capable of performing – and the vision, as defined by Strategy 2020, provide the source for determining what defence capabilities to presently maintain and create for the future in corporate plans. In this system, corporate capability planning is a centralized process. DND's senior management is responsible for identifying the capabilities needed by the Canadian Forces to deliver its mandate, to set resource priorities based on these capability requirements, and to establish an annual corporate business plan and priorities that balance sustainment of present activities and operations and investment towards modernization of the CF.<sup>45</sup> However, execution is decentralized, based on the delegation of authority and managerial flexibility


<sup>45</sup> DND. "Defence Planning and Management (DPM) home page," (1 April 2003)  
[http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/intro_e.asp) (14 May 2003).

balanced by accountability for results. It is thought that decisions should be made at as low a level as possible.<sup>46</sup> Level 1 managers would develop business plans aligned with the annual corporate plan as part of the business planning cycle.

The plans themselves are derived based on performance management whereby results from the previous cycle of business planning are the main measurement to determine resource allocation and attention. Objectives are assessed and given quantified measures and indicators for determining whether it has been achieved or not. Should a problem occur where a task was not accomplished to the specifications of the measures and indicators, it will be identified, reviewed, and possibly have resources and attention reallocated to it. Such a system requires a reference for the objectives that are to be managed. Strategy 2020 serves as this reference when objectives for change are concerned.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.



Strategy 2020's function is vital in the Defence Department's planning and management framework and system. As the guiding document for moving DND into the future, it has to be able to provide a clear understanding of where senior leaders want the department to go. It would be expected that the message that this corporate strategy document conveys would be inspiring, innovative, and able to lead the organization. For such a document, its message is just as important as its purpose.

### **Chapter Three: Strategy 2020's Content**

The physical manifestation of the strategy formulation process that occurred between September 1998 and March 1999 was Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020, released in June 1999. Its twelve pages of content summarize the discussions and decisions that transpired over those six months, and assert the ideas and visions held by the Senior Leadership Team for DND/CF.

The document's first section described the many factors that influence Defence decision-making. The first of these factors reiterated Defence's mandate and missions in relation to its responsibilities to the Canadian government, the nation, and Canadian values. The second factor reflected the broad, thematic expectations of DND/CF's key stakeholders as derived from a stakeholder analysis that identified national and international expectations of Defence. Foremost among these expectations are that Defence upholds the highest regard for Canadian values as a government institution, and continue to serve as a competent, meaningful partner and ally promoting international peace and security. Nationally, the Defence Department is expected to contribute to the achievement of Government priorities, comply with mandated requirements such as bilingualism, assist other federal departments, manage its resources prudently, and report openly on its activities to Parliament and the public.<sup>47</sup> Internationally, expectations emphasized Canada's role as a competent partner towards allies in the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) by performing a meaningful role in combined operations. The

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<sup>47</sup> DND. Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 1999), p. 3.

implication of this expectation is the need to keep pace with new military concepts, doctrine and technology.<sup>48</sup>

The third factor is a short description of the future strategic international environment based on emerging trends and observable patterns of behaviour:

- The United States will remain the dominant global power.
- The main sources of conflict will continue to be ethnic unrest, religious extremism, and resource disputes, with new sources stemming from environmental degradation and the threat posed to nation states by globalization.
- Non-state actors will increase in importance.
- The gap between developed and developing nations will remain.
- The proliferation of advanced weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, to state and non-state actors will remain a concern.
- The military battlefield will become global, reaching from the sea-floor to space, and will also involve cyberspace.
- Future operations will be conducted at an accelerated pace, requiring rapid coordination and a dependence on information.
- The rapid pace of technological change ensures not only greater effectiveness in the portability, range, precision and lethality of weapons but also that the effective lifespan of these weapons will decrease.
- Many emerging threats will be asymmetric.
- Canada's socio-economic forecast for the future continues to place a high priority on social, environmental, and economic welfare.
- Organizations in the future must be capable of adapting, innovating, and integrating information technologies and management practices.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p.4.

In such an environment, the planners of Strategy 2020 sought not only to find direction for the military, but for the Defence institution as a whole. ‘Flexibility’, ‘adaptive’, ‘innovative’, ‘strategically focussed’, and ‘proactive’ were buzzwords used to describe what the Department had to become. For the Department to succeed, it had to adhere to five strategic imperatives:

- Set and maintain a *coherent strategy* for the future by identifying priorities, key long-term strategic objectives, and shorter-term goals and targets;
- Nurture *pride in the institution* by meeting the highest of public standards in terms of ethos, values and professionalism, and by providing its members and employees with a compelling vision, a competitive quality of life and rewarding careers;
- Maximize its *strategic partnerships* through the most effective collaboration with Other Government Departments and by strengthening its links to like-minded nations;
- Maintain a *relevant force structure* that is inter-operable at the component and contingent headquarters level with Canada’s allies, globally deployable and affordable over time.
- Improve *resource stewardship* by striking a careful balance between the investment needed to maintain current operations and the investments in people, infrastructure and equipment needed to prepare for emerging risks and future challenges.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

It is the first imperative that, presumably, Strategy 2020 deals most directly with.

The actual strategy outlined in Strategy 2020 abides by the direction of the 1994 White Paper on Defence that stated Canada would maintain “multi-purpose combat capable forces”. The very core of the strategy is “to position the force structure of the CF to provide Canada with modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations.”<sup>51</sup> It went on to say that “the force structure must be viable, achievable, and affordable.”<sup>52</sup> These statements are reflected in the defining vision contained in Strategy 2020:

“The Defence Team will generate, employ and sustain high-quality, combat-capable, interoperable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces. We will exploit leading-edge doctrine and technologies to accomplish our domestic and international roles in the battlespace of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and be recognized, both at home and abroad, as an innovative, relevant knowledge-based institution. With transformational leadership and coherent management, we will build upon our proud heritage in pursuit of clear strategic objectives.”<sup>53</sup>

To achieve this vision, DND/CF must be able to do the following:

- set long-term objectives firmly based in the national interests of Canada;
- identify force structure and goals and targets that need to be achieved along the way;
- define military and leadership accountabilities and responsibilities;
- prioritize activities and resources to ensure this vision is achieved;
- establish criteria to measure performance; and
- ensure activities and outputs are achieving desired strategic outcomes in assuring the security of Canada.<sup>54</sup>

Advancing the Department would in part require building on DND/CF’s unique strengths. Distinctive competencies – i.e., something an organization does especially well,

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p.6.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p.7.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.



something that makes it ‘distinctive’ or distinguishes it in comparison to others – identify desired competencies for DND/CF. The Strategic Statement recognized command and leadership, multi-skilled people, doctrine, technology and training, modern management practices, and special relationships with principal allies as being the distinctive competencies that would assist in guiding the institution’s objectives.

Eight distinct strategic objectives were laid down as goals requiring attention. The strategic objectives themselves are general statements of what the Defence establishment has to build and maintain in order to offer a viable defence to Canadians in the coming years.<sup>55</sup>

The objectives were:

1. Innovative Path – Create an adaptive, innovative and relevant path into the future.
2. Decisive Leaders – Develop and sustain a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness and trust while improving our leaders’ abilities to lead and manage effectively.
3. Modernize – Field a viable and affordable force structure trained and equipped to generate advanced combat capabilities that target leading end doctrine and technologies relevant to the battlespace of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
4. Globally Deployable – Enhance the combat preparedness, global deployability and sustainability of our maritime, land, and air forces.
5. Interoperable – Strengthen our military to military relationships with our principal allies ensuring interoperable forces, doctrine and C<sup>4</sup>I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence).
6. Career of Choice – Position Defence as a rewarding, flexible and progressive workplace that builds professional teams of innovative and highly skilled men and women dedicated to accomplishing the mission.
7. Strategic Partnerships – Establish clear strategic, external partnerships to better position Defence to achieve national objectives.
8. Resource Stewardship – Adopt a comprehensive approach to planning, management and comptrollership, focused on operational requirements, that prepares us to respond rapidly and effectively to change.<sup>56</sup>

Each of these objectives was given five-year targets aimed at providing the necessary guidance for the entire department and the Canadian Forces, as well as to serve as

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<sup>55</sup> DND, Mutabilis in Mobili: Leading and Managing Strategic Change in DND and the CF. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2000), p. 5.

<sup>56</sup> DND, Strategy 2020, p.9-11.

benchmarks for determining the progress of necessary changes towards achieving the Defence vision.

The Strategy 2020 document concludes that it is “an achievable and pragmatic roadmap for the future of Canadian defence, based on a thorough assessment of the challenges and opportunities in the emerging defence environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>57</sup> However, the conclusion also offers a semblance of a warning for all within the Department about what needs to exist for the strategy to succeed. “No one environment, group, branch or service provider can operate in isolation from the strategy,”<sup>58</sup> thus there must be unity in the ‘Canadian Defence Team’, i.e. DND/CF. While there will continue to be changes in leadership and environment, as well as limitations and constraints, the institution must have a continuity of effort and resolve to remain focussed on making the vision a reality. Finally, there must be a partnership with Canadians, members of the Defence Team, and stakeholders to achieve “the best strategic fit within an appropriate resource envelope.”<sup>59</sup>

The brief statement of strategy contained in Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 demonstrates an institutional willingness to change, but does it ‘hold water’ as a direction for Defence in the future? Beyond its vision statements, strategic objectives, and distinctive competencies, what exactly is the nature of this document? Ascertaining the merits of Strategy 2020’s substance will identify not only possible weaknesses in direction, but potentially weakness in the directors of change that head DND/CF.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p.12

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

## **Chapter Four: An Assessment of Strategy 2020**

Examining the process and the essence of the statement of strategy has provided a better understanding of the thinking and decision-making behind DND/CF's principal guiding document. This understanding provides a backdrop that is useful in assessing Strategy 2020 as a viable and useful document. The objectives of such an assessment would be to determine whether the original intentions of the document were met, and to assess how well it provides direction and objectives for the future of the defence institution. Great care has to be taken in such an analysis to determine merits and faults on the basis of both corporate and military contextual perspectives.

### **Perspective 1: Corporate**

The process that developed Strategy 2020 was one of the many management and business practices introduced into DND when the department was required to balance its ability to operate with cuts to defence funding. DND had to make better use of its limited resources, and to do so required fundamental changes to management practices and work methods – the 'what we do' and 'how we do it'.<sup>60</sup> Renewal of the organization was based on the DND/CF mission (why we exist as an institution of government), vision (the kind of organization we have to be to carry out our mission), and management principles (principles that guide how we manage resources and conduct business).<sup>61</sup> These three aspects of the

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<sup>60</sup> DND. Framework for Renewal. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 1993), made available from the DND Intranet 1 October 2003.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

Defence organization were definitely present in Strategy 2020, so one could assume without fault the corporate nature of the document.

In producing a corporate strategy, the expression of vision and direction for the entire organization, the Strategy 2020 development process followed the basic pattern in management that DND had learned. First, DND needed to revisit the ‘fundamentals’ of the organization, for example: the DND/CF mission, vision and management principles; the organization’s mission or its assigned roles, responsibilities and tasks; outputs it was expected to produce and standards that currently apply to these outputs; the organization’s core capabilities and weaknesses; and current and anticipated resource allocations. Second, DND had to examine the ‘pressures for change’ in the organization’s external and internal environments, and the opportunities and demands represented by these trends. Finally, DND had to confirm what the organization has to accomplish to ‘survive and prosper’.<sup>62</sup>

Since attention in a corporate view is primarily focussed solely on the organization of National Defence, the main participants of the development process for Strategy 2020 were the senior leaders of DND/CF. In accordance with management practices, responsibility for the development of a vision for the organization, including its values and operating principles, is a combined leadership/management task that falls to the senior team of the organization.<sup>63</sup> It was, therefore, no mystery that the Defence Management Committee of all Level 1 Business managers would be the lead group behind the decisions, path-finding, and making of Strategy 2020. Once the senior management leaders determined DND/CF’s vision, values, operating principles, objectives and priorities etc., they would flow downwards –

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

along with other business planning activities – and cascade throughout the hierarchy.<sup>64</sup> The final vehicle for the cascading of corporate vision, direction and objectives was the Strategy 2020 document.

Considering the final product, it can be said that it met all the original intentions for the Strategy 2020 exercise. Development of Strategy 2020 did allow the senior management to look ahead at the future and craft a vision for the Department, including an idea of how the Canadian Forces would operate in the future. It had also followed from the guidance of the most current defence policy to match present policy with future activities. Stated objectives and objective areas in Strategy 2020 met the need for guidance and reference for Departmental actions and investment in areas deemed important to the organization. The targets set for each objective area would provide the indicators necessary to gauge performance towards change. Strategy 2020, in the corporate light, was short, sweet, and successful in meeting these all ‘corporate’ intentions.

### Perspective 2: Military

The Strategy 2020 development exercise was a classic managerial example of defining the organization’s corporate ‘strategic vision’, but does it fare well for a primarily military-focussed government department? What may work for businesses may not meet the guiding and planning needs for an organization dedicated to fighting wars and achieving national objectives.

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

What did it do vis-à-vis intentions?

Was Strategy 2020 able to provide a vision for Defence? Yes, a vision was stated in the document. However, no depth of definition was given to better understand just what this vision implied. Undefined language of “high-quality, combat-capable, interoperable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces” treats these concepts as implicitly clear, but with little elaboration their meanings are contestable. There lacks a qualitative and quantitative element that gives content to these terms. This allows anyone to interpret the broad direction envisioned by DND’s leaders. Furthermore, the strategic essence of the vision is seemingly vague. Without any substantial insight into the nation’s national interests and commitments, prevailing and new, there lacked any acknowledgement of the demands put upon our military and how they define the nature of the armed forces, vis-à-vis operational doctrine.

Does the strategic statement provide a long-term strategy to guide defence planning? What strategy and guidance Strategy 2020 does provide is much too broad to give sufficient, clear direction about what is intended for the institution and the forces that undertake the defence activity. In fact, there is little clarity and elaboration about the facets of direction, as Strategy 2020 had only planned to further define the vision in the years to come. Specifically, these plans mention more about developing and designing concepts than deciding them: “defining the long term strategy in 5 year increments”, “designing a viable and affordable force structure”, “defining and applying high standards for leadership selection and development”, “developing a comprehensive program to adopt new doctrine and equipment compatible with our allies”, “developing career policies and recruitment and retention

programs”, and “designing a integrated defence management system.”<sup>65</sup> In addition, five-year way-points corresponding to objective areas demonstrate a lack of willingness to think beyond for more longer-term vision, or reflect an incapacity of the leadership to make hard decisions because of continuing transitions and short terms in staff. One could almost suspect the senior leadership of stalling active decision-making for more time to contemplate these matters further.

Is there sufficient guidance for investment in the future? Despite there being eight objective areas for change, no priority has been given to suggest critical issue areas versus areas requiring less attention. Whether this is because all eight are equally critical than other, unmentioned areas, no effort has been made to quantify the amount of attention required to meet these objectives. Furthermore and as previously mentioned, although broad objectives are identified, there is not enough definition of what is envisioned strategically for the Canadian Forces to drive investment. For example, if the military is to become more globally deployable, what does this mean for the force structure’s design? What areas become critical for investment? What are the requirements and restrictions for equipment investment by moving in this direction? By not addressing such issues, capability decisions made without consideration for, or in the absence of strategy, will be subject to internal ideational conflicts, force ramifications upon future strategy by imposing paths that may or may not hold true in the future, and potentially posture the military for the wrong circumstances.

Ultimately, the question of most importance is “did Strategy 2020 bridge the current defence policy and future activities?” The difficulty in saying ‘yes’ to this question lies with

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<sup>65</sup> DND, Strategy 2020, p. 9-11.

the document's inherent lack of decisive action in providing definition or strategic discussion that binds defence policy and the future. There has not been adequate discussion of associating means with the ends of national interests, nor suggestion of the nature, shape and scope of the military means. How the military will serve the accomplishment of the state's aims is what predominantly defines the Defence institution, military branches, and defence activities, rather than the management that runs them. Strategy 2020 failed to not only to take this strategic discussion further, but was also unsuccessful at justifying how their intended directions followed from policy.

It can even be said that any attempt at bridging current defence policy with future activities is inevitably flawed because of timeliness. Current defence policy is still embodied in the 1994 White Paper on Defence (referred to as 1994WP), a policy that does not reflect the state of the current international security environment, especially after September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. Failing to account for the current, or near-future, situation makes defence planning impractical and risks the obsolescence of a military geared to the wrong international climate. Many academic reports have brought attention to this lingering problem and have demanded that government conduct foreign and defence policy reviews.<sup>66</sup> In the meantime, strategic planning in DND/CF is not only anchored on past views of the world by hanging on to the 1994WP, but is also in need of direction for contemporary issues and challenges that have arisen in recent years. Canadian strategic planning must therefore assume an artistic element for creating views of contemporary times where policy is deficient and proposing adaptive

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<sup>66</sup> Reports calling for foreign and defence reviews include: Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. To Secure a Nation. (Calgary, AB: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2001); Royal Canadian Military Institute. A Wake Up Call for Canada. (Toronto, ON: RCMI, 2001); Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. A People's Defence Review. (Calgary, AB: CMSS, 2003).



counter-measures, as well as be flexible to adapt quickly to sudden dramatic changes.

Because of its limited exploration of the current and future situations, and constant five-year time frame for review and redevelopment of this “living document”, Strategy 2020 falls short in providing sufficient guidance with respect to the present strategic situation, and will continue to do so in later editions if attention and interest in comprehensively identifying the future context and Canada’s place within.

Strategy 2020 contributes a sufficient sketch of what the institution must do in the years ahead to achieve its intended vision for DND/CF twenty years into the future.

Describing this document as a sketch is intentional, since it does not describe at length or in detail the nature and driving action to implement change. Instead, it offers a basic map of how to get to some form, whatever that may be. Its essence is akin to a general plan of action, as opposed to a specific implementation of action in itself. In other words, Strategy 2020 is essentially a ‘strategy to have a strategy’<sup>67</sup>, which signifies that there will be sub-processes which will provide greater definition and action as the department engages in the greater process of going forward, as opposed to providing any such decisive statements, guiding principles, or stances for the present. Vice Chief of Defence Garnett did reinforce such a distinction in a speech to the Toronto Board of Trade, that “...Strategy 2020 is not in itself a plan for how to use our resources or how to spend our money on individual equipment programs.”<sup>68</sup> By not addressing the nature and doctrine of the military activity - i.e. how military resources will be used to serve national interests, and the shape of the military

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<sup>67</sup> The author would like to thank his colleague William McAuley for this proper, if blunt, statement.

<sup>68</sup> Garnett, VAdm Gary. “Speaking Notes for Vice Admiral Gary Garnett,” VCDS Speeches, VCDS speech before the Toronto Board of Trade, 6 June 2000, <[http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcdsorg/speeches/tbt6jun00\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcdsorg/speeches/tbt6jun00_e.asp)> (4 September 2003).

required to undertake this activity - the DND Leadership Team through their strategic statement neglected to provide ample meat to their direction.

Thinking about the differences in management and military streams of thought does pose an interesting question: have the business practices adopted by Defence's institutional reforms of the mid-1990s made the Department more or less effective militarily? In February 2003, MND McCallum commissioned an advisory committee to explore and report on the administrative efficiency of DND and the CF, focussing primarily on National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) as the central hub for the defence institution's management. Although the report explores many aspects of management within NDHQ with much constructive criticism, only those concerning strategic formulation and Strategy 2020 will be mentioned.

The institution of National Defence is not without its share of problems when compared to other government departments. Yet, in examining the Department it should be held in mind that it is not like any other department or organization in that its activities affect the security and defence of the nation through military operations conducted at home and abroad. Defence is also different in that it receives more government funding than most other departments. This fact alone attracts great scrutiny from those wanting to ensure the efficient use of public money. The Committee further recognized how, in the past decade, Defence has had its share of operating in an environment of resource scarcity and that current procedures and much of the overall governance culture in DND/CF should be viewed as a response to this environment.<sup>69</sup> Though it has received some modest budget increases, in recent years DND/CF has shown its determination to move beyond and better position

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<sup>69</sup> DND, Achieving Administrative Excellence, p. iii.

Defence for the medium and long term through its internal efforts.<sup>70</sup> DND/CF's conduct of its efforts for progress and change are indeed worthy, but are not without their share of flaws systemic to the culture and procedures of the institution.

Weaknesses in DND/CF's strategic planning are perpetuated by inefficiencies in the bureaucratic, business-like, and managerial system in NDHQ. The report submitted by the Minister's advisory Committee, Achieving Administrative Excellence, identifies this system as inherently heavily dependent on consensus and committee networks, caught up in administrative process and detail, and resistant to strategic-level, transformational change.<sup>71</sup> Such a system allows only incremental rather than transformational change, making the Defence institution slow to adapt to changing times. As a product of NDHQ, Strategy 2020 would likely be symptomatic of such a system's weaknesses.

#### Participants:

One weakness identified by the report is NDHQ's reliance on a process of attaining consensus by committee. The primary committee involved in providing strategic direction and decision, the Defence Management Committee (DMC), is itself critiqued (by AAE) for being too large – 20 in number – and for being treated as a 'collection of equals'.<sup>72</sup> The size of the decision-making committee affects the comprehensiveness and specificity of any strategy and vision negatively, since agreement among too large a crowd can only be

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. Vii; 12; xii

<sup>72</sup> DND, Achieving Administrative Efficiency, p. 13.

achieved if kept at a broad understanding that can achieve consensus. The committee does have too many in its membership, some questionably present in strategic affairs.

With each member of the DMC holding equal decision-making weight, the weight of those managers with commands primary to the defence activity are devalued while managers with little significance, secondary, or support elements of the defence activity have greater influence than they ought. Members such as the Assistant Deputy Ministers of Human Resources (both civilian and military), the Legal Advisor, Director General Public Affairs, and ADM (Materiel) need not be present on the important decisive direction-making because they are areas primarily involved in the implementation of strategy and not directly in its crafting.

From the opposite point of view, one may have expected additional actors to be involved in the strategic planning of defence. One might expect the presence of other agencies with a stake in security and defence to participate, in an advisory capacity and not a decision-making one, in a process that would determine strategic-level guidance for the military. Representation in strategic deliberations from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) would be a logical assumption, as foreign policy flows to some degree into Defence. DND strategy should also be open to having experts from other government departments that would have an interest, such as Oceans & Fisheries (due to their responsibility for the Coast Guard), the Canadian International Development Agency (to coordinate a broad range for international action where humanitarian assistance is required), the Privy Council Office, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, to reflect national security, emergency preparedness, and domestic counter-

terrorism efforts stemming from any form of National Security Policy. However, the scope of the exercise was to provide departmental direction and not military strategic guidance, hence the process was kept completely in-house.

Interestingly enough, a military-focussed organization that is reliant on a working rapport between civilian (political, bureaucratic, managerial or otherwise) and military leaders surprisingly does not have any real consideration of focussing its organizational vision on the organization's *raison d'être* – conducting military operations to further political aims. However, very little military thought was brought to the table. Apart from the uniformed members of DMC (the CDS, VCDS, DCDS, and the three environmental Chiefs, at no point during the process were strategic planners and thinkers among each of the environmental commanders' staffs really involved, especially in providing strategic assessments and perspectives from the military. Their involvement was described as being almost trivial:

“It is important to understand that Strategy 2020 was written by a very small team within DGSP. Initially, the Environmental Commanders staffs (ECS) were shut out and not involved in the production of the document. Once the draft was completed, the ECS were provided a copy of the document and asked to provide comment. While ECS reviewed the document DGSP promulgated a number of newer editions of the document making it difficult to track changes. Further, inputs and observations from the ECS were not universally accepted.”<sup>73</sup>

In DND's committee-style environment, the military emphasis is virtually shunned as the three branch leaders must play on an equal playing field where they are outnumbered by the bureaucrats. Furthermore, the management world is a strikingly alien one for military

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<sup>73</sup> Williams, Capt(N). Kelly. “Capt(N) Williams Interview/Response to Questions,” 16 July 2004, personal email (16 July 2004).

personnel, versed in the ideas of policy-strategy relationships. It cannot be assumed that military leaders would have the same expectations or understandings of the Strategy 2020 process.

More importantly, and most lacking among the participants involved in this process, was the lack of political authority present that would ensure national policies and government objectives were followed, and would also give the political approval for such a guiding document. Instead, Strategy 2020 had no formal government approval and no cabinet 'imprimatur'.<sup>74</sup> There was no presence of the Minister of National Defence, the principal link between the political level and the military and the chief force involved in giving government guidance to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. Without this presence, or that of any formal political official to represent the government's national interests, ensuring that this 'corporate strategy' meets with the agenda of the political level is put into question.

Corporate strategy alignment with political interests also raises questions about the very heart of the Strategy 2020 exercise: is it a practical activity for the Department of National Defence? The concept of a corporate strategy challenges the traditional decision-making hierarchy and relationship between the political level/government and the military under its command. In matters of defence, these two levels are inseparable as it is up to the Government to dictate the terms, objectives, and aims of the nation to its military so that military activities do not function outside the bounds of what is in the national interest. Military force is determined, therefore, by what is politically acceptable and what is not in

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<sup>74</sup> Middlemiss, Danford W. and Stairs, Dennis. "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues," Policy Matters. Vol. 3, No. 7 (June 2002); p. 8.

accordance with policy. Furthermore, the political level ensures the subordination of the military by having the power to decide on resource allocations, operations, contingencies and capital acquisitions.<sup>75</sup> Corporations do not have such a relationship, since they incorporate a chief executive officer and board of directors already into their structure and as such operate with more independence. Since a military organization cannot act independently from the government, one wonders how practical a corporate strategy can be in the Department of National Defence.

Reinforcing the inefficient NDHQ structure are lower-level committees that strive to provide consensus-based solutions they feel would be acceptable to the senior-level decision-making committees.<sup>76</sup> The Strategic Formulation Support Team (SFST) that built the foundation and structure of the Strategy 2020 process is representative of this, due to its framing of discussions and decisions based via the Decision Support System computer program. The power held by this support group should not be underestimated, since its work directed for discussion and framed what choices the Senior Leadership would have. By catering to the objective of achieving consensus, decisions made by such committees will lack depth and strategic perspective due to their narrow focus<sup>77</sup>, resulting in nothing decisive at all.

Process:

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<sup>75</sup> Williams, Capt(N). Kelly. "Capt(N) Williams Interview/Response to Questions," 16 July 2004, personal email (16 July 2004).

<sup>76</sup> Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues," p. 8.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

How well Strategy 2020 has provided the direction necessary to guide the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is quantifying something abstract: it is all relative. Targets for meeting objectives fall only within the scope of a five year period, with little insight or conceptualization of the strategic role of the military in achieving the national aims and interests, and the necessary vision of the future forces required to serve the nation beyond that time-frame. With no real concept, little in identifying priorities, and scarce description of future needs, operations, and capabilities, Strategy 2020 contains only a vague vision. There are two reasons why this ambiguity is problematic. First, a hazy vision that lacks a clear strategy makes validation of projects and plans meant for adaptation, change, and preparation for the future impossible because there is little direction to drive decisions. With no direction or notion of where we want to go, there can be no decisions or plans made to ensure that we get there.

Second, in the absence of clear, descriptive, and understandable intent, validation of projects and plans is even more possible, even though they may detract from the true intentions of leaders. To reiterate the words of LGen Campbell, “if you don’t know where you’re going, any road will get you there.”<sup>78</sup> An abstract vision that does not provide sufficient information or direction will not only present many possible roads to take, but creates an atmosphere for competition between different views and their supporters over which path to take.

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<sup>78</sup> DND, Chief of the Air Staff. “Bluer Skies Ahead for Canada’s Air Force says Chief of the Air Staff,” 2002 Series on Modernizing Canada’s Air Force, 2002, <[www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library13\\_e.htm](http://www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library13_e.htm)> (11 October 2002).



Although the vision stated in the ‘corporate strategy’ document provides little guidance in military/doctrinal terms, it does provide something of an ideational framework to work with. There is a destination for the organization, encapsulated in the one-paragraph vision. And this destination is meant not only for the military but the organization as a whole. But the vision’s success is primarily determined by how widely accepted it is and how well its basic tenets are being followed throughout the organization, especially among the military branches.

Within DND/CF, Strategy 2020 serves more as a ‘corporate strategy’ encompassing both the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces as a whole, and not as a Canadian military strategy for the Canadian Forces.<sup>79</sup> Instead of providing any basis for ‘military strategy’, Strategy 2020 is instead a management product with the aim of clearly identifying an idea of the future and the particular areas requiring attention in order to propel the organization forward and turning it into the envisioned Department of the future. Its stated objectives did give performance measures, although not quantified, to aid in determining how far along the path of progress Defence had gone. And based on positive feedback from DMC members about the process, the Strategy 2020 exercise did develop the strategic leadership, corporate culture of DND/CF, and the overall ‘management’ aspects of the organization’s high-level decision-making apparatus. Strategy 2020 did achieve many of the management intentions as indicated earlier, but it may have overlooked – whether by

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<sup>79</sup> Black, LCol. Dean. “RE:Questions1,” 12 May 2004, personal email (12 May 2004).

nature, design, or point of reference – providing military-strategic answers. Those who were expecting such direction perhaps expected too much.

But what did the military do with the direction provided by Strategy 2020? Did the military branches foster the corporate vision?

One possibility is that Strategy 2020 failed to permeate down the corporate hierarchy, and that instead decisions were made in a completely opposite direction. The Administrative Efficiency committee stated in its report that there was no common understanding of priority among capability requirements for the long-term and that, rather than being resolved by a coherent overall plan, capital equipment and other requirements are instead driven from the ‘bottom up’.<sup>80</sup> Stovepipe thinking, generated from the environmental command staffs themselves – the Navy, Army, and Air Force – has encouraged a focus not on strategy and not necessarily on capabilities but on platforms<sup>81</sup>. Yet even among the military branches there may be differing opinions about the ‘way ahead’, spurred by parochial interests and limited funding for each environment’s activities. The organization’s progress towards its intended vision of its future self is ultimately the victim, as the committee suggests, because it has become “an internal resource competition rather than an effort to achieve defined results or corporate goals.”<sup>82</sup>

Does this inter-branch competition suggest divergence among the branches of the intended corporate strategy’s vision? Could this resource fight represent an ideational fight within an organization for steering towards the right path? Or perhaps it suggests deficiencies

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<sup>80</sup> DND, Achieving Administrative Efficiency, p. 13.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

in the Strategy 2020 document where there may not have been sufficient 'military' direction to guide branch plans, encouraging the Army, Navy, and Air Force to pursue their own paths to fill the gaps. It is presumptuous to believe that there is incoherence among the branches without having investigated their visions and paths into the future further. It does seem necessary that judging the success of Strategy 2020's requires a greater look at how accepted its ideas and plans have been among the three environmental commands of the Canadian Forces.

## **Chapter Five: Service Responses to the Strategy 2020 vision**

Since Strategy 2020's introduction as the DND's articulation of strategic vision and objectives for the future, many documents have appeared, claiming themselves to be strategies, visions, and '2020' in focus. At first glance, this phenomenon of sudden document production would seem to demonstrate Strategy 2020's iconic status as the 'guiding light for institutional direction and vision', providing the departmental reference for defence activities into the year 2020. These documents, one may conclude, are physical evidence of how much of a commanding effect the strategic statement has had on different parts of the Defence institution.

This conclusion is correct for certain documents produced by elements within the Department. Several documents sprang from Strategy 2020 to provide greater elaboration and definition of how stated objectives would be achieved for the specific area of leadership and human resources. Canadian Officership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (also referred to as Officership 2020) and The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (or NCM Corps 2020) both are a continuation of the defence strategy's objectives to set an innovative path into the future, develop and sustain a climate for decisive leadership, and position the working atmosphere into a career of choice for both levels of military leadership.<sup>83</sup> Along the same lines, Military HR Strategy 2020 outlines the directives for human resources necessary to match Defence objectives and face future 'people challenges',<sup>84</sup> while Accommodation in support of the Canadian Forces: A Vision for 2020

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<sup>83</sup> DND. Canadian Officership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2001); p. 2; DND. The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2003); p. 2.

<sup>84</sup> DND. Military HR Strategy 2020. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2002).

(or Accommodation 2020) details “the most desirable end-state to meet strategic Canadian Forces accommodation needs in the long term.”<sup>85</sup> The use of ‘2020’ first used by the departmental strategy has become a rallying cry for propelling every area of the institution into the future, with Strategy 2020 at the helm.

Although Strategy 2020 has proven to be a catalyst and a beacon for subsequent direction in the areas of leadership and human resources, of more importance is what impact it has had on the views and directions of the Canadian Forces’ military branches. The Navy, Army, and Air Force have also been actively publishing, or are in the process of developing, their strategic documents in recent years. One would normally assume that there is coherence between the departmental strategy and the views of the branches, and similarly that there is a shared and coordinated direction among the branches. The message from each strategy document should be in sync with Strategy 2020, and complement those visions and strategies from other elements within the department, especially with the other military branches.

#### Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020

The Navy was the first of the three branches to publish a ‘strategy document’, publishing Leadmark two years following Strategy 2020. Leadmark represented “a critical link to the capability-based planning framework set in place by Strategy 2020,” but went further by examining the principles of naval strategy essential for Canada as a medium power.<sup>86</sup> The document’s foreword clarified that Leadmark was “not a shopping list,” and

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<sup>85</sup> DND. Accommodation in support of the Canadian Forces: A Vision for 2020. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2002); p. 1.

<sup>86</sup> DND, Chief of the Maritime Staff [CMS], Directorate of Maritime Strategy [DMS]. Leadmark, (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2001), Foreword.

that “as a strategic document, [Leadmark] provides the rationale (the why) for capabilities (the what) required to fulfill projected naval tasks, and in so doing establishes a coherent linkage to Strategy 2020.”<sup>87</sup> The implementation of this naval strategy, or the ‘how’, would be contained in a follow-up document that would provide staff the necessary instructions to develop naval requirements.<sup>88</sup>

The Navy’s strategy document follows from a series of publications that reinforced the Navy’s role in Canadian security and defence.<sup>89</sup> The document that preceded Leadmark, Adjusting Course, was judged as being essentially on the right path barring minor changes and had been proven correct. However, it was admitted that Leadmark’s predecessor was developed in the absence of a common departmental frame of reference.<sup>90</sup> Writing of Leadmark began in 1998, before Strategy 2020 was completed and released. Three years of work, study and assessment resulted in the Navy’s strategy, during which time the authors attempted to dovetail Leadmark into Strategy 2020’s messages wherever possible.<sup>91</sup> The Navy strategy may not have been intended as a response to the corporate strategy, but attempts were made to connect the two documents.

Leadmark contained a textbook style primer on naval activity. The roles of navies - grouped as diplomatic, constabulary, and military - and the types of activities associated with each was described in expanded detail. From this point, the primer led into the classical mantras of naval strategy and authors Corbett and Mahan, and discussed the various rankings

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid., p.6.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Leadmark’s predecessors include The Naval Vision (1994), The Maritime Vision (1995) and Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada (1997).

<sup>90</sup> CMS, Leadmark, p. 1.

<sup>91</sup> Williams, Capt(N). Kelly. “Capt(N) Williams Interview/Response to Questions,” 16 July 2004, personal email (16 July 2004).

of navies. Garnering support for the Navy was further augmented with a historical narrative of Canada's maritime history, before beginning to deal with planning a strategy for the future. All this contextual information, one of the main traditions in Canadian naval documentation, provided a basis to not only understand the navy, but also to defend the navy's relevance.

This context also provided something else - initial conclusions for what Canada's Navy must be, according to the Navy. Given Canada's size and place in the world, the first conclusion was that the type of navy best suited for Canadian needs should be based on principles for a Rank 3 Medium Global Force Projection navy. A Rank 3 Navy, described as "not possessing the full range of capabilities but have a credible capacity ... and consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies"<sup>92</sup> is generally founded on five principles. First, the ability to influence events at a distance dictates that the threat of danger to the homeland, in home waters or abroad, can be removed or quelled. Second, conserving the freedom of the seas requires the security of oceanic global trading and travelways. Third, the Navy must also act as a joint enabler, playing a critical role in the transport, sustainment, and support of land forces ashore. Fourth, the uncertainty of requests for assistance will require preparation for a wide range of operations. Fifth, such a navy must continue to be versatile and combat capable in the face of conflict, necessitating the requirement to prepare for crisis

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<sup>92</sup> CMS, Leadmark, p. 44.

response that a mere constabulary role cannot achieve.<sup>93</sup> Essentially, this approach to naval strategy is how the Canadian Navy is portraying itself.

The Navy's interpretation of the future security environment was two-fold, the first being much in line with analyses of the international environment as written in Strategy 2020, whereas the second detailed anticipated developments of the future specific to the Navy. Global trends identified in Leadmark - global economics and the integration of economies, advances and proliferation of information technology, the rising world population, and change in the global environment – were no different from Strategy 2020. Neither was Leadmark's list of future security challenges: inter-state conflict, intra-state conflict, natural and civil disasters, international crime, and terrorism. The unique maritime security environment suggested maintaining sufficient capability to perform domestic tasks (disaster relief, sovereignty surveillance) independently and effectively with a wide and appropriate range of force options. Furthermore, CF's maritime forces would require the capacity to operate far from home shores. In deploying abroad, coastal naval forces and inshore military capabilities become more significant: improved missile technology, growing submarine use by nations, improvements to theatre ballistic and cruise missiles, range and power of shore-based anti-ship weaponry, ground-based aircraft, asymmetric warfare, and mines were all threats requiring consideration for international naval operations.<sup>94</sup>

Consistency of the navy's mission, values, and vision was said to flow from those established from Strategy 2020:

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid, p. 46-47.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, p. 72-89.



- The Maritime Command Mission: To generate and maintain combat-capable, multipurpose maritime forces to meet Canada's defence objectives.
- Canadian values to be defended: democracy and the rule of law; individual rights and freedoms as articulated in the Charter [of Rights and Freedoms]; peace, order and good government as defined in the constitution; and sustainable economic well-being.
- The Naval Vision: The New Navy – professional, proud and always ready to make a difference for Canada. This vision is best characterised by the traditional motto, "Ready, Aye, Ready."<sup>95</sup>

Leadmark made the point that greater specificity, in particular the essential acquisition of precision was necessary in defining the roles and functions, at home and abroad, to which the navy after next will be tailored. "For a medium power such as Canada," stated Leadmark, "with limited resources yet a desire to participate responsibly and effectively in world events, this means identifying those roles and functions that it must be ready to perform at or from the sea, either autonomously or in partnership with like-minded states, and those that will be left to others."<sup>96</sup> These roles and functions were:

- Military Role – Defend National and Allied Commitments
  - Sea Control, sea denial, fleet in being, maritime power projection.
- Diplomatic Role – Support Canadian Foreign Policy
  - Preventative deployments, coercion, maritime interdiction operations, peace support operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, civil military

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid, p. 92-93.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, p. 93.

cooperation, symbolic use, presence, humanitarian assistance, confidence building, track two diplomacy.

- Constabulary Role – Secure Canadian Sovereignty
  - Sovereignty Patrols, aid of the civil power, assistance to other government departments, search and rescue, disaster relief, oceans management.<sup>97</sup>

With the definition of these Canadian roles and missions, a naval strategy could then be crafted. The frame or shape of this naval strategy was based on the general principles of a medium power naval strategy, but with some specific additions for Canada's particular needs. Other than the original five principles of the basic medium global power projection navy (influence events at a distance, freedom of the seas, joint enabler, wide range of operations, versatile and capable), the Navy also included another three principles for a Canadian naval strategy. It has been accepted as a basic mode of operation for the Canadian Forces that its branches are more likely to conduct operations overseas as part of an alliance or coalition, and as such should provide sufficient assets (not merely a logistical or support role) to not only participate in but also influence the conduct of the operation and the employment of their forces to demonstrate the distinctiveness of Canadian participation. Related to participating in coalitions, the Canadian navy would also need to ensure a significant amount of interoperability to efficiently work alongside the US, allies, and other national services. Lastly, maintenance of an indigenous capacity, an independent ability to conduct domestic

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 95-100.

operations, as a principle would need to continue as an assurance of Canadian sovereignty over its territory.<sup>98</sup>

The ability to fulfill these principles generated a list of capability requirements or competencies. This list encompassed the various types of activities that the Navy must be capable of undertaking. It was divided by its core competencies – the foundation components necessary to establish legitimacy as a navy – C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), self defence, force generation, sustainment, and organic air - and force multipliers that add value to the navy's contribution to operations (force air defence, force under water warfare, sealift, naval fire support, and gateway C4ISR). An additional consideration– tailored capabilities for operations other than war – was given to accommodate activities of a non war-fighting nature. Only after all necessary combat capabilities had been achieved would remaining resources be directed towards this area.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 100-117.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, p. 126-127.

**RELATION OF NAVAL COMPETENCY COMPONENTS TO CF CAPABILITY AREAS**

<b>BASIC NAVAL CONCEPTS</b>	<b>NAVAL CORE COMPETENCIES</b>	<b>COMPETENCY COMPONENTS</b>	<b>CF CAPABILITY AREAS</b>
<b>FLOAT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To generate and maintain credible combat forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Force Generation</li> <li>• Sustainment (Resources/Maintenance)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Force Generation</li> </ul>
<b>MOVE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide sea-based service support and co-ordination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainment (Operational)</li> <li>• Sealift</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustain Forces</li> <li>• Corporate Strategy and Policy</li> <li>• Mobility</li> </ul>
<b>FIGHT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To know what is going on in real time and to be able to act with a wide range of force options</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• C4ISR</li> <li>• Self-Defence</li> <li>• Organic Air</li> <li>• Force Defence</li> <li>• Sealift</li> <li>• Naval Fire Support</li> <li>• Gateway C4ISR</li> <li>• Tailored Capabilities for OOTW</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command</li> <li>• Information and Intelligence</li> <li>• Conduct operations</li> <li>• Protect Forces</li> <li>• Corporate Strategy &amp; Policy</li> </ul>

**Figure 13: Relation of Naval competency components to CF capability areas (Leadmark, p. 125.)**

Worth mentioning is the list of identified capabilities that would not be pursued in the path towards the Navy after Next. Many of these were capabilities that fall under Major Global Force Projection navies, whereas others were deemed not required for the defence of Canada, brought to operations by other nations, or that would be treaty violations. Capabilities that would not be pursued are: strategic attack, amphibious assault, maritime pre-positioning, fleet air (carrier) capability, force mine countermeasures, offensive and defensive mine-laying, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and submarine salvage.<sup>100</sup>

From the lengthy discussions of navy types, missions and roles, competencies and capabilities, Leadmark concluded with a strategy, which stated:

“The Naval Strategy for 2020: The Canadian navy will continue its development as a highly adaptable and flexible force, ready to provide the government with a wide range of relevant policy options across a continuum of domestic and international contingencies up to mid-level military operations.

The navy will generate combat capable forces that are responsive, rapidly deployable, sustainable, versatile, lethal and survivable. Canada’s naval forces, from individual

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, p. 127.

units to complete Task Groups, will be tactically self-sufficient and be able to join or integrate into a joint, US or multinational force, anywhere in the world. The navy will enhance the capability to deploy Vanguard elements for crisis response and to support the rapid deployment of the Land and Air Main Contingency Forces.”<sup>101</sup>

### Observations:

Leadmark does not mince words by saying that it is descriptive in nature. In fact, it took an intuitive character by describing the future roles of the navy without much concern for the fiscal realities of the Canadian Forces. Martin Shadwick commented that Strategy 2020 “did not exactly provide the clearest of rationales for Canada’s defence establishment or an effective lead-in for Leadmark,” and in so doing created constraint on maritime strategy development from a higher national security or military strategy.<sup>102</sup> It stands to reason that the authors of Leadmark were very much attempting to portray what the Canadian Navy *could* do in the future and were arguing to make that depiction a reality. However, this intuitive thinking can become too focussed on the roles of the Naval branch of the military, rather than on how those are linked to greater purposes of the military.

The Navy’s vision itself denounced alternative views of the navy as being a purely constabulary force or a significantly smaller but combat-capable navy that could still support Canadian interests.<sup>103</sup> By declaring what roles and respective capabilities the Navy should and should not pursue, Leadmark provided a conceptual and innovative direction that was missing from higher defence authorities. More significantly, the Navy defined its own ‘identity’ through this interpretation of what a Canadian Navy should be within the very

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p. 119.

<sup>102</sup> Shadwick, Martin. “Commentary: The Leadmark Chronicles,” Canadian Military Journal. Vol. 2, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), p. 75.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

broad lines of the defence vision and continuing present-day missions. By describing what the Navy should be in order to achieve Canadian national interests, the Navy's strategy read as though it means to dictate to higher authorities what was necessary.

By asserting its own *raison d'être* however, the Navy reached an impasse. The Navy can declare what it should be and why, but only the decision-makers above it can decide whether or not to fund such initiatives. The sad reality, according to Fred Fowlow, is that government underfunding of the military will continue and that nothing will change.<sup>104</sup> The Navy strategy is as much a conceptual image of what the navy can be as it is a plea for attention to solve ongoing maritime equipment and force strength issues. Regrettably, under the guise of advocating more military spending the naval strategy reflects what the navy aspires to be and not the fiscal reality currently challenging Defence. By being so geared towards the ideal navy of the future, the guidance Leadmark offers may only be a dream.

Martin Shadwick's statement best describes Leadmark when he wrote "some sections of Leadmark... make constructive and thought-provoking efforts to explain why Canada needs a navy, but others fall short or smother potentially useful arguments under the deadweight of excess verbiage."<sup>105</sup> Leadmark was successful at defending the navy's relevance and arguing for a particular concept of a future Canadian navy sought by the military branch. However, it lacked the means or instructions to implement the plan because of continued under-funding. Without adequate funding, the strategy is unattainable in its purest ideal form.

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<sup>104</sup> Fowlow, Fred R. "When will the Government Reconcile Rhetoric with Reality?" Maritime Affairs.

<sup>105</sup> Shadwick, Martin. "The Leadmark Chronicles," Canadian Military Journal, p. 75.

### Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy

The Canadian Army's strategic document, Advancing with Purpose: the Army Strategy (henceforth referred to as the 'Army Strategy'), was released in 2002, while its soldiers were fighting the campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan. The strategy itself expressed "a holistic and balanced approach to preparing the Army for the future, while continuing to perform the tasks that Canadians expect today."<sup>106</sup>

Since 1997, the Army had undertaken multiple reviews prior to Army Strategy. These reviews produced the Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance 1998 (LFSDG '98), an updated version in the Spring of 2000 (LFSDG '01), and a more fundamental review, the Army Strategic Refocus, in the Fall of 2000, to deal with significant shifts in departmental strategic direction.<sup>107</sup> The army's strategic direction evolved with each review, and so, too, did each developmental process.

The Future Army Development Plan (8 March 1999) introduced the process the Army would use to develop and adopt a future focus that would lead the development of the future army. Development work was divided into a three timeframe planning approach. Planning would be undertaken for the Army of Today, the Army of Tomorrow, and the Army of the Future.<sup>108</sup> It was understood by the Army planners that the process would not only be linked to other departmental and branch force planning processes, but also would be tied with allied processes. Since the Army's small size meant that it could not operate alone, plans had to fit with the concept of working alongside allies in coalition operations.

<sup>106</sup> DND, Chief of the Land Staff [CLS]. Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2002); p. 1.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>108</sup> DND, CLS, Directorate Land Strategic Concepts [DLSC]. Future Army Development Plan. (Kingston: DLSC, 1999); p.1-2.

Army planners used what they call the Land Force Management Process, a process and mechanism used by the Army to project the future and to ensure such a projection flows into the development of doctrine, the definition of future material requirements, and the training of the Army's future soldiers and leaders.<sup>109</sup> Results from this process relied on the output of three parallel sub-processes that respond to one of three questions. The first of these questions, "what are the defining features of the future security environment?", sought definition of an accepted environment and a single perception of the future that would be equally agreeable. The second question, "what are the force capabilities and characteristics required in that environment?", followed by examining and ascertaining the potential roles and tasks of the future Army, based on the assessment of the future environment and its key features. The third question, "what are the alternative concepts and technologies essential to realise those capabilities?", provided definition to the concepts necessary to make the future Army a reality.<sup>110</sup>

Participants of this process were not only leaders of the Land Staff, but were also members drawn from within and outside the Army. A core team managed and coordinated the process, specifically the collecting, collating, analysing and disseminating information, and developing capability and conceptual options for the Army leadership. An extended team, consisting of staffs from within DND provided support to projects of interest to the Army. One other team - the virtual team made up of staff outside DND, e.g. academia, business, allies, etc. - produced information of interest to the Army. They worked together to

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid, pgs. 6, 2.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, p. 8-10.



create direction for the Army in the form of the Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance.<sup>111</sup>

The Army's examination of the future international security environment bore some resemblance to that described in Strategy 2020, specifically in their list of global trends that will influence events. This list was familiar: globalization, nationalism, population and environmental pressures, population migration, failed and rogue states, non-state centres of power, the decline of the nation state, weapons proliferation, and asymmetric attack. However, the Army's description added a few more trends: the role of the United States in the world, the changing concept of collective security now leaned heavily towards collective interest, and the whole host of possible futures that may occur.<sup>112</sup> The first deduction from reviewing these trends was the most obvious - that because her global interests are not immune to instability and unrest, Canada requires a global strategic focus.<sup>113</sup>

Rather than end the understanding of the future global environment at its trends, the Army view went further. The description recognized the lessons of history that, although documented, still remain relevant and present today. There was also an understanding of the influence from the domestic environment that would affect what the Army will become in future years. A myriad of emerging technologies, ranging from electromagnetic guns to quantum computers to biotechnology, were expected to alter the battlefield so significantly that proper management of their introduction, integration, and implementation would become even more important. Proper consideration was also given to Allied and force development

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>112</sup> DND, CLS, DLSC. The Future Security Environment. (Kingston: DLSC, 1999); p. 10-17.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, p. 17.

initiatives, namely NATO Land Operations (LO) 2020 and the US Army After Next (AAN), because of our coalition precondition in operations. The future security environment, detailed by these realities, would influence how the Army would progress.

LO 2020's purpose was to identify the type of land forces, their capabilities and characteristics that would be required in the year 2020 for warfighting and other military operations.<sup>114</sup> This document identified the two types of operations – conventional conflict between national entities or 'View 1' and asymmetric conflict or 'View 2' – as well as the operational capabilities and technologies required for both likely future views. Technologies were listed and then prioritized by inputting them into research studies and wargames. The conclusions drawn from the LO 2020 identified a 2020 battlespace variable in density, non-linear and more dispersed, that an ethos based on combat operations is fundamental, that NATO would need to overcome interoperability shortfalls, information dominance and superiority would remain key objectives, that urban environments would demand more attention, and that a reduced logistic drag was essential for military operations in 2020.<sup>115</sup>

The American AAN initiative consisted of several broad studies of warfare to the year 2025 intended to frame issues vital to the development of the US Army after 2010, and to integrate these issues into decisions that would influence future development programs. The AAN, established in 1996, is a cyclic program that provides a paper annually on the long-range future. That paper would be analysed and tested in studies and wargames that provide conceptual input into the next year's paper. Some interesting insights from the ANN series include 'advanced full dimension operations' and 'global manoeuvre' as being critical long-

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<sup>114</sup> DLSC. The Future Security Environment, p.32.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p.33.

term capabilities, but the deployability gap between the arrival of joint early entry and decisive forces into theatre places increased requirements on future strategic lift; there is a need for early entry ground forces with lethality, survivability, as well as air and ground tactical mobility; the Army of 2025 will be a hybrid force of mechanized, light and Strike forces; integrated combat efforts are imperative from the joint/combined force;<sup>116</sup> The Canadian Army has likely listened to these conclusions from their American neighbours, not only for the planning of its own army, but in terms of Canada's interoperability with its allies, most importantly of all the United States.

These observations of the emerging international and domestic environments have led Army analysts to make several deductions concerning the Army's future. First, for the Army to fulfill national policies it needed to be adequately resourced at all times. Therefore the leadership will have to be prepared to set priorities and assume risk, especially in the face of projected resource constraints. Second, it was seen that the majority of operations undertaken by the Army would be peace support and humanitarian assistance missions with a potential requirement for combat capability, however there would also be that slight chance of that rare operation requiring high-risk warfighting skills. A balance would therefore be required between frequency of the types of operations and importance of maintaining combat capabilities. Third, the Army would never lose its standing as a tool of domestic policy and as the government's instrument of last resort. Fourth, because emerging symmetric and asymmetric threats would challenge Canada's security as globalization reduced her geographic isolation, the Army would need to be capable of dealing with asymmetric attacks

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

at home and abroad as well as providing disaster relief. Fifth, Canada's global security and national interests could only be served collectively with other nations, and Canada would, therefore, need to retain a sustainable expeditionary capability, supported by adequate strategic and operational mobility. A Canadian contribution was expected to be a combined force acting as part of a US-led coalition, so communications, doctrine, procedures and sustainment would need to be compatible both with allies and with other branches of the Canadian Forces. Sixth, the violence and unpredictability witnessed in past nationalist, religious, tribal and ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War suggested that Army units participating in peace-support operations would require sufficient force protection and combat capability. Seventh, the Army would have to balance size and capability by addressing issues of training level, attention to technology, manpower, and readiness. Eighth, the Army would need to draw upon a broader and more diverse population to compete for scarce personnel resources and maintain the necessary quantity and quality of manpower.<sup>117</sup>

These deductions form what became the new vision of the Army's strategy, which is that the Army seeks to become more agile and lethal by focussing on strategically relevant and tactically decisive medium-weight forces.<sup>118</sup> This represents a significant departure from maintaining heavy armour forces associated with thinking during the Cold War era. Such a redefinition of the Army does suggest an incapacity to conduct the full range of operations across the spectrum of conflict as intended in the 1994WP, but that how the Army will operate, during times of war and peace, will be transformed.

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. 17.

<sup>118</sup> CLS, *Army Strategy*, p.13

The Army Strategy also includes additional goals that run parallel to the vision and corporate objectives of Strategy 2020. First, the Army would seek greater connectivity with Canadians by being more open to interaction with its primary stake-holders, all Canadians. This supports Strategy 2020's objective of Strategic Partnerships.<sup>119</sup> Second, Army culture would be shaped by way reformulation of its ethos, leadership doctrine, practices and professionalism that meet with the 'social, strategic and operational realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.' This objective corresponds to the corporate strategy's objectives of Innovative Path, Decisive Leaders and Career of Choice.<sup>120</sup> The Army's third objective refers to the previous discussion about the Army's own strategic thinking because it seeks to deliver a combat-capable, sustainable force structure. This objective will not only transform the army into a medium-weight, information age army but ensure that the army will be sustainable, interoperable, and as a result, effective. Army Objective 3 spoke directly to Modernization, Interoperability, and Effective Resource Stewardship goals of Strategy 2020.<sup>121</sup> Fourth, the Army aimed to manage its readiness through sustained manpower levels and preparations for the tempo of future deployments. Management of readiness standards for equipment, resources, and personnel will be improved and enhanced to ensure the goal of global deployability can be achieved.<sup>122</sup>

Although the portrayal of 'independence in thought' among thinkers and planners of the Land Staff, the Army's strategy in fact fits well with the overall vision and objectives of Strategy 2020. In fact, The Army Strategy document is business-like in appearance,

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid, p. 17.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, p. 18-19.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, p. 20-21.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, p. 22-23.

vocabulary, and structure. Not only does the Army have a vision and objectives, but 10- and 5-year targets corresponding to each objective that underlines the Army's transformation plans.

The Army experience in strategic thinking provides some interesting observations. Its change of direction towards medium-weight deployable forces stems not just from Canadian security requirements, but also incorporates a greater appreciation for the views of Canada's allies. The deductions and conclusions are the result of a rational, realistic appraisal of not only the capability needs for an international security environment of tomorrow but also of the potential domestic political and fiscal constraints that may continue.

### Canada's Air Force

"There is an old adage I frequently use when talking about planning, namely 'if you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there.' The problem, of course, is that you may not like the destination – and, once there, it may also be difficult to reverse course. If we put things in the context of major fleets or pieces of equipment, the choices we make today will determine the equipment military personnel will be using three decades from now, so we need to do our best to get things right."

- LGen Campbell, Chief of the Air Staff (2002)<sup>123</sup>

The Air Force was the last of the three military branches to publish some form of strategic vision document. Three Air Force documents that outlined current, short-term, and long-term plans and visions were released almost five years after Strategy 2020. The first, Canada's Air Force: a Vital National Security Institution, like the Navy's Leadmark document, described in general the attributes of air forces, where Canada's Air Force is today

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<sup>123</sup> DND, Chief of the Air Staff [CAS]. "Bluer Skies Ahead for Canada's Air Force says Chief of the Air Staff," 2002 Series on Modernizing Canada's Air Force, 2002, <[www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library13\\_e.htm](http://www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library13_e.htm)> (24 October 2003).

and what it does for the nation. Of greater interest concerning ‘strategic vision’ is Strategic Vectors, the second document of this series, provided the Air Force’s vision for the future. The document itself defines the Air Force’s perception of the strategic context facing Canada, the nature and limitations of the Canadian Air Force, the capabilities required for the future, and eight ‘vectors’, i.e. areas to focus energy. A greater appreciation for Air Force thought can be gained by looking at this particular document briefly.

The Canadian strategic context, as interpreted by the Air Force, reiterated the general themes in Canadian defence but with a post 11 September 2001 attitude. The tenets of Canadian security, the Canada-US relationship, and Canada’s long-standing internationalism once again took primacy in describing the strategic context, but with the addition of terms such as ‘homeland’ or ‘national security’. The recognition that Canada’s security “is solidly tied to international security and inextricably linked to the United States,” and that Canadian participation in defence and collective security organizations remains central in Canadian policies, has continued.<sup>124</sup> The Air Force anticipated the continuation of the tenets of homeland security, shared North American security, and engaged international security in future security and defence policies, and took these as the basis for creating its future path.

Strategic Vectors then went on to describe the nature of the Canadian Air Force and the limitations that are put unto it. The Air Force describes itself as a “global, multipurpose air force.”<sup>125</sup> This description related to the expectation that the Air Force must participate in international relations and that it retains a variety of capabilities, but not a full spectrum of nuclear and conventional capabilities, necessary to maintain aerospace control and provide

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<sup>124</sup> DND, CAS, Director General Air Force Development. Strategic Vectors. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2004) p. 13.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, p. 20.

the Canadian Government with flexibility and freedom of action required to respond to any circumstance. However, Canada's Air Force is subject to certain implications because of its responsibilities in relation to its size: limitations to its breadth and depth of capability, limited training opportunities above the tactical level, limited ability to regenerate trained and qualified personnel quickly, susceptibility to diseconomies of scale (i.e. fixed costs of Air Force capabilities progressively approach their total costs), and progressive inefficiency and inflexibility due to resorting to contracting out to the private sector.<sup>126</sup> Because of budgetary reductions of the 1990s and the adaptation to become more cost-effective undertaken in response to these reductions, the current Air Force identified itself as being a 'fragile organization' with approximately half the people and fewer than half the aircraft it had in 1989 as it entered the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>127</sup> Transformation, it was concluded, was necessary to ensure the long-term relevance, combat effectiveness, and the continuation of the Air Force's ability to effectively contribute to the security of Canada.<sup>128</sup>

The messages conveyed in the Air Force's mission and vision described a uniquely creative path towards the future aerospace force. The Air Force's mission to achieve "Canada's 21<sup>st</sup> Century Aerospace Force" was stated as becoming:

"A force based on excellence and professionalism, equipped, trained and ready to prevail in combat, with the reach and power to contribute effectively to national and international security."

Furthermore, it was implied that the Canadian Air Force would transform from the static air force of the Cold War and becoming a network-enabled, effects-based

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> *ibid*, p. 23.



expeditionary aerospace force.<sup>129</sup> To become such a force, eight strategic vectors were outlined as the courses Air Force will take to transform:

- Results focused operational capability: missions and operations, both domestic and international, demand that the Air Force pursue the necessary capabilities required to achieve the results expected by Canada and its people.
- Responsive expeditionary capability: despite previous success, the Air Force must be better able to deploy, re-deploy, operate and sustain forces anywhere around the world from Canada. This means designing Air Expeditionary Units that can be deployed, or assist in the air-lift and deployment needs of the Army and Navy.
- Transparent interoperability: operational interoperability with other coalition partners in the future will require improved communication, training, and systems.
- Transforming aerospace capabilities: new technologies and platforms will be exploited and introduced to enhance the Air Force's capabilities, and improve operational efficiency and effectiveness.
- Transformation enabling leadership: the Air Force aims to develop personal qualities and abilities in its leaders to make them more able to initiate and implement change as thinkers, leaders, and visionaries.
- Multi-skilled and well educated people: transformation will rely heavily on well educated, informed and ethical personnel at all rank levels capable of exploiting new aerospace capabilities. Through education and academics, Air Force personnel will gain a better understanding of the application of aerospace power.
- Actively engaging Canadians: increasing public awareness, understanding, and support of the Air Force requires reaching out to informed citizens, business leaders and political representatives, so that they may grasp what it is the Air Force is doing in their interest, and at what value.

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<sup>129</sup> The concept of a 'network enabled' force is understood as connecting sensors, operators, and decision-makers in order to share higher quality and more timely information, which will facilitate improved joint situational awareness, decision-making, collaboration, synchronization, and operational effectiveness. To be 'results-focused' suggests focusing on strategic level outcomes, or results, that contribute to Canadian security. CAS, Strategic Vectors. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2004), p. 33-37; Neil, Col. D.T. Phone interview with Author, tape recording, Calgary, AB., 6 May 2004.

- Improved resource stewardship: costs of investments and resource trade-offs have to be clearly understood, prioritized, and managed to make more efficient and effective use of Air Force resources. By incorporating a results-based resource allocation and strategic planning framework, there can be improved management and end-to-end consistency in service delivery.<sup>130</sup>

By these courses for action and the Air Force vision, Strategic Vectors was built on the foundation made by Strategy 2020.<sup>131</sup>

The third document, the Aerospace Capability Framework (ACF), outlined in more detail the plan to take the Air Force to the mid- to near-term waypoint that will be reviewed every two years.<sup>132</sup> Issues such as fleet modernization, command and control, personnel, training, simulation, doctrine, recruitment and retention were addressed. ACF also provided both philosophical and practical guidance needed by the Air Force to ‘get things right’.<sup>133</sup>

An obvious question is why it has taken so long for the Air Force to find a vision. Compared to its fellow branches, which have released material in 2001 and 2002, the Air Force seemed slower to find a path. The simple answer is its continuing struggle to ensure the provision of capabilities needed today while balancing with reductions to its budget.

LGen Campbell noted:

“We went through the period 1990 to 1998 in a mode of financial reductions, budget cuts and almost continuous change. And, while we collectively tried to keep an eye on the future, it was difficult during this period to develop anything long-range, when we were scrambling to deal with sequential budget cuts and changes upon changes.”<sup>134</sup>

<sup>130</sup> CAS, Strategic Vectors, p. 45-51.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid, p. 45.

<sup>132</sup> Neil, Col. D.T. Phone interview with Author, tape recording, Calgary, AB., 6 May 2004.

<sup>133</sup> CAS, “Bluer Skies head,” <[www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library13\\_e.htm](http://www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library13_e.htm)>

<sup>134</sup> CAS, “Bluer Skies head,” <[www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library13\\_e.htm](http://www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library13_e.htm)>

This is not to say that there has been no movement towards preparing the Air Force for the future prior to the introduction of its series of documents. On the contrary, there has been significant momentum towards modernizing the air fleet to assure its capabilities for future operations. This modernization does not represent a complete reconceptualization of Air Force roles in the Canadian Forces and total change, but gradual adaptation and transition of its current fleet for present and future missions.

In a series of articles on modernizing Canada's Air Force, many capabilities and projects were displayed to demonstrate the gradual transition to meet Canada's air defence needs. The upgrading of avionics systems to the CF-18 Hornet fleet of 80 aircraft will prepare the multi-role fighters for the next 20 years of fighter operations and extend its lifespan up to the 2017-2020 time frame. Similar upgrades to the CC-140 Aurora long range patrol aircraft will be the most comprehensive upgrades in 20 years, thus maintaining its presence in the future. Replacement of the controversial Sea King maritime helicopter, in service since the 1960s, will be given the attention it deserves, and in the meantime the helicopter will be given the necessary maintenance and upgrading to ensure its flight-worthiness. Programmes and projects to re-introduce strategic air-to-air refuelling and find greater strategic lift aircraft signify the Air Force's intent to acquire necessary capabilities for the future. Although the search and rescue role has been strengthened with the acquisition of Cormorant helicopters, other ageing aircraft are recognized as needing replacement.

Additional advancements in modernization include new technologies in command and control information systems and synthetic modelling and simulation.<sup>135</sup>

With these projects and programmes underway, modernization in the Air Force seems to be well handled. The financial situation, however, has not eased and still continues beyond the 1990-1998 period identified by LGen Campbell. In fact, with limited funding, ensuring that the Air Force meets its capability and commitment requirements for today and into the future has been a daunting feat, needing hard juggling. Funds for the modernization, upgrading, and updating of aircraft systems have been obtained through reducing fleet numbers by half over three years, starting in 2001.<sup>136</sup> Defence watchers and critics warn that such a reduction in aircraft seriously lessens Canada's capabilities, allowing the Air Force to meet its minimum commitments to NATO and NORAD, with room for little else.<sup>137</sup> In addition, shortages in trained mechanics coupled with the growing number of maintenance problems in ageing aircraft has grounded more of the Air Force's available air fleet. An example is Canada's fleet of CC-130 Hercules transport aircraft, where the number of truly serviceable aircraft out of the 32 total varies between 11 and 12 aircraft.<sup>138</sup>

But perhaps an even greater source for contention is not funding or personnel shortages, but the politicization of capabilities overshadowing and arguably even hijacking strategic decisions. As early as September 2003, Defence Minister John McCallum made his

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<sup>135</sup> DND, CAS. 2002 Series on Modernizing Canada's Air Force, 2002, <[www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library\\_e.htm](http://www.airforce.forces.ca/libradocs/library_e.htm)> (24 October 2003)

<sup>136</sup> Foot, Richard. "Air Force said poised to nearly halve its fleet," National Post. (19 Feb. 2001), p. A4.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Wattie, Chris. "Few Air Force Hercules can fly," National Post. (5 Jul. 2003), p.A1.

top priorities for major equipment purchases known. Only two among them related to the Air Force: the replacement of the Sea King helicopter and the acquisition of strategic lift.

From 1993 to 2004, the Sea King replacement controversy haunted the Defence Department for its 40-year age and how long the government continued to take before it spends the money for their replacement. These old helicopters are the beacons of mismanagement that have never lost the attraction of critics and the media, especially when an accident or crash involving a Sea King occurs. A valuable asset for naval operations in surveillance, search-and-rescue, interdiction and anti-submarine roles, as displayed in the war on terrorism, interest in the Sea King has never waned over the years after the controversial government decision to scrap the replacement program upon the Chrétien Liberal's rise to power. Thus, the failure to expeditiously replace the Sea King was grounded in politics than on any military strategy.

As indicated earlier, the Air Force was intent on acquiring a strategic lift capacity and was originally exploring various options of leasing or buying airlift aircraft. Strategic airlift received even greater interest and scrutiny with the Canadian deployment to Afghanistan in early 2002, when Canadian news cameras caught Canadian soldiers boarding American C-17 transport aircraft on film. The ensuing whirlwind of outcry from Canadians for an indigenous strategic lift capability was immense within the media, declaring the incident 'embarrassing.'<sup>139</sup> The American ambassador to Canada even stated openly that Canada

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<sup>139</sup> Leblanc, Daniel. "Delayed troop deployment embarrassing, MP says," Globe and Mail. (22 January 2002), p. A14.

needs its own airlift.<sup>140</sup> From the amount of public uproar, any decision to acquire airlift aircraft gained more credibility. When it seemed likely that aircraft would be procured or leased, Minister McCallum quashed the decision by stating that Canada would not be unilaterally purchasing strategic airlift for the Canadian Forces. His reasoning was that it would not be an efficient use of resources for a country the size of Canada, and that the absence of the capability had not once stopped Canada or significantly delayed the transport and deployment of personnel and equipment from A to B.<sup>141</sup> As a result, the exploration of and decision on strategic lift options was overturned by ministerial initiative and fell out of the hands of those who are tasked with dealing in all things air force.

Both priority areas indicate an interesting disconnection between the civilian government masters and the conductors of war and peace when it comes to strategic visions and decisions. Whereas the soldiers, sailors, and airmen have more operational knowledge of the application of combat forces, their vision and priorities do not necessarily match those of the policy-makers, leaders, and holders of the public purse. Instead, strategic priorities can become overshadowed by the political game, where what is 'trendy', 'cool', and 'sexy' require more attention than other capability gaps. There can still be compromise, since funds slated for acquiring strategic lift would go to other priorities such as the helicopter replacement project and the CF-18 and Aurora modernization. However, these compromises cannot trade one vital capability for another without impacting the overall operability of the Canadian Forces. Which requires greater attention – sustainment of present capabilities or

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<sup>140</sup> Blanchfield, Mike. "Move your own troops: Cellucci," *Ottawa Citizen*, (20 February 2002), p. A3.

<sup>141</sup> McCallum, John. "Embracing Reallocation, Embracing Change," Speech by the Minister of National Defence to the Canadian Defence Industries Association, 22 October 2003, <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1231](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1231)> (23 October 2003).

generation of future requirements? Such decisions need to be based on priorities for the organization that do not seem to be emphasized by senior managers and political leaders.

Conversely, priorities indicated by the Air Force may be argued as not being in the interest of the country. Halving the air fleet in order to keep the other half relevant for the next 20 years, while ensuring cost-effective expenditures, may be argued as strategically hindering, by delaying replacement of equipment pushed past their life expectancy. How relevant would an updated CF-18 truly become in 20 years when its air-frame can no longer support continuous updates and additions to keep it 'modern'? Were decisions to alter the force size based on strategy or on cost efficiency? Whereas the modernization of the Air Force has allowed advancement operationally, the same cannot be said for advancement strategically. However, one cannot blame the Air Force for taking such measures. The decision to halve the air fleet is more as an attempt to keep capabilities alive, which is seen as more important than the strategic ramifications of having half of an air force.

Surprisingly, infringement on the Air Force's operational area and decision-making turf may not be just a matter of politics. Jurisdiction over operational environment roles is slowly being blurred as new technologies are introduced without clear delineation of responsibility. The Army's purchase of French unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the Afghanistan mission in 2003 has undoubtedly challenged the Air Force's responsibility for aerial surveillance and reconnaissance and, according to the unspoken rule, 'everything that flies in the Canadian Forces belongs to the Air Force'.<sup>142</sup> One senior officer from the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Air Division suggested that to his disappointment the new ACF is deficient in the

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<sup>142</sup> Wattie, Chris. "Army buys spy drones for Afghan mission," National Post. (8 August 2003); p.A4.

area of UAVs, meanwhile the Army had ‘pulled a fast one’ as the Air Force struggles to find its part in this emerging technology.<sup>143</sup> It may very well be that the UAV capability is more operationally effective by being incorporated into the Army. Solving such “turf-fights” will require either a joint understanding of operational employment doctrine or capability responsibility, or even a complete reconstruction of the current demarcations of responsibility.

There is hope for advancing the modernization interests of the Air Force, so long as such an interest also has additional opportunities for the nation. Opportunities that cross into different Canadian sectors and departments can have a bandwagoning effect that can bring benefits to the military. In February 2002, Canada pledged its participation in the development of the American Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), committing US\$150 million to the programme over 10 years.<sup>144</sup> Interest in the fighter programme was spurred more by the lure of defence contracts for Canadian industries than to provide a replacement for Canada’s current fighter capability. A team of representatives from DND, DFAIT, and Industry Canada successfully won a greater return on investment than other countries co-operating with the project. However, though Canada is involved in the development and construction of the JSF, the decision to acquire the aircraft has yet to be made – and that remains a political decision.<sup>145</sup>

The controversies surrounding these problems are likely exaggerated and overblown by the media, but they are not without some degree of practical truth. The Air Force has

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<sup>143</sup> Comments made during a public question and answer period. BGen. Paul McCabe. “Canada Remembers,” talk at the University of Calgary, (10 November 2003).

<sup>144</sup> Hobson, Sharon. “Canada joins JSF programme,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, (13 February, 2002).

<sup>145</sup> Kirby, Jason. “Victory in the Skies,” *Canadian Business*, (23 November, 2003), p. 48-58.



adhered to the objectives and vision outlined in Strategy 2020, but has been able to implement the necessary changes gradually and with the challenges of financial balancing and outside influences, political or inter-service. How can modernization, global deployability, resource stewardship, and all of the corporate strategy objectives be accomplished in the Air Force without sufficient resources or reductions in capabilities? Without sufficient political guidance, set expectations, leeway, and boundaries for activity responsibility, preparing and implementing a path towards the Air Force of the future is almost impossible. And although the Air Force has released its series of documents outlining its 'game plan', its ability to implement this plan will still be vulnerable to unresolved difficulties and external influences. Expecting an organization such as the Air Force to successfully implement its vision, or that in Strategy 2020, under such circumstances may prove to be too optimistic.

#### Conclusions from the Military Branches:

Looking at the three environmental commands' approaches through their statements of strategies and visions for the future, one finds little detraction from the main messages written in Strategy 2020. On paper, the branches are within the bounds of the vision and objectives of the corporate strategy. Essentially, they draw from the basic objective paths laid out by the departmental strategy and have adopted the same vocabulary as their supposed source for direction. Where they may detract, or have simply become independent in their thinking, is in their search for more doctrinal guidance. Through their own visions of the future domestic and international environments, and conceptualization of the forces and

capabilities that are required to operate in such predicted conditions, the branches have taken to self-determination. Branches that have been slow to produce any form of vision or branch strategy struggled to find meaning and direction that fits within the corporate vision while trying to maintain what relevancy and capability they had.

These observations lead to some concerns about the flow of strategy and direction in the Department of National Defence. The fact that the military branches are forging their own directions suggests that there was insufficient military strategic and doctrinal direction coming from higher up in the chain of command, and as high up as the political level. Instead of a 'greater strategic picture' present to provide the role each branch plays in the strategy and what forces then become required to do so, such a concept is underdeveloped and abstract. Strategy 2020, as a corporate vision for the future of the entire Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, had insufficient guidance with respect to 'military strategy'. Because the corporate document was so tightly focussed on providing the Department with its own direction, it did not extend any linkages with the polity to understand the direction in which the country was being led and how the military would play a part in taking the country in that direction. That said, military doctrine falls outside the nature of what is defined by a corporate strategy. At a time when many might have felt there was a need for a document at the strategic level crafted in military doctrine-style terms, Strategy 2020 had little to offer the uniformed side of DND/CF in this respect. This might help to explain why individual services were quick to respond by producing their own strategic vision documents soon after the release of the 'corporate strategy.'<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Black, LCol. Dean. "RE:Questions1," 12 May 2004, personal email (12 May 2004).

Nevertheless, the independence of thinking exerted by the military's environmental branches definitely suggests a lack of linkage between their strategies/vision documents and Strategy 2020. There was no evidence to suggest that strategic thinkers and authors of the corporate strategy connected directly with those of the branch documents to ensure continuity of corporate messages and ideas into branch strategies. Conversely, there was also no connection with military thinkers and planners to the corporate strategy development process. Perhaps with such connectivity a 'military-strategic/doctrinal void' would not be present, and that the development of a corporate strategy could have coincided with the development of a military strategy as well.

Furthermore, nothing has been found that would suggest a common understanding of strategic issues that run across the branches. A greater picture of strategy would have to deal with issues that would relate across the branches: level of jointness reflecting operational readiness, geographic location and functionality of military bases (where bases should be maintained and whether options such as super-bases housing units from two or more branches would increase effectiveness), joint doctrine (how much cross-over of doctrine must there be to ensure the maximum effect of, for example, rapid reaction), jurisdiction over capability areas (which branch will be concerned with UAVs), and how the branches would operate together to provide a breadth of joint capabilities are just some of the topics left unmanaged. One may have hoped that there was some inter-branch communication when

branch strategies were being designed. However, no cooperation between the branches was present during the creation of their own vision documents.<sup>147</sup>

A possible explanation for this may be one of DND's own management principles of 'centralized planning with decentralized implementation'. It suggests that although departmental planning is conducted by senior leaders and managers, each of the different parts of the department are given the responsibility and degree of independence to execute these plans without too much oversight. Under the broad confines of Strategy 2020's objectives, the military branches have some scope to choose how they will implement their part of the corporate plans and vision. Little evidence of oversight is present in DND's management, as it is presumed that ownership of corporate ideas is adopted throughout so that individual sub-departments claim responsibility for their adherence. Interference through over-zealous or micro-management would be detrimental to progress in this light. Although the branches must answer to the centralized leadership with their business plans and performance to determine strengths, weaknesses, and areas that require more or less attention for the following annual business cycle, there is nothing to suggest that there is much interaction, cooperation, networking and unity within the Department to ensure that the corporate strategic vision is being pursued and that it will be achieved as envisioned by the senior leaders and managers.

Management of DND's internal workings may have encouraged greater separation of responsibilities but without a military strategy for reference it becomes up to the military and the branches themselves to determine and acquire the capabilities that they deem necessary to

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<sup>147</sup> Williams, Capt(N). Kelly. "Capt(N) Williams Interview/Response to Questions," 16 July 2004, personal email (16 July 2004).

fulfill the tasks they are expected to perform, to maintain their relevancy as an essential agent of government policy, and to protect their personnel. Without any greater strategy to find themselves in, the branches must root themselves in doctrines, strategies, and policies that they themselves have found relevant. In so doing, it is understandable why some critics may feel that each of the services don't seem to want to come out from under their own shells, but prefer to perhaps chart their own courses largely based however, on their past experiences. The Canadian Navy strategy, for example, paints that service more as an entity belonging to NATO and the US, rather than Canada. Similarly, the Army appears more connected to UN than NATO, and the Canadian Air Force far from appearing expeditionary in any way, is more easily understood in a NORAD context than anything else.<sup>148</sup>

Ironically, the means for the branches to develop their own directions is through the same management practices that created Strategy 2020. Although each of the branches have taken greater time and effort to develop their assessments, visions and paths for their own military directions, their products – the strategy/vision documents – have the same feel as the corporate strategy of the department. They instead reflect ‘corporate strategies’ of the individual branches. As a result, they too may be prone to the same problems that affect their ‘paternal’ departmental strategy.

#### Political-Military implications

Since military decisions are inextricably tied to the political level of decision-making, the branch responses can have an effect from the bottom-up. How the branches act

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<sup>148</sup> Black, LCol. Dean. “RE:Questions1,” 12 May 2004, personal email (12 May 2004).

independently from the political level in determining policy, strategy, and doctrine – and vice versa – can be detrimental to decision-making for both. Either side has the potential of restricting what options are available for policy-makers and military planners, and affecting the achievement of policy and strategy. As a result, such restriction hinders the effectiveness of the armed forces and the nation they serve.

Decisions about capabilities and forces made at the branch level can restrict or manipulate what options the government has to offer militarily. Without any frame of reference vis-à-vis the national objectives by which strategy and doctrine are determined, it is uncertain whether the political level would accept doctrinal changes, and their impact on military options, made by the branches. By redefining itself as a medium-weight force, the Army has also redefined the future of Canadian contributions and commitment options. The result of this is a change in how Canada can contribute in future areas of conflict in Allied operations that require a heavy-armour commitment. In effect, branch visions and plans that create strategic changes – even though they conform to the broad confines of the departmental vision - can impact the range of options available to the political level. If the political level is unwilling to state its national ambitions, objectives and policies clearly and decisively so that its departments can plan in accordance, then it is subject to decisions made by the bottom up.

In addition, politically- sensitive military decisions are being influenced by the political level to the point where there are fewer options to consider when determining strategy. In the cases of replacing the maritime helicopter and acquiring strategic lift capability, it was the Minister of National Defence who handed down decisions as to their

fate. In so doing, strategic thinking is hampered by having fewer options that would be deemed acceptable by the political level. It may have been more strategically sound to have an up-to-date maritime helicopter capability to maintain Canada's ability to participate in multi-national naval operations where such a capability is required, but the military is forced to compensate for government decisions seeking to get the most out of an aircraft long overdue for replacement. Military strategy, if one existed, may have also been best served by a Canadian-owned heavy strategic-lift capability for rapid deployment of aid, soldiers and equipment, but such a possibility will not reach consideration since the Minister negated any such option as politically unacceptable. The corporate strategy's objective of global deployability and its target to find a strategic air-lift solution became constrained because one possible solution has been struck as being infeasible. Although it is up to strategy to reflect the policies made at the political level, more efficient planning can be made if the government could produce more timely policies that would eliminate unapproved options before they reach the planning stage.

Furthermore, implementing change – whether actually in alignment with the vision or simply using the vision for justification – as well as each branch's own views about an appropriate doctrine for their service is challenged by fiscal constraints affecting the entire Defence organization. Because of limited funds left over for capital spending, branches must compete for cash to make their visions (and Defence's) possible. Without doctrinal guidance

for all three services, factionalism will continue to occur as each struggles to assert dominance in doctrine, for funds and attention.<sup>149</sup>

Although Strategy 2020 was unable to provide much in the way of doctrinal guidance, which led to follow-on documents by the military branches, the broad terms of its vision and objectives served to identify important areas within DND, military and civilian, that required attention. Global deployability, modernization, sustainability and readiness objectives should be seen as themes for the organization to focus on, as determined by the Department's leadership. Additional themes, such as quality of life (contained in the objective of 'career of choice'), resource stewardship, and strategic partners also spoke to non-military corporate issues linked but not directly associated to military strategy and doctrine. Overall, the message of Strategy 2020 spread throughout DND/CF, and followed through with more specific guidance documents for particular divisions of the organization, of both military (Leadmark, The Army Strategy, and Strategic Vectors) and para-military (Officership 2020, NCM 2020, HR-MIL 2020, and Accommodation 2020) areas. The Strategy 2020 message may have been short and broad, but it did provoke thought and momentum about change in the institution.

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<sup>149</sup> An example of branch competition has been published in the media, where a memo from the Chief of the Army to the Chief of the Defence Staff stated "The reality of the emerging security environment suggests that it is unlikely that the CF will be called upon to fight in 'blue skies or blue waters' and the overall value to our country of equipping to do so would be minimal compared to the impact of providing precision land effects." The memo further argued that there was insufficient funding for army modernization plans, and that funds from the Air Force and Navy could be funnelled to make the Army plans possible. Pugliese, David. "Army fights with navy, air force for cash," National Post, (18 October 2003), P. A1.



## **Chapter 6: Successes and Failures**

This examination of how strategy and vision has been handled in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, with specific reference to the document Strategy 2020 and the military responses to this ‘strategy,’ has touched upon some interesting themes. One theme is how well business and management definitions and concepts can be integrated into a public governmental organization, and more precisely into a civil-military organization and military environments. Is there contention between the kinds of cultures, and their application of concepts and definitions? Another theme has been how the hierarchy or ‘flow’ of vision has been handed down the different levels of decision-making and leadership. Does unity of purpose and vision exist for an entire organization such as DND to be capable of moving forward as a whole? Answering these thematic questions is key in gauging the success or failure of the message that resides in Strategy 2020.

The first step requires a return to the question of “what is Strategy 2020?” As previously mentioned, it does not subscribe to any traditional ‘military’ sense of strategy. Instead, it is a ‘corporate strategy’ document, intended to serve as the ‘lens’ or ‘vision’ that guided the activities of Defence into the future.<sup>150</sup> The adjective ‘corporate’ represents a holistic view of a group of people that, together, form a business or an organization.<sup>151</sup> In this instance, Strategy 2020 was to provide for Defence an idea of the future to strive for, to inspire the organization towards the kind of Defence organization the leadership wants in the future. The reasoning behind creating and having Strategy 2020 is no different from why

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<sup>150</sup> DND. Mutabilis in Mobili: Leading and Managing Strategic Change in DND and the CF. (Ottawa: DND, 2000), p.2.

<sup>151</sup> Inc.com. “Corporation: Definition, Types, Formation, Maintenance,” 2003, <<http://pf.inc.com/articles/1999/10/14108.html>> (2 July 2004).

businesses have mission statements<sup>152</sup>: because they believe that the effort of making such statements will challenge management and employees alike, establish an environment that fosters and nurtures positive change, and produce more powerful and successful enterprise over time than that which presently exists.<sup>153</sup> In this respect, corporate strategies and mission statements are very similar because of their parallel intents of determining the nature of business, organization, and goals strived for.

However, not all businesses have been successful in their visions, corporate strategies, or mission statements. It has been suggested that 60 per cent of ‘mission statement programmes’ among companies in Europe and North America have failed to achieve the anticipated benefits and results.<sup>154</sup> Reasons for their failure include:

- A lack of definition in the vision: Failure to build full understanding effectively, or to manage organizational interpretations of the mission
- A lack of management commitment: Cynicism, scepticism, uncertainty, resistance impacting all levels of the organization
- Failure to actively enrol employees, the marketplace and other influentials in support of the mission: Ineffective communication based on all the above
- A lack of planning and focused implementation: Seeing the work of bringing the mission to life as a ‘task’, or added burden, rather than as fundamental to the job
- The inability to deal effectively with breakdowns as they occur, representing a lack of commitment, or a lack of skill.<sup>155</sup>

In addition to these possible causes for failure, Strategy 2020 has to be measured against its original intentions and whether it meets the purposes for its existence. In many ways, Strategy 2020 did meet the basic intentions of DND leaders. The Strategy 2020

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<sup>152</sup> A Mission statement is defined as: “A statement of vision, or ambition that defines success and establishes the ground rules by which success will be achieved for a particular company or institution; the articulation of management’s intent regarding the future of an organization, expressed in aspirational terms.” in Foster, Timothy R.V. 101 Great Mission Statements. (London: Kogan Page Ltd., 1993); p.19.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, p.18

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid. p.23-24.

exercise did allow DND/CF to shift its attention towards the future to provide a picture of tomorrow, although the descriptions were brief and vague, and certain defining concepts were perceived as commonly understood. It was able to make a link between the current policy of the day and future activities. Strategy 2020 was also able to provide some guidance for defence planning through the identification of 'objective areas' to concentrate efforts needed to achieve the vision. Corporately, these objectives and targets have no faults as they provide a basis for planning. Strategy 2020 also provided a basis for long-term investment guidance to further develop capabilities, technologies and people.

Overall, as a vision document along the terms of the business world, the Strategy 2020 document is sufficient to provide a basis for direction by guiding the organisation towards an acceptable future view of itself, as well as motivation by providing an idea for members of the organization to embrace and foster. The eight objectives contained in the document also provided a basic plan for how the business of Defence would be conducted. From a business perspective, Strategy 2020 is a classic representation of what a corporate strategy should be.

However, Strategy 2020 suffers from weaknesses, not so much from the messages that it delivers, but because of the nature of its medium and external factors. Since Strategy 2020 is a strategy that is corporate in nature, DND's use of this business concept in a government department has a vital flaw: DND is not akin to a business or a corporation because it is not an independent organization. The frame of reference for a corporate strategy is for an organization as a whole to find direction, and it works well for businesses and corporations that are independent entities out for, traditionally, the goal of making profit. The


Department of National Defence is only a mere *department* of a larger organization – the Government of Canada. Whereas a corporation is virtually self-sustaining, since its goal is to make a profit while ensuring that its maintenance costs are low, a Department such as Defence is reliant not on the ebbs and flows of the market but on the policies and funding of an even higher authority. Just as the military is responsible to the political level, the department must respond to an external source for authority, specifically the Government of Canada. DND's vision must have the endorsement of the polity, something that has not been firmly established.

The greatest weakness of the corporate strategy document and the Strategy 2020 exercise is its disconnect from the higher political authority that determines the course for an entire nation, not simply and only for the use of armed force. Consistency between a department's vision and the government's vision for the nation's place in the future requires connectivity, communication, cooperation and understanding of the needs, expectations, and ambitions of both political leaders and military subordinates. Without such interaction, Canada's national security and defence becomes even more challenged from internal inefficiencies than external forces, and by un-preparedness for the threats and challenges of the future.

In this particular case of Strategy 2020, and more generally DND/CF, the Government of Canada has demonstrated indifference towards Defence issues and has made this obvious through its meagre defence spending. The fact of the matter is that there is not enough funding to achieve Defence's vision and objectives. This stems from the Canadian Government's record of military inattentiveness since at least 1990. The Canadian

government's decision to cash in the 'peace dividend' after the end of the Cold War saw defence budget reductions implemented under the 1994 White Paper. Cuts in defence spending meant a reduction of manpower and attention to equipment. This was followed by an unforeseen increase in operational deployments, international and domestic, that continues today. Capital spending, those funds used to implement change through new technologies, equipment, etc. is the last area allotted defence funding after maintenance, personnel, and operations costs are calculated and earmarked.

Equipment replacement and maintenance is one of the key problems linked to shortfalls of capital spending. Military capability is in part dependant on ensuring the availability of modern, maintained equipment required for operations. Unfortunately, the gravity of the situation is such that many equipment platforms are reaching the end of their life cycle, some still being maintained by 'life-extension programmes'. Without proper replacement, 'rust out' in the Canadian Forces puts operational readiness and military capability at risk.



With a higher operational tempo, older equipment requiring significant resources for maintenance and replacement, and the toll on manpower, capital funds to implement the vision becomes near impossible. A report by the Office of the Auditor General in 1998 identified that in the late 1980s, capital spending on equipment accounted for roughly 20 per cent of the defence budget. This figure fell to about 14 per cent of the 1998-99 defence budget.<sup>156</sup> An analysis done by the OAG also concluded that, in the worst case scenario, capital expenditures could drop as low as 9 to 12 per cent of the defence budget by 2012-

<sup>156</sup> OAG. "National Defence: Equipping and Modernizing the Canadian Forces," 1998 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, April 1998, <[www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9803ce.html](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9803ce.html)> (8 August 2001)

2013. Efforts by DND/CF to improve the situation have alleviated the strain on capital resources, but the Department was still short \$750 million per year of the amount required to modernize and maintain readiness when the OAG revisited the matter in 2000.<sup>157</sup> In fact, the OAG revealed that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces faced a budget crisis where the military was under such severe stress that cuts affecting force structure and readiness put its viability at risk. In their follow-up, the OAG noted:

“A review of the Department’s budgetary situation concluded in November 1999 that the Department had lost all flexibility to cope with cumulative resource pressures and was “out of manoeuvring room.” Defence planners estimated that the Department would require over \$1 billion annually in additional funding to operate even a smaller force while modernizing, revitalizing infrastructure and maintaining readiness.”<sup>158</sup>

For capital requirements alone, DND’s Capability Outlook 2002-2012 released in 2003 estimated a cost reaching \$30.6 billion for the next 10 years, whereas funds mentioned in the New Strategic Investment Plan are only \$27.4 billion over 15 years.<sup>159</sup> Meanwhile, Strategy 2020’s objective of attaining an earmarked 23% portion of the Defence budget in this context seems highly unachievable. In fact, DND has had to respond to fiscal limitations by downgrading Strategy 2020’s capital spending target to 21%, and then to disestablish the fixed target altogether.<sup>160</sup> Capital expenditures for the year 2004 have been suggested to be slightly less than 10% of the defence budget.<sup>161</sup>

<sup>157</sup> OAG. 2000 Report of the Auditor General. (Ottawa, ON: OAG, 2000), chapter 16, p. 24.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid, chapter 16, p. 26.

<sup>159</sup> VCDS. Capability Outlook 2002-2012. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2003); Sharon Hobson. “Readiness at a Price,” Janes Defence Weekly. (17 September 2003).

<sup>160</sup> Hobson, Sharon. “Readiness at a price,” Janes Defence Weekly. 17 September 2003.

<sup>161</sup> Williams, Capt(N). Kelly. “Capt(N) Williams Interview/Response to Questions,” 16 July 2004, personal email (16 July 2004).

The situation is not entirely bleak, since the Government of Canada has pledged to commit funding to certain equipment acquisitions. Decisions to acquire the Stryker mobile-gun system<sup>162</sup> and Joint Support Ships were given approval by the Government<sup>163</sup>, which signify some willingness to follow through on the vision laid out by Defence leaders. However, whether the \$500 million and \$2.1 billion price-tags for the programmes will come from new funding or from the existing budget is uncertain. If it is expected that the existing budget will offset the costs of these and other equipment replacement acquisition programmes, it would put even more stress on an already fiscally challenged military. Therefore, it is difficult to presume that there are sufficient funds available to make Strategy 2020's vision a reality since there is little money available to invest in the future, unless investment is allowed to take longer than originally planned.

Without the Government of Canada and its Defence Department coming to agreeable terms about the corporate strategy and vision, as demonstrated by the continuing concerns about capital spending, poor communication between policy and strategy is a contributing factor to the vision's problems. Despite continuing criticisms and reports by academic institutions, lobby groups, historians, retired generals, and government committees only modest cash injections have been added to defence spending. These injections are far short of what is required for the military. Why is it that the Government and the military cannot agree on a path forward? One can speculate the influence of political priorities such as health care, or perhaps the political sensitivity attached to ascribing to an inflexible plan during a time of

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<sup>162</sup> The Stryker is based on the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III 8x8 armoured personnel carrier and is armed with a 105mm auto-loading main gun.

<sup>163</sup> DND. "Minister of National Defence announces acquisition of a Mobile Gun System," 29 October 2003, <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1238](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1238)> (5 July 2004) ; Wattie, Chris. "The Big Boat is Coming Back," National Post. (19 April 2004).



uncertainty. The government's inability to understand the military's problems and concerns may also be a factor that has made attaining a common understanding with the military difficult.

In fact, there has also been little expression of what the Government wants as a future or a direction for departments such as National Defence and the military to understand either. Government direction for Defence still resides in the 1994 White Paper, and any decision or declaration that the Prime Minister may make in response to world events. There has been no attempt to draft a direction, vision, or plan – by way of foreign and defence policies, or even an expression of national security or 'grand' strategy – for an envisioned "Canada in the world of tomorrow", without which determining a military strategy becomes a difficult undertaking. Again, one can point to the unpredictability of the international system that plagues decision-makers with uncertainty and, in effect, demands flexibility rather than adherence and commitment to a rigid direction. The detriment of such 'ad-hoc' thinking is that no one knows what direction or objective to plan for.

This puts Strategy 2020 in a difficult spot. While the Strategy 2020 process was successful at providing vision and direction at a corporate scale for the entire Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, it was incapable of substituting for political leadership and providing military doctrine. Overall, what is necessary is a military strategy – something that is currently missing in Canada. The organizationally focussed management techniques of corporate strategies may work for independent entities of business, but fail to grasp the larger picture of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces' dependency on leadership and support from the higher political authority. Since it lacked the

guidance from the top to interpret the Government's vision for taking the nation into the future, and then determine a coinciding path that provides the necessary military strategic and doctrinal guidance, all Strategy 2020 could provide in terms of sufficient defining guidance was a broad and flexible interpretation for the future. This broad guidance had few answers for the military side of DND/CF to base their plans and preparations. As a result, the military branches took it upon themselves to craft their own 'strategic vision' documents to resolve military doctrinal issues and find their own direction.

From a military standpoint, the corporate strategy had little to offer the uniformed side of DND/CF.<sup>164</sup> What the operational branches found lacking was any substance that could be disseminated in military-strategic, doctrine-type terms. Specifically, what was missing was a military understanding about the specifics on the conduct of military activities and how such activities related to the overall scope of national policy. Such military-doctrinal terms must be defined and understood by the policy-/decision-makers and military leaders. Policy aspects, divisions of labour, and expectations must be fought over between the politician and the senior military officer to find agreement and common ground. Overall, the political and military-strategic levels have to find consensus in answering "what is it that you (the nation) wants us (the military) to do?"

For example, looking at the first sentence of Strategy 2020's vision statement:

"The Defence Team will generate, employ and sustain high-quality, combat-capable, interoperable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces."<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Black, LCol. Dean. "RE:Questions1," 12 May 2004, personal email (12 May 2004).

<sup>165</sup> DND. Strategy 2020, p. 7.

The term ‘high-quality’ with reference to military forces is rather moot, since no one would argue for decrepit forces. ‘Combat-capable’, a term introduced into Defence policy since the 1994 White Paper, is an elusive term that does not have a solid understanding. Instead of ‘combat-ready’, the notion of being ‘capable to fight in combat’ suggests that the military will retain its war-fighting abilities, but its overall readiness does not ascribe to any level of response. The concept of ‘interoperability’ is also a term requiring definition, especially from government officials, since it directly concerns Canadian sovereignty. Although Strategy 2020’s objective for this area seeks to “strengthen military to military relationships” and “manage [Canada’s] interoperability relationship with the US and other allies”, there is no sense about how much interoperability Canada will accept before national sovereignty, such as control over one’s own warship and its weapon systems, becomes challenged. Suggesting that the force must become ‘rapidly deployable’ invites questions and concerns about combat-readiness, force-planning, and timeframes for deployment. How ‘rapid’ must the ‘rapidly deployable’ force become? How must the force structure and the branches be organized to adopt such a practice? And with ‘task-tailoring’, what tasks must the Canadian Forces be capable of undertaking, and for which should they be specialized? The amount of flexibility contained within the corporate vision allowed different interpretations to emerge amongst the branches so as to match each environmental command’s areas of influence and operation. This was likely an oversight from the original intentions of the exercise since the crafters of the corporate strategy did not seem to recognize the needs of the military vis-à-vis doctrinal concepts. Simply, the adopters of the

business concept had not thought to consider how it would fit with a military frame of thinking.

Overall, the scope of the Strategy 2020 document is not flawed. On the contrary, as a corporate document it is a motivating and guiding beacon for propelling an institution forward by providing a vision to aim towards. Staff and personnel who are able to adopt and foster the ideas and plans encapsulated within the document will certainly benefit the organization with momentum towards the vision. Unfortunately it is prone to weaknesses from the political level above, and discontinuity from the operational branches below. The corporate strategy is much too vulnerable to failure because of a deficiency in commitment, resources, and leadership by Defence's political masters. The lack of political guidance and the military strategic and doctrinal guidance that would follow meant that it then became up to the military leaders of the separate branches to find their own paths and compete to have their paths funded. Using the vocabulary of Strategy 2020 as a vehicle for alignment in DND's business practices also provides additional justification for the branches to make their paths heard. So while various groups within DND/CF are rallying behind the basic corporate ideas and vision, these groups are also competing to make their visions, views on doctrine, and their parts of the corporate vision, a reality. Corporate leadership, and Strategy 2020, have therefore become moot as the branches attempt to compel the Government to act, thereby circumventing departmental leadership in the process by using the management system.

### Conclusions and the Future:

This examination of Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 was originally intended to assess the merits of the document as a functional part of Canadian military strategy. Instead, it uncovered how a corporate strategy permeated a military-based government organization. As a document, Strategy 2020 offers corporate directions for a Defence Department as a whole. Although it lacked the military-doctrinal guidance necessary to craft a military strategy and to guide military force planning, the document did provide both military and managerial objectives of particular interest to the Department's leadership. When Strategy 2020 is examined in terms of its true nature – a corporate strategy – then one finds that the issue of military strategy extends beyond the confines of the Defence Department into the political level.

There are changes already underway for Canadian defence. Upgrades to the Defence strategy are in the works, making way for a “Strategy 2025” that would provide long-term strategic vision for DND/CF.<sup>166</sup> This upgrading document will provide ‘effective, long-term, and enduring strategic planning’ for an unpredictable and potentially dangerous future, describe risks and find balanced methodologies for a medium-size country such as Canada, and to provide relevant guidance and context for the ‘optimisation of force structure for the 2025 time frame.’<sup>167</sup> Although the idea of ‘Strategy 2025’ is promising, it is uncertain whether this document, like its predecessor, will provide enough doctrinal guidance.

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<sup>166</sup> Dempster, MGen. Doug, “The CF in the Domestic and International Security Environment,” The ‘New Security Environment’: Is the Canadian Military up to the Challenge? Rudd, David & McDonough, David S. eds. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 51.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

Although the management practice that created Strategy 2020 and will presumably mould the upcoming 'Strategy 2025' is not an improper concept for DND/CF, the organization ought to consider the practicality of the exercise and adapting it to fit its unique situation. It cannot be assumed that all business practices can be transplanted to an organization such as the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. The Department's eagerness to pursue business definitions of efficiency has proven to be somewhat difficult in the end, and may have been counterproductive.<sup>168</sup> Strategy 2020 did function well corporately, but the process could use improvement and renovation to reflect the true nature of the Defence organization. Ensuring connectivity between policy and strategy formulation, greater emphasis on developing military strategy as well as a reflective corporate strategy, and a remodelling of current practices that best reflect how DND/CF as a unique organization functions can improve what structures and processes the Department has currently. Without making the proper linkages in the current structure of Defence decision-making, Strategy 2020 can succumb to the same irrelevance it wanted Defence to avoid.

Military strategic planners are also developing another new document, called the CF "Strategic Operating Concept". This document will, for the first time, articulate and integrate CF operations with a common view and a common concept of operations.<sup>169</sup> In essence, it will bridge the gap between the high-level Strategy 2020 and 2025 strategies with the environmental command vision documents with a common understanding of how the branches of the CF will operate together. Headed by the office of the Vice Chief of Staff,

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<sup>168</sup> Detomasi, David. "Re-engineering the Canadian Department of National Defence: Management and Command in the 1990s," Defense Analysis. (Vol 12, No. 3) pp. 327-346.

<sup>169</sup> Dempster, "The CF in the Domestic and International Security Environment," p. 52.

planners from the three environmental chiefs of staff are involved to attain this common understanding.<sup>170</sup>

These two developments aside, the largest problem affecting DND/CF continues to be the minimal amount of attention to military issues at the political level. Decisions made within the organization of Defence must adhere to policies and decisions made by the government. Strategies and visions created by the military or the Defence organization are still susceptible to neglect, lack of commitment and marginal leadership from the top. According to one CF Army general, “Vision without resources is hallucination.”<sup>171</sup> This is certainly the case when trying to meet the objectives of Strategy 2020, or any other forward-looking document within DND/CF. Without an expression of national interests and objectives, military strategy, doctrinal development and force structure are also left to drift.

There are great changes that will have to be made to resolve the problem of strategic drift in Canada. First and foremost is making the Government accountable for providing proper authority and attention to issues of national defence. Government officials, leaders, and ministers must understand the relationship between the state and its military, and that the political level must provide clear statements of national interests, objectives, focus, vision, and priorities when it comes to defence, global and domestic security, and worldly aspirations. Proper consideration to relate aspirations with the means can then occur. What is required is a national security strategy, regularly reviewed and updated, that contains the Government’s statement and reflection of national values and goals in the perceived environment of tomorrow, and the vision it believes of the future Canada. This national

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<sup>170</sup> Neil, Col. Dave. Phone interview with Author, tape recording, Calgary, AB, 6 May 2004.

<sup>171</sup> Speech by Major-General Ed Fitch, International Reserves Conference, Calgary, AB, March 2002.

security strategy would be the primary source for foreign, economic, social and defence policy.<sup>172</sup> The latest Canadian National Security Policy document does little to provide this guidance for any subordinate policies.<sup>173</sup>

Since it is accepted that the world and the future are both unpredictable, periodic review of foreign and defence policies must be standardized for every four years and updated after any event that causes significant changes to the international security environment, such as 11 September 2001 and the American war in Iraq. Such regularity should also coincide with electoral cycles and be a principal undertaking of a new government taking office. Only when national policies and objectives are clearly stated can a military strategy for achieving them be crafted. Strategy-making at the national level will facilitate a better understanding of intended directions for subordinate departments and provide a better framework for top-down leadership.

Furthermore, there must be the willingness and the support to back up the strategy. The inability to provide adequate defence funding makes any vision document useless, since change requires money to implement. The current under-funded state of the Canadian Forces is such that it is impractical to attempt any move forward towards a vision of the military twenty years down the road when the military is still struggling to operate for tomorrow.

Second, the strategic process within DND must be streamlined to ensure decisions made reflect government policies and meet the approval of government, are militarily viable, and espouse a comprehensive and effective plan. Making decision-making more efficient

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<sup>172</sup> Macnamara, W. D. and Fitz-Gerald, Ann. "A National Security Framework for Canada," IRPP Policy Matters. Vol. 3, No. 10 (October 2002).

<sup>173</sup> Canada, Privy Council Office [PCO]. Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy. (Ottawa, ON: PCO, 2004).



requires a governing body for strategic direction that is capable of being decisive on issues that need to be made and to provide the direction necessary to carry them out. The AAE Report recommends a smaller group than the Defence Management Committee to deal primarily with forward-looking, strategic issues with a focus on defence policy, strategic planning and direction, capability planning, resource allocation at the strategic level, and performance management. The suggested committee membership includes of the Associate Deputy Minister, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) and the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services).<sup>174</sup> Such a strategic committee would include only the Level 1 Managers directly involved with determining strategic direction, and not those with little/no strategic competence that make strategic planning in the DMC difficult. Another recommendation suggests that the Minister of National Defence play a more active leadership role in any committee that makes policy and strategic decisions.<sup>175</sup> Strategy-making that involves the cooperation of both political masters and military agents to arrive at mutual agreements and understandings about capabilities, funding, expectations, roles, missions, forces and structure strengthens the ties in civil-military relations and provides a chance for greater efficiency and effectiveness.

Using DND/CF's corporate strategy document Strategy 2020 and the branch strategic vision documents that followed, this examination of Canada's grasp of strategy in Defence has uncovered many difficulties concerning the development and application of strategic

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<sup>174</sup> DND. Achieving Administrative Excellence, p. 15.

<sup>175</sup> Bercuson, David, A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence. (Ottawa, ON: DND, 25 March 1997), p. 22.

vision. Although the corporate ideas of Strategy 2020 are not flawed, the ability to make them a reality is hindered from higher up. Military strategic ideas on the other hand, have not had any success because of a lack of direction again from the political level. In a perfect world, the Government of Canada, the Department of National Defence, and the Canadian Forces would be able to start anew, communicating and cooperating to forge direction, leadership, and vision from the top down, from a statement of objectives, to defence policy, to a corporate/military strategy, to a joint operating concept, and then to the strategic visions of the environmental command staffs. Unfortunately, there are already pieces in play and gaps in this hierarchy. Slowly, Canada is learning to develop a uniquely Canadian military strategy, and one would hope that perfection would be attained some time in the future.

Ultimately what is necessary in Canada is strategic unity, and that can only be achieved by leaders.<sup>176</sup> This idea, among others calling for change in how Canada currently conducts its business of military strategy, may not be new, but the problems still persist and remain unresolved. Any change in Canada's strategic planning situation must first start at the very top. It is time for the government to take decisive action and provide real leadership for the country, and direct the forces at Canada's disposal. To do otherwise risks becoming once again reliant on the strategy of others and losing all that once was Canada's sovereignty. Canada needs a commitment to prepare the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces for the future, and to prepare for the future the time to act is now.

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<sup>176</sup> Bland, Douglas. Chiefs of Defence. (Toronto: CISS, 1995); p. 212.

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