

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Northern Participation and Northern Development:  
A Case Study of Grassroots Participation in the  
1980 to 1985 Norman Wells Pipeline Project

by

Gary Keith Rhodes

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK

FACULTY OF SOCIAL WELFARE

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JANUARY 1988

© Gary Keith Rhodes 1988

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.




L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-42427-3

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY  
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled, "Northern Participation and Northern Development: A Case Study of Grassroots Participation in the 1980 to 1985 Norman Wells Pipeline Project" submitted by Gary Keith Rhodes in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Social Work.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dr. Joseph Hornick  
Supervisor  
Faculty of Social Welfare  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dr. Jacqueline Ismael  
Faculty of Social Welfare  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mike Robinson  
Arctic Institute of North America

Date



## ABSTRACT

This thesis is a case study of a particular Canadian Governmental attempt at allowing grassroots community participation with respect to a non-renewable resource development project in the Northwest Territories. In 1980, Interprovincial Pipe Line proposed to construct an oil pipeline from Norman Wells, Northwest Territories to Zama, Alberta. The proposal was approved and construction was completed in 1985. To help ensure that local interests and needs were given full consideration, the Federal government set up a Community Advisory Committee allowing grassroots participation. This study poses the question "was this Committee a vehicle for grassroots empowerment?" In examining this question, the study, firstly, focuses on relevant governmental and corporate policies in an attempt to identify the loci of power in resource development. Secondly, the research analyzes data received through a number of interviews with key informants regarding their participative experience on this Community Advisory Committee.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all the people who have contributed to the completion of this thesis. In particular, I offer special thanks to Dr. Jacqueline Ismael for helping to peak my interest in studying social issues in the Northwest Territories; to Jim Ross, who helped me focus my study; and to Dr. Joseph Hornick, who provided continual guidance and support through my endeavor. As well, I wish to thank those individuals who helped facilitate financial support through the University Endowment Fund and the Northern Scientific Training Program. Through their help my trip to the Northwest Territories was made possible. Lastly, I thank my wife, Gloria, who has patiently served as my proofreader and typist.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iv
LIST OF FIGURES .....	ix
LIST OF APPENDICES .....	x
CHAPTER ONE	
1.0 INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1 The Expressed Difficulty .....	1
1.2 Purpose of Study .....	7
1.3 Resource Development in the Canadian North .....	9
1.4 Oil and Norman Wells .....	11
1.5 Content of Thesis .....	13
CHAPTER TWO	
2.0 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY .....	17
2.1 Introduction .....	17
2.2 Dependency Theory .....	17
2.3 Basic Needs .....	23
2.3.1 The Target-Setting Approach .....	24
2.3.2 The Structural Approach .....	26
2.4 Popular Participation and Rural Development .....	28
2.5 Methodological Framework of Study .....	32
2.5.1 The Design .....	33
2.5.2 The Sample .....	33
2.5.3 Procedures for Data Collection .....	33
2.5.4 The Interview Schedule .....	34
2.5.6 Choice of Subjects .....	35
2.6 Limitations of Study .....	36

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	PAGE
 CHAPTER THREE	
3.0 POLICIES OF EMPOWERMENT .....	40
3.1 Introduction .....	40
3.2 The Nature of Policy Making .....	40
3.3 Policy Issues in the Canadian North .....	42
3.4 The Pipeline Approval Process .....	43
3.5 The Multinationals .....	44
3.6 The Government of Canada .....	48
3.6.1 The National Energy Board .....	51
3.6.2 Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office .....	56
3.6.3 DIAND .....	60
3.7 Power in the North .....	61
3.8 Native Marginalization .....	62
3.9 Pipeline Approved .....	70
3.10 The Community Advisory Committee .....	71
3.11 Summary .....	74
 CHAPTER FOUR	
4.0 INTERVIEWS WITH KEY INFORMANTS .....	80
4.1 Introduction .....	80
4.2 Description of Those Who Participated .....	81
4.2.1 Introduction .....	81
4.2.2 Demographic Characteristics .....	82
4.3 Issues Relevant to How Participation Occurred ...	83
4.3.1. Introduction .....	83

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
4.3.2 Basis of Participation .....	84
Who Initiated Participation? .....	85
Was Participation Voluntary .....	87
The Terms of Reference .....	91
The Motivation Behind Community Participation .....	94
4.3.3 Extent of Participation .....	95
Continuity of Experience .....	95
Range of Activities .....	97
4.3.4 Form of Participation .....	98
Liaisons and Conflicts With Other Organized Groups .....	99
Divergent or Individual Interests .....	105
Complexity of the Organization .....	107
Direct or Indirect Representation .....	110
Limits or Dictates .....	111
Channels for Participation and Communication .....	112
4.3.5 Extent of Participation .....	116
4.3.6 Emerging Generalizations .....	120
Suggestions for Future Participation .....	120
Barriers to Meaningful Participation .....	123
4.3.7 Summary .....	126

## CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS .....	133
5.1 Introduction .....	133
5.2 Popular Participation and Rural Development .....	133
5.3 Basic Needs .....	135
5.4 Dependency Theory .....	136
5.5 Conclusions .....	140
5.6 Summary of Recommendations Relating to Policy and Process Issues .....	144
5.7 Recommendations for Further Research .....	146



# TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	PAGE
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	150
APPENDIX I .....	154
APPENDIX II .....	157
APPENDIX III .....	162
APPENDIX IV .....	170
APPENDIX V .....	176

## LIST OF FIGURES

	PAGE
Figure 3.1 Schematic Diagram of the Federal Assessment and Review Process .....	58
Figure 3.2 Social Assistance by Age Group and Recipient Ethnic Status .....	65
Figure 3.3 Five Year Trends in NWT Infant Mortality Rate .....	67
Figure 3.4 Intra-Ethnic Comparisons of Labour Force Population Education Levels .....	69
Figure 3.5 Intra-Ethnic Comparison of Experienced Labour Force Population Education Levels .....	70

## LIST OF APPENDICES

	PAGE
APPENDIX I      The Participation Matrix .....	154
APPENDIX II     Interview Protocol .....	157
APPENDIX III    Informant Informed Consent .....	162
APPENDIX IIIA   Special Research Precautions .....	165
APPENDIX IV     Alcohol Abuse .....	170
APPENDIX V      Community Advisory Community Terms of Reference .....	176

## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 The Expressed Difficulty

One of the major topics of political debates in the 1970s is focused on the development of natural resources in the Canadian North. A variety of interest groups have emerged to join the debate, which features many complex components and issues. According to Robert Page, some of the issues include "environmental protection, Native rights, economic nationalism, energy conservation, the limitations of high technology, political sovereignty, public participation, and government regulation."<sup>1</sup> Page goes on to state that pipeline proposals have mobilized powerful economic interests including the multinational oil companies, banks, steel companies, and North American gas utilities. "The projects aroused the widest and most powerful coalition of public interest groups in Canadian history."<sup>2</sup>

In the mid-seventies, Mr. Justice Thomas Berger's landmark inquiry helped to focus Canadian attention on some of the complex issues surrounding Northern development. Berger, a former Native rights lawyer, who was serving as a British Columbia Supreme Court Justice at the time, began his inquiry in March 1974 after being commissioned by the Federal Government to study the feasibility of a plan to pipe natural

gas from Alaska's north slope through the Yukon and the Northwest Territories to southern markets.<sup>3</sup>

Public hearings for this inquiry began in the North in 1975. These hearings occurred not only in Yellowknife and Whitehorse, but also in thirty-five remote Northern Communities. Berger heard from hundreds of Natives at the grassroots level in a kind of town-meeting forum where issues relating to the proposed pipeline were discussed.<sup>4</sup>

In his final report, which was submitted in April 1977 Berger recommended that even though oil and gas development seemed inevitable, there should be a ten-year moratorium on pipeline construction. Berger felt that ten years would provide the Natives with enough time to settle their land claims issues and to seek entrenchment of aboriginal rights.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps the most lasting impact of the inquiry, however, was that it changed the popular image of the North which had previously been held by southern Canadians. Instead of a sparsely populated frontier whose resources were ready to be exploited, the North now is seen as a complex land whose people have their own aspirations, which in many cases are not compatible with the aspirations of outsiders.<sup>6</sup>

Thomas Berger has broadly pointed out that the debate on northern development centers around two philosophically opposing views: the North as a "frontier" (to be developed), or the North as a "homeland." He concluded from his study

that the Native people are increasingly demanding their right to determine their assimilation into Canadian life. "In the past, special status has meant Indian reserves. Now the Native people wish to substitute self-determination for enforced dependency."<sup>7</sup>

If the Native people of the North are going to enjoy the freedom of self-determination, the implications are clear. They must be allowed through policy and legislation to participate broadly in all decisions or actions affecting their homeland.

Interestingly, the issue of public participation with respect to northern development became a focal issue during the Berger Inquiry. Through his inquiries he was anxious to devise a more effective means of public participation. In his report he comments on the worth of public inquiries as follows:

They have brought new ideas into the public consciousness. They have expanded the vocabulary of politics, education and social science. They have added to the furniture that we now expect to find in Canada's storefront of ideas. And they have always had a real importance in providing considered advice to governments. This is their primary function. But in recent years, Commissions of Inquiry have begun to take on a new function: that of opening up issues to public discussion, of providing a forum for the exchange of ideas.<sup>8</sup>

To be sure, public participation was one of the critical components of the Berger Inquiry. As Robert Page points out, the Inquiry broke new ground in several important ways with respect to public policy. One of these ways was his achieving wide levels of public participation.<sup>9</sup>

It should be emphasized that Berger's process of public participation was not without its critics. Toward the end of the northern hearings, Berger made a trip through some of the southern cities in order to hold hearings. Little new information was discovered, but these southern hearings did demonstrate the intensity of some people's feelings regarding northern development and northern public participation.<sup>10</sup>

Robert Page points out that Mayor R. Sykes of Calgary, Alberta, was one of the strongest and most articulate spokesmen at the hearings held in Calgary. Page comments as follows:

Mayor Sykes claimed that while he did not question the 'integrity and good faith' of Berger and his inquiry, he had profound misgivings about the process. Public participation should not be 'a polling of ignorance or a process of intimidation.' The Commission has provided a 'platform for trouble makers attacking the territorial unity of Canada, threatening the energy resource supplies of all Canadians, and setting up claims that some Canadians have more rights' than others.<sup>11</sup>

Page goes on to state that Sykes identified four main areas of concern. Mayor Sykes' final point perhaps best

illustrates the depth of his conviction. Page in quoting Sykes, comments thusly:

Finally he believed the process will 'create distrust of the principle of consultation.' Simple unsophisticated people, when consulted, will come to believe that their views will have some 'identifiable effect on decisions' even if their comments have 'little of national value.' They will come to believe that sheer numbers, sheer emotion, the head count system 'can conquer fact and reason.'<sup>12</sup>

Although many people might strongly disagree with Sykes, it is also clear that many might agree with him.<sup>13</sup> Even some policy makers in Ottawa did not really appear to be interested in what the people were saying through the process of public participation. The issue of "self-determination" appeared to be "vague and dangerous idealism arousing Native expectations that could never be fulfilled."<sup>14</sup> Robert Page suggests that the Toronto Star reflected some of the corporate and government fears in the following comment:

'It is not surprising when Native leaders in the first flush of ambition put forward such fanciful ideas but it is regrettable when a man of Berger's experience and prestige endorses them.'<sup>15</sup>

In all probability, resource development will continue well into the foreseeable future in the Canadian North. Berger broadly categorizes two groups who wish to exert



power and control with respect to northern resource development -- those who see the North as a "frontier" and those who see it as a "homeland." It is a matter of public record that a preponderance of Native people wish to pursue self-determination with respect to development.<sup>16</sup> The Natives in essence must become empowered if they are to achieve self-determination. This in part might be accomplished through corporate and governmental policies and through legislation which promote effective participation. It is, of course, equally true that policy and legislation can be utilized to limit drastically Native empowerment through meaningful participation.

It is important to emphasize that concern with grassroots participation has become popularly associated with the development of underdeveloped countries or areas. According to many theorists, participation has become a vital component of development.<sup>17</sup> Peter Oakley and David Marsden, however, contrast two interpretations of participation. The approach most widely accepted is to view participation as an input to development. Here the people are "mobilized" to implement activities which are usually determined by outsiders. This interventionist interpretation is contrasted with the view which sees participation as "empowering" the rural poor to plan an effective role in rural development.<sup>18</sup> Clearly, no discussion of participation is complete without addressing the issue of power<sup>19</sup> and the locus of that power.

Commenting along this same vein, Korten and Klauss have discussed the issue of power in development. For them, questions of governance thus become critical. The suggestion here is that many contemporary human institutions tend to disempower people and to remove from them control over all but a small portion of their lives. Further, the authors state that "the empowerment of people to control their own lives and resources, and to direct and pursue their development as human beings is both a purpose of people-centred development and a means to its attainment."<sup>20</sup> Issues regarding power and control have clearly become major dilemmas in the development of underdeveloped societies, including the Canadian North.

## 1.2 Purpose of Study

Despite Thomas Berger's recommendation in 1977 that a Mackenzie Valley pipeline should be postponed for ten years,<sup>21</sup> the focus of resource development swung back to the Mackenzie Valley late in 1980 and early in 1981. This occurred when Imperial Oil and Interprovincial Pipe Line (IPL) proposed a new twelve-inch line to run from Norman Wells, Northwest Territories to Zama, Alberta. The Dene Nation, whose traditional Native homeland has been along the Mackenzie Valley, were not pleased about the pipeline proposal. In the words of Robert Page:

The announcement rekindled Dene fears that had eased since 1977. Both the NEB and the Environment Assessment and Review Process held public hearings and then approved the project, with the former allowing for an immediate start and the latter calling for a one-year delay. Both reports catalogued a number of deficiencies in the project that the applicant would have to overcome before construction could begin, and both reports challenged Mr. Justice Berger's ten-year moratorium to allow for settlement of the land claims in the Mackenzie Valley.<sup>22</sup>

Because the Dene had denounced the National Energy Board (NEB) and the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) reports, the Federal Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (IAND), John Munro, went north in hopes of negotiating a solution. To try to overcome Native opposition, Munro tried to get Native involvement in the project through jobs and equity investment. Ultimately a compromise, which attempted to balance development priorities and Native concerns, was reached. On July 30, 1981 Munro flew to Yellowknife to brief Native leaders and the Territorial Assembly representatives on the Government's decision.<sup>23</sup> On that same day a press release announced the Norman Wells Project. In the release the Minister stated that the Federal "Project Coordinator will be assisted by an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of communities in the NWT affected by the Project, to help ensure that local interests and needs are given full consideration."<sup>24</sup>

The Community Advisory Committee (CAC) was established to allow grassroots community participation with respect to the Norman Wells Project.

With the above in mind, a major question arises. Was the CAC an experiment in grassroots empowerment? This study will approach that question by reviewing and examining the process of participation which occurred in the CAC. The specific purposes of this exploratory case study are as follows:

1. To identify from archival data the relevant governmental and corporate policies which directly relate to this experiment in grassroots participation.
2. To examine data received through a number of interviews with key informants regarding their participative experience on the CAC.
3. To analyze the archival and interview data with respect to a number of participative variables which relate to Native empowerment in this development project.

### 1.3 Resource Development in the Canadian North

Just before the coming of the white man, life in the Mackenzie Valley region was characterized by the dominance of small self-sufficient groups of approximately twenty to thirty related persons. These groups maintained themselves by relying on the harvesting of the many kinds of bush resources found in the region. Resources included a wide

variety of fish, small game animals, big game such as moose and woodland caribou, and several kinds of edible berries. As well, the Dene, the Natives who inhabited the Mackenzie Valley region, relied on other products such as trees which were utilized in constructing shelter, in developing transportation, and as a fuel.<sup>25</sup>

In the late aboriginal period, just prior to direct European involvement, the Mackenzie Valley regional economy was a total economy both in terms of production and of the circulation of goods. Michael Asch explains as follows:

The people of the region were themselves wholly responsible for their own survival. They achieved this end by organizing themselves into self-sufficient local groups within which production and distribution were collective activities. Given the potential variation of resources in local regions from year to year, on occasion local groups found themselves unable to maintain their self-sufficiency. At these times, they would join with other local groups lucky enough to be enjoying a surplus. Hence, the principle of cooperation and mutual sharing found within local groups was extended to all the people of the region.<sup>26</sup>

The period of direct involvement with Europeans occurred when fur trading began in the last decade of the eighteenth century.<sup>27</sup> The initial incursions of white people into the Mackenzie Valley were limited, however, both by number and extent. Since they engaged in the fur trade, the whites lived close to the major river routes and were

dependent for their living on the Native people's annual harvest of furs. This pattern existed for more than a century, but it began to change in the early 1900s when geologists began to explore the Valley and the surrounding area. Oil was discovered at Norman Wells in 1920 and uranium and gold deposits were discovered in the region in the 1930s. In Thomas Berger's words: "Slowly the activities of industrial man moved farther from the main river transportation routes, away from the trading posts, into lands that had been the exclusive domain of the Native people."<sup>28</sup>

#### 1.4 Oil and Norman Wells

Actually, the existence of oil north of the sixtieth parallel has been known since 1789 when Alexander Mackenzie noted the presence of oil seeps along the banks of the river that carries his name, near Norman Wells. During the next one hundred years, explorers noted other seeps along the Mackenzie as well as on the north shore of the Great Slave Lake.<sup>29</sup> The first serious investigations, however, did not occur until 1911 when oil deposits at Norman Wells were examined. Since the results were encouraging, a drilling team was eventually sent to Norman Wells in 1919. Oil was struck in 1920.<sup>30</sup>

During the next two decades oil from Norman Wells served some local needs on and off, but the oil discovery did not receive any significant notoriety until World War II. In a

key wartime development the United States, fearing an attack on Alaska, devised a plan to supply oil to the area. This plan, which was called the CANOL Project (Canol was an acronym for Canadian Oil), envisioned a linkage between the Norman Wells field and Alaska by a pipeline and by the Alaska highway. The project, to construct a pipeline from Norman Wells to Whitehorse, Yukon Territory, was initiated in 1942 and completed in 1944. However, by this time the threat against Alaska had diminished considerably. As a result of this and because of economic considerations, the refinery at Whitehorse was shut down in 1945. By 1947 the pipeline was declared obsolete.<sup>31</sup>

During the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, Imperial Oil gradually built its annual production at Norman Wells. However, in 1972 the formation of world oil cartel known as Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) initiated a new era in petroleum pricing. From 1972 to 1981, OPEC's policies and actions produced a dramatic rise in the value of the Norman Wells production.<sup>32</sup>

As a result of the sharp rise in oil prices, Esso Resources Canada Ltd. (ESSO) and Interprovincial Pipe Line Ltd. (IPL) produced a joint developmental proposal in 1980. In this plan ESSO would expand the oil field facilities at Norman Wells while IPL would construct a twelve-inch pipeline from Norman Wells to Zama, Alberta. At Zama the pipeline would join the existing Southern Canadian Pipeline network.

In August 1981 the Government of Canada approved the Project. The Norman Wells Oilfield Expansion and Pipeline Project actually began in 1982 and was completed in 1985.<sup>33</sup>

### 1.5 Content of Thesis

With respect to the organization of this thesis, Chapter Two will explore the theoretical framework for this research. The Dependency Theory will be utilized in an effort to understand the historical and current patterns in developing societies. As well, the chapter will focus on one particular developmental strategy, the Basic Needs approach, which will feature two rather distinctive methods of meeting human needs. Further, participation in development will be examined and will focus on meaningful participation through empowerment. Finally, the chapter will explain the specific methodology utilized in the study.

Chapter Three will examine the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) which was established, ostensibly, to allow grassroots community participation during the recent Norman Wells Oilfield Expansion and Pipeline Project. More specifically, the chapter will attempt to analyze the major governmental and corporate policies which determined the degree of empowerment that the CAC experienced. The various loci of power will be identified, and an attempt will be made to identify the extent of that power.



Chapter Four will examine the data gathered in interviews with the key informants who attended CAC meetings, either as members or non-members. The chapter will focus on three issues: who participated; how did participation occur; and how should participation occur in the future. The data will be disaggregated to some extent in an attempt to make the analysis more meaningful.

Chapter Five contains an analysis of the key findings relevant to this experiment in grassroots participation. Within the theoretical framework identified in Chapter Two, this chapter will focus on the issues of dependency and empowerment as they relate to the CAC. Finally, the chapter will present recommendations arising as a result of this research.

# ENDNOTES

1. Robert Page, Northern Development: The Canadian Dilemma. (Toronto, 1986), p. X.
2. Ibid.
3. Steve Merti, "Berger's Voice Echoes Across the North," Calgary, Herald, July 28; 1986, p. A5.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Thomas, R. Berger, Northern Frontier Northern Homeland, The Report of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry: Volume One. (Ottawa, 1977), pp. VII, XXII-XIV.
8. Thomas R. Berger, Northern Frontier Northern Homeland, The Report of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry: Volume Two. (Ottawa, 1977), p. 223.
9. Page, op.cit., p. 122.
10. Ibid., p. 113.
11. Ibid., p. 114.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 115.
14. Ibid., p. 119.
15. Ibid.
16. Berger, Vol. One., op.cit., pp. XXII-XXIV.
17. John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity Through Specificity," World Development, Vol. 8, No. 2. (1980).
18. Peter Oakley and David Marsden, Approaches to Participation in Rural Development. (Geneva, 1984), p. VI.
19. Francis J. Bregha, Public Participation in Planning Policy and Programme. (Ottawa, 1975), p. 40.

- 20. David C. Korten and Rudi Klauss, (eds.), People Centered Development. (West Hartford, 1984), p. 4.
21. Berger, Vol. One, op.cit., p. XXVI.
22. Page, op.cit., p. 230.
23. Ibid., p. 231, 233.
24. InterGroup Consultants Ltd., Special Federal Programs for the Norman Wells Project: Evaluation and Review of Alternatives. (Prepared for the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs) (Winnipeg, 1985), p. 132.
25. Michael Asch, "The Dene Economy," in Dene Nation - The Colony Within, (ed.), Mel Watkins, (Toronto, 1977), p. 47.
26. Ibid., p. 49.
27. Ibid.
28. Berger, Vol. One, op.cit., p. 78.
29. H.J.F. Gerein, Community Planning and Development in Canada's Northwest Territories. Government of the Northwest Territories (Yellowknife, 1980), p. 37.
30. Robert M. Bone and Robert J. Mahnic, "Norman Wells: The Oil Center of the Northwest Territories," Arctic, Vol. 37, No. 1. (March, 1984), p. 53-54.
31. Ibid., p. 54.
32. Ibid., p. 55.
33. Ibid.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2.0 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

#### 2.1 Introduction

Theory helps us make sense out of a complex world. It helps us see patterns, explain events, and generally understand seemingly disconnected phenomena. In this chapter, the Dependency Theory will be utilized in an effort to understand the historical and current patterns in developing societies. As well, the chapter will focus on one particular developmental strategy, the Basic Needs Approach, and will feature two rather distinct methods of meeting human needs. Further, grassroots participation in development will be examined and will focus on meaningful participation through empowerment. Finally, the chapter will explain the specific methodology utilized in the study.

#### 2.2 Dependency Theory

As an academic pursuit, the study of the sociology of developing societies is relatively in its infancy. Broadly speaking, this enterprise came into its own during the 1950s and 1960s as a product of the New World situation that emerged after World War II. This period was characterized by radically new dynamics.<sup>1</sup> As the United States rose to political and economic dominance, as the Soviet Union consolidated its power, and as colonial societies gained their

independence, "projects of active intervention for the purpose of 'development' in poor and backward countries that had undergone the experience of direct or indirect colonial domination were now being widely discussed."<sup>2</sup>

Academics, economists, and politicians frequently utilized dichotomous terminology in distinguishing the difference between the two sets of societies or countries. Initial dichotomies such as backward and advanced economics, rich and poor, or traditional and modern ones, carried pejorative connotations and certainly suggested a strong bias on the part of advanced capitalistic countries.<sup>3</sup> It became clear to many that the goal for underdeveloped societies was or should be to move up toward an idealized model of modernity which was exemplified by the United States.<sup>4</sup>

Modernization, although including the concept of economic development, refers to much more than the economy. Because the term is so broad, there is difficulty in defining it precisely.<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, "the process of modernization or development has been conceptualized as the transition from static tradition-bound structures to the dynamic, continuous growth structures of the modern industrial societies."<sup>6</sup> Sociological issues have centered upon traditional institutions, beliefs and values which, it is believed, serve as impediments to economic development.<sup>7</sup>

The dramatic failure of the developmental strategy incorporated to modernize the developing world after World War II

has led in the 1960s and 1970s to some major shifts in theoretical orientation and terminology.<sup>8</sup> "Dependency theory emerged as a critique of neo-classical development and modernization theories. It has identified the essential unity of the development/underdevelopment dichotomy of nations."<sup>9</sup> The theory emphasizes the subordinate location of the Third World societies within the capitalistic world system and the determination of these countries' fate by external forces. This new orientation has abandoned the concepts of "tradition" versus "modernity" and adopted a new pair of major concepts, "core" and "periphery." This new framework has brought two sets of countries within the capitalistic world system into one of unequal relationships. The paired concepts of core/periphery have become the most pervasive image of the 1970s.<sup>10</sup>

Dependency theory focuses on the historical process of capital accumulation and expansion and is integrally related to production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. In terms of the historical process, the development of underdevelopment is related to the deepening of the capitalist mode of production in the central capitalist nations through its expansion to pre-capitalistic nations as peripheral formations for capitalist exploitation.<sup>11</sup> Samir Amin has pointed out that the capitalist mode of production possesses three means by which it checks the tendency of its rate of profit to fall. These means constitute the three profound tendencies of this

mode's ability to accumulate. The first is to increase the rate of surplus value by aggravating the conditions of capitalist exploitation at the center of the system. The second means is achieved by spreading the capitalist mode of production to new regions where the rate of surplus value can be much higher and where it is therefore possible to obtain a super profit through unequal exchange. The third means consists of developing various forms of waste which can include selling costs, military expenditures of luxury consumption, thus making it possible to spend profits that will not be invested due to a diminished rate of profit.<sup>12</sup>

Since the expansion of the capitalistic sphere is part of the focus of this study, Amin's second point is the most relevant. Here as central or core capitalism extends its mode to new regions in an effort to find solutions to its own problems, the relationship between the core and the periphery continues to be asymmetrical. This process of development of the periphery goes forward at the initiative of the core which is responsible for the distinctive structure assumed by the periphery, as something complementary and dominated. Amin identifies three types of distortion in the development of peripheral capitalism when compared with capitalism at the center of the system:

1. A crucial distortion toward export activities, which absorb the major part of the capital arriving from the center;

2. a distortion toward tertiary activities, which arises both from the special contradictions of peripheral capitalism and from the original structures of the peripheral formations; and
3. a distortion in the choice of branches of industry, toward light branches, together with the utilization of modern <sup>13</sup>techniques in these branches.

The deleterious effects of the relationship between the developed and developing countries is multiplied by a corollary process which occurs within the developing society. The process of transferring the surplus capital out of a nation dislocates labor and progressively marginalizes the masses. At the same time, the elite in the nation are being coopted and integrated "into a supernational economic, political, and/or social order."<sup>14</sup> This elite group, thus, have a vested interest in maintaining a system which exploits their natural resources and their fellow countrymen. Dependency and underdevelopment exist, in other words, no longer primarily in terms of external exploitation, but in the very structure of social life within the society.

In the words of Jacqueline Ismael:

The social structures of dependent societies are characterized by a syndrome of segmentation. The features of this syndrome are:

1. The progressive subordination of all sectors of the socio-economic infra



structure to the demands of a limited primary commodity export economy;

2. Dependence of the productive sector upon the importation of the products of western technologies;
3. Dependence of the internal market on the importation of essential consumer goods;
4. Proletarianization of labor;
5. Low levels of employment in the productive economic sector (marginalization of labor);
6. Rapid growth of the tertiary sector;
7. Increasing concentration of wealth and power.<sup>15</sup>

Ken Collier, a member of the University of Regina's Faculty of Social Work in Saskatchewan, utilizes the Dependency Theory and the concept of underdevelopment very specifically in explaining the economic and political position of North American Indians, especially those found in remote areas. He argues that the relationship between Natives and the advanced capitalist state is similar to the relations between Third World countries and the advanced industrialized world. Collier states that underdevelopment, which is far from accidental, occurs because of unequal exchange. "In North America, the industrial cities, by this argument, extract surplus value from the rural parts of the continent, and the imbalance between the metropolis and the hinterland is designed to maximize this transfer of value."<sup>16</sup>

It is clear that the Dependency Theory addresses, among other things, the actual disempowering of "peripheral" areas in order that the "core" might gain additional advantage. It is felt that this imbalance could be ameliorated somewhat, if the "rural poor" were empowered through effective participation in development.

### 2.3 Basic Needs

As it was becoming clear to many around 1970 that development in Third World societies was uneven, often having functional consequences for some people but dysfunctional consequences for others, international donor agencies began calling for a new development approach. One developmental strategy has been called the "basic needs" approach.<sup>17</sup> During the 1970s, as the failure of existing programmes to meet the needs of the majority was recognized in different policy areas, basic need strategies emerged at the international level. Even though basic need strategies have been adopted to a considerable extent within national development strategies, the gap between rhetoric and reality remains huge. The primary element in the basic needs strategy is that the needs of the poor must become the core of development policies. Many argue that the needs of the poor can only be met through income redistribution.<sup>18</sup> This argument gains some legitimacy when one notes that many Third World countries that experienced high rates of growth during the

1970s did not experience any reduction in human inequalities.<sup>19</sup>

Although there are many ways in which the analysis of basic needs could be approached, two methods are quite relevant to this discussion. Both approaches, the "target-setting" and the "structural," vary radically in their underlying theory and will be discussed in turn.<sup>20</sup>

### 2.3.1 The Target-Setting Approach

In target-setting, a standard is developed for each basic need. The standard adopted is the basic guidepost used in evaluation. Many times, short-term targets are developed, but the ultimate aim is to lift everyone up to a basic needs standard. Some proponents of this approach believe that the standard should be developed in a participatory planning framework, thus considering the expressed needs of those to whom the standards will apply. To the extent that this is not done, those proponents criticize this approach as being paternalistic.<sup>21</sup>

One method of setting a standard is by utilizing a target income level. Operationalizing this standard can be achieved in many ways, varying from the simple food basket approach representing the average needs of an individual, to a more expanded consumption basket target, or to an income level based on an ideal budget.

One criterion for deciding on a target income can be made by determining the point where the pattern changes from necessary to more luxurious foodstuffs.<sup>22</sup>

There are well-known difficulties with all versions of the target income approach. Firstly, it implicitly assumes that all basic needs are a function of income. Current relative prices, however, reflect the prevailing income distribution and structure, two very significant realities utilized in determining the cost of consumption items. It is almost a certainty that relative prices would change if the poor had greater purchasing power or if the structure of production changed. The target-setting approach to basic needs many feel could become a trap creating the all-too-familiar "growth-trickle-down" scenario. This method creates an income which represents the poverty line and which allows the number of people below it to be estimated. "The gap that needs to be filled is then estimated, and given current national product, the growth rate required to fill the gap is determined. Used in this sense, the basic needs approach is not constructive and may be thoroughly erroneous, i.e., it could lead to the conclusion that an inequalitarian growth strategy was justified."<sup>23</sup>

### 2.3.2 The Structural Approach

Advocates of the structural approach start from the premise that any target-setting relies on arbitrary or ad hoc judgements. Adherents state that this applies equally to the selection of basic needs, the standards or targets that are set, and the dates chosen for fulfillment of the needs. This target-setting approach is perfectly consistent with a totalitarian regime according to structuralists. As well, the focus of analysis and policy development is on very specific "needs" and tends to be divorced from larger issues involving the general socio-economic context. The target-setting approach usually tags on popular participation as a basic need but not to the satisfaction of the structuralists. They feel that once issues such as self-reliance, participation, and equality are allowed as basic needs, target-setting becomes redundant and probably misleading.<sup>24</sup>

According to the structuralists, perceived needs are usually determined by the structure of production and distribution. Consequently, to set needs in terms of the structure is invalid, especially if the observed structure is the cause of poverty and inequality. Those adhering to this method believe that the primary emphasis of research and policy recommendations should be to pursue the basic needs of people through the eradication of exploitation and through the redistribution of political

and economic power. "After all, according to structuralists, the ultimate human need is the opportunity to develop 'self-reliance' and the opportunity to be a part of a community of associated producers and consumers in which there is no subordination and deprivation of one group by another."<sup>25</sup>

Standing is not alone in identifying participation as a basic need and in emphasizing its importance in development. In the words of David Korten and Felipe Alfonso:

The need to participate, to participate fully, is a very basic and fundamental need. Only those who participate fully in the economic life of the community, who can and do contribute to producing the goods and services that the community needs and wants can have a claim to their rightful share of these benefits. Only those who participate fully in the social and political life of the community, who share the responsibility for determining what goals the community should strive for, what priorities it should have, what ideals, ideas, and the things it should value, who its leaders should be, will have the voice, the vote, the bargaining chips to enforce the claim that they have to the rightful share of the benefits that society produces and distributes. The need to participate is a keystone need. Satisfy it and you make man capable of satisfying his other basic needs.<sup>26</sup>

To be sure, a society's approach to providing its citizens with "basic needs" relates to the issue being examined in this study. A central theme in both the

target-setting and structural approach involves the use of power and citizen involvement through participation. In Standing's view, the former approach minimizes participation while the latter one seeks to empower people at a community level through effective participation. Clearly, the Native's desire for self-determination is compatible with the structural approach to basic needs.

#### 2.4 Popular Participation and Rural Development

During the period following World War II, as the problems of "underdeveloped" societies came into focus, the more advanced industrialized countries expressed increasing concern about the technology gap between more and less developed countries. Foreign aid was conceived as being a solution as it could be utilized to facilitate a technological transfer. The only requirement of participation on the part of the less developed peoples was that they adopt the new technology. This was predicated on the assumption that the new technology was, indeed, appropriate and productive. These assumptions, many of which have since been shown to be incorrect, were framed in terms of "traditionalism" as contrasted with "modernity." People's non-participation was attributed to "traditionalism" and resistance to "modernity."<sup>27</sup>

By the 1960s, development and foreign assistance efforts began to concentrate on resources and theories focused on various resource gaps, "between government revenue and

expenditure, between exports and imports, between savings and investment."<sup>28</sup> Capital accumulation was regarded as the crucial ingredient for development, and it required that people participate by making contributions which could be measured in resource terms. According to Cohen and Uphoff, this approach required people "to pay taxes, consume domestic products, produce more for export, save and invest, and hold down their consumption. This approach to participation, which was thought to justify exclusion of the public from decision-making participation was hardly one enthusiastically approved by the public."<sup>29</sup>

With respect to the issue of participation, clearly both the technology and resource-based theories of development are capital-intensive and imply a passive role for the majority of people. This approach bequeathed all crucial participation to the highly trained elites.<sup>30</sup>

In short, many of the attempts at "popular" participation since World War II have had rather narrow views. During this period, the three best-known participative attempts--rural cooperatives, community development, and animation rurale, have all shared certain basic problems. After synthesizing the views of various scholars, David Gow and Jerry Vansant list several of the most serious problems. Key issues revolved around the following: envisioned bottom-up approaches becoming vehicles to promote government programmes, interdepartmental bureaucratic jealousies,



governmental "cooperation" being dependent upon general population's willingness to go along with certain perspectives, governmental alliance with local elites in order to get quick results, and piecemeal approaches to development from community to community.<sup>31</sup>

As early development efforts, which were characterized by rather passive participation, failed to achieve their goals, a new consensus evolved. Based on experience, Third World governments and foreign donors realized by the early 1970s that participation was "a necessary condition for rural people to manage their affairs, control their environment, and enhance their own well-being."<sup>32</sup> In 1971, the United Nations, in a rather extensive statement on rural and urban development in Third World societies, emphasized the importance of popular participation.<sup>33</sup> The International Labor Office as well, has emphasized the importance of popular participation. In 1979, the Organization asserted the following:

Participation is both a means and an end in the context of basic needs. People must be given the opportunity to participate in making the decisions which affect them through organizations of their own choice, and be given the opportunity to take concrete action to carry out those decisions without conflicting with the rights of others. This forms the cornerstone of the basic needs approach to development, and although it may be a need which people can survive without having satisfied, it is one which is a requirement for the success of the basic

needs approach to development  
planning.<sup>34</sup>

To be sure, the concern with participation in development projects has become very popular in the 1970s and 1980s. Participation, however, is a broadly conceived notion, certainly lacking specificity. As a result, it can often be endorsed unambiguously on normative grounds even if the empirical basis is not clear. "There is a real danger that with growing faddishness and a lot of lip service, participation could become drained of substance and its relevance to development programs disputable."<sup>35</sup>

Since there is little systematic knowledge in the social sciences regarding development participation, the concept is even difficult to define. Part of the difficulty here is that participation is not a single phenomenon, but rather a complex of dynamics. Cohen and Uphoff make an attempt to define participation broadly as follows:

It appears more fruitful to regard participation as generally denoting the involvement of significant numbers of persons in situations or actions which enhance their well-being, i.e., their income, security, or self-esteem.<sup>36</sup>

From this broad definition, Cohen and Uphoff designed a framework (see Appendix I) which they feel will add "clarity through specificity" to the notion of participation. They stress from the outset that participation is not a thing that one can

measure in the same way that one might measure agriculture production. Rather, participation is treated as a rubric under which a number of empirical indicators can be placed. "In this sense, participation is an overarching concept best approached by looking at specific, more concrete components."<sup>37</sup>

## 2.5 Methodological Framework of Study

### 2.5.1 The Design

It is possible to distinguish three types of research methodologies used in policy research: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. For purposes of this research, the exploratory method is appropriate since this study does not emphasize the verification of theory, but rather, involves the hypothetical-developmental knowledge level.<sup>38</sup> At this level a researcher seeks "to describe social phenomena in a qualitative manner for the purpose of developing general concepts into more specific measurable variables or generating more specific research questions or hypotheses."<sup>39</sup>

The case study design, which is frequently used when the objective of the research is exploratory, will be utilized here. More specifically, the cross-sectional case study design will be employed. The basic approach of this design is to describe, thoroughly, a single unit during a specific period of time. Again, it is presumed that a thorough description of this unit will enable a

researcher to develop insights, ideas, questions, and hypotheses for further study. The design, therefore, entails a description of multiple experiences based on a variety of data.<sup>40</sup>

#### 2.5.2 The Sample

It is important to note that the sampling process in this type of design is purposive rather than random. In this type of process, the researcher deliberately selects input that will provide contrasting views, thus enhancing the development of ideas. Typically, this information comes from the scrutinizing of documents pertaining to the phenomenon and from inquiries made with key informants. Data gathered from these sources are then summarized in a qualitative manner with some quantitative data.<sup>41</sup>

#### 2.5.3 Procedures for Data Collection

In terms of this particular exploratory, cross-sectional case study, the unit of focus is the process of participation which occurred in the Community Advisory Committee, a Committee which was established as a mechanism for grassroots input during the 1981 to 1985 Norman Wells Oil Pipeline Project. The specific time frame extends from 1980, when Interprovincial Pipe Line Ltd. first made application to build the pipeline, to June 1986, when the interviews of the key informants for this research were completed. Data have been accumulated,

firstly through an archival search for all relevant documents; and, secondly, from interviews with key informants.

#### 2.5.4 the Interview Schedule

An interview schedule has been developed specifically for this research (see Appendix II). The schedule has been constructed based on input from various sources. Firstly, significant input has been gained through the work of Cohen and Uphoff, who have developed a matrix of participative variables (see Appendix I). The schedule actually focuses on two major issues which Cohen and Uphoff have identified as very relevant to resource development participation. They are as follows:

issues relevant to who participated.

issues relevant to how participation occurred.<sup>42</sup>

Initially a preliminary, sample schedule was developed. This sample was then pretested and discussed with several individuals who have expertise in research and a knowledge of the Canadian North. Ultimately, the instrument was refined, based on pretest results and based on an increased awareness of the backgrounds of those who were to serve as key informants. The instrument was also altered in order to reflect more accurately the purpose of the study.

The interview schedule includes closed-ended questions designed to access demographic and other very specific information. As well, there are a number of open-ended questions with probing designed to address the qualitative issues. The schedule is thus a blend between structured and semi-structured questions.<sup>43</sup>

#### 2.5.5 Choice of Subjects

With respect to obtaining key informants, it was determined from the outset that all informants would have to have had CAC experience, i.e., would have attended CAC meetings, either as a member or a nonmember. Preference was given to those who had attended the most meetings. After setting this criterion, minutes from the various CAC meetings were obtained. From these minutes it was possible to determine who attended and with what frequency.

A second major criterion for selection was to ensure that all the major interest groups were included in the sample. These selected groups were as follows: the Federal Government, the Government of the Northwest Territories, ESSO Resources Canada, Interprovincial Pipe Line, the Dene Nation, the Metis Association, and members from at least some of the affected communities. This criterion was met.

It should be noted that ten communities participated in the CAC. Because of time, budget, and the

availability of potential informants, representatives from only four of these communities were interviewed. A total of fifteen interviews were conducted. Eight of these interviews were with members from the various communities; and, of course, seven were with individuals with non-member status.

A final comment should be made with respect to the selection of the key informants. Prior to making the final selections, discussions were held with two individuals who had some knowledge of the CAC and its participants. These individuals made some recommendations regarding selection and where possible, given other criteria and restraints, these recommendations were considered.

## 2.6 Limitations of Study

Several limitations in this study are, perhaps, readily apparent. Because most of the informants know each other, because of the frequency of travel to different communities on the part of certain higher profile informants, and because some communities were represented by more than one key informant, the possibility of networking has to be considered as a definite limitation to this study. In other words, it is quite possible that some informants who had already been interviewed discussed the questions and their answers with other informants yet to be interviewed. It should be

emphasized, however, that networking does not appear to have been problematic except in two cases. In these cases two members requested that they be interviewed together. As a result of this joint session, networking occurred during the interview.

A second limitation is largely due to time and budget restraints. Because of these restraints some of the communities who had membership on the CAC are not represented in this research. As mentioned, a total of ten communities sent representatives to CAC meeting. The member informants in this research all came from a total of only four communities. Despite this limitation, it is believed that those individuals who were interviewed had divergent viewpoints which ranged across the continuum of possibility.

A third limitation relates to Chapter Four and to the analysis of the interview data. Because of the criteria utilized in choosing subjects, it would be fairly easy for informed readers to make educated guesses as to who said what. As a result, special precautions have been taken to protect the anonymity of the informants (see Appendix III). This becomes a limitation because some of the data has had to be eliminated or aggregated.



# ENDNOTES

1. Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin, Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies". (London, 1982), p. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. M. Gillis, D. Perkins, M. Roemer, D. Snodgrass, Economics of Development. (New York, 1983), pp. 5-6.
4. Alavi and Shanin, op.cit., p. 2.
5. Gillis, op.cit., p. 8.
6. Jacqueline Ismael, Kuwait. (New York, 1982), p. 2.
7. Ibid.
8. Alavi and Shanin, op.cit., p. 3
9. Ismael, op.cit., p. 3.
10. Alavi and Shanin, op.cit.
11. Ismael, op.cit.
12. Samir Amin, Unequal Development. (New York, 1976), p. 287.
13. Ibid., p. 288.
14. Ismael, op.cit., p. 5.
15. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
16. Ken Collier, Social Work with Rural Development. (Vancouver, 1984), p. 13.
17. Benno Galjart, "Counterdevelopment: A Position Paper," Community Development Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2. (April 1981), p. 88.
18. Stewart MacPherson, Social Policy in the Third World. (Totowa, New Jersey, 1981). p. 13.
19. Ibid.
20. Guy Standing and Richard Szal, Poverty and Basic Needs. (Geneva, 1979). p. 5.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

23. Ibid., p. 7.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
26. David C. Korten and Felipe B. Alfonso, (eds.), Bureaucracy and the Poor. (West Hartford, 1983). p. X.
27. John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity Through Specificity," World Development. Vol. 8, No. 2. (198), p. 215.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. David D. Gow and Jerry Vansant, "Beyond the Rhetoric of Rural Development Participation: How It Can Be Done?" World Development, Vol. 11, No. 5. (1983), p. 429.
32. Ibid., p. 427.
33. Popular Participation in Development: Emerging Trends in Community Development. (New York, 1971), pp. 1-7.
34. Standing and Szal, op.cit., p. 129.
35. Cohen and Uphoff, op.cit., p. 213.
36. Ibid., pp. 213-214.
37. Ibid., p. 218.
38. Richard M. Grinnell, Jr., (ed.), Social Work Research and Evaluation. (Itasca, 1981), p. 298.
39. Ibid., p. 199.
40. Ibid., p. 211.
41. Ibid., pp. 211-212.
42. Cohen and Uphoff, op.cit., pp. 219-225.
43. Richard M. Grinnell, Jr., (ed.), Social Work Research and Evaluation Second Edition. (Itasca, 1981), p. 313.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 POLICIES OF EMPOWERMENT

#### 3.1 Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter One, Chapter Three will examine the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) which was established, ostensibly, to allow grassroots community participation during the recent Norman Wells Oil Field Expansion and Pipeline Project. More specifically, the chapter will attempt to analyze the major governmental and corporate policies which determined the degree of empowerment that the CAC experienced. The various loci of power will be identified and an attempt will be made to identify the extent of that power.

#### 3.2 The Nature of Policy Making

There have been numerous attempts in the literature in recent years to conceptualize and define policy, policy making, and policy analysis. As policy research is a newly created field, there exists variation and disagreement in these attempts. Three levels of decisions involving policy have been distinguished based on the breadth of their implications. The first level is characterized by trivial and repetitive decisions about routine, almost daily actions. The second level involves more complex decision-making with wider ramifications and thus requires some degree of thought or

analysis. Such decisions have been called tactics. At the third level decisions which are made have the widest ramifications, the longest time perspective and generally require the most information and contemplation. It is for this third level that the term "policy" is reserved.<sup>1</sup>

Mayer and Greenwood have defined policy as follows:

A decision to act which is made in the name of a particular social group, which has complex implications and which constitutes an intent to influence the group members by provision of (positive or negative) sanctions.<sup>2</sup>

It should be noted that decisions at the policy level are based on the broad, long-range purposes of the top decision makers. Their "mission" is expressed in terms of goals. Mayer and Greenwood have explained, that the determination of goals lends direction and purpose to the planning process. It is an expression of an intention to act and is always stated as an infinitive. Further, it is important to realize that goal formulation "can be considered an expression of the policy maker's value preference."<sup>3</sup>

From the discussion above it seems clear that power and control are two of the central issues in the policy-making process. Policy makers exert power and control, firstly, by defining the mission of their group, and secondly, by seeking to influence group members through positive or negative sanctions.

### 3.3 Policy Issues in the Canadian North

Not surprisingly, issues of power and control appear to dominate public policy in the Canadian North. There are three interrelated issues which form the heart of northern politics. These three: Native land claims; political development with respect to the devolution of Federal power to the GNWT; and the future of the northern economies, translate into three policy issues which combine to produce the ultimate fate of the North.<sup>4</sup>

As Gurston Dacks explains, Any type of economic emphasis will differ from others in:

1. Whom it benefits most: some people will be particularly prepared to take advantage of a certain type of system while others will not be so well suited to do it, whether in terms of academic preparation, other training, financial resources, temperament, or tradition;
2. The options it offers to northerners and the options it forecloses; and
3. The cultural implications of the first two consequences, particularly if people find that they must adjust to a new economic situation so radically different from the former system that their abilities to cope are very severely tested.<sup>5</sup>

Dacks goes on to explain that Northerners want to maximize their control with respect to these issues. There is, however, by no means a consensus, even among Northerners, as to how the power should be distributed. For example, Non-Native Northerners frequently emphasize

political power for the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) while Natives emphasize their land claims.<sup>6</sup>

### 3.4 The Pipeline Approval Process

In a document dated March 1980, Interprovincial Pipe Line (N.W.) Ltd. (IPL) made application to the National Energy Board (NEB) to construct an oil pipeline from Norman Wells, Northwest Territories, to Zama, Alberta.<sup>7</sup> Although other federal agencies became involved in the project, application was made to the NEB because it "had the primary mandate for review and approval of projects designed to transport energy across provincial boundaries and was the regulatory agency under which IPL built and operated its entire system."<sup>8</sup>

In its proposal, IPL proposed to build and to operate a 324 millimeter pipeline which would transport crude oil from the Norman Wells oilfield to Southern Canadian markets. The pipeline was to be buried and would transverse 868 kilometers. The carrying capacity was expected to be 5,000 cubic meters per day. At the same time that IPL made application, Esso Resources Canada Ltd., as the proprietary agent for the Norman Wells oilfield, filed plans with the federal government to increase the field's overall production rates from 500 to 4,000 cubic meters per day.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the NEB's review of the application, other regulatory steps had to be taken before getting project

approval. The Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO) had recently been established and was mandated to conduct independent reviews of proposals such as the Norman Wells Project. As well, the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND) and the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) would have to agree to grant a right-of-way along the pipeline route. Finally, water licences for major water crossings at the Great Bear and Mackenzie Rivers had to be obtained from the Northwest Territorial Water Board.<sup>10</sup>

Obviously, this is only a thumbnail sketch of the regulatory steps involved. It is appropriate at this point to look at the various players in this regulatory process again from the perspective of policy and power.

### 3.5 The Multinationals

In the minds of some authorities, the Northwest Territories is a peripheral zone with respect to distant central poles of command. "Among these almost occult powers are the large multinational corporations, whose primary objectives do not include serving either the North or the indigenous people."<sup>11</sup>

It has been said that the multinational corporations are the economic symbols of colonialism. To be sure, the expense of northern megaprojects virtually necessitates the participation of the economically powerful multinational corporations.

"For example, in 1980 Esso Resources announced plans to add \$30 million to the \$70 million already invested in constructing and drilling from the Issungnak artificial island in the Beaufort Sea, and to carry out a \$460 million expansion program of its Norman Wells oilfield."<sup>12</sup>

These sums of money have to be seen as significant and illustrate the power of the external forces confronting the North as it tries to take control of its own destiny. Because of the tremendous resources these multinationals possess, including money, technology, marketing ability, and, management skills, Ottawa comes to rely on them as the vehicle for the northern development that it is so eager to see take place. The multinationals' power is increased because they have access to large amounts of information that even Ottawa does not possess. Because of this, they are able to put their proposed project in the best possible light. Further, the multinationals gain an advantage because of the high social status of some of their senior members. "In effect, their expertise enables them to act as initiators of the policy process and to force government into the role of reacting rather than leading."<sup>13</sup>

With respect to Native land claims, the multinationals support quick resolution in order to avoid the uncertainty created by the lack of a settlement. They, however, do not wish the settlement to give powers to the Native people who might somehow restrict their projects. The multinationals,



consequently, would require that the settlement be restricted and only apply to land surface rights. They would undoubtedly oppose any settlement that would give the Native people any real power over resource production, pricing, or royalty decisions.<sup>14</sup>

The multinational corporations wish to avoid environmental damage both as a matter of principle and because they know that a major environmental calamity could damage their relationship with the public and with Ottawa. On the other hand, these corporations must pay the costs of environmental protection and frequently view the standards Ottawa sets as too restrictive.<sup>15</sup>

In terms of socio-economics, "the oil and gas exploration industry tends to attempt to employ a substantial Native work force, while pipeline proponents have not all shown quite the same enthusiasm."<sup>16</sup> Industry does, however, attempt to deal with the various community problems, such as difficulties caused by the sudden influx of cash from wages, absence of family members working away on a project, or the intergenerational clashes that employment can produce. While it might be argued that industry ought not to bear the primary responsibility, "their statements on social impact tend to minimize the social destruction that will follow in their wake."<sup>17</sup>

With specific reference to environmental and socio-economic issues involving the Norman Wells pipeline, IPL

addressed these issues in their original application to the NEB. A synopsis of their policies in this regard is as follows:

The applicant is committed to constructing and operating the Pipe Line Project in such a manner as to protect the environment, limit socio-economic disruption and maximize local benefits. In order to meet this commitment, the Applicant will work closely with governments, local communities, Native organizations and other appropriate interest groups in project planning, construction, and operations and maintenance activities. Preliminary consultation and liaison has already begun and it is the intention of the Applicant to increase the level of these activities in the period ahead.

The Applicant's policy is to maximize opportunities for Northern residents, and proposes to implement a number of programs to ensure that local residents have advance information about, and have the opportunity for, project employment.

The Applicant will stimulate business opportunities and is committed to communicating the need for and establishing a preferred position for northern business with respect to such opportunities.<sup>18</sup>

In a similar fashion, Esso Resources made a policy commitment to deal with the various environmental and socio-economic issues. Jim Deyell of Esso Resources comments as follows:

The underlying principle relative to managing the socio-economic aspects of all Esso's development projects and operations is to provide maximum opportunity for the local communities to participate from both employment and business standpoints. Where possible Esso

provides opportunities for local communities to benefit from its oil and gas exploration and development activities and takes all reasonable action to provide effective operating plans to reduce or mitigate adverse environmental and socio-impacts and to maximize local benefits.<sup>19</sup>

### 3.6 The Government of Canada

In making application to the National Energy Board, IPL stated that their project would result in substantial benefits to both the regional and national public interests.<sup>20</sup> As Gurston Dacks, however, explains "there is no such thing as 'public interest' or a 'national good' that exists in any objective sense."<sup>21</sup> He explains that this title is simply something bestowed on the end product of the decision-making process. It is those with power who determine the end product and define national or public interest. "Policy must be explained in terms of the interplay of interests and values of the various actors involved in the decision-making process."<sup>22</sup> This idea gains some credence in looking at federal decision-makers with respect to policies affecting the Canadian North and ultimately the CAC.

In 1972 Ottawa listed its goals in the North as follows:

1. To provide for a higher standard of living, equality of life and equality of opportunity for Northern residents by methods which are compatible with their own preferences and aspirations.
2. To maintain and enhance the Northern environment with due consideration to economic and social development.

3. To encourage viable economic development within regions of the northern territories so as to realize their potential contribution to the national economy and the material well-being of Canadians.
4. To realize the potential contribution of the northern territories to the social and cultural development of Canada.
5. To further the evolution of government in the northern territories.
6. To maintain Canadian sovereignty and security in the North.
7. To develop fully the leisure and recreational opportunities in the northern territories.<sup>23</sup>

On the surface it would appear that these goals are contradictory. This, of course, is not to say that some formula for their achievement does not exist and that many Federal officials have worked avidly in pursuit of these goals. However, the balance of power in the Federal Government appears to favor non-renewable resource development over providing for the Native people. In other words, "Ottawa has clear interests in the North, which lead it to subordinate the evolution of northern Native society to the needs of megadevelopment whenever the two principles come into conflict."<sup>24</sup>

In the mind of Gurston Dacks, Ottawa's first and foremost set of interests with respect to the establishment of northern policy is economics.<sup>25</sup> Of course the reasons for this are complex and beyond the scope of this research.

Suffice to say, northern megaprojects provide opportunities for the stimulation of Canadian economy, and reduce the pressure of Canadian's balance of payments with respect to dependence on foreign crude oil. Even if Ottawa has to subsidize the production of frontier oil, a large portion of that subsidy would remain in Canada, and thus, stimulate the economy.<sup>26</sup>

Indeed, northern energy production would appear to be particularly attractive to Ottawa from an economic standpoint in that the federal government alone enjoys the legal right to all of the royalties from that production. The economic advantage is, of course, made possible because the GNWT does not have the legislated power that their provincial oil producing neighbors enjoy. The attractiveness of the federal advantage appears to be reflected in the 1980 National Energy Program, which encourages northern hydrocarbon exploration.<sup>27</sup>

It should be stated that Ottawa has ultimate constitutional power to pursue its economic interests in the North. The Government of Canada possesses complete regulatory authority over production of northern production of oil and gas. Ottawa enjoys this power largely because the territories have yet to receive provincial status and Native rights are as yet undefined.<sup>28</sup>

As eluded to earlier, despite its formal powers, Ottawa's actual power is limited. In order to pursue the economic

advantages that northern development might supply, the government becomes dependent on the multinationals. The multinationals, consequently, are in a position to insist upon certain conditions before proceeding with a project.<sup>29</sup> In an effort to encourage and maintain multinational presence in the Northwest Territories (NWT), the Government of Canada during the past three decades has offered a variety of incentives, particularly in the areas of infrastructure and tax breaks.<sup>30</sup> In short, the multinationals and Ottawa share actual power in the North and they together define the northern political context.<sup>31</sup>

### 3.6.1 The National Energy Board

The National Energy Board was established in 1959<sup>32</sup> and operates under the National Energy Board Act. Since its establishment, the Board has carried through with its complex job of regulating interprovincial and international energy transmission.<sup>33</sup> "The major goal of the National Energy Program is to promote development of oil and gas on Canadian lands."<sup>34</sup>

"The responsibilities of the National Energy Board involve two basic tasks: one as the private advisor to government; and the other as the regulator of the industry. As the advisor to the Minister of Energy, Mine and Resources, the NEB monitors and reports on virtually all aspects of federal energy policy. Under its

act of incorporation, the Board enjoys broad powers to force public disclosures and to recommend action 'in the public interest.'"<sup>35</sup> "The major regulatory functions of the Board consist of granting certificates of 'public convenience and necessity' for construction of inter-provincial and international pipelines and international electrical transmission lines; issuing licences for the export of power, oil, or natural gas, or the importing of natural gas; and approving federally regulated tariffs and tolls for pipelines."<sup>36</sup>

When the National Energy Board receives an application, such as the one received from Interprovincial Pipe Line (NW) Ltd. in 1980, there are six steps it has to follow:

1. In-house assessment of the filed documentation.
2. Deficiency letters issued by the NEB and the written response of the applicant to them.
3. Board order for public hearings and the filing of intent by interested parties.
4. Public hearings.
5. NEB report and recommendation to cabinet.
6. Cabinet <sup>37</sup>approval, modification, or rejection.

To elaborate on the above, the first step after receiving an application is an assessment by Board staff

members. Over the years these staff members "have built up considerable expertise on technical, legal, and economic aspects of regulating pipelines."<sup>38</sup> The deficiency letters can be clearly useful to the applicant in that they serve as alerts with respect to potential problems prior to the public hearings. The public hearing phase is announced by informing all individuals and corporations on the Board's mailing list and by advertising in key newspapers. Any individual or group can make application for intervenor status which, once granted, allows them to obtain a copy of the application and supporting documentation. Those with this status have a right to examine witnesses and to present written or oral evidence. It should be noted that the Board has the power to reject intervenor status but has not done so since the early 1970s. The hearings can be formal and legalistical and normally operate beyond media attention since the sessions are dominated by the technical detail of engineers, financial experts and lawyers. "The language problems at the NEB hearings often have little to do with either official language of the country. Technical jargon is the first line of defense for the harried witness."<sup>39</sup>

After the hearings the Board may take several months to complete a report which is sent to Cabinet. If a project is approved, it can be conditional, based on



correcting a deficiency or providing additional information. The Cabinet can reject a project approved by the Board, but Cabinet cannot rescue a project rejected by the Board. It should be noted that if Cabinet amends the NEB decision, it must be sanctioned by a bill through Parliament. "Appeals against an NEB decision lie through the Federal Court of Appeal, but appeals can be made only on the basis of questions pertaining to law or jurisdiction."<sup>40</sup>

From the above it is already clear that the legal and political position of the NEB as a regulatory board is far stronger than the advisory role of the public inquiry.<sup>41</sup> However, in an effort to understand the degree of power the federal government exercises through the National Energy Board, it is necessary to look at legislation and policy more closely. Part I of the National Energy Board Act begins by establishing the Board and addressing the "tenure of members" as follows:

3. (1) There shall be a Board to be called the National Energy Board, consisting of eleven members to be appointed by the Governor in Council.

(2) Subsection (3), Each member of the Board shall be appointed to hold office during good behavior for a period of seven years, but may be removed at any time by the Governor in Council upon address of the Senate and House of Commons.<sup>42</sup>

Robert Page points out that these appointed Board members are not necessarily as free to make their own recommendations as it first might appear. Firstly, members of the Board serve on many interdepartmental committees and task forces--no less than forty-four at the time of the Berger Northern Pipeline hearings.<sup>43</sup> Consequently, they are part of the web of government policy formation and not truly an independent regulatory board. Page explains the Board's lack of independence as follows:

Yet the necessary independence and objectivity needed for the job have been strained by our own theory of government and its expanding role in society. Unlike the United States, we do not subscribe to the theory of the separation of the powers of government but to the unity and paramountcy of Parliament. Therefore, regulatory boards as they evolved in Canada entailed an internal contradiction. They were to be independent and yet they were also a part of the internal interdepartmental committee system to define policy. They have been both regulators and advisors. Hence, the NEB is not free of the policy web of the Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, and its statements are expected to reflect the policy needs of the government in power. Any doubt on this point was exploded in October 1980, when Marc Lalonde indicated to the House of Commons that he would overrule the NEB if approval was not granted to the Trans-Quebec and Maritime Pipeline. The Board quickly announced its willingness to hold

hearings to reconsider its opposition to the project. Parliament is supreme and all the Minister is required to do is to suggest the passage of a bill to enforce his wishes. Although the Board is quasi-judicial, it does not operate at arm's length as do the courts.<sup>44</sup>

### 3.6.2 Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office

The Federal Environment Assessment Review which administers the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP), was established by Cabinet decision in 1973 and was amended by Cabinet in 1977. The Process involves an attempt to determine in advance the potential environmental impact of all federal projects, programs, and activities. "The ultimate responsibility for decisions resulting from the Process activities rests with the Minister of the Environment and his Cabinet colleagues."<sup>45</sup> It should be noted that the human element must also be considered with respect to any environmentally-related social consequences of a project.<sup>46</sup>

EARP's involvement automatically applies when a project is conceived. "This means that federal departments and agencies initiating the projects are responsible for both the initial assessment and for establishing the significance of the environmental impacts."<sup>47</sup> However, a considerable body of information is available to departments and agencies in applying the Process. Advice is

available from the Department of Environment throughout the screening procedure and in the development and review of the Initial Environmental Evaluation.<sup>48</sup>


Early in the planning stages, departments and agencies hopefully screen their proposed projects in an effort to identify adverse environmental effects. A guide book has been designed to assist in this task. Screening can result in one of three decisions by the initiating department.<sup>49</sup>

1. The department may conclude that the proposal has no potential adverse environmental effects or that such effects are known and are not considered significant. If this decision is made, the department concerned is responsible for implementing the measures required to prevent or mitigate the environmental effects identified, and for satisfying all other legislative, regulatory and Cabinet requirements related to the development and implementation of the Project.
2. The department may conclude that the project's potential environmental effects appear to be significant. In this case the project is referred to the Minister of the Environment for a formal review under the Process.
3. The department may conclude that the nature and scope of potential environmental effects cannot be determined readily by this procedure. If this is the decision, the proposal is subjected to a more detailed examination known as Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE).<sup>50</sup>

Please see Figure 3.1 for a diagram of the procedure described above.

FIGURE 3.1

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW PROCESS



Source: Revised Guide to the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process, Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1979), p.12.

With respect to the EARP panel, it should be stated that the group is made up of experts, usually four to six, who are selected based on knowledge and expertise relating to the project under review. In terms of membership, the panels may consist of federal, provincial or territorial public servants as well as persons from the private sector. It is important to note that special steps are taken to guard against the possibility of conflict of interest and to preserve the independence of the Panel. The Panel's report directly to the Minister of the Environment.<sup>51</sup>

After the Panel is formed, the proponent (IPL in this case) prepares an IEE and submits it through the initiator (the NEB in this case) to the Panel. After this, a technical and public review is conducted in the form of public meetings which provide an opportunity for the public, primarily the local citizens who might be affected by the project, to air their concerns and opinions before the Panel.<sup>52</sup> After the public hearings the Panel will make their recommendations to the Minister who can accept or reject them. The Cabinet in turn does the same.<sup>53</sup>

With the above in mind, it is important to stress the discretionary and advisory nature of the Process. "The ministry may decide there are no serious impacts, thus eliminating the appointment of an ERAP Panel and

the holding of public hearing, and, as noted, the Minister or Cabinet can totally reject recommendations coming from any panel. The Panel's power is only that of moral persuasion; they are not a regulatory board with the power to stop any project on their own."<sup>54</sup>

### 3.6.3 DIAND

Many believe that the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) has inhibited its ability to perform effectively in the North. DIAND appears to have conflicting responsibilities which include the trusteeship of northern Native people, protection of the northern environment, and promotion of northern economic development. The first two responsibilities, in the minds of some, appear to be incompatible with the third. In this regard, it should be noted that development priorities have dominated DIAND's overall policy decisions.<sup>55</sup> In short, DIAND has a legacy of weakness, partly because its client group is unpopular and politically weak in Ottawa, and partly because it has had great difficulty in reconciling contradictory interests.<sup>56</sup>

It should be stated that the Honorable John Munro, who took control of DIAND in early 1980, enjoyed more success than many of his predecessors. His ability to balance the needs of the NWT with the desires of Ottawa, his frequent trips to the North, and his political experience eventually allowed him "to be seen as an

advocate for the NWT albeit one who was not successful at all times with all issues."<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, the confusion of priorities within the Department still remains, as well as the never-ending political struggles between federal departments to control jurisdiction. Over the years Indian and Northern Affairs has lost some battles, particularly to Energy, Mines and Resources.<sup>58</sup>

### 3.7 Power in the North

As the reader has undoubtedly already deduced, the amount of political power concentrated in the North is limited. Although the Parliament of Canada has delegated some powers to the Government of the Northwest Territories, the GNWT still remains a subordinate entity. The relationship between the Federal government and this Territorial government is "analogous to that of a municipal council vis-a-vis a provincial government."<sup>59</sup>

As well, to date, the Dene in the North lack power because their rights remain undefined.<sup>60</sup> The cornerstone of the Dene land claims is the ownership and control of the land. Ongoing land claims negotiations involve many complex issues including which lands, surface and subsurface rights, taxation, and compensation for resource development.<sup>61</sup> Clearly, the Dene remain in a weakened position until the land claims issue is settled.



Another major deficiency for Northern peoples is their fragmentation. Native people are separated by differences in ethnicity, history, and economic interests. While this regionalism is unavoidable, it does divide their strength. The non-Native population of the North is just as diverse. These residents can be divided into two basic groups, the long-term residents and the transients. The long-term residents can again be divided into three groups, the business people and professionals, the public servants, and those who have come to seek relief from the hectic pace of the south.<sup>62</sup> Obviously, this kind of fragmentation does not lead to powerful unified political power.

### 3.8. Native Marginalization

In analyzing Native power in the North, it is important to examine the dynamic of marginalization. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the traditional hunting and gathering economy is overshadowed in several ways by the wage economy. The focus of the wage economy generally is on large-scale, capital-intensive and high-technological mega-projects.<sup>63</sup> Much of the wage economy in the North is based on the exportation of staples to the metropolis. This creates a kind of colonial link between the frontier hinterland and the staple-consuming metropolis. In this economic scenario, the core determines what resources become staples and what the staples are worth. The important factor is that economic

decisions are made outside the North in response to needs as they exist outside the North. "This is the essence of economic colonialism."<sup>64</sup>

With respect to the Mackenzie Valley, the wage economy can marginalize the Native people in a number of ways. The traditional economy can be undermined by a wage economy which entices Natives to work on megaprojects which may only last a few years, as was the case in Norman Wells.<sup>65</sup> As well, the boom-and-bust cycle can exacerbate this. The North can fall victim to waxing and waning of the South's economic needs. Such was the case in 1986, when the plunge in world oil prices caused several major oil companies to leave the North. This departure left almost six hundred Native people without jobs.<sup>66</sup>

Ironically, a steady wage economy can upset social relationships among Native people. Firstly, it may cause workers to have to leave their homes and, thus, to lose their social support systems. Secondly, it can give Native workers a social status which conflicts with the status traditionally assigned on the basis of other factors. Thirdly, it individualizes labor and can erode the sense of community which traditionally has been so basic to Native social organization.<sup>67</sup>

The wage economy clearly undermines the traditional economy by its very presence in the North. Non-Natives have largely invalidated Native lifestyles by imposing southern institutions and even place names on them, by denying Native

claim to the land, and by repudiating Native religion and language. "The marginality of Native people in the New Society of the North cannot help but have undermined all aspects of Native life and weakened the confidence and sense of personal efficacy of individual Native people."<sup>68</sup>

During an interview with one of the Native informants, the individual voluntarily expressed his frustration with respect to the above. The respondent spoke of the Native young people no longer pursuing traditional ways but rather working in the wage economy for a while and then sitting around while living off welfare. The young Natives are also abandoning the Dene law and showing disrespect and disobedience in dealing with elders and parents. The Native concluded that he was simply "born at the wrong time."

To look more specifically at problematic areas, unemployment is a major problem among Native people in the NWT. Although accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, the basic problem is that the communities to which the Native people have been moved hold very few jobs. The movement to communities also undermines the traditional economy of hunting and gathering which depended on a nomadic type of existence. The unemployment situation is made worse because a high number of young Native people are attempting to enter the labor force.<sup>69</sup>

The Native people in the Mackenzie Valley, to a large degree, moved into villages because government services were

only provided there. Many moved so they could be near their children who were attending village schools frequently because of government pressure to attend. This disruption in lifestyle has created a dependence on welfare payments for many Native people. A survey of Native social problems in the North reveals that Native people tend to be poor compared with non-Natives in the North. For example, the 1976 per capita income in Yellowknife, which was eighty-seven percent white, was \$8,027, whereas the nearby Rae-Edzo, which was nine percent white, had \$1,407 as a per capita income.<sup>70</sup>

FIGURE 3.2

## SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BY AGE GROUP AND RECIPIENT ETHNIC STATUS

AGE	TOTAL SA RECIPIENTS	INDIAN		NON-NATIVE	
		NUMBER	PERCENT OF AGE GROUP	NUMBER	PERCENT OF AGE GROUP
Under 20	162	104	64.2	58	35.8
20 - 29	672	377	56.1	295	43.9
30 - 39	412	231	56.1	181	43.9
40 - 49	293	194	66.2	99	33.8
50 - 59	304	199	65.5	105	34.5
60 - 64	150	113	75.3	37	24.7
65+	127	88	69.3	39	30.7
TOTAL	2,120	1,306	61.6	814	38.4

Adopted from: Social Assistance Program, Department of Social Services, Government of the Northwest Territories (Yellowknife, November 1985), p. 124.

Figure 3.2 shows social assistance by ethnicity and age grouping for the entire Native and non-Native populations in

the NWT in 1984-1985. It should be noted that the Inuit people are not included here and that Metis people are included in the non-Native statistics. It is clear from this chart that Native people have a greater dependence on welfare payments than do non-Natives.<sup>71</sup>

A recent report on the social assistance program in the NWT indicated that a majority of the people on welfare would work if they had the opportunity. The report revealed "that approximately two-thirds of the Social Assistance Program shows up a failure in the economic system to provide employment for persons in the Northwest Territories."<sup>72</sup>

In addition to poverty, Northern Natives suffer from other social ills. Alcohol abuse, which has increased significantly in the last quarter-century, is probably the most severe problem because it is so widespread and is so often a factor in family or other violence.<sup>73</sup>

In 1984, Resources Management Consultants published a report on alcohol abuse in the NWT. The major findings in this report are detailed in Appendix IV. Suffice to say, alcohol abuse is deemed to be the number one problem by many in the NWT. Fully eighty to ninety percent of all crime is alcohol-related and forty percent of all suicides. The total sentence admissions to the Yellowknife Corrections Institute increased by about twenty-one percent from 1978 to 1982 with the quantity of absolute alcohol sold increasing thirty-five percent from 1978 to 1982. It is important to note that the

findings did not vary widely regardless of the region of the NWT being considered.<sup>74</sup> In 1984, at the fourteenth annual meeting of the National Assembly of the Dene Nation, the Dene themselves recognized alcoholism to be the number one problem affecting their communities. Interestingly, they related the problem "to the move of the old way of life to the stress of living in community."<sup>75</sup>

In addition to their social problems, Native people in the North also suffer from far more health problems than other Canadians. Figure II shows that the infant mortality rate for Indians in the NWT actually increased from 1973 to 1983. In 1983 the rate was 44.3 for Indians and 10.4 for the non-Native population in the NWT.<sup>76</sup> By way of some comparison, the infant mortality for Canada in 1981 was 9.6.<sup>77</sup>

FIGURE 3.3

## FIVE YEAR TRENDS IN NWT INFANT MORTALITY RATE


INDICATOR	YEAR	INDIAN	OTHER
INFANT Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Livebirths)	1973	31.08	12.77
	1978	40.00	20.80
	1983	44.30	10.40

Adopted from: Regional Director, Health and Welfare Canada, Medical Services, N.W.T. Region, Report on Health Conditions in the Northwest Territories, (Yellowknife, 1984), p. 25.

Another characteristic of marginalization is the proletarianization of labor. Natives in the North tend to work at relatively unskilled jobs for limited periods of time, usually for low pay.<sup>78</sup> One factor undoubtedly contributing to this is the Native deficit in formal education when compared to the non-Native labor force. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show comparisons in this regard.<sup>79</sup> It should be noted that this demographic information deals geographically with the South Slave, North Slave, Upper MacKenzie, Lower Mackenzie, and Western Arctic areas.<sup>80</sup> The disparity in education is most dramatic at either end of the continuum. Native workers with less than a grade nine education make up 41.6 percent of the labor force while non-Native workers only make up 5.8 percent. At the other hand, only 5.2 percent of Native workers have attended university, while 27.8 percent of non-Native workers have had university training.<sup>81</sup>

FIGURE 3.4

INTRA-ETHNIC COMPARISONS OF LABOUR FORCE  
POPULATION EDUCATION LEVELS (1981 Census)



Source: The Joint Needs Assessment Committee, Human Resources Development Final Report, (Yellowknife, May 31, 1983), pp. 54a-54.

The Department of Social Services in Yellowknife has described the "working poor" in the Northwest Territories as follows:

The 'working poor' are those people who have full-time, part-time or periodic employment but do not have sufficient monthly income to meet their needs. The age group which is in the greatest need proportionately of financial assistance to supplement income is the 40-64 year-olds. This reflects the tendency of the group to be oriented toward the hunting and trapping economy and to rely on occasional jobs to earn extra income. Many older people find it difficult to get steady employment.

The education level of the working poor aged 40-64 is low; 50% have one or no years of education; 82% have four or less; only 4% have ten or more years. The



30-39 year-olds have more education; 22% have ten or more years; 27% have four or less; 21% have one or no years.

Young people 20-29 years old tend to have had an education of six to nine years. Only 25% have ten or more years; 45% have nine years; 64% have eight years; 87% have six years. As grade 10 is a minimum entry level for many jobs in the Northwest Territories, the 20-29 years old group may have difficulty in obtaining better or permanent jobs.<sup>82</sup>

FIGURE 3.5

INTRA-ETHNIC COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCED LABOUR FORCE  
POPULATION EDUCATION LEVELS (1981 Census)

	Less than Grade 9 Including No School		Grades 9-13 Non- University		Post- Secondary		University		Total	Total
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Native	1,560	41.6	1,140	30.4	850	22.7	195	5.2	3,745	100
Non-Native	605	5.8	3,590	34.5	3,310	31.8	2,895	27.8	10,400	100
Total	2,165	15.3	4,730	33.4	4,165	29.4	3,090	21.8	14,145	100

Source: The Joint Needs Assessment Committee, Human Resources Development Final Report, Vol. 1. (Yellowknife, May 31, 1983), p. 54.

### 3.9 Pipeline Approved

After IPL's application to the National Energy Board in 1980, the Board began the lengthy task of studies, public hearings and documentation. As well, public hearings took place in the summer and fall of 1980 as a part of the Federal

Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO) investigation of the proposal.<sup>83</sup> In a report dated January 1981, FEARO conditionally approved the project.<sup>84</sup> The NEB granted its conditional approval in a document dated March 1981.<sup>85</sup> The final decision, of course, rested with the Cabinet of the federal government. On July 30, 1981, Cabinet approved the project but required a two-year delay of construction until 1983 to allow Northerners to prepare properly in order to take advantage of the employment and business opportunities the project would offer.<sup>86</sup>

### 3.10 The Community Advisory Committee

As mentioned previously, a press release by John Munro on July 30, 1981, announced the approval of the Norman Wells Project. That release also revealed that the Federal Project Co-ordinator would be assisted by an advisory committee which would consist of representatives of communities in the NWT affected by the project, to help ensure that local interests and needs were given full consideration. It was not, however, until July 1983 that the Terms of Reference were drawn up by the Federal Co-ordinator in an attempt to more clearly delineate the role of the Committee.<sup>87</sup> The Terms, which appeared to establish a direct linkage between the people and the Minister of DIAND are as follows:

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NORMAN WELLS  
OILFIELD EXPANSION AND PIPELINE PROJECT  
COMMUNITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE MINISTER

1. The Committee will be made up of representatives from those communities affected by the Project. The minister may appoint one member from each community in the affected area. The Minister may also appoint one alternative member from each Community in the affected area.
2. The Committee will represent as directly as possible to the Minister the interests of the people in the affected communities by:
  - (a) providing the Minister with advice on the ways to minimize any adverse social, economic and environmental effects of the Project, and to maximize social and economic benefits including employment and business opportunities arising from the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Project.
  - (b) providing advice on local and regional interests related to the oil field expansion and pipeline construction.
  - (c) providing advice on measures to facilitate effective consultation and communications with groups and communities affected by the Project.
3. The Committee will meet quarterly; however, if additional meetings are deemed necessary by the Chairman, these may be held following consultation with the Project Coordinator.
4. The Committee will keep minutes which will be circulated to members, communities and the Project Coordinator.
5. The Committee will be funded with the budget being set by the Minister.
6. The Committee will elect its own Chairman.<sup>88</sup>

The Community Advisory Committee (CAC) held nine meetings from its first on December 2, 1982, to its last on February 27, 1985. "Six meetings were held in Yellowknife, two in Norman Wells, and one in Fort Simpson. Time periods between meetings ranged from six weeks to more than seven months."<sup>89</sup>

It should be noted that potential members and their alternatives were first selected by their communities and then approved by the Minister. In many of the communities where there was both a Band and Community Council, the latter selected the representative. The communities initially seeking membership were Norman Wells, Fort Norman, Fort Franklin, Fort Smith, Fort Simpson, Fort Providence and Hay River. Originally, both Fort Good Hope and Wrigley refused to join but did participate as observers in several earlier sessions. However, both communities did join the CAC by the December 1, 1983 meeting. "Fort Laird and the Hay River Reserve also had joined the Committee by the third and fourth meetings respectively. The Fort Simpson Band refused to participate on the Committee as a part of the Fort Simpson delegation from the fifth meeting onward."<sup>90</sup>

A significant number of non-members also attended the CAC meetings. These included members of the Federal Project Coordinators staff, GNWT representatives who were associated with the Norman Wells Project, employees of IPL and Esso, and other special guests who might be making a

presentation or be interested in a particular issue. It should be stated that non-members outnumbered members at most meetings.<sup>91</sup>

### 3.11 Summary

From the above discussion it appears that the loci of power with respect to resource development in the NWT lies with the multinational corporations and the Canadian Federal Government. The manifestation of the federal power is primarily seen through the National Energy Board which operates under the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. DIAND, which has a history of losing battles to the National Energy Board, does not appear to be able to act decisively because of a conflictual mandate. Other possible sources of political power include the GNWT, the Dene Nation, and the Northern people as a whole. However, as has been discussed, the GNWT remains a subordinate entity, the Dene rights are still undefined, and the Northern people are characterized by fragmentation. As well, the Dene appear to suffer from significant marginalization within their own socio-economic milieu. With the above in mind, one would not expect the CAC to be an effective experiment in grassroots empowerment. The next chapter will discuss the perceptions of many of those who attended CAC meetings.

# ENDNOTES

1. Robert Mayer and Ernest Greenwood, The Design of Social Policy Research. (Englewood Cliffs, 1980), pp. 3-4.
2. Ibid., pp. 5, 17.
3. Ibid., pp. 6, 8.
4. Gurston Dacks, A Choice of Futures: Politics in the Canadian North. (Toronto, 1981), p. 2.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. Ibid.
7. Interprovincial Pipe Line (N.W.) Ltd., Application to the National Energy Board, In respect of an Oil Pipeline from Norman Wells, Northwest Territories, to Zama, Alberta, Vol. 5 (1980).
8. Interprovincial Pipe Line (N.W.) Ltd., Summary Final Report on the Norman Wells to Zama Pipeline Project. (Edmonton, 1985), p. 5.
9. Ibid., p. 2.
10. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
11. Louis-Edmond Hamelin, Canadian Nordicity: It's Your North, Too. (Montreal, 1979), p. 242.
12. Dacks, op. cit., pp. 14, 24.
13. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
14. Ibid., p. 24.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 25.
17. Ibid.
18. Op. cit., Interprovincial Pipe Line (NW) Ltd., Application to the National Energy Board, p. 1.
19. J.W. Deyell, Norman Wells Expansion Project Wrap-Up Review: Opening Position Paper. (1985), p. 1.

20. National Energy Board, Reasons for Decision, In the Matter of an Application under the National Energy Board Act of Inter-provincial Pipe Line (N.W.) Ltd. (1981), p. 161.
21. Dacks, op. cit., p. 213.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
24. Ibid., pp. 26-29.
25. Ibid., p. 26.
26. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
27. Ibid., p. 27.
28. Ibid., pp. 5, 27, 196.
29. Ibid., p. 30.
30. George Braden, "Indicators of Southern Attitudes Toward the N.W.T.: 1979-83," in The North, Coordinator, Michael Whittington (Canada, 1985), p. 118.
31. Dacks, op. cit.
32. Hamelin, op. cit., p. 269.
33. Page, op. cit., p. 124.
34. Dacks, op. cit., p. 131.
35. Page, op. cit., pp. 124-125.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 126.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., pp. 128-129.
40. Ibid., p. 129.
41. Ibid.
42. The National Energy Board Act, Office Consolidation (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1983), p. 4.

43. Page, op. cit., p. 125.
44. Ibid., pp. 316-317.
45. Revised Guide to the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process, Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1979), p. 1.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 3.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Environmental Assessment Panels - What They Are - What They Do, Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1980), p. 3.
52. Ibid., p. 5.
53. Page, op. cit., p. 202.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 227.
56. Dacks, op. cit., p. 199.
57. Braden, op. cit., p. 113.
58. Page, op. cit., pp. 315-316.
59. Michael Whittington, "Political and Constitutional Development in the N.W.T. and Yukon: The Issues and the Interests," Whittington, op. cit., p. 70.
60. Dacks, op. cit., p. 39.
61. Whittington, op. cit., p. 81.
62. Dacks, op. cit., pp. 40-42.
63. Dacks, op. cit., p. 13.
64. Ibid., p. 14.
65. Ibid., p. 20.



66. "Oil Slump's Blistering Northerners," The Calgary Sun, November 2, 1986, p. 59.
67. Dacks, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
68. Ibid., p. 21.
69. Ibid., p. 22.
70. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
71. Social Assistance Program. Department of Social Services, Government of the Northwest Territories (Yellowknife, November 1985), pp. 123-124.
72. Ibid., p. 23.
73. Dacks, op. cit., p. 36.
74. Resources Management Consultants (N.W.T.) Ltd., Alcohol Abuse in the N.W.T.: A Problem Statement. (Presented to: The Alcohol and Drug Co-ordinating Council of the Northwest Territories), (Yellowknife, March 31, 1984). pp. II-IV.
75. Dene Nation, Dene Nation 1985-1987 Impact Proposal, (March 1985), Appendix E. p. 10.
76. Regional Director, Health and Welfare Canada, Medical Services, N.W.T. Region, Report on Health Conditions in the Northwest Territories, (Yellowknife, 1985), p. 25.
77. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1982. (New York, 1984), p. 316.
78. Dacks, op. cit., p. 22.
79. The Joint Needs Assessment Committee, Human Resources Development Final Report, Vol. I. (Yellowknife, May 31, 1983), pp. 54a-54.
80. Ibid., p. 17.
81. Ibid., pp. 54a-54.
82. Social Assistance Program, op. cit., p. 66.
83. "The Norman Wells Story," The Piper, Vol. 7., No.2, (Winter, 1985), p. 5.

84. Norman Wells Oilfield Development and Pipeline Project, Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (Ottawa, 1981), pp. 3-4.
85. National Energy Board, op. cit., pp. 179-186.
86. "The Norman Wells Story," op. cit.
87. InterGroup Consultants Ltd., Special Federal Programs for the Norman Wells Project: Evaluation and Review of Alternatives (Prepared for the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs), (Winnipeg, 1985), p. 137.
88. G. Les Clayton Views on Effectiveness of the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) on Norman Wells Project. Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Internal Document (Yellowknife, 1985), p. 17.
89. InterGroup Consultants Ltd., op. cit.
90. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
91. Ibid.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0 INTERVIEWS WITH KEY INFORMANTS

#### 4.1 Introduction

The chapter will focus on three issues: who participated; how did participation occur; and how should participation occur in the future. In accomplishing this the chapter will examine data gathered in interviews with the key informants, all of whom attended at least one CAC meeting; either as a member or a non-member. All members interviewed were residents of one of the affected communities during the Norman Wells Pipeline Project. All the non-members who have been interviewed were representatives of one of the following groups: The federal government's Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Metis Association, the Dene Nation, Esso Canada, and Interprovincial Pipe Line.

The analysis of the interview results has been done carefully, as explained in Chapter One, in an attempt to protect the anonymity of the informants. Because of the issue of anonymity, analysis at the subgroup level is sometimes difficult. However, some examination of subgroups is presented when anonymity can be protected and when such analysis adds meaning to the study. When useful, the results will be separated into two broad categories: "members" and "non-members." Within the "member" category, the data will

be further separated into two smaller categories: Native and non-Native. To clarify, "Native" refers to informants who are either Dene or Metis and "non-Native" refers to people from any other ethnic group. It should be noted that all non-Native member informants were Caucasian. In this study the total number of Native informants who were members of the CAC was three. There were five non-Native member informants.

When useful, the non-member data will be separated into four categories as follows: information from federal representatives; from GNWT representatives; from the proponents (Esso and IPL); and from Native groups (the Dene Nation and the Metis Association). Again, seven individuals served as non-member key informants.

#### 4.2 Description of Those Who Participated

##### 4.2.1 Introduction

Cohen and Uphoff have identified four different categories of participants whose characteristics warrant specific attention. They distinguish: (1) local residents; (2) local leaders; (3) government personnel; and (4) foreign personnel.<sup>1</sup> These categories can be further classified with respect to a number of important background characteristics. Some of these include: (1) age and sex; (2) educational level; (3) level of income; and (4) length of residence.<sup>2</sup> For purposes of this research

another background characteristic is deemed to be important, i.e., language of preference. The categories cited here, as well as these background characteristics, are considered important in looking at who participated in the CAC experience. Despite the importance of some of these characteristics, only general comments are being presented because of the issue of anonymity.

#### 4.2.2 Demographic Characteristics

In looking, firstly, at the CAC membership, all of the Native members tended to be elderly, had attained relatively low levels of education, and tended to prefer to communicate in their Native language. They were all local leaders. The non-Native members, all of whom were local leaders, tended to be middle-aged, tended to have some post-secondary training, and preferred to communicate in English. Their mean length of residence in the Northwest Territories was almost thirteen years. They were almost evenly divided between male and female.

Regarding the non-member informants, they tended to be male, tended to be middle-aged, tended to have post-secondary training, and preferred to communicate in English. Almost all had spent a number of years in the NWT.

#### 4.3 Issues Relevant to How Participation Occurred

##### 4.3.1 Introduction

Focusing on the "how" dimension adds a qualitative perspective to the analysis of participation. Attention to this can help answer questions such as why participation takes place, continues or declines, and why it has particular patterns.<sup>3</sup> Cohen and Uphoff emphasize some important areas of scrutiny with respect to the ways participation is occurring as follows:

- (1) Whether the initiative for participation comes mostly from above or below; or
- (2) whether the inducements for participation are more voluntary or coercive. It may be relevant to analyze and compare over time;
- (3) the structure; and
- (4) the channels of participation, whether it occurs on an individual or collective basis, with formal or informal organization, and whether it is direct participation or indirect representation. Further consideration should often be given to:
- (5) the duration; and
- (6) the scope of participation, whether it is once-and-for-all, intermittent or continuous, and whether it extends over a broad or narrow range of activities. Finally, it will usually be useful to consider;
- (7) empowerment; how much capacity people have to obtain the results which they tended to obtain from

their involvement in decision-making and implementation.<sup>4</sup>

The principles above have been utilized in looking at how participation occurred in the Community Advisory Committee. Interview data broadly focuses on four major areas: the basis of participation; the form of participation; the extent of participation; and the effect of participation.<sup>5</sup>

By way of summary, most experts agree that participation which is initiated from below, voluntary, organized, direct, continuous, broad in scope and empowered is the most participatory.<sup>6</sup> Of course, judgments differ and some endemic factors may virtually preclude certain participation. Nonetheless, analysis of this interview data will ultimately attempt to address the issues cited above.

#### 4.3.2 Basis of Participation

"Basis" can be defined as the "foundation or chief supporting factor of anything."<sup>7</sup> In looking at the basis of participation in the CAC experience, issues such as impetus, and incentive to participate are deemed to be quite important.<sup>8</sup> Questions relating to who initiated the process and whether participation was voluntary or coercive need to be answered.<sup>9</sup>

### Who Initiated Participation?

As cited earlier, it is a matter of public record that the Minister of DIAND established the Community Advisory Committee. Interestingly, however, the informants have divergent views regarding who provided the impetus and who was the initiator. All but one of the non-Native members believed that the federal government initiated the CAC. The one exception felt that the federal government in conjunction with the GNWT engineered this participative experience. The informant drew this conclusion because territorial representatives were always present when any federal presentations were given. With respect to the Native members, most believed that Esso had started the CAC, while one thought it was the federal government.

A GNWT non-member informant appeared to have some rather strong feeling regarding the impetus for the CAC. The respondent explained that the territorial government had believed all along that the GNWT rather than the federal government should be dealing with pipeline issues. In an attempt to organize in this regard, the territorial government had established a number of Development Impact Zones with each zone having regional representation. The resultant committees have come to be referred to as DIZ groups. The informant stated that while DIZ was being organized, the



Norman Wells Project began. A key federal employee with DIAND took note of the "DIZ" idea and liked it. However, the federal government felt they needed a body all their own, and, thus, initiated the CAC.

Both corporate informants believed that the federal government initiated the CAC, but one stated that the proponents provided the impetus. The respondent reported that both corporations involved had developed action plans regarding community input. One corporate action plan, which was very similar to the eventual CAC, was approved by DIAND and endorsed by the GNWT. Before the plan began, however, DIAND initiated their own consultative mechanism in the form of the CAC. The informant felt that the federal plan in a sense co-opted what industry was trying to do.

All federal informants stated that the federal government initiated the CAC. One, however, elaborated in an attempt to explain some of the confusion in this regard. This individual explained that before the CAC, there already existed an advisory committee in the Mackenzie region. It was called the Great Bear Mackenzie Regional Council and was set up and chaired by Esso representatives. Before the CAC started, a representative of DIAND, John Mar, attended one of these Regional Council meetings and announced that the CAC would soon be starting and would serve the same

purpose as Esso's Regional Council. The federal informant went on to say that there was much confusion on the part of Natives who could not quite understand why there would be another committee doing the same thing.

#### Was Participation Voluntary?

Another important area of scrutiny involves querying as to whether or not the participative experience was voluntary. All non-Native and two Native member informants felt participation was voluntary. One, however, seemed to imply that participation was not totally voluntary as evidenced by the statement, "They tell us to go and we go and we do our best what we say."

All non-member informants, who felt knowledgeable enough to comment, believed that participation was generally voluntary with one exception. One Native representative felt that the experience was mostly voluntary but needed to qualify that answer. The respondent stated that one particular Community Band Council received an official federal invitation to join the CAC in December 1983. The Council, however, did not want to participate in a committee that had "no teeth" and advised the Dene Nation of its decision. In December 1983, a federal representative visited this informant's community and basically said, use the system in place now, or we will not deal with your concerns. The Band

office in this case did send a member representative. The informant here felt that participation was not totally voluntary.

Another related issue involved whether or not there were any negative or positive inducements to participate. The non-Native member informants had divergent opinions in this regard. Two stated categorically that there were no positive or negative inducements, while another was not sure. A fourth stated that the honorarium which was extended to all members, and the travel opportunities probably were positive inducements to some. It should be noted in this regard, that all members while on CAC business received an honorarium of one hundred dollars per diem plus expenses. The informant explained that travelling to Yellowknife can be particularly appealing to Native people who consider it a real center. It could have been an opportunity to take care of personal business while at the same time enjoying some extra pocket money.

A final non-Native member informant strongly felt that there were both positive and negative inducements which affected this participative experience. The individual stated that the financial and travel rewards were probably the most important factors for some CAC members. It was noted that there appeared to be an atmosphere of "spare no expense" as illustrated by

members taking chartered flights to meetings and being paid an honorarium even if they failed to attend meetings.

This informant also was of the opinion that a far more subtle positive inducement affected this experiment in grassroots participation. The respondent explained that a leading federal representative often invited one of the leading members out for social evenings. This informant felt that the member was co-opted and, thus, began to support the federal perspective on most issues.

This informant was also convinced that a subtle type of negative coercion affected some of the CAC members. This brief account was given in order to illustrate the contention. A Northern female, who was working for one of the proponents during the Norman Wells Project, quit her job because of sexual harassment perpetrated by one of her supervisors. The woman pursued another job with a company which had sub-contracts with her previous employer. Allegedly, the smaller company was then contacted by the previous employer and told to terminate the woman or there would be no more contracts.

This informant reports that when information of this sort was brought up at CAC meetings, federal representatives would simply say, "That's not true." As a result of rumors of this type of coercion and the CAC's

ineffectiveness in dealing with the matter, this informant believes some members from business communities or members who had business interests of their own were afraid to challenge the proponents in the CAC forum. None of the Native members interviewed stated an awareness of any positive or negative inducements.

Information coming from non-member informants was varied. One GNWT representative felt that the honorarium was definitely an inducement to some who were described as professional meeting attenders. Both federal representatives felt that there were no positive or negative inducements and one added that the per diem rate, if anything, was too small and could be compared to helping the government for next to nothing. Both corporate representatives felt that there were positive inducements, including the stated opportunities to have direct access to the Minister of DIAND, to exert a real influence on the project, and to gain project-related information from primary sources.

One Native non-member representative had heard that the honorariums were a motivating factor but could not say for sure. The other was convinced that there were positive inducements and stated that federal representatives used the honorarium and other perks to influence members. The respondent also implicated the

proponents in stating that they give perks in order to influence.

#### The Terms of Reference

Another important area of scrutiny with respect to the "basis" of this participative experience involves the CAC's Terms of Reference. Please see Appendix V for the complete Terms which were drawn up by the federal coordinator of the Norman Wells Project. The federal coordinator was an employee of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.<sup>10</sup>

All informants were asked if they thought the Terms of Reference were clear, manageable, and correct. The answers basically were polarized at either end of the continuum of possibility. The federal informants are grouped at one end and a large majority of all other informants are grouped at the other. All of the federal informants indicated that the Terms were clear, manageable, and correct. One commented that they were short and to the point in order to provide as much flexibility as possible. The flexibility was deliberate and important in providing latitude for the Committee. In addressing the clarity of the Terms, the informant suggested that there is always some ambiguity when using the written word, but there was an impression that the members knew what they were supposed to do. The individual

explained that if there was any problem it was because the membership kept changing.

A majority of the comments from all other informants could be aggregated at the other end of a continuum. Excluding the federal informants, over eighty percent of those interviewed felt that the Terms of Reference were neither clear nor manageable. Over seventy-five percent believed that they were not correct. Many of those who felt that the Terms of Reference were inadequate expressed similar thoughts of dissatisfaction. Some of the more significant themes are as follows: the Terms were too vague, too broad, or too misleading; they were not manageable if they were not clear; and, they should have focused more on community needs. Some believed that the mandate was not manageable because that data provided by the proponents and government representatives was so technical that the members lacked the expertise to interpret it properly. Others, however, suggested that the information provided to the Committee was slanted in favor of the Project and was frequently presented as if to suggest that everything was going wonderfully well.

In looking more specifically at some of the concerns regarding the Terms of Reference, one non-Native member illustrated the confusion with an example. The interviewee explained that the Committee in effect had

been told to "bring in your own concerns from your community." Sometime thereafter, a member expressed this concern: "We don't want French up here." The informant noted that with the Terms being so broad, the concerns could have been anything and usually were.

A GNWT representative also indicated that the Terms of Reference were too general and broad. The respondent also indicated that they were incorrect because they brought the communities together into too close of a relationship.

One non-member Native representative stated that the Terms were very vague and could have been taken in several ways. They were written in "bureaucratese" (the language of bureaucrats).

A representative of one of the proponents commented at some length with respect to the Terms. The interviewee stated that the Terms led members originally to believe that they would have direct access to the Minister of DIAND with respect to project-related issues. Federal representatives attempted to generate enthusiasm in the communities by emphasizing this direct contact. This informant believed that the idea was positive and beneficial, but it was never operationalized. In reality, information was filtered through bureaucrats. The CAC was simply another bureaucratic structure.



This corporate informant pointed out that the expectations generated by the Terms of Reference were largely incompatible with the reality of the situation. The individual emphasized that the communities in the Mackenzie Valley broadly view industry as operating on their land and infringing upon their lifestyle. They want to manage their own land. Significant project-related input means exercising some power and control over their own land. On the other hand, the federal government managed the land along the Mackenzie Valley and industry managed the Norman Wells Project. The CAC, although billed as a vehicle that could have real and measurable influence, was only an advisory body allowing the Minister to accept or reject its advice.

The informant has concluded that the real reason for creating the CAC, despite the Terms of Reference, was not clear or manifest. It was speculated that the CAC may simply have been a political gimmick in order to give the appearance of giving something, or it may have been a vehicle designed to help the Minister keep in touch with "big picture concerns" as opposed to dealing with the concerns of specific communities.

#### The Motivation Behind Community Participation

With respect to the basis of participation, one final area of scrutiny is considered to be important. This involves the motivation behind community and/or

individual participation. All fifteen informants believed that the motivation behind participation was either to take advantage of an opportunity to exert a real influence or to gain information.

#### 4.3.3 Extent of Participation

In looking at the extent of participation, Cohen and Uphoff address two variables which may affect the success of the participatory experience. The first relates to the amount of time spent in participating. It is suggested that longer experiences with more regular meetings have a greater chance of becoming formal participatory organizations. In other words, continuous experiences are generally viewed as the most participatory. The other variable, intensity, relates to the range of project-related activities involving participation. Here, one should give careful attention to the number of activities in which people are participating, as well as to the effect of that range on their overall participative activities. It is possible that too many activities may lead to inadequate participation, but, on the other hand, multiple activities may reinforce one another and make the participant more effective.<sup>11</sup>

#### Continuity of Experience

Much of the relevant information in this regard is a matter of public record. One public report addresses the issue as follows:

The Community Advisory Committee held nine meetings between the first, on December 2, 1982, and the last, on February 27, 1985. Six meetings were held in Yellowknife, two in Norman Wells, and one in Fort Simpson. Time periods between meetings ranged from six weeks to more than seven months. . . .

Attendance at meetings was quite variable, ranging from three to nine people; five were required for a quorum. A quorum was not present at two meetings. The delegates from meeting to meeting usually changed substantially, making continuity difficult to attain.<sup>12</sup>

A significant majority of the informants confirmed that there were changes in the frequency of meetings and changes in the frequency of individual attendance. Most of the members emphasized that interest waned because the CAC was "going nowhere," was a "joke," or was built on "broken promises." As well, most of the members emphasized that the time allowed for CAC activities was not adequate or at least would not have been adequate had the CAC had a serious mission.

A federal informant, in commenting on the time issue appeared to blame the membership for any problems. One commented that the time was adequate, but that toward the end, members would not take the opportunity. Another stated that the members needed to spend more time on CAC business.

The informants were all asked who determined the time parameters regarding the frequency of meetings.

Only twelve informants responded to this question. Exactly fifty percent stated clearly that the Federal Project Coordinating Office determined the time parameters. They were all members. On the other hand, both federal informants stated that the CAC chairperson, in conjunction with the membership, determined the time and scheduling parameters. A GNWT informant, perhaps understandingly, stated that it was never clear who was scheduling the meetings.

#### Range of Activities

Most (90%) of the informants agreed that there were a number of other participatory activities with which a member could have gotten involved while serving on the CAC. A total of eight to ten other bodies were mentioned by various informants. Some of these bodies were directly related to the Norman Wells Project while others were more indirectly related. A strong majority of the informants also indicated that most members were involved with other activities.

As Cohen might predict, the answers were varied with respect to whether or not the quality of CAC experience was affected by the membership's involvement in other activities. Several informants emphasized the value of gaining a broad knowledge base by participating in various activities. Other informants believed that the Community Advisory Committee's effectiveness was

negatively affected by the pursuit of too many activities on the part of some members. A GNWT representative stated that many of the leaders and willing participants in smaller communities are simply overloaded. This is because the population base is so small, and of that number, only a few are willing to volunteer. Consequently, these few can suffer from information overload and burn out because of their many activities.

This, of course, does not even address the idea of a member's day-to-day job-related commitments. One member stated that full-time employment was definitely an impediment with respect to one's ability to participate. The respondent suggested that if any CAC-type body exists in the future, its chairperson should be employed full-time in that position.

#### 4.3.4 Form of Participation

Cohen and Uphoff have stated that the organizational pattern or "form" of the participative experience greatly affects the process of participation.<sup>13</sup> From the interview data, it is clear that numerous organizational factors and patterns affected this participative experience, most notably with respect to empowerment. Cohen and Uphoff's material has been utilized in synthesizing the following organizational factors:

1. Liaisons and conflicts with other organized groups.

2. Divergent or individual interests.
3. Complexity of the body.
4. Direct or indirect representation.
5. Limits or dictates.
6. Channels for participation or communication.

#### Liaisons and Conflicts with Other Organized Groups

Issues in this regard involve whether or not a member had to belong to another group in order to participate, whether or not certain groups were excluded and whether or not the CAC conflicted with any other organized groups. Each will be examined in turn.

One important question involving grassroots participation focuses on whether or not an individual has to be a member of a certain group in order to qualify or be eligible to participate. In other words, are some people eliminated because of the strict criteria for membership? There was some discrepancy among the informants with respect to this question, but some clear themes emerged. Firstly, it seems important to look at the initial selection process. Responses in this regard can be separated into two broad categories. One group emphasized that selection of CAC representatives was initiated by Town or Band Councils. They pointed out that these Councils made recommendations which could have included council members or individuals from the community at large. A

federal informant stated clearly that recommendations came from the Town and Band Council and that the resultant Committee was composed largely of elected leaders and prominent business people. A Native non-member representative with a slightly different emphasis indicated that most members came from the Town Councils resulting in the white business community being strongly represented. This notion is supported in part by InterGroup Consultants, a consulting firm which prepared an evaluation of the Norman Wells Project. In commenting on CAC Membership, the report states that "in many communities which have both a Band and Community Council, the representatives were selected by the Community Council."<sup>15</sup>

A second significant body of informants emphasized that members could simply come from the community at large. All three Native member informants emphasized this point.

In looking more specifically at particular exclusions, one-third of the informants emphasized that the Dene Nation were not adequately represented. Explanations for this generally explained that the Dene had largely excluded themselves because they did not support the existing CAC or because they were not asked to send their specific representatives. It should be emphasized that some Dene people did serve as CAC members.

A final area relating to exclusion involved the size of the Impact Zone. To clarify, only those communities in the Impact Zone were allowed to participate in the CAC. One federal representative acknowledged that the zone was geographically limited but indicated that it should have perhaps been smaller in an effort to facilitate a more effective participative experience.

On the other hand, two members, one a Native and one a non-Native, wondered why more communities which were upstream from Norman Wells were not included. They reasoned that any environmental damage to the Mackenzie River would not only affect Fort Good Hope, which was in the Impact Zone, but also other communities on the Mackenzie Delta.

During the various interviews, the informants were initially asked if any groups were excluded, but were later asked what groups should have been included. Answers here were somewhat revealing. Almost one-half (40%) of the informants stated that no groups were excluded from participation. Another group of informants believed that the Dene excluded themselves or at least felt excluded. A third group noted that communities outside the defined Impact Zone were excluded. There were no clear patterns when the responses were disaggregated.



When the informants, however, were asked what groups should have been included in the CAC, a clear majority (73%) stated that the body would have been more acceptable had the composition been altered. Two non-Native members and one Native non-member, representing twenty percent of the informants, emphasized the need for stronger leadership. One stated that "John O. Citizen" simply was not qualified to do an effective job. A second emphasized the need for members who could challenge the proponents. Another group, comprised of members and non-members, simply expressed suggestions regarding the member composition of the body. These suggestions are as follows: that the Dene Nation, the Metis Association, and the Hunters and Trappers Association should have had membership; that members from the Mackenzie Delta should have been included; that the membership should feature stronger economic interests; and that the membership should reflect a "good mix" of the various occupations in the area. There was no particular pattern with respect to the disaggregation of these responses.

Other comments of interest came from a GNWT informant and from two of the three Native member informants. The GNWT respondent indicated that this participative experience should have been cojointly coordinated by the federal and territorial governments.

This would involve a more equal distribution of power between the two governments. The two Native members mentioned above expressed strong, clear preferences with respect to membership. They believed that the composition should only include Dene, Metis, and long-term residents of the Northwest Territories. This would effectively exclude the white transient, whose interest in the region may only be temporary.

Perhaps not surprisingly, a strong majority of all informants indicated that the CAC was in conflict or potential conflict with other groups. More specifically, a majority, including all of the Native members and Native non-member representatives, believed that there was a conflict between the CAC and the Dene Nation. One informant pointed out that the Dene Nation did not have an official representative on the Committee and as a result did not have strong input. The individual noted that the Dene Nation challenged the entire concept of the CAC partially because the Committee, being the voice of the communities, effectively blocked Dene initiatives. The potential for conflict here is exemplified by the words of a non-Native CAC member when contrasted to those of a Native member. The non-Native member stated with some emotion that "the Dene don't represent all the people in the North. . . . The Dene Nation seem to think they are the chosen true people of the North

and the only ones who have any right to do anything or have anything. This comes across strong and clear in all instances." The Native member, also speaking with emotion, stated that the Native people should have been monitoring the Project. The individual believed that the CAC meetings were not really about the pipeline, but about spoiling the land. "We're trying to protect it. You're polluting my land."

Nearly half of the informants emphasized the potential for conflict between the Territorial Development Impact Zone (DIZ) Groups and the CAC. One informant explained that DIZ was set up by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources in the Northwest Territories. This non-Native CAC member believed that the federal government liked the DIZ concept but wanted their own mechanism in order to minimize territorial influence. The issue simply was one of "control." A federal informant commenting on DIZ admitted that there was public confusion regarding the apparent duplication of efforts between the CAC and DIZ. Explanation in this regard emphasized that the difference involved DIZ being broader in scope and the CAC being project specific.

### Divergent or Individual Interests

A large majority of all informants indicated that divergent interests impinged upon the success of the CAC as a participative mechanism. Interview data indicates a significant divergence between federal intentions and the desires of many Northerners. One non-Native member, when asked about the relevance of participation, chose the opportunity to talk about part of this conflict as follows:

If you want to talk relevance, the pipeline was going through no matter what. The Berger inquiry spent taxpayers' money listening to the people for well over one year and then in a rather lengthy report recommended that a ten-year moratorium on pipeline development be established. Berger completed his report in late 1976. The Norman Wells pipeline was completed in less than ten years after that moratorium. Where the hell is the ten year moratorium for the development of the Dene people and then we can discuss relevance.

Berger acted in a responsible manner. He had concern for the people. A lot of non-Native people were disappointed with Berger, but the majority of Native people in his affected communities were not. So whose interests were considered when the moratorium was broken? And then we'll talk relevance.

What do you mean participate with relevance . . . The whole idea of a moratorium was to allow these people to develop the expertise and to prepare for the impact of major

resource development. In many cases, Northerners may be thirty years behind the times when considering technology.

Another informant, a corporate non-member, stated that federal and corporate objectives are basically incompatible with Northern objectives. The individual explained that Northern communities view industry as operating on their land and infringing upon their lifestyle. They want to manage what happens on their land. The land, however, is really managed by the federal government and the project by industry. Consequently, the expectation, that the CAC would have a real measurable influence, was unrealistic. The Committee was only advisory, and the Minister had the power to veto.

Federal informants were not nearly so direct in discussing any federal/Northern conflict, but did make rather amorphous references to divergent interests. One stated that the members of the CAC were too interested in local concerns and were not concerned enough about National interests. Another stated that what the Minister wanted was to get an idea of the "big picture" problems along major policy lines. When the comments are considered together, one is certainly left with the impression that the federal/Northern relationship is hampered by divergent interests.

However, the relationship between and among Northerners also appears to be characterized by divergent interests. The interview data did not reveal any continuous themes but rather a collection of examples of how differing views impeded success. One Native representative believed that white business interests were too strongly represented. A non-Native member saw divergence between the high impact and low impact communities. A territorial representative saw Norman Wells, Fort Smith, and Hay River as having significantly different interests than some of the more traditional Native communities. One non-Native member stated that most of the members were only concerned about their own communities. Two of the informants stated the geographical area of inclusion should have been smaller in order to minimize divergent interests.

#### Complexity of the Organization

Factors relating to the complexity of a body involve whether or not there are well defined leadership roles, rules governing committee activities, and fairly clear standards for evaluating the performance of leaders. Cohen and Uphoff believe these are important issues relating to the complexity of the group. They advance the notion that local people may have difficulty engaging in meaningful participation if the organization becomes too complex. When this happens, local elites have the

opportunity to "capture" the organization and use it to promote their own ends. It is certainly conceivable that complexity could deliberately be designed into an organization in order to keep participation under close control.<sup>16</sup>

Responses in this regard broadly indicate that the Committee did not have well defined leadership roles, clear standards for evaluating the performance of leaders, or many rules regarding Committee activities. In this sense, the group was not complex and as a result, theoretically provided an opportunity for more meaningful participation at the grassroots level. More specifically, seventy percent of the thirteen informants who responded believed that the CAC rules were not highly structured. Illustrative comments include: "ad hoc," "no rules," "chit-chat sessions," "loose," "lack of direction," and "informal." One non-Native member acknowledged the disorganization, and admitted to making particular attempts at trying to promote a casual atmosphere in order to help the Native members feel more relaxed. Perhaps it is significant that none of the Native member informants complained about the CAC being disorganized.

Most (78%) of the fourteen informants responding believed that there were no Committee guidelines with respect to the quality of members. Not a single

informant stated an awareness of any formal CAC rules for evaluating its members or leaders.

From the information above, it seems clear that the Community Advisory Committee lacked complexity. There is also no clear evidence that the Committee was captured by local elites. In this regard, however, it is useful to disaggregate the data as some patterns are apparent. Firstly, the federal representatives stated clearly that they believed the Committee was responsible for its own rules and evaluative procedures and the communities were responsible for the quality of members sent. This perspective, on the surface, would appear to provide the opportunity for more meaningful grassroots participation. However, the lack of Committee rules and quality control seemed to be particularly irksome to most of the non-Native members, as well as to the Native non-member representatives. The Native members on the other hand, seemed very comfortable with the informality of the experience. One Native member chuckled in explaining that the CAC had no rules. The informant added, "If you got too drunk, they would tell you to leave."

In commenting on the type of qualities a CAC member should have, all Native members appeared to favor the informal approach which in essence would give many an opportunity to attend meetings. One commented



that it is not good to talk to the same person too long. A different guy can offer something. Another indicated that everyone in "my" community is a Band member and is, therefore, important. "The representative doesn't have to be special. We are all working together. We don't want to have people higher than other. People get higher and get too many responsibilities and get crazy."

In the context of evaluating representatives, the Native members seemed to believe that they were responsible to the Band and not necessarily to the CAC as a body. They all reported that they received guidance from their particular Bands.

A GNWT representative, interestingly, stated that the whole notion of establishing standards for representatives was a very sensitive issue. It was recommended that a question to this effect should probably not even be asked because of its sensitive nature. The question, however, was asked with no obvious negative repercussions. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the issue could be sensitive considering the dichotomous views.

#### Direct or Indirect Representation

Another organizational pattern which affects the process of participation involves whether a person participates directly or is represented by someone else. "Direct participation probably has greater impact on building individual capacity. Unfortunately, it is often

very difficult to achieve because of the numbers of participants who might be involved. It is also often difficult to get this kind of participation in rural areas because of inadequate infrastructure and because people may have a great deal of trouble finding time to journey to far away meetings.<sup>17</sup>

To be sure, it would have been impossible for every member of every affected community to travel to CAC meetings and to directly represent himself or herself. None of the informants, including the Native members, identified this as problematic. This lack of concern may, in part, be due to the alleged practice of welcoming non-member guests if they had something they wished to present at a CAC meeting.

#### Limits or Dictates

In reality, all of the organizational factors which are being discussed relate to limits in one form or another. Many of these have been and will be addressed in other sections. However, three miscellaneous items, not covered elsewhere, should be examined briefly.

Two members expressed concern over the issue of authority regarding CAC expenditures. One commented that a federal representative said that the CAC had money but the government controlled it. One federal informant admitted that the government did retain federal authority under the Financial Administration Act. Under

this Act a federal representative had to assume financial authority with respect to expenditures. The only way around this is if the government gives an individual or an organization a grant.

Two informants emphasized another structural difficulty which impeded the effectiveness of the CAC.

A federal informant explained as follows:

Another difficulty concerned the fact that a lot of issues and questions addressed to other Federal bodies were never answered. The other bodies did not have a mandate that required them to answer to a CAC. As a consequence, the issues died. DIAND does not have any clout over other Federal bureaucracies.

Three informants indicated that the CAC lost effectiveness because it started late--well after the Project had been approved. A federal respondent, however, stated that the Committee started at the right time.

#### Channels for Participation and Communication

Originally, when the CAC Terms of Reference were announced, there appeared to be an intent to establish a direct linkage between the CAC and the Minister of DIAND.<sup>18</sup> Not a single informant believed that this linkage was ever made. One non-Native member stated that this linkage was illusionary, while two Native members remarked that they did not get to meet the

Minister. A Native and a corporate representative described the Federal Project Coordinating Office as a bureaucratic filtering system which blocked direct access to the Minister. A federal informant, on the other hand, reaffirmed the notion that the membership had a direct link to the Minister and could bypass the entire bureaucracy. The individual asserted that they did not have to go through the Federal Coordinating Office. "They could get in touch with the Minister directly by letter or by phone. They could phone directly to the Minister, but I don't think they ever did. They did write a couple of letters."

A significant arena for participation and communication occurred at the actual CAC meetings. In these forums, information could be exchanged between and among a number of parties including the membership, federal and GNWT representatives, representatives for the proponents, and other resource people who might have been invited. Although a majority of all informants found the non-member guests helpful, a majority also believed that the information provided by the federal government and the proponents was either inaccurate or biased in favor of the Project. Those members expressing this view included three Natives and two non-Natives. The two Native non-member representatives also shared this view.

Three informants believed that a breakdown in communication occurred during CAC meetings because of the use of English and because of the technical nature of hydrocarbon terminology. To be sure, translators were available, but the possibility of accurate technical translations was questioned. It should be pointed out that informants expressing these concerns included two non-Native members and a Native non-member representative. None of the Native members expressed any concerns in this regard.

Most (80%) of the non-Native member informants were particularly concerned about one significant breakdown in communication. These members had the perception that the CAC potentially had significant power and latitude but knowledge of this potential was not discovered until the Norman Wells Project was almost completed. More specific comments included complaints that the membership did not understand that they could hold incamera sessions, hire their own secretariat, hire their own consultants, and exercise significant power through their chairperson. This lack of understanding was allegedly due to vague Terms of Reference and lack of federal communication. From the interview data collected, it is not possible to glean a clear federal response to these allegations.

As a result of the Committee's not having its own secretariat, the Federal Project Coordinating Office took responsibility for taking the minutes during CAC meetings, for typing them, and for disseminating them to the communities. Five informants, three non-Native and two Native non-member representatives, expressed significant concern in this regard. In their opinion, the minutes did not reflect what happened at CAC meetings. Comments ranged from accusations that the minutes were "doctored," to observations of the federal secretary's selectivity in taking minutes. As well, two non-Native members complained that it took too long to disseminate the minutes.

Another area of concern involved the members consultation and reporting at their own community level. Even though all of the informants indicated that they did consult with the community, a strong majority believed that community consultation was a major weakness in this participative experience. The stated reasons for this are numerous and include the following: lack of expertise; lack of interest on the part of either a member or a community; apathy; occupational distractions; and there being nothing to report. The Native members appeared to be the least critical in this regard.

Two other channels for participation received less attention in the interview data, but should be addressed

briefly. Firstly, three non-Native members complained that the members generally did not get to know one another well because of too few meetings or the lack of teleconferencing. Secondly, one non-Native member complained about media coverage regarding CAC meetings. The interviewee suggested that coverage was orchestrated by federal leaders, resulting in biased reporting.

A final channel of communication, utilized to a small degree by the CAC, involved writing letters to express Project-related concerns. One letter was written to the Department of Fisheries after allegations of oil pollution in the Mackenzie River surfaced in the CAC. The Department of Fisheries did conduct an investigation. According to one informant, this letter and the resulting investigation represented the CAC's greatest victory.

#### 5.3.5 Extent of Participation

It is axiomatic that the degree of power participants have can range from no power or influence to extensive power. In looking at a participative body, it is important to ascertain "whether or not participation is simply a formal action with little meaning or an activity which allows the individual to gain greater control over situations that would alter his or her life."<sup>19</sup>

In seeking to determine the degree of empowerment, Cohen and Uphoff recommend giving particular attention

to organizational and structural factors. As well, the channels for participation can be critical with respect to the potential for empowerment.<sup>20</sup> In this research, attention has been given to these factors with respect to the Community Advisory Committee.

Before looking specifically at the CAC, it is necessary to define clearly the notions of "organization," "structure," and "channels." "Organization" can be defined as "any unified, consolidated group of elements or a body of persons organized for some specific purpose."<sup>21</sup> "Structure" can be defined as "the arrangement or interrelation of all parts of a whole; manner of organization."<sup>22</sup> For purposes of this research, "structure" refers to the manner of organization with respect to limits and dictates affecting participation. "Channel" can be defined as any means of passage; the proper or official course of transmission of communication."<sup>23</sup> In this research, "channel" refers to lines of action or communication.

In commenting on the issue of empowerment, a strong majority of all informants agreed that the CAC exercised little power. Many responded to this issue with mocking derision. Only two informants took a contrary position. A corporate representative stated that the CAC had more influence than control. The respondent said that the proponents "realized" that the



CAC had access to the Minister and this made the proponents respond to CAC issues. One federal representative stated that the CAC had moderate influence and could have had more if the members had done their part.

The evidence overwhelmingly leads one to conclude that the CAC was not an empowered body. Firstly, it was only advisory in nature with Terms of Reference that appear to be based on federal goals and objectives. There is evidence suggesting that the federal action was unilateral in that it bypassed input from the GNWT, the Dene Nation, Northern Communities, and even the proponents. The resulting alienation appears to have been exacerbated during CAC meetings which members generally believed were orchestrated by the federal leadership.

The preponderance of evidence suggests that the meetings lacked complexity to the point that they became "chit-chat" sessions. Although Native members did not criticize the informality in particular, they did express disgust at the CAC's lack of power.

Northern divergent interests could surely serve to erode the power of a regional committee. In this case, divergent interests did not appear to be a significant factor in that the CAC did not appear to have much power which could have been eroded.

One of the most significant findings relates to what appears to be a massive communication breakdown. This finding gains significance when one considers that it is most difficult to exert a powerful influence without adequate or accurate information. Jacqueline Ismael, a Professor at The University of Calgary and a specialist in social policy, has stated that access to accurate information and the ability to process that information is a basic human need which relates to survival and quality of life. She has suggested that this need has significant political ramifications with respect to the type or amount of information governments release for public consumption.<sup>24</sup> Again, it is suggested that the power to exercise a significant influence in one's environment is inexorably linked to the availability of adequate and accurate information.

With this in mind, one important question logically surfaces with respect to the CAC. What kind of potential power did it really have? Toward the end, a number of non-Native CAC members started to believe that their Committee really did have power, but the membership simply had not been told the extent of that power. In this regard a federal representative emphasized that the Committee really did have direct access to the Minister. The potential power of the CAC is not clear, but it might be important to consider that the

federal coordinator retained financial authority and that the Minister of DIAND never attended a CAC meeting.

#### 4.3.6 Emerging Generalizations

##### Suggestions for Future Participation

All informants were asked to make suggestions regarding grassroots participation in future resource development projects. Since the suggestions were varied and detailed, it is not within the scope of this work to include all comments and rationales. Alternatively, suggestions will be listed by groups and noted in point form.

##### Non-Native Members

These members made the following comments with respect to future participation surrounding resource development projects:

Territorial based DIZ or regional councils would be better vehicles for participation.

Eliminate the federal government from the process. The proponents would have to deal directly with the GNWT, the Dene, and the Metis.

Keep the CAC, but make some changes, such as starting earlier, allowing the committee to determine its own mandate, have control over staff and budget, pay the chair-person and staff to work at duties full-time, have absolute power in certain areas, e.g., whether or not to hire union and how to define a Northerner, insuring quality

membership, and insuring that the affected area is chosen carefully.

#### Native Members

Regarding future participation, these members had the following comments:

DIZ and regional councils would be the most appropriate bodies in participation.

The communities would be empowered so that they could control their land and the pipeline.

The federal government, the GNWT, the Dene Nation, and perhaps the proponents would all have equal decision-making power.

#### Territorial Representatives

The one comment in this regard is as follows:

An amalgamated DIZ and regional council would be the most appropriate participative body.

#### Native Representatives

The Native representatives commented as follows:

Regional council would probably be the best participative body as it has legitimacy and credibility.

Any future body should recognize the Dene as equal partners in decision-making at the highest level.

Many of the CAC elements should be maintained. However, some changes should be made, such as obtaining

quality members and training them ahead of time, eliminating bureaucracy by dealing directly with the Minister, and establishing a mechanism to ensure that the proponents follow through.

#### Federal Representatives

Federal representatives offered the following suggestions:

It is important to maintain a CAC because community input is vital. However, changes need to be made, including: having them control their own budget by obtaining a grant or a contract, having a paid chairperson and staff, having more autonomy by being separated from the Project Coordinating Office, having them report directly to the Minister, and establishing a number of smaller regional groups.

All members should be hired full-time.

All communities should have a CAC office.

Have the CAC report directly to a new federal body with power over all federal agencies, including the NEB.

#### Corporate Representatives

Corporate representatives offered these suggestions:

Eliminate the CAC and have direct community consultation.

No grassroot participative body should be externally imposed.

Funding could be shared jointly by the territorial and federal governments.

If there be a CAC, it should start earlier.

Little participative progress can be made until the issues of land claims, devolution, and Native poverty are settled.

### Barriers to Meaningful Participation

All informants were asked to identify barriers which might impinge on future efforts in grassroots participation in resource development. Comments in this regard have been listed by groups and summarized, largely in point form below:

#### Non-Native Members

The federal government now has all the power and may feel threatened if it gives some away.

The proponents and government do not want a body with too much power.

Many Native people do not have the qualities necessary for effective participation.

It is not good politics to spend large amounts of taxpayers' money on just a few people.

A majority of the people from the various communities do not have enough education.

Divergent interests would negatively effect grassroots participation.

### Native Members

The federal and territorial governments have all the power and money and they want to keep it.

Distances are so vast between communities that it makes it difficult to participate.

Everything is a barrier to us.

The latter comment requires some clarification. The informant stated that the federal government from the beginning has seen the Dene as second class citizens. A general barrier has been created because Natives are not seen as equal to other Canadians. "Like now in the future if I go to a meeting in Ottawa, and say I want a board during the next pipeline that has power. If I said that in public, they would say, 'Well wait till the next meeting.' They would go to their own meeting. They would say, 'This guy's an Indian. We cannot give him the opportunity to have that power in that board.' So the barrier is that our Dene's rights aren't recognized so we can be equal to the next guy when we talk in a meeting. The barrier is too much discrimination."

The information continued, "The key element of the barrier are the Native lack of skill and lack of education. We can't even become second class nurses. Barriers too strong. Don't have a Native here who can be Hudson Bay clerk."

### Territorial Representatives

The federal government's reticence to devolve power to the territorial government and to settle land claims is a barrier.

### Native Representatives

The federal government wants to retain its power.

Slow moving land claims talks negatively affect participation.

The present federal regulatory system is a barrier to meaningful Northern participation.

The Dene's eroding political clout makes them less effective in participation.

Again, this last comment deserves further explanation. The informant explained that now many Northerners are more eager for economic progress. It was not easy to rally the people against the Norman Wells Project. Some people are not listening to the Dene leaders the way they used to. There, generally, does not appear to be as much public support for the Native cause and less public awareness of their stand.

### Federal Representatives

There are no barriers except possibly the people's lack of interest or lack of ability.

Certain groups do not want to give up their power.



### Corporate Representatives

Community resolve will determine the effectiveness of future participation.

The slow, clumsy bureaucratic transition of power is a barrier.

The Dene and Metis distrust of the governmental and corporate sectors is a barrier.

The geographical distance and sparse population affects the ability to participate and the amount of power.

#### 4.3.7 Summary

In reviewing "who participated," several observations should be highlighted. Firstly, among both categories of residents, there was not a single representative of what Cohen and Uphoff dub "local residents," or that large heterogenous group sometimes called the "rural poor." "It is this group of people who are usually the target of a rural development project."<sup>25</sup> Another observation relates to the Native members' general lack of formal education and probably lack of proficiency in English when compared with all other groups. This could certainly put them at a disadvantage. It is also interesting to note the relative parity in educational and socio-economic status between the non-Native members and the GNWT and federal representatives. This could set up interesting dynamics at meetings. As well, it appears that the non-Native

members are effectively utilizing the capitalistic system. Another observation concerns the Native representatives. These informants had the highest mean education level. A final observation involves the length of residence in the Northwest Territories. The Native members have the longest average, but there is a fairly high level of NWT residence among all groups.

With respect to the "basis" of participation, it is a matter of public record that the CAC was initiated from above by the Federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. However, two informants believed that the federal government co-opted more local initiatives. One believed that the DIZ groups were co-opted and the other the Dene initiative. As well, the federal government based its initiative on terms which have been described as flexible, vague, too broad, and not compatible with reality.

Most informants stated that participation was voluntary and motivated by a desire to have a direct influence and to obtain information. Although most stated that there were no positive inducements, there is some suggestion that the honorarium and travel opportunities may have been inducement to a few members. There was a slight indication that the federal government and the proponents may have been involved

in some negative coercion. A majority of the informants did not corroborate these allegations.

Regarding the extent of participation, it is clear that the CAC lacked continuity. Firstly, it started too late to have any impact on pre-Project related issues. Secondly, there were only nine meetings over a twenty-seven month period. Thirdly, attendance at the meetings was varied and sometimes meager.

To be sure, there were other Project-related opportunities to participate which may have added intensity to the experience. A significant majority of the members served as Band or Community Council members. Beyond this, it is unclear from the data how involved members were in other activities. Time constraints certainly appear to have been an issue for some. There were suggestions that too many other activities may have affected CAC attendance.

Interview data concerning organizational factors and patterns reveals significant dissatisfaction, if not alienation, between and among various groups and individuals. Divergent and individual interest, conflicts between groups, and what appears to be a massive breakdown in channels of communication are thematic. It might be considered positive that the group lacked complexity, thus promoting more participation perhaps on the part of the Native members. On the other hand, the

"chit-chat" sessions were unacceptable to most of the non-Native members.

Direct representation was not the norm in this experience. Although none of the members expressed significant concerns regarding their CAC activities, all three Native members emphasized not only the right of a person to represent himself if he so chooses, but also the benefits of fresh input.

It is clear that many empowerment issues arise in looking at organizational patterns. From the data presented, one has to conclude that the CAC had little power.

In summarizing, it is important to reiterate that most experts agree that participation which is initiated from below, voluntary, organized, direct, continuous, broad in scope, and empowered is the most participatory. In this regard the CAC had numerous difficulties. It was initiated from above, unorganized, lacked continuity, and was not empowered. Participation, however, was largely voluntary. One might conclude from the data presented that the CAC did have a broad scope. This conclusion could be drawn from the notion that the Minister was interested in "big picture" items and concerned about National interests. It is not, however, clear that regional interests were a

priority. If this be true, then the scope became considerably more narrow.

One can only conclude that the CAC was not especially participatory and was not very effective. However, it likely had educative value for all member and non-member participants. This is clearly evident in reviewing the recommendations and observations presented in the previous section. All factions offered insightful comments which indicate that, at worst, participation in the CAC was a learning experience.

ENDNOTES

1. John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity Through Specificity," World Development, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1980), p. 222.
2. Ibid., p. 223.
3. Ibid., p. 222.
4. Ibid., p. 223-224.
5. Ibid., p. 219.
6. Ibid., p. 225.
7. "Basis," Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, 1960, p. 122.
8. Cohen and Uphoff, op.cit., p. 219.
9. Ibid., p. 223.
10. Intergroup Consultants Ltd., Special Federal Programs for the Norman Wells Project: Evaluation and Review of Alternatives (Prepared for the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs), (Winnipeg, 1985), p. 132.
11. Cohen and Uphoff, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
12. InterGroup Consultants Ltd., op. cit., pp. 132-133.
13. Cohen and Uphoff, op. cit., p. 224.
14. Cohen and Uphoff, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
15. InterGroup Consultants Ltd., op. cit., p. 132.
16. Cohen and Uphoff, op. cit., p. 224.
17. Cohen and Uphoff, Ibid.
18. InterGroup Consultants Ltd., Ibid.
19. Cohen and Uphoff, op. cit., p. 225.
20. Ibid.
21. "Organization," Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language. op. cit., p. 1033.

22. Ibid., p. 1447.
23. Ibid., p. 244.
24. Presented in a lecture by Jacqueline Ismael on Comparative Social Policy (Social Work 621), January 20, 1985.
25. Cohen and Uphoff, op. cit., p. 222.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This research has focused on the Community Advisory Committee and has attempted to address issues of empowerment regarding this grassroots participative experience. In doing this, the study has examined governmental and corporate policies in an effort to identify the loci of power. As well, qualitative data were obtained through interviews with individuals who had a direct part in this CAC experience.

Chapter Five contains a discussion of the key findings as they relate to participative empowerment, basic needs, and dependency. As well, the chapter will present conclusions and recommendations which have been brought into focus as a result of this research.

#### 5.2 Popular Participation and Rural Development

We have seen that during the years following World War II, various approaches have been taken regarding grassroots participation and rural development. Early efforts, characterized by passive participation, have revealed some serious problems. It appears that some of the problems associated with these early efforts apply to the CAC. In many respects the CAC seems to have been a vehicle aimed at mobilizing the



people to participate in order to satisfy a federal need. This is evidenced by the fact that the Terms of Reference were generated at the federal level, ostensibly, without input from the local level. It is evidenced by the notion that the CAC was a moderate success based on the Minister's desire to deal with "big picture" items at a policy level. The suggestions that Dene input was ignored, the power of the DIZ groups was usurped, and part of the corporate consultative mechanism was replaced, also support this conclusion. As well, this notion is supported by the data in Chapter Three, which reveals that the federal government and the multinationals retain power in the North.

In the 1970's a new consensus arose regarding the development of Third World societies. Participation was seen as a "cornerstone"<sup>1</sup> and "a necessary condition for rural people to manage their affairs, control their environment, and enhance their own well-being."<sup>2</sup> Emerging thinking began to focus on questions of governance and empowerment. Korten and Klauss have suggested that many contemporary institutions tend to disempower people, whereas the goal of people-centered development has become the empowerment of people.<sup>3</sup>

In this research, an effort was made to look at a number of participatory variables in order to determine how participatory the experience was. Participation which is initiated from below, voluntary, organized, direct,

continuous, broad in scope and empowered is considered to be the most participatory. The data in Chapter Four reveal that the CAC fell short in all areas with one exception. It was largely voluntary. One can only conclude that the CAC experience was not an exercise in people-centered development.

### 5.3 Basic Needs

The primary element in the Basic Needs strategy is that the needs of the poor must become the core of development policies. Chapter Two discussed both the Target-Setting and Structural approach to basic needs. Although both emphasize value in participation, only the Structural approach emphasizes empowerment. Structuralists believe that the ultimate human need is the opportunity to develop self-reliance which can be accomplished through the eradication of exploitation and through the redistribution of political and economic power.

From the data presented in this study, it is clear that empowerment through a structural approach to basic needs was not pursued through the CAC, even though the notion appears quite compatible with the Dene people's desire for self-determination. Alternatively, it appears that a target-setting approach is being utilized by the GNWT's Financial Assistance Program. "The Goal of the Financial Assistance Program is that Northwest Territories residents are

able to meet their basic needs and become self-sufficient."<sup>4</sup>  
The structure, however, remains intact.

#### 5.4 Dependency Theory

As noted in Chapter Two, the Dependency Theory focuses on a framework which brings two sets of countries within a capitalistic world system into one of unequal relationships.<sup>5</sup> The development of underdevelopment is related to the deepening of the capitalist mode of production in central capitalist nations through its expansion to pre-capitalist nations as peripheral formations for capitalist exploitation.<sup>6</sup> The process of transferring the surplus capital out of a nation dislocates labor and progressively marginalizes the masses.<sup>7</sup> The social structures of dependent societies are characterized by a syndrome of segmentation which includes the increased concentration of wealth and power.<sup>8</sup>

The data in Chapter Three corroborate that the phenomenon of dependence exists to some degree in the NWT. Firstly, the federal government and the multinationals retain almost absolute power with the government retaining all royalty rights. The GNWT lacks any meaningful independence, and the Dene have yet to have their land claims rights defined. This is only exacerbated by the broad fragmentation found among Northern people.

The data also reveal significant Native marginalization in the North. With respect to the Mackenzie Valley, the wage

economy can marginalize the Native people in a number of ways. The traditional economy can be undermined by a wage economy which entices Natives to work on megaprojects which may only last a few years, as was the case in Norman Wells.<sup>9</sup> As well, the boom-and-bust cycle can exacerbate this. The North can fall victim to waxing and waning of the South's economic needs. Such was the case in 1986, when the plunge in world oil prices caused several major oil companies to leave the North. This departure left almost six hundred Native people without jobs.<sup>10</sup>

Ironically, a steady wage economy can upset social relationships among Native people. Firstly, it may cause workers to have to leave their homes and, thus to lose their social support systems. Secondly, it can give Native workers a social status which conflicts with the status traditionally assigned on the basis of other factors. Thirdly, it individualizes labor and can erode the sense of community which traditionally has been so basic to Native social organization.<sup>11</sup>

The wage economy clearly undermines the traditional economy by its very presence in the North. Non-Natives have largely invalidated Native lifestyles by imposing southern institutions and even place names on them, by denying Native claim to the land, and by repudiating Native religion and language. "The marginality of Native people in the New Society of the North cannot help but have undermined all

aspects of Native life and weakened the confidence and sense of personal efficacy of individual Native people."<sup>12</sup>

To look more specifically at problematic areas, unemployment is a major problem among Native people in the NWT. Although accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, the basic problem is that the communities to which the Native people have been moved hold very few jobs. The movement to communities also undermines the traditional economy of hunting and gathering which depended on a nomadic type of existence. The unemployment situation is made worse because a high number of young Native people are attempting to enter the labor force.<sup>13</sup>

The Native people in the Mackenzie Valley, to a large degree, moved into villages because government services were only provided there. Many moved so they could be near their children who were attending village schools frequently because of government pressure to attend. This disruption in lifestyle has created a dependence on welfare payments for many Native people. A survey of Native social problems in the North reveals that Native people tend to be poor compared to non-Natives in the North.<sup>14</sup>

Regarding Northern poverty and unemployment, a recent report on the Social Assistance Program in the NWT indicated that a majority of the people on welfare would work if they had the opportunity. The report revealed "that approximately two-thirds of the Social Assistance Program shows up a

failure in the economic system to provide employment for persons in the Northwest Territories."<sup>15</sup>

In addition to poverty, Northern Natives suffer from other social ills. Alcohol abuse, which has increased significantly in the last quarter century, is probably the most severe problem because it is so widespread and is so often a factor in family or other violence.

In addition to their social problems, Native people in the North also suffer from far more health problems than other Canadians. For example, the infant mortality rate for Indians in the NWT actually increased from 1973 to 1983. In 1983 the rate was 44.3 for Indians and 10.4 for the non-Native population in the NWT.<sup>16</sup> By way of comparison, the infant mortality for Canada in 1981 was 9.6.<sup>17</sup>

Another characteristic of marginalization is the proletarianization of labor. Natives in the North tend to work at relatively unskilled jobs for limited periods of time, usually for low pay.<sup>18</sup> One factor undoubtedly contributing to this is the Native deficit in formal education when compared to the non-Native labor force.<sup>19</sup>

Data from the interviews with key informants reveal, as well, a theme of dependency. The federal government set up the Terms of Reference and retained financial authority. As well, within the membership itself, the Natives appear to have had marginalized socio-economic status and educational levels.

## 5.5 Conclusions

Firstly, it is almost a certainty that resource development will continue in the North for the indefinite future. Evidence to this effect occurred just recently at the signing of an exploration agreement between Chevron Canada Resources Ltd. and residents of Fort Good Hope, NWT.<sup>20</sup> There is no evidence from the interview data that the non-Native or Native people in the North are opposed to development. There is strong evidence, however, that Northerners want to exercise power and influence regarding future development. At the moment, policies of commission, e.g., the National Energy Board Act which gives the federal government complete regulatory authority in the North, and policies of omission, e.g., the NWT lack provincial status and the land claims rights have not been settled, render the North politically weak. The CAC exercise simply offers more evidence of this weakness.

Development in the North to date does not appear to have enhanced, dramatically, the lifestyle of Native people. Many have become marginalized by a changing culture, poverty, and social and health problems. Can development equal progress for Northern Natives? What does the future hold?

In Chapter Four, Section 4.3.6, several pages were devoted to suggestions made by all informants regarding future resource participation. It is not the purpose here to

critique those comments as they reflect the legitimate ideas and feelings of those most intimately involved. It is recommended that the concrete suggestions as well as the feelings being expressed here be utilized as a guide in formulating future participative strategies in the North. The more thematic suggestions are summarized at the end of this chapter.

Recommendations other than the above almost seem presumptuous given the limitations of this research and the complexities of the North. Nonetheless, some ideas will be explored briefly, in an attempt to promote future discussions and possible areas for future research.

Firstly, it is believed that the North would be benefitted by two important structural changes, i.e., the completion of the process of devolution and a land claims agreement. Whether or not this occurs, however, Northern participation should be an integral part of future resource development projects. Not to do so is tantamount to great disregard. This is not to say that more participation is necessarily better, as its value depends on the circumstances, including whose needs are being met.<sup>21</sup> As well, "make-work" participation, that has little meaning and little impact, only promotes alienation and hostility. Even if benefits are forthcoming, people usually derive more satisfaction in having a personal role in their acquisition.<sup>22</sup> "Effective participation, it could be argued, needs to be based on productive activities, to be predicated on control over



productive assets, and to be relatively autonomous from incorporating external agencies, whether these are governmental or otherwise."<sup>23</sup>

Given the above, it is felt that an effective participative body which would be capable of affecting institutional processes should have the ability to utilize wide mobilization.<sup>24</sup> We have seen that Northern people live in a fragmented society characterized by divergent interests. However, the interview data does reveal areas of commonality. If Northern peoples could respond to various developmental issues in a more unified way, they could exercise greater political clout. In recent years public interest in mediation has increased dramatically. "Mediation is an intervention that is intended to resolve disputes and manage conflict by facilitating decision-making."<sup>25</sup> Mediation has been used effectively in a variety of conflictual situations including, for example, environmental disputes. Following this example, "the goal of environmental mediation is most often to realign the divergent positions enough to create a balance point that allows all participants to escape harm from each other. It is conflict management more than conflict resolution."<sup>26</sup> It is suggested that Northern people might utilize mediation in seeking resolution of their own internal conflicts, thereby increasing their chance of mounting crucial challenges with respect to external institutions.

If Northerners could determine collective needs, then the next step might be to raise their organizational technology in order to respond to those needs. Certainly "learning by doing" is an important exercise.<sup>27</sup> Since they will be dealing in an institutional world, they will need to be knowledgeable of institutional approaches. One very important objective is to gain access to accurate information and to be able to understand that information. Perhaps "sympathetic intermediaries" could be employed to help ferret out and interpret information, as well as to facilitate good communication in written and verbal exchanges. This latter point is deemed to be important as the following example will serve to illustrate.

During the interviews with key informants, one Native member was asked about barriers affecting future participation. The individual was unfamiliar with the word "barrier" and quickly stated as much. When a concrete example of a "barrier" was offered, the respondent quickly recognized the concept and offered a lengthy explanation as to the kind of barriers his people were facing. It is suggested that many breakdowns in communication can be avoided if people are sensitive to this issue and perform regular checks to make sure they are being understood. Again, this process could be facilitated.

In dealing in the institutional world, it is important to understand the institution's points of sensitivity.<sup>28</sup> Certainly, environmental damage is a key area. We have seen

that "big picture" items are important to the federal government. Institutions are broadly concerned about their public image. With this in mind, participative bodies could use the media effectively, not only to identify areas of concern, but to offer positive recognition where deserved.

It is also recommended that grassroots participative bodies become cognizant of institutional strategies.<sup>29</sup> In looking after their own interests, institutions have engaged in the formal co-optation of key leaders, provided special treatment for favored groups, and sought to exact negative sanctions against those falling into disfavor. An old cliché, "divide and conquer," makes reference to a possible institutional strategy. There are some who believe that the CAC was partially designed for this purpose. The point here is that participative bodies need to be aware of these strategies and need to find unified responses to them.

Another area of consideration regarding future participative experience concerns the possibility of appeal. When decisions or circumstances are unacceptable to Northerners, it is suggested that a mechanism of appeal be utilized.<sup>30</sup> Again, the process could be facilitated by a mediator.

## 5.6 Summary of Recommendations Relating to Policy and Process Issues

As mentioned previously, it is recommended that serious credence be given to the suggestions and feelings expressed by the informants in Chapter Four, Section 4.3.3. Some of the more thematic suggestions are as follows:

*The territorial based DIZ or regional councils would be better vehicles for participation.*

*Eliminate the federal Government from the process. The proponents would have to deal directly with the GNWT, the Dene, and the Metis.*

*Keep the CAC, but make some changes such as starting earlier, allowing the committee to determine its own mandate, pay the chairperson and staff to work at duties full-time, having absolute power in certain areas, (e.g., whether or not to hire union and how to define a Northerner,) ensuring quality membership, and ensuring that the affected area is chosen carefully.*

*The communities would be empowered so that they could control their land and the pipeline.*

*The federal government, the GNWT, the Dene Nation, and perhaps the proponents would all have equal decision-making power.*

*Many of the CAC elements should be maintained. However, some changes should be made, such as obtaining quality members and training them ahead of time.*

*It is important to maintain a CAC because community input is vital. However, changes need to be made, including: having them control their own budget by*

*obtaining a grant or a contract, having a paid chairperson and staff, having more autonomy by being separated from the Project Coordinating Office, having them report directly to the Minister, and establishing a number of smaller regional groups.*

*No grassroots participative body should be externally imposed.*

*Little participative progress can be made until the issues of land claims, devolution, and Native poverty are settled.*

Additionally, as a result of this research, the following recommendations are being highlighted:

*That future participation be based on productive activities and predicated on control over productive assets, and be relatively autonomous from external agencies.*

*That broad Northern mobilization be pursued by utilizing mediation as a tool in conflict management.*

*That access to accurate information and the understanding of that information be a priority.*

*That a unified approach in utilizing the media be pursued.*

*That participants make themselves aware of possible institutional strategies which may negatively affect participation and that they organize a unified response should these strategies be utilized.*

*That a mechanism for appeal be established and that a mediator be utilized in this process.*

### 5.7 Recommendations for Further Research

The following recommendations are being made with respect to further research:

*To compare the CAC experience with other resource development participative experiments in the NWT.*

*It would be particularly interesting to compare the next participatory effort in the Mackenzie Valley with the Community Advisory Committee.*

*To examine the utility of mediation as a tool in conflict resolution among Northerners.*

*To examine the utility of mediation as a tool in conflict resolution between Northerners and external powers.*

# ENDNOTES

1. Guy Standing and Richard Szal, Poverty and Basic Needs, (Geneva, 1979), p. 129.
2. David D. Gow and Jerry Vansant, "Beyond the Rhetoric of Rural Development Participation: How It Can Be Done?" World Development, Vol. II, No. 5. (1983), p. 427.
3. David C. Korten and Rudi Klauss, (eds.), People Centered Development, (West Hartford, 1984), p. 427.
4. Social Assistance Program, Department of Social Services, Government of the Northwest Territories (Yellowknife, November 1985), cover.
5. Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin, Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies", (Basingstoke, 1983), p. 1.
6. Jacqueline Ismael, Kuwait (New York, 1971), p. 2.
7. Ibid., p. 5.
8. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
9. Gurston Dacks, A Choice of Futures: Politics in the Canadian North (Toronto, 1981), p. 20.
10. "Oil Slump's Blistering Northerners," The Calgary Sun, November 2, 1986, p. 59.
11. Dacks, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
12. Ibid., p. 21.
13. Ibid., p. 22.
14. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
15. Social Assistance Program, op. cit., p. 23.
16. Dacks, op. cit., p. 36.
17. Regional Director, Health and Welfare Canada, Medical Services, NWT Region, Report on Health Conditions in the Northwest Territories, (Yellowknife, 1984), p. 25.
18. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1982, (New York, 1984), p. 316.

19. Dacks, op. cit., p. 22.
20. The Joint Needs Assessment Committee, Human Resources Development Final Report, (Yellowknife, May 31, 1983), p. 54a.
21. Gordon Jaremko, "Hunger for Jobs Felt in the North," Calgary Herald, July 2, 1987, p. E1.
22. John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity Through Specificity," World Development, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1980), p. 228.
23. Ibid., pp. 227-228.
24. Bernard Schaffer and Geoff Lamb, Can Equity Be Organized? (Paris, 1981), pp. 104-105.
25. Ibid., p. 111.
26. Jay Folbert and Alison Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation, (San Francisco, 1984), p. XI.
27. Ibid., p. 223.
28. Schaffer and Lamb, op. cit., p. 112.
29. Ibid., p. 109.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### BOOKS

- Alavi, Hamza and Teodor Shanin, (1982). Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies". London: MacMillan.
- Amin, Samir. (1976). Unequal Development. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Berger, Thomas, R. (1977). Northern Frontier Northern Homeland: The Report of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry: Volume One. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Berger, Thomas R. (1977). Northern Frontier Northern Homeland: The Report of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry: Volume Two. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Bregha, Francis J. (1975). Public Participation in Planning Policy and Programme. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Culture and Recreation.
- Canada. (1980). Environmental Assessment Panels - What They Are - What They Do. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Canada. (1981). National Energy Board. Reasons for Decision. In the Matter of an Application under the National Energy Board Act of Interprovincial Pipe Line (N.W.) Ltd. Ottawa.
- Canada. (1981). Norman Wells Oilfield Development and Pipeline Project: Report of the Environmental Assessment Panel. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Canada. (1985). Report on Health Conditions in the Northwest Territories. Yellowknife: Regional Director, Health and Welfare Canada, Medical Services, N.W.T. Region.
- Canada. (1979). Revised Guide to the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Canada. (1983). The National Energy Board Act. Office Consolidation. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Collier, Ken. (1984). Social Work With Rural Peoples: Theory and Practice. Vancouver: New Star Books.
- Dacks, Gurston. (1981). A Choice of Futures: Politics in the Canadian North. Toronto: Methuen Publications.

- Dene Nation. (1984). Dene Nation 1985 - 1987 Impact Proposal. Yellowknife.
- Folberg, Jay & Alison, Taylor. (1984). Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Gerein, H.J.F. (1980). Community Planning and Development in Canada's Northwest Territories. Yellowknife: Government of the Northwest Territories.
- Gillis, Malcolm, et al. (1983). Economics of Development. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.
- Grinnell, Richard M. Jr. (1981). Social Work Research and Evaluation. Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.
- Grinnell, Richard M. Jr. (1985). Social Work Research and Evaluation. Second Edition, Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.
- Hamelin, Louis-Edmond. (1979). Canadian Nordicity: It's Your North, Too. Montreal: Harvest House Ltd.
- InterGroup Consultants Ltd. (1985). Special Federal Programs for the Norman Wells Project: Evaluation and Review of Alternatives. Winnipeg: Prepared for the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.
- Interprovincial Pipe Line (N.W.) (1980). Application to the National Energy Board. Volume V. In Respect of an Oil Pipeline from Norman Wells, Northwest Territories to Zama, Alberta. Edmonton.
- Ismael, Jacqueline (1982). Kuwait. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Korten, David C. & Felipe B. Alfonso (Eds.), (1983). Bureaucracy and the Poor. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
- Korten, David C. & Rudi Klauss (Eds.), (1984). People Centered Development. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
- Mayer, Robert R. & Ernest Greenwood. (1980). The Design of Social Policy Research. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- MacPherson, Stewart. (1982). Social Policy in the Third World. Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun and Company Publishers, Inc.

Northwest Territories. (1985). Social Assistance Program: April 1980 - March 1985. Yellowknife: Department of Social Services.

Oakley, Peter & David Marsden. (1984). Approaches to Participation in Rural Development. Geneva: International Labor Office.

Page, Robert. (1986). Northern Development: The Canadian Dilemma. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd.

Resources Management Consultants (N.W.T.) Ltd. (1984). Alcohol Abuse in the N.W.T.: A Problem Statement. Yellowknife: Presented to the Alcohol and Drug Co-Ordinating Council of the Northwest Territories.

Schaffer, Bernard & Geoff, Lamb (1981). Can Equity Be Organized? Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Standing, Guy & Richard Szal. (1979). Poverty and Basic Needs. Geneva: International Labor Office.

The Joint Needs Assessment Committee. (1983). Human Resources Development Final Report, Volume I. Yellowknife.

United Nations. (1971). Popular Participation in Development: Emerging Trends in Community Development. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

United Nations. (1970). Statistical Yearbook 1969. New York: Statistical Office.

Watkins, Mel (Ed.), (1977). Dene Nation - The Colony Within. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language. (1960). Cleveland: The World Publishing Company.

Whittington, Michael S.(1985). The North. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

## ARTICLES

- Bone, Robert M. & Robert J. Mahnic. "Norman Wells: The Oil Center of the Northwest Territories." Arctic, pp. 53-60. Ed. Claudette Reed Upton, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 1984).
- Cohen, John M. & Norman Uphoff. "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity Through Specificity." World Development, Vol. 8 (1980), pp. 213-235.
- Galjart, Benno. "Counterdevelopment: A Position Paper." Community Development Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April 1981), pp. 88-96.
- Gow, David D. & Jerry Vansant. "Beyond the Rhetoric of Rural Development Participation: How Can It Be Done?" World Development, Vol. 11, No. 5. (1983), pp. 427-446.
- Jaremko, Gordon. "Hunger for Jobs Felt in the North." Calgary Herald, July 2, 1987, p. E1.
- Merti, Steve. "Berger's Voice Echoes Across the North." Calgary Herald, July 28, 1986, p. A5.
- "Oil Slump Blistering Northerners." The Calgary Sun, November 2, 1986, p. 59.
- "The Norman Wells Story." The Piper, Vol. 7, No. 2. (Winter 1985), pp. 4-7.

## UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

- Clayton, G. Les. "Views on Effectiveness of the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) on Norman Wells Project," Yellowknife: Nass River Research, July 1985.
- Deyell, Jim. "Norman Wells Expansion Project Wrap-Up Review: Opening Position Paper." Calgary: Esso Resources Canada Ltd., September 1985.
- Interprovincial Pipe Line (N.W.) Ltd. "Summary Final Report on the Norman Wells to Zama Pipeline Project." Submitted to the Pipeline Coordinator's Office, Yellowknife, N.W.T., September 1985.
- Ismael, Jacqueline. Presented in a lecture on Comparative Social Policy (Social Work 621), January 20, 1985.

## APPENDIX I


### The Participation Matrix

Source: John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity Through Specificity," World Development, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1980), p. 219.


APPENDIX I

PARTICIPATION MATRIX

Dimensions



Participation Matrix (continued)



Source: John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Through Specificity," World Development, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1980), p. 219.

## APPENDIX II

### Interview Protocol



## APPENDIX II

### Expert Interview Protocol

#### I. Introduce Study

The purpose of this study is to examine community participation with respect to the recently completed Norman Wells Oil Field Expansion and Pipeline Project. The study will focus on the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) which was established in order to facilitate community participation during the project. The policies relating to participation will be examined as well as selected issues relating to the process of participation. The timeframe will extend from 1980, when Interprovincial Pipe Line first made its application to the National Energy Board to build the pipeline, to the present, where evaluation of its effects is still being reviewed.

A number of issues have been identified in the literature with respect to resource development participation.

Three of these issues are as follows:

- issues relevant to who participated.
- issues relevant to how participation occurred.
- issues relevant to emerging generalizations.

#### II. Issues Relevant to How Participation Occurred

##### 2.1 Basis of Participation

- 2.1.1 Who initiated (impetus for) community participation? DIAND? GNWT? Native Organizations? Corporate Leaders? Affected Communities?

- 2.1.2 Did community participation in the form of the CAC occur in a voluntary way or was there some coercion involved? Were there positive or negative inducements, i.e., Impact Funding?
- 2.1.3 What was the motivation behind community participation?
- 2.1.4 Were the Terms of Reference (Mandate) clear? Manageable? Correct?
- 2.1.5 Why did you participate? How were you selected?

## 2.2 Form of Participation

- 2.2.1 Did one have to be a member of certain groups in order to participate?
- 2.2.2 Were any groups excluded from participation? Why?
- 2.2.3 What group representatives should have been included in the CAC?
- 2.2.4 Did the composition of the CAC represent the people in the area?
- 2.2.5 What qualities did one need in order to be a representative? Proven leader? Ability to use English?
- 2.2.6 What standards were established for evaluating representatives? Was this adequate?
- 2.2.7 Was "representation" an issue?
- 2.2.8 How were the rules in the CAC defined, i.e., voting rather than consensus?
- 2.2.9 How did you participate? With what relevance?

## 2.3 Extent of Participation

### - Time -

- 2.3.1 How much time was required to participate in the CAC?
- 2.3.2 How were these requirements determined?

2.3.3 Was the required time adequate from you own point of view?

2.3.4 How long did the entire participation experience last? Was this adequate?

2.3.5 Were changes in the frequency of participation noted? What caused this?

2.3.6 How many meetings did you attend? Dates?

- Intensity -

2.3.7 Were there a number of participatory activities with which an individual could get involved?

2.3.8 Was participation in one activity, i.e., community councils, a precondition for participation in the CAC?

2.3.9 Were the representatives generally involved in a number of other activities? Did this affect the quality of work done?

2.3.10 Were representatives required to report back to their communities? Why or why not? Did this work?

### 2.3 Effect of Participation

2.4.1 What degree of influence did the CAC have? Formal activities with little meaning? Structured channels for participation? Individual and unorganized (divergent interests)?

2.4.2 Will you describe the channels of information exchange between and among the various parties?

2.4.3 Were the non-members who attended CAC meetings helpful? Were they invited guests? Did they create any problems?

2.4.4 To what extent did structural (i.e., limits or dictates) and organizational (i.e., the groups involved) factors affect the amount, kind, and success of community participation? Did the CAC conflict with other organized groups?

2.4.5 Was the mandate of the CAC realized?

2.4.6 Was the CAC an appropriate participatory organization?

III Emerging Generalizations

- 3.1 With respect to future resource development projects, what lessons can be learned from the CAC experience?  
     Who participated?  
     Basis of participation?  
     Form of participation?  
     Extent of participation?  
     Effect of participation?
- 3.2 In your opinion, what would be an appropriate participatory organization?
- 3.3 How feasible are your suggestions?
- 3.4 What are the barriers?
- 3.5 How can they be overcome?
- 3.6 What are the implications? Short and long term?

IV Issues Relevant to Who Participated  
 (Demographic Information)

- 4.1 In what year were you born?
- 4.2 What is your gender?  
     Ethnicity? (e.g., are you Metis?)  
     Your language of preference?  
     Your family composition?
- 4.3 Can you tell me about your schooling?
- 4.4 Can you tell me what you do for a living?
- 4.5 Can you tell me your yearly income? (0 - 10,000),  
     (Above 10,000 - 20,000), (Above 20,000 - 30,000),  
     (Above 30,000 - 40,000), (Above 40,000 - 50,000),  
     (Above 50,000).
- 4.6 Residence during the Project? Before Project? After Project?
- 4.7 Length of time you have lived in the Northwest Territories?
- 4.8 Did you attend the CAC as a member or a non-member?

## APPENDIX III

### Informant Informed Consent

APPENDIX IIIInformant Informed ConsentConsent FormFaculty of Social WelfareThe University of Calgary

Title of Study: Native Participation and Northern Development: A Case Study of Grassroots Participation in the 1980 to 1985 Norman Wells Pipeline Project

Interviewer: Gary K. Rhodes, B.S.W., Master's Student

Supervisor: Joseph P. Hornick, Ph.D.

1. I, \_\_\_\_\_, consent to take part in a study attempting to understand the process of participation in the 1980-1985 Norman Wells oil pipeline project.
2. Gary K. Rhodes has requested an interview with me in order to obtain some written and taped information, some of which is of a personal nature, and ALL of which will be kept in strictest confidence.
3. The interview will take approximately one hour to one and one-half hours, but will be conducted skillfully in a private setting by Gary Rhodes, a social worker, experienced in this area.
4. Save for expenditure of time, there are no untoward effects of the interview.
5. I understand that there will be no direct benefit to me from participating in the study. However, the results of this study will be made available to me in summarized form, if I wish.
6. I also understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty, even after signing this form.
7. If the results are published, those results will be aggregated so that no individual, including myself, can be identified in any way.

8. The project and my part in it have been defined and fully explained to me by Gary Rhodes, and I understand his explanation. I have been given an opportunity to ask whatever questions I may have had and all such questions and inquiries have been answered to my satisfaction.

9. \_\_\_\_\_  
Name (print)                      Signature                      Date

10. I have explained the nature of the study to the respondent and believe he/she has understood it.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name (print)                      Signature                      Date

## APPENDIX IIIA

### Special Research Precautions



## APPENDIX IIIA

### Special Research Precautions

#### Precautions Taken to Ensure the Anonymity of Subjects

Every reasonable precaution has been taken to ensure the anonymity of the subjects. Contacts and interviews have been handled discreetly and with sensitivity toward the subject. All interviews were held privately and at a location approved by the client. If the results are published, the data will be aggregated so that no individual informant can be specifically identified. Despite these precautions, some readers may try to deduce who the subjects are. Because only key informants will be used, some readers may make correct deductions. Subjects have been appraised of this possibility and of the possibility of prejudice against them.

#### Ultimate Disposal of Records

To begin, it is important to state that most of the interviews were recorded on audio cassette when the subject gave his/her permission. If not, only written notes were taken. After the data is analyzed and the results are published, the audio and written records will be destroyed. It is anticipated that this will occur in the fall of 1987. Prior to this, records will be stored in the author's home. No one but this researcher will have access to them. Finally, it should be stated that no identifiable records will

be published, used for teaching, or presented in scientific meetings.

#### Special Precautions Given to Persons of Another Culture

Since some of the subjects who have been interviewed are from another culture, i.e., Native or Metis, special precautions have been followed. In this regard, this researcher utilized the guidelines emphasized in the document "Ethical Principles for the Conduct of Research in the North." The following principles regarding Northern research have been or will be followed:

##### Principles

1. The research must respect the privacy and dignity of the people.
2. The research should take into account the knowledge and experience of the people.
3. The research should respect the language, traditions and standards of the community.
4. The person in charge of the research is accountable for all decisions on the project, including the decisions of subordinates.
5. No research should begin before being fully explained to those who might be affected.
6. No research should begin without the consent of those who might be affected.
7. In seeking informed consent, researchers should clearly identify sponsors, purposes of the research, sources of

financial support, and investigators responsible for the research.

8. In seeking informed consent, researchers should explain the potential effects of the research on the community and the environment.
9. Informed consent should be obtained from each participant in research, as well as from the community at large.
10. Participants should be fully informed of any data gathering techniques to be used (tape and video recordings, photos, physiological measures, etc.), and the use to which they will be put.
11. No undue pressure should be applied to get consent for participation in a research project.
12. Research subjects should remain anonymous unless they have agreed to be identified; if anonymity cannot be guaranteed, the subject must be informed of the possible consequence of this before becoming involved in the research.
13. If, during the research, the community decides that the research may be unacceptable to the community, the researcher and the sponsor should suspend the study.
14. On-going explanations of research objectives, methods, findings and their interpretation should be made available to the community, with the opportunity for the people to comment before publication; summaries should also be made available in the local language.

15. Subject to requirements for anonymity, descriptions of the data should be left on file in the communities from which it was gathered, along with descriptions of the methods used and the place of data storage.
16. All research reports should be sent to the communities involved.
17. All research publications should refer to informed consent and community participation.
18. Subject to requirements for anonymity, publications should give appropriate credit to everyone who contributes to the research.

In summary, the author wishes to state clearly that all key informants were chosen based on their availability, their willingness to participate and their potential value to the study. Each informant was asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix III) which indicates their willingness to participate in the study. The subjects were not coerced, remunerated, or offered any special inducements.

## APPENDIX IV

### Alcohol Abuse

Source: Resources Management Consultants (N.W.T.) Ltd., Alcohol Abuse in the N.W.T.: A Problem Statement, (Presented to: The Alcohol and Drug Co-ordinating Council of the Northwest Territories), (Yellowknife, March 31, 1984), pp. iii-vi.

#### APPENDIX IV

In January 1984, a study which was designed, in part, to explore alcohol-related difficulties in the NWT was commissioned. The major findings of that study are as follows:

##### Quantitative Indicators

- \* It is estimated that about 90 percent of all offenses against persons reported are a direct result of alcohol abuse, and that in the NWT, alcohol contributes to about 80 percent of all crime.
- \* Total sentence admissions to the Yellowknife Corrections Institute have increased by about 21 percent from 1978 to 1982.
- \* The quantity of absolute alcohol sold in the NWT has increased by about 35 percent over the period 1978 to 1983.
- \* There have been 31 suicides in the NWT during the period 1979-1982 with alcohol involved in about 40 percent of the territorial suicides, and over 60 percent of the Inuvik Region cases.
- \* Over the 1979-1982 period, it is estimated that about 33 percent of all deaths in the NWT were violent deaths, and to some degree, can be linked to alcohol.

- \* An NWT total of 6,380 cases were handled by nursing stations and hospital staff for treatment of injuries and poisonings. It is estimated that 85 percent, or 4,575 cases, are alcohol related or inspired.
- \* Of the sixty-five communities in the NWT, twenty-six have opted for some form of liquor control.

#### Qualitative Information

General findings of an extensive interview and consultation process revealed:

- \* It is generally perceived by all informants that alcohol abuse is ranked as the number one problem facing the people of the NWT today.
- \* The Study findings concluded that the nature and extent of the problem at least in terms of how it is perceived by a broad range of knowledgeable individuals, does not vary widely, regardless of which region of the NWT one is considering.
- \* The management and organizational approaches toward alcohol and drug abuse programming are perceived to be adequate. Fine tuning is required, with emphasis on consolidating the staff functions at the Yellowknife level, and strengthening support to community-based programs.
- \* The psycho-social effects of alcohol abuse are pervasive. Fully 80 to 90 percent of all crime is judged to be

alcohol-related and involved crime mostly against persons. Other manifestations include family violence, and breakdown, and severe depression which leads to attempted and successful suicides. Alcohol abuse is viewed as more of a catalyst or facilitator of these broader social dislocations than as a root cause.

- \* The physical and medical effects of alcohol abuse occur mostly through accidents and violence against self or others while people are intoxicated. There is little indication of widespread alcoholic diseases such as cirrhosis. These facts make interpretation of medical data as they relate to alcohol problems very difficult indeed.
- \* In terms of the economic causes and/or effects of alcohol abuse, Study findings suggest there is no simple and conclusive relationship. People often have "binge-type" alcoholic celebrations when the proceeds from increased economic activity reach the community, but also drink because they are bored and frustrated over continuing unemployment and economic hardship. It is clear alcohol interferes with the functioning of most work places in the NWT through absenteeism and reduced efficiency. What is particularly disturbing about this, is drunkenness or a hang-over is often widely tolerated as an excuse for lower job efficiency. In addition, it is also clear people spend far less time in the pursuit of traditional land-based activity and renewable resource harvesting when they are drinking.



- \* There appears to be considerable consensus that simple rationing or prohibition is not the solution to alcohol problems in the NWT. This same consensus suggests a holistic approach, which involves community-based action and initiative on a wide range of economic and social concerns, is a viable and effective way of dealing with the problem. This was substantiated by the very clear impression that while the situation is still very serious, it has been improving in recent years as a direct result of community-based programming, not only in the alcohol and drug area but in many other aspects of community life (i.e.) economic development, education, local government development, etc.
- \* One of the basic problems or concerns discovered during the course of the research involves the availability or rather lack thereof, of good, consistent and relevant quantitative data. All agencies involved in the issue of alcohol abuse from those which control and vend alcohol to those which have to treat the problems that ultimately results regularly collect and/or generate administrative statistics. The problem is these statistics are not comprehensive, nor are they in any way co-ordinated or even internally consistent so that all those dealing with the problem can work from the same objective data base. There are not even coordinated and consistent statistics available on such basic indicators as levels of consumption, problem manifestations, and resources being applied to the problem.

- \* Additional aspects of the alcohol problem in the NWT include:
- The most widespread method of abuse is binge-drinking particularly at house parties.
  - There is considerable suspicion about the motivations of politicians, both territorial and federal, who are perceived as not doing enough to actively combat the alcohol problem.
  - A cursory look at treatment programs suggests they are not encountering major problems beyond overcrowded facilities, which are very common throughout the NWT in many private and public service delivery areas.

Source: Resources Management Consultants (N.W.T.) Ltd., Alcohol Abuse in the N.W.T.: A Problem Statement, (Presented to: The Alcohol and Drug Co-ordinating Council of the Northwest Territories), (Yellowknife, March 31, 1984), pp. iii-vi.

## APPENDIX V

### Community Advisory Committee

#### Terms of Reference

Source: G. Les Clayton, Views on Effectiveness of the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) on Norman Wells Project, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Internal Document (Yellowknife, 1985), p. 17

APPENDIX VTerms of Reference for the Norman WellsOil Field Expansion and Pipeline ProjectCommunity Advisory Committee to the Minister

1. The Committee will be made up of representatives from those communities affected by the Project. The Minister may appoint one member from each community in the affected area. The Minister may also appoint one alternative member from each community in the affected area.
2. The Community will represent as directly as possible to the Minister the interests of the people in the affected communities by:
  - (a) providing the Minister with advice on the ways to minimize any adverse social, economic and environmental effects of the Project, and to maximize social and economic benefits including employment and business opportunities arising from the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Project.
  - (b) providing advice on local and regional interests related to the oil field expansion and pipeline construction.
  - (c) providing advice on measures to facilitate effective consultation and communications with groups and communities affected by the Project.

3. The Committee will meet quarterly; however, if additional meetings are deemed necessary by the Chairman, these may be held following consultation with the Project Coordinator.
4. The Committee will keep minutes which will be circulated to the members, communities and Project Coordinator.
5. The Committee will be funded with the budget being set by the Minister.
6. The Committee will elect its own Chairman.

Source: G. Les Clayton, Views on Effectiveness of the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) on Norman Wells Project, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Internal Document (Yellowknife, 1985), p. 17.