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John Foster Dulles and the Complexities of French-American Relations, 1953-
1959

by

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Abstract

Before being appointed Secretary of State in 1953, Dulles had worked as a lawyer, international statesman and author. He brought to his new job a profound understanding of international relations and was intellectually equipped with a set of ideas to guide the Eisenhower administration's foreign policymaking machinery. Essentially, Dulles' agenda was to build interdependent relations among nations which would contribute to a more peaceful world by ending the recurring cycles of economic crisis and war. Peace was also to be built by making nations economically and militarily strong enough to resist Soviet Communist subversion. These ideas guided the way Dulles conducted American relations with France and his effort to secure for France a place in the new Europe. By early 1959, Dulles' work had yielded a reconciliation between Germany and France and also their cooperation in an atomic energy research program and in first steps towards economic integration.

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Organizational Nomenclature

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EURATOM	European Atomic Community
CJDP	Commission on a Just and Durable Peace
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SEATO	Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
EDC	European Defense Community
WEU	Western European Union
PPS	Policy Planning Staff
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
NSC	National Security Council
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
FOA	Foreign Operations Administration
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission

Footnote Abbreviations

NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
DS	Department of State
RG	Record Group

Introduction

Before taking up his post as Secretary of State in 1953, John Foster Dulles possessed significant experience working for government and as an international lawyer. His extensive intellectual preparation for working as a statesman certainly gave credence to those who said that Dulles had prepared for his whole life to become Secretary of State. Dulles' vigorous preparation meant that he had built up over time a personal bank of foreign policy ideas. The catholicity of his foreign policy thinking was sometimes concealed in the public "face" that Dulles chose to show to the American people. Firstly, Dulles had a reputation as a grim, unyielding, moralistic ideologue. He certainly was an ideologue but his forbidding demeanor was by design. If he was criticized for being too hardline, such criticism was not the kind that would cause him trouble. However, charges of softening his opposition to communism and of compromising with the enemies of the United States would be dangerous because such criticism would come closer to the truth than allegations of extreme rigidity. Both of these charges might reveal that Dulles was a realist who recognized that America could not impose its will on the world, but must pursue its purposes a little at a time.¹

Dulles also had many ideas about how the international system could be reformed. One key assumption underlying his reform ideas was that the system of sovereign states that had existed up until the early 1940's was no longer useful. This system of sovereign states was obsolete because national governments had shown themselves incapable of dealing with change in the evolving international system. Necessary reforms had been delayed and stress had built up so much that national leaders had chosen to seek reform by force, through war. Instead, Dulles believed that countries should focus on creating supranational institutions to perform some of the tasks that were normally associated with

¹H.W. Brands, *Cold Warriors*. New York:Columbia University Press, 1988. p. 25.

national governments. These tasks included adjudicating international disputes, overseeing national military establishments, and the regulation of international trade. It was only through international cooperation in supranational institutions that Dulles thought that a basis was possible for a peaceful world. Because Dulles was a Protestant Christian, he believed that cooperation was a necessity due to the Christian teaching that it was proper to have a concern and interest in the welfare of fellow human beings. Prevention of war and creation of peaceful conditions where people's needs were relatively satisfied would ensure that they lived in dignity they were owed by virtue of being "brothers" and "sisters" in Jesus Christ. However, it is important to consider that Dulles was not a Christian zealot when he conducted diplomacy. Dulles was pragmatic because he acquired experience in resolving some very complex problems and could see the difference between the way human beings were and how Christianity taught one how to behave. Consequently, Dulles' diplomacy always took into account secular realities about human behaviour and proceeded by assuming that peacefully changing human behaviour was a lengthy process.

Dulles also never made the mistake of confusing his public opinions with diplomacy. In fact, his diplomacy showed much more flexibility than was apparent in his public comments. Dulles knew that whatever the domestic value of uncompromising rhetoric, that strong talk was not diplomacy; it could only create the political preconditions for diplomacy. Diplomacy, an effort to put American principles into practice, called for compromise, for a sense that the desirable was not always possible and that in a world of contending and powerful interests, progress toward American goals would necessarily come only in small steps. If Dulles were ever tempted to try to force reality to conform to his desires, he had only to remember the tragic fate of Woodrow Wilson's post-Great War diplomacy, namely American adherence to the Versailles Treaty, whose results were not ratified by the American Senate. At the level of policy, Dulles' assessment of his term as Secretary of State would have been complicated by the fact that he never acted alone in important matters. Despite the contemporary view that

Eisenhower had turned control of foreign policy over to Dulles, the Secretary would have never claimed that he decided policy himself. He influenced and managed policy decisions, but President Eisenhower decided policy.²

While President Eisenhower made policy, the State department was also important because it served as the bureaucratic location where foreign policy was conceived and discussed before its implementation. The existing literature which discusses Dulles' effect on the State department and its internal politics views Dulles' work for the department in a negative light. According to Barry Rubin, despite lowered morale and sliced budgets, the State department still carried much of the burden of daily diplomacy.³ Rubin also contends that on longer range and major decisions, the department was at an increasing disadvantage because the Policy Planning Staff's influence was downgraded by Dulles himself.⁴ Townsend Hoopes is similarly negative when assessing Dulles' abilities as Secretary of State. According to Hoopes, Dulles showed a marked tendency to move directly from an abstract premise to its direct application in a specific situation.⁵ Hoopes also accuses Dulles of being insensitive to the interdependence of problems and of frequently saying or doing things with only a dim awareness of the adverse effects he was producing on other more important cases.⁶ These scholars do not mention that in the area of French-American relations, Dulles carefully considered the advice of the Policy Planning Staff when implementing policy, even though the advice pertained to an area of America-Europe relations where Dulles considered himself to be an expert. Essentially, Dulles followed the Policy Planning Staff's advice to stop catering to France's Big Power pretensions, to reconcile France and Germany, and to make diplomatic efforts to

²Ibid., pp. 19, 25.

³Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. p. 85-86.

⁴Ibid.,

⁵Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*. Boston: Little Brown, 1973. p. 488.

⁶Ibid.,

strengthen Western European political, economic, and military integration. Dulles' actions wherein he resolved in a wider European context the complex problems presented by French-American relations refute the arguments of scholars who evaluated his work from 1953 to 1959 and concluded that he was incapable of being an effective Secretary of State.

Though this thesis will focus on Dulles' diplomacy, it is important to remember that he was President Eisenhower's subordinate and therefore part of the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961). According to the new foreign policy literature, the former image of the popular general Eisenhower as an amiable but bumbling leader who presided over the "great postponement" of critical national and international issues during the 1950's can no longer be sustained by the evidence. On the contrary, he was intelligent, decisive and perceptive, a strong leader who led his nation peacefully through eight tortuous years of the Cold War. Certainly the new scholarship on Eisenhower is not uncritical, nor is it unanimous in its judgments on the various facets of the administration's record. According to Robert McMahon, a consensus is developing among the majority of new Eisenhower scholars that within the realm of foreign affairs, Eisenhower ranks as one of the most skilled and probably the most successful of all the post war presidents.⁷

However, Robert McMahon also thinks that more recent literature on US-Third World relations during Eisenhower's years in office suggests an alternative interpretation to the more positive evaluation of his foreign policy. The alternative view is summarized as follows. The Eisenhower administration grievously misunderstood and underestimated the most significant historical development of the mid-twentieth century-the force of Third World nationalism. This failure of perception constituted a major setback for American diplomacy. The Eisenhower administration insisted on viewing the Third World through

⁷Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," *Political Science Quarterly* (Volume 101) 1986, p. 457.

the invariably distorting lens of a Cold War geopolitical strategy that saw the Kremlin as the principal instigator of global unrest. As a result, the Eisenhower foreign policy establishment often simplified complicated local and regional developments, confusing nationalism with communism, thus aligning the United States with inherently unstable and unrepresentative regimes and wedding American interests to the *status quo* in areas undergoing fundamental social, political and economic upheaval.⁸

One area which the negative Eisenhower revisionists have not examined in enough depth in building a convincing case is the American diplomacy conducted *vis-a-vis* France while it was acting to suppress the Algerian rebellion. France's effort to suppress the rebellion in Algeria remained a concern for the U.S. State Department throughout 1955 and 1956. In his book *Confronting the Third World*, Gabriel Kolko argues that before the Algerian rebellion broke out, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicated that protracted French resistance to nationalistic demands in Morocco and Tunisia would only radicalize the independence movements and increase France's reliance on military repression. According to Kolko, the CIA was concerned that if the United States encouraged the more moderate nationalists this would alienate the French; but, should the United States remain silent, American prestige in the Third World would suffer, possibly endangering America's base in Morocco. By late 1956, the Algerian rebellion had become France's preoccupation until it deployed nearly 750,000 soldiers there in a futile, brutal war that bled the French economy and destabilized French domestic politics. In the United Nations, the US loyally sustained France, despite considerable reservations. Kolko is correct to assert that France was America's ally in Europe and that this relationship dominated US calculations.⁹ However, by writing about American diplomatic "passivity," Kolko implies that the United States could have done something useful to help France

⁸Ibid., p. 453.

⁹Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. pp. 89-90.

lessen the negative impact brought on by dealing with the Algerian rebellion. It is clear that the United States was relatively passive about reacting to France's war in Algeria but this was due to President Eisenhower's and Secretary of State Dulles' unfamiliarity with the Muslim world. Unfortunately, because Dulles had no assistants with a thorough knowledge of the Muslim world to advise him, he could bring very little information to bear in brokering a peaceful end to the Algerian rebellion. Kolko also neglects to mention that the United States government communicated with the Algerian rebels on an informal basis while also permitting them to move freely in the United States, much to French displeasure.

Writing in *Diplomatic History* in 1994, Irwin Wall¹⁰ emphasized the political divisions existing in the French Fourth Republic (1944-1958) but did not mention two competing opinions existing in the State Department about the situation in Algeria. One opinion held that Algeria's war was one of national liberation from colonial status. Another opinion was that Algeria's situation, where slightly over one million French *colons* dominated a larger population of nine million ethnic Algerians, was comparable to the Arab-Israeli situation where European Jews ruled "natives" of Palestinian ancestry. Wall's article does not discuss the quiet politicking done by Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. which contributed to the State Department adopting as policy his view that the Algerian conflict represented a war of national liberation. Wall also implies that Algeria was always an equally important factor in Franco-American relations from 1954 to 1958; clearly, this was not the case. In fact, views in the State Department of Algeria's place in French-American relations changed with the growing importance the United States attached in 1957 to the views and friendship of newly-independent non-aligned nations. Lastly, Wall overstates the military aid that the United States gave France. The evidence indicates that this aid was

¹⁰Irwin Wall, "The U.S., Algeria and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic," *Diplomatic History* (Fall 1994): 489-512.

minimal, that sentiment in favour of aid diminished during 1956-1957 and that this aid was given only to maintain constructive relations with France regarding Algeria.

In Africa's case, Robert McMahon argues that President Eisenhower's response to the shifting currents of African nationalism conform well to the pattern sketched of an administration largely insensitive to this new force. According to McMahon, Eisenhower was prone to viewing radical nationalism through the distorting prism of U.S.-Soviet relations which refashioned nationalism into a threatening manifestation of communism. Cold War blunders joined with deference to the former European colonial powers to frustrate development of constructive relations between Washington and the new African states.¹¹ In McMahon's article, there is no discussion about how the United States behaved with respect to the rebellion in Algeria. In Algeria's case, the State department was not insensitive to nationalism because it held mid-level meetings with Algerian rebel representatives. The United States at first grudgingly gave the French helicopters and small arms and then later refused to finance the purchase of these items for use in suppressing the Algerian rebellion. Lastly, McMahon's account does not contain the fact that Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., American representative to the United Nations, established good relations with former British and French colonies and convinced his government that it should respect the self-determination of these countries when making US foreign policy.

If the United States practiced an anti-imperialist diplomacy with the newly-independent British and French colonies as well as those like Algeria seeking independence, the US was also consistent in thwarting French initiatives that smacked of imperialism. The origins of an American diplomatic veto of Gaullist ideas of constructing a world directorate are found both in Dulles' anti-imperialism first voiced in 1940 and also in the presidential election of 1944 when Dulles acted as foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate Thomas Dewey. After the outbreak of the war in

¹¹ Ibid., p. 470.

Europe, Dulles found evidence of attitudes with which he could not feel comfortable. Henry Sloan Coffin, president of Union Theological Seminary, began articulating a pro-Allied position and became a vocal member of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.¹² Coffin argued that the war in Europe revolved around a "moral issue . . . between the triumph of unscrupulous and brutal tyranny and forces which promise an orderly world in which free men can breathe."¹³ When Coffin circulated a second statement in May 1940, urging "moral and material" aid to Great Britain and France, Dulles quickly voiced further disagreement: "The premise of the proposed statement appears to be that we should adopt as a permanent feature of our foreign policy an effective guarantee of the British and French empires."¹⁴ To Dulles, finding a way to move the world away from imperialism seemed a more logical goal. Dulles put his anti-imperialist beliefs into practice both during and after the Second World War. On 15 August 1944, the *New York Times* reported that the Soviet Union intended to submit a plan calling for a postwar security agency controlled by the great powers which then consisted of Great Britain, the United States, China and the Soviet Union. Dulles read the *Times* story with mixed feelings and was appalled by the Soviet plan and all that it implied. Dewey and Dulles knew that most Americans abhorred power politics. By issuing a strong statement insisting that the rights of small nations not be sacrificed to big power hegemony, Dewey could increase his political appeal to internationalists. Dulles helped draft the statement in which Dewey professed to be "deeply disturbed" by reports he had received concerning the Dumbarton Oaks conference: "these indicate that it is planned to subject the nations of the world, great and small, permanently to the coercive power of the four nations holding the conference. This arrangement would be the rankest form of

¹²Ronald Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power*. New York: The Free Press, 1982. p. 188.

¹³*Ibid.*,

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 189.

imperialism."¹⁵ The anti-imperialist diplomacy that Dulles carried out in the 1950's with respect to France and its current and former colonies constituted practical application of the above statement. Dulles personally helped negotiate an end to the war in Indochina and the Eisenhower administration maintained independent relations with the rebel Algerian *Front de Liberation Nationale*. In the late 1950's, the Eisenhower administration followed the same pattern when Dulles helped nix any agreement with Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle to set up a ruling triumvirate with power to regulate foreign relations and world trade composed of the United Kingdom, France and the United States.

The main primary sources used for this thesis are derived from several locations. For the first chapter, the John Foster Dulles Papers collected from the Mudd Manuscript Library form the backbone for the argument. For subsequent chapters, the Papers relating to Foreign Relations of the United States stored in the University of Calgary Mackimmie Library constitute the main primary sources. Supporting documentation is also used from the John Foster Dulles Oral History Project as well as the H. Alexander Smith Papers, material which primarily relates to the main players and policy process in the French governments of the 1950's. Other documentation was gathered from the United States National Archives at College Park, Maryland particularly Treasury department documents pertaining to France's financial crisis and the dispute about French government control of the oil and coal industries. Memoirs composed by former British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, former French ambassador Herve Alphand, French political economist Jean Monnet and former President Dwight Eisenhower round out the list of primary sources. The author did not use newspaper or magazine accounts as primary sources for this thesis because the focus was on the policy- making process itself and its participants. The author feels that contemporary newspapers wrote mostly about the general subjects that

15 Lawrence Yates, "John Foster Dulles and Bipartisanship, 1944-1952." Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Kansas, 1981. pp. 62-63.

diplomats were grappling with but did not offer very analytically meaningful accounts about how policy was actually made. Internal government documents and memoirs provided a much better account of how policy was made and of the reasoning behind actions taken.

As part of the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of State Dulles coped with many complexities embedded in French-American relations. In the context of the profound knowledge of and experience in international relations that Dulles brought to his job as Secretary of State, this thesis will primarily show how the ideas that he developed regarding diplomacy prior to 1953 had a concrete effect on the way he related diplomatically to both France and Western Europe. Though Dulles did not succeed in getting France to merge its armed forces in 1954 with other countries which were to form the Western European Union, he learned from American diplomatic mistakes and succeeded in getting France to join the European Atomic Community in 1958. Getting France to join EURATOM and the Economic Community ensured that France and Germany were united in the common enterprise of making the new Europe function effectively. By the end of Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State, West Germany was diplomatically bound to the West and war between France and West Germany began to be unthinkable. American hands were tied in terms of helping the French bring an end to the rebellion in Algeria. This was due to the anti-colonialist diplomacy pursued by Dulles and Eisenhower. Besides, the State Department lacked an adviser with deep knowledge of the Muslim world, knowledge which could have helped Dulles to broker a solution to the Algerian rebellion. France also underwent a change of regime when the Fourth Republic ended in 1958 and Charles de Gaulle was inaugurated as the first prime minister of the Fifth republic. Dulles and Eisenhower made sure that France received help with her financial crisis, help which eventually assisted in financially stabilizing the French government. Ultimately, John Foster Dulles was relatively successful in conducting

relations with France from 1953 to 1959. Though he made mistakes, Dulles learned from them and left a legacy of good French-American relations for his successors.

Chapter One: Intellectual Origins

When John Foster Dulles joined the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) as Secretary of State, he brought with him a wealth of experience in foreign affairs work both as an international lawyer and government consultant. He also brought to the State Department much intellectual "baggage" in the form of a developed worldview. Because his ideas on the conduct of diplomacy affected his choices and behaviour while he was Secretary of State, it is worth examining Dulles' ideas and their origins. This chapter will firstly explore the political and then the religious origins of Dulles' thought on statecraft and how it ought to be reformed. Later, the essay will refute the negative view of Dulles' moralism found in the existing literature by arguing that his use of the religious idiom in his statements contributed to democratic discussion of American foreign policy by American citizens. Dulles mentally integrated both religious and secular political principles into his worldview. In turn, these two strands of thought primarily affected the basic principles embodied in his diplomatic goals rather than the details of their execution.

One of the sources for Dulles' ideas on international relations is found in eighteenth century American constitutional thought. Evidently, Dulles found the inspiration for his own thinking about diplomacy contained in the ideas laid out in the *Federalist Papers*, a very important document in early American political history. According to Dulles, the broad lines of United States foreign policy were set out long ago by the Founding Fathers.¹⁶ In a speech to the Congress of Industrial Organizations labour union, Dulles highlighted the opening paragraph in the *Federalist Papers* : "that it seems to have been reserved to the American people . . . to show [other nations] the possibilities of a free

¹⁶Speech by J. F. Dulles "The Moral Initiative" 18 November 1953, Box 69, John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. (hereafter *JFDP*) p .1.

society."¹⁷ To Dulles, a free American society meant that there had to be rules in place to assure an orderly process of governing and to provide guidelines for resolving conflicts. In order for this to occur, the United States ratified a Constitution in 1789 with the support of George Washington who believed that it was impractical to let each state have sovereignty and yet provide for the interests and safety of all states combined.¹⁸

Washington added that these individual states entering a "society" with each other had to give up some freedom so that the new union could be preserved.¹⁹ Washington's opinion served as a basis for Dulles to assert his belief that the Constitution was a practical document because it

created as between the then sovereign states a federal agency having an equal share of responsibility for the welfare of all of the states and in favour of which the states surrendered their power to interfere with the interstate movement of goods, people and investments. [The states] also retained a large measure of local self-government.²⁰

In terms of practical diplomacy, Dulles believed that on the world stage some orderly way had to be created for resolving conflicts that had escalated into wars. In other words, relations between nation-states had to be governed by agreed-upon rules which served to help prevent conflicts and then to resolve them once they had arisen.

The *Federalist Papers* also promote the advantages that were derived when the sovereign States of the Union came together under the American Constitution in 1789. Dulles agreed with the authors of the *Federalist Papers* that it was important to unify entities and build up their economic, fiscal and diplomatic strength. Federalist paper number Five by John Jay promoted the idea that union of the American states allowed them to pool their strength and thwart enemy attempts to divide them against each other.

¹⁷Ibid., 1.

¹⁸Ibid., 4.

¹⁹Ibid., 4.

²⁰Speech to the Second Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, Box 290, *JFDP*, p. 6.

To illustrate his point, Jay used the example of Queen Anne of England who was arranging a 1707 union with Scotland:

Queen Anne makes some observations on . . . the Union then forming . . . "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace . . . it must increase your strength, riches and trade . . . being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interests will be enabled to resist all its enemies . . . that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only effectual way to secure our present and future happiness and disappoint the designs of our future enemies who will doubtless use their utmost endeavours to prevent or delay this union."²¹

The enemy of Free Europe in the 1950's was the Soviet Union whom the United States was trying to thwart. Dulles sought the defense of a united non-Communist Europe when he supported European integration efforts during his time as Secretary of State. Dulles also derived from the Federalist Papers his opinion that economic integration was good for a group of nations because they would be able to pool administrative resources, achieve cost savings and freer trade. This point was made by Alexander Hamilton in paper number Ninety Nine:

If in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists [government bureaucracies], we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the inland communications between the different confederacies . . . and if we also take into view the military establishment which . . . would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the States would be divided, we shall discover that a separation . . . [would equally injure] . . . the economy, commerce, and liberty of [all].²²

In other words, needless military and financial resources were wasted by a proliferation of small countries such as in Europe. This principle underpinned Dulles' support for the European creation of an atomic energy authority during the 1950's. In Dulles' worldview, nations could come together both to do atomic research and pool their armed forces to

²¹"Clinton Rossiter ed. *The Federalist Papers*. New York: New American Library, 1961. p. 50.

²²*Ibid.*, 99.

create better results than any nation could accomplish individually. Hamilton made a sensible point about armed forces with which Dulles agreed:

The authorities essential to a common defense are these: to raise armies, build and equip fleets, to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation because it is impossible to foresee or to define . . . the variety of national exigencies.²³

The principle of an armed forces with enough authority to do its work was what Dulles advocated that Europe create under the European Defense Community so that non-Communist European nations could pool their forces to protect themselves against the Soviet military threat.

The above quotations from the *Federalist Papers* and their effect on the way Dulles thought have to be placed in the context of the political battle in late eighteenth century America between Federalists like Alexander Hamilton and the Anti-Federalists, led by Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton served as the first Secretary of the Treasury in George Washington's cabinet. Federalists and Anti-Federalists were arguing about issues related to the Constitution and about the relative strength that commerce and agriculture should respectively enjoy in the early Republic. One key Federalist idea was that manufacturing should be the main economic activity in the United States, as opposed to the Anti-Federalist (Democratic-Republican) view that agriculture should predominate. Because Dulles' work in international law linked him to the major commercial interests in the United States, it is no coincidence that he favoured Hamilton's ideas which advanced the interests of commerce and manufacturing, interests whom Dulles served as a lawyer.

Another event in American political history which greatly affected Dulles' thinking on foreign relations was the negotiation of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 that then-President Woodrow Wilson accomplished, but failed to get ratified in the United States

²³Ibid., 153.

Senate. One concept that Dulles learned from this experience was the need to treat vanquished enemies justly and with an absence of vengefulness after the end of armed hostilities. As a legal counselor to the American Commission on Reparations, Dulles believed (as did Wilson) that the allies should not saddle Germany with a debilitating reparations burden: it simply made no sense to either of them to sacrifice Germany's rehabilitation and future economic growth to the political passions of the moment. That Dulles agreed with Wilson on this point is not coincidental because Wilson was one of Dulles' former professors from Princeton University who had a great influence on Dulles' intellectual development. Great Britain, France and Italy disagreed with Wilson and when they insisted that Germany be made to pay war costs, that is, the money spent by the Allies to prosecute the war, Dulles helped devise what he believed to be a satisfactory compromise between this position and that of the United States, which was to omit war costs from the final settlement. The gist of his compromise was that the peace treaty would contain one clause which would affirm Germany's *theoretical* liability for full reparations and another clause which would recognize its *practical* inability to make complete reparations for all loss and damage. For years to come, Dulles would speak of the "lessons" of the peace conference and the ratification debate primarily in terms of what peacemakers should seek to avoid: harsh treaties, domestic partisanship and negotiations based on emotion instead of reason. Dulles also readily admitted that the experience had not been without its salutary aspects: he personally had come away from the peace conference and his association with Woodrow Wilson with a stronger faith in international organization as the only practicable means by which a lasting world peace could be realized.²⁴

One consequence of these historical events was that Dulles became an internationalist at a very early age. A distinguishing characteristic of Dulles and those like

24 Yates, "John Foster Dulles and Bipartisanship, 1944-1952." pp. 15-17.

him was a deep-seated interest in the world beyond the United States.²⁵ Later in his life, Dulles admitted that participating in Woodrow Wilson's lectures at Princeton had sparked Dulles' interest in public affairs.²⁶ Like many others involved in business and banking, Dulles had excellent credentials for membership in a community of internationalists in the United States.²⁷ His travels abroad were extensive and there was no major internationalist cause in the 1920's which he refused to support. For instance, he showed his Wilsonian loyalties by remaining a firm enthusiast of the League of Nations and American participation in it.²⁸ In the early 1920's, Dulles became a sympathetic supporter of disarmament negotiations after the Washington Conference.²⁹ In 1921, the Republicans took over the executive branch and in the State, Treasury and Commerce departments such men as Charles E. Hughes, Herbert Hoover Jr., and Christian Herter frequently turned to Dulles for legal advice on a variety of international issues.³⁰ Dulles' close association with these men did not automatically translate into political support for the administrations they served.³¹ Although a Republican, he stood in stark opposition to what he condemned as the "futility and folly of a policy of attempted isolation," which he associated with Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge.³² Dulles' sentiment is an indication that his grandfather John Foster's stories, his training by Woodrow Wilson at Princeton and his experiences as an international lawyer had influenced him to adopt a broader perspective on a role for the United States in world affairs than those in the Harding and Coolidge administrations who possessed an "America First" mentality. Dulles put his internationalism into practice before he joined the State Department when he acted

²⁵Ronald Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power*. p. 77.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 10

²⁷*Ibid.*,

²⁸*Ibid.*,

²⁹*Ibid.*,

³⁰Yates, " John Foster Dulles and Bipartisanship," p. 18.

³¹*Ibid.*,

³²*Ibid.*,

as the lead member for the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace in the early 1940's and when he served as presidential candidate Thomas Dewey's adviser on foreign affairs in the 1944 and 1948 presidential campaigns.

The religious view that informed Dulles' thinking about international relations originated both in his upbringing as the son of a Presbyterian minister and also from his work for the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace (CJDP). For Dulles, it was impossible to speak of world politics in purely secular or purely religious terms because he used a rationale based on Christian faith to accomplish ostensibly secular political goals. For example, Dulles saw the roots of his own combination of realism and idealism at the Versailles Treaty negotiations in the example set by Jesus Christ of Nazareth. According to Dulles, Christ saw the futility of strife when it was done in a spirit of hatred, hypocrisy and prejudice.³³ As King of the Jews, Christ also saw that military victory, which He could have provided, would achieve no lasting result by itself unless the power of victory was given to people who could think straight.³⁴ Dulles believed that this "thinking straight" meant that victors had to understand that their fellow humans were "brothers" and "sisters," not simply defeated enemies.³⁵ Even in a value statement about American civic life, Dulles mixed religious and political concepts:

Our free society became a menace to every despot because we showed how to meet the hunger of the people for greater opportunity and . . . dignity. The tide of despotism was rolled back and we ourselves enjoyed security.³⁶

In this statement, the words *despot*, *despotism* and *security* are clearly secular political concepts. On the other hand, the word *dignity* is a religious concept as it is a basic tenet of Christianity that people have a fundamental level of dignity by virtue of being "brothers"

³³Speech to the Second Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, Box 290, *JFDP*, p 3.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 4.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 4.

³⁶Speech to Princeton National Alumni Luncheon 22 February 1952, Box 85, *JFDP*, p. 3.

and "sisters" in Jesus Christ. In another speech, Dulles voiced an opinion which integrated his secular and religious learning:

Military establishments and political alliances alone will not buy peace, security and happiness. We must find a way to do what despotism cannot do. That means we must recognize the equal dignity of all men and provide opportunity that extends from the most fortunate to the least fortunate among us.

The secular concepts Dulles mentioned above consist of the familiar *despotism*, *political alliances* and *military establishments*. He also mentioned the religious concepts of human *dignity*³⁷ and *peace*. What Dulles said above is significant because he hated despotism because of its disregard for human rights, rights which his Christian conscience told him were worthy of respect. Dulles' experience as a student in France had also shaped his sentiments on politics and how they related to treatment of people. In 1789, France had penned a Declaration of the Rights of Man and his still-developing student's mind could not help but be affected by French ideas about government. Lastly, for Dulles, tangible respect for human dignity and creation of peace went together because they constituted the desired outcome of Jesus Christ's teaching in the Christian Scriptures that "whatever you do to the least of my fellows, you also do to me."³⁸

In 1937, Dulles' newfound activism took him to two international conferences, both convened for the purpose of studying ways to promote world peace. The first conference, held in Paris and sponsored by the League of Nations, left him dismayed. The delegates failed to reach agreement on a single issue, a failure Dulles attributed to their inability to transcend national biases and conventional thinking. The second conference was held in Oxford, England and brought together prominent churchmen, whose deliberations Dulles found enlightening and constructive. Above all, he came away from

³⁷This use of "dignity" in a religious sense does not deny that the concept is also a secular one, or that it exists in other religious systems aside from Christianity. It seems that Dulles' strongly religious upbringing would have made him think of human dignity primarily in a Christian sense.

³⁸Speech "The Moral Initiative," Box 69, *JFDP*, p. 2.

the conference with a new enthusiasm for Christianity's role in the secular world. In the context of international relations, this meant that Christianity might provide both an antidote to dangerous nationalism and a stimulus to greater understanding and cooperation among the peoples of the world. If individuals were guided by the teachings of Jesus Christ in their earthly endeavours and if they would accept God as the object of their supreme loyalty instead of the nation-state, Dulles believed that they might be able to free their minds of prejudice and hate. In addition, people would rediscover a sense of duty towards their fellow men and learn to approach their common problems in a spirit of brotherhood, without reference to national boundaries. However, Dulles still believed that the attainment of lasting peace required adjustments and accommodations of a political nature.³⁹

Both the secular and Christian strands in Dulles' thought came together in his first book *War, Peace and Change* published in 1939. The ideas he expressed in this volume are important because they were reflected as well in many of Dulles' later speeches in which he analyzed the causes and prevention of war, as well as general world political events. *War, Peace and Change* addressed international problems from a secular philosophical perspective, terms of reference which were directed towards and comprehended by the small group of Americans who had university educations. Dulles' book had as its central theme "peaceful change" and offered its readers an objective enquiry into the causes of war and the means of eliminating war as a tool of statecraft. Dulles defined change as the process in which dynamic forces prevailed over static forces. He had become preoccupied with the concept of change during his year of study at the Sorbonne under the renowned philosopher Henri Bergson. Bergson's philosophy posited an open universe in permanent motion and in constant flux. According to Bergson, the universe was misunderstood by the human intellect accustomed to thinking of processes in

³⁹Yates, "John Foster Dulles and Bipartisanship," pp.31-32.

static terms. In writing his book, Dulles applied Bergson's ideas concerning change (in greatly simplified terms) to the study of international relations, specifically to the question of international conflict. Dulles' conclusion was that change, or more accurately the failure to understand and accommodate change in the international system, was the source of conflict in world affairs. Until statesmen could devise means to direct the impulse for change into peaceful channels, the pattern of recurrent, increasingly violent warfare would continue to be the dominant feature of international relations in the modern world.⁴⁰

Dulles analyzed the domestic life of nations in terms of the interaction between society, government and actual or potential conflicts to be resolved. According to Dulles, when conflict became intense within a nation, the resort to violence as a means to conflict resolution was always a distinct possibility. Yet in most countries, acts of violence ranging from individual crime to civil war were regarded as aberrant. Dulles believed that the reason for this situation was that nation-states were able to keep conflict within their borders under control through the imposition of what he referred to as the ethical solution and the authoritarian solution. By ethical solution, he meant the variety of means used to "mold the human spirit" in such ways as to strengthen the bonds of interdependency and consensus within a nation and to lessen the intensity of individual needs. What the ethical solution failed to achieve through education and persuasion, the authoritarian solution dealt with through state regulation of individual behaviour and through state actions carefully calculated to balance the divergent needs of satisfied and dissatisfied elements of the population. The result was a national equilibrium between static and dynamic forces, an equilibrium that required constant adjustment, but in which all segments of the population were made to feel *relatively* secure and *relatively* satisfied. Where society

⁴⁰Ibid., 22-23.

existed in such equilibrium, change proceeded peacefully, thus rendering violence irrelevant as a vehicle for altering the *status quo*.⁴¹

Dulles' experience as a practitioner of international law made it easy for him to apply the above analysis to international relations. Because each country had its own agenda and priorities, Dulles believed that the notion of world government was impractical and thought that setting up merely supranational institutions would take a long time. According to Dulles, national personification and the absence of shared beliefs and values on a worldwide scale obstructed imposition of the ethical solution on the international level. Simultaneously, the complexity of governmental functions and reluctance of nation-states to relinquish their claims to sovereignty made the creation of a supranational central authority capable of imposing the authoritarian solution on the nations of the world extremely difficult. Dulles admitted that there was a body of international law already in existence but that with the absence of a central authority capable of understanding and accommodating change, international law was limited because it represented little more than another means by which satisfied nations sought to perpetuate the *status quo*. According to Dulles, international law did not replace force or the threat of force as "the only way of assuring a change from conditions which to some nations might seem intolerable or unjust."⁴²

Dulles applied the above method of thinking when he examined the first aggressive annexation moves by the German Nazi regime and the Imperial Japanese. He came to the nuanced conclusion that all nations in Europe and East Asia who had blundered diplomatically were responsible for the outbreak of World War II. At one point in October 1939 he told an audience: "For fifteen years following the [Great War], Britain and France dominated Europe. They, with the United States, reached a power so overwhelming that

⁴¹Ibid., 23-24.

⁴²Ibid., 25.

their political and economic policies vitally affected all other peoples of the world . . . yet that power was exercised purely selfishly to the end of perpetuating [for themselves] a monopoly of advantage." In this statement, Dulles seemed to be implying that Axis campaigns were legitimate responses to overbearing behaviour by the beneficiaries of the *status quo*. In fact, Dulles did not mean to legitimize any side's actions. In *War, Peace and Change* he followed his catalogue of German, Japanese and Italian responses to the rigidity of international relations by writing: "the foregoing recitals are not by way of defense. What has happened to China, Ethiopia and to many Austrians and Czechs is repugnant to civilized mankind." At all points, Dulles tried to make it clear that it was the existing *system* of international relations that was at fault, not one or another particular nation. About the Allies Dulles wrote: "I do not blame personally the rulers of England and France for what they did or what they failed to do. They were the creatures of the system of which they formed part." The above discussion enables one to better understand why Dulles was uncomfortable about the attitude of those such as Henry Coffin who urged "moral and material" aid for the Allied war effort. Dulles was intelligent enough to see that a rigid international system led both Allies and the Axis countries to take actions which eventually led to war.⁴³

Dulles was fairly optimistic about human abilities to change the way international relations were conducted and he believed that functionalism would provide the key to solving international problems. He believed that humans had the faculties for rational and intelligent action which could be employed in a concerted effort to devise ways for applying the ethical and authoritarian solutions to the problem of international conflict. With respect to the ethical solution, Dulles suggested that a religious philosophy or political ideology devoid of nationalistic content, could be substituted for the nation-state as the object of individual devotion and self-sacrifice. With respect to the authoritarian

⁴³Pruessen, pp.181-183.

solution, Dulles realized that any attempt to create a world government with unlimited authority would founder on the rocks of national sovereignty. He did suggest that national governments might be persuaded to relinquish some of their powers to supranational agencies of a functional character, created for the purpose of dealing with common economic and political problems. Over time, this economic cooperation among nations might spill over into cooperation on political matters and lead to a willingness to impart an even greater degree of national authority to an international organization which had political as well as economic functions. It was on this gradual institutionalization of international cooperation that Dulles placed his greatest hopes for a more peaceful world.⁴⁴ Dulles implemented his ideas later during his time as Secretary of State (1953-1959) by encouraging the reconciliation of France and West Germany within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), within the European Coal and Steel Community and the Economic Community. By the end of Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State, armed conflict between France and West Germany began to be unthinkable.

It is important to realize that Dulles' late 1930's brand of internationalism did not advocate setting up a world supranational government. This issue arose from a conflict in the Franklin Roosevelt-era Republican party between supposed "isolationists" and "internationalists." According to Dulles, the real conflict in the party was between those who called for the recognition of the mutually helpful interdependence of independent nations and those calling for a form of world government with its own military force. In fact, Dulles believed that no world government could function except on the foundation of a world-wide community of spirit. This community spirit, according to Dulles, did not exist to a degree which would justify any nation committing its destiny to a body asserting world-wide authority. Dulles also emphasized that world government was

⁴⁴Yates, 26.

not the only alternative to world anarchy. Instead, much could be done by building between nations a cooperative relationship.⁴⁵

The concepts contained in *War, Peace and Change* may have been abstract and presented to a small group, but after the book was published, Dulles shared his ideas on how to prevent wars with a wider audience. On 12 March 1941 Dulles gave an address at the Second Presbyterian church in Philadelphia where he laid out his understanding of current events. In the speech, Dulles affirmed that there was very little American popular understanding of the causes of the current war and the Great War (1914-1918) as well as little interest in why both had happened.⁴⁶ According to Dulles, the popular view was that four great nations of the world happened at the same time to fall under the domination of a few evil men.⁴⁷ Dulles called this view the "devil theory of causation" and said that humans had used it to explain floods and other outbreaks of nature.⁴⁸ He implied that the "devil theory" was no longer a useful tool to explain why wars still occurred: "we still thereby seek to explain the explosions of human energy. This is simple; it saves us from mental exertion and relieves us of all causal responsibility."⁴⁹ Essentially, Dulles said that wars did not happen by accident because their ultimate source lay in human thoughts which were translated into actions. In his analysis of the causes of war, Dulles pointed out that in every community there are evil men of great ambition who are disposed to violence. Dulles then used an idea of Alexander Hamilton's to make a point about politics: "we must start our political thinking from the premise that in every community there will always be men who are ill disposed and prone to violence. The problem is to organize society so that such men will not come into the leadership of their community."⁵⁰ In other

⁴⁵Pruessen, 224.

⁴⁶Speech to the Second Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, Box 290, *JFDP*, p. 10.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*,

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁰Speech to the Second Presbyterian church, Philadelphia, Box 290, *JFDP*, p. 10.

words, people as citizens had to take active personal responsibility for the quality of their national governments.

Moving from analyzing national politics to an analysis of international relations, Dulles believed that nations had largely managed to avoid civil war but that no mechanisms were in place to prevent war between nations. Dulles also repeated his point that creating mechanisms to prevent conflict would be a gradual process.⁵¹ According to Dulles, an arbiter called "government" exercised "policy power" to repress individual and sporadic acts of violence. On the other hand, government was expected to keep violence within controllable limits by maintaining social conditions to prevent development of situations where discontent and a sense of injustice were acute.⁵² Dulles then took the countries of the world to task for failing to give universal application to political knowledge:

as between national groups, there exist no political mechanisms like those which maintain domestic tranquility [because] each state is sovereign and in each sovereignty the power is exercised for the benefit of the national group. The fundamental fact is that the nationalist system of wholly independent, fully sovereign states has completed its cycle of usefulness.⁵³

Dulles was speaking in 1941, only two years after war broke out in Europe and the League of Nations had demonstrated its utter incapacity to prevent war or reconcile warring nations. In 1944, Dulles continued to think along the same line and told a mass meeting in Washington, D.C. held days before the opening of the San Francisco conference that there should be a balance of enthusiasm for doing something with practicality about organizing the international system.⁵⁴ According to Dulles, the nations of the world were like so many "savage chieftains or frontiersmen" who had just begun to

⁵¹Ibid., 12.

⁵²Ibid., 12.

⁵³Ibid., 13-14.

⁵⁴Pruessen, *The Road to Power*, 204.

"gather around the campfire" for discussion.⁵⁵ Because this situation existed, Dulles believed that there were no shortcuts to meaningful international organization, a statement which constituted a reassertion of the necessity for gradualism in foreign affairs that he had discussed in *War, Peace and Change*.⁵⁶

Before exploring what Dulles accomplished when he participated as a leader of the Commission for a Just and Durable Peace (CJDP), the organization itself is worth examining. Work with the CJDP was an important chapter in Dulles' life. He served as its chairman from 1940 to 1946 and gave it a great deal of his time and energy. There was a Committee of Direction composed of two dozen Protestant leaders with which he worked. There were also several hundred members eventually within the full Commission to whom he brought ideas and statements for approval at periodic conferences. Dulles and his co-workers wanted first to get Americans thinking about international relations and the desirable ingredients for a future peace. Secondly, they were anxious to suggest ways in which these difficulties could be tackled. The CJDP was to inculcate "certain broad moral (and ethical) principles" with which the future plans of governments and peace conferences could be made to conform.⁵⁷

Where its chairman had usually directed his earlier peace-building efforts at limited audiences, the CJDP aimed for stimulation of a vast segment of American public opinion. Indeed, publicity efforts and public relations campaigns became the dominant ingredient in Dulles' church-related work during World War II. The lion's share of his energy in this sphere was directed toward taking a few basic ideas and publicizing them in such a way that would have maximum popular appeal. In short, the subject matter of these intensive publicity efforts involved a series of variations on basic themes. First, that the United States should accept its long-range responsibility as an important protagonist in the

⁵⁵Ibid.,

⁵⁶Ibid.,

⁵⁷Pruessen, 190-191.

international arena. Secondly, the horrors of war should be turned into a brighter future by citizens working for reforms in political and economic behaviour of nation-states. Thirdly, the United States should work to diminish fanatical attachments to national sovereignty by encouraging organic interdependence among the peoples of the world.⁵⁸

It is in 1942 that we observe the clearest synthesis of Christian principles and secular politics in Dulles' ideas for reforming international relations. This synthesis of his ideas originated in his leadership of the work of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace (CJDP). Firstly, Christianity teaches that people are "brothers" and "sisters" in Christ and that Christians must devote some concern to the welfare of society.

Accordingly, in its report the CJDP affirmed:

the principle of cooperation and mutual concern implicit in the moral order and essential to a just and durable peace calls for a true community of nations. The interdependent life of nations must be ordered by agencies having the duty and power to promote and safeguard the general welfare of all people.⁵⁹

In this statement, the secular principle of functional international organizations was combined with a Christian duty to be concerned about the welfare of one's fellow humans. The CJDP also stressed the necessity for decolonization by citing the American precedent: "government which derives its just power from the consent of the governed is the truest expression of the rights and dignity of man. This requires that we seek autonomy for all subject and colonial people."⁶⁰ In this passage, the Christian belief in dignity for all humans was combined with a plea to end the secular political despotism that European (and to a lesser extent American) colonialism had historically represented. The CJDP also favoured strengthened arms control when it stated that military establishments should be internationally controlled and be made subject to law under the community of nations.⁶¹ In

⁵⁸Pruessen, 192-194.

⁵⁹A Message from the National Study Conference on the Churches and a Just and Durable Peace March 3-5 1942, Box 290, *JFDP*, p. 10.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 11-12.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 12.

addition, the CJDP showed pragmatism when writing that it was unacceptable for one or more nations to be forcibly deprived of their arms while other nations retained the right of maintaining or expanding their military establishments and that this could produce only an uneasy peace for a limited period.⁶² Again, a concern for preserving peace (arguably both a secular and religious principle) was combined with a suggestion that all nations be allowed to maintain at least some armed forces for self defense, forces which would be regulated under international arms control agreements.

The CJDP also advanced Dulles' belief in international organization when it proposed a list of general tasks for national governments and those tasks which could be performed by supranational organizations. First, the suggested tasks for national government were enumerated: "preservation of public order, the maintenance of economic opportunity, the safeguarding of public health and welfare, and the direction of population movements."⁶³ The Committee also stated that the above tasks must be performed by local and national governments but in part they could now be effectively carried out only by international authority.⁶⁴ Logically, the CJDP went on to affirm that certain powers now exercised by national governments must be delegated to a higher level of authority, powers such as final judgment in controversies between nations, the maintenance and use of armed forces except for the preservation of domestic order and the regulation of international trade and population movements among nations.⁶⁵ This statement of the CJDP's was logical in light of the fact that the committee was suggesting mechanisms to prevent war from reoccurring over subjects that had provided ample grounds for armed conflict in the past. Though it took time to accomplish, the CJDP had a tangible effect on the postwar international order because the principles it enunciated led to the formation of

⁶²Ibid.,

⁶³Ibid., 19.

⁶⁴Ibid.,

⁶⁵Ibid.,

the United Nations Organization and embryonic forms of transnational government in Western Europe in the 1950's.

The ideas generated while Dulles worked as a Chairman of the Committee for a Just and Durable Peace also affected his diplomacy *vis-a-vis* France in the 1950's. For example, Dulles believed that by seeking the Christian Kingdom of God, the United States had developed into a rich country and that it was now its responsibility to live up to its historical legacy by sharing the spiritual, intellectual and material fruits of American society with other nations.⁶⁶ In terms of material fruits, on Dulles' watch as Secretary of State, great amounts of money were provided to France to buy arms with the intention of bringing the French to end the war in Indochina. Spiritual fruits of American society were embodied in the fact that Dulles articulated the need for and helped lay the foundations for a lasting peace between France and West Germany. Intellectual fruits of American civilization were shared in the way that Dulles intelligently conducted diplomacy with the French, under admittedly trying circumstances when French governments changed relatively frequently during the 1950's. It must be said that Dulles' diplomatic accomplishments with the French were not perfect. For instance, Dulles' inexperience in matters having to do with the Muslim world handicapped him in his diplomacy with the French because he was unable to help negotiate an end to France's military involvement in Algeria by the time he resigned as Secretary of State in 1959. A contributing factor to this outcome was the state of French domestic politics, a factor over which American diplomacy could exercise little control.

When one examines Dulles' personal ideology, it is important to realize that his Christian faith was only one component of the way he looked at the world. Lawrence Yates is correct when he writes that Dulles did not become a Statesman for Christ as he did not become overly preoccupied with moral absolutes and the struggle for good and

⁶⁶ Speech to Princeton National Alumni Luncheon 22 February 1952, *JFDP*, p. 3.

evil in the world. Yates correctly points out that excessive preoccupation with the moral absolutes was ruled out for Dulles because of his extensive experience in law and diplomacy. Having been actively involved in attempts to resolve some of the most intractable problems of his day, Dulles clearly recognized the gap between the real and the ideal. More importantly in shielding him from religious fanaticism, he understood that progress toward closing the gap between the real and the ideal entailed patience, the recognition of "practical limitations," plus the ability to "take account of what men are, not what the church thinks they ought to be." Yates is correct when he writes that it was this pragmatic outlook that influenced Dulles' thinking and his actions as he came to grips with important issues on a day-to-day basis. Regarding theological and moral considerations, these influenced Dulles more in conceiving the broad outlines of a certain diplomatic project, including the religious principle that this project would serve.⁶⁷

Dulles' diplomacy during the 1950's used his religious ideas as a base for strategy whereas his diplomatic tactics were guided by purely secular considerations. For instance, Franco-German reconciliation was based on the need for peace between the two peoples. Further projects for European integration such as the Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Community and Economic Community were designed to give both the French and Germans enough incentive to constructively maintain and improve their relations. Peace was the goal for French-German relations while secular functionalism was the tool used to achieve that goal. An end to the First Indochina war was necessary to save the people of South Vietnam from despotism by "godless Communists" in North Vietnam. Saving the people of South Vietnam by ending the war accomplished the strategic goal of creating peace while at the same time the tactics of secular diplomacy were used to defeat the Communist attempt to subvert South Vietnam. Though it did not happen while Dulles was Secretary of State, he wanted to see an end to French repression

⁶⁷Yates, "John Foster Dulles and Bipartisanship, 1944-1952," pp. 32-33.

in Algeria of a people with legitimate claims to autonomy. Dulles could not state his wish directly to the French because such a statement would aggravate French-American relations and endanger French receptiveness to American support of European projects involving France.

For Dulles, anti-communism was an important "arrow" in his "quiver" of ideas on his nation's role in international relations. His experiences more than a quarter century before the drafting of his magazine articles provided the real roots of his Cold War attitudes. As a lower echelon member of the Wilson administration between 1917 and 1919, he had witnessed and shared the first reactions to the Bolshevik Revolution. Dulles also had been surrounded by men who felt revulsion at the chaos associated with the Communists. The Bolsheviks in Russia were perceived as threats to Western civilization, giving rise to anguished deliberations in many capitals. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Dulles' uncle, was typically vitriolic, offering numerous descriptions of "anarchy" and the "forces of terrorism," while warning that "the fires were sweeping westward."⁶⁸

Although he did not speak like Lansing at that time, Dulles almost certainly shared the perspective he represented. As a government functionary in Washington and then in Paris, he joined in a variety of policy debates and programs specifically aimed at crushing the revolutionary menace. His work at the War Trade Board in 1918, for example, included participation in a scheme designed to defeat the Bolsheviks in Siberia; the Russian Bureau which he served as a Treasurer became a conduit for shipping goods to favoured Czech and Kolchak forces. Dulles became explicit about *communism* as he developed his own grand reform schemes. He began to perceive it as a rival "faith." For example, all of his work with the CJDPC was designed to chart a route away from the cycle of economic crisis and war which he believed were inherent in the existing world order. Like President Wilson before him, Dulles approached the problem from a reformer's

⁶⁸Pruessen, 267-268.

perspective and favoured moderate, peaceful changes to the global political economy. These changes would make Communism unattractive to adopt, especially by small newly independent former colonies and European countries beyond Soviet political influence. Communism, like fascism, Dulles considered an "alien faith" committed to worldwide realization through world revolution and whose approach and methods went against the very grain of his identity as a Christian and a supporter of a democratic form of government responsive to the popular will.⁶⁹

Dulles' ideology also deserves closer examination due to the charges of "moralism" made against him by contemporary critics and Cold War historians. The existing literature on Dulles shares the perspective that he was a "moralist" when he spoke publicly because he used Christian concepts to explain his position. Dulles' rhetorical moralism is negatively evaluated and is used to support a contention that he was "narrowminded" in not considering all the facts of a situation when he made American foreign policy.⁷⁰ Townsend Hoopes writes that Dulles frequently showed a tendency to adopt a "preacher's style" in his statements as a means of excluding factors which he found awkward or distasteful to deal with on their merits.⁷¹ These arguments need to be reexamined. Past historians who have written about Dulles' speaking style have not considered that he was speaking in a language laced with Judeo-Christian principles familiar to the American public. In this way, Dulles contributed to democratic discussion and consideration of foreign policy issues. Unlike the vast majority of Americans in the 1950's, Dulles had attended university and was part of a small portion of American society which was university-educated. In his public speeches on foreign policy, Dulles could have used more academic and abstract language, however, his message would not have been as well

⁶⁹Ibid., 268-269.

⁷⁰Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power*. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. p. 678.

⁷¹Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*. Boston: Little Brown, 1973. p. 126.

understood by Americans with much less formal education. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Dulles used the Christian religious idiom to make himself more clearly understood by American society which was in the 1950's overwhelmingly Judeo-Christian in its religious outlook and intellectual orientation. Average Americans might not have had as much formal schooling as Dulles, but attendance at religious services gave them a good basis for understanding and discussing among themselves Dulles' ideas on foreign policy. It should be noted that Dulles' use of the Christian idiom was the verbal parallel to the book *War or Peace* which he deliberately wrote to gain a mass audience for his ideas on foreign policy.

Summary

It is clear that Dulles acquired his outlook on international affairs both from his Christian religious background and from his examination of the world of secular power politics. In his writing, he emphasized the need for a more orderly international system to govern the relations of interdependent nations. At the same time, Dulles was not an advocate of world government because in the early 1940's he did not believe that the world shared a sufficient stock of trust and common values to make such an operation viable. Instead, supranational organizations could be created to which nations delegated power to deal with common economic and political problems. On the making of an appropriate foreign policy, Dulles was pragmatic because he recognized that force or the threat of force was more effective in changing what to some nations seemed intolerable situations rather than a recourse to following international law. From a Christian perspective, Dulles believed that it was the duty of humans to have concern for their fellow human beings. His experiences in the Versailles Treaty negotiations convinced him that people should act to help improve life in other nations by trying to prevent wars and resolve conflicts in a way that left a minimum of rancour between former enemies. By using the Judeo-Christian religious idiom when speaking to the American public, Dulles fostered democratic discussion of his ideas. Although the overwhelming majority of Americans did not receive university educations, this wider audience's attendance at

religious services gave it the tools to understand and discuss Dulles' foreign policy ideas. Though there was a strong Christian influence on the way Dulles thought, he did not become preoccupied with moral absolutes because while practicing international law, he learned that patience, consideration of practical limitations and to deal with people the way they were exemplified appropriate strategies to use when solving complex international problems.

Chapter Two First Two Years, 1953-1954

Foreign policy that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles implemented towards France during the 1950's cannot be fully understood without examining the process of how the State Department determined an appropriate set of policies to use when relating to France. This chapter will examine the decisions which were made after discussion of sometimes opposing views within the State department. While foreign policy towards France was being determined, American diplomatic actions towards that country were affected by the fact that not all the personnel who worked on French issues felt the same need to interpret French events to Americans working in the field, such as Dulles did when he took time to consult with Ambassador Douglas Dillon. Lastly, the State Department's structure and the useful analytical work completed by the Policy Planning Staff affected the substance and quality of decisions made. All of these conditions applied to the way foreign policy was made in the State Department during the early 1950's. Because the State Department was a political organization, it participated in the interdepartmental jockeying which occurred when it came time to implement a certain foreign policy.

As President and Secretary of State respectively during the 1950's, it took great political skill for Dwight Eisenhower and Foster Dulles to make and implement American foreign policy. Relations with France during the Eisenhower administration were complicated by the frequent changes of government on the French side which necessitated corresponding changes in American diplomatic strategies. This chapter will briefly explore Eisenhower's and Dulles' previous experience of working within government bureaucracies and then examine how that experience helped them make foreign policy towards France. By examining the controversy within the State department about whether a bilateral or a multilateral focus should have been adopted towards Western Europe, this chapter will refute the opinion found in the existing literature that Dulles was incapable of being an

effective Secretary of State. A crucial part of Dulles' effectiveness in leading the State Department was the firm support that he received from President Eisenhower. Due to their broad experience of working in government bureaucracies, both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles successfully solved problems affecting Franco-American relations. What helped them accomplish this was their people skills which in turn minimized the problems for rational decisionmaking which usually affect government departments such as decisions based on mistaken information, organizational sluggishness and conflict between personal and organizational benefits.

Decisions Were Based on Very Good Information

Problems affecting rational American decisionmaking about French-American relations were minimized in part by Secretary Dulles' life experience and his willingness to help Ambassador Dillon who dealt directly with the French. As a student, Dulles spent a year studying at the Sorbonne, a stay which allowed him to get familiar with French culture and worldviews. As a result of this stay, Dulles likely gained an appreciation for the fact that the French had a complex culture and that they were a highly civilized people. Douglas Dillon, an ambassador to France during the Eisenhower administration, found that Dulles because of his personal background and knowledge was quite understanding of French positions and reactions.⁷² According to Dillon, Dulles was more sympathetic and understanding in lending a hand to resolve complexities in Franco-American relations than people such as Deputy Undersecretary Robert Murphy to whom the ambassador would usually report.⁷³ Dillon's statement shows that the organization value of providing maximum assistance to "fieldworkers" such as Ambassador Dillon was imperfectly internalized because not everyone in the State Department was willing to make time to discuss problems with him and help him find solutions. In the case of Dillon's work for

⁷²John Foster Dulles Oral History Project (hereafter *JFDOHP*): interview with Douglas Dillon. Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. p. 6.

⁷³*Ibid.*,

Franco-American relations, the mutual exchange of information between him and Dulles about both day-to-day diplomacy and longer-range considerations made for a smoother policy implementation process than would have occurred under a different Secretary of State with other interests. One example of this is Dillon's information-gathering work which allowed Dulles to deal better with his French diplomatic counterparts such as Pierre Mendès-France about whom Dulles learned that he was an intelligent and purposeful man, a fact which Dulles later used to American advantage.

It was vital that Douglas Dillon correctly "get the measure" of Pierre Mendès-France because knowing about him would pay future diplomatic dividends for United States diplomacy. For instance, Dillon correctly recognized that Mendès-France was well positioned politically after the 1954 Indochina armistice:

Having won the settlement within the time he had specified and having brilliantly defended it before the Assembly, Mendès-France is now in a very strong position. He is receiving practically universal credit for having ended the war as well as recognition for his intelligence and purposefulness.⁷⁴

The last sentence of this message had particular relevance for the making of US foreign policy. Dulles wished to build a grouping of anti-Communist countries in Southeast Asia. To do this and get the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) established, Dulles had to make clear that this organization was dedicated to beating back Communist influence in the smaller countries of Asia. This line of argument succeeded in convincing Mendès-France to lend French support because the French prime minister agreed that Communist influence in Asia had to be countered and he also wanted to show that he was capable of cooperating with the United States. Even before SEATO was established, Dillon gave a favourable view of Mendès-France's work in foreign relations: "He is receiving credit . . . for having scored a diplomatic "victory" over the US by bringing the

⁷⁴Ambassador in France Dillon to the Department of State, 26 July 1954. *FRUS* 1952-1954 (Volume 6): Western Europe and Canada, p. 1439.

Undersecretary to Geneva but actually he has gone out of his way to stress fidelity to [the] basic concept of US-French cooperation."⁷⁵ One way that Mendès-France showed that he could cooperate with the United States was by affirming that a successful reconciliation of France and West Germany would need United Kingdom support, an opinion also shared in the US State Department.⁷⁶ Mendès-France followed through on his words by cooperatively adopting the British solution to the post-EDC impasse offered by British foreign minister Anthony Eden. Douglas Dillon's intelligence-gathering made Dulles realize that Mendès-France could be a teammate as long as the United States couched new ideas in terms that appealed to the French prime minister's logical ability, his sense of purpose and the need to make a constructive place for France in the new post-colonial international environment.

Another reason that imperfect information on France did not present a constraint to rational decisionmaking was that Dulles related frankly and straightforwardly to his French counterparts. For example, former French Prime Minister René Mayer in an oral history interview said that he found it very easy to speak frankly with Secretary Dulles.⁷⁷ Mayer also felt that Dulles was easy to understand partly because both men had originally trained for careers as lawyers which to Mayer meant that in some instances lawyers could understand each other better than non-lawyers.⁷⁸ Even with Foreign Minister⁷⁹ Pierre Mendès-France, over time a good working relationship evolved between him and Dulles despite original American suspicions of Mendès-France's political orientation. It helped that the Mendès-France government was more open with the United States both about the

⁷⁵Ibid., 1440.

⁷⁶Pierre Mendès-France, *Oeuvres Complètes: Gouverner, c'est choisir 1954-1955*. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1986. 18 September 1954 interview with the Manchester Guardian. p. 322.

⁷⁷ Interview with René Mayer, *JFDOHP*, p. 7.

⁷⁸Ibid., 8.

⁷⁹Pierre Mendès-France acted both as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for the length of his tenure from June 20, 1954 until February 5, 1955.

state of French relations with the Viet-Minh national front and about French needs for American assistance to provide for an orderly withdrawal of French infrastructure from Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Accords were negotiated.⁸⁰ Part of the reason relations between the Americans and Mendès-France were initially rocky was that Mendès-France did not always tell the Eisenhower administration what it wanted to hear. For instance, one goal of President Eisenhower's in 1953 and 1954 was to get France to ratify its membership in the European Defense Community (EDC), something that Mendès-France said would not happen (a correct prediction) because he could not obtain a constitutional majority for this in the French National Assembly. Up to this time, Mendès-France had been the only Prime Minister to tell the facts about the EDC and demonstrate their veracity by trying and failing to have the European Defense Community treaty ratified by the National Assembly. American-French relations had improved by November 1954, after Mendès-France had cooperated in finding an alternate solution for EDC in the form of the Western European Union.

Active Policymaking in the State Department

In 1953 and 1954, State Department organizational sluggishness was not an issue which blocked rational decisionmaking because Undersecretary of State Walter Smith managed the department very well. Part of his good management was to keep the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) busy writing reports which contained intelligent analysis of France and possible courses of action by the United States government. One PPS report entitled "France as a Problem for US Foreign Policy" gave a virtual blueprint of how the State department could help Western Europe make constructive use of the aftermath of the failed EDC plan. This report recognized that a replacement for EDC would have to include Britain and affirmed that recent experience showed that there was no way to bring

⁸⁰*The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam*. Volume I. Senator Gravel Edition. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. p. 114.

the French and Germans to any close arrangement without the UK standing by to act as a guarantor.⁸¹ The British would have to guarantee French political, military, and economic integrity because France feared Germany and those fears would increase with the eventual growth of German economic and political influence.⁸² In the plan that served as an alternate to EDC, the British would be in a privileged position because they would not be subject to the application of force and arms controls on their own territory since the Brussels arrangements would relate only to continental Europe.⁸³ Lastly, the alternate plan would not force the British to accept supranationalism because the new union would have no supranational features but would consist of an experiment that might, if members desired, adopt supranationality as an operating principle.⁸⁴

A report regarding a successor to EDC stated that US interests would be served by integration and consolidation of the countries of Western Europe. American interests would be served to the extent that a composite plan reconciled France and Germany while assuring their cooperation.⁸⁵ The United States wanted to avoid the unhappy role of being the "firefighter" who came to put out conflagrations taking the form of European civil wars. Secondly, the plan would have to establish a close and lasting British association with the continental group of powers.⁸⁶ Third, the plan would have to give promise of a strengthened European collective security system with German participation. Lastly, the Brussels reorganization of European defense would have to give impetus to European integration, with some promise of its organic and institutional evolution.⁸⁷ In fact, the plan

81 Policy Planning Staff report: "France as a Problem for US Foreign Policy," May 13, 1954, p. 38. RG 59: DS: NARA, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA).

82Ibid.,

83 Policy Planning Staff report: "Primary Considerations in Determining a US Negotiating Position at the London Conference", September 22, 1954, p. 5. RG 59: DS: NARA.

84Ibid.,

85Ibid.,

86Ibid.,

87Ibid., p. 6-7.

proposed by British foreign minister Anthony Eden and vigorously promoted by Dulles and the Eisenhower administration accomplished all of these objectives.

Diplomacy benefited the US reputation as a supporter of European integration

Another reason why constraints on rational decisionmaking were minimized was that President Eisenhower and Dulles acted in their relations with France and Europe by improving the United States' reputation as a supporter of an integrated Europe. For instance, the Eisenhower administration attempted to move the State department away from a bilateral focus in relations with European states to thinking about new political structures which could be built by the Europeans to help themselves solve problems on a multilateral basis. One big advantage of the new focus was that it helped prevent West Germany from playing countries off against each other or the West against the Soviets, as Dulles warned might happen⁸⁸ if the bilateral pattern of relations was not changed. By acting multilaterally in relations with European states, the State department would be more respected by those Europeans who favoured increased international integration. However, there is evidence that isolated individuals in the State department were attempting to build support for the notion that the United States should relate to European nations on a strictly bilateral basis. Walter Butterworth, a *charge d'affaires* in the UK, offered a criticism of Dulles' idea that European integration was a positive initiative:

The statement to which I take exception is 'the prevention of war between neighbouring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats but only by merging certain functions of government into supranational organizations'.⁸⁹

Butterworth offered the Entente Cordiale (1904) between Britain and France as an example of a bilateral initiative that had helped end the long record of strife between those

⁸⁸Rolf Steininger, "John Foster Dulles, the European Defense Community and the German Question," in Richard Immerman ed. *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. p. 80.

⁸⁹Telegram from Walter Butterworth to Livingston Merchant, September 1, 1954. *FRUS* 1952-1954 (Volume 5): Western European Security, part 2, p. 1127.

two nations.⁹⁰ Butterworth's opinion shows again that an important organization value such as the necessity of using multilateral approaches for dealing with European problems was not shared throughout the State department. Herbert Butterworth also characterized Dulles' encouragement of more supranational thinking in European governments as giving an impression of an ignorant or at best superficial approach to intricate human problems.⁹¹ In fact, Butterworth's criticism shows the superficiality of his own thinking about how to conduct foreign relations because he does not consider Britain's capability of playing a new multilateral role in its European relations. In the aftermath of EDC's failure, the Policy Planning Staff pointed out and Dulles concurred with in his actions, that Britain would have to play a key role in facilitating a reconciliation between France and Germany, an actuality which refuted the possibility of bilateral relations *alone* serving as the basis for settling old grievances in Western Europe. The record shows that it was at a conference of eight NATO members in September 1954 that a multilateral solution was refined by Dulles and the British to reconcile Western Europe by having West Germany, France and Britain make meaningful contributions to a lasting peace.

A more important factor in rational decisionmaking as to foreign policy was that President Eisenhower provided Dulles with important support for a multilateral approach to solving problems in Western Europe. This support in fact helped smother the bilateral approach being touted by lower-level State department employees and other departments like the Pentagon. Before the EDC had been defeated in August 1954, the Pentagon voiced its preference for an independent German membership in NATO, free of the limits on German production and force levels that were inherent in the EDC.⁹² The political assessment of the EDC's prospects was not encouraging because William Draper, the

⁹⁰Ibid., 1128.

⁹¹Ibid., 1128.

⁹²Brian Duchin, "The 'Agonizing Reappraisal': Eisenhower, Dulles and the European Defense Community," *Diplomatic History* 16 (Spring 1992), p. 205.

American representative on the NATO council, questioned the viability of a policy based on Franco-German cooperation.⁹³ In a telegram to Dulles, Draper took a pessimistic view of the possibilities of reconciling Germany and France: "The alternatives seem to me to be either unacceptable or unachievable a) [an] immediate German entrance into NATO b) [a] bilateral security pact with Germany (involving violent objection by France)."⁹⁴ In his telegram, Draper implies that there is no future possibility of reconciling France and Germany diplomatically and that their conflict will continue. In contradiction to Draper, Dulles had faith in Franco-German reconciliation plus he had the President's support to use all peaceful means at his disposal to bring about such a reconciliation. At the Big Three foreign ministers meeting in July 1953, Dulles insisted that he could not exaggerate the importance that the US attached to European integration. History, said the Secretary of State, showed that Europe would tear itself to pieces without Franco-German cooperation.

Those in the State Department of the 1950's who advocated bilateral means to solve European problems were defeated when foreign policy was implemented because they were matched against a politically experienced multilateralist President Eisenhower. After all, as a former general, Eisenhower had led the denazification of the American zone in defeated Germany after 1945, an event that called on him to make liberal use of his considerable political skills.⁹⁵ Former President Eisenhower's memoirs demonstrate his support of a multilateral process for solving problems in postwar Europe of the 1950's. One memoir entry indicates that he was looking at a larger geopolitical picture than the French: "understandable as the French attitude was, it could not ignore that the principal threat to French peace and tranquility in 1952 was posed by Soviet imperialism, not by a

⁹³Ibid., 206.

⁹⁴William Draper to Foster Dulles, 26 January 1953. *FRUS* 1952-1954 (Volume 5): 708-710.

⁹⁵Stephen Ambrose. *Eisenhower: 1890-1952*. (Volume I) New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. p. 421.

truncated, partially rearmed Germany."⁹⁶ This comment of Eisenhower's underlines through implication the fact that French living standards were still relatively low and that France was endangered by the French Communists who could use living standards as a propaganda item in appealing to the French masses. Because he knew that Franco-German reconciliation was not purely a military problem, Eisenhower took advice from those who saw the political context in which the US could act to solve problems:

General Gruenther expressed [the] conviction that, with *reasonable precautions*⁹⁷ [a political decision] on the part of the military commander of NATO, the composition and structure of the NATO force . . . would prevent the possibility of any member nation's taking military action against the others.⁹⁸

As the United States was the preponderant power in NATO in the 1950's, it meant that Americans had to work with all Western European countries by doing their best possible to solve problems affecting intra-European relations. There was no pragmatic alternative because the American need to keep Western European countries "onside" in the Cold War with the Soviets offered American policymakers the incentive to make NATO an effective political (as well as military) organization.

President Eisenhower went on record to support multilateralism in Europe to bolster Dulles' execution of a move to solve a particularly vexing Franco-German problem. According to Eisenhower, all that was necessary in Western Europe was that the countries cooperate.⁹⁹ The President recognized that the major problem was the age-old Franco-German situation and stated that he favoured reconciliation of the two groups and was pleased with the recent Paris and London accords.¹⁰⁰ A major hurdle to Franco-German

⁹⁶Dwight Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change 1953-1956*. New York: Doubleday, 1963. p. 400.

⁹⁷Italics here are mine.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 406.

⁹⁹United States Minutes of Opening Meeting of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Mendes-France, November 18 1954. *FRUS 1952-1954* (Volume 6): Western Europe and Canada, p. 1463-1464.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*,

reconciliation was the issue of who was going to control the Saar, an area that had been economically linked to France under a semi-autonomous status. Dulles had a role in facilitating the Saar solution because he twice brought together German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French Premier Mendès-France in October 1954 to discuss the region.¹⁰¹ When Adenauer and Mendès-France spoke one night during 20-23 October 1954, Dulles stayed up the whole night on call in his room if the French and West German leaders should need him.¹⁰² By the time he retired the next morning, a major hurdle regarding the Saar had been surmounted and the Franco-West German reconciliation over that territory was almost complete.¹⁰³ Dulles' spadework in the area of Franco-German relations had clearly shown results because he said that he had observed a better Franco-German understanding at the London and Paris conferences than he had seen in the past.¹⁰⁴ The net result of Dulles' work in conjunction with the French and Germans was that West Germany entered NATO in 1955¹⁰⁵ while France received pledges from the US and UK in the Western European Union (WEU)¹⁰⁶ that she would be protected from possible German attacks.

Due to Dulles' long experience with diplomatic matters, he knew how to behave so that his actions and those of his associates were harmonized to make the State department effective in accomplishing American diplomatic goals. Dulles' behaviour *vis-a-vis* the Europeans after EDC failed to get ratified by the French cannot be understood without examining how Dulles behaved toward the British when he was leading negotiations for a Japanese Peace treaty. In 1950, during the treaty negotiations, it became clear that Britain

¹⁰¹ Frederick Marks, *Power and Peace*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993. p. 60.

¹⁰² Ibid.,

¹⁰³ Ibid.,

¹⁰⁴ United States Minutes of Opening Meeting of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Mendès-France, November 18 1954. *FRUS 1952-1954* (Volume 6): Western Europe and Canada, p. 1463.

¹⁰⁵ This was the essential accomplishment of the Paris accords of September 1954.

¹⁰⁶ This was the essential accomplishment of the London accords of October 1954.

wanted to take a harder line with the Japanese in terms of a tougher position on reparations and the former enemy's shipbuilding capacity. To accomplish the American goal of reconstructing Japan after the war as least punitively as possible and to keep intact British friendship with the US, Dulles realized that some hard bargaining and concessions were required. As to concessions, there were quite a few. Some were very specific, such as the US agreement to require Japanese renunciation of pre-war commercial rights under the Congo Basin Treaties desired by the British to limit competition in one particular cheap textiles market. Other concessions were of a more general nature and demonstrated shrewd psychology on Dulles' part: he indicated a willingness to blend a lengthy British draft of Japanese liability clauses with the very brief American text. Dulles assumed that the detailed explanations of limited claims the U.S. was willing to tolerate would be unnecessary and would be better left to Tokyo to elaborate on its own, but he was willing to use British wording to give the British some pride of ownership. Lastly, Dulles asked the British in June 1950 to serve as a co-sponsor of the peace treaty and the conference that would soon be arranged. Dulles' actions kept the United States and the United Kingdom on friendly terms and set a successful precedent for their cooperation in the future to help achieve the two countries' common diplomatic goals.¹⁰⁷

The next occasion for British-American diplomatic cooperation came when the EDC project was declared dead and the UK's foreign minister Anthony Eden possessed an alternative that he was ready to implement. Imitating a tactic he used when the Japanese treaty was negotiated, Dulles had the British act as a "co-sponsor," but this time the object was to have Britain and America act as diplomatic "godparents" to France. Anglo-American sponsorship of France would allow a rearmed Germany to enter a western European defense alliance in good standing as an independent nation. In two ways Dulles acted as a competent statesman when Eden presented the British alternative to the EDC.

¹⁰⁷Pruessen, *The Road To Power*. p. 485.

Dulles was modest and did not let "pride of place" over America's leadership of the "Free World" get in the way of endorsing a worthy proposal. Secretary of State Dulles also gave an honest summary of the political difficulties at home of selling a modified version of EDC. For instance, the idea of a United States of Europe had great appeal in America and rejection of the EDC had come as a great shock which would be used by isolationists and opponents of foreign aid to reduce US international involvement. In addition, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were still engaged in their strategic reappraisal and had not yet reached their conclusions. In the face of withdrawal of troops from Korea and Japan, the presence of US troops in Germany was an exception to keeping US troops at home during peacetime. Dulles qualified the above remarks by saying that the US government could agree to restoration of German sovereignty and the admission of Germany into NATO, but could not accept any new commitments regarding American forces in Germany.¹⁰⁸

Essentially, Dulles made the State Department look good by being the mediator to the European post-EDC impasse when he accepted Anthony Eden's alternative to the European Defense Community. To get solutions and closure to longstanding problems, Dulles had to play his "bad guy" part which he did by threatening the British and French with unilateral German rearmament and a West German-American alliance. This threat was fruitful because it succeeded in influencing the British to "put some money down" for European military security by offering to defend continental Europe. According to Frederick Marks, Anthony Eden's last minute concession to a continental defense must be viewed as a response to some intense pressure emanating from Washington in conjunction with Dulles' offer to match Britain's commitment of troops to the continent. In 1954, Britain was finished as an imperial power. It was only after the US decided to extend its NATO commitment by sustaining its military presence in Europe over an acceptable length of time that Whitehall responded diplomatically by offering to cooperate in the new

¹⁰⁸Anthony Eden, *Memoirs*. London: Times Publishing, 1967. pp. 163-164.

Continental defense plan. By working with the British to defend the French against West Germany and the Soviet threat, Dulles satisfied France's main requirements.¹⁰⁹

The Policy Planning Staff contributed to the effective execution of foreign policy because their reports to Dulles sensitized him to the fact that relations with France were going to be difficult. Dulles was told that American diplomatic actions had to be tailored to France's political "personality" in a way that kept French-American relations on a cordial footing. The report stated that Americans could not assume that pressure or threats would yield desired results. This was because French leaders had cannily and correctly realized the "essentiality" of France to the United States¹¹⁰ and were not inclined to take at face value any hints that American politicians wished to dispense with France in reappraisals of European policy. In addition, any semblance of dictation by the US exacerbated France's hypersensitivity at her dependence on the United States and her fear that US policy would lead to a final holocaust in which France would perish.¹¹¹

Reading these reports helped Dulles devise a strategy to work with France in smart ways by manipulating such French character traits like an attachment to "honour." Although Anthony Eden proposed the key idea that would allow Germany to join NATO, he did not know how to finesse diplomacy quite as well as Dulles. Whitehall had recommended an Anglo-American ultimatum during the eleventh hour of French deliberation over WEU in December 1954 but Dulles rejected at least three separate British proposals along this line.¹¹² The first vote on WEU in December 1954 was negative but Dulles kept a low profile with President Eisenhower telling reporters that he

¹⁰⁹Marks, 59.

¹¹⁰France was essential to the United States because France represented a mighty fortress in Europe that the United States wanted to keep strong and help defend against Soviet and French Communist attempts to subvert the democratic French state. If a Communist subversion of France had been successful, there was a danger that the Soviet Union would possess political and economic control over all of Western Europe.

¹¹¹ PPS report, "France as a Problem for US Policy." p. 42.

¹¹²Marks, *Power and Peace*, 61.

did not believe that this was the ultimate verdict of the great French people and their Chamber of Deputies.¹¹³ It was beneficial for Franco-American relations in the 1950's that the US came to these relations from a more objective perspective as opposed to the British. The Franco-American relationship was different than the British-French relationship because Britain was France's historic enemy. In contrast, the American-French relationship was an alliance that dated from the American Revolution. Eden's way of attempting to cajole the French with his sledgehammer approach likely would not have worked to bring about France's entry into the Western European Union. If Eden's approach had been "successful," the French would have been hostile and the French assembly would likely have vetoed WEU membership. In contrast to Eden, Dulles focused throughout his tenure as Secretary of State on making sure that France was diplomatically respected. For instance in December 1954, to avoid wounding French honour, Dulles averted an abrupt cut off of American aid under the Richards Amendment. This message must have reached the French because a few days later the deputies voted 289-251 in favour of German NATO membership and two days later to approve the WEU by voting 287-260.¹¹⁴ This example shows that the high value the French placed on their honour could be effectively manipulated by an expert diplomat like Foster Dulles to achieve desired American diplomatic goals.

One reason that Dulles had been successful in achieving the successful result of having the French Parliament ratify the WEU was due to the fact that French Prime Minister Mendès-France was adept at manipulating the various political parties. Firstly with the failed EDC, Mendès-France tried to obtain changes to the plan that would facilitate its passage through the National Assembly.¹¹⁵ Among other modifications, he

¹¹³*Ibid.*,

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*,

¹¹⁵Maurice Larkin, *France Since the Popular Front*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. p. 242.

wanted to delay the supranational features of EDC which offended Gaullists and others in France who counted themselves as conservatives.¹¹⁶ Gaullists did not want France to be involved in supranational organizations because they believed France should have an independent foreign policy. Nevertheless, EDC was defeated in the National Assembly without these changes being made. When it came time to vote in December 1954 on German admission into NATO and the WEU, the National Assembly embraced this because NATO's supervision assured some degree of international control over the West German army and there were no longer any supranational features to the replacement for EDC to offend French rightists, thus enabling a sizable minority of Gaullists, some Radical-Socialists and Conservatives to contribute to the second 287-260 vote in favour of the Western European Union.¹¹⁷ Mendès-France's successful parliamentary manoeuvring was assisted by the British and American pledge to commit some of their armed forces to the European continent, an action that helped satisfy French Gaullists and conservatives that France would get protection within the framework of WEU from the German military threat.

Ike and Dulles Refuse to Prop Up the French Empire in Indochina

A sincere anti-imperialist belief set, advice from the British and Eisenhower's political abilities were all factors that led the US to refuse to help the French in Vietnam around the time in May 1954 that Dienbienphu fell. Even though in 1954, the British were finished as an imperial power, the Eisenhower administration still implicitly relied on the United Kingdom for foreign policy guidance. Regarding the US insistence that Britain get militarily involved in Vietnam, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Minister Anthony Eden were reluctant to intervene in a war they felt could not be won.¹¹⁸ They

¹¹⁶Ibid., 242.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 243.

¹¹⁸George Herring, "'A Good Stout Effort: John Foster Dulles and the Indochina Crisis, 1954-1955" in Richard Immerman ed. *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. p. 218.

were correctly convinced that France retained sufficient influence to secure a reasonable settlement at Geneva and they feared outside intervention would provoke a war with China, possibly precipitating World War III.¹¹⁹ Based on this British "advice," Dulles summarily rejected French Foreign Minister George Bidault's appeal for unilateral American intervention. Dulles affirmed to Eisenhower that an air strike might not save Dienbienphu. As an experienced diplomat, Dulles also knew that there would not be time before hypothetical military intervention to arrange "proper political understandings" with the French. Once American prestige was committed in battle, American negotiating positions in military and political matters would be almost negligible.¹²⁰ With all these factors to consider, Eisenhower and Dulles decided to hold up any military action pending developments at the Geneva Conference. It is noteworthy that George Herring and former President Eisenhower do not mention at all any involvement in decisionmaking regarding Indochina of Defense Secretary Charles Wilson.¹²¹ This omission testifies well to the Defense Secretary's weakness in bureaucratic politics because he evidently did not take any action that was worth remembering and repeating in both a historical account and a memoir describing crucial decisions. Lastly, Eisenhower's sincere anti-imperialist beliefs were the final block to any prospect of serious help being offered to the French: "[who] particularly could not get real [i.e. military] American support in that region unless they could unequivocally pledge independence to the Associated States upon the achievement of military victory."¹²² The aborted plan for "United Action" would have seen the US ally

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 218.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*.

¹²¹If some Presidents have been considered their own Secretaries of State, Eisenhower's background made him his own Defense Secretary. He looked to his defense secretaries to implement a defense budget unpopular with the armed services, to carry out his decisions, to bear the weight of military objections to ceilings on defense spending . . . not to suggest alternative policies.

Geoffrey Piller, "DOD's Office of International Security Affairs: The Brief Ascendancy of an Advisory System," *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1983). p. 61.

¹²²Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change*, 352.

itself with nations such as the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand in order to help the French "win" the First Indochina War.¹²³ A French grant of independence to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos would have given the coalition a concrete goal for which to fight. Because the French were not willing to make that promise to the Vietnamese, Eisenhower refused to send the French military any help to rescue them from the debacle at Dienbienphu.

Besides anti-colonialism, it was Eisenhower's sense of *realpolitik* and the support of key military people which made it easier to refuse to help the French after Dienbienphu collapsed. In late April 1954, Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that he discussed with key military chiefs the possibility of United States intervention by an air strike in Indochina.¹²⁴ Eisenhower recalled that all three military chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force recommended against this action.¹²⁵ The former President added in his memoirs that he remarked during the meeting that if the US were unilaterally to permit its forces to be drawn into the Indochina conflict and in a succession of Asian wars, the end result would be to drain off American resources and weaken the overall US defensive military position.¹²⁶ As a pragmatic Commander-in-Chief, Eisenhower wanted to avoid "hopeless" wars and thereby help keep the nation he led strong and vigorous. Even if American troops were to be sent to Indochina (which was increasingly unlikely), Eisenhower's administration argued that no Western power could go to Asia militarily except as one in a concert of other countries, a group that would have to include local Asian states.¹²⁷ The bottom line here was that Eisenhower was not going to mount the metaphorical cavalry horse and go to France's rescue alone because to do this was to lay the United States open

¹²³*The Pentagon Papers*. Senator Gravel Edition. Vol. I, p. 98.

¹²⁴Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 354.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*,

¹²⁶*Ibid.*,

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 352.

to the charge of imperialism and colonialism.¹²⁸ Avoidance of these negative charges was a constant American foreign policy concern during the 1950's.

Dulles Diplomacy Defeated by French Domestic Politics

Despite Dulles' diplomatic skill, the European Defense Community treaty was not ratified in France because of factors related to French domestic politics, something which Dulles could not control. Simply put, bureaucrats at the White House and State department could not go to France and apply an American-style "arm twist" to get intransigent Communist and Gaullist deputies to vote for EDC in the National Assembly. Because the Communists and Gaullists each controlled a quarter of National Assembly seats, this meant that no majority of deputies from moderate parties could be found to vote in French adherence to EDC. According to a report by Edgar Furniss Jr., it was intense Gaullist opposition which caused the Mayer and Laniel governments to postpone as long as possible submitting the treaty to the National Assembly for a vote.¹²⁹ Charles De Gaulle's opposition to ratification of EDC was largely predictable because he opposed almost every important step in international affairs taken by governments of the Fourth Republic (1944-1958), including participation in the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty.¹³⁰ De Gaulle opposed these initiatives because he felt that France should be independent and powerful in its foreign policy. He also decried the policies that successive French governments followed in favour of European unification. Instead of an EDC treaty linking France and West Germany, De Gaulle thought as late as 1949 that Franco-German *rapprochement* would be possible only when Germany became a federation of states.¹³¹ The Gaullists did not like EDC precisely because it would permit the rearmament of a

¹²⁸Ibid., 352.

¹²⁹Edgar Furniss Jr., "Weaknesses in French Foreign Policy-making." H. Alexander Smith Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University. p. 15.

¹³⁰ Ibid.,

¹³¹Ibid., 15.

united West Germany under conditions extremely disadvantageous to France¹³² (by including no protection against the German threat). On the other hand, French Communists voted against EDC because they did not wish to see this military alliance be a barrier to expansion of Soviet Communist influence in Western Europe. French Communists took their directions from the Soviet Union which preferred to see loosely organized states in Western Europe in order to bring them to the Soviet side through classic divide and conquer tactics. That the European Defense Community failed to be adopted in France was entirely due to French domestic politics, an independent factor over which the State Department had little control.

Summary

During 1953 and 1954, the process used within the State Department to make foreign policy towards France was successful in helping US-French relations move forward and provide constructive accomplishments. Imperfect information was minimized because Dulles knew France and French culture well and used this knowledge to help those such as Douglas Dillon solve problems that he encountered when dealing with the French. It also benefited American policymaking that Dulles related in a frank and straightforward manner with his French counterparts. Dulles' unusual willingness to assist Ambassador Dillon's conduct of relations with the French and the controversy in the State department about whether relations with Europe should be conducted on a multilateral basis show that central organization values were not adhered to in the same way by State department employees. Rational decisionmaking in the State department was buttressed in an overall fashion by the support that President Eisenhower gave Dulles in the effort to bring European nations to solve their problems on a multilateral basis. This was important because Dulles warned that if problems continued to be solved bilaterally, West Germany could potentially play the Soviets off against the Americans to see which side offered the

¹³² Ibid., 15.

best benefits for German friendship. Multilateral diplomacy was therefore a way to keep the Soviets from interfering to ill effect in Western European politics and to make sure that West Germany stayed on the non-communist "team." Dulles was an effective Secretary of State in 1953 and 1954 because he took the advice of the Policy Planning Staff and combined the advice with what he knew about the French. This information was not only used for Dulles' benefit but also in a way that allowed the State department to devise appropriate policies for French-American relations. Dulles secured French entry into the Western European Union by ensuring the French government was diplomatically respected and by manipulating the French attachment to "honour." He made sure that aid under the Richards amendment was continued in 1954 and this likely played a role in the French Parliament's ratification of German membership in NATO and French membership in the Western European Union. In 1954, President Eisenhower decided not to send troops to rescue the French position at Dienbienphu because France was not willing to grant independence to Indochina and because US military chiefs thought that American involvement in a colonial war would drain away valuable American military resources.

Chapter Three Stormier Diplomatic Weather, 1955-1956

The years 1955 and 1956 were not easy ones for Franco-American relations. There was no shortage of hard and unpleasant decisions that Dulles had to take *vis-a-vis* the French. However, learning from previous diplomatic mistakes that the United States made with France provided Dulles with help in some situations. With regard to the Algerian pacification campaign, American diplomatic options of counselling the French were limited because of the U.S. desire to preserve constructive relations with the French. This was the only possible course of action in the absence of expertise in the State department to guide relations with Muslim nations. Just as the United States government disagreed with the way France managed its colonies, there was a dispute in 1955 between the US Treasury department and the French over the way France managed its domestic economy. For a long time before the 1950's there was an economic tradition in France that the government had a preponderant role to play in directing businesses in what and how they produced, a type of influence that helped the government fulfil domestic or foreign policy goals.¹³³ This tradition of *dirigisme* ran counter to the American experience of limited government intervention into the business world through creation of state firms or heavy control of economic production and distribution. On the one occasion that French *dirigisme* became a contentious issue, America's solution to the dispute was relatively lenient because the American oil industry was prospering and the US government did not want to damage prospects for European integration. Lessons that Dulles learned from EDC's failure in 1954 contributed to the success that he enjoyed helping the Europeans diplomatically get EURATOM negotiated. Dulles showed his

¹³³ William Adams, *Restructuring the French Economy: Government and the Rise of Market Competition Since World War II*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1989. p. 3.

improved mastery of diplomacy by taking good advice and by sponsoring a pragmatic compromise in order to ensure EURATOM's ratification.

US Policy Response to the French War in Algeria

Essentially, during 1955 and 1956, France's response to the Algerian rebellion remained an ongoing source of contention for Franco-American relations. The Americans remained justifiably concerned that quantities of French NATO equipment were being shipped to repress the Algerian rebellion, a purpose for which this equipment was not intended. American diplomatic dispatches from France conceded that French reforms in Algeria were planned but offered little hope that these reforms would be fully effective in light of the hostilities. In the period from November 1954 to the end of 1956, the Algerian rebellion provided food for argument in French-American relations. The Algerian situation was contentious because U.S. diplomacy had to walk a tightrope by giving recognition to a desire by Algerians to be independent yet preserve relatively good relations with the French allies.

Through its reports, the Policy Planning Staff helped provide much needed context for helping American decisionmakers decide how to treat the French involvement in Algeria. The PPS provided an economic and philosophical background to explain why the French insisted on crushing the Algerian rebellion. According to the PPS, legal and economic ties inhibited France's ability to grant independence to Algeria. Of the three North African territories, Algeria was the most intimately linked with the French economy because Algeria and France were in a customs union which meant that no duties were levied on their trade. In addition, about 85% of Algeria's exports by value went to metropolitan France which resulted in industries in both countries finding whole or partial justification to maintain relations due to existence of these markets. Powerful industries and ready markets thus laid the basis for organized pressure on the French government to maintain the *status quo*. The PPS also stated that along with policies of straightforward colonial exploitation, France was motivated by a conception of the transfer of French

civilization and culture to the native peoples, with the connotation that this was somehow a mission placed on France by Providence.¹³⁴

PPS staffers recognized the difficulty France encountered in finding a solution for Algeria but they also noted that France's actions were colonialist. According to the PPS, if American interest in an Algerian solution was evident, then American capabilities for assisting such a solution were not. This situation existed because France was the dominant power in Algeria because of the French deployment of manpower and resources. France faced the extraordinarily complex problem of finding concessions that placated the Muslim population and which could be imposed on the European minority. The French government saw the suppression of guerrilla activity and terrorism as a prerequisite to successful negotiation. Because anti-colonialist nations believed that the United States exercised a decisive influence on French policy, France's unwillingness to concede in favour of Algerian nationalism was blamed on both the French and Americans. As for US policy, the PPS suggested that American influence on France could help encourage realistic policymaking in Paris. Not unreasonably, the PPS affirmed that because the French used American military equipment in the Algerian pacification campaign, that this fact entitled the Americans to at least some voice in French decisions.¹³⁵

Within the State department bureaucracy, a difference of opinion developed about whether the Algerian rebellion represented a war of national liberation or a situation similar to that of the Arabs *vis-a-vis* Israel. The American ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, was an anti-colonialist partly due to his experience of working at the UN where he made great efforts to forge good American relations with newly-independent former British and French colonies. Lodge thought that President Eisenhower should show some moral leadership and call on the Europeans to announce

¹³⁴ PPS Report: "U.S. Policy toward North Africa," July 12 1956 by Phillip Trezise RG 59: DS, NARA. pp.12,14.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 21-22, 27.

within ten years, timetables for decolonization.¹³⁶ The precedent for this was the action that the United States took to pre-announce and then grant independence to the Philippines in 1946. This idea of announcing timetables for decolonization served as the context for Lodge declaring in a telegram that: "one thing the U.S. should avoid . . . is to become the so-called muscle man who is required to lead a strong fight in defense of French colonialism . . . this [defense] would be most harmful to the American position throughout the whole non-white world."¹³⁷ Lodge's statement leads one to believe that he likely saw the rebellion in Algeria as an incipient war of national liberation from colonial status. On the other hand, Ambassador to France Douglas Dillon disagreed with Lodge's assessment of the French in Algeria. Dillon felt that: "Due to the large and long established French population in Algeria, the problem here is much more difficult and the difference between the French population . . . and the local Muslim population has more similarity to . . . the Israeli-Arab problem than it does to such a purely colonial situation as Indochina."¹³⁸ It was because Secretary of State Dulles also viewed France's involvement in Algeria as colonialist combined with his attempt to pursue anti-colonialist foreign policies that Dulles agreed with a conception of Algeria's situation as a war of national liberation. It was easy for Dulles to agree with Cabot Lodge because the native Algerians were fighting an "honest" war for independence, a war in which they did not enjoy Communist support, thus making it comparable to the American War of Independence fought from 1775 to 1781.

An examination of Dwight Eisenhower's memoirs provides indirect evidence that in the controversy between a conception of Algeria's rebellion as a "liberation struggle" or "an Israeli-Arab situation," President Eisenhower leaned towards the former view. The

¹³⁶ Brands, *Cold Warriors*, 169.

¹³⁷ Telegram from Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State, 1 November 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 18) Africa, pp. 230-231.

¹³⁸ Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, March 20 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 18) Africa, p. 241.

former President wrote that experiences in India, Indochina and Algeria had demonstrated that since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the use of occupying troops in foreign territories to sustain policy was a costly and difficult business.¹³⁹ Eisenhower added that unless the occupying power was ready to employ the brutalities of dictatorship, local unrest would soon grow into guerrilla resistance, then open revolt and possibly, wide-scale conflict.¹⁴⁰ It is noteworthy that Eisenhower refers to Algeria as a "foreign territory" which signifies that he did not believe that France's armed intervention in that colony was an "internal matter" as the French liked to claim. Dwight Eisenhower's analysis here indicates that he likely supported the notion of looking at the Algerian crisis as an incipient war of national liberation. His view won out as he convinced others about the soundness of his ideas which pertained to making and executing foreign policy. The best evidence for his successful lobbying comes from the fact that the United States diverted a grudging amount of helicopters and small arms to France for its suppression of the rebellion.¹⁴¹ By acting in this manner, Eisenhower did not want to impede unduly the progress of an honest revolt which he knew was not being actively subsidized by French or Soviet Communists.

The Policy Planning Staff set out a pragmatic American policy regarding Algeria when it wrote that American policymakers should not become too distracted by "hysterical" French domestic politics. The PPS concluded that French democracy and the Fourth republic were too deeply rooted to fall due to anything short of a wholly unlikely combination of political and military disasters. It was realistic to think that the French would blame the U.S. for French colonial ailments no matter what the Americans did. Even though it was hard to accomplish, the PPS suggested that French governments

139 Dwight Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961*. New York: Doubleday, 1965. p. 40.

140 Ibid.,

141 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, July 25 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 18): Africa, p. 243.

needed to be encouraged to adapt to France's declining imperial position and to be discouraged from wishful efforts to perpetuate a lost Big Power status. The report also stated that the United States should establish contact with the Algerian rebel movement and its various factions. This constituted very good advice because the rebels would provide a good source of independent information to replace French propaganda about events in Algeria.¹⁴²

In a sense, the abovementioned PPS report officially restated a course of action already being pursued by Dulles and the State department. Their actions included giving France a minimum number of weapons and chastising her for endangering NATO strength in Europe. Dulles put his feelings about the Algerian situation in a telegram sent to France on 27 May 1955. He wrote that the French government must be brought to realize both the seriousness with which the United States viewed the current situation and the difficulties created by the French only using traditional police measures against ethnic Algerians. Dulles also instructed Douglas Dillon to see French defense minister Antoine Pinay and tell him that the United States would not make available any helicopters for the French to use in Algeria. Dulles struck an idealistic note when he wrote that it has always been an American hope that France would be able to develop and carry out bold political, social and economic programs which the Americans could fully support. However, Dulles did not like the weakening of NATO defenses in Europe through division and transfer of units to North Africa. He affirmed his hope that French NATO strength on the continent could be restored quickly.¹⁴³ This message represented a continuing effort by Dulles to pursue an anti-imperialist brand of diplomacy *vis-a-vis* France.

In addition, instead of pleading with France to stop fighting the Algerian rebellion, Dulles pursued relations with the Algerian FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) in order

¹⁴² Ibid., 31, 33.

¹⁴³ Telegram from the Department of State to Embassy in France 27 May 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 18): Africa, pp. 219-220.

to get independent information about events in Algeria. Taking independent information from the Algerian rebels allowed Dulles to demonstrate to Third World ex-colonies that he was not getting all his information about the Algerian revolt from the obviously imperialist French government. It also sent a signal that Washington was respectful enough of groups seeking independence that US officials were willing to listen to "their side of the story" about why colonialism did not suit them and hear their reform proposals. On 29 November 1956, a meeting occurred at the State Department between middle-ranking officials and FLN leaders. The Secretary of State did not personally meet with the FLN representatives because this would have implied US recognition of a Provisional Government in Algeria, a move that would have risked damaging Franco-US relations. One of the "facts" that the FLN offered the Americans was that as in Indochina, France would never win the Algerian war because Algerians would continue to fight until the French accepted the principle of equality rather than assimilation.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, the FLN representatives believed that the war would continue to cause grave repercussions in Tunisia and Morocco, whose close ethnic and religious relationship to Algeria made the repercussions a basic fact of political and strategic life.¹⁴⁵ The U.S. possession of military bases in Morocco provided an important consideration for American policymakers. Dulles' hands were tied in terms of helping resolve the French-Algerian dispute by the American military which wanted to preserve its bases and strategic position in Morocco. For example, a National Security Council progress report stated that France's importance in Europe and as a member of NATO, plus the strategic value of bases in Morocco made extremely difficult a shift of American policy towards more support for Algerian nationalists against France.¹⁴⁶ The military reasoned that such a move could easily lead to

¹⁴⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, 29 November 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 18): Africa, p. 256.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*,

¹⁴⁶ National Security Council report: "U.S. Policy on French North Africa" 1 June 1955, p. 5, NARA.

more bloodshed than was caused by the present nationalist terror campaign.¹⁴⁷ In addition, the NSC asserted that the French would never allow themselves to be peaceably removed from Algeria.¹⁴⁸ Essentially, the NSC advocated that if the United States wished to preserve its strategic position in North Africa, then it had to outwardly respect sovereign France's view that Algeria was part of France, even though the US government did not agree. Here is one case where Dulles might have wished to provide support to the Algerian FLN against the French but moves in that direction were thwarted by the strong lobbying conducted by senior American military officers. However, Dulles never disagreed about France's importance as a European country and member of NATO and about the strategic value of bases in Morocco.

It must be understood that Algeria's situation constituted an irritant in Franco-American relations because U.S. policy planners judged that the rebellion did not pose a major threat to world peace. In 1956, the Policy Planning Staff offered the prognosis that France would continue its stable attachment to the Fourth republic and to unstable governments. The PPS also added that : "Algeria will be a dominant political issue within this framework until some kind of interim settlement can be devised for it. *U.S. policy needs to be concerned with this issue but not in an atmosphere of imminent crisis.*"¹⁴⁹ On 31 May 1956, Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. sent a telegram to Dulles in which Lodge gave his views about Algeria. The telegram discusses the effect that UN General Assembly discussions can have on resolving colonial issues:

it is always arguable whether UN discussion does help to bring about solution to such colonial problems in long run. Assembly discussion Moroccan and Tunisian questions did prod French, however slowly, into more realistic policy resulting in removing those cases from realm of disputes . . . We recommend [that U.S.] take position in [Security] Council on Algerian item . . . based on same grounds as in

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.,

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.,

¹⁴⁹ Italics are mine. Policy Planning Staff Report: "U.S. Policy toward North Africa," by Phillip Trezise July 12, 1956, NARA, p. 16.

Moroccan case i.e., situation there does not now threaten international peace and security.¹⁵⁰

Ambassador Lodge essentially felt that for the time being, the situation in Algeria was as stable as the French could make it after implementing certain reforms. These French reforms included an increase in agricultural wages and encouragement to Muslims to participate in public administration.¹⁵¹ Another series of reforms dealt with structural problems by reforming the system of landholding along with the disbursement of agricultural credits and provided additional positions for Muslim employment by the local Algerian government.¹⁵² American appraisal of these reforms was positive because the measures at last gave proof that the French were substituting actions for the words and promises which previous governments were castigated for not fulfilling.¹⁵³

At the end of 1956, despite the reforms started in Algeria, the U.S. State Department was not optimistic that the Algerian crisis was going to be resolved soon. Two major factors blocking resolution were French domestic politics and constitutional arrangements. In a 21 November 1956 telegram, Douglas Dillon affirmed that the French government's current attitude toward Algeria reflected shortsightedness and a lack of realism.¹⁵⁴ As a person with over two years experience working in France, Dillon understood why the French government acted as it did: "articulate French opinion, and particularly that of leading figures of most political parties is so strongly and emotionally opposed to significant concessions on Algeria that any French government finds it much easier to postpone than to act."¹⁵⁵ Dillon also put the current French government's

¹⁵⁰ N.A.R.A. File 751S.00 Telegram from Ambassador to UN Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to Secretary Dulles May 31, 1956, p. 1.

¹⁵¹ N.A.R.A. File 751S.00 Foreign Service Despatch from American Consulate General in Algiers, Algeria to the State Department. April 12, 1956. p.1.

¹⁵² Ibid.,

¹⁵³ Ibid.,

¹⁵⁴ Telegram from the Embassy in France in the Department of State, November 21 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 18) Africa, p. 250.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.,

attitude into the context of its recent defeat in the Suez crisis: "especially after [the] serious setback in Egypt, bold and forward looking proposals on Algeria at this time could arouse so much opposition in Assembly as to cause [the] government's overthrow."¹⁵⁶ Until the Mollet government was defeated in 1957, it took no more measures to deal with the situation in Algeria aside from the minor reforms mentioned above and pursuit of additional military repression of the rebellion.

There is evidence that the United States had little choice but to behave passively towards France diplomatically regarding Algeria. American choices were partly limited in the absence of an expert adviser on relations between Europeans and Muslims. The Eisenhower administration's choices as to diplomacy were limited because it did not want to be viewed as an accomplice to French "reforms" in Algeria that might not be effective. For instance, Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. wrote that the U.S. must avoid any attempt by the French government to get the Americans identified with any new French plan.¹⁵⁷ Hoover added that the U.S. government should not give any blank checks to support new French government policies which may turn out to be meaningless and unrealizable formulas.¹⁵⁸ Hoover affirmed that the United States did not wish to be a scapegoat either: the government had to avoid giving the impression that it was advising the French about Algerian policy so that Uncle Sam did not shoulder responsibility *vis-a-vis* the French cabinet, Parliament or public opinion for unpopular steps that the French government felt it had to take to get out of its Algerian impasse.¹⁵⁹ This constituted sound advice. France was a grown up nation who knew how to solve its own problems. After all, Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France had extricated France from Indochina in 1954 by

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.,

¹⁵⁷ Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in France, November 27 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 18) Africa, p. 253.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.,

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.,

negotiating a ceasefire in Geneva with Indochinese Communists. Therefore, there was no need for the United States to have France rely on it to solve the Algerian crisis.

Dispute About French Oil Industry and its Anti-Competitive Practices

Secretary of State Dulles was not much concerned about how the French managed their domestic economy and as such mounted no recorded opposition to French *dirigisme*. However, the Treasury Department monitored the *dirigisme* and on at least one occasion, *dirigisme* became a contentious issue in Franco-American relations. At the beginning of 1955, the Treasury department became aware of an agreement between the French coal and oil industries which fixed a 1955 quota for deliveries of oil to the domestic French market. A Treasury document admits that there was a valid ground for making the kind of agreement described above.¹⁶⁰ For instance, exceedingly high levels of coal stocks in France in 1954 and the difficulty of finding outlets for this production was the main impetus for this agreement.¹⁶¹ This situation induced Charbonnages de France to negotiate the agreement with the oil industry. Both parties desired to prevent the encroachment of black oils into the markets for coal.¹⁶² According to the Treasury department, this agreement was given the French Government's blessing.

The Treasury department provided an objective explanation of the coal-oil agreement. Although the oil industry in France was privately owned, it had to agree to the quota due to government pressure. Without such an agreement, the French government could control the import of crude oil either through increased tariffs or quantitative restrictions. The advantage to the petroleum industry was that it had an implicit commitment from the French government for licensing an adequate tonnage of crude oil

¹⁶⁰ N.A.R.A. File FRA/7/00 Commodities and Industries 1950-1959 Office of the US Representative to the ECSC, 24 January 1955. RG 56: General Records of the Treasury Department Country File: France, 1952-1959, p. 1.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.,

¹⁶² Ibid.,

imports which erased the uncertainty which might have existed without such an agreement.¹⁶³

The coal and oil industry agreement only became an issue because in 1954 the United States lent the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community one hundred million American dollars. Part of this loan was to go to Charbonnages de France so that this company modernized its equipment which would permit establishment of normal competitive conditions in the common market.¹⁶⁴ The Treasury department was trying to find some grounds within the laws of the ECSC that some rule had been violated by the internal French agreement. Treasury admitted that the only ECSC article which seemed to prove the incompatibility of the agreement with the Treaty was Article 3g which stipulated that Community institutions must promote expansion and modernization without any protective measures against competing industries. However, the US Treasury conceded that because the High Authority did not institute this protective measure it had not breached the Treaty. These facts considered, the Americans still found a way to chastise the Europeans. The Treasury department pointed out that Article 1 of the 100 million dollar U.S.- ECSC loan agreement expressly stated that loans made to assist enterprises in financing investment projects are "to be consistent with the operation of the common market free of national barriers and *private obstructions* to competition." The Americans concluded that the agreement between Charbonnages de France and the petroleum industry obviously constituted private obstruction to competition and therefore was against the ECSC founding treaty.¹⁶⁵

Originally, the question arose for the author about what kind of possible resolutions existed to this dispute between the Treasury department and the French

¹⁶³ Ibid., 2.

¹⁶⁴ Report by the State Department to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy March 16, 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4) Western European Security and Integration, p. 271.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 3-4.

government. Upon a reading of State department documents dealing with the area of cartels and anti-trust action in Europe, it is evident that the State department was willing to be lenient regarding European anti-competitive practices. On the level of policy, the State department affirmed that it was premature to attempt to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the High Authority's actions against restrictive practices. In dealing with restrictive practices, the Americans recognized that the High Authority was faced with very complex problems the solutions to which were inherently time-consuming, as demonstrated by the American experience. The State department felt that the progress being made was reasonably encouraging, particularly in light of the pioneering nature in Europe of the treaty's anti-cartel provisions. Pragmatically, the State department affirmed that any indication of the weakening of American support for the Coal and Steel Community at this time could have had extremely prejudicial effects on current developments in the Community and in the general area of European integration.¹⁶⁶

Even on a technical level, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) advised the government that the United States should tread lightly in dealing with anti-competitive practices in Europe. The FOA concluded that American policy towards the High Authority and the ECSC itself was sound and should be continued. The FOA admitted that the High Authority was the only agency in Europe armed with effective anti-cartel legislation. However, the FOA stated that national cartel activities, as in Germany and France, were the most dangerous and thus deserved priority attention. It was suggested that technical assistance projects could help in this area. It is noteworthy that the FOA did not recommend the application of serious sanctions to counteract cartel activities in France and Germany, for the reason that minor violations were to be solved amicably and in a way that did not ruin good America-Europe relations and progress towards European

¹⁶⁶ Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Waugh) to the Undersecretary of State (Hoover) April 18, 1955 *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4): Western European Security and Integration, pp. 280-281.

integration. Lastly, the FOA affirmed that the only long range solution to the cartel problems lay in expanding economies and an integrated Europe. Therefore, US foreign economic policy in Europe should continue to emphasize reduction of trade barriers and eventual European integration.¹⁶⁷

In 1955, there was not going to be a diplomatic brawl between the United States and France about the Charbonnages de France agreement likely because the American oil industry was doing very well due to an economic recovery. According to the Office of Defense Mobilization, a steadily rising level of domestic American economic activity meant that both American producers and importers of petroleum products enjoyed an expanding market substantially above the level anticipated in February 1955. At that time, the contraction of the US economy which characterized 1954 had already given way to increasing production and employment on a broad front. For the petroleum industry, it was a time of increased production and prices for their final product. Responding to a record total demand for crude oil nearly 7 percent above last year, total domestic production of crude oil during January to September 1955 exceeded 1954 production by nearly 6 percent. In addition, the average price of crude oil at the well remained stationary during 1955 at the postwar peak level of \$2.82 US per barrel.¹⁶⁸ US oil companies were not in the doldrums and were not likely to apply pressure to the US government to "get tough" about other nations who were competing with the American oil producers, especially when the agreement they found out about *limited* the market for oil in France's domestic market. Thus, in 1955 the politics of oil in America was handled in such a way

¹⁶⁷ Report by the Foreign Operations Administration to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy March 16, 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4) Western European Security and Integration, p. 272.

¹⁶⁸ Letter from the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (Flemming) to the Oil Importing Companies October 29, 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 10): Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, p. 547.

that American oil companies and the federal government did not act to upset the applecart of European integration efforts.

EURATOM as a Shoehorn to Further European Integration

In order to lay the basis for an integrated Europe, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles channeled State department processes in directions which met their foreign policy goals. Chief among American foreign policy objectives was to strengthen Western Europe against Soviet meddling in NATO nuclear politics and the reconciliation of France and Germany. More specific American diplomatic goals included keeping West Germany on the Western "team," expanding foreign markets for American-made nuclear reactor hardware, and ensuring that American fissionable material was not used by EURATOM for making nuclear weapons. Without being explicit, Eisenhower and Dulles conducted themselves in a manner that made U.S. help for establishing EURATOM contingent on plans and progress by ECSC members to establish a Common Market.

After the European Defense Community debacle, the Eisenhower administration pinned its hope for continuing movement toward a United States of Europe on European economic integration talks. The administration believed such discussions would improve Franco-German relations and bind the German Federal Republic more closely to the West. Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands had formed the ECSC in 1951, but further moves toward economic and political union were faltering. It soon became clear that any progress toward integration would have to be in the field of atomic energy.¹⁶⁹

For the United States to be able to guide this integration, some changes were needed in American practices regarding the handling of nuclear science knowledge. To a great extent, American failure to provide other countries information regarding the state of

¹⁶⁹ Jonathan Helmreich, "The United States and the Formation of Euratom," *Diplomatic History* (Summer 1991), p. 388.

American nuclear science was due to the US Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This legislation sharply limited the exchange of technical information on nuclear energy between the United States and other nations. Pressure increased on the United States to negotiate conventions relating to peaceful uses of atomic energy. A Cold War context meant that in Washington there was a strong feeling that if the United States did not take the lead and play midwife to the nuclear energy revolution, the Soviet Union might do so and thereby gain prestige and influence at the West's expense. Or the British might do so, and they would take valuable commercial contracts away from the United States. Toward the end of 1953, President Eisenhower announced his Atoms for Peace plan, calling for the creation of a pool of fissionable materials to be contributed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union from which the world's nations could draw for peaceful purposes. This pool was to be controlled by an international atomic energy agency under the aegis of the United Nations.¹⁷⁰

Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan was not really as altruistic as it appeared on the surface because he had other motives for promoting this plan. For instance, he wanted to help the European nations reduce their dependence on oil from the Middle East, the shipment of which could easily be disrupted by the Soviet Union. In addition, amidst the negative publicity created by reports about the effects of nuclear fallout, Atoms for Peace was also a way to lend redeeming value to what seemed an increasingly evil American engineering achievement. The program would also provide a way to stimulate foreign purchases of reactors built by American firms. Finally, the proposal signalled that the United States was eager to cooperate with other nations and it thus established a positive tone that was especially significant for American efforts to aid formation of EURATOM.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 389-390.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 390.

There is enough evidence to indicate that the United States was a very early supporter of plans by the Europeans to establish a common atomic authority. An internal State department document sheds light on how Americans felt about the European initiative: "there is particular interest in the Department . . . that the Europeans may decide to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy on an integrated basis."¹⁷² This document added that the State department would clearly consider a European decision to create an atomic authority on Schuman Plan lines as being in the American interest as a way of reviving European integration.¹⁷³ American officials realized that the atomic authority would act as a support for the Coal and Steel Community and permit the Europeans to make the best use of their individually inadequate resources in the atomic energy field.¹⁷⁴ Potential United States cooperation with an atomic authority was a more complicated problem because it involved bilateral relations with Belgium, French sensitivities and limitations imposed by the American Atomic Energy Act.¹⁷⁵ It is noteworthy that this document is relatively positive about the European initiative. A positive American attitude and willingness to assist likely helped the EURATOM initiative and definitely contributed to its eventual success.

That the influence of the Policy Planning Staff was downgraded in advice on European matters after 1954 was not as deleterious for Dulles and the State department as previous literature has suggested.¹⁷⁶ By 1955, Dulles and Eisenhower now had two years of experience in dealing with the French. In "learning by doing," EDC's failure taught lessons which Eisenhower and Dulles applied to helping the Europeans arrange for

¹⁷² Letter from the Acting Director for the Office of European Regional Affairs (Palmer) to the Councillor of the Embassy in Belgium (Sprouse) July 8, 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4): Western European Security and Integration, p. 312.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*,

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*,

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*,

¹⁷⁶ Rubin, *Secrets of State*, pp. 85-86.

EURATOM. One lesson applied to EURATOM's creation was a realization by the United States that to successfully form the atomic energy pool, all member nations would have to feel they got a good return of benefits for their contribution. For example, in 1955 René Mayer, then President of the supranational ECSC High Authority, gave very good advice about the diplomatic finesse required to create EURATOM. According to Mayer, it was essential that countries entering the atomic pool contribute what they could so that the French government could tell the Assembly that France received good advantages in return for contributing French know-how.¹⁷⁷ This promotion of French advantages would help prevent EURATOM from becoming a force to unite the French extreme Left and extreme Right in a coalition similar to the one which defeated the European Defense Community.¹⁷⁸ It is important to realize that Mayer spoke as a *French* representative whose advice carried weight because he had served as a French Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs minister. Mayer's advice carried additional weight due to the instability of French cabinets in the mid-1950's. Another lesson learned from the failure of the EDC was that the United States had to step up and provide an additional incentive for Western European countries to keep united in a common atomic pool. Harold Robinson, assistant to Ambassador Dillon, affirmed that the United States had to provide the Europeans with a diplomatic "candy" linked to atomic energy to help them form a common authority.¹⁷⁹ Essentially involving a fuller release of American atomic technical information to EURATOM members this incentive, according to Robinson, was valuable as it would

¹⁷⁷ Telegram from Ambassador Dillon to the State Department July 18, 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4) Western European Security and Integration, pp. 320-21.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*,

¹⁷⁹ Letter from the Special Assistant to the Ambassador in France (Robinson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Robert Bowie) December 27, 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4) Western European Integration and Security, p. 381.

inject a positive emotional note into European integration and help dispel the negative emotions left over more than a year after EDC's failure.¹⁸⁰

It is important to note that the US government provided support to European integration both rhetorically and through work done within the State department. For example, on July 1, 1955 Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant made three recommendations to Secretary Dulles. He recommended that the United States should treat a European common atomic authority as it would a national state. Another recommendation stated that President Eisenhower should indicate openness to working with a voluntary group of states dealing with atomic energy such as the European Coal and Steel Community. Lastly, Merchant recommended that the State Department and Atomic Energy Commission should discuss how the US would assist Belgium in transferring to a common authority the responsibilities, privileges and leadership that flowed from the US-Belgium bilateral accord of June 1955. A clash occurred when Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for atomic energy affairs Gerard Smith along with the AEC contested Merchant's proposals. According to Smith, ECSC states and especially France and Belgium had not yet established their attitudes towards atomic energy integration and he warned that the US "should not at this point adopt a policy of support for a European atomic energy authority even in principle, or make an announcement of support . . . [which might be] difficult to implement." Gerard Smith should not have worried. By January 16, 1956 at a conference sponsored by the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, the French came out in favour of atomic energy development, seeing in it greater independence for France and Europe in energy production.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.,

¹⁸¹ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*. transl. by Richard Mayne. New York: Doubleday, 1978, pp. 417, 419.

Dulles played his part and promptly endorsed Livingston Merchant's first two recommendations. Dulles behaved this way likely because the recommendations to treat the common atomic authority as a national state and emphasis on the principle of voluntarism fit in with the Eisenhower administration's internationalist inclinations and also supported the American objective of getting European countries working together on matters of common concern. With the third recommendation concerning Belgium, Dulles felt that emphasis should lie on assisting Belgium, taking care not to pressure the country in working out terms of association with any atomic authority. Again, Dulles applied lessons learned from France's parliamentary rejection of EDC because to him, slow and steady progress in integrating Belgium into a New Europe was better than to take a hands off approach and eventually have plans blow up in the State Department's face. This approach was likely motivated by the fact that the Belgian government, some of whose members were ethnically French, was just as sensitive to apparent American meddling in Belgian domestic affairs as was the French government. Aside from ethnicity, it was going to take the United States longer to win over Belgian industrialists who operated in a much less *dirigiste* economy than their French counterparts.¹⁸² Industrialists in Belgium favoured bilateral agreements with the US whereby Congo uranium was sold to the Americans who in turn offered enriched uranium and technological assistance to the Belgians.¹⁸³

There was resistance in other corners of the American government with regards to American support for EURATOM. Admiral Strauss, chairman of the AEC, considered the proposed EURATOM activities socialist, and Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. criticized EURATOM's proposed centralized research as "ivory tower" work. This resistance was eventually overcome by 1956 as French political economist Jean Monnet

¹⁸² Lawrence Scheinman, *Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. p. 144.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*,

alleviated Admiral Strauss' concern that EURATOM would lead to socialization of atomic energy in Europe.¹⁸⁴ Monnet argued that Euratom could not in any sense affect property rights or laws existing in several countries nor could it influence the relation between public and private enterprises in the United States.¹⁸⁵ Euratom's purposes were far removed from socialization. The primary purposes were to stimulate and ensure European atomic development on a sufficiently broad base to allow furnishing such needs of the area as could not be done nationally.¹⁸⁶ Secondly, Euratom furnished a satisfactory mechanism whereby fissionable material would be subjected to the necessary security controls.¹⁸⁷

Dulles won the game of convincing his fellows in the United States government such as Admiral Strauss to get on board and support EURATOM because Dulles' advisors put together a logical set of arguments in favour of US encouragement of European integration. First, the assistants argued that American encouragement of European integration had received strong support from Congress and that the movement had potential economic and military benefits for Europe. Secondly, the most helpful avenue for relaunching the movement towards European integration now appeared to be the creation of a European common atomic energy authority. The clinching argument for Dulles was that from the perspective of US foreign policy, a European decision to create a real and effective atomic energy authority would contribute strongly to the US objective of European unity.¹⁸⁸ Dulles' efforts met with success because after the memo laying out these arguments was written on July 26, 1955, there is no more recorded opposition by Admiral Strauss to Euratom's "socialist activities."

¹⁸⁴ Memorandum of a Conversation April 28, 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4) Western European Security and Integration, p. 433.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*,

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*,

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*,

¹⁸⁸ Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Barbour) to Secretary of State, July 26, 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4): Western European Security and Integration, pp. 322-323.

In the middle of 1955, uncertainty tinged with fear gripped the top echelons of the State Department because it was not felt that the department had done enough work to stickhandle European atomic integration into being. The failure of integration efforts might encourage narrow German nationalism which might try to exploit East-West tension. In contrast, collaboration on nuclear energy might lead to a United States of Europe. Up until late 1955, the United States had failed to exercise any significant influence at all on European integration because the State Department and Atomic Energy Commission had not spoken with one voice. The department quietly encouraged a supranational organization while the AEC was inviting the European nations to sign bilateral treaties. At a 22 September 1955 meeting of representatives from the American embassies in the six ECSC countries there had been a heated dispute over whether preference should be given to the ECSC over the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). If the United States wanted to work toward its objectives, it would have to make some far reaching decisions and take actions. Consensus achieved at the meeting recommended that the US work through the ECSC to provide technical assistance and funding to European nations to construct a reasonable atomic research program.¹⁸⁹ One advantage of supranational organization of such a program was that it allowed the USA to distinguish its European policies from the Soviet "divide and conquer" approach of bilaterally manipulating individual countries to come to a solution pleasing to the Soviets. EURATOM was going to be run and managed by the Europeans themselves with the aid of some American fissionable material, without having the Americans taking a leading role in making key decisions.

In his own thinking, Dulles came down firmly on the side of those in the State department who wanted European countries to take an integrated approach to doing atomic energy research and development. Dulles wasted little time in putting his thoughts

¹⁸⁹ Helmreich, "The United States and the Formation of EURATOM," pp. 397-398.

into action. By the beginning of 1956, Dulles was convinced that "only the Community of Six offers promise of opening the way to a genuine United States of Europe."¹⁹⁰ NATO, the OEEC and the Western European Union all provided avenues of cooperation, but on an integrative rather than a supranational level. British reluctance to become involved meant that Europe needed some vehicle that could move forward without the British. Dulles wanted the US to be prepared to do its utmost to further the creation of an integrated community. President Eisenhower soon gave Dulles strong support by asking the AEC and the State Department jointly to study what moves could be made in the field of atomic energy. Despite Admiral Strauss' reservations, in February 1956 Eisenhower told both the AEC chairman Strauss and Dulles that he was willing to permit fissionable material to be held outside the US if it were under international control. Eisenhower's interest in encouraging joint international control of fissionable material was clear and by spring the State department and the AEC reached agreement. The bilateral treaties would proceed with those European countries that took the initiative but these treaties would deal only with immediate needs and would provide technology that would advance rather than impede integration. Each country would be told that the State department and the AEC would grant more resources and information to a responsible and integrated community than to any individual country.¹⁹¹

The abovementioned US strategy was a way of implementing Howard Robinson's caution against declassifying information as a means of getting around the issue of transferring restricted data to other countries. According to Robinson, there would always be some restricted data and it was only access to this data that would make an international consortium attractive to its prospective members.¹⁹² Robinson's solution

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 399.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.,

¹⁹² Letter from Howard Robinson to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning Robert Bowie, 27 December 1955. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4): Western European Security and Integration, p. 381

was genial because it could be more easily sold and promoted, politically speaking. To be part of the nuclear club and get access to advanced American nuclear scientific information, all members of the EURATOM group would have to do is join and keep careful watch that the common stock of American-donated fissionable materials was kept under international control and was used solely for peaceful purposes.

Before EURATOM became a reality in 1957, a controversy about whether or not France would have the right to conduct nuclear weapons research would have to be faced and resolved. Resolution of this controversy was important because the ultimate solution would point either towards life or death for prospects of European atomic cooperation. Jean Monnet started the controversy because he proposed that no country taking part in Euratom should have the right to make atomic weapons. Douglas Dillon opposed Monnet's idea because he felt its retention in EURATOM would create great difficulties for ratifying EURATOM in France. Dillon correctly argued that France would not voluntarily renounce its right to make nuclear weapons without an extremely bitter parliamentary battle in which those advocating a right to make nuclear weapons seemed to have the advantage. Dillon remembered how the EDC was torpedoed and argued that any domestic French political fight over the nuclear weapons would be bound to arouse the same type of ultranationalist feeling successfully aroused against the EDC. Dillon ended his argument by writing that he feared an insistence that France renounce the right to manufacture nuclear weapons may well mean the end of its participation in EURATOM.¹⁹³

That this controversy was real and not contrived is shown by the fact that Dillon's concern about France and atomic weapons was echoed by former Prime Minister Rene Mayer. Mayer also strongly believed that France would never give up its atomic weapons

193 Telegram from Ambassador Dillon in France to the State Department, February 3 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4): Western European Security and Integration, p. 401.

and that if EURATOM had this as a condition, it would never be accepted by the French parliament. Dulles himself provided a solution to the controversy when he suggested that under the International Atomic Energy Agency there might be an agreement saying that "fourth countries" would not make atomic weapons for a period of time during which an effort would be made to eliminate these weapons by agreement between the Americans, British and Soviets.¹⁹⁴ Dulles thought that France and others might be willing during this period not to complicate the situation by introducing a new element. Eventually by July 1956, the French government agreed not to make any atomic weapons in the years 1956 to 1960, inclusive.¹⁹⁵ However, the government decided in late 1955 that nuclear weapon research would continue during the four years and that France would begin manufacturing nuclear weapons in 1961.¹⁹⁶ The eventual resolution to this controversy shows that United States diplomacy was willing to respect the rights of Western European nations to self-determination and self-defence, in contrast to Soviet diplomacy in Central and Eastern Europe which did not respect such rights.

It is important to note that American support for an integrated atomic community in Europe remained strong during 1956 because of the advantages such a grouping held for US diplomatic goals. According to the Americans, an atomic energy community would contribute to reviving the general integration movement which in turn would help tie West Germany to the Atlantic alliance. The new atomic community would submerge Franco-German rivalry through the creation of intimate common interests in the field of nuclear development. Furthermore, a common program merging the scientific and industrial potential of the Six appeared to offer the best chance to rapidly develop the nuclear industry in continental western Europe. In a warning note, the State department affirmed

194 Memorandum of Conversation, February 6 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4): Western European Security and Integration, pp. 406-407.

195 N.A.R.A. File 751.00 U.S. Department of State Record Group 59, July 11 1956, p. 1.

196 *Ibid.*,

that all the above objectives could be adequately met only through the exercise by the six country organization of governmental powers in the nuclear energy field.

In fact, the only major concerns that the United States had about EURATOM was any potential incentive for the member states to become "separatist" and make their own deals to acquire nuclear fuel for research and development purposes. According to Dulles, if EURATOM was to meet the test of common authority and responsibility and not amount to a mere coordinating mechanism with certain control responsibilities, the State department thought that EURATOM should have authority over fuel which would be as complete as if EURATOM owned the fuel. Dulles was also concerned that a compromise in the EURATOM draft which would permit member states under certain circumstances to make separate arrangements to procure material outside EURATOM channels seemed to strike at the heart of the EURATOM concept which was a six nation atomic community.¹⁹⁷ However, by the end of 1956, the Europeans themselves had resolved Dulles' major concerns about the political behaviour of EURATOM.

At the end of 1956, it was evident that definite progress on EURATOM had occurred and that the quality of American support had improved due to lessons learned from EDC's failure in 1954. Firstly, by December 3 1956, West Germany had accepted the position of the other five nations that the Community should have a purchase monopoly over nuclear fuel.¹⁹⁸ This result answered Dulles' concern that it might be too easy for European nations to make their own deals to acquire nuclear fuel. Additionally, West Germany and the other five nations agreed that exceptions for national procurement could be made by the community if the prices for material were "abusive" or if there was an acute shortage of supply.¹⁹⁹ These conditions obviously did not make it easier for member

197 Telegram from the Secretary of State to Embassy in Belgium, May 24, 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4): Western European Security and Integration, p. 443.

198 Current Status of Euratom Negotiations, December 3 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 4): Western European Security and Integration, p. 493.

199 *Ibid.*,

states to make their own deals, as the Americans had feared. In return for the German concessions regarding purchasing, the others conceded by not insisting on full ownership by EURATOM of fissionable material but agreed to subject fissionable material to complete control by the Community.²⁰⁰ This community control of the fuel was as complete as Dulles wished for it to be when he laid out his concerns about EURATOM. Lastly, the EURATOM treaty allowed the French to engage in nuclear weapons research and development which would permit explosion of a weapon in four years, as demanded by the chamber of deputies in July 1956.²⁰¹ Dulles, a pragmatic diplomat, realized that this concession to France was necessary so that EURATOM became a reality without excessively dividing domestic French politics and having EURATOM suffer the same fate as EDC in 1954.

Part of the reason that EURATOM was ratified by the French Assembly was due to the intelligent political concessions made by the existing government to placate key parties who could make or break French adherence to EURATOM. Guy Mollet was Prime Minister in 1956 and the most ardent supporters of EURATOM were his own Socialist party and the centrist Popular Republicans, both of whom advocated European integration. Together, the Socialists and Popular Republicans commanded only 174 votes in the Assembly which meant they needed support from other parties if EURATOM were to materialize. The groups which were crucial to this success were the Radical Socialists, the Independents and the Social-Republicans (former Gaullists) who together could provide 167 votes. Existing evidence leads to the conclusion that the initiative for European atomic union would have been voted down by the French Assembly if the Mollet government had not conceded to the powerful political forces operating within the assembly by guaranteeing the retention of French rights and capacity to undertake military

²⁰⁰ Ibid.,

²⁰¹ Ibid.,

atomic development. It is clear that many of the Independents, Radicals and Gaullists would have withdrawn support for the EURATOM project if its acceptance implied renunciation of French atomic weapons research and development.²⁰²

Suez Crisis and its effect on French-American Relations

On 26 July 1956, Egypt's President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the main Europe-Asia connection that the British used to ship goods and oil to Europe from the Middle East. Initially, the American response was to call a Suez Conference to try and find a peaceful way of resolving the dispute between Britain, France and Egypt. No peaceful solution was found at the conference but British and French anger with Egyptian President Nasser continued to mount. Without informing the United States of their intentions, these two ex-imperial powers decided to salvage their badly wounded pride by colluding with Israel to invade Egypt to get back the canal which had largely been owned by British shareholders. Unfortunately for Britain and France, they did not obtain the expected support from the American government. What these two aggressors received instead was a hearty condemnation and punishment from the United States.

The penalty for gross misconduct that the United States levied was to chill US diplomatic relations with Britain and France as well as to withhold American oil supplies from these two countries. Soon after receiving President Eisenhower's message on November 10 about the expected Anglo-French withdrawal from Egypt, Prime Ministers Guy Mollet and Anthony Eden decided that a fence-mending mission to Washington was essential. Eden called Eisenhower and was relieved when the President gave him an encouraging answer. However, during Secretary Dulles' absence in the opinion of Acting Secretary Hoover and other officials, the Third World would view a visit by both prime ministers to Washington before Britain and France had complied with the UN resolution

²⁰² Lawrence Scheinman, *Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. pp. 158-159, 163-164.

as American connivance with the ex-imperial powers. Hoover acted on his opinion and phoned Dulles at Walter Reed hospital to ask him to change Eisenhower's opinion. The Secretary phoned the White House and a few hours later Eisenhower informed Eden that the visit was off. The American government was sensitive to the feelings of Third World countries because had it behaved differently, any credit the US gained in the last ten days in the Middle East, Africa and Asia would have been dissipated. Later that winter, Washington also made it plain that despite already-evident shortages, economic dislocations and the onset of winter, Britain and France could not expect the United States to make oil available from the Western Hemisphere until after British and French forces had been completely withdrawn from Egypt.²⁰³

Ambassador Douglas Dillon was competent because he provided much needed perspective which helped Dulles deal with French reaction to American diplomacy in late 1956. According to Dillon, nationalization by Egypt of the Suez canal produced extreme tension throughout France, the explosive character of which was not fully understood in the United States. Some violent release for the French became necessary, and since no other effective means of dealing with Nasser were found, military action was almost inevitable. Dillon wrote that the immediate effect of the invasion of Egypt on French opinion was to substantially release tension, to unite the country behind the government and create the momentary illusion that France's old position had been restored. Dillon thought the French attitude toward the United States was ambivalent because the French were eager to cooperate with the United States but at the same time felt "sold out" by the American pursuit of popularity with the Afro-Asian states. He added one American action which contributed to this anti-US feeling was the failure to take fast action to help the European oil crisis which was correctly considered an economic sanction directed against

203 Chester Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956*. New York: Harper and Row, 1978. p. 215.

France and Britain. Another action contributing to bad feelings was the US association with Afro-Asian states in insisting upon troop withdrawal before any satisfactory commitments from Nasser had been obtained. Lastly, the French were angry about the US refusal to hold high level tripartite talks with France and Britain to work out joint policies for the Middle East, which in France's view threatened its security more than American security.²⁰⁴

Douglas Dillon's opinions helped Dulles take the French and British indignation in stride and as a result, Dulles was confident that the American relationship with France and Britain would endure despite the current storm. At an NSC meeting on 30 November 1956, Undersecretary Hoover observed that Dulles tended to feel that while it was unfortunate that the British and French seemed to be turning so bitterly against the US government, such an attitude was perfectly logical because it was a result of utter frustration. Furthermore, Dulles did not believe that the development foreshadowed any basic split between the United States on one side and Britain and France on the other. To Dulles, what was occurring was essentially a violent family squabble, one not likely to end in divorce.²⁰⁵ In the end, Dulles was correct because once passions cooled about the European military response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, diplomatic relations between France, Britain and the United States still contained wounded feelings but recovered with no break in further cordial relations.

Summary

During 1955, a difference of opinion existed in the State department about the nature of the Algerian situation. One strand of thought opined that France's problem in Algeria was analogous to the Israeli-Arab situation while another assertion held that it

²⁰⁴ Douglas Dillon Telegram from Embassy in France to the Department of State, 28 November 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 27): Western Europe and Canada, pp. 89-90.

²⁰⁵ Memorandum of Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the National Security Council, 30 November 1956. *FRUS 1955-1957*: (Volume 16) Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956. pp. 1220-1221.

represented an incipient war of national liberation. Dulles and Eisenhower believed that Algeria constituted an incipient war of liberation and disagreed with the French that it was an "internal" matter for the French to handle alone. Dulles refused to give any helicopters to the French and even authorized a mid-level State department meeting with the Front de Liberation Nationale rebel leadership to get information from the rebels and to demonstrate anti-colonialist sympathies by showing other ex-colonies that the United States was serious about giving a hearing to countries seeking independence.

Just as the United States government did not like to see French colonial *dirigisme* in action, American diplomacy also worked to discourage French economic *dirigisme*. In 1955, the United States Treasury department became aware of a deal between the French oil industry and the firm Charbonnages de France. This arrangement was noteworthy because it created a defined market for coal and limited the market for oil in France's domestic market. The agreement was anti-competitive because it effectively created a cartel in France for the sale of coal and oil. Anti-competitiveness mattered because the US had given a loan to the High Authority of the ECSC in 1954 which in part stipulated that this money loaned be used to modernize the coal industry. The French and Americans did not come to blows partly because American oil companies were doing well because of a resurgent American economy. The Treasury Department also decided that this agreement was only a minor breach of anti-trust laws to be solved by negotiation. The same department reminded the American government to remember that it also took some time to break up cartels in the United States during the late nineteenth century.

The peaceful, relatively non-confrontational approach used towards France to discourage economic *dirigisme* was used to encourage Western European nations to construct a common program of atomic research and development. A key tactic which helped Dulles get France and other European states to become members of EURATOM in 1957 was the promise to extend better treatment to a unit of European countries which worked together. This better treatment was in the form of classified information which

would be made available to countries that joined an atomic pool, rather than those who signed bilateral treaties with the United States. What secured French membership in EURATOM was the concession by other countries that France should be allowed to perform nuclear weapons research and development from 1956 to 1960 inclusive. This compromise signified that Dulles had learned his lesson from the EDC debacle and in 1957 did not allow the extreme Left and extreme Right in the French Assembly to scuttle the possibility of French membership in a common atomic authority. Dulles successfully managed to engineer the compromise without having French-American relations excessively embittered by the American refusal to support the Franco-British attack on Egypt in late 1956 in response to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez canal.

Chapter Four: Financial Crisis and Coming of de Gaulle, 1957-early 1959

The years 1957 to early 1959 were dramatic times in French-American relations. France's government experienced a financial crisis, the Fourth Republic ended and General Charles de Gaulle became French prime minister for the second time since the end of World War II. The crisis in French public finances occurred in the context of a booming general economy but was exacerbated by France's increased repression of the rebellion in Algeria. This rebellion did not cause the financial crisis but it did not help that the Algerian conflict was costing the French government approximately one billion dollars US extra per year in 1957 and 1958, a sum of money which could have gone for other uses. Dulles helped solve the French financial crisis by extending some American financial aid while assuring that the French government took necessary actions to rein in public spending and the deficit. Dulles did not extend any financial aid to the French military effort in Algeria because of well known American antipathy to French behaviour there. As a whole, French involvement in Algeria became much less contentious by early 1959 because it seemed that de Gaulle was slowly winding down that war to prepare for a grant of autonomy to Algeria. Lastly, Dulles was willing to explore but finally vetoed any attempt by de Gaulle to create a US/UK/French directorate which would have made decisions for NATO and other countries in the Free World.

One can also examine during this period the contrast between an intense US involvement in France's internal affairs and a later reluctance to become involved in French problems. This seeming dichotomy was one of the complexities of French-American relations that Dulles had to negotiate with President Eisenhower's help. For instance, the United States government was heavily involved in finding a solution for the French financial crisis, even if it did not give much financial assistance. The rationale behind this US behaviour was likely to help a very important country to get its finances fixed which would inoculate it against financial collapse or a rightist seizure of power. In the case of

Dulles' refusal to set up a ruling directorate with prime minister de Gaulle, the cool American reception given to the idea was driven by Dulles' anti-imperialist diplomacy. Dulles and his assistants also became less concerned about finding a solution for the Algerian rebellion because it appeared that General de Gaulle had a plan to end the war. The French also helped to push away the Americans by explaining that to prematurely end the war in Algeria by declaring Algeria independent would itself threaten a rightist revolution from those who believed that Algeria was an integral part of France.

In for a centime, in for a pound²⁰⁶

In early 1957, the State Department was aware of the French government's financial difficulties and recommended financing that would help it gain much needed income. An economic analysis revealed that since early 1956 France had relieved its inflationary pressures primarily through substantial increases of imports. These imports represented mainly energy, raw materials and equipment required by expanding French industrial production. The State department doubted that the French government would be able in the near future to reduce its expenditures and control domestic inflation by making difficult political decisions about Algeria, overseas territories, defense spending and social programs. Despite the difficulties that France faced, the American embassy in Paris recommended that an Export-Import Bank loan of \$100 million U.S. to finance the purchase of commercial aircraft be given to France's government. This loan would allow the French government to gain additional revenue through its state-owned airline and thus improve the country's public finances. The State department went no further in loaning new money to France because according to the department, this money would have provided the French government opportunities for avoiding necessary spending cutbacks to national defense expenditures, civil service payrolls and public works.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ The title for this subsection paraphrases the saying "In for a penny, in for a pound" and is meant to illustrate the intense American political involvement in France's financial crisis.

²⁰⁷ Telegram from the Embassy in France to Department of State, 19 February 1957.

In March 1957 the French were bluntly told that, although the United States would license arms exports to France for use in Algeria, the French would receive no financing from the American government for such purchases. American chargé d'affaires Charles Yost wrote that his government realized that considerable funds had been spent and committed by France to procure in the United States certain supplementary arms required by French forces operating in Algeria. According to Yost, while these French exports were licensed by the US government, it considered these requirements to be a matter for decision exclusively by France in accordance with its own plans and priorities. Yost concluded that the US government did not consider the financing of weapons purchases for Algeria, directly or indirectly, to be a suitable undertaking for the United States.²⁰⁸ In other words, the US government was not going to finance a military action with which it disagreed.

By May 1957, the "turn of the screw" being applied to French public finances by the American government was having some effect because the French took action to rein in public spending. For instance, the French government cut its budget by 250 billion francs and hoped to raise 150 billion francs in additional taxes. According to French minister Robert Marjolin, the French government had made substantial reductions to the tune of 66 billion francs from national defense, 25 billion from civil service payrolls and some remaining cuts in public works like roads, electrification and railways. Even with this apparent progress shown by the French government, the American government withheld loans from the French due to their heavy indebtedness. Douglas Dillon explained to minister Marjolin that it was difficult for the Export-Import bank to finance new French aircraft when France was already its largest borrower. Dillon stated that no large sums of

FRUS 1955-1957 (Volume 17): Western Europe and Canada, pp. 101-102.

²⁰⁸ Letter from the Charge d'affaires in France (Yost) to the French Minister of National Defense (Bourges-Maunoury) 13 March 1957. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 17): Western Europe and Canada, pp. 116-117.

money were available but that if the French government were to take further steps to remedy its financial situation, there might be various means for the United States to help France in a small way.²⁰⁹

Despite the French financial difficulties and the fact that France was bogged down in Algeria, the American government was optimistic about possible solutions to these problems. An NSC report of 19 October 1957 provided an upbeat summary of the overall French economy. It stated that France was one of the most prosperous countries in Europe with industrial raw materials and agricultural resources. The NSC felt that in 1957 France possessed the greatest abundance in its history, a high and rising standard of living as well as an expanding economy. This favourable situation did not preclude the possibility of reforms such as placing the fiscal system on a sounder footing and freeing the economy from foreign trade and exchange controls and government subsidies. The NSC report stated that implementation of the European Common Market treaty could eventually contribute to these reforms. In addition, increasing population and current development of nuclear energy would contribute to France's future economic potential.²¹⁰

Even though the United States government viewed the French economy as sound, the NSC did highlight French government fiscal weaknesses. For instance, French government accounts ran an annual deficit of roughly twenty percent of total expenditures. By writing about this, the NSC implied that this deficit was too high. In 1956, the Algerian campaign raised the overall government deficit by a billion US dollars to \$2.8 billion U.S. Since 1956, a rise in French government expenditures was largely attributable to increased government spending for purposes other than operations in Algeria. For example, the French government made high levels of investment and provided extensive credit to

209 Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State 17 May 1957. *FRUS 1955-1957* (Volume 17): Western Europe and Canada, pp. 125-126.

210 National Security Council report "Statement of US Policy on France" October 1957. *FRUS 1955-1957* Volume 17: Western Europe and Canada, pp. 183-184.

businesses. However, the inflation that accompanied the boom of the last eighteen months was dealt with largely through massive imports and continually expanding production, at the expense of French dollar reserves, which were seriously reduced. The NSC report gave the French government some credit in taking corrective steps because it stated that substantial cuts had been made in projected budgetary expenditures. However, to truly cure the French financial malaise, the NSC felt that France needed to cut the budget even more, decrease credit allocation and place restrictions on consumption and investment. The NSC's account of the French fiscal situation was realistic in its assessment that French governments could not further tighten the national belt and still remain in power.²¹¹ To take a harder line and cut more expenses would involve the French government in turning its back on its historic economic *dirigisme*.

The financial situation detailed above is important because it composed a key part of how the Americans and French viewed their relationship. According to the NSC, by 1957 relations between the two countries were not easy and would likely become more difficult given the French government's reluctance to admit its declining position and given the emergence of American influence in former and present areas of French influence. In addition, US ability to bring effective pressure on French attitudes and policies was limited by French stubbornness about conducting the Algerian campaign. At the end of the report, some US objectives were stated regarding relations with France. One objective was the maintenance of good US-French relations and French policies generally in consonance with American ones. Another listed objective was French political and economic contribution to and increased participation in European integration. These two objectives were accomplished by the end of Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State in early 1959. The United States did much work in association with the International Monetary Fund to assist France achieve economic and financial well-being by early 1959. The only objective in

²¹¹Ibid., 185.

Franco-American relations relevant to this thesis which was not accomplished by early 1959 was an equitable settlement of the Algerian conflict and this was not resolved because of factors having to do with French domestic politics.

Major provisions for French financial well-being were made in a credit agreement between France and the United States on 30 January 1958. The French obtained \$274 million US in financial facilities as a reward for undertaking significant measures to get their financial situation under control.²¹² For instance, the French parliament adopted a budget which drastically cut government spending and at the same time provided for new taxes to increase government revenues.²¹³ In addition, this budget provided that total outlays by the French Treasury would be covered by taxes and non-inflationary borrowing. The difference between total outlays and fiscal revenue would be covered by normal Treasury resources and the mobilization of savings.²¹⁴ These actions were made necessary because during 1957, due to rampant French inflation, the French drew down their foreign exchange and gold reserves, actions which were accompanied by a severe deficit in the balance of payments.²¹⁵ It appeared that France was going to run out of foreign exchange resources to pay outstanding balances but the French remedied this situation with measures taken in fall 1957.²¹⁶ The major decrease in French government spending combined with more efficient use of Treasury resources and the mobilization of savings helped reduce inflation, restricted credit and as such the American government decided that these actions deserved some American support.²¹⁷

212 Press Release 41 "Statement Issued by the French Government Regarding Financial Discussions with the Government of the United States," January 30, 1958. File 751S.00, DS, RG 59, NARA, p. 5.

213 Ibid., 5.

214 Ibid., 5

215 Memorandum of Press and Radio News Conference January 30, 1958. File 751S.00, DS, RG 59, NARA, p. 2.

216 Ibid.,

217 Ibid.,

In conjunction with other financing, the \$274 million in US financial facilities helped the French make a recovery in their balance of payments. According to the OEEC, the recovery in French balance of payments was quite remarkable in 1959. This was because the trade balance with foreign countries had shown a surplus since May 1959 and income from tourism had greatly increased. In addition, foreign and French investors showed their approval of the stabilized Fifth Republic regime by returning foreign currency to France such that in November 1959 France repaid \$200 million dollars of credit to the International Monetary Fund received in early 1958 in conjunction with American financial aid. Lastly, the devaluation of the French franc that occurred at the end of 1958 greatly increased French exports near the end of 1958 and during 1959.²¹⁸ Therefore, the NSC's stated goal to get France on a sounder financial footing was achieved by 1959, the year Dulles resigned his post as Secretary of State.

The financial aid that the French received from the US government was insufficient to restore order in French public finances. When Charles de Gaulle assumed power in June 1958 as prime minister, the American National Security Council underestimated his ability to resolve France's financial crisis. At the June 3 NSC meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson stated that France's financial situation was in crisis mode.²¹⁹ Anderson also said that he thought that France's financial outlook was very serious and predicted that France's government would not meet its balance of payments.²²⁰ Pessimistically, Secretary Anderson added that the French were likely going to be forced to delay implementing the Common Market.²²¹ In fact, by mid-July 1958, the French government offered tax advantages and in return successfully raised 320 billion francs to partially insure its solvency to the end of 1958.²²² In the same year, the French state also

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

²¹⁹ Editorial Note, 3 June 1958. *FRUS 1958-1960* Volume 7: Western Europe. p. 25.

²²⁰ Ibid.,

²²¹ Ibid.,

²²² Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle*. translated by Alan Sheridan. London: Harper Collins.

succeeded in reducing the budget deficit to a more manageable amount (587 B francs).²²³ To accomplish this, 300 billion francs in new taxes were raised while close to 400 billion francs were cut from expenses by abolishing many social and agricultural grants.²²⁴ Putting its finances in order permitted the French state to be strong enough to join the Common Market on January 1, 1959 as originally planned.²²⁵ In December 1958, De Gaulle and his advisors decided to free 90% of franc currency transactions in the EEC zone and they instituted an immediate reduction of close to 10% of customs tariffs with the other five Treaty of Rome partners.²²⁶

France in Algeria: A Disagreement Being Resolved

By July 1958, the French pacification campaign in Algeria was less important an issue in French-American relations because officials on both sides saw the problem as one on its way to being resolved. In a meeting with Secretary Dulles on 5 July 1958, de Gaulle affirmed that his main purpose for the time being was to calm things down (emotionally and politically speaking) in France regarding Algeria.²²⁷ De Gaulle expressed hope that Algerians would vote in the referendum on a new constitution.²²⁸ As far as Algeria was concerned, De Gaulle wished to take it one step at a time because he realized that the age of colonialism was over but that one had to move slowly if there was to be genuine independence.²²⁹ Algeria was not now a cause for recrimination on Dulles' and Eisenhower's part because both were sensitized in discussions with de Gaulle to the notion of an Algerian solution that would take time to accomplish. On 21 August 1958, President

1991. pp. 223-225.

²²³ Ibid.,

²²⁴ Ibid.,

²²⁵ Ibid.,

²²⁶ Ibid.,

²²⁷ Memorandum by Secretary of State Dulles, 5 July 1958. *FRUS 1958-1960* (Volume 7): Western Europe, p. 65.

²²⁸ Ibid.,

²²⁹ Ibid.,

Eisenhower told French foreign minister Couve de Murville that he feared future developments in North Africa and said that a solution to the Algerian problem was indispensable.²³⁰ Eisenhower concluded by stating his confidence that de Gaulle could accomplish a meaningful solution for Algeria.²³¹

One factor in reducing Algeria's importance as a "problem" in Franco-American relations was likely the clear explanations offered by Prime Minister de Gaulle's ministers to the Americans about the reasons for French behaviour in Algeria. In July 1958, Minister of State Pierre Pflimlin explained that the Algerian situation was calmer and that de Gaulle had matters under control, partly because De Gaulle cultivated an ambiguity about his approach to Algeria that allowed both Left and Right to read their intentions into De Gaulle's actions. Pflimlin added that it was impossible for France to have a liberal policy in Algeria today because immediate independence for Algeria was impossible without bringing on a revolution in France. Pflimlin emphasized that he did not agree with and was not defending such a state of affairs but that he wanted to let the Americans know the facts of French domestic politics.²³² After hearing Pflimlin's explanation, officials in the State Department were impressed with de Gaulle's measures for Algeria to appoint a liberal Algerian governor and the grant of clemency to prisoners in Algeria which the newly-installed President de Gaulle authorized in January 1959.²³³ The US embassy in France wrote that officials were convinced that De Gaulle regarded Algeria as a number one problem and that his government's success would depend on its solution. Therefore, the embassy felt that de Gaulle must continue to seek ways to find such solutions. That De

²³⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, 21 August 1958. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

²³¹ *Ibid.*,

²³² Memorandum of Conversation, 28 July 1958. **File 751.00**, DS, RG 59, p. 1, **NARA**.

²³³ On December 21, 1958 Charles de Gaulle was popularly elected President of France and was installed as first President of the Fifth republic on January 8, 1959. Historically in France, it was traditional for a newly installed king in his role as Chief Magistrate to grant clemency to prisoners. This action started the kingship on a good note and served to distinguish the new king from his predecessors.

Gaulle was in a liberal frame of mind on Algeria was demonstrated by his appointment of Paul Delouvrier (believed to have liberal views regarding Algeria) as Delegate General and de Gaulle's act of granting clemency to Algerian political detainees and rebel prisoners on January 13, 1959. This embassy despatch noted that clemency was granted despite opposition from most Algerian deputies and a considerable outcry by the Algerian Right. The despatch concluded that it was hard to conceive that the gesture of granting clemency was an isolated act from a long range solution.²³⁴

Three's Company: A Failed Gaullist Initiative

In 1958, after Charles de Gaulle's return to power as French prime minister, Dulles let France know that he was still proceeding to conduct American diplomacy along anti-imperialist lines. According to Dulles, the Free World Great Powers would always continue to have special responsibilities. Dulles also stated that in the context of decolonization then occurring, these special responsibilities had to be carefully exercised so as not to give the impression of dominating smaller, newly-independent nations because these nations attached great importance to the principle of sovereign equality. As a pragmatic man, Dulles knew that in every society a minority dominated the majority. In order to preserve its influence, the minority had a responsibility not to affront the majority. Dulles felt that to be effective, the minority had to exercise its influence in a discreet manner. Dulles concluded that an overt formalization of groupings for directing the Free World would be resented as imperialistic, but he also believed that an informal group could direct world affairs.²³⁵

In September 1958, De Gaulle wrote a letter to President Eisenhower in which the French prime minister did not agree with Dulles' vision of Great Power diplomacy.

²³⁴ Foreign Service despatch from American Embassy in Paris to the Department of State, 22 January 1959. File 751.00, DS, RG 59, p. 8, NARA.

²³⁵ Memorandum of Conversation 5 July 1958, *FRUS 1958-1960* (Volume 7): Western Europe, p. 57.

Because de Gaulle viewed himself as a saviour of France who wanted to reconstruct some of France's former imperial glory, he felt the best way to do this would be on a tripartite basis with the United Kingdom and the United States. Essentially, De Gaulle believed that NATO was concerned with an area of the world which was too small because Middle Eastern and African developments also concerned Europe, especially Britain and France as ex-imperial powers. He also believed that France's indivisible responsibilities extended to Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific in the same way as the responsibilities of Great Britain and the United States. From this analysis, de Gaulle concluded that an organization composed of the United States, Great Britain and France needed to be set up to create worldwide diplomatic and military strategy. De Gaulle believed that it would be up to this organization to make joint decisions on political issues affecting world security and on the other hand to establish strategic action plans regarding deployment of nuclear weapons.²³⁶

The American reaction to De Gaulle's letter showed American sensitivity to the feelings of smaller European nations and Asian and African nations outside NATO. For instance, Secretary Dulles was concerned about a pattern of tripartite talks being held and felt that this should be avoided. President Eisenhower supported Dulles and also felt that the meetings should not be held unless they were absolutely necessary. Dulles did not want the smaller NATO countries to believe that France, the UK and the US were deciding NATO's future without their input. However, Dulles was willing to consult the French about the tripartism. To do this effectively, he felt a need to ask Ambassador Hervé Alphand questions about revising the North Atlantic treaty and how France thought that areas outside NATO would be persuaded to accept NATO's extension to cover them. Dulles also added that from an anti-colonialist perspective, publicizing the de Gaulle

236 Letter from Prime Minister De Gaulle to President Eisenhower, 17 September 1958. *FRUS 1958-1960* (Volume 7): Western Europe, p. 83.

memorandum was dangerous because Asian and African nations would be opposed to both Euro-American tripartism and tripartite military operations outside NATO's area.²³⁷

By December 1958, the United States still did not accept France's idea of a new organization composed of itself, Britain and the United States which would plot world strategy. In response, the French clarified their ideas and emphasized that the proposed organization would have no vetoes and would not impose its decisions on fourth countries. According to Ambassador Alphand, de Gaulle proposed a US/UK/French organization which would seek to arrive at a common decision on matters concerning world security. Alphand emphasized that the organization would not be a "directorate" and said that the term had been invented by the press. The new organization would engage in organized and permanent consultation not just on urgent cases but would provide long range planning so that there would be no surprises as the French had experienced in recent years. Reacting to M. Alphand's words, deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy still expressed misgivings at the thought of another institution being established because this could lead to doubt and suspicion among the NATO allies. Instead, Murphy suggested that what was called for was an expansion of political consultation within NATO rather than a narrower three-power organization which would be bound to cause bad feelings.²³⁸

Essentially, on 15 December 1958 any thought of the United States, Great Britain and France creating a new organization to make decisions for the Free World was killed by Secretary Dulles. He said he agreed that a good deal more could be done to consult with France and Great Britain to achieve common understandings on policies in various parts of the world. However, Dulles firmly believed that consultations should be informal

²³⁷ Memorandum of Conversation 17 October 1958. *FRUS 1958-1960* (Volume 7): Western Europe, pp. 101-102.

²³⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, 4 December 1958. *FRUS 1958-1960* (Volume 7): Western Europe, pp. 131-132.

and not consist of structural reorganization of NATO in such a fashion that one country would have a veto power over others. Dulles stated that with France's rebirth under its present leadership, the US would not only find possible but desire closer diplomatic relations with France. In foreign policy, Dulles was conservative in the sense that with respect to Franco-American relations, he wanted to preserve what he considered were the best aspects. For instance, Dulles said that formal reorganization of NATO and construction of a new organization superimposed on NATO would wreck what existed and which had much value.²³⁹ What Dulles likely had in mind was to preserve the collegial tone of NATO decisionmaking which made the smaller countries feel that they could effectively contribute to decisionmaking rather than have decisions dictated by a small group of countries.

²³⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, 15 December 1958. *FRUS 1958-1960* (Volume 7): Western Europe, p. 151.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that in his handling of French-American relations from 1953 to 1959 that Foster Dulles was an effective Secretary of State. He provided help to the French which extricated France from its war in Indochina in 1954. In the same year the French were persuaded to join the Western European Union and to let their former German enemies become part of the NATO alliance. Dulles manipulated certain French political traits such as an attachment to "honour" by making sure France was always diplomatically respected. He avoided a cut off of aid under the Richards Amendment when the French parliament was voting on NATO membership for Germany and French participation in WEU. As a sign of his dedication to peacemaking, Dulles also stayed up all night during 20-23 October 1954 ready to mediate while France and West Germany negotiated a successful end to the Saar dispute. With respect to French membership in EURATOM, Dulles helped negotiate a compromise whereby the French were allowed to conduct nuclear research and development from 1956 to 1960. In return, France permitted limited national control of fissionable materials within EURATOM. In late 1957 and early 1958, Dulles made sure that France received American financial help with its fiscal crisis. This help was targeted so that the French were persuaded to restructure government finances to make further emergency foreign financial assistance unnecessary.

It is also clear that Dulles alone could not have accomplished what he did in facilitating French-American relations without the support of key individuals. For instance, Dulles used his knowledge of the French culture and philosophy of government to help Ambassador Douglas Dillon gather useful information for making American policies towards France. Ambassador Dillon helped Dulles to effectively handle French Premier Mendes-France's intelligence and sense of purpose which resulted in Mendes-France successfully defending in the French Assembly the Geneva agreement to end the First Indochina War. President Eisenhower also provided Dulles with important political

support at many key intervals. When deciding whether or not to intervene to save the French at Dienbienphu, Eisenhower decided against intervention on the advice of the British government and that of key American military chiefs. Dulles concurred and added that intervention would not work because there would not be time to arrange proper political understandings with the French. Eisenhower also supported Dulles' attempt to resolve problems in Europe multilaterally instead of bilaterally. The multilateral approach allowed the US to reconcile France and West Germany while keeping the Soviet Union out of Western European nuclear politics. The US by using a multilateral approach was able to set a positive example and distinguish American diplomacy from the classic Soviet divide-and-conquer approach. While EURATOM was being set up, President Eisenhower supported the idea of creating one nuclear agency which would have as an inducement to join a fuller release of American atomic information than would be available to countries making bilateral arrangements with the United States. In the end, EURATOM was negotiated and set up along multilateral lines. President Eisenhower also helped defeat the directorate initiative by France when he said trilateral meetings should not be held unless absolutely necessary. The Policy Planning Staff also provided Dulles with invaluable help in dealing with France. It is a sign of Dulles' considerable intelligence that he was willing to take and implement the PPS's advice even in an area where he considered himself to be an expert because of his life experience.

Even with all his strengths and the support he possessed, Dulles as a diplomat was not perfect and made mistakes. In 1954, Dulles was not able to persuade France to ratify French membership in the European Defense Community designed to create a common European army into which French and West German soldiers would be merged. The EDC idea failed in France partly because the French extreme Left and extreme Right joined forces to defeat EDC in the National Assembly. Dulles and the State Department learned from their mistake when it came time to negotiate French entry into EURATOM. Dulles was sensitized to the necessity of not having the French enter EURATOM on conditions

that would make it easy for French rightists and leftists to torpedo French entrance into EURATOM in the same way these groups defeated French adoption of EDC. American diplomacy solved that problem by letting France conduct nuclear research and development from 1956 to 1960 as a condition of France gaining entry into EURATOM. This move effectively neutralized the French Right which could no longer argue that France was being deprived of its independence when it joined EURATOM. Dulles and Eisenhower could not persuade the French to end the war in Algeria but this outcome had more to do with domestic French politics, something over which Dulles and Eisenhower had very little control when dealing with the Algerian issue.

Finally, Dulles and Eisenhower's foreign policies *vis-a-vis* the French in the 1950's were consistent in their pursuit of anti-colonialism. The United States extended a helping hand both with money and diplomatic muscle to get France to end its war in Indochina in 1954. In contradistinction to Soviet methods of ruling its European satellites, the European Atomic and Economic Communities were set up to be owned and controlled by the Europeans, without the Americans directing their activities. American anti-colonialism even embraced nations in North Africa who were seeking independence. Dulles acknowledged that Algerian FLN rebels had legitimate aspirations to independence when he authorized mid-level State department meetings with them. The Americans were pleased that when Charles de Gaulle came to power in France in 1958, that he was moving in the direction of granting Algeria independence. Dulles and President Eisenhower also understood that De Gaulle had to move gradually on the Algerian issue in order not to risk too violent a backlash from the French Right. However, Dulles and Eisenhower rejected a Gaullist initiative to form a British-French-American directorate which would make world policy. This was the result of American UN representative Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.'s work during which he established good relations with former British and French colonies and convinced the White House that it was in America's interest to take seriously the concerns of these Third World countries. This sentiment was translated into an American refusal to

make these countries in effect second-class citizens to be controlled by a directorate composed of former colonial rulers. A valuable legacy that Dulles left behind in the outcome of his diplomacy was the orderly way he built a stable framework within NATO, the Economic Community and EURATOM for American-French and American-European relations, a framework which has since been augmented by newer generations of European and American statesmen and stateswomen.

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