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COMPOSITE DIPLOMACY: CANADIAN INNOVATION AMIDST GLOBAL UNCERTAINTY

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Abstract – This condensed paper is the culmination of a one-year research effort – an investigation addressing two issue areas: the first being the West's apparent and disturbing inability to address and ameliorate emerging forms of global intrastate war, and second, Canada's dire need to resurrect its foreign policy in order to actively participate on the world stage. In answering both of these problems, the paper proposes that Canada adopt, as a policy focus, a newly formed diplomatic strategy termed *Composite Diplomacy*.

Introduction: Democratization and Conflict

Global conflict has begun a marked transformation since the end of the Cold War. Despite the rather auspicious news that the world has experienced a 60% drop in global war since 1991, the shifting nature and composition of emerging forms of conflict should be of significant concern.[1] While the platform for traditional Western foreign policy has been built chiefly upon the need to address issues of interstate politics and interstate war, current trends in global warfare have clearly highlighted an emerging challenge to this dominant state-centric doctrine.

Since the end of the Cold War, great-power politics based on the bifurcated struggle between East and West, have given way to smaller and more protracted regional disputes around the globe. Despite the enormous attention paid to the ongoing struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is 'intrastate' war (conflict within the borders of a nation), which now comprises nearly 100% of total global warfare.[2] Indeed, if we were to take a snapshot of global conflict in 1997 what we would see is a complete absence of any conventional interstate wars, even though there were 24 intrastate wars, and by the year 2000, 35 intrastate wars.[3] Such statistics demand attention – particularly with respect to the role of new actors and new motives. As an emerging aspect of security discourse, intrastate war and its associated variables require that analysis be directed at

[1] One of the most valid and reliable data sets on the incidence of war from 1946 – 2002 is published in: Ted Robert Gurr et al., *Peace and Conflict 2003*, (College Park: Center for International Development & Conflict Management, 2003). The data includes countries with populations of at least 500,000 in 2002, (which equates to 158 countries worldwide). Of these countries, those countries that had 500 or more deaths directly attributable to conflict were listed as conflicts. The magnitude and categorization of the conflicts were then measured using indices of combatant and casualty number, size of affected area and dislocated population, and extent of infrastructure damage. For more information on measuring war, see "Monty G. Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Effects of War", chapter 4 in Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
[2] Ibid.
[3] John McDonald, *The Need for Multi-Track Diplomacy*, (Washington: The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2000).

the underlying issues perpetuating it in order to construct effective and sustainable strategies of intervention.

Running lockstep into the rising incidence of intrastate war is the phenomenon of political change and transitional governments that have been specifically deemed offshoots of a 'third wave' of democratization – a global expansion of democratic countries from 40 in 1974, to over 100 in 1996.[4] Certainly, much of this so-called third wave of democracy has been attributed to the demise of the former-Soviet Union in 1991, which, upon its restructuring, released from its iron clasp the social and political identities of various groups who could no longer find political or ideological sanctuary under the communist umbrella.

With rare exception, all of the world's regions except Africa have shown positive strides toward the goal of liberal democracy. In Africa, many political transitions that promised democratic reform have subsequently stalled, leaving these nations mired in a quasi 'anocracy' – a sociopolitical condition in which the country is politically adrift between a pure autocracy and pure democracy. Such anocracies boast neither the absolute control of authoritarianism nor the constitutional freedoms of democracy – leaving instead a sociopolitical environment that can easily breed fear and competition. It is of no surprise then, that conditions of anocracy, which border on state collapse, are likely to present the ideal environment for intrastate conflict. In the words of Jack Levy, state collapse leaves ethnic groups in a world of "emerging anarchy", a world rife with uncertainty and fear about their ethnic future, and one that promotes a defensive reaction against other ethnic groups in the ensuing struggle for power and social space.[5] While the risk of intrastate war is certainly deemed proportional to a country's anocratic condition, nations that merely embark on the path of democratization or are in the process of democratization are also highly susceptible to conflict – being 40% more likely to experience intrastate fighting and hostilities than either stable autocracies or mature democracies.[6]

The Composition of Intrastate War: Actors and Motivating Forces

A study in 1995 produced by Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen not only highlighted the emerging global trends concerning intrastate war, it also brought to the fore one of the most salient, and troubling characteristics of intrastate war – the role of the citizen as both victim and combatant.[7] As opposed to conventional state-hired soldiers, citizens who fight in support of ethnic, religious, or communal-based affiliations present a formidable challenge for would-be interventionists, given the visceral motives for which they fight.

The traditional spoils of war – territory, resources, power, and wealth can remain visible on the surface of intrastate war. However, conflicts that involve citizen combatants may also contain less tangible underlying issues that can be missed through conventional analyses. As Jay

[4] The number of democracies here varies according to the measurements used to define a "democracy". Despite how democracy is defined, the range of data indicates a distinct and relative spike in the number of democratic regimes worldwide. For a discussion of the third wave, See, Larry Diamond, *Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over?,* Working Paper #236, (1997), World Wide Web: http://www.nd.edu/~kellogg/WPS/236.pdf

[5] Jack S. Levy, "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach", In Crocker et al., 2001, 3-27.

[6] E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, "Democratic Transitions and War", In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, and P. All, ed., *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001) 115.

[7] For a summary of Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen's 1995 study, see J.L. Rasmussen, "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century", In I.W. Zartman and J.L. Rasmussen, ed., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, (Washington: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) 23-50.

Rothman suggests, one common interpretation of these non-conventional motives can be described by the roles that the "primary group identities of the participants" play within the conflict.[8] Adding to this, former U.S. Ambassador and long-time diplomat John McDonald states that in the wake of the Cold War and warring empires, modern human conflict has been a product of efforts to preserve certain fundamental, non-negotiable human identities – namely religion, language, and culture.[9] J. Lewis Rasmussen points out that "nearly two-thirds of the ongoing conflicts in the year 1993 could be defined as 'identity-based'", a statistic that reflects a fundamental shift in the nature and dynamic of modern war .[10] The most hardened and intractable of these identities are the ones that become cemented to the defining quality of a particular group and are thus utterly non-negotiable, be it a religious identity, ethnic identity, or otherwise.

With prolonged societal conflict, the naming and categorizing of groups within a population can galvanize group membership and allegiance while promoting intolerance and suspicion of those who fall outside the group. As was evidenced during the Rwandan genocide, average individuals were more than capable of killing their fellow neighbours – a feat that can apparently be accomplished with devastating efficiency using the crudest of weapons. However, what was most interesting in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide was the apparent lack of personal accountability or perceived culpability for the murders. Seemingly, the perpetrators of the genocide, by way of strong in-group allegiances, permitted the group members' pro-social morals to override their own individual morals, thereby acquitting them of any wrongdoing – a phenomenon that is most certainly a testament to the strength of group memberships in conflict.[11] Indeed, genocide and torture remain the leading examples of processes in which individual conscience routinely capitulates in the face of collective attitudes and strongly defined group borders. According to Kenneth Jowitt, when 'groupthink' (a group behaviour pattern that is characteristic in riots) is seen in strongly defined group settings, the checks and balances normally afforded by personal morality are overridden by group behaviour. As Jowitt puts it, "where individualism is absent, violence is more likely to be present".[12]

The real issue of intrastate war is that it can introduce social and psychological variables into the calculus of political or military intervention – factors that conventional methods of strategy are ill equipped to handle. To ignore these new variables would be to operate on a fictional understanding of modern conflict – intervening with the hope that any deep social and psychological wounds and hatreds expressed by citizen combatants will somehow dissipate or heal upon the cessation of hostilities. The frequent re-ignition of citizen-level violence in the wake of formal peace agreements suggests that this is simply not the case.

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[8] Jay Rothman, *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict: The ARIA Framework*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997) 5.
[9] McDonald, 2000, 3-5.
[10] Rothman, 1997, 30
[11] Ervin Staub describes two forms of moral behaviour: "personal and prosocial". In so doing he notes that in "Nazi Germany, the former [personal morality] gave way to the latter because of the influence of the Nazi regime, which was inapplicable to Jews and other devalued groups". See Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), 145.
[12] Kenneth Jowitt, "Ethnicity: Nice, Nasty, and Nihilistic. In Ethnopolitical Warfare:
Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions", In Daniel Chirot, and Martin E. P. Seligman, *Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions*, (Washington, American Psychological Association, 2002) 27-48.

New Challenges for Intervention

Throughout history, wars and conflicts have been mostly fought or settled by strong-handed power-coercive strategies. Defining the victor and the vanquished was somewhat easier given the clearer definitions of who constituted a combatant as well as the highly predictable actions of both soldier and state during wartime. However, in intrastate and societal conflicts, the employment of power-coercive techniques as a strategy for attaining peace has become increasingly challenged because the traditional strategic understandings of power and threat seem incalculable when pitted against combatants primarily motivated by collective psychology. As such, past ceasefires between militaries that employed conventional armies – in which the uniformed soldiers could 'cleanly' terminate their hostilities toward one another – are radically different from the complex nature of ceasefire agreements between groups of citizen combatants.

As we are witnessing in Afghanistan and Iraq, those engaged in bringing about ceasefires and peace have been facing increasing challenge in their efforts to ameliorate internal disputes. As Janice Stein suggests, "Conflict that focuses primarily on identity - as distinct from conflict over the distribution or redistribution of material goods – appears to be especially difficult to manage and resolve".[13] Not only does this problem make the issue of intervention conceptually difficult to define and plan, strategists are also faced with the problem of how to formulate and sustain formal agreements between informal groups. As J. Lewis Rasmussen notes, a novel challenge for the contemporary diplomat is that "national and other identity groups typically define their actions as consistent with their own interpretation of legal conventions. [Combatants] may argue that since the conflict is internal, their actions fall outside the realm of international law … and domestic law".[14]

Even if ceasefire agreements are deemed to be legally binding by all informal parties, the issue of long-term 'agreement sustainability' is also a challenge for interveners. Street-level violence between citizens has often proven to be somewhat immune to formal diplomatic interventions and agreements, and as a result, "only one-third of negotiated settlements of identity civil wars that last for more than five years stick".[15] Researchers, diplomats and practitioners alike have toiled with the current rate of ceasefire failure, but as McDonald argues, "The world is not designed or structured today to cope with the kind of violence it is facing … Governments have refused to acknowledge this [paradigm] shift and so have not changed their historical approach to conflict … No institutional changes are taking place, nationally, or internationally, because the problem is not officially recognized".[16]

Given that there is little support for 'informal' agreements from political elites, combatants do not necessarily feel obliged to adhere to state-organized, or state-sponsored agreements, which is particularly true in circumstances where the formal ceasefire agreement does not reflect the sentiments of their group, or reduce the perceived threat posed by outside groups. This highlights the fundamental cause of formal ceasefire failure in the context of intrastate conflict – interventionists continue to practice diplomatic strategies that do not match the nature of the dispute, the type of actors engaged in the conflict, or the underlying causes and

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[13] Janice Gross Stein, "Problem Solving as Metaphor: Negotiation and Identity Conflict", *Peace and Conflict*, (1999), Vol. 5:3, 226.

[14] Zartman and Rasmussen, 1999, 30

[15] Fen Osler Hampson, "Why Orphaned Peace Settlements are More Prone to Failure", In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, ed., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, (Washington: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) 533.

[16] McDonald, 2000, 5-7

issues that inform the conflict. Charting a course for intrastate ceasefire and peace agreements requires that the architects of these agreements look beyond divisible issues such as territory and resources, and instead focus on the characteristics of both the new breed of combatant and the less tangible issues that underscore their motives for violence.

Getting on "Track"

Conducting formal peace processes at the level of the government is typically referred to as *Track I Diplomacy*. By definition, Track I diplomacy refers to all diplomatic efforts that are official and legally binding, and encompasses most conventional forms of peacemaking, including formal declarations at the elite level. In many instances, Track I is undoubtedly the best strategy for conflict resolution – if not the only strategy. However, intrastate war often falls outside the traditional sphere of Track I influence, and, as such, is not easily ameliorated through elite-level negotiations alone.

Alternatively, *Track II Diplomacy*, which was introduced by Joseph Montville in 1982, is a term used to define citizen-to-citizen diplomacy.[17] Today, Track II is often used more generally to refer to the work of professional conflict resolution practitioners engaging in citizen-level diplomacy – a practice typically accomplished by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The primary aim of Track II diplomacy is to work outside of formal government diplomatic channels in order to remain free of official persuasion or bias, which in many theatres of conflict can destroy free and open communication. Proponents of Track II technologies suggest that Track II provides a 'diplomatic' alternative or complement to the top-down philosophy of Track I, and as a result is better equipped to reach the citizenry at the grassroots level.

In comparing the two tracks of diplomacy, various observations can be made. Where Track I is heavily bureaucratic, Track II is unencumbered by bureaucracy. Where Track I must follow formal legal channels, Track II is flexible. Where Track I involves elite-level politicians, Track II deals directly with the combatants. Where Track I is official and structured, Track II is informal and integrative.

However, the relationship between the two tracks is not simply diametric in nature, it is also quite complementary. When Hal Saunders says, "peace requires a process of building constructive relationships in a civil society – not just negotiating, signing, and ratifying a formal agreement", he is emphasizing the need to consider various diplomatic tracks as complementary processes throughout the negotiation effort.[18] In particular, one key opportunity for the use of both tracks is when Track II is used as a prenegotiation tool – a tactic aimed at generating dialogue and fostering necessary trust prior to the onset of formal Track I negotiations. As Saunders suggests, such "reframing" of the conflict relationship allows the combatants to move from a state of "confrontation to negotiation" and readies them for effective dialogue at the negotiating table – a process that is essential for both the sustainability of the negotiated settlement, and the implementation of civil society.[19] As Daniel Druckman notes, "changes in the way parties interact may lay the foundation for constructive negotiation … [and] effective use of [Track II] prenegotiation preparations may spell the difference between successful and unsuccessful outcomes".[20]

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[17] Joseph, V. Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989)
[18] Hal H. Saunders, "Prenegotiation and Circum-Negotiation: Arenas of the Multilevel Peace Process", In Crocker et al., 2001, 483-496.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Daniel Druckman, "Negotiating in the International Context", In Zartman and Rasmussen, 1999, 81-124

Multi-Track Diplomacy

When Joseph Montville first introduced the term Track II diplomacy to highlight the utility of citizen-level diplomacy. Since then, Louise Diamond and John McDonald have expounded this theme and developed what is now known as *Multi-Track Diplomacy*.[21] At its most simple level, Multi-Track Diplomacy attempts to discover the various avenues from through conflict management can be exercised. By integrating a number of approaches, disputes can be addressed on a multitude of fronts, generating a more holistic system of intervention. In this sense, war fighting can be dealt with at the elite diplomatic level as well as at the level of the citizen-combatant. Certainly, the most favourable environment for Multi-Track Diplomacy would be situations of intrastate war and societal conflict – disputes often characterized by both state and non-state actors, as well as divisible and non-divisible interests. Indeed, it is the increasing complexity of modern conflict that supports the use of multi-track initiatives.

Barriers to Multi-Track Intervention

Given the promise of Multi-Track Diplomacy, why is it not being used more frequently? The answer rests in the difficult task of coordinating multiple agencies involved in intervention and peacemaking toward a single unified goal. Highlighting this very problem, a 2000 United Nations report stated, "There is a pattern of poor coordination and integration that characterizes global, regional, and national efforts to advance recovery from conflict".[22] One primary reason for this is that practitioners of Track I and Track II often view their strategies as being informed by two disparate schools of thought, and as such, operate them tactically independently of one another, but with the same relative end-goals in mind. In practical terms, this perceived incompatibility between official and non-official processes has often led to a disjointed collection of organizations descending upon conflict scenes in the hope of performing independent miracles.

The second barrier to track coordination comes in the form of competition for resources and leverage within the conflict. At the Track II level, intra-track competition over contracts and funding by NGOs and other Track II actors can encumber cooperation – creating a lack of shared pursuit.

Third, there can often exist a general level of suspicion between tracks in terms of process, methodology, or motive. Although it is not always the case, many Track II practitioners do not wish to be directly associated with Track I efforts because they disagree with the appropriateness of the strategy, and would rather remain unencumbered by what they perceive to be the contamination of open, integrative, and informal lines of communication. Conversely, many Track I practitioners see Track II processes as merely sideline operations, which do some good at the community level, but which really do not have significant leverage in the overall picture.

A fourth impediment to track coordination pertains to the length of time that a given agency is willing to spend on the conflict. Many Track I efforts seek the coveted ceasefire agreement through handshakes and signatures between elites, yet once the Track I practitioners have departed the conflict zone, violence often reoccurs. On the other hand, many Track II agencies are limited by the size of the grants they receive – sources of funding that is most often

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[21] For a discussion of Multi-Track Diplomacy and its uses, See, McDonald, 2000, or visit the website: www.imtd.org

[22] See Nicole Ball, "The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies", In Crocker et al., 2001, 719-736.

allocated for on-site projects of less than three years. Although a great deal of physical infrastructure can be rebuilt in a relatively short period of time, in a post-conflict society the social and psychological reparations needed to preserve formal agreements may demand long-term commitment in order to prevent a re-ignition of the conflict. This presents a very difficult problem for the coordination of various Track II efforts, as different agencies have different timelines, differing paces, and as such, differing agendas.

Finally, most Track II practitioners are wary of aligning with formal processes that are backed by particular governments because the Track II NGOs risk losing their hard-won impartiality and neutrality in the eyes of the on-site participants. Legitimacy and trust are essential components for non-official and quasi-official processes in order to facilitate open and unhindered dialogue that is free from suspicion.

An Introduction to *Composite Diplomacy*

One solution that could begin to bridge inter-track barriers is *Composite Diplomacy*, which is a comprehensive strategy that seemed to evolve quite naturally on the pages in front of me while I was investigating the dismal record of practitioner coordination. The concept of Composite Diplomacy differs from that of Multi-Track Diplomacy because it is a tool designed to bridge many of the inter-track barriers previously discussed by combining the merits and benefits of both formal and non-formal processes into one intervention platform. Essentially this is accomplished by bringing the Track II world directly into the formal diplomatic fold by granting them a seat at the strategy table to aid in operational coordination. In this sense, the efforts become coordinated and conjoined, rather than remaining operationally parallel.

The logistics of housing Track I and Track II efforts under one administrative roof are certainly daunting, but not impossible, and arguably essential in order to address the complexity of ethnopolitical intrastate conflict. As a system, Composite Diplomacy could immediately begin to address many of the basic operational cracks that have traditionally plagued the business of peace diplomacy because it would be capable of recognizing both the psychosocial nature of identity conflicts as well as the need for 'official' resolutions. Composite Diplomacy could allow for coordinated efforts, reduce secondary and tertiary harm, add legitimacy to deserving Track II agencies, harness and maximize the greatest cross section of diplomatic expertise and intellectual capital, reduce questionable agendas, and increase credibility through its multilateral partnerships. In sum, Composite Diplomacy has the ability to bring various subsystems together, into one concerted effort, with pertinent actors sharing ideas and concepts as an organized force.

The following points highlight the fundamental logic underlying Composite Diplomacy:

1. Composite Diplomacy assumes that no one particular diplomatic track used in isolation can truly 'solve' conflict.
2. Composite Diplomacy presumes that intrastate conflict of a societal nature likely contains social and psychological dimensions experienced by non-state actors, who do not always respond to, or respect, formal diplomatic agreements.
3. Composite Diplomacy is founded on the need to enhance coordination of resources and intellectual capital, using both state and non-state agencies.
4. Composite Diplomacy moves beyond the multi-track approach and combines these processes under one administration.
5. Composite Diplomacy seeks an end-state goal of positive peace and not merely the temporary absence of fighting (negative peace).

6. The Composite Diplomacy system is designed to remain highly flexible, in order to adapt to differing conflict scenarios and to differing roles, depending on the type of conflict, the actors involved, the core issues, and the entry point.
7. Composite Diplomacy recognizes that there needs to be a governing body for its coordination and operation, and that the governing body must first, be able to carry out multilateral operations, second, have the resources and finance pool to carry out the mandate, and third, have a relatively un-tarnished reputation throughout the world.

Is There a Role for Canada?

Accomplishing the necessary track cohesion for Composite Diplomacy would require a governing body responsible for directing tasks and allocating funds – an agency or institution that would be capable of understanding the track system enough to effectively facilitate the integration of best practices from both Track I and Track II. This governing body would need to act as a coordinating agency with knowledge of not only entry point calculation and grassroots power dynamics, but also of the value of what each group of practitioners brings to the table. Externally, this governing body would have to be very well respected globally and have access to funds, resources, and partnering nations and agencies in order to accomplish complex intrastate interventions.

Although many nations could answer the call, Canada is in a unique position to respond by housing Composite Diplomacy within a new policy for foreign intervention. At present, it would be difficult to deny that Canada is in need of a place on the world stage, having let slip over the past few decades its once well-recognized internationalism. Although Canada continues to contribute to many foreign causes around the world, it does so with a distinct lack of focus, leaving the country's foreign policy somewhat of a mystery both inside and outside of its borders. There are several reasons why this may be the case.

First, Canadians still think of Canada as a leader in Peacekeeping. Around the world too, this may be the perception, but it is unfortunately no longer grounded in reality. It is a phenomenon Jan Morris calls "aggressive self-denial".[23] He writes: "While Canada once supplied 10 percent of the world's peacekeepers, it now contributes less than 1 percent."[24] The myth of peacekeeping exceeds the record.

Second, Canada has a history of moderation. As a result, decision-making can become an arduous task of contemplation, reducing Canada to that of a nation of fence sitters. Andrew Cohen acknowledges this reality but says, "Our foreign policy need not be one of hand-wringing, head-scratching, and throat clearing; it need not remain in the shadows".[25]

Third, Canada has reduced budgetary expenditures for foreign intervention efforts, limiting its ability to assist in conflicts when needed. With the fastest growing economy in the G8, Canada still only spends 1.1% of its gross domestic product on its military, ranking it 153rd in the world.[26] Compare this with Canada's heyday of internationalism, when Canada spent 6.6 % of its GDP on the military. "With a current gross domestic product of $1.1 trillion, … a budgetary surplus of $8.9 billion in 2001-2002 and a projected surplus of $70 billion over the

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[23] See Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place In the World*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 2003) 203.
[24] Ibid, 29
[25] Ibid, 200
[26] Ibid, 27

next five years, Canada is one of the richest countries in the world".[27] Despite this apparent wealth, the orchestration of Canadian foreign policy programs does not appear to be adequately funded or directed.

Fourth, Canada relies heavily on the United States as its protectorate, with much of Canada's foreign policy hinging on the diplomatic necessity of maintaining positive Canada-U.S. relations. Apart from the recent clashes between the previous-Chretien government and the Bush Administration over Canada's position on Iraq, the relationship with the United States, and the world's largest undefended border between the nations, have remained relatively unscathed. Historically, this amicable relationship is well founded, beginning in the pages of the Monroe Doctrine of 1824, which declared that the defence of the United States would equate to the defence of North America, and also later by Theodore Roosevelt who stated, "the United States would not stand idly by" should Canadian soil be threatened by foreign entities.[28] Canada has, and continues to take, fair advantage of its protectorate to the south. With an understanding that the United States would act should Canada be threatened, Canada has never had to rely on a militarized culture during peace times.

Lastly, as Cohen explains, Canada loves to belong to clubs and to multilateral institutions.[29] Although it is admirable for Canada to take interest in various international organizations, the obvious cost of this strategy can be a lack of focus. Currently, Canada is a member of the G8, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization of American States, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Commonwealth of Nations, and la Francophonie, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the G20, the World Meteorological Association, and the International Criminal Court, to name a few. Due to these numerous memberships, the spread of Canada's resources over a number of fronts means that it has very little leverage in any one sphere, culminating in a serious lack of legitimacy, and some confusion as to Canada's place in the world. Certainly, as a wary nation, Canada is comforted by the company and co-authority found within these various multilateral institutions. However, this political positioning is a far cry from only a few decades ago, when Canada was accused of "punching above its weight" on the international stage, and, in doing so, winning the respect of the world for its innovation and contribution.[30] Should the goal in the current Martin government be to resurrect even part of the old guard, Canada must reflect carefully upon its resources, its capabilities, and its domestic and foreign interests, in order to generate a new and innovative foreign policy.

A Return to Canadian Innovation

Despite Canada's recent decline on the world stage, Canada has many significant attributes that make it an ideal candidate for conflict intervention and prevention. Canada's multicultural mosaic, professional diplomats, and intellectual capital should provide the essential ingredients to become a leader in foreign intervention strategy. Arguably, the first priority is determining where Canada's foreign policy should be focused.

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[27] Ibid, 161
[28] Military and Government Collection, *Defending Canada*, (1995), Vol. 60, Issue 6.
[29] See Cohen, 2003.
[30] Joseph Nye, The Challenge of Soft Power, World Wide Web (2003): http://www.time.com/time/magazine/intl/article/0,9171,1107990222-21163,00.html.

There are two overarching themes that make Composite Diplomacy a viable focal point for Canada. The first, of course, is the broadly defined global need to redress and recalculate the intervention strategies used in dealing with a new actors and new motives within intrastate wars. The second is the dire need for Canada to remedy its foreign policy void and refocus its contributions toward international interventions in a manner that supports Canadian interests. Indeed, Composite Diplomacy can match the needs of both of these problems by injecting Track II technologies directly into the Track I fold, using Canada as the lead agency. What this ultimately means is that Canada could become an innovative leader in brokering (and sustaining) third-party intervention in complex intrastate conflicts. That said, in order to achieve this level of readiness, the implementation of Composite Diplomacy would require several calculated phases.

Phase 1 – Creating a Composite Diplomacy Task Force

The first step is to promote an appreciation for the utility of Composite Diplomacy within the ranks of influential Canadian diplomats, academics, and practitioners. While even the best ideas may gain only limited support within a partisan environment, forming a common front of Canadian academics and practitioners from various political backgrounds will certainly start the policy reformation wheels turning. Recruitment for such an effort is certainly feasible, given the number of Canadians who are both concerned about the state of Canada's foreign policy and the state of world conflict.

Phase 2 – Defining Composite Diplomacy in the Canadian Context

The next step is to recruit experts to define clearly the principles and structure of Canadian Composite Diplomacy, including an assessment of where we are today, what our resources are, and what our capabilities will be within the Composite Diplomacy model. The ability to generate a pragmatic model using Composite Diplomacy relies on incorporating the input of government, non-government, and military stakeholders.

Phase 3 – Matching the Composite Diplomacy Vision to Canadian Values

Although current peacekeeping contributions are relatively dismal when compared to previous generations, the average Canadian remains quite proud of our international contributions. It is quite logical that Composite Diplomacy would also engender the same grassroots commitment and pride. While not the primary factor in all decisions, the gaining of constituent support is of prime concern for most Members of Parliament and Composite Diplomacy would likely be seen as a favourable initiative in the public eye.

Phase 4 – Establishing a Funding Policy

Funding is absolutely essential for Composite Diplomacy to work. If Canada is to introduce Composite Diplomacy to the world's intractable conflicts, it cannot do so with grossly limited budgets. Canada must be prepared to redirect significant funds to the effort in order to maximize capacity and minimize the risk of having to withdraw early from conflict zones.

Currently, there are funds budgeted for the DND, international development through CIDA, and through various government agencies that make funds available for NGO activities. While all of these sources of funding had been reduced in the final years of the Chretien government, the then Prime Minister was holding on to a promise to double funding for development projects by the year 2010.

Phase 5 – Restructuring the Military

Many Canadians are appalled at the military's current state of disrepair. In what Cohen humourously refers to as "the antique road show", the military is at a crossroads, with the essential questions being those of function and capacity [31]. Does Canada wish to keep a military that cannot be dispatched overseas because of a lack of quality equipment or means of transport? Should Canada's goal be the preservation of a traditional defensive force, or are there other solutions that better match the resources and philosophy within Canada? And, more importantly, what exactly *is* that philosophy?

If Composite Diplomacy is to redefine Canada's use of intervention, it must also redefine the military and its use. As a nation with coastlines, bordered by the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the defence of our nation is surely of paramount concern. However, with the world's strongest military to our south in the United States, and with an understanding of North American protection, national defence does not have to be our only focus. This is not to suggest that Canada be a free rider, but that Canada consider exactly what the capabilities of its military are and how effectively and rapidly it can deploy its forces. While funding is currently increasing for our military, the precise role of our forces still remains somewhat ill defined. Articulating strategic defence and intervention capabilities under the umbrella of Composite Diplomacy might not only aid in bringing clarity to Canada's military role, it might create a new niche for our military forces with respect to intrastate conflicts – a more clearly defined role that closely matches our resources and funding.

Phase 6 – Focusing on Specific Conflicts and Selection of Partners

Lack of focus would be disastrous while using Composite Diplomacy, as intrastate conflicts require long-term sustained intervention efforts at all levels of society. Phase six is concerned with where Canada should direct its Composite Diplomacy efforts and with whom it should partner? Questions such as where, when and why Canada should seek involvement would be addressed here.

Rather than spreading its resources too thin, Canada should focus its efforts on bringing about significant changes in specific theatres of conflict. In using Composite Diplomacy Canada should concentrate on conflicts of an intrastate nature, with societal elements that are not easily amenable through the traditional uses of force and separation of combatants. While there is no shortage of these conflicts around the globe, the selection of which one should fall within Canada's capability will ultimately rest on Canadian interests, a term many (falsely) equate to 'values'. In determining which conflicts to target, Canada might ask questions such as, which conflicts have higher levels of violence or are at the point of erupting into deadly violence? Which conflicts might Canada be uniquely suited for – such as francophone countries? Which conflicts are geographically small enough for Canada to strategically support its operations, provide supply lines, and troop carriage? And, which conflicts can Canada feasibly remain the governing agency for an extended period of time, understanding that premature withdrawal without proper societal transformation may only give further rise to renewed violence and subsequent redeployment?

Global partners could be selected after considering these types of specific questions. Indeed, Composite Diplomacy does not require that Canada provide all of the manpower, military might, or intellectual capital for a given theatre of conflict, only that it take the lead role

[31] Cohen, 161.

in facilitating the process of intervention. It is quite realistic that partnering could be accomplished through other governments and willing NGOs. Currently, most of the large NGOs in Canada, some of which are affiliated with the United States, the United Nations, and other global agencies, already bid on a grant-based system. In the Composite Diplomacy system, instead of winning a bid and receiving funds for a budgeted project, the partnering organization would win funding and a seat at the strategy table, where they would be expected to assist in formulating a plan and process of intervention using their unique insight into the conflict in question. Once a viable list of partners is established, it could be retained in a similar fashion to that of CANADEM, which currently retains the names of over 5000 skilled Canadian civilian experts, on stand-by for crisis situations.[32]

Phase 7 – Training

By way of its introduction, Composite Diplomacy training would be in effect throughout Phases 1 and 2 as well as ongoing throughout the latter phases once a specific conflict had been selected. More specifically, the training phase deals with the training of officials and diplomats, in order to supply them with a basic understanding of the unique qualities and challenges citizen combatants bring to the fore. This phase is particularly important, as the primary leaders in the Composite Diplomacy effort will likely have to conduct further training of their own for mid-level and grassroots practitioners when a conflict theatre is selected. As Composite Diplomacy is a system that seeks to consolidate the best practices from various tracks, to reduce overlap, and to legitimize and coordinate Track II efforts, a process of training, both conceptually and practically, should be provided for core members of the intervention team so that there can be a common understanding of process and end-goals.

Phase 8 – Policing NGOs?

There may be concern regarding non-participating NGOs. How should Canada keep NGOs that are not part of the Composite Diplomacy effort out of the conflict zone? Realistically it is highly unlikely that Canada would want to waste energy and time trying to keep other well-intentioned NGOs off Canadian ‘intervention turf’. Those NGOs could certainly play traditional roles of circum-negotiation at their own level and speed. However, should Canada be leading a comprehensive peace operation (which would obviously include all stakeholders); it seems logical to presume that the local disputants would favour participation in projects that were sanctioned by the Canadian team.

Phase 9 – Achieving Intervention Readiness

With the selected partners, the funding, and the training near completion, it will be time for Canada to go to work. Putting words into practice is always more difficult than it first appears, but the initial intervention will be a chance for Canada to begin a process of resurrecting its reputation on the world stage.

Undoubtedly, rebuilding Canada’s weakened legitimacy will take some time. Considering Norway’s ascent in reputation as a third-party intervener, it should be noted that it takes considerable time for a country to become regarded as the provider of ‘good offices’ during international crises – for Norway, a process that was surely assisted by its substantial financial

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[32] CANADEM is an agency that maintains a roster of nearly 5000 names of Canadian individuals and agencies who are deemed (by CANADEM) to be experts in a particular field of intervention and whose skills may be useful during international crises. See URL: http://www.canadem.ca/.

commitments to peace building efforts around the world. Canada can earn this level of reputation too, but it will take time, continuous effort, and positive outcomes in order to prove that Composite Diplomacy can be an effective and innovative strategy when confronting complex intrastate crises.

Phase 10 – Monitoring and Flexibility

As an antidote to status quo policies, Canadian Composite Diplomacy must provide for itself a continuous improvement feedback loop. As with any professional vocation in which lives are risked on a daily basis, it is extremely important to catalogue and identify areas that require improvement. This monitoring and restructuring function is also designed to keep ingenuity and innovation alive within the system while maintaining a structure that can be altered quickly in response to varying conflict demands.

Concluding Remarks

Composite Diplomacy speaks to the needs of two overarching themes: first, the global need to consider sustainable intervention strategies for the new challenges within modern intrastate conflict, and second, the dire need for Canada to reaffirm its focus on the international stage. In addition to answering these calls, Composite Diplomacy not only supports Canadian interests (and values) by intervening in deadly citizen-level conflicts, it satisfies Canada's affinity for multilateralism by granting Canada the authority to partner with various agencies, it addresses the underlying factors that tend to perpetuate grassroots fighting by concentrating on strategies designed to bring about positive peace rather than focusing solely on ceasefires, and it bridges conflict practitioner antagonisms by creating cohesive partnerships between official and non-official parties.

Finally, Canada must acknowledge that global contribution comes in many forms, with traditional top-down, power-coercive approaches currently being challenged in theatres dominated by citizen combatants. Canada must realize that these current realities also offer an opportunity – one in which Canada can fill its own current foreign policy void while also creating an intervention system that addresses the unique dynamics of intrastate war.

Canada still has a chance to be a world leader in peace building. Combining resources to address the multi-dimensional qualities of modern ethnopolitical conflict is indeed the face of the future. While military strategists toil over new concepts like 'Three Block War' or 'the 3-Ds: Defence, Development, and Diplomacy', the tactical achievements of these concepts remain short of their strategic intents.[33] Composite Diplomacy offers a specific alternative to these conceptual frameworks by incorporating the insights of various experts under one operational umbrella, as opposed to placing new labels on intervention forces without adequate training or understanding of how these roles should be properly executed. By comparison, Composite

[33] The Three-Block War concept refers to the need for modern soldiers to accept their roles as provider of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeper, and war-fighter. The term Three-Block is used because it refers to all these activities taking place simultaneously within three city blocks. This is what the General Commadant of the United States Marine Corps. referred to as "the landscape upon which the 21st Century battle will be fought". See Charles C. Krulak, "The Three Block War", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 64, Issue 5, (December 15, 1997). Alternatively, the 3-Ds refers to "Defence, Diplomacy, and Development" and refers to the to cooperative relationship the Canadian Forces, CIDA, and DFAIT must have within foreign policy. The terms of the 3-D concept were delivered during The Speech from the Throne. See Governor General of Canada, "Speech from the Throne", October 5, 2004, Available for viewing at URL: http://www.pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sft_e.pdf.

Diplomacy is much more akin to the British model "Defence Diplomacy", which seeks collaboration between its military and non-governmental agencies.[34]

Under the government of Prime Minister Paul Martin, Canada now has a choice – it can either choose to become increasingly marginalized by not addressing the realities and trends that challenge traditional intervention efforts, or it can grab the reins of innovation, and once again resurrect its position as a global leader in peacekeeping and peace building.

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[34] The British Ministry of Defence has implemented the "Defence Diplomacy" program. What differentiates this program from the U.S. Marine's Three Block War is that the British Program actively seeks insight from partnering agencies and NGOs in order to achieve "conflict resolution" within conflict zones. See "Defence Diplomacy: Paper No. 1", British Ministry of Defence. Also found at URL: http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/diplomacy.htm

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